AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

FOREIGN AFFAIRS PRESS BRIEFINGS 1984

SUPPLEMENT

Department of State
Washington
1988

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PREFACE

This microfiche publication, *American Foreign Policy: Foreign Affairs Press Briefings, 1984. Supplement*, presents the full texts of two series of documents: Department of State Daily Press Briefings and Department of State and White House Special Press Briefings. Some of these were published as extracts in the printed volume *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1984*. Volumes in the *American Foreign Policy* series, the authoritative official record of major public statements concerning foreign affairs, have been published since 1950.

The microfiche supplements to the series seek to ensure wider and more convenient official and public access to the highlights of the foreign affairs record. To date, microfiche supplements to the 1981, 1982, and 1983 printed volumes have been published. Because the microfiche supplement for 1984 includes only press briefings, the subtitle has been changed from *Current Documents*, which was used for previous supplements to the series, to *Foreign Affairs Press Briefings*. The printed guide accompanying the microfiche contains a comprehensive index to both the Daily and Special Briefings. The guide is also filmed as the first microfiche card in the set.

The foreign affairs briefings are divided into two parts in this publication. Part I contains the complete texts of the Department of State Daily Press Briefings held in 1984. At these briefings, the Department of State Spokesman provides to news correspondents officially accredited to the Department a daily review of major foreign affairs topics. These "noon briefings", which began during the 1960s, include prepared official announcements on events, appointments, and foreign policy issues as well as responses to questions from the correspondents.

Part II of this microfiche publication reproduces special press briefings by senior Department or White House officials on major foreign policy issues or on State visits by foreign dignitaries. These Department of State and White House Special Briefings are conducted "on the record" or "on background", in which case, the correspondents are interdicted from identifying the briefing officer. In the texts of the background briefings presented here, the names of the briefing officers, if mentioned, have been deleted.

This microfiche publication does not include interviews or off-the-record or deep background briefings, briefings before nonpress groups, or briefings by foreign spokesmen unless given jointly with U.S. officials. It also does not include press conferences by the President or the Secretary of State, almost all of which have been published previously in *Public Papers of the Presidents* or the Department of State *Bulletin.*

The President's Press Secretary or Deputy Press Secretary also gives daily briefings to White House correspondents on the full range of governmental activities and responsibilities. Only a small proportion of these White House daily press briefings deals with foreign affairs topics, and none of them is included here. Some selected passages from them on key foreign affairs issues, however, are printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1984*.

The record copies of the Department's Daily and Special Briefings, which are verbatim transcripts, are retained in the Department of State and will be transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration for permanent preservation. The texts reproduced in this microfiche publication are the only published form of these briefings. The original White House briefing records are retained by the Executive Office and will be preserved with other historical papers of the Reagan administration.

Evans Gerakas and William F. Sanford, Jr. prepared the documents for publication under the general direction of David S. Patterson, Chief of the Operations Staff. Tiffiony Wells and Elizabeth A. Barwick prepared the index to the Daily Briefings; Gloria S. Beasley and Rita M. Baker compiled the index to the Special Briefings. Ms. Baker developed the consolidated index and supervised the final review of the index, guide, and manuscript before publication.

William Z. Slany
The Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs

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Cyprus, **Daily**, Apr. 2, 18, June 4, July 20, 23, Aug. 15, Oct. 12, Dec. 13
Czechoslovakia, **Daily**, Apr. 25, 26, May 23, Aug. 20, Oct. 3, 29, Nov. 28

Dalai Lama, **Daily**, Aug. 28
Dam, Kenneth, **Daily**, Jan. 10, Feb. 8, May 1, 4, 23-25, June 1, 21, Aug. 6, 22, Oct. 1, 5, 12, 15, 17, Nov. 16, 29, Dec. 4, 5, 31

D'Aubuisson, Maj. Roberto:
  Daily, Jan. 27, Feb. 3, 29, Mar. 5, 7, May 15, June 5, 14, 25-28, Dec. 3
  Special, Mar. 13 (1), 22, May 9 (2), Oct. 9 (3)
Dawit, Walde Georgis, **Special**, Oct. 25, Nov. 1, 2 (2), 9 (1), Dec. 12
De La Espriella, **Daily**, Feb. 14
De Mita, Ciriaco, **Daily**, Dec. 18
De la Madrid Hurtado, Miguel:
  Daily, Apr. 13
  Special, May 14, 15
Deaver, Michael, **Special**, May 21 (3)
Debt, international, **Special**, June 7, 9, Dec. 3
Defense, Department of, **Daily**, Apr. 4, 5, 12, 13, Aug. 8, 27, Dec. 4, 5, 19, 21, 24, 27
Defense budget, **Special**, Mar. 15 (3), Dec. 6 (1)
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), **Daily**, Sept. 24
DeLorean, John, **Special**, Aug. 30
Deng Xiaoping:
  Daily, Oct. 12
  Special, Apr. 28
Denmark:
  Daily, May 10
  Special, May 25 (2)
DePree, Willard, **Daily**, June 7
Derwinski, Edward J., **Daily**, May 25, Aug. 21
D'Escoto Brockman, Miguel, **Daily**, Apr. 9
Die Zeit, **Daily**, Apr. 27
Diplomatic immunity, **Special**, June 22
Direct Communications Link (U.S.-Soviet):
  Daily, Jan. 11, Apr. 30, June 29, July 10-13, 16, 17
  Special, Jan. 13 (1), Apr. 3 (1), May 25 (2), July 17
Disinformation campaign, **Daily**, July 11-13, Aug. 6
Djibouti, **Daily**, Aug. 17, 21
Dobbins, James F., **Daily**, Oct. 1
Dobrynin, Anatoliy Fedorovich:
  Daily, Jan. 11, Apr. 3, 12, 13, May 10, June 15, 20, 21, 29, July 3, Sept. 17, 18, Nov. 16
  Special, Sept. 28
Dodd, Christopher A., **Daily**, Mar. 29
Dole, Elizabeth, **Special**, Nov. 27
Dole, Robert J., **Special**, Nov. 29, Dec. 6 (1)
Domenici, Pete V., **Special**, Nov. 29
Dominica:
  Daily, Dec. 4
  Special, July 16

Dominican Republic:
  Daily, Apr. 24, 25
  Special, Apr. 9 (1), 9 [10] (2), July 16
Dos Santos, José Eduardo, **Daily**, Oct. 15
Dozier, Gilbert, **Special**, Aug. 30
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), **Special**, Aug. 30
Drugs. *See* Narcotics.
Duarte Fuentes, José Napoleon:
  Daily, May 2, 4, 9, 15, 16, 21, June 14, 26, July 18, 20, 23, Oct. 9, 16, 17, 25, Dec. 4, 5, 7
  Special, May 9 (2), 21 (1), 31, July 13, Aug. 8, Oct. 1, 9 (3)
Dunsmore, Barrie, **Daily**, Sept. 14
Durazo Moreno, Arturo, **Daily**, Aug. 22
Duval, Gaetan, **Special**, Sept. 25 (2)

Eagleburger, Lawrence S.:
  Daily, Jan. 19, 27, Feb 2, 3, 13, 23, Mar. 2, 7, 16, 22, Apr. 2, 12, 13, 25, July 12
  Special, Jan. 30 (4), Oct. 9 (2)
Eastern Europe (*see also individual countries*, Warsaw Pact):
  Daily, Sept. 10
  Special, Aug. 3, Nov. 30
Eban, Abba, **Daily**, Apr. 6
Economic Summit, London:
  Daily, June 11
  Special, May 18, 23, 25 (1), June 9 (1), 9 (2)
Economy, international, **Special**, May 25 (1), Sept. 21 (1), Dec. 19 (1), 31
Ecuador, **Daily**, May 4, 7
Egypt:
  Daily, Jan. 13, 24, Feb. 1, 2, 21, 28, Mar. 8, 12, 19, 21-23, 26, 29, Apr. 20, 23, June 1, 5, 28, July 13, 31, Aug. 1, 6-8, 10, 13-15, 29, Sept. 19, 26-28, Oct. 3, 5, 15, 18, 19, 25, 29, Nov. 7, 9, 19, Dec. 11, 14, 17, 19
  Special, Feb. 10 (2), 14, Oct. 9 (2)
  Bright Star, **Daily**, Aug. 14
  Ras Banas facilities, **Daily**, Aug. 14, Oct. 19
El Salvador (*see also* Central America, Contadora peace process):
  Daily, Jan. 3-5, 9, 11, 16, 18, 25, 27, 30, 31, Feb. 2, 3, 6, 8, 10, 14, 16, 24, 27, 29, Mar. 2, 5, 7-9, 12, 13, 19, 21-23, 26, 27, 29, Apr. 2, 6, 10-13, 16-20, 23, 24, 26, 30, May 2-4, 7-10, 14, 16, 18, 21-25, 30, June 8, 12, 14, 25-26, July 5, 12, 13, 18, 23, Aug. 1, 2, 8, 10, 13, 15, 16, 29-31, Sept. 7, 10, 11, 13, 14, 24, 28, Oct.

El Salvador—Continued
    1-3, 9, 15-17, 19, 22, 24, 25, Nov. 2, 9, 14, 16, 19-21, 30, Dec. 3, 4, 7, 12, 13, 24
  Special, Jan. 11, 16 (2), 25 (1), 27, Apr. 9 [10] (2), May 9 (2), 14, 21 (1), 31, July 13, Oct. 9 (3), Dec. 4
  Elections, **Special**, Mar. 2 (1), 13 (1), 15 (2), Mar. 22, 29
  Human rights, **Special**, Feb. 10 (1)
  Land reform, **Special**, July 13
  Military situation, **Special**, Aug. 8
  U.S. aid, **Special**, Feb. 3 Mar. 2 (1), 13 (1), 15 (3), 29, July 13
Elizabeth II, Queen, **Daily**, Apr. 3
Elliott, Charles, **Special**, Nov. 1
Embassy security. *See under* State, Department of.
Emmerson, John, **Daily**, Mar. 26
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), **Daily**, Feb. 3
Erickson, James, **Special**, Aug. 2 (2)
Espinosa de los Reyes, **Special**, Apr. 17
Ethiopia:
  Daily, Jan. 6, 20, 24, 25, Feb. 6, Mar. 8, May 7, Aug. 9, Oct. 23, 29, Nov. 2, 9, 19, 26, Dec. 12, 27
  Special, Jan. 30 (3), Oct. 9 (1), 25, Nov. 1, 2 (2), 9 (1), 16, Dec. 5, 12, 27
European Community (EC), **Special**, Mar. 14, 16, 21 (1), May 18, 21 (2), 23, Nov. 30
European Economic Community (EEC), **Special**, Dec. 6 (2), 19 (1)
European Parliament, **Daily**, June 18
Evans and Novak, **Daily**, Jan. 3, Feb. 29, Mar. 21, Apr. 2, 25, May 4, 9, Oct. 22, Dec. 17
Evans, Melvin H., **Daily**, Nov. 27
Export Administration Act, **Special**, Apr. 2 (2)
Export controls (*see also* Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Security Export Controls; Trade, international):
  Daily, Sept. 12, 27
  Special, Apr. 6
Export-Import Bank:
  Daily, Mar. 29
  Special, Aug. 2 (3)

Fahd, King. *See* Saud.
Fairbanks, Charles H., Jr., **Special**, Feb. 10 (1)
Fairbanks, Richard, **Daily**, Mar. 9
Falklands, **Daily**, Aug. 23
Family planning. *See* Population.
Farrakhan, Louis, **Daily**, June 5, 7, Aug. 2
Fascell, Dante B., **Daily**, June 8, Sept. 26

Federal Bar Association, **Daily**, Mar. 29
Federal Budget Deficit Reduction Plan, **Special**, Mar. 15 (3)
Feldstein, Martin, **Special**, Feb. 2
Ferraro, Geraldine, **Daily**, Sept. 18
Ferreira Aldunate, Wilson, **Daily**, June 18, 19, Aug. 21, Nov. 30
Fiji, **Special**, Nov. 26 (1), 27
Fisheries:
  Daily, July 25, 26
  Special, Apr. 2 (2), Nov. 27
FitzGerald, Garret:
  Daily, Mar. 14
  Special, Mar. 15 (1), 16
Flynn, Richard J., **Special**, Apr. 17
Fo, Dario, **Daily**, Oct. 31
Foreign aid (*see also* Agency for International Development), **Daily**, Aug. 13, 22, 27, 29, 31, Sept. 7, 10, 11, 14, 18, 20, 27, 28, Nov. 2, 9, 20
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, **Special**, Mar. 5
Foreign Missions Act of *1982*, **Special**, June 22
Foreign Policy Association, **Daily**, Jan. 20
Foreign Relations, **Daily**, Apr. 13, June 4, Sept. [illegible], Dec. 4
Foreign Service. *See under* State, Department of.
Formosa. *See* Taiwan.
France:
  Daily, Jan. 17, Feb. 2, 3, Mar. 9, 26, 27, Apr. 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, May 29, June 7, Aug. 2, 27, 30, 31, Sept. 7, 13, 17, 18, 25, 26, Nov. 15, 19-21, Dec. 21, 24
  Special, Mar. 21 (1), 23, Nov. 26 (1), Dec. 21
Free Trade Zone, **Daily**, Sept. 4, 10
Freij, Elias, **Daily**, Mar. 26, June 14
Frem, Fadi, **Daily**, June 1, 6, 12, 14
Friendship Games, **Daily**, Aug. 22
Front-Line States (*see also* Southern Africa), **Special**, Feb. 9, May 9 (1), Nov. 2 (1)
Funseth, Robert L., **Daily**, Feb. 2

Gairy, Eric Matthew:
  Daily, Jan. 20
  Special, Oct. 17
Galbraith, John Kenneth, **Daily**, Feb. 2
Gandhi, Indira:
  Daily, Oct. 31, Nov. 1, 21, 29, Dec. 13
  Special, June 15
Gast, Lt. Gen. Philip C., **Daily**, June 6
Gavin, John, **Special**, Apr. 17

Gemayel, Amin:
Daily, Jan. 23, 24, 31, Feb. 3, 6-8, Mar. 2, June 1, Oct. 24
Special, Feb. 16 (2)
General Accounting Office (GAO), **Daily**, Mar. 2, 14, 23, June 25
General Advisory Committee report (*see also* Arms control), **Daily**, Sept. 6, 11, 12, 14, Oct. 9
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT):
Daily, Mar. 14
Special, May 23, June 9
Genocide, **Daily**, Apr. 12, Sept. 5, 6, 12
Genocide Convention:
Daily, Sept. 5, 6
Special, Sept. 5, 18 (1)
Genscher, Hans-Dietrich:
Daily, Apr. 23, May 22
Special, Nov. 30
Gerard, Jean Broward Shevlin, **Daily**, Dec. 31
German Democratic Republic:
Daily, Jan. 23, 25, Feb. 21, Apr. 9, Sept. 4, Oct. 1, 3
Special, Mar. 5, Nov. 30
Germany, Federal Republic of:
Daily, Mar. 22, 30, Apr. 6, 23, June 29, Aug. 6, Sept. 4, 7, 14, 24, Dec. 19
Special, Mar. 2 (2), 5, May 25 (1), Nov. 28, 30, Dec. 6 (2)
Ghana, **Daily**, Mar. 26
Ghorbal, Asraf A., **Daily**, June 1
Gibraltar, **Daily**, Nov. 28
Glemp, Jozef, **Daily**, Aug. 14
Global 2000 report, **Special**, Aug. 2 (1)
Goldwater, Barry:
Daily, Apr. 11
Special, Dec. 6 (1)
Gollust, David., **Daily**, Aug. 10
Goodby, James E.:
Daily, June 4
Special, Jan. 6 (1), 6 (2), Apr. 3 (1), 4 (2)
Goodman, Lt. Robert O., Jr.:
Daily, Jan. 3-5
Special, Jan. 3
Gorbachev, Mikhail:
Daily, Nov. 27, Dec. 18
Special, Dec. 20 (1), 21

Gorman, Gen. Paul:
  Daily, Aug. 2, 8
  Special, Apr. 17, Aug. 8
Gotlieb, Allan E., **Special**, Sept. 25 (1)
Graham, Billy, **Daily**, Aug. 23
Grange, Lt. Gen. David, **Special**, May 22
Granma, **Daily**, Nov. 16
Greece:
  Daily, Mar. 9, Apr. 3, May 18, June 28, July 9, 10, 12, Aug. 20, 21, Oct. 3-5, 9, 18, 25, Dec. 11
  Special, Dec. 6 (2)
Grenada:
  Daily, Jan. 4, 20, 26, 30, Feb. 10, 16, 23, 29, Mar. 29, Apr. 5, Oct. 4, 16, 17, Dec. 4
  Special, Jan. 9 (2), 27, Apr. 27, July 16, 19, Oct. 17
Gromyko, Andrei Andreievich:
  Daily, Jan. 3, 5, 6, 17-19, Feb. 13, 14, 23, 28, Mar. 12, June 15, 21, July 3, 13, 25, 27, 30, Aug. 16, 21-23, 29, 31, Sept. 4, 6, 10, 11, 13, 17, 18, 28, Nov. 7, 19-21, 26
  Special, Jan. 6 (1), 6 (2), 13 (1), 17 (2), 18 (2), May 25 (2), Sept. 21 (1), 23, 24, 28, 29, Nov. 22
Guam, **Special**, Nov. 26 (1)
Guatemala:
  Daily, Jan. 17, 20, 30, Feb. 2, 14, May 3, June 4, July 5, 6, 16, Oct. 30
  Special, Feb. 3, 17, Apr. 17
Guerrero, Francisco José, **Special**, Mar. 29
Guinea, **Daily**, Apr. 3, 12, Mar. 27
Gulf Cooperation Council, **Daily**, Apr. 25, May 16-18, 21, Sept. 12
Gulf of Suez, **Daily**, Aug. 1, 3, 13, 14, 29
Gutierrez Gutierrez, Carlos José, **Special**, Oct. 1

Haddad, Walid, **Daily**, Feb. 24, 27, Apr. 4
Haig, Alexander M., Jr., **Daily**, Feb. 13, Mar. 14, 27, Apr. 18, 20, May 7
Haiti, **Daily**, June 1
Harmel Study, **Special**, May 25 (2), 30 (1), 30 (2)
Harms, Roland, **Daily**, May 30
Harris, F. Allen, **Special**, Dec. 27
Hartman, Arthur A.:
  Daily, Jan. 20, Mar. 12, June 21, July 3
  Special, Sept. 28
Hassan II, King:
  Daily, Jan. 24, Mar. 22, Aug. 22, Nov. 15
  Special, Feb. 10 (2)

Hatch Act, **Daily**, Sept. 10
Haverkamp, Roy, **Daily**, Feb. 29,
Helms, Jesse:
  Daily, May 3, 9, 10, Oct. 26, Nov. 5
  Special, May 31
Helsinki Final Act:
  Daily, Jan. 30
  Special, Jan. 6 (1), 6 (2), 13 (1), Apr. 3 (1)
Heritage Foundation, **Daily**, May 25
Hernandez Cervantes, Hector, **Special**, May 14
Hess, Rudolf, **Daily**, Apr. 5
Hibbard, Donald E., **Daily**, Aug. 7
High, George B., **Special**, Apr. 17
Hijacking (*see also* Terrorism):
  Daily, Aug. 2, 27, 30, 31, Sept. 4, Dec. 4, 5, 7, 10-14, 17, 18
  Special, Dec. 17
Hockmeyer, Lt. Col. Wayne, **Special**, Aug. 2 (2)
Hodges, Luther H., Jr., **Special**, June 12
Holocaust:
  Daily, Apr. 24
  Special, Sept. 18 (1)
Homme, Robert, **Daily**, Mar. 26, 27
Honduras:
  Daily, Feb. 3, 6, 17, Mar. 9, 12, 27, Apr. 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 19, May 4, 14, July 30, Aug. 1, 13, 17, Sept. 4, 5, 16, 28, Oct. 9, Nov. 2, 8, 20, 26, 28, 30, Dec. 20
  Special, Mar. 15 (2)
Honecker, Erich, **Daily**, Sept. 4
Hong Kong:
  Daily, June 19, Sept. 19, 26
  Special, July 2
Hotline, U.S.-Soviet. *See* Direct Communications Link.
Howe, Geoffrey, **Daily**, June 20, Dec. 5
Hu Yaobang, **Special**, Apr. 26
Hughes, John, **Daily**, Aug. 20, Dec. 7, 21
Human rights:
  Daily, Jan. 4, 31, Feb. 7, 8, 21, Mar. 13, 16, 29, Apr. 12, 26, 27, May 16, 18, Aug. 1, 8, 9, Sept. 4, 14, 28, Nov. 1, Dec. 7
  Special, Jan. 13 (1), Feb. 10 (1), Sept. 5, 24, 28, Dec. 10 (1)
  Inter-American Human Rights Commission, **Daily**, June 8
Human Rights Convention, **Special**, Sept. 5

Human Rights Day:
  Daily, Dec. 7
  Special, Dec. 10 (1)
Hungary, **Daily**, Feb. 21, May 16, 23, Dec. 4, 5
Hunt, Leamon, **Daily**, Feb. 17,
Hussein, Saddam, **Daily**, Mar. 8
Hussein I, King:
  Daily, Jan. 13, 17, 19, 24, Feb. 10, 13, 14, 16, 27, Mar. 15, 19, 23, July 11-13, Aug. 20, Oct. 2, 9, 30, Nov. 16, Dec. 3
  Special, Feb. 10 (2), 13, 14

Ikle, Fred, **Special**, Mar. 29
Immigration, **Special**, Apr. 17, Dec. 14
Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S.:
  Daily, Aug. 1
  Special, Dec. 14
India:
  Daily, Jan. 4, 19, June 4, 7, 8, 11, July 19, 23, Aug. 6, 14, 27, 29, 31, Sept. 4, 14, 17, Nov. 1, 2, 5, 6, 13, 27, 29, Dec. 3, 5, 7, 10, 12, 31
  Special, June 15
Indochina, **Daily**, Apr. 5, Sept. 11
Indonesia, **Daily**, Apr. 23, May 21, Sept. 6, 14
Interagency Task Force on African Food Emergency (*see also* Food relief *under* Africa), **Special**, Oct. 9 (1), 25, Nov. 9 (1), Dec. 12
Inter-American Foundation, **Daily**, Jan. 25
Inter-American Human Rights Commission, **Daily**, June 8
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, **Daily**, May 7
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) (*see also* Arms control), **Daily**, Jan. 30
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, **Special**, Dec. 19 (2)
Interior, Department of the, **Daily**, Apr. 17
Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) (*see also* Arms control):
  Daily, Feb. 27, Mar. 13, May 8, 21, 23, June 1, 14, July 23, 24, Aug. 27
  Special, Jan. 17 (2), Apr. 27, May 25 (2), 30 (1), 30 (2), June 9, Sept. 21 (1), Nov. 28, 30, Dec. 20 (1), 21
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA):
  Daily, Dec. 12
  Special, Mar. 21 (2), Apr. 10 (1), 11, 26

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) (World Bank), **Daily**, Jan. 17, July 11
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO):
  Daily, Apr. 24
  Special, Aug. 28
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC):
  Daily, June 8
  Special, Oct. 25
International Conference on Population, **Special**, Aug. 2 (1)
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, **Special**, Sept. 5
International Court of Justice:
  Daily, Apr. 10, 16-18, 25, 27, 30, May 10, Aug. 15, 17
  Special, Apr. 9 (2), 9 (3)
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, **Special**, Sept. 5
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, **Special**, Sept. 5
International Covenant on the Rights of Women, **Special**, Sept. 5
International debt. *See* Debt, international.
International economy. *See* Economy, international.
International Energy Agency (IEA), **Special**, June 7, 9
International Geological Correlation Program, **Special**, Dec. 19 (2)
International Military Education and Training (IMET), **Daily**, Aug. 8
International Monetary Fund (IMF):
  Daily, Apr. 3, 10, 25, May 9, June 12, Sept. 14, Dec. 13, 17
  Special, May 25 (1), June 7, Aug. 2 (3), 3, Dec. 3
International Planned Parenthood, **Special**, Aug. 2 (1)
International Telecommunications Union (ITU), **Special**, Feb. 22
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International Trade Committee (ITC):
  Daily, June 15
  Special, Sept. 18 (2)
Interstate Committee for Liaison on the Shaelean Drought, **Special**, Dec. 10 (2), 11
Intersputnik, **Daily**, Aug. 22
Iran:
  Daily, Jan. 3, 9, 19, 23, Apr. 3, 5, 6, 9, 11, 18, 24, 27, 30, May 2, 4, 8, 10, 15-18, 21, 23-25, 29, June 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 14, 15, 18, 28, 29, July 5, 6, 10, 13, 18, 23, 25-27, Aug. 2, 6, 7, 14, 16, 17, 23, 27, 28, 31, Sept. 7,

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Iran-Iraq war (*see also* Persian Gulf):
Daily, Jan. 3, 9, Feb. 13, 17, 21, 23, 24, 27, 28, Mar. 2, 5, 7, 9, 12, 14, 26, 27, 29, 30, Apr. 9, 11, 18, 27, 30, May 8, 10, 15, 18, 21, 23, 24, June 1, 4, 8, 14, 18, 28, July 5, 6, 10, 13, 23, 25, 27, Dec. 17, 24
Special, Jan. 26 (2), May 18, 31, June 9 (1), 9 (2), Nov. 26 (2)
Iran Air, **Daily**, Aug. 31
Iraq:
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Special, Apr. 18 (1), Nov. 26 (2)
Ireland:
Daily, May 2, 4, Aug. 15
Special, Mar. 15 (1), 16, May 21 (2), 21 (3)
Irish Republican Army, **Daily**, Apr. 30
Islamic Conference, **Special**, Feb. 10 (2)
Islamic Jihad, **Daily**, Sept. 24
Israel (*see also Middle East entries*, Arab-Israeli dispute, Camp David, West Bank):
Daily, Jan. 4-6, 10, 17, 19, 20, 23, 25, 27, 30, Feb. 8, 23, 28, 29, Mar. 2, 7-9, 12, 13, 23, 26, 30, Apr. 2, 3, 6, 9, 12, 13, 17-20, 23-27, 30, May 1, 2-4, 7-10, 14-16, 18, 21, 23-25, 29, June 1, 4-8, 12, 14, 15, 18, 19, 21, 25, 28, 29, July 5, 6, 9, 11, 13, 16, 19, 23-26, 31, Sept. 4, 5, 10, 11, 14, 17-19, 24-27, Oct. 2, 3, 5, 15-19, 22-25, 29, 31, Nov. 1, 2, 6, 8, 19-21, 27, Dec. 3, 4, 10, 11, 13, 14, 17-21, 24, 26-28, 31
Special, Feb. 10 (1), 10 (2), 14, Apr. 30, June 15, Oct. 5, 9 (2)
Benveniste report, **Daily**, Apr. 9, 24, 26
U.S.-Israel Joint Economic Development Group, **Special**, Oct. 9 (2)
Israelyan, Viktor, **Special**, Apr. 18 (1)
Italy, **Daily**, Feb. 7, 21, Apr. 25, May 8, June 11, Aug. 23, Sept. 7, Oct. 26, 30, 31, Nov. 6, 28, Dec. 18, 24
IVEPO, **Daily**, May 4
Izvestia, **Daily**, Mar. 16, 19, 26

Jackson, Jesse:
Daily, Jan. 3-5, 11, Feb. 14, June 12, 20, 25, 27-29, July 5, Oct. 12
Special, Jan. 3, Apr. 9 (1), May 9 (2), Dec. 3 (1)
Japan:
Daily, Jan. 9, 24, 25, 30, Mar. 5, Apr. 3, 6, 11, May 2, 21, June 6, 12, 20, 29, Aug. 9, 15, 31, Sept. 10, 19, 21, Nov. 13, 14, Dec. 28
Special, Jan. 26 (2), 30 (4), May 23, June 7, Sept. 18 (2), 21 (1), Dec. 19 (1), 31
U.S.-Japan Economic Sub-Cabinet Consultations, **Special**, Sept. 21
Japan Society, **Daily**, Jan. 30
Jaruzelski, Gen. Wojciech:
Daily, Nov. 29
Special, Aug. 3
Jayewardene, J.R., **Special**, June 15
Jerusalem, **Daily**, Feb. 28, Mar. 2, 7, 12, 16, 22, 26, 27, 29, Apr. 2, 3, 5, 13, 25, May 2, 10, June 6, 22, July 20, 23, 25, Aug. 22, 28, Oct. 3, 29
U.S.S. *John F. Kennedy*, **Daily**, June 12
John Paul II, Pope, June 4, 11, Oct. 3, 26
Jonathan Institute Conference on International Terrorism, **Daily**, June 15
Jordan:
Daily, Jan. 6, 9, 13, 17, 19, 20, 25, 27, 30, 31, Feb. 13, 21, 28, Mar. 8, 9, 12, 15, 16, 19, 21-23, 26, May 15, 22, 23, June 6, Aug. 10, 15, 22, 27, 30, Sept. 27, Oct. 2, 15, 23, 30, Nov. 16, 27, Dec. 3, 4
Special, Feb. 10 (2), 13, 14, Oct. 9 (2), Nov. 26 (2)
Jorge Blanco, Salvador, **Special**, Apr. 9 (1), 9 [10] (2), July 19
Jumblatt, Walid:
Daily, Jan. 23, 24, 31, Feb. 1-3, 21, 24, Aug. 27, 28
Special, Feb. 16 (2)
Justice, Department of, **Special**, July 20

Kahane, Meir, **Daily**, July 26, Aug. 3, 13, 14, 21, 28, 29, 31, Sept. 5, 11, Dec. 27
Kalb, Bernard, **Daily**, Dec. 19
Kampelman, Max M., **Special**, Jan. 6 (1)
Kampuchea:
Daily, Mar. 29, 30, Apr. 23, 24, June 20, Sept. 12-14, Oct. 3, 16
Special, Jan. 18 (1), Apr. 12, 13, 27, July 2, Sept. 24

Kapar, Charles:
  Daily, Dec. 12-14, 17
  Special, Dec. 17
Karami, Rashid:
  Daily, Apr. 27, June 7, Aug. 20, Sept. 10
  Special, Oct. 5
Karim Lamrani, Mohammed:
  Daily, Feb. 29
  Special, Mar. 1
Karmal, Babrak, **Special**, Dec. 20 (2)
Kasten, Robert W., **Special**, July 10
Kaunda, Kenneth David, **Daily**, Apr. 13
Kelly, John H., **Daily**, May 3, 29, Aug. 10, Nov. 29, Dec. 19
Kennedy, Edward, **Daily**, Nov. 27, Dec. 3 (1)
Kennedy, Richard T.:
  Daily, Apr. 10, 13, May 18
  Special, Apr. 11, 18 (2), 26
Kenya, **Special**, July 10, Oct. 9 (1), 25, Nov. 1, 2 (2), 9 (1)
Keogh, Dennis W., **Daily**, Apr. 17
Kerr, Malcolm, **Daily**, Jan. 18, 20
Khaddam, 'Abd al-Halim, **Daily**, May 23, 24
Khalil, Samiha al-, **Daily**, Mar. 8
Kharg Island, **Daily**, Sept. 14, 21
Khomeini, Ayatollah, **Daily**, May 22, June 4, Aug. 6, 10
Kim Dae Jung, **Daily**, Sept. 12, Dec. 3
Kim Il Sung, Marshal, **Daily**, June 25
Kimche, David:
  Daily, Apr. 25-27
  Special, Oct. 9 (2)
Kin, Philippe, **Special**, Sept. 25 (2)
Kinnock, Neil, **Daily**, Feb. 14,
Kirchschlager, Rudolf, **Special**, Feb. 27, 28
Kirkland, Lane, **Daily**, Mar. 7, Nov. 30
Kirkpatrick, Jeane, **Daily**, Mar. 2, Apr. 10, 13, 16, July 23, Aug. 21, 28, Nov. 20, Dec. 11
Kissinger Commission. *See* National Bipartisan Commission on Central America *under* Central America.
Kissinger, Henry A.:
  Daily, Jan. 4, 9, 13, Feb. 17, 24, 27, Mar. 7, 26, Apr. 16, July 12, Oct. 12
  Special, Jan. 11, Mar. 5
Kittani, Ismat, **Daily**, Feb. 29, Mar. 8, 9, 13, 14, 16
U.S.S. *Kitty Hawk*, **Daily**, Mar. 22
Koch, Noel C., **Daily**, Mar. 29

Kohl, Helmut:
  Daily, Apr. 5
  Special, Mar. 2 (2), 5, June 7, Nov. 28, 30
Kondracke, Morton, **Daily**, Sept. 28
Korea:
  Daily, Jan. 9, 11, 13, 25, Apr. 11, May 4, June 4, 6, 25, July 31, Aug. 13, 31, Sept. 10, 12, 14, Oct. 1, 9, 16, Nov. 20, Dec. 3, 4, 14
  North-South talks, **Special**, Mar. 21 (2), Apr. 27
Korea, Democratic People's Republic of, **Daily**, Jan. 11, 25, May 2, Sept. 14
Korea, Republic of:
  Daily, May 2, Aug. 31, Sept. 10, 14, Dec. 3, 4
  Special, Jan. 9 (1), 10, 12, 30 (4), Apr. 30, Dec. 19 (1)
Korean Air Lines (KAL) Flight *007*:
  Daily, Feb. 27, June 18, 20, Aug. 27, 31, Sept. 7, Oct. 4, 5, Nov. 20
  Special, Aug. 28
Kountche, Brig. Gen. Seyni, **Special**, Dec. 7 (2), 10 (2), 11
Kozlov, Sergei, **Daily**, May 1-4, 8-10, June 6
Krasso, Gyorgy, **Daily**, Dec. 5
Kuwait:
  Daily, Mar. 27, May 15, 23, June 1, 4-6, 8, 12, 19, 25, 29, July 9, 13, 18, 20, 26, Aug. 15, 16, Sept. 18, Dec. 7, 11, 12, 14, 17
  Special, Dec. 17

La Prensa, **Daily**, Aug. 7, 31, May 3
Lamb, Robert E., **Special**, Jan. 24
Lange, David, **Daily**, Aug. 9, 28
Laos, **Daily**, Mar. 29, July 20, 26, Dec. 3
Lara Bonilla, Rodrigo, **Daily**, May 2
LaRouche, Lyndon, **Daily**, Mar. 2, 14, 16
Latin America (*see also individual countries*, Cartagena Group, Organization of American States):
  Daily, Jan. 23, Mar. 30, June 6, 8, 12, 19, 25
  Special, Jan. 27, May 14, June 7
Laurel, Salvador H., **Daily**, Feb. 21
Lawrence, Loren, **Daily**, Feb. 29
League of Women Voters, **Daily**, May 7
Lebanon:
  Daily, Jan. 3-6, 9-11, 13, 16, 18, 20, 23, 24, 26, 27, 30, 31, Feb. 1-3, 6-8, 10, 13-17, 21, 23, 24, 27-29, Mar. 2, 5, 7, 9, 12, 14, 16, 19, 21, 27, Apr. 2, 11, 16, 18, 20, 27, May 2-4, 7-9, 14-17, 21, 25, June 1, 4, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14, 18, 19, 21, 25, July 5, 6, 9, 11, 13, 16, 18-20, 26, 27, 30, 31, Aug. 10, 13, 15, 16, 20, 22, 23, 27-29, Sept. 5, 7,

Lebanon—Continued
    10, 11, 13, 20, 21, 24-26, 28, Oct. 1-5, 9, 15-19, 22-24, 26, 29, 30, Nov. 1, 8, 15, 27, 30, Dec. 3, 13, 14, 20, 24, 28
  Multinational Force in, **Special**, Feb. 7, 16 (2)
  Troop withdrawal from, **Special**, Sept. 23, Oct. 5, 9 (2)
  U.N. Interim Force in:
    Special, Oct. 5, 9 (2), Nov. 26 (1)
    Daily, Jan. 26, Feb. 8, Apr. 16, 18, 20, Oct. 16
  U.S. Marines in, **Special**, Jan. 25 (2), Feb. 7, 13, 16 (2), Mar. 21 (1)
Lesotho, **Special**, Feb. 9
Levi, Maj. Gen. Moshe, **Daily**, Sept. 11
Levin, Carl, **Daily**, Mar. 7, May 9
Lewis, Samuel W., **Daily**, Oct. 31, Nov. 1, 5, Dec. 19
Li Xiannian, **Special**, Apr. 26
Liberia, **Daily**, Aug. 28-30
Libya:
  Daily, Jan. 4, Mar. 19, Apr. 18, 19, 20, 23, 25, 30, May 1, 8-10, 18, June 4, 5, 7, 14, 18, 25, July 5, 10, 11, 27, 31, Aug. 14, 15, 17, 20-22, 27, 29-31, Sept. 4-7, 13, 17-19, 26, 28, Nov. 2, 15, 16, 19-21, 28, 30, Dec. 13, 14, 17, 24
  Special, Apr. 30, Dec. 7 (2), 10 (2), 11
Libya Federation, **Daily**, Aug. 31
Libyan People's Bureau, **Daily** Apr. 20, 23
Lighthizer, Robert, **Special**, Dec. 19 (1)
Litvin, Yuriy, **Daily**, Oct. 22
Logan Act, **Daily**, June 5, July 27
Lomeiko, Vladimir B., **Special**, Nov. 30
London Economic Summit. *See* Economic Summit, London.
Londono, Patricia, **Daily**, July 31, Aug. 1, 7, 15
Lopez Sibrian, Lt. Rodolfo I., **Daily**, Nov. 20, 30, Dec. 3, 4, 7
Lorton Penitentiary:
  Daily, Jan. 5, 17, 24, 30, Mar. 12, 14
  Special, Jan. 24, Mar. 12
Louison, George, **Special**, Oct. 17
Lubrani, Uri, **Daily**, May 14
Lucas, A.O., **Special**, Aug. 2 (2)
Luns, Joseph, **Daily**, May 30
Lusaka Agreement, **Special**, Nov. 2 (1)
Lusinchi, Jaime:
  Daily, Dec. 3
  Special, Dec. 3 (2), 4
Luther, William Joseph, **Daily**, July 5

Luxembourg:
  Daily, July 16, Nov. 9
  Special, Nov. 9 (3)
Luxembourg, Grand Duke and Duchess, **Special**, Nov. 9 (3)
Lyman, Princeton, **Special**, Dec. 27
Lyng, Richard, **Special**, Feb. 24

Ma'Ariv, **Daily**, Oct. 24
MacEachen, Allan J.:
  Daily, Mar. 26, Apr. 2
  Special, Apr. 2 (2)
McCutchan, Thomas, **Special**, Aug. 2 (2)
McFarlane, Robert C.:
  Daily, May 14, Nov. 8
  Special, Feb. 24, Nov. 22, 27, 28, 29
McGovern, George, **Special**, Aug. 1
McNamar, R.T., **Special**, Feb. 24
McPherson, M. Peter:
  Daily, Jan. 13, 25, Feb. 2, 27, Mar. 26, July 10, Aug. 1, 2, Sept. 19, Oct. 25, Dec. 12
  Special, Jan. 16 (1), 30 (3), 31, July 10, Aug. 2 (2), Oct. 9 (1), 17, Nov. 1, 2 (2), 9 (1), 16, 25, 27, Dec. 5, 12, 27
Magana Borja, Alvaro Alfredo, **Special**, Mar. 2 (1)
Mahathir bin Mohamad, **Special**, Jan. 17 (1), 18 (1)
Major, Peter Curtin, **Daily**, Sept. 12
Malaria:
  Daily, Aug. 2
  Special, Aug. 2 (2)
Malawi, **Special**, Feb. 9, Nov. 9 (1)
Malaysia:
  Daily, Jan. 20, Aug. 10, Nov. 16
  Special, Jan. 17 (1), 18 (1)
Mali, **Special**, Nov. 1
Malik, Adam, **Daily**, Sept. 6
Man and the Biosphere, **Special**, Dec. 19 (2)
Mandela, Nelson:
  Daily, Mar. 2
  Special, Dec. 10 (1)
Manley, Ivor, **Special**, Apr. 11
Mansfield, Michael J., **Special**, Jan. 26 (2)
Manzanillo talks. *See* Shlaudeman-Tinoco talks *under* Nicaragua.
Mara, Ratu Sir Kamisese, **Special**, Nov. 26 (1), 27
Marchenko, Valeriy, **Daily**, Oct. 15
Marcos, Ferdinand E., **Daily**, Feb. 24, Mar. 19, Nov. 19, 20
Mariannas, Northern, **Special**, Nov. 26 (1)

Mariategui, Sandro, **Daily**, Sept. 26
Marks, Leonard, **Special**, Feb. 22
Marks, Michael B., **Daily**, Feb. 21
Marshall Islands, **Daily**, Apr. 3
Martinique, **Special**, July 16
Masire, Quett K.J.:
  Daily, May 4
  Special, May 7, 9 (1)
Mathias, Charles McC., Jr., **Daily**, June 29
Mauritania:
  Daily, Dec. 12, 17, 27
  Special, July 10, Nov. 16
Mauritius, **Special**, Sept. 25 (2)
M'Bow, Amadou Mahtar, **Daily**, Jan. 20, Dec. 31
Meese, Edwin, III:
  Daily, May 23
  Special, Aug. 30
Mexico:
  Daily, Jan. 4, Feb. 3, Apr. 3, 17, May 3, 14, June 22, 25, 26, July 13, 19, Aug. 2, 22, Oct. 3, 30, Nov. 21, Dec. 13
  Special, Apr. 17, May 14, 15, 31, Aug. 30, Oct. 9 (3), Dec. 19 (1)
  U.S.-Mexico Binational Commission, **Special**, Apr. 17
MIAs. *See* POW/MIA's.
Michel, Robert H., **Special**, Nov. 29, Dec. 6 (1)
Micronesia, **Daily**, Apr. 3
Middendorf, J. William, III, **Daily**, Jan. 25, July 18
Middle East (*see also individual countries and other Middle East entries*, Arab-Israeli dispute, Camp David, Palestine Liberation Organization, West Bank):
  Daily, Jan. 4, 5, 18-20, 25, 26, Feb. 3, 7, 14, 16, 17, 23, 27, Mar. 15, 22, 26, 27, 30, Apr. 2, 4, 11-13, 16, June 6, 11, 14, 15, 21, 25, July 9-12, 16, 20, 25, 30, 31, Aug. 1, 6, 17, 20, 21, 28, 30, 31, Sept. 13, 17-19, 21, 25, 27, 28, Oct. 1, 9, 19, 24, 30, Nov. 1, 5-9, 13, 14, 16, 21, 30, Dec. 3, 4, 7, 10, 11, 13, 14, 17-20, 24, 27, 31
  Special, Jan. 18 (2), Sept. 23, 24, Oct. 9 (2), Nov. 26 (2)
Middle East conference, proposed, **Daily**, June 21, July 30, Sept. 25, Dec. 24
Middle East peace process (*see also* Camp David), **Daily**, Feb. 3, 27, Mar. 15, Sept. 26
Miskito Indians (*see also* Nicaragua), **Daily**, Apr. 16, June 8, Aug. 31, Oct. 22
Mitterrand, François:
  Daily, Mar. 21, June 22, Dec. 17
  Special, Mar. 21 (1), 23

Mobutu, Marshal Sese Seko, **Special**, Aug. 2 (3), Sept. 23
Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, **Daily**, May 21
Mondale, Walter F., **Daily**, Jan. 3, Sept. 17, 18, Oct. 3
Monroe Doctrine, **Daily**, Nov. 8, 13
Monterrosa, Lt. Col. Domingo, **Daily**, Oct. 24
Montono, Moriyuki, **Special**, Sept. 21
Moran Lopez, Fernando, **Special**, Dec. 6 (2)
Morocco:
  Daily, Feb. 28, 29, Mar. 22, Aug. 15, 20-22, 27, 29-31, Sept. 4-7, 13, 17, 28, Nov. 13
  Special, Mar. 1, July 10
Morocco-Libyan Treaty of Union, **Daily**, Sept. 17
Motley, Langhorne A., **Daily**, Jan. 20, 24, 25, Feb. 14, 21, Mar. 27, May 2, June 15, 27-29, Oct. 4
Moynihan, Daniel P., **Daily**, June 14
Mozambique:
  Daily, Jan. 27, Feb. 21, Mar. 16, Oct. 3, Dec. 7, 28
  Special, Jan. 30 (3), Feb. 9, 15, Mar. 13 (2), 14, Apr. 27, May 9 (1), July 10, Oct. 9 (1), 25, Nov. 1, 16, Dec. 11
Mroz, John Edwin, **Daily**, Feb. 21
Mubarak, Sheikh Khalifa Ahmed Abdel-Aziz al-, **Daily**, Feb. 8
Mubarak, Mohammed Hosni:
  Daily, Jan. 27, Feb. 3, 8, 10, 14, 16, Mar. 12, Apr. 6, May 2, Oct. 3, 9, Nov. 21
  Special, Feb. 10 (2), 14
Muldoon, Robert D.:
  Daily, Feb. 21
  Special, Feb. 23, 24
Mulroney, Brian, **Special**, Sept. 25 (1)
Murphy, Richard W.:
  Daily, Jan. 31, Feb. 3, 6-8, Mar. 26, Apr. 11-13, 16, 27, May 15, 16, 21-23, June 11, 19, 29, July 20, 25, 31, Aug. 27, Sept. 24, 25, 27, 28, Nov. 1, 5-9, 13, 14, 16, 30, Dec. 3, 4, 7, 10, 11, 13, 14, 17-20, 31
  Special, Sept. 23, 24
Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations (*see also* Arms control):
  Daily, Jan. 13, 19, 20, 23, Apr. 23, May 25
  Special, Apr. 19
Myers, Sondra, **Special**, Sept. 18 (1)

Nakajima, **Special**, Jan. 30 (4)
Nakasone, Yasuhiro, **Special**, June 7, Nov. 28, Dec. 31
Nalen, Craig A., **Special**, Jan. 9 (2), June 12

Namibia (*see also* South Africa):
  Daily, Jan. 6, 20, 23, Feb. 3, 6, 21, Mar. 13, Apr. 16, May 3, 14, 22, June 6, 8, 11, July 25, 27, Aug. 14, 16, Oct. 15, 31, Nov. 2
  Special, Feb. 9, May 7, 9 (1), Nov. 2 (1), Dec. 3 (1), 7 (1)
Narcotics:
  Daily, Apr. 30, May 2, June 19, July 11, 19, Sept. 14
  Special, Apr. 12, 13, Aug. 30, Dec. 3 (2), 4
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), **Special**, Jan. 26 (1), July 20
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), **Special**, Oct. 17
National Bipartisan Commission on Central America. *See under* Central America.
National Broadcasting Company, **Daily**, Mar. 2
National Center for Export-Import Studies, **Daily**, June 15
National Leadership Forum, **Special**, Apr. 5
National Newspaper Association, **Daily**, Mar. 2
National Press Club, **Daily**, Aug. 2
National Public Radio, **Daily**, Aug. 2
National Security Council (NSC), **Daily**, Aug. 1
National security policy, **Special**, Apr. 5, 20 (2), Dec. 20 (1)
Ne'eman, Yuval, **Daily**, May 14
Negroponte, John, **Special**, Mar. 15 (2)
Netherlands:
  Daily, Mar. 21, Apr. 25, May 23, June 1, 14
  Special, May 18, 25 (2), 30 (1), Nov. 28
Neutrality Act, **Daily**, Apr. 13, Sept. 5-7, 10
Neva, Frank, **Special**, Aug. 2 (2)
Nevin, Louis, **Daily**, June 29
New Forum, **Daily**, Aug. 17
New Ireland Forum, **Special**, May 21 (2)
U.S.S. *New Jersey*, **Daily**, Feb. 7, Mar. 2
New York Times, **Daily**, Sept. 25, Nov. 20
New Zealand:
  Daily, Feb. 21, Mar. 19, June 20, July 16, 23, Aug. 9, 28, Sept. 10, 13, 14, 18, 26
  Special, Feb. 23, 24, July 2, Nov. 26 (1), 27
Newell, Gregory J.:
  Daily, Feb. 7, Mar. 29, Aug. 10, Sept. 13, Dec. 13, 19
  Special, Dec. 19 (2)
Nguyen Co Thach, **Daily**, Sept. 13, 14
Nicaragua (*see also* Central America, Contadora peace process, Miskito Indians):
  Daily, Jan. 4, 5, 10, 13, 16, 18-20, 27, 31, Feb. 6, 14, 21, 23, Mar. 7-9, 13, 21, 22, 29, 30, Apr. 3-6, 9-13, 16-20, 23, 25-27, 30, May 1, 3, 4, 7, 9, 10, 14, 21, 23, 24, 30,

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  Special, Jan. 11, Feb. 3, Mar. 15 (2), Apr. 9 (1), 9 [10] (2), 20 (2), 27, May 9 (2), 14, 15, July 19, Oct. 1, 9 (3), Dec. 4
  Civilian Military Assistance Group, **Daily**, Sept. 6, 7, 10, 13
  Shlaudeman-Tinoco meetings, **Daily**, July 19, Aug. 2, Sept. 7, 26, 27, Oct. 30, Nov. 20, 21
Niger:
  Daily, Dec. 7
  Special, Oct. 9 (1), 25, Nov. 2 (2), 9 (1), Dec. 7 (2), 10 (2), 11
Nigeria:
  Daily, Jan. 3, 4, 19, July 6
  Special, Feb. 10 (1)
Nightline, **Daily**, Nov. 28
Nippon Telephone and Telegraph Company, **Special**, Jan. 26 (2)
Nitze, Paul H., **Special**, Jan. 17 (2)
Nkomati Accords, **Special**, May 9 (1), Dec. 11
Nofziger, Lynn, **Special**, Aug. 30
Nolan, James E., **Special**, June 22
Normandy invasion anniversary, **Special**, May 22
North Atlantic Council, Ministerial Meeting:
  Daily, Apr. 12, 16, 30, May 23, 25, 29
  Special, May 25 (2), 30 (1), 30 (2)
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO):
  Daily, Feb. 27, Mar. 7, Apr. 26, May 17, 25, 30, June 4, 11, 20, Sept. 14, Oct. 1, 24, Nov. 5, 14, 19, Dec. 5, 11
  Special, Jan. 6 (2), 13 (1), Apr. 19, May 25 (2), Sept. 25 (1), Nov. 9 (3), 28, 30, Dec. 6 (2), 21
Norway, **Daily**, Jan. 23, 27
Novosti, **Daily**, Aug. 20
Nuclear energy:
  Daily, Aug. 30
  Special, Apr. 11
Nuclear free zone, **Daily**, Aug. 28
Nuclear nonproliferation (*see also* Arms control):
  Daily, Oct. 30, Nov. 1
  Special, Jan. 9 (1), 10, 12, Apr. 11
Nuclear ships, **Daily**, Sept. 13, 26

Nuclear testing:
  Daily, Mar. 7, 29, July 18
  Special, Nov. 26 (1), 27, Dec. 20 (1), 21
Nuclear weapons (*see also* Arms control):
  Daily, Apr. 16
  Special, Sept. 29, Nov. 22, 27, 30
Nujoma, Sam, **Daily**, Feb. 23, June 11
Nunn, Sam, **Daily**, June 20
Nussenzweig, Ruth, **Special**, Aug. 2 (2)
Nussenzweig, Victor, **Special**, Aug. 2 (2)

Oakley, Phyllis, **Special**, Dec. 20 (2)
Odeh, Adnan Abu, **Daily**, Dec. 4
Ogarkov, Marshal Nikolai, **Daily**, Sept. 13
Oil:
  Daily, July 11, 17, 31, Aug. 1, 10, 14, 27, Oct. 22, 30
  Special, June 7, 9, Nov. 26 (2), Dec. 3 (1), 4
Olympics:
  Daily, Jan. 19, 20, Mar. 2, 19, Apr. 9, 10, 16, 17, May 8, 9, July 10-13, 27, Aug. 6, 14, 15
  Special, Jan. 30 (2), Feb. 1
Oman, **Daily**, Apr. 13, Sept. 19
O'Mara, Dennis, **Daily**, Dec. 28
O'Neill, Thomas P., Jr.:
  Daily, Apr. 5
  Special, Nov. 1
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), **Special**, Apr. 11
Organization of African Unity (OAU), **Daily**, Nov. 13
Organization of American States (OAS) (*see also* Latin America):
  Daily, Apr. 10, June 8, July 18
  Special, Nov. 9 (2)
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), (*see also* Oil), **Daily**, Aug. 27, Oct. 22, 30
Ortega, Daniel:
  Daily, June 4, 12, Aug. 3, Sept. 24, 28, Oct. 2, 4, 9
  Special, Jan. 27, Dec. 4
Outer space (*see also* Space shuttle, Space station):
  Daily, June 15
  Commercial use of, **Special**, July 20
  Militarization of (*see also* Antisatellite weapons, Arms control, Strategic Defense Initiative), **Special**, June 29

Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC):
  Daily, July 23
  Special, Mar. 27, June 12

Pacific Basin, **Special**, Apr. 20 (2), Dec. 31
Paganelli, Robert P.:
  Daily, Jan. 3
  Special, Jan. 3
Pakistan:
  Daily, Jan. 19, Feb. 1, May 18, 22, 23, June 15, 21, July 19, 23, Aug. 17, 23, 29, Oct. 12, 23, 25, 31, Nov. 16, Dec. 5, 26
  Special, Aug. 30, Dec. 20 (2)
Palestine, **Daily**, Apr. 3, 10, 23, Sept. 12
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO):
  Daily, Jan. 5, 6, 17, 19, 27, Feb. 7, Mar. 19, May 10, 16, July 5, 9, 19, Aug. 10, Nov. 16, 28
  Special, Feb. 10 (2), 14, Apr. 27
Palestinian National Council, **Daily**, Nov. 16
Palmer, Robie M., **Daily**, May 24, June 7, Aug. 1
Panama:
  Daily, Feb. 14, Mar. 21, May 4, 7-9, 16, Aug. 3, 20, 29, Sept. 7, 12, Oct. 3
  Special, Oct. 9 (3)
Panama Canal, **Daily**, Nov. 16
Papal Nuncio, **Daily**, Jan. 10
Papandreou, Andreas, **Daily**, July 12, Oct. 4, 5, 9, 18, 25
Paraguay:
  Daily, Mar. 23, May 1
  Special, Dec. 10 (1)
Pastora, Eden:
  Daily, June 1, 4, 5, 27-29, Oct. 5
  Special, May 31
Paz Barnica, Edgardo, **Daily**, Apr. 3
Peace Corps, **Special**, Nov. 26 (1)
Pelletreau, Robert W., Jr., **Daily**, Feb. 23, July 6, 9, 11, Sept. 13
Peltier, Leonard, **Daily**, June 28
Percy, Charles H., **Daily**, June 14, Sept. 4
Peres, Shimon:
  Daily, Feb. 23, Apr. 9, Sept. 14, 17, 18, Oct. 3, 5, 9, 17, 22
  Special, Oct. 5, 9 (2)
Perez, Carlos Andres, **Daily**, Apr. 30, May 1
Perez de Cuellar, Javier, **Daily**, June 18, Aug. 29
Perez Esquivel, Adolfo, **Daily**, Apr. 10
Perez Vega, Gen. Reynaldo, **Daily**, Mar. 22

Persian Gulf (*see also* Iran-Iraq war, Straits of Hormuz):
Daily, Jan. 3, Feb. 3, 28, Mar. 7, 8, 13, 29, Apr. 25, 26, May 4, 10, 15-18, 21-25, 29, 30, June 1, 4-8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 19, 21, 25, 26, 28, July 19, Aug. 23, 29, Sept. 12, 21, Oct. 9, Nov. 30, Dec. 3
Special, May 18, 25 (2), 30 (1), June 9, Dec. 20 (2)
Peru, **Daily**, July 23, Aug. 27, Sept. 26, 28, Oct. 31
Peters, Olga, **Daily**, Nov. 14
Philippines (*see also* Agrava Board):
Daily, Feb. 24, 28, Mar. 19, Apr. 6, May 9, 14, 15, 17, 18, Nov. 19, 20, Dec. 26
Special, Feb. 10 (1)
Pickering, Thomas E.:
Daily, Mar. 13, 2, May 3, June 26, Aug. 8
Special, Mar. 13 (1), 29, Aug. 8
Pinochet, August, **Daily**, Aug. 8, 20, Sept. 12
Poland (*see also* Solidarity):
Daily, Jan. 10, 19, Mar. 14, Apr. 9, 20, June 18, July 12, 17-19, 23, 25-27, 31, Aug. 1, 3, 13, 14, 17, Sept. 14, Oct. 5, 22, 23, 25, 29-31, Dec. 12, 13, 17
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Polisario, **Daily**, Nov. 13
Polyakov, Ivan Y., **Daily**, Oct. 17
Popieluszko, Jerzy, **Daily**, Oct. 22, 31
Population:
Daily, July 11, 13, Aug. 2, 15, 17
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Portugal:
Daily, Mar. 12, Aug. 16, Oct. 30
Special, Mar. 13 (2), 14, Dec. 6 (2)
POW/MIAs (prisoners of war/missing in action):
Daily, Feb. 28, Apr. 17, 23, July 20, Sept. 14, Oct. 19, Dec. 10
Special, July 2
Pravda, **Daily**, Jan. 25, Mar. 2, Apr. 25
Prem Tinsulanonda, Gen.:
Daily, Apr. 11
Special, Apr. 12, 13
Prensa Latina, **Daily**, Jan. 31
Presser, Jackie, **Special**, Aug. 30
Prisoners of war. *See* POW/MIAs.
Progressive, **Daily**, Apr. 17
Public health:
Daily, Aug. 2
Special, Aug. 2 (2)
Puerto Rico, **Daily**, Oct. 3
Purcell, James N., Jr., **Special**, Dec. 27

Qadhafi, Col. Mu'ammar al-, **Daily**, Apr. 30, May 1, 9, 10, June 4, Sept. 4, Nov. 15

Quainton, Anthony, **Daily**, Jan. 4, May 7

Quintana Lacaci, Lt. Gen. Guillermo, **Daily**, Jan. 30

Rabin, Itzhak, **Daily**, June 25, Oct. 29

Radio frequencies. *See* World Administrative Radio Conference for High Frequency Broadcasting.

Radix, Kendrick, **Special**, Oct. 17

Ramirez Ocampo, Augusto, **Daily**, Apr. 12, Nov. 28

Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), **Daily**, May 24

Rauff, Walter, **Daily**, Jan. 26, **Daily**, Feb. 2,

Reagan, Ronald:
- **Daily**, Jan. 3, 9, 17, 19, 25, Feb. 7, 16, Mar. 2, 15, 19, 21, 27, 29, Apr. 27, May 1-4, 8, 14-16, 22, 23, June 6, 11, 14, 26, 29, July 23, 25, Aug. 3, 13-16, 21-23, 29, Sept. 6, 10, 11, 14, 25-27, Oct. 12, 16, 24, 31
- **Special**, Jan. 3, 6 (1), 10, 12, 17 (2), 18 (1), 18 (2), 25 (2), Feb. 2, Apr. 3 (1), 5, July 16, Sept. 23
- Africa, **Special**, Dec. 11
- Arms control, **Special**, Nov. 22, Dec. 20 (1)
- Austria, **Special**, Feb. 27, 28
- Botswana, **Special**, May 9 (1)
- Canada, **Special**, Sept. 25 (1)
- Caribbean, **Special**, July 19
- Central America, **Special**, Feb. 3, 17, May 9 (2), 15
- China visit, **Special**, Mar. 21 (2), Apr. 3 (2), 6, 10 (1), 10 (3), 16, 18 (2), 20 (1), 20 (2), 26, 27, 28, 30
- Defense budget, **Special**, Nov. 29, Dec. 6 (1)
- Dominican Republic, **Special**, Apr. 9 [10] (2)
- Egypt, **Special**, Feb. 10 (2)
- Europe visit, **Special**, May 18, 22
- Fiji, **Special**, Nov. 27
- France, **Special**, Mar. 23
- Germany, Federal Republic of, **Special**, Nov. 30
- Ireland, **Special**, Mar. 16, May 21 (2), 21 (3)
- Israel, **Special**, Oct. 9 (2)
- Japan, **Special**, June 7, Dec. 31
- Jordan, **Special**, Feb. 10 (2), 13
- Mexico, **Special**, Apr. 17, May 15
- Middle East peace, **Special**, Oct. 5
- Morocco, **Special**, Mar. 1
- Narcotics, **Special**, Aug. 30
- New Zealand, **Special**, Feb. 23, 24
- Normandy invasion anniversary, **Special**, May 22
- South Africa, **Special**, Dec. 3 (1), 7 (1)
- Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, **Special**, Jan. 30 (1)

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  Thailand, **Special**, Apr. 13
  Trade, international, **Special**, Dec. 19 (1), Sept. 18 (2)
  United Nations visit, **Special**, Sept. 24
  U.S.-Soviet relations, **Special**, Sept. 21 (1), 28
  Venezuela, **Special**, Dec. 4
  Yugoslavia, **Special**, Feb. 1
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  Minesweeping, **Daily**, Aug. 9, 10, 13-16, 20, 23, 29, Sept. 10, 12, 17
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  Daily, Mar. 7, 16, Aug. 16, 29, Sept. 10, 11, 13, 14, 21
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Regan, Donald T., **Special**, Feb. 16 (1), 24, Mar. 21 (2), 27, Apr. 3 (2), 17, June 7, 9, Sept. 23, Nov. 29
Regier, Frank, **Daily**, Apr. 16
Rittner, Carol, **Special**, Sept. 18 (1)
Rivera, Brooklyn, **Daily**, Aug. 31, Nov. 30
Robelo, Alfonso, **Daily**, Dec. 26
Rodino, Peter, **Daily**, Apr. 13
Rogers, Gen. Bernard, **Special**, Nov. 30
Romania, **Daily**, Apr. 2, 5, May 23, July 19, Sept. 4, Dec. 4
Romanov, Grigory, **Daily**, Oct. 15
Rosenne, Meir, **Daily**, Feb. 23, May 25
Roslik, **Daily**, May 9
Rota military base, **Daily**, Aug. 8
Rowny, Lt. Gen. Edward L., USA (Ret.):
  Daily, Mar. 8, Apr. 10, Sept. 26
  Special, Jan. 30 (1)
Rumsfeld, Donald:
  Daily, Jan. 3-6, 9-11, 13, 17, 20, 24, 26, 27, 30, 31, Feb. 6-8, 13, 15, 17, 23, 24, 27, 28, Mar. 2, 5, 9, 22, 26, 30, Apr. 4
  Special, Feb. 13
Ruppe, Loret, **Special**, Nov. 27
Rusk, Dean, **Daily**, Feb. 7
Rutka, Robert, **Daily**, Jan. 31
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Sakharov, Andrei:
  Daily, Apr. 26, June 4, 7, 8, July 11, Aug. 7, 23, Oct. 17
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Salem, Elie, **Daily**, May 15, 16
Santivanez, Roberto, **Daily**, Apr. 2
Santos, Jose Eduardo dos, **Special**, Nov. 2 (1)
Sasser, James Ralph, **Special**, Mar. 29
Saud, Fahd bin Abd al-Aziz al-, **Daily**, Feb. 2, May 21, 22
Saudi Arabia:
  Daily, Jan. 9, 17, Feb. 8, 29, Mar. 12, 21, 22, 26, 27, Apr. 6, 13, 26, 27, 30, June 5, 6, 12, 14, 21, 22, July 25, Aug. 13, 15, 23, 30, Sept. 4, 24, Nov. 20, Dec. 7, 14
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Savimbi, Jonas, **Special**, Nov. 2 (1), Dec. 3 (1)
Sayre, Robert M., **Daily**, June 25
Schaden, Lt. Col. Richard, **Special**, Aug. 8
Schaufelberger, Lt. Cdr. Alfred, **Special**, Mar. 29
Schneider, William, Jr.:
  Daily, Feb. 29, Mar. 8, 29, July 25
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School of the Americas, **Daily**, Aug. 20
Schrock, Prof., **Special**, Apr. 17
Schwartz, David, **Daily**, Jan. 25
Scowcroft, Brent:
  Daily, Mar. 26, Apr. 3
  Special, Apr. 9 (3)
Seaga, Edward, **Special**, July 19
Senegal, **Special**, July 10, Oct. 25
Sepulveda Amor, Bernardo, **Special**, Apr. 17, May 14, Oct. 1, 9 (3)
Seregni Mosquera, Gen. Leber, **Daily**, Mar. 21
Shamir, Yitzhak:
  Daily, Jan. 19, Mar. 8, Sept. 14, Dec. 4, 10
  Special, Feb. 13
Shannon, James M., **Daily**, Oct. 15
Shapar, Howard, **Special**, Apr. 11
Sharon, Ariel:
  Daily, May 4, 16, Aug. 27
  Special, Oct. 5
Shlaudeman, Harry W. (*see also* Shlaudeman-Tinoco meetings *under* Nicaragua):
  Daily, Feb. 17, Mar. 26, 29, Apr. 20, May 3, June 4, 5, 12, 20, 22, 25, 26, 28, July 6, 17, 19, Aug. 2, 15, Sept. 7, 26, 27, Oct. 2, 4, 15, 16, 30, Nov. 2, 19, 21, Dec. 10
  Special, Mar. 28, July 19, Oct. 9 (3), Nov. 9 (2), Dec. 3
Shultz, George P.:
  Daily, Jan. 3-6, 10, 11, 13, 17, 19, 20, 23, 24, 27, 30, 31, Feb. 2, 7, 8, 13-16, 21, 23, 24, 27, 29, Mar. 2, 7-9, 21, 22, 26, 27, Apr. 2-5, 11-13, 17, 18, 20, 23, May 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 10, 14-16, 21-23, 29, 30, June 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12,

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  14, 15, 18-22, 25-29, July 3, 12, 13, 16, 23-25, Aug. 1, 3, 6, 8, 13, 16, 17, 20-22, 27, 29, 31, Sept. 4-7, 10-14, 17-19, 24, 26-28, Oct. 3, 9, 15, 16, 24, 25, Nov. 1, 2, 5-9, 13-16, 19-21, 26-30, Dec. 4, 5, 7, 10, 13, 14, 17-20, 31
  Special, Jan. 6 (1), 6 (2), 1, 13 (1), 18 2), Feb. 10 (2), Sept. 23, 24, Oct. 17
  Arms control, **Special**, Nov. 22
  Austria, **Special**, Feb. 27, 28
  Brazil visit, **Special**, Nov. 9 (2)
  Canada, **Special**, Apr. 2 (2)
  Central America, **Special**, May 31, Oct. 9 (3)
  China, **Special**, Apr. 30
  Economic Summit, London, **Special**, June 9 (2)
  Europe visit, **Special**, Dec. 6 (2)
  Fiji, **Special**, Nov. 27
  France, **Special**, Mar. 23
  Germany, Federal Republic, **Special**, Nov. 30
  Iran-Iraq war, **Special**, May 31
  Latin America visit, **Special**, Jan. 27
  Mexico, **Special**, Apr. 17
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  Reagan's trip to China, **Special**, Apr. 18 (2)
  Southern Africa, **Special**, Feb. 15
  U.S.-Soviet relations, **Special**, Sept. 28, 29
Siguel, Rudolfo, **Daily**, Mar. 13
Sihanouk, Prince Samdech Norodom, **Special**, July 2, Sept. 24
Silberman, Laurence H., **Daily**, Feb. 24, 27, Mar. 2, 22, 26
Silva Herzog Flores, Jesus, **Special**, Apr. 17, May 14
Skates, Col. Ray, **Special**, May 22
Smith, William French, **Special**, Aug. 30
Soares, Mario Alberto:
  Daily, Mar. 12
  Special, Mar. 13 (2), 14
Sokolov, Marshal Sergei L., **Daily**, Mar. 22
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  Daily, June 12, Dec. 12
  Special, Aug. 3
Somalia:
  Daily, Feb. 8, Aug. 9, Nov. 26
  Special, Jan. 30 (3)
Son Sann:
  Daily, Sept. 13
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South Africa (*see also* Sullivan principles):
  Daily, Jan. 3, 5, 6, 9, 13, 20, 23, 31, Feb. 1, 8, 15-17, 21, 23, 24, 27, Mar. 2, 12, 13, 16, 19, 21, 22, 29, Apr. 3, 4, 16, 17, 24, June 8, 11, July 3, Aug. 1, 14, 16, 22, 23, 28, 29, 31, Sept. 4, 5, 7, 14, 18, 19, Oct. 1-4, 9, 15, 16, 23, 24, 29, Nov. 6, 15, 19, 20, 26, 28-30, Dec. 4, 5, 12, 14, 20, 28
  Special, Feb. 9, 15, Mar. 13 (2), Apr. 27, May 9 (1), Nov. 2 (1), 9 (1), Dec. 3 (1), 7 (1), 10 (1), 11, Dec. 19 (1)
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South Carolina Bar Association, **Daily**, Apr. 11
South Pacific Commission, **Special**, Nov. 26 (1)
South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO):
  Daily, Feb. 6, Mar. 13, Apr. 16, June 11, 12, July 25, 26, Aug. 1
  Special, Feb. 9, 15, May 7, Nov. 2 (1)
Southeast Asia, **Daily**, Apr. 17
Southern Africa (*see also individual countries*):
  Daily, Jan. 10, Apr. 13, June 6, 8, 12, July 3, 26, Sept. 10, Dec. 7
  Special, Feb. 9, 15, Mar. 13 (2), Nov. 2 (1), Dec. 3 (1), 7 (1), 11
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Soviet Military Power, 1984, **Daily**, Apr. 9
Soviet Union (*see also* Direct Communications Link, U.S.-Soviet summit, proposed):
  Daily, Jan. 3-6, 10, 11, 13, 16-20, 24-26, 30, Feb. 1-3, 7, 8, 10, 13-16, 21, 23, 24, 27, 28, Mar. 2, 7, 12, 14, 16, 19, 21, 22, 26, 29, Apr. 3-5, 9-13, 16-20, 23-25, 27, 30, May 1-4, 8-10, 14-16, 18, 21, 22, 24, 25, 30, June 4, 6-8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18-22, 25-29, July 3, 5, 6, 9-13, 16-18, 23-27, 30, Aug. 1-3, 6-8, 10, 13-17, 20-23, 27-29, 31, Sept. 6, 7, 13, 14, 26, 27, 29, Oct. 1, 3, 4, 9, 12, 15, 17, 19, 22, 24-26, 30, Nov. 1, 2, 5, 7-9, 13-16, 19-21, 26-30
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  Afghanistan invasion, **Special**, Dec. 20 (2)
  African food relief, **Special**, Nov. 2 (2), 9 (1), 16, Dec. 12
  Arms control, **Special**, Jan. 25 (2), Nov. 22, 28, Dec. 20 (1), 21
  Berlin, **Special**, Apr. 4 (1)
  Chemical weapons, **Special**, Apr. 18 (1)
  Conference on Disarmament in Europe, **Special**, Apr. 3 (1)
  Detained American seamen, **Daily**, Sept. 17-19
  Human rights, **Special**, Feb. 10 (1), Dec. 10 (1)

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  Korean Air Lines Flight *007*, **Special**, Aug. 28
  Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction, **Special**, Apr. 19
  U.S. antisatellite weapons program, **Special**, Apr. 2 (1)
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  Daily, Dec. 19
  Special, Apr. 10 (1), July 20
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  Daily, Jan. 30, Feb. 24, Mar. 9, June 4, Aug. 8, Nov. 28
  Special, Dec. 6 (2), 19 (1)
Speakes, Larry M., **Special**, Jan. 3, 11
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Spiers, Ronald M.:
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Sri Lanka:
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Star wars. *See* Strategic Defense Initiative.
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  Daily, Jan. 3-6, 9-11, 13, 16-20, 23-27, 30, 31, Feb. 1-3, 6-8, 10, 13-15, 17, 21, 23, 24, 27-29, July 12, Aug. 14, 22, 27, Dec. 3, 5, 7, 12, 17, 19, 21
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  Advisory Panel on U.S. Mission Security, **Daily**, Mar. 29, Aug. 3
  Embassy security, **Daily**, Aug. 3, Sept. 20, 24, Dec. 3
  Foreign Service, **Daily**, May 7
  Security, **Special**, Jan. 24, Mar. 12
Stearns, Monteagle, **Daily**, July 12
Steel:
  Daily, June 12
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Stein, Herbert, **Daily**, Oct. 3
Stockman, David B., **Special**, Nov. 29, Dec. 6 (1)
Stone, Richard B., **Daily**, Jan. 4-6, Feb. 17, Apr. 11

Straits of Hormuz (*see also* Iran-Iraq war, Persian Gulf), **Daily**, Mar. 21, Aug. 29
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II (SALT II) (*1979*) (*see also* Arms control):
  Daily, Jan. 25, 30, Dec. 4, 5
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Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) (*see also* Arms control):
  Daily, Jan. 31, Mar. 13, Apr. 3
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  Daily, Dec. 4, 17, 24
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  Special, Jan. 30 (3), Feb. 15, Apr. 9 (1), Oct. 9 (1), 25, Nov. 9 (1), Dec. 27
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  Daily, June 19
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Syria:
  Daily, Jan. 3-6, 9, 11, 13, Feb. 6-8, 13, 15, Mar. 7, 8, 29, Apr. 16, 27, May 3, 4, 24, July 6, 26, Sept. 12, 19, 24, 27, Oct. 18, 29, Nov. 5, 7, Dec. 13
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Tariq Aziz, Isa, **Daily**, Nov. 21

Tayib, Maj. Gen. Umar Mohammed al-, **Daily**, Mar. 2

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Telegraphnoye Agentstvo Sovyetskovo Soyuza (TASS), **Daily**, Jan. 25, Feb. 24, Mar. 7, 8, Apr. 5, May 4, June 26, July 6, 12, 13, 23, 24, 27, Aug. 15, 16, Nov. 2, 9

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  Special, June 9 (1), 9 (2), Nov. 28, Dec. 10 (1), 20 (1), 21

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Tikhonov, Nikolay Aleksandrovich:

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Touré, Ahmed Sekou, **Daily**, Mar. 27
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  Daily, Apr. 3, June 12, 15, Aug. 7-9, 20, 30, Sept. 4, 10, 27
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  Daily, Mar. 9, Apr. 2, 18, July 9, 10, 23, Aug. 2, Nov. 19
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  Daily, Jan. 20, Mar. 2, 14, 19, 22, 23, May 9, Aug. 8, 10, 15, Sept. 13, Dec. 4, 5, 7, 10, 12-14, 18, 19, 31
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U.N. Peacekeeping Forces, **Daily**, Feb. 2

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U.N. World Health Organization (WHO), **Special**, Aug. 2 (2)

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Uruguay:
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  Special, Mar. 5, 23, June 27, 29, Sept. 21 (1), Nov. 22
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Ustinov, Marshal Dmitriy Fedorovich:
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  Daily, Jan. 10, 13, 27, 30, June 4, July 10, 12, Aug. 1
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Veliotes, Nicholas A., **Daily**, Mar. 7, Aug. 29
Venezuela:
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Vogel, Hans Jochen, **Daily**, Mar. 13
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Volcker, Paul A., **Special**, Dec. 3
Von Damm, Helene, **Special**, Feb. 28

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Wallis, W. Allen:
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Weinberger, Caspar W.:
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Weinig, Sheldon, **Special**, Jan. 9 (2)
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Weizsäcker, Richard von, **Daily**, June 29
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  Daily, Jan. 3, 13, Feb. 27, Mar. 7, Apr. 24, May 15, 22, 29, June 14, July 13, 16, 25, 31, Aug. 31, Nov. 1, 21, Dec. 17
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  Daily, Feb. 3, 6
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Wick, Charles Z., **Daily**, May 4
Wicker, Tom, **Daily**, Sept. 7
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Willoch, Kare, **Special**, Sept. 23
Wilson, William A., **Daily**, July 10, 12
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Wisner, Frank, **Daily**, Jan. 27, July 26, Oct. 15, 19, 22
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  Daily, Nov. 16, 29
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World Food Program, **Special**, Oct. 25, Nov. 2 (2
World Population Plan of Action, **Special**, Aug. 2 (1)
World Vision, **Special**, Oct. 25
Worldnet, **Daily**, Apr. 17
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Xia Yuren, **Daily**, Jan. 25

Yamamura, Shinjiro, **Daily**, Apr. 3
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Zapata Romero, Joaquin Alfredo, **Daily**, Apr. 17, 18
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Zhao Ziyang:
  Daily, Jan. 4, 6, 13, 20
  Special, Jan. 9 (1), 10, 12, Apr. 20 (2), 26, 27
Zhou Peiyuan, **Special**, Apr. 26
Zia-al-Haq, Gen. Mohammed, **Daily**, Oct. 12, 31
Zimbabwe:
  Daily, Apr. 11, Sept. 28
  Special, July 10
Zionism, **Daily**, Jan. 25

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Monday, January 3, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #1

TUESDAY, JANUARY 3, 1984, 12:30 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, all. I'd like to welcome you all back from the holidays.

I have a short statement from the Secretary of State on Lt. Goodman's release. The Secretary says as follows:

> "I want to express appreciation for the efforts of all those who have been helpful in securing Lt. Goodman's release, especially the efforts of Rev. Jackson and Ambassador Paganelli. The decision of the Syrian Government to release Lt. Goodman can only be helpful to the course of relations between our two countries."

That's the end of the statement from Secretary Shultz.

Q How do you expect to follow up on that statement and on the release?

A I think we'll let the Secretary's words and the President's words speak for themselves, Jim. Won't have anything (inaudible)

Q What does the action of the Syrian Government tell you about their policies or their intentions?

A I think we will leave that to the future and leave that to the diplomatic negotiations that we have with them, and have had. We've been in very close touch with them on the question of Lt. Goodman and other matters, and those good relations in terms of communications will continue.

Q And in terms of U.S. policy now, will there be any change such as an altering of the reconnaissance flights over Syrian positions.

A No, there is no change in our policy on reconnaissance flights.

Q Who will Rumsfeld see? Will he go to Damascus on this trip?

A Don't have anything for you on Ambassador Rumsfeld's travel plans. He's in Washington today, as you know -- was at the White House earlier this morning. But I don't have anything for you on his travel plans.

Q I thought (inaudible) said he was leaving this evening? Can you go even that far?

A I don't have anything for you on Ambassador Rumsfeld's (inaudible)

Q Can you tell us who will greet Jackson and Goodman at the airport tomorrow?

A I think you need to keep in touch with the Pentagon on those travel plans. As we understand it, the plane on which the Rev. Jackson and Lt. Goodman are traveling out of Damascus to Germany has left Damascus, and will arrive in Germany later this evening. Another plane will pick them up, and we expect that plane to leave this evening and to be at an East Coast destination, at the moment around 6:20 our time tomorrow morning. But I think you need to keep in touch with the Pentagon as to that destination.

I think, as Larry Speakes indicated this morning, there may be a question of Lt. Goodman's determining where he wants to go.

Q Can you tell us who will greet him?

A I think it will depend on where they decide to come in.

Q Do you view Rev. Jackson and Ambassador Paganelli as co-equals there in securing Lt. Goodman's release?

A Ambassador Paganelli, as you know, has been a central figure in the United States' negotiations on this matter, I think the Syrian Government in its announcement made the point that it was responding to a request by the United States Government and Rev. Jackson. Rev. Jackson, of course, was a private individual, and affected this happy outcome.

Q John, did actually, the Administration know that the Syrians have requested or hinted that it would like U.S. overflights, surveillance flights, to stop, and you are saying nothing will change on that?

A (A) I'm not going to get into the substance of our diplomatic negotiations with the Syrian Government; (B) I've seen the same reports that you have in the press that the Syrian Government has asked for cessation of reconnaissance flights; (C) there is no change in our policy on reconnaissance flights.

Q John, on Lebanon, do you have any comment on the cuts in the standing size of both the Italian and the French contingents in the MNF?

A No more, I think, on the Italian situation than we offered the other day, Bernie. Insofar as the French are concerned, we were informed in advance that France planned to return some of its MNF forces to the UNIFIL contingent, from which these units were originally drawn.

We were also advised that France's commitment to the MNF mission remains unchanged. Each contributor to the Multinational Force determines the size of the force needed to accomplish its mission. The French have had in Beirut for some time a force exceeding the size of their original commitment.

Q John, is redeployment of the Marines under consideration?

A I have nothing on that for you.

Q Is it not even under consideration?

A I think there have been suggestions that the possibility of redeployment, not a change in mission, but a possibility of redeployment is something that has been discussed at some levels in the Administraton.

Q Maybe I missed it, but did you put any interpretation on what the motivations were for Assad to release Goodman?

A No, I can't.

Q Do you see this as a move by Assad to invigorate public opinion in the U.S. that is already opposed to U.S. policy in Lebanon, to escalate their opposition?

A Can't speculate, Bernie. I think you would have to ask President Assad and the Syrian Government what the motivation was.

Q Did the United States know before Jackson left for Damascus -- were you told in any way by Syria that the release of Lt. Goodman would take place?

A You put me in a difficult position because in effect what you're asking me to do is reveal the substance of our diplomatic conversations, and traditionally, we don't do that. But I would steer you away from any suggestion that we were aware of this.

The first call, in fact, indicating Lt. Goodman's release came in at about 4:45 a.m. this morning, and that was a call from Ambassador Paganelli to the Department.

Q When you said before that there would be no change in U.S. policy on reconnaissance, is that across-the-board, that is to say that the release of the Lieutenant by the Syrians will not alter, revise, or overhaul what we know to be -- to the degree that we know it -- U.S. policy in Lebanon right now?

A What I said was that there is no change in policy that has existed on reconnaissance flights. They are not hostile in intent; they are flown purely for self-defense of our forces in the area.

Q And will continue --

A And there is no change in our policy.

Q And will continue?

A No change in our policy.

Q John, do you read the Syrians' move as a gesture of good will, and therefore, there is a need to reciprocate, politically speaking?

A I think I'll leave you with the Secretary's words in his statement.

Q John, could I ask you a question about the conduct of diplomacy here? You make the point, in your statement, of saying that Jackson is a private citizen.

A Yes.

Q Don't you run the risk now of Alan Cranston's negotiating with the Soviet Union and Walter Mondale negotiating with King Hussein? Is there some implication here for the conduct of American diplomacy?

A I don't think there is any contradiction between the happy outcome of Rev. Jackson's mission and some of the reservations and concerns that the Administration expressed before his departure. I don't think there is any inconsistency.

The Government would be concerned that any private mission jeopardize any effort to secure the release of an American citizen, for example. But, happily, this one has worked out successfully; but that doesn't mean that the same concerns would not apply to any other such mission.

Q If you're talking about "other missions," and here you are speaking specifically of the release of an American prisoner --

A Yes.

Q -- but what about the conduct of other diplomatic missions, such as getting Hussein to the talks, or starting the arms negotiations or any one of a number of other things? Do you see any implication for foreign policy conduct with private citizens engaging in unilateral negotiations?

A I think it's very hard, given the kind of abstract scenario you're suggesting, for us to say we would welcome a mission by "X"; we would not welcome a mission by "Y." You have to look at these case by case.

Q John, refresh my memory? Who did Jackson talk with here at the State Department?

A He saw Assistant Secretary Murphy and he saw Under Secretary Eagleburger.

Q John, if we could come back to redeployment, you said it has been discussed at some levels. Is this only redeployment off-shore, or are other forms of redeployment also being discussed?

A I'm not going to be able to get into it. As you know, we tend not to discuss plans that are circulating within the Administration until they come to fruition.

Q So it's just redeployment, whether off-shore or not?

A What I said is that it had been in the public domain, that there is some discussion of change in redeployment of the Marines, but not the mission. Where that discussion will end, I do not know.

Q John, you said before Jackson left, or the President said, that such a mission could be counterproductive, and it seemed from all of the public statements that you were quite negative about his going there, and yet he has produced Goodman. Do you think you were too negative, to begin with?

A I don't think that the concerns and the caution about non-governmental missions running parallel to very vigorous diplomatic efforts, I don't think those cautions, in general, were or are ill-founded. I think that is something that a responsible Administration -- whatever the Administration is -- I think has to be concerned about, that in something as serious and as delicate as this, that the very vigorous and continuous efforts of Ambassador Paganelli would not be offset, undercut, or harmed in any way by another initiative.

Q Just to follow that up, if I might, the judgment here, as I got it, was that the Syrians would not release Goodman. In other words --

A I don't know whether anybody could make that judgment --

Q Well, a number of your colleagues were making that kind of a judgment and passing it on ON BACKGROUND, that this is not in Syria's interest; it's not the way Syria sees itself playing a Middle East role.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you see now that perhaps your judgment of Syria has been wrong, as it has been in the past -- and you've acknowledged that on occasion?

A I don't think it is really appropriate to make sweeping assessments of Syrian intentions or Syrian policy. I think what the Secretary said about what this augurs for the future of U.S.-Syrian relations is obvious. And I think I'll leave you with those words.

Bernie?

Q There is a lot of diplomatic phrasing you're using. I wonder if I could just ask you more bluntly -- the United States will give nothing to Assad, in return for the release of Goodman? Is that right?

A Well, if you mean were there any conditions attendant upon his release, I think the Rev. Jackson has said that insofar as his discussions were concerned, he offered nothing, and indeed, of course, was not in a position to offer anything. And, certainly, as far as the United States is concerned, there are no conditions.

Q So Assad gets nothing in return?

A Well, if you mean were there conditions attendant upon Lt. Goodman's release, the answer to that is no. What the future of Syrian-U.S. relations are is up to you to conjecture.

Q The release of Goodman by the Syrians, that doesn't look to you as an embarrassment to the Reagan Administration, or does it come from the fact that the Syrians want to show, like my colleague said that, you know, your judgment of them in the past has been wrong, and possibly they want to prove to you that you have been wrong?

A I think the President said he was delighted by Lt. Goodman's release.

I think everybody in this town is delighted by his release.

Q Now that it's all over, and the Lieutenant is out, can you shed any more light on why Ambassador Rumsfeld did not take this matter up with the Syrians?

A No more, I think, than we have done before, and that is that the diplomatic efforts to secure Lt. Goodman's release were carefully orchestrated, were very vigorous, were continued on a daily basis; that Ambassador Paganelli was the key factor in the diplomatic initiative; that certainly other government officials who visited Damascus would have been, and were, supportive; but beyond that I'm not going to get into what Ambassador Rumsfeld did or did not talk about with (inaudible)

Q Well, it's pretty clear that he did not, so says Mr. Khaddam, anyway.

A Okay.

Q And a lot of people gain the impression because he did not, or it was reported that he did not -- the Department did not refute that -- that this was an indication of a lack of interest on the part of the Administration or the Government regarding the Lieutenant. I think Jesse Jackson made that -- that was the point at which he got into all this.

Now that it's all over, granted that Paganelli was making vigorous representations and all the rest, can you say why the judgment was made that Rumsfeld should not take it up?

A I'm going to continue not to get into what Ambassador Rumsfeld discussed or did not discuss. However, the suggestion that whatever position he took in his discussions with the Syrians was somehow an expression of disinterest or carelessness on the part of himself or the Administration is simply hogwash.

Q You're not -- you're saying that this was part of the strategy was not to mention the Lieutenant when Rumsfeld went there?

A If I said that, I would be confirming what Ambassador Rumsfeld did or didn't talk about. What I'm saying is that the overall strategy was coordinated and there was not a -- that any suggestion that there was forgetfulness or carelessness on the part of any of those involved in this is just nonsense.

Q It wasn't carelessness or it wasn't forgetfulness --

A Correct.

Q It was part of the -- if, indeed, that's what happened, this was part of a strategy --

A Correct.

Q -- to go there and not mention the Lieutenant?

Q Lieutenant Goodman said this morning that he was prepared mentally to stay about six months there. If it wasn't for Jesse Jackson, would you think that the time-frame would be that he could be out by six months or something like that?

A I don't know. It's difficult to say. The United States would have continued its daily efforts to secure his release.

Q John, if there were no conditions offered by the United States, how was Paganelli negotiating for the return of Lieutenant Goodman?

A I think that our position with the Syrian Government was based on the same basis as Reverend Jackson's, that this release should be effected on humanitarian grounds.

Q John, when the actual release statement was made on the part of the Syrians, was it made exclusively to Jackson or was Paganelli there, or was it to Paganelli? Whom did the Syrians choose to break the word to whom?

A I cannot answer that question, and I'm sure it's a matter of record. It can easily be answered. I cannot answer it. All I can say is that Ambassador Paganelli was in very close touch with the Reverend Jackson, was with him a great deal of the time; but I do not know under what circumstances --

Q Can you take it, please?

A Let me see if we do know here.

Q Is it understood that if the United States happened to have a Syrian member of the armed forces fall into its hands that he or she would be returned?

A I think that's a very hypothetical situation. I think we will not choose to answer that one.

Q John, is it more logical to leave it to the Syrians to say to whom they responded, to the Reagan Administration or to Mr. Jackson?

A In fact, in their statement they said that they were responding to overtures both by the United States Government and the Reverend Jackson, but where you could put the weight on that, I guess you'd have to ask the Syrians.

Q Do you have anything on the President of Nigeria and (inaudible) the U.S. Government supports the new military government?

A Yes, Nigeria. The United States supports constitutional and representative government as essential to democracy and human freedom. We regret the removal of Nigeria's Government by unconstitutional means. However, the coup in Nigeria appears to have been an internal affair.

We are looking towards working with the authorities there.

Q Do you have any reason to doubt that there is a Libyan connection in the coup d'etat in Nigeria?

A I don't have anything for you on a Libyan connection in Nigeria.

Q Can we get a copy of that statement?

A Sure.

Q Has the American Embassy, the Ambassador, if he's present in Nigeria, been in touch the new leadership? You say you're looking forward to working with him.

A I do not know whether that is the case, Don. We've been in contact with a number of American businessmen, American missionaries, to see how they are doing. All of them report themselves safe. There are about 7,100 Americans in Nigeria.

Insofar as travel to Nigeria is concerned, the International Airport remains closed. Telecommunications with the outside world remain shut off; a travel advisory recommending against travel to Nigeria is in effect. But I do not know whether our Embassy has been in touch with the new leadership.

Q John, why is the U.S. Government is supporting all the dictators in the world. Are they intending to bring democracy to change a dictatorship?

A I think the United States' position on democratic --

Q Including Pakistan.

A I think the United States' position on democractic institutions and the need for them and the support of their growth is well known.

Q John, if this is an unconstitutionally placed government, why is the United States looking forward to working with it?

A Because it is the Government of Nigeria, as we understand it.

Q And does its manner of coming to power affect any U.S. aid programs or any U.S. recommendations to the IMF?

A Not that I'm aware at the moment. I presume that before any new agreements or bilateral accords were signed, there would be a period of time for review, but I'm not aware that any existing arrangements are in jeopardy.

Q Do you know whether President Shagari is alive or dead?

A I don't know. I can not say.

Q A clarification. When you read the statement, did you say the United States is looking toward or looking forward?

A I thought I said looking -- yes; I may have said "forward" but I should have said "looking towards working with the authorities."

Q Has any any working group inside the State Department been formed in the wake of the coup at all, or interagency?

A I can't answer that. I don't know.

Q Can you look into it. No?

Q Any reaction, John, to General Buhari's statement, that some people accused of corruption will be jailed without trial?

A No, I don't.

Q Not even on human rights?

A No, don't have any reaction to that statement.

Q John, over the weekend there was a newspaper report that said that the United States had urged its friends in the Persian Gulf area not -- to further restrict trade with Iran; and also that the United States had told its friends in the Persian Gulf that a victory in that war by Iraq would not be -- should be prevented.

Do you have any comment on that report?

A Not in the kind of general way you raise it, Ralph; no.

Q Did the United States -- 20 Questions -- did the United States tell its friends in Persian Gulf that victory by Iran should be avoided at all costs?

A No. We've had a mission in the area, and I think the Press Office can provide you some guidance on that, but we wouldn't get into the extent or the detail of the diplomatic discussions anyway.

Q The United States maintain its previously stated positions on Iran and Iraq?

A Yes. Sure.

Q As it pertains to that war?

A Sure.

Q Yesterday, Evans & Novak had a very interesting commentary in the Washington Post that the President has discussed with Mr. Shultz in the Oval Office a new strategy which deals that they will put more emphasis in peace in the West Bank rather than the President carrying the votes of the Jewish community in the United States. Do you have any comment on that?

A I'm afraid that one got by me. I didn't catch that one; sorry.

Q A couple of Latin American questions. Do you have anything on a protest or a representation the United States made to Colombia about their refusal to extradite people accused of drug crimes?

A No.

Q And, second, do you have any current readout on the military situation in El Salvador?

A Yes. We can confirm what I think is pretty much known. That the military headquarters at El Paraiso was overrun for five hours on December 30 by a sizeable guerrilla force, and that the Cuscatlan bridge over the Lempa River was destroyed on January 1.

These are serious developments but they're hardly irreversible. They point up again the need for continuing military assistance to El Salvador at increased levels.

Q Do you have anything on the Chinese Prime Minister's visit, and also whether the U.S. is prepared to sell out Taiwan in order to gain Chinese friendship?

A I think our position on Taiwan has been adequately stated on a number of occasions. Happy to have you dig that out. And so far as the first part of the question is concerned, I think perhaps a little nearer the Prime Minister's visit, there would be a background briefing on this.

Q What was that last sentence you made to El Salvador, please? "It points up the. . ."

A The need for increased military assistance.

Q An increased military --

A Well, the need for continuing military assistance at increased levels. (Laughter)

I thought my paraphrasing --

Q Do you have numbers?

A I don't have numbers.

Q What kinds of increased levels are you talking about, John?

A Bernie just asked me if I had numbers, and I said no.

Q Could we follow on El Salvador for a sec? Do you have anything on death squads?

A No.

Q No?

A Not beyond what we've said.

Q How about -- anything on censorship?

A No.

Q Can you look into that latter question, because they called up --

A Which latter question?

Q The question of censorship, that they were not -- they've been calling on news agencies in San Salvador and telling them not to report on anything but authorized and official information on --

A Is it a published report?

Q Yes.

A Can you tell me where it was published so that --

Q It was partly published in the New York Times.

A How can we research the question if you don't tell me where it was published?

Q Well, I'm sorry. It was published in the New York Times over the weekend. I can provide you with a dispatch on it.

Q John, back to China?

A Yes.

Q Can you tell us anything about Don Oberdorfer's report on the U.S.-China agreement?

A Yes. The U.S.-PRC Industrial and Technological Cooperation Accord, which has been under negotiation since last spring, was recently completed in Beijing. We expect the Accord to be signed during the Premier's upcoming visit to Washington.

Q Can you tell us what it covers?

A No. I have to refer you to Commerce for that.

Q Can you tell us if copies can be released?

A Of the agreement --

Q Yes.

A -- before it's signed? I doubt that we would release it before it's signed.

Q There were reports in London that Ambassador Dobrynin approached the South African Ambassador last week and warned him against any attempt to overthrow the Angolan

Government, and if any such attempt were tried, there could be serious consequences in terms of Soviet-South African relations. Do you have anything on that?

A No, I don't.

Q Also on the Russians, John, there's a report out of Moscow that the Soviet Foreign Minister will not discuss disarmament matters when he meets Secretary Shultz in Stockholm. Do you have any comment on that?

A No. We expect to have a full discussion on a wide range of activities.

Q Will that include Lebanon?

A It might.

Q Can I go back to Lebanon one second?

A Sure.

Q Do you have any comment on the statement by Senator Mondale that the United States should withdraw within 45 days its troops from Lebanon?

A No. Congress made a determination about a time-frame for withdrawal, and that time-frame exists. I suppose if you keep changing that time-frame you would inject a note of inconsistency in U.S. foreign policy.

Q He says, as I understand it, that his decision was based in part on the report by the Pentagon's blue ribbon committee. Do you think that changes the situation in some important respect in Lebanon?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q There was also a statement on the weekend that Chairman Arafat has officially rejected talks under the Reagan plan. Do you have any comment on that, and does that dash off any hopes that the Administration had of reviving the talks with King Hussein?

A No. Our position on the September 1 initiative remains unchanged.

Q Anything more on Angola from last week?

A No.

Q John, do you have any comment on a Newsweek report that the El Salvador guerrillas may be preparing an offensive to disrupt the presidential election in March?

A No. No, I don't.

Q And on Argentina, do you have any comment on the judicial process that's going on there?

A No.

Q Thank you.

A Okay.

(Press briefing concluded at 1:05 P.M.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Wednesday, January 4, 1983 /1984/

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #2

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 4, 1984, 12:27 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, all. A couple of announcements up front. Firstly, the availability of the document, The Quest for Peace. Available in the Press Office after today's briefing will be copies of a publication called The Quest for Peace, which is a compilation of U.S. public statements and documents relating to the Arab-Israeli peace process from 1967 through 1983. The publication was prepared by the Office of the Historian in the Bureau of Public Affairs.

Secondly, Secretary Shultz's trip to Stockholm. A couple of additions: The Secretary will travel to London, January 15 and 16 for consultations with Her Majesty's Government enroute to the opening session of the Conference on Security- and Confidence-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe in Stockholm. Before returning to Washington, he will visit Oslo on January 19 for consultations with the Norwegian Government.

And thirdly, just a point on Ambassador Quainton: As you know, we don't discuss Presidential appointments. However, we want to discount any misleading impressions concerning our Ambassador to Nicaragua, Mr. Quainton. If and when Ambassador Quainton moves to a new assignment, that will be normal rotation. He has done a fine job in Nicaragua. We have great confidence in him. When he does move, he will proceed to another important assignment.

Our ambassadors serve at the pleasure of the President. Neither Dr. Kissinger nor anybody else outside the Government is responsible for the appointment of ambassadors, and Dr. Kissinger made no recommendation to the Administration that Ambassador Quainton be replaced.

That's all I have up front. I don't have a very fat book, but I'll be happy to proceed.

Q Did Mr. Kissinger make any comment on the service of Mr. Quainton?

A I don't know. I guess you would have to ask Dr. Kissinger. I'm talking about the process and the authority.

Q Anything received by this Department?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Are his two years up?

A I think he has been there -- I'm not quite sure on the tenure. It's not quite two years, I think.

Q Let me go back briefly on the trip. The Secretary will be leaving here on the 15th?

A If January 15th is the Saturday, he'll leave on that Saturday evening; be in London Sunday; go on to Stockholm; and then be in Oslo, I guess it's the Thursday.

Q Sunday is the 15th.

A Sunday is the 15th?

Q I thought he was leaving --

Q Sunday is the 14th.

A O.K. Can we check that? I thought he was leaving Saturday night, and I still think he is leaving Saturday night.

Q Sunday night?

A Saturday night.

(Laughter)

Q Is Oslo an overnight?

A Oslo will, at the moment, will be an overnight. I think we will leave late on Wednesday, Stockholm, spend that night in Oslo, and part of the next day, and come back on the Thursday.

Q Will London--

Q The sun never comes up.

A If we leave on Saturday night, we will arrive in London Sunday morning, and I'm not quite sure whether we overnight in London, and go on to Stockholm early next morning. I think we do. I think we do.

Q John, can I try one more on --

A On what date we leave?

Q No, on the Kissinger thing. Your statement said that Kissinger made no recommendation that he be replaced, so your statement says something about what Kissinger said, or says what Kissinger didn't say. Would you be willing to say what else Kissinger didn't say?

A I don't know. (Laughter) I've long since learned in Washington, this is a gossipy town and I cannot possibily verify what everybody says to everybody else in this town and don't intend to, but I think this arises from the New York Times story of this morning in which Dr. Kissinger denies that he was involved in any way in any decision that might be made about Ambassador Quainton and what we're doing is agreeing with that position.

Q But making a recommendation that he be replaced and informing the White House, or complaining to the White House about his conduct, are two very different things.

A Yes, they'd be two very different things.

Q You said that he didn't do one. Will you say that he didn't do the other?

A You'll have to ask Dr. Kissinger what comments he might have made about this case, if any. I don't know. What I'm saying is I'm talking about the process and the authority and making the point Dr. Kissinger was not and is not involved in that kind of a decision.

Q Did Kissinger have anything to do with the fact that you have offered this statement today?

A I think Dr. Kissinger took a healthy interest in the New York Times item this morning.

Q John, do you have any comment on the new Israeli raids in the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon and their timing?

A No, I don't. We were not informed in advance; don't have any readout for you on the outcome of the raids, and don't have any comment on them.

Q To follow up, do you have any further information on the time and date -- time and place of the meeting for the joint Israeli-U.S. Commission?

A I do not. The last I heard it was -- the thinking was January, but I do not know whether -- and my recollection is that it probably will be in Washington, and I think the time was January, but I do not have a date. Let me take a look and see whether we can get anything on that for you.

Q Do you have any information on the resumption of the National Reconciliation Conference, when and where?

A No; don't.

Q There's more talk in Israel now about the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon without waiting for a Syrian similar withdrawal. How does the Administration feel about that?

A I don't think we would -- I'm not aware of what specific reports you're referring to in Israel. Our position is clear: Withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon is what we're aiming for.

Q Would we support the unilateral withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon at this time?

A I think that is something that the various parties have to talk through themselves and make their decisions about, and at that time we might have a view on it.

Q Where is Mr. Rumsfeld today?

A Rumsfeld is in Beirut today.

Q Will he go to Damascus?

Q Who has he seen?

A I don't know who he has seen today, and don't have anything for you on his onward travel plans.

Let me just check and see whether -- anybody know who he has seen today? No. Not yet.

Q John, is it your understanding that there is a security plan in Lebanon which is very close to being accepted by most of the combatants and could, in fact, go into effect --

A I think if -- there is discussion of such a plan. If such a plan were to come to fruition, that would please us, and we would consider it to be a positive step.

Q As it's presently being discussed in public, it would seem it would provide an opportunity for, at very least, redeployment of Marine forces, if not withdrawal of some of them. Is that the proper inference?

A In what sense do you mean "redeployment?"

Q If, for example, the airport were to be declared a neutral area, or if indeed there were promises that there would be no firing on them there, the Marines could presumably go somewhere else, or home.

A Yes. I'm saying "yes" in that I heard your question; not "yes" to the question of redeployment. Don't have anything on that. As you know, there has been some discussion on deployment of the Marines within their present mission area and within the existing mandate, and I'm sure that discussion goes on, but I don't have anything on any different plan or redeployment outside that area.

Q John, are those discussions related to the reports of the near agreement on the security plan --

A No.

Q -- and/or the political agreement?

A No. I think that's the kind of on-going review of the Marines' situation in light of the security situation that has been going on for some time, and undoubtedly would continue, given the dangers and pressures of the day.

Q John, can you confirm reports on Grenada, when the United States sent troops to that island last October it notified the Cubans in advance of its intentions to do so?

A I think we have answered that question before and offered you some guidance on it which -- undoubtedly it could be dug up.

Q As a follow-up, can you tell me who made this decision to notify the Cubans?

A Why don't you get the guidance that we gave before, and I think that may answer your question.

Marvin?

Q On that security plan though, if that were to work -- and I know that your answer was conditional, as you answered it before --but if it were to work, could it not be seen as being a reason to withdraw the Marines?

A I don't know about that, Marvin. I think it will be a welcome development in that it would be consolidation of the government's authority over a wider area that is not occupied by foreign forces and that would be welcome, but I wouldn't make the jump to the MNF.

Q And, one of these -- one of the ideas in that security plan, it would affect about forty percent of the country. So would any serious thought be given to pulling the Marines out until such time as you felt that the writ of the government extended over all of the country?

A I think the President has talked about his own thoughts about withdrawal of the Marines and when that might occur and how that might occur, and I think I won't attempt to go beyond what he said.

Q Because this fits in with the first point that he made.

A As I say, I think if this matures -- it's a Lebanese initiative -- it would be welcome. I think it would be an indication of growing stability. Obviously, that is a factor in our overall thinking about Lebanon, but I wouldn't try to relate it to the departure of the Marines.

Q John, I'm confused between what you're saying and what some of the questions are carrying. What is it you're welcoming?

A The reports of a Lebanese plan in conjunction with various factions to extend the authority of the government and the military into areas presently not totally policed by the central government.

Q Wasn't that one of the approaches agreed upon when President Gemayel was here a few weeks ago?

A It may -- I mean, it wouldn't surprise me. It obviously is something that everybody has been enthusiastic about.

Q Don't you have any comment on the events of Tunisia yesterday?

A Not a great deal. I can give you a little update on the situation there and the Americans there.

There have been no reports of injury or harm to Americans in Tunisia. There has been no substantial damage to American property, although some cars owned by Americans were damaged by indiscriminate throwing of rocks by passing demonstrators. The trouble in Tunisia has not been aimed at foreigners or at Americans in particular.

There are about 740 Americans registered with the Embassy and resident in Tunisia. This figure includes U.S. citizens with the Embassy and other U.S. government offices as well as citizens employed by American companies, mostly petroleum companies in Tunisia, and also some private citizens. Obviously, there may be some American tourists in Tunisia in addition to those figures.

There's no official travel advisory notice warning U.S. citizens against traveling to Tunisia, but it might be prudent for those contemplating travel there to wait until the law and order situation is back to normal.

Q John, how do you read the so-called coordination between the Libyan and the Tunisian Governments, which sounds very odd, taking the past experience in consideration?

A Don't have any analysis or comment for you.

Q El Salvador?

A Sure.

Q Any thoughts on reports that the Salvadorans are not moving quickly enough to curb death squad activity?

A Yes. Don't agree with that suggestion. While the press reports differ in their appraisal of progress to date, the United States' assessment is that positive steps are being taken.

We're not prepared to offer a comprehensive statement at this point, but among those steps are the December 19 arrest of Captain Eduardo Avila which we hope will further a resolution in the case of the death of our two American land reform advisors, the transfer of military officers, and the public commitment of the Salvadoran military to deal with the issue.

The important point is that the leadership of both the Administration and the Government of El Salvador have made clear a determination to deal with the problems of extremist violence as rapidly as possible. We should look at the overall progress achieved rather than the means by which it is obtained.

We would expect these steps to continue but cannot confirm as authoritative the specific dates and numbers suggested in some press reports.

Q Have they then removed the 25 principal suspects that the U.S. wanted to be removed?

A As I say, I can't confirm specific numbers.

Q What is your analysis of the fact that the -- in the orders of the day yesterday, there were no major changes in the military lineup? That was taken as the signal that the government was really ignoring your plea.

A Not responding specificially to that point, Barrie, but we think progress is being made. We think they are being responsive, and have heard very clearly our message which was clearly communicated, and that there is progress on this front.

Q Does that mean you're satisfied with what's been done?

A One always wants more progress, swifter. I think that's a fair statement, but we think progress is being made. We're satisifed that progress is being made.

Q Can we have a copy of the statement you made a moment ago?

A Sure.

Q Do you have any elaboration on your suggestion yesterday that an increase in military aid may be sought?

A No, we've made no secret of the fact that the current level of military assistance is clearly inadequate, but at this point we're not prepared to offer any specific comment on any possible supplemental requests.

Q How inadequate? How do you define them?

A That it's not adequate.

Q Would you have some ballpark figures on how much you're --

A No, don't have any figures.

Q Would you quarrel with the $100 million figure in the --

A Don't have any figures for you.

Q Has El Salvador asked the United States help for restoring that big bridge that was blown up?

A I'm sorry?

Q Has El Salvador asked for some assistance from the U.S. for restoring that bridge that the guerrillas blew up?

A I don't know, Don. I don't know.

Q Could you find out if that's the case?

A We'll take a look at it; sure.

Q Do you have any comment to the 33 Democrats that are saying that the position of President Reagan to wait for the certification of El Salvador human rights is in contradiction with Section 7 of Article I of the Constitution?

A No.

Q No comment at all?

A No. Our position on certification was made clear at the time, and I think the Administration's actions on the human rights front in Salvador have spoken for themselves since then.

Q New subject?

Q No, no. Could you elaborate a little bit on what you -- when you said the Salvadoran Government has tranferred military advisors, what significance does that have?

A I think that means that those -- I guess I'm just going to stand on those words. (Laughter) I guess I'm just going to stand on those words for rather obvious reasons.

Q On a related question, on Mexican death squads. Now that Guadalupe Mendoza Espinoza has attempted the assassination by stabbing of a political rival, Juan Perez of the Mexican Labor Party, has the State Department in any way changed its policy toward his party, the National Action Party in Mexico?

A I'm not aware of any change towards his party.

Q Okay, can you take it, because in the past you have invited leaders of the PAN to diplomatic receptions, you've claimed that they're a legitimate, political faction in Mexico, and treated them as a legitimate, political faction?

Although their leaders have publicly threatened violence, and now one of their leaders has engaged in an attempted stabbing of a political opponent, it seemed to me that there might be a re-evaluation in order. In fact, there might even be any examination of those in the Department who recommended this policy toward the PAN to begin with?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Mike?

Q Do you have anything new for us on the situation in Nigeria?

A An update insofar as -- the situation throughout Nigeria is calm; appears to be returning to normal. The international airports are open; the curfew has been lifted.

It's also reported that telecommunications contact with the outside world is in the process of being restored, but at last report the land borders of Nigeria were still closed.

We still have a travel advisory in effect because although the airports are open, the problem of communicating with Nigeria remains. In addition, one may expect that the backlog of travelers will create delays. Our Embassy there is monitoring the situation closely, and the advisory will be revised or rescinded as soon as conditions warrant.

Our Embassy in Lagos and our Consulate in Kaduna have been in touch with a number of American business firms, and missionary organizations and individuals. They're all reported safe. There have been no incidents of violence directed against Americans or other foreigners.

Insofar as contact with the new government is concerned, the heads of diplomatic missions to Nigeria have been convoked by the new government today, and our charge d'affaires plans to attend.

That's really about all I have.

Q Copy, please?

A Yes; sure.

Q Anything on the political or physical health of the deposed president, or his whereabouts?

A Not really. Seen the reports about ex-President Shagari and other senior members of his government being taken into custody. I don't wish to speculate on what the new government may do, but consistent with our general concerns on such matters, it's our hope that any action taken will be in accord with due process and will maintain Nigeria's positive record with regard to human rights in general.

Q Could you say something about the foreign policy implications of the release of Lieutenant Goodman?

A I think the President's words yesterday and the Secretary's words, and the Deputy Secretary's words really cover the ground, Dana.

Q John, just in that connection, the Reverend Jackson described the release as a breakthrough for peace. Will the Department agree with that description?

A I think the President and the Secretary characterized the release of Lieutenant Goodman in terms of their hopes for the future of U.S.-Syrian relations, and I think that's where we would stand.

Q And do you see this as an opportunity for the U.S. to take a new initiative, a new step?

A It's not a question of taking a new step. It's a question of continuing the kind of diplomatic intitiative that we've had underway.

As you know, Ambassador Rumsfeld is back in the area. After having had consultations here, there are consultations through other diplomatic channels, and those will go forward vigorously.

Q Is the point now -- if you could help us in this sense -- is the point now to try, for example, to take the security plan, which is being discussed by the Lebanese, and try to encourage that through to a final result, to fruition, or are you taking this and trying to move it in another direction?

A I think that successful conclusion and implementation of the security plan in Lebanon would be a positive step. As you know, we are looking towards national reconciliation, and I think President Gemayel and others are working toward that end. And, of course, beyond that is the ultimate goal of the withdrawal of foreign forces. There's movement, certainly, on those fronts.

Q John, has a time been set for the briefing on the Zhao Ziyang visit?

A I don't think a time has been set. I think it is likely to be Monday, but we'll get back to you as soon as we --

Q After he arrives?

A You're talking about the Chinese Premier?

Q Yes.

A Monday; yes.

Q Some forces in Lebanon are saying that the Israeli behavior, especially with the air raids against the Bekaa Valley, is an attempt to foil the Gemayel plan for security.

A Some sources are saying that?

Q Forces. I mean forces; some national forces inside Lebanon. Yes. Those who are supposed to get into agreement with Mr. Gemayel.

A Haven't seen -- I don't see what evidence there is to bear out that thesis.

Q John, Lebanon: You just ran through a couple of things on our goals in Lebanon. You said our ultimate objective is the withdrawal of foreign forces, and then you said there's movement on those fronts; we're getting closer to the withdrawal of foreign forces. I mean, is there progress on that?

A I don't want to electrify you. Work continues towards that goal, shall we say.

Q John, Izvestia described Jackson's success in the Goodman negotiations as a political victory for Jackson over Reagan. Does the Administration agree with that assessment?

A We rarely agree with Izvestia.

Q Now, you described -- another question, on the same subject. You've described Jackson's mission as a private mission?

A Correct.

Q Presumably, you have reason to believe he wasn't acting as an agent of the U.S. Government.

A Yes.

Q How do you know he wasn't acting as an agent of some other government?

A Why don't you ask Reverend Jackson?

Q We have asked him. He hasn't denied the funding he gets from Muammar Quaddafi, amongst others. Why aren't you aware of that?

A Are you seeking to ask intelligent questions or are you seeking to use this as some kind of political platform?

Q I would stack the intelligence of my questions against --

A Are there anymore intelligent, journalistic -- if you don't be quiet, I will have your microphone turned off.

Q Do you have anything, John, on a buildup of Indian divisions along the Paki border?

A No.

Q Any reports of that?

A No.

Q Can you look into it?

A Be glad to look into it.

Q John, do you have anything on Ambassador Stone's travels?

A Stone is -- was today, early this morning, in Honduras; went on to Costa Rica, and will be in El Salvador late today, overnighting there. Nothing beyond that for you.

Q No Nicaragua stop you can tell us about?

A Nothing I can tell you about. No.

Q Where is the dialogue now, between Contadora and Nicaragua?

A Proceeding.

Q It is proceeding?

A Yes. Trust me.

Q On the U.N. Secretary General's, I guess, refusal to keep on the job a Soviet defector -- he asked to stay on the job until he, I think, gets American --

A Yes, I think our Mission at the U.N. may be happy to answer that question.

Q Thank you.

A Okay.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:55 p.m.)

Becker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Thursday, January 5, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #3

THURSDAY, JANUARY 5, 1984, 12:25 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: O.K. Good afternoon. I don't have any announcements. Be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, can you comment on the comments by Foreign Minister Gromyko regarding the resumption of missile talks, duplicity of the United States to be deploying missiles while calling for resumption of the talks?

A The tone and substance of the Soviet statement were unfortunate, but not particularly new. For a speech with the supposed purpose of criticizing hypocrisy and polemics, the use of such rhetoric as "propagandistic narcotics" seemed strained, to say the least, and undercut Mr. Gromyko's assertions that the Soviet Union was "not lacking in good will" to reduce international tensions.

For our part, we have made clear that we are interested in pursuing a serious, businesslike and constructive dialogue with the Soviets on the full range of issues between our two countries. That will continue to be our approach to the Secretary's meeting with Mr. Gromyko this January 18th.

Q On that point, how does this affect the atmosphere of those talks, though? What is the attitude you find expressed by the -

A I think I will stand on that guidance.

Q Alan, can we have a copy of that statement?

A Sure.

Q Can you comment on -- I know you're not going to, but I have to ask -- can you comment on how the Gromyko statement differs from Secretary Shultz' comments prior to the last scheduled meeting the two men were to have and the agenda for that meeting?

A Well, I don't --

Q You commented on this agenda. I thought you might comment on the first.

A In terms of the agenda, I don't have a comment other than, as I say, our approach is serious, businesslike, constructive, and looking toward the full range of issues.

Q That's this time. It wasn't the last time, was it?

A Well, the last time, obviously, we had a particular circumstance.

Q Has there been any agreement with the Soviet Union on the agenda, or has the matter been discussed with them yet?

A I think that the question of specifics certainly has been discussed, Bernie, but I don't have anything to offer you beyond what I've said.

Q Was it discussed when Ambassador Dobrynin met with the Secretary?

A I think that is a fair assumption.

Q Are other meetings of that sort scheduled before the meeting in Stockholm?

A Are other meetings scheduled--

Q Yes.

A -- between now and then? I don't know, Marvin, whether there are or not.

Q How would you describe the Secretary's attitude toward these meetings? Is he enthusiastic about seeing Mr. Gromyko, or would he rather stay at home?

A Mike, I really am going to stick with the statement I've given you. I think it is quite adequate to describe the U.S. approach, including the Secretary's personal approach.

Q There are reports out of Beirut that the Lebanese Government, as part of this package to arrange a security agreement with the other factions in Lebanon, is asking the Multinational Force, including the Americans, to supply some kind of back-up support for the Lebanese forces if they move out into new areas.

Has the U.S. actually received such a request? Does it have any opinion about it?

A I'm not sure what you mean by, or what the reports mean by "back-up" on that, Bernie. I guess I'm not going to get into the question of the specifics of the dialogue. We've discussed the role and the mission and the mandate frequently -- and I hope consistently -- and that hasn't changed, so that I don't have anything new to offer you in that respect.

Q In the wake of the Jackson trip and so forth, has there been any kind of follow-up at all between the United States and Syria?

A I don't have anything to offer you today on that.

Q Has anything happened, or you have nothing that you know about?

A I just don't have anything to offer you. If I did, I would offer it to you.

Q Alan, since the State Department worked with and reportedly briefed the Reverend Jesse Jackson, who, as you probably know, in front of the President and Secretary Shultz, said at the White House yesterday -- does the State Department agree with Mr. Jackson's statement regarding Lieutenant Goodman, that "The Syrians had the right to kill him"?

A Lester, I'm not going to try to go back to rehash the issue. I would guess I'd have to say I don't -- I didn't see that statement, frankly.

Q There were 26 television cameras focused, and it is --

A I guess I missed all 26.

Q I can play it if you'd like to hear it.

A I'm not disputing you. I didn't hear it.

Q All I want to know is, if the State Department that briefed this man has nothing to say when he suggests --

A I don't think anybody suggested in the U.S. Government that they had the right to kill him, and I --

Q He was a guest of the White House, and he did it right in front of Secretary Shultz. Has Shultz said anything?

A I haven't heard the Secretary address the issue.

Q Would you --

A I think I've just answered your question.

Q No, you didn't.

A Yes.

Q But how do you feel, Alan, do you agree with this, that the Syrians had the right to kill Lt. Goodman or not?

A As I just said, Lester -- but you were too busy interrupting -- nobody in the U.S. Government that I'm aware of has ever said the Syrians had the right to kill him. And that's --

Q You would deny this statement, and he was wrong?

A I will address you in terms of what the U.S. policy is. I'm not going to respond --

Q Will you deny the statement and repudiate it, Alan?

A I haven't personally seen the statement, and I can't address it. I'm telling you what the policy is --

Q Oh, come on.

A -- and our position is, Lester.

Q What about Goodman saying that he was punched by the Syrians? Have you had any official reaction on that?

A As far as I know, he --

Q I forget the exact phrasing.

A I've seen some reports on that. I don't know that he has been fully debriefed, and I think that one would have to get his debriefing before one could comment on that. Obviously, one would be concerned -- the U. S. Government would be concerned if that is the case.

I didn't hear him; I saw some press reports which had talked about that when, I guess, they were still in Syria; but I don't have anything to confirm it or to comment on it at this time.

Q To go back to Bernie's question about back-up support on the MNF, and you went and said, "We've stated our policy on the MNF many times," which is certainly true.

A Yes.

Q At a certain point, about a year or so ago, it was the idea that if the Lebanese army could move out, the MNF would move into certain positions and provide that kind of back-up support. But it seems as though the political and diplomatic climate has now changed. So the question, I think, is a valid one: Do you see the MNF role and the American part in it as backing up the Lebanese army as and if it should move beyond its current positions?

A I can't answer that in a specific way, Marvin, because first of all, it poses a hypothetical situation in terms of what may happen with the Lebanese Armed Forces. But the mandate is within the Beirut area.

Q Right.

A And specifically, how the MNF would carry out the mandate, which is in all the public documents and all the statements we've talked about, within that, I can't speculate for you in that situation. I think we'd have to wait and see.

Q And could you tell us, in fact, whether there is such a request in from the Lebanese Government?

A As I said, I don't think I can really get into the question of what sorts of requests have or have not been made.

Q Alan, can you tell us your analysis of the current state of play on the negotiations for a new security arrangement in Lebanon, who has signed on, who hasn't, who may be about to?

A No, I really can't. The negotiations are currently underway about improving the security situation in certain areas of Lebanon, and extending the authority of the central government into those areas with the approval of the various communities that are involved. That is an ongoing process, and until it is agreed and in place, or at least announced, I think it would be inappropriate and probably unhelpful to comment from here, so I will decline to (inaudible)

Q There are reports that the Syrians and the Israelis have given their blessing to it. Any thoughts on that?

A I can't really address that. I think you would have to ask the parties directly concerned.

Excuse me. Did I hear Mr. Schieffer's voice? No, I didn't.

MR. SCHIEFFER: He asked my question.

A All right. Sorry.

O.K. Go ahead.

Q Is Mr. Rumsfeld having any negotiations or what is (inaudible)

Q What role did Mr. Rumsfeld, the Middle East envoy --

A My usual and John's usual inability and reticence to comment on Ambassador Rumsfeld's activities -- he's in Beirut today.

Q What role is the U.S. playing in these maneuvers taking place within the Lebanese political context?

A We certainly are talking to a lot of people, but beyond that, I would really not have any kind of characterization to offer you. This is their plan that they're talking about and their effort.

Q Do we have anybody on the scene there aside from Bartholomew and Rumsfeld?

A Well, Ambassador Bartholomew is there; Ambassador Rumsfeld has now returned to the area. But this is, basically, something that is going on within the Government of Lebanon and the other groups that are concerned. It's not a U.S. effort.

Q Are you all for it?

A We are for anything which will promote the objectives of expanding the authority of the central government and establishing peace and accomplishing the other goals that we have talked about -- getting the foreign forces out and so on.

Q Alan, just one other question, please: At what point in geography does the word "peacekeeping" come to the end of its role, in Lebanese geography?

A I'd refer you back, Bernie, to the letters which went up to the Hill. When the U.S. MNF contingent went out there, it talked about the Beirut area. I'm not prepared to try and get a map out to define that specifically, but that is the geographic boundary as of this point.

Q Alan, do you have any reading of the impact of the Israeli raid on Balbek -- the number of people killed, the extent to which there may or may not have been civilian casualties?

A I don't have anything on it.

Q Do you have any comment on the --

A Don't have anything.

Q Would it be fair for us to conclude from your comments about the Lebanese security agreement that the U.S. is afraid to publicly and strongly endorse the process that is going on for fear of giving it the kiss of death with Syria?

A No. I don't think I'd get that dramatic. I think that the point is that it is something that is going on within Lebanon. It's obviously a complicated and sensitive issue, and there is simply no positive purpose to be served by commenting on it from here.

Q Picking up Barrie's question, the United States has no comment on this latest Israeli round of bombing?

A No. I think John was asked about this yesterday --

Q But today?

A -- and he stated we had not been informed, which is the case. Other than that, (inaudible)

Q You don't see this as a cycle of violence and so forth?

A I don't have any comment on it.

Q Alan, senior Israeli officials expressed their concern today as to what they expect as U.S.-Syrian dialogue that could result in things that wouldn't make Israel happy. Have you been informed formally by such --

A Frankly, I don't know whether that thought has been formally expressed to us or not, but I wouldn't be able to get into it if I did. The fact of dialogue between the United States and various parties in the Middle East is there, and we have indicated that we intend to continue dialogue. But our policy and our objectives are also laid out, and those have not changed.

-- MORE --

Q Alan, why can't you comment on this raid yesterday? You say that you haven't been informed. In light of your strategic agreement and whatever you just did with Israel on November 29th, doesn't any responsibility fall somewhere that this could -- like Bernie said -- escalate the violence in the area?

A (A), I don't have anything to offer you on it and, (b), I think that by bringing in the results of the visit by the Prime Minister here, you're skewing the nature of that visit and the results of it; so I'd refer you back to what was said specifically about that visit, but I don't have any comment to offer you on that.

Q Is it justifiable or unjustifiable? Is it defensive or offensive? I mean, how do you see this?

A I just don't have anything for you on that.

Q Alan, to go back to the Gemayel plan, can you tell us anything about what effect this might have on the May 17th agreement, and what's the current U.S. policy towards that agreement? Has there been any change?

A I don't know what you're calling the "Gemayel plan." If you're talking about the things that have been talked about in the paper --

Q Yes.

A -- in the last few days, I'm not sure I necessarily see a relevance to it. In any case, our position on the May 17th agreement has not changed. We continue to support it.

Q Alan, would you quarrel with the view that our reluctance even to express regret over the loss of life in this latest Israeli strike in Lebanon at least indicates a tacit approval on our part of what is going on?

A No, I wouldn't draw any lessons or anything from it other than that I don't have anything to offer you on it.

Q Alan, when will the joint commission -- American and Israeli commission -- resume or meet?

A I think that this was asked yesterday and we got an answer that's going to be posted. My recollection is that it has not been set as of this point, but people are looking toward later this month. We'll just have to keep you posted when that happens.

Q The Israelis announced that this will be by the last week of January.

A That could be. I'm not aware that that actually has been, myself -- in checking it this morning, I'm not aware that that had been set. It may be that that's what they're looking towards and what we're looking towards, but I don't have an announcement or any information that it has been finally agreed at this point. I don't dispute the idea that might happen.

Q To follow up -- I mean technically, this commission will deal with such a thing if there is an attack -- for example, if Israel will launch any attack -- to coordinate that with the Americans or not?

A No, no. To go back to the briefings that were given at the time. This is not a planning group of that sort. Go back and look at the briefings. I think you'll find it's quite a different --

Q It is not for any discussion, or any coordination of policy or anything?

A Let me refer you back to the briefings that were offered at the time of the visit, and I think you'll find that they lay out the parameters of that commission.

Q Alan, do you have any reports of a PLO withdrawal from Lebanon?

A Beyond the evacuation from Tripoli?

Q Beyond.

A Do I have a report on that or not?

Q Being withdrawn into Syria.

A I don't.

Q Alan, a two-part, if I may.

The Pentagon said this morning that they asked the International Red Cross to treat Lieutenant Goodman as a prisoner of war. Does the State Department agree or disagree?

A I'd refer you to what the Pentagon said about that.

Q Well, I mean what is the State Department's feeling? What was he -- a prisoner of war, hostage, kidnap victim, what? How do you describe him? This is certainly international relations.

A I wouldn't dispute what the Pentagon said about it. For the technical aspect you'd have to ask the ICRC.

Q Sure, O.K.

Does the State Department know of any expertise in diplomatic or humanitarian projects possessed by Mr. Tom Porter, who was in the Jackson entourage of 14 that flew to Damascus? And he was Jesse Jackson's campaign manager.

I ask this because there are churches raising money to pay for this trip, and I wondered if Mr. Porter is known to you to have any expertise in humanitarian --

A Lester, I don't know anything about anybody --

Q You don't. You've never heard of Porter?

A It has nothing to do with what I've heard or haven't heard of a private group --

Q Well, what does the State Department --

A -- and you'd have to go to the --

Q Sure. No, no -- what does the State Department feel was the purpose of a campaign manager in this allegedly purely humanitarian endeavor? Do you have any ideas?

A You can ask the people who were involved in that.

Q I will.

Q Alan, about the question here, there is -- as you probably know this morning -- a report that an Israeli official said that the United States tacitly approves of these Israeli bombings. Can you deny that?

A I'm not going to go off of the position that I've given you, which is I don't have anything to give you on it. So I'm not going to address what an Israeli official said or didn't say.

Q Excuse me, Alan. I mean there is a direct report by an Israeli official saying that the United States tacitly approves this. I'm not asking you to comment on it.

A That --

Q Do you approve or do you not? Can you deny it? Would you say, "No, we do not approve"?

A Neither on the basis of your question nor any of the other questions do I have anything to say to you about that.

Q The Fatah Central Committee reached a number of decisions. Did you have any comment on that?

A Don't have anything on that.

Q I want to bring you back to this question of the Israeli bombing, Alan.

A Yes.

Q You have in the past, when there's been such a strike, talked about cycles of violence and so forth.

A Sometimes.

Q Not recently, right.

Why is there this "No comment" at this particular point?

A I don't have anything to offer you on it.

Q For what reason?

A I don't have anything to offer you on it.

Q Alan, are you expecting something later today?

A Am I expecting something later? No, I don't think particularly.

Q Alan, can you say that we should draw no lessons from your refusal to comment on this, that your decision-making is purely capricious and reflects no --

A No.

Q -- rational decision-making process?

A I don't think you should do that, Stan.

Q Well, then we have to draw lessons from it.

Q What other conclusions can we reach, Alan?

Q Have there been civilians -- at least, according to Larry Pintak, CBS and all of the networks, and this morning all of the newspapers, showing devastation and destructions of homes and other things? And I believe I find it rather insensitive that the State Department will not come and make a statement whether it's approve or disapprove, condemn or not condemn, or anything.

A Look, the tragedy --

Q This really makes us wonder what's this policy all about.

A There is a lot of tragedy and loss of human life going on in that region and in that country. That we condemn, and that we deplore, and that we regret --

Q Would you condemn this too?

A -- but I don't have anything specific to say beyond this --

Q Why not?

Q You've been muzzled. Isn't that the honest truth?

A No, Lester.

Q You've been muzzled, gagged?

A I don't think so.

Q Yes, you have.

A Lester, would you just calm down?

Q Just tell us.

We sympathize, Alan. Tell us the truth.

A Can you point out certain things, Alan, which may have contributed to this last positive development in Lebanon about the likely Lebanese Government taking over control of 40 percent of Lebanon which is not under Israeli or Syrian control? Can you point out certain things that may have contributed to that?

A I don't think so. I think we'd really have to leave comments about what is happening and the reasons for what is happening to those who are directly involved -- the various Lebanese parties, the Lebanese Government, and so on. I don't think I have anything to offer you.

Q Any American official took part in that -- do you know? Can you say?

A Again, I say we've talked to a lot of people about it -- certainly -- but I don't have any judgments to offer you.

Q Alan, the reconnaissance flights of the U.S. aircraft -- are they continuing the same time as the Israelis bombing the Bekaa Valley?

A I have not talked, and I don't intend to talk, about specifics of our military activities. As John has indicated, there's no change in our policy. But I'm not going to get into the specifics of operational details.

Q Away from the Israeli bombings and strikes, are they continuing?

A As I say, I'm not going to get into the question of specifics. Our policy on this question has not changed.

Q You said earlier that Israel did not inform the U.S. in advance, and John said yesterday that Israel did not inform the U.S. in advance of the strikes.

A Right.

Q Aside from being informed in advance, was there any coordination -- strategic or otherwise -- with Israel as it specifically relates to these raids?

A These were Israeli raids taken on Israeli initiative, and you'd have to go ask the Israelis about them. They don't have anything to do with us.

Q "Anything to do."

Q Do you have any information about whether El Salvador requested money to rebuild that destroyed bridge?

A Yes. There is an answer, which is going to be posted to that question. So let me refer you to it. It will be posted this afternoon.

Q O.K.

Q Alan, South Africa?

A Yes.

Q Any comment on the warning from the Soviet Union asking South Africa to stop direct and indirect military activities in Angola?

A No. I really don't have anything on that. That is something you would have to address to either of those two governments.

Q How about -- is the U.S. initiative still operative, that Chester Crocker initiative for Cuban withdrawal from Angola? Is the U.S. position the same on that?

A The U.S. position on Namibia and southern Africa and the issue of the non-linked but, nonetheless, related issue of Cuban presence and so on hasn't changed. None of that's changed, in essence, in answer to your question.

Q Alan, a two-part.

The first part, I'm sure, is very easy. (Laughter.) Can you give us some --

A It usually is, Lester. (Laughter.)

Q -- progress report on the investigation and what it has disclosed as to who was responsible for sending, oh, the secret information to Lorton Reformatory?

A I don't have any update for you on that.

Q You mean they're still looking?

A The investigation continues.

Q They're still looking.

Now, the other thing is this: The Washington Post in a long story on your counterpart at the White House, quoted him as saying he knows there are 10,000 ways of evading a question. He knows them all.

How many thousand do you know. (Laughter.)

A I'm studying your methods, Lester, and I will let you know when I finish.

Q The members of the Kissinger Commission, when they went to Nicaragua, were reported to have been not too well treated in Nicaragua. Now Ambassador Stone is going to Nicaragua today and there has been one attack by the contras. Doesn't the United States have any way of restraining these attacks when one member, one Ambassador like Stone, is going to Nicaragua?

A I don't know how you would expect me to address a question about --

Q How do you expect the Nicaraguans to treat Ambassador Stone when they are attacking by forces backed by the U.S.?

A I expect that the Nicaraguan Government will treat Ambassador Stone with the respect and attention that an envoy of the President of the United States deserves.

Q Is he there?

A He is going. He was to have gone. I don't have confirmation of his actual arrival, George, but he was to have gone from El Salvador to Managua today; and he will be going on to Bogota tonight, where he will overnight.

Q Is he going to attend the Contadora Anniversary on Monday or Tuesday of next week?

A Where is that?

Q Contadora.

A Oh, in Contadora? I'm not aware of his plans in that respect.

Q O.K., thank you.,

(Whereupon, at 12:48 p.m., the briefing was concluded.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, January 6, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #4

FRIDAY, JANUARY 6, 1984, 12:20 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: I have a very lean book today, but I have a couple of announcements up front.

There will be a background briefing by a senior Administration official on the upcoming visit of Chinese Premier Zhao on Monday at 11:00 a.m. in the White House Press Briefing Room.

I have an announcement on a speech by Deputy Secretary Dam. Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam will deliver an on-the-record address to the American Farm Bureau Federation's annual meeting. That will be at 10:45 in the morning, Tuesday, January 10, in the Orlando, Florida, Convention Center. The subject is "U.S. Foreign Policy and Agricultural Trade." If you want to cover this event, please contact John Lewis of the American Farm Bureau Federation at the Orlando Marriott Hotel. He's at (305) 351-2420. That's John Lewis, (305) 351-2420.

(I have) a statement on the southern African negotiations. As we stated on December 27, the United States Government believes that a disengagement of forces in southern Angola is a crucial first step toward ending the cycle of violence in that area. In this context, we welcomed the South African December 15 disengagement offer, and we now welcome the Angolan Government's December 31 statement of its position to the U.N. Secretary General as positive developments.

The United States will be encouraging interested parties to cooperate in bringing about an effective disengagement of forces on January 31. In addition to addressing the immediate, urgent need to end the violence, a disengagement of forces can also work toward creating conditions favorable to larger efforts to achieve an overall negotiated solution.

In this connection, we are continuing to pursue our contacts with all parties. We continue to welcome the U.N. Secretary General's helpful involvement in this effort to achieve independence for Namibia and peace in the region.

That's all I've got.

Q What did the Angolans say in their statement?

A I don't have their -- I guess you ought to go back and get the specifics on their announcement.

Q Can we have a copy of that statement?

A Sure.

Q John, on that Angolan question, several days ago the South African Foreign Ministry put out a statement acknowledging that they had had communications from the Soviet Union about South African activities in Angola, calling them unacceptable. Does the United States have any comment on that, or on the Soviet Tass statement, which I understand came out the day before yesterday, with regard to South Africa and Angola?

A No, no comment on the Tass statement. We've made clear in our statements, and in other guidance over the past two weeks, our position regarding the whole situation in southern Africa. No further comment.

Q You don't have any comment on Soviet-South African matters?

A No, we do not.

Q Can we stay on Africa one more time?

A Sure.

Q There's a report that the Cubans have begun to withdraw from Ethiopia. Any guidance on that?

A No, don't have any guidance on that. I'm not sure whether we have had anything on that earlier. I can't recall it; no, I guess not. I guess there's been no further, no earlier guidance.

Q Do you have confirmation; do you have anything on it?

A No, don't have anything on it.

Q Can you take the question?

A Let's look into that for you; sure.

Q On Lebanon, what can you tell us about what the United States is prepared to do to adjust the -- two things: first, the situation of the Marines, and (2) to adjust the May 17 agreement?

A To adjust the situation of the Marines? I'm not quite sure, Jim, I follow you.

Q Are you willing to redeploy? Are you planning to redeploy?

A No plans to redeploy. As we have said, the question of deployment within the present mandate, within the present mission, certainly has been looked at from to time, and certainly continues to be looked at, but no plans to make any change that I'm aware of.

On May 17, no change on that.

Q Is there under consideration a Lebanese request to deploy troops to southern Lebanon?

A You'll have to ask the Lebanese if they want to talk about any request.

Q John, if I could follow the May 17 --

A But I would -- in connection with the reports of Lebanese requests, I guess I'd really steer you to what I just said, that we're not planning any change.

Q [illegible] the May 17, apart from any changes, would you be willing to, in effect, set it aside and set up a new agreement?

A Our position on the May 17 agreement is absolutely firm and unchanged.

Q John, the Israeli Chief of Staff is quoted today in an Israeli newspaper as saying that he would not oppose withdrawing the Israeli troops and leaving Syrian troops behind. In other words, apparently this is the first time the Israelis have said they would consider a unilateral withdrawal. Is that something we would look favorably on?

A I don't think we should respond to individual statements by individual Israelis. It seems to me that the question of withdrawal is a matter for governmental decision. Governments are involved in that, and I think governments should make plain their position on that.

Q What is the status of the negotiations going on now in Lebanon between the Gemayel Government and the other factions?

A I guess they're still moving forward. You've seen various conflicting reports of ups and downs. Don't have anything for you on where it stands.

Q There was a great deal of optimism. Have those negotiations been set back?

A If they come to the kind of agreement that has been suggested, yes, we would be pleased by that and consider that constructive. Obviously, if it doesn't come about, I guess we would consider that the opposite of constructive.

Q Will there be an announcement this weekend of some sort?

A I don't know. It seems to be moving from day to day.

Q Where is Rumsfeld?

A Rumsfeld's been in Israel today.

Q In Israel, also, there are reports, I understand, of likely application of Israeli law over the territories which the Egyptian Foreign Minister has sent telegrams to the Secretary of -- the United Nations Secretary General, to EEC officials, to the Israelis, and I don't know if the United States has received any such. Can you confirm these reports?

A I'm sorry, I missed the first part of the question.

Q The Israelis are reported to be considering officially by the Knesset to apply Israeli law over the territories, the occupied territories. I received a report about it since yesterday, and today I see in FBIS where the Foreign Minister of Egypt or the Under Secretary have sent telegrams complaining to the United Nations --

A I'm not aware of that. I'm not just not up on that. I haven't seen that.

Q Would you please look into it?

A   I'll look into it, but I sort of caution you that we don't usually indicate who's sent telegrams and who's said what to us through diplomatic channels. But because I know notning about it, I'll take a look at it; but I don't promise, if there is some diplomatic interchange, to come back and tell you what it was.

Q   If you do look at it and you find that there is some light to it, can you also tell us what will the United States' response be then?

A   Let me take a look and see whether we might have something for you on that during the day.

Q   Do you have any reaction to Hussein's recalling of the Parliament, and whether this helps the peace process or --

A   I think Alan had something yesterday, which I have with me. I'd be happy to give you the words.

The United States welcomes that reconvening of the Jordanian Parliament as we would any move toward popular participation in the political life of any country, particularly one with which we have as close a relationship as Jordan.

Q   Copy of that?

A   Sure.

Q   Do you see it as being a step towards some resumption of a negotiation process, the Parliament being recalled?

A   I think you'd have to ask the Jordanians where they see it leading.

Q   Your statement cast it in the light of popular participation, but it's generally seen as a factor in the potential negotiations regarding the West Bank.

A   I think we would have to see how that evolves. I mean, we have -- we're welcoming the reconvening of the Parliament.

Q   Do you see it in any way as an effort to reincorporate the areas into Jordan?

A   No, I think it's a reconvening of the Parliament with the existing representatives.

Q John, has President Assad agreed to see Mr. Rumsfeld?

A Don't have anything for you on Mr. Rumsfeld's onward plans or meetings. Sorry.

Q Aside from his plans to go, has the U.S. been invited to send him?

A I honestly do not know where we stand on a visit to Syria.

Q John, if the security arrangements in Lebanon will be reached, according to the news, in 40 percent of the country which is not under occupation by Syria and Israel --

A I keep hearing that 40 percent figure. Maybe it's correct; I'm not quite sure about that percentage, but --

Q -- you know, the part which is not occupied, what will be in store for freeing the other 60 percent or the other percentage of the country of Lebanon which is occupied under occupation forces?

A What would be in store? The withdrawal of the forces, the occupying forces, in those areas.

Q The strategy which was planned already a long time ago to call on all the forces, or are you going to have some other initiative? (sic)

A The goal was set a long time ago and is still being worked towards.

Q If I might follow up on my colleague's question about the Israeli Chief of Staff statement, could you interpret this that this is a reflection of the Israeli Government, too, opinion, because he is the Israeli Chief of Staff, and he wasn't saying this specially? (sic)

A I know, but I think you have to ask the Israelis. I don't think we can answer that.

Q Can we envision a withdrawal of the American Marines while Syrian and/or Israeli forces still are occupying portions of Lebanon?

A Well, I think the President has talked about withdrawal of the Marines and the circumstances under which those would take place, and I guess I would refer you to his words. There have been one or two positive developments since then: the raising of the seige on the village and now the discussion of a security arrangement. But basically I think I'd refer you to the President's words, particularly, I think, in his radio address.

Q You have welcomed the likelihood of elections in Jordan. I would like to draw your attention to something that -- the elections there actually have a significance that goes beyond the present borders of Jordan -- and I guess you are aware of this -- of the two banks of the Jordan, when the Kingdom was composed of the two banks, and Palestinians from the West Bank were also taking part in that Parliament.

In your statement, did you take that into consideration, or would you like to add something in this line?

A What we said, we said; and we welcome the reconvening of the Parliament. Where that will lead and what the implications of that are, I can't speculate on.

Q Short of just demanding or requesting the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon, has the United States laid out for the Syrians any kind of detailed steps that would be required on their part that might lead to the withdrawal of American Marines from that country? Have we, either through Jesse Jackson, through our American Ambassador there, or through any other diplomatic contacts, said to the Syrians, in effect, "Look, this is what has to happen in order for what you regard as a threat, the presence of the American Marines, to be -- "?

A Well, let me answer that by saying we never talk about diplomatic discussions, so I wouldn't get into the details; but I think you would be going down the wrong road if you suggested that there has been that kind of exchange. There clearly has been discussion of Syrian withdrawal and what has to happen. I think the end result for Marine withdrawal is out there, but I don't think that there has been any detailed discussion of that. I think it's obvious.

Q How do you respond in this respect to growing fears, especially in Western Europe and particularly in West Germany, that the withdrawal of American forces in Lebanon might be something like the beginning of the withdrawal of American forces in Europe in general?

A First of all, we're not talking about the withdrawal of American forces from Lebanon. Others may be, but the Administration is not talking about that. Secondly, I know of no plans to link the ultimate withdrawal of Marines from Lebanon to a run-down of U.S. forces in Western Europe.

Q It would be a hell of a story!

(Laughter)

Q John, on another subject, is there any work being done in the way of presenting any new arms control proposals or new negotiating proposals to Mr. Gromyko when Mr. Shultz meets with him?

A Well, as we have consistently said, Geneva is the place where we talk about arms control. It may well be that arms control, in general, may be discussed in Stockholm.

Q Would you lead me along the lines of speculating that Mr. Shultz may tell Mr. Gromyko that if the Russians returned to Geneva, they might find the Americans more forthcoming or more flexible?

A I wouldn't lead you down the road to speculation under any circumstances. (Laughter)

Q Well, John, I want to pursue this for a minute, because before the holidays a senior White House official in a backgrounder indicated that a good deal of work was going to be done in the next two or three weeks on looking at the current American positions, and possibly laying out some new positions.

Is that work going on? Can't you --

A Well, it may or may not be, and I'm not going to talk about that. But I mean, given the character --

Q You're not viewing Stockholm as a negotiating session?

A I think you would be misled to think that in a three-hour meeting, with translation, that would or could become a negotiating session. Yes, you're right: it could not. I don't think it could.

Q Is the President going to make a major speech on U.S.-Soviet relations before that meeting takes place?

A I don't know. I guess you'd better check with the White House on that, Barrie.

Q Could I ask about Central America? Why is it Ambassador Stone never seems to be able to complete his Central American trips? Yesterday --

A Yes.

Q -- was another example. Do you know why he came back?

A Changed plans. I think he came back for consultations in Washington.

Q Do you know if he is going to see the President?

A I think he would expect to see the President and other officials, yes. Sure.

Q John, to go back to the Middle East for a second, do you have any comment either on reports of withdrawal or evacuation or removal of Soviet advisers from Syria?

A No; don't have anything on that.

Q Anything on the same context regarding PLO forces from Lebanon to Syria?

A No. Seen the reports, seen the conflicting reports; don't have anything on that either.

Q There are reports that Jumblatt's objections are what is holding up this Lebanese security negotiation.

A Seen those reports.

Q What about them?

A As I said earlier, this goes up and down from hour to hour.

Q Is it up or down now, in your estimation?

A I don't know where it stands. We're still --

Q Can I get another crack at Stone?

A Sure.

Q Was he told something in Managua yesterday that you can tell us about?

A I think you would be misled if you thought that there was some drama or some significance attached to what was a change in plan. He's back; he didn't go to Bogota; he will go to Bogota, will include that in a future swing through the area, but nothing dramatic in his return.

Q Had he found out about today's meeting?

A I can't imagine what you're talking about.

(Laughter)

Q Do you have anything on the draft registration in Afghanistan?

A Sorry, Ami?

Q On the draft registration in Afghanistan?

A No, I do not. I'm sorry.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:39 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

MONDAY, JANUARY 9, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #5

MONDAY, JANUARY 9, 1984, 12:21 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: My names is Hughes. I have no announcements. Quick briefing. Out by 25 past 12:00.

MR. ANDERSON: All over? Finished?

MR. HUGHES: Just finished, Jim. No. I have no announcements. I'll be glad to take any questions.

Q Okay. Can we start with Lebanon? Can you tell us what you see coming out of the meeting of the Arab Foreign Ministers in Damascus?

A No. Don't really have any comment on that. It's their conference, so I think the readout would have to come from them.

Q What was the question?

A What do we have coming out of the three Foreign Minsters' meeting.

Q And what do you see as the prospects for the Geneva meeting to resume again?

A I think we have to wait for a readout from them.

Q And you're not in any way participating, hearing about, or in any way involved with this?

A Well, not directly involved. No.

Q Where is Mr. Rumsfeld?

A Rumsfeld is in Israel today.

Q I can't hear you, John.

A Rumsfeld is in Israel today.

Q Has he been invited to Damascus?

A Not a question of being invited to Damascus. I don't know whether he will go to Damascus on this particular sortie, this particular swing, of the Middle East. I don't have any details on that.

Q Is there some doubt he will go to Damascus?

A No. Just don't have anything for you on his onward plans at the moment.

Q Wouldn't it be almost mandatory that he go to Syria?

A Well, just don't -- I mean, I'm not suggesting that he's not or I'm not suggesting that he is, but I just don't have anything for you on his onward plans.

Q Do you know what happened to that security pact that people were saying was supposed to be signed or announced on Friday afternoon?

A Well, as we understand it, there's agreement in principle, but there are some loose ends. And, as I understand it, discussions are still going on to see whether those loose ends can be tied up or whatever one does with loose ends.

Q John, on the situation around Beirut, some of the Generals at the Pentagon are privately saying that Vessey's mission there is to work toward the buildup of ten Lebanese battalions, that there's now four trained, and the idea would be that they would assume control in the greater Beirut metropolitan area, and that then the Marines and the others in the Multinational Force would be withdrawn.

Is there anything you could say to enlighten us on that in general and Vessey's trip in particular?

A No. I don't have anything on General Vessey's trip and the specifics that you mention, but it isn't any secret that we have been committed to training and expanding the capability of the LAF, and that is going on, and I'm sure would continue to go on. But as to the specific numbers, no, I don't have anything for you on that.

Q The only thing about that, John, is that sort of assumes that southern Lebanon and the area occupied by Syria would -- it doesn't address that. I mean, what would happen to those areas if the Lebanese army takes control of, say, Beirut metropolitan area? What about the rest of Lebanon?

A Well, I suppose your -- I mean, I guess the context in which you're raising this is that there's discussion about extending LAF control over the unoccupied territory. Obviously, moving into those -- into that territory which is occupied is another step, but that doesn't mean that anybody has abandoned the goal of removing the Israelis and the Syrians and remnants of the PLO from those areas.

Q Mr. Dam seemed somewhat optimistic about Syria's attitude. I was wondering if, aside from the release of the American flyer, could you give us specific illustrations of that cooperation?

A No. I really couldn't. I think the Deputy Secretary addressed that yesterday, and I'll leave you with his words.

Q Well, he did address the issue in a very general way. I was wondering if you could be more specific.

A No. I really can't.

Q Has Israel told the United States that it's willing to pull most of its forces out of Lebanon without any agreement to withdraw on Syria's part?

A Well, wouldn't get into our diplomatic discussions, but I also wouldn't want to steer you in any direction. I would just refer you to what I said on Friday, that that would be an Israeli Government decision. I think there were some Israeli Government words over the weekend, and we don't have anything beyond that.

Q Another question --

A Incidentally, there was an incorrect reference in The New York Times this morning. It suggested that I was referring in what I said on Friday to a statement by Mr. Arens. The question I was asked was about a statement by General Levi, and it was to General Levi's reported remark that I was responding.

Q There are reports from Jordan this morning in FBIS that the Reagan Administration is considering changing some of the wordings in the Reagan plan in order to fit with the Arab leaders' desire or requirement.

A A report in FBIS this morning?

Q Yes.

A That there's a change in the Reagan plan?

Q Yes. That President Reagan and Mr. Shultz have discussed this, and they want to put some teeth to it --

A Haven't seen the FBIS report and am very much unaware of any change in the Reagan plan.

Q A follow-up: In light of Mr. Arafat's rejection of the Reagan peace plan, what do you foresee in his upcoming visit to Jordan which could happen in the next few days, that the talks with King Hussein --

A Between Mr. Arafat and King Hussein?

Q Yes.

A Oh, I think that's up to them.

Q New subject?

A Yes.

-- MORE --

Q Do you have any reaction to the North Korean proposal reported in Seoul on the radio -- no, not on the radio, I'm sorry, but reported in Seoul -- that the North Korean leadership is prepared to meet with the United States and South Korea to discuss differences?

A Those are press stories, and don't have very detailed comment on press stories; but it is a longstanding U.S. Government position that the solution in Korea must be worked out primarily by the Koreans themselves through a dialogue between South and North. The United States supports efforts to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula and permit progress towards peaceful reunification.

We would note that tensions have recently been heightened by the North Korean bomb attack in Rangoon, an action which raises serious questions about North Korean intentions and motives.

Q Copies of that?

A Sure.

Q What is your comment on the thrust of The Washington Post editorial of today about an actual tilt and the new policy in the Iran-Iraq war that the United States Government is undertaking?

A No comment on The Washington Post editorial. No change in our position.

Q What is your position?

A As set out many times before.

Q Is the U.S. Government satisfied with the actions taken so far by the El Salvador Government on the death squads?

A I don't think I really have anything to say, Jim, beyond what I said the other day, in that there is progress and there is movement -- we consider there is movement -- that they heard very clearly what the Vice President had to say, what the Secretary has had to say, and what the President has had to say, and that there is a response to that.

Q And there was a built-in deadline in what the Vice President had to say, which is right about now.

A I'm not sure that anybody has tied themselves into dates, Jim, for action. I think what we've looked for is movement, and I think we're seeing it.

Q What movement?

A I think various people are being reassigned, and some of the things that were discussed by the Vice President with the Salvadoran leadership are taking place.

Q Japan?

A Yes.

Q A Japanese newspaper reported, quoting the American official document, that the U.S. submarine carried nuclear weapons to Yokoska without prior consultation with the Japanese Government --

A Yes.

Q -- from 1960 to 1963. Do you have any comment on that?

A Well, we'll have to refer any questions regarding the specific missions of the two submarines in question, the "Growler" and the "Grayback," to the Department of Defense. U.S. policy on nuclear weapons as it relates to Japan remains unchanged. We understand the special sentiment of the Japanese people with respect to nuclear weapons; we are faithfully honoring our obligations under the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, and will continue to do so. U.S. policy on nuclear weapons in general is, without exception, neither to confirm nor deny their presence or absence anywhere.

Q Copy?

A Sure.

Q To follow up, please: but if the article is true, the U.S. Government violated the Mutual Security Treaty with the Japanese Government, because without prior consultation --

A I'm not going to go beyond the words I've offered to you which I think set out our commitments and our understanding of them.

Q On Friday, the U.S. abstained on a vote regarding Angola and South Africa. Why did the U.S. abstain rather than veto?

A   Let me go back and look at that for you.

Q   Also another one: I saw your posting on Cubans in Ethiopia. There was another report that there was, I think, an overthrow in Suriname also as a protest against the Cubans there. Do you have anything on that?

A   No, don't have anything on that.

Q   Will you look into that too, please?

A   Sure.

Q   Thank you.

Q   John, there was a report yesterday on a network that a Syrian Minister was quoted as saying -- he actually said on the network while being interviewed by an American newsman, that the Syrian Government did not take part, did not know about, and did not support the attack on the Marines. Does that fit into the picture of what was said yesterday, somehow improving the tension between the United States and Syria?

A   I think --

Q   Are you also aware of that report?

A   Am I aware of the television report or of the interview?

Q   Yes.

A   Yes, I'm aware of the interview, but I think I'll leave you with the words of various officials including especially the Secretary of State on this subject.

Q   Mike Wallace last night, on Sixty Minutes, said that the State Department refused to allow a representative to appear on his portion on Syria, on CBS. Do you have any explanation why the State Department refused?

A   It's not a question of refusing to allow; I guess it's a question of just not choosing to participate.

Q   It was of significance, you know, there were many officials of Syria and other places on --

A I won't bore you with the number of interview requests we get every day and those we are able to respond to and those we're not able to respond to, for a variety of reasons.

Q Is it because you are in contact now with Syria reaching a very sensitive position or --

A No. I think it was just a decision not to participate in that particular program.

Q Do you have any notion now how the Kissinger report is going to be put out -- when and where?

A I think I would refer you to the White House -- I don't know whether there has been a White House announcement yet. I guess there hasn't.

Q There has.

A There has? What did they say?

Q It was vague.

Q (Inaudiable) not sure if it was ON BACKGROUND or not.

(Laughter)

A I would look for some activity sort of the middle of the week.

Q They are saying now tomorrow.

A They're saying tomorrow?

Q Three-ish.

A I guess there are two phases to this, but I think I really have to refer you to them.

Q Thank you.

A All right.

(The briefing concluded at 12:32 P.M.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, January 10, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #6

TUESDAY, JANUARY 10, 1984, 11:48 A.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, everybody. I have a few announcements up front.

Available in the Press Office are copies of Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam's speech before the American Farm Bureau Federation. The subject is "U.S. Foreign Policy and Agricultural Trade." That's the speech he is giving today in Orlando.

Also available in the Press Office after the briefing will be copies of a report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America. The report is embargoed until 3:00 p.m. tomorrow, Wednesday -- that's the Kissinger Commission Report available after the briefing, but embargoed until tomorrow.

Can we have a little quiet back there, please?

Statement on the death of Souvanna Phouma: The United States has learned with regret of the death January 10 of Souvanna Phouma, former Prime Minister of Laos. For many years after Laos gained its independence, Souvanna Phouma was a leading figure in the history of his country. During his long tenure as Prime Minister, many officials of the United States and other countries had the opportunity to work with Souvanna Phouma towards the goal of a united, independent, non-aligned Laos and the peaceful reconciliation of all of Laos' people. The United States extends to Souvanna Phouma's family the condolences of his many friends here.

Finally, on U.S.-Vatican diplomatic relations, the United States of America and the Holy See, in the desire to further promote the existing mutual friendly relations, have decided by common agreement to establish diplomatic relations between them at the level of embassy on the part of the United States of America and of nunciature on the part of the Holy See, as of today, January 10, 1984.

That's all I have for you.

Q Can you explain why the announcement was made from the Vatican at 7:30 this morning?

A I think it had to do with publication in Osservatorio Romano, Jim. I think that was the --

Q They accommodate to the press there? (Laughter)

A There happens to have been a different time schedule.

Q Just as a matter of curiosity, was it not decided to make it a simultaneous --

A I think there was an original thought along those lines, but in practical terms, I think it appeared in their official newspaper a little ahead of the time we were able to get out and give you the news this morning.

Q Another mechanical problem: In most cities, the Papal Nuncio becomes dean of the diplomatic corps. Will that be the case in Washington?

A I can't answer that question, Jim. I don't know.

Q Do they get absolution with free publication? (Laughter)

A Sorry?

Q Do they get absolution?

A I can't answer that question either. Be happy to look at the diplomatic --

Q Physically, what difference does the establishment of these relations make?

A I think, obviously, better communications. We will elevate our representative -- there will no longer be a representative; it will be an Ambassador on the part of the United States -- and I think they have an Apostolic Delegate at the moment, and I think he will be succeeded by a Papal Nuncio. But I would refer you to them for their title.

Q What would be the number of people in the U.S. Embassy?

A I don't know.

Q There is a small office now.

A There is a small office there at the moment, and I'm not sure how that will change.

Q How does that make for better communications? Will the legations be bigger in both --

A I don't know if they will be better; it's just an upgrading of the relationship and I guess an improvement of the channel of communication by elevation.

Q Yes. Well, how does that improve the channel of communication, is what I'm getting at?

A I guess we will have the same channel of communication as the 107 other countries that recognize the Vatican, that have established diplomatic relations before us.

Q Is there a deficiency in the communications now?

A It's not a question of a deficiency; it's a question of putting ourselves on the same basis as 107 other countries at a time when we think it is appropriate to do it.

Q John, what has changed since 1952, the last time this was proposed, when there was a fairly large amount of opposition to the idea of full diplomatic relations with the Vatican? What has changed to make this a more appropriate time, as you just said.

A I think the President has decided that this is the appropriate time to do it.

Q Can you be any more --

A No.

Q -- forthcoming with an explanation for what has changed?

A No, I can't.

Q John, other than communications --

A I think the White House -- Ambassadors being Presidential appointees, I think the White House would make any announcement on any intention to nominate by the President.

I think they will. I think they will at their noon briefing.

Q Will he be available? I believe he's in town, or was supposed to be in town.

A I guess we have to wait until the White House makes its announcement.

Q Is he in town now?

A I guess we'd have to see who they are intending to nominate.

Q Well, let's guess that it's Wilson. Is he here? Do you know whether he is here?

A We'll wait and see what their announcement is. I know we're frustrating you a little, but there is a protocol involved.

Q Has the Secretary received any calls in opposition to this move?

A Not that I'm aware of, no.

Q , John, do you anticipate this is going to require a new building, or will the additional expense simply be in salaries?

A I don't know. I'll be glad to look into that and see if, at this stage, there is any further information available.

Q How do you respond to protests from the American Jewish Congress and other religious groups that this is a violation of the separation of church and state?

A Well, it isn't.

Q Why isn't it?

A It's not a violation of church and state because for a long time, we recognized the Holy See as having an international personality distinct from the Roman Catholic Church. This relationship will be with the Holy See. The Holy See is distinct from the Catholic Church.

Q Could you parse that a little bit? What is the distinction?

A I think the Pope has responsibilities and a leadership role in the Roman Catholic Church, as he has in the Holy See, which is responsible for the Vatican, which is a sovereign city-state. The two roles, as I understand it, are separate.

Q Does that mean the relationship will be between the Government of the United States --

A -- And of the Holy See.

Q -- and of the Government of the Vatican City-State, and not with the Catholic Church?

A With the Holy See, that's correct. With the Holy See.

Q Not with the Catholic Church?

A Correct.

Q O.K. Could I ask you whether this move is being made in anticipation of another Papal visit?

A I'm sorry. I can't see who's asking the question. Oh, sorry Ralph.

Q Sorry. Can I ask whether this move is being made in anticipation of another Papal visit to the United States?

A Not that I know of. I mean, I'm not aware that there is another Papal visit.

-- MORE --

Q Do we need more and better communications with the Holy See, John? I mean, what else is accomplished? We don't trade with the Holy See.

A Well, I think it puts this relationship on a par with similar relationships we have with a variety of other such entities. We have relationships already with the Vatican. We are involved in various treaties with them. We're not exactly in the forefront here. As I say, 107 nations -- all the major nations of the world -- have such relations, and we're simply upgrading to that status.

Q But, John, 107 other nations don't have separation of church and state doctrines either.

A That is not -- as I just said, that's not a problem.

Q The Holy See has been there since a number of centuries. What's new in the relations between the Holy See and the United States to necessitate this step, which, if I may say as a foreign correspondent, is somehow against the trend of the public opinion in the United States.

A I don't think it is against the trend in public opinion, and, as I say, I think we have addressed this question, of the separation of church and state. There's a long history of representation. I just refresh your memory.

The United States has had a presidential personal representative to the Holy See for many years. The tradition was established in 1939 by President Roosevelt when he appointed Myron Taylor as his personal representative. The Holy See is an international focal point of diplomatic contact, and, as I say, we're joining 107 other nations, including all our major allies, in establishing diplomatic relations with the Holy See.

Q Sir, you said that the Vatican has an international personality distinct from the Catholic Church --

A Yes.

Q -- and that's how you get around the church-state thing. Could you --

A Well, it's not a "getting around it." It's a recognition of the fact.

Q Could you explain what is that international personality that makes it distinctive and different from the Catholic Church?

A Well, the Holy See is a government of a sovereign city-state and operates as such, and is recognized as such by most of the nations of the world.

Q What does that government do, sir, besides administer 100-some acres?

A Well, I think it's involved in treaties, and it's involved in negotiations, and a variety of other activities, but I don't think I ought to be speaking for the Holy See. I think you ought to talk to them.

Q Would it be accurate for us to report, then, that the relationship will deal not with matters relating to the Catholic Church but only with treaties and --

A I don't think it will be accurate to report that. I think it will be accurate to make a point that there is a separation -- a constitutional, legal separation between the Holy See and the Catholic Church, and that it is not a conflict between church and state for the United States nor, indeed, for the other countries.

Q Sir, would you care to offer any response to the comment put out today by the joint Baptist Conference that refers to this move as a "ludicrous leap of logic reeking of Orwell's 1984?" (Laughter)

A I haven't seen the comment, I'm afraid.

Q Do you care to offer a comment now that you've heard it, sir?

A No. I wouldn't.

Q What are the positive steps for doing it? We've asked about the city-church state, but why did the President decide to now do it?

A Well, what are the reasons for not doing it?

Q That's what we've gone into.

A Well, it's considered an appropriate time by the Administration to do it. As I say, we're not exactly at the head of the diplomatic line here.

Q They offered to help on the U.S.-Soviet arms talks, I believe. Was that involved in any way?

A Well, I wouldn't get into any kind of diplomatic discussions that we might have had, but I think that a suggestion of a *quid pro quo* is going down the wrong road. This is simply the right time to do it.

Q John, what we're trying to get at is what will be different?

A We will have an Ambassador to the Holy See in Rome. The Holy See will have a Papal Nuncio in Washington as distinct from an Apostolic Delegate.

Q And why --

A It will be an upgrading of that relationship so that our relationship with the Holy See, the government of a sovereign city-state, will conform to the relationship we have with other countries, and, indeed, will conform to the relationship that most other countries have with the Holy See.

Q John, did the Administration, in consideration of what would be an appropriate time, give consideration to the thought of delaying this move until after the election to avoid any possible connection between the 51 million Catholic voters --

A I'm not aware that any consideration was given to that.

Q Did the Congress have any opportunity to have its say?

A Sure. We've consulted with Congress, have done that, have undergone that process, and, as a matter of fact, Congress recently repealed the 1867 Statute which stated that Federal funds could not be used for a diplomatic mission to the Vatican, so Congress has taken the appropriate action.

Q And it will, in effect, have another go at it in the sense that the Ambassador-designate will now have to be approved --

A That's right. That's correct.

Q Although he did not have to be approved previously.

A I guess he did not have to be. I guess he did not have to be -- but he certainly will in the future. Yes. He'll have to be confirmed.

Q John, does this have anything to do with the development of U.S. policy towards Poland?

A No.

Q John, does this, on the other hand, give the Holy See any special status in diplomacy as a neutral ground or a place for the Pope to work through in terms of diplomacy towards world peace?

A Does it enhance --

Q Does this enhance the Holy See as a neutral ground for diplomacy?

A I don't know that it does, Jim. I don't see that it does, but I may be going beyond my expertise in the area, but I can't at first glimpse see that.

Q New subject?

A Sure.

Q No. One more, please. Do you know whether this gentleman -- I think his name is Wilson, the California man who's being appointed -- do you know whether he is a member of the Catholic Church?

A I do not.

Q Yes.

A Somebody tells me he is, but I don't know that.

Q Would this ambassadorial --

A But that's not a requirement. (Laughter) An Ambassador to the Holy See need not necessarily be a Roman Catholic.

Q Would this Ambassadorial link provide any way, for example, for the Administration to try to present its views to the American Conference of Bishops on its nuclear weapons stand? Would that be an appropriate use of this new Ambassadorial upgrading, sir?

A I don't know. I don't think we have had problems in making our views known to the American Bishops in the past. I don't see why this channel would change that.

Q New subject?

A Sure.

Q Can you tell us where Ambassador Rumsfeld is today, and whether he's received an invitation to go to Damascus?

A He's in Israel today. Don't have anything for you on his onward travel plans.

Q Does he have an invitation?

A I don't have anything for you on his onward travel plans.

Q Was he in Algiers?

A Yes. He was in Algiers over the weekend.

Q Anything regarding the Israeli Government's position towards the unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon?

A No.

Q Nothing new?

A Nothing beyond what I said yesterday.

Q Do you have anything on the talks regarding the security plan of the Geneva Conference?

A No. I guess the parties are still talking. Don't have anything new to offer.

Q Okay. Thank you.

Q John, anything on the trip of Mr. Abrams to Nicaragua?

A Mr. Abrams?

Q Abrams -- to Nicaragua?

A Elliott Abrams?

Q Yes.

A I don't know. Anybody know anything about it? (No response) Sorry.

Q Anything new on southern Africa to speak of?

A No. Nothing new on southern Africa.

(The briefing concluded at 12:04 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Wednesday, January 11, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #7

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 11, 1983, 12:14 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, everybody. Just like to draw to your attention that in the Press Office afterwards will be available copies of Deputy Secretary Kenneth Dam's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this morning. I guess he's still up on the Hill. The subject of his prepared statement was "Policy Options in Lebanon."

That's all I have.

Q On Lebanon, where is Ambassador Rumsfeld?

A Rumsfeld is today still in Beirut.

Q Is he going --

A No. He still is in Beirut. That's correct.

Q Is he going to Damascus?

A Don't have anything to announce on his plans, but I wouldn't steer you away from that, but I don't have any announcement on when.

Q And who is he seeing in Beirut?

A I don't know who he's -- he has seen, Jim. He traditionally sees the principal leaders and President Gemayel. I don't know whether he has seen -- I don't know who he has seen today.

Q Would you like to comment on any of the statements made in the last day or so by Mr. Jumblatt or the Syrians about their reasons for not going along with this security agreement?

A No. I think that the parties and factions involved are continuing to talk, and we will have to wait to see whether they come to a successful resolution of what differences they have.

Q John, yesterday The New York Times had a story about the Administration believes that Israel has live options which might entertain in relation to withdrawing from Lebanon without simultaneous withdrawal of the Syrian forces. Can you elaborate the Administration's live options?

A I have nothing to say beyond what I said yesterday, which I think was to refer to what I said on Friday.

Q Go back to Friday --

A I know that's not helpful.

Q Friday we'll go back to --

A I have nothing for you. At least my story is consistent. I said the same thing yesterday as I said on Friday.

Q Would you steer us away from drawing the conclusion that if Rumsfeld goes to Damascus he will see Assad as opposed to Arafat?

A I wouldn't rule out his seeing President Assad if he goes to Damascus. I'm not announcing he's going to Damascus.

Q I understand, but you didn't steer us away from drawing --

A Didn't steer you away from --

Q -- the conclusion that he was going to Damascus.

A Right.

Q I'm asking whether you would steer us --

A No.

Q -- away from the conclusion --

A No.

Q -- that if he goes --

A No. I wouldn't steer you away.

Q Is he with diplomatic chauffeurs?

A (Laughter) Only on off days, Bernie.

Q Is the Secretary going to have a meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin before he leaves for his trip?

A I don't think the Secretary will see Mr. Dobrynin.

Q Who's he with right now in the building?

Q Wait a minute. Who will?

A I think Ambassador Dobrynin may be in the building --

Q He is.

A He either is or will shortly be in the building for a luncheon with Secretary Burt, Assistant Secretary Burt.

Q New subject?

Q Can you tell us what that's about, John?

A I think it has to do with the continuing discussions about the hotline situation, Greg.

Q Do you have any comment on --

Q (Inaudible)

A No. I think this is a hotline discussion.

Q This is not preparatory to the Gromyko meeting?

A No. This is the continuing discussion we've had. The Soviets are going to be here today, through the 13th for a discussion of confidence-building measures involving the improvement of communications links between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

We've talked about these in the past, and this is simply a continuing chapter in that -- in the evolution of that discussion.

Q Is this a technical kind of thing --

A Yes.

Q -- about upgrading the communications links?

A Yes. That's right.

Q And is there a special delegation from Moscow?

A Yes. There is.

Q Technical team?

A Technical team. Yes.

Q When did they come, John?

A I don't know when they came, but I think their first contact with us is today. I think I'm right in saying that.

Q Is that contact here at the State Department?

A Yes.

Q Is that Dobrynin that's leading it?

A Dobrynin?

Q The delegation -- is that the idea?

A I don't know whether he is leading their delegation -- you have to get the lineup from them -- but he is accompanying their delegation.

Q And will they be at the luncheon?

A Dobrynin will be at the lunch. Yes.

Q With the technical group?

A Yes.

Q Thank you.

Q Is it just limited, John, to the improvement of communications links, or --

A Yes.

Q They're not discussing other confidence-building measures?

A No. I'm sure they're discussing confidence-building measures, but it is a technical discussion --

Q Has this been split out in any formal sense from the START negotiations? Because they were discussing them in the context of START.

A Well, I think these have always gone foward separately, and, obviously, have a bearing on that, but I think these have always gone forward separately and focus on the hot line.

Q John, do you know if --

Q Are these confidence --

Q -- are there any more new technological equipments and so forth that are being proposed for linking up the two countries, more sophisticated communications gear?

A I don't know where the technical discussion stands. I guess that's -- you know, that's the kind of thing that they'll be into during this meeting.

Q Besides Burt, who else?

A I don't have a lineup on --

Q Can we get a list of who's there?

A I could probably do that for you. It would involve, obviously, NSC and Department of Defense on our side, but I don't -- let me see who -- if I can find out for you who is there in addition to Burt.

Q Ambassador Goodby last week said that one of the topics that we hope for agreement in Stockholm was on communications and crises. Is this part of that, or is this strictly the bilateral hotline?

A I think this is a very technical-level discussion, Bernie, and I think you should see it in that light.

Q Do you know anything about the technical side at all that you can tell us?

A No.

Q You have no -- none of the technical details?

A No. I'm sorry. I'm totally --

Q John, what is the position of the United States on talks with North Korea?

A Well, I think, as the President said last night, quadripartite talks might well contribute to a reduction of tension.

Q That's not a new position. We have insisted on this for --

A We've been talking about this for some time.

Q Well, let me ask --

Q Is there anything new in what you understand the North Korean position to be as reflected in that press dispatch?

A Well, in light of what happened in Rangoon, of course, we, like the Government of South Korea, remain skeptical of the motives and intentions of North Korea, but we have to wait and see.

Q Well, no, the reason I'm asking that is some of the wires are portraying the North Korean proposal as something new. It's my understanding the North Koreans have always demanded separate talks with South Korea and separate talks with the United States, and we have always asked for four-way talks.

The North Koreans don't now seem to be putting forward anything --

A They seem to be including South Korea, though. I think that is correct.

Q The North Koreans seem to be including South Korea.

A Seem to be including South Korea.

Q As a participant?

A Yes.

Q As an observer?

A Yes. As -- well --

Q Why do we want China in the talks? What's wrong with just talking to North Korea?

A Well, I think it really would be premature for us to get into detailed discussion of the shape or form or participants of such a conference on Korea, but I think the President said what he said last night, that we would favor a quadripartite meeting, should that come about. And, obviously, an essential of that is that South Korea should be there and speaking for itself, and China has played a role in this -- evolution of this.

Q John, this morning, Evans and Novak -

Q Stay on the same subject.

Q What kind of communications have there been with Pyongyang about this? Has there been --

A They've been diplomatic, but I'm not going to get into who talked to who, where and how, Bernie.

-- MORE --

Q When you say that the North Koreans -- in the past, I remember when President Carter called for talks, the North Koreans indicated they were ready to talk to the U.S. but leave South Korea out of it. They didn't want to deal with them.

A I think that's correct.

Q Is this now a new element of North Korean policy that you are sensing?

A If our collective recollection is correct and if they are now, in fact, saying, "Let's sit down and talk with South Korea," I guess that's a new development.

Q But has that been confirmed by what Premier Zhao told President Reagan, in any way?

A I can't talk about discussions between the Chinese and ourselves here.

Q John, can't we get the American reading of whether it does in fact mean even an elyptical invitation of the South Koreans? What is the American assessment?

A I think that we would be taking a look at it; I think the South Koreans would be taking a look at it, and weighing what it means. But beyond that --

Q You have no sense of -- other than indicating that?

A No, but as I say, I think you also have to, in the light of what happened in Rangoon and the conjunction of these events, I think you have to take a little time to weigh what is going on here.

Q John, in that connection, South Korea today is saying that it would not join such negotiations until North Korea accepts responsibility for Rangoon.

A Uh-huh.

Q Your position a moment ago was that the U.S. is skeptical of the North Korean --

A -- motivations.

Q -- statements and motivations.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you go as far as being skeptical enough to say that South Korea should not join such talks unless there is a formal statement of acceptance?

A No. I confined remarks to our skepticism on what I've already offered you.

Q So the U.S. position is, at this point at least, publicly less strict in terms of --

A The U.S. position in terms that the President enunciated it last night.

Q -- which is that it has only to be skeptical --

A A quadripartite conference might, if it comes about, might contribute to a reduction of tension on the Korean Peninsula.

Q Since he didn't make reference to Rangoon, then you would not --

A I think he has Rangoon in mind.

Q John, the North Koreans said that this proposal was delivered to us in a letter which was handed to the Chinese. Can you give us the date that we received it --

A No.

Q -- and the date that was on the letter?

A No.

Q Have we received the letter from the Chinese?

A Not going to get into the context of our diplomatic discussions on this.

Q You can't even get into the mechanics of how the letter was delivered?

A No. Not going to.

Q Can you confirm that we did receive the letter?

A Not going to get into it.

Q How do we know about it?

(Laughter)

A Trust me.

Q Trust you?

(Laughter)

Q Don't get carried away.

Q Is that personal or institutional, John?

(Laughter)

Q Can you say whether (inaudible) American response --

A No.

Q -- other than what the President said publicly?

A No, I can't. Can't.

Q Is it fair, John, to draw the conclusion from what you say that if Rangoon had not happened, Washington would jump at this?

A I don't think we ever make such dramatic statements as that.

Q But the skepticism that you say grew out of Rangoon -- before Rangoon, Washington was always skeptical of North Korean motives.

A Well, there may be some justification for that.

Q John, the White House Spokesman, Larry Speakes, this morning cited what he called "a new State Department estimate" that says 40 percent of the death-squad-style killings in El Salvador are attributable to the left. What evidence, if any, do you have to support that charge?

A Well, I haven't exactly seen what Larry Speakes said, so I really can't get into it. I can say that there is a downward trend in civilian deaths in El Salvador attributed to political violence. The number of deaths has dropped sharply over the past three years.

Our Embassy compilation of press accounts of such deaths shows a monthly average of 178 for the first 6 months of 1983, and an average of 104 for the last six months of last year, so that's a downward trend.

As you know, the President indicated that the Department will provide a report on the situation, on El Salvador, to the Congress no later than January 16, and that report will contain an analysis and an evaluation of this issue.

Q Can we have a copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q John, does the State Department have any material evidence, as opposed to press accounts in El Salvador, to support Mr. Speakes' contention that 40 percent of the death-squad murders are the work of the political left?

A Well, as I say, I haven't seen what Mr. Speakes said this morning, so I'm not going to comment. I've given you what we have on the trend. I'm not sure whether the Embassy has anything beyond press accounts. I don't know.

Q John --

A But why don't you wait until the report goes out?

Q John, the figures that you mentioned may be right for the six-monthly period, but from the information coming from this podium, in fact in the last couple of months in 1983, there was a rapid increase in the death squads.

A I' afraid, in terms of statistics, Jim, I can do no better than give you the ones I have given you. But if you think there is a discrepancy, we'll be glad to take a look at it.

Q Yes, because the alarm that was expressed by Vice President Bush and by Ambassador Pickering took place in November and December.

A Uh-huh.

Q But now you are telling us at this time that they were expressing alarm, in fact there was quite a noticeable decrease.

A Let me take a look and see what the answer is to that question.

Q John, can you determine if there is in fact a new State Department estimate that supports the Speakes declaration, that the State Department has a 40 percent estimate on the --

A I don't know. I haven't seen what is in that report to Congress.

Q Can you give us a summation of your evaluation of those figures, John? Do we take heart from it? Are we discouraged? Are we somewhere in between?

A Well, if -- Jim has raised a fair point, which we would be glad to look at; but on the basis of it, if you have a downward trend, I guess that is something that everybody would be happy with.

On the general problem of death squads, as you know, we have detected progress. We have made some very sharp statements and some strong signals, and we are seeing what we consider to be a positive response to those signals.

Q John, if I may pursue that, a senior, ex-State Department official, who authored a Commission report, said this morning that --

A Can you be a little more -- (Laughter)

Q Well, he's ON BACKGROUND so I don't want to -

A Oh, well, yes.

Q But he said that he thought that these death squads would end -- the death-squad killings would end in the near future. Do you share that optimism?

A I think we would certainly hope that that would be the case.

Q You have nothing to go on to --

A Nothing beyond what I've --

Q John, you referred in your comments on the deaths to a "sharp decrease" over the past three years, but a "downward trend" in the past year.

A Uh-huh.

Q Would you characterize what you've described in the past year as a "sharp decrease", or were you referring to the distinction between what has happened in the past year, compared to what happened three years ago?

A I don't know that I'd characterize it, but going from 100 whatever-it-was to slightly over 100 certainly would seem to represent progress, but I'm going to look into Jim's question, which is a fair one.

Q John, there is a story this morning in "Evans and Novak", that Mr. Jackson carried a letter from Assad to President Reagan.

A Yes.

Q Do you have any comment on that --

A No.

Q -- in light of this, do you have any date for Rumsfeld to visit with Assad?

A No, nothing to announce on a Syrian visit by Ambassador Rumsfeld. But as I said earlier, I wouldn't steer you away from it.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:31 p.m.)

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Lennox

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JAN 30 1984
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, January 13, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #8

FRIDAY, JANUARY 13, 1984, 12:26 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good morning. A couple of announcements:

There will be a BACKGROUND briefing today -- that's a reminder -- at 2:00 o'clock in this briefing room on the Secretary's travels to London, Stockholm and Oslo.

Also, on Monday AID Administrator Peter McPherson will hold a news briefing on the humanitarian and economic assistance aspects of the Kissinger Commission Report. That will be Monday in this briefing room at 2:00 o'clock. That session will be ON THE RECORD and for sound and camera.

That's all I have for you.

Q What time was that again?

A 2:00 o'clock on Monday.

Q Anything on Rumsfeld's meeting with Assad?

A No. He's in Damascus, saw Khaddam and Assad, but no readout for you.

Q I know you don't tell us his travel plans, but would you tell us if he, after this meeting, intends to come back to the United States? Not particularly when, but --

A I think not directly.

Q Will he go to London and see the Secretary maybe?

A I am not aware of such a plan at the moment. You know, one never rules anything out, but I'm not aware of that at the moment, Bernie.

Q What is your assessment of the overall situation regarding the negotiations for the security agreement? And what is prompting, do you think, this new round of fighting in Beirut?

A Can't speculate, and have nothing for you on the progress of the negotiations beyond what the Secretary said yesterday. He referred to the ups and downs that take place in Lebanon.

Q Do you have any sense of who it is that is responsible for the attack on the Marines today?

A No. Have a little readout on what is actually happening there on the ground. This morning U.S. MNF positions in the southeast part of the airport, Beirut airport, came under heavy small arms fire from a building to the east of their positions.

The Marines returned fire. There were no Marine casualties. After LAF units were fired upon from the same area, they also returned fire. The overall exchange lasted about two hours, during which there were large secondary explosions seen coming from the building from which the fire had originated. As a result of all this, the Beirut Airport was closed for about an hour. It's now open again.

The French MNF contingent and LAF units have been involved in exchanges with unidentified militiamen in West Beirut.

The wife of the French Cultural Attache in Beirut is in good condition after she was slightly wounded by a gunman who reportedly fled on a motorcycle.

We have seen reports this morning of artillery and small arms exchanges in the greater Beirut area. We've also seen a report that a school bus was attacked near Hadath.

The United States is concerned about the flareup of violence in the greater Beirut area. We call on the parties to excercise restraint, to spare innocent civilian lives, and to respect the cease-fire.

Q Copy of that, John?

Q Did the Secretary and Mr. Andreotti discuss the MNF, and did the Italians give you any new signals about their participation?

A I'm sure they did. I think Mr. Andreotti himself had some remarks about the MNF and the continuing Italian commitment to it this morning, but I think there may emerge other statements during the day. But I think he already talked about it this morning.

Q Did he explain in detail the Italian decision to draw down and sort of --

A I don't know what was discussed in his meeting with the Secretary, but I understand he made some public statements after the meeting about Italy's commitment to the MNF.

Q Here or at the White House?

A Anybody have any idea? Sorry.

Q White House.

A White House? Okay.

Q John, yesterday Spadolini, I think it was, suggested that Italy and perhaps the other MNF partners should go in the direction of being replaced by U.N. forces. I remember the President made a remark about that, too, in his year-ender with the wire agencies.

Is there any more thought given to going to the U.N., which is --

A I don't know that there's any more thought given to going to the U.N., Bill. This is something that is out there, has been talked about from time to time over a fairly extended period, and I think the Secretary has mentioned it as well.

There's also been discussion of the obvious demerits of the idea of Soviet involvement and Soviet veto over U.N. forces. But -- so I don't know that there is any more thrust or discussion being given to an idea that has been discussed over the months.

Q John, despite the Secretary's reply yesterday, I'm still having trouble understanding the timing of the --

A Timing of?

Q No. The timing of the -- accusing the Soviets of violating the old treaties, even while he's going to see Gromyko.

Will the issuance of the report at this time complicate the Secretary's trip or the opportunity to resume arms talks?

A   I don't see that it is any complication. You have a strategy; you have a relationship with a country that is a sophisticated relationship; and there are various facets of that that proceed at the same time.

I think what the Secretary said was that you have to be realistic and you have to speak out if you see a violation. You would be derelict in not bringing that to the attention of the other party, but that does not preclude a discussion and a dialogue which is able and is going on through a variety of channels.

Q   Are you convinced --

A   So it's not a contradiction.

Q   Is Congress all that sophisticated, too?

A   I'm not a --

Q   You're going to have to sell the treaty eventually.

A   -- spokesman for Congress.

Q   No. I mean, you negotiate on two -- at least on two levels. You also have to eventually persuade Congress to ratify a treaty. And doesn't it become harder to get Congress to go along when the Soviets are accused of being liars and cheats?

A   You have to look of the realities of the situation. If there are indeed violations, we would be derelict in not speaking out on them.

Lester?

Q   Can I go to a new subject?

A   It's okay with me.

Q   John, since you have served as the editor of a famed church-owned daily newspaper, as well --

A   Why don't we keep this on U.S. foreign policy rather than personal?

Q It is. It's -- that's exactly -- as well as an unusually well informed spokesman at the State Department, and since The New York Times reports you saying that there is no violation of separation of church and state because the United States is recognizing the Holy See rather than the Roman Catholic Church itself, could you tell us if the Holy See is not a religious establishment, does the State Department regard it as a real estate establishment or what kind of establishment? And I have two follow-ups.

A I thought we made our position quite clear the other day, and I don't have anything to add to it.

Q From the reports here, John, it isn't clear. What kind of establishment --

A Might not be clear to you --

Q -- do you regard it as?

A -- but it was clear to me when I said it at the time.

Q Well, could you just clarify this?

A No.

Q What kind of --

A I think I was clear at the time. I made --

Q In other words, it's not a religious establishment. Is that what you're saying?

A I made clear the distinction between the Holy See and the city-state --

Q It wasn't clear to The New York Times.

A Well, I'm sorry.

Q Let me try a follow-up. Since the world has hundreds of millions of Moslems in countries all over the world who have a holy city in Mecca, why has the State Department failed to recommend an Ambassador to Mecca, other than the fact that the Moslem vote in the United States is negligible.

A I'm not aware of any plans to establish diplomatic relations with Mecca.

Q I understand. I'm asking why. Why are there -- no ambassador to --

A Not relevant, Lester.

Q That's not relevant.

A Not the same situation.

-- MORE --

Q Will the State Department recommend ambassadors to the World Council of Churches?

A I'm not aware of any plans, Lester.

Are there any serious questions?

Q That's a very serious question. You're being sued, John.

A So be it, Lester.

Q You're being sued --

A We got three questions from you, Lester. Why don't you hold off.

Q Can I ask a logistical question on the trip. If you can tell us, on background or on the record, when might Mr. Shultz hold his news conference? What I have in mind is Gromyko has a habit of holding a news conference after the Americans leave and say something rather --

A Why don't we have a little chat after this on-the-record session.

Q Okay.

Q John, any developments on the helicopter in Honduras, Nicaragua -- any reply?

A The Nicaraguans have come back to us. We're looking at that response, but nothing beyond that. Still looking into the question of -- obviously, an investigation continues to go on into what happened on the scene, but I think the Pentagon is probably a better source.

Q Have they come back with the fuller explanation that was requested?

A Not able to get into what is in the communication, but they did deliver a communication to us last evening.

Q Sorry, was it delivered here or was it delivered in Managua?

A Here, delivered here.

Q John, can I ask you -- back on the Middle East -- a question. While in Beirut, General Vessey was reported to have -- was reported from Beirut by a network news agency that he was looking into the Lebanese Government to officially request the Marines to leave Beirut, and then it was reported that he also asked for $600 million, or the Lebanese Government had asked for. (Sic) Can you confirm this report, and do you have anything to say about him?

A The suggestion that U.S. military aid to the LAF in terms of training and equipment is some kind of deal for the exit of the Marines, of course, is ridiculous. No change in the position on the Marines. Insofar as the military training program to the LAF, yes, that goes forward vigorously, and I'm sure the Pentagon can tell you where it stands and I'm sure military officers would have discussed that during their visit.

Q A follow-up to this. You are -- I mean, it also was reported at the time that a specific date was mentioned -- June 6 -- by which it was reported the Marines would have left Beirut. So you're saying that there is no grounds to that, no --

A Anybody who is suggesting there's a date for the departure of the Marines is being very fanciful.

Q Can you confirm the report that the U.S. is seriously contemplating a new MBFR proposal which could be unveiled in Stockholm?

A I don't have a great deal for you on that, Barrie, but I'll give you the words we have. We and our Allies participating in the MBFR talks remain committed to seeking progress. However, we're not going to speculate about what we might do if the talks resume.

It's premature to talk about initiatives in negotiations which are not now taking place. The first order of business is to resume the talks. The Soviets said that they would set a date for resumption later through diplomatic channels. We have not yet heard from them. They are aware that we are prepared to resume the talks as soon as possible.

Q John, can I also go back to a particular point? As far as aid to the LAF, is there -- I mean, their figure of $600 million is anywhere correct? I mean, is the United States considering giving them --

A I really don't have that, but I think the Pentagon could give you -- I'm sure they would give you a full account of what we're doing and what's envisaged.

Q John, do you have anything further on the situation on the Korean peninsula, the diplomatic initiatives going forward, and what the Chinese Premier proposed when he was here and when he proposed it?

A No, I really don't beyond what the Secretary said on this subject yesterday and what I had said earlier, referring to the President's remarks about our feeling on a quadripartitite meeting. I think that the Washington Times yesterday -- sorry Mr. Howe isn't here -- misquoted me at the press conference in suggesting that I had said talks could only take place between the two, North Korea and South Korea. That wasn't what I said. I said they both would have to be involved, but we have never talked about two-party talks.

Q Can you go beyond that, to China and the United States?

A No. As the President said, we think that quadripartitite talks might well lead to a reduction of tension on the Korean peninsula, but it's premature to talk about the shape of any such conference or who might be involved.

Q Last Friday you were asked about Egypt's protest to the United Nations about Israelis applying their authorities on the West Bank of Jordan. Had the State Department, the United State Government, received such a copy of the protest or something like that to this effect?

A Have we had some guidence on that? Let me take a look at that. I'm not quite sure where we stand on that.

Q Another question. Do you have anything to offer on the upcoming visit or meeting between Arafat and King Hussein?

A No.

Q Anything about the upcoming Islamic Summit Conference which will be held soon?

A No.

Q Do you have anything further on the charges by the Friends Committee on arms to South Africa?

A I think we might have something for you a little later in the day on that. Why don't you keep checking with the Press Office.

Q John, there are rather lengthy lists of violations on the part of the Soviet Union to the SALT I treaties. Could you be specific as to which items is the Secretary going to take up with Mr. Gromyko in his meeting on the 18th?

A No, I can't. The Secretary sort of declined yesterday to get into his agenda, and I would be foolhearty to go beyond what he said yesterday.

Q But he is going to go over the violations?

A I don't think he talked about that. I think he declined to be drawn on what he might talk about with Mr. Gromyko. Sorry.

Q John --

A Yes, Lester.

Q There's a couple of others on this. Why are we not building -- is there some explanation that you gave as to why we're not building an embassy in Vatican City, or is it the land shortage?

A I think the present facilities are considered adequate for the moment.

Q I see. It has nothing to do with the land shortage?

A I'm not aware of that.

Q The Times quotes somebody, unidentified, from the State Department as saying that this will involve moderate costs. Whenever I hear that term from the State Department, you'll understand if I wince, because I don't know exactly what you mean by "moderate." What -- could you define that?

A I think you haven't caught up with the guidance that we offered, Lester, last week. Why don't you take a look at that.

Q Well, let me ask one final question. Does Secretary Shultz want you and Mr. Romberg to conduct briefings only for the benefit of those who come here everyday or should those of us who can't come everyday, because we have other assignments, be entitled to answers?

A If you mean are we going to repeat answers that everybody in this room may have heard —

Q Not everybody, because everybody doesn't come.

A — well, most in this room may have heard when you can just as easily walk a few steps down the hall and read a piece of paper, the answer to that is no.

Q I see. In other words, we have to read all of -- if we are away -- for instance, if somebody is overseas and they come back, they have to read the entire briefing. Is that right?

A Well, I do. Why shouldn't you?

Q Because you work full time, and you work for the government and I don't.

A Then, you're going to miss great pearls, Lester.

Q I see.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:45 P.M.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

MONDAY, JANUARY 16, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #9

MONDAY, JANUARY 16, 1984, 12:42 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. Sorry for the delay. Just one announcement to remind you, as we announced last week, that AID Administrator Peter McPherson will be briefing today at 2:00 p.m. on the humanitarian and economic assistance recommendations of the Kissinger Commission Report.

Following that briefing, we will have available in the Press Office copies of the "Report to Congress on El Salvador" -- that's the title of it -- which will be transmitted to the Congress early this afternoon. There will then be a backgrounder on that report about 30 minutes following Mr. McPherson's briefing, so you'll have a chance to go through that. The briefing will be ON BACKGROUND with attribution to State Department officials.

Q On that, how is that different from certification, what this report is?

A Well, I will answer you briefly, Jim, but you also should talk about this with your briefers this afternoon. Obviously, there was a formal requirement under the law previously to certify. When the President went against that bill, he also instructed, however, that there be a report to the Congress, and that the first one of those reports, although not necessarily saying what the pattern would be after that -- but that the first one be on the date when that certification requirement had been, so that this -- that's the difference.

Q What time will that be?

A Well, assuming that Mr. McPherson briefed from about 2:00 to about 2:30 and the report is made available then at about 2:30, that BACKGROUND briefing would take place approximately 3:00 o'clock.

Okay. That's it for announcements. Happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, on Lebanon, do you still believe that the plan for a cease-fire and a political settlement in a security framework is possible?

A The short answer to that is yes, but I don't have any update to give you on the status of talks on that.

Q Do you consider the hopes for such a plan to have been set back by the fighting that took place over the weekend?

A Well, I'm not going to try, Jim, to give you temperature readings on it. I simply would say that the process is going forward. There are a lot of conversations which are being held, and it is important that that take place.

Q Where is Mr. Rumsfeld?

A Ambassador Rumsfeld is in Israel at the moment. He was previously, a little bit earlier, in Lebanon.

Q Anything on Shafik Wazzan's statement that Lebanon might not ratify the May 17 agreement?

A No. The position of the government of Lebanon remains that they stand behind that agreement. So -

Q On the President's speech today, there was a suggestion when he was talking about Shultz meeting Gromyko -- I forgot the words, but it's something like "This should be the first of a number of meetings."

Is there an arrangement already between the two countries for a series of meetings, of which this is the first?

A I don't have anything on it to give to you, Marvin. I would think that we ought to let the first meeting -- the meeting that is taking place, take place, and see what happens after that, but I leave you with, obviously, what the President said about it. But I don't have anything to give you on a series of meetings other than to note that there, of course, has been a series of meetings in the past which you know about that has taken place here over a period of time between the Secretary and Ambassador Dobrynin. There also have been conversations in Moscow with our Embassy there, but I don't have any meeting -- specific meetings to give to you at this point.

Q I just want to know whether I'm being hung up on the grammar or whether there is lurking behind the grammar some diplomatic reality? In other words, there is --

A Well, I understand your question, I just don't have any --

Q There are events that take place. There are General Assembly meetings, and they do get together and all that.

A Right.

Q But is there a series -- a special series of meetings that has been agreed to?

A I don't have anything to give you, talking about any special series of meetings. I think that we would have to let the future take care of itself essentially, and why don't we also let the results of that meeting be briefed as -- after that meeting takes place by the Secretary or his party or however that's to be done.

-- MORE --

Q On Lebanon, we always hear that the Syrian position still has not changed. So can we assume that Rumsfeld hasn't achieved anything so far?

A I don't have anything to give you, as I usually do not, about Ambassador Rumsfeld and his mission.

Q But what about the Syrian position? I mean, even we see it more hard than ever. Now they say that nothing will happen until the agreement is abrogated. Now, Shafiq Wazzan said, "though not ratified," so what is happening?

A We, obviously, have taken note of the Syrian positions on that, and I guess what I would simply say about that is that our purposes remain as they have been, and we are continuing to work for the goals we have set up for ourselves and will persist in that.

Q Is there any hardening of the Syrian position or shifting, or what? Can you tell --

A I don't think I'm going to try to characterize that in specific terms in that way.

Jim?

Q Are we still pursuing further explanations from the Nicaraguans on the shooting down of the helicopter last week?

A I think we are looking for something further in terms of a more detailed explanation of what happened. I think there was some initial response which we did not -- I guess last week John indicated we wouldn't get into detail, but I think it essentially went along the lines of what they had been saying publicly.

Q Then, the issue is not settled. Is it clear why the aircraft was in that position now, from our own investigation?

A I don't have anything further on it, Jim. You might want to check with the Pentagon, but I don't have anything further on it.

Q Do you have any comment on press reports that U.S. personnel have been traveling by helicopters to a supply depot three miles from the Nicaraguan border?

A   No, I don't know anything about them, but I refer you to the Pentagon on their ground rules.

Q   Alan, following up on the question of the helicopter, the answer that the Nicaraguans gave you already, although it was not very detailed, what is your position on that specific answer?

A   I don't have a judgment to give you about that. I think our position on it was made known in various statements last week on the incident.

A   Is that it?

Q   Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:50 p.m.)

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Becker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF [illegible]TE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #10

TUESDAY, JANUARY 17, 1984, 12:10 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have no announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Do you know about this arms sale between France and Saudi Arabia?

A Don't have anything on that, Jim. Saw the reports in the morning papers, obviously, and I think there was some comment that was attributed to DOD, but I don't have anything on it.

Q Does that mean the United States was not informed or (inaudible) —

A No, it doesn't mean that. It means I don't have anything for you. But as I say, I saw some comment attributed to the Pentagon on it.

Q — which strikes me that the U.S. Government was informed. What I'm trying to find out is if the State Department was.

A I just don't have anything to give you on it.

Q Do you have anything on the kidnapping of the Saudi diplomat in Beirut?

A Nothing very specific. We, obviously, are aware of the reports, and understand that a Saudi Arabian Consul was kidnapped by unknown gunmen in Beirut earlier today. Don't have any details.

We condemn in the strongest terms the kidnapping of diplomatic or consular personnel, and we call for his early release.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the manner in which the Russians reacted to the President's speech?

A Not a lot, Marvin. The response, as I saw it, was issued yesterday before the speech was even made, and it certainly — It's what it was: it was a Tass and Novosti reaction, not an official governmental reaction, I think. I would refer to what the ---

Q You're drawing a distinction between Tass and the Soviet Government?

A Well, I think that they say sometimes differently nuanced things, use different words sometimes. I would not draw a large distinction talking about the independence of Tass and Novosti.

Q Yes.

A But the point I would make, too, is one the Secretary made in his press conference in London, which is to talk about the responsibility of the United States, the Soviet Union, and other governments to work for greater security and stability in the world. And we trust, therefore, that the Soviet Union will take the President's words seriously, and will respond in kind.

Q Alan, any chance of sweetening the offer, the reopening of Aeroflot offices, that sort of thing?

A I don't have anything to suggest that that's underway.

Q The Middle East? Do you have any comment on --

Q Let me just follow?

Q O.K.

Q There were Soviet Government media reactions that followed the President's speech as well, and they were more detailed than the ones that preceded.

A Well, let's see what happens with this, Marvin. I think also we have, of course, Mr. Gromyko's speech which is coming up, and beyond the public statements, we have the meeting which is coming up.

Certainly, the meeting is tomorrow. I understand that there may be a postponement of his speech until tomorrow because the whole schedule of the Conference was slipping. But in any case --

Q Will the meeting slip as well, do you think?

A No, not to my understanding.

Q Postponement of the Gromyko speech --

A You had better get that out of the Conference; but my understanding, just for your guidance is that, in fact, it was a possibility because of nothing other than the fact that the whole schedule was slipping some. But that may be wrong.

Q Do you have any comment on the King Hussein speech to the Jordanian Parliament yesterday?

A What aspect are you focusing on?

Q Any aspect. I mean, is his call to the PLO, to, you know, bring Egypt back in, majority rule among the Arab countries --

A I guess the only one I really could address would be the peace process issue as a general matter, and our position on that has been consistent, which is that the best way to give new impetus to the peace process would be for the early entry of Jordan into negotiations with Israel. We support King Hussein's efforts to create conditions necessary for him to enter peace talks with Israel, but beyond that, I don't have any specific comment on his address.

Q Alan, on this note: there were reports circulating sometime after the breakdown of the talks between Arafat and King Hussein that King Hussein was asking, specifically, for the United States to issue a call, or to achieve some agreement with Israel to freeze the settlements on the West Bank. Whatever happened on this thing? This is one condition that Jordan is seeing by entering the peace talks.

A Well, this has been addressed many times, as you know, from here and other U.S. Government podiums. I don't have anything new to offer you on that. Our position on the continuing settlement activities is clear; but I don't have any new position to give you on that or any diplomatic reporting to give you.

Q Alan, do you see this as a way of King Hussein trying to get those elements of the PLO still loyal to Arafat to engage in negotiations with him first?

A I think I'd have to let King Hussein speak for himself on that, Marvin. I don't think it's proper for me to do that.

Q On this point, Alan, what is it that the United States would like to see King Hussein doing? I mean, does the United States --

A We would like to see King Hussein enter the peace talks. It's obvious that he needs certain backing -- he's talked about this; we've talked about it -- backing from Palestinians and from other Arab states to do that. He has been working on this for some time. And as I said before, we support him in his efforts to create the conditions necessary for him to enter peace talks with Israel.

Beyond that, specifically how he is going to do this or whether various things he's doing are designed to talk to that or other aspects of his own policies, we'd have to leave to him to address.

Q To follow up on that, Alan, as you probably well know, it would require King Hussein to have an approval from the PLO or Arafat, especially to talk on behalf of the Palestinian people -- to replace the PLO, it would require a reversal of the '74 Resolution.

Is that what the United States is looking forward to? I mean, would you like King Hussein to receive a commitment from or an approval by Arafat to talk on behalf of the Palestinians? Can you address that, especially?

A What we would like to have happen -- I'm really repeating myself -- is to have him come to the table. There are certain conditions which are necessary for that to happen. We hope that those conditions will be available to him. I'm not going to try to specify what it is that he will need beyond the way I've already described it.

Q Would that include -- Can you just tell me if that includes the reversal, or the right to talk or to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians?

A He needs, clearly, backing from Palestinians; but I can't get more detailed with you than that at this point.

-- MORE --

Q Do you expect the Israelis to be quite ready for such talks?

A I can't really. I can't speak for the Israelis on that. Our position on this is clear. I refer you back to the President's September 1, '82 initiative. We're plowing over old ground on this, but let's -- the first step, I think, is to see if we can get King Hussein -- not if we can get, but if King Hussein can be in a position to come to the table.

Q In the light of the fact -- excuse me, Marvin -- in the light of the fact that the Israelis still are rejecting the Reagan initiative, they have nothing new --

A We've talked about this many times. The Reagan initiative, the September 1 peace plan, is clearly the position we would take in those talks, the positions we would support in those talks.

Marvin?

Q Alan, twice you've said this backing of the Palestinians, but you haven't said the PLO. Are you trying to draw a distinction there?

A We're not trying to specify specifically whom King Hussein needs as backers. That's something he will have to --

Q You say the "Palestinians." Who do you mean?

A I'm not going to try to define it further.

Q Alan, do you have anything further on the Secretary's comment on the lack of progress in Ambassador Rumsfeld's talks with the Syrians?

A No.

Q Where is Ambassador Rumsfeld today?

A He is in Israel.

Q Can I ask on the first -- Jim's question, Alan? Can you address this aspect of it: Saudi officials were quoting as -- interpreting this sale or the purchase from France as a way of protest to the strategic cooperation agreed upon between U.S. and Israel. Would you -- do you see it as such? Would you care to comment and respond?

A I don't have a characterization to offer you. Why don't you ask the Saudis what --

Q We know what the Saudis said. We're trying to get your response to it.

A I know -- you're telling me what Saudi sources have said, but I'm not going to respond to that.

Q Can you tell us how lenient the Secretary will be with Mr. Gromyko when he meets him in Stockholm --

A I'm sorry, I missed the first part of your question. How --

Q How lenient the Secretary will be with Gromyko in order to bring the Russians back to the peace table?

A I don't it's a question of being lenient. It's a question of putting our policies and positions out, discussing the full range of issues, and having a discussion of that sort. I wouldn't characterize it in terms of leniency, particularly.

Q Do you think he will ever be able to bring them back to the peace talk table?

A I can't predict on that, and I don't think we have tended to do that. In terms of the arms talks that are going on, or had been going on, in any case in Geneva and in Vienna, we think we have good positions out there. We have a reasonable negotiating position. We're willing to negotiate. It's not take-it-or-leave-it. And we think the Soviets should come back to the table. We hope they will.

Q Alan, I just heard you saying that you want King Hussein to come to the negotiating table. Based on what? Is it the President Reagan initiative, the first summit conference, the United Nations Resolutions 242/338, or what? What are the conditions that you want, all the circumstances that you want him to come?

A I'm really not going to go back and have a briefing on all the things that we've briefed on in the last year and a half. I refer you back to the record on it.

Our position at those talks would be the President's position as laid out in his speech. We've made it clear that others may come in with other positions on the issues. That's what negotiations are all about.

Q Several months ago when there was a bit of a crises in Chad, the U.S. had forces that went into the region. Have all of those forces been withdrawn?

A U.S. had forces --

Q Yes.

A I see what you're saying.

Q There were planes that flew in in Sudan.

A Clearly, the planes have left. I guess the quickest way is to ask you to ask the Pentagon the answer to that question. I don't know the answer to that question.

Q Do you -- has that call just passed by? Is there no U.S. concern with what is now happening in Chad?

A Oh, I wouldn't say that. I don't think that that's --

Q Do you have anything down there that -- nothing?

A I don't have written guidance but I think that we have been concerned. There is guidance actually, probably available in the Press Office, about the talks at the OAU and our concern that those talks have not gone anywhere, and I think there is continuing concern for precisely what it is that Libya intends with its occupation forces in northern Chad.

Q Because none of those forces have gone back, have they?

A Libyan forces?

Q Yes.

A No.

Q Also under the category of pending business, does the State Department now have any clearer view of how classified documents got to the Lorton Prison?

A Don't have anything new on that at this point, Larry. There may be something coming up in the next week or so, and we will make it known to you. You won't have to drag it out of us when we have something to say about it.

Q There's been a new spate of coup rumors out of Guatemala. Have you seen any of these reports? Do you have anything on them?

A Not really. We don't have information. Obviously, we're aware of those reports, but we don't have information to confirm the reports.

We would oppose any change of government in Guatemala other than through democratic means. Since coming to power, General Mejia has confirmed that his government would hold constituent assembly elections this July, and we fully support this decision and look foward to the early announcement of an electoral law.

Q Copy of that?

A Yes.

Q Alan, just one more thing, and you don't have to go back to a year and a half of briefings. Hussein, if he does have a green light, so to speak, he needs a partner to talk, assuming that those talks you're encouraging are to be under the Reagan plan. Israel has refused or rejected the Reagan plan and will not talk on the Reagan plan, so who can you tell us King Hussein will be talking, negotiating with on the Reagan plan?

A I guess I really am going to have to refer you back to the record because we have made clear that we would not expect that all of the parties that would sit down at the talks, which are already established under the Camp David Accords, and the basis is laid out in those Accords, but we would not expect everybody who comes there to come with the same negotiating position.

We would go with the negotiating position the President has laid out. We have made very clear that the President's initiative is well within the Camp David Accords. So we don't see a problem in that particular respect. Others come to the table with different positions, fine. The point is to go back and talk.

Q You know that Israel would come to the negotiating table?

A I'm not going to try to speak for Israel. So, I think, as I say, the next step is essentially for King Hussein to obtain the support that he needs to come to the table. That's not a new position. That's what we've been saying for quite sometime.

Q Can I understand from this that you would like very much to open the negotiation with King Hussein and the PLO or King Hussein -- or the PLO through King Hussein first, and then after that to carry it on to Israel because Israel will not participate in these talks as --

A I don't think I would consider that an interpretation of what I said. I'd go back to my word instead of trying to drag the PLO and the United States into the same forum on that.

Q A report in the Washington Post -- the budget -- the Reagan Administration cut the budget by the World Bank. But cutting the budget of the World Bank, that means this Administration doesn't care for the Third World countries or poor countries and also the poor in this country?

A No, no. I wouldn't say that at all. This was the position the Administration took and I would refer you to the statements that have been made by the representatives to the various conferences that have been held, but it certainly would be amistake to say the Administration doesn't care about Third World countries.

Q I mean, also, is there any secret deal with China because China is also affected by the budget?

A No.

Q Thank you.

A Okay, you're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:26 P.M.)

Glenon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 18, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #11

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 18, 1984, 12:14 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Okay. A hardy crew. I have a couple of announcements for you.

First, an announcement regarding the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. Available in the Press Office is the 1983 Report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. The Commission is an independent, bipartisan body created by Congress to conduct a continuing overview of the U.S. Information Agency. Its Chairman is Edwin J. Feulner, Jr.

The Commission has assessed current programs and activities of the agency, which includes the Voice of America. Its report and recommendations are being submitted today to President Reagan, the Congress, the Secretary of State, and USIA Director Charles Z. Wick.

Questions concerning the report should be directed to G. Richard Monsen or Bruce Gregory of the Advisory Commission's staff. Telephone number on that is 485-2457.

Second --

Q Alan, will we be able to get copies of that?

A In the Press Office afterward.

Second, a statement regarding the assassination of Dr. Kerr. At about 9:30 this morning Beirut time, two unidentified male assailants attacked Dr. Malcolm Kerr, the President of the American University in Beirut, as he was exiting an elevator enroute to his office at the university. Dr. Kerr was pronounced dead at American University Hopsital shortly afterwards. AUB has been closed in mourning for Dr. Kerr.

We understand that members of the Kerr family are in Beirut. We urge you to respect their privacy in the wake of their grievous loss.

We have no information on Dr. Kerr's assailants beyond press reports that the Islamic Jihad publicly has claimed responsibility for the assassination. We view Dr. Kerr's assassination as an outrageous and contemptible act directed against a respected educator who tirelessly and courageously served the principles of academic freedom and excellence in education. We wish to express our deepest sympathy to the Kerr family.

Dr. Kerr's untimely and tragic death at the hands of these despicable assassins must strengthen our resolve not to give in to the acts of terrorists. Terrorism is repugnant and contrary to the principles for which Dr. Kerr stood.

Q May we have a copy of that, please?

A Sure. That's it on announcements and so forth. Happy to take questions.

Q Alan, when you say "strengthen our resolve not to give in to terrorism," does that translate into anything specific?

A I don't have anything specific at this point except that it clearly means we should not back away in the face -- specifically in the face of terrorist activities and say, "My goodness, we better leave." Not going to do that.

Q Alan, this is the most recent in a number of terrorist activities by the Islamic Jihad against Americans in Lebanon. Is the United States going to do anything about this group, or just let it continue?

A Well, we've indicated before we're not really sure what this group is, whether there indeed is a group as such or whether different people doing different things are using the same name. We just don't know anything about it.

Obviously, we're concerned. We will investigate, together with others -- Lebanese authorities in this case -- others in activities which are appropriate, but we certainly don't just sit back and say that there's nothing we can do. We try to find out what we can about them.

Q Would you refresh our memory, Alan, on what investigations or what investigative process we've been participating in, in light of these long string of incidents?

A Well, I can't specifically recall all of them, Jim. You've got, obviously, the Beirut bombing, you've got the Marine bombing, you've got the bombing in

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Kuwait, you've got -- I mean, there are other incidents: the bombings against the French, the bombings against the Israelis, and you've got a lot of things that are terrorist type activities that have been undertaken and which are -- obviously, people are trying to follow up and get as much detail on as possible.

Q What type of assistance are we offering local authorities in these investigations?

A I don't recall, frankly, what we've said in the past. We've talked about it to the extent that I think we have done things in the past or were willing to talk about it. I don't know in this case. This obviously just happened, and I don't know what's happening on the ground in this case.

Q In that these -- the last two things they've claimed credit for -- the Saudi and Dr. Kerr -- have been directed towards individuals, different from the past bombings, any different thing we can do in terms of security or anything different we're doing now since they seem to be at least at the moment going after individuals?

A I don't know the answers to -- whether every individual -- in this case the president of a university -- can be expected to have some sort of mammoth security apparatus. I don't know how you deal with that sort of thing. I'm not an expert on terrorism, but I'm sure that people are looking at this and considering ways that at least one can reduce the chances and advice that can be given to individuals in situations where the possibility of terrorism may be perceived to be particularly high.

But, obviously, people have to go about their lives, and as long as there are murderers who are determined to kill people, obviously, there is a risk. But you do what you can.

-- MORE --

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Q New subject? On a lighter note, what are these penguins and whales demonstrating against outside the C Street entrance? What is the conference going on here now?

A It's an Antarctica Conference. An informal working group consisting of representatives of the 16 nations who are consultative parties to the Antarctic Treaty opened the third in a series of meetings in Washington today. The purpose of the meeting is to continue efforts begun about 1½ years ago to negotiate and draft a new agreement with regard to the potential exploration and development of mineral resources in the Antarctic which would supplement the Antarctic Treaty itself.

The meeting will continue for the next eight working days, ending on January 27. At the conclusion of the meeting, the Chairman of the working group, Christopher Beeby from New Zealand, will brief the press, but the time and place for that briefing has not yet been set. No substantive information will be available during the course of the discussions, so I guess I have to ask you to hold your questions until that time.

Q Copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Do we have any response to Mr. Gromyko's speech in Stockholm?

A I'm sure there'll be a response, Greg, but I think we will defer to the Secretary's party on that question.

Q It was rather tough sounding. Do we consider it a rejection in any way of Reagan's --

A It's very tempting to comment, but as I say, we'll defer comment to the Secretary's party.

No other questions?

A Alan, a group, the Arms Control Association today criticized the Administration for releasing seven possible violations of treaties submitted by the Soviet Union. It said that going public sort of gave the lie to the President's intentions of dealing again with the Soviets when there are private channels for dealing with these. What would the comment be in response to that?

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A First of all, as of this point we have not made any detailed, on-the-record comment on this subject. As you know, we have indicated that the Hill is being briefed in response to their requirement for a report. A report was done. They're being briefed on it at this point. The report will actually be sent up to the Hill shortly. I don't have a precise time on that.

Information on that subject was presented during a background briefing last week. And I guess we just don't have anything more to say beyond what the Secretary indicated in his press conference last week, which is that, first of all, there's no inconsistency between having problems and trying to work ahead and resolve not only those problems but others as well. But also there's no inclination to hide from the problems that we have. So I guess that would be the response I would have to give you on that.

Q Alan, a couple of questions on Central America. Anything new on the case of Captain Avila? Any new information; anything new you wish to say?

A There really isn't much on that. As the report on the situation in El Salvador, which was issued on the 16th indicated, the Salvadoran Attorney General is continuing to pursue the prosecution in the case of the murders of Michael Hammer and Mark Pearlman, despite a number of adverse rulings by the Salvadoran courts.

Captain Eduardo Avila has been linked to that case, and in December '83 he was charged with an infraction of military discipline and was arrested. That current charge carries a penalty of thirty days' detention, but it's possible additional charges could be filed against him.

Our concerns in the issue are clearly related to any testimony that Captain Avila might be able to provide which would further a resolution in the AIFLD case.

Q Which raises the question of, has it been possible to take testimony from him while he was --

A I think that's a question you would have to address to Salvadoran authorities.

Q Okay. On Nicaragua, Mr. Ortega gave a wide-ranging press conference yesterday in which he said, among other things, that he believed the crew of the helicopter that went down on the Honduran border were "sappers;" that is to say, engineers who specialized in mines and such. Anything on that?

He also charged that the FDN has U.S. support for a rather large-scale offensive with the aim of liberating territory.

A On the second part, I will obviously not comment, as we never do, on allegations of intelligence activity.

On the former, I really would refer you to what the Pentagon has said about this. They have pointed out that the two passengers were engineers who were involved in improvement of the airfield at Aguacate, and that the helicopter was on a routine flight between San Lorenzo and Aguacate, as part of the Ahuas Tara II joint military exercise. So that would not obviously agree in any way with that description of their role for that flight's mission.

Q One final question on that. Mr. Ortega said he believed that the United States and Honduras were discussing the possibility of a joint U.S.-Honduran military base or bases. Anything on that?

A I think, again, there has been indication before that we don't have any plan to establish bases, U.S. bases, in Honduras. On the other hand, we have been working on -- in part of this exercise in upgrading the airfield, and so on, to facilitate the exercise and upgrade those capabilities, but it isn't a question of establishing a U.S. base in those places.

Q Would there be any reason now why the helicopter was unmarked if it was on a routine flight?

A It's been said that it was unmarked, but I think that the Pentagon's indicated there were markings on it. It's been said that there was mud over the markings. I think Mike Burch has indicated he was looking into that question. He wasn't confirming that was the case, but he understood that if that was the case, there was a question to be answered and he said he was looking into it. I don't know that he's resolved that yet.

As you may know, the two engineers who were passengers on the plane were giving a press conference in Honduras today. So it is possible -- I don't have a readout on that because it was only due to end a few minutes ago -- but it's possible they had answers to some of these questions. I just don't know, however. And I really would have to refer you to the Pentagon for that kind of question.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:30 P.M.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

THURSDAY, JANUARY 19, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #12

THURSDAY, JANUARY 19, 1984, 12:27 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have one statement for you regarding Iranian persecution of the Baha'i. We've recently received additional disturbing reports of the Iranian Government's severe persecution of that country's Baha'i community. According to these reports, during November and December 1983, Iranian authorities arrested some 180 Baha'i, most of them former elected members of Baha'i organizations which disbanded in early September following a declaration by Iran's Chief Revolutionary Prosecutor that "activities of Baha'is are banned in Iran."

In addition, 70 more Baha'is were reportedly arrested January 1 through 3, 1984. As of last week more than 550 Baha'is, many of them women, were imprisoned in Iran. Some Baha'is are known to have died under torture while in prison; others have simply disappeared and are presumed dead.

The United States supports efforts in international fora such as the U.N. Human Rights Commission and the U.N. General Assembly's Third Committee to highlight and to combat the Iranian Government-directed persecution of the Baha'is. We wish to take this occasion to reiterate what President Reagan has already said last May 22: "America and the world are increasingly alarmed and dismayed at the persecution and severe repression of the Baha'is in Iran."

That's the end of the statement. Happy to --

Q Copies of that, please, Alan?

A Yes. Sure.

Q Any reason, other than the obvious, for doing that now?

A No. But I think the reason is indeed rather obvious.

Q Tell me what the obvious reason --

A It's a pretty terrible situation --

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Q I know, but --

A -- and it's worth calling attention to.

Q Why does Khomeini dislike the Baha'is?

A I don't pretend to be an expert on why Khomeini dislikes Baha'is or a lot of other people. I'll leave that -- why don't you go ask the Iranians. Maybe it would be interesting to get some responses from them.

Q Alan, what can you tell us about decisions made by this government to lift some of the Polish sanctions?

A Okay. The President has decided to permit the landing of Polish charter flights and lift the ban on fishing by Polish vessels in U.S. waters. You recall that in December, the President stated "we will give immediate and serious consideration to the issues raised by Lech Walesa."

The President has also taken note of some positive developments in Poland such as the release of the vast majority of political prisoners and the successful visit by His Holiness Pope John Paul II.

It is the President's hope that the Administration's action will help contribute to the process of reconciliation and the improvement of human rights in Poland.

Q Can I ask a question about this? Did we get anything in reciprocity?

A I think that the basis for the decision is as I have just given it to you.

Q Charter flights, I understand, are 88 --

A That's right. That's the number that they requested.

Q Over what period of time?

A I think that is in the course of a year.

Q 88 this year?

A I will check on this.

Q These are Polish charter planes or any charter plane from Poland?

A No. These are -- well, they requested 88 charter flights, and that is the number that they have been granted.

Q For what purpose, Alan?

A It hasn't -- not specified.

Q And are we to understand this as the first step in a process that will continue?

A Well, let me note a couple things on that. First, other sanctions remain in place, and it's our hope that the situation will improve sufficiently to permit us to lift other sanctions as well in the near future.

The Polish Government has taken some positive steps: The release of the vast majority of political prisoners and the successful visit by the Pope. Very serious human rights problems remain, such as those still imprisoned and their treatment, and, the pending trials of the 11 KOR and Solidarity activists. We will continue to do what we can to encourage a policy of reconciliation in Poland.

The President's step-by-step policy toward Poland remains unchanged.

Q Can you quantify the release of political prisoners?

A How many? I do not have numbers on that. Sorry.

Q Do we know how many remain in custody?

A Don't have anything in detail for you on that.

Q Do we know, though?

A I can't answer that question. I don't know.

Q Alan, in a statement on May 1 of '82, Reagan was listing the conditions under which we would lift sanctions, and one of them was the reopening of a genuine dialogue between the government and Solidarity led by Lech Walesa. Have we given up on that condition?

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A I think that it has been -- there have been a lot of statements over time about that, about the need for dialogue with representative trade unions and so on. And, as I say, the President's policy has not changed on this, and the steps which have been taken are taken, as I say, for the reasons I have given you.

Q Alan, could you spell out which sanctions remain in place?

A Yes. A freeze on new credits, suspension of Poland's MFN status, opposition to Poland's membership in the IMF, suspension of landing rights for regularly scheduled flights for the Polish airline LOT, suspension of travel between the two countries under the Maria-Sklodowska-Curie joint travel fund which finances joint scientific research projects, suspension of Export-Import Bank's line of credit insurance for Poland, and curtailment of the shipment of non-humanitarian agricultural commodities for distribution by the Polish Government.

Q Copy of that?

A Yes. We can make that available.

Q There's a report that -- I can't describe the source of it now, I don't know, it was sent to us from New York -- that Moscow is considering not attending the summer Olympics in Los Angeles because "the State Department is interfering with their travel arrangements."

Do you have anything on that at all?

A No. Not really. The U.S. has obligations, obviously, in terms of allowing people to go to the Olympics, and we will uphold those responsibilities as host in all respects. This includes allowing athletes from all countries properly accredited to the IOC unhindered entry.

As President Reagan stated, "The United States will welcome athletes from all nations to participate in the 1984 Olympic games in Los Angeles."

Q Do you know what might be the source of their complaint?

A No. I don't.

Q They haven't filed a formal note of concern or protest with the State Department?

A I don't know what the situation is that you're raising specifically. That's really what I've got on it at this point, Dennis.

Q Has there been some problem with their accreditation?

A I'm not aware of a problem with their accreditation.

-- MORE --

Q May I go to the Middle East for a question or two? King Hussein is reported to have said he will not discuss the Reagan plan when and if he meets with Yassir Arafat of the PLO because, he says, the United States did not meet what he was told by U.S. officials, that is a freeze on settlements and Israel would withdraw from Lebanon.

Do you have any comment on that?

A No. We've addressed these kinds of questions many, many times before. I don't have anything new to offer you on it.

Q It is something that just came up yesterday.

A But we have addressed the issues many times before, and I'll refer you back to our record on that.

Q Are you aware of any U.S. Government approach to Arafat within the last three weeks?

A No. Our position on the PLO remains unchanged.

Q -- indirect approach to Arafat?

A No, the answer is; but the fact is, obviously, we talk to people who talk to Arafat. If you want to call that an indirect approach in any sense, I suppose you could. But I would caution you against doing that, because you're asking me have we purposefully done something (inaudible).

Q Have we purposefully tried to get a message through to Arafat through a third party?

A I'm not aware that we have, Marvin. Our message to Arafat is one that has been articulated many times over many years, which is that our position on dealing with the PLO is as it has been, that is we would talk with them if they did the things we have insisted upon, which is to accept 242, 338, and Israel's right to exist.

Q That's a "no," then. So far as you know, there has been no indirect approach to Arafat?

A I'm not aware of any approaches.

Q You could also refer me back to many previous statements, but I'm going to ask you about Shamir's comment where he is saying that he is disappointed, so to speak, with King Hussein because King Hussein knows that Israel has rejected the Reagan plan and would never talk with "the terrorists." Do you have any comment on that?

A No.

Q Do you have any comment on a Washington Post story today that Argentina has said they will no longer help the contras in Central America?

A No, Bill. We have, obviously, in terms of allegations of U.S. involvement with contras, declined to address such questions because they include allegations of intelligence-type activity; and I think the same kind of thing would hold in that case, but also because it would be commenting on another country's foreign policy and involvement in a third country, and I don't think I'm going to do that.

I did note that that article talked about perhaps a decision by Argentina to support very strongly the Contadora process, which of course, we do as well; and we share what is reported to be Argentina's encouragement by the results of a most recent Contadora meeting, as an indication that the negotiating process among the Central American countries is a serious effort and is moving forward. That they have chosen to support this apparently is something that we would, obviously, welcome.

Q Alan, on the Polish thing again, allowing the Poles to go back to fishing in American waters, how much of a catch did they have in the past? Is there a price tag on that?

A I don't have figures for the past; can't give you a specific number on the future either. That depends, as I understand it, largely on the amount -- for any country -- on the amount that that country agrees to buy from U.S. fishermen. And once there are joint venture agreements in place, then allocations are made.

Q Is that the way it works?

A That's the way it works.

Q In the North Atlantic only or what?

A Excuse me.

Q It is in the North Atlantic only?

A I don't know what waters we're specifically talking about.

Q Alan, I gather a member of the new Nigerian regime has been in town. Has he had any discussions with officials of the State Department? And what was the subject?

A I think we did have some guidance on this subject before, and I would ask you to check in the Press Office on that.

Q Allan, any readout on the Malaysian Prime Minister's visit?

A No. There have been readouts at the White House, and I would have to refer you to those.

Q Alan, on this Polish decision, when did the President make this decision?

A I don't have that, Marvin.

Q Was that decision passed on by Shultz to Gromyko?

A (A) I don't know, and (B) I'm not going to get into the subjects discussed between the Secretary and the Foreign Minister.

Q Do you know if a date has been set to resume MBFR?

A I think the Secretary addressed this, and I don't have anything beyond what he said about it.

Q The report said he was vague.

Q So is Alan. (Laughter)

Q There is a report in a Dallas paper that the Reagan Admninstration wants to renew a request for a Jordanian Strike Force. Do you have anything on that?

A No. Obviously, there have been reports about this subject in the past, and we have declined to comment on them, and I'm going to stick to that at this point.

Q While I have your attention, anything about the Honduran report in the paper this morning that that helicopter was actually on a mission?

A Yes, simply that we have checked very carefully and stand by our previous statements that that helicopter was on a routine flight between San Lorenzo and Aguacate. The investigation that DOD is conducting is continuing on that, and obviously, there are a number of questions left to be answered if they can be. For example: Did that helicopter indeed stray inadvertently into Nicaraguan air space?

I don't know that we'll get a definitive answer on that, but anyway that's a question that is obviously out there, and it's not clear. What is clear is that Nicaraguan troops fired on the helicopter and its crew after it had come down in Honduran territory.

Q Do you have any notion what this, I guess it was a colonel, was talking about then -- what kind of -- ?

A No.

Q Was a flight plan filed three days in advance?

A No. Really, you should go to the Pentagon for all these kinds of questions, but I have checked on them and the answer is that I've been told very clearly, no, and that it is not a practice to file a flight plan three days in advance, so I don't know how that tracks at all.

Q Who would you file a flight plan with if you were going to fly across Honduran air space? Do they have something like our FAA?

A You've really got to go to the Pentagon for that kind of question.

Q Alan, I guess I should ask if there is any independent assessment here of the Shultz-Gromyko talks, or any statement on Gromyko's speech?

A We will stick with where I was yesterday, which is that any comment on that comes out of the party.

Page 10 is missing.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, January 20, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #12/137

FRIDAY, JANUARY 20, 1984, 12:19 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have two brief announcements:

First, to tell you that available in the Press Office is the text, as prepared for delivery, of a speech given by Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Motley before the Foreign Policy Association in New York City last night. The speech is entitled "Is Peace Possible in Central America?"

Second, with regard to the Guatemalan elections, we note with pleasure that yesterday the Guatemalan Government issued the electoral decree covering the Constituent Assembly elections to be held on July 1. We believe the Government of Guatemala has taken an important step toward the establishment of democratic, constitutional rule in Guatemala.

That's it for announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, do you know anything about a meeting that's taking place on Cape Verde between Angola and South Africa?

A Not really. That's a -- I've seen the reports on that, Jim. That's a subject I think you would have to address to the governments referred to in that --

Q Is Frank Wisner there?

A I don't know where Frank is at this particular point.

Q Well, is the United States taking any part, direct or indirect?

A Ah, are there any -- you're taking about are there tripartite talks, in essence, going on --

Q No.

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A The answer to that is we remain in continuing contact with all the parties to the negotiations, including both Angola and South Africa, but there are no tripartite talks going on involving the U.S., South Africa and Angola as reported in the press.

Q There is no American representation at all at that meeting?

A Well, I think that would constitute tripartite talks.

Q Well, we could have an observer who would not be part of the --

A I'm not trying to be clever.

Q Okay.

Q Could you check --

A But, again, if it's a question of staying in touch, sure, we're in touch.

Q Would you check to see if Frank Wisner is there?

A Is where?

Q In Cape Verde.

A I'll try and see if I can find out where he is. I'm not sure that I have that, but, yes, I'll look into it.

Q Do you have anything on the same subject with respect to the rejection of the Angolan proposal that was covered today?

A Well, simply that in our view it is not possible to gauge the status of a complex ongoing negotiation through textual analysis of press communiques issued by various parties in various contexts over many weeks.

The South African proposal for a 30-day disengagement starting January 31 remains very much alive, and we're confident that no party has rejected it.

In our continuing contacts with the parties, we will be urging the importance of a period of restraint to help create the atmosphere for resolving the broader issues.

Q May we get a copy of that?

A Yes.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the activities of Mr. Rumsfeld?

A He's in London at this point, having earlier been in Rome.

Q Do you have a reaction to the Islamic Conference and Egypt?

A I don't, Bill.

Q Any further information on the threats of some sort of Kamikaze in the Lebanon area?

A No, not really. I think that the Pentagon has some words on that. Essentially the answer is that U.S. forces are always aware of and preparing against various kinds of contingencies, but I'm not going to talk about specific contingencies.

Q Does this mean that the last information was really serious, that there is something around?

A What it means it that we don't talk about the kinds of preparations that are made to deal with various contingencies. I wouldn't -- I'm not trying to steer you one way or another on it.

Q Can you bring us up to date? Is there now a new examination of the circumstances of the helicopter's downing on the border between Honduras and Nicaragua?

A I don't think there's a new investigation of that, Jim. There has been an ongoing investigation, a thorough one, being conducted by the Department of Defense. We've talked about this, referred to it several times, as has DOD. But, again, following reports this morning, we've checked with the Pentagon, we've checked with our Embassy, and we stand by the previous statements.

Q Are there any official U.S. personnel in that area involved with road construction or road inspection -- that is, of any U.S. Government agency -- from, say, six kilometers to the east of Las Strojes and near Cifuentes?

A I don't know specifically what might be going on in terms of road construction. I think that the Pentagon has indicated that they're not involved in that road construction, but I really would refer you to them.

Q What about other agencies? If AID, for example, is helping with the road or infrastructures, as they sometimes do. That wouldn't be a Defense Department --

A Okay. Check with AID. I just don't know the answer to it.

Q Alan, that investigation that you mentioned on the helicopter incident, is that finished, complete? Do you have findings of it?

A No. I have not -- to my knowledge, it is not yet complete, although, obviously, they have spent a fair amount of time on it at this point. But I'm not aware that it's complete yet. But, again, check with the Pentagon.

Q Can you confirm the assertion in the Post today that Negroponte has ordered details to be re-examined and that the Embassy has gone to Honduran authorities to account for the differences in their accounts of the incident?

A I can't address the first part of it. I don't know the answer. In terms of are we in touch with the Honduran authorities, the answer to that is yes. We are trying to square away why it is that different kinds of statements are coming out of the Honduran authorities compared with what our investigations and inquiries and so on have shown to be the facts.

Q Alan, just to clarify, are there -- is there one investigation by the Defense Department and the Embassy inquiries are part of that, or is the Embassy conducting a separate investigation with a separate report?

A I don't know that the Embassy is conducting a separate investigation. Obviously, with all the statements that are being quoted in the press, people are concerned to make sure that we understand what -- not only what happened, but what is behind the various statements -- is there some misunderstanding -- or just what it is.

In any case, I think everybody's working together, but the basic look at it, the examination that's going on, is the DOD investigation of it.

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Q Alan, after the Secretary left Stockholm and after he held his news conference, reports appeared in Stockholm quoting the Soviets as saying there may be a possibility that the MBFR talks could resume.

A Yes.

Q Do you have anything to think that may be right?

A All I can really say about that is that there has been no date agreed, and we obviously are hopeful that we could reach agreement to resume the MBFR talks in the foreseeable future. But I can't really take you beyond that at this point. I'm aware of the report you're talking about, but I can't take you beyond that.

Q Alan, is there a sort of standing invitation to King Hussein to visit Washington?

A I don't know -- the answer is I don't know whether there's in essence a "standing invitation." Obviously, he is always welcome here pending working out scheduling problems, but I don't know, you know, in the technical sense whether there --

Q Would you take the question, please?

A No. I think that the fact of the matter is that he's always welcome to come here.

Q Do you have anything on the situation in Uruguay where there apparently is a little bit of unrest?

A Yes. I do have something on it.

Our Embassy in Uruguay reports that the general strike called for January 18 was honored by most participants, affecting most of the country's commerce, business and industry.

The Government of Uruguay has responded by issuing a decree declaring the Interunion Worker's Assembly (PIT), the labor group that organized the strike, illegal and dissolving that organization. The decree also prohibits reporting on the general strike or any future strike calls.

Our policy has been to support a political process, as determined by the Uruguayans themselves, which will lead to the return of a democratic constitutional government in Uruguay. We believe that freedom of assembly and of expression, including the development of free and independent labor organizations, are fundamental elements of a democratic system.

We note that important steps have been taken to carry out the transition to a democratic government in Uruguay. The established transition timetable calls for elections in November 1984 and the return to a civilian government in 1985. The Government of Uruguay has repeatedly reaffirmed its commitment to this timetable. We believe the continuation of this process is important and hope that events occuring during the past few days will not disrupt the achievement of this objective.

Q Copy, please?

A Sure.

Q Are you urging them to lift the ban on the trade union? That's not clear by this statement.

A I don't think I would get into the question of, you know, what our discussions might be. Our approach to the issues are expressed in that statement.

Q Alan, with the end of this month approaching now, do you have further information on the joint commission, the Israeli-American joint commission?

A I don't.

Q Noth [illegible]

Q Alan, Eric Gairy is to return to Grenada tomorrow, and he has said that he expects to be afforded some special status, receiving security, etc., as the last elected Prime Minister of Grenada.

What will his status be in the view of our Mission there, and do you foresee any talks or contacts between the official U.S. Mission and Sir Eric?

A I don't know whether there'd be any contacts with him. Obviously, there would be contacts with a variety of people in Grenada. As far as his status, I think that's a matter of what -- where he fits into the current Grenadan Government, and to my knowledge -- you know, we have the Governor-General and we have the government in place at this point, and I'd refer you to them to discuss their own government structure.

Q Alan, do you have anything further on the Soviet travel arrangements for the Olympics that we asked on yesterday?

A Not really a lot. I don't know -- I mean, most of what I have, really, is to reiterate the points that we made yesterday, that we are not seeking to -- or not only not seeking to, but are not in the way of arrangements that are being made or liaison between Los Angeles Olympic Organizating Committee and the Soviets. They apparently have been in contact and have reached agreements within their competence, so I don't really have anything on that.

I said yesterday that we have responsibilities as host, and we will uphold those responsibilities in all respects, including allowing athletes and other Olympic delegation members from all countries properly accredited to the IOC unhindered entry to the United States and, of course, access to all Olympic events.

Q Who has responsibility for security?

A I don't know the answer to that, Spence. That's obviously not a -- I'm sure that our people would be involved to some extent, but we're talking about security within the United States, and that doesn't strike me as being essentially a State Department matter.

Q Alan, the statement that you read and that others in this building are talking about covers athletes, members of the official delegations --

A Yes.

Q What about journalists, Soviet --

A Well, if properly accredited to the IOC, they will also have full access to the Olympic facilities.

Q I think at the news conference yesterday they claimed that the United States had prevented them from appointing an Olympics attache. Could you address that one?

A Well, in principle we don't have any objection to a Soviet Olympic attache in Los Angeles, and we're willing to discuss a request for that. But the Soviets have not brought up with the Department of State any specific individual or submitted a visa application.

Q Alan, there is almost --

A Let me take some other questions. I'll come back to you. Larry?

Q On the subject of travel arrangements, in a different field, did the Soviet Union refuse permission for an American aircraft to land in Moscow to pick up Ambassador Hartman to take him to the Stockholm talks?

A I don't know the answer to that question.

Q Do you have any statement on the UNESCO Director General's letter to Shultz earlier this week?

A No, not really a statement. It's a long letter, as you're aware, and it was dated the 18th, a couple days ago. We have -- I assume you have copies. They made it available. We can make available a copy if you don't have one. But at this point we don't have a particular response to it.

Q Alan, one more on the Olympics, if I could. In a sense, the crux of the matter appears to be a question of to whom the Soviets must address their requests. Is it the Department's position that the Soviets should address their requests for travel arrangements directly to the Department? And, secondly, I gather the import of what you said about the attache is that certainly in that case they should address such a request directly to the Department.

A Well, if they're looking for a visa, I would think that's right. The issue of charters and so on, I gather, has been discussed between -- transportation has been discussed with the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee. At this point I really am not in a position to go beyond that, but obviously any agreement that they -- those two committees -- reach between them within their own competence, that's fine.

The government has certain responsibilities and competence as well, and therefore any agreement that would affect our areas of competence could not be binding between those two committees, so we would have to get involved. But I can't really at this point spell out for you all the details of how all this is going to work. I just don't know at this point.

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Q There is almost a unanimous condemnation in Lebanon from different factions of the murder of -- assassination of Dr. Kerr. How do you read this?

A I think I read it as a reflection of the high regard in which Dr. Kerr was held by a variety of people across the spectrum within Lebanon, and it only underscores the tragedy of the assassination, murder, of a man who's dedicated his life to learning and understanding.

Q But behind the academic prestige of Dr. Kerr, you don't find any political indications to the fact that the Lebanese, even the Shi'ites and the others who were accused of being terrorists, taking this attitude? You don't find it political?

A I don't think I'm prepared at this point to draw those kinds of conclusions. I think to understand the motivations of the murderers, you'd have to get ahold of them and ask them.

Q Alan, on Monday in his speech President Reagan claimed that nuclear weapons are good for the world peace, or in a way that means the U.S. at least has made the world safer by making more nuclear weapons. That means this Administration is committed to build more nuclear weapons rather than to put pressure on others not to do so?

A I'm not going to try to -- first of all, the attitude towards the approach, serious approach towards disarmament and arms control is laid out in a variety of speeches and presentations. I'm not going to try to do that.

I'm also not going to try to give a seminar here on deterrence, but I think that that is in fact the context in which the President made his remarks, and I would refer you to that and to general discussions of deterrence as opposed to suggesting that the effort is indeed in some way to willy-nilly build weapons. That clearly is not the case.

Q But really in a way how long the world will be safer by building more nuclear weapons? (Sic)

A Well, again, I'd refer you to a lot of discussion that exists in the literature about the question of deterrence and the concept of deterrence.

Q Alan, do you have any official confirmation of the reported pullout of Cuban troops from Ethiopia?

A I don't have confirmation. I think we indicated the other day there were some indications that there might be some draw-down of some of the Cuban forces in Ethiopia, but I don't have any specifics to give you at this point.

Larry?

Q Do you have any -- does the State Department have any reaction to the remarks yesterday afternoon of the Malaysian Prime Minister in which he severely criticized the United States and the industrialized nations of the world for ignoring or thwarting what he said are the legitimate aspirations of the Third World, including Malaysia?

A Not a specific response to that, no. I've only really seen the wires on it, and I don't have a response. I think that -- I addressed the other day -- the question was asked about whether our contribution to IDA reflected any lack of concern for the Third World, and the answer to that is no, and the answer to this essentially is no, too. But I haven't seen his remarks, and I really don't have a specific response.

Q Do you have any comment on reports saying that Mr. Zhao Ziyang, the Chinese Prime Minister, was very critical to the U.S. policy in the Middle East?

A No. I'm not going to try to speak for Mr. Zhao -- he can speak for himself -- and we're not going to go into the details of the talks beyond what may have been briefed at the White House following his visit here.

Q Alan, Jordan announced day before yesterday that it is not ready to deal with the Reagan plan because you couldn't -- the United States couldn't secure the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon completely and you couldn't get the Israelis to freeze the settlements in the West Bank. Do you have any position on that?

A You asked -- I thought it was you, maybe it was Ghassan -- somebody asked this question the other day.

Q I'm sorry. I was sick. I wasn't here.

A Yes.

Q Alan, a report in the U.S. News and World Report about where the U.S. will stand if the Kremlin is taken by the Russian military.

A I'm sorry? Say that again.

Q If the Russian military takes over the Kremlin, where the U.S. will stand --

A No. I think I'm not going to try to grapple with that one.

Q I mean, if that means the U.S. will support the Russian military as the U.S. does the other military governments?

A It means it's a very speculative question.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:39 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Monday, January 23, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #14

MONDAY, JANUARY 23, 1984, 12:27 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I have a few announcements up front. First, I'd like to congratulate Jim Slade who, I understand, has succeeded Mr. Nokes as President of the State Department Correspondents Association. I don't see Jim here today, but congratulations anyway.

Q Can't hear you.

A Jim Slade, your new President of your Correspondents Association, congratulations.

An announcement on the Secretary's travel plans. We've previously announced that Secretary Shultz will visit Brazil in early February at the invitation of Foreign Minister Guerreiro.

As part of the same trip, the Secretary will visit Venezuela Feburary 1 to 3, and will attend the February 2 inauguration of the new Venezuelan President, Mr. Lusinchi.

Following his visit to Brazil, the Secretary will travel to Grenada and Barbados on February 7 and 8. The Secretary plans to attend Grenada's Independence Day ceremonies on February 7 as a guest of Governor General Sir Paul Scoon and Chairman of the Advisory Council, Nicholas Braithwaite.

On February 8, the Secretary will meet with the Prime Minister of Barbados, Mr. Adams, and Foreign Minister Tull as well as the Prime Ministers of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States.

Q Before you go on, may I ask a question?

A Sure.

Q Will he spend -- how much time will he spend in Grenada?

A It will not be an overnight, Jim.

An announcement on Iran.

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Q Are there any other possible stops on that trip?

A Let me chat about that after the session.

On January 14, 1984, Secretary Shultz formally designated Iran as a country that has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism. Mention of this designation is included in the Secretary of Commerce's report to Congress on the annual renewal of foreign policy controls, and that formal designation is published in today's Federal Register.

And, lastly, on the situation of our Embassy in Berlin, the six East Germans who came to the U.S. Embassy in East Berlin on Friday requesting assistance in immigrating from the GDR have left the Embassy voluntarily. They departed following the conclusion of negotiations with an East German attorney, Dr. Wolfgang Vogel. All of the six individuals have arrived safely in West Berlin.

That's all I have in the way of --

Q Copy on that?

A Sure.

Q John, can I go back to your previous one on Iran? What does that change, since Iran was already excluded from military sales?

A That's correct, Jim. There are already a number of controls on Iran. What this means is that it tightens those regulations. A validated Commerce Department export license will be required for the export to Iran of crime control and detection equipment, of certain military vehicles and equipment on the regional stability list, of aircraft valued at $3 million each or more, of helicopters over 10,000 pounds empty weight, and of goods and technology subject to national security controls if destined for military end-use and valued at $7 million or more.

Most of these items are already subject to a licensing requirement for export to Iran, for either national security or foreign policy purposes. This designation will not mean any change in our licensing policy for export of military items to Iran, none of which is currently approved.

Q Copy of that?

A Sure.

Q And what event or series of events convinced the Secretary to put Iran on the list?

A I think based on convincing evidence of a broad Iranian policy furthering terrorism beyond its borders, including public statements by Iranian officials supporting those acts.

Q What other countries are on the list?

A I don't have a list.

Q Are there other countries on the list?

A There is a terrorism list. I don't happen to have it with me.

Q John, is this the first time Iran has been so formally designated?

A I'll be glad to look at that for you, Bernie. I do not think so. I don't know the answer to that.

Q And are you suggesting that Iran at this point could, if the licenses are issued, get choppers and aircraft, et cetera?

A I think it's very unlikely.

Q John, Iraq was taken off that same list, was it not?

A Let me check on that for you. I'm really not that familiar with it.

Q My recollection, it was. The two together, does that, in effect, ammount to a de facto tilt in the direction of Iraq?

A No. I'd say it's not a tilt. Our position on the Iran-Iraq war and the supply of weapons to both Iran and Iraq is the same. There's no change in that.

This is a specific finding in connection with terrorism.

Q Along those lines, John, of military sales, there is a story this weekend about U.S. concern over Agusta-Bell, the Italian-based manufacturer of Hueys.

A Uh-huh.

Q They have a whole bunch of helicopters that Iran had previously ordered and may have paid for -- I don't know -- and it was suggested that the U.S. Government might step in and become the buyer of second place. Anything on that?

A Don't have anything for you on that, Bill.

Q How about those countries with which we are friendly, which have in the past, either openly or clandestinely, provided Iran with arms, Israel most specifically?

A Our position on the supplies is quite clear. There has been no change in our position.

Q Do we expect the Department to contact other arms suppliers with which we have friendly relations?

A I think they are and would be aware of our position.

Q John, do we get any oil from Iran at this time? And does its placement on the terrorist list affect our ability to buy oil from them?

A I think there is a small -- there is a question regarding oil, but I do not know whether this move would affect that, John.

Q What's the question?

A Whether it would affect the importation of oil?

Q Yes.

A I don't know whether it would affect it or not.

Q You say that there is a small amount being purchased now?

A I understand that there is; but I'd be glad to look into it for you. I think there is a small amount.

Q John, on Friday, King Hassan, of Morocco, said at a press conference, at the Islamic Conference organization, that President Mubarak of Egypt had told him that as far as the Camp David Agreements were concerned, it was essentially dead; that while it may survive as an agreement, Egypt had gotten all it wanted from it, and there was no need to really look at it as a live document.

This has touched off some statements in Israel, and I just wondered whether you have either heard from the Israelis and/or talked to the Egyptians about this.

A I do not know the answer to either of those questions.

Q You have nothing on the statement?

A No.

Q John, since you began the meeting with a reference to a domestic situation, when one of our colleagues asked one of your staff why the State Department Press Office is concealing the list of reporters and their affiliates who are accredited, he was told by this staffer, "If you don't like it, why don't you sue us?"

So, on behalf of this colleague, I have been appointed by the U.S. District Court to serve you and Mr. Romberg.

(Documents handed to the Spokesman and Mr. Romberg.)

A And the question is?

Q Why do you conceal the list of the accredited reporters?

A I think in light of your action, Lester, I would be unwise to offer any response.

Q You'd rather discuss it in court? I mean, the thing is this: You know there are hundreds of --

A Are you going to make a speech now or are you going --

Q I just thought we might save the problem of taking you to court, John, if you would tell us why, when the Congressional Directory has hundreds of names and affiliates, why are you concealing this list?

I'd be honored, personally --

A I think we did, in fact, offer you a formal --

Q You didn't offer me; I'm just a process-server. My appointment is here by the District Court.

A All right. Are there any other questions?

Q I see. O.K.

Q Do you have anything on Jumblatt and what he said over the weekend concerning --

A Not really, Marvin. There have been confusing reports, first that he was asking for the removal of President Gemayel, and then there appeared to be a qualification of that, that he was not; that he was asking for the removal of the Cabinet. But I think in view of the confusion, that we won't have any comment.

Q Is Rumsfeld back yet?

A Yes, he's in Washington.

Q Do you know of any plans, John, for him to break the cycle of silence and --

A No, I do not know of any plans for him to break the cycle of silence.

(Laughter)

Q John, going back to your announcement on the Berlin refugees, what precautions is the U.S. Government taking to make sure that this doesn't become a precedent?

A Well, I don't think we will get into special precautions. As you know, there are -- there's a misconception apparently surrounding the question of asylum. Asylum is something that is not decided upon by an Embassy. That is something that is ruled on and decided upon here. But I'm not going to get into a question of what may or may not be taking place at various embassies.

Q Well, did the East Germans ask for any assurance that the United States would not encourage future cases?

A I don't think we're going to get into discussions surrounding this case. The East Germans were represented -- I think that's the right way to put it -- by an East German attorney. Our Embassy in Berlin certainly had some discussions with that attorney and wanted to be helpful in resolving the situation, but I think that really the East German Government and the West German Government would be the correct ones to go to for a fuller version.

Q Didn't, John, that Norwegian -- I think you met the man, in fact --

A I was trying to remember whether I did. I don't think I did.

Q Wasn't he sitting next to you, maybe, at the press conference?

A No. I think that was -- I have the name written down in my notebook -- but I think that is not in fact the individual they're talking about.

Q But --

A But, no, I don't have anything on the Norwegian press gentleman.

Q John, do you have any more on the talks with the Soviets, conventional force talks and START talks that are supposed to go on?

A No. On the conventional talks, the Secretary talked of the March 16 resumption date during his session on

ABC yesterday. That is, of course, an Alliance decision, but I don't see any reason why that date wouldn't hold, why it wouldn't be good.

Q Are you going to make any new initiatives there?

A I don't think we will get into details of our position.

Q John, do you have anything on the meetings on the strategic cooperation that is going on? Could you tell us who the participants are, the Americans and Israelis?

A Yes. The meeting is being held in Washington today and tomorrow. Don't have anything on the agenda. The American team would be led by Admiral Howe. I do not know who is leading the Israeli team.

Q John, will there be a read-out here on Foreign Minister Abe's visit coming on Friday before the visit?

A I don't know of any plans to do a backgrounder. Let me take a look at it.

Q Are you going to have a read-out on the JPMG?

A I don't think so.

Q John, is the U.S. participating in tripartite talks between Angola and South Africa?

A No.

Q Indirectly?

A No.

Q Giving any advice to either side?

A Well, we certainly have been trying to move things along in a positive direction, but insofar as talks that were held -- as I think Mr. Romberg said on Friday, they were not tripartite talks.

Q John, are you going to have copies of that compliance report over here? The White House is talking about releasing it this afternoon.

A That's the classified document.

Q I guess it is, come to think of it. (Laughter)

A That --

Q The question still applies.

A In that case, we probably won't be distributing that, Hank.

Q John, did I just miss on the Namibia -- there was a question on Namibia. I think --

A The question is whether the United States has been involved. I guess the Angolans and the South Africans were meeting in Cape Verde, and the question is whether we were involved as a government, as a party, to those talks, and the answer was and is no.

Q And where is Frank Wisner now?

A He was in Cape Verde, and he had some talks with the Angolans, but he was not a participant in those talks between those two governments.

Q And where is he now?

A I think he's in Portugal now.

Q Okay. Thank you.

A Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:43 p.m.)

Becker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, January 24, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #15

TUESDAY, JANUARY 24, 1984, 12:17 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I have a few announcements up front.

Available in the Press Office is the prepared statement of Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Langhorne Motley before the House Armed Services Committee. That was today. The subject is the circumstances which led to U.S. participation in the collective security and rescue operation on the island of Grenada last October.

Abe briefing on Thursday at 2:30. A senior State Department official will give a briefing on the upcoming visit of Japan's Foreign Minister Abe. It will be here in our briefing room. It will be ON BACKGROUND.

Finally, this afternoon -- not finally, but this afternoon -- on Lorton, Assistant Secretary for Administration Robert Lamb will hold a briefing on the Department's investigation of the Lorton papers incident. That will be at 3:00 this afternoon, be ON THE RECORD, cameras allowed. An executive summary of the investigative report on the incident will be made available in the Press Office at about 2:45, embargoed until 3:00.

Q Is it possible to get that summary earlier for those who wouldn't necessarily stay around for the --

A Let's see if we can inch it up a little, Bernie.

Q Like after lunch?

A No. I don't think we'll be able to do it that soon, but we might be able to improve on it by 15 minutes, something like that.

Q Break the embargo.

A Finally -- this time really finally -- press announcement of Western proposals at CDE conference. The NATO allies have tabled a package of confidence- and security-building measures at the CDE in Stockholm. The six measures, which make up this package, are described in an announcement available in the Press Office.

The early introduction of the package demonstrates the seriousness of purpose with which the West has approached the CDE. In keeping with the CDE mandate, the six Western proposals to be negotiated are militarily significant, designed to make real progress in improving security in Europe. They will be politically binding, a commitment acknowledged by all participants. They are verifiable, perhaps the most imporant factor of all in building confidence, and, finally, the measures will be applicable to the whole of Europe west of the Urals.

This is a significant advance over the measures negotiated in Helsinki in 1975 which were only applicable to the Western 250 kilometers of the Soviet Union. If they are adopted, the Western proposals will contribute to more openness, more predictability and less uncertainty about the military situation in Europe. They are concrete, practical, and realistic measures, not unverifiable declarations of good intent or repetitions of commitments already undertaken in other agreements. They are mutually reinforcing -- that is, each measure is made stronger by the others.

That's all I have for you up front. Be glad to take any questions.

Q John, first, have you heard of a coup or an attempted coup in Angola?

A No. I have not.

Q Could you look into to see if --

A See what we have, but don't know anything.

Q Okay. On another subject: What is Mr. Rumsfeld doing in Washington?

A Well, today he's involved in a number of consultations on the Hill with various congressmen and senators. As you know, he has talked with the Secretary, I think the President, and is having a number of consultations in Washington.

Q Does the fact that he is back here mean that his mission is now suspended?

A Not to my knowledge. I think it's one of his routine return visits to Washington for consultation.

Q Are you saying, then, he will be going back?

A Certainly don't have any suggestion -- I'm not aware of any suggestion that he will not.

Q Do you have any comment today on Mr. Jumblatt's repeating his call for the resignation of Mr. Gemayel or the (inaudible)?

A No, not really. Mr. Jumblatt's statements have been confusing and contradictory, and I don't think we'll have any comment on them.

Q In what way were they contradictory?

A Well, we had the initial announcement that he was calling for President Gemayel's ouster; then we had a clarification that he wasn't calling for President Gemayel's ouster, but only the Cabinet; and now we have a further report that he is calling for President Gemayel's ouster. And I think that is contradictory and confusing, so we won't have any comment on it.

Q From the point of view of U.S. interests, what difference does it make if he is calling for the ouster of the Cabinet or the President, whom the Cabinet serves?

A Our position and policy has been absolutely plain and is unchanged that we support the legitimate government of Lebanon and we support that Government's efforts to bring about national reconciliation.

Q -- which includes the Cabinet.

A Well, that's for the Lebanese to work out among themselves. We're not deciding the composition. All we're saying is that we support the legitimate government and its efforts to effect national reconciliation. How that is brought about is up to the Lebanese.

Q May we assume that you are now steering away from the security plan, and you are reducing your requirements or whatever demands from Mr. Gemayel?

A Well, it's not our security plan; however, our position on it has not changed.

Q You mean you still would like that security plan to come out?

A Yes, a security plan that in turn would lead to national reconciliation would be a very constructive development.

Q But due to the fact that it is not coming out, you would like to come to some agreement to bring about something similar or closer that will have more dialogue with the opposing parties?

A You mean an alternative security plan?

Q Possibly -- some arrangement there.

A I think that's for the Lebanese to take the initiative on that.

Q I'm referring to the story of John Goshko this morning in the Post, you know, this --

A To the Post story, the suggestion that there's a -- No, no, there is no change in our position. We have supported national reconciliation of all the parties. It seems to us it's not the United States that is narrowing its focus; it is certain factions that are refusing to participate in that process. That is where the narrowing of focus is coming from. It's not from the United States.

Q John, on Jumblatt's statements, are any American officials in touch with him, I mean, have any been in touch with him recently?

A I don't know how recently. Obviously, we have talked with him over a period of time, but I don't know how recently.

Q John, these certain factions you referred to, were those controlled by Syria?

A I think I won't specify. We'll leave it for you and history to chronicle.

Q John, will you have any results to tell us about on this Israeli-American Military Political Committee?

A No, don't think so; don't think there will be any readout.

Q No readout?

A No.

Q Why is that, John?

A Guess they are confidential discussions.

Q Yes. But it was announced when the concept of "strategic cooperation" first came up, it was announced with some fanfare, and suddenly now it disappears.

A Well, I don't know about fanfare.

Q Well, what do you call a briefing?

A (Laughter) You extracted from it, probably. Well, I guess just a decision that there will be no readout.

Q Could it be because of the adverse reaction in the Arab world?

A I think these are confidential discussions. They are discussing a number of issues of which you are aware. I'm sure there will be further discussions. This Political Military Committee is due to meet twice a year, and I think probably the answer is they are not going to announce after every meeting a blow-by-blow program of what has been discussed and what has been decided.

Q Only the Israelis --

Q You will tell us where they are meeting?

A Yes. They were meeting down at Fort McNair.

Q Fort McNair?

A (To staff) Isn't that right, Fort McNair? Yes, I think that's right.

-- MORE --

Q Is the call of the two American aircraft carriers into Haifa, is that part this new strategic cooperation, or whatever you want to call it? I think it's the Eisenhower.

A The two aircraft carriers --

Q The Eisenhower and the --

A I'm sorry, I wasn't -- I mean, it's not unusual that they should call into Haifa.

Q It's the first time, I understand.

A No, I don't think -- the Pentagon could tell you that, but I don't think so. I don't think this is the first call.

Q Do you have any comment today on the question I asked yesterday for which you had no comment about King Hassan's statement that he had been told by President Mubarak that Camp David is essentially dead.

A Not really beyond to restate what is the obvious, Bernie, and that is that President Mubarak and other senior Egyptian officials in their public statements and in private statments to us have made clear Egypt's continuing support for the Camp David Accords.

Egypt continues to be a full and active partner in the peace process. In addition, President Mubarak has spoken out in support of the President's 1982 peace intiative urging King Hussein to enter expanded negotiations with Israel. That's the record.

Q A copy of this?

A Sure.

Q On this point, Mr. Shamir is quoted in the paper this morning that he said that King Hussein completely doesn't agree with Camp David, or something to this effect, that he doesn't go along with Camp David. What do you --

A Don't have any comment.

Q That they want to go along with Camp David, the only thing there is no other alternative for peace talks but based on Camp David?

A Don't have anything to respond on that.

Q What's your position? Does King Hussein accept Camp David and 242 — what's the story?

A Our position on the peace process and the circumstances under which the various parties would sit down together and who those parties might be has been made very plain; no change in that.

Q Do you have anything on a small report on the FBIS about Iraq allegedly receiving Soviet SS-12 missiles which have a range of 800 kilometers?

A No, I don't. Sorry.

Q Going to Angola, following the Cape Verde meetings, is the U.S. getting any closer to eventual recognition of Angola?

A I don't know there is any change in that position. I think what we have been doing is working to bring stability to southern Africa, but in terms of changed relationships, no, I think there's no change.

Q Has there been any change in the numbers of Cubans in Angola?

A In Angola? Not to my knowledge.

Q Ethiopia?

A Ethiopia? You want to try Ethiopia?

Q No, I was asking about Angola first. (Laughter)

A Not to my knowledge. We've seen some reports about lesser numbers in Ethopia.

Q I was wondering whether there were -- one of the things I had heard was that there may be greater numbers in Angola because there are lesser -- fewer in Ethopia.

A I think some months ago there was a little blip in the Cuban figures in Angola. I'm not aware of anymore recent change. Insofar as the departure of Cubans from Ethopia, if they go home and behave themselves, that's something we would welcome.

Q Back to Iraq for a second. Do you if, pursuant to Don Rumsfeld's first trip, when he visited Iraq, is there any formal procedure set up for consultation between the United States and Iraq on --

A As a result of that meeting?

Q As a result of that meeting?

A No.

Q Have there been any meetings since that; do you know?

A There may well have been. I'm not aware of them, but, I mean, I wouldn't rule out that there had been some meetings between Americans and Iraqis. I don't know at what level, but --

Q Could you take the question?

A I'll take a look at it, sure.

Q On Iraq, there is contrbversy in the Congress about Dixon-Berman versus Boschwitz about reinstating Iraq in the countries which support terrorism. What's the position of the State Department on this?

A Iraq is not on the terrorism list at the moment.

Q It's not?

A No.

Q But what's this Dixon-Berman thing that's going to be doing to the effort today?

A Don't know.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:30 P.M.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Wednesday, January 25, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #16

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 25, 1984, 12:27 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have got a couple of announcements and statements. First, available in the Press Office is the joint prepared statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee by AID Administrator McPherson, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Motley, and U.S. Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States, Ambassador Middendorf. The subject of the testimony is "The Inter-American Foundation."

Also, to tell you that this afternoon, sometime after this briefing -- I'm afraid I don't have a specific time to give you at this point -- copies of the report on the status of land reform in El Salvador, which is being transmitted to the Congress today, will be available.

As you know, pursuant to Section 101 (B) of the second Continuing Resolution for FY 84, that is P.L. 98-151 it was stipulated that not more than 90 percent" of the amount made available for military assistance to El Salvador in FY 1984 could be spent until the President had certified to the Congress that "the Government of El Salvador has not taken any action which would alter, suspend, or terminate the land reform program for Phase I or Phase III..." and that the Government of El Salvador "continues to make documented progress on implementing the land reform program."

The document transmitted to the Congress today notes that the new constitution adopted by El Salvador in December protects the land reform program as implemented to date, and provides for the implementation of Phase II which had been deferred. In addition, the Legislative Assembly extended until June 30, 1984, the period during which applications could be filed by tenant farmers under Phase III, the "Land to the Tiller" program. In brief, despite numerous problems, not the least among them left- and right-wing violence, the report documents the accomplishments of land reform -- in four years, over 92,000 Salvadorans have received land either individually or as a member of cooperatives; including their families, more than 550,000 people have benefitted from the agrarian reform; and over 23 percent of El Salvador's total farmland has been transferred to those who previously worked the land but did not own it.

At 3:30 p.m. today, in the briefing room, there will be a background briefing on that land reform certification. For your guidance only — not for publication -- the briefers will be James H. Michael, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs and Peter W. Askin, Director of the Office of Central American Affairs in the Agency for International Development.

A Joint Press Statement is being issued today regarding the Joint Political Miltary Group that has been meeting recently. The statement reads as follows:

As announced by both governments subsequent to the visit of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir of Israel to Washington last November, a Joint Political Military Group has been formed to examine ways to enhance cooperation between our two countries as announced by Prime Minister Shamir and President Reagan.

That group has held its first meeting, in Washington, January 23rd and 24th. The JPMG will convene later in the year.

I'm sure that answers all the question you have about that.

(Laughter)

Q Filing break on that one?

A Let me go on. I have one other statement. No, I think we'll hold the filing break till we finish all of the nuances of that.

Regarding a Pravda attack on Zionism, on January 17, Pravda ran an article drawing sweeping connections between Zionism and Nazism. The views expressed in that piece are so outrageous and so indefensible that we are reluctant to dignify them, or even call further attention to them with a response. Nevertheless, the Soviets should know that no intelligent person can be swayed by the insupportable charges made in that article, and that efforts to refute charges of widespread anti-Semitism in the USSR by slandering the Jewish victims of Nazism convince no one, but rather have precisely the opposite effect. The Soviet authorities cannot disguise their responsibility for the publication of such slander. It comes on the heels of other similar articles in recent months, and as we see it, this is a trend which does no honor to the USSR.

Q Copy?

A Yes.

That's it for announcements. Be happy to take questions.

Q Following that, does the State Department have any reaction to another statement coming from the Soviet Union -- I guess it was an interview with Andropov about arms control?

A Yes, I do have a reaction to that interview. We welcome Chairman Andropov's assertion that the Soviets also believe in dialogue, and we agree wholeheartedly that our common objective should be concrete agreements on the issues that divide our two countries.

As the President said, we think our policies over the past three years have made the world a safer place, but that does not mean we think it is safe enough, and we are ready to redouble our efforts to work with the Soviets to reduce tensions and arms and make it safer still.

Steady American strength and purpose are essential if that effort is to be successful, and neither the Soviets nor anyone else have any reason to be afraid or to refuse to negotiate.

Some of the familiar Soviet proposals he mentioned do not seem very concrete to us. For our part, we have on the table a whole range of specific proposals that try to take into account some of the concerns he described.

We want a joint effort to get down to the business of solving these problems, and we are ready if the Soviets are. We are ready to sit down at any time to discuss solutions that deal realistically and equitably with both sides' interests and concerns.

Regarding intermediate-range missiles, it was Soviet deployment prior to the December 1979 NATO decision which upset the military balance, not the recent NATO deployments. At the U.N., the President proposed a flexible framework for negotiations which could be the basis for agreement. In Geneva, the U.S. placed new proposals on the negotiating table just one week before the Soviets walked out.

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Q Can we have a copy of that first one?

A Copy? Sure.

Q Other than reading this statement, are you taking any measures to follow the dialogue up?

A I don't think I would get into the specifics of our diplomacy on this, Jim. I think that the Secretary addressed, in terms that he considered appropriate, what came out after his meeting with Mr. Gromyko, and I think I'll leave you with the words that were given you at that time.

Q Alan, yesterday, the Boston Globe had a story that a senior Soviet official had suggested that they might be interested in an interim, or a limited, strategic arms agreement which could be negotiated rather quickly.

A Yes.

Q Do you consider that any kind of a signal to the United States? And what, generally, do you think of the notion?

A I can't tell you whether it is a signal or not a signal, Barry, but we, too, would like to reach a START agreement this year. The United States believes that the proposals it currently has on the table are fair and equitable, and if implemented would result in reductions to a more stable balance of strategic forces.

As the President said on January 16th, the U.S. is prepared to meet the Soviets half way if they will do likewise. The first step should be for the Soviets to return to the negotiating table.

Q Alan, do you read anything different or anything new into the slight change of phraseology in Andropov's statement which talked about the readiness to return to the situation? He said the Soviets are ready for an agreement if the U.S. shows that it is prepared to return to the situation that existed prior to the deployment.

That's a little different from saying they won't return to the table until the U.S., or the West goes back to that situation. Am I reading too much into that or --

A I guess I'm not going to try from here to parse all of those sentences. I understand the point you're making. I think the fact of the matter is, as I said, the U.S. has positions on the table at Geneva on INF, and we're not going to find out what those kinds of utterances mean, if they have any special nuanced meanings, until the negotiations resume.

Q Alan --

A It's up to the Soviets, I think, to explain to us if they have something further to say on that question.

Q That goes to the very question of whether the negotiations will resume.

A You can't explore and have a dialogue if you don't have a dialogue, right? So -- I don't know how to get around that one, Ralph.

Bernie?

Q Alan, the response to the Andropov statement, does that go to the Soviets privately, or does this seem to be a negotiation in public?

A I don't know that I would call it a negotiation, and I cannot tell you honestly whether this would be, in some way, transmitted privately; but I think that you can take it that certainly it is a public response to a public, published interview.

Q Has Shultz had any meetings with Dobrynin since he has been back -- Shultz has been back?

A I'm not aware that he has had any meetings with Ambassador Dobrynin since he's been back.

Q Same or related subject, do you have a response to the Soviet --

A Bernie, if there is something different on that, I'll let you know, but I don't think so.

Q Alan, do you have a response to the Soviet reply to the U.S. charge of violations of the SALT and other accords -- their reply calling our charges an "odious smear," and accusing the United States of specific violations of its own.

A You're talking about the piece in The Washington Post this morning, or are you talking about a TASS piece the other day?

Q I'm talking about the TASS piece yesterday.

A I don't have a specific response to that TASS piece, which was intemperate to say the least; but in terms of any response on violations, the fact is the U.S. is abiding by its commitments under SALT II, that is, not to undercut the provisions of SALT II, as we have said we would not, and other arms control agreements which we have reached.

Q To follow up on that, can you be specific on their charges about the MX, the Midgetman, and the testing of an anti-satellite weapon?

A I'll refer you back to things on all of those which we have said in the past. That has all been addressed in previous statements and briefings that have been offered to you, Larry. I don't happen to have that guidance, and I don't want to try to wing it, but let me just leave you with that request to go back and look at what we've said before.

Q Alan, does that also apply to the charge that the United States violated Article XII by putting missiles in Europe?

A Article XXII, is it?* That's what I mean. I have something here which talks about the article this morning in which a general charge -- there was a violation --

Q That's right.

A -- of what I read as Article XXII.* In response to that, simply to say that -- first of all, the only provision of SALT II which would have applied to the long-range INF systems was contained in the Protocol to SALT II, and that limited deloyments until December 31, 1981, of cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 nautical miles on sea-based or on land-based launchers. That provision would have expired in 1981, however, even if SALT II had been ratified.

Moreover, the Pershing II and GLCMs are intermediate-range nuclear forces being deployed to counter the threat to the U.S. Allies posed by the SS-20 and other Soviet INF systems. The Soviet General quoted this morning -- Starodubov, I guess it is -- asserts that these systems are viewed as strategic by the Soviet Union, and therefore, circumvent Article XXII of the SALT II Treaty. However, by mutual agreement, the treaty defines land-based strategic missiles as those having a range of 5,500 kilometers or more. Since our INF systems do not fall into that category, Starodubov's contention is incorrect. Moreover, in signing SALT II, the U.S. stated explicitly that any future limitations on U.S. systems principally designed for theater missions would have to be accompanied by appropriate limits on Soviet theater systems like the SS-20.

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*NOTE: The guidance contained a typographical error. The correct designation is XII.

It was the absence of coverage of the INF systems in the SALT II treaty that led NATO to propose, and the Soviets afterward to accept, the INF negotiations which began in 1981. We regret the Soviets chose to unilaterally walk out of the INF talks last November. We are prepared to resume those negotiations, and to secure an agreement eliminating or substantially reducing U.S. and Soviet longer-range land-based INF missiles as soon as possible.

Q Alan, can we have a copy of that, please?

A Yes.

Q Alan, also on arms control questions, do you have any response to a book recently published by the Carnegie Endowment and the Brookings Institute, called Ballistic Missile Defense which criticizes President Reagan's ballistic missile defense program on diplomatic, political, strategic, and technical grounds?

A I think, again, as there has been discussion of that system in the past, we have explained our positions. I don't have any new guidance to offer you today, and I'd refer you back to the record.

-- MORE --

Q To follow up on that, one of the authors of that study is a Mr. David Schwartz, who was hired by the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in the State Department to work on this issue, after publishing this report for Brookings, which was highly critical of the President.

Can you do anything to comment on why he was hired by Rick Burt in that position?

A I don't have any background on that.

Q Can you look into that?

A No. Go ahead.

Q It will be charged in a seminar in Washington sponsored by the Executive Intelligence Review on Friday. There's a reason for that.

A Excuse me. This is not a propaganda forum for your conference that's coming up. You'll have your conference, you'll make your statement --

Q Just for NBC?

A No, not just for NBC.

Q I've never seen you cut off Kalb on a question like that.

Q On Monday, the Department confirmed six were given permission to stay in the West.

A Excuse me, six --

Q The six were given permission to stay in the West. They were West, I mean East Germans; not the Chinese. But why Dr. Yuren, the Chinese physican, was denied permission political asylum in the United States?

A First of all, we don't comment on asylum cases. Second of all, we explained all we really had to say about the German case, and I think you're trying to mix up a variety of concepts which are not mixable.

Q Alan, the Soviets come almost every day with sort of literature against capitalism, Kantism, Hegelianism, every sort of "isms" without you coming out with sort of response to that. Why, when they are attacking Zionism? Where the United States is here?

A This attack was, as the statement I gave you said, so outrageous and so obnoxious that it was felt necessary to say something about it.

Q It applies to their literature on all sorts of philosophies and doctrines all over the world.

A Sometimes it does and sometimes it doesn't. I'm not arguing that they don't put out all sorts of very nasty stuff. I wouldn't argue that for a minute.

Q This statement from Andropov, does it indicate to you that Andropov is back in power, or is he out? Because he was missing since August of last year.

A I think we've declined to comment on Mr. Andropov's health. I also think the Secretary addressed this question before about indications that we had that he was functioning, and in any case we deal with the Soviet Government and we obviously are dealing with a functioning government.

Q Anything on the reports of Cuban pullback from Ethiopia?

A No. I indicated the other day, Jim, when you weren't here that there are indications, yes, that there is some drawdown perhaps going on, but I don't have any details on it.

Q (Inaudible) the previous reference to me or my brother. I would just like to say that while I'm delighted that whatever is said on our behalf is listened to so carefully, let there be no confusion between what we say and what is said.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on Japan's increase in the size of its defense budget?

A Yes. Very simply, that we understand and appreciate the efforts of the Japanese political leadership to maximize budget allocations for defense at a time when serious fiscal problems force spending cutbacks elsewhere.

We believe it extremely important that Japan achieve the capabilities to fulfill mutually agreed-upon roles and missions laid out by former Prime Minister Suzuki in 1981, and we will continue to focus on that objective rather than on budget levels, which are, after all, up to the Japanese to decide.

Q Copy of that?

A Yes.

Q When will the joint Israeli/American Committee meet again?

A Don't have anything for you on that.

Q Do you have any comment on Canadian Foreign Minister MacEachen's comments about compensation for nine Canadians who apparently were used in an experiment on LSD and electric shock treatments? Are you aware of that --

A I'm not aware of it nor do I think it -- well, I'm not aware of it. I don't know what agency of government is particularly involved.

Q It supposedly involves the CIA.

A I see. I don't have anything on it.

Q Mr. MacEachen made his comments on the record. Would you care to look into that?

A I'll take a look and see if we can get anything for you.

Q Alan, Ambassador Kirkpatrick is quoted as saying that the Secretary's -- the United Nations Secretary General's proposal to have an international conference on the Middle East is ill-advised and harmful. Is that Secretary Shultz's views? Does he express the Secretary's views, or the Administration's views, by saying so?

A Yes, indeed. Ambassador Kirkpatrick, as you suggested, sent a letter to the Secretary General, or to the Security Council President, I guess it was -- excuse me -- stating our opposition to the conference.

The U.S. voted against the U.N. General Assembly Resolution which endorsed the holding of this conference.

The United States is committed to the effort to find a just and lasting peace to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Our view is that the holding of such an international conference is not the most productive approach to the search for peace.

The only realistic path to peace is direct negotiations among the parties directly concerned, based upon U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, a process the U.S. has encouraged in the Camp David Accords and President Reagan's September 1, 1982, initiative.

I believe that the text has been -- is available in New York, and I think if you needed it we could probably make it available to you here.

Q And can we please have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Let me ask you something else. Another on the Middle East also. There were reports yesterday, Alan, that the United States is considering seriously to supply Jordan with surface-to-air missiles and to push on with the Jordanian strike force. Can you tell us something about that?

A Not a lot. The question of possible sale of Stingers, which I think is the missile that was mentioned, has been under discussion for a long time, I guess. But if and when a decision is made on that, we would notify Congress promptly in the usual manner. But I don't have anything beyond that, and we have not addressed, as far as the -- however you define the Jordanian force -- I don't have anything new to say to you. We have not commented. I don't have anything at this point to say about it.

Q Was that discussed with the Israeli joint political/military group?

A I don't have anything on the content of the talks at all, John.

Q Alan, on that meeting, there was a parallel meeting involving financial experts, I think, in this building, under Secretaries Schneider and Wallis were leading the American team. Do you have anything on that? Also taking place Monday and Tuesday.

A Yes, there was some guidance. I thought that -- we have some guidance, I think, in the Press Office on this, Jim. I don't happen to have it with me. But there were some economic talks that went on.

Q Is your objection to this international conference in the Middle East on Palestine stems from the fact that you're afraid that the Soviet Union will be part and parcel to try to negotiate direct negotiations between the parties concerned?

A Let me refer you to Ambassador Kirkpatrick's letter and --

Q Can we get that letter?

A I can get you a copy of that.

Q Is the sale of Stingers separate from the RDF? Is that --

A As far as the sale of Stingers, I've given you that. As far as any other programs are concerned, I don't have anything to say about them, so I'm going to have to leave you with it that way?

Q It's unconnected to?

A I'm going to have to leave you with what I've just given you on it, Bill.

Q Is there a request from Jordan to supply them with this officially and it's being discussed now, or what is it exactly; where does it stand?

A I'm not in a position to say. I just don't know about request or not request. The fact is, as I said, there's been discussion about this for some time. I don't know how -- I don't have a way of qualifying it in the way that you're asking. But as I'm saying, there's been discussion. But if a decision is taken to do that, then we would notify Congress promptly in the usual ways.

Q But as of now, no decision has been taken?

A That's right.

Q Will it be tomorrow?

A There's no decision --

Q There's no announcement.

A There certainly is no announcement. I guess I am not absolutely up to date on the state of play.

Q You said if and when a decision.

A Okay, that's fair. I say that and I will stick with that, but I just don't know whether -- I don't have anything to say about it beyond what I've said at this point. Let's leave it at that.

Q Do you have any comment on North Korea's rejection of the inclusion of China in the Korea talks?

A You're going back some way. I don't recall, frankly, Ralph. We've had guidance in the past on the question of Korea talks. John's addressed it here at the briefing, and I think that the President talked about it -- I just don't have the guidance. The point, basically, is to get the two parties to talk. That isn't to say that's an exclusive forum, or whatever. But anyway, let me refer you back to both what's been said and what exists in the way of guidance. I don't have it here.

Q I have another question about the Middle East, please. Do you have any comment on this statement attributed to Mr. Terzi, the observer of the PLO in United Nations, that the PLO leadership would be willing to recognize Israel within the '67 borders?

A I think that the PLO has said a variety of things that have included things of that nature before, but they have other parts to those statements, so I don't have a real comment on it. But I don't know that that is the entirety of what he said or the entirety of the PLO position on that.

Q One more on another subject, if I might. There is an article this morning in the paper that says that a British musical group is claiming credit for a tape recording of Thatcher and Reagan, that the Administration implied last year was a product of Soviet forgery. Do you have any comment on that?

A The Soviets have clearly engaged extensively in "active measures," which is what they call those kinds of activities, and we've documented this in a variety of ways.

The tape that you're referring to seemed to fit into that pattern and was addressed in that context. If it turns out that it was a hoax, as these people claim, and I don't have any reason for knowing one way or another, then it was a hoax. But that doesn't change the fact, even if that were true, that the Soviets, in fact, have engaged very extensively in active measures.

Q If I could follow that. It may not change the fact that they've engaged in them, but does it cast some doubt on the U.S. compilation of examples of this sort of thing?

A I don't think so. I think -- you could go back and look at what has been published and the nature of the evidence is described in those publications, so it's there for you to make your judgments about.

Q Could this admission prejudice their chances of -- that is, the Crass's group -- chances of getting a visa to come to this country? (Laughter)

A I haven't got the slightest idea.

Q Alan, your answer about the strike force, is it the same -- I mean, you said what you said based on the fact that you did not tackle this problem or admit its existence all together previously, or is it something new? I mean, when we asked about this before --

A We haven't addressed these reports that have been out about this, and I'm not sure that the term that you're using is the appropriate term, in any case, for whatever programs that have been described. But we haven't addressed it, and I'm not going to address it here.

Spence?

Q Will you answer it now, please? You did not address it before and you don't address it now --

A That's right.

Did you have a question? I'm sorry.

Q Do you attach any significance to the Israeli Government apology to the Jordanian Government about wounding three Jordanian soldiers the day before yesterday?

A Attach significance to it?

Q This is the first time that Israel apologized in doing something like that.

A I don't know if it's the first time they've apologized --

Q Can you look into the matter?

A They apologized; it stands on its own.

Q Do you have any confirmation or comment of the reported death of an American fighting with the guerrillas in El Salvador?

A I don't really have anything on that. There was, I think, one sentence which says that in the guidance. Yes. We've seen the reports in the press. We're looking into them.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:55 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Thursday, January 26, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #17

THURSDAY, JANUARY 26, 1984, 12:37 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: A few announcements -- mainly on backgrounders, testimony, and things of that sort. To remind you that there will be a BACKGROUND briefing today here in the briefing room at 2:30 by a senior Department official on the upcoming visit of Japanese Foreign Minister Abe. Also, available in the Press Office at 1:30 today will be the prepared statement of Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Richard Murphy before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the subject, "Foreign Policy in the Middle East."

Available in the Press Office, also at 1:30, will be the prepared statements of Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Langhorne A. Motley and Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Elliott Abrams before the Joint House Subcommittees on Western Hemisphere Affairs and Human Rights, subject, "El Salvador."

Finally, there will be a BACKGROUNDER on the Secretary's forthcoming trip to Latin America and the Caribbean tomorrow, on Friday, at 3:30 here in the briefing room.

That's it for announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Is Frank Wisner coming back here?

A Yes.

Q What is he coming back with? What was accomplished in his talks there?

A I don't have anything to offer you, Jim, on the results of his conversations.

Q On travels, does Mr. Rumsfeld have any plans to go back to the Middle East?

A Again, we have not telegraphed his movements ahead of time, and I'm afraid I can't do that for you. But I would remind you of what John said the other day, that there is no indication that he wouldn't do that; but I can't give you specifics.

Q Have there been any exchanges, Alan, with the Soviets since the meeting between Mr. Gromyko and Secretary Shultz?

A Any exchanges with the Soviets?

Q Oral, verbal, or --

A I'm sure there have been exchanges with the Soviets, but -- There are exchanges.

Q Have you received any kind of a new arms control proposal from the Soviets -- strategic arms control proposal?

A Again, I think I'm not going to go into the specifics of our conversations except to say that I think the Secretary explained -- and we have said on the record -- there were briefings after his meeting, both in a BACKGROUNDER and on the record later about the Soviet attitude towards the nuclear talks. We'll let the Soviets speak for themselves on that. They seem to have done that.

Q I'm not asking you about what the Soviets said --

A Yes, but you're asking about exchanges, and I'm not going to get into that.

Q No. I'm just asking, have we, the United States, the State Department, the White House, received anything new from the Soviets in the way of a proposal --

A You're asking me about exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union, and as I said, I'm not going to get into it.

Q Do you have anything on the Times story: of the Vatican reported to have furnished aid to fleeing Nazis, which refers to a declassified State Department report?

A I have some information on it; I don't have a great deal. What, specifically, are you interested in with regard to it?

Q What you in fact do have.

A O.K. I have not seen the report; I don't know what the report contains, and I'm certainly not in a position to confirm or deny the veracity of allegations which are reported in this article to be in the report regarding activities in the late forties. I'm not in a position to do that at this point.

The case of Walter Rauff has involved longstanding efforts by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, and now the Government of Israel, to press their extradition claims in Chile.

In 1983, Mr. Wiesenthal sent a telegram to President Reagan concerning the Rauff case. In responding on behalf of the President, the Department told Mr. Wiesenthal at that time that although the United States has no legal standing in the case, we will continue to explore fully any possible role that we would have for assisting the West German extradition request to see that justice is done in the case. That's about as far as I can take it.

Q Do you have anything on steps, by way of exploration done by the Administration?

A Don't have anything to offer you on that.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A No. I'm afraid you're going to have to get it from the transcript.

Q Can you tell us at this time, was there any specific communication by the U.S. Government to the Government of Chile following this statement to Mr. Wiesenthal?

A I think I just said I'm not going to be able to go any further in terms of what may or may not have been done.

Q Can you tell us whether the State Department today believes that the report made in 1947 was a genuine report by a Foreign Service Officer who was known to have been a reliable person?

A I'll repeat what I said at the very beginning of my statement on this, and that is, I am not in a position to confirm or deny allegations which may or may not be, or which may, be included in that report. I haven't seen it, and I'm just not in a position to comoment on it at this point.

Q Alan, as you probably read, there have been press reports in the Middle East quoting some unnamed Western diplomats that the Administration here has already told the Gemayel Government that it would back an army offensive in the areas around Beirut, aimed at the Shi'ites.

Is there anything to that?

A Well, you put me in the usual problem of commenting on our diplomatic conversations, and I guess I cannot get into our diplomatic conversations, on the one hand. But with respect to our general approach, I can say the following: That we continue to support negotiations among the parties in Lebanon as a way to attain the goal of national reconciliation. An obvious first step is the security arrangements plan to strengthen the cease-fire and enable the government to provide better security to the inhabitants of greater Beirut.

Negotiations between the government and various militia groups have been under way for some weeks. We understand they're continuing.

Q Copy of that?

Q Alan, if I may follow up, I'm sure you've read the Post piece saying that this process has virtually come to a halt.

A Well, we basically, I think, don't share that. We think that conversations are continuing. We understand that negotiations are continuing. We support those efforts.

While, obviously, the situation is difficult, nonetheless, we're hopeful that the negotiations will lead to improvements, and we believe it's premature to reach the sort of watershed conclusions regarding the situation on the ground in Lebanon that that report suggests.

Q Alan, could I just take you back to the other story? It says that the State Department report on the Nazis, etc., is declassified.

A Uh-huh.

Q I take that to be the case. Therefore, can you make copies available to us?

A I will look into it, Bernie. I don't know if that's the case. I'll be happy to take a look at it.

Q Alan, the Democratic leadership on the Hill is beginning to demand -- as you probably saw in The Wall Street Journal piece today -- that the Administration take its case to the U.N., risk a Soviet veto, but at least ask for UNIFIL to replace MNF. Have you got anything on that?

A The UNIFIL and the MNF, although separate in origin and structure, can be considered part of a broad-based international effort to help Lebanon recover its stability and independence.

The U.S. is one of a dozen countries involved. Our forces amount to about one-ninth of the total. The UNIFIL mandate has been limited to the southern part of Lebanon and to helping secure the restoration of Lebanese Government authority.

UNIFIL may well have a greater role as the situation changes. We're continuing to examine the possibilities of a broader U.N. peacekeeping role in Lebanon. Obviously, we believe that the MNF is playing an important function which we have explained at great length.

Q Can you expand that answer to include the possibility of using UNTSO?

A I don't think that the question is -- I can't in a specific way, Jim. UNTSO has been referred to, as has UNIFIL been referred to, by the Secretary and others in saying, now, as we look to the future and at some possible U.N. or international role, we could look at the various mechanisms which exist. But I can't really try to be more specific at this point about what a U.N. role might be in the future.

Q Can you really say, Alan, whether we've had any discussions recently with either the Syrians or the Russians with reference to the UNIFIL force?

A Can't say. Don't think if -- again, I don't think we'd get into the question of the specifics of our discussions. We have had discussions with various parties all along on all sorts of aspects of this -- of the Middle East question and Lebanon question, but I'm not going to be more specific than that.

Q Are you aware of any change in attitude, either on the Syrian side or the Soviet side, to UNIFIL?

A I don't think that I really could speak for the Soviets or the Syrians. I think you ought to ask them that question.

Q Can we get a copy of that, Alan?

A I can give you a copy of part of it, Bill.

Q Would you like to see UNIFIL step into the MNF role and clear the way for an MNF pullback?

A I think what I'm saying to you on this, Bernie, is that, clearly, we have been looking at, will continue to look at, the question of a possible U.N., including specifically UNIFIL, role in Lebanon, or changed UNIFIL role in Lebanon, as the situation changes.

At this particular point the MNF is playing a vital role in support of the Lebanese Government as it seeks to establish its authority, first in the Beirut area and then more broadly.

I cannot try to give you the kind of specific answer other than to go back to the point we have made before, which is if your question is, are we looking for an excuse to cease -- to cut and run, the answer to that is no.

Q Where will those United Nations forces be placed that you're looking at?

A You're trying to pin me down on specifics of something which I'm saying is a conceptual approach which I'm sure has been discussed or thought about by various people, but I'm not prepared to try to do that. You're getting way ahead of the situation.

Q What is the point --

Q Is it in the Beirut area, Alan?

A Excuse me. Excuse me.

Q Will it be in the Beirut --

A   I'm not going to try to go further with this, Ghassan.

Q   Alan, a few months ago, I believe, when Flora Lewis interviewed with President Gemayel, he said that the United States was trying to push him to get that reconciliation, and he wasn't really at the time ready to give that reconciliation process, and now they're talking about the reconciliation process.

How effective is -- without going into the exchange of diplomacy, or whatever it is -- the response of President Gemayel to your efforts which -- there are reports saying that the United States has not been putting enough pressure or enough facilitation to Gemayel to come with the reconciliation.

How effective was, and how did he reach -- how did you reach with President Gemayel into the point of reconciliation? (Sic)

A   I don't think it's a question to be addressed in those terms. Two points on it. One, our position on national reconciliation and a broad-based government and all of that has been quite clear and quite -- expressed quite openly here and elsewhere. But in terms of President Gemayel's decisions and what he has proceeded with in terms of his proposals and his efforts are precisely that -- his decisions, his proposals, his efforts -- and I think that your question is premised on false premises.

Q   Alan, you talk about associations continuing, etc., difficult and what-not. In the U.S. view, what is the primary reason for the negotiations not to have made a good deal more progress, to put it all very charitably?

A   I don't know that we can identify what the principle reasons are. There have been various parties who have seemed to have introduced new considerations from time to time. I think that Mr. Dam, the Deputy Secretary, addressed the question when he testified recently on the Hill. He talked about the Syrian role. I'd refer you to that testimony.

So I think that there's been a complex of factors, but, as I say, our understanding is that these talks go on. In fact, the same paper which carried the story this morning about how everything had broken down carried another story which talked about new proposals which have been made, looking to move the discussions forward. So I think I'll stand on what I said.

Q Alan, Mr. Saeb Salem, who is a former prime minister in Lebanon, a moderate, and a friend of the United States, was yesterday bitterly critical to both President Gemayel and U.S. Administration.

Do you have any comment on that?

A No. I think our positions and our efforts to be supportive and helpful are well known, and I don't have anything new to add to it.

Q Alan, are there any consultations between the U.S. Government and the Federal Republic of Germany concerning arms sales to Saudi Arabia?

A Have there been consultations?

Q Yes. Or contacts or --

A Again, I wouldn't get into the question of what consultations may or may not have taken place. I'm not trying to lead you one way or another on that.

Q Is there any attitude of the U.S. Government concerning arms sales to Saudi Arabia?

A I don't have anything to say about that. I'd refer you to our own relationship, but I don't have anything to say.

Q Alan --

A I'll get back to you in a second, Lester.

Q Do you have anything today on the Stinger sales to Jordan?

A No. Don't have anything.

Q Same as yesterday.

Q Alan, last Friday the State Department's former spokesman, Hodding Carter, emceed a Public Broadcasting program in which he repeatedly said that the Cuban Government was notified five hours before our landings in Grenada.

Has the State Department asked PBS for a correction of this in view of Secretary Shultz's letter of November 29 to Senator Wallop?

A   I'm not aware of any request for a correction. However, the implication of your question is correct; that is to say, that there was no 5-hour previous notification. There was no prior notification at all.

-- MORE --

Q Since this is a federally funded public broadcasting system, aren't you anxious that what Mr. Carter has apparently mistakenly conveyed to all of his listeners should be corrected?

A I think that we're always interested in making sure that the reporting is accurate, Lester, and I think --

Q What will you do?

A I don't know, but I think you raised an interesting point about whether we should at least be in touch with him. I don't know if we want to raise in some formal way any more than we necessarily do with anybody else.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the report of the SS-22's in East Germany?

A Not a great deal, actually. We're not in a position to confirm those reports at this time. The Soviets, as I think I've indicated before -- certainly has been indicated from this podium before -- announced last year they intended to deploy additional nuclear-capable missiles in eastern European states in response to the U.S. long-range INF deployments, and, in fact, of course they have recently announced that they had deployed additional "operational tactical missiles" in East Germany, and I think they mentioned Czechoslovakia as well. But they didn't specify the systems involved.

In any case, as I indicated when asked about this several days ago, we believe there is no justification whatsoever for any Soviet so-called "countermeasures" in view of their current nuclear and conventional capabilities.

Q There is a report from Lebanon on a cable from Mr. Jumblatt to Secretary Shultz. Do you have anything on that, or if the Secretary intends to reply?

A I don't have anything on it.

Q Do you have anything on the --

Q Wait a minute. Has he received such a cable?

A I don't have anything on it.

Q Do you have anything on the question I asked yesterday about the new Soviet missile sale to Iraq?

A No.

Q Can you tell us whether Hussein met with Rumsfeld in London last month?

A I don't recall. I thought that question came up and was answered --

Q I was on the trip but --

A Let me check on it and see what I can get on it.

Q You said that there is no justification for these countermeasures by the Soviets. And yesterday one senior official at the White House conceded that the U.S. position of negotiating with strength could lead to a new arms race. Do you see these deployments as the beginning of the arms race by the Soviets?

A I don't think I'm going to try to make a judgment on that. I think what I would simply say is that rather than deploying more nuclear-capable missiles in addition to their already considerable SS-20 force, which is targeted against western Europe, that the Soviets should return to the negotiating table and resume work with us on an equitable, verifiable INF agreement.

Q Is there a danager of this arms race, or do you have --

A I said, I'm not going to try to speculate. I just responded to your question.

Q Alan, in the President's speech last night, he referred to legislation he would introduce on terrorism.

A Yes.

Q What's that about?

A I checked on that, in fact, Bernie, to see if there was anything further I could say at this point. The answer is, I don't have anything further I can say at this point. When the proposals are made, I'm told that we can try and put together a briefing or something of that sort for you.

Q Do you have any idea on the time involved here; where they are now?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q Any further information on Chad?

A On Chad? Further to what? I don't know -- we had some guidance available --

Q Related to the deterioration of the situation, and the French aircraft being shot down?

A Obviously, we've seen the reports, and also French Defense Minister Hernu's statements. We regret the loss of life in this encounter, with the airplane being shot down.

The U.S. deplores this continuing evidence of Libyan-backed aggression in Chad. We reiterate our view that Libya must end its aggression and withdraw its forces from Chad forthwith. The U.S. will continue its efforts in support of the legitimate government of Chad and French efforts to assist this government.

Q Alan, there have been somewhat frantic or hysterical comments being made by the Iranians over the last few days about American plots. Allegedly, their being put on the terrorist list in this country has persuaded them that there is some kind of an American plan or plot to attack Iran.

Are there any circumstances at all under which this government would consider any kind of retaliatory action against Iran?

A That's a very speculative question, asking for a hypothetical answer, and I'm not going to try to go into that kind of thing, John.

Q John -- I mean, Alan, UPI, in this report, which is filed January 23 -- and I'm sure you've seen because it concerns John Hughes -- reports, "Hughes said earlier requests from Kinsolving and Accuracy in Media also requested the addresses and social security numbers of the correspondents. The State Department press officer refused to comply."

Did Hughes said this, or is UPI incorrect?

A I don't know the answer to that, Lester.

Q I wonder if you could take the question, Alan, because I never asked -- never, never, never asked for social security numbers and I never asked even for the list. All I was doing is serving as appointment by the U.S. District Court as a process server; and the point is, you are being -- in other words, by UPI, apparently all over the country -- being represented as saying that I said something I never said. So will you take the question and get us an answer by Monday?

A Oh, I don't commit myself to anything like that, Lester.

Q You will take the question?

A I will look into the question. You might also talk --

Q When will Hughes be back?

A Excuse me. You might also talk to UPI.

Q There was a story in the Washington Post this morning regarding Ziad Abu el-Eain who is supposed to be exchanged with the other prisoners from Israeli jails, and according to the Red Cross he was retained back to Nafha Prison and he was not freed. Is the United States Government planning to take any interest in Ziad Abu el-Eain's case since originally Ziad Abu el-Eain was extradited to Israel by the United States Government?

A This is an old story, and we had guidance on this before. Basically, the issue of that exchange is something that we were not involved, in regarding which we would have no particular comment. Our involvement in that case was of a different nature --

Q Alan, I would like to ask another question on Press Office policy. Two days ago, an NBC Nightly News crew under the direction of producer Margo Dunlap was admitted to this briefing room for the purpose, as Miss Dunlap explained it, of filming a piece for a campaign propaganda piece that NBC is doing on behalf of the Mondale campaign against the campaign of his opponent Lyndon Larouche.

Was the Press Office aware that that's the purpose of the NBC crew being here, or were you misinformed by NBC that she was here to cover foreign policy the way the rest of us are?

A I don't know the answer to the question as to what was said, and I can't tell you.

Q Will you look into this because this goes to the question of your accredition of NBC correspondents and their legitimacy as a news organization as opposed to a political —

A Lots of questions are raised in lots of ways about that sort of thing.

Q On Latin America, if I may?

A Sorry?

Q Do you have any reaction to the treaty, to the agreement between Chile and Argentina on the Beagle Channel?

A We had something the other day. Let me refer you back to the Press Office on that.

Q And also, do you have any readout on the upcoming visit of the President of the Dominican Republic?

A I don't have any particular guidance on it here. I think it was announced by the White House this morning, so I refer you to that announcement.

Q Alan, I have one more question for you on the Walter Rauff affair, if you will.

A Yes.

Q Is there some general guidance that you have for us about American involvement in assistance in the hunt for Nazis, whether it's by the Federal Republic of Germany or Israel or any other country with which we have diplomatic relations? Is there some unit that's been assigned to handle this liaison?

A A unit to handle the liaison? I think that the Justice Department has generally taken a lead on this matter, and they have an office devoted, as you are doubtless aware, to that question. So I would focus — if you're looking for a specific office that deals with that question, I'd refer you there.

(Press briefing concluded at 1:03 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, January 27, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #18

FRIDAY, JANUARY 27, 1984, 12:24 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon all. I have a couple of announcements up front.

As we announced earlier, Secretary Shultz will be traveling to Venezuela, Brazil, Grenada and Barbados next week. In addition to these stops, the Secretary has accepted an invitation to visit El Salvador during that trip which lasts from January 31 to February 8. He will be in El Salvador on January 31.

The Secretary earlier had to postpone a visit to El Salvador scheduled for last October, and he looks forward to exchanging views with President Magana, Foreign Minister Chavez Mena and other Salvadoran leaders.

El Salvador is currently in the midst of a presidential campaign for the March 25 elections, and this visit will provide a first-hand opportunity to discuss our many shared interests. The US Administration's determination to request from the U.S. Congress funding necessary to implement fully the recommendations of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America will also be discussed.

A couple of reminders about --

Q Will he see Major D'Aubuisson?

A I don't have a schedule yet for him, Mike, other than these two names mentioned. I just don't have his schedule.

Q How long will he be there?

A He'll be there a day.

Q What time?

A A day.

Q Overnight?

A Let's talk about the overnight part after the session.

Q Do you know if among those leaders he's going to meet any presidential candidates?

A That's why I say -- I don't know what his schedule is other than the two.

On that trip, you might address some of those questions to a senior Administration official this afternoon who will brief on the Secretary's trip at 3:30 today.

There will also be an on-the-record briefing this afternoon at 4:15 following the conclusion of the meetings of the Consultative Parties Working Group on Antarctic Mineral Resources. That will be in Room 1107. The Chairman of the Working Group, Mr. Chris Bebee of New Zealand, will be available to answer questions with regard to the substance of the meetings. Mr. R. Tucker Scully, Director of the Department of State's Office of Oceans and Polar Affairs and Head of the U.S. delegation will be available to answer questions from the U.S. perspective. That's Room 1107, 4:15 this afternoon; and the background briefing on the Secretary's trip, 3:30 in this Briefing Room.

That's all I've got for you.

Q John, what can you tell us about the current Administration's plans for a strike force involving Jordanian troops?

A I do have some words for you on that, Jim.

The Administration intends to submit an FY 1984 supplemental budget request. We won't have further comment on that request until it goes to the Congress on Monday and until we've had an opportunity to consult with the Congress. After it is released, we will be prepared to discuss publicly any part of the budget proposal which is unclassified or which is subsequently declassified.

Q Well, the fact that you've responded to my question about a Jordanian strike force with a response about a budget request, can we infer from that, then, the budget request will include a request for funds for such a force?

A You put me in a difficult position because it is at this stage classified. But should it become declassified, and it may well be, then we'll be glad to talk about it.

Q Maybe we can discuss the unclassified portion of it that was in the New York Times today.

A Well, we might. What did you have in mind?

Q I was wondering if you've had any indications from Israel as to how it feels about this particular program.

A No, I think you'd have to ask the Israelis. I've seen those comments from the Israelis, and I think you'd have to ask them for what their position is on this.

Q Is it your plan now, John, to make any part of the Jordanian strike force supplemental public?

A I'm not aware that anything at this stage is public.

Q That is an answer but not to the question. The question is, do you plan to make it any part of that supplemental concerning the Jordanian strike force public in the future?

A I wouldn't be surprised if it does become public.

Q But John, without reference to what you're going to do on Monday, why did the Administration decide not to go ahead with such a force last year?

A I guess you're still talking about a subject that was in a classified phase at that time, and therefore I guess I'm just really not able to talk about it.

Q Would you steer us away from re-reporting the facts as declassified in this morning's New York Times?

A No, I wouldn't steer you away from the story.

Q John, you said that you will not -- in answering Jim -- that you will not answer a question about something that was classified.

A Correct.

Q Well, you answered something, his first question, in a way saying that yes, there is. Can you discuss that aspect to it. You obviously --

A No. What I said was that to my knowledge at this stage there is no portion involving Jordan, say, that is unclassified. But I think that it might well become declassified and should it become declassified, then I think we'll be glad to talk about it.

Q John, what reason does the Administration have at this time to repeat the effort?

A You're really putting me on the spot because we are talking about, as I say, material that was classified. But without talking about the substance of classified recommendations, I think there has been no change in the Administration's viewpoint on this particular subject. The rationalization and the importance of it would remain unchanged.

Q Do you feel that there may be a change or could be change in Congress' viewpoint on this subject?

A Have to wait and see.

Q Without discussing directly that, where does the projected sale of Stinger missiles to Jordan stand?

A Don't have anything for you on that, Jim.

Q Are there any plans, John, to submit two separate requests of arms, I mean, to Congress. Are you planning to submit two separate requests for aid to Jordan?

A Why don't we wait and see later in next week and see how it all turns out.

Q If you can tell us now, is it one package that you're going to ask from the Congress, or is it two separate?

A Just not going to get into that, but might be able to shed a little light on this next week.

Q A technical point on this: You say that the Administration will submit a supplemental -- budget supplemental request.

A Uh-huh.

Q Under whose -- under what appropriation does this go -- Defense, State Department, who? And who will get this money?

A I cannot answer that question.

Q You mean you don't know rather than --

A I don't know.

Q It's not a matter of classification.

A I don't know specifically how that's -- I don't know whose --

Q Is there anybody, any other country, supporting Jordan militarily at present with funds? Do we know?

A I don't know. Have to ask other countries.

Q Early this year I believe there were indications that Israel will not object to this idea, from reading some reports, and this morning at 9:00 o'clock CBS reported that Mr. Shamir said that they are against it and they are against the sale -- supposedly some sale of -- I think some kind of weapons, I forget the --

A CBS reported --

Q Yes.

A -- that Mr. Shamir is against the sale?

Q Yes. Also, some sale -- anything to the Saudi Arabians.

A I'll let CBS clear that one with you.

Q Excuse me?

A I'm not aware of that, but I'll let --

Q Yes. This morning it was on the air, and also some sale for some type of weapons to Saudi Arabia also. On this matter can you look into this? Was his -- his objection stems from what?

A No. I don't think we'd have any comment. If you're talking about Israeli --

Q Objection to the --

A -- reaction, I think you'd have to talk to the Israelis.

Q Well, but you know last week there was talk that they will not object. Today they are objecting. What's --

A I'm aware of the speculation. I'm aware of nuances in different stories this morning. The New York Times, for example, is somewhat different from CBS, but I think you have to ask the Israelis.

Q Maybe we could ask the United States whether or not it asked the Israelis not to oppose it.

A Oh, we would never get into a discussion of diplomatic exchanges, Barrie.

Q Did Ambassador Rosenne come in Friday and Monday to see Larry Eagleburger?

A He -- I think he was in. Yes. I think he was. I don't know. I'm not quite sure what days, but yes, I think he was in.

Q Has a request for this equipment come from Jordan to the United States?

A Not going to get into our discussions with Jordan. We've had a long-standing interest in mutual security with Jordan, but I'm not going to get into specifics of discussions we might have had with them.

Q Don't you traditionally disclose when a formal request is made?

A Why don't we wait until next week and see what unfolds.

Q Could you deal with the justifications or the policy?

A I think we'll wait until next week, Bernie.

Q Could you give us anything about the visit from Mr. Rumsfeld to the region, especially --

A Yes. He's on his way back. He is about to arrive in the region very shortly, but I can't tell you where he is going to be until he gets there.

Q Yeah. But what I'd like to ask is, are you optimistic for his trip, because he's involved -- I think there is -- Ambassador Murphy is joining him.

A Maybe.

Q And a couple of --

A Uh-huh. I don't know whether -- I really don't know whether Ambassador Murphy has gone, but I wouldn't rule it out.

Q John, I'm sorry. Who is on his way back to the region?

A Mr. Rumsfeld.

Q Thank you.

A Mr. Rumsfeld. Ambassador Rumsfeld.

Q Is there a firm date on Rumsfeld meeting President Assad?

A Don't have anything for you on visits by Ambassador Rumsfeld to Syria.

Q You don't have it? There's no such date?

A I just don't have anything. You know, a traditionally non-communicative mode on Ambassador Rumsfeld's travel plans.

Q John, do you have anything on Secretary Crocker? That is, who he has seen, what he is doing?

A Nothing really beyond what Alan gave you yesterday. I don't have an update to that.

Q What about Deputy Assistant Secretary Wisner? Can you confirm --

A Yes. I think he -- I think Mr. Wisner is -- not sure whether he is yet -- I'm not sure whether Frank Wisner is back.

MR. ROMBERG: He is back.

MR. HUGHES: He is back in Washington. Okay. And he did meet with the Mozambican Minister of State in the Presidency shortly before he returned to Washington. He was taking advantage of his presence in Lebanon -- in Lisbon -- to discuss with him -- beg pardon -- matters of mutual concern.

Q John, do we have anything on President Mubarak going to Jordan and Iraq?

A No.

Q You have no information?

A No.

Q Do you have anything about the statement made in the Congress yesterday about asking the State Department for something in writing from President Mubarak that he has not discarded Camp David as was reported by the King of Morocco?

A No. I don't.

Q You haven't heard anything about that?

A No.

Q Well, you probably will.

The other thing is that I wonder if you have statements for public dissemination about a report in The New York Times about what it calls "a long, secret State Department report in 1947 that called the Vatican the largest single organization involved in the illegal movement of immigrants, including Nazis?"

A Well, the report is in the public domain, and be happy to make it available to you after this briefing in the Press Office.

Q Good. Now, the other thing is the -- well, I'll come to it. Could I continue with this, or is there somebody else?

A No. Go ahead.

Q I mean, I've got a lot of questions. I don't get out as often as I should.

A We're all spellbound, I think. (Laughter)

Q They're all spellbound?

A Go ahead.

Q The question on the -- Lebanon. The Secretary was in private session yesterday in the Congress, but Assistant Secretary Murphy was in public session.

A Yes.

Q The question I'm asking here, is there any change whatever in the May 17 -- change in attitude by the State Department --

A No.

Q -- towards the May 17 agreement?

A No.

Q Still the same?

A Yes.

Q Firm?

A Yes.

Q Strong, "we don't move?"

A Yes.

Q Right. Thank you.

Q John, what's the State Department position about a letter published this week in the Washington Jewish Week by Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights, regarding the PLO and the Nicaraguans, Sandinistas?

A I wasn't aware of the letter, but I understand you're about to make me instantly aware of the letter, and therefore we would be glad to take a look at it after this briefing.

Q Thank you.

-- MORE --

Q Any confirmation or comment on the reported killing of an American in El Salvador?

A Yes, do have something on that.

Our Embassy in El Salvador has confirmed that an American citizen, Linda Louise Cancel — she was born on July 7, 1960, in California; I don't have her home town -- was shot and killed in eastern El Salvador as she was riding with her husband and children to Costa Rica. U.S. Consular officials visited the scene to render assistance after receiving initial reports of the attack by uniformed men. The eye witnesses included her husband, the U.S. citizen driver of the vehicle, and the Salvadoran customs official who was apparently travelling with them in the bus, who subsequently informed the Consular Officers that the killers were guerrillas.

According to the testimony given to the Consular Officers by Ms. Cancel's husband, Mr. Curtis Lewenz, and other witnesses, the four -- that's Mr. and Mrs. Lewenz and, I guess, two children -- were en route to Costa Rica in a large family bus in the company of a Salvadoran Customs Officer. On January 26 -- that's yesterday -- at approximately 7:30 in the morning on the Pan American Highway near the turnoff to Sociedad, located in the department of Morazan between the cities of Jocoro and Santa Rosa de Lima, traffic began to slow down and some cars pulled off the side of the road. The bus continued, passing the vehicles that had stopped. A yellow Toyota followed behind, and the occupants of the Toyota signaled the bus to stop. Fearing harm from the occupants of the Toyota, the driver continued at a higher rate of speed.

A little farther down the road the victim's vehicle encountered two armed men dressed in a combination of military and civilian clothing who signaled the bus to stop. The Customs Officer reports that he told the driver to stop, but the driver continued on his way. They then were hit by gunfire from the surrounding hillsides. One bullet hit Mrs. Cancel in the upper right side, and three struck the vehicle.

In addition to Mrs. Cancel and her husband, they had their daughter, who was born in 1982, and their son, who was born in 1978.

The reason the Customs Officer was with them is that he joined them at the Guatemala/El Salvador border for the purpose of escorting them out of the country.

The family was travelling with most of their possessions. Apparently they were moving to Costa Rica. And since they were in transit, they would have had to submit to an inventory of their goods upon entering and leaving Salvadoran territory. However, for a small fee, the Salvadoran Government provides the service of a customs escort from border to border in order to avoid the delays caused by making two inventories. And that's why the Customs Officer was with them. He was not in uniform; he was wearing civilian clothes.

Witnesses told Consular Officers that the area was occupied by guerrillas and that the guerrillas had stopped traffic ahead. That is really about all I have for you on it.

Q Who was driving, John, do you know?

A I think the husband was driving.

Q John, can we get a copy of the statement?

A Yes, you can get a copy of what I just read.

Q Also, the other day I asked Alan about the reported death of another American that apparently was fighting with the guerrillas, and he just told me that he had seen the report. Do you have anything more now?

A I don't have anything on that. No, I don't have anything further? Be glad to check to see if we do.

Q Do you know if the Embassy is making any investigation of the death?

A I don't know.

(To staff) Is it checking?

STAFF: The Embassy's checking.

A Yes, the Embassy is checking.

Q Do you have anything with respect to El Salvador on the report in The Times today that the Justice Department had only received the names of some people with respect to death squads, "self-exiles" or "auto exiles?"

A Well, that is an ongoing investigation, and so we are not going to be very forthcoming. We have made clear a number of times the seriousness with which we regard extremist violence in El Salvador. That includes violence from the left as well as the right. Our concern, obviously, extends to the question of whatever degree that violence might be aided and abetted from within the United States and the extent to which this might be occurring; and the possibility of violations of U.S. law is a matter under investigation, and so we are not prepared to comment on an ongoing process.

Q Also, one other on the same story: It says here there was a cable that was made available to The New York Times from January '81, which identified Roberto d'Aubuisson as the agent of six exile leaders, to funnel money and help to death squads operating in El Salvador.

Can you confirm that you had that information in January of 1981?

A Can't. Didn't know anything about it until you raised it.

Q Can you look into it?

A We'll take a look at it.

Q John, had you heard anything on that spy case in Norway? Apparently --

A No. No, I don't. I had an interest in it, as we have been there so recently and met a number of Norwegian officials; but I don't think we met him during our stay there.

Q Aha. Trying to get out of it, huh?

(Laughter)

Q John, do you have anything on Mr. Abe's meeting with the Secretary this morning?

A I don't. I think there might be a readout at the conclusion of Mr. Abe's meeting, probably on Monday.

Q May I ask one more question?

A Sure.

Q The Smithsonian has cancelled an archeology exhibit that was being prepared with cooperation with the Museum of Israel in Jerusalem. The State Department had some part in the exhibit. I'm not imputing that the State Department had something to do with the cancellation, although it might. But what I would like to know is, what role did the State Department play in this particular exhibit?

A In a Smithsonian exhibition that had been cancelled?

Q Yes. There is something -- the State Department does have a part, a connection with the transfer of the exhibits from overseas to the United States and back to the countries involved, and so on.

A I'll take a look at it and see what --

Q Would you?

A Sure.

Q John, just for the record, since you were able to give us the color of the Toyota in El Salvador, could you explain why the Department is unable to offer even the slightest bit of detail about an issue of at least equally important public discussion as the sale of $220 million worth of weapons to Jordan on the same day that it is able to tell us the color of the --

A Yes, because the one is classified information and the other is not.

Q But you said that it will be declassified. What difference does it make, if it's going to be declassified anyway?

A I guess the difference is that I would go to jail if I gave you classified information. (Laughter) It may not be important to you, but it does have a bearing on my tenure at this podium. (Laughter)

Q So you're putting your jailing above the public interest, is that it?

(Laughter)

(The briefing concluded at 12:47 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
MONDAY, JANUARY 30, 1983 /1984/

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #19

MONDAY, JANUARY 30, 1984, 12:30 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have several announcements.

First, the Secretary will make an announcement on the subject of aid to Africa here in the Press Briefing Room, room 2118, at 2:15 this afternoon. The announcement will be followed by an ON-THE-RECORD briefing by AID Administrator Peter McPherson and Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Princeton Lyman.

In addition, there will be a briefing on the visit of Japanese Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe today here in the briefing room at 3:15. The briefing will be ON BACKGROUND, attributable to a senior Administration official.

Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam will address the Japan Society ON THE RECORD, Monday, February 6, 5:30-6:45 p.m., at the Japan House, which is at 333 East 47th Street in New York City. If you want to cover the event, please contact Victoria Lyon-Bestor -- that's L-y-o-n hyphen B-e-s-t-o-r -- or Mary Allis -- A-l-l-i-s -- of the Japan Society at Area Code (212) 832-1155.

Also, to tell you that tomorrow, Tuesday, January 31, at 2:30 p.m., Peter McPherson, Director of AID, William Schneider, Jr., Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, and Ronald Spiers, Under Secretary for Management, will hold a press conference.

I might note at this point that while it will be ON THE RECORD and for cameras, it will be embargoed until noon, Wednesday, February 1. The purpose of the briefing is to give an overview of most of the major developments and issues pertaining to the proposed FY-85 State Department foreign assistance budget.

Also, obviously, there will be other aspects that Mr. Spiers will cover regarding the State Department. Specifically, they will address issues relating to the FMS

Program and assistance to Egypt and Israel, as well as several others matters. I understand they will not, however, be prepared to discuss details of assistance to Central America at that time.

Q Where is that?

A That will be here in this room, tomorrow, Tuesday, at 2:30 p.m., again, embargoed until noon on Wednesday.

Q Alan, will that cover FY-84 supplemental also?

A No. That's on FY-85.

Q Just FY-85?

A FY-85.

Regarding steps to combat terrorism, we've had inquiries on the intent of the President's remarks in the State of the Union message on cooperation with our allies on terrorism, and the submission to the Congress on legislation on the same subject.

There was a meeting in the Department, January 26-27, with security experts from the Summit Seven countries to discuss our continuing joint efforts to carry out the Venice Declaration of 1981 on protection of diplomatic personnel.

This is part of a continuing effort, and we anticipate a further meeting in April on these matters of common concern. The legislative package is in the final clearance stages, and we expect that it will be transmitted to the Congress in the near future. We will provide a briefing at that time.

Q Copy, please?

A We can give you a copy of that, yes.

And, finally, just to tell you that available in the Press Office is a statement on the U.S. Government's strong objections to the European Community's efforts to restrict imports of U.S. non-grain feed ingredients.

That's it for announcements. Happy to take questions.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the list of charges by TASS over the weekend about U.S. arms control violations?

A Yes, I do. We are disappointed with the initial Soviet response to expressed U.S. concerns regarding Soviet arms control non-compliance. As the President said in his letter transmitting a report to the Congress on this subject, "It is essential that all parties to agreements comply with them."

The President stated that after a careful review of many months and numerous diplomatic exchanges with the U.S.S.R., the Administration had determined that violations or probable violations had occurred with respect to seven initial issues analyzed. The U.S.S.R. has been informed of these determinations.

Regrettably, it has responded initially not by treating the issue seriously, but by dusting off a familiar list of spurious countercharges. The Soviet charges of U.S. arms control violations are baseless. As the President said on January 23, the U.S. is continuing to carry out its own obligations and commitments under relevant agreements.

We hope the initial Soviet reaction is not their last word, and the Soviets will prove ready to engage in a constructive dialogue with us on compliance by undertaking explanations, clarifications and corrective actions as appropriate.

Q Copy?

A Sure.

Q Specifically, denied the accusations.

A Yes.

Q Do you have any background on specifics?

A Yes. I do. Why don't you tell me which specific ones. There are an awful lot.

Q Let's go down the whole list?

A Go down the list. What is it that -- Why don't you tell me what you're interested in.

Q Well, come on. You would save us all a lot of time if you would --

A   But there's an awful lot here, and we'll spend a lot of time here, Bernie, if I give you everything I've got.

Q   Well, why don't you put it out as a --

A   I think the question of -- which are the specific things that you're interested in, go ahead and ask.

Q   Start with concealment.

A   The question of shelters?

Q   Yes.

A   During initial Minuteman construction as well as the Miniteman silo upgrade program during the mid-70s, environmental shelters were employed to protect construction at the launchers from the weather. The facts concerning the activities being carried out at the launchers were provided and explained in full detail to the Soviets and were also available in the public domain. In response to Soviet expressions of concern, the shelters were modified, and their use was discontinued after the completion of the Minutemanm silo upgrade program in early 1979.

In the case of the Titan II silo, a cover was used to protect it from the weather during repair work on damage due to an accident. It was specifically designed to avoid any impediment to national technical means, and was removed promptly after the need for it ended. The Soviets have been fully aware of these facts for at least several years.

Q   Copy?

A   Sure.

Q   All right. The second one is "Soviet-described direct violations of the SALT II Treaty, alleged U.S. failure to work out solutions regarding long-range land- and sea-based cruise missiles as specified in the protocol."

A   I guess that comes under the --

Q   Not following the protocol, I guess.

A   Noncircumvention?

Q   No, but go ahead with that one.

(Laughter)

A The protocol. Let's do the protocol, the long-range cruise missiles.

The SALT II protocol would have expired on December 31, 1981, even if SALT II had been ratified and entered into force. The U.S. was in full compliance with all provisions of the Protocol when it would have been in effect. The U.S. made it clear at the time SALT II was signed that the Protocol would not be extended. The subsequent NATO decision to deploy land-based longer-range INF missiles in Europe was made in response to a specific and growing Soviet threat, namely SS-20 deployments. The U.S. remains willing to negotiate on all long-range INF systems, including ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs). It is the Soviets who have broken off the INF talks and thereby impeded efforts to negotiate an agreement involving GLCMs.

Q Copy?

A Yes.

Q What about the radar violation of the '72 ABM treaty?

A There is no merit whatsoever in these charges. The Shemya Island radar in the Aleutians is for national technical means of verification, and the Pave Paws radars are Ballistic Missile Early Warning (BMEW) radars located on the periphery of national territory and oriented outward, as specifically permitted by the Treaty.

Q Copy?

A Yes.

Q What about noncircumvention on the Pershing?

A The U.S. made clear to the Soviets during the SALT II negotiations, and subsequently stated publicly following signature of the Treaty, that the SALT II noncircumvention provision would not alter existing patterns of cooperation with our Allies or preclude transfer of systems and weapons technology.

The only provision of SALT II which would have applied to the long-range INF system was contained in its Protocol. This limited deployment until December 31, 1981, of cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers on sea-based or on land-based launchers. That provision would have expired in 1981, however, even if SALT II had been ratified.

The Pershing II and GLCM are intermediate-range nuclear forces being deployed to counter the threat to the U.S. Allies posed by the SS-20 and other Soviet INF systems. Recently, a Soviet spokesman asserted that these systems are viewed as strategic by the Soviet Union and, therefore, circumvent Article XII of the SALT II Treaty. As pointed out before, by mutual agreement, however, the treaty defines land-based strategic ballistic missiles as those having a range of 5,500 km or more. Since our INF systems do not fall into that category, the Soviet spokesman's contention is groundless. Moreover, in signing SALT II, the U.S. stated explicitly that any future limitations on U.S. systems principally designed for theater missions would have to be accompanied by appropriate limits on Soviet theater systems like the SS-20. ✓

Q What about the charge that the U.S. has gone over the 150 kiloton threshold limit?

A Since the effective date of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties, the United States has conducted no nuclear tests having yields which exceeded the 150 kiloton threshold of these treaties.

Q The Minuteman IIIs and Minuteman II silos have been covered?

A No.

Q What was the effective date of -- I know I can look it up, but --

A I don't have here the effective date. Of the TTBT and the PNET Treaties?

Q Yes, please.

I knew it. But I don't.

Q On the conversion of Minuteman IIs, is that the question?

Q Yes.

A The Minuteman II silos were not converted to Minuteman III launchers. The Soviets have been informed that any launchers of Minuteman II ICBMs converted to launchers of Minuteman III ICBMs would be made distinguishable on the basis of externally observable design features, as required by the SALT II Treaty. In the course of the SALT II negotiations, the U.S. had 550 Minuteman III ICBMs, as is well known.

Q Can we have copies of all that?

A Sure.

Q What about the charge that the U.S. has systematically violated confidentiality, in connection with the agreed principle of confidentiality?

A The SCC?

Q Yes.

A The U.S. continues properly to discharge its obligations and responsibilities under the Regulations of the Standing Consultative Commission. The U.S. Government is not making public the proceedings of the Commission. The appearance of stories in the press about the SCC and possible subjects under discussion there does not reflect a change in that policy.

Q Alan, were the Soviet charges matters of long debate and concern between the two countries?

A I can't answer you in a comprehensive way on that. I know that on a number of these issues, they have been raised years past, and some of them haven't been raised, in fact, in years. But as I'm indicating to you, I can't tell you whether each one of these has been raised individually, but what I will tell you is that on each of these, there is no basis for the charges.

As I'm indicating, I've been reading you specific responses to each of these; but the fact of the matter is that they have dragged out a bunch of spurious charges in response to the concerns that we have made clear and we consider to be serious matters.

Q Had each of these been raised at the Standard Consultative Committee?

A I'm not going to get into what is raised in that Committee.

Q Can you post those answers? Plus whatever answers we may not have asked about thus far?

A No. I think if you've got specific questions, I'll be happy to go into them. I don't think we need to go putting out stuff which you may not be interested in. I'm not going to post it, but I said I would make it available. I'll be happy to make it available. I'm not going to put it all up on the board, but we'll put it out on the table for you.

Q Oh, that's fine.

Q Alan, did you cover all of the alleged violations of the Helsinki Agreement in your answer there?

A No, the Helsinki, I think, was another question that they raised.

The United States is in compliance with all the undertakings, human rights, as well as security, contained in the Helsinki Final Act. Our military activities are completely in accordance with the provisions of the Final Act.

We and our Allies notify all exercises which exceed the threshold of 25,000 troops established by the Final Act, and often notify smaller-scale military maneuvers, as a voluntary effort to strengthen mutual confidence.

We regret that the Soviet Union has not always reciprocated. Not only have the Warsaw Pact nations generally declined to provide voluntary notification of any exercise which did not reach the 25,000 troop threshold, as the President's report to Congress on compliance indicated, but the Soviet Union, in a clearcut failure to comply with the Final Act, failed to adquately notify the exercise Zapad 81, which involved some 100,000 troops. *

* After the briefing, the Spokesman added the following:

The Soviet accusation's lack of substance is demonstrated by the fact that the Soviet Union has never formally approached the U.S. concerning possible U.S. failures to comply with the security provisions of the Final Act. Only in response to U.S. concerns about Soviet compliance with arms control agreements has the Soviet Union seen fit to lodge these unsubstantiated charges.

Q Copy of that, Alan, please?

A Yes.

Q What about the violations of the '63 Limited Test Ban Treaty -- radioactive substances beyond --

A What, the venting aspects?

Q Yes.

A Both the United States and the USSR have encountered some difficulty in totally containing all their underground nuclear tests. The United States, however, has had only a few problems in the past with the venting of radioactive debris from underground tests at the Nevada Test site. As more experience was gained with the containment of underground tests, venting from U.S. tests became even more rare. Over the past decade, there has been only one incident of local and minor venting. The Soviets had not raised their concerns about U.S. venting with us since 1976, until the latest reference to it.

Q Can we have a copy of that answer and the previous one, please?

A Yes. We can provide copies of all the answers that I've given you.

Q What about the charge that a Soviet document accused Washington of unilaterally blocking talks on anti-satellite systems, nuclear testing, demilitarization of the Indian Ocean?

A I don't have anything on the Indian Ocean, per se. Anti-satellite testing -- space-based systems, is that what you're talking about?

Q Yes.

A The ABM Treaty does not prohibit research, and both sides have had research programs since the signing of the Treaty. Soviet research and development efforts in the ABM field have been continuous and more extensive than our own. Our program calls only for enhanced research in this area. The President stated in his March 23, 1983, speech that U.S. activities in this area would be consistent with U.S. treaty obligations.

Q How many have you got left now?

(Laughter)

A You've got most of them.

Q Were any of their accusations true, Alan?

A No.

Q In other words, it's a complete tissue of historical ineptitude -- would you describe it that way?

A I will leave it to you to characterize it, Lester.

Q You wouldn't deny that description?

A I would just stick to the words I've used.

Q -- a pack of lies?

(Laughter)

A Lester, you can use all the dramatic terms --

Q Thank you.

A Any other questions on this one?

Q Yes. Following the United States charges of violations, or probable violations, basically made public here on, I believe it was the 13th, has the U.S. taken these questions again to the Soviets through diplomatic means, and have you gotten any response? You sort of indicated not, but you didn't really explicitly address it. I'm talking about now the charges the U.S. made.

A I understand. I don't think I can address the second part of the question any further. On the first part, I'll refer you to what I said in the opening response, which is that the USSR has been informed of these determinations, that is those that we made about violations or probable violations.

Q (Inaudible) since you made them, right?

A They have been informed. I think you can take that to mean it's more than simply a background briefing here on a Friday afternoon.

Q Alan, to follow on that. I took your earlier comments calling this Soviet response, the "Soviet initial response." Was I wrong to assume that that means what it says, which is --

A I will leave you with the words, and I wouldn't quarrel with your interpretation of it.

Q There was a related story that a NATO study claims that the Soviet military spending has gone down in recent years. Do you have anything on that?

A Yes, I do. The NATO estimates of military spending trends are similar to estimates by the U.S. intelligence community which were included in testimony on the Hill in September 1983. We can only speculate on the causes of the apparent slow-down in the growth of Soviet military spending. However, as the NATO study points out, Soviet military spending remains at a very high level, between 14 and 16 percent of GNP.

It is important to keep in mind that what we're talking about is the decline in the growth rate in real Soviet defense spending, and not a decline in the level of absolute outlays. Soviet defense spending remains at a very high level, and is continuing to grow.

Q Copy of that, please?

A Yes.

Q Do you have any comments on King Hussein's news conference on his rejection of the idea of a Jordanian rapid deployment force?

A No, I don't.

Q No comment?

A No.

Q How about the supplemental request for that force; is that to be opened today?

A I don't have anything new on that beyond what we said last week, Jim. The budget supplemental for FY-84, I understand, is scheduled to go to the Congress later this week. And as John indicated last week, when he talked about this at that time, we would be prepared to talk about portions which are unclassified. So let's wait until that goes forward and see where we are.

Q Yes. He said it was going to be today.

A I'm telling you, as of this point, that it's scheduled to go later this week.

Q Alan, on Guatemala.

A Go ahead, George.

Q You announced a year ago that helicopter spare parts could be sold to Guatemala on a cash basis --

A Right.

Q -- and we saw an announcement over the weekend by the Guatemalan Foreign Minister, highlighted by a major newspaper today, did anything happen between January '83 and January '84 which prevented the shipment of those spare parts to Guatemala?

A Did anything happen which prevented it? I can't tell you which -- our position, however, is as it has been in the story on this, as you suggest, is not new. That is, a year ago we agreed to permit the cash sale of certain items including helicopter spare parts which had been requested previously by the Government of Guatemala. We reaffirm that commitment in October, and again recently, and so that has been our position consistently. I think if you look back at responses to questions on that, you will find that's the case.

Q Have they done anything on human rights that would justify the sale going forward?

A Again, I would go back and look at what we said at the time. We made known that we would permit those items to go forward. I don't have anything new to offer you on that.

Q Let me make sure I understand something about these budget briefings that are coming up. Do these all relate to Fiscal '85?

A The ones I -- the one for tomorrow, embargoed until Wednesday, relates to 1985. What I said about the FY-84 supplemental is that when that goes forward we would be prepared to addess those questions.

Jim?

Q Back on Guatemala for a second. Did you have any reaction to the report issued by Americas Watch last week, which was written up yesterday in the Times, about what they regard as the deterioriating situation in the past year under the Mejia government; and has there been any resolution to any of the disappearances or killings of the AID contract employees? I think there are three of them who've died in the last year.

A On the latter, I don't have anything to report to you. On the former, as you know our own human rights country reports are due out shortly, and I think we'll refer you to those reports when they come out.

Q Back to the Middle East?

Q Guatemala.

A Go ahead.

Q This is unclear. Was there not a decision conveyed to the Guatemalans at the end of last year that these sales of spare parts are being held up?

A As usual, if you ask about what we talked about with the Guatemalans, you put me in the kind position where I can't answer the question.

Our position on this has been, as I articulated it to you, and I can't take you beyond that.

Q So you're saying, in other words, there was no change?

A I said we made that commitment. We reiterated it in October. Again, recently. That's really all I can say to you about it. I can't get into diplomatic dialogue.

David?

Q Okay, back to the Middle East.

A Go ahead. We'll come back.

Q Okay, yes. Two things. One, yesterday there was an attempted attack on the Al Aqsa Mosque. Do you have any comment on that or guidance?

A Yes, I do. We, of course, deplore and condemn the senseless effort to do violence to one of Islam's most sacred mosques. We note, also, that this attempt has been condemned by the Government of Israel.

Q That's it?

A That's it.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the statements attributed to U.S. citizen Mier Kahane who said that we will not -- you know, they will not do it themselves but he almost in a way that as an Israeli - American citizen, I think, there is a responsibility to what he said?

A Our attitude towards such attacks is quite clear, and to just deplore and condemn them and certainly not to condone them or agree with sentiment which would do so.

Q Thank you, Alan. Do you have anything on Chester Crocker's talks? Is any progress being made down there?

A I don't have anything to give you on that. Sorry.

Ralph?

Q Anything on Rumsfeld's whereabouts today, and his invitation, if any, to see President Assad?

A He's in Damascus, and I've seen by wires -- wire reports that he has seen Minister Khaddam. He was in Beirut and Amman over the weekend, but I don't have anything for you on either the nature of his talks or other appointments he may have.

Q In connection with that -- maybe I missed something, but there's a posted piece of guidance that says it's standard procedure not to disclose his schedule after it happens. The question specifically related to his trip to London --

A I understand that. We have not always given you details on whom he has seen and when he's seen them. Sometimes we mention it, sometimes we don't.

Q It's not standard procedure not to do that?

A Well, standard procedure sometimes to do it and sometimes not to do it. (Laughter)

Jim?

Q On Guatemala again. I'm a little unclear as to what the status of this is. Has a sale has been consummated and delivery agreed upon, or is the only thing that happened on Saturday is that the Foreign Minister went in and that Chapin simply said, "if you want to buy $2 million worth, you may buy $2 million worth?"

A You're again asking me to get into details of the discussions. I'm not going to do that. My understanding is they're have been no deliveries. I can't tell you what went on in those conversations. I don't know. I wasn't there, and I actually haven't seen a report of it.

Q In December, Alan, you knocked down explicitly stories from Guatemala by senior Guatemalan leaders, including the head of the armed forces, that an agreement had been reached and that deliveries were coming in such --

A I just don't have anything more than I've just given you. Sorry.

Lester?

Q To the Mediterranean. Russell Shaw, who is the ranking public information officer at the United States Catholic Conference, which is the national headquarters of the Roman Catholic Church in the United States, has said, and this is a quote, "The statement that the Holy See is distinct from the Catholic Church is a badly phrased, imprecise, overstatement that is the equivalent of saying that Congress is different from the United States."

Do you have any reaction to this statement, Alan, and I have one follow-up?

A Our position on this was laid out at the time, and I think you were absent, but I'm sure you've taken a look at the transcript carefully.

Q I checked the transcript carefully.

A Good.

Q On one follow-up. Dr. James Dunn of the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs, which represents 27 million Baptists said, and this is a quote: "The treatment of the religious press by the State Department Officer John Hughes is simply another evidence of this Administration's insensitivity to countless millions' principal concern about church/state separation. It's an evidence of what seems at least to be an arrogant and insensitive response to very serious questions, trivialization and making light of earnest questions seeking information about the justification of this Administration's attempt to send a United States Ambassador to the Roman Catholic Church."

Comment? (Laugher)

A I don't think I can keep all that in my head. The fact is it was not treated in a trivial way, and we put out the position, explained it, the basis for it. Certainly took seriously the questions which were raised and answered them to the best of our ability.

Q Alan, on Friday, you took a question regarding State Department involvement in a Smithsonian exhibition. Do you have anything on that?

A I guess we haven't gotten anything back on that yet, but we will try and get something for you on that.

Q Newsweek today reports that a new book being published in Israel by Zev Schieff and Yehud Yauri says the United States was notified six months in advance of the invasion of Lebanon. Do you have any comment?

A We've addressed that many times in the past, that we did not have advance notice and did not give a green light.

Q Have you seen this particular report?

A I've heard about the report. I haven't seen it.

Q I have a related question.

A Try it.

Q Here goes. This has to do with another war which is called Grenada. And it has to do with timing. On October 26, you put out a press -- you posted an answer to a question saying that you notified Cuba "in a timely manner" prior to the invasion, presumably.

A Prior -- what?

Q You didn't say "prior," but you said in "a timely manner."

A Yes, right.

Q On January 24, last week, Secretary Motley said that we carefully delayed informing Cuba until the next morning so they could not interfere with the success of the operation?

A Right. There's nothing inconsistent between those statement. They were not informed -- you must have missed during your absence a lot of statements on this, Jim -- did not inform the Cubans ahead time. There was never any intention to inform the Cubans ahead of time. The purpose was to inform them in a timely manner once the operation was underway so that they would understand what we were doing and hopefully would restrain their forces from firing and therefore could avoid loss of life. But there was never any intention or any actuality of advance notification.

Q Wait. I'm sorry. When you say "in a timely manner," you're saying that in a manner to reduce casualties?

A That's right.

Q But not prior to the actual landing?

A That's correct.

Q So that you accepted the notion that there could be or would be some casualties but then to notify them as soon as possible?

A I suppose these construction workers could have been assumed to be organized to resist --

Q Well, can you say when the Embassy, or the Interest Section was informed --

A Let me ask you to go back and take a look. I think it's been addressed in the record.

Q Not precisely.

A We did talk about it and the fact that -- when we tried to notify them, in fact, because our communications were down and we suggested people might want to contact the Government of Cuba as to why that was the case; that, therefore, it was delayed even longer than we would have intended. But in any case it was never intended to be before the operation began.

Stan?

A Alan, over the last several weeks, a series of articles have appeared in *Izvestia*, *Red Star*, *Literanaya* (sic) *Gazeta*, the Libyan News Service Jana, attacking a prominent U.S. citizen, Lyndon LaRouche because of his support for this Administration's foreign policy in the area of strategic weapons buildup, including an allegation that LaRouche was sent as an emissary of President Reagan to Italy to organize for a ballistic missile defense program.

Do you have any comment on those allegations and slanders?

A Not knowing the facts, no, I really can't.

Q Can you look into that?

A No. I think that we don't comment on charges against private individuals, and so I will just will leave you there. I'm not aware of any mission undertaken on behalf of the government.

Q As a follow-up on that, Alan, now that NBC Nightly News has announced that it will join these Soviet and Libyan press outlets in a series of slander attacks against LaRouche on behalf of the KGB, do you still --

A You may take that up with NBC.

Q Do you still -- well, you put out a statement Friday describing NBC as a legitimate news service. Do you stand by that?

A Yes, I stand by that.

Q   Alan, you had a statement on terrorism earlier. I wonder if you have any comment on the killing of an army general in Spain?

A   Yes.

Q   And I have a follow-up.

A   We condemn the cowardly and brutal assassination of Lieutenant General Quintana this past Sunday in Madrid. Such terrorist acts constitute an attack on the civilized and democratic values of free men and women everywhere, and they underscore the need for strengthened international cooperation to eliminate the scourge of terrorism.

Q   Also, Prime Minister Gonzalez is asking the Council of Europe for an international terrorism conference, or something like that. Do you have any feeling, official feelings or any intention to send a representative or something like that?

A   Don't know anything about that. Sorry.

Q   Do you have any comment on the Evans & Novak column this morning about the deviciveness in the U.S. Administration between Secretary Shultz and Mr. Weinberger about Lebanon?

A   We don't ever get into columns like that.

Q   Anything on either Salvadoran -- the impressment into the army or McCartney's article yesterday in the Post on the border situation and the helicopter?

A   I don't have anything on the border situation. On the report this morning in the New York Times, I think, is the one you're referring to --

Q   Christian Science Monitor.

A   The Monitor as well. There have been a number of reports that the Salvadoran army and guerrilla groups are forceably recruiting Salvandoran youths. The Salvadoran Government has itself expressed concern over such actions and is seeking to improve the current decentralized recruitment procedures that allow for such abuses.

I don't have any specific information regarding numbers. As the New York Times article, at least, notes this morning, all young men in El Salvador are subject to military service.

Q Can I get a copy of that, please?

A Yes.

Lester?

Q Alan, according to the New York Times, in a very small piece in the back pages, the State Department has finally learned, and I note after five months of investigation, who it was that is responsible for sending those government secrets to Lorton Reformatory by mistake. But the Times reports that you're refusing to reveal who these people are and how they are to be disciplined, which is in such direct contrast to reprimands in the Pentagon and various other places --

A What's your question?

Q My question is, how can the State Department recently expect any other government department, whether Defense or Intelligence, to give -- to share with the State Department any classified material given what's happened and what you're doing about it?

A I would refer you, Lester, to the briefing which was held here. Perhaps you missed it, but there was an on-the-record briefing on this subject.

Q You explained -- you're not saying the Times was inaccurate, are you, Alan? God knows, you wouldn't say --

A I didn't read the story, so I couldn't address that.

Q Alan, another four years of Mr. Reagan means more nuclear weapons in the world and less human rights?

A No, I wouldn't say that. (Laughter)

(Press briefing concluded at 1:05 P.M.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, January 31, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #20

TUESDAY, JANUARY 31, 1984, 12:30 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have several items up front for you. First, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Paul Wolfowitz will address the Asia Society, or is I guess at this point addressing the Asia Society in New York. The subject of the speech is "Foreign Policy towards Korea." An as-delivered text will be available in the Press Office later this afternoon.

To remind you that there will be an ON-THE-RECORD briefing here in the briefing room this afternoon by Peter McPherson, Director of AID; William Schneider, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology; and Ronald Spiers, Under Secretary of State for Management, addressing issues pertaining to the proposed FY-85 State Department budget including foreign assistance.

The briefing will be for cameras. However, again to remind you, it will be embargoed until noon tomorrow, February 1.

Q What time is that?

A The briefing will be here at 2:30.

A lot of questions have been asked about the Human Rights Reports so let me tell you that in compliance with the provisions of Section 116-D-1 and 502-B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the U.S. Department of State will deliver to the Congress today the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1983. Printing requirements will take approximately one week. It is planned now that the document will be provided simultaneously to members of the Hill press corps and the Department press corps one day before it is made available to the public, on an embargoed basis, and that Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, will hold an ON-THE-RECORD briefing on that report prior to the lifting of the embargo, so you will get it one day embargoed, be able to go through it, and come into a briefing the next day, ask your questions, following which the embargo on the report and the briefing will be lifted.

Q That will be next week?

A It will be next week, yes.

Q No precise date?

A I don't have a precise date at this point. It could be early in the week, but obviously, the printing is going to be the deciding factor.

Q Is it going to be delivered today?

A It is being delivered to the Hill today.

Q To whom on the Hill?

A I don't know.

To take note of stories which appeared this morning, there are erroneous reports in the morning papers that the U.S. Government has ousted Robert Rutka, a Canadian national who has had dealings with the Cuban Government news agency, Prensa Latina. The U.S. Government has not asked Mr. Rutka to leave the country, nor to cease activities as a journalist in the United States.

In a letter that was mailed January 19, a follow-up was sent on January 26, the Treasury Department warned Mr. Rutka against continued dealings with Prensa Latina. It is our understanding that as a person within the United States who is engaging in transactions with a Cuban-controlled entity, Mr. Rutka is required to apply for a license under the provisions of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations. He has not done so. Suggest you contact the Treasury Department for further details.

Q Can we ask questions on that?

A You can ask questions, but basically, you're going to have to go to Treasury on that, Jim.

Q You say Prensa Latina, but he works for an organization which Canadians call Prensa Latina, Ltd. Is there any legal significance to be attached to that difference?

A You'll again have to go to Treasury who apply the regulations.

And, finally, an announcement on the South African public announcement today regarding nuclear export policy and international safeguards. The Department is pleased to note that the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Corporation of South Africa has announced today that the Government of South Africa will conduct and administer its external nuclear affairs in a manner which is in line with the spirit, principles, and goals of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines.

The Government of South Africa stated today it will transfer nuclear material, equipment, and technology identified in the so-called "trigger list" of the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines only if the recipient country agrees to place such material, equipment, or technology under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, and gives assurances that such items will be used only for peaceful and non-explosive purposes.

South Africa has also stated that it is prepared to resume discussions with the IAEA, to place under safeguards a semi-commercial uranium plant which it is constructing. South Africa has invited the United States to resume discussions on the technical aspects of the application of safeguards on such an enrichment facility.

We believe that the South African announcement represents an important step by that government. These actions regarding their nuclear exports are consistent with efforts by the United States and other governments to develop a common nuclear supply policy in the interest of limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the resumption of negotiations with the IAEA offers the potential for expanding the scope of IAEA safeguards to a large sensitive nuclear facility. The United States is of course prepared to resume technical discussions with the Government of South Africa on the technical aspects of such safeguards.

The Government of South Africa has not agreed to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or to place all of its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. We believe that such a step would be most desirable, and it is our hope that the Government of South Africa will eventually appreciate the benefits of its joining the 116 other countries in adhering to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and we will continue to make these views known to the Government of South Africa.

Q May we have a copy of that?

A Yes. That's it. Happy to take --

Q A question on that: Do you have the name of the facility that you referred to there toward the beginning?

A Yes. I think I do have that. Why don't I ask you to get that later, Jim. I think we do have the one that they're talking about, including --

Q Does it start with a "V," do you remember?

A You're talking about the Valindaba facility?

Q Yes.

A That's a pilot scale of uranium enrichment facility, as I understand it.

Q Can we get the extended guidance that --

A Well, why don't you ask in the Press Office. I'm not going to hand out a lot of stuff, but I'm happy to have questions answered there. But why don't you address those questions in the Press Office later.

Q Does this announcement result from any U.S. initiative? Is it part of constructive engagement?

A I don't think it's a question of U.S. initiative on this thing. We have had discussions. Our policy has been to foster constructive dialogue with the Government of South Africa on non-proliferation matters and particularly in the area of international safeguards.

I note that the South African announcement today contains a reference to discussions on nuclear policy and safeguards with the United States and notes that South Africa has become aware of U.S. concerns about its intentions in the area of nuclear supply.

Q Alan, back on the Prensa Latina, Ltd. guidance --

A Yes.

Q You say go to Treasury, but you do, I understand, have some words prepared there.

A I already gave them to you.

Q No. There are other words --

A No. I'm afraid -- on what?

Q -- that have been prepared. The idea being that if he were to apply for a license, an important consideration on whether that license to continue operations would be granted, would be reciprocity for an American journalist to go to Cuba. Is that indeed the case?

A Well, I think it would be -- I'm not going to predict if he does do that what the likelihood of his getting a license is. One factor Treasury might wish to weigh is whether the U.S. journalists would be granted comparable newsgathering abilities in Cuba.

Q Okay. Another follow-up also on South Africa but on another subject: Stories from South Africa today talk about U.S. assurances in connection with the withdrawal of South African troops from the Angolan border areas. Are there any such?

A Well, I'm not going to get into the -- without trying to lead you one way or another on this, Jim, I'm not going to get into the substance of our diplomatic discussions. What I can say about the Prime Minister's statement today is that, first of all, we don't have a full text of his remarks on the floor of the Parliament, but we welcome the action regarding the implementation of the disengagement and withdrawal as a positive and important step.

We're actively encouraging all interested parties to cooperate in bringing about an effective disengagement of forces which will create conditions favorable to larger efforts to achieve an overall negotiated solution to the Namibia independence issue.

Q And repeating my question, are there any U.S. assurances made in connection with this?

A To repeat my answer, I'm not going to get, without leading you one way or another, into the question of what our diplomatic dialogue entails.

Q What is our understanding of the scope of the disengagement referred to by Botha today?

A I'm not going to try to get into further detail on it, Jim. I think that the important thing is that it is moving forward. We hope it will contribute to a larger process.

Q Well, let me just ask more specifically, if I can. Is it your understanding that the South African disengagement will be total, in the sense that all South African troops and personnel in Angola presently will leave Angola?

A I'm not going to try to get into the details of it. Let's see how it works out.

Q You released -- do you have a situation report on Lebanon, the killing of one Marine and wounding three?

A Yes. We have a little bit on that. Yesterday there were two incidents involving the U.S. MNF contingent. Two Marines were slightly wounded in the first. In the second, one Marine was killed, another seriously wounded.

The Marines returned fire each time. The seriously wounded Marine has been medevaced to the U.S.S. Guam, but, again, as usual I'd refer you to DOD for further details.

There was heavy fighting yesterday in the southern suburbs of Beirut and along the Alayh ridge line, and during the night there were artillery exchanges at Suq al-Gharb, Qabr Shmun, and Khalde.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Yes.

Q Alan, can you tell us where Rumsfeld is, and can you tell us if he met with Assad?

A He is in Israel. I don't have any information about a meeting with Assad.

Q Alan, there was a story yesterday that after his meetings, I think with Khaddam, U.S. officials were quoted as saying that they were pleased by the progress that had been made.

If that report is accurate, could you share what that progress is?

A Marvin, we don't talk about Mr. Rumsfeld's missions, so I'm going to stay away from it, I'm afraid.

Q Well, you talked about one report today being erroneous. Would you say that report was?

A We don't talk about Ambassador Rumsfeld's missions.

Q Did Ambassador Rumsfeld meet any U.N. officials while he was in the United States?

A I don't know. He may well have, but I don't have any information to give you on that.

Q Had he been intending to see Assad?

A Again, I think that he carried out, to my knowledge, the schedule he was intending to carry out, so I will leave you with that.

Q How about Assistant Secretary Murphy?

A He is still in the region. I'm not sure he's with Ambassador Rumsfeld at the moment.

Q Is he in Syria?

A He may have stayed in Syria. I think that with this mission of -- a lot of people on it, people will be dropping in and out of it, so I expect he will join up with him again -- with Ambassador Rumsfeld again as he continues that mission.

Q Alan, do you have any reaction to a report from Beirut today that an independent republic is going to be declared in south Lebanon within the next 48 hours?

A An independent republic? I hadn't heard the reports.

Q Could you check it?

A No. I think I'd refer you to the Lebanese on that. I don't know anything about it.

Q Do you have anything on the reports that the Foreign Minister of Lebanon is going to visit Washington?

A No. I don't have anything on that. I think he has visited here from time to time, but I don't have anything specific on a visit upcoming.

Q Alan, anything on Arafat going to Jordan or on Gemayel-Assad summit?

A Nope. Nothing.

Q Alan, Jumblatt has been asking for the -- possibly for the third or fourth time -- for the resignation of President Gemayel, and he repeated that in the last 24 hours.

A You say who has? Assad?

Q No. Walid Jumblatt.

A Jumblatt.

Q Yes.

A Well, our support -- I mean, I don't know really what to say beyond what we said before. Our support for the Government of Lebanon remains as it has been and for the various policies we have talked about before, but I don't have a specific reaction beyond that.

Marvin?

Q Alan, is it now U.S. policy that the INF talks -- it would be desirable for the INF talks to be absorbed in the START negotiations?

A No. I think that Ambassador Rowny addressed this yesterday, and some of the early reports I think suggested that was what he was saying. In fact, I think I had thought that had gotten cleared off -- cleared up -- excuse me -- later in the day.

But the trade-offs that he was talking about were trade-offs between areas of U.S. advantage -- for example in heavy bombers, air-launch cruise missile -- as against areas of Soviet advantage -- for example, strategic ballistic missiles. And he was not suggesting that it was our proposal or, indeed, that it was the Soviet proposal to merge those negotiations.

Q And the U.S. position is that we still do not want to see the merger take place?

A That it would complicate negotiations.

Q How do we feel about the characterization of those talks as being near a breakthrough at the time it was cut off?

A You have his words. I don't think that's quite what he said. I'd look at it. I think he talked about trying to get back to this issue of trade-offs and getting a breakthrough there. But anyway I'd refer you to what he said on that.

A Alan, do you have anything that you can tell us about the on-going project on terrorism, either the legislative aspect of it or the intra-government group?

A I don't. I saw an article this morning based on apparently some background briefing. I'm really were I was, I'm afraid, in terms of being able to help you on that, which is to say that when that proposal goes forward we'd be happy to have a briefing on the proposal, the package on terrorism, but I can't do anything for you at this point.

Q When you say it goes forward, when it goes to the Hill?

A Yes.

Q This is inter-agency?

A Certainly there are inter-agency aspects to it; sure.

Q Which agencies are involved in that?

A I don't know. All the agencies involved. Clearly, Justice is involved; we're involved. I don't know. Obviously, there are others that have an input, but in terms of the legislative side of it, it seemed to me that those are the two principal agencies other than the White House.

Q One more on another subject. Do you have any comment on the report about food aid in El Salvador being sold?

A Yes. I saw that story this morning. We're aware of the story. We regard the charges as very serious. So serious in fact that we're sending the highest available

AID official in the Food for Peace Office, Mr. Charles Gladson, Deputy Assistant Administrator, to investigate the matter.

We're hoping that representatives from the Catholic Relief Services and the U.N. World Food Program, both of which are involved in providing U.S.-donated food stuffs in El Salvador, will accompany Mr. Gladson on this important mission.

Our AID Mission in El Salvador was contacted yesterday on the allegation and immediately sent a team to look into them. The team included Government of El Salvador officials, the Inspector General of the Military, and Food for Peace officers. Mr. Juan Vasquez of the L.A. Times also went.

Q In what capacity?

A I guess he had raised the issue. I don't know. You'll have to ask the L.A. Times.

The team combed the market and the entire area -- there were, by the way, there was at least one other journalist offered the opportunity who turned it down -- the team combed the market and the entire area and what they found was 450 pounds of cornmeal in several three- and five-pounds sacks, these being in PL-480 sacks; 40 pounds of powdered milk in one opened sack; 140 pounds of bulgar in two sealed 50-pound sacks and one opened sack. And in two grain stores, they found several sealed sacks marked as U.S. donated foods. When opened, however, these sacks contained locally produced rice and sugar.

Poor people, I would note, sometimes don't throw reuseable materal such as plastic foodsacks away, and apparently the sacks had been reused to ship and sell locally produced food.

PL-480 sacks are numbered, and we will be using these numbers to track the movement of these foodstuffs.

In the past, allegations of this nature, when investigated, have not proved to be major diversions or misuses of U.S. donated foodstuffs, and I have a list which I can make available to you later of a past audit, and investigations regarding the U.S. donated foodstuffs in El Salvador.

As I say, however, the charges are taken seriously and people are going to look at it.

Q Can we get a copy?

A Yes.

Excuse me. Ralph, do you have a follow-up?

A I just wanted to ask whether Secretary Shultz is expected to deal with this issue during his one-day stop in El Salvador?

A I would not think it would be a principal topic of discussion.

Q Alan, in that investigation that was carried out on the spot, did it include the national guard headquarters that was next to the market, because the Christian Science Monitor reported that that's apparently -- or indicated that was where the source of a lot of this was?

A I would suggest in follow-up on that that you be in touch with AID and see what you can find out. I don't have further detail.

Q On that same topic. You said past allegations of this kind of thing have not proven to be major diversions of food. What have they been? What is the explanations in the past?

A As I say, I have a sheet which I'll give you which has information on that.

Q In the past, what has it been?

A I don't have it in my head, and I'm going to give you the sheet on it.

Q A follow-up?

A Charles?

Q In the article, though, there was mention of also other types of goods being sold, such as weaponry. I'm wondering if the investigation includes -- you're only mentioning AID people. That is, there have been allegations in the past that a lot of weaponry that is supplied to Salvadoran army gets sold on the black market. Are you looking into that?

A I don't know specifically. That's not something I think that's particularly new as a charge.

Obviously, there is always concern if there's any diversion of equipment from its proper use.

This particular story, however, relates to diversion of foodstuffs, and it is being followed up.

Q On your recitation of on-the-spot investigation, you were saying --

A On the what? On-the-spot investigation? Sorry.

A The sacks found, you were saying there that there's no evidence so far of any U.S. food being sold?

A No, I didn't say that.

Q What was --

A Why don't you go back and read what I said, and then see --

Q I'm going to, but in case it's not clear there I'm asking now.

A I think it is clear. That they found bags which were PL-480 sacks and in the one case it looked like, at least, it had been refilled. They're investigating it. That's as much as I can say about it.

Q Any other cases --

A I don't know.

Q You don't know whether they contained PL-480 food?

A I don't know. But I think -- I said they were sacks and they had foods in them. I can't tell you whether they were the foods originally. They may have been. I'm not trying to deny that. I'm saying they're looking into that and this is what they found.

Q How could they tell, Alan?

A What? On local rice and sugar? I think that the kind of stuff that's there, it's fairly easily distinguished if you take a look at it.

Q Did the Salvadoran authorities ask the FBI to assist in the investigation?

A John, let's not have -- any serious questions?

Q Do you have complete up-to-date list of countries considered by the United States to be terrorism-supporting states?

A There is the terrorist list, and we provided that the other day, I think, when talking about adding Iran to that list. I think there were four other countries.

Q Is there guidance on that?

A I don't want to misstate it. I think -- let's check on it later, but that list is publicly available.

Q Do you have any comment on the article today on Nicaragua command control in the Post?

A Yes. According to the best information available to us, the Sandinistas continue to provide vital military support to the Salvadoran insurgents, including a command and control center, numerous training centers and a logistical base for arms, ammunition, and other supplies.

Q And when you -- in this article, it raises the question of what the United States means when it says "command and control." You just used the word "a command and control center," meaning there must be more than one, I guess, that is used by the Salvadoran guerrillas.

Can you define what you mean by it?

A Command and control center of a military organization is where the top military commanders and staff of the organization are located and where strategic planning is carried out.

Q Thank you.

A Your welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:46 P.M.)

1-265

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #21

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1984, 12:12 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have just one announcement, a follow-on to yesterday's briefing, on which the embargo has just come off, and that is that there are a few -- and I would emphasize "a few" -- sets of 8 X 12 color prints on some of the charts, I think about five of the charts that were here yesterday. So if your organization can really use those color charts, why don't you talk to the Press Office afterward. They'll try to help you on that.

That's all I have on announcements. Be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, is the State Department going to put out a transcript of some remarks made yesterday by Under Secretary Eagleburger?

A The State Department doesn't have a transcript of those remarks, Jim.

Q You say you don't have?

A No.

Q Can you get one?

A I don't know. I would think you'd have to go to the organization to get such.

Q Well, do you know if accounts of what the Under Secretary said are accurate?

A I don't have the transcript, so I can't very well comment on it.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the certain assurances the United States has made to the South African Government in terms of the ceasefire, as announced --

A Talked about this yesterday, I thought, a little bit, Jim, not -- I don't, the quick answer is, and I'd refer you back to what I said. I don't have that same piece of guidance here, but our hope is, obviously, that this disengagement process will go forward and lead to a broader settlement of the problems in the region, in Namibia and so on. But I don't have anything specific on that.

Q Even though now you've seen the full text of the Prime Minister's remarks?

A Well, I haven't personally. I suppose other people have, but, in any case, the answer is the same.

Q Alan, there were some figures, at least in my newspaper, from Secretary Shultz's airplane on the level of aid for Salvador.

A Uh-huh. I would refer you back to the cautions given you yesterday by the briefers about final figures for individual countries in Central America.

Q I was going to ask particularly about -- they had a figure of $ 220 million in military aid for FY-85 which even giving a certain -- seemed much too high, and I don't know --

A Okay. Bernie, I just don't have anything today on those figures. I think that there will be something later in the week coming out on this whole plan, and I think -- I trust that there will be figures available at that time. But I really -- it may turn out that the figures that were in that story are accurate. I can't tell you that -- I don't know -- but the fact is I would still urge you to be cautious about the figures.

Q Is there much -- I mean, unfortunately, we are all having to write stories about the Central American aid figures tonight.

A I understand that, but the fact of the matter is also there's been no announcement of those figures, and I don't see how we can really deal with that, since we are planning to have something on that later in the week.

Q Why -- what is happening later in the week?

A Well, why don't we talk about it later?

Q Do you have any comment on a long story in The Washington Post today, suggesting circumstantial evidence of an Iranian and Syrian connection in the Beirut bombings?

A Simply that the thrust of that story is not inconsistent with our previous statements regarding responsibility for the October 23 attacks, which I think is the principal one addressed in there, although we're not going to address for obvious reason the details in the article. At this point, we are unable to be as definitive as those reporters have been.

As Secretary Shultz said on October 24, while we don't know "who is directly responsible for the attacks, it is not difficult to detect who are the opponents of stability in Lebanon." That was a quote.

There is strong circumstantial evidence of continuing Iranian involvement in, and support for, terrorism in Lebanon. And, as the Secretary noted, again a quote: "Syria must bear a share of responsibility for any Iranian actions in Lebanon whether or not Syria knew of any specific terrorist plans."

Q Copy of that?

A Copy? Yes. It may take a little while, but we can give you a copy of that.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the various -- does the State Department have any position on the Democratic proposal on Lebanon?

A I think Larry Speakes addressed this this morning at his briefing, and I'd refer you to his remarks.

Q And equally on Gemayel's statement that withdrawal would lead to a Soviet-styled -- Soviet-controlled council, revolutionary council? The statement of --

A No. I don't have a specific response to that. I think we have indicated that various parties in the Middle East have made very clear to us they think that the withdrawal of the MNF would be a very serious problem.

Q About the statement by the Secretary now, I mean, are you telling us that the -- you know that those behind the October 23rd are Iranians and, therefore, you think the Syrians are responsible for it? I mean, there's a negation in there.

A Yes. I'm going to leave you with the words that I used, and you'll have to write it as you interpret those words.

Q But can you -- why is -- I mean how, therefore, the Syrians are responsible? Why are they responsible? Can you tell us? If you don't know who the cause is, how can you blame somebody?

A   Well, we've gone over this many times. We're not trying to say anything new. We're also not backing away from what we have said before, so I will leave you with a lot of briefing that has gone on prior to this.

Q   Alan, just to clarify on the Speakes' thing, on the Democrats, Speakes said the Democrats are playing politics with the MNF withdrawal from Lebanon, and you're referring us to what Speakes said.

Can we assume from that that the State Department endorses that -- those specific words?

A   The White House has addressed this subject. I'm not going to go into it.

Q   And the State Department has nothing to say about the Capitol Hill moves, both by Democrats and Republicans, on the question of withdrawal?

A   As I said, the policy, in terms of attitudes of people in the region and in terms of the Administration's policy on the MNF presence and all that, has been articulated many times, and the importance of remaining steadfast. There's nothing new about that.

As far as the reaction this morning, I refer you to what Larry said on it. I don't have anything to say.

Q   Well, can I just follow that for a second? Shultz was on the Hill last week and others were on the Hill last week making a major lobbying effort to head off the kind of thing that Speakes is now referring to.

Should we see this as the next step in the Administration's lobbying effort to publicly accuse it of becoming a political football?

A   I think there are a lot of conversations going on to try to make sure that this problem is satisfactorily resolved.

Q   On Lebanon also, do you have any comment on a statement by Walid Jumblatt saying that the negotiations leading to a new national consensus in Lebanon are a waste of time?

A No. The discussions, in fact, are continuing, and we support that effort, and we want to see it move forward. We think it's very important that it move forward.

Q Would you try to sort out the differences between Mr. Burt and Mr. Rowny over what would happen if the Russians returned to the table, Mr. Rowny saying that he thought the two sides could bring about a breakthrough, and Mr. Burt saying he didn't see any early resolution?

A Well, I haven't -- I'm not sure that I really can. I have not seen Mr. Burt's words. I've seen a press account of it. I'm not sure that from what I saw there was any particular difference, but I just -- I'm not in a position really to comment on it. I'm going to have to leave you with the thoughts, I think, that Ambassador Rowny expressed that view following his meeting with the President. And, as I say, I don't see any necessary contradiction. I think you have to put both of their words into context, and I don't have the transcript of Rick's.

Q Could you say anything about the status of the Administration's effort to finance something in the nature of a strike force in Jordan, or the status --

A No. That subject, which has come up before -- don't have anything to say on it. Haven't had in the past and I don't have at this point. If we do in the future, we'll let you know, but I don't at this point.

Q Do you have any news about the Lebanese/Syrian Presidents holding a summit in Saudia Arabia sometime?

A No.

Q To the fact of this statement about the Marines in Lebanon of the Democratic Party, CBS this morning -- and I will try to put you in the picture -- said that Larry Speakes almost said that these Democrats are almost unpatriotic because of their position.

Is it unpatriotic in America now to be critical of foreign policy in Lebanon?

A I'm just going to leave you -- I don't have the exact things that he said. I'd refer you to what he said, and you can read them for yourselves.

Q Alan, let's say that intelligence reports are true that Iranians pay $50,000 for the bombing. Now, what kind of action is the U.S. going to take -

A Again, I'm not going to address any specific parts of that article which talk about intelligence reports. I'm not going to get into it.

Q On the other article on a Capitol Hill report which says that the U.S. is establishing a substantial semi-permanent military capability with a thousand U.S. military troops remaining in Honduras after the Big Pine II exercises. Do you have any comment on that?

A I'd refer you to the Pentagon. My understanding is that -- and, again, it's really for your guidance, because it really has to be a Pentagon matter -- but I'm told there is no decision at this point. I'm not saying there won't be. I don't know. But in any case, there is no decision to leave behind people. That exercise goes on for -- what? -- another couple weeks, I guess. So we'll see what happens.

Q How about the non-personnel aspect of that question?

A As to equipment and so on being left behind?

Q Substantial semi-permanent military capability?

A Again, I think you'd have to ask the Pentagon what the details on it would be.

Q That report also indicates that there would be another exercise -- perhaps not in such large scope -- later on this year. Would there be any need for military engineers and support personnel to stay there?

A You'd have to ask the Pentagon. To my knowledge, there's no decision to do that. I certainly don't rule out that there would be another exercise, but my understanding, pending your check with the Pentagon, is there's no decision to have one. But I can't tell you what would be required. That's a military judgment.

Q Alan, is there any further information on the internal developments in Lebanon?

A About the what? Internal developments in Lebanon?

Q Yes.

A No.

Q And on Chad?

A Chad, I don't have any update to give you beyond what we had the other day on Chad.

Q Do you have contacts with the French concerning the latest deterioration in the position there?

A I can't comment in specific terms whether we've had -- when our most recent contacts have been with the French, but certainly we do talk to the French about developments there. There's no question about that.

Q At least, you must be following the contacts between the French and the Libyans in this concern?

A That's something that would be up to the French and Libyans to comment on. But, as I say, we certainly would keep up with the French on it.

Q On Honduras, there is consideration to leaving behind people; is that correct?

A You'd have to ask the Pentagon. I just don't know. I'm just saying as far as I know, I've the seen the reports, and I asked is there a decision to do that. And I'm told, no, there is no decision to do that.

Q Does the State Department favor that --

A I wouldn't get into agency positions one way or another. That's not to lead you --

Q Would King Hussein be having any talks with Administration officials while he's here for medical treatment?

A My understanding on that is that there are no appointments set, but I certainly wouldn't rule that out. That's obviously a possibility.

Q Does he expect to come to Washington as far as you know?

A You would have to check with the Jordanian Embassy on his schedule. But as I say, I wouldn't rule out the possibility of talks.

Q Alan, the next meeting of the Israeli military/political working group, or whatever they're being called, will be held in Israel. Can you tell us who, from the U.S., will head that delegation?

A I don't think we've said anything about the next meeting other than there will be another meeting. I don't think we've specified when, where or who, and I don't have anything to give you on that.

Q There is a report in one of the opposition newspapers in Cairo that the American Embassy in Cairo decided to give itself the responsibility of choosing the Egyptian journalists who are to visit the United States. Do you have anything on that?

A I don't have anything on it. I don't know under what program you're talking...There are a variety of programs under which people come to the U.S. So I just don't know the answer to that question.

Q Any comments on the $37 billion Soviet aid to Pakistan?

A $37 billion Soviet aid to Pakistan?

Q Right.

A No. I think we had some guidance the other day, which I would refer you to in the Press Office, on the Soviet Union and Pakistan. I'm not sure whether that was the specific question or not, but let me refer you to the Press Office on it.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded 12:27 P.M.)

Becker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #22

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 1984, 12:20 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have a couple of announcements for you. First, available in the Press Office is the prepared statement by AID Administrator Peter McPherson before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The subject of the testimony is the Administration's annual proposal for foreign economic assistance.

Also available later this afternoon in the Press Office will be the prepared statement by Under Secretary for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The testimony will be on Lebanon. As you may know, that testimony is scheduled for 1:30 this afternoon. It is open. I believe it is in Room 2172 of the Rayburn Building.

A sad announcement: Many of you know that Robert Funseth, former Spokesman for the Department, lost his son Eric last Sunday. All of us want to express our deepest sympathy to Bob and his wife, Marilyn. We share their grief and hope they know our hearts and thoughts are with them.

Mr. Funseth has asked us to let his friends know that the memorial service for Eric will be held this Saturday, February 4, at 11:00 a.m. at St. John's Church, Lafayette Square. The family requests no flowers but rather that contributions be made to the Outreach Program at St. John's Church or to the Eric C. Funseth Memorial Fund of Sheppard and Enock Pratt Hospital in Baltimore. The mailing addresses for these charities are posted on the Bulletin Boards in the Main Press Office and also in Room 2310.

That is it for announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Before I ask a question, I'd just like to say that I'm sure we all join you in expressing your sympathy to Bob and his family.

Can you tell us about this current situation with Ambassador Galbraith in Paris?

A Not really a lot, Jim. I think that the Embassy, our Embassy in Paris, indicated yesterday that there had been a misunderstanding about what the Ambassador had said due to inaccurate and incomplete transcript of the broadcast which had taken place last Sunday night.

I understand that the Ambassador did meet with the French Prime Minister on February 1, but I don't have any details to give you.

Q There's no change contemplated in the Ambassador's status?

A No.

Q Do you have any comment on the statements made by President Hafiz al-Assad of Syria yesterday regarding the American troops in Lebanon?

A No, I don't.

Q Any comment on Prince Abdullah?

A I think that I do have some comment. I think that there was some reporting, or interpreting, of what he was saying, that he was suggesting he was advocating pulling the U.S. Marines out of Lebanon. That's not our understanding of the Saudi position, and it's certainly not what Crown Prince Abdullah said in his January 29 meeting with the distinguished American visitors to Saudi Arabia. The Crown Prince recognizes fully that a U.S. withdrawal now would harm the U.S. reputation and tarnish that of its friends. Saudi Arabia has told us that it supports the request of the Government of Lebanon for the Multinational Force presence, and we understand that remains the Saudi Government position.

Q Alan, on the other part of the statement that was attributed therefore only to a senior Saudi official, they said something about President Gemayel, that he is unyielding to any compromise, he thinks that he's negotiating from his point of strength by having the Marines there and having the Israeli occupation almost supporting him. Do you have any comment on this source.

A No. As I say, the Saudi Government supported the Government of Lebanon's request for the MNF presence, and we understand that remains their position. I'm not going to comment on a source.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A The copy of what I gave you, sure.

Q Just to be clear, that Saudi position that you gave to us is something based upon a check by the U.S. following the report, right?

A I think what I gave you at the end, which says that we understand that remains the Saudi Government position, is a current understanding.

Q Did we have somebody at this meeting? Was there some State Department representative there?

A I don't have the details of the meeting, Bernie. But I don't think there's any question about the confidence of what we're saying.

Q Wasn't it the case that King Fahd sent a message to President Reagan last November, saying that the Israelis should leave Lebanon and then he was sure Syria would leave?

A I don't recall what we have said about Presidential messages/exchanges with the King. Saudi Arabia has been clear in its support for a Lebanon free of all foreign forces. Obviously, their goal and ours, in that respect, are identical. But for their view of how that might best be accomplished, I'd have to ask you to talk to them.

Q How is it that you have --

A How what?

Q How is it that you have such -- I mean, information about the subject with the Saudis? After the statement of Prince Abdullah did you?

A I said to Marvin, I'm not going to go into details of how and when we conduct our exchanges, but that the understanding that I expressed in the initial statement, that we understand that that remains their position, is a current understanding.

Q But what I am asking --

A I understand your question, and I would ask you to listen to my answer. It's a current understanding.

Q Let me try it one other way. He seemed to be saying also that the Syrians were to pull out if the United

States troops and all the other foreign forces did. Is that a proposal that you're considering?

A That who said this?

Q Abdullah.

A As I said, as far as their views -- his views, or the Saudi Government's views, on how one can best achieve what is a shared goal of the withdrawal of all the foreign forces, you should talk to them. I think we've talked before about the question of unilateral pullout. I don't have anything new to add to that subject today.

Q Alan, on this matter, can you confirm or deny that the United States objected to an Israeli withdrawal, an additional Israeli withdrawal in southern Lebanon? There were reports that you sounded an objection and you said if you will withdrawal to the Israelis, that things in southern Lebanon will go haywire?

A No. I don't have a specific response to that report. We have indicated before -- certainly -- obviously, as you know, we favor the withdrawal of all the forces. As to any possible further drawdowns, that we were sure that there would be full consultation on that subject. But I don't have anything to take you beyond our standing position on that; give you any detail on that.

Q Let me follow up. You had the -- you didn't want to comment until after in detail about Mr. Jumblatt's statements, but I think yesterday's statement about that the possibility of a warfare in Lebanon will erupt anytime soon is more serious than just saying that you're supporting the Government of Mr. Gemayel. Do you have any comments on this such severity of statements coming out now?

A No, I'm not going to try to comment daily on what Mr. Jumblatt says. The situation is one, right now, setting aside his remarks about a breakdown in the situation and so on, but as far as the situation -- I'll give you a little sitrep: No incidents involving the U.S. MNF in the MNF contingent in the past 24 hours.

There was fighting yesterday along the Alayh ridgeline and in Beirut's southern suburbs and extensive shelling of East Beirut last night.

We are concerned about the increase of violence in the Greater Beirut area and call on all the parties to respect the ceasefire. We note with particular concern reports of shelling in heavily populated civilian areas and urge the combatants spare innocent civilian lives.

Q A copy of that?

A Yes.

Q And, again, about the statement made by Prince Abdullah, would you say that it was a sort of surprise to the U.S. Administration?

A -- Again, I think that you're assuming that he said something in your question -- that I'm saying that he didn't say, so --

Q Alan, I guess we have a problem with what you think he has said. And maybe the story is different on what he had said.

The story I saw had him saying that if the United States troops would withdraw, he was confident that Syrian troops would also withdraw. It sounded like a new proposal.

Q There were other stories that were simply saying that the U.S. should pull the Marines out and I'm addressing those stories. As far as -- again, I just refer you back to what I said about his views, or the Saudi views, on sequencing a withdrawal or how that might be effected best -- I would refer you to the Saudis. I'm not going to get into that. Marvin.

Q I was just going to try to parse your answer a little bit. Because you were saying that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia share the same overall goal.

A Right.

Q Now, you're --

A Which is the withdrawal of all foreign forces.

Q And now you've put in the word "sequence" and maybe that's where the hangup is. Is it the Saudi --

A No. I said -- I'm sorry -- in answer to the question initially, I said, as to how the Saudis think that that goal, that shared goal, can best be achieved, I refer you to them.

Q Right. But are you disputing that this is, in fact, what he has reported to have said or that he might have said to you?

A I don't have anything on that, as to what he might have said on that subject. What we're particularly focused on was that some of the reporting seemed to suggest the Marines should get out of Lebanon, and that isn't what he said.

Q Okay. But is it possible that the Marines getting out of Lebanon is part of the sequence that is now being expressed by Saudi officials, in part, to the U.S.?

A Again, I can't take you beyond what I've said on that, but I would refer you again to the specifics of what I've said in the first place, which is that the Crown Prince recognizes fully a U.S. withdrawal now would harm the U.S. reputation and tarnish that of its friends.

Q Do you see the statements of Prince Abdullah as part and parcel of the new relations between Saudi Arabia and some of the so-called radical Arab countries, like Libya and Syria?

A I don't see how you -- I'm not sure I can follow the question and put it into context. I don't --

Q No, I mean to say if this is a reflection of a new attitude being taken by the Saudi Government in the light of their better relations now with the Syrians and the Libyans?

A I think what we're saying is that we don't see a change in what their position has been.

Q Do you have any indication that the Soviet Union is increasing its push or its involvement in the Lebanese quagmire or the whole question there of Lebanon, because there are reports also that indicates that there are too much of activity as a result of Mr. Jumblatt was in Moscow and then came back to Damascus, and other things? Is there a connection there, a direct connection to this?

A Between that and --

Q Between that and the Soviet Union involvement, that this is why this escalation is coming to this point?

A I don't have any judgments to offer you on that. We have addressed -- the Secretary talked about Mr.

Jumblatt and his trip, and we've expressed before our concerns about the large-scale Soviet military presence in Syria, and so on. But I don't have anything new -- the kind of assessment you're asking for, I don't have.

Q Do you have any comment on the Egyptian Government's banning on any films by Columbia pictures?

A I don't.

Ralph?

Q No comment?

A I saw the story, but I don't have anything on it.

Q Alan, back on the Prince again for just a second. You seem to be focusing on the reputation of the U.S. and the reputation of the U.S.'s friends; is that why the Marines should not be withdrawn now, because withdrawing them would tarnish the reputations?

A No. I think I will refer you, as terms of U.S. policy today, to Mr. Eagleburger's statement and let him speak specifically to the U.S. policy. It'll be an open session.

--MORE--

Q Alan, on the Prince also, I understand the thrust of what he told the visiting businessmen, and I quote as much as I can from Amman, that had it been that you sent the MNF, including the Marines, to the Lebanon in order to stop the Israeli invasion, you would have been welcome, and these are his words. And he added, now the objective of the MNF in Beirut is to protect persons with false policies. What do you say to this?

A Well, Crown Prince Abdullah cautioned against intervention in Lebanon to protect, as you say, "individuals or particular factions." We've made it clear from the beginning our forces and our policy are dedicated to rebuilding an independent Lebanon with a free government.

We're supporting a legitimate government. We do not and will not use our power to support one faction against another. This policy is understood by the Saudi Arabian Government.

Q Copy?

A Yes.

Q Let me go back to this subject of President Gemayel and your efforts to exert pressure, or convincing President Gemayel to come to an agreement with the factions there.

There have been all kind of reports and throughout the time, you know, there were bits and pieces of your efforts to put President Gemayel in the right place in telling him that he has to acquiesce and he has to cooperate with the rest of the people there and the other factions.

All indications there that you are always criticized now that you didn't put enough pressure, and with this statement of Prince Abdullah, there is indication that he is not listening to almost because you are supporting him personally more than you are supporting the peace efforts to try to bring about there.

So could you clear the atmosphere of your real efforts, you know, intensive efforts to bring about a reconciliation and settlement in Lebanon, and that President Gemayel will abide by your, you know, desire and the wish of the other factions to come --

Q I don't think we tell presidents of other countries what to do. The fact of the matter is, we have made very clear, both in words and in deeds our belief that a national reconciliation process is very important in Lebanon. President Gemayel has said that as well. So, obviously, we have engaged in extensive conversations. The various missions of negotiators, now Ambassador Rumsfeld, have been importantly focused in part on this question, but I think that the premise of the question about telling other governments what to do is not a premise we would accept.

Q You just mentioned that the U.S. objective now is to achieve Lebanese Government independence. If that is to be done through military force, which now it is reported as almost inevitable, would that still be within U.S. -- acceptable U.S. approach to have to achieve in --

A I don't necessarily accept your statement about inevitability and I therefore say that is in the realm of the speculative, and I'm not going to try to address it.

Q Any reaction to the report that the Soviets are backing off their position that they wouldn't want a U.N. peacekeeping force in Lebanon?

A No. I think you'd have to let them speak for themselves on that question.

Q Well, let me just ask you one other thing. Last week a high Department official in an open session said that when he was questioned about proposals that the MNF be phased out and a U.N. force of some kind be phased in, that it was his understanding that the Soviets had never been too keen on peacekeeping forces and that they would veto it if we went before the U.N. with that kind of proposal.

Is that still --

A I don't have anything to offer you on that. It is possible that in the course of his discussions this afternoon, Mr. Eagleburger might -- I don't know -- but why don't you say what he has to say about that?

Q Can we say that there is an agreement between the Americans and the Saudis on the final goal in Lebanon, but there is disagreement on the means or the ways that you --

A I'm not going to try to get into what our dialogue is like with the Saudis or any other government --

Q You also put it that --

A Well, you are, because you're asking whether we're disagreeing with each other. I'm simply saying that they will have to speak for themselves on their views on obtaining it, but there's no question that the goals are the same.

Q The Secretary said in Salvador that the United States is neutral in that election coming up, yet the Times today suggests there are fears that a D'Aubuisson victory would create one situation and a Duarte victory might lead to a coup the other way.

Do you have any statement to sort out the U.S. position on the election?

A Well, on the question of elections and our position on the elections, the Secretary's words are unambiguous, and I leave you with those. As far as the question of coups and so on and so forth, the Salvadoran military has pledged itself to provide the security necessary for the March 25 election to take place, fully concurring with the importance of free elections to the pacification effort, and we believe the results of the election will be respected.

Q How about the gist of the article which suggests there are fears that a D'Aubuisson victory -- that that would lead to continued human rights abuse and therefore Congressional cutting.

A I'm not going to try to speculate about what a future government might be and what its policies might be.

Q I forget, why was D'Aubuisson refused a visa back a couple months ago?

A You forget? I'd refer you to the record. That will refresh your memory.

Q Oh, all right. (Laughter.)

Q Is the language you just used the same used before the last Guatemalan election?

A I'd refer you to the record, to check that.

Q Okay.

Q Comments that this President had only three --

A I'm sorry, I can't --

Q Comments that this President had only three foreign policy elements: one, missiles, second, troops, and third, military aid.

A Well, that's not a question. Go ahead, Steve.

Q Alan, do you have any comment this morning on the foreign policy implications of this morning's Post story on EDB?

A I think that that question is somewhat up in the air. As far as the story and the reference to the Caribbean Basin, for example, the Environmental Protection Agency has not yet announced what it will actually require regarding agricultural imports which have been treated with EDB.

The Public Health decisions in this regard are beyond the purview of the Department of State, and I will have to refer to the technical agencies involved for further information on their eventual rulings.

Regardless of the foreign policy considerations which may be involved in any U.S. trade policy, all U.S. agricultural imports have always been subject to strictly enforced requirements of U.S. health and sanitation authorities.

It's in the economic and political interests of the United States to encourage the economic development of less developed nations, many of which are heavily dependent on agricultural exports. And we're in close touch with the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Agriculture on this matter. But that's really as far as I can take you at this particular point.

Q Okay. Can you just react to the report in the Post that the Embassies have -- that Embassies or the State Department, has suggested to the EPA that if it bans EDB, it could harm the Caribbean Basin Initiative?

A I don't know the facts, and I don't have any comment.

Q Alan, do you have any further information on the diplomatic crisis with France resulting from the statements made by the U.S. Ambassador?

A Oh, I think I would steer you away from using dramatic terms like "diplomatic crisis." I don't have anything further to say beyond what I said before, though, about it.

Jim?

Q The Post today quotes Associated Press as saying that the helicopter sale to Guatemala had been delayed as a result of an increase in human rights abuses in that country in the past year. Can you address that?

A Not really. All I can really say to you is that approximately $2 million in helicopter and aircraft spare parts under a cash sale offer made to the government of Guatemala in January '83 are being sold. The sale was never consummated because the Guatemalan Government said it lacked funds to purchase the equipment. In November the Guatemalan Government renewed its August request, made a down payment, and these cases are being processed at this time. I don't have a specific shipment date.

Q What was the August request about? I didn't understand that part.

A There was -- in August, apparently they first made a request about this which they then renewed in November, and at that time -- that is, in November, they then made a down payment.

Q Alan, why didn't we respond at the time that the request was made in August if there were no legal or policy barriers to the sale?

A Well, I don't have anything. I've given you everything I can on that.

Q Can you look into that?

A No. I think that the fact is that the sale is going forward. You recall that in January '83 we announced that after extended consultations with the Congress and analysis of the situation in Guatemala, the Government had decided to permit the cash sale to the Government of Guatemala of some 15 previously-requested spare parts and safety-of-flight cases under the FMS program.

That decision was made in light of the human rights improvements that had taken place in Guatemala since the Rios Montt Government came to power in March of '82, and we gave you, I think, at that time a list which I won't go through. And the decision to proceed with the shipment is made to fulfill that commitment.

Q Excuse me --

A And we took into consideration the human rights situation at that time in reaching our decision. As far as our current assessment of the situation in Guatemala, the human rights situation, that will be detailed in the forthcoming human rights country reports which will be available next week.

Q Can we get a copy of what you just read?

A No. I think you're going to have to get it from the transcript.

Q All right. Then if I could just follow. The reason I ask about the August is that -- and why I'd like you to look into that, is because it's implicit in the guidance that you gave. You said there was a request in August, but then the Guatemalans had to renew their request in November before it was acted upon, and that gives rise to an implication that there was a problem between August and November.

A I just don't have anything further for you.

Q In that connection, you cited as the reason for providing the equipment now was that -- in order to fulfill that commitment, that January commitment.

Would you have cited other reasons if there were other reasons?

A I don't know. I mean, the fact is we have --

Q Well --

A We've addressed the issue several times and referred to that commitment and referred you back to the record where you can find that, and said we would live up to that commitment.

Q You're living up to that commitment, and you're saying that the reason for doing -- for providing the material now is to live up to that commitment. Are you saying --

A We try to live up to our commitments.

Q Right. Are you saying -- by specifying one reason, are you saying that that's the reason for doing it?

A I can't tell you whether there are other factors involved, but that is basically what we're doing is: we said we would sell it; they've asked to buy it; we're selling it.

Q Because we can easily draw the implication there that if you're citing that reason, then there may very well be changes in the human rights assessment, but you feel that you have to live up to that January commitment.

A Well, I can't draw your conclusions for you, but I can tell you that this is what our policy is.

Q Can you tell us where the JLP is?

A No.

Q Do you have any guidance on the Chilean refusal to expel Rauff, and Israel's formal request?

A Simply to note, as we previously have, that the U.S. Government position on Nazi war criminals is clear. They should be returned to justice. But the U.S. has no jurisdiction in the Rauff case, but we're prepared to offer any appropriate assistance to see that justice is done.

Q What kind of assistance would be appropriate?

A I don't have details to offer you on that.

Q Okay. Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:44 p.m.)

~~[illegible]~~/Becker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, February 3, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #23

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1984, 12:15 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I do not have any announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Can you bring us up to date on what you hear from Lebanon? It seems that large-scale fighting has broken out again.

A I can give you what I have in the way of a sitrep, Jim. It is, I would caution you, however, based on information which is a couple of hours old, so -- that's just the nature of the process.

There have been no incidents involving -- well, the guidance here says there's no incidents involving U.S. MNF contingent in the past 24 hours. In fact, I would double-check that. There may have been some small arms exchange. Nothing big, but there may have been some small arms incidents.

There has been heavy fighting in the greater Beirut area. I understand that all the parties have agreed to a cease-fire which is, one hopes, in the process of being implemented. But, again, that's a cautionary -- there should be a cautionary note introduced into what actually is happening on the ground there.

All U.S. personnel in the Beirut area are safe though some windows were broken at the Ambassador's residence yesterday as a result of nearby shelling. But I really don't have a more up-to-date reading. I think that your colleagues probably are more current than we can be in terms of keeping you informed.

Q Do you have any political statement on the situation?

A I do not. I think that Under Secretary Eagleburger had extensive remarks about the situation yesterday, and I would refer you to his testimony.

Q What does this new, heavy fighting say to you about the possibility of a security framework eventually being negotiated?

A I don't know that one can draw firm and fast conclusions from it. Obviously, it is not a happy situation where you have shelling and firing and so on, but I don't think that it necessarily means that that process at all is dead. That process continues.

Q Alan, do you have any further breakout beyond what was given at the White House today on the figures for Central American countries other than El Salvador?

A I don't have any information beyond that. That's where -- I mean, that briefing was as complete as we can provide information at this point.

Q Can you make available here the pieces of paper that were made available there?

A I don't know. I will look at it. I assume you covered it over there, so I'll look at it; but obviously the information is primarily going to come out of the White House.

Q Why is the information that was provided today so scant? I mean, this has been -- the figures provided today were in the Washington Times of all places two weeks ago. So it doesn't seem like anything more has happened. Do you have an explanation?

A I think that there are consultations continuing with the Congress, and I think there is, among other things, some hesitancy to give great detail in public while the consultations with the Congress on this package continue.

Q In that case, why was this briefing held today and not postponed until you got things more together?

A Oh, I think the basic philosophy and the basic numbers framework are available at this point, and it seemed an appropriate time to do it. I don't think that there will be a great delay in providing the detail, but in any case it was done and you'll just have to take what you can get out of it.

Q Do you have any comment on the French-Soviet trade agreement signed today?

A I don't.

Jim?

Q Do you have any comment on the statements made by former Ambassador White yesterday on the Hill, saying that this government has information which it has covered up which would implicate D'Aubuisson in the killing of Archbishop Romero?

A That simply is not true. As we've stated in response to these charges on at least three earlier occasions, we're well aware of the allegations linking Mr. D'Aubuisson to the death of Archbishop Romero. The information available to us, however, is limited and incomplete and no conclusions can be drawn from it.

In 1982, in May, and again in May of 1983, we provided the documentary information available to the Department on this matter to the House Foreign Affairs Committee. In addition, a Department official testified on the subject before a closed session of that Committee on May 26, 1982.

Q Is that true that no cable was sent to the State Department saying that --

A No, I'm not going to get into the question of cables, specific cables, that may or may not have been sent. But what I'm saying --

Q But I mean, that's what his testimony rests on, though.

A No. What his testimony rests on is that cables that he sent were allegedly withheld; and without addressing specific cables, what I'm saying to you is nothing was withheld.

Q Nothing has been withheld? Is that what you said?

A Yes. Nothing over which -- you know, no State Department reports were withheld.

Q Why was your information about this limited, as you said?

A That's the nature of the information.

Chris?

Q The other element of his testimony was the names of six Salvadorans living in Miami.

A Again, I'm not going to get into the specifics of specific reports.

Q But that is a completely different --

A The approach of the Department of State, however, has been to provide that information which we have on that subject -- that is, people who may be in this country involved in death squad activity -- to the Justice Department, and that has been done. Obviously that's --

Q Is it your understanding that those people and others are under investigation at the present time?

A You would have to check with the Justice Department. I can't answer.

Q Did you also just say a minute ago that the policy was also to give the information to Congress since nothing has been withheld?

A Talking about Mr. D'Aubuisson and his involvement was the first question. Now, we're talking about some individuals who were named by Mr. White. Again, I'm not going to get into the specifics of what was reported by our Embassy during his time or other times; but as a general approach and a general matter, when we have information on activity which could be illegal in this country, that information is turned over to the Justice Department.

Q With respect to --

A Excuse me. Lars, did you have a question?

Q I think it's hopeless, but the Justice Department complains that the information they got was very vague, very common Hispanic last names, no addresses, nothing like that.

A Well, I'm not sure that the information that we had -- I can't address that, O.K.? I can't really speak to the accuracy of that report from Justice, but I'm not sure that -- I don't know about whether information provided is last names only or addresses or what; I guess it really is hopeless in the sense that I can't get into the detail on it.

Q Were these specific names provided to the Justice Department?

A I think I have just said, I'm not going to get into --

Q When were they provided to the Justice Department?

A I don't have information on when names were provided to Justice.

Q Okay. And with respect to the D'Aubuisson-Romero connection, is there presently an investigation in El Salvador or in the United States with respect to the responsibility for that assassination?

A I think that if there is an investigation going on in El Salvador, you should check with the Salvadoran authorities. The information that we have has been -- I've described it to you, and I've described what we have done with it.

Q When you say that the reports or evidence are limited and incomplete, are you suggesting that some of the reports or evidence that you have do bear on this matter and do support, in however limited or incomplete a fashion, the thesis being put forward by Ambassador White?

A I think it's clear that there is reporting that is relevant to this matter. I'm not going to go beyond that.

Q Why is it that the United States has not made public, especially since there is no investigation in El Salvador, the evidence that bears on this matter, which was clearly a crime?

A We often do not make public information which, for a variety of reasons, including sources and methods, including other factors which go into the legitimate classification of information, as you well know.

Ghassan.

Q Alan, back on the Middle East, do you have any more comments today on Prince Abdullah's remarks of yesterday?

A I can repeat to you essentially what was said yesterday by Ambassador Eagleburger up on the Hill. And I also understand that the Saudi Embassy may be prepared to address this question as well, so I was informed -- I can't say; I haven't been in touch with them directly, but I have been told that they are prepared to address the question if asked.

But to basically review, we have reviewed the record of what Crown Prince Abdullah said in his January 29 meeting with distinguished American visitors to Saudi Arabia and which U.S. Embassy officials also attended, to clear up a point that was asked yesterday.

When asked by members of the group for his reaction should the Marines withdraw, Crown Prince Abdullah said he did not favor this. He stated that, "If they are withdrawn, the U.S. will be shamed. I do not want the U.S. to mar its reputation because that of its friends will be tarnished as well. U.S. forces should be withdrawn only along with or after the Israeli forces."

Taken in context, the Crown Prince's remarks are consistent with what the Government of Saudi Arabia has told us, which is that it supports the request of the Government of Lebanon for the Multinational Force presence; and as I indicated yesterday, we understand that that remains the Saudi Government position.

Q Can I, please -- first of all, can we have a copy of what you read just now?

A Sure.

Q And two -- ah, what do I want to ask -- can we also have a copy of Secretary Eagleburger's remarks yesterday? Do you have that?

A I think the prepared remarks were available in the Press Office yesterday, and perhaps they can dig out some copies which are left over. As far as the rest of this statement in which this may have come, you really would have to go to the Hill. But I recall that he did address that, I think in the question-and-answer period, so I'm not sure that what we have for you will cover that.

Q One more thing, please. About two weeks ago there was a report which I think you or John addressed of President Mubarak telling King Hassan that Camp David is dead. You told us at the time, and was satisfactory (sic). But recently, there was a report where U.S. officials were quoted saying that Kamal Hassan Ali "swore" Mubarak never said those remarks.

Would you comment on that? Can you clarify this for me?

A No, I think we have expressed several times our understanding of the Egyptian Government's firm continued dedication to 242, Camp David; but as far as specific remarks and so on, really, it's the Egyptian President. You should ask the Government of Egypt.

Q But can you tell us if you, to your knowledge, the Foreign Minister of Egypt ever made these remarks, that he swore that Mubarak never --

A I'm not going to address the question of what may have transpired between officials of the U.S. Government and the Government of Egypt.

Ralph?

Q I know that you have answered this question in the past, but sometimes the answers change. Do you have any comment today on the continuing and repeated calls by Mr. Jumblatt for President Gemayel's resignation?

A No, other than to say that our support for the legitimate Government of Lebanon and its efforts at national reconciliation and establishing its authority throughout Lebanon remains firm.

-- MORE --

Q Do you have any comment on his repeated suggestion that the U.S. -- that that statement by the U.S. reflects support of an unpopular faction of the Lebanese political community?

A Well, I haven't seen what he said specifically other than -- I mean, I've seen his remarks in the past. I don't know what this one is. It is clear, however, that is not U.S. policy. It is not what we are doing. We're supporting a government which was elected through a process which exists in Lebanon and which also has dedicated itself to broadening the political base. So the answer is we are certainly not supporting any faction; we are supporting the central government.

Q Anything on the Jordanian force?

A No.

Q Can you also -- on the Middle East, while on the Middle East -- can you tell us if the U.S. received any "firm protest" or any protest about the Mubarak statement from the Government of Israel?

A Again, I'm not going to get into the question of any conversations between ourselves and another govenment of that sort.

Q The Embassy in Tegucigalpa is reporting a helicopter crash yesterday in which some American soldiers were killed and wounded. Do we know whether that was near the Nicaraguan border; how close I'm not sure. Do you know whether --

A This was what kind of -- I don't know anything about it.

Q It was a U.S. Army helicopter crash in northeast Honduras near the Nicaraguan border. I just wondered if it was -- there was bad weather. Are we calling it an accident or hostile action?

A I don't know anything about it. I guess you'd have to check with the Pentagon on it.

Q The Pentagon says it was 35 miles from the border. There was no hostile fire. It was bad weather, and the plane went down with four dead, six wounded.

A Thank you, Rick.

Q Did you have anything on Sudan?

A On?

Q Sudan. There was a raid on a Chevron installation.

A I had something yesterday. I don't think I have it with me, so could you check -- let me just double check to be sure I don't have it. Yeah, maybe I do have it with me actually. Excuse me.

Again, this is from yesterday. Okay? I don't have an update beyond what it was.

Our Embassy in Khartoum reports that it was informed a group of armed men, estimated between 15 to 20 of them, attacked a Chevron drilling barge at its Rub Kona base camp near Bentiu in southern Sudan.

Three third-country nationals were killed in the attack, all contractor employees. Six more were wounded, including an American whose injuries we understand are slight. At this time -- at the time this guidance was prepared, and I don't have any update -- we had no specific information on the group responsible for the attack. I think that remains the case. We still do not.

Q Alan, do you have anything on a London Telegraph story that the United States and Britain have agreed to set up convoys if necessary to protect ships going through the Straits of Hormuz?

A Yes. I do have something on that. We have had bilateral consultations with the British about the situation in the Gulf. These consultations continue, but to say that they constitute joint planning for operations would be an exaggeration.

In any event, comments on military plans or operations would have to come from the Department of Defense.

Q Do you have anything on the meeting between Murphy and the Iraqi President?

A No, I don't.

Q Can you be any more helpful on the meeting between Eagleburger and the French Ambassador today?

A No. That meeting was set up some days ago, I guess. It was originally scheduled, as I understand it, for yesterday and was postponed because of Under Secretary Eagleburger's appearance on the Hill, so it was rescheduled for today.

Q Was it set up before the Galbraith incident or after the Galbraith incident?

A I believe it was set up before, but in any case it was not set up for the purpose of dealing with that.

Q Anything on the efforts in southern Africa for a settlement?

A Don't have anything new to offer you today on that, Bernie.

Q Is Crocker going to be seeing the Contact Group?

A I don't have anything --

Q I saw something to the effect that he had gone to London from Johannesburg.

A Yes. Ozzie, I don't know. I certainly don't rule out the fact that he might be touching base with various people. Whether he's going to do a complete tour or what he's doing, I don't know.

Q You mentioned earlier in the week a meeting of security officials about terrorism from other countries. Again, a British paper had a lot more detail on this, said it was in part to coordinate efforts in conjunction with the Olympic games. Is that accurate?

A I don't know the answer.

Q And it was held at the CIA, not here.

A Yes. Again, I don't have details on it. I still am hoping that we'll get something, but I'm not, unfortunately, getting a lot of positive signs that we'll get a briefing on this terrorism package, at which point it will be an opportune moment to ask a lot of questions about this sort of thing. You're talking about the Los Angeles Olympics?

Q Yes.

A Since that's a little ways off, let me ask you to hold that and try and put those questions when we get that briefing, and we're working on it.

Steve?

Q Alan, about the middle of December the Administration tightened its trade sanctions on Libya, and at the time said that -- or it was said that the policy was still under review.

Can you tell us if any further actions have been taken or are under consideration?

A I don't have anything to give you on that. I will check, and if there's anything new to say, I'll get it. Okay?

Roberto, did you have a question?

Q Yes. You said that we should hold for some kind of a package, wasn't it?

A I had indicated before that when the President's initiative on terrorism, which is a legislative package, is ready to be briefed on, we will have a briefing -- we'll set up a briefing -- and it seems to me that's a good occasion to ask those questions.

Spence?

Q Has there been any reply given to North Korea on the tripartite talks with South Korea on peace in the peninsula?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q Alan?

A Chris? Excuse me.

Q Do you have anything -- the EDB ban was announced this morning. Do you have anything on how that will affect our foreign trade imports --

A I don't have anything on that.

Q You said a couple of days ago that anything you had to say would wait until the --

A Yes. I will pass on the continuing interest. Obviously it's an important story. Stan?

Q Alan, is there any change in State Department policy toward the Mexican National Action Party in light of, (1) a large-scale drug bust involving a police chief and other officials of the P.A.N. party in Mexico yesterday; and (2) the announcement of joint rallies against government economic policies by the P.A.N. and the Soviet-linked Mexican Socialist Community Party?

A I'm not aware that the United States Government has a policy toward specific parties.

Q I asked about State Department policy, not the U.S. Government policy, and you've posted statements regarding your policy to the P.A.N. --

A Regarding contacts.

Q Well, is there any change in your policy on contacts with the P.A.N.?

A I don't have anything new to say.

Q Okay. Thank you.

A Okay.

(The briefing concluded at 12:35 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Monday, February 6, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #24

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 1984, 12:35 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I understand we have a microphone problem, so let me ask you for the sake of everybody, including our Court Reporters, but also including your colleagues, to speak up loudly with your questions.

Q Should we stand up.

A It's up to you whether you want to stand up.

Q (Inaudible.)

A Cameras are in the back of the room. So during the question period, they can only get the back of your head.

Let me make a couple of announcements first. Available in the Press Office is the prepared text of the speech to be given by Deputy Secretary Kenneth Dam before the Japan Society today in New York. The subject of the address is Economic Diplomacy. The text is embargoed until 5:30 p.m., Eastern Standard Time, which is the delivery time.

Also available in the Press Office at 2:00 p.m. is the prepared statement by Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Paul Wolfowitz before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Testimony will be on the FY-85 Foreign Assistance Proposal for East Asia and the Pacific.

And, finally, available at 2:00 p.m. today in the Press Office will be the prepared statement by Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Richard Burt before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The subject is Security Assistance Requirements for the European Region in FY-85. That includes Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Spain and Portugal.

That is it for announcements. I will be happy to take your questions.

Q Can you bring us up to date on the situation in Lebanon, and whether you think the Lebanese Government is still, in fact, in place and operating --

A Okay, let's --

Q -- that the Lebanese Government is still, in fact, in place and operating?

A Let me give you a couple of different responses to that. (Laughter) Presumably, consistent. No, I've addressed different aspect of it.

First of all, on the situation there, just to give you a little bit -- and this may be out of date. In fact, I know one aspect in which it certainly is out of date, and that is late reports of possible casualties to a couple of Marines. There's some conflicting late reports on that, so I just don't have information on that.

Following the imposition of a 1:00 p.m., Beirut time, curfew, firing began again in Beirut. I understand the shelling has been very heavy in both east and west Beirut and in the southern suburbs. Much of the shelling is between the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Amal militia but some of the shelling is coming from the mountains.

There are reports of a large number of Shi'a refugees fleeing into west Beirut. The airport is closed.

I understand that all U.S. Embassy personnel are safe. As I say, initially when this was drafted, we had no reports of Marine casualties. There are some recent reports which suggest there may have been a couple.

As far as the government situation is concerned, as you know, President Gemayel has issued an 8-point plan. The plan has called for political and administrative reforms; a February 28 reconvening in Geneva of the talks on political reconciliation; acceptance of Prime Minister Wazzan's resignation; formation of a government of national unity. LAF preparation for deployment to the south and to the north; a comprehensive and total ceasefire and an observer committee made up of retired military personnel; intensified Lebanese/Syrian consultations; and, complete withdrawal of all external forces from Lebanon.

We share the goals expressed in President Gemayel's announced program, from the most immediate objective of a total ceasefire to the longer range goals of a broadened government of national unity and the withdrawl of external forces from Lebanon.

We have continually urged all Lebanese parties to sit down at the negotiating table to settle their differences. In particular, we welcome President Gemayel's call to reconvene the reconciliation talks in Geneva, and we urge all parties to accept his offer.

We believe President Gemayel's program offers a practical basis for ending the deterioration of the situation in Lebanon.

One other dimension, I guess, I would mention --

Q Copy --

A Copy? Surely. One other dimension which perhaps has been clarified at this point, but there was some confusion about what the Amal leader, Nabih Barri, has called for in terms of the Shi'a personnel in the army. He did not call for the Shi'as in the LAF to leave the army. He said that in the event they are ordered to fire on the people, they should not do so.

We do not have information that they are leaving the army. As I say, he didn't ask them to leave and they have not done so.

It is obviously very important to the integrity of the LAF that it remain the army of all the people of Lebanon. It would be clearly against the interest of the Shi'a to withdraw from the army. The only way their interest and the interests of all the confessional groups in Lebanon can be assured is for each of those groups to participate as responsible members of the army and the government.

Q Copy?

A Copy.

Q Do you have more?

A No. Jim, go ahead. Loudly, please.

Q Could I follow-up. At least one of the eight points announced, or laid out by President Gemayel, would imply a willingness to scrap the May 17 agreement. What is the U.S. attitude about that?

A I guess I would refer you, one, to his words, and I'd ask you to look at them carefully. Our position on the May 17 agreement is clear. We have supported it; we do. Our understanding also is that the GOL -- Government of Lebanon -- also is unchanged in its position, but that is not inconsistent with the idea that everything is on the table for discussion, which is what I believe President Gemayel mentioned. So I don't think there's been anything further on that beyond what I've just suggested.

A Alan, can you explain what maybe President Gemayel means by "he was embarrassed by the May 17 agreement," which he mentioned yesterday?

A I think you'd have to get the amplification from him.

Q He said, or it was mentioned yesterday in Lebanon that the United States requested from Gemayel to include the opposition in an enlarged government.

Is this something new or something that you talked about before with the Lebanese Government?

A You've asked this question several times before. The U.S. position in favor of a broadened government of national reconciliation has been clear and clearly stated many times. I think we have also pointed out that President Gemayel's support for a broadened government for national reconciliation has also been stated several times. Beyond that I don't intend to go into the diplomatic dialogue.

Q What impresses me or struck me yesterday is that it was mentioned yesterday in the context of the whole crises in Lebanon as if it were something new that the United States has just put in in the last 48 or 72 hours to the Lebanese Government?

A I don't think that the record would support that contention.

Bernie?

Q Alan, what value does this appeal of yours have insofar as diffusing the tensions in Lebanon?

A I can't tell you what value a particular appeal has, Bernie. Obviously, we also have active diplomacy underway to try to help in anyway we can. Ambassadors Rumsfeld and Murphy -- Assistant Secretary Murphy -- are in Beirut today. But I can't try to spell out for you more specifically what effect it may have. We hope that the situation calms down and that progress is made.

Q Can I just follow up? To what degree is the United States disposed toward introducing military force, say, by way of the ships to make its views felt and influence the situation in Lebanon?

A I don't have anything new to offer you on the question of our ships and the practices they followed and the rules they have followed, so I guess I'd have to refer you back to the record on what we have said about that before.

Q A follow-up. Will the United States, in fact, resort to force to insure the viability/credibility of the Lebanese Armed Forces or of President Gemayel?

A Again, I don't have anything new to say to you about that at this point. I would refer you back to what we have said before.

Q You're not ruling out the force?

A I have nothing new to say about it. I'd refer you back to what we have said on the record about this before. I would also tell you not necessarily specifically with regard to your question, but I do understand that the White House may have something to say as well about the Lebanese situation today, so you might want to refer to your colleagues there.

Bernie?

Q I wanted to know about the meetings that are going on. There's a report that Vice President Bush was summoned back from a hockey game and Weinberger was summoned off the Hill this morning. Are there these crisis, NSC meetings --

A I think I'd have to refer you to the White House on any meetings of that sort.

Q Alan, could you tell us anything at all about the Syrian role in this? Some people in the White House are saying that the infiltration of arms, Syrian-facilitiated arms, ammo, and even some PLO fighters -- about 250 strong -- have been reinfiltrated at the courtesy of the Syrians into West Beirut. Do you have anything to --

A I don't have specifics. I think that Secretary Shultz has addressed his approach, the Government's approach to Syria in his -- I'm trying to look and see whether this is in a press conference or whether this was perhaps on the plane on the way; it may have been on the plane. But I think you got the wire reports of that.

Q Anything beyond that?

A I understand that -- No, I don't have anything beyond that.

Q Is there some specific information you have that Syria instigated the latest fighting?

A Bernie, I have nothing really to take you beyond what the Secretary said.

Q The Secretary seems to be just rehashing what Eagleburger is saying. Is there any evidence of any specific Syrian role?

A Let me read you a wire. I can't confirm it because I haven't gotten an official report on what he said, but I've got a wire which one of your colleagues wrote from that trip. "I know there are lots of threats, telephone threats occurred. There's a pattern of shelling and violence that is having a bearing." Also, apparently he said that the Syrians had used "force, shelling and attacks."

I've got to really refer you to what the reporting is. I cannot -- I don't have a report of that conversation, and I cannot --

Q I don't care what Shultz said. I just want to know what your intelligence information said.

A I'm not likely to give you a lot of detail on our intelligence information.

Q Two questions, Alan. Can you confirm or deny the reports of rather large-scale desertions by Moslem members of the LAF. You spoke of the importance of maintaining --

A I think I answered that before when I said that Nabih Barri had not called for their leaving the army, and they have not done so.

Ralph?

Q Alan, given the resignation of the Cabinet and President Gemayel's present situation, does the United States still believe that President Gemayel's government is the legitimate government of Lebanon, and would you care to repeat today the Administration's pledge of support?

A I think everything I've said is very clearly a reiteration of that point. I might note that Prime Minister Wazzan had offered to resign on several previous occasions for the purpose of clearing away for a government of national reconciliation. Organization of such a government would be a significant step towards stability in Lebanon and we support such a process.

Q Does that mean that you see his resignation is actually a step in the right direction in the view of the eyes of the U.S.?

A I think in that respect, it is seen by him --

Q I'm asking about what --

A I understand that, and if I may finish my answer. It is seen by him in that light, and we certainly are not quarreling and, in fact, support the idea that a government of national reconciliation would be a significant step towards stability in Lebanon.

John?

Q I understand that President Gemayel is --

A Can you speak up so your colleagues can hear?

Q I understand that President Gemayel is meeting today with two former Sunni Prime Ministers. To what extent -- one of them, apparently an elderly statesman who helped form that 1943 covenant -- would the U.S. like to see those two gentlemen (inaudible)?

A I'm not going to try to comment on specifics. Obviously, he is actively engaged in following up on his 8-point program.

Bassem?

Q A couple of questions.

A Can you speak up a little bit, please?

Q There are a couple of reports out of Beirut that ships, U.S. ships fired on the mountains today. Do you have any comment?

A I don't. You'd have to ask the Pentagon. I haven't seen any reports.

Q From what you have been saying, you leave the impression that national reconciliation is still a viable possibility while the Druze leader, Mr. Jumblatt, as well as Mr. Barri represent the majority, the major faction of the country, namely, the Shi'ites, that asked for President Gemayel's resignation. I don't see the possibility of it.

A Our position is as I have articulated it to you. I don't think we have confirmation of the reports -- I'm not denying them -- but I don't think we have confirmation of the reports that Mr. Barri called for the resignation. I've seen the wires, and so on. But in any case, I will leave you with the words I had before on the 8-point program that President Gemayel put forth.

Roy, did you have a question?

Q I'll pass for now.

Q We will remember that President Reagan since a few weeks ago said that he will be ready to withdraw the Marines from Lebanon in case the situation is collapsing there. How can we define "collapse" if it is not the prevailing state now in Lebanon?

A I'm not going to try to define "collapse." That was also the subject you'll recall of a lot of follow-up, both in the press and the President himself addressed it later. The fact of the matter is that we continue to be -- the President continues to be strongly behind the Multinational Force and its contribution to the process in Lebanon; and I think that, as I said before, there will be a White House statement on this subject and I really would refer you to that.

Ghassan?

Q Two questions. Can we infer from what the Secretary is quoted (inaudible) that he understands the Lebanese Cabinet has resigned (inaudible).

A Could you speak up again?

Q What I am asking is what you just read us now on what the Reagan Administration on the record said that Secretary Shultz is referring to Syrian threats, and I'm asking you, can we understand that what he's inferring is that the Lebanese Cabinet has resigned because of Syrian threats?

A I, again, don't have the full text of what he said. I'm going to have to leave you with the reports coming out of the party at this point. I just don't have --

Q Is there any plan --

Q One other point, please. Can you tell us the answer to the first question about the May 17? If I misunderstood you, please correct me. Did you say that the May 17 can also be the subject for discussions now?

A I think what I'm saying is that I understand that as far -- the question was raised, "hasn't the May 17 agreement been tossed aside by President Gemayel?" My understanding is that all he has done is to say that everything is up for discussion. He hasn't addressed the May 17 agreement in any new way. We don't see an inconsistency between that position, that everything is on the table for discussion on the one hand with what is our understanding of continued GOL support for that agreement.

Q Would the United States Government, as the party that brought about the May 17 agreement, would you like to see the May 17 put on the table and discussed?

A Our positon remains one of support for the May 17 agreement. I think that's as far I may go.

Don, did you have a question?

Q Yes. Going back to the question about Gemayel. Does the United States have a position on whether Gemayel should resign, or does it consider that strictly a matter for him to decide?

A Obviously, if he -- in essence, any government, obviously, is made up by its own domestic situation in the processes. In one sense, it's not ours to comment on, and on the other hand, I would not want to leave you with anything that, as I said to Ralph, a reiteration of our continuing strong support for the government of President Gemayel, the Government of Lebanon.

Q Would you argue with the characterization that the situation in Beirut is now deteriorating rapidly?

A I'm not going to try to make those kinds of judgments.

Jim?

Q Do you believe the reconciliaton can be pulled off without the full cooperation of both President Assad and the Druze leader, Mr. Jumblatt, who is today on the record saying the only hope is a new President?

A Mr. Jumblatt has said a lot of different things. Let's let the process work itself out.

Jim?

Q To nail down on the May 17 question, do you interpret Mr. Gemayel's remarks as meaning that, among other things, and including everything, the May 17 agreement is on the table?

A I think you'll have to ask him what he meant by it. I can only tell you what our position is as I have already done.

Q Does the State Department see any connection, direct or indirect, between the debate going on in the U.S. Congress about the continued presence of the U.S. Marines and the intransigence shown by some of the parties in the Lebanese debate?

A Jim, I think that has been -- the answer to that is clearly yes, and I would refer you to the words of Under Secretary Eagleburger on the subject the other day up on the Hill. I think Secretary Shultz has addressed this in the last day. For a higher level, more authoritative version, I refer you to --

--MORE--

Q Right. Can I take it one step beyond what they said? Would the State Department, as a matter of Administration policy, like to see that debate suspended, therefore?

A I don't think anybody has called for the suspension of the debate. I think the question is what message is transmitted by proposals which would appear to be calling for a reversal of the earlier decision to allow the MNF force to be there for 18 months and to work within that framework. This sort of on-again/off-again approach, is I think, what has concerned people.

Q Right. But my question is: If it is having a negative impact, in your point of view, on the situation -- the political situation in Lebanon -- would it be better if that debate were suspended?

A I don't have any words beyond what the Secretary and Mr. Eagleburger offered on it.

Q Once before the U.S. military ships off shore went to the rescue of Gemayel with the New Jersey. Would the United States do that again for that specific purpose in contrast to protecting the Marines or is U.S. military force to be used only for protecting the Marines?

A Again, we've addressed the issue before, Bernie, and I'm afraid I can't answer your question this time any differently than I did the last time. That is to say that we said a number of things about what rules apply and under what circumstances they are to be used. I have to refer you back to that; I don't have anything new to say about that.

Q Alan, can you tell us how Rumsfeld and Murphy are operating --

A Can you speak up?

Q Are Rumsfeld and Murphy operating out of the Residence, out of the Embassy, and has there been any shelling of either location?

A I think I'm going to duck on the question of specifically where they are for perhaps obvious reasons. In terms of any shelling, I'm not aware of any shelling. I've seen no reports of shelling of either the Residence or the Embassy.

Q Has the Embassy come in under any fire of any kind since it's not far from the area of the fighting?

A As I say, there were reports on the wire which indicated some Marines in the area of the Embassy may have been wounded. I can't tell you what the specifics of that may have been. I can't even confirm that.

Q Alan, President Gemayel said that everything's on the table and you said you don't want to define what he means by "everything." Is the United States urging him not to suspend or scrap the May 17th agreement as a way of bringing about reconciliation?

A You're asking me to get into the question of the U.S. dialogue with the Government of Lebanon, and I'm afraid I can't really do that.

Q Well, does the U.S. wish that he should not scrap the May 17th agreement?

A You're asking the same question in another way. I'm not going to get into it.

Our position on the May 17th agreement has not changed, and I'll leave it at that.

Q A new subject?

A No. Let's finish off on this one. I don't want to go to a new thing.

Q Just to clean up something you mentioned a little earlier, you referred twice to this White House announcement. Can we anticipate a new announcement or a changed position on the status of the Marines?

A That's not what I'm talking about. I think that we were talking about -- it's my understanding, and I haven't seen the text, frankly, -- and I can't guarantee you there will be something coming up -- but there was discussion of possibly something coming out of the White House which would address the current situation.

Q Could that be also reaffirmation, speaking about the Marines now?

A Let's wait and see what it says. I don't want to try to steal their thunder.

Q Can we expect any solution without the full cooperation of the Syrians in Lebanon?

A We've talked about this before. I don't have anything new to say. The Syrians have obviously not proved to be very helpful in the current situation, so we would be looking for some cooperation. We think there should be. We think it is in everyone's interest, including Syria's, that there be; but I can't try to project the course of events.

Q Alan, the Lebanese army is one of the main factors the policy of this Administration is putting emphasis on. I think with the latest performance of this army, do you think it is still believing that a solution could be coming forth within months?

Q I don't think that the situation, which is obviously not a happy one, but I don't think that the situation at this moment vitiates what we have said before on this subject. So, obviously, there is need to strengthen the Lebanese army; and we have been engaged in that process, through training and equipment and so on, and we will continue to be engaged in that process.

Q Alan, has the question been raised about the visit of Mubarak this coming weekend, with this whole situation?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q You have nothing on Mubarak at all?

A No, no.

Q Alan, are you prepared today to say that the situation in Lebanon has improved over the long run, over the last six months, and that progress has been made as the President has said on so many occasions?

A I refer you to the President's words. They speak for themselves.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the tripartite talks which were held in Israel the end of December with the participation of Mr. Bartholomew -- the U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon -- and Mr. Kimche and Mr. Siad Haddad from Lebanon to try to work out a formula to bypass Mr. Jumblatt and his opposition to an agreement in the area?

A No. I wouldn't get into any specifics of any discussions we have. Obviously, we're talking with all of the various parties to try to help move the process forward, but I'm not going to get into detail.

Q Alan, what you said a moment ago, when you characterized the Syria role -- is it that in your view the Syrians are primarily responsible for the current flareup?

A Are the Syrians primarily responsible for the current flareup?

Q Yes.

A I don't know how to assign specific weights, but certainly the Syrians bear responsibility for the current situation. Beyond that, as to how one assigns weights, I don't think I could do it.

Q Alan, if we follow that through its logical conclusion, and we hear you saying that the Syurians have not been helpful, we have to conclude that the Syrian goal is to undermine Gemayel as the President of Lebanon. Therefore, what incentive is there, in your words, to expect some cooperation. What incentive for Syria is there? Why is it in their interest, as you said, to have cooperation? They're reaching their goals now; they're accomplishing their goals at the moment.

A You've defined their goals. I'm not going to try to define Syrian goals, I'll let them do that for themselves. What is clearly in Syria's interest is that there be stability and peace in its region, and the current situation -- to which, as we've said, they have contributed -- does not go in that direction.

Q Alan, what do you have working for you now in a way to defuse this? You talk about the fact that Rumsfeld is in the area and Murphy, that President Gemayel has an eight-point plan, you express hopes and so forth. But we see what the military realities are on the ground. What does the U.S. have working for it at the present time?

A I think basically what is working -- not for the U.S. but what is working for the situation -- for a positive resolution is that it is in the interests of the various parties to stop the shooting and to work constructively on a government of national reconciliation. That has been an agreement of the various parties within Lebanon for some time; and there is, so far as I can tell, no change in that --

Q Yes, but there's no --

A -- shared objective.

Q But there's no change in the continued violence and tension.

A Well --

Q I don't see where your incentive moves anything.

A It changes from time to time; but there's obviously a lot of discussion going on, a lot of activity. The President -- that is President Gemayel's proposal has just been announced. We hear that he is engaged in active discussions with various people. Let's let the situation evolve.

Q Is there any consideration being given to the Secretary cutting short his trip or Deputy Secretary Dam not going to New York to make a speech about Japan?

A I know of none, no.

Q Can you tell me if there is any contradiction or there isn't between what the Secretary has been reported as saying or what the Vice President said yesterday that the collapse of the cabinet is not that negative? Are the Syrians doing something good for U.S. policy there? (Laughter.)

A I think I'll leave what I said before on that.

Q Really then, is there a contradiction, because (inaudible)

A I think what the Vice President said is that the situation is not a totally pessimistic one and there may in fact be an opportunity here to move towards a broader government, a more broadly-based government. That would be something that we have supported, President Gemayel has been working on, and so on. That's perhaps to be separated from the question of mischief-making.

Q Is there a special study group set up to monitor this, an inter-departmental one, within the State Department?

A There are all sorts of groups which always get involved in this kind of situation, but I have nothing special to offer you.

Q Do I understand you to say you welcome the resignation of Wazzan?

A I didn't say "welcome." I didn't quite put it that way.

Q I'm trying to sort out some of the convolutions on your part. (Laughter.)

A Bernie, what I said was --

Q Seriously.

A -- seriously -- he had offered to resign -- Prime Minister Wazzan had offered to resign on several previous occasions for the purpose of facilitating the formation of a government of national reconciliation. O.K.?

He has now done that and has, in the course of resigning, made it clear that that is an objective that he hopes will be fulfilled. Obviously, the organization of such a government would be a significant step toward stability in Lebanon.

Q Do you have any reason to believe that that is actually about to arise now?

A I think we've just been discussing this and now we're getting a little silly.

Q Have the Syrians been cautioned and warned in the last 48 to 72 hours by the United States that any action that results in the death or any casualties -- American casualties, Marine casualities -- at the airport -- there will be reprisals for them against Syrian positions in Lebanon?

A Our position on striking back if our forces -- that is, the MNF -- or diplomatic mission and so on -- are attacked is quite clear. We're not there as a force to go out and create trouble, but we will respond if fired upon.

Q Let me follow that up. The Secretary has said himself that we will retaliate. My question is: Have the Syrians been reminded of that in the last 72 hours?

A I'm not going to get into the question of whether there has or has not been any further dialogue, but I don't think the Syrians need reminding. I think they're well aware of our position. Jim?

Q In connection with that, can you confirm the reports from last night that Lebanese army positions near the Marine barracks have in fact been abandoned?

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A   No, I cannot confirm that. I've seen reports which conflict with that suggestion, so I cannot confirm it from here.

Q   Do you think if the balance of power was in favor of America that the situation would be diffeent?

A   I don't now how to start to address that question.

Q   Do you have anything on two American diplomats being ejected from Ethiopia?

A   Yes, I do.

We were informed early last week by the Ethiopian Government that it required the departure of four officers serving at our Embassy. They subsequently left Ethiopia. We told the Ethiopians they would have to withdraw two of their diplomats in Washington. One has left; the other has severed his connections with the Ethiopian Government and asked to remain in the United States.

The expulsion order has been suspended to permit the INS to review his application.

Q   In other words, he's asked for asylum I take it?

A   I think I would have to stick with the words I've given you. I don't know technically what he's done, Don, but I guess I wouldn't be in a position to go beyond that.

Q   I mean what is the main purpose of all this? What are the Ethiopians saying about why is it requiring these people to go? Do you accept it, reject it, or what is it all about?

A   Under the terms of the Vienna Convention, a state is not required to give a reason when asking for the recall of foreign diplomats. No specific reasons were given by either side in this instance.

Q   What kind of numbers does this mean (inaudible)

A   I don't know, frankly. I saw a wire report which indicated that it left two accredited diplomats, but I don't know --

Q   Two U.S. diplomats?

A U.S. diplomats.

But I can't confirm that. I have not looked at the table of organization.

Q And is there something that led to this? Is it just out of the blue or what?

A I think I'm going to have to leave you with that; but, as I say, in response, we said they would have to withdraw two, and named them. One has asked to stay. And we're doing that.

Q Can you give us the names of the Americans?

A Yes, I can give you names.

The Americans are Ernest Brant, First Secretary; Paul Bradley, Second Secretary; Timothy Wells, Commercial Officer; Robert Kragie, Vice Consul.

The Ethiopians are -- forgive my pronunciation -- Belay G. Tsadik, First Secretary. Also, Gelagay Zawde, Commercial Counselor. And it is Mr. Zawde who elected to seek to remain in the United States.

Q Can you tell us a little bit more about Tsadik -- as to his age, his background?

A I don't have anything further.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the Soviet overflight of Taiwan airspace for about 35 minutes?

A I don't know anything about it.

Q Anything on the status, or comment, on Honduras -- on the buildup of American facilities?

A Not a great deal. As we said before, there are no U.S. bases in Honduras and no plans to establish them. There is another joint exercise which is now scheduled for later this year in Honduras. Congressional consultations have been initiated and formal announcement will be made once the details and exact timing are finalized, and I'd refer you to the Pentagon for detials on that.

With regard to the allegations regarding use of DOD funds, which I think is what Senator Sasser has addressed, again I would refer you to DOD.

Q How would you answer if I were to say that it looked like the U.S. was managing to maintain a large military force in Honduras on the pretext of exercises around the clock throughout the year by having the exercises repeat and be in recess only for short periods during the year? Do you have any comment?

A I only know of one other exercise that is scheduled at this point for Honduras. I think Secretary Weinberger addressed the question of some people staying behind. I don't have anything further on that.

Jim?

Q Do you have anything on a report that appears today in the Christian Science Monitor about El Salvador land reform in quoting an Inspector General's report which is a lot less rosy than the parts of the report that were given out here on January 16th?

A Yes. There is an extensive document, an AID management response, to the Inspector General's report which we can make available. It probably would have to be reproduced. It's fairly thick; it's about 12 pages or so. And I think rather than trying to go through it here, I'd refer you to that.

Q Alan, do you have any comment or any confirmation about these reports quoting Administration officials as saying that the U.S. Government has lost two sources of information about death squads and that's why you don't have or you have limited information about D'Aubuisson and the death squads and who made the (inaudible)?

A No, I really don't have anything on that. I mean, we've made clear a number of times the seriousness with which we regard extremist violence in El Salvador, including violence from the left as well as from the rightest death squads?

I think I noted on Friday that we have testified or commented on the charges on at least three earlier occasions and provided documentary evidence, information, from the Department earlier to the House Foreign Affairs Committee and also to the FBI.

As far as any sources are concerned, obviously, that would be confidential so I really can't comment on that.

Q Do you have anything also on Central America -- anything today about this supposed plan of the Nicaraguan Government to delay the elections?

A I think the Secretary addressed that as well, so I refer you to his words on that.

Jim?

Q That's what I was going to ask about, except I was going to add that --

A Right.

Q -- they seem to be implying a link between U.S. support for the contras and the elections. Do you have any comment with respect to that link?

A Again, I refer you to what the Secretary said.

Q On Namibia, would the United States like to see South Africa accept the results of an election there, even if it brings SWAPO to power? And would the United States be prepared to accept such a result there?

A I think that there have been many pronouncements on that before, Russ, and I refer you back to what all those are.

Q Do you have any comment on the statement issued over the weekend by Prince Bandar, the Saudi Ambassador to Washington, saying that it is the position of Saudi Arabia to watch the Marines in Lebanon; and is not their position as such, as it was expressed in the statement, which were in the papers, that only the Lebanese Government could ask for the removal of the Marines and not the Saudi Government (which) has no position to say it?

A I'm not aware of his statement.

Q Anything about the annual report of human rights?

A No, not anything yet. Perhaps later this week we'll have something.

Q Thank you, Alan.

(Whereupon, at 1:13 p.m., the briefing was concluded.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, February 7, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #25

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 1984, 12:04 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A couple of announcements:

Available in the Press Office is the prepared statement by Under Secretary for Economic Affairs Wallis before the Joint Economic Committee. The testimony, which I believe was this morning, was on economic policy.

Also available in the Press Office at 3:30 will be the prepared statement by Assistant Secretary for International Organizational Affairs Gregory Newell before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations. The subject of his testimony will be the authorization for international organizations and programs.

Additionally, at 3:30 in the Press Office will be the prepared statement by Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs Richard Burt before the House Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. The subject will be developments in Europe.

One other announcement: Secretary of State George P. Shultz will serve as host for a dinner on Thursday, February 9, marking the establishment of the Dean and Virginia Rusk Fellowship and honoring the former Secretary of State on his 75th birthday.

The dinner, in the Department's Benjamin Franklin Room, is co-sponsored by the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and the Southern Center of International Studies at Atlanta.

Arrangements for a photo pool to cover the receiving line prior to the dinner will be made by Darlene Kirk of our Press Office, 632-2492. For further information on the event, contact Roberta Magenti at Georgetown University at 625-3321 or 625-8136. That's 625-3321 or -8136.

That is it for announcements, and --

Q Can I just -- on this thing, who will be the most senior American official at this dinner?

A Active official?

Q Will the President be there?

A The Secretary, I believe, will be the seniormost American official.

Q The President's in California. He's not coming back until Sunday.

Q But he could come back for the dinner.

Q Can you start out by bringing us up to date on Lebanon, and specifically is the United States evacuating anybody?

A Okay. I will bring you up to date on what I can. I caution you, I do not have a lot to say to you today about Lebanon.

As far as movement of people is concerned, as a prudent response to the most recent deterioration of the security situation in Beirut, the remaining dependents of U.S.G. employees have departed or are in the process of departing. We're also drawing down some temporary duty personnel and others whose services are not mandatory at this time.

The Embassy continues to operate and is staffed for all essential functions. As far as the situation --

Q Stop there for a moment. How many people are we talking about here?

A Well, my understanding is that those who have been left -- who have left so far included 25 employees and 13 dependents. And I think that there are a few more dependents who will be -- who are still there and who are in the process of leaving or will be leaving.

Q Where to?

A I'm told Cyprus, but I don't know if that is presumably a temporary destination.

Q How many does that leave?

A Well, it will leave -- once all the other dependents are out, that's it. I don't have an exact figure. I've seen a number of something like 69

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American officials, but I can't confirm that absolutely to you, Bernie. So -- but assuming that's a rough measure.

Q Thank you.

A That gives you something.

On the situation, I probably am not going to be able to give you much more than you know from your own sources, but let me just give you what I do have.

We're aware, obviously, of fighting between the LAF and various units in -- militia units in West Beirut, firing there, shells also landing in East Beirut today. A curfew remains in effect. Artillery struck throughout the night in West Beirut. Several buildings inhabited by U.S. Government personnel were hit, but no U.S. personnel were injured. Many shells have struck the campus of the American University in Beirut.

Two Embassy employees were detained by a Shi'ite militia group last night, but they were later released and all Mission personnel have been accounted for. Today the U.S.S. New Jersey fired five-inch rounds against mortar and artillery positions that were firing on the U.S. MNF positions. One Marine was seriously wounded by the incoming fire, but, again, for details as usual I would refer you to the Pentagon. The airport remains closed.

(Mr. Carlson handed paper to Mr. Romberg)

I'm given new figures, if I may, on the departures: 24 employees taken out, 17 dependents taken out. So that leaves, according to this figure, 34 assigned personnel and one dependent. Okay?

Q Alan --

Q Wait a minute --

Q That leaves there now?

A Now that leaves 34 assigned personnel, one dependent.

Q That knocks down the 69 figure, is that right?

A Yes.

Q Has the situation gotten worse, Alan, would you say, in terms of the --

A Oh, I don't think I'm going to try to give you judgments on that. I'll let you draw your own conclusions.

Q Alan, what about --

A It's not what you would call a terrific situation, John. (Laughter)

Q What about the MNF forces there? The Secretary is quoted on the AP as saying today that we've been in discussion with them. I gather from someone that Mitterrand has called for the immediate withdrawal of the MNF.

A I haven't seen that. There is, has been and there is historically, if you will -- in a short term of "historical sense" -- a lot of consultation among the MNF contributing nations. That continues. But I don't have anything new to offer you on that.

Q Is there likely to be a meeting?

A A meeting --

Q Of the Ministers again?

Q The Italians have called for a meeting --

A I don't know of any plans at this moment for a meeting, but I don't know, John.

Q Alan, what is the form of --

A Excuse me. Bernie, go ahead. Did you want to finish?

Q Yes. Let me finish my question. How germane -- you know, I recognize that things change, but we've been given statements Sunday and again yesterday. I mean, how seriously should we take these statements, or do they just reflect yesterday's view of things?

In other words, the President put out a statement which seemed to reflect a determination to stick with it in Lebanon and to -- called on Syria to do certain things. Then we see certain statements by the Secretary which came later which are interpreted by the reporters traveling with him as suggesting that we're looking for a way out of there.

I would just really like to know what the policy is? Have the Secretary's comments been taken out of context or what?

A I think that the Secretary -- I would have to say to you that the President's statement on this yesterday, the White House statement, was very clear, and I did not read the Secretary's statements as being inconsistent with that.

I think basically what he was saying is we're looking for the most effective way to do what it is the President has made clear we are continuing to do.

Q And then he said today about we're looking at different ways of the MNF to do --

A That's what I'm saying. The MNF or whatever, I mean, we're always looking for the most effective way. Go back to what Larry Eagleburger said last week. That's true.

Having said that, I don't have anything new to say to you today about it.

Q Were all these -- all the remarks by Shultz should not, from your point of view, be seen in the context of what Bernie's suggesting as a review that could lead to a withdrawal?

A I'm not going to try to get into the question of what would -- what reviews are being conducted. Obviously, officials are concerned about not only the immediate situation but the longer-term situation, and are looking at it. But I really am not here to address the question of options or anything of that sort.

Q Where is Rumsfeld?

A He is in Beirut.

Q He didn't go to Damascus? That story's incorrect?

A That story is incorrect. I didn't know there was such a story, but, in any case, he did not go.

Q Murphy?

A Murphy was in Beirut, may still be there, but in fact he was looking to leave Beirut to do a round of consultations in Europe. Whether he has left or not, I simply don't know.

Q Any contact with the Syrians in the last 24-48 hours?

A I don't know whether there was diplomatic contact. There may well have been. I can't tell you.

Q You're not answering that question of mine -- a review by the U.S. that could lead to a withdrawal.

A No. I'm not answering your question. I'm saying I'm not going to get into the question -- I'm not going to address the question one way or another of what policy options, possiblities or lack of possibilities; but I think it would be wrong to walk out of here and say the State Department today refused to rule out this or rule out that. I'm just not addressing the issues.

Q Well, but in the past you have. You've just knocked that down -- you know, you've written obituaries for that idea more than once.

A Well, in terms of the U.S. participation in the Multinational Force and the standing behind, firmly behind, the Government of Lebanon, there is no change in policy. I'm not suggesting that to you at all. There is no change.

Q When you knocked down the Rumsfeld-to-Damascus story, were you just knocking down the fact that he hasn't left yet, or that he's not going at all?

A I don't know of any plans for him to go, frankly, although I think we probably would not want to get into his advance schedule. But he is in Beirut and -- that's just a fact.

Q As we speak, he's in Beirut.

A Well, he was a short while ago. Yes. As we speak he is in Beirut.

Q Has the situation calmed down enough in Beirut so that either he or Ambassador Bartholomew are able to move around to talk to people?

A They are talking to people. I don't know where they are talking to them or how. I just can't answer it; I don't know the facts.

Q To clean up the Murphy thing just quickly, he's going to Europe to consult with the MNF partners?

A I think he will be.

Q So that would be the answer to the question about whether there will be a Ministers' meeting --

A No. I --

Q At least preliminary there will be an Assistant Secretary of State's meeting.

A No, no, no, no. "Preliminary" -- I'm not casting it that way at all. I'm simply saying that he is intending to leave Beirut and do some consultations in Europe with the MNF partners, but I'm not at all suggesting that that's a preliminary to a Ministers' meeting.

Q What --

A Excuse me. There was a question over here.

Q Is that going to be the principal forum or will there be meetings here at the Department or at the Ministerial level in each of the capitals concerning this urgent round of consultations?

A There are all sorts of consultations and discussions which go on all the time, so --

Q Any ones in particular that you're aware of that have taken place or will --

A I'd really rather not go into a lot of detail on it, simply because we have not done that; but it is not unusual that we should have active discussions with our MNF partners. We have had; we are having; we will continue to have.

Bernie?

Q Was the French Foreign Ministry representative here today for such discussions?

A I don't know. They may well have been.

Q Alan, what is the explanation that you're offering on an official level for the introduction of the New Jersey firing?

A I'm sorry? Why?

Q Why. Yes.

A Because the MNF was fired upon. This is hardly the first time the New Jersey has fired. I would remind you, I said they fired their five-inch guns, but that hardly precludes firing whatever else is necessary.

Bassam?

Q Was the U.S. unit fired on, when you say the MNF was fired on?

A I don't have details. I'm sorry.

Q A clarification, Alan: You said that your support to the Lebanese Government is unwavering, standing with the Lebanese Government. What government? I mean, Gemayel or his government? There is none at all. Please clarify it for us.

A There may not be -- actually, I understand in fact the Cabinet Ministers were requested to stay on temporarily, so there is a government. Now you want to get into a philosophical discussion. I'm not going to do that for you.

Q Alan, have you got any response from the Syrian Government to the statement made by President Reagan yesterday?

A The answer is I don't know, but I guess I wouldn't be able to comment in any case regarding that. I think that they probably have expressed themselves publicly, but I don't happen to have that.

Q Alan, the Marine who was seriously injured, was that in an attack today or is that the same one yesterday?

A No. I think there were two, Greg.

Q There were two.

A There was one yesterday at the airport --

Q There were two separate attacks apparently on the airport facilities yesterday and today?

A I don't know where the second Marine was injured -- you know, where he was when he was injured. And I'm not sure -- I really would ask you to go to the Pentagon because --

Q Yes. I'm still confused. The New Jersey response today was in an attack on the Marines today?

A It was -- again, I don't have detail, but it was -- excuse me, I guess I do in this one respect. I'll go back; I'm sorry. In answer to Bernie's question before, it was the U.S. MNF position. Okay?

Mortar and artillery positions that were firing on U.S. MNF positions. Okay?

Q The Pentagon said it was the French position that was being --

A Well, it may have been two different things that were going on.

Q Alan --

A Excuse me. John?

Q Could I go back to Bernie Kalb's question just for a second about the rationale for the return fire?

Is this in your understanding a simple outgrowth of President Reagan's remarks on September 14 that we would return fire if fired upon? Or is it something broader than that, that this is firing to protect Americans in Beirut, to support the Gemayel Government? In other words, it goes beyond what the President said on the 14th?

A This -- I don't think I could be clearer that in terms of the New Jersey, what this says very clearly is they fired five-inch rounds against mortar and artillery positions that were firing on the U.S. MNF positions.

But, in any case, we have indicated before that they would fire also on positions which fired on U.S. personnel or MNF positions and so on. So that position has been laid out long since.

Q So there is nothing politically different about this than, say, firing the last time guns were used two weeks ago?

A No.

Q The 15th.

Q Just a second. Does that also apply to airpower?

A Yes. That's my understanding.

Q Couple of questions, Alan. The firing today by the New Jersey was not in support of the Gemayel Government, is that correct?

A I'm not going to repeat it a third time, Bernie.

Q No, no. But --

A I just read it three times --

Q But it hasn't been put to you that way.

A It's very clear; it says it was in response to an attack on an MNF position. Okay? I can't answer it any clearer than that.

Q Has there been any --

A Chris, do you have a question?

Q FYI, as Bill was saying, the Pentagon says very specifically it was Druze firing on the French this morning that brought the firing shortly before 6:15 from the five-inch guns of the New Jersey.

A Okay. Well, then if they've got something different, I guess I would defer to the Pentagon's announcement on it. But that also doesn't fall outside, as I said to John before, what was announced before as things we would respond to.

Q Alan, you were asked earlier -- just to clarify something -- you said in the endorsement in terms of U.S. participation in the MNF, "and we're strongly behind or firmly behind the Government of Lebanon. There's no change in that."

Do you want to add Gemayel to that? Are you strongly behind President Gemayel or not?

A Sure.

Q Yes, just as much --

A There's no change in that.

Bernie?

Q Has there been any -- after the President's statement yesterday so specifically directed against Syria, have we noticed any change in any Syrian behavior on the following lines? The infiltration of supplies to the militia through the Syrian-held positions?

A Finish your list and I'll tell you.

-- MORE --

Q Any effort on the part of the Syrians to respond through diplomatic channels to the President? Any invitation extended to Rumsfeld to continue discussions, etc.?

A I'm not aware of any --

Q Have there been any Syrian blip along any of these lines?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q Alan, could we get away from the military situation for just a second and ask you for a sitrep on the government of Lebanon --

A Don't have one to give you.

Q -- and a sitrep on the political efforts that Gemayel may or may not be doing?

A I don't have anything new to give you on that today.

Q Last night, I believe the news said that there were unidentified sources which fired at the Marines or the MNF. From the action of the New Jersey this morning, have you found out, or the intelligence or maybe the forces on the ground, found out that where is this source or the New Jersey hit back, because -- the unidentified source, which was that? (sic)

A I don't think -- first of all, in light of apparent Pentagon statements which are different from this, I refer you to the Pentagon as to what they did.

Secondly -- and maybe we'll just cut out giving you sitreps -- secondly, I don't think the point is necessarily to say that you knew who was behind the weapon when it fired as much as it is to say when you fired on the position you knew where it was, or you knew where it was -- well, I'll leave it at that.

But I don't know that one needs to know the identity of the person or persons actually firing the weapon before you fire back.

Quite the opposite. Anybody who fires on those forces will be fired upon.

Jim? Go ahead.

Q Has the United States or anybody thought of bringing the United Nations into this business now?

A There have -- I don't know what you mean by "bringing them in." We've addressed before the question of a possible U.N. role. I don't have anything new to say about that. I think that there have been discussions in the past with the U.N. I'm sure there will be further ones.

Q Specifically, in line with the President's statement yesterday that Syria certainly bears some responsbility --

A Right.

Q -- would that not be one pressure point to bring on the Syrians?

A Well, I'm sure that the Secretary General and the U.N. are interested in this question, and we've had consultations with them. I don't have anything specific to offer you on it, though. Bernie?

Q Alan, is it the U.S. understanding that the target of the New Jersey was within Syrian-held territory.

A I don't know the answer to that.

Q I would like to follow up on my question, Alan. In light of this, what happened, could it be discounted or could it be suggested or inferred that there was a provocation from some sources on the ground in Beirut itself to fire at the MNF or at the Marines in order to have that retaliation which happened this morning at 6:15? I mean, couldn't you find that there are some elements, trigger-happy, who want to create the situation of confusion?

A I have no basis for making that speculation.

Jeff?

Q Alan, is it the contention of the U.S. Government at this time that it has taken no military action in direct support of the Gemayel Government and has only fired and bombed in support of the U.S. Marines and the MNF forces?

A I think that the point was made some several weeks, months ago, in the case of Suq al-Gharb where a Lebanese position was potentially going to be overrun, that that would have endangered the MNF although that wasn't a direct attack against the MNF. So that falls, again, within the -- that was a circumstance that was made clear and is a little different from a direct attack.

Q My question is still not answered, Alan.

A I just answered it to the extent I'm going to answer it, Jeff.

Q Would it be right to assume that contacts with the different factions in Lebanon -- different factions in Lebanon -- have been disconnected now with the United States with the exception of the Gemayel government?

A No. That would not be an accurate statement.

Q Excuse me if you addressed this in the first five minutes, but can you tell us -- can you assess for us what the situation regarding the Lebanese Army is, the reports that they are handing over weapons to militia, that they are working with the militia in certain instances?

A I can't confirm those reports. I wouldn't deny those reports, but I don't have information.

Q You have nothing above and beyond what you said yesterday about it?

A No.

Q And with respect to their positions around the perimeter of the Marines, of where the Marines are --

A I don't have anything on that.

Q Can you say whether or not the U.S. training of the LAF continues? And resupply programs, are they still on-going or has that been suspended?

A You means as of this moment as opposed to --

Q Well, because of the situation, has there been an alteration in that schedule?

A You would have to ask the -- there's certainly no alteration of the policy. In terms of the

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actuality on the ground, I guess I'd have to refer you to the Pentagon to find that out. But there's no change in policy.

Q Alan, a follow-up on his question. Isn't it true that some of the forces that have left the Army are the same forces that have been trained by U.S. special forces trainers? They've left not only with their weapons but also with the advanced training they've received from the U.S.?

A I don't know. I don't know who has left the Army.

Q Alan, is the U.S. participating in discussions to reconstitute the Lebanese Government?

A Participating in discussions? I can only, really, John, refer you back to what I've said before -- that is, that we have tried to help facilitate the formation of a broadly based government and that effort certainly continues. But I don't have anything new to say. That's hardly a new --

Q No, but we can assume that Bartholomew and others are in touch with various possible candidates who --

A I don't know that they're getting -- how deeply one would get into the question of trying to broker a settlement. That's not what I'm trying to say. But in terms of working with various parties and encouraging that sort of more broadly based government, that certainly is being done.

Q Alan, the opposition militia has said a precondition for any formation of a broadly based government would necessitate the abrogation of the May 17 agreement.

If that's what it took to get what we're hoping to facilitate -- that is, the formation of a broadly based government -- would the United States abandon its support for May 17?

A Two points: (1) our position hasn't changed; (2) I'm not going to try to speculate on a hypothetical.

Q Does the Administration think that the inclusion of a Lebanese Army man like General Tannous would add to the stability of the Lebanese situation?

A I'm not going to try to speculate or suggest from here who the appropriate individuals are.

Q Okay, could I ask you another question on that? There's talk in Beirut this morning that the Administration may have a coup d'etat on their hands, what they're calling there a "white coup," from the Lebanese army leadership.

A I'm not aware of that.

Q Are you happy with the behavior of the Democratic representatives by shelving the resolution in the Congress and not to push in the evacuation of the Marines now until --

A I don't have anything new to say. We've expressed our views on that before. Nothing new on that.

Greg, did you have a question?

Q Whether Shultz is coming back early at all?

A No indication that he's coming back early. I talked with them when they were actually, I guess, in the air on the way to Grenada and they were certainly planning to go ahead with their full schedule, and I have no indication that anything other than that is suggested.

Q Alan, what can you tell us, if anything, about consultations with Israel on the situation in Beirut?

A Surely, there are conversations --

Q On the military?

A -- with a variety of parties. Well, a lot of consultations go on. I'm not going to get into details about it.

Q Following up Ralph, there are reports on FBIS that an Israeli armored column is heading north from the Awali line.

A That's the first I know about it.

Q Alan, are you asking the Arab moderates to put some more pressure on Syria right now?

A Again, you're asking a lot of questions about what it is we're saying to other governments. I'm not going to get into that. We have had a lot of discussions with Arab governments, we have worked cooperatively with a lot of them, and that effort continues.

Q Well, but would you like them to do it right now?

A I think we'll continue our discussions.

Q Have you been discussing this issue with the Soviets lately, and how would you describe the Soviet role in the last 4-5 days?

A I don't have a characterization of the Soviet role in the last four or five days to offer you, and I really don't know when the last discussions of the issue with the Soviets took place.

Q Alan, is American support of Lebanon inextricably linked to support of Amin Gemayel personally?

A I think that our position in support of the Government of Lebanon and for the efforts at national reconciliation and a broad government are quite clear, well known. I'm going to leave it at that. We certainly have supported President Gemayel's efforts and stand behind him. But you're asking basically a speculative, hypothetical situation, implicit in your question. I'm not going to try to address it.

Q Alan, is it the U.S. view that the militia, the Shi'ites, etc., the opposition militia, are calling the shots on their own or that they are essentially being manipulated by Syria?

A I think this gets back to a question that was asked yesterday about sort of the weight of responsibility in all this. That's part of that question; and I'm not going to try to apportion weights as to what is being done by any group on their own, what is being done with the encouragement of others.

What I said yesterday, and it remains true today, is that Syria bears responsibility, but I'm not going to try to apportion that.

Q Can you be anymore specific in terms of amount of arms that the Syrians have facilitiated into the area or --

A   I can't, John.

Q   Can you confirm the presence of these PLO factions that are reportedly back in West Beirut, several hundred?

A   I can't confirm it. I'm aware of the reports; I've seen reports, and so on. I'm not in a position certainly to deny them, but I'm not in a position to confirm them either.

Q   What is that? PLO fighters coming into Beirut, West Beirut?

A   Yes, West Beirut. Palestinians.

Q   What can you tell us about the flow of ordinance -- arms -- to the militia?

A   I don't have any information to share with you.

Q   Alan, let's have a filing break, okay?

A   Filing break? Yes, okay.

Q   Alan, due to the fact that Mr. Shafiq Wazzan yesterday requested or asked for the abrogation of the May 17 agreement -- and this is not a hypothetical question -- if Mr. Gemayel himself will come tomorrow or in the next few days or the next few hours and say to the United States, "let's abolish this or abrogate it," what will be your position on that?

A   The very word "if" in your question makes it a hypothetical question. I'm not going to get into it. I'm not going to get into it.

Q   It looks like it. You know, it's coming to it. (Laughter)

A   You're free to make your own judgment on it. You're asking me for our response to a hypothetical situation. I don't have a response to a hypothetical.

Q   Up to yesterday you were just refraining to see the desertion from the Lebanese Army of the Shi'ites and others. What's your explanation of today?

A   Sure, I've seen reports of this, but I can't confirm it. Based on our official reporting, I'm not in a position to confirm that. But --

Q   There is no "if" here in this question, you know. It's a fact now.

A   You assert it as a fact; I'm telling you I can't confirm it. So --

Q   Alan, how should President Gemayel's government read the evacuation of dependents and non-essential diplomatic personnel from the U.S. Embassy in Beirut?

A   Simply as a prudent move to take out people who are not required there, but certainly the Embassy operation continues. And as I say, they're non-essential personnel who were taken out, and I would not try to read broad political signals into that.

Q   Well, let me just follow that. Wouldn't it be accurate to read it as a U.S. assessment that militarily, and from a security standpoint, the U.S. does not believe that the Gemayel Government is in control in Lebanon?

A   No. I think that that's a sweeping generalization. As I say, go back to what I said about the fact that, yes, there is some deterioration in the situation, it's the prudent thing to do. That's why we're doing it.

Q   In what way -- wait a minute -- in what way is it sweeping? We're talking about an area around the U.S. and British Embassy compound in Beirut, the only area in which Gemayel's army had any effective control until a few days ago.

A   There are shells coming in which -- as I say, that buildings housing U.S. Government personnel were hit, although there were no injuries. I think it's the prudent thing to do. If you don't agree with that, that's your privilege.

Bernie?

Q   Alan, do you have a sense of how long the firing by the New Jersey lasted?

A   I don't. I'm sure the Pentagon can give you something on that.

Q Did the firing precede the partial evacuation?

A Oh, I think it did; yes.

Q Have you received any other evacuation requests from any Americans over there in Beirut?

A I don't know if there have been any, frankly. Obviously, people have in mind the fact that there are a lot of American citizens there, and I'm sure that people have considered what they might do if there really were a breakdown.

Q But no requests for you to evacuate Americans?

A I can't say "no requests." I don't know the answer to that.

Q Alan, the French have consistently taken as many attacks as the U.S. MNF, and obviously they are as equally diplomatically active. Are we coordinating our diplomacy with Paris, or is this a two-pronged activity going on?

A I think we're in very close touch with our MNF partners, as I say; and Ambassador Murphy is going to Europe to consult; there are various consultations going on through embassies, and so on.

Q And are we also coordinating with Rafiq al-Hariri, the Saudi "envoy"?

A I can't give you a late readout on that. We've been in touch clearly with the Saudis and have worked with them and with others, but I don't have a --

Q Have you given a ballpark figure on the number of Americans in Beirut? Do you have such a thing?

A I have one in my head, but I don't know if it's accurate enough to share with you at this point, so -- I can try and --

Q Can you do it on an estimated basis?

A Well, why don't we talk about that later.

Q Alan, can you characterize for us the relative state of cohesiveness of the MNF partners at this point?

A   As I have said several times, there is good coordination. It continues. It's active.

Q   That's wasn't the question.

Q   Alan, the original invasion by the Israelis of Lebanon, which was embraced very warmly by Henry Kissinger at the time -- in fact, even before it happened -- in the last few months the President has also gone out of his way to state that he, now in retrospect, does support that.

I'm wondering, in light of what it's led to now, if there's any sort of reassessment?

A   I'm not aware that that's the case --

Q   What is? The reassessment or --

A   That the basis of your question is the case. Go ahead.

Q   Alan, have any other embassies carried out any kind of partial evacuation comparable to the U.S.?

A   I don't know. You'd have to check with their governments.

Q   Secondly. Do you characterize the present play of whatever negotiations there are among the various competing factions as being at a deadlock? Is it stagnant now? Are there any talks underway?

A   I would prefer not to characterize what other people are doing. As I say, our efforts continue but I don't want to try to characterize what factions in Lebanon may be doing.

Q   Is it the U.S. feeling that there will actually have to be a rather serious "shoot 'em up" before there will be a serious negotiation?

A   That's very speculative, Bernie. I don't think I'd like to engage in that one.

Q   I just want to be clear on one thing. Were you saying earlier, when you talked about motar and artillery firing on U.S. positions, are you talking about U.S. positions at the airport, the MNF at the airport?

A   MNF positions.

Q   MNF. Not U.S. at the airport?

A   That's what this guidance says. Go ask the Pentagon, however, since there seems to be some discrepancy between this and the Pentagon.

Is there anything else?

Q   Let's go.

A   Okay. Let's go.

Q   Thank you.

A   You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:36 P.M.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #26

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1984, 12:50 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. Sorry for the delay. I have a few announcements up front.

First, regarding the assassination of the United Arab Emirates Ambassador in France. We condemn in the strongest terms the assassination today in Paris of the United Arab Emirates Ambassador to France, Khalifa Ahmed Abd al-Aziz al-Mubarak. We wish to extend our condolences to the Government of the United Arab Emirates and to Ambassador al-Mubarak's family.

Second, regarding the visit of the Somali Foreign Minister: Somali Foreign Minister Jama Barre, who is in Washington on a private visit, met with the Acting Secretary on Febrary 7. The United States Government continues to encourage the peaceful solution of differences among states in the Horn region and noted Somali willingness to improve relations with its neighbors. The United States Government supports Somalia's long-term economic policies directed toward liberalization and intends to assist Somalia meet short-term needs.

Q Copy?

A Sure. Regarding the human rights reports long awaited. It is expected -- let me caution you -- "expected" okay? -- that copies of the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1983 will be available for the press late tomorrow morning. They would be distributed to you on an embargoed basis from the Press Office as soon as they're available tomorrow.

It is currently planned that the reports would be embargoed until noon on Friday, February 10. Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Elliott Abrams will hold an On-the-Record briefing on the report Friday morning at 11:30. That briefing also would be embargoed until noon on Friday to coincide with the release of the embargo on the reports. This is all conditional on having those reports in hand, so if we have to change the ground rules at the last minute, I hope you'll understand, but that is our plan at this time.

Also, regarding a briefing, a backgrounder in this case, there will be a press BACKGROUNDER on southern Africa held in this room tomorrow, Thursday, February 9, at 4:00 p.m.

That is it for announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q What is the outlook for a press conference from the Secretary?

A I don't have any suggestion of a press conference on the Secretary's return. He's had several, of course, during this trip, but I don't know of any plans for one when he comes back.

Q Alan, what are we accomplishing at this point by shelling behind Syrian lines in Lebanon?

A (A) I guess I've got to tell you that I'm not totally up to date on the situation on the ground. I do understand that the U.S.S. New Jersey fired 16-inch shells at targets which were firing at various targets, including the Ambassador's residence, today.

I think that I would refer you, basically, to the President's statement of yesterday, which I can quote to you if you would like.

Q We have it.

A You have it? Good. I hope you understand it. Read it carefully.

Q We need your interpretation of it.

A Read it carefully. No, you don't need interpretation, but I would read it. It explains precisely why and under what circumstances there would be such firing, and so that -- you ask me why; I'm a little puzzled in the sense that it is explained in that statement.

Q I asked what we're accomplishing; not why.

A We're firing on targets that are firing, at a minimum, at the Ambassador's residence, and at other targets.

Q What is the effect of this new policy on American diplomatic efforts to bring about a political solution in Lebanon?

A The question is really a broad one, as you suggest, of what effectiveness of the MNF is. These changes that were announced by the President yesterday are designed to make our participation in the MNF more effective, and hopefully, more convincing to those participants actually in the region that it is sensible to reach a political accommodation, a solution.

Q We are working diplomatically in conjunction with the MNF, but not only as a part of it. Mr. Rumsfeld is not there as an instrument of the MNF. He's there as an instrument of American policy. So my question goes beyond the question of the MNF.

Do you believe that this bombardment behind Syrian lines and the destruction today of a Syrian artillery command center is going to be helpful in getting people to make a deal?

A I can't make that judgment. Beyond what I just said to you before, Jeff, and I'd refer you to those words, but the basis on which we will engage in fire have been laid out.

Bernie?

Q How are you reconciling the use of the big guns with the fact that you have not yet moved any of the Marines out, and doesn't that --

A I don't see the connection.

Q I'll make it clear for you, then. Doesn't that increase the possibility that the Marines, also known as "sitting ducks," might be brought under attack because of the broadened use of military power as set forth in the President's statement?

A Again, you've got to go basically to the Pentagon to find out precisely what targets were being fired at, including the Ambassador's residence, but there's no change in the sense that we have said before, when American diplomats, MNF, whatever, are being fired on, we will fire back.

Q There is a change --

A There is a change in what the President said yesterday, but if you want to look at that specific thing, for example, you could have done it under the previous circumstance as well as under the new circumstance. When we're fired on, we're going to fire back. And the Ambassador's residence was certainly included under the previous terms and it obviously is included under the new circumstance.

The fact that the Marines -- the redeployment of the Marines has not begun doesn't mean that you sit there and let your facilities be shelled and not respond.

Q Is this withdrawal of 500, whatever the number will come to ultimately, is it your understanding that it will take place within a month of --

A No. What will happen --

Q What is the timing on that?

A Okay. The timing on that is that -- first of all, as the President indicated, it will begin soon. We estimate that about 500 Marines will deploy on board ship within the coming month.

As the President's statement indicated, though, we won't be taking any action on redeployment until a plan has been submitted to the President.

Q Until what?

A A plan has been submitted to the President. I can't tell you beyond that at this stage what the further stagings that were indicated by the President will be. I just don't know that.

Q Is this the first step of a total pullout which you're disguising as a phased withdrawal?

A No. I think the President indicated in his statement yesterday, quite clearly, his continued commitment to the MNF and to support of the Government of Lebanon, and I would reject that characterization.

Q One other thing. What is the objective of all these new things yesterday?

A The objective is to make the MNF more effective. It's quite clear that the deployment of the Marines at the airport had become both an excuse for some of the parties, saying "we won't do anything until those people go," and also a target. So that what has been under consideration for several weeks now has been, how do we structure our participation in the MNF under the existing mandate and within the existing policy framework to be more effective; and these steps that were announced yesterday are designed to do that.

Q Alan, given that, are you encouraging President Gemayel to step down as well --

A No.

Q -- since the MNF had functioned as an excuse to further progress, would we then, since they are also saying that President Gemayel as president is a bar to further the progress, are we encouraging him to step down at this point?

A No, clearly not.

Ralph?

Q Is the purpose of the one-month delay in redeployments or withdrawals to give Gemayel a timetable during which he can get his act together, or not, before actual movement takes place? What's the --

A I'm not saying there's a one-month delay.

Q Well, the Marines in Beirut this morning were saying that it could be done in three or four days if the orders were given for that purpose. So what's the purpose of the delay, making the announcement, and then just delaying the actual movement?

A The announcement is to articulate a policy. You don't do things which are perceived to be of major dimension without explaining yourself. So that's why you have a policy announcement.

In terms of why phasing it, you phase it so it is done in an orderly way and doesn't give a misperception of a pullout, to go back to what we were discussing before. It is a redeployment, as I think Secretary Weinberger talked about it this morning, and it is going to be done, as the President said yesterday, in stages. It's not going to be done all at once.

I also -- I don't know when it's going to begin, Ralph. I don't know anybody who said there's going to be a month delay in beginning --

Q You said five hundred over one month, so that would mean a few each day, perhaps --

A I don't know.

Q Well, at the very most, you could have 500 moving at one time out of 1,500.

A That's right. It'll be done in an orderly way.

Ghassan?

Q Two questions, Alan.

A I'm sorry, I can't hear you.

Q Two questions. You just told us now that the Marines -- one of the reasons besides firing at the Marines is that some parties said they will not do something until or unless the Marines are moved. Is this -- I've never heard this before. Are they being moved out because of political as well as military pressures to facilitate certain things in Beirut?

A There is no question, and I don't really have writ, I guess, to go beyond a general statement -- perhaps some of this is in the public domain; perhaps not all of it is. I just will make a general statement.

There's no question that some of the parties were using the current deployment pattern of the MNF as an excuse not to move ahead on the political front. Whether that was a valid excuse, obviously, is a question for judgment. But in any case, to the extent that people were trying to do that, this will eliminate that excuse.

Q Which party, Alan?

A As I say, I'm not prepared to go into greater detail on that.

Q Can I please follow up on this? So this actually could be seen as a positive gesture on the part of the United States to continue to open more political discussions. Am I wrong in understanding it that way?

A Certainly, the objective of the entire package is to facilitate movement toward the various goals that we have laid out many times.

Q Alan, I know you don't want to go into further details but there are two basic parties in Lebanon -- our guys and their guys -- and there's been some hint that Gemayel has not been willing to make more concessions than he did because he had the United States behind him. Are you suggesting that perhaps he is the party that didn't make the political concessions?

A No; no, I'm not making that suggestion.

Q The bad guys?

A I prefer not to go into that characterization, but I'm not suggesting what you were raising about President Gemayel.

Q Alan, Republican and Democratic Congressional critics of the decision to escalate the military involvement of the U.S. ships believe that the United States will actually take sides in the civil war in Lebanon against the wish of the majority of the Lebanese people. How do you answer these critics?

A The same way I've answered that question the half dozen times you've raised it before, which is to say, we are not taking sides on behalf of any one faction or confessional group within Lebanon against others. We are working on behalf of support for the central government of Lebanon, a broadening of that government, the establishment of that government's authority throughout the country of Lebanon.

Ji[illegible]

Q [illegible]rdon me to repeat what we asked yesterday and the day before yesterday: Is there a government in Lebanon now? I mean, you know --

A There is a government. The President remains. I think that, clearly, there needs to be re-establishment. There is, in a sense, I guess you'd have to say, a caretaker government in the sense that the Prime Minister has resigned and has asked to be replaced. So that process will move forward. But there is a government in Lebanon we're dealing with, including obviously President Gemayel.

Jim?

Q I'd like to refer your attention to the second point in the President's statement, saying "When the government of Lebanon is able to reconstitute itself," and so on, the United States pledges to do X, Y and Z.

A Uh-huh. I think that gets to the point I was just making.

Q Can you tell me whether, in fact, the United States will do X, Y and Z before the government reconstitutes itself?

A First of all, that gets to the point I was just making about the fact that there is in a sense a caretaker government there, and so that process of reconstituting the government is underway.

As far as training and equipping, and so on, there is an on-going program, and there's nothing in the President's package which suggests that that program would not continue as it has been.

Q I'm not asking whether it'll continue; I'm asking about the words "vigorously accelerate", "speed up delivery", "improve the flow", "intensify training," which points to a change in the schedule. Will these changes in the scheduling, or in the pace, of the U.S. training program take place only when the Government of Lebanon is able to reconstitute itself, or is it taking place even as we speak in advance of any formal reconstitution?

A No. I think, basically, as the President noted yesterday, are plans to accelerate -- for that acclera-tion that you're referring to -- are contingent on progress towards reconstitution of the government, which obviously involves the question of political stability which in turn affects the ability of the LAF to absorb equipment and training. So that is the answer to that.

Excuse me, John, you have a question?

Q Alan, could you tell us a little about the consultations with the MNF partners on this? The reports are that they were notified not until an hour before the announcement was made. Is that accurate?

A There was -- let me just go back a little bit on the history of this thing. I think part of it I'm going to have to leave to Larry Speakes in terms of the President and his decisions. But let me just try what I can on this.

As I indicated before, the review of this has been going on for some weeks. An effort to make more effective the MNF contribution that we have, I'd refer you back, for example, just as an indication of that, to Larry Eagleburger's remarks in his prepared testimony -- toward the end of that testimony -- before the House Foreign Affairs Committee last week.

The decision, in principle, to go ahead with these moves was made by the President last week. Consultations with various parties began at that time -- obviously, the Government of Lebanon and others as well.

The Government of Lebanon then gave its go-ahead, said "do this" in recent days, and we began more intensive consultations about what we were going to do. As the situation in Beirut changed in the last few days, there was, in effect, a pause to review because this was a long-term program that people were looking at; it was a policy being adopted for long-term reasons, not for purposes of dealing with the short-term contingency, and people wanted to take a look at it. They did, and then the decision was made to go ahead, and I think that there was, perhaps, some unsureness about the exact timing of that announcement yesterday and I think that's what's been reflected. But there was consultation about the general purposes of this quite a bit before that.

Again, as to the exact timing and that sort of thing, I really have to refer you to Larry Speakes.

Q Wasn't it early yesterday that the MNF partners heard for the first time that the United States would be pulling the Marines back onto the ships?

A Early yesterday? I can't -- I honestly don't know when, but there was a consultative process going on all along. I just don't know specifically when, John. I'm not trying to duck it. I don't know the answer, and I'm not sure that I would get into great detail, but I don't think that's the kind of thing that was being reflected necessarily, at least, in the stories that I read this morning which were talking about, I think, a different problem where it seemed to be a shorter notice than that.

Q Alan, granted that this is 1984, how do you make an army more effective by pulling it out?

A It's not a question of making an army more effective --

Q Our armed forces.

A Our presence there has been not to be a fighting force in the sense of going out and challenging people, but to be a supporting presence. We've gone through that and I don't intend to rehearse all of that.

As I said before, the fact of the matter, however, is that it was clear over time that that force was increasingly becoming both an excuse and a target. So the issue was, how do you make your contribution in a more effective way, in a way which, in fact, is safer? So, this approach to trying to provide more fire power, more training, more equipment for the Lebanese Armed Forces, and yet have that presence there.

Not all the Marines are going to be pulled out; not all military uniform personnel will be pulled out. You'll have trainers, for example. You'll have people guarding facilities. We'll just have to see how that evolves. I'm not prepared to address that in great detail because I think all that's been worked out. But that question is, how do you get things done in a way which contributes to your longer-term objectives.

David?

Q Something I'd appreciate your explaining to me. You said before that U.S. goals there had not changed by which I mean -- I assume you mean -- the overall goals: strong central government, withdrawal of foreign forces, secure the northern border. Could you please explain to me how the Marine withdrawal contributes to those goals?

A Again, I think, the point -- I think I'm going to begin to stop going over the same ground. The point is to try more effectively to contribute to the process, essentially, the political process, and the ending of the hostilities between the various factions supported, to some extent, importantly externally within Lebanon. And it is felt that this approach, this three-pronged approach the President addressed, or announced yesterday, will contribute to that.

Q Will we encourage the rest of the MNF to leave as well?

A Oh, I think that they understand the purposes of what we're doing. It's not a question of encouraging the other parties to leave; no. I understand from various reports this morning that the British have withdrawn their contingent also to a ship. They haven't left the MNF. I don't know what the French and Italians will do, if anything, and I'd obviously have to refer you to them.

Q Alan, can you spell out for us, please, the disintegration of the Lebanese Army, the extent of it?

A I have nothing to offer you on it.

Q Is it as bad as has been painted, that they were defecting in wholesale lots, or --

A I don't have details on it, Bill. I've seen reports but I don't have details on it. Again, I'm not suggesting that the whole thing is holding together. Obviously, there are units which are holding together quite well, but I just don't have details to give you on that.

Chris?

Q "MNF" means Multinational Force?

A Right.

Q If we take our Marines and over a period we put them all on the ships or we put them somewhere else and the other nations, our other partners, do a similar kind of thing, and most of them are saying things like they are going to, and the British have already done it, what is the Multinational Force? Is it a flotilla off the coast? What is it? Does it exist anymore after that?

A Sure. It is a presence which is still there, and, as I said before, I'm not clear as to precisely who will be on the ground. They won't all be part of the MNF. Presumably, there'll be other personnel there as well. But the fact of the matter is, it wasn't there as a fighting unit, per se. It was there as a presence. That presence will remain. There will be other dimensions to our presence which we've talked about.

Bernie?

--MORE--

Q Could I just follow that, please?

A Yeah. Go ahead.

Q Our -- the presence that will remain, though, is the 110 trainers, who clearly are supporting the Lebanese Army. I mean, it can't be much more direct than that. So our only presence will be -- at some point will be -- that training presence on the ground plus the flotilla --

A No. I didn't say that. And I think we're going to have to see what the remaining force will look like. We talked about, in the President's announcement, an accelerated program of training and equipping. Presumably, that will include more people. There will be Marines or others around to be guarding facilities, not just, you know -- so there's a function.

Q It's my point that we will be increasing the training aspect of it, we will -- there will no longer be a multinational aspect of it at all, so we are --

A Well --

Q How does that make it --

A You will have --

Q -- simply being a supporter of the Lebanese Army and not any kind of multinational thing at all?

A Well, I think that the principle -- the presence will remain. You will have the ships which will be both offshore containing the Marines in them and also the firepower which those ships represent.

Bernie?

Q Alan, a couple of things here. Do you have a sense of the number of Americans in Beirut and what precautions are being taken --

A Yes. I have something on that.

Q -- to protect Americans, as well as the U.S. press there?

A I don't have anything specific on the press. I do have -- let me give you what I've got, though, on American citizens and so on.

First of all, the figures, I must say to you, are not easy to come by. I am trusting that these are final figures, for the moment anyway.

Yesterday 41 Americans departed Beirut as part of the U.S. drawdown of government personnel. Of those, 24 are U.S. Government employees, 17 dependents.

Today a total of 49 Americans departed Beirut, including 45 U.S. AID host-country contractors, three State Department employees, and one dependent.

The Department, of course, has contingency plans -- always does -- for evacuation of private citizens and specified third-country nationals -- has it for all countries in which the U.S. Government is formally represented.

In addition, we -- with regard specifically to Lebanon, we have standing agreements with various countries to assist in the removal of their citizens residing in the country, should that become necessary.

We, of course, continue to monitor the situation closely, and we intend to implement evacuation plans in the event that this becomes necessary. But I would stress to you, that is not a decision which has been taken by any means, and at this point the U.S. has only undertaken a drawdown of U.S. personnel in Beirut.

There is no formal evacuation underway, but, obviously, we will give American citizens a facilitative support, as resources permit, to arrange departure via commercial means.

Q And the numbers?

A Now, as far as the number of various kinds of Americans in Beirut, there are 191 U.S. Government employees now in Beirut, 106 of whom are temporary duty trainers assigned to the Office of Military Cooperation. No dependents remain in Beirut.

We estimate that there are also approximately 1350 U.S. citizens in Beirut. They are employees of U.S. firms or full-time residents, clergy, relief workers and their dependents.

We also estimate that about 900 dual Lebanese-American nationals reside in Beirut, and that there are about 174 resident aliens there as well.

So far as we know, all American citizens are safe and accounted for.

Q What does an American citizen get told if he or she calls the Embassy inside Beirut today -- or they can't get through to the Embassy. But if they could speak to an American State Department official in Beirut, what would they be told? Is it time to leave?

A There is no evacuation under way. There is -- there has been a travel advisory issued -- let me just read it to you -- on this.

It says, "The Department of State advised that the situation in Lebanon remains hazardous. In view of the worsened security situation, dependents of U.S. Government employees have left the country, but the Embassy in Beirut remains in operation. All Americans should avoid travel to Lebanon at this time."

In answer to your question about somebody who's already there, I just -- I don't believe that any formal notice of any sort has been given. There is no evacuation under way, as I say, although that may -- that limits, because there's no evacuation under way, limits the kinds of things that the Embassy can do. They certainly would, within their resources, provide facilitative assistance for commercial travel out.

Q What's the date of that advisory?

A The advisory is dated the 8th.

Q That's today.

A That's today.

Q Alan, would you cite for us the Congressional language under which the President feels he has authority to expand the ability of the Sixth Fleet to take under fire positions in Lebanon that are not taking the Marines under fire?

A I think I would -- I guess if you're going to ask me about a military question, I'll refer you to the military organization, the Pentagon. But the --

Q That's a legal question.

A But there is -- has been an understanding -- well, there was a submission under the War Powers Act which went up. There's no change in that. The mandate of the forces there and basic terms and the role has not changed. There was, as I reminded you yesterday in response to a question, an occasion in -- some time ago at Suq-al-Gharb where there was firing on what were not directly U.S. forces, but it was felt that that firing, if the attack had succeeded, would have endangered U.S. personnel -- MNF and other U.S. personnel -- and that was done at that time.

As the President indicated in his statement yesterday, again to go back to the text, his first point was "To enhance the safety of American and other MNF personnel in Lebanon, I have authorized U.S. Naval forces, under the existing mandate of the MNF. . ." and so on.

Q He says "under the existing mandate." I'm just asking you --

A That's right.

Q -- what language in the mandate would you cite to support that authority?

A Well, I don't have the mandate. I'd refer you back to it. It's on the public record, Bill.

Q Alan, since you -- since the U.S. bombardments there in Lebanon are in part intended to support the Lebanese Army, can you tell us in non-military terms what is the present status of this army, of the LAF?

A You're saying the firing is to support the army? No. That is not the purpose. The firing, as I just read, is to support the safety, or in support of the safety, of Americans there, and that is the basic underlying principle of that.

Q It's not intended to support the army, the Lebanese Army?

A Well, our policy support for the Central Government of Lebanon, and for the Lebanese Armed Forces is one thing. The mandate under which we would be using fire refers to the safety of Americans, so that's another thing.

Q Anyway, could you characterize in non-military terms the situation of the LAF there now?

A No. I was asked about that before, and I really don't have anything for you.

Q Alan, I've got a clarification on the numbers, and I have a question as well. Does your head count apply to Americans in Lebanon but outside of Beirut, or are those strictly people in the City of Beirut?

A I will check. I believe this is in Beirut. This is --

Q If you could --

A This says in Beirut. Okay?

Q -- somehow get a country-wide figure, that would be helpful.

A Well, okay. I will put the question. I don't know that I can answer it satisfactorily.

Q The question I have is, at the time the Multinational Force was chartered, one of its key functions was envisioned as providing a buffer for us at the point at which foreign troops began to withdraw to fill the void left by that withdrawal.

Does this new policy foreclose that eventual role, should there be a negotiated withdrawal of Syrian and Israeli troops?

A Well, I'm not sure I agree with your description of the role. It was described as an "interposition force", which didn't necessarily say that there was going to be any movement out in any direction as there was withdrawal of forces -- of the force that it was interposing between.

Well, I think that what might have happened, or what might happen in the future, I'm not really going to try to speculate about. But I would really ask you to go back and check on what was said at the time, because I don't think that it was suggested, and we always, I think, have said we don't know, in terms of when foreign forces withdraw, how we would deal with an expanded MNF role, if there would be an expanded MNF role, if there will be an expansion of the MNF forces; and all those questions we basically set aside because we didn't know the answers to those things.

So it really, I'm afraid, falls into the realm of the hypothetical. But there was not laid out any plan which --

Q Is that not a moot possibility?

A I'm not going to try to speculate on the future on that, Bill.

Q Alan, do you have anything to tell us about the consultations with Israel, and if these consultations are within the framework of the strategic agreements with Israel?

A Oh, I — we have had a lot of consultation with the various parties, including Israel, the other Arab states in the region, and so on. So there's nothing new about that, and we have been in touch with Israel about our plans in this case.

Q Alan, do I understand --

A Excuse me. What?

Q Is the Israeli position being cooperative with the United States in the decision --

A I don't think I'm going to describe any one party. I'm not going to start down a list of what's the attitude. We have good, close cooperative relations with Israel, but I'm not going to start characterizing our conversations on this.

Q Do I understand correctly that we do not contemplate shooting behind Syrian lines except somehow when a case can be made it's in defense of Americans there?

A I suggest to you, you read the President's statement. That isn't what it says. It says -- well, you have it, and you told me not to read it, so I won't do that.

Q Alan --

A Excuse me?

Q Follow on that, please, Alan?

A Yes. Excuse me. Go ahead.

Q Reading through the President's statement yesterday, he talks about accelerating arms, but there doesn't seem to be any money in the '84-'85 budget for this sort of arms. Does that mean you're going to go to the Congress for a supplement?

A Well, I'm sure there would have to be arrangements made to find funding for it, yes. I don't know precisely what would be done, but there would obviously have to be some money.

Q Could I also ask you about the radar system that has been in Lebanon helping the forces find out where the attacks are coming from? Is that going to stay along with the advisers?

A I think I would have to ask you to go to the Pentagon to talk about that.

Jim?

Q Could we have a filing break?

A Any objection to a filing break? (There was no objection) Okay. Filing break.

Q Can I go back to the President's statement on the first one which you just read? Are we to interpret that statement as meaning that any firing from parts of Lebanon controlled by Syria into greater Beirut automatically affects the safety of American and other MNF personnel in Lebanon?

A I think that is a reasonable reading of that.

Q Alan, under the President's plan, any firing by Syrian artillery units inside Lebanon, having nothing to do with Shi'a or Druze, does that qualify for becoming a target? And has there been any firing exclusively Syrian?

A I don't know the answer to the question, the second question. Again, I'd have to refer you to the President's words. He talks about any — "against any units firing into greater Beirut from parts of Lebanon controlled by Syria as well as against any units directly attacking American or MNF personnel and facilities".

Q So Syrian artillery could draw a hit by the U.S.?

A If they — yes. If they fire, they could be fired upon.

Q Alan, there's a variety of interpretations in the President's move as representing a failure of his policy and a stunning defeat for his policy. Could you address that question?

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A I think that what I have said makes clear that what is at issue here, what has been announced here, is a policy which has been under consideration for some weeks in an attempt to, not leave the situation but rather to strengthen the effort that we're making and make it more effective.

So I think it is not reasonable to characterize it as -- bespeaking a failure, but rather as a serious effort to try to be more effective.

Q Do you see these latest steps as a triumph of U.S. policy?

A I don't think I'm prepared to talk about triumphs, but I think the fact is we're trying to be more effective in doing what we're doing.

Jeff?

Q Alan, when the New Jersey first used its 16-inch guns, government officials were very careful about explaining to us that because of the tremendous damage that each of the shells do, that we use them very sparingly. And this morning we fired more 16-inch shells in a single salvo than have been used since the New Jersey was first deployed, put into action with the big guns.

Are we to take that as an indication that our concern about collateral damage has decreased?

A I don't think I would take it as that. I cannot tell you, though, what the nature of the targets was. You'd have to go to the Pentagon for that. But the concern about innocent people being affected is no less than it was.

Ralph?

Q Alan, in light of everything you've said about trying to increase the effectiveness of the Multinational Force in Lebanon, did Secretary Shultz or -- recommend, or did the Administration consider, reinforcing the Multinational Force on the ground?

A I think I've indicated before I don't go into the question of options, and I don't intend to do that today.

Q Alan, since you said that the review has been going on for some weeks, there are reports last night that the decision by the President was made after Mr. Rumsfeld met with President Gemayel for two hours -- his situation report about the situation in Lebanon was so negative that the President made the decision to come out with the statement. What do you comment on that?

A Well, I said that the decision was made in principle last week. We then went ahead with various consultations, including, of course, centrally, with the Government of Lebanon. But -- and that the terms -- I indicated before that in terms of the timing, specific timing, of that announcement yesterday, I'm really going to have to defer to Larry Speakes. I'm not capable of answering that. I'm not with the party.

Q Alan, I know the Deputy Secretary's testimony this afternoon is closed, but would you anticipate that what you are telling us right now is the operative American position, and there will not be some major policy shift in that this afternoon?

A I certainly would not anticipate a major policy shift being announced this afternoon.

Q Alan, do you have any comment --

Q Alan --

A Please, please.

Q What does the last sentence in the paragraph about shelling in the President's statement mean, where he says "We will stand firm to deter those who seek to influence Lebanon's future by intimidation"? Doesn't that suggest a different purpose, of supporting the government?

A I think it indicates a determination, but I don't think it indicates anything that's inconsistent with what I've said before.

Q Do you have any comment on the statement made by Italian Foreign Minister Mr. Andreotti that the decision taken by Mr. Reagan is a unilateral action and dangerous to the MNF?

A Well, I hadn't seen that statement. I really can't comment on it. There obviously -- we did -- as I say, there were consultations. The decision is as explained in the President's statement, and I would leave you with that.

Q Alan --

Q In that regard --

A Max?

Q I know you can't go into diplomatic exchanges, but Reuters has a report that the Soviets are sending one of their top guys to Damascus next week. Have we been in touch with the Soviet Union in the last 24 hours on this subject?

A I don't know the answer to that, Max.

Ghassan?

Q The President's statement -- I think there is -- you, in my understanding, expressed two views here. I'd like to pin you down.

Is it in defense of the MNF, or is it, as the President says it, "firing at the greater Beirut area, as well as." How do you read "as well as," as separate from or alongside?

A I think, again, I've got to refer you to the text.

Q It's an interpretative area, Alan.

A What it says is -- I know. We can go through great textual analysis here, but the fact is, it says that they are authorized under the existing mandate to provide naval gunfire and air support against -- and let me sort of number them for you:

(1) Any units firing into greater Beirut from parts of Lebanon controlled by Syria. Okay? That's one. Any units firing into greater Beirut from Syrian -- from parts of Lebanon controlled by Syria, as well as,

(2) Against any units directly attacking American or MNF personnel or facilities.

So those are different things.

Q But --

Q To follow up --

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Q I have a follow-up. The Druze factions are accusing the Lebanese Army, which they call as Gemayel Army, of firing at the Marines with the purpose to create the pretext for the American ships to shell the Syrian positions.

A Well, I'm not aware of that, but I guess I would have to say that since the response is generally back to the direct place from which the fire came, that strikes me as a rather dangerous approach to life, if anybody is doing that.

Q Are you very sure of the sources of fire coming to the Beirut area?

A I can't tell you in every instance we are, but I think that the fact of the matter is that we have pretty good resources on that.

Jim?

Q On the MNF question that was just raised, and with the Italian Foreign Minister as well, can you say, were there any reservations expressed by any of the MNF partners about such an announcement at this time, when there were consultations, and was there anything more than consultations? Was there a meeting of the minds that would suggest an MNF agreement, that is, across -- the English, the French, the Italians?

A Again, I am, as usual, not going to get into the diplomacy. I think that the various MNF governments can express themselves as they wish.

Q Last night --

Q Another subject?

A No. Let's stay with this one.

Q Last night Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi Ambassador who negotiated the last cease-fire with the United States and with Mr. Rumsfeld and others, said on "Nightline" that he was not consulted about the decision of the President or the announcement of the President, and he said he knew about it after it happened. What do you answer to this?

A Well, I don't know what -- specifically what consultations were held with the Government of Saudi Arabia. I'm sorry.

Let's basically finish this off -- two more questions -- and go to something else. Bill?

Q How about the UNIFIL forces? What's the progress of attempts to bring them into the picture?

A Well, I don't know of anything specific. I think their mandate comes up -- when? I can't remember when it comes up, but it's -- yes -- it will be due in the next couple months, I guess, for renewal. But I don't think -- at this point I don't have anything to say to you about a UNIFIL force sort of filling in behind or anything of that sort.

Q You'd be bringing them up from the south, not just renewing their mandate.

A Yeah. I don't know of any consideration actively being given to that or by the UNIFIL contributors to thinking about that.

Q Alan, is it true that Bartholomew and Rumsfeld were pinned down briefly yesterday at the U.S. Embassy and wanted to leave but were unable to leave because of the fighting outside?

A I don't know the answer to that, but there was firing around the residence and so on, so, I mean, I don't -- I can't say it's not true, Ralph. I just don't know the answer to it.

Q Where are they today, Alan?

A Well, Ambassador Rumsfeld is in Beirut. Ambassador Murphy was in Rome. He is enroute to Paris and London.

Q All these diplomats that came out of Beirut, are they coming to the United States?

A They -- all of those who were -- who departed have been transported to Cyprus, will proceed from there to various onward destinations. The temporary-duty employees will be returning to the United States within the next several days. Permanent Department of State employees are on duty status and may be temporarily reassigned to other posts or to the Department.

We anticipate that all the dependents will be returning to the U.S., but I just don't really have anything further on that.

Q Alan, could it be assumed that the American flotilla offshore of Lebanon will remain to stay there even after the United Nations peacekeeping force is taking charge there?

A You're taking me way down a future road which I'm just not prepared to get into. Can we close off this subject and take anything else that anybody's interested in, if there's anything else?

Q Yes. Do you have any comment on the vote yesterday by the House on certification in Salvador?

A Yes. We don't see any necessity for a head-to-head confrontation on this issue. Our position on this issue is well known. There is agreement among the Executive, the Congress and the Commission that human rights progress is essential, but in our judgment the all-or-nothing basis of the previous certification language has not been effective.

We concur with the consensus on conditionality in military assistance reached by the Bipartisan Commission that "Vigorous concurrent policies on both the military and human rights fronts are needed to break out of the demoralizing cycle of deterioration on the one hand, and abuses on the other.

"We believe policies of increased aid and increased pressure to safeguard human rights would improve both security and justice. A slackening on one front would undermine our objective on the other. El Salvador must succeed on both, or it will not succeed on either."

That's the end of the quote. We expect to continue to discuss this issue with the Congress in the context of the Central America Democracy Peace and Development Initiative which will be transmitted to Congress shortly, perhaps before the end of the week.

Q Copy of that, please?

A Yes.

Q Do you have any remarks or reaction to the statements of the Mexican President yesterday?

A No. We don't. Okay?

Q Thank you, Alan.

A You're welcome.
(The briefing concluded at 1:35 p.m.)

Becker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, February 10, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #27

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 1984, 1:10 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. A couple of announcements up front. As you know, yesterday afternoon the Press Office made available the fourth set of Grenada documents. Due to the limited quantity, I'm afraid we're going to have to limit distribution of those sets to one copy per news organization.

Point number 2, as you know, President Mubarak and King Hussein are scheduled to be here next week. Obviously, with developments in Moscow --

Q Who is scheduled? I'm sorry.

A Mubarak and Hussein. Obviously, there may be some state of flux in the travel of various dignitaries around the world, but assuming that those visits are still on schedule, we are going ahead with the BACKGROUNDER this afternoon at 2 o'clock in our briefing room on their visits.

Q That's 2 o'clock, John?

A That's 2 o'clock.

Q Mubarak, Monday, and Hussein, Tuesday, or vice versa?

A I think it is Hussein, Monday, and Mubarak, Tuesday. I think that's the way it goes.

Q Will they meet each other?

A I don't have anything for you on that.

O.K. That's all I have. Any questions?

Q What is the U.S. position on the May 17th agreement? And has the United States asked Israel not to object if the Lebanese say it should be abrogated?

A   Well, no change in our position, Bernie. Not going to get into, as usual, diplomatic exchanges, but on the subject of the May 17th agreement, it is designed to advance us toward our goal of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. That continues to be our objective, and we, therefore, continue tp support the agreement, and are not advocating repudiation of that agreement.

Q   Are you doing it privately?

A   I think I have overwhelmed you with about all I've got to say on that.

Q   And "not advocating..." What was that again, please?

A   Repudiation.

Q   How about modification?

A   Not -- Don't have anything on --

Q   How about shelving?

A   (Laughter)

Q   No. Seriously.

A   It's a good agreement. We were witnesses to it. It's between Lebanon and Israel -- no change in our estimate of the usefulness of that agreement.

Q   What about --

Q   Let me put it another way.

A   You could put it another way, but I'd give you the same answer.

Q   Let me put it another way, if I may, that if it came down to the crunch in negotiations, say, between the militia and President Gemayel where the retention of the May 17 agreement was the final stumbling block preventing the assemblage of the various forces around the table, would the United States just look the other way?

A   A hypothetical question. You're asking me what our position is on this particular day. I'm telling you what our position is, what our policy is.

Q You are denying what Bernie asked you, that the U.S. has asked Israel to look the other way?

A I said we weren't going to, as usual and as is pro forma, not going to discuss any diplomatic talks we might or might not have had.

Q Is it fair to infer, though, that your prime concern is the withdrawal of all foreign forces rather than this specific piece of paper?

A That's what the May 17 agreement leads toward. There are other aspects, of course --

Q There are other aspects --

A -- that are important: the security of Israel is important.

Q Right. But is your prime concern the withdrawal of foreign forces or is your prime concern the May 17th agreement?

A Well, I don't think we would weight it; I would think what we would say is the May 17 agreement is a good one leading to a variety of objectives, not only the withdrawal of foreign forces. But clearly, that is a very key one.

Q Is it only the letter to Israel, the side letter that calls for simultaneous, in effect simultaneous withdrawal?

A Well, as you know, we don't talk about alleged side letters, although they are very much -- however they may be in the public domain.

Q Let me ask you one other question. Is it possible in your view that the agreement itself could be renegotiated in any way to provide for additional security guarantees for Syria or any --

A I'm telling you where we stand on the May 17 agreement. I guess -- You know, you're raising hypothetical questions.

Q Have you received word on the discussions that have gone on in Damascus and/or Beirut on the possibilities of a new government?

A No, not really, Bernie. As you can imagine, the Lebanese officials are very active in pursuing the various initiatives that they have offered. Other governments clearly are trying to be helpful -- we certainly are. Ambassador Rumsfeld is in Beirut; Ambassador Bartholomew is, similarly active in helping as he can; but beyond that, don't have any --

Q Have you had a recent message from President Assad or from anyone in the Syrian Government that Mr. Rumsfeld would be welcome to come back to Damascus?

A I'm not aware of such a message, John.

Q John, on the May 17th, Israel has redeployed once, and now there are reports that it may do it again.

A Uh-huh.

Q Is your understanding that these redeployments or partial withdrawals are in accordance with the May 17th ? I'm trying to put it out to you (inaudible)

A Oh, I think that is a rather legal question, and that I probably would be wise not to answer it. It is the total withdrawal of all foreign forces that is our objective.

Q I mean, my intention, John, was, if Israel goes through another partial withdrawal, and the Lebanese Government comes to you and says, "Well, we would like to abrogate the agreement since Israel has withdrawn "X" number of miles from Beirut."

Would the United States Government, then, support the abrogation of or reopening, or doing away with (inaudible)

A I guess we'd give an answer at that time; But you're asking me where we are today.

Lester.

Q The Republican Whip in the House said about the State Department yesterday, "You folks are not in touch with reality," and he called Deputy Secretary Dam's briefing, "the usual State Department gobbledygook."

My question is, do you believe the Republican Whip is not worthy of a comment, or do you believe that his charges are unanswerable, or will you respond to these strong charges now?

A I'm not aware that anybody is responding in the Department today, and I'm not.

Q In other words, "No comment?"

A That's it.

Q All right. Could I ask one follow-up on that? Since Mr. Lott said that the American people heard Reagan, or heard the President say that the Marines would be redeployed, "That's got to begin immediately," what's the Secretary's reaction to that?

A I'm sorry. I didn't quite follow the question.

Q Well, this is just a quote. He said, "The American people --"

A I'm sorry. Who is this, saying this?

Q This is Trent Lott, the House Minority Whip.

A Uh-huh.

Q Your party.

A Uh-huh.

(Laughter)

Q I presume it's your party. The American people heard him -- that's the President -- say they would be redeployed -- that's the Marines -- "And that's got to begin immediately."

What is the Secretary's reaction to that?

A Well, it's not a question of the Secretary's reaction; it's a question of looking at the facts of the situation. The facts of the situation are that the Secretary of Defense is to present to the President a plan for that redeployment. As far as I know, that plan is not yet before the President.

Q John, could you tell us anything, please, about whether any efforts are underway by the United States to drop the Multinational Force problem, so to speak, in the hands of the U.N. Security Council, that there be an alternate force created to supplant the MNF?

A No. There have been some discussions at the U.N., I think yesterday. I think the Lebanese were involved; I think we were involved; I think the French were involved. And I think our position is that nothing in a very concrete form has emerged.

I think our position is that we are listening with interest to those discussions.

Q Let me phrase it more sharply, then: Is the United States pushing a proposal encouraging, seeking to stimulate a proposal to create a United Nations Force that would, in fact, supplant -- a U.N. force to supplant the Multinational Force, and is the U.S. doing this?

A You ask "is the United States stimulating that?" I think that goes beyond what I said. I think what we're doing is listening.

As we have said on a number of occasions in the past, we certainly have no objection to looking at the way in which the United Nations could be helpful in Lebanon. We have consistently supported the extension of the UNIFIL Force in Lebanon.

There have been problems about a U.N. Force, not the least of which is that problem of a Soviet veto. So in principle, we have no problem with exploring a more constructive use of U.N. forces in Lebanon, but as to specifics, don't have anything to offer you as to whether anybody has come up with a plan that is acceptable.

Q Apart from exploring, would the United States like to see a U.N. Force supplant the MNF?

A I think it would depend on the circumstances, composition, and various other aspects surrounding such a U.N. force, particularly where it might operate, and what its mandate might be.

Q Didn't the Secretary try to effect such a U.N. force last fall, when he was up at the U.N.?

A I don't know about "effect a U.N. force." There has always been this looming problem in the background of the Soviet ability to hamper and hinder the work of such a force, and indeed, to restrict the duration under which it might operate. So that has always been a reality out there, but certainly, we have gone to great lengths to try to get the UNIFIL force extended, and encourage those countries which have contributed to UNIFIL, although the work that UNIFIL is currently doing is, I'm sure, not as meaningful as those contributing countries would wish.

-- MORE --

Q Let me just follow that up. Is this one of the areas the Secretary alluded to where he thinks the Soviets might be able to take more cooperative --

A I suppose if the Soviets did not block such a force and the kind of work it might do and where it might be disposed, I presume that we would look with greater interest at such a plan.

Q John, does the Israeli bombing today of positions near Beirut constitute a helpful action in your mind? Was it coordinated with the United States?

A No. It was not coordinated with the United States.

Q Well, is it a helpful or an unhelpful action in terms of what you're trying to achieve in Lebanon?

A Don't have any comment for you on that. The Israelis took the action they did. They did not consult with us in advance or coordinate, but we don't have any comment on it.

Q But how could they not coordinate when in fact you're firing on some targets and they're firing on some targets? How do you avoid hitting the same targets? How do you avoid hitting each other?

A I don't know. I mean, it is possible -- I do not know whether at some low level there might have been coordination when aircraft are flying in the same area or something like that, but, if -- I mean, I assume your question is basically a political question, and the answer to that is that there was not coordination. And there may not have been any military coordination at all. I do not know. But sometimes pilots alert other pilots to the fact that they're flying in an area.

Q It's certainly going to be seen in the area as something that was coordinated --

A I'm sorry. I didn't get the first part.

Q I would assume it will be seen in the area as something that is coordinated.

A Well, but those in the area who see it as coordinated would be wrong.

Q Do you ever communicate in the context of the strategic consensus?

A I'm sorry?

Q In a strategic cooperation agreement, which I understand you have with Israel, do you ever communicate and let each other know what you're doing?

A Well, it's not a strategic agreement, Bernie. I think we've gone over that ground. It's a political/military committee, as I understand it, which met once in January and is due to meet again in June.

Q All right. I'll let you edit my question. What is the answer?

A Well, that organization is not involved in the kind of coordination that you're suggesting.

Q I see.

Q John, can I ask you a question here on the Secretary's statement? He said he sent a message to Mr. Gromyko. That was by a message to the Embassy here or cable traffic to our Moscow Embassy, and the same, please, for the President? How was that conveyed?

A Well, I think I do not know physically how that was transmitted, but I expect it would have been transmitted by cable to our Embassy in Moscow to be put into letter form and delivered in Moscow. I think that is usually the way.

Q What time -- do you have any idea when the President's cable went out and when the Secretary's? Were these together?

A I don't know what time they went out. The Secretary was alerted around 6:00 this morning by our Operations Center to the fact that Mr. Andropov had died. Was in the office shortly thereafter conferring with various aids.

Q Excuse me. May I check that time?

A Sure.

Q 6:00 o'clock, you say?

A It was around 6:00. It might have been a few minutes after 6:00.

Q Didn't the Secretary say that we did not receive any official notification from the Soviets about this?

A On the funeral arrangements, or, indeed, on the --

Q On the death.

A Yes. That's right. But our information, our Embassy confirmed.

Q At about 6:00.

Q Prior to the official announcement.

A I --

Q 6:00 o'clock is about half an hour prior --

A Let me just think back to the sequence. I guess it would be prior because I think the official announcement did come after that. Yes.

Q Could I follow that up? Did you begin to get reports in this building or in any other place in this government on Friday that Mr. Andropov was --

A No.

Q -- about to die?

A Friday. No. What are we today? We're -- Thursday. Today's Friday. Last Friday?

Q Last week?

A No.

Q Alan, has anything --

Q What was the cause of death?

A Don't know.

Q Do we know?

A Don't know.

Q John, has the Embassy reported anything untoward going on in the Soviet Union? I mean, given the fact that these things are always unprecedented?

A No.

Q But there's no unusual activity?

A No.

Q I wonder if you'd comment on various interpretations --

A Not that we're aware of.

Q -- various interpretations about what the Secretary said, ranging from -- he left it wide open that the President might attend the funeral of Andropov, to the President can't wait to attend the funeral of Andropov.

Q Or won't go.

A The President can't wait to attend the funeral?

Q In other words, he's rarin' to go if there's the slightest indication of an amber light from Moscow?

A (Laughter) That's a somewhat colorful interpretation, I think, of --

Q A colorful reply is not required.

A Why don't I give you a plain reply to your colorful question. I think that the question of a delegation to the funeral is something that is under consideration, and, as I say, I think the Secretary said we haven't yet had a formal notification of arrangements. Obviously, thinking is going on about who would go, but just as obviously it would be improper to make any announcements about who would go before one has been invited.

Q Did Mr. Bush leave as scheduled today?

A No. He did not leave. He did not -- I think there have been some changes in his schedule. I think he was to leave late tonight, and I frankly do not know where his -- I think that is in some doubt now.

Q Where is he going?

A He's going to Europe.

Q John, could I ask you the same question I asked the Secretary? Isn't the decision whether the President will go largely dependent on whether the Soviets have in fact --

A Whether the Soviets --

Q Whether the Soviets have in fact designated a new leader?

A Well, I can't tell you what factors that the President will take into account when he makes his decision.

Q Has the Secretary made any recommendation to the President?

A I don't think we would get into that kind of internal discussion, John.

Q John, on the Secretary also, but about the Middle East: Would you care to dispel the many reports that the Secretary is not happy with what is going on in Lebanon, that it is not really to the State Department's taste, the whole redeployment and the whole change in the U.S. troops in Lebanon?

A No.

Q Could you tell us something about --

A No. I don't think so. The President has taken his decisions on Lebanon, the Secretary supports those decisions, and I don't think we would get into discussion that may or may not have gone on inside the Administration.

Q Can you clear up this question --

Q Filing break?

A Filing break? Sure.

Q Can you clear up the question on whether a decision in principle was made February 1 or whether it wasn't made?

A Let me go back and do a little specific research on that for you. I think some folks are working on that.

Q John, you always said that you consult with MNF partners, especially France --

A Uh-huh.

Q But recently there are comments from -- France was very un-understanding -- I mean, they criticize you heavily.

A Uh-huh. Well, you know, good friends sometimes do not agree with each other on various points. I don't know what their point of disagreement is, but we consult with them regularly.

Q They criticized the shelling very much, though. What's your reaction?

A Well, I don't have any reaction. The President took the decision that he did, and the Administration is four-square behind that, and I can only speak for our government.

Q John, yesterday the Secretary testified that this government has been consulting with its European allies on the question of applying some sort of economic pressure on the Syrian Government.

Can you specify which allies and which type of --

A No. I really can't go beyond what he gave you.

Q John, on Central America, yesterday there was a news conference in Mexico in which the rebel leaders in El Salvador made a new peace proposal.

Do you have any reaction to that?

A Was that the one where they talked about participation at elections?

Q Well, they would not disrupt the elections. That's one thing they said.

A Okay. We're carefully reviewing the text of the proposal. As was made clear during the Secretary of

State's visit to El Salvador, the Salvadoran Peace Commission remains open to renewing contact with the FDR/FMLN in order to discuss ways for them to join in the democratic process.

On Mr. Ungo's pledge that the guerrillas will not disrupt the election, we note that Mr. Ungo made similar statements in 1982 before the Constituent Assembly election. He obviously was not speaking for armed guerrillas on that occasion because there were strenuous efforts to stop the vote. Mario Aquinada, another FDR/FMLN spokesman and representative of the Communist Party of El Salvador, stated in Bogota on January 25 that while the guerrillas would not specifically target the election, "maybe some bridges will fall or some traffic will be stopped."

Because of the guerrillas' failure to disrupt the elections in 1982, it comes as no surprise that they are downplaying that aspect of their strategy this time.

Furthermore, the proposal calls for the abrogation of the new Salvadoran constitution, and, as you know, that's the product of a Constituent Assembly elected by 80 percent of the eligible voters. It would be injudicious to negotiate away the fruits of the democratic system.

Q Copy, please?

A Copy? sure.

Q But the proposal is nothing new?

A It doesn't seem to be.

Q A follow-up question on El Salvador, also: There was a -- Michael Barnes, the Chairman of the House Western Hemisphere Affairs Subcommittee yesterday said that you -- the Administration was preparing to end-run Congress and send additional aid to El Salvador.

Do you have any confirmation of that?

A Well, not confirmation. I have a comment on it. In light of the fact as indicated in Congressional testimony on January 26 by Assistant Secretary Motley that the congressionally approved funds will be exhausted prior to the March 25 elections in El Salvador, it's fair to say we're looking at various options. But at this point we're not prepared to get into specifics.

We are clearly concerned about the need to assist the Government of El Salvador in ensuring adequate security through the March 25 election period. Those elections are central to peace and progress in El Salvador. Any guerrilla effort to prevent free elections must be effectively countered. We have been and will continue to consult the Congress about this issue.

Q Copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q (inaudible) the $179 million for '84, and this $64.8 million --

A I think that is correct.

Q We have a briefing at 2:00.

A Sure.

Q Thank you.

A Okay.

(The briefing concluded at 1:34 p.m.)

Becker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Monday, February 13, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #28

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 1984, 12:20 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, all. A couple of announcements: Secretary Shultz will deliver a foreign policy address -- the subject will be Africa -- to the World Affairs Council at the Westin Hotel, in Boston, on Wednesday, February 15. We expect him to speak about 7:30, and barring any technical difficulties, we are going to pipe live into the Press Room the speech. Anyone interested in actually covering the event in Boston should contact Lisa Collins of the World Affairs Council in Boston. She's at 617-482-1740. That's Leisa Collins, World Affairs Council at Boston, 617-482-1740.

The Council will present its Christian A. Herter Memorial Award for a significant contribution to better international understanding to the Secretary on that occasion. That's Wednesday, in Boston.

I understand that after the President's lunch with King Hussein today, there is likely to be a readout at the White House about 1:15. It will be ON BACKGROUND.

That's all I have.

Q Will we be able to have the text of the Secretary's speech before 7:00?

A I certainly hope so.

Q Is there a Q&A, too?

A There will be a Q&A, yes.

Q This is Wednesday night?

A Wednesday night.

Q John, what is now the U.S. position on the May 17 agreement?

A No change since the words I gave you on Friday, Jim. Be glad to repeat them.

Q Please.

A The May 17 agreement is designed to advance us toward our goal of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. That continues to be our objective, and we are, therefore, not advocating repudiation of the agreement, which we continue to support.

Q Should the Lebanese Government choose to repudiate it, what then?

A We were and are a witness to that agreement between the Governments of Lebanon and Israel. We think it's a good agreement, and we stand by it. Should the governments involved take some action on it, then that would be -- One cannot prevent them taking action, but we think it is a good agreement, and we stand by it.

Q John, in that connection -- I've forgotten the exact word you used, abrogate or some --

A Today?

Q Yes, just now.

A Repudiate.

Q Repudiate. How about something short of repudiate, like modify, change, rewrite?

A You can try me on each of those, but the language is still the same.

Q O.K. You'd fit any of those words into that same thing?

A Uh-huh.

Q Did you say now, John, that if the two concerned parties discuss it and decide to do something of what he said, the United States will not oppose it?

A No, I didn't say that. I said one could not prevent that, obviously -- an action by those governments. But you're asking us what our position is. If you want -- you have to talk to the Israelis and the Lebanese about their position.

I think Prime Minister Shamir had some words over the weekend on Israel's position; but as far as our position is concerned, it's a good agreement, and we stand by it.

Q But what you're saying now, John, again, you will not actively involve yourself in trying not to reopen --

A No, I didn't say that. I was really just posing, perhaps trying to anticipate the next question.

Q Will the Administration involve itself in making sure that the agreement is not done away with? Would you say that?

A I think that's a hypothetical situation. I'm telling you what our position is today.

Q Just to follow that up, though, John, is there any even beginning thought here of involving the Secretary in some personal way in an effort to --

A -- to travel to the Middle East, do you mean?

Q Well, or, yes, in some way -- related to the May 17 agreement?

A No.

Q Are you urging the Lebanese, that is to say the Government of Lebanon, such as it is now, not to abrogate the agreement with Israel?

A Well, you know, we don't get into our back-and-forth with the Government of Israel, the Government of Lebanon, indeed any government. What I can best do is tell you what our position is and where we stand.

Q Well, there is some confusion about the Administration position. At the White House, they are pitching it in a different direction. They are saying the United States is not a party to the agreement, that it is a matter between Israel and Lebanon, we're just an observer. And you're saying that in a slightly different way.

A No. I think I said all those things, that we are not a party to the agreement; we were witness to it. It is an agreement between Israel and Lebanon -- I think I said that this morning. I don't think we're pitching it a different way. We're telling you where we stand, and not trying to delve into the future.

Q Would you be unhappy if the agreement were abrogated?

A Well, I think we're just going to stand on our words, that we think it's a good agreement, that we continue to support it, and we're not suggesting the repudiation of it.

Q John, Mr. Shamir, over the weekend, in his latest statement about the agreement, sounded very tough wording to the Lebanese Government across the board: "If you're not going to live up to the agreement, we're going to implement" -- just to paraphrase what he said -- "Implement the security arrangements that we have inside Lebanon or in Lebanon by ourself," which this is, you know, the tone of this sounds like there will be some, possibly another involvement, military involvement to capitalize on the situation of the terms of the agreement and the security agreement that -- (sic)

A That's a statement. What's the question?

Q The threat -- It sounded like it's a threat for military action in Lebanon, if the Lebanese will --

A That's your deduction.

Q Now, what do you comment on this such language? The language is very rough -- harsh language.

A No, we don't have any comment. I think Prime Minister Shamir's words speak for themselves.

Q Where do we stand on the U.N. possibility, in light of the Syrian statements over the weekend about their possible receptiveness towards a U.N. force replacing the MNF --

A Really no change, I think, in what I said last week, and I think Larry Speakes had something to say about it, too.

The United States is not opposed in principle to an expanded U.N. presence in Beirut provided the step is taken in a way that effectively helps to settle the Lebanese problem. We are willing to study specific suggestions and would adopt a position in accordance with the realities of the situation at the time.

The wishes of the Lebanese Government would, of course, be a critical element. We would judge any such proposal in the context of our basic policy goals for Lebanon, namely, a stable, representative government exercising sovereignty throughout Lebanon, and the withdrawal of foreign forces.

As I said, I think last week, there have been some discussions at the U.N. and we're listening to see what might come of those, but obviously there are a lot of question marks.

Q Copy of that, John?

A Sure.

Q We're not taking a lead in trying to work --

A No, we're not taking the lead; no.

Q John, on the agreement again, the U.S. attitude is being seen in some circles in the Middle East as really beginning to be an obstacle actually to national reconciliation in Lebanon. Do you agree with that? And when do you think that -- I mean, when do you think it would become the U.S. ascribing to the agreement becomes an obstacle?

A No, don't agree with that. A lot of people at the time that agreement was negotiated asked the United States to negotiate Israel's departure from Lebanon. We negotiated the agreement and the conditions under which that departure might take place. That's what we were asked to do. That's what we did.

Q John, on that agreement, let me come at it from a somewhat different angle and see whether it helps at all.

A Lots of luck. (Laughter)

Q If the agreement is -- is the agreement seen by the United States in the context of the survival of the Gemayel Government? And if it is seen in that context, would you trade one for the other? Is the survival of the government worth more than the agreement or is the agreement worth more, or are they unrelated?

A I told you weren't going to have any luck with that question, Ralph.

Q They're not related at all?

A I don't think you can put it in that context. The agreement was designed to do certain things, and it was an agreement signed between the legitimate government of Lebanon -- President Gemayel's government -- and the Government of Israel, and set out very clearly certain events that would take place. That's what it was intended to do, but it's not a question of linking it to the survival of a government; it was an agreement signed at that time by the legitimate Government of Lebanon which continues to be that government.

Q It seems those events haven't taken place, doesn't that put the agreement in a new light?

A Those events haven't taken place because the Syrians haven't done what they said they would do.

Q Precisely. And since they don't seem to be planning to do it under the agreement, don't you have to take a different approach?

A I'm telling you where we stand on the agreement. Obviously, you have a situation of change and fluidity in Lebanon, and I can't speak to hypothetical developments.

Q Can we go to something perhaps more productive?

A Good idea.

Q Do you have anything on Chernenko's accession?

A Don't have a great deal because we think it will be inappropriate for us to comment on matters of Soviet domestic policy or to speculate at this early date as to the possible policies and decisions of the new Soviet leadership.

Having said that, I just point out that as the President emphasized in his condolence message and in his Saturday radio address, the President hopes that the Soviet leaders will join with us in a productive dialogue aimed at finding areas of constructive cooperation in the search for peace. In his discussions in Moscow, Vice

President Bush will be carrying a letter from the President to the new Soviet leadership reaffirming this message, and I think that's where we are.

Q Has the Secretary, John, sent a cable to, or any message to Gromyko?

A I think that is correct, Bill. I think one went out last week -- yes -- from the Secretary to Gromyko.

Q Can you give us some idea of the level of specificity involved in that letter, or is it just a general call?

A I can't. I don't know. I really don't.

Q You don't know if it was addressed to Mr. Chernenko, *per se*, or --

A I don't know what the addressee is.

Q The cable to Gromyko, did that affirm any kind of a general willingness to meet if the Soviets --

A I think that was -- I think you should see the cable from the Secretary to Gromyko in the same light as the cable from the President, the initial cable being a message of condolence; a fairly formal cable.

Q It does not contain any such general --

A I think you should see it in that light. I do not know how far it goes, but I think that was the occasion for it and the intent of that cable.

Q Do you expect relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union to improve with Chernenko at the helm?

A I think that we have consistently refused to speculate on what the Soviets might do and assert where we are. And as you know, our policy is based on strength which the Administration believes it has achieved in the three years that it has been in office. It is based on a realistic appraisal of what the other side is doing, and we think we have continued to make realism a cornerstone of our policy. And the third leg is to be willing to engage in a constructive dialogue, and we have consistently said that we are ready for that, and I think Vice President Bush is reaffirming that during his visit to Moscow. So we are ready -- I think the Vice President said we are ready to return tomorrow to the START talks, INF talks, which would be a tangible indication of Soviet willingness to pursue that dialogue.

Q Do you regard Chernenko as a temporary leader or a permanent replacement?

A I think I would be going beyond our statement, that we're relunctant to get into Soviet internal affairs -- if I gave you a comment.

Q Is it now fairly clear in your mind that the Administration is continuing to adhere to its original conditions or its original idea about what would bring about a meeting between the two leaders?

As you know, there were some stories last week from unnamed officials elsewhere in the country that suggested the Administration would like to see a get-acquainted meeting of the two leaders. Where does all that stand?

A I don't think there's any change in the Administration's position, namely, that a summit meeting should be carefully prepared and that there should be some meaningful outcome.

Sorry, go ahead.

Q Would you include in that -- "a summit meeting should be carefully prepared" -- any kind of session of President Reagan and General Secretary Chernenko? Do you think a get-acquainted meeting is something different that also could take place?

A I don't want to lead you either way, and it would be foolish to lead you, I think, given the present situation in Moscow. But if you're asking me, would the President rule out such a meeting this year, I think, clearly, we could not rule them out. We're not ruling it out; we're not ruling it in. I think those conditions --

Q I guess what I'm trying to get at is: Does the Administration view a "get-acquainted session" in some different light than they do -- than it does the general idea of a summit meeting which you were referring to before?

A It depends what you mean by "get-acquainted meeting." I think the President and his advisors have made clear their reluctance to have a meeting in which the two leaders just sit down and chat. I think the President has made clear that you should not raise expectations unless you're going to come out of such a meeting with something meaningful, something constructive. I'm not specifying what that is.

Q Is that different from --

A No.

Q Can you have a get-acquainted meeting in which something constructive occurs which is not considered a summit; that is, carefully prepared and has concrete results?

A I don't know whether you can have a get-acquainted meeting between two leaders that would not be considered a summit.

Q That's what I'm getting at. The Administration used the phrase "get acquainted."

A I suppose you get acquainted in the sense that this would be the first time the two have met.

--MORE--

Q John, there have been two kinds of meetings between Soviet and American leaders. There have been -- the ones in recent years have generally been -- a date is set and there's a big agenda or -- and/or a signing of a document. That was -- for instance, the last one was Carter's meeting with Brezhnev, really, it was not much more than just signing the SALT agreement and some other talks. That was, I guess, a well prepared meeting.

You also had a kind of informal meeting between Ford, President Ford, and Brezhnev at the time of the signing of the Helsinki Agreement in '75, I guess. You also had President Reagan's proposal to Brezhnev that they get together while they'd be in New York, assuming Brezhnev would have come to New York for a special disarmament session.

Is there any thinking of that kind of meeting? That's what I think people mean by get-together.

A No. I think you've gone really beyond where we are. I think there's a readiness to meet in terms of a meeting, as I said before, that was reasonably carefully prepared and out of which would come something of substance or something that is worthwhile. But just how that could be structured, how soon it could be structured, where it could be structured, under what cirumcstances, I think that's ahead of where we are.

Q John, back on the Middle East, please, one more thing: What can you tell us about the message that's being relayed to King Hussein and President Mubarak?

A The message?

Q I mean, anything that -- what can you tell us about what would the United States encourage these two leaders to do for the peace process?

A Well, I think you had a backgrounder on this on Friday, and I think you will have a backgrounder after the King's meeting with the President today, so I'll leave it to those expert officials to brief you.

Q Will there be any effort, do you know, at this point by the President to bring both leaders together for a joint meeting with him or not?

A I think the White House has announced, as I recall, yes.

Q Meeting tomorrow?

A I think they will have lunch together.

Q There was a report yesterday about the Saudi-French initiative for simultaneous Israeli and Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, that they are working about it. Do you have any comment on that?

A No. Don't have any comment on plans, discussions, that might be being considered or under way.

Q John, do you have any confirmation of a report out of Angola that UNITA shot down an airliner with about 100 Cuban --

A No. Just saw that on the wire, but don't have anything on it, Jim. But I saw probably the same report you did.

Q John, can you tell us where Rumsfeld is today, please?

A Yes. He's -- he will be back in Washington very shortly.

Q Tomorrow?

A No. Today.

Q Have you explored with the Syrians a visit over the last few days with Rumsfeld?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q You have not explored it?

A Not to my knowledge. No.

Q He hasn't been to Syria on this --

A No. He has not. I think I'm correct in saying he's not been to -- I'm 95 percent sure.

Q Do you have any comment on the Syrian Foreign, or Deputy Foreign Minister's remarks that Syria's patience is running out?

A I think Under Secretary Eagleburger responded to that in a very articulate way yesterday.

Q Is that the last word on it?

A I don't think any further word is necessary.

Q Any apologies sent to Mr. Khaddam?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q John, were we approached by the Lebanese for -- to arrange a -- to participate, rather, in a Lebanese-Syrian-Saudi-American meeting at the Foreign Ministers' level?

A I'm not aware of that, Bill. I'm not aware of that.

Q Apparently they tried to arrange something these last few days.

A Ah-hah. Not aware of it.

Q Do you have any comment on the Syrian warning -- I've forgotten what day it was issued -- about no more shelling of the -- Syrian patience is being tested? Any comment on that?

A No.

Q Policy change on the shelling at all?

A No. We will -- you mean a threat to our ships?

Q Yes.

A Yes. Well, we will defend ourselves, and we will defend our ships, of course, and if the Syrians control those areas under their responsibility in Lebanon, they will have no problems with us.

Q Has the Administration notified Congress that it will sell the Stinger missiles to Jordan?

A I think an informal notification went up late last week, Jim. I don't have anything more on it for you at the moment.

Q John, do you have any idea what's the significance of Alayh -- the City of Alayh which was bombarded by the U.S. ships, and there were pictures on CBS and ABC over the weekend? What was Alayh in the way of consideration that it was bombarded more than any other parts in Lebanon?

A I don't have anything for you on that. Sorry.

Q Could you tell me once again what the purpose of the shelling is? I mean, in the President's statement last week he said it was to protect -- to just -- in response to shelling of East Beirut or of greater Beirut, but then there were later statements that it was to protect the MNF. I'm just wondering what --

A Well, it is. It's to protect Americans, both military and non-military, and the MNF.

Q Do you know how that fits under the September agreement, the September War Powers Resolution?

A Well, it does fit very well with that agreement. It has always been clear that we would defend Americans in Beirut.

Q But that refers to the MNF, the September War Powers Act, not to Americans in general.

A Well, MNF -- for example, MNF forces are deployed in various parts of the city, and there is an Embassy there. There are various U.S. missions. It is very hard to shoot into central Beirut without jeopardizing Americans.

Q Do you have anything on the arrest of five persons in New Jersey on Saturday involving attempting to smuggle some advanced technology to China?

A No. That's a matter of ongoing investigation, and I think we won't have any comment on it at this stage.

Q Do you have any comments on the most recent developments in the war between Iran and Iraq and shelling of cities and so forth?

A No. Not really any comment, Don. Our position is as it has been all along, that we think a negotiated settlement of that unfortunate war is the answer to the problem, and that is what we would like to see.

Q And could you explain, if you have it at hand, why the State Department, according to reports anyway, has classified the sale of helicopters to Taiwan as a non-military sale, although the only reported difference between these and military helicopters is they don't have the guns on them?

A Well, I don't think that is the difference. I think what we are talking about is the sale of a civilian aircraft -- a civilian helicopter to Taiwan.

Q Is there any requirement that the aircraft or helicopter only be used for civilian purposes?

A Well, I think that's what it is planned to be used for. I think that the initial story said that the United States was authorizing a sale of the Blackhawk helicopter to Taiwan. That's absolutely not correct. That is an offensive helicopter, and what we are talking about is the sale of the S-70C.

Q And if the Taiwanese go on to use this helicopter for non-civilian or military purposes, what will the United States do about it, or is there any provision that they can't?

A Well, we're operating under the law which does provide for the sale of commercial, non-military aircraft to Taiwan, and are perfectly within our right to proceed with that sale.

Q What I'm getting at is, is there any requirement on Taiwan that they not use this later for military purposes once they get the aircraft?

A Well, I don't know how you can make that -- I mean, we sell commercial aircraft and equipment around the world to a variety of countries. I think our posture has to be that we will regulate or not sell, in the cases of certain countries, or sell military equipment, and this equipment does not fall within that category.

Q So there's no real requirement on them, or you don't have a response on that?

A Well, we have made a judgment on the basis of a civilian commercial helicopter.

Q Do you know what role former Secretary Haig played in getting approval of --

A Well, the suggestion that Secretary Haig talked to Larry Eagleburger about this is absolutely untrue.

Q Untrue --

A Absolutely untrue that they talked or that he sought to influence in any way. I have that from Mr. Eagleburger directly.

Q Did the former Secretary talk to any other State Department officials about it?

A (Laughter) I mean, I wouldn't say no to that question because I don't know who he talked to, but I will stand by the firm denial of any suggestion that there was any improper influence. I really don't have a record of who every former Secretary of State spoke to in this building.

Q Just to be clear, you're also standing by the denial that there was any conversation with --

A Yes.

Q Related to this --

A Yes.

Q Between the Secretary and --

A And Eagleburger. Correct. What Don was asking was, is it conceivable that he may have talked to somebody else.

Q Okay. Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:45 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, February 14, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #29

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 1984, 12:17 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I have no announcements and no news.

The Press Office drew a little red heart on my schedule and a black heart on Mr. Romberg's schedule. I'll let you draw your own conclusions. (Laughter)

Q None on ours.

A None on yours? Well, that's life. Life is hard, Ralph. (Laughter)

Q A couple of detailed stories maybe you can clean up for us.

A O.K.

Q One: In their meeting yesterday, did the Secretary of State and Mr. Kinnock of the British Labor Party have words with each other?

A I think it was a frank exchange of views, Jim. I think the atmosphere was good, but I think there were clearly differences of viewpoints on such assorted issues as Central America and nuclear deterrence.

Q And were those differences enthusiastically expressed?

A I wasn't at the meeting, but I'm sure both men expressed with great clarity and consummate articulation, skill, the respective viewpoints.

Q Another story out of London quotes the former British Prime Minister, James Callaghan, as saying that there have been secret U.S.-Soviet talks.

A I saw that, and I don't quite understand what Mr. Callaghan was referring to. As we've said, there have been a variety of channels -- Secretary Shultz has talked with Ambassador Dobrynin here; Ambassador Hartman has talked with Soviet officials in Moscow; there have been other channels. But I don't really understand what Mr. Callaghan was talking about -- a "secret" channel.

Q He used the word -- I don't know how specifically he meant it -- "secret and -- trusted secret emissaries."

A Yes. No, I don't understand that, don't know what he means.

Q Have there been any emissaries, other than -- I mean, I suppose you can consider Harriman, to some extent, an emissary. But I mean, have there been any --

A Well, nothing, John, that I can think of sort of in this kind of atmosphere. It's all been fairly obvious and direct. I think the suggestion here is that there's something clandestine, and certainly I'm not aware of anything like that.

Q Did Ambassador Hartman see Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko more often in the last several months, the last six months, than we might have been led to believe? I mean, there was a time when he had seen him --

A I honestly can't answer that. I don't know. Certainly Ambassador Hartman had access in Moscow, but how frequently his meetings took place, I don't know.

Q Do you have a reading yet on Bush's meeting with Chernenko?

A I don't. We haven't had a report. I think the Vice President went more or less directly to the airport, and (I've) seen those first wire service reports of his press conference. But, no, we don't have a readout yet.

Q Are you encouraged by what the Vice President said?

A I think we won't respond to wire service reports. Not that -- we don't intend any disrespect of the wire service reports, but I think we'll just wait until we have a fuller readout.

Q Could you offer us such a readout later in the day, when it becomes available to you?

A No promises.

Q What about the apparent Soviet shift on the U.N. force to replace the MNF, a story that's in one of the papers?

A Shift, Soviet shift?

Q Well, there's a story in The Washington Post this morning that the Soviets might be willing, or in fact are willing, to have the Security Council approve a U.N. force. Does that come as a surprise? Is that something we welcome? Do we want to explore it with the Russians?

A Well, as we've said over the past several days, there are some talks going on at the U.N., and we are certainly interested in them to see how they turn out. Our position has always been that there may be a larger role for the U.N. in Lebanon. What that might be depends on what everybody has in mind, what restraints would be imposed on it.

I'm not going to get into the conditions, but I see that the Soviets, or the press is reporting a variety of Soviet conditions.

Q Are we talking to the Soviets about this directly in New York or anywhere else?

A I'm not aware of any direct talks with the Soviets on this particular subject today.

Q John, one of the things that the Soviets supposedly are demanding is the removal of the Sixth Fleet from offshore. Would that be an acceptable condition?

A Well, that's what I say: we've seen these reports of various Soviet conditions, but I don't think we're in any position to comment today. As I say, we continue to be in a listening posture and see where it all goes. There are various governments, various parties, discussing this, attempting to move things along; but I think it's premature for us to have a reaction.

Q But John, let's pick up Barrie's question. Would the United States find acceptable a condition that involved the withdrawal of the U.S. Sixth Fleet?

A Well, it depends on what you mean. There is no suggestion of that at the moment. I mean, how far are you projecting this? What is the scenario? But the President has made clear --

Q But if you're going to leave that hang open there, which is what you're doing --

A No, I'm not leaving it hang open. What I'm saying is there's no change in the President's position and that there is a rearrangement of the MNF Force. They presumably will go on the ships off the coast of Lebanon and those ships will stay there, as far as I'm aware. There's no change in the President's position.

Q So does that mean that you're not going to buy a package which calls for the withdrawal of the Fleet?

A I don't know what you're talking about, two years, three years, four years down the road; but certainly at the moment there is no plan that I'm aware of to change the disposition.

Q In light of a couple of things which happened in the last twenty-four hours, or maybe -- this is the Soviet Union supposedly or reportedly acceptance or shift in position about the United Nation forces in Lebanon --

A Sorry -- accepted whose position?

Q The United Nations forces in Lebanon, you know, that reported shift in their position, accepting of the United Nation, to have United Nations forces in Lebanon with all of their terms. And the second point is the return of the Sunni Moslem leaders of Lebanon from a trip to Moscow and then coming back and not asking for the removal or the downfall of Mr. Gemayel. Do you see anything that could be a softening or a change in the posture and the position of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the situation in Lebanon?

A I don't know that it's a softening. I also don't think you should see this as an overnight change in the Soviet position. There have been some hints that the Soviets might be moving in this direction, and all that's happening is that this is being explored at the U.N. to see what kind of conditions, restrictions, obstructions might be put in the place of such a plan. Where it will come out, I don't know.

We have consistently said that we thought the U.N. might play a more constructive role in Lebanon. The problem has always been the Soviet veto. If there is to be a real change in that position, I think that is something to which we would listen with interest. But I also note that a number of conditions are being offered by the Soviet Union which seem to be fairly drastic ones.

Q But you welcome such hints or such indications that maybe something --

A It would depend, I think, on the basis on which the U.N. would operate, what the length of its assignment would be. As you know, the Soviet Union would be in a position to restrict the length of that assignment, where it would operate and other conditions that might be attached to its presence. We'd have to look at all those.

Q Are there any on-going discussions with the Soviets about this subject, or you're announcing something now that the Soviets will know about in the press?

A Well, I'm not sure -- there may well have been references to it in past conversations. I'm not sure about that. But in response to John's specific question which I took to mean, are we in negotiations with the Soviet Union today on this issue -- not that I'm aware of. I think what we're doing is adopting a listening and looking posture at the U.N. as various governments move this or attempt to move this plan.

Q Is what you heard so far, John, enough to kind of try to seek some means to discuss with the Soviets these subjects?

A I just don't have anything for you. I think we have to see more in terms of what it is they really are suggesting, if they, in fact, are suggesting anything.

Q (Inaudible) in general, with this now becoming, I guess, somewhat more pregnant than it was last week or a couple of weeks ago, with the Vice President having emerged from his meeting with Mr. Chernenko saying that there are opportunities for constructive dialogue, is it more reasonable now to expect that the Secretary may want to have a meeting with Mr. Gromyko sometime in the next few weeks?

A I suppose one could speculate, but there's certainly nothing planned. There's nothing on the agenda.

Q Has that been raised by either side?

A Not that I'm aware of. I don't know whether it's been raised in Moscow. I'm not aware that it has.

Q You don't know whether the Vice President had instructions to raise the possibility?

A No, I do not.

Q John, if the Soviets did not veto an alternate U.N. force to replace the MNF force in Beirut, would the United States -- and in fact, the U.N. force was created, at least, on paper -- would the United States accept that at any price?

A At any price?

Q Yes, at any price.

A Obviously not.

Q On the same: The French and the Italians, who are MNF partners, are obviously involved in these talks at the United Nations. Are we taking simply a "listening posture" to what they themselves are doing, or do we have confidence in their ability to negotiate in our interests?

A It's not a question of "negotiating in our interests." Obviously, we are in touch with our MNF partners at the U.N. and elsewhere, and obviously we are watching this carefully as it moves along, if it moves along.

Q John, which conditions are the ones that you characterized as "fairly drastic?"

A We're not going to get into that, Ralph. You've seen reports of those conditions, and I'm not going to get into them.

Q All of them are or --

A No, I'm not going to analyze them one by one.

Q John, why do you choose to portray the U.S. in such a passive posture when it is so desparately looking for a way out of Lebanon with the Marines? (Laughter)

A You do come up with colorful, r n-interpretations of our position, Bernie. I think ingrained caution, in terms of our diplomatic negotiations with the Soviet Union over a period years, would cause us to look with great carefulness. I'm sure you would approve of that caution.

Q No, I don't mean -- forgetting what the Soviet stipulations might be, just a more energetic role. I think Murphy the other day, when he testified on the Hill, talked about an aggressive pursuit of this whole approach; and you are sort of saying, we're sort of tuned in, we'll see how it goes, and so forth. Isn't the U.S. doing a lot more than that?

A I think we want to be careful. I think we want to look at what might emerge. There are also some practical questions to be raised -- namely, which countries would be prepared to dispatch troops to Beirut in the present circumstances. There are a number of questions, I think, to be thought through and answered.

Q Would the U.S.?

A Would the U.S. be prepared to put its troops into U.N. forces? I think that probably is academic, and perhaps not a question that the U.S. would decide.

Q Overtaken by events.

Q John, would you care to comment on reports that Secretary Weinberger was surprised at the extent of the firing by the New Jersey on that first day, which seems to have been inspired by this building?

A No, I really wouldn't. I think the Pentagon had a briefing over there today, and I'm sure they were asked that question. The President's position when he announced the redeployment was perfectly clear, that over a period of time the Marines would be redeployed to the ships; that we certainly would reserve the right to fire under certain circumstances from the New Jersey and, indeed, other warships off the coast; and that we would be doing a number of -- engaging in a number of new programs in the field of anti-terrorism and so forth and so on. So it was a three-point program that he announced.

Q The report was that Weinberger was somewhat surprised and shocked at the extent of the firing by the New Jersey. Was this building?

A I saw the report. I'm not aware of any feeling that the response undertaken by the New Jersey was out of line with what the President had mandated.

Q John, do you see the latest shelling which happened, I believe, overnight in line of this caution which has been issued, that restraint or -- that was issued, that, you know, shoot with restraint or bomb with restraint or shell with restraint that was issued by the Pentagon? (sic)

A I'm not sure that -- you're phrasing it a certain way, but the rules of engagement are quite clear in that we will fire when fired upon or we will fire upon guns in Syrian-held territory in Lebanon firing into greater Beirut.

Q Would you like to add to the confusion on whether the United States will fire in direct support of the Lebanese Armed Forces regardless of whether the Marines are under attack?

A The United States will fire under the rules of engagement that I just gave you, Bernie; when Americans are directly fired on or when guns firing out of Syrian-controlled territory are firing into greater Beirut.

Q What about guns firing out of east Beirut into greater Beirut?

A When they're firing at us, I think the position is quite clear, that we will fire --

Q "Firing at us" means -- what? -- only at the airport?

A I have explained that very carefully.

Q That's just what I thought. You said earlier that you were firing on Syrian guns because they were firing into greater Beirut.

A That's correct.

Q That's not a dodge; that's into greater Beirut, right?

A I think the rationale is that when you're firing into greater Beirut, if you have been there, you would know that any American in greater Beirut might well be in jeopardy.

--MORE--

Q John, just to pick it up -- you used the word "Syrian guns," and there are -- some radio reports talk about the U.S. ships firing at Syrian positions. Is it in fact Syrian positions or militia in Syrian-held parts?

A I think the --

Q Do we have any evidence that they're firing directly at Syrian gun positions, manned by Syrians?

A Well, I'm not sure you always know who is manning the gun that fired at you, Bernie, but when it fires and you locate it, we will fire back irrespective of who's manning it.

Q Do you have any comment on an Arthur Young report about the Salvadoran Central Bank's use of foreign exchange?

A There is some fairly lengthy guidance which arrived just as I was about to come down here, and I haven't digested it, but you can get it from the Press Office afterwards. Sure.

Q Do you know -- well, I guess you wouldn't, but do you know why the report was classified?

A I don't. That may be covered in the guidance. I don't know. I just didn't have a moment to look at the guidance.

Q John, do you have anything for us on the resignation of the Panamanian President?

A Not a great deal. We really don't comment on changes in other governments, but I'll give you what I have.

Factually, his resignation was announced yesterday. Neither he nor his successor have yet given an explanation of it. He was succeeded by Vice President Jorge Illueca who was President of the 1983 General Assembly. Probably I'm not getting that pronounciation right.

We understand that a number of cabinet ministers are submitting their resignations and that others will probably remain in office, but don't have complete information on cabinet changes at this time, and I don't have any comment on a change in government by a friendly country.

Q What effect will this have on the presidential election?

A Apparently none, and we're pleased with that. A national election for a new president, two vice presidents and a national legislature is scheduled for May 6. In his first public statement the new president reaffirmed the Panamanian Government's commitment to hold the election as scheduled. We have no reason to doubt that this will be done, and we are gratified that the electoral process, to which we attach great importance in all countries in the region, will proceed.

Q The new President, he gave a very strong speech against U.S. actions in Central America just about two months ago.

A Uh-huh.

Q Does this bode ill for U.S.-Panamanian relations?

A Not that we're aware of, Jim. Can see no change.

Q Have we had any contact with him there, our Ambassador or any U.S. officials?

A I don't know what has taken place since this announcement, but I'm sure we have good contact and access.

Q Can I ask, John, on the same area, does the State Department have an opinion about the wisdom of Reverend Jackson going to Nicaragua?

A Seen all those reports about invitations to Government officials. I think the only awareness we have in this building is of an invitation to Assistant Secretary Motley, but don't have any comment on whether the Democratic candidates would go on up.

Q Is Motley going?

A I don't know.

Q The same area again: The head of the Socialist Party in Guatemala was kidnapped and killed, and there has been a lot of big rise in urban violence just in the last few weeks there.

Do you have any statement on trends?

A No.

Q Would you look into it?

A Well, that's pretty broad --

Q Well, it's a pretty important assassination.

A -- question. Why don't you give me a precise question?

Q All right. There have been reports of increasing urban violence in Guatemala City and in other urban areas of the country, and among the latest victims has been the leader of the Socialist Party -- Social Democratic Party there. He was supposed to participate in elections in July.

Do you have any comment with respect to this trend?

A Okay. We'll take that one.

Q John, could I just --

Q John, did you say you had no comment on any invitation -- pardon me, Ralph -- no comments on invitations to any of the Democratic candidates?

A Uh-huh. That's right.

Q John, could I take you back to the U.N. force again for just a second? Could you explain the difference between the position the U.S. is taking now, in effect withholding its views on a U.N. force? Compare that to what you said was your fear of a Soviet veto. Is there any difference between a Soviet veto and a U.S. veto?

A No. We've always tried to keep UNIFIL in place, although one might have questioned its value, and we have paid tribute to those countries who have maintained their forces in UNIFIL against the prospect that it might become more potent and more useful at some stage.

But insofar as another U.N. force, separate U.N. force, without that mandate, the legitimacy of which and the duration of which would be subject to constant Soviet veto, has posed obvious problems.

So we have always thought that a broader U.N. role in Lebanon might be something that would be very useful. We've always been cautious about the way in which such a force might be hobbled or be the hostage, if you will, of a Soviet veto.

Q John, on Lebanon also, about a question of Bernie, you could probably disconfirm it -- a senior White House official --

A I very rarely confirm Bernie Kalb's questions. (Laughter)

Q I said maybe you want to disconfirm what I am going to say about Bernie's question -- a senior official of the White House last week was briefing foreign reporters in the Foreign Press Center, and he said that in some cases the Administration has certain, beyond any question, information that Syrian guns, manned by Syrian personnel, were shooting into the greater Beirut area.

A Yes.

Q I think I mentioned that to you, and next thing you answered Bernie now that your answer wasn't this definite. I just would like to --

A No, no, no. No, I think you misunderstand me. I'm not suggesting there hasn't been fire from guns in Syrian-held territory.

Q By Syrians.

A By Syrians, yes.

Q Okay.

A But I'm not suggesting that every time we respond to fire from a gun that fires at us, we know that it's manned by a Syrian crew.

Q But you are saying -- then you are saying Syrian guns, Syrian crew --

A On some occasions.

Q Let me just clear something up. Isn't the UNIFIL force that's there now subject to periodic veto in the sense that the mandate has to be renewed by the Syrian --

A It does have to be renewed, but it has a different kind of function, and one that apparently is not so subject to challenge.

Q John, would the United States, as a result of the current visit of President Mubarak and King Hussein in their meeting with the President, welcome the revival of President Reagan's peace initiative of September 1, '82, and what role will the Palestinians -- are supposed to play in this -- end of this?

A It's not a question of reviving it. That peace initiative has always been in place, and I just remind you to what you all may not have taken seriously at the time the President launched it. He suggested that we Americans are sometimes accused of being impetuous and impulsive and having a short attention span, but that he was launching this for the long haul, that he knew it would be hard, he knew it would be difficult, but we would keep at it, and that's what he's been doing.

Q Could you please help clarify something, then, coming back to this point? You're saying that at times there have been Syrian guns manned by Syrian crews in Lebanon firing into greater Beirut?

A I think that's a fair presumption.

Q Have they also fired at the U.S. Marines?

A I can't answer that one, Bernie. I don't know. I'm not aware of that.

Q John, on that first question about the Kinnock-Shultz meeting, as I understand it, Mr. Kinnock said that Shultz lost his temper or lost his cool, something along that line. Is that true?

A I don't know. I wasn't in the meeting. This -- I have very rarely seen this Secretary of State lose his temper.

Q That "can't" answer on the Marines, is that because you don't know, or you're not aware of it?

A I'm sorry, Bernie?

Q On the question of Syrian crews, with Syrian guns firing at U.S. Marines.

A Well, I think it is a presumption based on reasonable information. Obviously, one is under some inhibition about walking up there and physically identifying the gunners.

Q No. But the assumption is that Syrian guns, Syrian crews, have fired at the U.S. Marines. Is that what you're saying?

A No. I think the presumption --

Q What are you saying?

A The presumption is that Syrian guns, manned by Syrian crews, have fired into greater Beirut.

Q All right. Now what about the Marines?

A That's where I drew the line.

Q That you do not know?

A I don't know. Couldn't confirm that.

Q Okay. Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:42 p.m.)

Baker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Wednesday, February 15, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #30

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1984, 1:10 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Just have a brief housekeeping announcement, and that is that the Department of State is pleased to announce that Vice President Aureliano Chaves of Brazil will visit Washington March 19 to 20. He has accepted the invitation of Vice President Bush for a working luncheon on March 19. Vice President Chavez will see other senior officials of the Administration, Congressional leaders and private-sector representatives during his stay in the United States. Vice President Bush, during his visit to Brazil in 1981, invited Vice President Chavez to visit Washington and is pleased that they now have been able to arrange a mutually convenient time to renew their acquaintance.

That's all I have for you.

Q John, we have seen and heard the Secretary of State. Beyond that, however, does the United States have any advance indications that the Government of Lebanon is going to abrogate the May 17 agreement?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q Could you take that, please?

A Well, (a) I want to be straight with you -- not that I'm aware of -- but (b) I don't think we would get into confidential, diplomatic messages even had they been passed. But I'm trying to be as straight with you as I can.

Q John, could you give us a general situation report? It appears that things are deteriorating quite rapidly.

A Obviously it's a very fluid situation in Beirut. I don't really have the latest reports. As a matter of fact, you all may have them faster than we do. Clearly, the LAF suffered a setback yesterday, and just as clearly the PSP and Shi'a militias have improved their positions south and southeast of Beirut.

The United States stresses that the key to the resolution of Lebanon's problems lies in political negotiation between the parties and not in military action.

Q John, could you tell us what prompted the Secretary to come down on such short notice to make this statement?

A He has come down from time to time at important moments to offer comments, and I think his feeling today was, clearly, we have a changing situation in Beirut. We have just had a visit to Washington by an important president of an Arab country and an important king of an Arab country, and I think his purpose was to underline the continuity and the constancy of U.S. policy in the Middle East and its continuing commitment.

Q How about his coming down here to defend a policy that is increasingly crumbling on the ground in Lebanon and is under increasing attack and seems to be approaching a debacle?

A I don't necessarily agree with your characterization, Bernie. I don't think anybody would argue that the situation in Lebanon is as we would choose to have it. Our motivation for being there has been and is an honorable one. We have dedicated a considerable amount of effort to it. It is a worthy cause. The stability of Lebanon is important to the stability of the Middle East and therefore to our national interest. We have worked hard at it, and I'm sure will continue to work hard at it although the results so far may not be as we might have hoped to see them.

Q John, can I just follow up please? At one point when the Secretary talked about continuing U.S. support for the May 17 agreement, he coupled that with a sentence about "those who would dispense with this agreement must bear responsibility to find alternative formulas for Israeli withdrawal."

At the same time he also said that "the United States would stand with its friends in the Middle East."

If Gemayel abrogates, does the U.S. still stand with Gemayel himself in contrast to the Lebanese government?

A There isn't any question about the continuing support of the United States for the legitimate government of Lebanon. President Gemayel heads that legitimate government.

Our position on May 17 has been, continues to be, clear. A variety of parties involved asked us to be helpful in securing an agreement which would lead to the removal of Israeli forces. We were helpful, I think, in negotiating, or helping to negotiate, that agreement. We don't walk away from our commitments. We stand by it, and that is where we are.

Q In the Secretary's statement this morning, he said "the Syrian-sponsored violence has presented us with difficult choices," and he lists a few things that we're continuing to do. But I'm wondering, what are those choices exactly and how have we chosen --

A I think I will leave you with the Secretary's words. I don't think I want to get into interpreting what he meant to say or -- I think the words speak for themselves, and I think I will leave you with those words.

Q Specifically, could you tell us whether there's any likelihood of speeding up the Marine redeployment, which he also mentioned, or turning over equipment? Who do we turn the airport over to right now?

A I don't know. I think that, as you know, the Secretary of Defense has made recommendations to the President, and the President will make that decision.

Q Who do we turn the airport over to at this point?

A I can't tell you that.

Q John, on that same sentence that was cited by -- just now, it says the difficult choices are "in view of the legislative and other constraints." Does this mean that the Administration is considering seeking to amend the legislation passed last fall with respect to rules of engagement and purpose of the Marines?

A I'm really going to stand on what the Secretary said and not attempt to go beyond that. But I think you would be going down the wrong road if you made that interpretation. My judgment is that the Secretary is speaking to a situation as it has existed; and, as you know, he and other members of the Administration have felt under certain Congressional restraints in the conduct of foreign policy in Lebanon.

Q John, the Secretary referred to Syrian-sponsored military activity. Would it be correct to say Syrian and Soviet-sponsored activity?"

A I'm not speaking to what direct role the Soviets have in Lebanon, but there isn't any secret about the presence of many thousands of Soviets in Syria, the increase in the flow weaponry and I suppose the stiffening of Syria that may have been the result of that intrusion of weaponry.

Q But would you say that this proves wrong those pundits who have said that the alleged change in leadership in Moscow creates a new opportunity in U.S.-Soviet relations?

A I think we're very fresh into the change in Soviet leadership and don't really have any remarks on that.

Q Are you exploring alternative formulas for an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, or are you relying solely on the May 17 agreement to bring this about?

A I'm not aware of such explorations. The May 17 is a good agreement. It sets out the conditions under which Israel would withdraw, and I think the Secretary's remarks about it and the implications of abrogation were very clear.

Q Another aspect of that, John, please. It is clear -- I don't want to put it like Bernie did yesterday -- that the agreement is going to be abrogated. Now, if that happens, will the United States -- is the United States washing its hands out of Lebanon in as far as the withdrawal of Israel and others, or will the United States still facilitate or provide some means to bring about the withdrawal of all foreign forces, including Israel?

A The United States did what was suggested of it and what was asked of it in terms of helping to bring about that agreement. We stand by it.

If there should be abrogation by two of the parties, I guess that's one situation. If there should be a unilateral abrogation, then I think what the Secretary is saying is somebody has to find an alternative formula for the withdrawal of Israeli troops because that's one of the facets of that agreement that is spelled out.

Q Does that mean, John, that the United States -- if that happens, will the United States still aid the withdrawal of the Israeli force in Lebanon or will it just stay aside --

A The United States clearly remains committed -- and the Secretary made that clear this morning and the President has made that clear -- clearly committed to the goals that we have set in Lebanon, which are difficult to achieve but nevertheless to which we remain committed -- namely, the withdrawal of all foreign forces. And we will continue to work to that end. What we're pointing out is that there is specific provision for the withdrawal of Israeli forces, and at the time that was negotiated it was suggested that it would have a bearing on the withdrawal of Syrian forces.

Q John, yesterday, you were having some reluctance about accepting the role of the Soviet Union to try to bring the replacement of the MNF with UNIFIL. Since you just said that since events are fast-moving in Beirut and you issued caution and apparent warning to Mr. Gemayel not to abrogate the May 17 agreement, can you see yourself putting all of your efforts now, since you are getting too much entangled and there is no way out of it, behind the United Nations and the Security Council and the UNIFIL and expanding it to bring some peace and harmony in Lebanon and stop the bloodshed now? (sic)

A No change basically in our position as from yesterday, and indeed as from previous days and weeks. As we've stated, we're not opposed in principle to an expanded U.N. presence in Beirut and are willing to study specific suggestions. Any such proposal would have to be studied carefully. The wishes of the Lebanese Government and the preferences of the U.N. Secretary General would, as always, be critical elements.

As you know, discussions are underway on this possibility among members of the Security Council and other interested governments in New York. A formal meeting of the Council, I think, was due to take place late this morning and another is scheduled for tomorrow.

Insofar as Soviet conditions mentioned, there have been various reports on the nature of those conditions. In some versions they're described as conditions that must be fulfilled before any discussion of an enhanced U.N. role in Lebanon is undertaken. That is obviously unacceptable.

Perhaps the Security Council discussion this morning will shed some light on the Soviet conditions. We're following those discussions closely and will determine our position as they proceed, but I can't get any further into a discussion of these reports.

Q John, can we get a copy of this, please?

A Yes, sure.

Q Thank you.

Q John, the President seems to be -- sorry -- the Secretary seems to be making a distinction here between a UN presence for such purposes as protecting the refugee camps and then beyond that a peacekeeping or peace supervisory force of some kind. Is there such a distinction? Do we think that the UN may be able to do something now more --

A Again, I don't really want to get into the business of interpreting his remarks, but I don't think he's making a distinction there, Hank. I think what he's saying is that the camps and the obvious tragic history of their past makes that an especially important aspect should there be a UN role.

Q After Secretary Lehman's statement yesterday, I think some of us are still confused as to what are the rules of engagement for the use of U.S. naval and air weaponry in Lebanon.

You said yesterday, I believe, that it could be used in response to attacks on Americans or to shelling which put American lives -- civil or military -- at risk and that by definition attacks on downtown Beirut would be considered putting American lives at risk.

My question is twofold. Is there any other rule of engagement where they could be used other than merely to protect American lives? And, secondly, would they be used to respond to shelling coming only from areas held by predominantly by Muslim forces or could they be used to respond to shelling coming from areas where the predominance of forces was Christian or Israeli?

A I thought that by the end of the day yesterday there was no confusion. (Laughter.) I thought it had been clarified.

But the rules of engagement are absolutely clear. We will fire on those who fire on us or who jeopardize American military or civilian lives; and we will fire, or reserve the right to fire, on emplacements and positions in Syrian-held territory from which there is firing into Greater Beirut.

Q Firing from Syrian-held territory?

A Syrian-held territory.

Q Not, for instance, Phalangists firing into West Beirut?

A Outside Greater Beirut? Not that I'm aware of at the moment.

Q You mean if they were firing from East Beirut into downtown Beirut?

A We will fire on anybody in Greater Beirut who fires on American positions.

Q In Greater Beirut?

A Yes, sure.

Q What about coming from south of the Awali if the firing came from there?

A I think that's a little academic.

Q Well, not really. It's happened before.

Q Do we understand that there will be no United Nations peacekeep forcing, keep force, if there's no stability in Lebanon? (sic) I mean, do you understand that?

A I think the Secretary was setting out the kind of logical conditions that would have to prevail before people would likely contribute forces to a UN peacekeeping force.

Q Another subject?

A I'm going to take Ralph, and I'll come back to you in a minute.

Q Just a question again on Secretary Shultz's comment about what it is the U.S. is proceeding to do. He said we are proceeding to redeploy our Marine detachment.

A Correct.

Q So far there hasn't been any proceeding on that front.

A Yes.

Q Is this a sign that some Marines are actually moving to the ships?

A I don't think so. You'd really have to ask the Pentagon, but as I follow the story, I think what has happened is that some equipment is being packed up and indeed maybe already have been shipped out to the ships. But I think the President has the plan under consideration and will make his decision about how fast the Marines will redeploy.

Q To follow that, on the same sentence, "we are proceeding to provide materiel to the LAF --

A Correct.

Q -- as circumstances permit."

A Correct.

Q Does that mean that the flow of materiel to the LAF has slowed because circumstances are not permitting it and that the U.S. is focusing its attention more now on packing up the gear and getting it on the ships than the --

A No, no; it does not mean that. It means that the flow is continuing to Beirut on schedule. There may well be, given the problems, given the fighting -- I don't know -- there may well be problems about unloading and distributing it. But basically what is in the pipeline continues to move through.

Q John, also on Lebanon, there are reports that President Gemayel may be making a radio address to his nation. Do you have any advance indications?

A No. We were besieged by those reports yesterday, all of which came to naught, and I guess they continue to circulate today. But I don't have anything.

Q John, on the UN question again, please, when you say that any role -- a significant role by the UN -- is predicated on or presupposes some measure of political accord, do you mean by that the reorganization of the Lebanese Government involving the factions or something less than that, such as a cease-fire of some kind? What is meant by that before you'll seriously consider it?

A Again, I really don't want to get into the business of interpreting what the Secretary said, but I think there are some obvious implications. You have to have a request for such a force from the government, and I suppose that government has to have support and it has to be a legitimate request from that country.

Q John, in an earlier briefing today a senior official was asked about the possibility of Americans serving in some kind of truce-observing team or somehow being sent to the border between Angola and Namibia, and the official would neither rule it out nor rule it in. Can you clarify it in any way?

A I'm reluctant to do it in an on the record briefing, commenting on a background briefing. I'd be glad to pour cold water on it after this session.

Q O.K.

Q John, if the agreement is abrogated by Gemayel -- admittedly, a hypothetical cord in this five-minute period -- after that period, after it is abrogated, would the New Jersey and the other U.S. ships continue to fire into Greater Beirut for any reason?

A I know of no reason why the rules of engagement would be changed under the present circumstances, including abrogation of the treaty.

Q John, where is Rumsfeld now? Where is he going?

A He's here.

Q And where is he going now?

A As always, I'm sorry to say we will be uncommunicative about this.

Q Can you say the nature of his next mission? I mean, is he going back to Beirut?

A Oh, I think he'll be involved in the Middle East peace process and the Lebanon problem. (Laughter.)

Q A second question then.

Q Seriously, John, is he going back to where he --

A I would expect him to. I don't know how soon, but I would expect him to come back there.

Q To go back to Bernie's earlier question, and I phrase it a slightly different way, do you consider that the events overnight and the trends of the last week or so in Lebanon constitute a setback for American policy?

A I guess I thought I answered that, as well as I'm able, before. It's been a worthy cause; it's been an honorable cause for the United States. We have worked hard at it; we have done our best. We'll continue to be committed as best we're able.

Clearly, the results to date have not been, I'm sure, as many would have wished them, including the Administration. But Lebanon has endured agony for many, many years and it's a tough problem.

Q But I'm saying in the broader context is this a setback for the United States and maybe even for the West?

A If you mean is there any diminution of effort on the overall Middle East peace front, I think the answer to that is no, and I think that is quite clear from what has transpired during the visits of President Mubarak and King Hussein.

Q John, do you have any consultation right now going on with your MNF partners regarding the fast-moving situation in Lebanon?

A Yes, there's consultation going on.

Q And my second part of the question: Can we see that statement of the Secretary stems from the fact that it's predictable, possibly, the May 17 agreement will be abrogated and he's just putting the cart in front of the horse, or whatever it is, the situation, by issuing this warning about not to abrogate it? (sic)

A Clearly he responded to that point. But I think you'd be wrong in thinking that that was the only factor that motivated him to make some remarks about the Middle East in general. We've had a number of developments in the Middle East, and I think he thought it was worthwhile to tell you where we are and where we're going.

Q John, on that very question, could you share with us at what point this morning the Secretary decided to come down?

A Well, the idea circulated earlier on in the morning, but in fact his decision to come down was made sometime after noon, after twelve o'clock.

Q After twelve?

A Yes.

Q Was the statement just going to be put out as a piece of paper and then he decided to read it?

A Statements of any kind in this great institution get worked on until the last minute, actually.

Q Is this at all related to an earlier session the President had with some reporters where he --

A No.

Q -- made some comments?

A No, no.

Q The statement that the Secretary read --

A I think what you should see is the Hussein visit, the Mubarak visit, and events in Beirut. It's been, as we all know, a very active few days in the Middle East.

Q John, the statement that the Secretary read then was prepared prior to his decision to come down? I didn't understand that. It might have been distributed, that statement?

A I really don't want to get into the mechanics of how we do all this, but in general statements in this great institution get worked on; input feeds in, flows in; they get torn apart. People decide whether they should be given, whether they shouldn't, whether paragraphs should be deleted. And when all that has gone on, if it's a question of the Secretary making a statement, he obviously applies himself personally to it and does what he will do to it.

Q John, would there have been --

Q Would he have called the President on this, to decide to --

A I do not know whether he talked to the President today.

Q John, thank you.

Q Shall we adjourn.

A Sounds like there's a move to adjourn.

(Whereupon, at 1:30 p.m., the briefing was concluded.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Thursday, February 16, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

[DPC #31]

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1984, 12:07 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have a couple of announcements for you. First of all, the Secretary will address the Creve Coeur Club at the Civic Center in Peoria, Illinois, on Wednesday, February 22. His speech is scheduled for 9:30 p.m. Central Standard Time -- that is 10:30 p.m. here. Anyone interested in covering this event should contact Jeff Hawkinson at (309) 698-2525, extension 80. It is, because of the hour at which it is being delivered, not going to be piped back here.

Q What is the subject?

A Don't have a subject to give you at this point.

Second, assuming, as we expect, that the Congress will have received by tomorrow the proposed legislation that embodies the consensus arrived at by the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, there will be a BACKGROUNDER in the briefing room here, tomorrow, February 17, at 2:00 p.m. We will confirm that BACKGROUNDER at tomorrow's briefing, but just to give you a heads up on that.

Q Query on that?

A Sorry?

Q A question on that, please?

A Well, --

Q You just had a BACKGROUNDER last week at the White House. Is there going to be something new?

A There is a legislative package which would go up, so it has the specifics that you were asking about so insistently, as I recall.

There will also be an ON-THE-RECORD press briefing by Ambassador Leonard H. Marks at 11 o'clock Wednesday morning, February 22, on the results of the recent World Administrative Radio Conference for High Frequency

Broadcasting. Ambassador Marks, head of the U.S. Delegation, and other members of the delegation will be present to answer your questions.

That is it for announcements. I will be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, what can you tell us, please, about the proposal that has been submitted, I understand, to this government regarding Lebanon? And what is your judgment of it?

A Well, there are various parties working on a number of proposals, Mike. There is one that the Saudis have proposed -- that is the most recent of them -- but we're not going to comment on any of them. So, I'm afraid that's where we are.

Q Alan, according to published reports, one feature of this Saudi plan is abrogation of the May 17 agreement. Do we have any reaction to that?

A I think that the Secretary addressed pretty clearly yesterday the Administration's view on the May 17 agreement and continuing support for that agreement.

Q How do you know that's the Administration's view? I say that because I'm reading what the President said yesterday, that whereas the Secretary said, "We continue to support" -- if that was the precise phrasing; the President said about the agreement, "We are not a party to it, so there is no way we should have a position one way or the other on whether it is abrogated or not."

A Two points on that, Bernie: First of all, if you look at the question that was asked to which the President was responding, it stated, "Yes, I understand that the U.S. supports the plan, but if" such-and-such and such-and-such. So there was an assumption that underlay the President's response to that, and he didn't have a need to repeat that.

Secondly, I would say to you that the Secretary's remarks -- while I won't go into details of the proceedings and how they were processed -- I think you can assume that they had the President's views incorporated in them.

Q I don't understand the assumption. The question is, it says, "Reagan was asked what he thought of Lebanon abrogating the agreement"?

A No. I think you have to go and look at the transcript which the White House has, and look at the question. It was a rather long question, and includes the statement saying effectively, "I understand the Administration supports the May 17 agreement," so he was answering based on that assumption.

Q Alan, on the Saudi initiative, I mean you're talking about many different plans. I think we're only really talking about one. We are told that the President of Lebanon signed it. We are also told an American helicopter has flown the document to Cyprus where Saudi diplomats are supposed to pick it up to take to Syria. Obviously, if we're so laid back on it, why is the U.S. military helping ferry the document around?

A I don't know that that is the case. I can't deny it, because I don't know it; but I certainly haven't heard of that. But in any case, it's not our plan; I don't have any comment on that or any other plan at this point.

Q To follow up --

A And I think Larry Speakes addressed this to some extent also this morning, so I'd refer you to what he said.

Q Is there an American involved in this particular negotiating process?

A Involved in this negotiating process? Between whom? I mean --

Q Specifically, in the Saudi plan.

A Well, I don't really want to get into the details of it, but I think you would be misled if you think we were somehow in the middle of this.

Q Alan, was the Saudi plan seen as being in competition with U.S. proposals for the --

A As I say, I'm just not going to get into discussions of specific plans, so I don't think that I answer that question.

Q What about your view on the French proposal at the U.N.?

A Maybe we could also talk about this a little bit later, but --

Q What about the French proposal at the U.N. which, essentially, is for an immediate U.N. presence in Beirut? Do you have a view on it?

A I think, again, the Secretary addressed the question of a U.N. force in his statement yesterday, and talked about some of the problems in the sense that conditions necessary for such a force do not obtain at the present moment.

Q About the Saudi part to this, I mean it is reported that the Saudis are advising Gemayel to abrogate. What does this do to American-Saudi relations if you can confirm what I just told you now, that the Saudis aiding or advising Gemayel to abrogate the agreement?

A I'm afraid that to even begin to address that, I'd have to get into the details, and I said I won't do that, so I just can't be responsive to that.

Q Back on the question Secretary Shultz raised yesterday when he used the phrase "legislative restraints." He said, "In spite of legislative restraints, we are proceeding along these several points," and he listed them.

Could you tell us what legislative restraints the Secretary is talking about, the Administration is talking about? To say that the U.S. is doing these things in spite of legislative restraints --

A No, I don't think that's what he said, Ralph. I don't think he said, "In spite of."

Q -- suggests that if there were no legislative restraints, the Administration would prefer to be doing something else. What would the Administration prefer to be doing in Lebanon now?

A That's a very hypothetical question, and I don't intend to go into that.

Q Well, wait a minute. Can I follow that, Alan, please? The Secretary used the phrase "legislative restraints." I'm trying to find out what restraints on Administration policy are there in place now.

A I'll just cite you one, and I don't know everything he had in mind; but one would be the October resolution.

Q Resolution. What about --

A I'm not -- John declined to go into it further; I'm going to decline to go into it further. The Secretary made his remarks; I refer you to them. I think you mischaracterized the conditionality of what he said in your original question. But go look at the remarks.

Q Alan, on the May 17 agreement, are we telling the Lebanese, or in any other way trying to influence them, against abrogating the agreement?

A All I'm going to say about the agreement is that our position on it is clear, stated again by the Secretary. And I'm not going to get into the diplomacy of this.

Q Alan, could you take Bernie's question about the U.S. military lending a hand to make sure the American humiliation is complete?

A You rephrased his question, I take it?

Q It's not my question.

Q No, no. I rephrased it. That's right.

A Yes, you did.

Q Could you take his part and my part?

(Laughter)

A Your part I will leave to your own characterizations. I will take a look into the question of what one might say, but I think the answer is going to be, without steering you one way or another, we're not going to get into the question of what we're doing. But I will look at it.

Q My question is that those eight points, as I see it, if they were all put into effect, the U.S. should like.

A Well, I think as far as anything we have to say from here, I've exhausted that.

Q The Israelis have threatened that if the May 17 agreement is abrogated, they'll, I gather, effectively shut off the south from the rest of Lebanon. What's the U.S. position on that?

A I don't have anything to give you on that.

Q Alan, was your support for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon contingent and dependent only on that Lebanon keeps the May 17 agreement, or was it based on your repeated statements that you want Lebanon to be free from foreign forces?

I'll go back to what the Secretary said that they will have to resort to other alternatives for Israeli withdrawal, as you know, the United States has withdrawn its hands from withdrawing Israeli forces unless they will abide by the May 17 agreement.

A I think the Secretary's words are pretty clear on that. I don't think he quite said it that way, but on the other hand, I think his words are clear as to the responsibility would be on those who would seek to set aside that plan, for finding alternative methods. But our objectives, seeking the withdrawal of all foreign forces, have not changed.

Q Alan, since the collapse of the Lebanese Army, Ambassador Bartholomew has spent some time talking to rebel leaders, including a couple of hours with Nabih Berri. Have we, in fact, cut a deal with the opposition to protect the Marines at their surrounded position at the airport? And does part of that deal involve the non-use of the U.S. Navy and its guns in protecting the Lebanese Government?

A I can't really address the specifics of what his conversations have been. As you know, we have had contact with a number of the leaders of various segments of Lebanese society on a regular basis, so there is nothing unusual about that. I'm sure that, obviously, we have an interest in the safety of our Marines.

As far as the rules are concerned, however, regarding shooting at people who shoot at us, that hasn't changed. And as far as the rule, the other part of it that the President announced, that is firing into Syrian-controlled territory, when fire is directed from sites against greater Beirut, thereby endangering Americans, that hasn't changed either.

If what you're suggesting is that various groups are not going to fire on the Marines, the fact of the matter is that if they don't fire on the Marines, the Marines aren't going to fire on them.

Q Nor would the Navy?

A No. You're talking about people who are within the Beirut area and who are not firing on us, we're not going to fire on them.

Q Following on that, there were reports from Beirut today that the fighting may spread into the Baabda area, specifically, that some of the dissident forces may try to move in and take control of Baabda.

What would we do if the fighting was to affect either U.S. Embassy residents and/or the Presidential residence?

A Well, you're setting up a speculative situation, a hypothetical situation, and I'm not going to --

Q But it's very possible.

A Well, I'm not going to try to speculate on the possibilities of it. I think it is hypothetical, and I don't intend to try to get into it.

Q Regardless of our own position, has or has not President Gemayel agreed to abrogate the May 17 agreement?

A I think you would have to ask President Gemayel. I don't think it is up to us to talk about him.

-- MORE --

Q By saying that the U.S. continues to support the May 17th agreement, are you saying that the U.S. will not support any plan which includes abrogation?

A I'm not going to address our position on various plans. The President got asked a question related to this that Bernie raised earlier. He answered it, but not in a way which backed away from our support for that plan, but I'm not going to try to elaborate on that issue.

Q Alan, what sort of faith does the United States have in the word or a commitment of Syria?

A You're setting out a broad-principled question, and I don't know how to really deal with that. I suppose in any agreement with anybody we would want to make sure we have appropriate measures to be sure that any agreements are followed up.

Q May I switch to another subject, maybe as a kind of relief for you? You know the statements were made recently by the higher officials of this Administration about a dsesire to improve relations with my country, the Soviet Union -- about necessity to start constructive dialogue.

A Yes.

Q As far as my government is concerned, the position is that to have fruitful dialogue we need to deal with each other not from the position of strength but as equal.

A Yes.

Q Do you have any knowledge of any concrete proposals being contemplated by the Administration to start such a constructive dialogue?

A I think that I would not get into the question in detail of what we might or might not have in mind in any specific terms, but I think that it has been made very clear that indeed the President and this Govenrment are interested in a meaningful, constructive dialogue, including on arms control and arms reduction and other issues; and we would hope to get a similar response and attitude from the Soviet Government.

The Vice President has spoken I think a couple of times now publicly about his conversations with General Secretary Chernenko, and I don't have anything to add to that.

I would only comment about one point of your question, and that is a position of strength. The U.S. has not said it seeks a position of superiority, and it is not U.S. policy to seek a position of superiority.

Q Alan, on the same subject, a former official of the Carter Administration, now an adviser to Vice President Mondale, has said that he has negotiated an arrangement with officials of this Department whereby the various arms control talks would be merged and one Presidential plenipotentiary negotiator would be appointed to oversee the talks. The names Brent Scowcroft and Henry Kissinger have come up as possible candidates for that position. Is such a plan under discussion in the Administration?

A I'm not going to talk about what's under discussion in the Administration, but I think our position on merging talks has been made clear, and I'd refer you back to the record on that.

Q Alan, can you tell us whether Secretary Shultz has read Tony Lewis' column in the Times today and whether or not he has any reaction to it?

A I don't know, and I don't know whether he has a reaction to it.

Q Could you take that question?

A No. I'm not going to ask for his reaction to a newspaper column.

Q Alan, do you have any comment, please, on the report in the Times as well, regarding the classified investigation of the report on the murder of the nuns, alleging a high cover-up in the Salvadoran military?

A I'm not sure whether I have guidance on this. There was guidance on this. Of course, this is the second go-around on this story in the last couple of days. I don't have that with me; let me refer it to you.

Let me say one thing though. I don't know if it's come to your attention that the appeals court in San Vicente upheld early this month the lower court's elevation of the case to the plenario. That is the final stage of the judicial proceedings. This means the case is definitively raised to the plenario and no further defense appeals on elevation to plenario are possible.

This final stage of the judicial process includes, under Salvadoran law, a number of specific steps -- a period for the presentation of additional evidence, the selection of a jury and the presentation of the case to the jury.

The entire process normally takes two to three months, so I would refer you to that; but there is also other guidance, Mike, which talks more directly to your question, and let me refer you to the Press Office on that.

Q Alan, is anything available yet on the defense to the Supreme Court? They have not yet ruled on it, have they?

A I saw a story in the paper which said that. I can only tell you that this is what our understanding is of the situation as of this moment.

Q There was a story yesterday in The Washington Times that the caveat that senior U.S. officials made at the White House briefing room after the end of the talks of President Mubarak and King Hussein and President Reagan, which read that "you cannot control statements of head of states but certainly you do not endorse it by standing there," were a result of a consultation between Mr. Weinberger and Mr. Shultz, and a senior U.S. official was saying these things after consultation. Can you take the question, confirm or deny such a thing?

A No, I would not get into that. But I guess I would say to anybody who was there the atmosphere did not suggest calculated statements so much. But, in any case, I'm certainly not going to take a question about how our procedures from these things work.

Q I want to follow that up. Is this customary? I've been in this city for about five years, and I see a lot of heads of state -- European, Middle Eastern, whatever. But never in my life in this city I have seen such a statement come out of a spokesman while, you know, the people state departing say the statement that you don't agree with what he said (sic), and it looks like Leslie Stahl from CBS said was it an embarrassment to the President or was it a repudiation of head of state of Arab country. By saying these things, coming at the White House at the briefing room you know just minutes after the departure of people, it looked to me unusual.

Could you answer if there was any precedent or this is the first time that such a spokesman discussed it?

A I haven't got the slightest idea.

Q Alan, you referred earlier to the White House statement --

A Thank you. Your colleague says they said the same thing -- previously.

Q Alan, you referred earlier to the White House statement yesterday about the U.S. Navy responding to shelling from Syrian-held territory. I asked John yesterday if the U.S. Navy could respond to shelling of downtown Beirut from Philangist-held territory, and he said, "Yes."

These two would appear to be in contradiction. Is the Navy only authorized to fire on Muslim forces, or can they fire on Christian forces as well if they cause the same trouble?

A I would refer you back. You keep on picking at it, but go back and look at what the President said. He laid it out, it's very specific, and --

Q He said Syrian-held territory.

A He said Syrian-controlled territory into Greater Beirut, or anybody who fires on U.S. or MNF personnel.

Q Iran-Iraq, Alan?

A Go ahead. Yes -- I really don't have anything on Iran-Iraq today. I mean our position hasn't changed on it; we'd like to see the war ended. But I don't have anything new on it today.

Q Thank you.

Q Do you have any comment on talks between Angola and South Africa now?

A No, I really don't.

Q On the disengagement matter?

A No. I gather that there was a press report that the South African Foreign Minister had gone home, and that may be so. I don't know; we don't have the final report. But it is far from our impression, just to be clear on this -- far from our impression that the talks ended in failure -- so if you were to tend it in that direction, that would be a mistake.

Q Did they end?

A I just don't know what's going on on the ground. As I say, I don't have a final report on it.

Q Coming back to the Middle East on one point, there is a report this morning -- which I knew of yesterday, however -- of Israeli settlers chopping the fingers of an 80-something years old Palestinian because he refused to sell his land to them. Are you aware of the report, and would you care to comment on it?

A No.

Q If not, would you take it, please?

A I won't take it. I'm not aware of the report. Obviously it would be a horrible thing if that happened, but I just can't confirm that.

Q There are reports this morning out of Lebanon of showing reporters to the site of an alleged massacre in some town which had previously been held by Druze, then taken over last fall by Christian militia and the LAF, and has now gone back to Druze hands again. Do you have any comment on the reports of those killings, which were alleged to have been done by Christian forces at the time of the takeover in October?

A I don't know anything about it. I think there have been various reports on various sides about killings, and obviously those are tragic events if in fact they took place, but I'm not going to be able to comment on specific allegations.

Q A report of a Palestinian PLO fighter reinfiltration into Beirut -- do you have anything on that?

A Nothing beyond what I think we said the other day, which is that we are aware of reports of such reinfiltration. Can't confirm it from here, but the reports are very disturbing, and we take the matter very seriously.

Q Alan?

A Jim.

Q Do you have anything on the Grenada airport?

A   I don't have anything new on it. That is, I think that the recommendations have come in now from the team that looked at it. It's being studied. There may be something shortly on it, but I don't have anything right now.

Q   Also, if I may, there are reports that the United States has indicated to its OECD partners that it may withdraw from UNCTAD in Geneva; and, also, that it's considering reducing, if not withdrawing, from the UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Do you have any comment on that?

A   No; I'm not aware of those reports.

Q   No?

A   I'll look into them; yes.

Q   Alan, have we received a diplomatic note from Canada regarding transporter pollution policy of this Administration, reducing acid rain?

A   Acid rain? No.

We understand that a diplomatic demarche of some kind by the Government of Canada is likely; but we won't have any comment, of course, until we've seen it.

In general terms, we're certainly aware that the recent U.S. Government policy decision on acid rain was unwelcome to the Government of Canada. The Canadians would have preferred a decision to launch a new control program.

Even though such an option was put aside for now, the President's statement of January 25th was important. The Administration recognizes that acid rain is a problem and is taking steps to deal with the matter through additional research and mitigation measures.

As EPA Chief William Ruckelshaus has reported publicly, the President concluded that we do not yet have enough information about that problem to warrant a program to control the sources of acid rain. While study of the problem proceeds, the President has called for development of new technologies to reduce the air pollutants which cause acid rain.

Although clearly the Govenrment of Canada has taken a different position on this issue, we believe areas of agreement remain and hope that U.S.-Canadian cooperation on some aspects of the acid rain problem will continue.

Q Can we have a copy of that, including your follow-up on that?

A No. I think we'll just put it out straight.

Q I'd like to ask you about --

A Excuse me; I can't hear.

Q Excuse me. I'd like to ask you about the statement which was given by Mr. Shultz yesterday. I don't know if anybody else asked this question. When he said that the only peace proposal will be the President Reagan initiatives and 242, does that mean that Fez and the Egyptian-French proposal for peace is not considerable (sic) in this Administration, or --

A What it means is that the President and the Administration as a whole believe that the President's initiative of Septemer 1, 1982, is the only proposal that we're aware of that has -- based on, of course, Camp David which is based, of course, on Resolution 242 -- is the only proposal that we think has a prospect for bringing a solution to that.

At the same time, we have never insisted that when people return to the table -- which is what we want to happen --

Q Yes.

A -- that they accept that in all its detail, that everybody can come to the table with their own positions -- of course, the negotiations based on the principles on which they are. But as far as the President's initiative, those are the proposals that we will support.

Q Thank you, Alan.

A You're welcome.

(Whereupon, at 12:33 p.m., the press briefing was concluded.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, February 17, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

FRIDAY , FEBRUARY 17, 1984, 12:25 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

DPC#32

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. Two brief announcements: First of all, we're still on a tentative schedule for 2 o'clock. Hope to resolve that as soon as possible, but at the moment, it's still a tentative BACKGROUND briefing at 2:00 here on the proposed legislation resulting from the report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America.

Housekeeping: The Press Office will have normal Saturday hours tomorrow, but on Monday, which is a holiday, it will be on a Sunday schedule, so it will not be open. That's it for announcements. Be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, can we start out with Lebanon? What do you hear about the Lebanese Government and the May 17 Agreement? Is everything still as it was?

A I don't have anything to offer on that.

Q Which means what? That you haven't heard from them, or what?

A It means I don't have anything to offer on it.

Q What about the situation on the ground?

A The situation on the ground is fairly quiet, actually -- no incidents involving the U.S. MNF contingent in the last 24 hours. This is all, again, 10 o'clock Eastern time.

Reports that U.S. aircraft were attacking positions outside Beirut are false -- I want to get that clear because there were some wire reports this morning on it -- and Beirut is, reportedly, quiet this morning. Yesterday, there were sporadic exchanges in the greater Beirut area.

Q Do you have a formal Gemayel acceptance of the eight-point package?

A I'll refer you to my briefing of yesterday.

Q No, no. Your briefing of yesterday is old stuff.

(Laughter)

A I will allow President Gemayel to speak for himself, or have his spokesman speak for him rather than having us speak for him.

Q But you have no notification in any form?

A I think I answered Jim before.

Q No, no. Jim didn't ask that question.

A Well, all right. I'll give you the same answer. I'm not going to address President Gemayel's view on this.

Q There is a report of a massacre there where the LAF, which I'm not really implying anything, which the U.S. supported, and poured $1 billion worth of weapons to, and since October the bodies are on the street there.

Do you care to comment on that, and how -- I mean, what is the Lebanese Army's role in it, as far as you know?

A I don't have specific information on the massacres and the reports of massacres at Kafr Matta, which I believe is what you're referring to, and also which, I believe, was raised in the briefing yesterday. Nonetheless, I will repeat what I said yesterday, which is that we condemn, in the strongest terms, the needless taking of innocent lives. And I would refer you back for a more comprehensive statement, with regard to reported massacres from various sources, of September 9, 1983. We can make that available to you later if you're interested in it. But obviously, we condemn those. But I'm not going to get into trying to comment on each individual report.

As I said yesterday, there are reports of massacres by all sorts of different people. It's a terrible situation when that happens, but I'm not going to try to confirm it.

Q I would like, plese, to try to get something about the fact that the LAF has been in the area since the massacre was committed, and the LAF is the force in Lebanon which the United States has backed and continues to back. So --

A I've given you what I have on the subject.

Q Do you have anything new about Iraq-Iran?

A Not really a great deal that is new. We have seen numerous press reports describing intensified fighting along the Iran-Iraq border and preparations associated with offensive military operations.

We are concerned about the escalation that appears to be taking place. We deplore the reported loss of civilian lives on both sides and the destruction of non-military targets, and we renew our call for a negotiated settlement of the war based on principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Q Alan, given the fact that you have said you have nothing to offer on the eight-point plan and so forth -- we accept that as of now -- but tell us -- there is so much confusion about where we stand on seven of the eight points.

On the eighth point about the May 17, we had the Secretary of State talk, but what about the other seven? Where do we stand on those?

A I have no comment on the reported eight-point plan at all.

Q Do we have a copy of the eight-point plan?

A I think I just said I don't have a comment at all on the reported eight-point plan.

Q That's not answering the question, though.

A It answers the question.

Lester, did you have a question?

Q Alan, in his statement on the murder of Leamon Hunt, Secretary Shultz said that, "It must inspire us to rededicate ourselves to the cause of peace and to defiance of forces of terror."

A two-part question: Could you tell us, Alan, how does the Secretary mean that we should "rededicate ourselves" to "defiance of terror," other than being patient?

A I think, again -- and in this case it does call for your patience -- there is a legislative package, which will be going forward, to deal with terrorism, and that will be an important set of measures in that respect.

Q Good. Will this package differ in any way with President Reagan's promise in 1981, "Let terrorists beware that when the rules of international behavior are violated, our policy will be one of swift and effective retribution," --

A Well, I think --

Q -- or is that inoperative now, Alan?

A I think I'll let you make the judgment based on the briefings that will be held at the time the package goes forward.

Q You won't say that this statement of 1981 of President Reagan's is now inoperative, will you, Alan?

A I'm not saying that.

Q Can you give a better sense, after the talks with President Mubarak and King Hussein earlier this week, of whether the Administration does plan to do anything in the area of the broader Middle East peace process this year? In other words, is there any review going on? Are you --

A You got a briefing after those visits, and I really have nothing to add to add to it. We, obviously, continue to believe that the broad peace effort in the Middle East is a very important effort, and we will be active on it; but I don't have anything specific to offer you beyond what the briefer did the other day.

Q -- because the impression came up at the BACKGROUND briefing at the White House yesterday, it seems to be around town that the Administration is disengaging from Lebanon in terms of trying to influence events there now, and that it's talking about the broader Middle East issues, but not really planning to do anything. I wonder if you have anything to counter that impression that's gaining.

A I don't think, in order to counter your impression, Roy, I intend to lay out our diplomatic strategy, but the fact is, the Secretary addressed our broad policy, both as regards Lebanon and as regards the Middle East, in his statement the other day. I'll refer you to that. The President is on the record in his statements, and I don't think there is any doubt about the sincerity and importance that we attach to it.

Mike?

Q Alan, why has Ambassador Stone resigned? What does this mean insofar as a change in policy, if any, for Central America?

A Basically, I'm not going to have any responses on that subject. Larry Speakes has addressed it, and I refer you to what he said.

I will reiterate, I think, the point that he has made that the issues -- the resignation of Ambassador Stone does not suggest any policy disagreement or any policy change that would be forthcoming.

Q Is there a disagreement in personalities --

A Again, I'm not going to go beyond that.

Q -- with regard to Ambassador Motley?

A I'm basically going to refer you to what Larry had to say.

Q To follow up on that --

A No; I'll come back to you, Lester.

Q Mr. Stone's office is referring all calls to you personally, and so I have to ask -- (laughter)

A Well, they're wrong. They should refer them to Larry Speakes at the White House.

Q But the question is, is the Post story of the difference between Stone and Motley true or false?

A Again, I'm not going to have anything to say. I refer you to Larry Speakes' briefings.

Q Alan, where does the U.S. stand on the May 17 Agreement today?

A Where we stood yesterday, and the day before, and the day before that.

Q Still --

Q Why won't you comment on the eight-point plan?

A There are various plans which have been discussed from time to time. I'm not going to get into it. We haven't generally done that in the past, and don't intend to do it at this point.

Q Can I be excused to go to Larry Speakes? (Laughter)

A You are welcome to go to Larry Speakes, Lester.

Larry, he's coming your way!

(Laughter)

-- MORE --

Q Is there now a diplomatic mission of some sort regarding the Mid-East, which is directed out of this Department which involves Henry Kissinger?

A I am not aware of such.

Q Maybe I keep the wrong company, but that's what I get from the company I keep.

A Well, that may be. (Laughter)

Q Is Rumsfeld going back, to Beirut?

A Is Rumsfeld going back?

Q There was a report from Beirut to that effect.

A It is difficult, Ozzie, because we don't talk about his schedule ahead of time. As a general matter, without trying to specify anything, I would expect he would go back, yes.

Q So they were saying he was due back in Beirut today.

A That is not correct, but I am not really going to go beyond that.

Q Alan, you said you weren't going to make any comment on past events in the Stone situation. What about the future? Is that position going to be dissolved or filled?

A No. I think that there has been an announcement at the White House that Ambassador Shlaudeman will fill that role.

Q On your situation report, have we had actual practice with the assurance that the Marines have unrestricted use of the beach and access to the beach in their redeployment efforts?

A I will give you my understanding, but for an official answer, go to the Pentagon. My understanding is there is no problem, that there is nothing between -- there are no forces between the Marines and the beach, so that the suggestion they somehow have to go through somebody's lines to get to the beach, to my understanding is incorrect.

Q We heard it from the briefer yesterday at the White House.

A I am not sure it was a reference to the beach. I don't know what other activities the Marines may be doing or carrying out, but anyway, basically, let me ask you to ask the Pentagon because they have got the detail on this.

I'm sorry, you had a housekeeping question?

Q Yes, a housekeeping one on Shlaudeman and when the nomination might go up.

A I would ask you to ask the White House. It is obviously a White House nomination.

Q A second follow-up on that. Would Shlaudeman's job description differ in any way from Stone's?

A My understanding is it would not.

Q Where is Stone today?

A I don't know precisely where he is. He is not in Washington today.

Q Alan, kind of a related matter. There're refugee camps in Honduras, which --

A Excuse me, I can't hear you.

Q There're refugee camps in Honduras, near the border with El Salvador. They are to be moved to make way for exercises under Grenadero I. The UNHCR says they are going to go ahead and move them. Honduras says that. But there is some indication that a number of the refugees are trying to get back, do not want to be moved, and are trying to get back to El Salvador. Some of them may be dying along the way. Fourteen bodies were discovered late last week near there.

Does the United States have a position with respect to whether these refugees should be relocated? And if you don't have an answer, could you take the question?

A Let me take a look at it. I don't know. I thought we had actually addressed this issue previously, but I will take a look at it for you.

Q Alan, who is conducting the negotiations in Beirut to try to find somebody to turn the airport over to?

A I guess I am not going to get into great detail as to how, what kind of liaison we have got, but we have, as we have indicated before, fairly close, certainly frequent, discussions with our MNF partners, the Government of Lebanon, and that goes on in a variety of places.

Q Who is in charge now? Is it Bartholomew who is in charge?

A Who is in charge where?

Q Of the negotiations in Beirut?

A You are suggesting that that is where that issue will necessarily only be discussed. Obviously he is the Ambassador there, and is the senior American official on the scene at this point.

I can't tell you whether it is through his channels that we would be discussing the various specifics of the fall-out from the redeployment, or whether it would be discussed elsewhere, as well, or even there at a different level.

Q But certainly there is a negotiation going on of some kind, isn't there, with the factions, if not with -- I mean, it can't be with the MNF, because they are leaving, as well.

A I am not sure I would accept that. Well, go ahead.

Q Could I -- I would just like to get some answer, because --

A I don't think we have to give you the details of how the discussions are carried out, Roy. There are discussions. It is an issue that people are thinking about, but I am not going to have any detail for you.

Q Can I continue? How are the discussions going? I mean, can you give us any kind of a report on it?

A I don't have anything for you.

Bernie?

Q Alan, what kind of impact do you think the present situation, the U.S. redeployment, to use the most charitable word --

A It's an accurate word. Go ahead.

Q -- in Lebanon will have on trying to recruit the sense of confidence on the part of those Arab states that the President would like to join the peace process.

We heard President Mubarak, in an interview with the Post, talk about it being a disaster to withdraw the Marines, and the whole question has come up about the impact of what is happening in Lebanon on U.S. credibility in the Middle East.

How does that complicate the Administration's effort to move forward, to nourish and expand the peace process beyond its present state?

A I don't know that I can answer you in specific terms. My understanding is that President Mubarak said some other things, too, which weren't quite as stark as you just characterized them, talking about the U.S. continuing to participate in the MNF, which the U.S. is continuing to do.

So, it isn't as if the U.S. were picking up its forces and leaving the MNF. That is not the case.

I think that we have indicated before that various states in the region have indicated to us the importance of our continued participation in the MNF. That certainly is an important thing to the U.S. Government, and, obviously, what we have made clear is the effort here is to make the participation as effective as possible.

I can't tell you what the effect of whatever we do or whatever happens in Lebanon, specifically, or more generally, will be on others. But, obviously, we are going to do our best to try to see that the objectives we have laid out, both in Lebanon and, more broadly, in the peace process, are realized.

Q Alan, to follow up on that point, given Dr. Kissinger's experience in Vietnam, shouldn't he be called on at this point?

A Jim, did you have a question?

Q Do you have anything on Lusaka?

A Yes, I do have something on Lusaka, but it is basically to refer you to the communique which has been issued in which it was agreed that a small number of American representatives could participate in the activities of the Joint Commission at the request of the parties. I am now addressing the issue of the U.S. role. We are looking into the matter now. Obviously, we want to be helpful, in light of the interest of the parties, and the role that we have played and will continue to play in promoting prospects for a peaceful settlement.

As we have indicated previously, we would envisage that the number of Americans who might participate would be small, but the communique, I think, is available on a -- it has been issued publicly, so I would refer you to it.

Q Can you make it available to us?

A Can we do that? Yes, we can make it available.

Q Coming back to the Middle East, what is the purpose of keeping the Marines on the ships in front of Beirut?

A I don't think I want to go back and rehearse all that has been said over the last several days. There has been extensive commentary on that. The President has addressed it, the Secretary has addressed it, and I'm really going to refer you back to it instead of trying to rehash it.

Q Can I try another Stone question?

A You can try.

Q Would you characterize in any way his service as Special Ambassador to date, his accomplishments in that role?

A I am not going to try to be terribly specific except to say that -- I guess I shouldn't be speaking for the President, Larry Speakes should be doing that -- but I think it is fair to say that the President and the Secretary have valued the role he has played, and, again, let me refer you to what Larry has said today about that subject.

Q Okay, thank you.

A You are welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:43 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, February 21, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC#33

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 1984, 12:29 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A few announcements:

First, to inform you that the Press Office has a new addition to the front office staff, Mrs. Gabrielle Mallon, who is seated over there. Would you stand up so everybody can see you? Gabrielle was formerly with the Foreign Service Institute as an assistant to the course manager on "Coping with Violence Abroad," so watch out! (Laughter)

Available in the Press Office at 2:30 will be the prepared statement by the Secretary before the Senate Budget Committee. The subject of the testimony is Foreign Affairs and the FY-85 Foreign Assistance Request.

Also available in the Press Office at 2:00 p.m. will be the prepared statement by Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Motley, before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs. It will be on the Central American Initiative -- that is, the Administration's proposals in response to the Kissinger Commission Report.

Also, as you know, the Secretary will be appearing on the Hill tomorrow again, and we will not have a noon briefing tomorrow.

Q What time tomorrow?

A Was it 10:00? Ten o'clock I think it is.

Q Will that be the last Hill appearance this week?

A This week?

Q Yes.

A I'll have to check on that, George. He's got a few scheduled. There are a lot of people interested in the foreign assistance request, and he will be up -- we'll try and check and see if it's the last one this week.

To remind you that the Secretary will address the Creve Coeur Club at the Civic Center in Peoria, Illinois, tomorrow, the 22nd of February. The speech is entitled "Human Rights and the Moral Dimension of U.S. Foreign Policy." It is scheduled for 9:30 p.m. Central Time, so that's 10:30 p.m. here. Anyone interested in covering the event should contact Jeff Hawkinson at Area Code 309-698-2525, extension 80. I think I indicated the other day that because of the late hour, we will not be piping the address back here.

Q Will there be Q&A?

Q Will there be an advance text?

A Advance text? We'll do our best. On Q&A, I don't know the answer to that.

Q Could you find that out, Alan, because that could be important for us?

A O.K.

Q Thank you.

A No Q&A, I'm informed.

Q No Q&A?

A If there is a change in that, we'll let you know.

Q Is he coming back to Washington tomorrow night?

A I can't remember whether he is or not, Mike.

Q Could you check on that?

A Yes. I think he does come back tomorrow night. I think he does come back tomorrow night.

Also to remind you -- let me just keep on going on the announcements -- that there will be a briefing ON THE RECORD by Ambassador Leonard Marks at 11 o'clock tomorrow morning, February 22, on the results of the recent World Administrative Radio Conference for High Frequency Broadcasting. Ambassador Marks, who was head of the U.S. Delegation, and other members of the Delegation will be present to take questions.

And finally, as I think probably most of you already know, this morning in New York a further report containing information available to the United States on the use of chemical and toxin weapons was submitted to the Secretary General of the United Nations, and copies of the U.N. submission are available in the Press Office.

That is it for announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q On the speech just one moment, on the advance copy, you said you'll do your best, which meaning what time we will be able to have it if it's ready? (Sic)

A I can't predict that.

Q You said you would do your best. Your best today or tomorrow?

A That means as soon as we have it. Oh, I think we would not have it today. I would not look for a text today, but I can't tell you, as we're never able to, precisely when a text will be available. But obviously, it would be embargoed until delivery. But in terms of giving you an advance copy, we'll do what we can.

Q Alan, can you give us a report of what is happening on the ground in Beirut -- peace negotiations, withdrawal of the Marines and --?

A Well, as far as the negotiations and all of that, I do not have anything to offer you. As far as the situation in and around Beirut, there have been no incidents involving the U.S. MNF contingent in the past 24 hours. Beirut is reported to be relatively calm today, though there were some exchanges along the Green Line.

Shelling in the Suq al Gharb area has reportedly decreased. The airport remains closed, and this morning Israeli aircraft attacked positions near Bhamdun and Ayn al-Jadidah -- pardon my pronunciation -- along the Beirut-Damascus highway.

As far as redeployment, again I don't have a lot to offer you. The U.S. Marines have completed the preliminary moves necessary prior to commencing loading of combat personnel aboard amphibious shipping offshore. It is anticipated that they will commence redeployment operations within the week. I don't have further detail on that.

As you know, the British contingent has redeployed; the Italian contingent redeployed aboard ship except for a 100-man unit which remained in the port area. The French contingent is in place.

Q Pentagon officials are saying this morning that a decision has been made to at least to try to turn the airport over to the Lebanese Army, bringing them in by helicopter or by the sea. Do you have any comment on that?

A The only comment I really have is that that issue has been dicussed with the government of Lebanon and our MNF partners. I think discussions with the government are continuing, but I don't have any update to give you of the sort that you're talking about.

Q Alan, do you have anything on Mr. Jumblatt visiting Washington in March?

A Simply that --

Q Who he will see, if anyone?

A Simply that his visa application will be judged on its merits and in accordance with U.S. law.

Q Has he actually submitted that application?

A I believe he has, yes.

Q In Damascus?

A I believe that's correct, Mike.

Jim?

Q Anything --

A Sorry?

Q Is there anything tentatively arranged for any appointments?

A I'm not aware of anything, no.

Q Just follow up, please, Alan. Was he encouraged to apply or was it originated with him?

A I think he originated the application.

Connie?

Q There's a report out of Israel today that the United States is trying to arrange a meeting with perhaps Arafat or other Palestinians with using Jordan and Egypt as an intermediaries. Do you have anything on that?

A No. Our position on dealing with the PLO remains unchanged. It has been consistent -- the need to accept 242, 338 and Israel's right to exist.

As far as the position on the peace talks is concerned, that also remains unchanged, which is we would like to see those talks move forward. We think the next step is for King Hussein to enter the talks. He has made it very clear that he needs further backing -- we understand that -- from other Arab states and from Palestinians, and we hope that that support will be forthcoming.

Q Will you be able to look into this specific report, though, please?

A No.

Q Alan, AFP is running a report that last week Afghan rebels mounted a major assault on the Soviet Embassy in Kabul. Do you have anything on that?

A I don't have anything on that, Bill. Sorry.

Q Back on the Middle East for a second?

A Yes.

Q Are we in consultation with Israel about its own military activity in Lebanon and, if so, do we have any comment with respect to it?

A I don't have any comment. They certainly have undertaken whatever activity they're undertaking on their own. Whether anybody in the military chain later on or somehow has discussed it, I don't know. But in terms of the activity, it is not something that they're clearing with us or anything of that sort, so it's their activity.

Q Alan, what is Mr. Burt doing in East Germany, Bulgaria and Hungary?

A I had some guidance on that the other day. I'm afraid I don't have it with me. He basically, I think -- I may be wrong -- but I think he has not been out there into those countries since he has become Assistant Secretary. So this is an opportunity for him to do that.

Q I gather he's the first American official of any senior rank to visit East Berlin. Does the United States recognize East Berlin as the capital of the GDR? I guess we do if we have an Embassy there.

A We have an Embassy there.

Q I thought we never recognized -- well, that's an old question.

A We have our Embassy there.

Q Alan, I want to go back to the Jumblatt visit. He has been visiting the United States frequently during the last years, but his visa application at this time is going to be seen in a new light?

A No, I think --

Q In the light of his role during the last months --

A I don't think it's appropriate to go into the details, but I think that he has -- that each time he has applied, his visa application has had to be reviewed. And, as I say, it will be reviewed in accordance with circumstances, the law, and so on.

Q Is that the extent of the information you have on it, because I heard -- it was reported that he actually cancelled the trip to Washington, to the United States?

A If that is true, you're ahead of me. But as of my last understanding, which was just before I came out here, this is where we are.

Q Do you have anything on the Iran-Iraq war?

A No, I don't have anything new on the Iran-Iraq war.

Q Excuse me, just a follow up. There are reports that Administration officials are increasingly concerned about the level of fighting there.

A I think I had something on this at the end of last week, Tim, which I'd refer you back to. The answer is, we are concerned about possible escalation, and I'd refer you, as I say, back to what I had on that.

Bernie?

Q Alan, sometime ago when the Suq al-Gharb situation was seen in a threatening light from the U.S. point of view, that was called of vital interest and the U.S. Navy went to work on that area.

Given the present circumstances, the present situation of Suq al-Gharb, why is the U.S. Navy not lending a hand on Suq al-Gharb, it once having been characterized as a vital U.S. interest?

A I think there are a couple of things to keep in mind. First of all, to my knowledge, there has not been -- while there's been shelling, and so on, there's not been any sort of major assault against Suq al-Gharb, so the circumstance is something to keep in mind. And, as I said in giving you the little rundown on the situation, our reporting is that the firing around Suq al-Gharb at this point has decreased.

At the same time, you're correct in pointing out that the rules of engagement permitted that activity at that time, and to my understanding there is no change which would prohibit that, should circumstances be decided to warrant that. But I just don't have anything specific to offer at this particular point.

Q Let me follow up, if I may. Has a deal been worked out between the United States and the various militias that are bringing Beirut under attack whereby the U.S. has agreed not, regardless of whether Suq al-Gharb falls, not to use the U.S. Navy against the militia in return for the militia not in any way interrupting the planned deployment of the American Marines?

A I think I just, in effect, answered the question by saying that the rules of engagement have not been restricted to eliminate the possibility of doing that. At the same time, I guess I've got to say -- repeat what we indicated last week, I think what the Secretary indicated -- that is, while it is always a risk, that the Marines do not seem to be in a particularly heightened state of danger at this point. Obviously, we'll be alert and take appropriate precautions as they are moving out of the airport. That's the way the circumstances --

Q Let me just follow up. Is there a deal that has been worked out?

A Of the sort that you're --

Q Yes. Forget rules of engagement for a moment.

A No, I think --

Q Has any package been worked out secretly with the militias?

A You're asking me now, you're pushing me on things that I couldn't, as a matter of principle --

Q Has a package been worked out publicly?

A You're asking me as a matter of principle -- okay, publicly, I'm not aware of any packages that have been announced, Bernie.

I think that -- well, you put me in a box because we don't talk about our --

Q That's the whole idea.

A That's the idea; I know. I would not suggest to you that the U.S. is hindered in its ability to make independent judgments and take actions in accordance with its rules of engagement.

Q Does that mean then, by extrapolation, there is no such deal?

A I think I'll let you extrapolate.

Q Just a second. Was any deal discussed with the militia --

A Again -- now, you're really asking me to talk about what the United States talks about in its private conversations, and without trying to steer you one way or another, I'm simply not going to do that.

Q A follow up. Since the rules of engagement hasn't changed, does that mean the Navy will bombard Suq al-Gharb if it's being attacked?

A No. I think that what it means is that there is -- that the same reasoning which applied and the same capabilities which applied, could apply but a decision, obviously, is made in individual circumstances.

Q But the circumstances change. There's no Marines, I mean, in the future.

A I'm not going to try to get ahead of the facts. The facts are that Suq al-Gharb has not been under major assault, and I'm not going to try to project what the judgments will be if that were to happen.

Ghasson?

Q Could we have a filing break?

A Okay, filing break.

Q I'll try to put it in a different way. You said that there is no major assault. If there would be something that the United States would call "a major assault," will the Navy be reactivated?

A I say that is a judgment that would have to made at the time, depending on the circumstances. I'm not going to try to prejudge it.

Q Do you have anything on South Africa's lastest agreements with Mozambique?

A We have continued to encourage the various parties in southern Africa to conduct dialogue to resolve their differences, and we welcome the fact of the meeting but have no comment on the substance of any reported agreements.

Q Can you give us any details on the U.S. role in this and also tell us what other meetings are going on now?

A Don't have anything further for you.

--MORE--

Q Is the United States setting up some sort of a consultate or diplomatic office in Windhoek?

A I don't have anything specifically on Windhoek. I can check and see if there's anything going on, but I don't have anything to offer you on it.

Q Do you have anything on Luanda?

A No. I think that our view on relations with Angola has been addressed before.

Q What American officials are down there now besides the Ambassador?

A Down -- ?

Q Well, down where talks are being held right now, and you can tell us where they are?

A I don't know which talks you're specifically referring to.

Q The whole area there. There are intensified talks going on by the parties.

A The talks that are going on, I think between Mozambique and southern Africa, are talks going on between them. We talked about the tripartite talks last week, and I don't have anything new basically to offer at this particular point on that.

Q Is Secretary Crocker back?

A I think he is back.

Q Do you have anything on reported talks between one of Crocker's deputies and a leader of the ANC?

A No.

Q Is the United States sending a group to monitor along the border between Angola and Namibia?

A Well, I think again we had something on this last week which indicated that --

Q But you have nothing beyond that?

A I have nothing beyond what the guidance was at the end of last week.

Q Alan, the first time the Suq al-Gharb U.S. Navy shelling took place, that, on its own, was described as of vital interest with no particular link to the Marines. Is that right?

A I think -- no, that is not right. That is not right. What it talked about was -- well, let me refer you back to the record when you talk about it rather than pulling it out of my head, but the connection with Americans and the safety of Americans in the Beirut area was part of that.

Q So that if the rules of engagement haven't changed, as you say, any U.S. action in support of Suq al-Gharb would have to be linked to some threat against the Marines.

A Not only the Marines. I think I'd refer you to what we said about the Marines, American diplomatic presence and so on and so forth.

Q Do you have a comment on the U.S. submission today to the U.N.?

A I'm sorry. I can't hear you.

Q Do you have a comment on the U.S. submission to the U.N. today? The chemical --

A I don't really have a comment on it. There are a whole lot of specifics, in terms of why we've done it -- because we had more data and so on. But basically I thought that the submission, which I went over before I came out here, was pretty self-explanatory.

Q Alan, there was a report on the weekend that (there were) some contacts for the last two years or for a period of ten months between the Administration and the PLO. An officer from the State Department did make a comment. Can you tell us a little more about it, or can you make something on the record as to if you can confirm these things, what was the purpose, and can you tell us any more about it is what I mean?

A Not really much beyond what was said over the weekend, which is to say this is a story based on allegedly leaked information, and I guess we can't get into detail on that. But two points:

(1) We have contact with a variety of people who either -- who claim to have contact with the PLO.

(2) We have consistently said, both publicly and privately, the same thing, which is that we will not negotiate with or recognize the PLO until the PLO accepts U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and recognizes Israel's right to exist.

There is no change in that. We've said that if they do these things, that we'll talk with them. There's no change in that.

Q Can I just follow up? What you're saying, then, that the contact with a variety of people who had contact with the PLO -- I mean, but there was intention to do that, or is it you talked to them and they had contact with the PLO?

A There are a variety of people who have said, "We have contact with the PLO. What should we tell the PLO about the U.S. position?" They should tell the U.S. about the PLO -- or our position about dealing with the PLO is just what I said, and that is what we've said.

Q Alan, but does that mean that 50 meetings with Yasser Arafat to tell him what you want?

A I can't tell you about 50 meetings with Arafat. I can only tell you what our position is.

Q Can you tell us in specific reference to the Times' piece whether then-Assistant Secretary Veliotes worked with Mr. Mroz to work out specific memoranda that would be cleared with the PLO with a view towards establishing formally that relationship?

A Marvin, I'm not going to get into any specific -- I guess the word isn't "allegation," but any specific reports of specific kinds of contacts because I think that there are a variety of people and we could begin to go down a long list of people who say that they're dealing with the PLO. I'm not going to do that.

Q When is --

A But the policy is consistent, has been consistently expressed in private and in public.

Q Right. The point I'm trying to get at is in this particular effort as reported, the thrust of it is that the United States was trying its best to work out common understandings with the PLO through an intermediary in order to achieve mutual recognition; it was not simply passing on the general policy which you have done eloquently today. Isn't that correct?

A I'm not going to get into discussing any specifics of supposed contacts. I think that the Secretary indicated, in answer to questions last week up in Boston, that if the PLO would do the things that we have said that we would require that they do in order to talk to them, we'd be glad to have that happen.

Q But you're painting it all very passively. The point of this story was there was an active, directed effort by the Assistant Secretary of State through an intermediary to work out a deal.

A Well, I understand your point, but I really don't have anything further. I'm not going to go into specifics. Jim?

Q On -- the Nicaraguans announced today they going to hold --

Q I have a follow-up --

A Excuse me?

Q I have a follow-up on the same question, please.

A All right. Let's stay on this question. Go ahead.

Q Have you deemed it necessary to get into contacts with Israel to get them, to put them in the image (sic), to inform them in advance before getting into contacts with those variety of people?

A We have made clear publicly and privately, and the Government of Israel knows this, what our position is, and so I don't think that it is necessary every time somebody comes to us and says, "I have contact with the PLO. What should I tell the PLO about the U.S. position?" to tell Israel or anybody else specifically about that. But our position has been consistent.

Q Do you have anything on a reported Russian concession on chemical weapons negotiations on the issue of verification?

A I don't have anything new on that. I saw that report this morning. We did have something the other day about the policy. This was -- well, it was a previous story, I guess, about a week ago where they talked about accepting in principle a proposal for rapid on-site inspection. Shall I give you that? Again, I can't totally relate it to the story that I read today, but, in any case, it was not clear from that announcement exactly what principles the Soviets had accepted.

The United States has pressed in the CD for a comprehensive chemical weapons ban. An essential element in ensuring that nations respect such a ban is effective verification. The U.S. favors implementation of a series of rigorous inspection procedures, including mandatory and challenge inspections. The Soviets have previously accepted the principle of challenge inspection, but it failed to elaborate on this in the CD. If the Soviets have accepted the principle that states should be obligated to submit to international on-site inspection if a state accused of violating the CW treaty fails to explain satisfactorily its activities within seven days, we would welcome such a move.

Q Copy of that, please, Alan?

A Yes.

Q You say that is week old guidance?

A That is a week old in response to a specific story at that time. Again, I'm at a little bit of a loss to know quite how this relates to the story of today. Jim, you've been --

Q Yes. On Nicaragua, the Sandinistas announced elections today to take place November 4 this year. Do you have a comment?

A Don't. I haven't seen that, frankly, so --

Q Is it possible you'd be posting one later today, or will you have to wait until tomorrow?

A I can't tell you. I'll have to take a look at it.

Q Can we get a background briefing here on Prime Minister Muldoon's visit, either here or at the White House?

A   I don't know the answer to that. Why don't you check later with the Press Office, and we can try and find out.

Q   Thank you.

A   You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:54 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Thursday, February 23, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

[DPC #34]

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 1984, 12:15 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, all. Got a couple of housekeeping announcements up front and then a statement. Available in the Press Office is the prepared statement by Under Secretary for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The subject of that testimony is "Moving the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem."

Also available in the Press Office at 2:00 this afternoon will be the prepared statement by Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Robert Pelletreau before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. That testimony is on "Aid to Lebanon."

Announcement on the speaking engagement by the Secretary: Secretary of State Shultz will deliver ON-THE-RECORD remarks at the 1984 Conservative Political Action Conference on Friday, March 2. That will be at 4:15 p.m. at the Sheraton-Washington Hotel. If you want to cover this event, please be in touch with Ellen Lathem of Gray & Company. She is at (202)-333-7400. Barring technical difficulties -- I love that caveat -- we plan to pipe in the Secretary's remarks and the question-and-answer session into the briefing room.

Finally, a statement on the bombing of the Soviet compound in New York. Last night, a bomb was thrown over the fence of the Soviet U.N. Mission's housing complex in New York. The bomb exploded doing extensive damage to a vehicle in the parking lot and causing a fire. There are reports that a group which calls itself "Jewish Direct Action" is claiming responsibility for this act of terrorism. This disgraceful, cowardly attack brings disrepute upon the United States.

If it was, in fact, committed by a group which purports to support Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union, the group is doing a disservice to that cause. The United States Government has long supported, and continues to support, the right of Soviet Jews to emmigrate to the country of their choice. We have nothing but respect for the courage of those Soviet Jews, who, at the risk of their homes, their careers, and in some cases, their freedom, attempt peacefully and openly to exercise the basic human right of freedom to travel.

The United States Government condemns this act of terrorism against the Soviet U.N. Mission complex. We have nothing but contempt for anyone who would attack the accredited representatives of a foreign government on our soil. They understand nothing of human rights, and are akin to the fanatics who have committed terrorist attacks on our own diplomats and military personnel abroad.

There is no place in this country for terrorism, and foreign diplomats must be allowed to carry out their activities without a terrorist threat against them. The resources of the federal government will be brought to bear to find out who committed last night's bombing, and to prosecute the perpetrators to the full extent of the law.

Q Copy of that?

A Sure.

That's all I've got for you. Be happy to take any questions.

Q John, can you bring us up to date on what you think is going on in Lebanon?

A No incidents involving the MNF in the past 24 hours -- that's on the military front. We are -- Ambassador Bartholomew is discussing with the Government of Lebanon the question of to whom the airport would be handed over when the Marines are redeployed.

On the diplomatic front, a lot of activity continues. We're monitoring that.

Q Are you hopeful of the report from Damascus that Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi Ambassador --

A I'm sorry. I can't -- There's a little discussion going on here. I didn't get that.

Q Are you hopeful from the reports from Damascus that the Saudis and the Syrians are almost about reaching some new ideas in the --

A Don't have anything for you on that. The reports are conflicting as to whether there is some resolution, some agreement or not, and who is party to it, so don't have anything for you on it.

Q John, are we in fairly regular touch with the Saudis about this?

A Yes, I think so. Yes.

Q How regular?

A I can't give you a blow-by-blow, John, but I think --

Q Daily, weekly, monthly, hourly?

A I can't even narrow that down for you. I don't know whether it is daily.

Q Where is Mr. Rumsfeld?

A He's here in Washington.

Q Is he going back?

A Don't have anything for you on his travel plans. He's consulting here in Washington; don't know quite when he'll go back to the area.

Q But is there any consideration to his going back? Is it part of his --

A Is there consideration to his going back?

Q Yes.

A Oh, yes, I think it's -- I think that's --

Q I mean, he hasn't cut off his efforts?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q John, Flora Lewis has a column in today's New York Times about some contacts involving the United States indirectly. Do you have any knowledge of that -- involving the PLO?

A No, I do not have any knowledge of it. I did skim the Flora Lewis column. It didn't seem to me to go much beyond what has been said on this particular topic. Maybe I missed something.

Q One thing I saw which I thought was new was that the Tunisian, in between, had brought a piece of paper to the State Department which gave a formula by which the PLO would recognize Israel. But then, there was never any response from the United States.

A No, I don't have anything on that particular point.

Q Will you look into that to see if that was ever, in fact, brought to the attention of the State Department?

A Let me see if we can give you anything more than we have done. Sure.

Q John, anything on Iran-Iraq?

A Obviously, there is heavy fighting. I don't have a great deal, but I'll be happy to give you what I have. Fighting is continuing. As far as we are aware, there is no evidence that the lines of battle have changed significantly in the past several days.

The United States deplores the continuation of fighting, and in particular, attacks on civilian targets. We urge both parties to accept mediation and the ceasefire provisions contained in U.N. Security Council Resolution 540.

Q John, Iraq said that it accepts most of the Resolution, and they are asking the Americans are they I mean, willing to deplore or that if Iran penetrates Iraq, I mean -- are you standing still if Iran penetrates to Basra or something like that, what your position will be? (sic)

A I think that the President was clear in his remarks yesterday, last night, about the importance of the Gulf. Don't have anything for you beyond that.

Q Have the orders to ships operating in that region been changed in any way, or will they be in the next few days, John?

A Not that I'm aware of, Jim. I'm not aware of that.

Q John, is your concern about this war stem from the fact that you would like to see the flow of oil to the Western world going unhindered by any blockade, or is it because also the human suffering which is going on on both sides?

A I was about to say -- you answered your own question. I was about to say, of course, there is concern about the flow of oil, but there is also concern about a lot of people getting killed -- large numbers of people getting killed.

Q John, you've said here that there is no evidence that the lines of battle have significantly changed. Does that mean that you are disputing the Iranian claim that they have broken off, intercepted the road between Basra and Baghdad?

A I think what we're saying is that we've seen a lot of claims and counterclaims on both sides and a lot of rhetoric, and as far as we can judge, there is no substantial change.

Q John, an Iraqi official said that you are equating them with Iranian -- even the Iranian are the aggressor and the Iraqi accepted all proposals for peace. You don't have any stand on that?

A Not beyond our position on the whole conflict as we have stated it before.

Q John, has there been any change of rules of engagement in Lebanon? The President talked of restraint last night.

A No, I don't think there has been any change in the rules of engagement, but I also think that he was very clear on that last night.

Q In the sense that --

A In the sense that it seemed to me that what he was doing was confirming the rules of engagement, offering the words, obviously, "on restraint"; but there seemed to be no change in the definition of the rules of engagement.

Q I just wanted to get a sense from you on whether your degree of concern about what is happening between Iran and Iraq has deepened. For the last three or four years you've been concerned about fighting, concerned about the possibility of closing the Straits of Hormuz. As a result of the latest offensive, can you say that the concern is more widespread? Do you see evidence of Iranian planes or ships being deployed to take any action? What's different?

A We have long been concerned about it and worried about it, but obviously, when you see increased military activity, and you track that forward and consider the implications of that, and the responses that there might be by one side or the other, I think it's a fair statement to say that that deepens one's concern, yes.

Q John, since Iraq, about a few days ago, stopped the shelling of civilian areas for one week, and it was sort of a testing ground -- and Iran responded to this -- and said, "We want to see if the real Iraqis will stick it."

A Uh-huh.

Q Have you been doing anything related to some of the requests of Iraq to ask your allies such as Israel and some European countries to stop sending some spare parts and shipments of weapons and other things --

A As we have said before, we have been in touch with a number of countries about the flow of arms to the area.

Q I mean have you been fortifying your position or making more efforts, doubling your efforts, as a result of your statement of concern?

A Underlining our position.

Q John, the President said last night during his news conference that the mission of the Marines was originally to prevent a war between Syria and Israel.

I may have missed something in the past year, but could you refresh my memory as to when the Administration declared that to have been the mission of the Marines?

A I don't know whether it was declared to be the mission, but I think that that certainly is obvious that they were interposed between those forces.

Q At the airport in Beirut?

A Well, they were -- obviously, you had the threat of confrontation between Syrian and Israeli forces. That must have been a concern of everybody. I don't think you'd be right in saying that was the basic mission, but it certainly was an aspect of it.

Q John, also at the President's press conference last night, he dealt with the question about -- remarks about Mr. Shultz, and said he wouldn't take a resignation from him at this time.

What is Mr. Shultz's attitude toward a resignation at this time?

A His attitude towards a resignation? Well, as I have consistently said to various people who have called me about it and talked to me about it in the past several days and, indeed, when we went through this flurry some months ago, the Secretary has not offered his resignation, has no intention of resigning.

The President described such reports last night as disgraceful, and, as you know, the President declined to accept the resignation which has not been offered. (Laughter)

Q Do you see anything pregnant in the remark "at this time?"

A Pregnant?

Q Uh-huh.

A In the President's remark?

Q Yes.

A You're going to have to flesh that one out for me. What do you mean?

Q That he might accept it.

Q The Secretary told him that he may resign at the end of the term, for instance?

A Oh, I wouldn't get into that. I think the Secretary on that particular question of a second term has made the point in public before that it probably isn't the right thing to offer yourself up for a second term before the President has been re-elected and has an opportunity to determine who he wants in his cabinet. I think this Secretary of State isn't the kind of man to seize office before being asked.

Q John, on the Cohen meeting this afternoon, did Secretary Shultz request that meeting, and can you tell us something about that?

A I'm not sure how that one was raised. Yes. Let me see what I can find. I'm not sure.

Q The same question on the Perez meeting today.

A That was requested by Mr. Perez. Fairly routine. He's been to the United States, I think, about once a year, has usually seen the Secretary of State and the Vice President on those visits. The Secretary has seen Mr. Perez and other Israeli leaders, both in government and in opposition during his visits to Israel.

Q But, John, wasn't Ambassador Rosenne at that meeting?

A Yes.

Q Didn't it turn into a kind of a -- like more of a working meeting than just courtesy?

A Ambassador Rosenne was certainly at the meeting this morning, but that, too, I think is fairly usual. There's nothing unusual.

Q Going further, didn't it turn into more of a working meeting than a courtesy thing, discussing matters such as U.S. contacts with the PLO and so forth?

A I don't know, because I wasn't there, but that could well have come up. I don't know. I guess -- I don't know whether Mr. Perez has come down yet. I don't think he has.

Q Yes, he has.

A He did? Well, you have the advantage of me. Did he say anything?

Q Yes.

A Ah hah. Okay. Well, then you know more than I do.

Q Have you been consulted on the air raids made by the Israelis against --

A No. No coordination.

Q No coordination?

A No.

Q Do you have a certain position towards these?

A No. No comment.

Q No comment?

A No.

Q John, on Grenada, do you have any comment on the charges levied against the -- I think it's 18 people --

A No. That process is going forward. We wouldn't have a comment on it.

Q John, couple of questions on Nicaragua. In the Secretary's comments yesterday, does he believe that a reduction in the voting age to 16 automatically jeopardizes a free and fair election in Nicaragua?

A I think I'll leave you with his words. I think he raised a question about the motivation behind that.

Q But as a general statement, does the State Department regard the reduction of voting age to 16 as something that may jeopardize free elections?

A The State Department hasn't taken a position on that. I think I'd just leave you with the Secretary's question mark.

Q And one other question on his comments. He said that the elections were being called on "very short notice." Can you explain that in the context of the other elections in Salvador and Guatemala that have been called --

A No. And, indeed, I can't quite remember that phrase. I'd like to go back and look at what he said so I can see. I just can't quite put my finger on that.

Q If Israel didn't coordinate with you about the bombing or the raids in Lebanon, had Israel told you anything about the plan to build a Phalangist army in southern Lebanon, and arm it with the equipment that the Phalangists dragged away from the Lebanese forces?

A I'm not aware -- I mean, as a general principle, we don't talk about our diplomatic discussions, but I'm not aware of any specific --

Q Do you have any comment, John, on the news coming out from the -- CBS, as far as I remember, on lots of U.S. arms being taken by the Phalangists from the army?

A No. The Pentagon, I think, had some words yesterday on the flow of arms, U.S. arms, to Lebanon, and I'm sure they can flesh that out for you. But, no, I don't have anything on arms that are being lost.

Q Can you confirm the news?

A No. I can't confirm it. I mean, I saw some news clips --

Q Do you have any comment on reports that there is consideration to a Shultz-Gromyko meeting perhaps in connection with the March 16?

A Yes. I think you'd be going down -- March 16, I think, is not the right way to look at it. In general a Shultz-Gromyko meeting -- I don't think one can ever rule anything out, but certainly nothing is in train on that subject.

Q John, how are you, then, communicating other than by Presidential statement your desire to improve relations with the Soviet Union?

A Oh, there are a number of channels. There's Stockholm, there's their Ambassador here, there's our Ambassador there.

Q Are they meeting?

A I don't know whether Ambassador Dobrynin has been in, in the past several days. I don't think he's been in since the Secretary got back from the weekend, but that channel is always a --

Q What areas of Soviet-American relations right now are being explored?

A Well, there is the CDE area at Stockholm. I would say that is a principal one. There is the MBFR. As you know, INF is stalled, but we remain ready to return at a moment's notice. START -- we have not been given a date, and the position on that remains as it was.

Q Have you begun to talk about cultural relations again, consular?

A I'm not aware of that discussion going forward, Marvin.

Q On both consular and --

A I'm not aware of that.

Q On Angola's -- or any plans to send now U.S. personnel to the border area?

A Well, not to the border area. There is the question of a U.S. liaison office in Windhoek. An administrative support staff has arrived in Windhoek to prepare for the opening of our liaison office later in the week. That liaison office will be headed by Mr. William Twaddell who was our charge d'affaires at our Embassy in Maputo, Mozambique, from 1980 to 1983.

Including the administrative support staff, that liaison mission will not total more than a dozen people. The liaison office is there in order that we can be on hand to play the role envisioned for us under the terms of the military disengagement agreed by South Africa and Angola. Our role will be limited to assisting with the disengagement of forces now under way in southern Angola.

Q How long will that office be there, do you think, John? Is there --

A I don't know. I can't tell you how long that will operate.

Q To follow on that, are there any military personnel involved, included in this group?

A It's a Department of State operation. Final details are being worked out. We do plan to have military expertise available to our liaison office. I'm not sure how that will be done, whether it will be done from the Embassy in Pretoria -- I guess it's Pretoria/Cape Town, in fact -- but the details are not worked out.

Q And, also, will this office handle anything in Windhoek other than matters concerning the disengagement, or is that its sole purpose?

A No. I think its sole purpose at this stage is to be a presence between the Angolans and the South Africans, as need be, for the passing of messages, and so forth and so on.

Q One other on the same subject, if I may. Sam Nujoma is in -- or was in Canada yesterday, and reports say he is coming here.

A Uh-huh.

Q Is he meeting with anyone here?

A Yes. I think he's seeing Mr. Crocker this afternoon.

Q When is that?

A I don't know whether I have a time on that for you.

Q Is it today?

A It's today. Yes.

Q Oh. I'm sorry.

A I don't have a time.

Q John, I have another question on the Middle East, please. Anything -- any more information about the moves with the United Nations towards a U.N. peacekeeping force for Lebanon?

A No. There's continuing activity at the U.N. and some today. One would expect that to continue during this week, but, no, nothing coming to a conclusion that I'm aware of.

Q Do you expect the United Nations -- the Security Council to hold a meeting for this purpose?

A I don't know. I think it's too early -- at least I don't know.

Q John, going back to Africa for a second, with all this activity, a security arrangement between Mozambique and South Africa, the U.S. setting up a liaison office in Namibia, talks presumably ongoing between Angola and South Africa. Is the State Department encouraged by the general momentum? Is there big "mo" in southern Africa?

A (Laughter) Well, I think there certainly have been some developments in the past several days which, at this stage, lead to encouragement, but I think this has been going on for a long time, and we are always cautious about predicting too much that is constructive emerging in a very short time.

But, certainly, there are developments under way which seem to suggest that there is movement in the direction we would like to see.

Q John, do current counter-terrorist activities of the U.S. Government involve collaboration with foreign governmental agencies as well as perhaps private agencies in the United States and abroad?

A You sound like you're getting into an intelligence area, and I really wouldn't comment on that.

Q Well, I'm getting into counter-terrorism which is a responsibility of this Department, and what I'd like to raise is an issue, which has become something of an international issue, and which may jeopardize the counter-terrorist activities of the U.S. Government, and therefore the safety of U.S. personnel abroad and perhaps even here in the United States, which is the international --

A And that is?

Q Which is the international issue which has been raised over the fact that this Administration has denied Secret Service protection to a man who has been publicly targeted by Libya for his --

A I think the Treasury Department --

Q -- support of this Administration.

A I think the Treasury Department controls the Secret Service. You ought to ask --

Q Well, the Treasury Department controls that, but are you concerned for the safety of U.S. personnel, given the fact that the Administration --

A Always, always concerned for the safety of U.S. citizens.

Q -- has now publicly announced that it will not protect those who cooperate with it in anti-terrorist actions?

A Always concerned with the safety of U.S. personnel. Okay?

Q Thank you, John.

(The briefing concluded at 12:39 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, February 24, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #35

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1984, 12:31 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, all. I have a couple of statements up front on the assassination of the Spanish Senator and a Salvadoran legislator.

Firstly, we deplore the brutal assassination of Spanish Senator Enrique Casas Vila in San Sebastian, Spain, February 23. On this sad occasion we convey our sympathy to his family and to the people and Government of Spain. Particularly in view of the upcoming regional elections in Spain, we condemn this cowardly political assassination and affirm our strong support and admiration for Spain's vigorous democracy.

We also take this occasion to renew our support for increased international efforts against terrorism whose ultimate targets are the democratic and civilized values we share with free people and free nations everywhere.

In the case of the Salvadoran assassination, we deplore the assassination of Roberto Ismael Ayala, legislative assembly representative of the Authentic Institutional Party in El Salvador. No group has claimed responsibility.

As with the assassination of ARENA party representative Ricardo Arnoldo Pohl in late January, we have consistently deplored political violence. In these specific cases the attacks are not only against individuals, but against one of the basic organs through which Salvadoran citizens are trying to achieve progress and an end to violence through democracy and the rule of law.

And, finally, just to comment on the TASS report, we note with distaste the TASS dispatch charging American official connivance in the bombing of the Soviet housing compound in New York. As you know, we issued a statement yesterday denouncing the disgraceful, cowardly attack against Soviet property. We today reiterate our condemnation of this terrorist action and our contempt for its perpetrators. And further today, in light of the TASS dispatch, we reject as completely unfounded any accusation of U.S. complicity or connivance in that event.

That's all I've got for you. Happy to --

Q Copy of that, John?

A Sure. Well --

Q The last one?

A Yeah. I'll -- I think you'd have to get that one from the transcript because that is --

Q On that subject --

A -- partly me.

Q -- what is the state of the anti-terrorist legislation?

A I can't give you the latest state of play on that. I know that the White House is working on that, Jim. But I can't tell you exactly where it is.

Q A follow up on the Salvadoran part of your statement.

A Uh-huh.

Q Has there been any decision on dispatching additional emergency military funds to El Salvador?

A No. I think that's a matter still under consideration.

Q Okay.

Q Can you bring us up to date, John, on Lebanon? Is the cease-fire holding?

A Well, we've seen the same kind of reports that you have. (There) seems to be, certainly, a cessation of violence. We hope that the cease-fire does take effect. We hope that it holds. There have been no incidents in the past 24 hours involving the U.S. component of the MNF.

Q Is Rumsfeld here?

A Yes. He's here. He's here with Ambassador Silberman. We expect that when Ambassador Rumsfeld returns to the area, Ambassador Silberman would go with him, but don't have anything for you on their plans for travel.

Q Can you tell us anything about to whom the Marines will be turning over the airport?

A I think that's a matter that's currently under discussion between our Ambassador in Beirut and the Government of Lebanon, Bernie.

Q Will it be that the Marines will be turning over the airport to the very Moslem groups that the *New Jersey* was shelling a couple of weeks ago?

A I think, as I say, that's a matter that's under discussion between the Lebanese authorities and our Embassy.

Q Is that even a remote possibility?

A Well, it's certainly a possibility that the airport will be turned over to LAF forces.

Q Some of whom are also members of units that the United States was shelling?

A I can't give you anything on that.

Q That was Bernie's question.

A Well, I can't answer that. I'm saying what is a possibility is that the airport might be handed over to the Lebanese Army, which seems a distinct possibility.

Q Which units of the Lebanese Army?

A You can keep on asking that question, and I can keep on telling you I don't know the answer to that.

Q Why do you say it's a possibility? I mean, they can't take the airport to Grenada, can they?

A I don't think they can take the airport to Grenada. No.

Q They've got to turn it over to somebody.

A That's correct.

Q So why are you --

A It might be good to turn it over to somebody who can control it, I would think.

Q Well, the Moslem gunmen who surround the airport quite conceivably could control it after the Marines leave. Does that mean it's the right group to turn it over to?

A I don't think that was the drift of Bernie's question. I think the drift of Bernie's question was what units within -- as I understood it; maybe I misunderstood it -- what units within the Lebanese Armed Forces it might be turned over. Was that your question?

Q My question was, will the Marines be turning over the airport to the Moslem militia groups that just --

A The militia groups? No.

Q Yes.

A No. I cannot tell you to whom they will be turning it over, but I think that is less likely than their turning it over to the Lebanese Armed Forces.

Q But is it possible that they would turn it over to soldiers or units of the Lebanese Armed Forces that are cooperating with the Shi'ite militia?

A Well, I thought that was the thrust of Bernie's question, and that's what I was telling you, that I cannot tell you to which unit of the Lebanese Armed Forces -- if, indeed, that is the decision -- the airport would be turned over. That is something that the Government of Lebanon, in concert with our Ambassador, there would have to decide.

Q John, there was a report in FBIS this morning that Fadi Frem, who is the head of the Phalangist armed forces -- he has a position in the Phalangists -- was asked to coordinate with the Israelis to create a deterrent to the Syrian presence and influence in Lebanon. Do you have any thoughts about that?

A No. Haven't seen that and don't have any reaction to it.

Q Can you look into this matter?

A I'll take a look.

Q Do we know, John, whether the Israelis are going to cooperate with the cease-fire as far as ceasing their air strikes?

A I can't answer that. You'll have to ask them.

Q Jumblatt -- do we have anything more on his arriving in the United States?

A I think he has decided not to undertake that trip at the moment.

Q Did the U.S. approve or disapprove of the visa?

A I think it was academic. I think he decided not to come, so the question of --

Q Did it ever reach a decision on the visa?

A I'm not aware that it did, Bernie.

Q John, on another part of the world, there are reports today from southern Africa that this disengagement may be breaking down, that the UNITA forces had seized a diamond town and taken a whole lot of foreign hostages. Is this in violation of the understanding that had been reached?

A Well, I think that a meeting is imminent, as I understand it, Bernie, between the South Africans and the Angolans on suggestions that there may have been infringements of the disengagement process.

Q John --

A I think that's to take place this weekend. I'm not quite sure about it.

Q Supposing it turns out to be UNITA, which is not claimed, certainly, by the Angolans or by the South Africans? How does that play into the whole thing?

A Well, I think we'll wait and see how the weekend meeting turns out.

Q What is the role of the United States' diplomats going to be in this meeting, if any?

A I do not know -- I'm not quite sure where this meeting is held, Don, so I'm not sure whether we are going to be physically present at such a meeting. As I understand it, we are not members of the commission. That doesn't mean that we couldn't be present at a meeting on occasion, and it certainly doesn't mean that we could not or would not be helpful in passing messages between the two sides if that were deemed to be helpful. But I'm not sure whether specifically we're going to be at this meeting.

Q Well, the person who was named -- I forget his name -- yesterday, a diplomat --

A Twaddell.

Q Yes. Will he be there physically and be able to take part?

A I do not know whether he's in position yet. Does anybody happen to know that? Don't know.

Q Could we find out?

A We can look at that for you. Sure. Find out where he is.

Q John, with respect to the meeting -- I guess, I think it's to take place tomorrow -- my understanding is that it's been requested by South Africa because of their allegation last night that several hundred SWAPO troops were moving into the area from which they're withdrawing.

A Uh-huh.

Q So my question with respect to UNITA is, do you think that any action by UNITA is relevant to the disengagement process? Is that the U.S. view?

A Well, I guess it's relevant, but I don't have comment for you on how that might fit into meetings over the weekend and how it might be discussed.

Q John, picking up Bernie Gwertzman's story the other day -- perhaps this was asked -- has there been any authorized -- authorization by the Administration to revive those secret contacts with the PLO with a view toward achieving American objectives with respect to the PLO?

A I think Secretary Shultz pretty much responded to that in his testimony the other day. I forget when it was, Wednesday or Thursday. I forget before which Committee, but I think he made the point that that there was no activity at the moment.

Q What do you mean by "at the moment"?

A Well, I think that he made the point that nothing was going on currently.

Q Can I ask on Lebanon, John? Is the United States now in support of a cease-fire there?

A A cease-fire where?

Q In Lebanon.

A Anything that leads to the end of the killing in Lebanon is obviously something we welcome.

Q Okay. Will that --

A We were a key factor in an earlier cease-fire, as you remember, which did not hold.

Q Okay. Will that include also Israeli bombings? Will the cease-fire -- would you also support a cease-fire that Israel also cease its activities there?

A The long-term goals which we have consistently set for Lebanon still apply -- namely, the withdrawal of all foreign forces, the sovereignty of the legitimate government, and concern for Israel's security on its northern borders.

Q Okay, John. What I mean is that in the last five days there have been attacks or strikes by Israeli air force, and, John, I'm trying to understand if you -- this government's support for a cease-fire would include that -- would indicate that Israel also should cease those activities; and, if so, would you ask Israel to do so?

A I don't really have anything for you on that. I think the Israelis have talked of attacking Palestinian terrorist bases, and we have understood Israel's concern about Palestinian terrorism directed at Israel from Lebanese enclaves.

-- MORE --

Q Do you have -- excuse me, just one more thing -- do you have, does this government have any indication that there are PLO troops in Lebanon armed and ready, or have already engaged in fighting against Israel?

A I can't give you a specific indication of what they have done, but there isn't any doubt that there has been reinfiltration into Lebanon of Palestinian forces and that is something that we think is very serious.

Q John, I mean, again, if there are so-called PLO, it's not really defined by the US Government or Israel what is a PLO? There are people coming to Lebanon because that part of West Beirut where 500,000 Palestinians are in that section of Lebanon and including Beirut. Some people are returning for their families. Will you call that PLO reinfiltration?

A You asked me whether we had any doubt that Palestinian combat fighters had returned. No, we do not have any doubt.

Q On this question, since you -- Israeli presence in Lebanon was the motive or was the reason that you went there to try to bring about the evacuation of all foreign forces, occupying forces from Lebanon. Now the Israelis --

A I think there were some Syrians in Lebanon. I think there's been some others there, too.

Q And Syrians and PLO and others, but, you know, the invasion of June of 1982 generated the whole situation. What I'm asking here, the day before yesterday or yesterday you didn't make any comment on Israeli raids in Lebanon, and you said there was no coordination with the Israelis.

A Correct.

Q The Israelis are now acting alone, without coordination with you, without anything, without consultating --

A Without coordination on the air strikes, yes.

Q So it's sort of, it's their domain, it's their territory, it's their case that they are doing strikes.

A It's not their domain, and I wasn't responding, I did not give a comment, on the air strikes, but there are certain realities that are obvious in the confused situation in Lebanon.

Q You couldn't offer any evidence, and I have from NPR reporters on the scene and other reporters who were there and they scoured the whole area for one week and they couldn't find a single PLO combatant in the area, and Israel now coming with the excuses of saying that there are PLO infiltrators there, so what can we come to this -- (sic)

A Well, we will have to differ. You say there is not a single Palestinian fighter in Lebanon, and we differ with you.

Q I didn't say it. These are, you know, the reports from NPR and others.

A Yes, well, we would differ with any report that says there's not a single Palestinian fighter in Lebanon and there's been no reinfiltration.

Q John, can I just understand the one point that was raised? You are not calling on the Israelis to observe the cease-fire?

A It's not a question of calling on the Israelis to observe the cease-fire --

Q Well, let me say, would you call on the Israelis to observe the cease-fire and put an end to the air raids because of the cease-fire?

A I'm not going to respond to that question at the moment, Bernie.

Q John, can we go to a different area?

A Sure.

Q On Iran-Iraq, do you have anything fresh on Iran's remarks that we might keep to ourselves in that region?

A I'm sorry. Any --

Q Fresh --

A Comment on Iran's remarks that we might keep to ourselves?

Q Yes.

A I have to probe a little to find what --

Q They're saying today that the United States ought to stay out of it.

A I think the United States has done its best (a) to stay out of it and (b) to remain a nonpartisan in the question of this very tragic war. I think our record has been pretty good.

Q There is a report today that the United States might or has plans to put in ground troops if the Straits of Hormuz are threatened. Can you tell us anything about that?

A I haven't seen that report, and I'm certainly not aware of it.

Q John, have you any reading on a statement by Khomeini in which he said that Iran would not initiate any action that would lead to the closure of the Straits unless the right of traffic was denied to Iran?

A No, don't have any --

Q Do you see that as a change?

A No, don't have any evaluation of it.

Q Are civilian targets still being hit?

A I can't give you a readout of what has been hit today.

Q John, do you stay with your comment yesterday --

A Yes.

Q -- that there is no substantial change in the battlelines?

A That's correct. There appears to have been an Iranian advance, some indication that it's been repulsed, and I think the situation is about as I said yesterday, that the lines have not substantially changed at this stage.

Q Would you -- is there some feeling that this Iranian advance is not over?

A I think that's a legitimate deduction.

Q John, can I also -- just one about the answer to Bernie. The U.S. then sees the cease-fire there as between the factions in Lebanon, and Israel's activities, military activities there, will not fit under the cease-fire which you told us now U.S. supports? Is that the correct understanding?

A I'm just simply not going to respond to a question as to what position we're going to take on Israeli air strikes. That's what I am declining to do. But our long-term goals for the removal of all foreign forces are, of course, still very much in mind.

Q John, about the Iraq-Iran war, there's no chance that the U.S.A. will intervene to implement the United Nations Resolution on the war, or any kind of mediation or anything? I mean, are you waiting until the Straits of Hormuz is blocked or something like that happens, then you interfere?

A I think the President has offered words which go about as far as indicating what action we might take, and I think we'll rest on his words. He was not very specific in indicating what action we would take in the event of the Straits being blocked, but I think he made American resolve and interest fairly evident.

Q I mean, we understood that until this happened, America will not interfere. That's the understanding?

A Not "intervene?"

Q Intervene peacefully or any other way.

A I think we have worked at it peacefully without much -- along with others. I don't see the war having been brought to a conclusion yet.

Q John, Philippine opposition leader Salvador Laurel has been received by senior Administration officials and continues to be today. I'm curious, what message is the Administration trying to send to President Marcos right now about the upcoming elections in the Philippines?

A I guess you're really raising two questions. Yes, I think Under Secretary Eagleburger either has seen or is about to see -- was it yesterday? -- Mr. Laurel. That's a perfectly normal contact between a member of the moderate opposition in the Philippines, but I'm not going to get into what kind of discussions they might have had.

Q What kind of general message is this Administration sending to Mr. Marcos?

A That's why I separated the two. Well, I think that we have on many occasions expressed our support for the democratic process in the Philippines and underlined the necessity for that moving forward.

Q On the same subject, in the past few days two Filipinos with direct or indirect links to the military establishment have come forward here in Washington and alleged that the Marcos regime was behind the death of Senator Aquino. Do you have any comment?

A No. We've seen the reports of those charges but don't have any comment on them.

Q Is the aid package for the Filipinos affected in any way by these allegations?

A I'm not aware of any change in our thinking on the proposed aid program for the Philippines.

Q On that point, Congressman Solarz, who is Chairman of the Asian Affairs Committee, a subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs, proposed yesterday a change in the aid program for the Philippines which would make it much more weighted on economic and less on military than the proposal given by the Administration.

A Yes.

Q Does it seem as though this proposal would be acceptable to the Administration? Does the Administration consider it to be in keeping with the bases agreement which was signed a few months ago with the Philippines?

A Don, as you say, it was only put forward yesterday, and I think where we are is in the process of considering it, taking a look at what Mr. Solarz has suggested.

Q Has there been any decision on supplying U.S. aid to Grenada to finish that airport?

A No. I do not know -- I do not think a decision has been taken on that. As you know, that's a matter that we were looking at, and so far as I know there has been no decision on that.

Q John, a couple days ago DAS Michel was talking on the Hill about Cubans -- the Cuban Government using its expertise from drug smuggling to steal high technology. Do you have anything more on that?

A I don't.

Q Could I ask you two specific questions to take?

A Uh-huh.

Q He says, "Recent reports suggest that the Cubans may be engaged in..." so on and so forth to smuggle such equipment." Could you find out, is he talking about press reports or --

A Let's see what we can develop for you.

Q And one more, please. He says, "We have no reason to doubt that it would also cooperate with drug smugglers in order to obtain high technology equipment." Could you find out if he has any reason to believe?

A Sure.

Q Thank you.

Q John, is the Secretary going to meet today with Dr. Walid Haddad, the advisor of President Gemayel, and do you have anything of the --

A I do not think that is on his schedule. Haddad? Walid Haddad? I don't think so. I think Mr. Haddad has meet with Assistant Secretary Murphy. I don't think he is scheduled to see the Secretary.

Q The Lebanese Embassy told me that he's supposed to see him at 3:00 p.m. It's not on his schedule?

A Then, if the Lebanese Embassy says that, let me take a look at it. I didn't think it was on the Secretary's schedule, but let me take a look at it.

Q Do you have anything about the talks he's having here?

A Can I what? Sorry.

Q Do you have any comments about the talks that Dr. Haddad is having?

A No, I really don't. As I say, he has spent quite a bit of time with Assistant Secretary Murphy, but I don't really have anything for you on what they're talking about.

Q John, in Correo de la Cera a couple of days ago, there was an interview by Henry Brandon with Henry Kissinger which was run in which Kissinger announced his availability for the post of special negotiator to Moscow, I presume for this Administration. Has he made that candidacy known to you here?

A Not that I'm aware of. This is the first I've heard of (a) the report and (b) the alleged offer.

Q You don't know if that's under discussion?

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:55 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Monday, February 27, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #36

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 1984, 12:12 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Order in the court. I'm all up to speed on these legal phrases since Mr. Romberg spent two days on jury duty. (Laughter)

I don't have any announcements for you today except to say that available in the Press Office is the prepared statement by AID Administrator Peter McPherson before the House Appropriations Committee today. The subject of that testimony was the $90 million food supplemental request for Africa. That's all I've got.

Q Can we start with Lebanon? First of all, do you know anything about an American priest reportedly being killed?

A Seen that report and the Embassy is looking into it, Jim.

Q No confirmation of it?

A Don't have any confirmation of it, no.

Q And what about the situation in general?

A The situation in general -- there was a fair amount of firing yesterday in the Greater Beirut area. Apparently it subsided after midnight, although we've seen some reports of resumed firing today. The Beirut International Airport remains closed.

Q John, there was a report over the weekend -- I forget where -- suggesting or claiming that Rumsfeld might not go back to Lebanon, period -- that that issue had been put behind and --

A Saw that report. Really don't have anything for you on his plans. As we have said, we continue to expect that he will go back to the region. Don't have

Q He's supposed to have left last night, in fact.

A No, I don't think so.

Q He did not?

A Did not. He's still in the country, and I'm not aware of any plans that he was to have left last night.

Q But has he dropped Lebanon as to his portfolio?

A Well, don't have anything for you on that, Bernie. As he formulates his travel plans, we'll let you know when he's going and where he's going.

I guess we won't let you know where he is going until he gets there; that's the --

Q No, I'm not asking where he is going, but rather whether he is interested in Lebanon any more.

A I'm sure he's interested in Lebanon. Just what his itinerary is there, I can't tell you today.

Q John, there is a report out of the White House that he's not going back immediately and that he is refocusing his attention off Lebanon and onto the broader Mid-East peace process. Could you address that and maybe bring us up to date on the broader Mid-East peace process?

A Well, I don't know about the first part, that he's not going back to Lebanon. I just, really, don't have anything for you on that. He has always been involved in the broader process as well, and I don't find anything new or unusual about his involvement in the broader Middle East process.

Q Is the broader process on "hold," as one report had it over the weekend?

A Not at all, no. Not at all.

Q Can you give some examples of how it is not?

A I think that, as you are aware, there have been some meetings over the weekend in Amman between King Hussein and Mr. Arafat. I think one would want to see how those develop. But certainly that is --

Q I think in particular that the description of being "on hold," was applied to American thinking, formulating.

A On the peace process?

Q Yes.

A I'm not aware of a "hold" on the peace process.

Q John, you do say that he has, Rumsfeld, been involved in the broader peace process.

A Uh-huh.

Q But in answer to Bernie's question on whether he has dropped Lebanon, you have nothing to say on that?

A What I'm really doing is responding to the question of to where he is travelling, Bernie; and I'm not aware that any travel plans have been set for him yet, so I can't tell you whether he's going back to Lebanon or not.

Q I'm not asking about travel. I'm saying that you are noting his continued involvement on broader peace process; but to the specific question as to whether he has dropped Lebanon, you're not as forthcoming.

A I don't know to what extent he's going to be directly involved in diplomacy involving Lebanon, but certainly his interest I'm sure in it remains high.

Q There is also the question of experience. Rumsfeld's career is unblemished by Middle East experience, including the broader sense.

A He is a very experienced negotiator --

Q With Arabs?

A -- with an acute involvement in foreign affairs. He's had posts in diplomacy, been a Congressman. I don't think many people would agree with your apparent characterization that he is not fitted for the role.

Q John, to what degree do you think the American Marine redeployment, to use your word, has affected American influence and credibility in the Middle East as the Administration pushes toward energizing the peace process?

A I don't know. I suppose that question is being asked of Britain and France and Italy, all of whom have been involved in the attempt to bring more stability and peace to Lebanon.

As we have said before, that has not so far turned out as we would have hoped it would turn out, but it has been an honorable motivation, I think, on our part and of the other MNF parties. We have worked hard at it; we have lost lives at it, as have the others; and we consider it to have been worthwhile.

It may not have been a rewarding experience, but it has been selfless on the part of the United States and the other nations who were involved and who have given their lives in that cause. I think it will be seen in that light.

Q John, who do we turn the airport over to?

A The airport was turned over to the 33rd Battalion of the Lebanese Army.

Q Have they taken custody of it?

A I think they are in control of the runways, the control tower, and the terminal building.

Q Yesterday, several television reports showed the Amal militia taking positions. Are they being moved out or are they sharing in control?

A I really think you have to go to the Pentagon for a detailed rundown on where that stands. There have been some confusing reports that militiamen may be positioned around the airport. There was another report that some of the LAF might have been flying a militia flag. I think in view of the confusion, the Pentagon is probably the best place to put that question.

Q Isn't that unit you identified either a defecting unit from the Forces or at least a noncombatant in the recent fighting?

A I wouldn't steer you away from that, but, again, I think you ought to get the Pentagon to give you detailed -- I think the commander of that unit is an officer who was a liaison officer with the MNF -- to the MNF, I should say.

Q For the record, why are we continuing to fly reconnaissance flights now that the Marines have left?

A Well, we still have Americans in the City of Beirut, Bernie. I'll give you a more precise answer to that.

While the Marines have deployed from Beirut International Airport to their ships offshore, there are still U.S. military and diplomatic personnel and facilities in Lebanon that we must protect.

Q Why must we keep them there?

A There are about 150 Marines, I think, in Beirut protecting the Embassy and the residence; and there are about 180 plus, I think, people attached to the Embassy. I can give you a breakdown on those numbers.

As of last week, there were 23 State Department employees, 14 Marine security guards, 23 people from other U.S. governmental agencies, and 97 on temporary duty, about 80 of whom are U.S. Army trainers and one member of the Rumsfeld mission. So the total number of USG personnel assigned to the Embassy is 158, although that number obviously fluctuates modestly on a daily basis.

Q Along the same lines, John, why are we continuing to shell?

A Rules of engagement are unchanged. Same conditions apply.

Q Even when the evidence on the ground suggests that the New Jersey especially is really inaccurate? Reuters reported this morning that 18 goats died of shock.

A Twelve goats, I think.

Q Twelve goats. Exaggerate. Normal exaggeration.

A Well, saw the report. But the fact is that both the New Jersey and other ships fired in response to fire on American units or American aircraft, and the rules of engagement remain unchanged.

Q John, just to pursue that a little further. What is the American current position on the question of the Suq Al-Gharb position? It's currently being held by the

Lebanese Army. Do we consider their continued holding of that position critical to the security of the Embassy?

A Well, that's sort of an academic situation. The situation there is static, but we understand that not very much is happening there. There is far less activity, and people are pretty much in place as they have been, so there seems to be no movement at Suq al-Gharb.

Q Several months ago the United States shelled that position in order to keep it in the hands of the Lebanese Army. Would we do so again if it were threatened?

A I think that our commanders on the scene would take tactical decisions within the rules of engagement as they presently are defined.

Q Is there any contemplation of moving people out of the U.S. Embassy to take them out of harms way?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q Does it mean that as long as there are 158 Americans with the Embassy and Marines in training and other things, you will continue the reconnaissance flights and you will engage in the shelling when you see that they are in danger?

A No change in the decision to fly reconnaissance flights, and there's no change in the rules of engagement.

Q I want to follow on something you said earlier about King Hussein and Arafat. There are reports which indicate that the United States next -- the next step that the United States will be taking in the Middle East or undertaking, it will hinge or depend on the outcome of these talks, awaiting the results of these talks. What do you make of this?

A Well, I wouldn't say "hinge on the outcome of those talks," but as everybody knows King Hussein is a central factor in the peace plans that we have suggested, and this is an important meeting; sure.

Q Excuse me, I want to follow on this. When King Hussein was here at the White House, a senior U.S. official was asked if he satisfied the King and thinks that King Hussein brought about here, and he said flatly no. (Sic)

A I'm sorry, I didn't quite understand that.

Q If he satisfied the -- the senior official said, was asked if the United States Administration satisfied King Hussein in his visit to answer his requests or demands or appeal to the United States Administration in many areas, and he said flatly no. Anything happen since the visit of King Hussein to Washington and now the meeting in Jordan that you're expecting any movement which will come out of this meeting?

A I'm not personally familiar with that particular statement that you cite, but there's been no change in our position since then.

Q John, can we talk for just a second. Today is the first opportunity to discuss the mission of the Marines in Lebanon since their redeployment. Could you state for us what the Marine mission is now?

A I think the President has made that very clear on a number of occasions and made clear our policy: the redeployment of the Marines, the continuation of the air cover plus the training role that the United States pursue as appropriate.

Q The presence of the Marines on the ships is still to provide a presence in Lebanon; is that correct?

A I think the President defined that very clearly the other night in his press conference.

Q To follow on that, can you, for the record, tell us whether you -- you haven't used the word "MNF" so far in this briefing and that was part of the rules of engagement, or they were cited as one -- their safety was cited as one reason for the rules of engagement of a couple weeks ago.

Does, for the record, the MNF currently exist in the Reagan Administration's view despite the fact that only one member is on the ground.

Q I don't know -- well, there are two members on the ground -- France and the United States.

A The personnel that you went through include members of the MNF contingent?

A I was perhaps being a little too literal when you said "on the ground," but certainly the United States is there and the French are there, so two components of the MNF are still there.

I assume -- but I mean you raise an interesting legal question.

Q Can we get an answer to it?

A Sure. Let's try.

Q Could I -- you've got me confused with your numbers. At one point you said 180 plus. That's wrong.

A I said 180 plus before I started reading from my detailed --

Q And then you said 158, but the numbers that you gave add up to 157.

A I thought I added them up and got one short this morning and then I found I'd neglected the Rumsfeld man; if you include him, does it still come out? Is it still short?

A No. I see, okay.

Q Is the Rumsfeld person apart from the 97?

A All I know is, anticipating your arithmetic, I went over it this morning and first said, wait a minute, there's one short here, and then went over it again and found it did add up.

Q The Rumsfeld man is not one of the 23 State Department people?

A No, but he's included as one of the one hundred and -- whatever the total is. Does that give you a right figure?

Q Yes.

A Okay, that's it.

Q John, picking up Jim's question, are you suggesting that the Marines who are guarding the Embassy and the residence are considered by the United States as part of a continuing MNF?

A No. What I was saying is that the MNF force is deployed on the ships offshore and, as the President has said, is there and is available. I really was responding to the suggestion that there is only one country involved, and that's not so.

Q John, are you concerned that the redeployment may affect America's ability to nuture some kind of settlement in the Middle East?

A I don't see it. There's certainly no diminution of effort on our part, and all the factors that certainly were there and that we have perceived to be there that should move the various parties towards peace, surely are still there and surely the agony of Lebanon should underline the necessity of moving forward. So, no, don't see any reason to --

Q What about the quotes that have be ascribed in the last two or three weeks to both Hussein and Mubarak, saying that a pullout along the lines that the United States has now effected would damage the credibility of the United States and its ability to conduct a middleman role in the Middle East?

A Yes. Well, you know, one has seen those quotes but certain realities have confronted us on the ground, the Administration made the decision to redeploy those Marines. You have heard what the President has said about our fortitude and commitment, and we think that the quality of our effort, the sincerity of our effort, plus what the President has said are words that speak for themselves.

Q You think they will be believed, these words?

A We certainly hope so.

Q John, about the Arafat and Hussein talks, you said that they are important talks. What would the United States like to come out of them in order to think that they were kind of successful or that they have not failed?

A As we have consistently hoped for in terms of the President's September 1 initiative, movement in the direction of additional parties going to the peace table.

Q You mean for Jordan to represent the Palestinians in a --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- with Palestinian, non-PLO Palestinians?

A Sure. As we have consistently said, you cannot determine the fate of the Palestinians without some kind of Palestinian voice, some kind of Palestinian presence. Now how that is to be brought about is clearly something that the parties themselves have to discuss. But this is a meeting that conceivably could facilitate in that process.

Q Just one follow-up on this. Is the United States itself, through your ambassadors in the region or consuls in Jerusalem on the West Bank, have you tried to reach any Palestinians there to induce them to come into the talks or something? There are statements from the West Bank that would lead people to believe that the United States may actually be involved in trying to convince some --

A It depends what you mean by "be involved." It's like our talks on a number of issues which are part of the foreign policy of the United States. We talk freely with a number of people about those hopes and objectives and try to encourage others to move in that direction.

Q Would that include some mayors on the West Bank?

A I don't have any specifics but it may well have done.

Q John, there's a report, or there have been reports, about Ambassador Silberman having a role in the Middle East negotiations. Can you define what his role should be?

A I think that when Ambassador Rumsfeld returns to the Middle East, Ambassador Silberman will go with him and be a key part of Ambassador Rumsfeld's team.

Q Did the Administration put any time limit on the period that the Marines will be on the offshore?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q Another question. Do you have anything new on the Soviet position regarding the Security Council that you know?

A No. That debate at the U.N. is going forward, as you well know. The members of the Security Council have consulted; consultations are continuing with an informal session of the Council. France has introduced a draft resolution which remains the focus of discussion. The consultations in New York haven't arrived yet at any concrete results, so really can't speculate about it.

As to the idea of injecting a U.N. force in Beirut, there's general agreement that a measure of stability on the ground is necessary for the effective functioning of this or any peacekeeping force. It cannot be expected to interject itself in the middle of a battlefield among warring groups. The agreement of the Government of Lebanon is also a key element. However, this doesn't mean that the Security Council should not consider the possible arrangements for such a force.

Q Can I have a copy of this?

A Sure.

--MORE--

Q Another question. Do you have anything on the meeting --

Q Before you leave that --

A Hold on.

Q Before you leave that, I was unclear from that whether the U.S. favors the introduction of such a force or not.

A Well, certainly not opposed to discussing it, but I think we would want to see the negotiations and the consultations a little further along before we had any additional comment, John. That's where we are.

Q But is --

A Let me -- excuse me. Let me go back to --

Q Do you have anything on the meeting last Friday that Dr. Haddad, the National Security Adviser of President Gemayel, held with the Secretary here?

A No. I really don't. I think somebody here said that Dr. Haddad had some comments when he came down. I'm not sure whether that's --

Q He did not.

A He did not. Okay. No. Sorry.

Q You have nothing on it.

Q John, is it true that the United States will accept a Jordanian-Palestinian, which is called Arab delegation, in the enlarged peace talks as a result of the visit of King Hussein and President Mubarak and their talks with President Reagan last week?

A As a result of President Mubarak --

Q You know, the talks which were held by the heads of states, Arab states, with President Mubarak and King Hussein, their meeting in the White House?

A Okay. And would the United States accept a delegation where?

Q A joint Arab delegation which would consist of Jordanians and Palestinians in the upcoming stage of talks in the Middle East, peaceful talks?

A Well, what you seem to be talking about is the same kind of thing we've been talking about over a long period of time.

Q It's a little different from the way that it's --

A That's why I wanted to be careful how I answered your question. Why is it a little different?

Q This is why I'm asking this, because they say it's now called an Arab delegation which will consist of Palestinians and Jordanians, and not only Jordanians to represent the Palestinians or something like that. This is what I understand that it will be -- it's accepted by the White House to have Palestinians with the Jordanians in the enlarged peace talks.

A Not aware of that, but it doesn't frankly sound very different to me from what we have been talking about, and that, of course, is a question for the Jordanians and the Palestinians to work out.

Q John, has the State Department had a chance to see the essay by Henry Kissinger in this week's Time magazine in which he proposes a rather radical restructuring of NATO, including the giving up of the U.S. command role?

A Yes. We note, Jim, that Dr. Kissinger has reaffirmed the centrality of the transatlantic defense relationship to Western security and world peace. We share that view.

We believe that the NATO alliance is healthy, that its structure is sound, and that its strategy is valid and viable.

The Administration believes all Allies should make a greater effort to strengthen NATO defenses, and is pleased to note the progress that is being made in this regard.

The United States for its part will continue to make an undiminished contribution to the strength of the Alliance.

Views such as Dr. Kissinger's represent his own thinking and are constructive contributions to the healthy consideration of issues within the community of Alliance security concerns.

Q Well, among other things, he suggests that the Europeans take over the negotiator's role on the medium-range -- on missiles based in Europe. Would the State Department go along with that?

A Don't have any comment on that. I think our words here speak for themselves about the Alliance.

Q He also calls for a major study of the whole Alliance structure once the U.S. elections are done. Would the State Department support such a study?

A I'm not aware of any thinking that's being done along those lines.

Q Could we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q John, related to that, there was a story yesterday that major West European countries will have their defense ministers meeting for a discussion of European, West European, defense strategy. How does the U.S. regard that?

A I haven't got any comment for you on that, Marvin. Sorry.

Q Could you give it a shot?

A Sure.

Q John, has a decision been made on whether to dispatch additional emergency aid to El Salvador?

A No. I think that's still under consideration.

Q John, anything on Iran-Iraq today? What's your assessment of what took place over the weekend?

A Okay. Be glad to give you what I've got, while also making the point that we really aren't in great shape to give you a detailed battlefield report day by day. But, however, on the basis of our information it seems clear that Iranian claims of successful incursions have been exaggerated and that Iraq has repulsed several probes with heavy Iranian losses. There has been large-scale fighting, but we have no evidence of significant changes in the battle front.

The United States regrets that Iraq's recent moratorium on attacking civilian areas went unreciprocated and has ended. It is tragic that so many lives are being lost in needless continued fighting.

It is unfortunate that Iran has not heeded repeated calls by the world community for restraint, cease-fires and negotiations toward a settlement of the conflict. The United States continues to believe that there can be no military resolution of this dangerous conflict.

Q Copy?

A Sure.

Q That's a --

Q Could you read that sentence, the one about regretting that Iraq's acts on civilians?

A We regret that Iraq's recent moratorium on attacking civilian areas went unreciprocated and has ended.

Q Okay.

Q John, in light of such a lengthy statement, are we considering any new moves to bolster Iraq's war effort in the interest of achieving a cease-fire and peace?

A We're very involved, as we have been all along, in the field of diplomacy, if that's what you mean.

Q I just -- I think that's -- what you just read seemed to be the most fulsome and pro-Iraqi statement that I've heard in a long time with respect to this war.

A Just a statement of the facts as we see them.

Q But -- no, I understand. But does it herald any change on the ground in terms of our neutrality or anything like that?

A No.

Q No difference?

Q Can I follow that up, John? Are we involved at all in any kind of contingency planning with Iraq about possible help to them in the event of a successful Iranian strike or a closing of the Straits of Hormuz or anything of that sort?

A Well, the President and the Secretary, as you know, have made our position plain on the closing of the Straits, which we would consider a very serious development. But I think you'd have to go to the Pentagon for any discussion that they might want to offer of their contingency planning.

Q John, in connection with the act of diplomacy, has Japan, which has been active in this area, informed the U.S. of any shift in position on Iran's part perhaps with regard to whether it --

A I don't think we're, Ralph -- as always, I think we're going to disappoint you on the details of who we've been talking to and who has said what to whom in which closed room.

Q Can we get away from the question of who said what to whom, but go to the nub of the question, which is whether the U.S. is aware of any change in Iran's diplomatic position?

A In Iran's diplomatic position?

Q Yes.

A No.

Q Are there any plans to send senior U.S. officials such as Murphy -- to send him back to Iraq? Is there anything cooking on that?

A I'm not aware of any, Jim. I'm not aware of any.

Q John, can you confirm numbers in The New York Times about the American military advisers in Salvador, the number has risen to 96?

A No. I refer you to the Pentagon on that. I understand that we are rigidly adhering to that 55 ceiling limit on trainers, but I think the Pentagon -- I'll leave them to flesh out where we stand in terms of personnel there.

Bernie?

Q John, is the pipeline of military supplies to the Lebanese Armed Forces continuing as before?

A Again, I think I'd refer you to the Pentagon, Bernie. I think what is in the pipeline is on its way, but I think on a shipment-by-shipment basis we're looking at the situation to see what is going and to whom at what time.

Q John, do you have any details about the hostage-taking in Angola, or do you have any comment on the taking of the hostages?

A No, I don't.

Q No reaction or comment?

A No.

Q You don't mind?

A I don't know what you're talking about.

Q Well, 77 hostages were taken in the south (sic) of Angola by UNITA on Friday.

A Uh-huh.

Q And I wondered if you had any reaction to the taking of hostages.

A No. Don't have anything on it.

Q Can I follow up on -- well, do you have anything on this week's meeting between Angola and South Africa?

A I think it went, so far as we can tell, fairly well. We were not there. They met, I think, on Saturday -- that's correct. Both sides seemed to be interested in conducting serious, businesslike talks. Have to refer you to the two governments concerned for any readout. As I say, we were not in that first meeting, but remain ready to be present or to assist when requested by the parties.

Q And, also to follow on just the previous question with respect to the 77 hostages who were taken by UNITA, you were asked about that -- I think it was you, but maybe it was Alan -- on Friday -- I can't recall --

A I was?

Q And there was no --

A It doesn't ring a bell.

Q Was it Alan?

A It doesn't ring a bell with either Alan or me.

Q Well, I thought perhaps it was raised, but, in any case, you didn't have much to say about the situation with respect either to SWAPO or Angola, South Africa --

A Right.

Q Or UNITA.

A Right.

Q And then a piece of guidance appeared outside that you had not used in the briefing. Can you say what that was in response to?

A It was in response to the fact that I hadn't found it in my book. (Laughter)

Q All right.

Q John. Two questions -- I could ask that earlier one a little differently. Is Lebanon -- is achieving a government of reconciliation in Lebanon still a high priority responsibility for Mr. Rumsfeld?

A Oh, I think that's a fair statement, yes. I think that's a priority of the United States Government, and I'm sure Ambassador Rumsfeld subscribes to that.

Q Okay. And the second one was, is it still American doctrine that any firing upon Beirut from Syrian-held positions is tantamount to firing upon American citizens?

A That's still part of our rules of engagement. As I say, I think the commanders will make tactical decisions at the time, but that is still part of their rule of engagement.

(Beeping sound)

Q Another subject, John. Does the United States plan in the next --

A Are you trying to give us a message?

Q -- in the next several weeks or months to present a claim for -- to the Soviet Embassy, the Soviet Government, claim for compensation of the lives of the Americans who were killed, the 61 Americans in the KAL?

A KAL?

Q Yes.

A Let me see where that is. I just don't know where that stands.

Q I understand that's being compiled now and is going to be presented shortly.

A Be glad to take a look and see if we have anything.

Q John, Grenada airport or anti-terrorism legislation? Anything on either one of these?

A No. No development, I'm afraid.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:44 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #37

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 1984, 12:35 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have no announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, have you had an opportunity to look at Mr. Gromyko's remarks? Do you see anything new in them? Do you have a response?

A Well, in this speech to a domestic Soviet audience in Minsk, Mr. Gromyko chose to characterize U.S. policies in rather familiar and unconstructive rhetoric. Such statements certainly do not square with the expressed desire of the Soviet ledership cited even by Mr. Gromyko in this latest speech for a productive dialogue with the United States.

As the President has stated, we remain committed to such a dialogue and hope the Soviet leaders will sit down with us in an effort to solve some of the real problems that divide us. It's Soviet actions, not words that count.

Q Does the President have a -- as the L.A. Times -- I think the AP and L.A. is reporting, is there a new proposal for MBFR that you could tell us about?

A I can't tell you about Presidential actions. I can simply tell you that together with our Allies we are preparing the western approach to the next round of the MBFR talks which will resume in Vienna on March 16. We remain interested in achieving genuine progress in those talks.

Q Do you have a specific reaction to Gromyko's idea of a Middle East conference (inaudible)?

A Yes. The proposal is not a new one, as you're well aware. It was a prominent part of Mr. Brezhenev's remarks on the Mideast in his last major policy statement on the area in the autumn of 1982. At that time it did not generate much interest among the nations of the region.

The United States continues to believe that negotiations along the lines enunciated by the President in his Mideast peace plan of September 1, 1982, offered the best opportunity to reach a peaceful resolution of regional problems.

Q Yesterday, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, in this regard, passed an amendment to the foreign aid. First of all, they deprived Jordan from getting any assistance until Jordan -- King Hussein will make available that he will have peace with Israel.

And the second part -- I want your comment on it -- relating to the attempts to get in touch or negotiate or talk or approach, whatever, any feelings between the United States Administration and the PLO.

Knowing that from the beginning that you wanted to get the PLO to recognize Israel so you can recognize the PLO, do you see this to restrict completely and prohibit any contacts between the United States Administration and any PLO even though a third party going along with your policy or restricting your action or movement in the future to bring about recognition of the PLO and recognition of Israel and your recognition in the area?

A With regard to the PLO, the U.S. has not violated and has no intention to violate what it has said on this issue, in terms of recognizing and negotiating with the PLO. Our policy remains unchanged.

At the same time, it isn't appropriate -- it is not appropriate for Congress to involve itself in the details of the execution of policy which by very definition, execution, is an Executive Branch function. Similarly, with respect to arms for Jordan, the Administration will decide when it's in a position to move on that question.

The Congress, of course, has its constitutional role in the authorization and appropriation process. But, again, it is not appropriate in the Administration's view to impose those sorts of strictures on the execution of policy.

Q Can we get a copy?

A I'm afraid you're going to have to get that from the transcript.

Q Alan, speaking of the PLO, since the Reverend Jesse Jackson has been so deeply involved in foreign affairs, does Secretary Shultz believe in the sincerity of his repentance and that he should be commended for having only lied for about two weeks?

A I don't think we're going to speak here from this podium about the domestic political campaign, Lester.

Q It's foreign policy.

A I've just given you an answer.

Q Do you have anything on the shooting incident in the Straits of Hormuz or near the Straits of Hormuz Sunday?

A I think that I do have what DOD is doing on this incident, but I really am going to refer you to them. They have, I think, rather detailed guidance on what happened, and it really is their matter and I really do prefer that they address it.

Bill, you had a -- Bill Beecher, did you have a question?

Q No.

A Okay, I'm sorry to have interrupted --

Q Do you have anything with respect to Iran-Iraq now on the alleged attack on tankers near Kharg Island?

A We are not able to confirm that such an attack took place.

Q Would you expound on that, Alan? The Pentagon intelligence sources have said that they've examined, or at least made a preliminary study of the evidence and have come to a preliminary conclusion that there was no attack. Are you saying that that is your assessment as well?

A Well, by the very nature of your question, you're asking me to comment in some way on intelligence information. I, as you know, am loath to do that, but I would not -- I'm not quarreling with you. I'm simply saying as an ON-THE-RECORD statement that we cannot confirm that attack.

Q Could I follow that up. Without getting into the content of intelligence matters, could you tell us how far down the river the assessment is?

A I can't really give you detail on that.

Q Are these preliminary conclusions, or are they firm conclusions?

A Again, you're asking me to comment on what you're citing as intelligence sources, defense intelligence sources, and I guess I just can't really do that, John. I'm sorry.

Q Yesterday, the statement that was issued late yesterday said that if there had been such attacks, they would be unfortunate -- I think the word was used -- escalation of the war situation.

Has the United States been in touch with Iraq to express its concern, or what have we been doing with Iraq since these developments began?

A I don't have details on that to give to you, Don. I think our statement last night speaks for itself. I think it reiterated our strong and long-held position that we don't believe there can be a military solution, but it had other things to say as well, and I would refer you to the entire statement.

Q Let me take one other in that same conflict. Iran says, and it said several times -- recently, again, today -- that Iraq is using chemical weapons in the Persian Gulf war. Does the United States have any indication of whether this is true? Does the United States have any position about the use of chemical weapons in the war?

A I am not able from here to confirm to you that it is true. But our position on the use of chemical weapons is clear, and we would find that a problem.

Q A problem?

A We would regret and oppose the use of such weapons.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the explosion in East Jerusalem?

A We condemn this grotesque terrorist act.

Q Do you see it as a sort of protest by the Arabs to the discussion in the Congress about the recognition by the United States of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel?

A I have no idea what lies behind it. I've seen a couple of press reports on different people claiming responsibility, and I think it's too early at this point to say, but there is no excuse, whatever the reason may be, that is justifiable.

Jim?

Q Alan?

A Okay, Ralph.

Q Can we talk about Rumsfeld for a second, please? Can you tell us where he is?

A He's in the United States.

Q Have you seen the report that says he will resign after his next trip to the region?

A Have seen it; don't have any information to that effect, and having checked carefully on that story, I can guarantee to you that the various people who are commenting on and writing on the issue to that effect have no information either on which to base that.

Q Can you tell us anything about Silberman's status at this pont?

A He remains as he has been, an unpaid consultant.

Q When will he start to be paid?

A I'm not sure that he will. In fact, I understand that Ambassador Rumsfeld is not paid either. That has happened in the past, so I don't know that I would -- I just don't know the answers to whether Ambassador Silberman at some point would get paid, but he's -- that's not necessarily the fact.

Q Does that raise the question of if he's -- if Rumsfeld is unpaid, which I was not aware of, it's not possible for someone who's unpaid to resign; is it or is it? (Laughter) Technically, he's not doing the job now?

A Don't wrap your story around that technicality. He's certainly a Presidential envoy, and I think you can go back and find in the record ample justification to support that point.

Q On Silberman, yesterday he was described by, I believe it was John Hughes -- whoever was giving the briefing -- as a key part of Rumsfeld's team. Now you call him an unpaid consultant.

A Well, that's a technical term. I'm not disagreeing with what John said about that in any way or backing away from it. But in terms of what his technical role is, just as I believe technically, in addition to being the President's special representative, or whatever the official title is for Ambassador Rumsfeld, he's technically I think on somebody's personnel form an unpaid expert, or an unpaid consultant, or -- "expert," I guess, would be the proper term in this case.

Ambassador Silberman is an unpaid consultant, but nonetheless, he, indeed, is a key part of Ambassador Rumsfeld's team.

Q Alan, has he never been formally named to this post? He sort of came into the public domain in a backhanded fashion.

A I don't know whether he's -- I don't know how that was effected.

Q Is there any indication of how long he is expected to or has agreed to serve as a key member of the team?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q Have you checked with this unpaid key member of the team? Are you speaking on behalf of him regarding these reports that he is preparing to resign?

A I think it was to the unpaid expert as opposed to the unpaid key member of the team that you may be referring. (Laughter)

Q I talked to the horse's mouth, I guess.

A I have not personally talked to Ambassador

Rumsfeld, but I think that you can take the position that I have given you as reflecting his views.

Q Is he in the building, Alan?

A I don't know if he's in the building today.

Q There's been a great crescendo of media reports that I'm sure you're aware of that our Lebanon policy has been a disaster, that Secretary Weinberger opposed the idea of putting Marines in Beirut which Secretary Shultz favored, and one news magazine has even suggested that Howard Baker will be succeeding Secretary Shultz.

My question is, does John believe that it was appropriate that both of his precedessors, Dean Fisher and Hodding Carter, resigned along with their respective Secretary, or does he expect to linger longer?

A I don't think that there's any suggestion whatsoever that Secretary Shultz has resignation plans.

Q Well, in the event --

A Oh, I don't --

Q In the event, would he go with him? I mean, it's kind of a settee kind of a thing.

A It's sort of hypothetical.

Q It's hypothetical. I see.

Q President Mubarak of Egypt, since his speech that was characterized as a surprise to the U.S. Administration here in Washington, came out with a series of statements that at least suggest that he is very much in difference with the U.S. Administration towards Syria, towards Lebanon, toward the Soviet Union, and maybe even towards Libya. Do you have any comment on his statements?

A I don't. I'm not familiar with the details of his statements. I think that it would also probably be inappropriate to comment in any detail. But I would also reiterate to you the points that were made during and following his visit here, which is that we have very good relations with President Mubarak and with the Government of Egypt, and certainly it is not to be expected that we agree on all issues. But that doesn't change that basic fact or the nature of the relationship.

Q Alan, does the U.S. provide, sell, grant any military supplies to Iraq or Iran?

A Military?

Q Yes.

A No. You know what our position is on that. We do not have any military supply relationship --

Q With either one?

A -- directly or indirectly with either Iran or Iraq. That has been our consistent policy.

Bill?

Q Is there any conversation going on with the Soviet Union over the Iran-Iraq situation?

A I guess I couldn't get into details of what our dialogue with the Soviets has been like. Certainly, the Middle East and various aspects of the Middle East have come up in conversations, but I really am not going to -- I'm afraid I'm not going to get into that.

George?

Q Regarding the reports of Rumsfeld's early departure, I believe you said, "The various people who are commenting have no information on which to base that." You mean to say you have not heard any suggestion to that effect in the various meetings you've attended in this building?

A I think that what I'm doing is perhaps reflecting when I say "no information," maybe you can say somebody said something so they're repeating what they heard. What I'm saying is that based on the facts of the matter, they have no true facts, if I may use that perhaps redundant term, on which to base that.

Q Are you saying he didn't plan to leave?

A I don't know what his plans over the long term may be. But the story was that he was going to make one more trip and was going to resign, and I've responded to that.

Ghassan?

Q Alan, I have two questions, please. First of all, the subcommittee yesterday also turned down an Administration -- a request, it seems, to sell Jordan F-16s and mobile missiles. Has Jordan, in fact, requested this officially, can you tell us?

A I can't tell you. I don't know. I haven't checked on that.

Q Has the Administration asked the Congress to approve this to Jordan?

A I can't tell you. I don't know. Certainly -- well, at this point, I think whatever is on the record from the Pentagon is what we have on-the-record in terms of requests. But I don't have anything -- in terms of -- you're talking about F-16s and --

Q F-16s and mobile missiles.

A -- and mobile Hawkes. I should think that if those were requested, I'm very sure that if those were requested those would be on-the-record, and I'm not aware that those have gone to the Hill. You might check with the Pentagon, but I just am not aware of that at all.

Ralph?

Q One more thing, please. Also, the subcommittee yesterday added $250 million more to FY-85 to Israel beyond what the Administration has requested. Will the Administration support that or will you actually fight against it?

A I can't tell you, because there's obviously a very long legislative process involved here, what specific actions the Administration might or might not take. Obviously, the Administration stands by its proposals, but I can't answer your question in specific terms; I don't know.

Q Just one last thing, please?

A Well --

Q About the PLO contact. If the subcommittee and then the Congress approves the amendment to the '75 memo with Kissinger, will that be binding on the American Government or future American governments?

A I don't know what the legislative situation is on that.

Ralph?

Q Alan, let me just clear up one more on Rumsfeld. Until yesterday, as recently as yesterday, John was saying that he expected Rumsfeld to make another trip to the region. He didn't have any specific plans to announce or anything of that sort.

If we ask you that question today, is the answer the same? You expect him to make another trip to the region?

A Yes, but I don't have any information on when that might be.

Q Do you expect him to go to Lebanon?

A Again, I don't have any information nor, as a matter of principle, would I get into questions of itinerary.

Marvin?

Q Is there, in the U.S. Government, a task force on the Persian Gulf?

A I think that the -- there was a spokesman at the White House, or somebody at the White House, who addressed this issue this morning indicating that there were a couple of different groups which did exist, working groups, which has existed for some months to look at the economic and other dimensions of this question, so I think that in that respect the answer is yes.

I don't have the details of how that's being done, but I think it was addressed and if you check with your White House colleagues, you'll find --

Q Is one of those in force here at the State Department?

A Well, I think State probably chairs one of those, reporting then through the NSC.

Q Which one -- the economics or --

A Economics or --

Q Or diplomacy?

A Well, I would think that it would be the latter. I just don't have the details on that, Marvin, and I would refer you to what was said at the White House this morning.

David?

Q Do you have anything on Gemayel's trip to Damascus?

A No, I don't.

Q Do you have anything on the Prime Minister of Morocco's visit? There was some reports about the American solution for western Sahara conflict --

A The American -- what?

Q American solution? There was some reports from the Arab world about this.

A I'm not aware of an American solution. Our position on resolution of that conflict is long on the record and I'd refer you back to what we've said. I don't have the magic words in front of me, but it isn't a question of an American solution.

Q What about the visit of the Prime Minister? Do you have anything?

A I don't have anything here.

Q Any decision on El Salvador (inaudible) aid?

A I don't have anything new to say on El Salvador today.

Q Alan, do you have any southern Africa guidance today on all the various meetings, or anything else on those hostages, those 77 hostages in Angola?

A No, I don't.

Q Going back to your earlier answer to my question about the Congress, you said, then, two points not appropriate for the Congress to interfere in the operation of what the President and his aides are doing, and not appropriate for them to put the restrictions.

Besides the "not appropriate," are you trying now to possibly have sort of a confrontation situation with the members of this committee or other committees?

A No, I don't think we're ever looking for a confrontation at all.

Q Besides, then, appropriate -- they're going to pass the thing. Will the President veto this type of thing which will come (inaudible)

A You can ask your question at the White House, but I think the basic answer is one never -- you know, this is part of a long legislative process. That's not the kind of thing which I think you'll find Presidential Spokesmen talking about at this stage of the game.

Q Alan, will we -- do we have any plans to move our Embassy to the German Democratic Republic out of East Berlin or is Israel to remain as the only nation's capital in the world where we put our Embassy in another city?

A As far as East Berlin is concerned, I know of no plan to change. As far as, do we approve --

Q Do we approve of that as the capital?

A As far as Jerusalem is concerned, I refer you to Larry Eagleburger's testimony.

Q What I wanted to ask, do we approve of the East German regime having that as the --

A I just speak to the facts. The facts are, we have our Embassy there.

Q Alan, could I ask you a couple questions on Asia. Several days ago the Department was asked about the U.S. -- about the Administration position regarding a proposal of Congressman Solarz to change the mix of aid going to the Philippines. At that time, the answer was that it's under study. Now I understand that the subcommittee has adopted something like this, very similar to it, if not the same proposal. Do you have a position on --

A I don't have an update on what we said the other day, Don. I'm sure in due course we will have something, but I just don't have anything today.

Q And, secondly, does the State Department have any reaction to statements by the Vietnamese government that they are going to redouble their efforts to find American missing in action, and so forth, in southeastern Asia; and do you think this will have any effect on Vietnamese-American relationships down the road?

A I think we have some guidance on this in the Press Office. Let me refer you to that, and if we don't, I will endeavor to get you something on that.

Q Do you have anything on the Grenada airport decision?

A Don't have anything new on that.

Q Back on the Philippines for a second. Opposition leader Jose Dickno today accused the U.S. Embassy of seeking to persuade the opposition to participate in the May elections, and that they were using inducements -- financial and logistical. Do you have any comment on that?

A I don't know anything about the facts, but I don't -- all I can really say is that we have consistently supported free and fair elections in which the opposition would have an equitable opportunity to compete, participate, and the working out of modalities for that is obviously first and foremost a Philippine responsibility. So I don't have any comment beyond that.

Q Do you have any comment on the views expressed widely in the U.S. press during the last days that the emphasis of the U.S. Administration policy in the Middle East has been shifted to Iran-Iraq war, away from Lebanon?

A I think that it is simply factually there. It is a fact that the Iran-Iraq war and its heating up is something which has caught peoples' attention. It is potentially -- it is a very serious matter and potentially an even more serious matter. So I don't think one has to talk about diverting attention in order to make that rather obvious statement.

Our concerns for an interest in Lebanon remain; remain as they have been, the goals remain as they have been, and at this point the principal dialogue, although we are actively engaged in talking to some people, clearly is taking place between some of the parties out there who are on the ground.

I think, though, it would be a mistake to suggest that the U.S. somehow was no longer interested in, no longer takes seriously the situation in Lebanon. And if I may refer back to a question asked both yesterday and today, it would similarly be a mistake to suggest that Ambassador Rumsfeld no longer has an interest in or is involved in matters regarding Lebanon.

Q I think the key word in the question was the "emphasis."

A I can't really measure that for you. I mean, I don't know how one measures "emphasis." There's been emphasis all along in the last several months on Lebanon and on the Middle East peace process. Iran-Iraq has been a continuing problem. It has gotten to be a more acute problem recently, so, yes, there is more attention being paid to it. There's no question about that, but I really can't weigh these things the way you want to do.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 1:00 P.M.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 29, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #38

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 29, 1984, 12:26 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon all. A couple of announcements up front. Secretary Shultz will be testifying at 9:30 tomorrow morning before the Senate Appropriations Committee on the Fiscal Year '85 Budget Request. Prepared text will be available in the Press Office at that time. Due to his appearance on the Hill, we will not be having a noon briefing tomorrow.

Point Number 2: Available in the Press Office at 2:00 this afternoon will be the prepared statement by Under Secretary for Science and Technology William Schneider before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. That testimony is on foreign assistance.

Point Number 3: Briefing on a BACKGROUNDER on El Salvador on Friday, March 2, at 10:00 here in the briefing room. There'll be a BACKGROUNDER on the situation in El Salvador as that country approaches the March 25 presidential elections.

And, finally, an announcement on the appointment of a charge to Grenada: The State Department announces the appointment of Ambassador Loren E. Lawrence -- that's L-A-W-R-E-N-C-E -- as the new U.S. charge d'affaires in Grenada.

Q Loren?

A Loren: L-O-R-E-N. Middle initial is "E" and his surname is Lawrence, L-A-W-R-E-N-C-E. He'll be replacing Charles A. Gillespie, who will be returning to Washington to resume his responsibilities as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs. Ambassador Lawrence, a career Foreign Service Officer, was the United States' Ambassador to Jamaica from 1979 to 1982. Prior to his present assignment, he was detailed to the Americas Society, headed by David Rockfeller. He served with the United States Business Committee on Jamaica, which is affiliated with the Americas Society. He also was the Society's Vice President and headed its recently formed office in Miami.

Roy Haverkamp, -- H-A-V-E-R-K-A-M-P -- also a career Foreign Sevice Officer, who served as Deputy Chief of Mission in our Embassy in Jamaica from 1978 to 1981, will be accompanying Ambassador Lawrence to Grenada and serving as the Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy.

That's all I have for you.

Q How is it it's just a charge?

A That is the level that is appropriate to territories -- to islands of that size in the Caribbean, and is in line with other islands.

Q Will he be reporting to (inaudible)?

A I'm not sure what -- let me check what their reporting line is; whether that's through Bridgetown or whether it's direct to Washington.

Q And, also, we missed the time of the briefing.

A I think it was 10:00 -- 10:00, Friday.

Q John, has this government now been informed by President Gemayel that he _is_ abrogating the May 17 agreement?

A Will do one of two things. First, not -- traditionally, I'm not going into our diplomatic exchanges, but, in fact -- I think the fact of the matter is that President Gemayel is in Damascus and we, like you, will have to wait to see what developments ensue.

Q And what about the situation in Beirut itself; what do you hear?

A In Beirut itself? Don't have anything on that car bomb explosion for you this morning. We've seen the same reports as you have. We're looking into them.

Yesterday, there was fighting along the Green line. There were also sporadic exchanges in the Suq al-Gharb area. Today, the airport and the Port of Beirut remain closed.

Q Do you have any comment on the statements by a senior diplomatic source who said that the United States was asked but did not agree to take military action in case the Syrians should move into areas where the possibility of Christian massacres exists?

A No, I think in principle, again, we would not get into diplomatic exchanges with other governments or other diplomats. But, also, as a matter of general principle, the United States would be deeply concerned should there be attacks on civilians of any religious community, and would certainly consider an appropriate response.

Q What does that mean -- military?

A I think we will just simply hold to the words we've offered you, Jim.

Q Is there any information on the second meeting of the U.S.-Israeli political/military commission?

A I don't -- no. I don't have anything on it.

Q It's being said that it's now held in Israel, but no other information.

A It's now being held in Israel? I think that's very unlikely.

Q I saw the report coming from the Middle East.

A I don't think so. I think that meeting -- that committee was supposed to meet on a 6-monthly basis. Let me take a look at that, but I have great doubt about that report.

Q Can you take the question?

A Okay, sure.

Q John, how do you describe the relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia these days in light of the Saudis taking initiative in the matter of cease-fire and bringing about a possible solution to the Lebanese question outside the participation of the United States in it?

A We have common goals in Lebanon; we have common interests in a number of places, and those relations are good.

Q The reason I'm asking this question because of the story -- this front page of the Washington

Post today left the impression that you almost told the Lebanese somehow to do it by themselves with the Saudis and others and possibly stay away from the United States' participation in trying to come to a solution.

A Do what? Do what themselves?

Q If they want to abrogate the May 17 agreement and possibly the Saudis have an interest in abrogating it to bring about the peaceful solution to Lebanon question, they were objecting to the abrogation of the agreement and telling them -- like the Secretary said in his statement when he was here that anybody who wants to abrogate the agreement has to look for alternatives or a solution to get the Israelis out.

In light of this, you know, what's the substance of --

A What you say is correct. That is our position, that we have consistently thought this was a good agreement and are aware of discussions and suggestions and reports that one side might abrogate that treaty. That would be a reality. It doesn't alter our analysis, our feeling that it was and is a good agreement. It doesn't alter what the Secrtary has previously said: namely, that those who seek to abrogate it bear responsibility for defining, achieving some alternative way of insuring Israeli withdrawal. That has been our position all along. That is our position. But I wouldn't use the characterization that you used, which seemed rather harsh.

Q Did Prince Bandar brief you yesterday about his meeting in Damascus?

A He was in; he saw the Secretary. Obviously, we're not going to get into what they discussed.

Q At what time was he here yesterday?

A I think he was in around 2:30 in the afternoon; I think he was in early afternoon.

Q John, if you won't get into what's discussed, would you say whether or not there was a letter delivered?

A I think Prince Bandar was bearing a letter, yes, from King Fahd to the President.

Q Would you steer us away from believing the reports of what that letter contained?

A I wouldn't get into reports of what that letter contained. I wouldn't steer you one way or the other. Just not going to get into the content of the letter.

Q What would be the U.S. sense insofar as the impact on American credibility in the Middle East if President Gemayel were, in fact, to abrogate an agreement that was brought about with the major assistance by the United States?

A What effect would that have on American credibility? His abrogation of the treaty?

Q Because of the involvement of the United States in the achievement of that agreement in the first place. Now, if it turns out that way to be repudiated, what effect would that have in the perception, as you would see it, in the Middle East?

A It's really hard for me to project along the lines you suggest, Bernie, but the record is very clear. The United States was asked to assist in getting an agreement which would insure the withdrawal of the Israelis. The United States did that. Certain other actions which one presumes might take place after that, such as Syrian withdrawal, haven't happened. That's clearly not the fault of the United States.

The United States has invested, I think, a great deal in terms of commitment in Lebanon; and I think countries and historians will have to judge the validity of that commitment and involvement. As I've said before, we think it's been honorable; we think it's been worthwhile; and we think it was the right thing to do to try to bring peace to Lebanon.

Q Would you characterize as a warning, saying that those who are going to abrogate the agreement should bear the responsibility? Is that a sort of warning, or just drawing the attention of the --

A I don't think it's a warning; I think it is a statement of fact. You have seen various statements by the Israelis, how they would view the abrogation; you have seen statements coming out of Israel on what Israel did or surrendered, or negotiated away -- various Israeli spokesmen have talked about that -- to participate in the May 17 Agreement. So I'll just refer you to Israel for a discussion of what might take that place.

Q John, do you have a reading of the talks with Prime Minister Lamrani of Morocco, at all?

A Not a great deal, Bill. The focus of the discussion is the economic situation in Morocco. He is making a two-day official working visit to Washington; he is going to meet with the President. I'm not sure -- I guess that's today; I'm not sure what the time schedule is.

The President, the Vice President -- he has already met with the Secretary of State. He'll be seeing other members of the Executive Branch, members of Congress. The discussions will focus on economic questions. The Moroccan delegation will be meeting with the IMF and with officials of the World Bank, as well with other members of the U.S. Government about that economic situation.

The United States will be reviewing with the Moroccans various bilateral issues, including development and security assistance programs, and will discuss several ongoing negotiations, and I think the Prime Minister has with him his Ministers of Information, Economic Planning, Finance, Commerce, and Agriculture, as well as some senior military officials from Morocco.

Q John, what is the official U.S. position on the Western Sahara now? Do we still not recognize the annexation?

A I think I'll refer you to th[illegible]ds we've used in the past.

Q There is no change in --

A No change.

Q John, anything new on Iran/Iraq?

A Not a great deal, but I will give you what little I have. No change in our evaluation of the situation insofar as Kharg Island is concerned. We still have nothing to add to our previous statements regarding the claims of both sides. That's about it.

Q Why is Ismat Kittani coming to Washington? Will he be meeting with -- he's the Under Secretary.

A Yes. Let me do a little research on that one for you.

Q John, I have a couple of questions on Central America. One is, has a decision been made on additional aid for El Salvador?

A No.

Q The other question is, there was a report earlier today that maybe you have approved a visa for D'Aubuisson to finally come --

A Not true, no application from Mr. D'Aubuisson since the time of his previous visa application, which I will get for you in a minute. The previous one was November 14, 1983. No request since then, nothing pending.

Q Should he make a request, would you now grant the visa?

A Look at it in terms of U.S. law, existing laws.

Q Also on El Salvador, there is a State Department document that is circulating on the Hill and that was cited by The Wall Street Journal some weeks ago about the U.S. and the Archbishop's office's methodology on tallying human rights violations and civilian non-combattant deaths.

Now America's Watch, a human rights organization, has issued a report on it. Do you have any comment with respect to this?

A No.

Q Can we get a copy of the cable in question since it has --

A I'm just blank on what you're talking about, so let me take a look at it.

Q O.K.

Q Suq al-Gharb was once described by the Administration as of vital U.S. interest.

A Uh-huh.

Q Is it so? I ask that in the context of a report that the U.S. apparently told the Lebanese that there would not be any military naval fire to support the Lebanese Armed Forces on the ground.

A A couple of things: I think the situation at Suq al-Gharb is relatively static, firstly, Bernie, but in fact, our rules of engagement have not changed, and will be implemented tactically by military commanders on the scene, as need be.

Q How are you reconciling "have not changed" when once you did fire to help the LAF in Suq al-Gharb, and now, apparently the report is, that you will not?

A Well, I'm telling you where the rules of engagement stand. There has been no change in them. We will fire when fired upon.

Q Wait a minute. Will you fire if Suq al-Gharb comes under the threat of --

A I think if Americans are fired on from wherever, that fire will be returned.

Q The first time on Suq al-Gharb, it was not linked to any Americans; it was linked to Suq al-Gharb on its own.

A Well, it was linked to the safety of Americans. I think there was the danger that the loss of that position might present American forces --

Q That was an after-thought?

A No, that was not an after-thought.

Q Even if that's true, then, John, since the Marines are no longer there, are you saying that Suq al-Gharb no longer fills that category?

A I am saying that clearly there have been changes in the disposition of American forces in Beirut. The rules of engagement have not changed, and will be implemented at the time of incidents in the light of tactical decisions made by military commanders.

-- MORE --

Q John, are there American troops in Suq al-Gharb?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q Okay. If shooting -- if Suq al-Gharb was being shelled or bombarded, whatever it is, and there are no Americans, will naval units of the United States respond, react?

A Well, as I say, the rules of engagement haven't changed. The yardstick is the safety of Americans in the greater Beirut area, and the situation would be looked at in the light of the situation.

Q But you -- I'm a little bit confused. If there are no Americans there, and you said the safety of Americans are involved, why will then the United States Navy ships reply if Suq al-Gharb is under attack?

A Well, I didn't -- you're making a judgment. I didn't say that. What I said was that the safety of Americans in Beirut is the yardstick. They wouldn't have to be in Suq al-Gharb. There could well be a danger to them --

Q Okay. Will --

A -- without them being in Suq al-Gharb.

Q Will bombardment of Suq al-Gharb, in your estimates, threaten Americans in Beirut?

A Well, I'm not going to get into hypothetical situations.

Q John, wait a minute now. You've just changed -- I think you just changed what you said in the last two minutes.

A Oh, perish the thought. (Laughter)

Q You said there has been a change in the disposition of American --

A Correct.

Q -- forces in Lebanon since the fighting --

A In Beirut.

Q On Suq -- in Beirut -- well, in Lebanon --

A Right.

Q -- since the firing on Suq-al-Gharb the last time.

A So you make different judgments --

Q So you make different judgments --

A -- as to whether Americans are in jeopardy.

Q Right. The question now -- but then in this later answer you suggested that at the time of the last firing on Suq al-Gharb the yardstick was the safety of Americans in Beirut --

A Right.

Q -- as opposed to the safety of Americans at the airport, which was the issue the last time.

A I'm not -- well, I'd have to go back and look at the language. I'm not sure that the definition was that fine, Ralph, and I don't think we have ever taken a position that we will only defend the Americans at the airport and have no concern about Americans in the rest of Beirut.

Q Well, no, now wait a minute. Nobody ever suggested that. But the firing on Suq al-Gharb -- at the time Suq al-Gharb was seen as a strategic point from which the Marines at the airport could be attacked.

A That's correct.

Q And for that reason the U.S. said, in order to protect American positions, there was firing on Suq al-Gharb. Now --

A That's correct.

Q -- the disposition of Americans has changed. There are no Americans at those positions which could be fired upon from Suq al-Gharb.

A Well, I don't know where else you could fire on from Suq al-Gharb. I'm not a military expert.

Q How about the U.S. residents?

A If you could fire -- it seems to me if you could fire on the American Ambassador's residence from Suq al-Gharb and somebody did, I would think that we would fire back under the present rules of engagement.

Q Another one on the Lebanon thing: Going back to something you said a little while ago -- and this may be -- seem really picky, and I don't mean to be that way -- the U.S. has invested so much effort and so on, you concluded by saying it was the right thing to do to try to bring peace to Lebanon.

The tone of that statement suggested that everything was in the past tense.

A Not at all. No.

Q You didn't mean to suggest that? You --

A No, no. I was talking about the entry of the American Marines, the deaths of American Marines. As you know, you have a redeployment, they're there, they're on the ships, the President has talked about the circumstances in which they might be used.

Q John, any decision on Grenada, on the building of the airport?

A Not really. As you know, the United States is interested in being helpful, but don't have anything to give you today on that. But certainly we continue to look at it, and the United States has an interest in being helpful in the finish --

Q The study has been completed?

A I think the study's been completed.

Q And --

A But I just don't have anything to give you in terms of a decision today.

Q Okay.

Q John, the statement attributed to a senior official, a U.S. senior official -- he said that as soon as the Marines pulled out of Beirut, all the factions of the Beirut area tried to talk to us, meaning to the United States. Can one assume now that the relations are better with the factions in Beirut?

A Oh, I don't know that I'd characterize them. Our ambassador there is a very active and vigorous ambassador, has consistently talked to a variety of factions, and you certainly may be assured that he's continuing to do that. And there certainly seems to be a healthy enthusiasm on the part of various factions to keep talking with our ambassador there and other diplomats, American diplomats.

Q John --

Q John, on the --

A Excuse me. Let me take one over here.

Q In Evans & Novak column this morning -- I don't want to ask about the column in general, but there is a piece, or report, that says that the Secretary of State is not taking a position favorable to Iraq or tilting towards Iraq, in the column, as a result of his tilt or whatever the terminology that he uses because of the -- a feel from the Israelis because Israelis doesn't want him to side with Iraq against Iran. What do you comment on this -- such statements?

A I think that the State Department now, like various other agencies of government, is sort of about at the point where we're no longer commenting on Evans & Novak columns.

Q No longer commenting on Evans & Novak? Why? Is it because it's taken out of context or is it because --

A It --

Q I know that you comment --

A It gets to be a regular business of having to amplify and modify and correct and restate, and I think we're out of the business.

Q John, about Morocco, I mean, recently the Western Sahara dominated the Moroccan scene, especially your great help to Morocco.

A Uh-huh.

Q So can you shed some light on the conflict there? What's your position on the conflict --

A Be glad --

Q (Inaudible)

A No. It doesn't mean no change, and I'd refer you to the carefully crafted words we've offered in the past on it.

Q There was a resolution by African -- Organization of African Unity lately that Morocco should do a referendum there.

A Uh-huh.

Q And until now they haven't done it, so what's your position on that?

A I don't know that we have taken a position on that, but I'll refer you to the carefully crafted words we've used in the past on this subject.

Q John, one question on the Salvador aid thing again. Is it safe for us to assume that by Friday at 10:00 a.m. there will be a decision on aid to El Salvador?

A Oh, I wouldn't assume -- I wouldn't make such an assumption. If -- I mean, if your question is --

Q Well, is the fact of the matter --

A -- does the backgrounder by a senior Administration official, is it tied to that event, no. The answer is, not. This is -- this particular official has had plans to be here for some time, and we thought this was a good time to give you a backgrounder.

Q John, when do you expect a decision to be made? Do you think it -

A When?

Q Yes.

A Don't have anything for you on that today.

Q Back on Beirut for just a second, John?

A Sure.

Q Is it the State Department's opinion that the United States has expended its best efforts to ensure that the May 17 agreement is not abrogated or interfered with?

A Expended its best efforts?

Q Yes.

A I think we have repeatedly made clear our position on it. It was something that we were not a signatory to, but we were a witness to, and we certainly facilitated, and our commitment was to it and is to it. It's up to the parties to decide how to proceed.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:51 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
Friday, March 2, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #39

FRIDAY, MARCH 2, 1984, 12:34 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, everybody. I have a flurry of housekeeping announcements up front for you.

First of all, the Secretary of State will accept the American Legion Auxiliary's Third Public Service Award today at 5:20 in the Loy Henderson Conference Room. He will make brief acceptance remarks -- probably about five minutes. The award is presented annually for distinguished service to the nation. President Reagan accepted this award in 1982, and Secretary Weinberger in 1983. If you want to cover this event, please be in touch with Barbara Good at 632-2713, and I guess the setup time in the Loy Henderson Room is going to be from around noon to about 3:00 o'clock.

Q Is Mr. Weinberger going to be there?

A I really don't know. Just to remind you that Secretary Shultz will deliver on-the-record remarks at the 1984 Conservative Political Action Conference today. That's at 4:15 at the Sheraton-Washington Hotel. If you want to cover that one, please be in touch with Ellen Lathem, L-a-t-h-e-m, at Gray and Company. She's at 333-7400. Barring technical difficulties -- always the caveat -- we plan to pipe the Secretary's remarks in and the Q&A session to the briefing room this afternoon.

Q 4:15 you said?

A Yes, Hank. That's 4:15.

Q Do you have a text on that?

A I do not think there's a text on that.

Q Can you give us the subject?

A Not, I think, at this stage.

Q Is this a speech or just remarks?

A It will be remarks.

Under Secretary for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger will address the National Newspaper Association in the Loy Henderson Auditorium at 5:00 p.m. on Wednesday, March 7. His topic will be the Atlantic Alliance. That session is open to coverage, including cameras. However, the Q&A session will be limited to questions from NNA members.

Got a bunch of stuff available for you in the Press Office. In the Press Office are copies of the Congressional Presentation on the FY-1985 Security Assistance Program. Sadly, due to the limited number, distribution will be one copy per news organization.

Also available in the Press Office is the prepared statement by Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick before the Senate Appropriations Committee today. The subject of that testimony is the voting patterns at the United Nations during 1983.

Also in the Press Office will be copies of our U.S. Policy Review of UNESCO. That review has been completed, and copies will be available in the Press Office after the briefing.

Finally, just a readout on the visit here this morning by the Vice President of the Sudan. Vice President Umer al-Tayyib of Sudan met this morning with Secretary Shultz for an exchange of views on U.S.-Sudanese relations. The Vice President is meeting Vice President Bush and other senior government officials during his visit.

Vice President al-Tayyib's visit gave us a welcome opportunity to reaffirm the close and cooperative relationship between the Sudan and the United States. We strongly support the efforts of Sudanese authorities to seek political solutions to internal political differences, and we condemn the efforts by outside powers to exploit current internal differences for their own purposes.

I think that's about --

Q Copy of that last one, please, John?

A Sure.

Q John, can you explain why the United States has denied a visa to the Soviet representative of the Olympics team?

A Yes, I can. The Soviets submitted a visa request for a person to be accredited to the United States with full diplomatic immunity to serve for six months as an attache dealing with Olympic matters. We found the individual in question to be unacceptable for this purpose. We informed the Soviets in December that this person would be unacceptable, and we did so within days of the Soviets having indicated to us through the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee their desire to assign him to the United States.

We want to make it clear that this action was solely a matter of the individual involved. We are fully prepared to meet our obligations under the International Olympic Charter as host government for the summer Olympics, including accepting the presence in Los Angeles of a Soviet Olympics attache.

However, the person who holds that position must be acceptable for that purpose. In other words, it must be someone whose activities will be solely related to the Olympics. The reasons for rejecting this particular individual involve matters of internal security which we're not going to get into any further.

Q Matters of internal security of this country?

A Of this country.

Q Has this gentleman been in this country before?

A He has been in this country before.

Q In what position?

Q Did we ever bounce him?

A I don't know -- I'm not aware of that, Hank. I'm not -- I think he served in the Soviet Embassy here on a previous occasion, and he was here, I think, in November on a different kind of visa with the Soviet visiting delegation, Olympic delegation, I gather.

Q John, assuming he was a KGB agent, why would that make him ineligible to be a Soviet Olympic attache?

A Well, whether he -- I'm not going to have any comment on whether he is or is not a KGB agent, or whether we think he is. But our position is that we think that anybody who's going to be an Olympic attache ought to be an Olympic attache.

Q How do you know he won't be?

A Well, I think you just have to accept the fact that we have made a judgment in this case on grounds of internal security, and we don't think the internal security of the United States would be best served by having this particular gentleman operating for six months in Los Angeles.

Q Do you base it on his --

Q Who made the decision, John? Do you know?

A I cannot give you that, John. I do not -- it's a Departmental decision, but specifically who made it, I don't know.

Q Do you know if there was considerable dispute between this agency and other agencies?

A I'm not aware of any.

Q Couldn't the fellow be both? Couldn't he both be a good Olympic official and a KGB agent?

A I think that would be what would cause the problem, Bernie.

Q John, how much -- getting for a minute to the public image of this episode, is it worth the appearance that the United States now has of blocking an Olympic official from coming to the U.S. to have --

A That may be your interpretation of the appearance. It's not a correct, factual analysis. As I said, there's no suggestion -- the bottom line here is there's no suggestion that we are blocking in any way the legitimate activity of a Soviet Olympic delegation. What we are seeking to block is illegitimate activity.

Q But my question is, is it worth it? Whether the damage that he could do to U.S. national security is serious enough to justify creating the possible image that may be created by this?

A I don't see why there's an image problem. It seems to me we are perfectly in order on grounds of national security on rejecting a specific individual while making it totally clear that we would accept another individual.

Q Was there any contact with the Soviet Embassy after December in reference to this?

A I think there have been discussions.

Q John, on the matter of timeliness, you say that the Soviets were notified.

A Yes.

Q Was the U.S. Olympic Committee also notified?

A That I cannot answer, Jim. Maybe somebody can. I'll be glad to take a look at that question.

Q Their chief complaint is that they were not told.

A Uh-huh.

Q And now time is running out.

A Uh-huh. Uh-huh. Okay. Let me see if -- what kind of contact we've had.

Q John, along those lines, could you give us a little bit more detail about that back and forth in December --

A I really can't --

Q When it was, at what level, where and so forth?

A No. I really can't give you back and forth on the timing of the back and forth. Obviously, the Soviets don't agree with our action on this and have made their view known to us.

Q Did this fall out of some action he may have taken during the November visit, John? He's been here before, as you say.

A He was here before, and the decision to give him a visa in November and refuse him this time, various factors entered into that decision, and one of them was the length of time that he would be here as an Olympic attache, which I say is six months or more, as distinct from the length of his previous visit.

Also, an additional factor is that in this instance -- I forget the characterization of the visa, which I can get for you, on which he came before -- but the visa under which he would be operating, or the accreditation under which he would be operating if we had granted him entry on this occasion, would be full diplomatic immunity.

Q Which means he could travel distances from Los Angeles?

A I'm not sure whether restrictions would still be imposed on how far he could travel, but, obviously, full diplomatic immunity confers a degree of latitude that other kinds of visas do not.

Q John, do the representatives from other countries have that kind of immunity?

Q Could we hear the question, please?

A Do representatives from -- let me check on that for you, Hank. I'm not sure about that.

Q John, the FBI has repeatedly told Congress that about 60 percent of all Soviet and East-bloc diplomats here are KGB or military intelligence.

A Uh-huh.

Q We routinely, obviously, give visas to Soviet diplomats who we know not to be, or at least have to suspect are not intelligence agents. Why, in this particular case, since you're dealing with somebody you theortetically know is an agent and therefore would have less difficulty in observing, is there such a self-righteousness about it?

A Well, I don't think it's self-righteousness. I think that national security, the internal security of the United States, given one or two developments that have taken place lately, given the experience of a number of other countries confronted by Soviet espionage, is an issue to be taken very seriously, and I'm really not prepared to get into the details of why one Soviet official is approved and another not.

Q John, the Soviets know pretty well how we operate. They must have expected that his name would come up "tilt" on our computers. Do you think that they put his name forward on purpose, expecting that, looking for this kind of response?

A I don't know. I guess you'd have to -- I think probably they are better able to offer you an analysis of their motivation than I am.

Q I'm wondering whether it's possible that we might have fallen for a provocation.

A Well, the fact is that we have made our decision on a basis of internal security and the principles that govern our decisions in this matter.

Q John, is the fact that the Olympics are being held in a restricted area and the nature of some of the defense-related facilities in the area of the Olympic games a factor in this decision?

A Well, without going into that, I think, obviously, the question of internal security does have a bearing on where Soviets are traveling and operating.

Q John, besides the length of time and the visa, specific visa, was there any evidence of what this individual could do here, or was that based only on -

A I'm really not going to get into our estimate of who he is or what he is or what he might do.

Q John, the State Department rejected this man three months ago. Why is it just coming out now? Does this indicate Soviet persistence on this one individual?

A Well, as I say, we told the Soviets in December that he would be unacceptable. Despite that, they presented his name in a formal manner. I guess that formal period of consideration was about 18 days. The application was formally submitted to our Embassy in Moscow on February 10. Given the nature of this case, the formal decision process required consultations back and forth and with other -- perhaps with other agencies, and our decision was made on February 28.

Q Why do you think they are being so persistent, John?

A I don't know. You'll have to ask them.

Q John, you mentioned a minute ago, given one or two developments lately Were they developments related to this individual, or --

A No, no, no. I didn't mean to mislead you. What I got asked was a general question --

Q Yes. Well --

A -- why are you so worried about someone --

Q What developments were you talking about lately?

A Well, I'm talking about --

Q I mean, the last time the U.S. threw somebody out was --that we were told about, was last, early last summer, I think.

A Well, I think it would be naive to suggest that Soviet intelligence activities are not continuing.

Q Is the whole --

Q John, excuse me. I think you may have misspoken, or I miswrote. The application was made on December 10, you say?

Q February 10.

A The Soviets told us back in December that this would be the individual. We told them --

Q Yeah.

A -- informally --

Q Right.

A -- or unofficially, or however you will, that he would be not acceptable.

Q I see.

A They came --

Q In November.

A In December.

Q No. In November you told them he would be unacceptable, and they came back in December --

Q No, no.

A Am I misleading you here? Do you think I'm right, or do you think Bernie Kalb's right?

Q I think you're right, John.

A You think I'm right. (Laughter)

Q Could you do the chronology so I can get it right? (Laughter) And possibly you too.

A We informed the Soviets in December that this person would be unacceptable, and we did so within days of the Soviets having indicated to us their desire to assign him to the U.S. Now, I don't quite know when in December, Bernie, so I -- you know, there could be a little slippage there in terms of months, but in fact it was in December.

Q Was he ever thrown out of the country, out of this country?

A I do not -- I am not aware that he was ever thrown out of this country.

-- MORE --

Q Continuing with your chronology, and then, something, the 10th of some month?

A Formally?

Q Yes.

A February 10, in Moscow, they submitted their visa application. We took 18 days to consider that and make the decision, and our decision was made February 28.

Q You told them when?

A February 28.

Q Could you help us out, John. You said he had been at the U.S. Embassy as well as having visited in November.

A He was here briefly in November. It's my understanding -- I'd like to go back and check this, but it's my understanding that he had previously been assigned to Washington and served in the Soviet Embassy in Washington, but let me check that for you.

Q What delegation was he on when he was here in November? Was it that high-level negotiation?

A Let me get that one for you, that answer as well. But it was an Olympics delegation.

Q Was it an Olympics delegation in November?

A Yes.

Q In November it was an Olympics delegation?

A In November.

Q John, should we read this as a kind of bottomline situation in which the Administration feels it has to put up with incoming Soviet diplomats who are obviously or potentially likely KGB and GRU, but that it draws the line on Olympic officials being GRU and KGB?

A Oh, I don't think I would draw lines anyway -- anywhere. I would simply say that the United States probably has an interest in Soviet diplomats who may be KGB officials.

Q John, what happens to the rest of the list in the meantime? Have other approvals been made or is the list held in abeyance?

A Of non-Soviets?

Q Of Olympic delegation?

A Of Olympic delegation? Let me check that for you.

Q Thank you.

Q John, do you know if there's been any suggestion by the Soviets in this exchange that they might not attend the Olympics?

A No, I'm not aware of such a suggestion.

Q On a related question to this, do you have any comment on the speech in Moscow by General Secretary Chernenko this morning?

A I think Larry Speakes had some initial White House reaction which you might want to check. Whether we would have any further analysis during the day, I'm not sure. We'll get back to you.

Q Do you anticipate you may?

A Sorry?

Q Do you anticipate you may have sometime today?

A Might have some; might have something later on that.

Q Could we get back to the Olympic thing for just a second, please?

A Sure.

Q Let me follow -- go one step beyond and ask you whether any decision has been made yet by the Administration on how other members of the Soviet Olympic participants, whether they be sports athletes or administrators of the teams or whatever, how they would arrive in Los Angeles? There was some decision on the Aeroflot landing.

A I don't, unless there's been some new development.

MR. ROMBERG: I don't we have anything on it.

MR. HUGHES: No, we don't.

Q And the second question is with regard to athletes. Will the same considerations that went into deciding whether this man can come here for that duration of time apply to athletes and trainers, and so on, who may come and --

A Can't answer that of my own knowledge, but let me see if I can help you with that.

Q John, how long was he here? Do you know in November when he was here on the Olympic delegation?

A It was briefly.

Q Briefly?

A Briefly.

Q But why was he allowed in then? Did he just slip through the net?

A Different kind of visa; different kind of situation. As I understand it, he was not afforded full diplomatic immunity under those circumstances, and I don't know -- we can probably get that for you -- the duration of his visa but it was a short-term visa; different kind of visa. B-2, is it --

MR. ROMBERG: B-1.

MR. HUGHES: B-1 visa, and obviously different length of time, different kind of visa, different situation.

Q Couldn't you have stopped him then as well on the basis of the same considerations that you did this time?

A I presume we could have. I presume we could have, and I presume we chose not to.

Q Did you learn anything during his November visit that influenced the December --

A Nice try, Bernie, but I don't think I'll go any further.

Q What about his being in the Soviet Embassy here? Do you have any idea when?

A I don't, but we'll try to find out for you.

Q John, I want to make sure I didn't miss something a while ago when you said you didn't know of his ever having been thown out of this country. Does the "this" have any significance?

A No, no, I wasn't playing games. I mean, I just don't know.

Q What other countries have attaches or would-be attaches similar to this case? Do other countries also have -- do all the countries have special attaches?

A They may. I don't know. They do; I'm told they do.

Q Just what would be the nature of his job as attache to the Olympics?

A You're going beyond the instant expertise I brought to this briefing today, I'm afraid.

Q John, could you say anything about the Secretary's view of this since last week before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I think, he said he opposed the policy of denying visas, and his quote was something like we can accept all comers?

A I don't see any contradiction between a decision based on security concerns and the general philosophical view expressed on his part about the readiness to have dissenting -- people of dissenting views into the United States. I think we're talking somewhat different categories here. Not always, but I guess some of the time.

Q Do you have a position as a Department of State towards the campaign to prevent the Soviet Union from attending the Olympic games?

A We're not attempting to prevent the Soviet Union -- the United States Government is not attempting to prevent the Soviet Union.

Q Can we have a filing break?

A Filing break? Sure.

Q Can I ask one thing on this, John? Is it normal that such officials coming for such capacity to ask for what this man asks and you're denying him; that is, full immunity, or something like that?

A I think in the capacity in which he's coming, the request is not out of line.

Q It's not out of line?

A If you're asking technically whether the request is out of line, I don't think the request is out of line.

Q And if he were to ask for less than that immunity, would he be allowed in this country?

A Hypothetical situation, but I wouldn't put a lot of money on it. (Laughter)

Q Do you have any comment on the meetings in Damascus which have now ended between President Assad and President Gemayel?

A Really don't. President Gemayel is, as you know, back in Beirut. We've seen Beirut's reports of initial reaction by Lebanese officials to those talks. Our Ambassador, I think, met with the Foreign Minister, Mr. Salem, this morning, but don't have any readout for you from our point of view and I think probably the Lebanese Embassy is the right place to get it.

Q One question on the Soviet diplomat. What could he do in this country that other Soviet diplomats, eventually reassigned for this post, couldn't do?

A I guess I'm just really not going to get into the activities of Soviet diplomats and how --

Q What about Mr. Rumsfeld? What's he doing?

A He's still in the country, as is Ambassador Silberman. No travel plans to give you.

Q John, there were attacks on Beit Meri

and Suq al-Gharb last night and today, I believe. Do those attacks threaten Americans in Beirut?

A Can't give you an answer on that, and I would refer you to the Pentagon on any further amplification. I suppose you might ask the question whether pinpointing of those positions doesn't encourage attacks on them.

Q Doesn't encourage attacks on -- who is "them"?

A On the individuals who are, who may be in those positions.

Q By whom? Attacks by whom?

A By whoever is attacking them. There's no longer much security attached to their presence there, as it's been so widely publicized.

Q John, is the removal from, first of all, of the New Jersey to Israel's shores correct; and if it is, militarily and for what the New Jersey has done there? What are we to think of that?

A I'm not aware of it. I think the Pentagon can answer that. American ships certainly have visited Israel on port call. Maybe it's something that's going on in that connection, but I'm not aware of it. Try the Pentagon. They would know.

Q Do you know if it will return to the Lebanese shores soon?

A You have me at a disadvantage. I didn't know it wasn't off Lebanon. I'm sorry. Does anybody know where the New Jersey is? No.

Q Would you like to amplify at all on the Secretary's comments about the problems of the War Powers Act, because at least on the Hill -- I gather he talked to it also in an interview with the wires yesterday -- but on the Hill he never was quite specific about what it was -- he seemed to be more upset about the fact that there was consultation with the Congress than with the provisions of the War Powers Act itself. I couldn't -- would he like to see the War Powers Act dropped or revised?

A I think he made clear his views on that yesterday, and I think he was referring both to the public, the understandable public character of the discussions that you have to have about disposition of forces, and also to the instability that that sometimes creates in peoples' minds and, indeed, in the minds of folks who do not wish us well but who certainly are able to read the newspapers.

Q Because the reason I was asking is that, clearly, the mood of the Congress -- at least many, and by polls of people -- were opposed to any kind of widening American military involvement in Lebanon in that period.

Is he suggesting that if you didn't have problems with the War Powers Act that there wouldn't have been that kind of opposition, or that he would have liked to have used more military force than he was able to? It's not clear what he really complaining about because clearly the complaints about the Marines didn't stem because there was a War Powers Act but because of the views of the members of Congress.

A But I think he has raised -- he has raised questions before about the desirability and the constitutionality of the War Powers Act Resolution. But I also think that in particular, insofar as it had a bearing on the disposition of military forces in Lebanon, the Secretary had some concerns about that which he has expressed on a number of occasions.

Q John, what would the foreign policy implications be, especially the response that the State Department expects from the Islamic world, if Congress goes ahead and recognizes Jerusalem as the capital of Israel?

A Our position on that has been made plain. We've given a lot of testimony which I refer you to on that.

Q John, I want to take you back to the Olympics. If the guy is stopped this time, I still don't understand your reasons about a different kind of visa -- not diplomatic immunity -- as to why he was given a visa the last time. It sounds like a snafu on the State Department's part if the present policy is the right one.

A Well, it's tempting to respond to your bait, Bernie, and deny the snafu and give you a long explanation of why he got a visa one time and why he didn't another, but I'm going to steel myself and not respond to your question.

Q John, can I just follow that up? Is there any concern that, with the hopes that have been expressed for improving Soviet-American relations, that this might have, a deleterious effect on the chances for improved relations?

A   Denying of a visa to their Olympic attache?

Q   Yes.

A   No, I don't think so.

Q   Do you have any situation report on Iran-Iraq today?

A   Not --

Q   Can we stay on Assad or Gemayel for just a minute?

A   Sure.

Q   Stay on it! We aren't on it.

Q   There have been information --

(Laughter)

Q   I didn't hear what was said.

A   He said, stay on it; we ain't on it!

Q   He should say it out loud so we can all hear it. (Laughter)

A   Iran-Iraq? Do we have anything on Iraq? Not very much.

Q   Is it over?

A   It's almost over. Oh, you mean the briefing or Iran-Iraq? I thought you were referring to the briefing. (Laughter)

Q   My question is --

A   Hold on, hold on, hold on. I'm going to give you the ten words we have on Iran-Iraq, which won't cheer your day a great deal.

It's the United States understanding from the Iraqi announcement of the alleged attacks on ships in the Persian Gulf yesterday that the reported attack took place in the area well to the north of Kharg Island near the Iranian port of Bandar Khomeini.

The United States cannot confirm the reports, but Iraq has been attacking Iranian convoys in this area for some time. I'm afraid that doesn't take you very much further.

Q   What about on the ground action? Do you have any indication what's going on there?

A No, I really don't have anything that I can give you. There is continuing activity, Don, but don't have very much --

Q John, Israeli officials have been very critical to the U.S. position during the last days regarding --

A Israeli officials have been very critical of U.S. positions? On what?

Q On your policy in Lebanon, especially since the pullout of the Marines from Beirut. Do you have any comment on that?

A No, because I don't know what you're referring to. What aspects of our policy are they critical of?

Q Let us take the latest one. Mr. Ben-Elizar is coming out with very harsh critic against the U.S. policy against the U.S. policy against the --

A No, I'm afraid I don't have anything for you on it. I'm not aware of it.

Q Can you tell us anything about the meeting yesterday between the Secretary and Mr. Arens? Do you have any readout?

A I don't think we do have any kind of readout out on Arens. No. Sorry. Prime Minister Arens himself spoke briefly, I think, afterwards.

Q John, do you have anything on the release of Toivo in Namibia?

A Sure do. This is Mr. Toivo ja Toivo in South Africa.

The United States welcomes the decision by the South African Government to release Mr. Toivo ja Toivo and also Eliaser Audili. We understand that other Namibian leaders may be released as well. The United States is engaged in an intensive effort to bring about Namibian independence through implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 435, and that Resolution calls for the release of all political detainees so that they can participate fully and freely in the political process.

Q Copy?

A Sure.

Q I'm sorry. Can we get a copy?

A Sure.

Q Do we consider now, since the release is made, that 435 is in the process of being implemented, or is this prior?

A I think that we would see this as the helpful step in that direction.

Q One more on this, please. There are reports that Nelson Mandella may also be released. Do we have any position on that, and are we encouraging it to take place?

A Well, you know that the United States has always opposed the process of political detention for political purposes. We've noted in the past that there were strong humanitarian reasons to release Mr. Mandella and that continues to be our position.

Q Are we urging it actively on the South Africans?

A I think the South African government has long been aware of our position on this.

Q John, coming back to Assad and Gemayel --

A Uh-huh.

Q The questions arises here that Secretary Weinberger, according to the reports in the papers -- I didn't hear it myself personally -- seemed to indicate to the troops in the Mediterranean, when he was visiting them, and again yesterday at the House Arms Services Subcommittee, that if the May 17 agreement is abrogated, well, that's not a big deal; there are some other ways of getting around this, and so on. Does the State Department uphold that view or does it still insist --

A Well, as you said, you haven't read or hadn't heard what Mr. Weinberger said, and I haven't in detail, but our position the May 17 agreement is as it has been, remains unchanged; that it was and is a good agreement, and that those who take steps to abrogate it automatically have to assume some responsibility for finding alternative means to secure the departure of Israeli forces.

Q Also, on Lebanon. Does the United States have artillery spotters up on that ridgeline?

A I think we're going to refer you to the Pentagon, and I don't think they're give you very much on the disposition of -- or the placing of individual units.

Q It goes to the rules of engagement that you've been talking about from this forum, which is, if they were threated -- and they have been shelled apparently -- is that then cause for retaliation by the offshore batteries of the U.S. Navy?

A Rules of engagement, as I've said day after day, remain unchanged. But I'm not going to get into the specific locations of individual units.

Q The rules of engagement that you've discussed talk about Americans in the Greater Beirut area.

A We're talking about Americans being fired on.

Q Yes, in the Greater Beirut area; right?

A We've talked about gunfire -- we've talked about fire from Syrian positions into Greater Beirut. But I think the normal -- we're talking about specific rules of engagement in Beirut. There are normal rules of engagement concerning Americans being fired on anywhere in the world. There are normal rules of engagement which troops --

Q The point I'm getting at, if they are up there, in fact, as artillery spotters, they come under attack, does that -- is that then included in the rules of engagement which you have discussed from here?

A I don't want to split hairs with you under which rules of engagement they would respond, but don't think there's much doubt that if American forces are fired upon their commanders certainly would feel they had the right to respond. Whether they would in every case, I don't know. But, certainly, nobody is going to see American troops fired on without exercising, if necessary, the option to return that fire.

Q John, could I take us through the steps on this UNESCO matter where it seems like the Congress has taken the initiative to have the General Accounting Office look into UNESCO's administration, and on the other hand it seems to me that -- I have never heard the GAO taking --

putting a staff in a foreign country to investigate a U.N. Council's actions, administrative actions. I was wondering if you could clarify that? Where does the State Department --

A The GAO is supportive of the continuing examination of the situation, but whether the GAO has ever undertaken a study in another country, you'll have to ask them.

Q Would the State Department have people with the GAO staff doing this as the representatives --

A I'm not aware that we'll have anybody with them. This is basically a Congressional, not Administration, initiative. But the State Department, of course, will follow it with interest and lend it its customary cooperation, but whether there would be personnel there I can't answer.

Q John, do you have any comment on the action by the subcommittee on the Hill yesterday of cutting off aid to El Salvador unless certification, etc.?

A That was the -- was that the Barnes --

Q Yes.

A Yes, I do have something on that. Let me see if I can put my hand on that afterwards for you. I have such a voluminous amount of guidance today that I don't happen --

Q To the degree you can get it now, we would like to have that while you're up here.

Q You don't know what number that is, Alan, do you?

MR. ROMBERG: (Indicating page)

MR. HUGHES: Wonderful. You may have wondered what Alan Romberg does on a day when he doesn't brief. And that's what he does, he keeps track of -- except, however, he's given me the guidance on Bangladesh. (Laughter)

On February 17, the --

Q It's all the same. They all say no comment.

A No. This is a good one. On February 17, the President transmitted to Congress a draft bill requesting the authorization of funds and the legal authorities needed to implement the recommendations of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America. A substantial amount of consultation with the Congress had occurred prior to yesterday's subcommittee action.

The subcommittee print forwarded to the full committee yesterday is so far from the Commission's report and recommendations, and so far from providing a legislative basis for coherent policy in the region, that we would feel compelled to oppose its enactment.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q On February --

A Sorry?

Q Can I follow on that.

A Sure.

Q I don't want to waste anybody's time. Do you have any if asked follow-up on that, because I'd like to ask about it. (Laughter)

A I can assure you with complete authority that there is no if asked follow-up on that. You've got it all.

Q Fine.

Q On February 27, Pravada had a story in which the ballistic missile defense program of this Administration was compared to the wartime Nazi seeking Verwunderwafen and President Reagan was compared to Adolph Hitler. Do you have any comment on that?

A I think it's a ridiculous -- if you're correct, I think it's a ridiculous comparison.

Q If I can follow up on that point. This morning, NBC ran a series of attacks on the staunchest public supporter of that ballistic missile program, Lydon LaRouche, in which Pravada's line was used and LaRouche was called the American Hitler. Do you have any comment on those stories?

A Any suggestion that likens President Reagan in any way to Adolph Hitler or likens his policies to Nazi policies is, of course, ridiculous and reprehensible. But insofar as your fight with NBC is concerned, I think you better go talk to NBC.

Q John --

Q (Inaudible) -- they're being sued for $60 million. If I may follow up?

Q John, may I ask --

A And your question?

Q Will you reconsider the question of accredition to NBC, now that they have put themselves on the public record as the dirtiest political action committee in the history of television coverage in the United States?

Q Ah, come on --

A The answer to your question --

(General babble of voices)

Q Let's go.

Q Let's end --

A Shall we close our briefing?

Q Thank you, John.

(The briefing was concluded at 1:15 p.m.)

Becker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Monday, March 5, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #40

MONDAY, MARCH 5, 1984, 12:25 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: I have a couple of announcements up front. One a housekeeping announcement and one on Lebanon and one on Iran-Iraq.

Housekeeping: They'll be no noon briefing tomorrow due to the Secretary's appearance on the Hill. He will be testifying before the House Appropriations Committee at 2:00 in the afternoon.

Q 2:00?

A 2:00, on the FY-85 foreign assistance budget request.

On Lebanon. The Government of Lebanon has said it has cancelled the Cabinet decision which approved the unratified May 17 agreement and thereby removed the authority of President Gemayel to exchange the instruments for the ratification of the agreement.

The United States regrets this decision. The United States played a facilitating role in the negotiations that produced that accord and was a witness to its signature. That proposed agreement still represents the only agreed formula for ensuring both Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon and Israel's legitimate security interests in a manner consistent with Lebanese sovereignty. Lebanon needs peaceful, cooperative relations with all its neighbors. Those who were responsible for the rejection of the agreement must now bear the responsibility to find an alternative negotiated formula to bring about Israeli withdrawal.

At the same time, the United Staes does not intend to abandon the people or the legitimate Government of Lebanon. Diplomacy continues, with the aim of ending the fighting and reaching a political solution to Lebanon's conflicts.

We will contribute to this process. Similarly, we stand ready to continue appropriate economic and military assistance, but decisions on these issues will be taken as the situation unfolds. In any event, we will continue to take all appropriate measures to ensure that United States personnel and property are fully protected.

Our long-term goals remain: The restoration of a sovereign, independent, unified Lebanon; the removal of all foreign forces; and the security of Israel's northern border. We oppose the partition of Lebanon, which could only lead to even greater instability.

The Middle East is a region of vital importance to the United States and our friends and Allies. The United States will continue to be deeply concerned and involved in efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli problem and other critical issues in the Middle East, including the crisis in the Gulf.

I have a statement on the --

Q Copy of that?

A Sure, copy of that. And I also have a statement on the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war.

The United States has concluded that the available evidence indicates that Iraq has used lethal chemical weapons. The United States strongly condemns the prohibited use of chemical weapons wherever it occurs. There can be no justification for their use by any country.

The United States has been working for many years with other nations to establish a treaty banning production and stockpiling of lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons, in order to strengthen the present international prohibitions against their use. The use of chemical weapons in recent conflicts, including the Iran-Iraq war, only adds to the urgency of this undertaking.

While condemning Iraq's resort to chemical weapons, the United States also calls on the Government of Iran to accept the good offices offered by a number of countries and international organizations to put an end to the bloodshed. The United States finds the present Iranian regime's intransigent refusal to deviate from its avowed objective of eliminating the legitimate government of neighboring Iraq to be inconsistent with the accepted norms of behavior among nations.

Q Copy of that, please?

A I haven't quite finished yet. The United States deplores the tragic and needless loss of both Iranian and Iraqi lives, especially through attacks on civilian populations. We urge both states to respect their obligations under international conventions designed to mitigate the human suffering of warfare, particuarly those banning the use of chemical weapons, and requiring the humane treatment of prisoners of war and protection of civilians.

That's it.

Q Copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q John, going back to your Lebanon statement, in the view of the United States, what alternative did the Government of Lebanon have to abrogation?

A It's not for us to make a pronouncement on that. That was an agreement that the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel, with our facilitation, had agreed to, and it was the basis for actions which all the parties sought to see carried through.

Q You have expressed your regret presumably -- here, publicly and presumably to the Lebanese Government. In place of the action that they have taken, what course did the U.S. Government recommend?

A It's not a question of the Government of the United States recommending. It's a question of the United States having been involved in an agreement, a legitimate agreement, between two parties which as we thought had honored.

Q What could -- I'll try once more. What could the Government of Lebanon have done given the present situation in which it was being torn apart by war, partly because of objections to this May 17 agreement?

A You're asking us to analyze the motivation of the Government of Lebanon and to give you their rationale for their decision to abrogate this agreement. I think you have to ask them. I don't think we can offer that agreement -- we can offer that interpretation.

Q John, has there been any request from President Gemayel or anybody in the government there for the U.S. to discuss with Israel any new arrangement in the south, any new plans for withdrawal?

A   Well, I think we welcome the mention in the Lebanese Government statement -- the Cabinet recognition of the importance of one of our continuing goals, namely, the need to implement adequate security arrangements in southern Lebanon, to prevent terrorist infiltration across Lebanon's borders. But just how that will be done, remains to be seen. This is very soon after the announcement.

The United States clearly remains involved and interested, but how the Government of Israel will respond on this particular question remains to be seen.

Q   John, this is a variation on that same question; broader perhaps. You've stated U.S. goals now in the light of this event. Mainly a restatement of goals.

A   Correct.

Q   What do you do now? Are you in a passive role now, or where do you go from here?

A   We remain involved diplomatically. Our ships remain offshore, as the President has said, as long as they fulfill a useful purpose. We remain committed in the fields of economic assistance, in the field of military assistance, in the field of training, insofar as those programs are practical and insofar as they can be implemented. And in the case of certain shipments of materiel, obviously we look at those on a case-by-case basis.

Q   Can I follow?

A   Sure.

Q   Do you plan to take positive action now to turn back toward the broader Mideast negotiation, the future of the West Bank, Palestinian autonomy, Israel-Arab negotiations generally?

A   Well, it's not a question of us ever having pulled back or let that initiative lie fallow. We have continued, as we have said over the months and years, to try to work these two problems on a parallel track; not to let Lebanon, which clearly has been a problem, obscure or hold back movement on the overall peace plan. That continues.

Q   Will the United States --

A   Excuse me, let me take Bernie. Go ahead.

[redacted]

Q Will the U.S. be prepared to play any role in the search for an alternative formula to bring about withdrawal?

A As we have consistently said, Bernie, I think a heavy responsibility is on those who decided to abrogate, who moved in the abrogation of this treaty. I think the responsibility, as the Secretary has said on a number of occasions, lies primarily on those factions to find some alternative method of securing Israel's departure.

Q Can you --

A That's not to say that the United States is not involved, is not interested, and will be helpful.

Q Can you itemize the "those" you keep referring to?

A No, I think --

Q Is it Syria and the Moslem militia that oppose the agreement? Is that what you mean by "those?"

A I think that's a fair, factual analysis; sure. Can I take Jim?

Q Does this statement, however, the way it's worded, take us out of play as initiators of ideas? Do we now take a more passive role?

A I don't think -- it certainly doesn't take us out of play, Jim, in Lebanon or the United States. As the Secretary has said and as the President has said, we will continue to remain engaged, but I think our statement speaks for itself: That those who have moved on the abrogation bear a special responsibility to come up with alternative formulas.

Q When you use the word "alternative," do you mean alternative to the text of the agreement or alternative to the method which is direct negotiations?

A The May 17 Agreement provided a formula under which Israel would withdraw its troops. That presumably is no longer in effect. So you presumably have to look at some other formula to achieve the same goal.

Q My question means, if you are accepting the indirect negotiations or even non-negotiations with Israel as a method of --

A I think it's too early to say.

Q -- getting an agreement to withdraw from Lebanon?

A I think it's too early to say. I think the various parties involved will have to make that decision as to how they proceed to probe and come together, if they do, on how to effect such a formula.

Q Is there any willingness to renegotiate another agreement? I mean, are you willing to enter in the future in any agreement, new agreement, since this agreement never achieved anything?

A I think that's going to be up to the parties involved who are going to have to decide where they want to go on that issue.

Q You are open to any suggestion?

A I think the United States is always interested in establishing peace. I think our record in Lebanon is rather dramatic testimony to that, and I'm sure if we can be helpful in bringing peace to Lebanon in some way, we will.

Q Does this create any need at all, as far as the Secretary is concerned, for a high-level meeting with the Israelis? This event --

A As you know, he met with Mr. Arens last week. I'm not aware of any other plans. We're obviously in close touch with the Israelis there in Israel and here. I'm not aware of any high-level meetings planned, John.

Q The Israelis have been approached by the Lebanese already who have suggested new talks and how they, in Qiryat Shemona, and the initial Israeli reaction is, no dice. But -- will the U.S. diplomatically be involved between the two countries?

A As I say, I think it will have to -- you've already indicated a certain exchange, and I'm not confirming it or denying it, but I think we will have to see how the various parties tackle this problem.

Q John, you answered a question earlier about -- from Bernie -- that the U.S. will continue to play a role in safeguarding. Let's say, one of the American objectives: defending or protecting Israel's northern settlement.

A Correct.

Q Is that the limits of U.S. involvement as far as the south of Lebanon is concerned?

A No.

Q The other two objections now are --

A No, the objectives remain the same. A sovereign Lebanon controlling its entire territory; the withdrawal of all foreign forces; and the security of Israel.

Q How does the United States involve itself in safeguarding or protecting Israel's northern settlements?

A I think Israel is very active in that regard.

Q But what I mean, you said you will be involved. What -- how will the U.S. be involved?

A We have always said, and that has always been a basis of our involvement in this particular negotiation, that one of the factors, one of our goals in which we are in total agreement with Israel, is the protection of Israel's northern borders. We would not participate in any discussion or any negotiation that did not take those -- that priority into effect, into account.

Q Just one last thing on this, please. Will -- a few weeks ago you -- somebody of our colleagues here mentioned to you a possible unilateral Israeli withdrawal, and I remember -- it was probably off-the-record -- you said something like "it's interesting."

A I said off-the-record something? If that's what I said --

Q Forgive me for putting it that way.

A -- I wouldn't dream of responding to it. In fact, everybody is so shocked they turned the light off here.

Q Is there anywhere the prospect that the United States would request Israel for a further unilateral withdrawal from the south of Lebanon?

A I'm not aware of any such request or any inclination to make such a request.

Q John, you seem to introduce some qualifiers about continuing economic and military assistance. Is there going to be any reduction to try to sort that out, please?

A Sure.

Q Will there be any reduction because of the Lebanese abrogation of continued U.S. military and economic aid?

A Okay, I didn't mean to mislead you. When I -- if you detected any note of hestitation or reservation, it was simply on pragmatic or practical grounds. No, there's no change in the policy, no change in the plan, no change in the figures. But obviously the situation is fluid. If you're going to train people, if you're going to send military supplies, or even if you're going to send economic aid, you need to take a look at the situation on the ground and see whether the people to whom you have been sending those supplies are in a position to receive them, what they will do with them, that kind of thing.

That was the -- if you detected a note of reservation, it was simply pragmatism.

Q Is there currently a hold on military aid, John?

A Not a hold on military aid, but I think the Pentagon has said that it's being looked at on a case-by-case, shipment-by-shipment basis; but not a hold, no.

Q Can I ask you in that connection of practical matters, what's the status now of the U.S. effort to rebuild or build a new Embassy in Beirut? Is that sort of also going to be on hold at this point?

A I haven't looked at that for some time. Let me see what we have on that.

Q What are Ambassador Rumsfeld's plans?

A No travel plans at the moment.

Q John, this clearly represents a U.S. diplomatic setback, to put it very mildly. What do you see the repercussions in the Middle East in connection with the U.S. effort to promote a broader peace? How does one put faith in what the U.S. says if we see these results?

A I think, as the Secretary of State has said, the interesting thing is that everybody seems to want to talk to the United States; that everybody wants the United States to be involved. That's inside Lebanon, and that seems to be so in many countries throughout the Middle East so the confidence in the U.S. as a helpful participant in the bid to bring peace about doesn't seem to be diminished. Nobody is saying that they don't want to talk to the United States, or they don't want U.S. involvement. Quite to the contrary.

Q When you say "everybody," you're including Syria?

A I perhaps should leave a question mark where Syria is concerned.

--MORE--

Q John, do you see this as a victory for Syria?

A It's kind of hard to quantify it, but certainly Syria's influence in Lebanon seems to be on the upsurge.

Q On this -- along that same line, considering the Secretary's own efforts, does he have a sense of failure?

A I don't think so. He thinks that it is not a failure to have been presented with a challenge in a country that has been tearing itself apart for many, many years, to have given a considerable American effort and lives to try to bring about peace in that country, and perhaps not to have brought that about in the same way that many others have brought it about. But I don't think that in the sense that the British or the French or the Italians are ascribing a failure to their efforts, I don't think the United States is saying that it was not a worthy thing to have done, even though the desired result has not been achieved.

Q Who do you hold to blame? Do you hold Syria to blame, and what is the U.S. attitude now toward Syria?

A Oh, I think it's been clear that Syria has not been helpful in these unfolding events.

Q Repeatedly, you mentioned the security of Israel and all of your intentions were to guarantee the security of Israel, and I never heard you from before or today that the concern of this government is also the security of Lebanon, and what the Lebanese people, the elected officials in Lebanon, want.

A Uh-huh.

Q With your formula, with the May 17 agreement before, there was a status quo and there was stalemate and possibly the partition of Lebanon was a net result according to the old interpretation.

Now the Syrians have influence there, they got together with the Lebanese, and there is a cease-fire, there is national reconciliation, there is movement, and they don't want the May 17 agreement. And by you calling on security of Israel, you are hardening the position of Israel in the future for negotiation and not leaving the door open for any future development that could be benefited.

A Well, we're not hardening the position. Israel has always been concerned, understandably so, with its northern boundary, across which it has faced and suffered various terrorist attacks. That concern is still there today. It is legitimate. We recognize it as legitimate. We understand their concern. We think that any settlement has to take into account Israel's concerns.

Q Let's go a little bit possibly to the June war, prior to the June war. For 11 months there was no terrorist attack on Israel, and Israel under the pretense of whatever to come and wipe out the PLO and other things created all of this havoc in the whole Lebanese territory, and there's no peace now.

A Well, that's an interesting observation, but I'm not sure what your question is.

Q John, are you saying that the Habib agreement has not been respected for 11 months before the Israeli attack?

A All I am is saying that Israel has had legitimate concerns, and I don't think, really, any fair-minded person would dispute that about terrorist activity, PLO presence in Lebanon, and those concerns we understand.

Q About the other statement that you made, what is the evidence that you have that chemical warfare is being used by Iraq and what kind -

A Have independent evidence and also substantial amount of non-Iranian media evidence, and other evidence besides.

Q And what kind of chemical warfare essentially?

A I don't have anything more specific than I gave you, Jim.

Q Do you have any people there in the area?

A I am not sure whether there are any U.S. Government observers in the area.

Q What kind of chemicals?

Q John, have we had any contact with Sweden?

A I cannot -- let me see if I can run that down for you.

Q How recently --

Q Sweden --

Q Austria --

A Not going to get into the other sources.

Q John, could you put it -- do you have a time-frame on this, how recent, because I remember about a year ago there were similar allegations that the Iraqis --

A Well, I think it's during the current offensive, the current Iranian offensive.

Q When did the United States come to the conclusion that there was sufficient evidence to show -- whatever word you used, that --

A I think recently, Don.

Q What do you mean by "recently"?

A Well, I think within the past several days.

Q Do you know if these are connected to the stories about six months ago that the Soviets had supplied the Iraqis with chemical weapons?

A I don't have anything for you on who is the supplier.

Q John, is there a determination being made on D'Aubuisson's visa?

A Well, he was not -- he has not been granted a visa to visit the United States.

Q He did apply and was --

A Well, let me give you the facts as we understand them, Jim. Mr. D'Aubuisson apparently last week requested a visa in his diplomatic passport. There was some question as to whether the passport was still valid, because it was issued in his capacity as President of the Constituent Assembly, a post which he no longer holds. So I think that Mr. D'Aubuisson was informed of this, and his passport is being returned to him today.

On the broader issue of U.S. visits by Salvadoran presidential candidates prior to the March 25 election, it is our expectation, and I think it would be our clear preference, that none of the inscribed presidential candidates for the March 25 election visit and bring their campaign to the United States prior to the election.

Q Get of copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q Is that the basis, then, for his -- or the State Department's rejection that he is a candidate?

A Well, there are a number of bases for the State Department's position. First, there was this technical question of whether a formal visa application had been submitted, and I grant that as a technical question.

You may ask about what would happen if he submitted an appropriate and a technically correct visa application. The law provides that we have to look at that on a case-by-case basis, and we would. But I also have to remind you that, as the Secretary said in his testimony last week, we did deny a visa to Mr. D'Aubuisson back in November, and we see nothing that has changed in that decision and the circumstances surrounding that decision should a new application be submittd.

Q Right. And that denial in November, was that because he was a candidate or because he had something in his past which you found unsavory?

A I think we offered rather careful words at the time. I'd refer you back to those words, Jim, at the time.

Q Do you have any comment to make on the Times story on Saturday, in connection with El Salvador and the various charges made against D'Aubuisson?

A Yes. We do. As you know, we have been actively pursuing the death squad issue for some time and believe there has been recent progress. It remains a most important issue for us.

Insofar as The New York Times article is concerned, there are a number of serious charges in it. The article itself notes that these charges made anonymously could not be independently verified, and so we're not prepared to comment on unverified accusations.

President Magana and Defense Minister Vidas Cassanova responded to some of the accusations while they were in Texas this weekend, and we refer you to their remarks.

We would be very interested in discussing the purported information directly with the source. Until we can, we're not in a position to judge the accuracy of the information for ourselves.

Q Does that mean you have not talked to the gentleman?

A Have not -- well, it's an anonymous source.

Q Yeah. But that's not too difficult to find out.

A Have not talked to the source.

Q John, following up on that question, the evidence that is available to the State Department on Mr. D'Aubuisson, is that still non-conclusive?

A I think I'm going to hold to the words offered by the Secretary in his testimony on that, and in his remarks to the Conservative Political Action Committee on Friday.

Q Another question on El Salvador: The reason why you denied a visa the last time was because it was against the public interest, I think it was --

A I think we gave you a specific section.

Q That would still be the same reason now. And at the same time it's linked --

A Well, have to be a little careful here. We do not have before us a valid application --

Q Well, had he --

A Okay. I think that's a fair inference.

Q Along the same lines, at the same time that the visa was denied for D'Aubuisson the last time, you also denied a visa for Commander Borge in Nicaragua.

A True. Correct. Around the same time. Yes.

Q At the time it was felt that you were denying a visa to make it even.

A I think we disputed that at the time.

Q I'd like to go back to the Times article raised by Bernie. Do these allegations cause concern on the part of the Administration, specifically with respect to the fact that Mr. D'Aubuisson is a presidential candidate?

A Well, I think any stories concerning death squad activity in El Salvador are looked at seriously in the State Department and by the Administration. The Administration is on record with many statements about the repugnance of this activity, and so I think any suggestion that it continues or any suggestion that it is linked to individuals is looked at, yes. But I'm not commenting specifically on anonymous source material.

Q John, what can you tell us --

Q The fact, however -- excuse me -- this didn't come out of the blue. The LA Times, the Albuquerque Journal, have printed extensive investigative charges in which some of the informants are actually named that make substantially the same charges.

A Uh-huh.

Q Are these also being looked into by the State Department?

A I'm sure -- they may well be. I don't know. I'm sure somebody may be. But I don't know of my own knowledge.

Q Okay. And, finally, if I may, Ambassador Kirkpatrick referred to "real evidence" with respect to D'Aubuisson's participation or leadership in the death squads.

Is there such a thing as "real evidence" that identifies Major D'Aubuisson with the death squads?

A Refer you to the Secretary's words on that particular subject when that question was put to him in testimony last week.

Q John, can you say if the United States has set deadlines for reaching agreements with Japan on economic and military matters?

A   Well, it's not a question of deadlines, Spencer, but, obviously, we hope all this will move forward with dispatch. We are in the process of negotiation with the Japanese on a variety of trade and other economic issues. Both sides have agreed that it is in our mutual interests to resolve these issues as quickly as possible. There have been no ultimatums delivered. On the beef and citrus issue, however, the current agreement on quota expansion does expire March 31 of this year, and both sides hope that a new and expanded regime can be agreed upon before that date.

Q   Is the United States investigating as to where from Iraqis got the chemical weapons now being used against Iran?

A   I don't know whether it's a question of investigating. I just don't have anything for you on origin.

Q   John --

Q   John, what can you tell us about --

A   Excuse me. One minute.

Q   -- the Secretary's breakfast talks with Chancellor Kohl this morning?

A   Nothing. You'll get a readout later in the day at the White House.

Q   John, is Walid Jumblatt on his way here or --

A   I don't think so. I know that rumor recurs, but where we are is that there's nothing new and that he withdrew his plans to come to the United States.

Q   John, there's a story on the wires quoting the Vice President of the Sudan who was here last week, saying while he was here he got an agreement from the U.S. to airlift emergency military supplies to his country to -- and that General Walters is on his way to be -- today to represent the President there and help him fight rebels? What is going on?

A   General Walters is, I think, due to arrive in the Sudan this evening, and he'll be meeting with senior officials. On the weapons request and the airlift, no decisions on that have been taken. We do have a continuing security cooperation relationship with the Sudan. Our military assistance program to the Sudan is our largest in Africa. It is being reviewed in light of recent developments in the Sudan. Nevertheless, the clear emphasis in our total aid program is on economic assistance, and we continue to believe that the Sudan's problems can most effectively be addressed through economic means.

We are reviewing Vice President Tayyib's request for military assistance within the framework of our ongoing security relationship. No specific decisions have been made yet on either weapons systems or the modes of delivery.

Q Was he talking off the top of his head? I mean, unless --

A High officials --

Q You're saying there's a sharp discrepancy --

A -- of other governments rarely talk off the top of their head.

Q Well, you're confident your guidance is up to date.

A I'm confident our guidance is up to date.

Q Can we get a copy of the statement?

A Sure.

Q You end up by saying "no specific decisions have been taken." Has an overall decision been taken to give some further aid to the Sudan of a military nature?

A I think this language is correct, and I don't think we're playing games with you. I think also one would have to say that these discussions went on in an aura of sympathy for the Sudan's problem.

Q Is such an airlift being considered, John?

A I think if it's something that's been requested of us by a friendly and important foreign leader, it is something we would look at.

Q John, can we go back to El Salvador for a moment?

A Sure.

Q What's the rationale for denying visas to these other five or six or seven candidates? I should think it would be in the public interest to hear as much from them as possible.

A Well, it's not a question of denying visas. It's expressing hope that they won't come, and I think the -- (Laughter) -- the point of that is so that we will not intrude American politics into El Salvador, and that they will not intrude Salvadoran politics into the United States.

Q Yeah, but couldn't the case be made that there is such an enormous American involvement there that it would be to the advantage of the American people to find out as much about it as they can?

A Well, I don't think there's any impediment to the American people finding out a great deal about the course of the Salvadoran election.

Q No better way than to have these -- I would think, than to have these candidates come up here. Isn't that correct?

A Well, that's a point of view, and, clearly, another point of view is prevailing.

Q John, on the same subject again for a second, there's some confusion with respect to the Kissinger dissent in the Kissinger Commission, whether the Administration agrees with it. The Secretary said last week that as a last resort arms could be cut off to El Salvador, he could see that --

A Uh-huh.

Q That that would be a last resort. And Ambassador Kirkpatrick on Friday indicated that, no, that arms must continue --

A No. There's no contradiction.

Q -- because it was vital to the defense of Western civilization.

A No contradiction. The Secretary was offered -- was asked a specific "yes or no" question and in his --

with his traditional up front response said, yes, he would respond to that "yes or no" question, "but" and then went on to offer a series of reservations and specifically made the point that that would be a -- you never say no, you won't do a thing in a bargaining situation, but made very clear what his position was, and there is no difference between himself and Ambassador Kirkpatrick.

Q Could you then clarify, if there is no difference, what the Administration's position is with respect to the Kissinger comment at the end of the Commission report, in which he was joined by two other Commission members, whether the Administration endorses that comment?

A I haven't got that comment in my head.

Q It's readily available.

A It's a pretty philosophical remark.

Q Well, the comment simply states that El Salvador should be supported, in any case, if the alternative is a Marxist-Leninist victory.

A I think we'll simply stand on what the President has said and Secretary has said --

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 1:00 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 7, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #41

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 7, 1984, 12:16 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. Just a brief announcement. Under Secretary for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger will address the National Newspaper Association in the Loy Henderson Auditorium today at 5:00. His topic will be "The Transatlantic Relationship." There will be a prepared text available in the Press Office around 4:00 this afternoon. That session is open to coverage, including cameras, but questions will be limited to members of the National Newspaper Association.

That's all I have.

Q The Secretary seemed a little testy yesterday.

A Testy? (Laughter)

Q Yes. Is that an accurate impression of mine?

A I think he was vigorous in articulating his position, Jim.

Q And what does he think -- does he think that he will get -- the Administration will get what it wants out of Congress in terms of El Salvador --

A Well, the Secretary certainly --

Q -- in terms of El Salvador and the Central American package, in terms of the whole Central American package?

A The Secretary very rarely predicts, as you know, but I certainly think that he hopes that the Administration will. He feels that the Commission was a bipartisan one; that people came to it from all quarters of the spectrum. Their minds were certainly not made up. They came at it with different viewpoints. They worked hard at it. It is not a report that is manufactured by the staff; it is not boilerplate. It represents very dedicated work by the individuals themselves and accurately reflects their viewpoint.

They came to some recommendations, and I think he hopes that members of Congress and the Senate will see the wisdom of those recommendations.

Q Can I follow on that?

A Yes.

Q Lane Kirkland, who is an important member of that panel, he's recently made clear that he, and the AFL-CIO which he represents, opposes military aid to El Salvador because they don't fulfill the conditions -- that is, the government there doesn't fulfill the conditions set out in the Kissinger Commission Report itself. Can you explain that discrepancy?

A No, I wouldn't attempt to explain Mr. Kirkland's position. I think I would let him explain his position himself, and also refer you to his input into the Commission Report. But the fact is that that question of conditionality is obviously something on which there's disagreement.

Q But, was -- I still don't understand. There seems to have been disagreement as to how that conditionality was to be interpreted, by the members of the Commission themselves, including Mr. Kirkland.

What I don't understand is, the State Department is now saying that the Commission agreed that military aid should be forthcoming immediately, whereas Kirkland, for one example, says that's not true.

A I guess I'd like to go back and look at the words in the Commission Report, but I think basically there is a consensus in the Commission's Report and what we're talking about, as the Secretary has said and as I think the President has said just on that question of conditionality -- if I can pronounce it -- the Administration's position is that it hopes that this is something that can be worked out intelligently and sensibly with Congress.

Q John?

A Yes, Marvin?

Q Maybe you can help us on this. Is the Secretary really saying that the situation militarily is so serious in El Salvador that unless U.S. military aid is provided very quickly, the government forces will not have the means to repel the enemy attacks?

A   Well, I don't like to go over the Secretary's words and reinterpret them. But I think the theme underlying what he has said is that you're going to have an election; there may not be a conclusion first time around, and you may have to have a subsequent round, meaning that you've got an election campaign proceeding perhaps over a period of a couple of months.

It is a fair surmise, and I think there's already evidence, that the left would like to disrupt that election process. That puts an added strain on the military which perhaps has to deploy itself somewhat differently during an election campaign than it might otherwise do and, clearly, may draw on its resources. As long as there is uncertainty about those resources and when the ammunition comes and how many bullets there are available, it is very difficult to provide the adequate security shield behind which that election can take place.

Q   Is the logic of that, John, that the military in El Salvador does not have the means at its disposal right now to handle another two or three months of warfare?

A   I can't give you a specific time with which they'd run out of ammunition; can't tell you what they are going to be required to do. But I think, as the Administration has made clear, if you bob around and create an air of uncertainty for the military in El Salvador, that they do not quite know from year to year, or sometimes even from month to month, what the flow of materiel is going to be and with what they will be able to fight, that takes the heart out of their campaign.

Q   John, Congressman Long yesterday indicated, if I heard him right, that it was his view they should not go forward with the supplemental appropriation request prior to the elections so they so they see whether d'Aubisson or somebody else becomes elected. I don't remember that the Secretary specifically commented on that point. I don't think it was in the form of a question by Congressman Long, but more a statement of his position.

What would the the Administration's reaction to postponing action on the supplemental until Congress is able to see who wins the election?

A   I think you are right. The Secretary did not respond on that point, and I think it was a statement from the Congressman, so probably it would be improper and foolish to suggest a specific reaction from the Secretary. But I think there are those in the Administration who would think that that could have a very critical effect on the performance of the army, and therefore, on the conduct of the elections.

Q But does the State Department have a position on it?

A Let me see what we can produce for you in terms of a formal position.

Q John, a follow on that: before the Senate Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee last week, the Secretary was asked about that, and his response was that since we are calling on the Salvadorans to hold an open, free, honest election, then if they do it, we have to accept the results of it, whatever that might be.

Does that mean -- That, basically, means that if d'Aubisson is elected president, we would be willing to go forward and work with (inaudible)?

A I think the Secretary's words speak for themselves. If you believe in the democratic process, you have to follow the diplomatic process to its logical end. You can't believe in the diplomatic process, and pick and choose candidates, and winners.

Q The diplomatic process?

(Laughter)

A Democratic. Beg pardon. The other is so close to my thinking all the time.

Q But wouldn't the selection of a president by the electorate in El Salvador, the identity of that person and that person's past, have some kind of influence on this Administration's approach and backing for --

A I think it could well have influence on various segments of American society. But that's not out of line with the response to the question.

Q Is there, then, a contingency position on the part of the Administration if, for instance, d'Aubisson is elected?

A We're in favor of the process; we are enthusiastically in favor of the process, and seeing it go forward. There are six candidates.

Q With respect to that process, one of Duarte's offices, or an office connected with the Duarte campaign, was shot out today by a group of people.

A Uh-huh.

Q And I guess one of the death squads took credit for that.

A Uh-huh.

Q I'd like to ask whether there is any comment to that. And also, ten days ago, the largest labor union in El Salvador, one which is associated with the AFL-CIO here, gave a press conference in which they charged that many of their members were being approached by army officers in various parts of the country, and told that they would have to vote for either the PCN or ARENA, but not for the PDC candidate, or they could be at risk. I know that goes back ten days.

Do you have any comment on that or today's attack?

A Nothing on the second question. On the first, concerning the attack, yes. The United States strongly deplores such acts of violence. Our Embassy in San Salvador confirms that this attack occurred and tnat there were no injuries. As reported in the press, the Secret Anti-communist Command claimed responsibility for this attack.

Also, on March 6, the guerrillas, in San Vincente Department, machine-gunned an ambulance, killing two Red Cross workers who were attempting to come to the aid of battle casualties. Violence from both the left and the right is clearly aimed at the electoral process in El Salvador, and we condemn both.

The United States is convinced that the courage and the determination of the Salvadoran people will prevail, despite these attempts by armed extremists of both sides to undermine the elections.

Q Copy?

A Sure.

Q John, would it be correct to assume that the Administration is strengthening its position in the Congress out of fear of the repetition of the Lebanese episode in El Salvador?

A I want to be sure I'm following your train of thinking here. We're doing --

Q It seems that the parallel lines between Lebanon and El Salvador are somehow having their impact on the position of the Administration and the Congress regarding El Salvador.

A I think the two are not parallel. But I think the Administration is taking the position it is on Central America because it believes it is right. It believes it is an important area to us; it believes there are important issues at stake in terms of the national interest of the United States as well as the peoples of Central America, and particularly El Salvador themselves.

Q I think these were the same terms mentioned in time of the Lebanese crisis.

A I think that these underlie the United States foreign policy around the world. Obviously, we operate in many areas of the world, we consider to be, where the outcome is considered to be in our national interest. At the same time, I think there is also an element of compassion underlying American foreign policy and the desire to bring peace to various parts of the world, and to support the ability of free men everywhere to enjoy the kind of society that we enjoy.

Q John, has the Secretary seen the President today?

A I do not know whether -- it may well be, Mike, but I'm not sure it's on the schedule.

Q Can you ch ---

A He sees him very frequently. I don't know whether he's on. Let me check. See if --

Q If you would. What is the meeting with the leadership on the Hill about today?

A I think that is a luncheon hosted by Senator Baker at his request, and I don't know what the issue is.

Q I'll put the earlier question in another way perhaps: Is the Administration's concern about El Salvador so deep because, so soon after having suffered a setback in its policy on Lebanon, it fears that if there are not sufficient arms sent quickly to El Salvador, the government there might suffer a major setback as well?

A I suppose people can make that surmise. I don't think it would be accurate to suggest that we have only lately come to our commitment in El Salvador. I think that has been apparent for some time, and the reasons for it are obvious.

Q (Inaudible) not to the commitment, but to the degree of concern that would prompt the Secretary to uncharacteristically display a side of him we don't often see.

A I don't think that's true, because the Kissinger Commission has been at work for many months, and this analysis of the situation and our support for the cause of democracy there and our unenthusiastic attitude towards the flow of arms from outside El Salvador into the country is not something that has surfaced only in the wake of what events have transpired in Lebanon.

Q John, is the decision on the aid supplemental, the decision whether to go around Congress and use the Emergency Fund, before the President now?

A Well, without necessarily subscribing to the language, the way you describe it, "going around Congress," --

Q All right --

A -- no, I think no decision has been made on that, as the Secretary indicated yesterday.

Q The Secretary also said yesterday not only that no decision had been made, but that nothing was before the President on that. Is that still the case?

A I think that's correct.

Q There were two reports in the Christian Science Monitor yesterday on El Salvador, one having to do with aid to refugees --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- and diversion, and the other having to do with voting and registration of voters, especially in refugee places. Do you have a comment on that?

A Don't remember the voting one. On the aid story, I think there is some guidance which basically suggests that that is a re-hash of an old story and responds to it; but that guidance was available yesterday.

Q Will you make it available after the briefing?

A Sure. Get it from the Press Office.

Q John, to turn Marvin's question the other way round, do you think that Congress is taking out its ire about the setback in Lebanon on Central American policy?

A I wouldn't dream of analyzing Congressional motivation or emotions.

-- MORE --

Q John, to follow along those lines, and let me ask you about a specific report we've gotten from French Government sources, which is that there are currently either private or back-channel discussions the United States is engaged in with the Soviet Union on the specific point of bringing the Soviets in to play a role in the Mideast in exchange for some sort of Soviet pledge for a free hand for the United States in Central America, and included in those discussions also is a discussion of U.S.-European policy along the framework set out in Kissinger's March 5 Time magazine piece.

Can you comment on that?

A And the question is?

Q Well, do you have any comment on this report that we've received? Are there any such discussions going on?

A Well, never really have any discussion on private channels between ourselves and the Soviet Union, although the Secretary has talked about the kinds of discussions that we've had with Ambassador Dobrynin here, and that Ambassador Hartman has had in Moscow, but -- and I guess our position, for the record has to be we don't get into those private discussions. But I think you'd be on very shaky ground if you thought that we were in any way involved in some kind of discussion to bring the Soviet Union into the Middle Eastern --

Q If I can follow up on that, Kissinger published this piece March 5 --

A Uh-huh.

Q Richard Burt is quoted, and I believe the quote is accurate, as calling the proposals "bizarre." However, the very week that the article came out and was on the newsstands, Kissinger was appointed to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

A Uh-huh.

Q What is his role in the Administration? Is he involved in consultations on these discussions with the Soviets?

A The -- Secretary Kissinger is, I think, a valued confidant of the Secretary of State, as are other former Secretaries of State, and that continues.

Q You mean even though you've got an Assistant Secretary who calls his ideas "bizarre"?

A I don't really know whether you're correct on your quote --

Q But a senior official who was briefing at the White House --

A The situation concerning --

Q -- who I think is aware of Burt's motivations, confirmed that it was a correct assessment.

A Well, the situation concerning Mr. Kissinger's role is unchanged.

Q John, do you have any response to Iraq's charges about the U.S. use of chemical warfare in Vietnam?

A No. I don't. We said what we had to say on that. Don't have any further response.

Q John, they called your statement day before yesterday "unbalanced and hypocritical."

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you have any comment on that?

A No.

Q John, what is the State Department explanation for the fact that after all the several years of war in El Salvador, the strength of the rebel forces is estimated to about doubled?

A Don't know if you're correct on that particular statistic, but if you mean why is rebel -- why the rebels are still in business --

Q No, no. That's not the question. I mean, an increase -- a numerical increase in their strength from estimates earlier, if I remember correctly, five to six thousand, to one I read recently that brings it up to about nine, ten, eleven.

A I think we had a little guidance on that a couple of weeks ago, Bernie. Let me go back and dig that out for you.

Q John, back on the Middle East. Recently there's a book been published called Taking Sides which, among other things, charges that U.S. pilots flew combat reconnaissance missions, despite U.S. denials, during the 1967 Six-Day War, for Israel.

A Uh-huh.

Q I'm told now that the Government of Jordan has made a demarche about this charge to the United States, and the State Department has responded.

Can you tell us what that response was?

A I'd be glad to take a look at it. I'm not aware of that, but I'd be glad to take a look at it for you.

Q John, Ambassador Veliotes, your Ambassador in Egypt, said -- it was reported in the paper, telling the Congressmen that if you removed the Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, please let me know ahead of time so I will remove from Egypt or the Embassy 2500 Americans, and he issued that warning and said what you are getting into it. Do you have any comment on that -- on that story?

A I haven't seen such a comment by Ambassador Veliotes, but our position on the Embassy in Tel Aviv and the suggestions that it should move to Jerusalem is quite clear, and there's a lot of testimony on that. But I'm not aware of Ambassador Veliotes' comments.

Q It was in the, I believe, the Chicago Sun which --

A I'm still not aware of it. Sorry.

Q John -- any reaction, John, to the TASS report this morning -- accusations by TASS this morning that the U.S. is violating airspace in the Persian Gulf, attempting to control traffic in the Gulf?

A No.

Q John, to follow up with this, have you been in contact with the Soviet Union regarding the Gulf war during the last few days?

A Well, I don't think we'll get into that kind of detail. Obviously, we are in frequent contact with the Soviet Union, and, obviously, they are aware of our concerns about the Middle East in general and specific areas. But I'm not going to get into any detail.

Q John, do you have any cooperation on the -- with Western Europe on the Gulf area? Is there any joint command or anything like that?

A Not talking about joint command, but there certainly have been discussions. They are -- various countries are concerned, and there certainly have been discussions with those who are concerned.

Q While you're on the subject, do you have any update of what we think is going on in the Persian Gulf?

A Really don't, Don. We've seen the claims of both sides; suggestion that the Iraqis have moved against the Iranians; seen reports from the Iranians that the attack is repulsed; obviously, reports of heavy loss of life, particularly on the Iranian side. But can't confirm the claims or the counterclaims on either side.

Q On another subject the Secretary testified to yesterday regarding the relief and reconstruction aid for Lebanon that has not yet been allocated, or whatever the word is -- put out for -- committed, I think. Has a decision been made whether that will be sent to Lebanon or whether it will be reprogrammed for some other place?

A I don't think a decision has been made. As I said a couple of days back, the plans remain in position, but in terms of practical considerations, what will be the situation on the ground and to what extent you can carry through on those plans, I think that's a reasonable question. But I don't think an answer has been offered to that, and neither has a decision been made yet on reprogramming, I don't think.

Q Is it a kind of "wait and see" posture, or what?

A I think we're looking and seeing what develops.

Q Do you have anything on the Times story about tensions reported within the leadership in Syria?

A No. Don't have anything on that, Bernie. Seen those reports. We are aware of -- as others are, of enhanced security arrangements in Damascus over the past several days, but don't have any comment on them.

Q Over the past several days?

A Uh-huh.

Q Still under way?

A I think the reports indicate that.

Q You have no sense of what --

A No comment on it.

Q Could you -- no comment on it?

A Uh-huh.

Q Whose reports are these?

A I think we've seen some press reports, among others, but, certainly, it's obvious to people in Damascus.

Q Do you know what form the intense security arrangements take?

A I think there are more troops around certain buildings.

Q John, do you have anything on the Soviet underground test reported by Sweden this morning?

A No. Do not. Sorry.

Q Do you have anything on a missing American citizen reporter in Beirut, Jerry Levin?

A Something we're concerned about. The Embassy is looking into that. Don't have any -- sadly, don't have any late information on it.

Q John, you mentioned an address by Mr. Eagleburger. Is that going to be his last?

A I presume you are referring to newspaper reports --

Q You presume.

A -- that he's moving on, but I don't have anything on that for you.

Q Do you have anything on Armacost coming in?

A No. I don't have anything for you on that. Assuming that there were anything to those reports of Mr. Eagleburger's departure, I guess you'd be talking about Presidential appointments.

Q John, I just need to understand this part attributed to Secretary Shultz in the Congress yesterday, when he says that "I think the Soviets and the Syrians were astonished that we just took our Marines out." Isn't he talking against the decision taken by the President himself?

A Well, I don't think that was testimony yesterday. I think that was in his testimony last week.

Q He repeated it yesterday.

A He repeated it yesterday, did he? I think what he was saying is that that was the evaluation of their reaction, that they had expected that something would be bargained or given in return for that.

Q Still it sounds like being critical to the decision taken by President Reagan himself.

A I think it's a factual analysis of Soviet and Syrian reaction.

Q John, can you clarify something that came up last week? As I recall, the Secretary said before this Conservative Political Action Conference, or whatever it was, that he had no active request for a visa for Roberto d'Aubuisson. And yet three days later --

A Yes.

Q -- it seems to me that during that time the request must have been active. Can you clarify that?

A Well, I think his statement came a day on the heels of our statement here that there was no active request, and that's what we believed and understood at that time. As I said, a little later it transpired that we were a little too categoric, and that Mr. d'Aubuisson had in fact presented his passport. And I'm not -- I mean, we didn't get it right.

But the fact is that it was a diplomatic passport. There was a query about that. It wasn't handed to a Consular Officer; it was handed to a Political Officer, and in the scope of things, technically there was not an application. But I think our information -- initial information was not correct.

Q Anything on Nicaraguan charges that mines are being supplied to the insurgents?

A Not a thing.

Q Did you receive a protest?

A Did I read the what?

Q Did the State Department receive a protest from the Nicaraguans --

A I'm not sure whether we've had anything on that. Let me take a look at that.

Q John, do you have anything about the Israeli Government arrest of seven American Jews, settlers, in the West Bank who were reportedly involved with the attack on the Palestinian workers?

A The Consul General in Jerusalem is looking into that.

Q Okay. Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:42 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Thursday, March 8, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #42

THURSDAY, MARCH 8, 1984, 12:17 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

Q Let's get this show on the road. I've got a luncheon date.

MR. HUGHES: Bill has an early lunch? Okay. Early lunch. Short briefing. Don't have anything for you anyway.

Q We already know that.

A Do you know that? As distinct from other days. Couple of housekeeping announcements.

Available in the Press Office is the prepared Statement by Under Secretary for Science and Technology William Schneider before the House Appropriations Committee. The subject of the testimony is security assistance.

Also available in the Press Office is the text of a speech by Chief Strategic Arms Negotiator Ambassador Edward Rowny before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council. That's embargoed until 3:30 EST today. And that is all the goodies I have for you.

Q John, what can you tell us of the status of the Administration's efforts to get emergency, or whatever you want to call it, military aid to El Salvador? Where is that on Capitol Hill? Where is that and what else?

A Yeah. Okay. That has moved since last we spoke. An amendment for $93 million in military assistance for El Salvador will be considered in an appropriation bill before the Senate. The Executive Branch strongly supports the enactment of this amendment. We've made no secret of the Government of El Salvador's urgent need for such added assistance to provide the necessary security to protect the ongoing electoral process beginning with the March 25 presidential elections.

A little background on the current situation in El Salvador which has led to this action. The Administration's military assistance request for El Salvador for FY-84 was cut back under the continuing resolution from $86 million to $64 million under the continuing resolution.

Of this, some 30 percent continues to be conditioned on a verdict in the churchwomen's case which, as we've previously indicated, is on track, but in which we cannot expect a final verdict for several months. That effectively leaves only some $45 million for this fiscal year. This amount was obligated at the end of last month.

At the moment, materiel, ranging from ammunition to medical supplies, is being exhausted. The uncertainty of future supplies not only affects the Salvadoran military's ability to counter a stepped-up guerrilla insurgency, it also leaves in serious doubt that Government's ability to provide security for the presidential election which has already been subjected to guerrilla attacks.

We had hoped, and the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America had recommended, swift action to deal with the security needs in El Salvador. It now appears that the Congressional legislative process could hardly be expected to be completed for a number of months, possibly around June.

The need for this additional military assistance is now. The issue, then, is of an estimated need for some $265 million in military assistance -- that's the FY-84 request -- and the requested supplemental, of which only some $45 million has been made available this year.

Under the circumstances, we are faced with the limited alternatives of the exercise of options available to the President under existing laws, or providing the Congress with the opportunity to act on a legislative amendment to a current piece of legislation.

At any rate, the current amendment to provide $93 million in currently needed military assistance represents only a portion of the recommended supplemental in the legislative package implementing the Bipartisan Commission's recommendations, and that would be sufficient only to meet immediate needs and assure continuity of supply lines during this critical period.

This is an extended explanation of the developments which have brought us to this juncture, but the issue boils down to an essential question: Either the ongoing democratic effort and the upcoming presidential election in El Salvador is worth protecting, or it is not. We believe that it is.

Q Copy of that?

A Sure.

Q On the $93 million that you are seeking today, are you going to deduct that from the $178.7 million supplemental?

A It is my understanding -- I would bow to more expert opinion on that, but that is my understanding; yes, that --

Q They passed out and you would only seek the balance here?

A That is my understanding.

Q Could we ask you, does this process of using the current legislation, as you called it, will that result in the end in not having a vote on this matter in the House Appropriations Subcommittee headed by Chairman Long; and is it fair for us to suggest that that was a goal of the Administration?

A Well, I think that we have been confronted by some realities in the past several days. There, clearly, as we have conferred with Congressmen and Senators, there has been objection which has been expressed to taking some of the steps that are available to the President in terms of emergency measures.

It has been made clear that it's less desirable. We also have had the situation where the testimony -- where the Secretary appeared to testify before Congressman Long's committee, and Chairman Long made it clear that his committee would not vote on this until after the presidential elections. Well, the need is now; not after the presidential elections. So the President has decided to go this route, and there will, of course, be a vote on this bill.

Q In order to -- the President has decided to go this route in order to do what? In order not to have a vote --

A No, he has taken account of the various opinions and views that have been expressed, and this is one avenue available to him and he has proceeded -- decided to proceed in this direction.

Q Can we get you to say that the Administration is trying to bypass that committee, or --

A If you're trying to bypass the process, you might go another route. The fact is, this is simply a technical device to bring it before Congress.

Q John, even if you go this route, it's still going to take weeks because the amended resolutions, which have already been passed by the House, will have to go back to the House; correct?

A I can't answer that question because I'm not an expert in the area.

Q John, why $93 million? That's more than any annual request by the Administration and you knew last year when you submitted your '84 request the elections were going to take place?

A It's a realistic assessment of what is needed.

Q So you've changed your assessment from a year ago as to this year?

A It's a realistic assessment of what is now needed.

Q What is the basis of the changed assessment?

A I'm just telling you that it is what the Administration believes at this time is needed.

Q Can you be more specific about that particular aspect of it?

A No, I really can't.

Q Is there reason to believe that there'll be a new offensive, a new guerrilla offensive?

A Maybe you weren't here yesterday, John. But, as I said, I think there is evidence that the left is seeking to, as they did in the case of the previous election, attempting to subvert it, attempting to prevent the people of El Salvador from voting which they did in large numbers the last time around.

The army obviously has to deploy in a different manner to protect the election, and it is the judgment of the experts that these supplies are needed.

Q How long do you expect the $93 million to last?

A Can't give you an estimate on that.

Q John, could you be more specific about what is needed here? You just mentioned "ammunition to medical supplies". Do you have a more comprehensive estimate than that?

A No, I really -- I don't; I don't.

Q Can you take that as far as a (inaudible) breakdown; helicopters, spare parts.

A Let me see what we might have on that.

Q On that question, the Administration has recently stressed that the Salvadoran rebels are receiving a lot of supplies from Nicaragua; virtually anything they want.

Why is it that according to senior officials who have talked about their assistance needs, and what you mentioned today, there's nothing in there that would -- that's designed to help interdict the arms flow?

A Well, I think what the Salvadoran army is aleady doing is helpful in the area of interdiction. Obviously, the army in Salvador is attempting to prevent weapons from the outside falling into guerrilla hands.

Q No, but I mean -- for example, patrol boats: Claims have come that they're coming in a lot by boat and yet --

A You're recommending that we seek a lot more?

Q No, I'm asking a question; and the question is, why if we're so concerned about the arms flow aren't some of the things that we're now asking for involved in arms interdiction?

A Nothing -- I take well the implication that we really should come before Congress and ask for a lot more, but I think the feeling is that this is appropriate at this time and nothing that is suggested in this amount is in any way intended to signal any flagging concern about the arms flow.

Q John, do you have anything on an additional $21 million appropriation that the Administration will be asking for using a similar device, I guess you said or technical device?

A No, I don't.

Q You don't have anything on that?

A No, I don't.

Q Anything new on the proposed aid to Jordan? That is --

Q Let's finish this.

A Well, I can finish this one quickly. No, nothing new on aid to Jordan.

Q What if you don't get the money, John?

A I think the Salvadoran Army would be hard put.

Q Well, I mean, that's logical. They're hard put even before, but what if you don't --

A Harder put.

Q And what being harder put would they then face?

A I think you can trace the implications of that as well as I can or anybody in this room. Our interest is in helping the Salvadorans to provide a strong shield behind which they can hold that election. If you don't have a strong shield, I presume the election is more open to manipulation and subversion.

Q Do you believe that if you don't get this money, the government forces in El Salvador would not be able to stand up against the rebels?

A It's hard to make a statement that will create a headline. But I think they will be, as I said, hard put.

Q Is failure to supply this extra funding tantamount to abandonment?

A As I say, it's hard to ascribe words to it, but I think there isn't any question that there is an urgent need. The Administration feels that urgent need should be met, and clearly the Administration is pursuing this with a great amount of vigor and commitment to see that we do what we think should be done for El Salvador.

Q On the Hill in the last couple of days, you've said there have been urgent consultations. Has the Administration received any indications from the Hill, either from the Senate side or from the House side, that using this device will, in fact, enable the Administration to successfully get this appropriation; or is this an effort to having given up one way of going about it to try another way and see if this flies?

A I think it's an effort to work with the Congress to secure passage of this particular legislation, and these particular funds, after having conferred with members of the Congress, listened their views, and tried to take them into account.

Q Was this recommended by members of Congress?

A I don't know that it was recommended. I think that the President has considered a number of options and decided, in the light of what he has been hearing from a variety of sources, including members of Congress, that this is the way to attempt to go.

Q Aren't you saying -- aren't you implying here that if Congress doesn't agree to appropriate this money that the blame will be at the footstep of Congress?

A I don't think it's for us to apportion blame. I think it is to state what is obvious, that there is a serious need in El Salvador. There is a serious situation there, and should the appropriate level of support not be given, the process that we have tried to support, the democratic process in El Salvador, would be in jeopardy.

Q Doesn't that constitute a warning? I mean, you're saying either the on-going --

A It's not a warning; it's a statement of the facts. The facts are obvious.

Q It's not a warning to Congress?

A It's a statement of the reality of the situation. We hope that Congress will agree with our appraisal of the reality of the situation.

Q If you don't get this money from Congress, do you plan, then, to go to one of the alternative funding methods? 506 -- Section 506/614, the reprogramming any of the others?

A I think we would have to wait and see. I think we would pursue this track and see how this turns out.

Q Is there a deadline for Congress to act?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q Has any senior official signed off on a March 22? That is, that the order will be given to draw on March 22 if there's no Congressional action?

A I'm not aware of that, Jim.

Q On that statement, you said no conviction, or a verdict rather, in the nuns' case will not be "several months." That's a little -- well, at least one month more than what has previously been said by senior officials in the last month or so. Are you -- do you think there's going to be another delay?

A No, I don't. I don't think you should read anything into that. There's been no change in the consensus within the Administration in recent weeks about the timeframe on the trial.

Q What about the recent decision by the court to take testimony from Vides Casanova and others when the defense attorney for the six quit? They had to appoint a new defense attorney; has that changed?

A You may have a later wrinkle than I have, although I don't think so. I thought we were now through the process and at the final stage, but maybe you know something I don't know.

Q John, what is the real critical phase here? The elections? I mean, the efforts the military will go to to protect the elections?

A I think that introduces a new factor. You would have a situation where the army and the government would be running out of certain supplies, in any event. But you have a complicating factor in that you're trying to run an election in the midst of a guerrilla, leftist campaign where people are blowing up bridges, destroying roads, trying to injure and bring down the infrastructure of the country, which is hardly a great platform on which to run elections.

Q That goes on all the time with or without an election. Do you discount the efforts of -- statement of Mr. Ungo that his group will not disrupt the elections, et cetera?

A I haven't seen a great deal of evidence to support that.

Q John, I'll try it this way. A couple of months ago you were talking -- generically, were talking about the progress that has been made by the Salvadoran military --

A Uh-hum.

Q Political progress that has been made, the progress on the death squads --

A Uh-hum.

Q -- and suddenly we're hearing that the whole kit and caboodle could fall down unless you get eighty some odd million dollars immediately. What --

A I don't think there's any contradition in those figures.

--MORE--

Q No contradiction. What has happened, then, to put all of those rosy predictions in a suddenly dire situation?

A Well, I don't know that they're rosy predictions. I think we have tried to be realistic about the pace of development in El Salvador. I don't think anybody, for a moment, pretends that the situation is ideal. Nevertheless, the fact is that there has been progress in the areas that we think are important.

As you know, the military cycle goes up and down. Right now, the army seems to be on something of an offensive to try to forestall guerrilla activity. I guess that's heartening on the military side, although we would be the first to admit that the thing goes in cycles; and certainly there has been an attempt to move things forward on the human rights front. There has been an effort to curb "death squad" activity, and in none of these areas are we satisfied with the progress; we would like to see more. But there has been progress. And I think while that continues, that is heartening. That's our position.

Q But John, you're saying that the democratic process would be in jeopardy if you don't get the money. Now, jeopardy comes in different degrees, I appreciate that.

A If you have an army defending the tender shoots of democracy and trying to protect people as they want to go to the ballot boxes, and they don't have any bullets in their rifles and are not able to defend that process, it seems to me your placing the process in jeopardy.

Q It's that bad, they don't have bullets?

A I'm perhaps waxing a little, using a little journalistic license. But I'm talking in terms of supplies and the ability to insure the security of the country and the system.

Q Is the Administration ready to make any commitment on certification, or any mandatory requirement on human rights compliance?

A I think the Secretary has indicated on a number of occasions in testimony that we are at one with Congress in terms of wanting to see progress. The real question is the best method of insuring that that goes forward and that we are willing to talk to the Congress and try to work something out on that.

Q What active role will the Secretary be taking in pursuing this objective? It's going to the Hill. Do you have anything planned on testimony -- meetings?

A I'm sure he is making some calls to Congressmen. I'm sure he will be talking to Congressmen and trying to underline the importance and urgency of this initiative.

Q Isn't the bottom line --

Q John, I just want to come back to this again. Given what the Secretary had to say about Lebanon and the role of the Congress and the setbacks there, isn't the bottom line here that he is telegraphing to the Congress that if this money is not forthcoming, they will be responsible for any adverse developments in El Salvador?

A Well, I think what he is saying and what the Administration is saying, that if you do not provide the resources for El Salvador to defend itself and maintain its security, you are raising obvious threats. It's not a question of our making threats; it's a question of the threat to the process and to those who are struggling to move Salvador forward in the direction that everybody would like to see.

Q John, how do you explain the degree of skepticism about the reaction on Capitol Hill to what you believe and the Secretary believes is in fact slow, but not necessarily enough, progress? Is it politically rooted? There is such a collision of assessments; you've got to have some understanding of why is there so much skepticism on the Hill.

A It's hard for me to analyze and ascribe motivation to Congressmen and Senators. There may well be some political implications; I suppose there may be a lack of understanding; there may be misinformation. All these are factors, could be factors.

Q If you turn that question around, to what degree is there a commitment on the part of the Administration to this policy, because it is part of a policy and they are going to stay with it even though they are rather unhappy with the rate of progress and so forth, that you don't want to appear to wash your hands of another debacle?

A I don't think that is, if I may say so, Bernie, a very profound analysis (laughter) because not only the Administration is concerned. It's not a narrow, partisan outlook. We have had a bipartisan commission which came at this from different points of view and has come up with certain recommendations. They perceive the urgency perhaps even more urgently than the Administration.

Q Let the record note that the profundity was even more miniscule than the report.

A (Laughter)

Q Do you have any reaction today to Soviet claims about U.S. intentions in the Persian Gulf?

A No. Tass, clearly, is incorrect -- You're talking about the Tass statement?

Q Yes.

A Yes, sure. They are incorrect in misreading (laughter) the situation. The Soviets are well aware that the United States and many other nations share a concern for the peace and stability of the region and for the maintenance of the right of free navigation in the international waters of the Persian Gulf; and any ascribing of ulterior or evil motives, of course, is nonsense.

Q A couple of points: This morning Mr. Shamir, in Israel, criticized Egypt about the Camp David and said they reneged on the Camp David Accords; and Syria called on Egypt to abrogate or cancel the Camp David Agreement. Do you have any position on that?

A This is a Shamir statement? Run that by again.

Q Shamir accused Egypt of reneging on the letter and the spirit or whatever of Camp David. He said that, he accused that the Egyptian press kept attacking Israel and all kind of things, and Mr. Assad, I think, of the Syrian Government called on the Egyptian Government to cancel the Camp David Agreement.

A O.K. We believe that the essential point is that the foundation of peace between Egypt and Israel remains, although the relationship obviously is not as smooth as all of us would like to see; but we believe that the basic foundation is there.

Q Do you have anything new on Syria today, John -- internal developments that would amplify some of the thoughts you had yesterday?

A No, I really don't, Bernie. I'm sorry.

Q Do you have any comment on what President Saddam Husayn said that --

A President who?

Q Saddam Husayn, of Iraq --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- said about accusing Iraq of using the chemical warfare, that he said you borrowed this talk from Iran, and you are laying the bridges of amity with them.

A I don't think we really have much to say beyond what we've already said on this. Our condemnation of Iraq's use of lethal chemical weapons was unqualified; but at the same time, we take note of Iraq's repeatedly expressed willingness to cease fire, and Iran's refusal to do so.

It's a fact that the Iranian regime, not Iraq, now holds the key to ending the bloodshed. In particular the regime's wanton destruction of human life through human wave tactics and its continued rejection of numerous mediation efforts belie the moral basis which Iran claims. But that doesn't affect what we said about Iraq's use of chemical weapons.

Q John, in that connection, going back to the chemical warfare thing, as the State Department now says it knew about the use of chemical weapons sometime ago, why did it take so long for the State Department to condemn the use of those weapons publicly?

A Oh, I think on these things, Ralph, you work through various channels and see which are most productive. We had talked with Iraq about this, and it seemed the principal thing to do, to make the statement we did.

Q The principal thing was to make the statement, but --

A The principal thing was to work through a number of channels to try to resolve problems.

Q Over a period of a year, maybe more?

A I can't give you a time span.

Q John, have any appointments now been made in the Administration for Ismet Kittani, when he comes next week?

A I don't know whether appointments have been made. I think he might well see Assistant Secretary Murphy; he might see Mr. Eagleburger. But I do not know whether appointments have firmly been made, but I think those would be logical people for him --

Q John, could you assess for us a situation in Nicaragua, as you see it at the moment -- the degree to which U.S. pressures there might have caused changes in Nicaraguan behavior and the degree to which these pressures need to be maintained?

A Well, I'm really a little reluctant to give you a sort of off-the-top-of-my-head view of the situation in Nicaragua, but the Secretary has made clear and I think various other Administration officials have made clear that we are noting with interest some of the things that are being said by Nicaraguan leaders, which appear to hold promise. However, words have to be backed up by specific actions, and we are looking for that kind of movement.

I think, in a nutshell, that would be an accurate capsuling of what has been said.

Q And about the U.S. pressures that have been applied?

A No, don't have --

Q The effect of those pressures?

A Don't have anything on that.

Q State Department officials have said, probably since the end of January, that a number of the measures announced by the Sandinistas have really turned out to be cosmetic and lacking in substance. You hinted at that.

A Uh-huh.

Q Does that remain the assessment of the Administration that there is still a complete lack of substance to so-called liberalization in election measures?

A I wouldn't say a complete lack of substance, but there certainly is a lot of substance lacking behind the words.

Q And what, in your opinion, can the United States do to bring about more action behind those words?

A -- can the United States do? I think it's up to the Nicaraguans to put some more substance into those promises.

Q Do you have any comment on Israel's refusal to allow the director of a charitable educational institution of Ramallah on the occupied West Bank, namely the institution called an-Nash al-Usra, which is the welfare of the family, who was denied to travel from the West Bank to any place, and was put on house arrest? Her name is Mrs. Samiha al-Khalil. She is very well known. Can you look into this matter, please?

A Let me see what we might have. I'm not aware of it.

Q John, do you have anything on reports that the Cubans have withdrawn about half of their 10,000-man force from Ethiopia?

A Don't have anything on numbers. I think we have responded to that story before, and there is something earlier. But I'm not sure that we were able to be very specific on numbers.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:45 p.m.)

Allnxon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, March 9, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #43

FRIDAY, MARCH 9, 1984, 12:10: P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

Q Any new ideas?

MR. HUGHES: New ideas? I have no new ideas; I have no announcements; I have no news, so let's get this over and get on to lunch. (Laughter)

Q Do you have any ideas what you're going to do to get some aid to your friends fighting the Government of Nicaragua?

A I'm sure that discussions are going on today, both within the Administration and between the Administration and Congressional leadership. I can't tell you how we will proceed with that.

Q What role is Secretary Shultz taking in this?

A Well, as you know, he spent more than two hours with the Senate Intelligence Committee yesterday afternoon. He may have made some calls last night -- I'm not sure whether he did -- and I'm not sure whether he's making any calls to Congressmen today, but I wouldn't rule it out. He might well be.

Q What are the calls --

Q Did Secretary Shultz express regret to the Committee on the manner in which this matter on Nicaraguan aid, rebel aid, has been handled?

A Well, let me do that in two parts. Obviously it was a closed meeting, so we don't talk about what he said in the meeting.

Having said that, yes, I think there's no question in general about the Secretary's feeling of regret that the consultations with the Senate Intelligence Committee could not have gone forward before the discussions with the Appropriations Committee.

Q He's expressing regret over the fact that he didn't consult with that committee? He's not expressing regret for the manner in which it was --

A No.

Q -- decided to --

A You mean about the addition of the amendment to the bill?

Q -- to get --

A No, the Administration was not.

Q I'm sorry. I didn't hear the answer to that, John.

A No. He's expressing regret -- obviously, he's speaking for the Administration -- but, no, there was no expression of regret about the manner in which the Administration attempted to tackle that problem, if you're talking about specifically adding an amendment to a bill. No.

Q There's no regret for that?

A Not that I know of.

Q Is anyone willing to admit who it was that did it?

A Oh, I'm sure it was an Administration position, Barrie. And as you always know, we never get into details of who says what in an Administration decision.

Q The people up on the Hill were extremely critical of the State Department yesterday. Was it the State Department that thought this idea up?

A I'm really not going to get into that. There was, however -- I just would say, there was an erroneous network report last night which said that the Secretary had apologized for the way the White House had handled this; and let me say that that is not correct. That was not correct.

Q Did he apologize for the way the State Department handled it?

A What the Secretary did was express regret -- as I say, I want to carefully draw this line between what he said in a closed meeting; but nevertheless, there isn't any question about the Secretary's regret that the process of consultation with the appropriate Select Committee, the Intelligence Committee, had not gone forward in the proper manner.

Q John, just to make sure that I understand this, he feels that maybe the Intelligence Committee should have been told --

A Not a good process to go to the appropriations committee before you go to the authorizing committee.

Q What about the notice that was given to the Appropriations Committee, and particularly its Chair, Senator Hatfield? Does he regret having given less than 24 hours' formal notice?

A I can't offer you a comment on that specific point because I haven't heard him speak on that particular point. But I think you also have to remember that all this moved very fast. The opportunity of these particular bills coming up was something that moved very fast, and the Administration moved very fast in view of the problems it faces, in view of the urgency of the situation, and in view of the fact that Chairman Long's committee had said it would not vote on the funds until after the election, which clearly is a problem for the Administration, and in view of the fact that various Congressmen and Senators had said that they would prefer the Administration did not go the emergency route.

Q Getting away for a minute from the sort of bureaucratic --

A It's not bureaucratic. It's the legislative process. That's what we're talking about.

Q Well, all right. Getting away for a minute from the legislative process of the details of which committee you go to and so on, doesn't the Administration at this point feel a frustration or disappointment or anger or something over the fact that it is unable to accomplish what it clearly feels it ought to be able to accomplish quickly and easily?

A Feels disapointment.

Q And what about -- I mean, where does that lead you? Don't you, at some point, draw the conclusion that you can't do it?

A That's not what I said at the beginning of this session. What I said was that we were disappointed, but we were working with the Congressional leadership.

Q You still think there is a chance of attaching this material to another bill?

A Don't know how it can be done, but we think that the facts of the situation in Central America, we hope, will be influential.

Q John, to follow on that, does the regret mean that you will no longer try to attach the $93 million to the Africa food bill?

A No, that's not what I said. The regret was over the process of consultation with the Intelligence Committee.

Q Would you just please run through that regret again, because obviously there seems to be some confusion at precisely what the regret is targeted at? Could you take it one step at a time, please?

A The regret was that the process did not go forward as we concede it should have and as we think is the correct way to go forward -- namely, that you talk to the authorizing committee before you talk to the appropriations committee.

Q Both attempts, the attempt for funds for the Contras, plus the --

A That's the principle on which Congress operates and which --

Q Where is Congress going to go now? I mean, with the authorizing committee having had their briefing now, and the appropriating committee going to perhaps be meeting on Tuesday to consider at least one of the amendments on one of the bills, do you see now that that process has gone in what you seem to think is the right way to do it?

A I think that is what folks are talking about today, how to move this forward in a manner that is satisfactory.

Q So there is no regret at --

A Adding the amendment to a bill? No.

Q Or the speed or the suddenness or the last-minute kind of high-balling it past Congress?

A "High-balling it past Congress." That's another one of your colorful phrases. (Laughter)

Q But there's no regret about that?

A No. This --

Q That there's not an opportunity to explore or debate; here it is at the last minute, and there's no regret about that?

A There are certain realities in that there is a sense of urgency about what needs to be done. You face a situation in El Salvador where you are going -- you are already into an election campaign, where you have harassment from the left, where you have an army that is running out of supplies -- that has to be remedied.

Congess apparently is unable to move swiftly on that, so the Administration has, as you know, been looking for several days on how best to proceed; been consulting, been seeking to move this forward with the most dispatch that we can.

Q Was the Secretary part of the decision that led to the action to go in there, virtually at the last minute, to add an amendment?

A Well, as you well know, Bernie, we tend not to -- the Secretary has talked about the decision-making process in the Administration on many occasions and has expressed astonishment that some of you think there should be unanimity, and has said on many occasions that, indeed, it is healthy that different viewpoints are expressed within the Administration. I'm talking general, philisophical terms now, not specifically about this particular decision.

So we have consistently not talked about who said what in the Administration. You get the Presidential decision, and it's supported.

Q Can you tell us at what time the decision was made to go forward with that amendment proposal when they actually did it? How many hours or days was there before?

A I cannot tell you. I think the final decision was made sometime on -- we're Friday today -- I think Wednesday, Bernie, but I cannot give you the hour or the minute-by-minute sequence, I'm afraid.

Q Did it originate --

A Sorry?

Q Did it originate from Secretary Motley?

A As I say, we don't talk about where ideas originate from.

Q It is important in this --

A It's an Administration decision. The President made the decision to proceed in a certain way, and that's the way we're going --

Q The question is on the regret, because -- did the Secretary say he regretted that the Intelligence Committee had not been informed or briefed ahead time because the regret meant that he personally had forgotten to do it or that he personally didn't know about it, about the amendment, so therefore there was no way to get to the Intelligence Committee first? In other words, is it a kind of "I'm sorry I bumped into your car?" Was it that kind of --

A No, it wasn't that kind of situation. (Laughter)

Q But the point of the regret, was it just kind of politeness that, "I'm sorry --"

A No, it's not a question of politeness. It's an earnest sense of regret --

(Podium light goes off.)

We have to terminate this briefing unless I can get this light on. (Laughter)

It's an earnest sense of regret that the process did not go forward as Congress would have preferred it to go forward and as we would have preferred it to go forward in an ideal situation. But there was an acceleration of activity; things moved fast; the bills were available at very short notice, and the Administration moved on that, and the appropriate consultation didn't take place.

Q John, you've explained the urgency with regard to El Salvador. The regretful situation, as I understand it, has to do with Nicaragua. What is the urgency to pump another $20 million or so into the counter-revolutionary activity there?

A Well, as you know, I have a little problem with that in that you're talking about --

Q I will make it vague. What is the urgency to increase the funding in that area, or whatever?

A I think I will leave to the White House discussion of that particular covert activity.

Q John, under the law, it was pointed out yesterday in the Appropriations Committee the State Department and CIA had the obligation to keep informed the Intelligence Committee about developments there and that there was no notice of any kind with respect to any urgency with respect to the matter that they had to deal with yesterday.

A Let me point out to you that the Secretary -- contrary to some reports last night that the Secetary rushed up the Hill, let me point out to you that the session with the Senate Intelligence Committee had been scheduled for sometime, and the Secretary knew he was going up there to talk with that committee.

Q No, but with -- a lot of the criticism went to planning of the whole Central America policy. Why is it that --

A Not that I heard yesterday. I heard -- I did not hear criticism of policy. I heard criticism of process --

Q That's what I said, the planning of the policy.

A -- and that underlined the Secretary's regret, because people who were and are expressing support of the Administration's policy, and did again yesterday, were concerned about the process. That goes to the heart of his regret, and that's Bernie's question; that he regrets that we went forward with a process which clearly alienated people who support the Administration's policy, and that is not a good thing to do because you lose votes of people who are for you.

Q But that's not the point I was trying to make. I mean, that's precisely -- planning or procedure doesn't make that much difference.

The point was that Senator Inouye, Senator Leahy, other Senators on the Appropriations Committee, pointed out that by law the responsible Executive authorities must provide up-to-date information at regular intervals with respect to on-going programs to the Intelligence Committee; that this did not take place because there was no notion of any urgency communicated by any senior official or Executive Branch member to the Intelligence Committee prior to yesterday's meeting. Do you have any comment on that?

A No, except it does not seem to me to be at variance with the Secretary's expression of regret over the way it was handled.

Q John, getting back for just a second to your statement that there is no regret over adding an amendment to a bill, a lot of the criticism from both Democrats and Republicans at the Committee yesterday was over, paraphrasing some of their words, "putting Central American policy on the backs of the poor in the fuel bill." That was mentioned by a number of Senators in the Committee.

That is not -- well, that is, to some extent, a procedural matter, but it's also a policy matter.

A No. Its a technical legislative question. It is not at all unusual for diverse subjects to be discussed in one bill.

Q That's correct, it's not unusual for diverse subjects, but it's a matter of policy in terms of getting one policy matter successfully through Congress.

A Which bill would you have suggested we affix the amendment to?

Q I'm not in the Administration, but I'm asking you whether there's any regret?

A How many bills are there proceeding at a pace which would give you the urgency for sending supplies to El Salvador?

Q I think you're asking me the questions, and I guess --

A   Well, you're asking me why we chose a particular bill.

Q   No, no.

A   There are two bills available.

Q   No, I'm not asking that question. I asked whether the Administration, in light of the criticism it received yesterday from bipartisan members of the Senate Appropriations Committee on that subject of attaching it to a very popular bill that affects poor people in northeastern states, and so on, does the Administration have any regret over, in retrospect, having done it now, over doing that?

A   I'm not sure how the Administration will proceed at something. I'm sure it's being discussed today. But I'm not aware of any sense of wrong-doing or any sense of -- or any feeling that this was unusual measure to take. As you know, it is fairly standard.

Q   Could you answer that question which you asked rhetorically: How many bills are there to which these amendments could have been affixed?

A   I think there are two bills.

Q   Two?

A   And I think one is involved with the Salvador portion; one is involved with the Nicaragua portion.

Q   What is the -- do you have any sense of what the emergency allocations are available to the government to --

A   To Salvador?

Q   -- to proceed, yes.

A   Any sense of what emergency allocations are available?

Q   In other words, what -- in looking forward, what recourses, what's the amount of money in the emergency till that the Secretary, the State Department has access to for --

A   I don't, John. You mean if we don't get this money, what runs out? No, I don't have those figures. I'm sorry.

Q Do you have any comment on the military action that seems to have taken place between Greece and Turkey? Do we know anything about it? What is the stand on it?

A Well, seen the reports, seeking clarification of that with both the Greek and Turkish Governments both here in Washington and in Athens and Ankara. In all those discussions, we are urging restraint.

Q John, the Turks say that the incident took place in an area which was for an operation which had been planned much in advance and that everyone knew about it. Is that correct, as far as you know?

A I think -- I wouldn't steer you away from that deduction but I think I'm really reluctant to get into specifics until we have something more from the respective governments. But if anybody came to me and offered that thesis, I wouldn't say "be careful."

Q That was a NATO operation, wasn't it? I mean, it wasn't simply Turkish? Or was it simply Turkish?

A I don't know whether it was a NATO operation. I think the Turkish position is that they were operating in an area that had been delineated for the exercise; that they didn't move out of it, that what they fired fell within that. But I prefer you to get that from them rather than us.

Q We did get it from them. I'm just asking you.

A Okay, fine. I wouldn't steer you away from it.

Q The Greek Government has said that the destroyer was definitely in Greek territorial waters and thus firing upon it constitutes, according to the United Nation's definition, an act of aggression. Why don't you condemn it as such?

A I thought I just explained that we were seeking the facts.

Q Okay.

A It's good to have the facts before you make condemnatory statements.

Q Isn't there some dispute over what's territorial water, and what isn't, in that precise point?

A There may be. As I say, we're looking into the facts.

Q Do you have confirmation about -- of the reports that the Turks have moved an additional division close to the Greek-Turkish border in Greece?

A No, I have none whatsoever.

--MORE--

Q Another subject: Any comment on the NBC News report about 2000 American troops going into the Honduran border to --

A Little puzzled --

Q -- help with the election protection mission?

A Little puzzled by that. Pentagon isn't able to shed much light on that, but I refer you to them and to statements that we have made earlier about exercises in the area, but nobody seems to know anything about troops going there close to the border or certainly anything of that kind of scale. But I think --

Q What about the purpose of the -- the alleged purpose of the mission to help with the election protection process, the election shield process.

A Don't know anything about that. Try the Pentagon.

Q John, just to follow that up --

Q Do you deny that the Administration is planning to begin next week emergency readiness exercises in that area?

A No. And I think the Pentagon, as we have -- we said, I think, early in February, we talked about a small number of Americans being left behind after the exercises, plus readiness exercises, and we talked about that at the time. But very small numbers are involved, and when we were queried on this last night and again this morning, I must say the Pentagon appears to be bemused by all this.

Q Are they denying the numbers?

A I'd rather you speak to them, but I don't --

Q Well, they give you guidance on these issues. Are they denying the numbers?

A Well, the guidance that we got was that they were bemused and were looking into it, because they knew of nothing of that scope or magnitude.

Q John, what's the (inaudible) -- just the size of the operation, not the operation itself?

A It's a report that 2,000 Americans --

Q I know the report, but what -- are you denying that exercises will be held close to the border?

A I think the Pentagon would deny that, yes. Close to the border, yes. But I really would prefer you -- it's their story, and we're really unaware of it.

Q But it was cited -- the State Department was cited as the source of the story.

A Ah! Well, that may be, John, but the fact remains we are unaware of it. (Laughter) The State Department is often cited in stories that we're unaware of and indeed turn out not to be true.

Q On Salvador, John, there are these strikes that have been going on for some time, and the army moved in to end at least one yesterday.

Do you have any comment on the strikes, and specifically do you have any comment with respect to the Post article which says that the FMLN is behind the strikes?

A Well, I just offer these words to you, Jim:

Notwithstanding promises by the guerrillas' political spokesmen to the effect that there would be no disruption of the voting process, the guerrillas themselves have spoken clearly through their actions.

Since the beginning of the Salvadoran presidential campaign, two Legislative Assembly deputies have been assassinated, as well as the head of the military tribunal. An attack on two trains on February 27 showed utter disregard for the lives of civilians. On March 6, guerrillas attacked on ambulance of the International Committee of the Red Cross, killing two Red Cross workers. Three gas stations were blown up in San Salvador last week; the guerrillas have stepped up their attacks on power lines; bombings are up. The guerrillas have warned villagers in San Miguel and Usulutan departments not to participate in campaign activities.

We think it's clear that the guerrillas, or at least segments within them, wish to see the elections take place within an atmosphere of terror. This parallels closely the guerrilla strategy during the 1982 elections, a strategy which failed completely when faced with the Salvadoran people's desire for continued democratic process.

While --

Q Copy of that?

A Well, haven't quite finished yet.

While such things are hard to prove conclusively, the evidence available to us suggests strongly that the guerrillas have been actively trying to inflame the recent strikes by public sector workers. Nevertheless, we understand that at least one of the major unions involved has indicated a willingness to accept the wage increases offered by the government.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q With respect to the assassinations that you mentioned, which -- to you knowledge has the FMLN taken any responsibility for them?

A Taken responsibility?

Q Yes.

A For assassinations?

Q Yeah.

A Be glad to take a look at that for you.

Q Do you see any problem because of -- between what you have just said and what's going on in Nicaragua, in view that they're having elections also and that the anti-Sandinistas are also blowing up things and all like that?

A Well, I think the situation is somewhat different; but anyway, insofar as Nicaragua's elections are concerned, we yet really know very little about how they will proceed, and there also is the problem of what occurs in the run-up period to an election -- whether you have a free press, whether you have free movement, and whether you really provide the conditions that enable people to go forward with the free election.

Q John, can I ask you on another area of the world? Do you have anything today that you can tell us about the Jordanian strike force?

A No.

Q Nothing?

A No.

Q Do you have anything -- any comment, or do you care to comment on an ad today in The Washington Post from apparently (inaudible) or opinion-makers in the Gulf critical of U.S. policy in Lebanon lately?

A No. Sorry. I didn't see it.

Q John, does the United States continue to receive reports that Iraq is continuing to use chemical weapons or gas in the war in the Persian Gulf?

A You phrased that very carefully, Don. Have we -- I cannot tell you whether we have evidence, since we offered our statement, that the use of chemical weapons continues. No, I can't answer that.

Q Could you check into whether or not you have continuing evidence of their use?

A Let me see what we might have.

Q And, parallel to that, has any assurance been received or statement from Iraq to the effect that they will not heretofore, henceforth use such weapons?

A Well --

Q Since the statement made on Monday.

A Uh-huh. I think that really would involve getting into the diplomatic back and forth, and probably we wouldn't have a great deal for you on that.

Q Do you have anything about the situation in the Persian Gulf, either the situation on the ground or anything else about --

A No.

Q -- what's going on there?

A No. Don't really have any update.

Q John, can you clarify the status of Rumsfeld? Is he still Middle East envoy, or is he back at Searle?

A Is he where?

Q There were reports yesterday that he is back at least part-time running Searle.

A Yes. Well, that's -- but that has never changed. His position has always been that part of his time he will go back to Chicago and pick up with his company. As you know, he's an unpaid special negotiator, has responsibilities to his company, and so part of the time he works on the Middle East full-time. But when he's back, he has commuted between Chicago and Washington, and has -- I think he in fact is here in Washington this week.

Q Does that, John, give the Middle East the attention it merits, that sort of arrangement, a part-time envoy?

A I think for the moment he is looking at his future travel plans and has nothing in mind for the moment, but we'll see how that turns out.

Q Would you lead us away from the idea that Rumsfeld is backing off the Middle East and backing into Searle?

A No. I think where I would lead you is that Rumsfeld is carrying out the kind of program that he pretty much said he would. I think he made it clear when he came on board that he couldn't come for an indefinite period. The time when he would return full-time to his company I think was never spelled out and isn't spelled out now. But I don't see in his pattern of travel or of involvement much different to what I think he forecast would be the situation when he first came.

Q Would --

A He's been in a somewhat different situation than the others who had a kind of an open-ended thing. I think he made it clear from the very beginning that at some stage he would have to go back to his company.

Q John, would characterize this as familiar, having a Presidential envoy who is part-timer?

A Would I characterize it --

Q Is this a familiar procedure to have a position --

A I don't know whether it is familiar in the case of -- it probably was not the case with Ambassador

Habib and Ambassador McFarlane, but it was the case with Ambassador Rumsfeld. When he came aboard, it was quite clear that this was the way he would proceed.

Q John, do we anticipate that Rumsfeld will make another trip out to the Middle East?

A Don't have anything on his travel plans. I'm sure that's something he's looking at now.

Q Do we think there will be another trip out to the Middle East by Rumsfeld?

A There may be.

Q John, is Dick Fairbanks now in fact coordinating Iran-Iraq policy as part of his --

A We do have some guidance of a day or two ago on Ambassador Fairbanks' role which we can pull out.

Q John, do you have any comment on the increasing reports of the conflict in Syria, internal conflict?

A No.

Q Nothing?

A No.

Q Any information you can offer us on the reported new U.S. strategy in the Middle East based on a closer cooperation between Israel and Jordan?

A I'm sorry? The new U.S. --

Q Strategy reported yesterday.

A I'm sorry. I'm not getting it.

Q Strategy.

A Strategy. The new U.S. strategy?

Q Yes.

A With relation to?

Q The accord --

A In relation to?

Q In the Middle East, based on a closer relation between Israel and Jordan reported yesterday.

A No. I really don't.

Q Would you characterize the relations between the U.S. and Iraq as still improving as they were just before the chemical weapons episode?

A Well, certainly we desire to see an improvement in our relations with Iraq, and, as you know, there have been some contacts and discussions. Certainly that access and that exchange continues to go forward without any impediment that I'm aware of.

Q Does Kittani still intend be next Wednesday?

A Kittani is here, I think, next week on an unofficial visit, and we do expect him to see probably Secretary Murphy and Secretary Eagleburger.

Q John, two question on Spain, if I may. Do you have any comment on the firing of French warships against Spanish fishing boats yesterday --

A No.

Q -- that had some --

A No.

Q And, also, do you have any readouts on the meeting that took place -- that will take place Monday between the Secretary and the Spanish Defense Minister?

A Any readout on a meeting?

Q Yes. I mean, what they are going to talk about or something.

A No.

Q Do you have anything today on Lebanon and reports that Israel may pull back on the weekend?

A No.

Q And, also, I think this was overlooked at the very beginning. Do you have a specific statement with regard to the action taken by the Senate Appropriations Committee yesterday?

A I think I'll give you -- I'll refer you to the fine words that I offered. (Laughter) Don't always follow my statement, you know. (Laughter)

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:39 p.m.)

Becker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Monday, March 12, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #42 /et seq. +27

MONDAY, MARCH 12, 1984, 12:26 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I have a couple of announcements up front.

Firstly, housekeeping. There will be a background briefing in the White House Press Briefing Room tomorrow at 10:00 in the morning on the visit of Portuguese Prime Minister Soares.

I have a statement for you on the Lorton incident. The Director General of the Foreign Service has found that the three employees referred to him by the Inspector General for disciplinary action bore varying degrees of responsibility in the Lorton incident. Appropriate disciplinary action in all three cases has been taken. Two employees were given letters of reprimand which will be placed in their personnel files. The third employee was given an oral admonishment.

The Department's investigation revealed certain procedural weaknesses, not attributable to any one individual which contributed to the unfortunate handling of the missing documents. Action is being taken to implement the necessary changes. Because of these weaknesses, the Director General decided that full responsibility should not be borne by these individuals. Therefore, the disciplinary action was less severe than might otherwise had been the case. For example, the disciplinary action taken did not include suspension from duty nor separation from employment.

The Department of Justice, after a thorough review, has indicated it will not pursue criminal prosecution against the State Department employees, and in this circumstance and in keeping with our normal policy, the Department of State will not release the names of the employees who have been disciplined.

And, finally, a statement on the inaccurate stories about an airlift of weaponry to the Sudan.

We understand the the Eithopian Foreign Ministry has announced the postponement of talks scheduled for March 12 between Ethiopia and Sudan about bilateral tensions. The

Ministry statement cited as a reason for the postponement a "massive airlifting of sophisticated weapons by the United States Government to Sudan."

As you recall, rumors of an imminent airlift of military equipment circulated following the visit of Sudanese Vice President Tayyib to Washington ten days ago. We want to confirm our statement that at that time that U.S. and Sudanese authorities are reviewing the on-going military assistance program to determine how the U.S. can strenghten Sudan's defensive capability against increased security threats from outside the country. But no decision has been taken yet as to the type of military equipment or the mode of delivery.

That's all I have for you.

Q Copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Has it been decided whether to send more military equipment even if you haven't decided what type?

A I think what we said at the time still applies, Don. That, obviously, we would look at such a request from a country like the Sudan sympathetically within the framework of sympathy, but the fact is that no decision has been made. There is a program, and it may well be that there might be some acceleration of that program, or something like that, but the fact is that no decision has yet been made.

Q Is there going to be a readout on Walters' talks with Nimeiri?

A I don't. No, I don't.

Q Is Ambassador Walters back?

A Ambassador Walters is back in Washington, but I don't have any readout.

Q On that Lorton statement that you made, as I remember the last briefing, the question was no so much whether full responsibility would be borne by the three individuals but whether the responsibility would be accepted and recognized by their leaders, or the people to whom they are responsible to, and you've ducked all of that in the statement here.

A Ducked it?

Q Why is that?

A Well, I've told you what the disciplinary action is and, in general, against whom it has been taken. That's the decision.

Q Who's responsible for the management of problems that you mentioned? You didn't call them management problems, but clearly there's a deficiency in procedures there?

A Yes, there has been.

Q Who's responsible for that?

A Well, I think the investigation has pinpointed deficiencies in various areas, and those are being corrected.

Q Yes, but who's responsible for the deficiencies in those various areas?

A I can't give you a single personality, Ralph, I'm afraid.

Q Could you specify several personalities, perhaps?

A It may well be.

Q In the statement that you read, I got the impression that you were going very lightly on the three because the ultimate responsibility should have been borne by senior officials and that it implied that in the future that would be the thrust of the approach. Why isn't it being taken this time?

A We hope that there won't be a repetition.

Q Forget what your hopes are. Why, in fact, is this amounting to a whitewash of what you yourself admit as deficiency and incompetence in safeguarding the secrets of the State Department?

A I think that in the light of the number of questions you have raised, what we will try to do is get you a BACKGROUNDER this afternoon by some of those officials more directly involved with that. So why don't we lay that on for this afternoon?

Q What time --

A As soon as we can find out who's available at what time, but I presume 3:00/4:00, somewhere around there.

Q Maybe somebody whose responsible could come down?

A Somebody involved; sure. I'm glad you have disavowed any responsibility on my party, Marvin.

Q John, if I could pursue that for just one more point. Could you just tell us, if you won't tell us the names -- and I can understand why -- can you tell us what position levels the people are?

A I really can't unless whoever we get this afternoon wants to go further, but I really can't because I think that might indicate who they might be. But perhaps you'll have better luck with whoever comes down this afternoon.

Q John, will you tell us whether they're Foreign Service or GS?

A Two answers to that question: I'm not sure whether I would tell you if I knew, but I don't know.

Q John, on another subject, reports from Iran and elsewhere now say that there are indications that in addition to the lethal toxic gas that you mentioned last week, there are indications that mycotoxins may have been used.

A Yes, looking into that; don't have anything for you on it, though.

Q How are you looking into it?

A I can't give you the specifics, Jim. I'm sure the folks who follow that very closely are pursuing a variety of avenues of inquiry.

Q John, do you have any comment on the proposal by the South African Foreign Minister for a regional meeting to solve the problems there, which seems to contradict the approach through the U.N. 435?

A We welcome continued expressions such as Foreign Minister Botha's -- he is the South African Foreign Minister -- of his government's readiness to solve the regional problems of southern Africa through negotiations. We clearly wish to maintain the momentum presently achieved through existing mechanisms and fora, such as the joint South African Government-Angola Joint Military Commission.

We take note of the Foreign Minister's latest idea. Our position on such a meeting would depend on further developments in the negotiations and the desires of all the parties. We intend to work with all parties to build from the current disengagement process to a broader settlement which includes Namibian independence and the U.N. Security Resolution 435. Concerning Angola it has long been our view that the civil strife in that country can only be resolved by political means and by the Angolan parties themselves.

Q Copy?

A Sure.

Q John, what do you think about the proposal to have SWAPO and UNITA forces there?

A I think this statement sets the tone of response at this stage. I think we want to look at it carefully, see how the parties involved respond to this, and see how it moves along.

Q Do you see this as a new route? Bernie talked about the --

A I think it's a new suggestion, yes; I think it's a new initiative.

Q Could it be a delaying tactic?

A I think we'll have to -- I think that's why we have to see how the parties respond to this, Bernie. It's kind of hard to characterize --

Q There is a senior member of UNITA -- Mr. Chitunda, I think it is -- who is more or less considered their foreign minister, who is in Washington now. Does the Department intend to have some of its senior people see him?

A I'm not aware that he's here. I didn't know that, but I'll take a look.

Q He was as of Friday. Could you find out --

A Sure.

Q And going back to another point raised about Iran-Iraq, is there any answer to the question I raised on Friday about whether the United States continues to receive reports that Iraq is continuing to use --

A No, don't have anything further on that.

Q Could you look into that?

A Sure.

Q John, further on that, do you have any comment on the Iranians' letter to the Red Cross -- I'm sorry, the Iraqi letter to the Red Cross saying that they would welcome an independent evaluation of the use and --

A If that turns out to be correct, we would welcome that. We would welcome the inquiry. As you know, we have supported the idea of a U.N. inquiry.

Q That doesn't, in your mind, though, cast any doubt on the evidence that you received of recent use by Iraq?

A No change in our statement, as we gave it.

Q On the African thing, had the U.S. been consulted by the South Africans before --

A I don't think we were aware of this, Bernie.

Q Can I stay on that for just a second?

A Sure.

Q In the report from the Times today, it says that there was little evidence that much of a withdrawal has taken place in southern Angola. Do you have anything as to the progress of the disengagement?

A I don't, but I'm just trying to recall what has been in the public domain and what seems to have been substantiated. I'm not sure I'd agree with that thesis. I thought that there was considerable progress, but that there had been an impediment as the South Africans thought that there had been some counter-activity.

Q Do you have any idea as to when the disengagement is to be completed? Is there a date, like April 1 or something like that?

A I think the South Africans talked of a date initially. Whether that date still holds, I don't know; but I think there was a date. But I mean, that's a matter of public record, but I forget what that date was.

Q Do you have any comment on the Egyptian President Mubarak's views, which he made yesterday on CBS on Egyptian-Israeli relations? And what will be the position of the Reagan Administration if the Congress will link the U.S. aid to Egypt with the return of the Egyptian Ambassador to Tel Aviv?

A No. Don't have any comment on either.

Q Can I follow that up? He accused Israel of violating the Camp David Accords and listed several different allegations. Do you concur with those?

A Don't have any reaction to those statements.

Q Do you think Israel has been violating the Camp David Accords?

A Don't have any comment for you.

Q Syria today called on Egypt to abrogate Camp David in the wake of the May 17 abrogation. Do you have any observations to make on that?

A Hadn't caught that report, Bernie, but obviously, would not be enthusiastic about such a call.

Q Are you concerned about an Iranian victory?

A An Iranian victory?

Q Yes.

A Are we concerned about it?

Q Yes.

A Well, I think it would not produce stability in the area.

Q What about the recent development in Syria? Do you have any comment on the appointment or (inaudible) --

A No.

Q Can you compare for us the level of participation by the United States in the current round of Lebanese reconciliation talks, as compared to the previous round last year?

A In Lausanne?

Q Yes.

A Well, there is no U.S. partiocipation in those talks at Lausanne. I think there is --

Q At this time?

A At this time.

Q The last time?

A Ambassador Fairbanks was on scene, and on this occasion I think there is an officer from the political section of the Embassy in Beirut present, but not participating in those talks.

Q And the last time Fairbanks was a --

A I'm not quite sure what -- I'm getting a signal here that he was on scene. I guess the level of representation was different, but the rationale was the same -- not a participant one.

Q Can you explain the downgrading of the U.S. on-scene presence?

A No. I'll really let you draw your own conclusions. I don't have anything for you on that.

Q How about your answer to my colleague about an Iranian victory, can we say that in the war, if that happens, that this will create instability in the Arabian Gulf area and Iraq?

A Yes. I think an Iranian victory would create instability, yes, in the area. Sure.

Q And you are concerned. So what are you doing besides --

A Well, don't misunderstand what I'm saying. As a matter of fact, don't misunderstand what I'm not saying. (Laughter) Our position is unchanged; our position of neutrality is unchanged. But having said that, in response to a direct question, "How would we feel about an Iranian victory," we think it would be a destabilizing development.

Q Would an Iraqi victory be destabilizing?

A We don't think that a victory by either side is in the interest of the region. What we have argued for is a diplomatic settlement.

Q Would an Iraqi victory be destabilizing?

A I presume a victory by one side or the other, with logical implications of that, could be destabilizing.

Q John, how is the State Department's effort with the Senate Appropriations Committee going on additional military aid to El Salvador?

A I think that that is being worked on today, and that continues to move along, Marvin.

Q What do you mean, "moving along?" Are you getting anywhere?

A I'm sure that various folks are talking about it. I'm sure that the White House and State Department are discussing that with Congressmen and Senators today.

Q A lot of telephone work today?

A I'm sure there's telephone work, sure. Maybe visits, too.

-- more --

Q Anything on Ambassador Hartman's talks with Gromyko? The Soviet news agency seemed to suggest that no progress at all in relations.

A Well, we regret that the Soviet news agency characterized those talks, Bernie, because we prefer that they be held on a confidential basis. Ambassador Hartman did call on the Soviet Foreign Minister as part of our continuing dialogue aimed at solving some of the real problems in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. And, as I say, it's our practice not to comment on the substance or the atmosphere of those confidential diplomatic exchanges, and we regret that the Soviet side chose to publicize them.

Q John, back on El Salvador --

Q But you're not challenging the facts.

A The facts? That there was a meeting?

Q No. The way they characterized them.

A As I say, we prefer not to characterize those sessions, and they have, and we regret that. So I don't think we would confirm their version of the facts.

Q John, on El Salvador, is it true that only about $27 million of the $93 million is for replenishing stocks that are running out? The rest is for new helicopters, a new program?

A I don't -- there certainly is diversity of need. A key item is ammunition. We understand that less than 60 days of supply is available in El Salvador for 40-millimeter rifle grenades, less than 90 days supply of 81-millimeter mortar ammunition; ammunition for 105 millimeter artillery will shortly have to be ordered. The Salvadoran Air Force is completely out of 2.75-inch rockets, which are used by spotter aircraft to mark targets, and they will shortly be out of 250-pound, 500-pound and 750-pound bombs.

The Salvadoran Army has already -- has in training about 1400 men for whom there are no rifles, and there are a number of other aspects to the shortages. So, sure, I'm sure it's not all ammunition, but it's materiel that is of vital need to them.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A   Sure.

Q   Do you have any additional information as to what's included in the $93 million besides what you just said?

A   I have some additional. Be glad to make this available for you afterwards, but nothing beyond this.

Q   Okay. Also on El Salvador, yesterday 27 Christian Democrats were detained by army troops under the command of a Colonel Cruz in Morazan because it is said --

A   Reported to have been detained.

Q   Yeah. Cruz --

A   We understand --

Q   Pardon?

A   We looked into that and we're unable to confirm that.

Q   Could you look into it a little more --

A   We did look into it.

Q   Oh. So you're finished looking into it?

A   Yup. Couldn't confirm it.

Q   So in other words, this did not take place, to your knowledge?

A   It did not take place to our knowledge, that's right.

Q   John, does the -- another subject. Is the way now clear for China to buy arms in this country, including high technology arms, without further ado, or is legislation required?

A   I can't answer that question specifically on legislation, Spence. As you know, there has been a Chinese military team in the country.

When Defense Secretary Weinberger visited China last September, we agreed with the Chinese to hold follow-on discussions at the staff level. Such meetings have taken place and will continue to take place.

The two sides have simply agreed to explore the possibility of cooperation in defensive areas such as anti-air and anti-tank systems. A Chinese work team recently conducted staff-level discussions on those subjects. The work team was here, not negotiating arms purchases, although it did visit a variety of U.S. business firms while it was here. But, specifically on the question of legislation, let me take a look at that for you.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q John, echoing the story yesterday from The New York Times about Secretary Shultz addressing the Congress members in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about the fear, or the possibility of -- that moving the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem will provoke a wave of anti-Americanism or violence in the area, in the Middle East and the Islamic countries:

My question is, will the Administration hold these Congressmen responsible just in case, heaven forbids, any violence will erupt in this area where these concerns are stemming out now?

A Well, I think our position on the proposal to move the Embassy is perfectly plain, and I think there has been adequate testimony by Secretary Eagleburger on the implications of that. And I'm not quite sure whether -- quite where we are on the document mentioned in The New York Times yesterday. I'm not sure whether that's in the public domain or not, so until I check that one, let me hold off on that.

But, at any rate, our position on the State Department's opposition to the move of the Embassy is perfectly clear and the reasons for that have been indicated time and again.

Q John, this week's issue of Newsweek magazine says that Congress may be reluctant to give more aid to El Salvador because of the U.S. buildup, military buildup, in Honduras. Do you have any comment to this?

A I haven't seen that particular Newsweek story, so I really can't vouch for that particular point of view, but I wouldn't see the logic of that particular point of view.

Q The story also says that -- identifies the source of The New York Times article on D'Aubuisson and the death squads. Do you have any confirmation of any identifications?

A This is in Newsweek --

Q Yes.

A -- again? No. I'm sorry. I haven't seen it. I haven't seen the story.

Q On that story, the CIA overflights alleged by Newsweek. Any comment on that?

A Guess you'd have to go to the CIA and ask them.

Q Do you have any --

A I'm sure they'll be a great outpouring of information.

Q Does the Administration have any policy on American advisers or trainers or troops in Honduras flying airplanes over El Salvador, and weaponry emanating from those airplanes targeted at Salvadoran rebels?

A I guess you'd have to go to the CIA and the Pentagon, and I'm sure they'd be delighted to --

Q John, on a related matter, there was a statement out of Honduras by a U.S. official that Guatemala and El Salvador will participate in the Granadero I exercises scheduled to begin sometime in late spring or early summer, along the border between Honduras and El Salvador.

A I'm sorry. Guatemala and --

Q El Salvador. Salvadoran --

A Salvador.

Q -- troops would participate in the joint exercise with the Hondurans and the Americans. Do you have any -- can you confirm?

A I don't. Try the Pentagon on exercises.

Q John, on the question of the U.S. Embassy in Israel, is it the State Department's view that a decision on moving it from one place to another could be taken by the Congress, or is this within the purview of the Executive Branch?

A Gosh, you raise a very good legal question, and I think I would be unwise to give you a snap --

Q Could you check on that?

A -- judgment. See what we might have on it. Sure.

Q Over the weekend, on Friday The Washington Post ran a story that there was little objection from the Jewish lobby, or the Zionist lobby, to the sale of missiles or possibly the other thing which was supposed to be the Rapid Deployment Force for Jordan, and Saturday The New York Times ran a story which is completely the opposite.

What is the status of selling Stingers to Jordan and Saudi Arabia? What's the whole story?

A Well, we've made the appropriate notifications to Congress, as you well know.

Q What was the meeting this morning with the Foreign Ministers of Honduras and Costa Rica about?

A They're here for the OAS meeting. They came in to see the Secretary. Obviously, they discussed Central American matters and the urgency and importance, significance, of the Kissinger Commission report. I think they went over to see the President after that, and in fact came out and, I think, had some words in public about their visit here.

Q Okay. Thank you.

(Mr. Romberg hands Mr. Hughes a note)

A Flash from the front! The BACKGROUND briefing on Lorton will be at 4:00 o'clock this afternoon.

(The briefing concluded at 12:51 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

TUESDAY, MARCH 13, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #43

TUESDAY, MARCH 13, 1984, 12:08 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: All right. Why don't we go ahead? I don't have any announcements. Happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, do you have anything regarding Iran's latest charge that Iraq is using chemical weapons in an attack yesterday near Basra?

A Don't have any update on what we said the other day, Mike.

Q Do you have anything regarding the possible source of these chemical -- these warfare weapons?

A No. Again, don't have anything on that.

Q Do you have anything about 250 U.S.-made helicopters going to Iraq?

A 250 U.S.-made helicopters?

Q Bell helicopters. It may have been through a third party, but there are a lot of reports.

A No.

Q Could you look into it?

A I'm not sure how we'd look into it. Refer you to the regulations which cover helicopters, and so on, in Iraq -- well, helicopter sales in general and what kind of controls there are -- but I don't know quite how we'd specifically look into what I presume would be a commercial sale.

Q Alan, on aid to El Salvador, Ambassador Pickering at the White House this morning specified that $43 million of the $93 million in the Administration's request is for helicopters, ambulances, and trucks. Most of the choppers and trucks would -- and all of the trucks would be used for what he called "mobility," and the other $50 million would be for what he called "continued sustainment" of the Salvadoran military -- uniforms, ammunition, and training.

The question is, the Administration has made its case for passage of the $93 million on replenishment of supplies that have run down, run out, are running out, will run out in the near future regarding the elections. How does that argument apply to the helicopters -- the medivac helicopters, the ambulances, the nine or ten additional choppers and trucks -- for mobility?

A I don't think the case, Ralph, has been solely made on the question of what ammunition would run out, although that obviously is an important factor, and I think the President noted yesterday that medical supplies -- shipments of medical supplies have already stopped, and, obviously, that is a serious problem.

The basic point beyond those immediate needs, which are quite obvious and which were detailed at some length here, I think, yesterday in the guidance John had, is that there is an ongoing situation in El Salvador where the Salvadoran military needs to be able to deal with it. It needs to be able to deal with it in the immediate future in the context of the election, which is what we are importantly focused on, but it needs to have confidence it's going to be able to deal with it beyond that.

I think that, again, the other day we addressed this point, that if you don't have confidence that you are going to be in a position to continue to fight effectively, it affects how you deal in the immediate situation. In the case of ammunition, that's perhaps most dramatic where if you don't know where your next shipment of bullets is coming from, you may husband your bullets in a way which is not suitable for effective fighting. The same thing would be true in a broader way of not having the appropriate tools.

There is a validated request, for example, for helicopters. That is to say, it has been examined by the appropriate officials and determined -- in the U.S. Government and determined to be a valid requirement. So the question gets back again to whether there will be any possibility, or what the possibilities would be, for getting legislation in an appropriate time frame to be able to get this kind of equipment to be useful.

And so the decision, obviously, is that this is needed, that the time frame is such that it is needed in legislation which is going to be passed in the near future as opposed to waiting three months or whatever it would be.

Q If I may follow, doesn't that latter argument in effect say that the Congressional appropriations process is not to the Administration's liking in terms of doing things on a long-term basis, that you have to do everything in terms of an emergency because you just don't like the way the process works?

A No. It's simply facing the fact of what the situation is on the ground, and what the situation is in terms of the legislative calendar on the Hill, and the need to work with Congress as effectively as we can to deal with both those situations.

Q Alan, can I follow Ralph's question a little bit? How did this become so sudden? Surely the Salvadorans didn't shoot off all that stuff John catalogued yesterday in two weeks.

A I don't think it is necessarily so sudden in the sense that you're suggesting. What -- we've talked about this here before. What has been the case is that there is no prospect for getting that money by other means in legislative -- in legislation, and, therefore, these bills that are pending were seen as an appropriate vehicle and one that was necessary to utilize to get that funding in a timely manner.

Q Alan, what is the status of the tactics at the moment? I understand that you've now moved off of the aid to poor people bill and simply are trying to get the Intelligence Committee to approve the Nicaraguan aid on the one hand.

A I don't know what the exact tactical situation is, Barrie. The -- you'd have to, I guess, check with the committees on what their scheduling is. I read in the paper the same thing you did about the Intelligence Committee potentially looking at that -- at their issue, and I really would have to refer you to them.

I don't know what the Appropriations Committee schedule is, and I'm just not prepared at this point to talk about possible options. I think that this is something that we obviously are working on and need to continue to consult with the Congress on. I think we're just going to have to leave it that way. I don't have anything more on it.

Q Alan, does the fact that M-16 ammunition was not on the list given yesterday mean that that's not a problem? They have lots of ammunition?

A I don't know. I don't recall it was on the list. I guess I would mainly refer you to the Pentagon as to what -- for a detailed list of that.

Q Well, but it's hard to get anyone to say what's on those lists.

A Okay.

Q And that's one of the most obvious things. You'd think of the government troops going out after -- you know, in response to guerrilla actions, and the most common thing they need is M-16 ammunition, but that was not mentioned.

A Well, I'll try to see if there's anything I can get on that, but I'm not sure where the best place is to go -- but I will check on that.

Q The Kissinger Commission recommended that all military aid to El Salvador be accompanied by legislatively mandated conditions regarding human rights. Why is the Reagan Administration dispensing with that recommendation on this $93 million?

A I think that the basic issue of what has come to be called "conditionality" is one that the President addressed in his message to Congress in which he acknowledged support of the idea of trying to get improvements in human rights, and that there should be linkage in some way with the provision of funding.

The question is how and what is the most effective way of doing this? We're, as an Administration, on record at great length about that, and I think that there is no question of the Administration's willingness to continue to work with the Congress to find an effective way of doing that. So I don't think there's anything -- any effort to basically avoid that question. But that's something which has to be worked out, I think, in a bill which would come out on the more basic approaches and probably can't be worked into something in the immediate future.

But the idea of linking aid to improvement in human rights is not something the Administration argues with at all.

Q But hold on for a second. You're asking $93 million, which is more than any year in the last five -- well, in history -- that El Salvador has gotten in one year in military aid. And for that $93 million you're proposing no legislatively mandated human rights conditions. How can you then say that you -- the Administration is not seeking to avoid that issue?

A That is not the point here.

Ralph?

Q Sorry?

Q What is the point here?

A The point here is to try to get the necessary supplies to meet the situation in a time frame that is relevant to that situation.

Q That could be done if the Administration proposed, itself, conditionality on the money.

A First of all, we're not talking about an authorization bill; we're talking about an appropriation bill, and --

Q But you --

A Obviously, this is an issue which requires continued discussion with the Congress. I think we'll let that process work itself out and not try to define it from here.

Q Can I change the subject?

A Yes, please. (Laughter)

Q Do you have any -- could you give us the -- whatever your understanding is at the moment of the Soviet terms for returning to the Geneva negotiations?

A No. I think we'll let the Soviets speak for themselves on it.

Q Let me pursue that, then. Have you had any indication that the Soviets would return if there were some kind of a pause in the deployment schedule?

A Again, I think that the Soviets are going to have to say what their position is. Our position is clear, which is that we would like to resume both sets of negotiations, INF and START, now. We're prepared to do so, and we have positions already on the table. We're prepared to continue negotiations.

Q Are there any conditions under which the United States would consider a pause in the continuing deployment?

A I'm not aware of anything specific on this, John. You're talking about an effort to get them back to the table or something?

Q No, not necessarily. A pause -- the question was are there any conditions under which the United States would pause --

A That's a very sweeping --

Q -- in the context of resumed negotiations?

A There certainly is no plan for a pause. The question of what might be negotiated I can't really predict to you whether is part of an overall settlement which would meet the U.S. objectives. This, that, or the other thing might not be included. But you would be misguided if you were to suggest at this point that the U.S. and the deploying countries -- or the countries in which these missiles will be deployed -- envisage a pause, absent an agreement.

Q Alan, could I follow that up in a slightly different way? There is a story coming out of Moscow now that the Soviets are quietly saying that they would be prepared to return to a combined START and INF session if the U.S. would simply agree to hold off any more deployments of cruise and Pershing for a year or so.

Are you totally unaware of that Soviet --

A Yes. And I think that there have been some public statements -- first of all, I'm not aware of any Soviet proposal to merge, and we've already made clear that -- the fact that we think a merger would be a complicating factor. But, as I say, I'm not aware of any proposal on the Soviet part to do that.

Q Is there a --

A Second of all, I'm not aware of the specifics, and I think that the Soviets -- Mr. Chernenko, among others -- have talked publicly about this, or TASS has made releases, none of which encompasses what you're talking about.

Q This apparently comes from -- out of Vogel's chats with Chernenko.

A We'll stick with what I just said.

-- MORE --

Q Can we just pursue that for a minute? Are there any discussions going on with the Soviets about terms for resuming the Geneva negotiations?

A I can't --

Q When Hartman met with Gromyko, for example, was there any detailed discussion about that subject?

A I'm not going to get into the question of what Ambassador Hartman and Mr. Gromyko may have talked about, John. The fact is, as I said, we are ready, willing and able to go back to the table on INF and START and hope the Soviets will decide to do likewise.

Q But let me -- Alan, just let me pursue that -- because there's no sense, I don't think, or no public sense, of anything going on in the way of any kind of an effort being made by this Administration. Is no effort being made -- I mean to try to figure out some basis upon which the talks could be broadened, the talks could be resumed? Is it just a question of our sitting back and deciding when the Russians want to come back they'll come back and that's it?

A I'm not going to rise to the bait of trying to explain to you what specifically we may be doing. The fact is there are conversations going on. Ambassador Hartman's meeting with Prime Minister Gromyko is an example of dialogue. Specifically, what is being discussed I'm simply not going to get into.

Q SWAPO yesterday rejected South Africa's proposal for a Namibia conference on its own terms, and I wanted to know what the Administration is going to do to get the talks back on track under the UN mandate and is the Administration talking to any other members of the Contact Group?

A I don't have any comment, really, on the statements that were made in the last 24 hours. We had a statement the other day on this subject and I refer you back to that. Obviously, we hope that this process of disengagement which has been undertaken will move forward. I think you know what the arrangements are with respect to that. I won't go over that. So we look forward to that process continuing.

Q That statement was kind of a holding type of statement in that it said that the United States is looking into it, considering it and so forth -- that is to say, the South African proposal. Now, 24 hours later, do you have some further judgment to make regarding it?

A I don't. I would recall for you that one of the points that was made in that was that we would also be looking at the reaction of the various parties concerned, but I don't have any updated reaction or do I necessarily expect to have one. I think we probably will see what unfolds at this point.

Q Is somebody going to go out there to try to investigate this a little more directly?

A I don't know, Don, whether anyone will be doing any traveling. Obviously, we do. And it gets back -- I'm sorry I dropped a part of your question. We continue to talk with various parties involved in this process, and we will continue to do that.

Q What about the other members of the Contact Group, like the British and the Germans?

A Obviously, we talk with them; but in terms of what they're doing and what their attitudes are, I'll have to refer you to them.

Q Alan, do you have any further information on what's going on in south Sudan?

A No, I don't.

Q At least, you must be following the situation there.

A Sorry?

Q You must be following the situation there.

A Yes.

Q You don't have any background about what's going on?

A Not to offer from the podium, no.

Q Do you have any -- I'm sorry, did I interrupt?

A Yes.

Q O.K. Do you have any comment on the series of two interviews now of the Cuban Vice President that have appeared in the Post -- yesterday the one about -- that they're prepared to withdraw all advisers, civilian and military, from Nicaragua; and today the one about Angola?

A As far as Nicaragua is concerned, one of the aspects of what was said in that interview apparently was that they're replacing some of the female and older male members of both teachers and medical personnel with younger men, apparently with military training. So Cuba in that respect is hardening its presence in Nicaragua by transferring into Nicaragua people who are better able to fight.

In this light, Cuba's conditional offer to withdraw its military advisers is none too convincing or that Cuba has admitted to having only 200 military advisers in Nicaragua -- a number which bears little relation to reality. We estimate at this point between 2500 and 3500 military and security advisers in Nicaragua -- Cubans.

In connection with the withdrawal of all foreign military and security advisers and forces from Central America, of course we have expressed our support for the Contadora process's efforts to reach a verifiable agreement to reduce the presence of foreign military advisers in the region.

So that is a general statement.

Q He said, specifically --

A I don't have anything on Angola.

Q Well, with respect to Nicaragua, he said that the Cubans would be prepared to withdraw all advisers -- military, security, and civilian --

A Well --

Q -- if that would guarantee peace in the region and between Nicaragua and the United States. You have no response to that statement?

A Go back to the framework that the Contadora Group has laid out and there is a comprehensive set of issues that are addressed in that framework. It seems to me that this perhaps addresses itself perhaps to one aspect of that, but there are other aspects as well.

Q You said "apparently with military training." I don't recall the article saying anything about the military training.

A Well, I --

Q Are you making that assumption or are you quoting from the article?

A No. I think it said something about -- I don't have the article in front of me, but it said something about "better prepared" or there was some language in there which left that impression.

Q How many advisers does the United States believe the Cubans have, both civilian and military?

A I just said twenty-five --

Q No, no, no.

A No?

Q Both civilian and military.

A We have given you these figures before. If you want me to try and get you an updated total --

Q That would be helpful.

A All right.

Q Do you count among the military and security advisers those advisers to which you refer who may be younger and have military training?

A No. I don't think that those are included in the total.

Q You've been using 2,000 on the number of military advisers, and now you're saying 2,500 to 3,500. Is that a new figure, this --

A It's a new figure in relation to the 2,000. I can't tell you, George, when the estimate changed on that.

Q On Iran --

Q Do you know that almost every young people in Cuba has military training, and also do you have evidence that these people are a special military training?

A I think I'll leave you with what I've already said about that.

Don, did you have something?

Q Well, I was going to ask you in regard to the charges further -- the question I've asked for several days with regard to Iran and Iraq -- whether the United States believes that Iraq continues to use chemical weapons in the war.

A I don't have anything to give you, and I don't know that we're going to try to give you a day-by-day reading on that. Our concern has been expressed. There apparently is a UN team which is now in Iran, so I guess we'll see what happens.

Q I'm not asking for a day-by-day. Well, the fact is that on Monday of last week -- which is eight days ago --

A Yes.

Q -- you stated that the United States has evidence which convinces them -- it, the Government -- that these weapons are being used --

A Yes.

Q -- and I've consistently asked you: Does the United States believe that they're still being used or not?

The Iranians charged -- yesterday, I believe -- that they are being used against this island, whatever its name is, where this military action has been taking place; and so it seems to me proper to ask the question whether your evidence shows that they're continuing to use it even after the U.S. protest or whether they've stopped it.

A No. I just don't have anything for you today.

Q Do you have anything about the reports, of which there's another one today in the Wall Street Journal, of the use of mycotoxins?

A We are obviously alert to that report. We're looking into it. I don't have any specific information --

Q You're looking into it --

A Don't have any specifics to offer you on that, but obviously any charges of that sort are taken seriously.

Q Alan, do you have any information on an increase in military supplies going in to the insurgents in El Salvador?

A An increase? I don't have a rate, kind of reading to give you. I think that it is fair enough to say that -- and maybe somebody else does, but I don't -- but it's fair enough to say that there is certainly a continuing inflow of support to the insurgents in El Salvador.

Q Let me ask it a different way. Is there any increase or any change in that flow to suggest that a lot more is coming in in preparation for some kind of new attacks connected to the elections?

A I will take a look at that, Marvin. I don't know if I can provide a specific answer to that question.

Q Alan, back on Iran-Iraq, do you have anything on the schedule of the Iraqi Foreign Ministry official who is visiting here this week?

A I don't have anything. Let me see. I think we've indicated we expected that he would meet with both Mr. Eagleburger and Mr. Murphy; and I have no reason to change that, but let me see if I can get anything more specific for you on that.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on this report coming from Israel about an official protest from the Israeli Government against the activities of U.S. Sixth Fleet somehow opposing the activity of the Israeli aircraft in the area?

A I'm not aware of it. I guess you'd have to check with the Pentagon and see what they have.

Jim?

Q Do you have anything -- two questions: One, Rudolfo Siguel in Chile was fired or dismissed by the government from his position as head of the copper workers. Do you have anything on that? And, also, the --

A No, I don't.

Q Oh. Could you look into it?

A I will look into it, but I don't think we need to comment on every action of every country in the world to --

Q I'm not suggesting. It's just that --

A Yes, go ahead.

Q -- you have commented on Siguel before when bad things happened to him.

A I will look into it.

Q And there's -- the head of the Christian Democratic Party of Guatemala is in Washington. Is he meeting with anybody here?

A Don't know. Let me take a look at that.

Q Alan, just the one thing on Pickering. He was at the White House today to just brief the President, bring him up to date on things, or I mean is there some --

A You'd have to check with the White House on that, I think.

Q All right. Could I ask you also: Why is he back in Washington at this moment? Is he here for the --

A I don't know specifically, but it isn't unusual for an Ambassador to come back to Washington from time to time.

Q Well, he was here like, was it, two weeks ago or last week; and then I think he went back down briefly.

A I don't know.

Q Well --

Q Does it have anything to do with the request for military aid?

Q Yeah. I mean --

A It may be that he's back here for consultations on that issue. I just don't happen to know.

Q No, but you're not --

Q But would it be unfair for us to conclude that he's here to help the lobbying effort?

A You mean to help make representations and explain the Administration's policy? (Laughter.)

Obviously, he is appearing in various ways, but he also -- so to the extent that that helps, obviously that's very important and he's a very effective spokesman. But I'm sure he's also doing other things in terms of consulting on where we go.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Whereupon, at 12:32 p.m., the briefing was concluded.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 14, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #44

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 14, 1984, 12:16 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: This is one of those days where you can't get anything in, and we don't have anything to give you. But, as Bernie Kalb always says, "No news is good news."

Couple of housekeeping announcements. Available in the Press Office at 2:00 o'clock this afternoon will be the prepared statement by Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Paul Wolfowitz before the House Appropriations Committee. The subject of his testimony is the FY-85 foreign assistance proposal for East Asia and the Pacific.

BACKGROUND briefing tomorrow at the White House briefing room, 10:00 o'clock in the morning, on the visit of Prime Minister Garret FitzGerald of Ireland. That's White House briefing room, tomorrow morning, 10:00 o'clock, and that is about all I -- not only about all, it is all I have for today.

Q On the Gulf war, the allegations of lethal toxins used by the Iraqis, have you been looking into these allegations of mycotoxins?

A The yellow rain aspect of it?

Q Yes.

A Yes. Sure.

Q And what have you found out?

A Don't have anything.

Q Could I follow that up --

Q What is the -- is it because the scientific process takes longer, or is it because everything has turned up negative, or is it --

A No. It's just a question of pursuing the investigation -- it's not an easy investigation -- and accumulating what information we can turn up.

Q John, to follow that up, this morning on the record, Ismet Kittani, the Iraqi version of Eagleburger, I guess, mentioned you by name, mentioned the State Department's allegations of use, and questioned -- asked why in the world the State Department did this without offering any evidence on the record, and how could it behave this way?

A Well, we did it because we consider it to be a matter of principle and something that we feel very strongly about. Chemical warfare is something which we have felt strongly about consistently over the years, and it was not a question of making that announcement impulsively or without diplomatic dialogue with various parties in advance of it. That had been done, and we consider that it was the right thing to do to bring that to the attention of the world.

Q So then where is the evidence, John?

A Well, we're -- there's no question in our minds of the correctness of our statement or the evidence, but we're not producing it. As I said at the time, we had independent evidence, but also there were a variety of other reports, and we consider all those to bear out the veracity of what we said.

Q But in such a serious matter -- the use of chemical weapons is a serious charge -- wouldn't it be more forthcoming to actually present the evidence, as exactly the Department has done, or tried to do, in the case of Afghanistan or Kampuchea and so on?

A Well, as we have said, we certainly would cooperate with others who are investigating this, and, as you know, the U.N. is investigating it, and let us see where these various investigations lead us.

Q So if you're waiting to see -- I'm trying to understand the logic -- if you're waiting to see where the investigations lead, why make the charge before seeing where they --

A Well, we're -- we were and are convinced of what we said in our statement. There's no question of going back on that, so we came out with our statement at that particular time. As to making evidence available, there are various parties investigating, and let us see where that comes out in the longer run.

Q Is it because the evidence is of an intelligence nature?

A I'm not going to get into the origin of the evidence.

Q When you say you're willing to cooperate with the United Nations investigation, are you going to turn over your evidence to the U.N. investigators?

A Well, I don't want to be specific. What I'm saying is, we support the investigation that is going forward. Let us see how that continues to move forward, and in general, and as a matter of principle, we would be supportive. What we will give to anybody who asks us, I can't specify at this stage.

Q Same subject. Are you implying the Iraqi are covering it up or lying?

A No, we're not implying anything. We came to certain conclusions; we told you what those conclusions were. We continue to believe those conclusions. We have confidence in those conclusions, and they stand out there. It's not a question of making charges against anybody after the fact.

Q New subject?

A Sure.

Q Under Secretary of Defense Richard DeLauer said on Capitol Hill in the last couple of days that the Administration is pursuing back-channel negotiations with the Soviets on arms control matters. From this podium, you seem to have said that the only discussions with the Soviets are through their ambassador here and our ambassador in Moscow. Are you aware of any back-channel negotiations; do you know what DeLauer was talking about?

A We don't talk about the methods of our discussions with the Soviets, or the content. I think Mr. Romberg addessed this question masterfully yesterday, and I don't have anything to add to that.

Q Could you refresh our memory about that memorable --

A As to what Mr. Romberg said?

Q Yes.

A Although it was tremendously impressive, Bernie, I don't have his words emblazoned in my memory. We'll have to all go back to the transcript.

Q Do you have video tapes?

A No, I don't have video tapes.

Q Since you said that you are satisfied with the presence of evidence in the way of Iraq using the chemicals, allegedly using the chemicals, and you say that you have the evidence, are you ready to submit the evidence since the United Nations now is discussing this, to the United Nations --

A As I said, we will be cooperative with that investigation but I'm not going to specifically tell you what piece of evidence we might hand over or how that might be done. But in terms of broadly supporting an investigation, yes.

Q And possibly one of my colleagues ask you this, what Mr. Kittani said this morning on the record, that you are almost repeating what the Iranians claim, or possibly your statements have been used, overused by the Iranians more than it's supposed to be used in this matter.

A I don't think we can be held responsible for the way people use our statements. We said what we had to say and what we believed to be the case about Iraq's use of chemical weapons. That doesn't alter the fact that we've been very critical of various Iranian actions, and continue to be critical. But the fact was that on this specific issue of chemical warfare, we said what we said and I think that was the right thing to do, irrespective of how people may use or misuse that statement.

Q Let me please press this because we have this man, before we came here. There is a feel here that this could be distracting from the vehemence and the violence of the whole human wave atmosphere that Iran is using and possibly Khomeini might be satisfied that this issue has been overblown, or it could be overblown.

So what do you see that you will offer in the way of not to just, you know, focus on this issue which is part and parcel of the whole war there?

A We were not and have not been focusing only on this issue. We have talked about the deplorable casualties in the Iran-Iraq war. We have certainly held no brief-out for Iran or what Iran is doing presently on Iraqi terrority, but that doesn't alter the fact that we continue to feel strongly about the use of chemical weapons.

Q On the same subject. Mr. Kittani thinks that all your evidence is based on the patients who have been treated in Europe, and he thinks maybe these patients are victims of laboratory test in Iran. You have no way to substantiate that.

A I don't have any comment on his words about that.

Q What's your reaction to the Senate Appropriation subcommittee's decision this morning --

A I'm glad that all this is moving along, and obviously in what we consider to be the right direction.

Q Do you have any reaction to the church-state dispute in Poland over the crosses in the schools?

A No, really don't have any comment on that. We continue to hope for a dialogue and national reconciliation in Poland, but don't have any specific comment on the current --

Q Do you have any comment on the cease-fire in Lebanon?

A No, I don't, Jim. It seems to fragile. That doesn't come as a kind of factual assessment.

Q Has the Soviet Union proposed a new attache for the Olympics after the --

A I haven't heard of any new proposal on that. Have you heard anything on that? I haven't heard that they've come up with anybody.

Q Anything on the request of UNESCO that the U.S. Government make the intiative for these documents rather than the Senate?

A That is a GAO investigation, and GAO, as you know, is an arm of the Congress and so it is a Congressional and not an Administration initiative although we are, of course, following it with interest and will lend it our customary cooperation. It's a little premature to talk at this stage about an Executive Branch approach to UNESCO of the kind now being discussed by UNESCO officials because we have, as yet, had no request from the GAO to facilitate the review, and thus no description of what exactly the review will entail.

The GAO has conducted reviews of U.S. relations with a number of multilateral organizations, including UNESCO itself. The Administration has cooperated in reviews of that kind and will do so in this case as appropriate.

Q I understand Fascell sent a letter last week to the Secretary asking for both general cooperation and that the Administration identify itself as the request (inaudible).

A It may have. I'm not aware of that, Jim.

Q When you described the -- or when you say that the United States, or the Administration wishes to be cooperative, and so on, what does that mean in terms of the issue specifically at hand now?

A It means that the UNESCO situation is very much on our minds. We've taken the position we have on UNESCO. We have objections to the way they operate both on a philosophical basis and a pragmatic basis in terms of their budget administration. GAO is taking a look at that. We will be cooperative, but as far as the specific request is concerned of the Executive Branch, haven't had one.

Q But what?

A Haven't had one.

Q From the GAO?

A Yes, or UNESCO that I'm aware of.

Q And you would require a specific request in order to then go to UNESCO and say, "We'd like you to cooperate in this?"

A Yes. I think in the way -- in the light of the way GAO traditionally operates, if the Executive were to receive a specific request or become involved, I think we'd look at it at that time.

Q John?

A Lester?

Q Yesterday, the Washington Times reported that a senior State Department official denied yesterday -- so I guess it was Monday -- that there was a "cover-up" or "whitewash" in the case of three employees at State who permitted classified documents to be transferred to the federal prison at Lorton. It also reported one of the three individuals received a verbal reprimand, and the other two received letters of reprimand which will be put in their personnel files, but removed after one year.

If this is an accurate report, I have a two-part question: First, did Secretary Shultz order this or was that a decision on a lower --

A That was addressed -- I guess you weren't here for the backgrounder.

Q I'm sorry, but I just wonder. Is Shultz -- he ordered this, right?

A Ordered?

Q I mean, was it Shultz' decision that this matter be disposed of in this manner?

A The Secretary approves those decisions.

Q He approved this? All right, then, a two-part question: If this is not a "cover-up" or a "whitewash", as apparently the senior American official denied that it was a "cover-up" and a "whitewash", what is your definition of "cover-up" and "whitewash"?

A Oh, Lester --

Q What do you mean by it? If this is not -- because it certainly appears to be a "cover-up" and a "whitewash" -- how would you define it? Why would you say it's not a "cover-up" and a "whitewash"?

A I guess I will let you go to your Roget or your Webster, and define those words, Lester.

Q One last thing: How, under the circumstances, does the Secretary, if he approves this kind of disposition, how can he reasonably expect the Pentagon or the CIA ever to share classified documents with the State Department again?

A Well, I think that the rationale and the reasoning behind that decision were explained at that backgrounder. Why don't you take that text of that backgrounder and read it?

Q That it's satisfactorily explained? You think it was satisfactorily explained, John?

A I think it was satisfactorily explained, sure.

Q John, on Angola, does the State Department have any comment on Secretary Haig's confirmed visit to southern Angola for talks with Jonas Savimbi?

A No, no, don't; but he is a private citizen.

Q Was he advised at all or did he contact --

A I don't know whether anybody talked to -- I just don't know whether anybody talked to him.

Q He hasn't contacted you since the meetings?

A He may have done. Former Secretaries of State are often in touch with the Department and often inform of their travel plans, but they are certainly not obliged to; and I don't know whether he did or not.

Q Could you check that for me?

A We'll take a look at it and see whether --

Q On the same area, there are reports now that there hasn't been any progress in the disengagement for about two weeks since the first joint commission meeting met. Do you have anything on that at all?

A No, I really don't.

Q John, there are reports in the Lebanese press that Israeli officials met with Lebanese officials in

Lausanne, and requested from the Lebanese Government a new security agreement to replace the May 17 Agreement. Do you have anything on this?

A No. Guess you'll have to ask the Lebanese and the Israelis.

Q Do you have any further thoughts, John, on the South African proposal for a regional conference, now that you've looked at it more closely?

A Well, not a great deal. Give you what we have. We see no indication that the South African Government is seeking to circumvent U.N. Security Council Resolution 435. In their joint statement following their January meeting in Lusaka, South African and Angolan representatives reaffirmed that Resolution 435 remains the accepted basis for a Namibia settlement, and also I think Foreign Minister Botha, in the _Cape Times_, in an interview with the _Cape Times_, emphasized that his ideas for a regional conference do not indicate a shift in South Africa's adherence to the Resolution, or any change in South Africa's requirement that a firm agreement on Cuban withdrawal precede implementation of that Resolution. So he himself is saying there is no change in the South Africans' position.

Q Copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q When was that interview given?

A The interview was on March 14th.

Q John, the _Review of the News_, which is a publication of the John Burch Society, carries a report that the State Department is currently investigating contacts between State Department officials, or employees, and organizations associated with Lyndon LaRouche.

One: Can you confirm that?

A No, cannot.

Q Can you take that?

A Yes.

Q If it turns out that there is such an investigation, can you report on what the reasons for that are?

A Let me find out what the facts are.

Q -- because there are, obviously, many organizations that could potentially come in contact with State Department officials, and it would be very interesting to see what your reasons are for one that you may choose to investigate.

Q Do you have anything today on the destitution of Seguel, in Chile?

A No.

Q And also, do you have any comment on the GATT decision in Geneva, on sugar?

A Yes, I do have something on that.

Do you want anything on the seal hunt in Canada? (Laughter)

The U.S. action in cutting the quota was taken for reasons that were not trade-related. In other words, the United States was not seeking, and did not gain, trade advantages from its action. To resolve the problem, the larger political issues between the United States and Nicaragua must be addressed. The U.S. will urge Nicaragua to address these issues in a constructive fashion.

Q Any particular form in which they will be addressed?

A No, I think that --

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A -- the possibilities are obvious.

Q Can we get a copy of the statement?

A Sure.

Q John, there have been repeated charges from Afghanistan that the United States is attempting to destabilize them. There have also been reports of massive desertions from the Afghan army and further reports on a Soviet offensive against the Mujahaddin.

Could we get some kind of an update on what is going on in Afghanistan?

A Let me see what we might be able to produce for you on that.

Q John, do you have any comment to the statements of the Vice Prime Minister (sic) of Cuba about radio broadcasts?

A Radio broadcasts?

Q Yes. He was saying that Cubans were launching an interference.

A No.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:35 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Thursday, March 15, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #45

THURSDAY, MARCH 15, 1984, 12:51 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. Sorry we're a little late.

A couple of announcements up front. First, a housekeeping announcement: Available in the Press Office is the prepared statement by Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Richard Murphy, and it was made before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations this morning. The subject of the testimony was the FY-85 Request for Economic and Security Assistance for the Near East.

Second, we have a statement on The New York Times interview with King Hussein of Jordan. Of course, we differ with some aspects of King Hussein's assessment of the situation and of American policy. As President Reagan made clear in his address to the United Jewish Appeal Tuesday night, the United States is supportive of Jordan's security, and continues to uphold the views outlined in the President's September 1 initiative for Arab-Israeli peace, including our position on the status of Jerusalem and on settlements. American support for Jordan has taken the form not only of security assistance, but also of action in times of stress.

The King's remarks do point to some serious problems we now face. The forces of extremism and terrorism are complicating the situation in the region, increasing the risks to moderates who contemplate joining the peace process. This bears out the President's concern that American constancy and American credibility are crucial to hopes for peace.

The Congress shares in this responsibility to ensure that the United States is a steadfast and reliable friend of all those who are interested in peaceful solutions. This applies to Jordan.

For over three decades, the United States has followed a consistent and principled policy of promoting Arab-Israeli negotiations. Both sides must know that there is no possibility of progress toward peace in the absence of negotiation. The President's September 1 initiative was, and remains, the most realistic, workable, and promising approach to a solution. Backing away from negotiation, even temporarily, does nothing for the Palestinian cause.

The United States has had, does have, and will always have, a strong friendship with Israel. This, too, is a policy the United States has followed consistently for over three decades. The progress made since 1973 shows that this friendship is fully compatible with successful Arab-Israeli negotiations. President Reagan remains ready, as before, to offer our support and assistance whenever the parties in the area are ready to step forward.

We repeat there is no possibility of progress without negotiation. Five wars in 36 years have made clear the futility of violence. The parties in the region must recognize that only with their effort and commitment can real progress be achieved. That's the end of the statement.

Be happy to take your questions.

Q Copy?

A Sure.

Q In light of the despairing tone of the Hussein interview, are you still hopeful that there is any chance at all that Jordan will enter the negotiations?

A Well, we continue to hope for that. Of course, this is a disappointment, but as the President said when he announced his initiative, this would be a long-term commitment on the part of the United States.

Q Apart from the statements that you and Mr. McFarland and others have made, is the United States making any direct contact with the King or his representatives to put this message through?

A I don't know what Ambassador Viets' schedule, our Ambassador in Amman, was today. He sees the King frequently. He may have seen him this morning. I can't tell you.

Q From this end, are you planning to either call the King or --

A Not aware of any immediate plan.

Q John, did the statements made by the King come to the Administration as a surprise?

A Are you talking about the timing of when we were aware of them?

Q No, I'm talking about the substance of what the King said. Does the whole thrust of the King's position, as outlined in the interview, come as a surprise to the Administration?

A I think the Administration regrets the timing, but I have to say that we have had, Bernie, our ups and downs in the Middle East; and the participants in the process have, from time to time, exuded pessimism; and then you have gone to the other end of the cycle, perhaps not optimism, but less than pessimism. So I think you had phases and, obviously, the King is in a pessimistic phase.

Q But on surprise -- I notice you're not answering the question of surprise.

A But did we learn of it yesterday? Yes, we learned --

Q On substance: did the thrust of the King's remarks come as a surprise?

A We were not aware that he was going to make this statement, give this interview.

Q You know, this is more than pessimism: this is a judgment by -- In part, the King says, "I'm very concerned about the United States and its double standard everywhere. I now realize that principles mean nothing to the United States."

Isn't this a terrible thing to hear from a man who is supposed to be a friend of the United States in that region?

A Well, as I said, there are certainly aspects of the King's remarks with which we disagree, and clearly, we disagree with the suggestion that the United States is unprincipled.

Q What could have prompted him, do you think, to have this feeling?

A I suppose -- well, I guess you'll have to ask him, but I suppose he's drawing on an apparent lack of progress.

Q Does this make any difference to the Administration's plans to push the Stinger sale?

A No change in the position of the Stinger.

Q And how about the logistic force, whatever that's called?

A The logistic force? That's, of course, a classified program, but the Administration will continue to move forward on that front.

Q John, following that up, what impact do you think this interview will have on chances of getting those particular two projects cleared through the Congress?

A Have to wait and see. As we said, we think the Congress has a role to play in our relations with moderate Arab states as well as with Israel. The Congress is part of this decision-making process.

Q John, did the King know ahead of time what the President intended to say in his speech to the American Jewish Congress(sic)?

A I'm not sure what the sequence of that was, Bernie. I know in the New York Times there's some reference by the King to the President's remarks, but I'm not quite sure when he knew the substance of those.

Q John, I take it you went over this with the Secretary. Was the Secretary in touch with the President on this?

A I'm not sure whether the Secretary talked to the President this morning, but obviously the Secretary is today, as always, in touch with the White House.

Q John, on the question of Bernie -- I mean, I'd like to ask a question, but the FBIS today does state that both the Israeli Government and King Hussein have received advance copies of the speech, according to Israel's radio.

Now my question is, is that actually a normal procedure to send such advance copies to foreign governments, or, if not, why in this case?

A That King Hussein had made available to Israel his speech?

Q No, no.

A I'm not sure I understand you.

Q That the White House had made available advance copies to both Israel and to the Jordanian Government.

A Of the President's speech?

Q That's right.

A May have done. I don't know.

Q Okay. Can you -- is this a normal procedure?

A I don't know whether it's normal. It certainly wouldn't be abnormal for an important address by the President. You might want to tell various people he's making it.

Q You would say this is an important speech; is that what you're saying?

A The President's speech to the United Jewish Appeal?

Q Yes.

A I would say it was an important speech.

Q And one last thing. What is so significant about the timing? You mentioned the timing is wrong. Why is it wrong? Would it have been right to say it a month from today or a month ago?

A I think the point that we're trying to make is that the President had strongly defended Jordan in his UJA speech; had restated his positions on settlements and on the Embassy in Israel, and I guess the timing was less than ideal.

Q Okay, one last thing, please. I think, when the King was asked about it, according to, I think, the New York Times also is saying, "I'm not impressed." I think, what I understand is that he believes so -- as someone from my contacts with the Arab ambassadors here that it is -- it was up to the United States to produce something a long time ago even since the advance of President Reagan's September plan where they claim that the Israelis have rejected it first.

Now, do you think the Arabs have a case there, that the United States could have produced something a little earlier than talk to young leadership of B'nai B'rith a few months before national elections?

A I do think that others besides the United States have some responsibility to work toward peace in the Middle East. I think Arabs and Israelis are clearly going to have to be involved, as we have suggested in our statement here.

The United States can be helpful. I think our record over 30-plus years indicates that it has tried to be helpful. That's what our foreign policy is based on, the desire to bring peace and stability to the area. But to suggest that only the United States can achieve peace in the Middle East seems to me to be rather fanciful.

Q Would it be right to assume that President Reagan, when he delivered his speech to the United Jewish Appeal, was basing it on different perceptions of the King's attitude?

A I think the President was restating his policy in the Middle East.

Q What about the specific allegations with respect to being turned down on the questions of votes in the U.N. on settlements and permitting, or asking Israel to permit Palestinians to attend the PNC?

A Well, we, as we traditionally do, are not going to get into the question of diplomatic correspondence or who said what to whom. So on the question of the U.N. vote, don't have anything for you and I don't have anything for you on the question of movement of the West Bankers except to say that in general we support the principle of freedom of movement, but I'm not going to get into any discussion we may have had between governments on that.

Q A couple of questions. Could you amplify in any way what you had in your prepared statement where you talked about the forces of terrorism increasing the risks of those who are planning to join the peace process? Do you mean to put Hussein in that context of somebody who is facing risks?

A Yes.

Q You do?

A Yes.

Q And from whom?

A I think the direction from which the risk comes has been obvious for some time. You've had extremist movements at work in the Middle East; you have had a "government terrorism," as the Secretary has termed it, and I think it's quite clear the kinds of people that he has been talking about.

Q Do you think that then the trust of the interview might be done -- might have been made to, as a form of insurance on the part of Hussein to meet some of the requirements of those you regard as terrorists or extremists?

A I don't know. I'll leave that to you, Bernie, to analyze the King's motives.

Q John, one of Hussein's complaints, with respect to the Reagan initiative, was that we seem to be putting much of the pressure on the Arabs to get their act together to join the peace talks; and he notes that Israel, from the outset, has rejected the plan. It has never said that it would really reconsider that rejection. Do you think he has a complaint there, that we're putting too much a burden on the Arabs and not enough on Israel to make that plan work?

A I think we've tried to work, clearly, to use what influence we have with Israel, and we have tried to use our influence with the moderate Arab states. I don't think "pressure" is a good word. "Pressure" does not seem, in the diplomatic area, does not seem to have paid great dividends in the Middle East.

I think the United States has tried to be persuasive and helpful; tried to facilitate the kind of dialogue and the kind of negotiation that clearly has to take place.

Q John, do you consider the current activity in Congressional committees such as that that came to move the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, the restrictions of selling some arms to Jordan, and the continuous increasing grants and money to Israel through Congressional committees were motivating forces which ended the hopes of Jordan that they were putting on the United States to come about with something? Because I understand in your statement you said something about the Congress -- that the Congress shares in this responsibility?

A Yes.

Q So you consider all of these --

A I'm not taking all those -- I'm not giving you an omnibus answer to all of those factors, but I think clearly the problems with which some of the programs are faced in Congress that affect Jordan certainly did have an influence on King Hussein. That would seem obvious.

Q Let me continue my line of questioning in this way. Do you have an idea that these Congressional committees and these actions are in contradiction to the national interest of the interest of the United States in the Middle East which are creating a situation that you were hoping to move after Lebanon to something which could be productive? So you hold these committees and subcommittees and these people who are carrying all of these banners responsible to the failure now who have contacts with Jordan?

Q The Administration has clearly set forth its program, and has certain initiatives with regard to Jordan. And insofar as Congress, or certain elements in Congress are taking a contrary view, obviously that is a difference of opinion, and it is not in accord of our view of how the policy of the United States should move forward, but that's an internal debate.

Q Can we say that this -- what King Hussein said is the aftermath of his visit because a lot of reports said that his visit to Washington was not productive at all. Can we link it with this?

A Well, you know, I can't give you motivation or analyze why the King said what he did at this particular time. I think you'd have to ask him.

Q John, do you see this statement by King Hussein as parallel to the abrogation by President Gemayel of the May agreement with Israel?

A I don't know quite what you mean by that question. If you mean, is it disappointing, is it a setback, of course, it is; yes.

Q I mean that he is -- as President Gemayel is put under pressure by so many forces in the Arab world and that he's not finding the United States position to be much reliable?

A I don't want to analyze Jordanian motivations. But if you're asking me, is it fact that a great deal of Soviet weaponry has been moved into Syria and must Jordan be concerned by that, I presume the answer would be yes. But I think you'd have to ask the Jordanians about that.

Q John, when you say "certain elements in Congress," are you referring to Senator Moynihan, among others?

A What I didn't want to do was simply to make a blanket reference to Congress. I'm just pointing out that there are differences of view and some support the Administration's point of view on some of these issues and some do not.

--MORE--

Q John, your last remark about Syria getting weapons from Syria, are you suggesting that Hussein --

Q Soviet Union.

Q From the Soviets. Are you suggesting that the Hussein statement may be aimed more at Damascus than it is at Washington?

A No. I'm not suggesting that, Bernie. I'm just drawing your attention to certain realities in the area. Somebody asked me, "Where does the threat come from?" and I think the Jordanians ought to answer that. But if we all, together, look at some of the realities of the situation, one of the realities is a great flow of offensive weaponry into Syria from the Soviet Union, and I presume that other countries in the area, including Jordan, are concerned by that.

Q John, with respect to the Reagan initiative, we have Israel having rejected the initiative all along. We now have Jordan, one of the key players, saying it's basically a non-starter as far as the Arab world is concerned. Where do we go next in our search for a Middle East peace?

A Well, I think we continue to exercise the fortitude and the endurance which the President predicted when he announced his initiative. Nobody pretended at that time that it would be easy, and nobody pretends that it's particularly easy right now.

But the President did offer a set of ideas. He did pledge to move in a constructive direction, and these ideas do move us in a constructive direction.

I can't answer your question as to how long it takes, but I think the President has made clear that he's going to stick with it for a very simple reason: There isn't a very attractive alternative to negotiation. The only alternative to negotiation in the Middle East is sliding back down that slippery road to war, and that is not something that the United States is prepared to accept as inevitable.

Q What about the King's comment that since the U.S. is so pro-Israel and the Soviets so pro-Syrian, the only feasible alternative he could see is a large conference with all the Security Council members as well as everybody else in the Middle East?

A That's one of the aspects of his remarks with which we disagree.

Q Why?

A Don't agree with that. Don't feel that a larger conference, particularly involving the Soviet Union, which has hardly been a helpful or constructive influence in the Middle East -- don't believe that that would be a movement in the direction of stability or progress.

Q John, is there, as a result --

A Excuse me. Let me -- the gentleman has been trying to get --

Q You claim that there is no alternative to the President's plan, but could you name any interested party who shares this view?

A (Laughter) Well, I think you'd have to keep working at it. I think that there have been various expressions about the President's initiative by various countries. Agreed, those change from time to time, but we have to keep working to bring the key parties together.

Q What about King Hussein's contention that the U.S. can no longer be an honest broker?

A I don't think that is really borne out by the facts, and no glossing over what the King has said at this particular moment, but also I don't think the King has shut the door on the prospect of ultimate negotiations. It may be a matter of timing, but as Secretary Shultz has pointed out, certainly a large number of countries and individuals in the Middle East want to keep talking to the United States and keep pleading with the United States not to give up on the area and not to reduce its sense of commitment.

Q John, as a result of the developments in the last week, is there any attempt within the Department or the Administration to reassess the procedures whereby analyses are made, policies are produced, or to re-evaluate any of the personalities who have been involved in making these policies?

A I don't think so. I think, obviously, there is constant discussion in the State Department on -- in all of the geographic areas in which we're interested, and that process goes on. Obviously, there's been a lot of discussion about the Middle East. It's --

Q Nothing that's escalated -- I don't wan put words in your mouth, but no housecleaning purges, anything --

A No. If you mean, do people -- I've discovered in my time here that nobody goes home at night, and nobody goes home on weekends. If you mean that that trend is even worse lately, yes, people -- the lights burn late and people are talking and discussing.

Q John, you say that the conference with the participation of the Soviet Union is not acceptable. King Hussein and Mr. Arafat a few days ago --and you didn't comment on that -- I believe the State Department didn't say anything about it -- they said that Syria and the Soviet Union has to have a role in there.

Since you didn't see eye to eye, it might be very hard for you to swallow a role for the Soviet Union --

A Uh-huh.

Q And your concern for peace and stability in the Middle East is eminent from your participation in Lebanon with the Marines and other things. Can you see a way that you could meet with the Soviets with the participation of the Syrians and others to bring about such a thing?

A We don't see any prospect of generating any great enthusiasm on the part of this Administration for that, and, as I say, the reason for that is the record of the Soviet Union in the area. And I just ask you to ask yourself whether you think what the Soviets have been doing is conducive to peace and stability.

Q This is an opinion of the United States, but it looks like it's not the opinion of the parties in the Middle East, you know.

A As I said, there are areas in which we disagree. That clearly is one of them.

Q John, on that point, I mean, you guys have not been that successful. (Laughter) Now, why not give the Soviets a chance? (Laughter) Maybe they could put a deal together. What's wrong with it?

A Well, your compassion and your generosity and eagerness to include the -- (laughter) --

Q I'm just stating the facts.

A -- our Soviet friends is very touching, but I haven't quite arrived at that point yet.

Q Well, do you think that's a possibility, though?

A I don't see anybody talking about it.

Q . John, could you address the question -- if I understood you correctly, you said there would be no change in the Administration's position in pressing for the Stinger sale and the joint strike force.

A Yes.

Q Is that the essence of the position, then, no diminishing of the Administration being in the vanguard of pushing those two programs?

A Well, there's no change. There simply -- I mean, I was asked the question, "Is there any change in the Administration's policy on Stinger?" and the answer to that is no.

Q Well, how do you -- how would you reconcile the decision to go forward on both those programs and the indictment of the King of overall U.S. policy?

A As I said, in some -- with some aspects of what the King said, we disagree, but the importance of Jordan is clear cut. The program that we were recommending before was a good one. We don't see any reason to change our point of view --

Q John --

A It's needed for Jordan.

Q John, can I ask you a question here? How perceptions could be so different? I mean, the President gave a speech to a Jewish organization in which he supported Jordan and was described by a State Department official yesterday as being "audacious" in his daring to do this.

King Hussein who read the speech, obviously was aware of it, came down on the side that the U.S. is completely pro-Israel and is of no use as a broker.

I mean, is it possible you could have these two views coinciding side by side? I mean, is there any explanation --

A It's certainly hard to explain, isn't it? The President was reiterating our viewpoints that he has made before, underscoring them, before that particular audience. But I can't analyze King Hussein. Parties in this whole process, as I pointed out, vary in their attitude from time to time. I think if you went back and looked at some of the King's statements in earlier months and years, there would be times when he would be gloomy and times when he would be less gloomy.

Q Would you agree that in an election year now the chances of anything happening in a positive vein are rather slim?

A Well, it's hard to predict. We will keep engaged, and see how that engagement proves out.

Q John, can I ask one: In the statement you mentioned something about terrorism in the Middle East.

A Uh-huh.

Q What were you really telling us, since you turned down the possibility that you were saying the King was trying to sell "maybe a popular philosophy in the Middle East now to be antagonistic to the United States and not too good a friend of the United States."

What -- you turned that down. What then were you trying to say in this terrorism -- reference to terrorism?

A What is obvious, namely, that those in the Arab world who have moved in the direction of peace from time to time have not had easy going and have been threatened, as we well know in Lebanon.

I think the Secretary has told the story of the Lebanese Colonel who was sitting at his desk and got the telephone call, urging him to leave the army. If he did not -- and return to his confessional group -- if he did not, his son would be shot one hour hence. One hour hence his telephone rang and he got the word that his son had been shot and was in the hospital.

The path of peace is not easy.

Q Okay. Just to follow up then: Are you aware of any such threats to King Hussein which he may have --

A No. I think we would have to let Jordan speak to that, but I don't think the concept of subversion and terror would be particularly new in Jordan, as in a number of other Arab countries.

Q And one other thing, please. Jim asked about the substance of -- you said that generally the United States supports moving -- movement of people from one country to the other.

A Yes.

Q Well, are you then saying that Israel would be better at letting some people, Palestinians, to --

A No. What I said was that we weren't going to get into diplomatic exchange that we might or might not have had, but that as a general principle we support freedom of movement.

Q Which applies to the Palestinians in the West Bank.

A Which would apply to those people.

Q John --

Q John, could I ask you on that, I mean, here a guy comes up with some substantive things, the King, and you're saying that this guy's doing it because somebody's holding a gun to his head.

A No. That's not what I said at all.

Q Is that what you're trying to get over here?

A No. I was drawing attention to the reality of terrorism in the area.

Q John, while we're on the reality of terrorism, don't you think that now that the Administration has made it clear through its handling of the LaRouche case, that it won't lift a finger --

Q No, no.

Q -- to even enforce its own laws to protect a U.S. Presidential candidate, that King Hussein or anybody --

A I don't think that we will entertain --

Q John --

A -- political statements in this briefing --

Q No, no. Not --

A -- and if we -- if this is going to become a venue for political statements, we will end this briefing and --

Q What kind of a statement is that?

A That's the end of the briefing today, gentlemen.

(The briefing concluded at 1:20 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, March 16, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #46

FRIDAY, MARCH 16, 1984, 12:30 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon all. Couple of announcements:

Available in the Press Office is a statement on the U.S. attendance at the Second International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa, to be held in Geneva July the 9th through the 11th.

Also available in the Press Office is an embargoed text of Assistant Secretary for Human Rights Elliott Abrams' address. That will be tomorrow. It's available today, embargoed, but the address is tomorrow before the Third Annual Human Rights Conference of the Baltic-American Freedom League in Los Angeles. The topic covered is "Human Rights in the Baltic States."

Then yesterday the Secretary sent to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate a report to the Congress on Administration efforts to achieve peace in Central America. That report was required under Section 109 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 1984. There are a number of copies of that report already available in the Press Office, and I understand we will have more, a larger quantity, later today.

In brief, the report makes the following points:

Peace in Central America is a paramount policy goal. The report discusses the Contadora Process, stresses the strong continuing U.S. support for it. The report emphasizes, as did the legislation that mandated it, that a key to peace in Central America is the attitude of the Government of Nicaragua. The U.S. remains prepared to view favorably real changes in Nicaragua's behavior and concrete positive actions on its part, particularly in Nicaragua's election ground rules. But thus far recent signals and gestures from the Sandinistas have not been accompanied by the substantive, concrete changes that are necessary conditions for peace.

The report points out that while regional dialogue is essential to peace and stability in Central America, it's only one aspect of our policy. We also support political reform, economic development, and security of the region's democratic nations.

The report concludes with a reminder of the importance of bipartisan Congressional support for U.S. Central American policy. It urges prompt approval of the Administration's "Democracy, Peace and Development Initiative" now before Congress as well as early confirmation of the President's new Ambassador-at-Large for Central American negotiations -- as you know, that confirmation hearing is not scheduled for an early date -- and also calls for adequate funding for the various programs that are an integral part of our policy to achieve stability and peace in an area where we have vital interests.

So that's the report, copies of which are available in some small quantity and will be available in larger quantity later this afternoon.

Q And will we get the statement you just read to accompany it?

A You certainly can.

Q What can you tell us about the missing American diplomat in Beirut?

A Mr. Buckley? Not a great deal more probably that you've read or heard already. We don't have a great deal more. According to eyewitnesses he was abducted and forced into a car by three armed men about 7:30 a.m., Beirut time, as he was leaving his apartment building in West Beirut.

We do not know who seized him. We are in touch with the Lebanese authorities, with various factions in Lebanon, and also the Syrians. All of them have indicated they will be cooperative, and that is about all I really have for you on that situation.

Q Do you have any biographical information on him?

A I have a little. He's 56 years of age. He was born in Medford, Mass., May 30, 1928. He is a graduate of Boston University where he received a B.A. in international relations. He served in the United States Army, reaching the rank of Captain. Prior to beginning his civilian Federal Service, he was a self-employed building contractor and a librarian in Massachusetts. He was employed as a civilian by the Department of the Army in 1965, served both in Washington and Vietnam, joined the State Department Foreign Service in 1983, was assigned to the American Embassy in Beirut in July 1983 as a political officer.

Q Does the biography say what he was doing between '70 and about '83?

A I don't have any -- well, other than the fact that he worked in Massachusetts, but I don't have dates on that, Jim.

Q He joined the Foreign Service in 1983?

A He joined the State Department Foreign Service in 1983.

Q What was his role in the Army?

A I don't know what he did in the army.

Q John, why did you get in touch --

Q How about --

A Sorry?

Q How about distributing a longer version of this biography?

A We'll see what we can produce for you during the day; sure.

Q John, why were you in touch with, among others you say, the Lebanese Government, the various Lebanese factions and the Syrians. Where the Syrians and why the Syrians?

A Anybody who might be helpful in trying to locate him for us, Bernie. Don't misunderstand me. When I say we're in touch with factions and we're in touch with the Syrians, this is not in any way to suggest culpability. What I'm suggesting is that we're working with people who perhaps have been helpful in such cases in the past and who could conceivably be helpful on this case.

Q John, the Sudan. Have you got anything on this bombing attack on Omdurman?

A We're aware of that bombing attack. We deplore it. (We're) consulting with the Government of Sudan and other friendly countries in the region.

Q Do you have any clue as to the source of the attack? There are reports that it was a TU-22 which --

A TU-22, I think --

Q -- which Libya apparently only has in the region.

A That seems to be the conventional wisdom, that the only TU-22s in the area belong to Libya, but --

Q Is the ubiquitous Mr. Walters out in that part of the world?

A No, General Walters I saw in the building this morning, so he's right here.

Q What about the discussion that was going on sending some additional military equipment by air to the Sudan? You said it was under discussion, or something.

A I don't know that any decision has been made on that, Bernie. Be glad to see of it's still where it was.

Q Aren't we making the jump that if the conventional wisdom is that only the -- that Libya has the only -22s in the area, that it is in fact a Libyan plane that made the bombing run?

A I'm not making the conventional jump because obviously one can't be sure of that. I'm just stating the facts as they appear to be. The Sudanese seem to think that it was a TU-22, and Bill is stating what apparently is obvious, that the only TU-22s around are based in Libya.

Q Did the Sudanese tell you that they think it's a Libyan plane?

A I do not know whether the Sudanese have said anything about the nationality of the plane, but I think they have said that it's a TU-22.

Q Is it possible, John, that you might have something more on this later today?

A Keep in touch with us and if anything develops, be glad to let you know.

Q Is there any chance of sending any AWACS there?

A Nothing on that, Bernie.

Q Don't we, in fact, have surveillance aircraft in Sudan now?

A You'd have to talk to the Pentagon on that. I don't know what's there.

Q Any chance of rerouting --

A I don't think so. I don't think there are.

Q Any chance, John, of rerouting some of our naval forces that are now off the Lebanese coast?

A I guess you'll have to talk to the Pentagon and see, but I don't have anything for you.

Q How serious do you see this?

A I guess it's serious when a plane bombs your capital. I'm sure the Sudanese consider it to be very serious.

--MORE--

Q The Sudanese are saying that the aircraft was coming from the south direction to Omdurman, so how about Ethiopia, because there is the possibility that it came from Ethiopia, not from Libya?

A Well, I don't -- I mean, that's why I'm reluctant to bite on where the plane came from, but I don't think the direction of a bombing run necessarily indicates where it came from. It has been known for aircraft to come in from a different direction than from the country in which they originated.

Q You expect the Libyans to have bases outside of their country, south of Sudan?

A Do I know that they have bases? Well, they have, they operate --

Q Expect them to have bases --

A If you're asking me that question, not in this context, sure. They've got, obviously, bases from which they operate in Chad, as a result of their activities there. But that's a factual response to your question. I'm not suggesting anything in connection with this incident.

Q John, do you have any comment on South Africa and Mozambique signing a peace treaty, and the United States -- what role it may have had in that?

A I don't, Mike, have anything on that. Let me see if we might have something on it.

Q John, a minor point on Buckley. My notes say you have him at age 56, born in May of 1928.

A Am I off on the date there -- a discrepancy?

Q That would make him 55.

A O.K. Let us go back and --

Q One month short.

A Either somebody has gotten the birth date wrong or his age. Why don't we just check that?

Q He will be 56.

A Have we clarified that?

Q Unless this is a Gary Hart-type operation. (Laughter)

A You're in a very playful mood today. (Laughter) It's Friday.

Q John, still on the Middle East area, do you now think that the chances for the Stinger sale are affected at all by King Hussein's statements?

A Hard to say how they are affected. The Administration's position is unchanged. We will go forward with the Stinger project.

Q Have you been able to talk to him? Has the Ambassador talked to him, to find out any further insights into what prompted his statements?

A I don't have a readout for you, but Ambassador Viets sees the King frequently and may well have talked with him since this.

Q Who requested the meeting today, Mr. Eagleburger or the Jordanian?

A We requested that meeting with the Jordanian Ambassador.

Q What was the subject to be discussed? Stingers?

A Obviously, they would discuss King Hussein's remarks, but there are a number of other matters going forward in connection with Jordan, not the least of which is the Stinger and the JLP, and this meeting was set up with a variety of topics in mind, but I'm certainly not suggesting --

Q When was that set up?

A I think it was originated yesterday, but again, as I say, they will cover a number of topics.

Q John, on that other matter before the Senate, about moving the Embassy to Jerusalem, there are those in the Administration who fear that such a move would be catastrophic for U.S. interests in the Middle East and may, in fact, even endanger U.S. diplomats and U.S. embassies in the Middle East.

I'm just wondering whether or not the Administration is going to Congress and talking about this?

A Oh, yes, I think the Administration is. The Administration feels very strongly about this, is strongly opposed to it, and I think has made that position very clear. It's something the President feels strongly about.

Q On the Stingers, the Wall Street Journal says that the Administration has decided, despite its feelings, to reduce its lobbying efforts on it. Are you denying that?

A Reduce its lobbying efforts?

Q Yes.

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q John, about the Iraq-Iran war, yesterday Mr. Kittani met Eagleburger --

A Yes.

Q -- and in the view of the decision of the Arab Foreign Minister in Baghdad, can you tell us anything?

A I can't. Mr. Kittani met Secretary Eagleburger yesterday afternoon; the Secretary dropped by, spent some time at that meeting. I think he probably has also seen Secretary Murphy this morning by now, but I don't have any readout for you on those meetings.

Q John, do you have any response to the March 12 Izvestia article on the front page of their international section, which attacked the Reagan Administration for having ties to what they described as "neo-Fascist groupings" led by Lyndon LaRouche?

A Haven't seen it.

Q You expect me to believe that?

A I expect you to believe the statement that I --

Q Let me ask you this. Does --

A Are you suggesting that I told you a lie?

Q Well, I'm suggesting --

A Are you suggesting that I told you a lie?

Q If you said you --

A New subject. No more questions from you.

Q If you said you, meaning the State Department --

A Would you like me to close this briefing now?

Q -- I find it hard to believe --

Q Come on.

Q Oh, cut it out.

Q Aw --

Q Shut it off.

Q I find it hard to believe that the State Department is not aware --

Q That's enough.

Q -- of something on the front page of the international section of --

(Microphones off and briefing was concluded at 12:44 p.m.)

Becker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Monday, March 19, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #47

MONDAY, MARCH 19, 1984, 12:30 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A couple of announcements. First, I would like to introduce Irene Novak, who is going to be with the Press Office for about six weeks as part of an on-going personnel rotation program within the Bureau of Public Affairs. Irene comes from the Office of Public Information in the Bureau, and she's been there since that office was opened about four years ago. She has a great deal of experience, therefore, in answering all kinds of questions, and I know you'll join me and the others in the Press Office in welcoming her.

Why don't you stand up so they can see who you are.

(Ms. Novak stood up.)

Okay. Available in the Press Office is the prepared text of Deputy Secretary Dam's address before the Export-Import Bank's Annual Exporters' Conference. The speech is entitled "ASEAN's High Road to Growth: Lessons for the Developing World."

That's it on announcements. Happy to take your questions.

No questions?

Q Could you confirm that there are AWACS planes in the Sudan and give us the purpose and why they're there?

A And why they're there?

Q Yes.

A Following the unprovoked attack on Sudan by a Libyan aircraft on March 16, the Egyptian and Sudanese governments have requested our assistance to bolster the capability of Egyptian and Sudanese air defense systems by providing early warning of air attacks.

The AWACS will take part in combined air defense operations being carried out by Egypt and Sudan. The purpose of these operations is to deter sustained attacks by demonstrating that the three countries can rapidly put in place the assets necessary to deal with such aggression. We're also examining what longer-term assistance we can provide Sudan in the air defense area.

Q Copy?

A Yes.

Q How many AWACS, Alan?

A I'm going to have to refer you for details to the Pentagon on that sort --

Q Can you amplify that phrase, "the three countries making assets available?" Is that to suggest that the United States -- to what degree, to paraphrase, would the United States be prepared to support Sudan militarily?

A I think that -- well, I guess basically I would refer you back to what I said which is that this is an effort to bolster the air defense systems of Egypt and Sudan, which is what they have requested us to do. I can't really go beyond at this point, in terms in of what the long -- what I've said, in terms of the longer-term measures, that those are being looked at. The AWACS deployment is a -- I don't have a timeframe precisely, but it's a short-term effort which would be followed up by a longer-term --

Q Do you rule out the use of U.S. manpower; military power, manpower?

A Well, of course, there are U.S. military personnel in the aircraft. What are you -- are you referring to something other than that?

Q Because of that word, you make a point of the three countries' assets and there you include the United States, so we can have some idea of the range of the American military commitment.

A Well, what we're talking about is the deployment of AWACS aircraft, in this case.

Q (Inaudible)

A Beyond that, again, as I say, we're looking at what longer-term measures we might take to assist Sudan in the air defense area.

Ralph?

Q Alan, you mentioned this business about looking to a system in the air defense area. Last week, and the week before, the discussion of that review was in the context of Ethiopia. Was that review at that time in the context of Libya and Ethiopia or has that review now been broadened to deal with air defense vis-a-vis Libya as well as the situation with Ethiopia?

A I don't recall, myself, putting it in the context of Ethiopia. The request was in the context of the Vice President of Sudan's conversations when he was here. That review is on-going.

In specific answer to your question, obviously we would look at the requirements, and I think the Sudanese would look at the requirements, in terms of the overall situation, including the Libyan attack.

Q Am I wrong? I thought the questions that were asked were in the context of his request, which I believe was in the context of Ethiopia. But are you saying now that it was not; it was --

A I'm not addressing specifically what he asked for. I don't recall that we have done that. I don't know what the Sudanese have talked about. But, obviously, as I say, it would be in the context of the overall situation, including this attack on Friday.

Q Is the attack that took place on Friday, this bombing raid, considered by the Department to be part of the problem which caused the earlier review and caused General Walters to go out there, or is this considered to be something separate and different from the general situation that had obtained previously?

A I don't know if I can address it specifically as you've phrased it --

Q Explain what is going on out there.

A -- but the Libyan threat to Sudan is not new as a general matter. However, this attack which obviously was not expected was a new element, is a new element, and will be looked at in terms of considering the overall assistance package that would be provided in response to Vice President Tayyib's request.

Q Could you explain what it was that caused the concern of the Vice President and the consideration here, going back several weeks, of some accelerated assistance to Iran?

A I think we referred both -- to Sudan. I think we referred both, Don, to concerns of pressure from Ethiopia and Libya.

Q Alan, there's a report that one of the unexploded bombs found after the raid was of Soviet manufacture, fairly recent Soviet manufacture. Do you have any further information on the party which carried out the attack, and do you believe the Soviets were involved as a supplier?

A Well, we have good reason to believe that the attack was from Libya. Among other things, the reports from Sudan, which were based on eyewitness accounts, are that the plane was Soviet-built Tupelov TU-22, supersonic bomber, and Libya is the only state in the region known to have TU-22s in its air force. It's not, I think, surprising that they would be armed with Soviet ordnance as well.

Q Do you know that to be true, that --

A I do not know that myself to be true.

Q Alan, is the AWACS there solely with defensive, as it were, rules of engagement, or could they be used if the Egyptians decide to retaliate or take a pre-emptive action?

A They are only there for defensive early warning for the Egyptian and Sudanese defense forces. There's no intention to use them in offensive operations.

Q Alan, have the Egyptians asked for, and has the United States given permission for, transferring any American-supplied military equipment from Egypt to Sudan?

A I don't know the answer to that. I think I would have to refer you to the Pentagon on that question.

Q Also --

A And I'm not sure that they have the answer, to that but --

Q Would you know if there are any indications that the bombing raid last Friday was more than an isolated incident? Have there been any reports of any build-up of either bombers or troops or anything menacing to Sudan?

A There is no evidence of preparations for a massive attack. But as the attack of last Friday shows, there can be a surprise attack, and we certainly would not rule out, and would be concerned about, the possibility of that sort of thing. But we don't have any evidence of massive attack preparations.

Q Alan --

A Go ahead.

Q Do you have anything to prove that Libya is the actor behind this raid besides the fact that it's only a Soviet aircraft, TU-22?

A I'm going to stick with what I said before, which is, we have reason to believe that Libya was responsible for this attack. I'm not going to be able to go beyond that.

Q Because on Friday we had already this piece of information in hand, but you refrained from saying that it's Libya. Now, you're saying it's Libya -

A That's right.

Q -- without adding anything to this.

A Well, we sometimes don't cite what information we have because we're not able to do that. But we do have reason to believe that.

Jim?

Q Alan, on what you're reviewing now, just to make sure, last week you said there was a review, or the two countries were reviewing what was needed. And now you're saying that you're determining long-term defense systems.

Are the two issues synonymous; are the two reviews synonymous?

A In terms of the Sudan?

Q Yes.

A Yes. I think this is all being folded into the consideration of the request that was made before.

Q Alan, is there any retraining program being considered for that squadron of F-5s that we have given to the Sudan? It seemed to be pretty ineffective in defending the capital.

A I'd ask you to check with the Pentagon. Don't know the answer to that.

--MORE--

Q Could you give us any outline of that request now, the dimensions of the Sudanese --

A No. I can't do that. Sorry.

Q Alan, you said the AWACS deployment was short-term. Is the review expected to be completed before the end of the AWACS deployment? I mean, should we look for the two things to happen at the same time?

A You're trying to pin me down to a calendar. I can't tell you that. Obviously, there is a need to try to deal with the defense situation and the possibility that there would be instances where that would be required. So ideally one would be able to do this in a normal fashion in which you would not have gaps.

But I can't really tell you, Ralph, how -- we don't have a projection for the deployment period for the AWACS. I don't have a projection for the completion of the review and the availability of whatever supplies may be determined to be necessary. So I just can't give you that kind of a calendar.

Q Can you characterize the review in the same words you characterized the deployment -- short-term?

A I just said I can't give you a timeframe on it.

Abdu Salam?

Q Since you ruled out the airlifting of military hardware to Sudan and you are saying that there is a review going on now, can we understand that the first results of the ongoing review was to send the AWACS and the possibility in the future might come about that you might have an airlifting of equipment and weapons and arms, since there was a report this morning, in one of the papers, that it was decided to airlift something. But you are saying no.

Q Yeah. That review continues. I would just caution you that the AWACS deployment is in response to a separate request from Egypt and the Sudan. It was not part of the request that we had been reviewing since Vice President Tayyib's visit here, so I would put them in somewhat -- your question seemed to bunch them together a little more than I think I would do.

But, in any case, the review of what we might supply under the existing agreement, but what we might airlift if we're going to do that, and so on, is still being looked at.

Q Let me ask another question: Do you have any motive, if you pinpointed Libya as being involved in this air attack on Sudan?

A Yes.

Q Do you have any motives? Do you understand or could you say that there are motives for the Libyans? What are the motives that you can understand?

A I can't try to explain Libya's motives in this.

Q When you said a moment ago there's no projection for deployment, do I take that to mean that the deployment in fact is open-ended at this point?

A That's -- I say it's going to be a short-term measure, so I would steer you away from the suggestion or the implication of the term "open-ended." On the other hand, we don't have an ending date, so with that caveat, I suppose, in a sense, and a very narrow sense, yes, we can't tell you when they're going to leave.

Q Last time when there was war in Chad, also you sent AWACS for a couple of days, for a couple of weeks, and you withdrew them. And then some Sudanese officials said that same thing will happen, you will put them there a couple of weeks, then you withdrew them, and then another attack will come, and so on and so forth. Why don't you station them there? That's the question I have.

A I think there are a lot of reasons, most of which I guess I would ask you to talk to the Pentagon about, but, as I said, there is a recognition of a longer-term need, and that need is being addressed.

Q Has the scope of the rebel attacks in the southern Sudan -- have they increased markedly since President Nimeiri was here in November? And, also, does the State Department have any intelligence on the "cooperation agreement" between the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement and a fringe of the right-wing Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan?

A I don't have anything for you on either of those.

Q Nothing on that?

Q Another topic or --

Q I have a few questions on the Libyan affairs.

A Go ahead.

Q Have you been directing any warnings to Libya through a third party?

A Well, I think all I really can say is that we have passed a message to the -- or through the Belgians, who are our protecting power, to the Libyans, but I don't have any comment on the substance of that message.

Q I have three questions, or Southern-Hemisphere type questions: Do you have anything about those anti-nuclear protests in New Zealand about the arrest?

A No.

Q Does that weaken the Alliance in any way, these type of protests?

A I don't have anything for you on that.

Q Alan, do you have any --

Q Well, can we --

A Go ahead. You've got two more.

Q Last week there were a number of nations, including New Zealand and Australia, backed a U.S. position on UNESCO. Did you have anything to say on that? Do you have anything?

A Well, I think we had a guidance available last week on the large group of nations which got together and made some points, and you can get that from the Press Office, but I don't have it with me.

Q Last -- BBC's got a report that South Africa has said it's going to stop providing intelligence to the U.S. about Soviet warships to the U.S. and the U.K. because the South Africans say they can't get spare parts because of the embargo, and therefore they can't help out. Do we have anything on this or could you look into it, please?

A No. I don't have anything, and I wouldn't look into it. You're talking about matters which touch on intelligence, and I wouldn't -- without steering you one way or another, I wouldn't get into it.

Q Do you have any comment on King Hussein's interview with CBS yesterday?

A No. I really don't. I think Larry Speakes addressed this this morning at the White House, and I'd refer you to what he said, but I don't have anything to add.

Q Is the decision still made to go ahead with the Stinger?

A Yes.

Q Alan, has the State Department taken a position on the possibility of the PLO sending some participants to the Olympics?

A The PLO?

Q Yes. (Laughter)

A I'm not aware the PLO is a member of the Olympics.

Q Become aware of it, because it's coming up.

A Are they a member of the Olympics?

Q Not yet. (Laughter)

A Let's deal with things as we have to. We have enough problems to deal with.

Q Okay. All right. Another problem: Do you have any comment on the remarks made by President Marcos of the Philippines on U.S. involvement in his political -- his elections?

A Not really. We have made clear that we're not -- what we're for is democratic elections, and we have not interfered, and I don't think his remarks were directed at the United States in any case. So I really don't have any statement beyond that.

Q Why did he mention the United States by name?

A I thought he directed his remarks at others. But, in any case, we're not interfering in the elections, and we have no intention to do so.

Q Do you have anything on special arrangements the Administration might be making to observe elections in El Salvador next Sunday?

A I don't at this point. I think we will have an announcement soon on -- it may not be from here, but the Government will have an announcement soon on our observer delegation. Obviously, there will be one, and it will go shortly.

I also understand that there are over 20 countries who are sending official observers, beyond which there are many countries that are sending unofficial observers, and there are some estimates which suggest that there may be even more observers, both unofficial and official, than were there in March '82. So I think there will be a lot of people around watching this process unfold.

Q Anything on the visit of the Angolan President to Cuba?

A No. I don't, Bernie.

Q Alan, what is the status of the U.S. Marines off Lebanon's coast? Any changes in their rules of engagement or in their deployment?

A Don't have anything new on that.

Q Do you have any situation report on the Iran-Iraq war?

A No. I don't.

Q Anything on the article in the Post yesterday by Lally Weymouth on what happened between October of '82 and -- nothing at all?

A No.

Q How about Mr. Buckley? Do you have anything new on him?

A No. I don't have anything new. Obviously, the efforts continue, but I don't have anything new on him.

Q As far as you know, no one has claimed responsibility?

A I haven't seen anything on that, that suggests anybody has. No.

Q Alan, is the U.S. still observing closely the Lebanese conference in Lausanne?

A Sure. We have somebody there.

Q How do you read the developments --

A I don't have a readout to give you. I think that you doubtless have a lot of reports coming in, and I'll refer you to what you may have.

Q Alan, first let me clear this question. Are questions regarding Soviet-inspired terrorist attacks on U.S. Presidents or other political figures in the United States in order at this briefing?

A If they involve United States -- well, let's see what your question is. I hear a Lyndon LaRouche question coming up. Go ahead.

Q Well, now that you have had time to review the March 12 -- and by "you" I mean the Department, not you personally, have had time to review the March 12 Izvestia attack on alleged connections between Lyndon LaRouche and the Reagan Administration, do you read that article, (1) as a call for the Administration to cut off its ties to Lyndon LaRouche and associated organizations, a call from the Izvestia which is a Soviet state publication?

A Finish your questions.

Q Well, that's my first question.

A Well, I'm not aware that anybody has particularly read that article. Maybe somebody has, but it hasn't come to my attention --

Q Well, can you take --

A Nor did the -- well, no, I don't think we'd go around and ask everybody who reads Izvestia whether they may have read that article.

Q No -- well -- I'm asking for --

A It is not up to --

Q I'm asking for an Administration evaluation of that article, which did include a direct attack on the Reagan Administration.

A Well --

Q If you don't want to give one, don't give one, but --

A I just don't have anything for you on it.

Q Okay. Second, do you read it as a call for terrorist actions against President Reagan, Lyndon LaRouche, or other political figures in the United States?

A Having said that, I'm not aware if anybody's read it. I can't really respond to that.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:49 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Wednesday, March 21, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #50

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 21, 1984, 12:50 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I've got a couple of announcements and one statement.

As a reminder, there will be a BACKGROUND briefing in the White House Press Briefing Room on the visit of French President Francois Mitterrand today at 2:30 p.m.

There will also be a BACKGROUND briefing at the White House this afternoon at 3:30 o'clock on President Reagan's forthcoming trip to the People's Republic of China.

A statement by Secretary Shultz on Afghanistan Day: March 21, the traditional Afghan New Year's celebration, is once again being observed in the United States as Afghanistan Day.

As in previous years, various private organizations, as well as the United States Government, are marking this day to emphasize the struggle of the Afghan people against the Soviet invader continues, just as American solidarity with the Afghan cause also continues.

President Reagan is issuing a proclamation from the White House, designating March 21 as Afghanistan Day. With it, he is expressing America's admiration for the heroism and bravery of the Afghan people.

An Afghanistan Day Forum is being organized on Capitol Hill at which the Counsellor of the State Department, Edwin J. Derwinski, will outline the constancy of United States' policy toward Afghanistan. I understand that in Washington and New York, marches and demonstrations will also take place.

The Department of State welcomes manifestations of public support for the Afghan resistance for mujahadin. Their sustained country-wide struggle against tyranny and oppression is worthy of our esteem. Their courage and determination are an inspiration to us all. I remember with great feeling my visit to an Afghan refugee camp in Peshar, Pakistan, last July where I had the privilege of meeting with a group of Afghan refugee leaders. Their steady resolve and quite dignity moved me to say then, as I repeat for you, "We are with you. I share you confidence that in the end freedom will prevail, we will prevail."

The goal of United States' policy toward Afghanistan remains a negotiated political settlement based upon the complete withdrawal of Soviet forces and the other essential points spelled out in the five United Nations General Assembly resolutions on Afghanistan.

My wish for all Afghans in this new year would be that this settlement can be achieved as quickly as possible. I wish that Afghanistan could know peace, freedom and the return of all her sons and daughters who have fled oppression for refuge abroad.

Again, that is in the Secretary's name. That's it on announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Do you have --

Q Copies of that, Alan?

A Copies? Yes.

Q Do you have any reaction to a protest handed over to the U.S. Charge' in Moscow by Gromyko in which he calls the United States responsible for the mining of the Soviet ship in Nicaragua and accuses the United States of being responsible for state-sponsored terrorism?

A We understand that a Soviet tanker ran into a mine either entering or exiting Puerto Sandino in Nicaragua, and that there were injuries and some damage.

We note that anti-Sandinista forces have widely advertised that certain Nicaraguan ports have been mined. It would appear that the Soviet tanker struck one of these mines. We have no further information on the incident.

We have received a protest from the Soviet Union charging U.S. responsibility, and we reject that charge. We regret, of course, any injury to mariners or shipping, but it was well known from previous incidents that there were dangers in the area. To a great extent, these regional dangers and tensions result from Soviet encouragement of conflict in Central America and the Caribbean, and therefore the Soviets are hardly in a position to blame others for an increase in violence there.

As to your question about state terrorism, obviously, we would reject that as well.

Q Copy of your statement?

A Yes.

Q Any plans to see Dobrynin today? Anyone in the Department, Alan?

A I think all I could say about that is that our views on this and our rejection of the charges will be transmitted through diplomatic channels.

Q Do you have any view on the placing of mines in Nicaraguan waters?

A I don't have any words to offer you beyond what I just did on that, Jim.

Q Has the United States provided underwater mines to -- either directly or indirectly to anti-Sandinista guerrillas?

A Jim, as always, I'm not going to comment on any alleged intelligence activities.

Q You won't deny it then?

A Don't walk away saying the State Department didn't deny. I don't address questions which relate to alleged intelligence activities.

Q Alan, does the State Department condemn the use of underwater mines by forces opposed to the Government of Nicaragua?

A Again, I think that I'm going to stick at this point with the words that I've just offered you in the opening answer.

Q Alan, can I ask a philosophical question about this? How is this different in terms of the provision of oil and energy supplies from Salvadoran guerrillas' attempts at breaking down the infrastructure or downing power lines and so on? What's the distinction here?

A I don't think I'm going to try to address that. I'll let you do your own analysis of that.

Q Do you believe there is a distinction?

A I just said I think I'm not going to address your --

Q Alan, as late as yesterday noon, Secretary Shultz is urging the Congress to approve the money to support the counter-revolutionaries in Nicaragua, saying it's necessary "to keep up the pressure on Nicaragua to negotiate," and calling upon Congress "to recognize the validity of the struggle of the Nicaraguans who are resisting totalitarianism."

In view of that, how can you say that there's no responsibility on the part of the United States which furnishes the money, if not anything else, which leads to the mining of ports?

A Well, I'm going to leave you with what I said, and, obviously, with what the Secretary said yesterday.

Q Alan, the Secretary yesterday welcomed the Havana communique by the Angolan and Cuban Governments, and yesterday -- a related -- Foreign Minister Botha of South Africa rejected the communique because of some of the language in it.

Is this seen as a setback for Assistant Secretary Crocker's activities down there, or just as parrying one propaganda against another?

A Well, we understand that South Africans are unhappy with the rhetorical formulations in the communique, particularly with respect to the ANC and SWAPO. The South Africans have made their point. South Africa, like other parties, continues to approach the peace process in a serious manner. We are working with all parties to move that process forward. We note that South Africa has not taken exception to the basic message in the communique and has expressed its satisfaction with disengagement.

Q Copy?

A Yes.

Q Alan, yesterday evening the Cuban Government seized two yachts, two American yachts, that had strayed from -- into Cuban waters. Do you have any response to that, and what is the United States doing in order to get the release of the Americans that are being held?

A The Department has been advised by the U.S. Coast Guard that two U.S. registry sailing vessels were seized by Cuban patrol boats on March 20, 1984, while reportedly participating in a race between Jamaica and Florida.

The approximately 19 people aboard these sailboats are thought to be U.S. citizens. We have nothing further on the identity of the passengers that I can offer to you, nor on their current whereabouts or that of the boats. The U.S. Interests Section in Havana has urgently requested full information from the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is awaiting a reply.

Q Alan, do you know what contact there may have been already with the Cuban Government about this?

A Well, I say, the Interests Section has urgently requested full information from the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Q Have the Governments of Jordan and Saudi Arabia been advised about the Stinger decision?

A The short answer to that question is yes. As the White House announced earlier today, the President has decided not to proceed with the sale of Stinger missiles to Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Appropriate parties have been notified and formal notification to Congress will go foward shortly.

Q What did they tell you when you notified them?

A Don't have anything to offer you on that.

Q I'd like to return for a minute to the --

A Excuse me. Could we stay on this subject or --

Q I'd like to return to the mining --

Q Can we just finish up with the Stinger since we're on it? Do you have any explanation, Alan, as to why these sales were cancelled?

A Well, the decision not to proceed was taken for obvious reasons relating to the legislative situation and the prospects for approval.

Q Why is the decision covering Saudi Arabia --

A Sorry?

Q Why is the decision covering Saudi Arabia besides Jordan?

A Well, I think the fact is that the "Stinger issue," if I may put quotes around that, has been addressed essentially on the Hill at this point as affecting both the Saudi and the Jordanian prospective sales, and so therefore the judgment about the legislative situation was made about both of those sales.

Q What does this cancellation, Alan, do for our relationships in the moderate Arab world? Is this going to hurt U.S. -- the pursuance of U.S. policy in the area?

A As the Secretary said yesterday, our interest in the security of Saudi Arabia and Jordan remains firm. We will continue to take appropriate steps to help meet their security needs, but I'm not -- I can't speculate beyond that on the kind of reaction. Obviously, we remain concerned, and we remain involved.

Q How can we take appropriate steps, Alan, if Congressional opposition is going to be a given each time?

A Well, as I say, the Secretary said yesterday there are a lot of things that are involved here, a lot of different kinds of assistance and relationships, and so we remain firm in our interests and commitment on that.

Q Is there in your mind a package here that you give up on the Stinger in order to be assured that you're going to get other parts of the request?

A Well, I can't really predict, Marvin, what effect this would have on other --

Q In terms of your own planning.

A Well --

Q Was that what you had in mind?

A Again, I can't predict that, and I think we'll just let that situation evolve and see what happens about it.

Q I was asking you whether -- what you had in your mind, not what the effect is going to be.

A Well, I think that I will have to stand on what I just said.

Bernie?

Q Was the cancellation motivated by the expectation of defeat on the Hill, or was the cancellation motivated by King Hussein's sharp attack against the United States?

A No. I think, as I said, the decision not to proceed was based upon our assessment of the legislative situation. Now, as the Secretary said yesterday, those elements that you raised are not unrelated in terms of that legislative situation, but, nonetheless, the decision taken by the Administration was related to the prospects for approval.

Q Alan, whatever the reasons, do you think that the cancellation sends some sort of message to the Arab world?

A To the --

Q Arab world.

A Arab world. I can't judge what messages will be derived from this action. I can only tell you what we've done and why we've done it.

Q Is the Administration considering Saudi Arabia somehow responsible for the attitude taken by King Hussein?

A No. That's -- again, this is not the point. The point is, as I explained it, relating to the legislative situation.

Ralph?

Q Alan, apropros of the legislative situation, I'm curious to know what distinction the Administration sees between the legislative situation and the prospects for approval of the Stinger issue versus the prospects for approval of the aid to El Salvador in the House of Representatives? You haven't taken the same steps on the two issues despite the level of opposition on the Central America money that you have in the Stinger.

A   Well, I guess we will wait and see what happens on that Salvadoran package.

Q   Why the distinction?

A   I guess there's a different judgment as to the prospects here.

-- MORE --

Q Does the legislative situation you talked about in connection with the Stinger apply equally to the package, the $220 million package, for Jordan, or do you see that in a different context?

A Allowing for the difficulty I have in addressing that subject, because we have not addressed it, I'm confining my statements to the Stinger. And I think that the White House statement this morning was confined to the Stinger.

Q You have nothing to say on the other part?

A No.

Q Alan, can I go back to the mining?

A Yes.

Q On March 3, a Dutch, or a Dutch-made -- I can't quite tell from the stories -- vessel hit a mine off the west coast of Nicaragua, not very far from where this incident occurred; was any protest received by that? Did the United States have any response to it at the time?

A From --

Q From either the Dutch or from the people who own the vessel or anybody else?

A Don't know. Why don't I check and see if I can find something on it.

Q Alright. And on March 7, a Panamanian freighter hit a mine. Similarly, was there any protest to the United States, any request for damages, or does the U.S. have any response?

A Well, I think we posted an answer on March 7 on the question about a protest having been received.

Q (Inaudible).

A I think that there was, but I ask you to check.

Q And has there been any response to it? Has the United States responded in some way to that protest, as you evidently have done today or are doing?

A Don't know the answer to that. I'll see if I can get you something.

Q From whom was the protest?

A I believe that the protest was from the Government of Nicaragua.

Q Is the mining of the port endorsed by the United States?

A Again, I'm not going to get into that subject, Bernie.

Q Alan, I want to go back to southern Africa for a second.

A Let's stay on the mining.

Q What would you say if an American ship were to hit a mine?

A Well, you're asking me to speculate on something that hasn't happened, so I think I will not do that.

Q Back on southern Africa. Was there anything out of the Havana communique which, in your view, would stall or would constitute an obstacle to the disengagement and the implementation of 435?

A I think at this point I'm going to stick with what I gave you and with what the Secretary said at his press conference yesterday. Don't have anything really beyond that to offer you. We've looked at the communique and that's really the extent of what we're going to have to say at this point.

Marvin?

Q Do you have anything on the Evans & Novak column today?

A I don't, but I understand that the Department of Defense has had something to say about that column so I would refer you to them.

Q I see.

Q Alan, do you have anything -- U.S. reaction to the developments in Switzerland, the Lebanese failure to solve their problems?

A Yes. Just very briefly. We're disappointed that the conferees seemed to have been unable to make greater progress toward national reconciliation. We hope that the parties will continue to work to make more meaningful the fragile cease-fire that now exists.

Q Do you think -- back to the yachts -- do you think that the Cuban action was appropriate?

A I'm sorry. With regard to the yachts?

Q With regard to the yachts.

A We're still looking at the question of what happened, so I really don't have any further comment for you at this point.

Q What steps might the U.S. take to secure those people?

A As I said, we have been in touch with the Cuban authorities, the Foreign Ministry, through our Interests Section in Havana. So we're obviously involved in trying to do that.

Q Alan, Jordan's King Hussein gave another interview -- yet another interview -- to the BBC yesterday in which some of his words appear to modify or moderate the citicism that he leveled last week in the New York Times interview.

Has the U.S. received any kind of note or comment from Hussein since the New York Times interview was published by way of explanation or anything to suggest that he may not have felt the way it came out, or something like that?

A I guess I really am not going to get into the question of diplomatic exchange. We have frequent contact with King Hussein, but I'm not going to try to address specific exchanges on specific topics.

Q Any comment on the BBC version?

A I haven't seen it, and I doubt that we would want to comment on every interview.

Q Would you address the continuity of U.S. foreign policy in advocating a negotiated political solution in Afghanistan and resisting that in El Salvador?

A I would disagree with your characterization of resisting negotiations in El Salvador. What we are looking for in El Salvador is the promotion of the democratic process. And what we have frequently said we support is dialogue leading to participation by the left in the electoral process. That position is consistent and has not changed.

Q That part I understand. But how would you reconcile that with calling for a negotiated solution in Afghanistan?

A Well, the negotiated -- the call for a negotiated solution is, as opposed to a military solution, obviously what we're trying to do is get the Soviet forces out and let the Afghans run their own country.

Q Is that power-sharing that you're calling for in Afghanistan?

A I don't think that you can compare the two situations, Bernie. I would not, but I don't think that they're parallel.

Q Do you have a statement on the release of General Seregni in Uruguay?

A I believe I do. We welcome the release of Seregni as we did the March 3 release of mathematician Jose Luis Massera. We favor any step which helps improve the climate for dialogue between the political parties and the government. This is consistent with our policy of supporting a political process, determined by the Uruguayans themselves, which will lead to the return of a democratic constitutional government in Uruguay.

Q Alan, do you have anything on this New York Times report that a Salvadoran, or former Salvadoran official was paid $50,000 to a -- well, he was paid $50,000 and then made some statements?

A As we noted at the time that the articles based on this anonymous source first surfaced, we have some basic questions as to the credibility of many aspects of the story.

Most of the charges made in the original story were not new, and it remains unclear whether this source had personal knowledge of the events or whether he's repeating rumors or "common knowledge."

We have made known to his contacts our interest in meeting with the source, as we indicated at that time.

Q Has anybody from the Department met with him?

A I don't believe anybody from the Department had met with him; no, Don.

Q Does the United States know who the source is?

A Does the United States know? I suppose --

Q Does the government know?

A I don't know who the source is, and I don't know whether anybody else does or doesn't at this point. But that's the comment I have to offer you on it.

Q Alan, back to King Hussein. Do you know if the Egyptian Government is trying to mediate, to at least limit the damage in relations between the Administration and King Hussein?

A I don't really -- the answer is, I don't know the answer to that specific question. But I guess we would not discuss the details of our diplomatic dialogue in any case; and, as I say, we have frequent contact and full dialogue with King Hussein, so we're not lacking for communications.

Q To follow up, please. Are you expecting the Presidential advisor in Egypt to come to Washington within a few days?

A I don't know the answer to that question.

Q On that subject. The Administration knew, or should have known, on March 1 when the Letters of Proposal were sent to Capitol Hill. Since March 1, what changed?

A I think that the Secretary addressed this yesterday as have others, in terms of the situation on the Hill following the New York Times interview.

Q You think that was the critical factor, then?

A The critical factor? I don't know. I would refer you to the Secretary's words as to the importance of that, however.

Q Why does that affect Saudi Arabia, then?

A I think I said before that the problem is that the Stinger issue has been approached, as we judge it on the Hill, as sort of one issue and not differentiating, and that is the judgment that we have made.

Q Am I incorrect in saying that the March 1 letter only referred to Jordan, the Jordan sale?

A There was a different -- a separate notification on Saudi Stingers, which went up -- I believe it was before it, but I'm not sure. But in any case, a separate notification went up.

Q Has there been an interview by a Saudi official we don't know about? (Laughter)

A Barrie.

Q Taking a look at your statement about the Moscow protest regarding the bombing, the sort of operative phrase here seems to be that that mining was widely advertised, I'm wondering if the Iranians were to use Soviet mines and put them in the Gulf of Hormuz and widely advertised it, that we thought that would be sufficient?

A Oh, I think we might take some mine-clearing action. But the fact of the matter is that the mining was widely advertised and --

Q So that justifies it?

A I'm not trying to justify anything. I'm simply stating what the facts are. And, as I said, we regret the injuries. I can provide the text of what I read to you before.

Q I have that.

A I'm not trying to justify or not justify. I'm simply stating what the facts are.

Q Do you know if they were -- I'm sorry, Barrie. Do you know if they were U.S.-made mines?

A Do I know if they're U.S.-made mines?

Q Yes.

A I haven't got the slightest idea.

Q It's not "you." Does the U.S. know whether these mines are of U.S. manufacture?

A I don't know.

Q Alan, would the U.S. engage in mine-clearing operations around Nicaragua?

A Would the U.S. engage in mine-clearing --

Q You said that the U.S. would engage in mine-clearing operations in the Strait of Hormuz.

A Well, we've declared ourselves in terms of an international waterway and keeping that waterway open. I'm speculating when I say that, but I don't think I'm speculating too wildly about the fact that we would take action.

You're dealing with a totally different situation in which the Nicaraguans presumably are saying they're going to deal with.

Q Alan, does the U.S. approve of the mine-laying as a way of cutting of what you call "a continuing flow of aid to the guerrillas in El Salvador?"

A I think I would say, again, I'm not in a position to address the question of rightness or wrongness of that.

Q Would the United States object, Alan, if the Soviet Union were to send mind sweepers to clear those mines out of Nicaraguan and international waters?

A Would we object? It's speculative, but I don't know any -- it's speculative. I would not see an objection, particularly myself, but I guess we would have to wait for an official response to see -- if that happened.

Q Alan, do you have any information on the developments in Sudan and the crises of Libya?

A No, there really is nothing new there. The U.S., as you know, has assisted in airlifting Egyptian defense equipment, and so on, to the Sudan. There's been no decision yet, as far as I know, on moving ahead with any expediting of U.S. equipment to Sudan. And, also, if there were to be some, I'm informed that it would be incorrect to talk about an airlift. There might be some special flights, a couple special flights, or something like that; but it wouldn't be some massive sort of airlift.

Q On that point, it's also been reported that Egyptian military personnel -- around 2,000, I think, or up to 2,000 -- are going to be involved in the Sudan in setting up this air defensive system. Are any United States personnel, either military or civilian, going to be involved in setting up an air defense system within Sudan?

A At this point, I don't think I can answer that beyond what we may have said, in general, about assisting in Sudan's air defense. But I indicated before, the other day, that we would be looking at how we could help in Sudan'a air defense as a longer-term proposition. Whether that would mean that U.S. personnel would be involved in trying to bring in appropriate equipment or repairing equipment, or something like that, I can't tell you, Don. I think we'd have to wait and see what that --

Q Related to that, if you could just tolerate one more.

A Go ahead.

Q The report from Libya says that the Peoples Committee of Foreign Liaison, which is more or less similar to the Foreign Ministry in other countries, has refused to accept a U.S. memorandum sent to them. Evidently, the warning that has been referred to by Secretary Shultz and others.

Does the U.S. have any comment on their refusal to accept this?

A I don't specifically. I'd refer you back to what the Secretary said yesterday. And that is, with regard to the AWACS, the Libyans should know that the planes are there and that they should not be interfered with.

Q Okay. Thank you.

A You're welcome.
(Press briefing concluded at 1:27 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Thursday, March 22, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #51

THURSDAY, MARCH 22, 1984, 12:20 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A couple of announcements:

Available in the Press Office is the text of an address by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger before the Regional Foreign Policy Conference in Birmingham, Alabama. His speech is entitled "Security Policy and Arms Control" and is scheduled for delivery at 1:15 Central Standard Time; therefore, please note that the text is embargoed until 2:15 p.m. Eastern Standard Time.

Also available in the Press Office is a statement by Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Paul Wolfowitz before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Mr. Wolfowitz testified at 10:30 this morning. The subject was the FY 1985 Foreign Assistance request.

Finally, also available in the Press Office is the testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters Clyde Taylor before the House Committee on Appropriations. Mr. Taylor was scheduled to appear at 10:30 today on the FY '85 budget request.

That's it for announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, is it the Administration's intention to go ahead with the sale of Stinger missiles to Saudi Arabia?

A To Saudi Arabia?

Q Yeah.

A As I indicated yesterday, the Administration is not going ahead, and the Department of Defense is sending an official letter today withdrawing the notification of both Stinger sales -- that is, to Jordan and Saudi Arabia -- and, in addition, Under Secretary of State Schneider is informing the Chairman of the appropriate Congressional committees of the sales withdrawal.

Q Follow-up to that, Alan. Stingers are part of the JLP package. Have they been surgically removed from that to make it more palatable?

A Well, I'm not sure -- I can't really talk about the JLP package since it is not unclassified, so --

Q I mean, it's the most classified open secret in town, Alan. (Laughter)

A Such is life.

Q Okay.

Q Well, Alan, back on the Saudi Arabian sale, have you heard from either of those governments on their reaction to your cancellation of the sale?

A Well, as I indicated to you, we notified both those governments, and I don't think I will get into the question of their reaction and the conversation between us. But we have notified them.

Q Alan, were Arab ambassadors notified yesterday that the Stinger sale to both Jordan and Saudi Arabia would be sent up to the Hill once again when the elections were over?

A Well, I saw your piece on that, Marvin. You attributed it to sources quoting Secretary Weinberger. I would refer you to the Pentagon to address Secretary Weinberger.

As far as anything that may have been said by the State Department, I'm not going to get into the conversations that go on. What I would say is that the President and the Secretary have recently made clear the importance of Jordan's security to U.S. national interests in the Middle East. But I'm not going to speculate on this specific question.

Q It sounds like a "yes."

A No. I wouldn't say "it sounds like a yes" at all. I'm just not going to speculate on the issue that you're raising. That's -- you're talking about some future event, and I'm not going to speculate on some future event.

Q Well, it's not a future event if it was said yesterday to a group of Arab ambassadors.

A Well, as I say, I'm not going to get into the question of -- without trying to lead you one way or another -- what has been said in the dialogue, but I'm just not going to speculate on the question.

Q It raises a question about motivation here -- in other words, that the decision to withdraw was a political decision rather than a diplomatic one --

Q Oh, heavens.

Q -- if you put it off until after the elections.

A Well, I think I've really said -- between what I said yesterday and what I've just said -- everything that I have to say.

Q What is the Administration's intent? Is it to resubmit it at some point for approval?

A I just think I said I'm not going to speculate on that.

Q Alan, is there any new move by the Administration regarding the RDF, the Jordanian RDF?

A Well, that was what Bill was asking about before, the so-called JLP. There is no unclassified program, so I can't talk about it.

Q Is the Administration looking at this move as now being more forthcoming from the Congress in the light of the cancellation of the Stinger to Saudi Arabia and Jordan?

A I think I addressed this yesterday when I said that I cannot speculate about the impact on the other things such as the issue you're raising.

Q But at least, you hope?

A We hope that everything that is put up by the Administration is approved. (Laughter)

Q Alan, have you now dropped the policy that John announced last week of closing the briefing when a political question is asked, referring to Marvin's questions?

A I believe if you'd look at the record, you'd find that John referred to political statements, so you've incorrectly --

Q But the record --

A -- you've incorrectly quoted John.

Q But if you look at the record, you'll see that what were asked were questions. No statements were made.

A Do you have a question, or are you just going to give speeches?

Q I asked my question. Now, I'm trying to get you to answer.

A Mike, do you have a --

Q Alan, do you have anything regarding the arrest of an American serviceman in West Germany on spying charges?

A No. I'm going to have to refer you to the Pentagon. I saw the wire, but I think that's a Pentagon question.

Q Do you have anything on the flap in southern Africa following Van Niekerk's statements in Namibia?

A Yes -- well, I don't know about the flap, but the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pik Botha, has issued a subsequent statement in which the Department of Foreign Affairs clarifies Dr. Van Niekerk's remarks. Mr. Botha states that Dr. Van Niekerk had assured him that what was said was not an accurate version of his remarks.

Mr. Botha's statement makes clear South Africa's position that U.N. Security Council Resolution 435 cannot be implemented until agreement has been reached on Cuban troop withdrawal, which represents no change in South Africa's position on those issues.

We consider the Foreign Minister's remarks on the subject to be definitive. There is no change in the U.S. position. We are seeking a regional settlement that includes implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 435. This will result in internationally recognized independence for Namibia. We know of no viable alternative.

Q May I follow up? Are you making any plans to meet with the Angolans soon?

A Well, there is the possibility that we would meet with the Angolans in the near future. I don't have any specific dates or plans to offer you at this point, however.

Q Do you know anything about a meeting set for London with the Angolans?

A No, I don't.

Q Do you have any travel plans of Chet Crocker to announce?

A No, I don't.

Q Alan, how about Mr. Rumsfeld and the purpose of his visit to the Middle East?

A Well, he and Ambassador Silberman are in Cairo. Our usual reticence about talking about what they're doing and where they're going will obtain, so other than saying that he remains the Special Representative for the Middle East, which is a very broad mandate, I really don't have anything to offer you on his specific mission at this point.

Q Alan, what is your reaction to the reports that the head of the Treasury Police in El Salvador has been in the employ of the United States Government, the C.I.A. specifically?

A Obviously, you're asking a question about C.I.A. which I could not respond to.

Q Well, he's been in the employ of the United States Government.

A Well, the specific charge or allegation is that he was in the employ of the C.I.A.

Q That dodge, is that the way you're getting out of this one?

A It's not a dodge; it's a standing, long-term standing policy.

Q The White House seems to have denied that this morning. You're not going to back up what the White House had to say?

A I have no idea what the White House said. I'm telling you how I'm going to handle it.

Go ahead, Jim.

Q If the United States and the Reagan Administration are going to be credible with respect to death squads, it seems to me they have to, in some way, deny this because --

A That may be what it seems to you, but I'm going to stick by the position we have long held.

Q You don't think that the U.S. Government's position on death squads is somewhat touched, or its credibility with respect to Salvadorans in the high command may be in some way affected by the fact that the kind of "Big Daddy" of the death squads was paid $90,000 a year by the United States Government?

A Again, those are allegations that I can't confirm and that you would have to take elsewhere to try, if you want to get confirmation. I don't talk about intelligence activities.

The allegations regarding his activities in death squads have been made before; there is nothing new about that. And my understanding is that the press report, the interview with this anonymous source, indicates itself that the charges could not be confirmed. But I just am not going to get into the question, whatever you may believe needs to be done about alleged intelligence activities.

Q Are you seeking to investigate? Is the United States Government seeking to investigate these allegations of which you just took note?

A Again, you're asking me about intelligence activities. I'm not going to answer any.

Q What can you tell us about the letter sent by Secretary Shultz to King Hassan of Morocco in reference to the issue of Jerusalem and the transfer of the American Embassy?

A Nothing in particular. I saw the wire story on that. Our position, the Administration position, on the movement of the Embassy is quite clear, open, on the record, and addressed by the Secretary in his press conference the other day, by Under Secretary Eagleburger up on the Hill, so I don't think there is anything new to say about that.

-- MORE --

Q Alan, do you have comment --

Q To follow up with the same question.

A All right. Go ahead.

Q It is presumed that the letter by Secretary Shultz is in reply to a letter from King Hassan of Morocco to President Reagan. Is it usual that the Secretary of State gives a reply to a Head of State?

A Without getting into the question of what happened in this particular case, there are many times when the Secretary of State writes to heads of state, yes.

Q I mean in reply, in reply to a letter sent to President Reagan?

A I don't have the specific facts in my head nor would I really get into the question of an exchange of letters. But, as I say, it is not unusual for the Secretary to write to heads of state.

Q Alan, does the State Department have any comment on the Soviet submarine incident with the Kitty Hawk?

A I don't, really. I think that you're going to have to go to the Navy for that, Ralph.

Q Is there anything further on the diplomatic process with regard to the incident in Nicaraguan waters?

A No, I think you've probably got what we had last night. I don't have anything new on that.

Q Any protest from the Nicaraguans?

A I'm not aware that we got a protest on it, Jim. I can --

Q They said in a broadcast they had sent one.

A It may be that one has been submitted. I haven't seen it. If you want, I can check and see.

Q Do you have anything, Alan, on what is charged to be criminal arson at UNESCO and/or are you in touch with the French Government about that?

A I'm sure that our delegation at UNESCO is interested in the question. I don't have anything -- I mean, obviously, it's a police matter and they're on top of it, so --

Q Back on Nicaragua. Has this government given agrement to the designated Ambassador from Nicaragua?

A I don't think that would be up to us to announce, to talk about any agrement process, so I'm going to have to beg off that particular question.

Bernie?

Q That's what I was going to ask.

A Mike?

Q Do you have anything on the status of the yachtsmen in Cuba?

A Yes, they have been released. The Department has been advised by the U.S. Coast Guard that the two U.S. registry sailing vessels, Brigadoon and Cashasha, seized by Cuban patrol boats on March 20 were released along with their crews made up mostly of American citizens early on March 22, and were proceeding to Montego Bay, Jamaica.

Privacy Act constraints prevents identification of the crew members.

George?

Q I thought it was kind of unusual that you gave the details of what is normally -- what would normally be considered a private discussion, the one yesterday between Mr. Eagleburger and Mr. Sokolov. How come this departure from normal practice?

A Well, we make those decisions from time to time to keep it interesting. (Laughter)

Q I thought it was a gross breach of security myself.

A Did you? (Laughter)

Q Can we ask you make a similar departure on intelligence questions --

A No.

Q -- with regard to the JLP? (Laughter)

Q On Carranza again --

A I'm sorry?

Q On Carranza again, in 1980, after the nuns were killed, the United States sent down a mission which included former Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs William Rogers, and when he came back he said he didn't -- he admitted he didn't accomplish much but he got Carranza transferred from his position in the Defense Ministry to another position.

In that he was acting on behalf of the State Department, can you tell us why that was important, and whether, in fact, he was transferred at the urging of the U.S. State Department?

A I guess I would refer you back to what Mr. Rogers said at the time.

Q Okay. And also, one other on Nicaragua and the agrement, for the record, it's also alleged here that General Perez worked as a "asset" for various organizations of the United States Government. Do you have any comment on that?

A No. On the same basis, I would not address the issue.

Q Alan, do you know anything about a delegation that's going to Taiwan containing five or six former ambassadors and some Administration people, either just shortly before, during or after the President's trip to China?

A I don't know anything about it.

Q Can you take the question?

A Well, not with that limited identification I don't think I could.

Q Well, wait a minute, Alan, because I understand the Administration is not wild about seeking publicity for this particular mission. But I'd like to find out who in the Administration is going and when this was planned.

A Well, I will look into it, but I don't promise to answer.

Q Another on Central America. The head of the Bishops' Conference in El Salvador, who is in Washington right now, said this morning that the Bishops' Conference in El Salvador opposed increased military aid from the United States to El Salvador. Do you have any comment?

A No. As I read the paper, he favored continuing military aid but had other things to say about it, too. I don't have a comment on it.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:35 p.m.)

Burke

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, March 23, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #52

FRIDAY, MARCH 23, 1984, 12:17 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. This may be a very brief briefing, but just one announcement to tell you that available in the Press Office is an announcement on the UNESCO Monitoring Panel that will monitor change in UNESCO in 1984 in connection with the U.S. decision to withdraw. You'll recall that it was announced at the time of the withdrawal announcement that there would be such a panel established. That's it for announcements.

I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q On UNESCO, do you have any more information on this apparent act of arson?

A I do not, Jim.

Q Do you have anything on the GAO request?

A Yes. I can't remember whether it's a fuller guidance or not that's in the Press Office. Basically, the answer is that the GAO did come to us requesting that we support their request, and we have been in touch with UNESCO on this. But let me ask you -- for the more formal, considered words -- to get the guidance in the Press Office, but the answer is essentially that we have said, "Please cooperate with GAO."

Q To UNESCO?

A To UNESCO.

Q Do you have anything, Alan, on an alleged terrorist threat to the Embassy in Jakarta?

A No. I've seen the wire. I think that we would probably not want to get into any specifics in any case, but as always, I can assure you that any threats are taken most seriously, and we take all the appropriate steps that we can.

Q Is there any time limit for the AWACS to stay where they are now in Egypt or -- ?

A No. I think when I originally responded to questions after they were deployed, I indicated that we did not have a termination date for them, and that remains the case.

Q Are there any developments relating to the situation in Sudan and the crisis with Libya?

A I don't have anything new to provide today, no.

Q Anything, Alan, on a NATO member, Greece, allowing Libyan military aircraft to land at airports in Greece?

A No. I think that's not a new issue, as I recall.

Q The last one was Syrian, I think.

A I don't have anything on it, don't know anything about it.

Q Anything on the shooting down of the Salvadoran plane carrying ballot boxes?

A Not specifically except that it is obvious that the guerrillas are seeking, contrary to statements by some of their political leaders, to disrupt the election, and that's self-evident.

Q How does the Department feel regarding the compromise that was apparently reached on Capitol Hill to give part of the money, or approve part of the money for El Salvador and vote sometime in the next couple of weeks?

A We're pleased that the agreement reflected bipartisanship and an agreement on the basic urgency of the requested funds. The $61.75 million will satisfy the most immediate military and medical requirements, but does not address other urgent needs. A reduction in the amount that can be provided now increases the need that Congress take up promptly the balance of our $178 million supplemental request, which is part of the Administration's legislative package on the recommendations of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America.

Following what we expect to be quick Senate consideration of the bill early next week, we look forward to speedy approval in conference.

We would note in the context of the Senate action, our pleasure in the Senate's confirmation of Ambassador Harry W. Shlaudeman as the President's Special Envoy to Central America.

Q Copy?

A Copy? Yes.

Q I didn't understand your reaction to George's statement: Does the United States have evidence that those who are responsible for mining the airfield at which the plane landed knew that it was carrying ballot boxes, and that's why they blew up the plane?

A No. What I'm saying, though, is that there are a lot of efforts going on to try to disrupt the election, including trying to prevent security measures being taken, for example, in outlying regions; and I can't tell you whether they knew in this specific instance. That really wasn't what I was trying to say to you.

Q Alan, it had originally been argued that that aid, that's now going to be approved sometime next week, presumably by the Senate, was needed in order to assure smoothly-run elections in El Salvador.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you think that incidents like this plane affair reflect the absence of that aid?

A I can't really draw a specific connection there, but the fact of the matter is that we're also talking about an election process, by the way, not just the election which comes up this Sunday; but presumably, there may well be a runoff and so on that goes well beyond that.

I can't make that linkage, but we have talked about the actual physical needs in terms of ammunition, medical supplies, and other equipment on the one hand, and also the psychological approach when it is uncertain what follow-on supplies are going to be coming in.

Q Alan, there were reports this morning that the members of the MNF in the Far East embassies received threats from a group -- I don't remember the name. Do you know anything about it?

A I think this is related to a question that Bill Scally raised before. I don't have any specific information on it, and I really couldn't respond on specific instances. Obviously, we are aware of threats; we take them seriously when we are aware of them. And we take what appropriate actions we can to deal with them, but I really can't get into specifics.

Q Alan, can I go back to Sudan for a second?

A Sure.

Q The Christian Science Monitor reported yesterday that there were eyewitnesses that did not identify the plane involved as a Soviet-built plane -- but, well, it was a Soviet-built plane, a MIG, of the kind flown by the Sudanese Air Force. And there does seem to be a growing impression, according to their reporter there, Colin Legum, that in fact this may have been a provocative act because the bombs hit a senior official of the Islamic Brotherhood.

Does the United States still have its own evidence and its own certainty that in fact it was a Libyan plane, or are they taking another look at this?

A Well, we have the evidence that we have talked about, and the reason to believe that we talked about, that this was indeed a Libyan plane, a TU-22. We're aware of those reports. There were other reports that had come out before the Monitor story yesterday, which said the same thing.

There are also eyewitness reports which identify the aircraft as a TU-22, so in terms of eyewitness accounts, the evidence is not clear. So I would have to refer you back, though, without being able to provide you with all the evidence that we have. But it is still our belief that, indeed, it was what we said it was.

Q Alan, is this evidence that you're talking about, is it independent evidence, or you got it from the Sudanese or the Egyptians?

A I think that it would include independent evidence.

Q Alan, it seems that the reaction of the so-called "moderate" Arab governments to what King Hussein said about the U.S. policy in the Middle East is a reaction favoring what King Hussein said. Do you have any comment on that?

A No, I don't think I could speak for, or address the comments of other governments. I think I will just leave that one alone.

Q Have you come to any conclusions about whether mycotoxins are being used by Iraq?

A No. The question continues to be looked at, Jim, but we have people who are seized with that issue and also related issues about chemical warfare. We are still looking at that. Don't have anything to report to you at this point.

-- MORE --

Q Alan, are you accepting the theory there that -- I mean, do you know that Arabs -- Arab governments or moderate Arab governments are favorably reviewing what King Hussein said?

A No, I'm not addressing what other governments are saying or not saying. I think I'm just going to stay away from the question of what other governments may think at this point. We've addressed ourselves to it, and I'm just going to have to leave it at that.

Q May I ask the same question more precisely?

A Uh-hum.

Q Mr. al-Baz, who is the advisor of President Mubarak --

A I saw --

Q -- is one of those who talk very favorably about King Hussein's statements relating to U.S. policy.

A I accept the fact that you're making a more specific question, but I'm going to leave you with the same answer.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the new Israeli elections?

A No, I don't.

Q Do you have anything on Paraguay, and closing of the main newspaper?

A Yes, I do. Our Embassy in Asuncion, Paraguay, has informed us that on March 22, the Government of Paraguay closed down the country's most widely read newspaper ABC Color for an indefinite time. ABC Color's closure closely followed the detention of its owner, Aldo Zuccolillo.

While ABC Color has experienced government harassment in the past, the paper's closure represents the most drastic action which the Government has taken against the paper. The Government's stated reason for closing ABC Color was that the paper systematically attempted to subvert public order through the publication of seditious opinions in its editorials and by acting as the mouthpiece for the unrecognized opposition parties.

The Government of the United States has been encouraged by a number of positive steps taken by the Government of Paraguay since December 1983. However, we deeply deplore the closure of ABC Color, which represents a serious violation of the principle of freedom of the press. The Government of the United States has repeatedly stated its commitment to the principle of freedom of the press, which is recognized by all democratic governments as one of the necessary conditions for the flourishing of democracy. We hope that ABC Color's owner will either be released or receive due process and that ABC Color can resume publication at the earliest possible moment. The Government of the United States will continue to follow this event with great interest and concern.

Q Copy, please?

A Yes.

Q There is a report in one of the U.S. weeklies claiming that there had been an agreement with Iraq to pay sort of (sic) $7 billion to finance Iraq in its position now -- in it's hardship, economic hardship in war.

A From whom?

Q From the United States.

A $7 billion from the United States?

Q Yes. Do you have any comment on the report?

A I don't know anything about it. That doesn't -- I don't know anything about any such agreement.

Q To take you back to the aid question a minute, there was a suggestion being made in the Senate that if they didn't agree to go ahead with some amount of aid and vote on it, the Administration might take another alternative route, one of the emergency methods. Has that decision been made on that yet; is there anything -- is that possible?

A Well, I think, as the Secretary said the other day, the focus of our attention at this point is on getting this emergency money passed; and also, as I indicated in my earlier response, getting the full supplemental passed at the earliest possible moment. I'm not going to speculate on what else might be done.

Q Alan, a follow-up on the Salvador question, if you -- if the Administration agrees to the $61.75 million, that means that you're no longer seeking $178 million as a supplemental this year; right?

A I don't know how that -- I don't know how the arithmetic is done on it, but the amount of money sought is the $178 which was put into the supplemental in the first place.

I would presume, based on what we've been saying, that you would take out -- that that's the total, and therefore how you put it together is another question. But the whole supplemental is what we are --

Q So you're still going to be seeking the rest of it, the balance later on?

A Sure. Sure. That's what I say, urging the speediest possible action on that. I can't tell you what the arithmetic is and how that would work out.

Q No. But you're no longer going to be seeking the $93 million; that is correct?

A As I said before, we're pleased at this bipartisan action and it meets certain urgent requirements, but it doesn't meet all of them. So we want speedy action on the other things as well.

Q Alan, does that amount insure being able to protect a run-off election since the Pentagon says that the Salvadoran military should run out of bullets by mid-May?

A I can't really answer that question for you at this point, Jim.

Q Do you know what it might be in terms of distribution of those funds?

A No, I don't.

Q Do you have any view on the reports that the Soviet Union has agreed to supply Iraq with a nuclear reactor to replace the one that was destroyed by Israel a year or two ago?

A Yes, I do have something on that. We understand that the contemplated project merely involves a very preliminary feasibility and siting study for the possible future construction of a nuclear power reactor by the Soviet Union for the generation of electricity in Iraq. It does not, at this time, include a contract for the actual supply of a reactor.

It is significant that both the Soviet Union and Iraq are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, under which they are committed to placing international safeguards inspections on any power reactors exported to Iraq, as well as all other nuclear facilities in that country.

These safeguards would be administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, and only after approval by the IAEA's Board of Governors, on which the United States has a permanent seat.

The Soviet Union also adheres to international nuclear supplier guidelines which require it to assure the peaceful purposes of its nuclear exports through application of safeguards and other measures.

Q Copy?

A Sure.

Q Could I follow up on that?

A Go ahead.

Q By saying that it merely involves the preliminary feasibility studies, feasibility in siting study, are you trying to suggest something about the U.S. attitude toward it; either it's more favorable or less favorable because it's only this early study? Why are you saying it?

A It's a fact. I would go on, I guess, to say that if the preliminary study were to demonstrate the project's feasibility, actual construction of a nuclear power reactor would require at least 8 to 10 years before fuel loading and operation.

So it's simply a statement of the facts, Don. It's --

Q What is the attitude toward it?

A I don't have a general attitude to give you, except that we take note, significant note of the fact that, as I said before, both parties are members of the -- or parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and are committed to putting safeguards on any such reactor.

Q Would the United States be willing to, or interested in trying to see if it could make a nuclear agreement on cooperation or peaceful uses of nuclear energy with Iraq?

A I don't have any indication that there is such discussion going on, Don, so I don't have a general statement to issue.

Q Did you talk to the Soviets about this?

A I'm not aware there's been any discussion with the Soviet Union, specifically, about this. No.

Q Did the Iraqis raise the issue with you when the Under Secretary of State of Iraq was here?

A I don't know the answer, and I don't think we would get into the question of our diplomatic discussions with them.

Q Did you have a chance previously, Alan, to comment on the Palestinians wanting to join the PNC? Is there anything that you can refer me to? Would you care to comment, or anything now?

A Not really in specific terms on that. I think we addressed this some time ago, in fact, when, I guess -- at the time of King Hussein's interview with the New York Times. To the extent that we're prepared to address it, let me refer you back to what was said at that particular point.

Q Alan, to follow up with this. Do you have anything for us about the meetings that are going to be held in Washington between Mr. Elias Freij, the Mayor of Bethlehem, and U.S. Administration officials?

A Nothing to say about it particularly. He is here. He has been, I guess, on a tour of other countries as well. He got to this country some days ago; is coming to Washington. He will be seeing the Secretary next week, but I don't have anything particular to say about it. This is not an unusual occurrence particularly.

Q What about Shawa?

Q Forgive me --

A I think he will also --

Q Both of them will meet the Secretary at the same time?

A Yes.

Q Carranza said yesterday the Salvadoran armed forces were initiating an investigation into the charges made by, in his view, Santivanez. Do you have any reaction to that?

A No.

Q Do you have any reaction to the story about Nicaragua going -- naming Astorga as their next ambassador?

A No, I think that came up yesterday, and I don't have anything on that. We would not get into the question of nominations or agrement, or anything of that sort.

Q When is Mr. Armacost planning to leave the Philippines, or has he already left there?

A He has not left. I don't have a precise date on that, Don. I don't know.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

Q (Press briefing concluded at 12:37 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Monday, March 26, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #53

MONDAY, MARCH 26, 1984, 12:14 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. Several announcements. One of which, hearing Bernie and John talk, reminds me that I want to straighten the record on one thing. On a couple of stories which have appeared -- I don't want to go back into the issue, but for the record, it was written that Ambassador Murphy did not know of the Stinger decision, that is the decision to withdraw the Stinger, until 12 hours after that decision was taken.

That is not the case, and the record should show that. The decision was taken -- I don't remember what day of the week it was, but whatever evening it was, I think Larry Speakes talked about it that evening. Various cables went out which were cleared off appropriately in the bureaus, including by Ambassador Murphy. So whatever the confusion on that was, let me just make that point.

Also to tell you that the Secretary will be testifying tomorrow at 10:00 a.m. before the House Appropriations Subcommittee. The subject will be the State Department budget. Due to his appearance, we will not be having our noon briefing tomorrow.*

He is also scheduled to appear before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee, again on the State Department Budget on Wednesday, at 10:00 a.m. We'll let you know during the course of the day tomorrow whether we will have a press briefing on Wednesday.

An announcement regarding the Secretary's meeting with the Canadian Foreign Minister or Secretary of State for External Affairs: The Honorable Allan J. MacEachen, Canada's Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs will visit Washington April 1-2 for meetings on bilateral and multilateral topics with the Secretary. In October 1982, shortly after both Ministers assumed their present responsibilities, they met in Ottawa and agreed to meet at least four times a year. This will be their seventh round of discussions.

*It was learned after the briefing that the Secretary's appearance will be in closed session and, therefore, there will be a noon briefing March 27.

On the death of John Emmerson, we were very saddened to learn of the passing on March 24 of John K. Emmerson, who served with distinction in the Foreign Service of our nation from 1936 to 1968. During his career in the Department of State, Mr. Emmerson served in posts on four continents, but it was his service and knowledge of Asia for which he will be remembered most. He was a noted scholar and diplomat in Japanese affairs, and his summer residence in Nikko, the "Akadamon," has been home to generations of "Japan hands." He will be missed by his many friends and colleagues in the Department, and we extend our deepest sympathy to his widow and family.

Finally, regarding Ambassador Shlaudeman's swearing-in ceremony today, there will be tight pool coverage upstairs in the Madison-Monroe Room. The Secretary will attend, and we anticipate that both he and Ambassador Shlaudeman will make remarks.

Immediately afterwards -- do you have a time on that? 2:00? Presumably, it will go on for 20 minutes to half an hour. But in any case, immediately afterwards, I'm told that NBC Radio will come to the briefing room here, and distribute the audio remarks.

That's it for announcements.

Be happy to take questions.

Q Anything on the elections, Alan?

A Which election was that, George? (Laughter)

Q Turkish election! (Laughter)

A Yes. First of all, I'd also note to you that I think that there will be some other related events over at the White House that Larry Speakes will talk about, so I refer you to that.

Our Embassy and the U.S. observers agree that there was an extremely large voter turnout at the polls yesterday. The Central Elections Council, the CCE, will not begin having any official vote tallies until sometime this afternoon.

At this point, we're in no position to provide any definitive figures on overall vote or division among the parties. The co-chairmen of the official U.S. observer delegation, House Majority Leader Wright and Senator Roth, held a press conference earlier this morning prior to their departure from San Salvador. Speaking on behalf of the delegation, they characterized the turnout as a vote for peace and democratic government, and a message to the armed guerrillas that the people did not agree with their violent program.

The co-chairmen indicated the likelihood of a runoff election and their hope that the Central Elections Commission would be able to simplify the voting procedures before such a runoff.

In that connection, it should be noted that all of the eight participating political parties in the election had agreed upon the use of an electoral registry and admittedly highly sophisticated procedure with the clear effort to minimize to the greatest extent any presence of fraud or accusations of fraud.

The voters should also be more familiar with the new procedures for the next round. In brief, it appears to us that the voters of El Salvador have once again placed their clear and unmistakable faith in the electoral process and democracy.

Q Copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q Alan, anything at all in the meeting between Secretary Shultz and Mayor Freij of Bethlehem?

A Don't have anything on it. I understand the Mayor had something to say when he came downstairs, but I don't have a readout to give you.

Q At this point, I understand that Mr. McPherson will be seeing the Mayors -- one or two of them -- this afternoon at 1:30. What's the purpose of the meeting with Mr. McPherson?

A I'm afraid I'd have to refer you to AID. I don't know specifically what is on the agenda for that.

Q Alan, do you have a comment on the shooting incident in Strasbourg this morning or last night?

A Yes, I have some information on that. At this point we know that Robert Homme is in -- that's H-o-mm-e -- is in a Strasbourg hospital in stable condition and apparently conscious and talking. We have every indication that he will fully recover from his injuries.

The Lebanese Revolutionary Army Faction has claimed responsibility for the shooting. We have no further information other than that. This group has claimed responsibility for a number of attacks against American and Israeli personnel in France between 1981 and 1982, including the assassination of Defense Attache Colonel Ray, and the attempted assassinations of Commercial Counselor Grant in July 1981* and DCM Christian Chapman in November 1981. The French authorities are investigating this claim and other leads.

Q Copy of that?

Q (Inaudible)

A He is the Counselor General in Strasbourg.

Copy? Yes, sure.

Q Had he been in the Middle East for some time?

A I don't know what -- where he has served.

Q Do you know anything about this Lebanese Revolutionary Army Faction?

A Other than what I just gave you, no.

Q Alan, do you have anything to comment on the story this morning about the accusations of Defense Minister of Israel, Moshe Arens, against Mr. Weinberger, that he needs psychoanalysis, or something like that?

A No. I think Mr. Arens had some further comment about that story, but I don't have anything on it.

Q I want to follow. Is the United States still supporting Security Council Resolution 242 with all its language, or is there any change in the position of the United States toward this resolution that was supported originally by the United States?

A No change.

Q No change?

*Subsequently corrected to read July 1982.

Q Can you tell us anything of what the State Department, or the Government knows about what took place, if anything, in the Persian Gulf over the weekend or in the last few days? As you know, Iraq has claimed that they have sunk some tankers near Kharg Island. Is this believed to be true by American officials, or what do we think is going on there?

A Don, I really can't confirm that. I've also seen that the Government of Iran has denied that any such activity took place. I just don't have any information to share with you on confirming or denying it.

Q I gather there's an Israeli press report saying that the U.S. Government is considering moving -- not moving -- considering setting up a liaison office in Jerusalem as a kind of compromise on this Jerusalem bill.

A It's just not true. There is no such plan under consideration; no change in the U.S. position on Jerusalem.

Q On that issue, Alan, the White House has confirmed that they've been in touch with the three former Presidents -- Nixon, Carter and Ford. Do you know to what -- on this Jerusalem issue -- to what aim or purpose would --

A You'd have to ask the White House.

Q Is it the Secretary's desire that the three former Presidents support the President's position --

A I think we'll let the White House speak to the issue. The Administration's position on the issue is quite clear.

--MORE--

Q On the question of Shultz with Mr. Freij, what was the purpose of his talk with the Secretary in light of King Hussein's objections or rule-out of entering the peace talks?

A I don't have any readout to give you or an agenda to give you, but I would not view that conversation as connected with -- in its origins with King Hussein's statements.

Clearly, they're interested in events on the West Bank and so on, but I can't speak to actually what went on in the conversation. As I say, Mayor Freij, I understand, had some comments when he came down.

Q Any further information on Ambassador Rumsfeld's activities?

A Yes. He and Ambassador Silberman are in Baghdad. Earlier today they were in Kuwait. Over the weekend they were in the Sudan, North Yemen, Qatar, and Bahrain.

Q Can you tell if he discussed the Jerusalem problem with the Israelis?

A Not going to go into what he may have discussed, sorry.

Q Would you comment at all on the nature of his mission in the Persian Gulf?

A No. Ralph, as you know, I don't get into what he does and so on. I'm going to stick with that.

Q You began the briefing denying that Mr. Murphy did not know about the decision in the 12 hours and, you know, you denied the story.

A Yes.

Q It was in the same story the impression that there was sort of an agreement between Mr. Eagleburger and Mr. Thomas Dyne of AIPAC about "You drop this, we'll drop that" sort of accommodation about the Jerusalem bill.

A Yes. As I said also in that statement, I didn't intend to get back into the other parts of that story. I addressed that all last week, and I refer you back to what I said at that point.

Q It's in this story.

A I'm sorry, but it is in the transcript to the extent we're going to talk about it.

Q Do you have anything else to say about the numerous reports of snafus in the Salvadoran election other than it was highly sophisticated and you hope it will be simplified next time?

A No. I think that really is the sum and substance of it -- that it was a complicated procedure and that there is a feeling in El Salvador, I think, that the election commission should try to simplify that procedure.

But, in any case, we're not aware of any charge of fraud or impropriety on any major scale, so --

Q Would you have wished that it was a little smoother than it seemed to have been, at least? It seems that lots of places didn't have ballots or boxes, that didn't know where to send people. And this is not just isolated incidents, but it seems rural and citywide.

A Yes, except our impression is that fewer voters were actually denied a vote due to procedural difficulties than were suggested by reports early in the day. And we do expect that the percentage will represent a lower percentage than the March '82 vote.

But, nonetheless, again, we feel that the very heavy turnout is a fairly significant endorsement of democracy and the electoral process.

Q Do you have anything on --

Q Alan, are you aware of any charge of fraud on a major scale?

A I don't know of any charges. I can't tell you that there is no place that there isn't, that somebody hasn't raised. I don't know of any personally. And that I guess you'd have to look to the Salvadorans to address; but certainly there is. The purpose of avoiding any perception of fraud or any reality of fraud, as far as we can tell, seems to have been achieved, even if it had these problems associated with it.

Q Do you have anything on the guerrilla activities surrounding the election?

A Simply that, obviously, the guerrillas did attempt to do some things to disrupt the election, including seizing identity cards, including attacking the power system, including taking steps -- in some cases, at least -- to prevent people from going to the voting booths, so that there were some severe power disruptions and so on.

But, in fact, the preliminary reports indicate that the guerrilla actions prevented citizens from voting in perhaps 44 municipalities, which were predominantly small towns representing a potential electorate of about 35,000 voters -- that is less than two percent.

Q Do you have anything on the walkout of the computer technicians, and --

A No.

Q -- have they asked for help from the United States in tallying the vote now?

A I don't know the answer to that, Jim. I saw the story on the computer technician. It looked to me a little differently described from the way you just described it.

Q Could you comment on how early elections in Israel is going to affect U.S. efforts to reach a peace in the Middle East?

A No, I don't have any comment on it.

Q It is the fifth anniversary of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. Do you have anything to rattle off?

A I don't; I don't have anything.

Q That was my question.

A O.K.

Jim?

Q Do you know anything about the state of emergency in Chile for 90 days and Lavandero trying to solve it?

A Why don't I try and get you something afterwards? I think we can probably produce something -- there's something in preparation.

Q Alan, do you have anything on a newspaper report that General Scowcroft was unable to deliver a letter from President Reagan to senior --

A No.

Q -- Soviet leaders?

A No.

Q Let me ask you one other question. On the exchange of correspondence that did take place between the President and the Soviet leadership, has there been any constructive response, as far you know, from the Soviets at any level?

A I don't think I intend to characterize Presidential correspondence.

Q Well, what about -- in general, without reference to the question?

A I don't have any new words to offer you on that, John. Our position is we're ready and anxious to have a constructive dialogue, but I will leave it at that.

Jim?

Q Do you have anything on an attempted coup in Ghana, or the situation there now?

A No.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the March 18 endorsement by Izvestia of Kissinger's campaign to be named Secretary of State? (Laughter.)

A I wasn't aware they had done that.

Q Can you look into it?

A No. I don't think I can comment on --

Q You have commented on Izvestia's suggestions regarding U.S. foreign policy in the past.

A I think I'll leave that alone.

Q Can I try again on Camp David? Are we pleased with the way things have gone over the past five years or disappointed?

A I don't have any words to offer you today on this.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Whereupon, at 12:27 p.m., the briefing was concluded.)

Becker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, March 27, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #54

TUESDAY, MARCH 27, 1984, 12:09 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I've got a couple of announcements (and) a statement.

Yesterday, as I indicated, we wouldn't be here today. I don't know whether we're going to be here tomorrow. (Laughter) The testimony tomorrow apparently is open. The Secretary is scheduled to appear before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on the State Department budget -- the State/Commerce/Justice Subcommittee -- at 10:00 a.m. Check with the Press Office later this afternoon, if you will, and we will try to have a decision on that.

Q If he does appear, you don't?

A That's unclear. He is going to appear, Marvin. It's just a question of judgment, basically, coming back off the Hill as to whether, in the course of discussing the budget, they will be able to get to some of the kinds of questions you might be interested in and whether the logistics will work out even if that isn't the case. So that's the kind of judgment.

Also, available -- or not also -- but available in the Press Office are copies of the prepared statement of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Langhorne A. Motley before the House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations. The subject is the Administration's legislative package on the recommendations of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America.

A statement regarding the death of the Guinean President:

The United States regrets the untimely death of President Sekou Toure of the Republic of Guinea in Cleveland, March 26. Sekou Toure was an internationally respected statesman whose efforts on behalf of peaceful settlement of disputes had earned for him and his country an enviable reputation for peacemaking. He exercised a unifying role within the Organization of African Unity and African affairs generally. The United States valued his wise and prudent counsel. We expect to continue the close and cooperative relations between our two countries.

Q Can we have a copy of that, please?

A Copy. That's it for announcements. Be happy to take questions.

Q On that -- I can check elsewhere -- but do you recall the last time he was in the United States for a visit with the President or the Secretary?

A I don't know when he was last in the United States, but the last time he --

Q Recently.

A Okay. Well, the last time he saw the President was when he was here in 1982, in the summer. He came here on a private visit. That was in late June and early July, and he met with the President at the White House on that occasion.

Q Alan, do you have any late word from El Salvador on what the votes appear to be?

A I don't really have a -- I don't have anything on that. As you know, the voting procedures were very complex, designed to be resistant to fraud, and so the reporting is also a complex procedure. Unlike March '82, for example, no official vote tallies are being transmitted to the Central Elections Commission by telegram. After the polls closed on Sunday the poll watchers actually broke open the ballot boxes, counted the votes, filled out and signed official tallies, turned ballots and documentation over to the electoral commission in each municipality; and this is also being followed at the departmental or provincial level. And the CCE, or the Central Elections Commission, in San Salvador won't begin announcing official results until all of the tabulation and documentation in a department is complete. So it takes time, but, as I say, the purpose is to avoid fraud. So I don't have anything at this point.

Q The Christian Democrats are claiming something like 45 percent of the vote. Does that sound at all accurate to you?

A I really think I will leave aside, or set aside, any question about numbers. I don't -- I've seen various figures. I think Ambassador Pickering has talked about various figures based on his conversations with people, and I don't quarrel with any of that. But we just don't have it, and I don't think I should be talking from here about results which have not been announced by the Salvadorans.

Q It does appear that a runoff will be necessary?

A I would say at this time it appears that way. Sure.

Q Yesterday a commission named by the United Nations reported that chemical weapons have been used in the Persian Gulf war.

A Uh-huh.

Q And all the indications seemed to be that the weapons were used by Iraq. Do you have any response to this or any statement on it?

A We haven't had an opportunity to review the results in detail, but it appears that their findings are consistent with our own evidence which indicates Iraq has used lethal chemical weapons.

While we have condemned Iraq's resort to chemical weapons, we also call on the Government of Iran to accept the good offices offered by a number of countries and international organizations to put an end to the bloodshed.

Q Does it appear that -- could I follow up on that?

A Sure.

Q Does it appear that Iraq is continuing to use these chemical weapons even after the United States called upon them to stop?

A Don, we have recently received reports regarding use since March 5, which was when we issued our statement, but we have so far been unable to confirm those reports. However, we are continuing to watch the situation closely.

Q Has the United States been back in touch with Iraq about the matter?

A I think that I will not get into the question of details over diplomatic dialogue, but certainly our concerns about this matter are not unknown to the Government of Iraq.

Q Alan, following that up, you said "recently." Is that after Mr. Kittani concluded his meetings here?

A I'm not --

Q Or did you receive the report while he was here?

A I'm not going to try to be more specific than to say since we issued our statement on March 5.

Q You recently received reports?

A That is correct -- I said that -- and talking about since March 5. But I think we also -- there was another time back in there, and I can't remember when, when we, I think, indicated we had not received any reports. So if you take the two and put them together, I guess you can say it was in that period. I don't have that date with me.

Q Alan, what types of reports? Can you characterize them?

A No. I cannot.

Q How about the reports of mycotoxins?

A Obviously we've seen those reports. We're continuing to check out the allegations, but we have no information to offer at this point.

Q Alan, I remember that when it came out to light that the Soviets were using chemical warfare in Afghanistan, you went out of your way to bring out to people here at the State Department the gas mask that was found with some traces there. Why aren't you making such a big deal of the use this time?

A I think that your characterization or the implicit accusation that we're trying to hide it is totally unfounded. The fact is we volunteered a statement on this subject on March 5, and I refer you back to it.

Q Alan, what is the connection between Iran's refusal -- why did you link Iran's refusal to negotiate an end to the war with the question about the possible use of chemical weapons?

A Because there is --

Q What is the connection in your -- in the State Department's mind?

A The basic connection is that the war is continuing, and the need to bring the use of all weapons, including any chemical weapons use that might be still ongoing, to an end; and that the Government of Iraq had indicated -- and I'd refer you back to some statements we made before -- willingness to look to that, but the Government of Iran has not.

Q Alan, to go back to my question, I wasn't accusing anything. I'm just trying to find out why there's a different stance taken. Is there a different policy in following use of violations of chemical warfare, or is it just -- what's the policy?

A I refer you to our statement. I don't accept the basic premise of your approach to this.

Q Alan, do you have anything new to offer on the issue of Jerusalem? Any reaction to President Carter's remarks?

A No. Nothing on that.

Q Alan --

Q On that point, Alan, did Prince Bandar come in here late yesterday?

A Not that I'm aware of, but that doesn't mean it didn't happen.

Q Well, could you check on whether in fact he had a meeting with either the Secretary or some other senior official?

A I can check on it. I don't know that I can provide an answer to it.

Q Because the Press Office was saying --

A I'd be happy to check on it.

Q -- yesterday late in the day.

A That?

Q That he had come in to see the Secretary.

A Well, then -- I'm not personally aware of it, but I wasn't here late in the day, so why do you question that?

Q Well, I would like to know whether he came in, first. I'd like to know what he delivered.

A Well, that you won't get; but in terms of whether he came in, if you've gotten an answer from the Press Office, I don't know why the question is still there.

-- MORE --

Q I suppose the answer is that he came in -- if he came in -- he came in by a way other than the C Street entrance, and since early in this Administration, when there has been an effort that everybody come in -- all Ambassadors are treated the same, go in the front door, blah, blah, blah -- if he came in, why did he come in through some other entrance?

A Well, I don't know that any of that is factual, but let me check it out. Once you've raised these questions, Marvin, let me check it out.

Q Okay.

Q Alan, are you prepared to react in any way to Carter's interview with Ted Kopel last night, including his criticism of the Administration, saying that except for one speech on September 1, 1982, the Administration has not been aggressively pursuing, you know, peace or a formula, you know -- a solution?

A I think that the various efforts that have been made and the various statements made by the President, by the Secretary and by others answer that more effectively than I could, trying to respond off the cuff here.

Q Alan, back in connection with Iraq again, a Kuwaiti court today sentenced the people who it believes were responsible in the American Embassy bombing in Kuwait, and it turned out that, at least according to the court, a large number of those who were convicted are Iraqis. Does the U.S. have any reaction to that, in light of the Secretary's statements on state-supported terrorism?

A Well, I think you're making an assumption there which I would guess I would have to refer you to the Government of Kuwait to address, and that is whether they have charged the Government of Iraq with involvement in that. I'm not aware that that charge has been made. But I guess I'd have to refer you to the Kuwaitis on that.

Q Could I follow that and ask, then, whether you have any comment on it in light of the Administration's decision to remove Iraq from the terrorist list?

A No. I don't have anything new on that.

Q Do you have anything on the statements by the Argentine Finance Minister about going beyond the March 31 deadline?

A I don't really. I've got some guidance which I'm not going to use, frankly, because Secretary Regan addressed this this morning, and I think that he certainly speaks authoritatively for the Administration, much more than I could on this kind of question, so I refer you --

Q (Inaudible)

A I don't know specifically the context, but I think the Treasury Department would be happy to provide you his words.

Q On that subject, do you know what our -- I'm not asking you to react; I'm asking you if you know what Argentina, in fact, is doing?

A I don't think it is up to us specifically to talk about, you know, what Argentina is doing at this stage, unless we have --

Q Specifically I said I'm not asking you that. I was asking, do you know?

A Oh, I think we have -- well, I don't know if we know what final decisions may have been taken. I can't answer the question in detail. I don't know the answer to that. Certainly, we're aware of the various discussions which are going on, and so on. And we have somebody down there. I think that Secretary Regan indicated this morning, for example, that Mr. McNamara is down in Argentina at this particular point. But let me refer you to what he said this morning because I think it may address some of the questions you have.

Q Do you have anything there on Secretary Haig's memoirs?

A No.

Q Clearance procedures?

A No.

Q Could you take a couple of questions on that?

A Well, what are your questions?

Q O.K. Could you tell us when he submitted his memoirs for clearance? Who in the State Department cleared it? What right does he have, as a private citizen, to have top secret information declassified and appear in his memoirs when no other person -- for example, you, Gwertzman, or any of these guys around here -- could?

Could you try those three, to begin with?

A I will try them, Marvin. I can't promise what the results will be.

Q Is Secretary Shultz seeing the Arab Ambassadors, as was tentatively thought he might, today?

A I believe he is.

Q Five o'clock?

A I think that's correct.

Q What is it on? Jerusalem?

A Well, it's their meeting. They requested it. I guess I would leave it to them to talk about what they wanted to --

Q Are these the Arab Ambassadors, as distinct from the Islamic group?

A No, I think that -- well, let me get a characterization of which group it is.

Q The Islamic group.

A I think it is the Islamic group.

Q This is the one under the Moroccan Ambassador's leadership?

A I believe that's correct, Bernie, but why don't we check and see? I think it is. It's a group of five Ambassadors who are coming in. Let me see if I can get something more precise on that.

Q Is it the same group that was up on the Hill last week?

A That I don't know, Marvin.

Q I asked about it.

A The ones that were on the Hill?

Q Yeah.

A Okay. I don't know who was on the Hill. I don't think I --

Q Oh, we had a big discussion about it.

A Well, I don't think I was addressing it in terms of who was on the Hill.

Q Who were the five?

Q Anything new on the timetable of the AWACS sent to Sudan? Any timetable for their coming out?

A No, don't have anything on that.

Q Do you have anything on two events in Honduras, one the alleged abduction of a union leader by police earlier this month, named Vindel? And the second question is on the bombings yesterday in San Pedro Sula?

A No. Don't have anything on either of those.

Q Anything more on the shooting of the U.S. Consul General in Strasbourg?

A Just to note that he is now home and recuperating well, we understand, physically active, and he hopes to be returning to his duties very soon.

Q Was he able to offer any clues as to who --

A That I don't know. Obviously the matter remains under investigation; and I think probably we would leave that kind of question unaddressed at this point.

Q How about Mr. Buckley? Any word on William Buckley?

A Don't have anything new to offer on that.

Q Alan, do you have anything at all on the situation in Afghanistan --

A No.

Q -- particularly reports about massive rebel attacks on gasoline convoys which has now caused a severe shortage of gasoline in Kabul and --

A No, I don't. I've seen the reports, but I don't have any comment on them.

O.K.?

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:24 P.M.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Thursday, March 29, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #55

THURSDAY, MARCH 29, 1984, 12:35 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. Several announcements:

Available in the Press Office is the prepared text of a speech given today by Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology William Schneider, Jr., before the Federal Bar Association in Newton, Massachusetts. The topic of the address is "Technology Transfer in the International Marketplace." He must have made a quick trip, since I saw him this morning.

Also available in the Press Office is the prepared statement by Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Gregory J. Newell before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations for Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies. The subject of his testimony was "Contributions to International Organizations."

Additionally, available in the Press Office is the prepared statement by Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Allen Wallis, before the House Committee on Europe and the Middle East. His testimony was on "East-West Economic Issues."

As I think you probably already know, there will be an ON-THE-RECORD briefing by Ambassador to El Salvador Thomas R. Pickering today here in the briefing room at 3:00 p.m. The subject will be El Salvador. State Department and White House press with valid press passes will be admitted to the briefing.

Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights Elliott Abrams will debate Senator Christopher Dodd of Connecticut in New York tomorrow on the subject of "The Media and Human Rights." (Laughter) The debate --

Q (Inaudible)

A Tune in. The debate is being sponsored by the Center for Communications. Copies of Assistant Secretary Abrams' remarks will be available in the Press Office today on an embargoed basis. Also, I understand that the speech will be open for coverage, to be held at the Great Hall of the Cooper Union, Cooper Square, at 7th and Third Avenue, New York City. The contact is Catherine Gay at Area Code 212 210-8878.

Finally, on the "what's available" side, available in the Press Office is the prepared text of remarks by the Secretary at the luncheon for Chief Executive Officers of U.S. firms in South Africa. The remarks are embargoed until 1:45.

And finally, a statement on the recent wave of terrorist attacks:

In the last three days, there have been terrorist attacks against an American diplomat in France, a British diplomat in Greece, and a French diplomat in Lebanon, as well as a series of attacks aimed at Turkish personnel in Iran. We deeply regret the injuries sustained by the victims of these attacks and the death of British diplomat Kenneth Whittey. Terrorists pretend to justify the killing and maiming of innocent human beings in the name of political and religious beliefs. This can never be accepted by civilized people anywhere in the world. The United States Government deplores terrorism in all its forms, in the name of whatever cause it may be committed, and we continue to call upon all governments throughout the world to join us in combatting this evil.

That is it for announcements. I will be happy to take questions.

Q A copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q Can you tell us what, if anything, the U.S. Government, and specifically the Ex-Im Bank, is doing about the Argentine inability to pay interest?

A I don't have a great deal to give you except I can talk a little bit about the story that appeared this morning which suggested that there was a cut-off by the Ex-Im. There has been no decision by the Ex-Im Bank Board to cut off Argentina, although it is true that one small project was turned down recently. There are a number of arrearages on EX-Im Bank loans which are outstanding, as there are to other private and governmental financial institutions. This is not a new problem, since many of these arrearages were inherited by the Alfonsin administration from the previous government.

Ex-Im practice has been to defer transactions until corrective measures are taken. We expect the arrearages will be cleared up when Argentina reaches agreement with the IMF and the commercial banks on an economic program and additional credits. These discussions are continuing, and we're hopeful that they will be successfully concluded in the near future.

By the way, there was one point in the article in The Washington Post on this this morning. I am told that Ambassador Ortiz did not speak with President Reagan on the phone last night.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Yeah.

Q You say no decision has been made to withhold further credit; but to put it the other way, there will be no new loans granted to Argentina until the situation is cleared up, right?

A I think, basically, you should go to Ex-Im to pursue this; but as I say, Ex-Im practice has been to defer transactions until corrective measures are taken. But there has only been one small project that was recently turned down.

Q Alan, have they requested a bridge loan? And is the United States willing to provide a bridge loan?

A I think I'm going to cut off any further comment on this. Obviously there are discussions going on, and I don't think that further comment from here is going to be a positive contribution to that, so I'm going to leave that alone.

Q New subject?

A New subject.

Q Can I just try this one, though?

A No. I've said everything I have to say on the subject.

Q Everything more you're going to say is negative, huh.

Q On your statement, Alan, on these terrorist attacks, does the U.S. believe that these attacks in Strasbourg, Athens, and Beirut are linked in any way or perpetrated by the same organization or coordinated in any sense?

A Well, we don't know of any specific link among these incidents in the sense of pre-arranged coordination. At the same time, terrorists do communicate with each other, and they tend to use each others' ideas, and that pattern makes it vitally important that the perpetrators of these acts be brought to justice. But again, we do not know of any specific link in that sense.

Q Do you trace this back at all to the attack, not to the -- to the menace or the threat that surfaced, I think it was last week, in Indonesia when a terrorist organization threatened officials of the Multinational Force?

A I think you will recall, Bill, that we have not commented on those reports, and I'm not going to try to do that at this time.

Q How about any link to the assassination -- was it last month? -- of the head of the Sinai Observer Force?

A I can't draw links among any of these specifically. I can only just give you what I have on that.

Bernie.

Q Alan, the American who was hurt in Strasbourg --

A Uh-huh.

Q Are you saying that is an act of terrorism, because there had been some reports that it might have been as a result of a private dispute?

A Yes. That is not true. There were reports, and those reports are untrue.

Q New subject?

A Yes.

Q Alan, on the terrorism thing, just a sec --

A Okay, go ahead.

Q You mention in the last statement, I think, that you were working or hoping to work with other countries; right? In your last statement?

A Uh-huh.

Q That is something that you have been saying, you generically have been saying there, for a long time -- for years, in fact -- with less than stunning results. What's happening? What are you doing? How are you trying to pull the Europeans together, for example, on this question?

A Marvin, I don't have specifics to offer you on that. The effort continues. It is simply a fact that sometimes talking about what we're doing makes what we're trying to do more difficult, and I think I'm going to have to beg off of that.

Q Okay. Could you even say that the kind of cooordination that Haig talked about three years ago you have, at least, begun to achieve?

A Well, I can't recall frankly what specifically he was talking about. The effort continues, and that's really all I can say at this particular point.

Q On this same subject, Secretary Shultz yesterday testified regarding forming some long-range study commission on terrorism and improving U.S. embassies and U.S. facilities in the Persian Gulf, evidently because of terrorism.

A Uh-huh.

Q Could you give us any further details of what it is he has in mind, or the Department has in mind?

A I can give you a little bit on that. The advisory panel, which the Secretary referred to, it is being formed at this point, and the Department is in the process of panel membership selection. When the selection is completed, the names will be released.

The advisory panel will be asked to develop the best possible security strategy designed to meet present and future threats against our missions and their personnel abroad. The Secretary has established May 1, 1984, for initiation of the panel's work, and he will expect to receive their report by December.

Q How about the (inaudible)? Do you have anything on that. He also announced, sort of in the same paragraph?

A About improved facilities?

Q Yes.

A Based on the recent history of terrorist attacks against our missions and personnel in the Persian Gulf, the Department has and will continue to increase security measures for their protection.

New security measures are being examined and improvements have already been made at our installations. Additionally, we're exploring all other means, including greater protection by the host governments, of increasing the safety of our people.

Congress has made funds available for these efforts and the Department considers this matter to be one of its highest priorities. For security reasons we will not reveal the specifics of the measures we have or will take in the Persian Gulf region.

Q Is it anticipated that the Department is going to ask for further money in this Fiscal Year? Are you going to ask for a supplemental for this?

A I can't answer that. As I say, Congress has made funds available for these efforts. So I would have to say at this point that that would have to be convered by that statement. Whether in the future there would be some further need, I can't project at this time.

Q Alan, the Secretary said yesterday that the State Department is working with the OMB -- his words -- to develop a budget amendment on that subject. Do you have anything -- and the Department has said before that it will have a package of anti-terrorism measures, and so on. Do you have anything yet to offer on that score?

A Let me check on the budget amendment question, because that seems to be somewhat different from these words, and see if there's anything, and if there is we'll try and get back to you on that.

On the package, it is still --

Q Pending.

A -- pending.

Q Do you have anything --

A Let me take John's question.

Q On Central America, are American planes flying reconnaissance, intelligence and/or communications missions in aid of the El Salvadoran forces' campaign against the guerrillas?

A After all of that wait, I'm afraid I'm going to have to refer you to the Pentagon, and I don't think they normally talk about reconnaissance flights, etc., but I will refer you to them, John.

Q On the subject of terrorism, do you have any comment on what President Assad of Syria said concerning the accusation of Syria being responsible for what happened of terrorist actions inside Lebanon? He said that he cannot be accused of this as much as the U.S. cannot be accused of terrorist actions inside the U.S.

A I think we have addressed before the question of responsibility for various attacks which took place, have taken place, in Lebanon, and I don't have anything new. But we have talked about responsibility at a minimum by those whose terrority is used for a terrorist going through and so on and so forth. But I refer you back, basically, to what we've said before.

Q Any other comment on his statements, please, that you have?

A I don't have any comment on it.

Q His interview with Time magazine.

A I don't have anything on that.

Q On Central America --

Q Same subject. You mentioned Persian Gulf. But what about the other part of the Middle East? Is there any planning for them?

A I think there is a major program of security enhancement which is a world-wide program. And certainly that would include the Middle East and other areas, too.

Obviously, if you look at the pattern of terrorism over the last -- not only the last several days but before that, it is not only something that takes place in the Middle East or the Gulf region. So there is a need to pay attention to that issue around the world.

Q Why focusing, Alan, on the Persian Gulf? Would you steer us away from deducing that you are talking about the threat or the menace of Iranian-inspired terrorism?

A I think I will simply stick with what I said, which was to refer to the recent history of terrorist attacks against missions and personnel in the Persian Gulf as the reason for that.

Ralph?

Q Alan, could we get back to Central America again for just a second? I'd like to follow up a little more on John's questions.

Do you have any comment on the allegation that the -- that American troops are now authorized to carry more sophisticated sidearms, and on the allegation that the U.S. is no longer adhering to its self-imposed 55-person limit in El Salvador?

A First of all, a lot of these questions, presumably, could be addressed if you want to put them to Ambassador Pickering. I'm sure he can give you a complete explanation. The fact is that we have explained the self-imposed 55-man limit on trainers continues, and we've talked about that, I think, at some length before, and refer you back to what we've said about that.

Q But it does continue? The limit on trainers at 55 continues?

A We've not exceeded that number of trainers. There are other personnel there who are doing other things, and as I say there is -- that's been addressed before and there is guidance which goes back some time explaining precisely what the situation is in that regard. Nobody is hiding anything.

In terms of the kind of weapon -- personal weapon that they carry, I think that also is explained in previously existing guidance, and I think it also has been previously addressed. I don't happen to have it with me, but if you want to get it from somebody live today, I suggest you put the question at 3:00.

Q Can I follow that, please? Senator Sasser made a statement on the Hill a short while before this briefing, saying that the Defense Department had acknowledged that three times recently -- twice in November and once in March in the San Miguel area of El Salvador -- American forces came under hostile fire. Doesn't that suggest that American forces in El Salvador have become part of the war, part of the civil war, rather than trainers or advisors?

A I don't know what the Senator said, and I don't know what the facts are. But based on what you just said to me, I don't think one could draw that kind of a sweeping conclusion. One has never ruled out, as one never ruled out the presence of American personnel anywhere where there's an occasional incident that they may be caught in, that that constitutes -- you can't rule that out. On the other hand, that hardly constitutes involvement in combat in the sense that we're usually talking about.

Q Sasser --

Q Alan, can I follow on that?

A I'll come back to you in a second.

Q Following the same thing, Sasser also charges, as I understand it, that the Administration had failed to notify Congress of these incidents and that under the Arms Export Control Act that needed to be done. Is that your understanding of the Arms Export Control Act, in general?

A I don't personally know, and I guess we can check on that. But I don't know what the requirement is, and I don't know if it was done in this case.

Jim?

Q With respect to the question that John raised a minute ago and your answer here, my understanding is that U.S. personnel in El Salvador -- military personnel -- have been told that they can't purposefully get into areas where combat may take place. But we now have a report that in fact pilots, American pilots in American airplanes, may be flying directly over where combat takes place. Now, I know they're not advisors, but I'd like you to try to distinguish the two situations. And, also, I wonder if you could articulate why it is the State Department, which is in charge of policy in the area, can't comment on the question of whether U.S. personnel are flying aircraft?

A We don't comment on operational -- military operational questions, and I would refer you to the Pentagon. I think that is going to have to stand as the answer to your question.

Q You mean, so anytime that an American military personnel may be involved with anything having to do with combat, you automatically wouldn't comment because it's an operational duty and we have to go to the Pentagon.

A No, I think I just did comment in answer to Ralph's question, and I said I would check on the facts regarding the other one. But in terms of operations, which is different from the general question of reconnaissance, for example, that's not a question I'm about to address from this podium.

Q Can you give us a definition, though, Alan? Is reconnaissance an advisory role?

A Is it an advisory role?

Q That's right.

A I'm not aware that it would be considered such, but why don't you ask the Pentagon. They're the ones who maintain such definitions.

Q Also on Central America --

A No, let's go back --

Q Just what you have on the bees.

A On the bees. (Laughter) I have a lot on the bees.

Q Can I have a copy, please.

A Why don't you wait until you see what it is?

Again, we're dealing with the question of two scientists saying that yellow rain is caused by bee excrement, or is in fact bee excrement.

This particular theory to explain chemical and toxin warfare attacks in Afghanistan, Laos and Kampuchea was first advanced in May of last year by the same scientists. We stated at that time that such a theory ignores and is inconsistent with the large body of scientific as well as other factual evidence which has been presented by the United States, by other nations and by other private researchers, much of which has been on the public record for several years.

The record on this issue is clear. The United States has subjected both its evidence and its conclusions to extensive review and analysis by independent authorities in the field as well as government experts, and our conclusions stand.

It is not an unknown fact that bees do defecate, causing yellow spots, sometimes in groups, even in the United States. This observation, however, simply does not explain why people have been made sick and have died after chemical attacks only in areas of Afghanistan, Laos and Kampuchea where combat has taken place.

While we have encouraged people and nations to examine the evidence and investigate the situation on their own, we also believe that in drawing their conclusions there is a need to take full account of the vast pre-existing body of information and data. This is the way that problems and issues, including those with aspects involving science, are normally addressed.

Continued unsupported speculation on a possible natural explanation of the origin of casualties and deaths from the prohibited use of chemical weapons only serves to divert serious attention from the real-cause issues on chemical warfare. It does nothing to stop the on-going human suffering caused by the prohibited use of such weaponry. In this regard, our attention should first be focused on stopping the use of these weapons and then on attaining a comprehensive and verifiable chemical weapons ban.

Q Copy of that, Alan, please?

A Yes.

Q Alan, the same charge has been made about a lot of your evidence, that it -- you say there is a large, large body. Even though I haven't followed this this closely, each time you have presented something there have been complaints made that the evidence put forward is sketchy, that it's subject to differing interpretations, and that it ignores other evidence. Is this --

A Well, I would refer you --

Q I mean, you know --

A John, I'd refer you to several reports that have been previously issued in the United States as well as statements by independent researchers and nations, including Canada, France, and Thailand, and the report of the investigation conducted by the United Nations in 1982.

Don, you had a question.

Q On Central America, before we leave that, could you comment on the report that another ship leaving the Port of Corinto has been hit by a mine which Nicaragua says was planted by the United States-backed Contras?

A I've seen the press reports on that. I guess there's a TASS report, and there's a Nicaraguan Government communique, and I guess this morning I saw some further reporting, talking about a Liberian-registered vessel in the area of Corinto being damaged by a mine on March 28. I don't have details on that, so that's really all I would --

Q Would you consider this into the category of the terrorism in all its forms which the United States so greatly deplores, for whatever reason, in the world?

A I think I addressed the question of the rights and wrongs of this the other day, Don, and I don't have anything new to say about that.

Q You don't consider it, then, to be terrorism?

A Again, I addressed --

Q To put mines in the waters of another country?

A Well, I addressed this -- you're suggesting the United States did that, and as we made clear, the United States is not responsible. But in terms of what I had to say the other day, I'd refer you back to the transcript on that.

Q Alan --

Q Alan, on the Gulf, do you have any confirmation of reports that a Korean tender was attacked?

A Well, there were some reports, I gather, that there was some sort of an incident -- a hit -- a ship was hit today. I don't have details on that, and I must say I'm not going to get into the business of providing confirmation or not every time there are reports because often we don't know, in fact, what has taken place, and the confirmation tends to come out of shipping circles or insurance circles or whatever. So that's all I've really got on it.

Q Alan, yesterday it was confirmed that a Greek ship, the Filikon L., was hit by an Iraqi missile, and so what is the American position on Iraq attacking unarmed vessels in the Persian Gulf? Do we have a position?

A I guess the point that we have made several times on this is that our position on freedom of navigation, of neutral shipping in international waters, is well known. The threat to shipping in the Gulf is only one way in which the continuation of the Iran-Iraq war directly threatens the interests of all who have a stake in international commerce, and we obviously would urge that this war be brought to a conclusion, a negotiated conclusion.

Q Do we condemn these attacks?

A Well, again, I say our position on freedom of navigation is well known.

Q But why don't we condemn the attacks?

A I think that our view on this is quite clear on that, Bill.

Q Alan, is there any comment on the announcement that they're using for the first time these French warplanes -- that is to say, Iraq's announcement of a couple days ago?

A No. I saw what the Iraqi Government said, and I don't really -- you know, I have no reason to quarrel with it, but I don't have any comment on it.

Q Is that considered an escalation of the war, as far as you're concerned?

A I'm not going to try to characterize that, Don.

Q Along the same lines, Alan, does the U.S. consider it an escalation, these reports of large numbers of Egyptian troops going to Iraq?

A Large numbers of Egyptian troops going to Iraq?

Q Egyptian troops.

A Don't have anything on that.

Q Something related to that: Do you have reports on the Egyptian army having gone on a higher state of alert in connection with activities from, they claim, Libya?

A I don't. The only thing I really have is that Qadhafi has made several recent allusions to plans for a so-called "green march" or a mass march across the Libyan-Egyptian border. He attempted a march in the past of that sort, so his threats cannot be ignored. The march did not take place on March 28 as originally indicated, but obviously Egypt is aware of Qadhafi's statements concerning a march. But as far as their state of alert or anything of that sort, I would have to refer you to the Government of Egypt.

Q Do you have anything on --

Q Is there anything, Alan, between Egypt and the United States on military planning in the event of a Libyan attack?

A I couldn't get into the question -- without commenting one way, leading you one way or another -- I just couldn't get into the question of that sort of military planning.

Q Anything on the situation in Sudan now?

A The situation in the Sudan?

Q Yes.

A With respect to?

Q To the south, the insurgents in the south.

A No. I don't have a situation report here.

Q What do you have?

Q How about with respect to the arms?

A The arms? I can give you just an update on where we were on this -- where we are on this. We indicated last week we were identifying some items that had been requested that might be sent to -- no, excuse me -- might be sent by air because of their urgent needs. We now anticipate that within the next few days two shipments will depart, using MAC-supplied aircraft.

As indicated by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Koch yesterday before the House Foreign Affairs Africa Subcommittee, the principal items being sent include radios, flak jackets and ammunition. These are being paid for out of existing military assistance funds. As you know, AWACS remain in Egypt, and a radar repair team is in the Sudan to help improve that country's air defense capability following the Libyan bombing of the Omdurman radio station.

Q How many people in that radar repair team?

A I do not know. Why don't I ask you to check with the Pentagon on that, Jim?

Q Can we get that as well, please?

A That may take awhile. It's not neat.

Q On this subject of the arms in the Sudan, there was testimony yesterday, as you noted, before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, which some members of Congress found, they said, confusing and which left a degree of lack of clarity about the uses to which U.S. arms could be put in Sudan, especially the southern part of Sudan.

At one point it was noted by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Bishop that the U.S. agreements permit the use of U.S. equipment for internal security as well as other purposes, and at another point he seemed to be saying that the equipment and arms could be used for a defensive purpose in the south but not for a more offensive purpose of attacking insurgents.

At the same time there were statements that the United States had made it clear it would not permit its equipment to be used to take a war to the insurgents in the south.

Can you clarify, either here or in some other way, what are the rules regarding the use of American arms and military equipment in the Sudan?

A All right. Let me try that. Our military assistance program is designed to help Sudan defend itself against external aggression. Most of the equipment we provide is not appropriate for use against the internal insurgent threat and is unlikely to be used in the south.

As Deputy Assistant Secretary Bishop said yesterday to the Wolpe Committee, we have reminded the Government of Sudan that our assistance is to protect Sudan against external threats, and they have indicated they understand our position. Nevertheless, government forces may use U.S. equipment for legitimate self-defense against internal and external threats. Such self-defense is explicitly authorized in our military assistance agreement with Sudan, which in turn reflects the foreign aid legislation.

Q Copy of that?

A Yes.

Q Also, State Department officials have been quoted in various publications as saying that up to 25 percent of U.S. military aid is counter-insurgency aid. Can you confirm that?

A Is counter-insurgency aid?

Q Counter-insurgency aid.

A I think, again, for the details I would ask you to go to the Pentagon and see what they've got.

Q Alan, on Central America --

A Uh-huh.

Q Military sources in Guatemala are saying -- are talking about the possibility of a meeting of the Presidents of Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica in Washington by the end of April. Do you have -- has the U.S. taken any initiative to organize such a meeting?

A I'm not aware of that particularly, but I really would refer you to those governments if they're planning to meet. I'm sure --

Q Could you find out --

A -- they're quite capable of making such decisions.

Q Could you find out if there is a --

A No. I'll refer you to those governments who are -- if they're going to meet, let them tell you about it.

Q They are going to meet with President Reagan, that's the information.

A Well, that I'd have to ask you to ask the White House.

Q Two questions on the President's interview yesterday relating to Central America. He seemed to be going way beyond the State Department on a couple of things that he said. He said that the rebels now are demanding that they be allowed to participate in the government, despite what the State Department said, that they only want elections.

And, secondly, that --

A You're talking about El Salvador?

Q I'm talking about Nicaragua.

A Well, I don't have the text in front of me, and I don't think I would comment on that.

Q Could you take -- could you make --

A No. I think I'd refer you to Larry Speakes, Jim. I'm not going to comment on the President's interview.

Q Alan, can you confirm that Ambassador Shlaudeman took off, and, if so, where to?

A Yes, he did. He went -- I don't know precisely when he left, but he went to Tegucigalpa.

Q Alan, do you know anything about a protest or a demarche handed to the Canadian Government involving some lotteries, sports pool, or something?

A I don't.

Q Could you look into that, please?

A I can look into it. You think it was presented by the State Department?

Q Yeah. By Eagleburger to Ambassador Gottlieb last week.

A Let me check on it and see what we've got.

Q Has Canada agreed to provide police training to Grenada and replace U.S. troops?

A I'd refer you to the Canadian Government.

Q No, no, no. Shultz mentioned it yesterday. He alluded to it; and the Canadians said it was true, an agreement has been reached; and I would like to know what's --

A Well, then you've got what you've got. I don't think I need to address it further.

Q Do you have anything in your book on a fairly large underground test out of the Soviet Union today?

A No. I saw the -- I saw a wire on that this morning, but I don't have anything on it.

Q Alan, can you confirm that it's the Administration's position that any bill calling for the transfer of the Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem should be vetoed?

A I'm not going to comment on the question of veto. That's not something that I would normally do from here, but, in any case --

Q Anything on Jerusalem at all?

A -- I think that the -- I don't have anything new on Jerusalem. The President addressed it in his interview with the Times, and I would refer you to that as well as a number of other statements that have been made.

Q Death threats on electoral officials in El Salvador?

A Yes, I have something on that.

We understand that the Secret Anti-Communist Army issued a communique calling upon the Salvadoran Armed Forces to intervene directly in the electoral process and warning that those guilty for disorder in Sunday's elections will be punished.

We condemn any threats or acts of violence directed against last Sunday's elections. Despite intimidation by the extreme left and far from perfect voting procedures, the Salvadoran people showed through their massive turnout that they want to vote, and they did vote. The process did not run as smoothly as could be hoped for, but there are unofficial projections indicating that more than 70 percent of the country's eligible voters cast their ballots. The political parties involved have endorsed the voting and have agreed upon the outcome. The U.S. official observer delegation has also indicated that the elections were fair despite guerrilla intimidation and bureaucratic problems.

The Secret Anti-Communist Army has shown once again its enormous capacity to offend the sensibilities of democratic people. One can only wonder what motivates these terrorists. There are no indications that anybody, including the Armed Forces, will pay any attention to them.

Q Copy?

Q Also in the same communique they announced that they had tried and executed somebody.

A Don't have anything --

Q Do you want to deplore that also, or --

A Well, obviously, if that had taken place, I would. I don't have confirmation of that, though.

Q Okay. Thank you, Alan.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 1:07 p.m.)

Becker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, March 30, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #56

FRIDAY, MARCH 30, 1984, 12:27 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. Couple of announcements up front.

First a housekeeping one. On Wednesday, April 4, there will be an all-day National Foreign Policy Conference on Central America in the Loy Henderson conference room. Among those expected to speak are AID Administrator Peter McPherson, Assistant Secretary for Human Rights Elliott Abrams, Ambassador Otto Reich and Deputy Assistant Secretary Craig Johnston. Questions during the Q&A sessions will be limited to the invited guests, but the overall session is open to press coverage, and for further information you should see Kathleen Lang -- Mrs. Lang -- in the Press Office. Just FYI, it's possible that Secretary Shultz may give short welcoming remarks, but we're not sure about that yet.

Q Is this Friday or --

A That, Hank, is Wednesday, April 4.

Q Who is invited?

A I'm sorry?

Q Who are the guests?

A The guests include editors of papers across the country, business leaders, education leaders, church leaders. It's one of the -- one of our regular State Department conferences.

I have a statement on chemical weapons controls. As a result of our continued concern about the use of chemical weapons, the Secretaries of State and Commerce have decided to institute foreign policy controls for the export to Iran and Iraq of certain compounds which could be used in the manufacture of chemical weapons.

Applications for validated licenses will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Applications will generally be denied where there is reason to believe that these chemicals will be used in producing chemical weapons or would otherwise be devoted to chemical warfare.

This position is consistent with our strong policies in opposition to the use of prohibited chemical weapons and our policy of neutrality in the Iran-Iraq war.

The five chemicals affected are potassium fluoride, dimethyl methlyphosphonate, methylphosphonol difluoride, phosphorous oxychloride, and thioglycol.

Q Bravo.

A Thank you.

Q Copy?

A Copy.

Q What are the chemical compounds, John? (Laughter)

A I will not give you those in public, but if you want to have a BACKGROUND session with me afterwards, I happen to have them all in my head.

Q John, why don't you just furnish us a copy?

A Okay. You're welcome to the copy.

Q John, is this reconfirming or a result of findings that your material has been used by the Iraqi side against --

A To the best of our knowledge the United States has not been the source of chemicals used by Iraq to manufacture chemical weapons. However, since many components are commonly used for other purposes, we cannot preclude the possiblity that U.S.-sourced chemicals have been exported to Iraq.

We're not aware that they have, but because these chemicals are in fairly general usage, it is possible, without our knowledge, that they have. These steps that we're taking are obviously to curb such export in the future.

Q John, has the United States made any effort to tell its allies not to do the same?

A We have on the overall question of chemical export and the export of equipment that could be used for chemical warfare, yes, of course. In particular, there is the question of Germany. We have discussed with German authorities reports that facilities capable of producing nerve gas may have been shipped to Iraq by a German company.

The German Government has been investigating the matter on an urgent basis, and probably you should go to the German Government to talk to them about it.

Q John, does that statement imply that none of the chemical weapons Iraq is alleged to have used were produced whole, outside of its borders?

A I can't really answer that with certainty, Jim. I can't answer that.

Q I just want to make sure of one point -- and it's probably there in the text if you'll give us that copy -- but do you say that it is not -- to the best of your knowledge, that American chemicals -- these American chemicals had not been exported to Iraq or had not been used in weapons manufacture?

A What I said is that to the best of our knowledge the U.S. has not been the source of the chemical used by Iraq to manufacture chemical weapons. I can't guarantee exports in general.

Q John, yesterday you were uncertain as to whether Iraq was continuing to use or engage in chemical warfare following the March 5 statement from that podium.

You said you had seen reports. Are you sure one way or the other now?

A I've been away, as you know, for awhile. No change in our situation. Sorry, can't --

Q John, I'm a little unsure of the reason for imposing the restrictions on both Iran and Iraq. Is there any suggestion that Iran has also used chemical weapons?

A I'm not sure whether there is any suggestion that they have used them, but the intent would be to make sure that neither side uses them.

Q You're, in effect, punishing one side for doing something that it hasn't done?

A There's a war going on that we would like to see ended. We're neutral in that war. We are opposed to the use of chemical weapons. As you know, we're deeply involved in trying to get an international treaty approved on that question. So we think that in this particular case it is intelligent and wise and prudent to ban exports to both.

Q John, some Iraqi officials claim that these -- supposedly Iranians who were injured or being poisoned or affected by the poison -- were victims of some experimentations in Iran itself to use chemicals against the Iraqis in the war. Was there any substance to this, or did you find anything or any --

A I don't know. We have said what we have said, and what we believe about the use of chemical weapons by Iraq. That stands. But I can't give you details on every single case who was examined by a doctor as to what the source is.

Q John, then, can you -- specifically, can you comment on the New York Times story today regarding the mass production of nerve gas by Iraq?

A Well, not really. I mean, we're not going to get into that story which quotes a lot of unnamed sources, but, in essence, what I'm doing is confirming that we have been in touch with the Government of West Germany, which is mentioned in that story, over some time, both here in Washington and in Bonn, and I suggest you go to the Germans. I think they've made some statements, and I think you probably should take it up with them as it's a matter within their competence.

Q Is this government in the process of collecting evidence that Iraq is, indeed, using nerve gas?

A This government?

Q Yes.

A I think we have not had any doubt in the past, and have said that we think that there is use of nerve gas by Iraq.

Q John, can --

Q (Inaudible)

A Well, wouldn't have any problem about saying that there has been use of nerve gas.

Q John, can we go make to the announcement that you made, for a minute? Does this policy has extraterritorial application?

A I think you'll have to go to Commerce. I think they will be making an announcement. I think they will have to answer that.

Q Do you know if it's retroactive?

A I do not. I think, for the details, you have to go them. I believe that the regulations are available for inspection at the Office of the Federal Register. They're going to be published next week in the Federal Register, but I think in the meantime, for implementation and details, Commerce is the place to go.

Q You say they're going to make an announcement today?

A There is some suggestion that Commerce may make an announcement today.

Q John, to clarify your prior thing, you say you now would have no quarrel with the proposition, that you have confirmed evidence that Iraq has used nerve gas and that you apparently have had guidance to that effect. Could you make that available, and also tell us how long you have known this?

A I beg to confer with my colleague here because --

MR. ROMBERG: There's nothing other than what you've said.

Q What is he saying?

A There's nothing other than what I've said. (Laughter) I'm the oracle.

Q John, is there any assurance that third countries may be using, may be shipping this sort of chemical to either country -- Iraq, specifically?

A Any assurances? You mean, from them?

Q Yes.

A I don't know. I guess you'd have to ask them.

Q No, no. But, I mean exporters to, say, a foreign country which may in turn export the chemical to Iraq --

A I think if we thought that somebody was being used to launder or work as an intermediary, I think if we thought the ultimate destination was either Iraq or Iran, we would take care of that.

Q What I'm saying is, is there any mechanism to look into something like this?

A I think the regulations will cover that.

Q Also, have we also raised the matter of export of chemicals with Japan or another other European producers?

A I don't want to give you a list of countries we've talked with. But, as you know, we've had a very active diplomatic initiative on this, and have talked to a number of governments, including --

Q So it's not just the Germans?

A In connection with specific equipment, we have talked with the Germans. But in terms of our concern, in general, we've talked with a large number of governments.

Q John, do you have any thoughts on the impact of the whole question of the use of chemical and nerve gas weapons now; the impact on the American effort to achieve a chemical weapons ban treaty?

A I would hope that the horrors of it would underline the urgency of taking steps in this regard.

Q But does this point out the difficulties in verification which you would face?

A The whole question of verification not only in this area, but in general, is something of which we're very mindful. You have to be able to verify any arms control agreement. That is a basic plank of our approach to arms control.

Q Doesn't this particular incident demonstrate that that's virtually impossible because of the --

A No.

Q -- commonality of these --

A Yes, but I don't think you can give up on such an awesome problem as this just because it's difficult. I think you have to keep working at it.

Q John, have the Iraqis acknowledged to us that they are using chemical weapons -- nerve gas, in particular?

A I'm not going to get into our discussions with the Iraqis. What they have said in public on this issue is available to you. But I'm not going to get into our back-and-forth on it.

Q Has there been any export of these chemicals from the U.S. to Iran or Iraq at all in the past; in the recent past? I mean, is there any reason to believe --

A Do we have reason? No, we do not have reason to believe that exports from the United States have been used by either Iran or Iraq in this connection.

Q I guess I'm raising the question of -- imposing a ban on the export of these chemicals may not have any effect since there may not have been any export of them in the first place. Do you know whether there has been any export of these chemicals, whether or not they were used?

A I think there is interest in acquiring these chemicals.

Q John, have we also been in touch with the Government of Israel about the implications of introducing chemical weapons in such a highly volatile area?

A Have not talked with Israel about this.

Q You say you think there is interest in acquiring these chemicals. Does that mean that either Iran or Iraq, or both have asked? Well, Iran certainly would not, but does that mean that Iraq --

A I think there has been some interest in acquiring them, yes.

Q Direct interest with the U.S. companies, you mean?

A I think there has been.

Q Okay.

Q Could you give more details?

A No, I really couldn't.

Q Can you tell us if there are any contracts in force --

A I'm sorry, somebody asked me about the question of Israel. I may have --

Q I did. And you said, we have not talked with Israel.

A Oh, I thought you were asking about a specific issue with Israel. No, I really don't have anything for you on general talks with Israel. But I thought you were going back to a point made in the Hersh story.

Q Well, the point -- I mean, the Hersh story was that we were -- one point he made in that story was that he implied that the U.S. thought about air strikes --

A Yes, that was the question I was responding to.

Q And that Israel had also.

A There is no -- there has been and is no consideration whatsoever of U.S. air strikes against these alleged installations, and there's been no discussion of such strikes with Israel.

Q Has there been consideration in this government of asking Israel to deploy --

A Not that I'm aware of. I'll just remind you of our position on the Israeli strike on the Iraqi nuclear facility in 1980 - 1982?

Q One.

A Which we condemned.

Q John, the Iraqis continue to deny that they are using these weapons. They are, in effect, lying then, right?

A Well, I'll let you make that deduction.

Q Do you have any comment on the report that the U.S. is providing Iraq with intelligence gathered by the satellites over the Middle East?

A No, never talk about exchange of intelligence.

Q John, why, up until now, since you had guidance, which you just shared with us that Iraq has used -- it's the American Government's belief that Iraq has used nerve gas, why have you not released that up until now?

A I'll have to defer to my distinguished colleague on that particular question because this came up during my absence.

Q Is it possible, John, you're more forthcoming than Alan?

A No. Heavens, perish the thought. (Laughter)

Q Do we have any --

A Do you want a filing break?

Q No. You and Alan have a filing break and tell us what this is. (Laughter)

Q Do we have any evidence or confirmation that these facilities which Germany is supposed to have provided to Iraq actually are there?

A No, I think you ought to talk to the German Government about that.

Q Who started the idea of bombing these installations which --

A Who started the idea of it? It started in the New York Times this morning as far as I'm concerned.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the --

A John.

Q It's John.

Q John, do you have any comment on the story concerning Alejandro Orfila in the Post today?

A Sorry -- Orfila? No, no comment on that. I think that's a matter for the OAS legal folks to take a look at.

Q John, can I go back to the Central America issue that we sort of went over yesterday to try to achieve a little more precision on it? We were discussing yesterday the mining of a Nicaraguan harbor, and in the course of that discussion Alan referred back to some -- a statement he made a few days earlier about responsibility for the mining in which a Soviet oil ship was damaged and some Soviet -- some crew members of that ship were injured.

His answer there was, "You're suggesting the United States did that and, as we made clear, the United States is not responsible."

My question is, is the U.S. saying that it is not responsible for the Soviet ship's action in hitting the mine, or that it is not responsible for the presence of the mine in the harbor which exploded, damaging the Soviet ship?

A Well, I never seek to interpret, modify, amplify anything --

Q I'm not asking you to do that.

A -- that Mr. Romberg has says. I think his words spoke for themselves, but I think probably the latter, not the former.

Q The latter? Not responsible for the presence of the mine in the habor that damaged --

A Yes.

Q Then, let me ask you a follow-up question. In connection with the mining of the Nicaraguan port, vis-a-vis the mining, or the potential mining of international waters in the Straits of Hormuz, is it the U.S. view that it is acceptable or -- I don't want to choose a word -- but appropriate or acceptable for mines to be placed in national waters but not in international waters?

A I'm not going to give you a lawyer's response to that, but the fact is, there is quite a difference between national and international waters, and our statement relates to international waters.

--MORE--

Q But you don't want to make a similar statement regarding freedom of navigation in Central American waters?

A I don't. No.

Q So I'm trying to get the distinction there. What is the distinction?

A I think I will leave you with Mr. Romberg's words; I can't give you a clearer distinction, I'm afraid.

Q John, if you're applying the same rule to Iraq and Iran, saying that you are not responsible for chemical weapons used in the war by material you are exporting to Iraq or to Iran, you would have said the same thing about Nicaragua, about providing the Contras with dynamite or mines?

A We have not discussed the question of aid, alleged aid to the Contras, and will not.

Q I mean, these are two different rules for about the same situation. They are war here and war there.

A Well, they are the same in that there are wars in each place, but I'm certainy not going to discuss alleged intelligence activities in Nicaragua.

Q A Panamanian merchant vessel was apparently hit by machine gun fire as it was coming into Corinto from a boat identified as a paranya. Do you have any comment on that attack?

A No, I don't.

Q Can you confirm that the attack took place?

A No, can't. Don't know anything about it.

Q Do you have any comment with respect to the apparent request by Nicaragua for mine-sweeping equipment from the Soviet Union and North Korea?

A No. I guess that's something they would talk to the Soviets about, and as far as we're concerned, it's hypothetical.

Q Let me understand that for a second. Should that request be fulfilled, the United States has no particular objection to mine-sweeping equipment being made available from those countries to Nicaragua?

A I'm not aware of any objection, but I just reiterate that I think it's a hypothetical question.

Q John, do you have anything on Vietnamese troops entering the Thai territory in pursuit of guerrillas or refugees?

A Well, I think there was something yesterday, Spence, which may not have been used. The United States is very concerned at reports which highlight the threat to Thailand's security and to stability in Southeast Asia posed by the continuing illegal Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea and Hanoi's refusal to negotiate a comprehensive political settlement.

The success of U.N. General Assembly Resolutions supported by the great majority of the world's nations have called for a political solution based on the withdrawal of foreign forces and the restoration of self-determination for the Khmer people. The United States once again urges Vietnam to agree to negotiate a just solution to the problem of Kampuchea on the basis of the relevant U.N. resolutions. And that's about all I have on that.

Q Will a copy be made available, please?

A Sure.

Q John, there is a thing from Iranian radio where they claim that the State Department has cut off their telephone lines.

A Yes, I think that's correct, and I think Mr. Romberg did not handle that yesterday.

(Laughter)

Q What's this all about?

A That is the Iranian Interests Section in --

Q -- in the Algerian Embassy, yes.

A O.K. And I just happen to have that right at hand here. On March 23, the State Department's Office of Foreign Missions reduced the telephone service to the Iranian Interests Section from 50 lines to 10 lines. That action was taken because we did not consider that such a large number of telephone lines was required to conduct the authorized business of the Interests Section and because of the imbalance compared with the number of telephone lines available to the American Interests Section of the Swiss Embassy in Tehran.

The Interests Section was established to provide consular and administrative services for the Iranian community resident in the United States. I know your next question will be, "How many telephone lines are there available at the U.S. Interests Section at the Swiss Embassy in Tehran?" There are three telephone lines, at most, available in Tehran.

Q Do they work?

A I think that's why it says "three at most." I assume they may not all be working at the same time.

Q May I ask you a couple of questions that are --

Q (inaudible) does not cut off the Iranian and Iraqi access to the chemicals that can be the components of chemical weapons. Is there anything else that this government can do to limit or stop the chemical warfare?

A Well, it has already done quite a lot. We've continued to raise the issue in high-level diplomatic channels since late last year. In our 1984 report to the U.N. Secretary General on chemical weapons use, we alerted the U.N. of our grave concern over reports that Iraq had used chemical weapons. We took note of the Iranian allegations in our 1983 Human Rights Report on Iraq. We forcefully drew the attention of other governments to the problem through our public condemnation of March 5 and through previous diplomatic discussions. We have supported U.N. efforts to investigate and favor a Security Council statement on the report.

We are instituting, as I told you this morning, special licensing requirements for exports to Iran and Iraq of certain compounds which could be used in the manufacture of chemical weapons. We have urged other countries to do likewise. We continue to support efforts to try to induce Iran to accept a ceasefire, because stopping hostilities is the most effective and practical way to prevent further use of chemical weapons. And in humanitarian terms, we cannot and should not limit our attention to the victims of chemical weapons. Instead, we must also work to stop the tragedy of the tens of thousands of lives -- many of them belonging to children -- which are needlessly being lost because of the Iranian regime's continued attempts to spread its revolution throughout the region. So it is not as though we have been inactive or backward.

Q Is there any consideration being given to any form of military action by the United States or its allies to stop this?

A Not that I am aware of. You are aware of the President's statements on the international waters and the protection thereof in the Gulf of Hormuz. But beyond that, I'm not aware of anything.

Q Nothing in terms of --

Q Copy of that statement, the earlier one?

A This one I just read?

Q Yes.

A Sure.

Q John, it's been suggested that Iran could not carry on the war if it no longer had markets for its oil. One of the major markets is Japan, which, I think, buys like 400,000 barrels a day.

Are we contemplating or trying to do anything in the direction of getting countries that are allies to stop buying oil from Iran?

A Not about stop buying oil, but countries with influence in Iran, certainly we have been in touch with, and various of them are using their influence with Iran. I think that is a diplomatic initiative, not the kind of economic boycott that you're speaking of.

Q What countries? Can you identify them?

A I will let them, I think, speak for themselves.

Q John, you read in that long statement about children. ABC had a report a couple of days ago or yesterday --

A Yes.

Q -- saying that he was asked, I think, by the anchorman whether there were any children in that area where he was filming the film from the Iranian side.

A Yes.

Q (Inaudible) Island. He said there were no children.

A No. What he said was that he had visited a number of areas, and he had seen a number of young children none of whom were involved in hostilities. He was asked the question whether he had seen children engaged in hostilities. It was a factual question, and he gave what I presume was a factual answer, and said, "No;" but he didn't say there were no -- that it's not possible that there were children involved.

Q May I follow, please?

A He told what he saw.

Q I want to follow up on this point. My colleague asked you a question about sharing intelligence. There were reports here that the United States, in its way of possibly tilting towards Iraq in the with Iran, that they were going to share intelligence, and they would put pressure or ask, or underline -- like you said a few weeks ago to me -- underline to the friendly countries in the western world, including Japan, not to deal or to buy oil from Iran, and not to ship the weapons and other things.

What is the substance of these talks about that you will be sharing intelligence to help Iraqis know what's the story there?

A Just as a general proposition, we never talk about with whom we share intelligence, if we do.

Q But would you say relations with Iran, I mean U.S.-Iranian relations, are now less tense than they had been before -- I mean after the chemical weapons episode?

A Well, it's hard to characterize them. They're certainly not very good. But whether there's been a mild improvement, I --

Q John, in light of your finding that Iraq has used nerve gas and/or other forms of chemical warfare, does this have any effect on U.S. recent initiatives to expand commercial relationships with Iraq across a broad range, and also a willingness to re-open diplomatic relations?

A No. I'm not aware of any change in our position. We're interested in being involved in a closer dialogue with Iraq.

Q John, how many countries are capable of providing the five chemical bases that you mentioned?

A I can't answer that. In fact, I might not even be able to repeat the chemicals if you asked me again. Maybe Commerce can, Fred. I'm just not sure.

Q John, can you tell us where Rumsfeld is now? And how many days he spent in Baghdad, please?

A Ambassador Rumsfeld returned to Washington yesterday afternoon, saw the Secretary. I think he is still in Washington today. But I would expect that he would want to go back to Chicago.

Q How long did he spend in Baghdad?

A I don't know the answer to that. I'm sorry.

Q Do you expect him to return to the Middle East?

A I don't know of any plans for him to go back there. I wouldn't rule it out.

Q Is he due to retire?

A I don't know [illegible] ere's any change in his -- due to retire?

Q Yes.

A Retire as --

Q -- Special Envoy.

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q John, was Silberman with him on this last trip?

A Yes, and returned with him.

Q Is the State Department aware of the case of a Palestinian ex-prisoner, Abdul Aziz Shaheen, whom the Israeli military office is planning to deport home from the Gaza Strip, after spending 15 years in Israeli jails, since 1967?

A I'm not. It is possible that during the past few days Mr. Romberg (inaudible)

Q Can you look, please, into this matter --

A O.K. I'll take a look and see --

Q -- in the light of your concern for human rights and (inaudible)

A Sure.

Q Anything on internal exile for political leaders in Chile that was announced?

A No.

Q Thank you.

A O.K.

(The briefing concluded at 12:55 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Monday, April 2, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #56 et seq. +17

MONDAY, APRIL 2, 1984, 12:12 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I have a few housekeeping announcements up front on an otherwise lean day. There will be a BACKGROUND briefing in the White House press briefing room today at 2 o'clock on the anti-satellite program.

There will be a BACKGROUND briefing by senior State Department officials on the visit to the United States of Canadian Foreign Minister MacEachen. That will be this afternoon at 4:30 in this briefing room.

Q John, there is the possibility of an overlap with Mr. MacEachen's press conference which is just one hour earlier at the Canadian Embassy.

A I didn't know he was having a press conference. Let us take a look at that. His is at 3:30? O.K. Let's take a look at that and see whether we can be a little accommodating.

Another housekeeping announcement, there will be tight pool coverage of the signing ceremony for the Ross High Dam Treaty between the United States and Canada. That is at 2:15 this afternoon in the Secretary's reception area on the seventh floor, and if you want information concerning that pool, please see Darlene Kirk in the Press Office.

Finally, one in which you have the most acute interest, new carpeting for the press room is scheduled to be installed this Saturday, April 7. Beginning Friday afternoon, the partitions that form press booths will be dismantled, and telephones will be temporarily disconnected. (This is serious stuff.) Movers will be on hand to relocate office furniture. Correspondents are urged to do whatever they can to make the carpet installation easier. This includes making arrangements for the temporary removal of special equipment such as computer terminals, as necessary. It also includes packing books and other items into boxes which the press office can provide, and making sure that the boxes are clearly marked with the name of the correspondent's news organization. We cannot guarantee that unmarked or loose items will be returned to their proper owners. That sounds ominous.

Correspondents who plan to staff the Department on Saturday are advised that the working conditions in the press room will be less than ideal. I gather that is the understatement of the week. It's going to be pretty difficult to work there Saturday. However, I'm delighted to say that if you have any questions or need special assistance, you can direct all these queries not to me, but to Joe Reap in the Press Office -- poor fellow.

That's all I have for you.

Q John, can you give us a reading on what are the conditions in the Bekaa today, the Israeli shelling?

A Not -- I can't really give you anything, Mike. We've seen the reports, but don't have any confirmation or any comment.

Q John, do you have any reaction to the Evans and Novak piece today implying that the U.S. would react very vigorously to any new Iranian terrorist attack in the Gulf?

A Not really, don't have any specific comment on that report, but just refer you to what the President has said in the past about the responsibility that those who embark on terrorism must assume for those actions. But as I say, I refer you to the President's words and I'm not responding specifically to the Evans and Novak column, I'm just --

Q Why do you recall what the President has said? There was no action taken on the -

A I thought I would just remind you that the President has had some things to say about terrorism in the past, and that they still stand.

Q Is the State Department coordinating with the DOD regarding the establishment of an agency for anti-terrorism?

A Not that I am aware of. There has been some talk about how the Administration will handle the overall question of terrorism, but I'm not familiar with that specific phase of it.

Q Do we have any reaction to the ousting of General Alvarez in Honduras?

A Yes. We do have something on that, as soon as I can put my hand on it. The resignation of General Alvarez and other members of the Honduran Armed Forces was an internal Honduran matter. An account has been officially released by the Government of Honduras, and it would be inappropriate for the United States to try to characterize the events.

President Suazo has renewed his government's pledge for further consolidation of democracy in Honduras, development of a pluralistic society, unwavering efforts for the peaceful resolution of conflict in Central America. The United States fully supports the Honduran commitment to these processes.

President Suazo has emphasized his often-stated position that "the military should not meddle in political affairs, and that politicans should not meddle in military affairs" if the democratic process is to be vibrant and respect for civilian rule, based on the rule of law, is to be maintained.

Neither Honduran public statements nor our Embassy's discussions with President Suazo and other Honduran officials give us reason to believe that our traditional close and cooperative bilateral relationship will not continue. The preparatory phase of the Granadero I joint military exercise began April 1, as previously scheduled.

Q Had we been forewarned at all that this was about to happen?

A No.

Q John, you call this a resignation?

A I think I would let the Government of Honduras characterize it.

Q I wanted your characterization. Can you characterize it at all?

A It's their internal affair, so I think we'll let them characterize it.

Q How does this affect U.S. policy down there. It seems that we were really trying to -- much of our policy was based on our relationship with Alvarez.

A No. Our policy is based on our relationship with the Government of Honduras.

Q You say we weren't forewarned. We've got more than 300 intelligence people down there. What are they doing? I mean, how come we had no indication this was going to happen?

A I guess you have to ask the intelligence -- If what you say is correct, I guess you would have to ask those people. But this was an internal affair, and so far as I know, we were not consulted or informed about it.

Q I don't mean consulted, but you say you had no indication that this was about to happen?

A Well, what is your question?

Q The question is, did you have any indication that Alvarez was in trouble?

A I've already answered that. The answer to that is no.

Q John, you also said that the military should not meddle in political affairs.

A President Suazo said that.

Q Do we have any reading as to -- Was he meddling in political affairs in --

A I think you'll have to ask the Honduran Government.

Q What about with respect to the other members of the high command, a whole group of them left. Do you have any -- Have you inquired as to why it was necessary to go beyond just Alvarez?

A Oh, I'm sure our Ambassador in Honduras is aware of that and discussing the situation with Honduran officials and indeed his fellow diplomats, but that's the kind of normal evaluation that goes on in a situation like this.

Q John, a new subject, please: What sort of role do you see the Secretary playing in the political campaign? Is he going to scramble in there and take on the democratic candidates? I ask that against the background of ridiculing Senator Hart's position on Central America on the television yesterday.

A It wasn't ridiculing Senator Hart's position; it was giving his factual assessment of a suggestion made by Senator Hart, I think.

Q I see. Is that the way you're going to "slice the cake"?

(Laughter)

Q John, the Secretary also commented on Jerusalem yesterday -- and this matter keeps on coming up. If you were asked as an Administration spokesman, which you are in fact being right now, "Where is the capital of Israel?" what would your response be?

A Well, our position is that -- As you know, the Government of Israel maintains that Jerusalem is the capital; we maintain our Embassy in Tel Aviv. And we have said on many occasions what our position is concerning the future of Jerusalem.

Q But this skirts the issue. Where is the capital of Israel?

A Well, I've done the best I can for you.

Q John, last week the Senate Foreign Relations Committee adopted an amendment which tied all military grants for Turkey to the evacuation by the Turkish Cypriots of a town in Cyprus. The Administration opposed this action.

How seriously, in your view, would this affect U.S.-Turkish relations if it were to be adopted? Is there any consideration of the Administration doing something to try to get this repealed? How do you see the legislative situation in the wake of all that?

A I don't know where we are in terms of the legislative situation, Don. Obviously, the Administration feels, is much concerned about the possibility of reduction of aid to Turkey below what it has asked for, but I don't have anything new for you on the linkage with the Cyprus situation beyond what we might have had last week.

Q Well, the linkage was put on by the Committee.

A I know.

Q Yes.

A   But I don't know what we have beyond any comment we may have had last week.

Q   There was no comment, I gather, last week.

A   There was none?

Q   Could you post whatever it is that you have to say about it?

A   Right.

Q   Back to politics, do you see the Secretary joining the fray, taking on the Democratic candidates?

A   I guess probably, Bernie, you should do a little homework on the Constitutional status of the Secretary of State in an election campaign -- and I don't have it at the top of my head. But as you know, there are rules governing the participation of State Department and State Department officers. I know the Secretary is much interested in those, and obviously determined that they shall be observed. But I don't --

Q   There hasn't been a Secretary of State that has observed them in twenty years.

A   Well -- I don't have anything for you on his plans for this year, if that's what you mean.

Q   Could you refresh my memory as to what role the Secretary of State normally plays, according to you, on the basis of (inaudible)?

A   I don't, because I don't have the regulations with me, Bernie, but we would be happy to pull them out for you.

Marvin?

Q   Two questions on terrorism: Does the United States coordinate its actions, or is it seeking to coordinate its actions, in the Middle East with Israel? And second, what about the incident in Jerusalem today?

A   Let me be sure I understand your first question a little more fully. I'm not quite sure what it is you're asking.

Q In the effort to do something about terrorism in the Middle East, there have been many large paragraphs and much rhetoric -- and I'm asking the specific: Are you seeking to coordinate U.S. activities with Israel in the Middle East, in this area?

A Well, "seeking to coordinate U.S. activities -- " As you know, there are various levels of communication and exchange with the Israelis, not the least of which is in the political-military field; and as you know, there are those meetings going on every six months between the U.S. and the Israeli side. But that may not be where you're going. If you're asking about the exchange of intelligence information, I guess I would have to decline to answer that one.

-- MORE --

Q Well, in your effort to try to be more effective fighting terrorism in the Middle East from the Persian Gulf to Lebanon's Embassy, are you seeking to coordinate those activities with Israel?

A Well, I think it is a reasonable presumption that we would be cooperating with a number of governments, not only in the Middle East but elsewhere, to attempt to curb and forestall terrorism.

Q Which countries could you tell us that you're cooperating with in the Middle East?

A I can't, no, but I think there are a string of countries that will be fairly obvious, but I'm not going to give you a list.

Q Could you do the second one? Do you have a --

A The second one on Jerusalem? We deplore and condemn this calculated act of violence in Jerusalem. To the best of our knowledge, there were no American citizens involved. No American citizen casualties, but we're still checking that.

Clearly, this confronts the Palestinians with a kind of dilemma they have been facing. Whether they go down the track or road of violence or whether they go down the track or road of negotiation. In this particular instance, they seem to have taken the track of violence and that is extremely distressing to the United States.

Violence begets violence, and what the United States would prefer to see is a return to the peace process and a return to negotiation.

Q Is this an example of terrorism in the U.S. view?

A I don't know. I think it's a little early to make a judgment as to how you'd define this, Marvin. It is a bloody and unpalatable action. But just how you define it -- and my instant reaction is, yes, it is terrorism. You know, there may be others who would have a different view.

Q John, why do you say Palestinians in this? Has there been --

A I think there's been a claim by the Palestinians.

Q A few days ago, a few weeks ago, the Senate Appropriations Committee, I believe, resolved or decided to give Israel enough grants to pay the debt owed to the United States. Does this go with the spirit of the Administration's request for assistance to Israel? What do you comment on that?

A I'm sorry, I lost -- I missed the theme on that.

Q There was a resolution in one of the Appropriations Committees in the Congress; I think it was the Senate or the House of Representatives which decided that at the request of Alan Cranston from California and other Senators to give Israel enough grants to repay the debt owed to the United States in the upcoming Fiscal Year 1985. What do you have to comment on that?

A Well, I'm not familiar with that particular instance that you're citing. But, in general, there is a move on the part of the Administration to move in terms of aid and military aid to outright grant rather than loan. That is a trend that is underway, but I'm not familiar with this particular --

Q Which is that this trend is welcomed or it is appreciative --

A Well, the Administration is moving and wishes to move in that direction for outright grant.

Q Second question: About the Jerusalem position, as a result of your -- of the Administration's hardening position or standing steadfast in it's position --

A It's not a hardening position. It's an objective position.

Q I mean steadfast in its position, actual, factual position, there was some change. Are you -- how do you look at the changes in watering down the resolution which will be non-binding or some -- to this effect, that the sponsors, the co-sponsors of both resolutions in the House and the Senate looking towards a different resolution. What your position will be on it?

A I don't think we can comment on specific legislative initiatives until we see what they are. But I think, in general, the Secretary has indicated that the Administration will not respond with much enthusiasm to such initiatives as we have heard rumored.

The Administration has a strong position on the Embassy, and is maintaining that position. But just how the President will react in response to specific legislative overtures or compromises, I can't predict. But as the Secretary said yesterday, the President feels very strongly about this.

Q Let me follow this, please. In light of the Administration, or the State Department now going into the line of damage control to the policy in the Middle East, according to reports in some of the newsletters here, do you see that raising this issue now already created some damage or, you know, touched on the credibility of the United States in the Middle East and the Islamic world; what's your position on it? What's your -

A The Embassy situation?

Q Yes, yes. The timing -- raising the issue now?

A I don't know that there's really any more that I could say other than what the President and the Secretary have said about the intensity of feeling they have about this. Clearly, they do not feel it is an appropriate time to raise this.

Q John, can you comment on the Middle East, please? There is a report coming from Radio Israel that Ambassador Rumsfeld gave a sort of pledge to the Israelis that he did not promise the Lebanese that the U.S. is going to mediate in the Lebanese crises anymore. Do you have any --

A "Gave the Israelis a promise that the U.S. would not" --

Q The United States is not going to mediate with the Lebanese crises anymore? Do you have any information of this?

A The question is, we don't talk about Ambassador Rumsfeld's discussions. Having said that, and not responding to that particular question, I think our position in Lebanon is perfectly plain. Our Ambassador is there. Our Ambassador remains engaged; is talking to a variety of factions in Lebanon; will be helpful. Apparently, various factions want to speak to the United States, want the United States to be involved, and therefore will be involved at that diplomatic level.

Q Does this mean you are still in contact with different factions in Lebanon?

A Yes. Sure.

Q On a daily basis?

A I don't know whether our Ambassador is seeing specific people on a daily basis, but he's certainly very active.

Q Do you have anything on a reported coup attempt in Sudan over the weekend?

A I don't, Jim, I'm afraid. No.

Q John, back on terrorism for just one second. Any progress on the terrorism legislative package?

A Not that I'm aware of, no. I'm sure there's progress on it, but I'm just not aware of any development on it.

A note from the front: Mr. MacEachen's press conference will end about 4:15, and we are unable to change our 4:30 briefing time because of other involvements involving the briefers. Sorry about that. 4:30 for our briefing, but you'll have fifteen minutes to get from the Canadian press conference.

Q We'll have a filing break.

A Sorry about that, folks.

Yes, Marvin?

Q Do you have something on the Romanian-Bulgarian communique as it referred to missile deployments in Europe, I was wondering?

A No, I'm afraid I don't, Marvin.

Q Well, could you try to look into this question of whether that is seen here as an indication of a shift, perhaps in the Soviet position. That's Number 1. Number 2 --

Q Why don't you tell me what's in the -- I'm not familiar with the communique --

A It talked about equal steps. There's a suggestion of equal moves by both superpowers as a way of resolving the issue.

A All right. Let's take a look.

Q I was wondering if, first, that in your view, it would be seen as a Soviet shift; and, second, what the U.S. would think of the idea itself?

A Okay. Let's see what we can come up with.

Q Two questions on El Salvador. The first is, what happens now in the case of Captain Avila and Lopez Sibrian and the other guards? Whether Santivanez, the man whose named as being the New York Times and CBS informant about death squads, and so on, has requested asylum, or has approached the Administration in any sense?

A On the second question, I was about to make a certain declaration by myself when I was counseled by my colleague, Mr. Romberg. We do not discuss asylum matters.

Q Could Romberg leave the room? (Laughter)

A Insofar as the first question, Captain Avila, who had been charged with an infraction of military discipline, was provisionally released from pretrial detention several days ago on his own recognizance, but with instructions to remain within the country.

This procedure is permitted by Salvadoran law. As our Embassy indicated, we are concerned about his release, and it is -- as it is clear to us that he can provide, we think, important testimony related to the Sheraton case. We would not want to see the opportunity lost to obtain that evidence.

The United States continues to expect the Government of El Salvador to follow through on this case. In that connection, we understand that Captain Avila did comply with the subpoena and appeared at a judicial hearing on Saturday morning. We will continue to monitor developments in that case very closely.

Q Do you know, John, whether if in the next ten days you do not get evidence from Avila implicating Lopez

Sibrian, then the case will go to trial with the two individuals who are now in detention and that will be that?

A I don't. I'm afraid I can't answer that question.

Q Okay. And can you tell us at all about the man reported to be Santivanez? Has his consuldom been -- has he been relieved of his consul status? And has he gotten in touch with the Administration, not with respect to whether he's asking for asylum, but pursuant to your request, to speak with this individual?

A It's my understanding that the Government of El Salvador did inform Protocol last week of this pending change. And as a matter of fact, we had a little glitch on that because, I think, on Friday or Saturday we were unaware of that as, indeed, other -- as, indeed, the geographic bureau in the State Department was. But in retrospect, apparently there was a formal notification to Protocol.

Insofar as being in contact with the individual you name, as I understand it officials of the appropriate geographic bureau made that request of Senator Tsongas' staff and Senator Kennedy's staff, and it has been a --

MR. ROMBERG: Congressman Shannon.

MR. HUGHES: Congressman Shannon. Beg your pardon. And there has been no response, so the State Department officials have not, as I understand it, interviewed the gentlemen.

Go ahead.

Q Is Mr. Eagleburger keeping his trip to Europe; and, especially, there are reports he's dropped out his stay in Spain?

A I'm not -- he certainly is in Europe right now and I think he's due back later this week. There may have been one or two minor shifts in his itinerary, but I'm not aware, unless somebody else knows, that he's dropped Spain as of this -- I mean, I wouldn't rule it out, but I'm not aware that he has.

Q Would you look at that?

A Sure.

Q Thank you.

Q At the risk of being tiresome, have you anything to say about the Evans & Novak story that says that the Administration has made a tentative decision to employ massive reprisal force, preferably directly against Iran itself in case of a new terrorist attack on a U.S. Embassy or Americans anywhere? That it clearly directed --

A Yes, I did do that, Dana, and satisfied everybody in the room except Bernie Kalb with my answer.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:40 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
Tuesday, April 3, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #57

TUESDAY, APRIL 3, 1984, 12:16 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, everybody. This should not take long. Couple of announcements up front.

Available in the Press Office later this afternoon -- can't give you a time on this, but I suggest you take a look at it -- will be the text of Secretary Shultz's address before the Trilateral Commission dinner in Washington tonight at 8:00. The subject of the speech is "Power and Diplomacy in the 1980s." That is a closed session, but we will make that speech available on an embargoed basis to you, and as I say, I can't give you an exact time on when it will be available. But in view of the significance of it, we will try to get it to you as early as possible this afternoon.

Q 8:00 p.m.?

A I think the release time will be 8:00, Ralph.

Q Can you tell us what the significance of it is?

A It's a very good speech. (Laughter) It's a very good speech, and it addresses itself to some of the issues the Secretary has recently been discussing.

Also available from the Press Office later today will be a press release concerning the Administration's submission to Congress of a proposed joint resolution, approving the Compact of Free Association between the United States and the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia.

That's all I have for you. Be glad to take what few questions you might have.

Q John, what can you tell us about the coup in Guinea? Who's in charge, and what are conditions?

A Well, the local radio station has announced that the military has taken control in Guinea. Our Embassy there reports that all Americans are safe, so far as the

Embassy knows. We've had an initial contact between the -- our Ambassador there in Conakry and representatives of the new government. They have indicated a desire to maintain Guinea's excellent relations with the United States.

As far as Americans in the country are concerned, our estimate is about 100 Americans in Guinea. That includes the official community, the Embassy staff, as well as Americans at mining sites in northwestern Guinea. As you know, the Vice President was in Conakry last Friday for the funeral of Guinea's President, Sekou Toure, who died of heart failure in the United States last week.

That's really about all I have for you.

Q Who did the Ambassador see?

A I'm not sure, Mike. I don't have a fix on who he talked to.

Q John, do you have anything on the incident in the South China Sea, the Soviets firing, apparently, 8 single --

A Not beyond what the Pentagon has, Bernie. I think they've confirmed the substance of those reports on the firing.

Q On another subject --

Q Wait a minute. On that subject, has there been any communication with the Embassy here, Ambassador Dobrynin, or --

A Well, as you know the Secretary saw Ambassador Dobrynin yesterday, but I'm not aware of the substance of those discussions, and specifically in answer to your question, I'm not aware of any conversation between the two governments on that particular issue, but I'm not ruling out that it hasn't taken place.

Q What was the meeting regarding yesterday? At whose request?

A That was one of the continuing meetings that the Secretary has had with Ambassador Dobrynin and undoubtedly will continue to have here, and that Ambassador Hartmen has been having with officials -- Soviets officials -- in Moscow.

Q Could you put some characterization on that meeting, in the sense of, does the fact that the -- are they moving in a direction where we're starting to see some falling away of some of the ice?

A Well, I think I will stay away from a characterization, Bernie, and I think the Secretary would. We are interested in maintaining the dialogue that has been going on. There are such channels as this. They're being used, and I guess that is worthwhile. Not a guess that's worthwhile, it is worthwhile.

Q Could you, John -- you talk about one of the continuing series of meetings. Can you -- do you have the calendar on these meetings by any chance?

A I don't, Bernie. I can't give you a number on them.

Q Ambassador Hartman said when he was here last that he hoped to start serious discussions with the Soviets on cultural exchanges.

A Uh-huh. Don't have anything.

Q Did anything happen on that yet?

A Don't have anything for you on that.

Q Anything on the Soviet naval maneuvers off of Norway, described as some of the largest?

A No. I don't think -- let me check this for you, but I do not think any notification in this particular instance is required of the -- of this character of exercise -- any advance notification.

Q John, any concern with the size of it?

A Don't have any comment on that.

Q Would you relate that Dobrynin meeting yesterday at all to the Scowcroft visit last week or two weeks ago, whatever?

A I think you should see the Dobrynin visit within this context of a continuing contact between the Secretary and Ambassador Dobrynin here and Ambassador Hartman and various Soviet officials in Moscow. I think there's an interest in both sides in maintaining those discussions that have been going on for sometime.

Q Not in the context of passing any specific messages from the White House to the Kremlin?

A No, I think you should see them within this context of wanting to continue discussions at this level.

Q During his discussion of another meeting with Mr. Gromyko?

A The Secretary and Mr. Gromyko and --

Q Yes.

A No.

Q None?

Q John, when you say no, do you know that that did not come up in the meeting between Shultz and Gromyko?

A If the question is, is there a plan for the Secretary and Mr. Gromyko to meet, no, not so far as I know.

Q No, but the possibility of getting --

A I don't know.

Marvin?

Q There's supposed to be an effort on reciprocity. It's a small point, perhaps, but on the protocol side, if Ambassador Dobrynin is seeing the Secretary, is Ambassador Hartman seeing Gromyko?

A Why don't we get something to you on that later in the day.

Q John, in light of the questions that were asked yesterday about terrorism in Jerusalem and the question of what is the capital of Israel, it seems that the answers weren't quite complete and I wonder if you could fill them out a little bit.

And then there's another point which I have in relation to so-called negotiations with the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, which ought to be clarified.

The questions are these: Is West Jerusalem considered by the State Department as an integral part of Israel, or is it subject to negotiation as well?

A I refer you to our statements that we've made previously on the status of Jerusalem.

Q No, no, no. I'm talking about West Jerusalem as apart from the unified city of Jerusalem.

A And I told you that I refer you to the statements we have previously made on the status of Jerusalem.

Q Can you tell me when?

A No, you'll have to check that with the Press Office.

Q I'll have to check. All right. The Secretary has said that both Israel and the United States consider Jerusalem as a unified city. This was in his opposition to the Jerusalem bill now in the Congress. So on that basis he opposed -- that was one of the reasons why he opposes the bill.

The question then arises, is all of Jerusalem -- west, east, Old City -- subject to negotiations between parties unnamed so far, or what? Where does the State Department stand on that?

A Don't have anything to add to the many statements we have made before on the status of Jerusalem.

Q You won't clarify that now in light of the statements that have been made?

A It is clarified in the many statements we have made on the status of Jerusalem. I'm not going to modify or --

Q I didn't ask you to modify. I just ask to clarify.

A I will let you --

Q Or put them down in writing.

A I will let you do the research on --

Q You'll do me -- all right, I'll try to do it for you and come back.

A I think this gentleman is not quite through.

Q On terrorism in Jerusalem, you said that, as I heard it on the mechanism we have here, that you suppose that the shooting in the crowds yesterday in Jerusalem was terrorism but you thought others might not think so. Is there a division of thinking on this in the State Department?

A No, and I don't think that's what I said. I think what I said was that we had just received the reports of the incident but, clearly, there's no question about it being an act of terrorism. And in that regard I would say that certain statements made by Syrian commanders in Lebanon and some Lebanese politicians indicating approval of this act are considered by the United States to be scandalous.

Q That's much fuller than what I heard yesterday. Now that the question of --

A As time goes by, we produce more language.

Q Good. Now, the question -- it's in reference to an editorial in the Washington Post which charged that the State Department negotiated -- I repeat the word -- "negotiate" is what the editorial in the Post said -- with the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee in relation to the question of selling Stingers to Jordan.

Does the State Department, in your knowledge, under the Shultz Administration, ever negotiate with any private organization on any issue of policy for the United States? This also seems scandalous to me.

A I don't know about the word "negotiate." I'm sure the State Department officials are in touch and consult and exchange views with a variety of groups. I wouldn't see anything unusual about that, but I --

Q But the word is "negotiate." This is the sticking word, and that has a great deal of meaning. Doesn't it to you?

A Yes, it does.

Q And you repudiate that word?

A It's not a question of repudiating. It's a question of not being aware of it.

Q All right, now the --

A Let's see, number five. Maybe this will be your last.

Q All right. Did I ask four already? Well, thank you. (Laughter)

The fifth question is, the expressions of sympathy by Queen Elizabeth regarding the Palestinians on her visit to Jordan, do you have a comment on that?

A No.

Q No comment at all?

A No. That's the end of question of number five. Okay, Connie?

Q (Inaudible).

A I said I had no comment on it.

Q Do you have anything on that bombing in Durban this morning?

A Obviously, we deplore that violence in Durban. Durban, South Africa.

Q There are reports out of Zimbabwe claiming that tourists, including the two Americans, are alive and in Zambia. Does the State Department have any reason --

A No, don't have any comment on that.

Q Do you have reason to believe those reports?

A Don't have any comment on that.

Q Have you made any contact with Zambia at all? Is the State Department going to make any contact?

A Well, I think you may be assured that we have maintained a close interest in that situation.

Q John, on your Guinea statement, just for a second, to go back. You didn't in any way deplore a military takeover despite the constitution. Was there any reason for that?

A No. I think it's simply early hours, Jim.

Q I mean, the question is of the principle of a military takeover. You said there is a new government there, so I assume that you -- I mean, that you've come to that conclusion. But there was no notion that this is not the way to go about changing things in --

A Well, as I said, it's early; it's very early hours. It's been a very preliminary contact, and I'm just trying to describe the situation on the ground as we see it without trying to characterize what the new government is.

Q John, do you have anything on the Athens incident involving the U.S. officer?

A Not a great deal. I think the Pentagon may be able to be a little bit more forthcoming, but I'll tell you gladly what I have. We're obviously deeply concerned about the increased level of terrorism directed at American officials.

The shooting of an American NCO today in Athens is of special concern because of the assassination last year of Navy Captain Tsantes. I may not have that pronunciation correct. T-s-a-n-t-e-s.

In Greece, as in many other countries, we are increasing our efforts in cooperation with the host governments to protect American personnel, and we certainly anticipate the Greek Government will extend every effort to apprehend, prosecute, and punish the perpetrators of these heinous crimes. So far we only have a brief report on the incident, and I suggest you go to the Pentagon and see if they have anything more for you.

But as we understand it, an American noncommissioned officer was shot by two men on a motorcycle while driving on a main road near the U.S. military facility near Athens. Although wounded, the NCO managed to get to a hospital and get medical treatment. We understand he's in stable condition. He's assigned to the joint U.S. military assistance group in Athens. No one has claimed responsibility.

I know that names are moving on the wires, but as far as we're concerned we can't give you his name pending notification of next of kin.

--MORE--

Q John, do you have any comment on reports that China has been engaged in rather large-scale sale of military equipment to Iran, including some jet fighters?

A Don't have anything very specific for you on that, Bernie. As you know, in general, we have deplored the sale of weaponry to either side in that war. Certainly, that is our own position: We have not supplied weaponry to either side, and we have made that position known. And we have been in touch with a number of governments, particularly on the question of arms supplied to Iran, given the situation on the ground.

Q Have you been in touch with the Chinese?

A Not going to get into specifics of our diplomatic exchanges.

Q John, can we stay on that for just a second?

A Uh-huh.

Q The head of the Iraqi Interests Section here yesterday called on the United States to step up its contacts with the Brits, the West Germans, the French, the Japanese, and the South Koreans in an effort to try to persuade them to buy less oil, which then the Iranians turn into weapons purchases. Is that part of that diplomatic --

A Don't have anything for you on that.

Q John, on the same subject, did the Iraqis invite the United States to send observers to the front to investigate the charges of the use of chemical weapons by Iraq?

A I'm not aware of any official invitation. There have been some American correspondents recently at the front. But I'm not aware --

Q Can you look into the question of an official invitation --

A Whether they offered --

Q -- an invitation and how you responded to it?

A Sure.

Q John, what did you mean "especially" on Iran a moment ago?

A As I say, our position on the supply of arms to either side is clear; but there, obviously, is a threatening situation. Iran is being very intransigent, is refusing to respond to Iraqi overtures for settlement, and clearly Iran is the particularly intransigent party at the moment. So while our own position is that we have not supplied arms to either side -- and that is the position of other governments -- and that remains our position, nevertheless, we would be particularly concerned about the supply of arms to Iran at this moment.

Q John, there was a story yesterday, or a report, that one of the leaders of Iran said that if Iraq would use chemical weapons, we will produce chemical weapons. Do you have any indication? I asked you this possibly last week, I think, and you said that there was no indication.

There are reports that there are some chemical weapons which have been used by the Iranians in the war against Iraq. Do you have any indication to this effect?

A No, I don't have any --

Q -- on this threat, the contents, the implications of this threat that they will produce chemical weapons like Iran?

A Not aware of such developments, but obviously, we would be as strong in our deploring the use of chemical weapons by Iran as we have been in the case of Iraq.

Q Last week also you said that there were no indications, or there were no talks between the United States and Israel about the bombing of these facilities.

A That's correct.

Q You know, this is the position, the last position, that the whole thing, that was just pure imagination?

A Yes.

Q And fabrication.

A Yes.

Q John, you don't have anything on Iran's use of chemical weapons, there is nothing?

A I do not, Marvin. Are you aware of something I --

Q No, no. I was just trying to follow up and ask you, is there anything --

A No, I do not; no.

Q John, has the Israeli Government informed us or asked us for information about an American woman who was reportedly linked to yesterday's attack?

A I'm not aware of such a request, Bill. I saw something on the wire, I think, about that; but I'm not aware of such a request.

Q John, anything on -- Do you anticipate an agreement in this week's meetings between the Japanese Agriculture Minister and the U.S. on the beef and citrus issues?

A Well, we certainly are hopeful, specifically on beef and citrus. The arrangements which specified quota levels for Japan's fiscal year 1983 for beef and citrus products expired, as you know, March 31. We've been negotiating expanded access for these products for the period after March 31. The Japanese Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Yamamura, is arriving in Washington today for further discussions with U.S. officials, and we hope a mutually acceptable agreement can be developed.

While it would be premature to set a specific date for the conclusion of the talks, the Japanese understand the urgency of resolving the issue, and we're certain that the Japanese will not do anything to adversely affect current trade in beef and citrus while we're negotiating new arrangements.

Q Is the U.S. prepared to reduce its request for the number of tons of trade below 10,000 tons to a level closer to the 5,000 that the Japanese have proposed?

A I'm not aware of any change in the U.S. position.

Q Is he seeing anyone in the building, the Agriculture Minister?

A Mr. Yamamura? Here?

Q Yes, in this building.

A I'm not sure. I can't answer that.

Q John, when the Soviet Ambassador comes in next time, can you put that on the schedule?

A I think --

Q What's the reason that it is not?

A I think that the Secretary, traditionally, has not listed that particular meeting.

Q He's been on there once in a while.

A Has there been -- perish the thought: Has there been contradiction in our position on that? Let me look at that.

(Laughter)

Q Did he come in the front entrance or did he go the basement route?

A I'm sure he came in the front entrance.

Q Is the principal objective of those continuing discussions, renewal of the START and INF talks?

A It's a broad dialogue which covers a variety of issues that are of concern to both countries. Certainly, arms control is one of those issues, but there are bilateral and regional matters also, which we traditionally discuss; and I would assume that those three areas -- I'm not suggesting that they are discussed in each meeting, but I'm sure those three areas certainly would be part of the body of the discussion.

Q John, do you have anything on either --

A I don't want to mislead you, however, in suggesting that negotiations are going on, if that's what lay behind your question.

Q John, could you clarify one thing: Are the Soviets discussing arms control issues outside of the anti-satellite moratorium with us?

A Well, as is well known -- I mean, I could go over the state of play, as you know. Nothing is happening on START and INF. MBFR, you know what is happening there.

Q What I'm getting at is, are they even talking about --

A Is there movement on the nuclear --

Q -- conditions for resuming the talks or anything of that sort?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q Do you have anything, John, on either the Oberdorfer article that the Administration is considering pulling the Foreign Aid bill, or (2) anything more on the activities in Honduras in the light of Paz Barnica's statements yesterday?

A I do have something on the Foreign Aid bill. That's the question -- the report this morning suggesting that the bill might be withdrawn?

Q Yes.

A It's true that the Administration is seriously concerned about several of the amendments accepted last week in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee markup, but reports that we are washing our hands of the bill are premature. We have indicated to the Congress that we remain strong supporters of the authorization process and firm believers in the important contributions which the Senate Foreign Relations Committee can make to the formulation and conduct of foreign policy.

We are working actively with the Committee to overcome problems with the proposed bill and a draft bill which the Administration can support on the floor of the Senate.

Q May we have a copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q And also, nothing more on Honduras?

A Nothing more on Honduras.

Q Do you have anything on published charges yesterday that the U. S. is stonewalling the Australians on the Nugan Hand probe?

A I think there was some guidance yesterday which you can get in the Press Office.

Q John, any comment on criticism by the Mexicans and French at the United Nations of the mining of harbors in Nicaragua?

A No.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:40 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Wednesday, April 4, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #58

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 4, 1984, 12:17 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I guess we'll get going here with a couple of housekeeping announcements up front. Available in the Press Office is the prepared statement by Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs Gregory Newell before the House Committee on Appropriations. The subject of his testimony is the FY-85 request for certain voluntarily-funded organizations and programs.

And as for number two, today is the thirty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. The President has issued a proclamation commemorating this anniversary, rededicating the United States to the NATO Alliance, and welcoming the Washington meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers scheduled for May. The President's proclamation calls upon the American people to join him in these initiatives. Copies of the proclamation are available in the Press Office.

That is all I have. I will be glad to answer a question or two.

(No questions.)

Well, in that case -- (Laughter)

Q John, do you have any comment on the Economishkay A Gazeta article suggesting that the United States could get out of its economic difficulties by cutting its defense budget?

A No, haven't seen it.

Q Same subject. Do you have any comment on the report called "Democracy Must Work" issued by the Trilateral Commission which the Secretary addressed last night, which had six points in its action agenda, three of which included proposals that the United States cut its defense budget?

A No.

Q Did the Secretary read that report before he addressed the group?

A I don't know. But, however, the Administration's position on its defense budget in a general sense is perfectly clear.

Q So it's the Soviet Union's position and so is the Trilateral Commission's, is that correct?

A Well, I don't know. I haven't talked with the Soviet Union about its position on our defense budget, although I suspect their position is fairly predictable.

Q As is the Trilateral Commission's.

A I must say, I haven't read the --

(Several correspondents arrived at the briefing.)

Q We seem to have had what they call a "failure in communication" here. I think a quorum is thought to be --

A Well, the names of all those who arrived late have been taken (laughter) --

Q -- And placed on the roll of honor. (Laughter)

A Oh, yes. And those who were not here at the beginning of the briefing will not be allowed to ask questions for three days. (Laughter)

Q Next time, don't start it so early.

Q The spokesman who does not provide substantive responses (inaudible)

A This is a dangerous trend you're suggesting, Marvin. (Laughter)

Q I think we have a critical mass now.

A I might point out there is one serious questioner in this group, Mr. Troute.

Q I thought it had been presented already.

The Secretary's speech last night talked about, I think, "bold initiatives to combat terrorism." Any further thoughts on those, or preemptive, or preventative strikes, anything along that line at all?

A No. As you know, the Secretary has been giving considerable thought to this over a period of weeks and months, and surely in the light of developments that have taken place in the world in recent months, some of which have been directed against us, the Administration, obviously, is giving very careful thought to what is an increasing problem. But I don't have anything for you on specifics.

Q What kind of thought? Are there study groups?

A I think various people are considering this and studying it, and mulling over what, obviously, is a very difficult problem, and how best to respond to it.

Q When would you expect to have some sort of program to present?

A Dennis, I can't give you a timetable. I don't know that there is a specific deadline for the conclusion of these thoughts and studies.

Q Is there going to be a plan? The Secretary talked about active defense, which has its own dimensions of self-contradiction. Does he feel that --

A I'm sure that we're getting to the question.

Q No. Is there going to be a program, John? Is it going to be just words in mid-air -- threatening them with polysyllables? (Laughter) Or is there going to be --

A This gets better as we go on. I'm afraid you're out of time.

(Laughter)

A What exactly was your question, Mr. Kalb?

Q A program -- Wasn't there a thought that a program would be submitted for consideration so that there would be a working strategy that you'd punch up in case of a crisis or anticipated crisis?

A I can't give you chapter and verse -- I can't tell you how that's going to happen; but clearly, a great deal of thinking and a great deal of work is being done on this very menacing problem. But just how that will be coordinated and to whom that will be presented, on which day, which week, and which month, I can't give you a timetable.

Q John, the language of his speech yesterday, however -- no pun intended -- seems to preempt whatever decision would be taken by such a decision group, when he says "When and how should we take preventive or," not "when and if," but rather "when and how."

A Well, these are --

Q Is he, in effect, saying that we are now prepared to take preemptive action?

A I think what the Secretary is saying -- and I don't want to and I don't intend to interpret his speech; the words speak for themselves -- but I think what he is saying is that we have a new situation in the world. We are not always in a clear-cut, all-out war situation -- clearly, we're not in such a situation at the moment; but on the other hand, neither is the world at total peace. There have been gray areas in between, and there likely will continue to be such areas. We are facing a new kind of warfare with the waging of terrorism and the waging of state-sponsored terrorism. What he is saying is that the United States must develop effective ways to counter this.

Q But remember when this Administration first came to office, the first news conference given by then Secretary Haig dealt with that precise subject. Is this just simply an evolution of that concern, or is there something new since January 1981?

A I think there has been an evolution of events. The United States has been subjected to a variety of increasingly distasteful and violent terrorist actions by various groups.

Q And has that evolution of events, then, caused an evolution of U.S. policy?

A Well, I think it clearly is spurring reaction. I think what the Secretary is saying is that this kind of warfare by state-sponsored terrorism cannot be tolerated, and the United States and others will have to take actions to counter it. It's a new kind of technique, and we must probably develop new techniques to counter it.

Q John, is it any kind of inconsistency to maintain diplomatic relations, even to provide aid to governments that engage in what you call "this new kind of warfare?"

A In a general sense, Marvin, without getting into specific countries, I don't think it is necessarily a contradiction. You may still want to maintain diplomatic relations, and you may want to negotiate with certain governments even while policies that they pursue may be very distasteful to us. So in a general sense, I don't think there is a contradiction.

Q Would you expect to emerge from the study groups a legislative program?

A Can't really give you a specific -- as you know, the White House has talked about an anti-terrorism package -- that is one track -- but I really can't tell you what the specifics will be of the kind of thinking and studying that is going on at the moment.

Q John, what is the Secretary envisioning when he says, "It is more and more appropriate that the nations of the West face up to the need for active defense against terrorism?" Is he talking about the need for a NATO Task Force or a western alliance against terrorism? What does he specifically mean there?

A I think he, necessarily, is addressing himself to the problems of the United States, but other countries have suffered similar problems, and I'm sure that there is consideration being given to the sharing of techniques and ideas, and perhaps cooperation.

Q On another subject, John, could I ask you about a report that France has agreed, has offered to help Nicaragua clear mines from its ports? Do you have any comment on that?

A Well, I've seen some initial French wire service reports on that story, but I think until we see something in the more official manner, we won't have any comment. It's a rather hypothetical story at the moment.

Q Why is it hypothetical?

A I don't think we would respond, as I say, to a wire service report; and I think there is some confusion about exactly what was said by Mr. Cheysson -- I think that's the one you're referring to. So I think until we see something that we can sink our teeth into, we will wait for any comment.

Q Since you have said in the past that you have no objection to the Soviets' clearing mines, would you have any objection to anyone else doing so?

A Don't know that we said we had no objection to the Soviets' clearing mines. I think we were asked about some travel plans of Nicaraguan leaders to the Soviet Union, and said that would be a hypothetical situation.

Q New subject, John: Ambassador Rumsfeld -- where is he? And what do you see his mission as being at the present time, given what the Secretary said about two weeks ago, that this might be a time for the United States to hold off, and perhaps that very fact might stimulate the various parties in the Middle East to scramble for their own way out?

A I don't know where he is. I haven't seen him in the building today, Bernie. It may be that he is between here and Chicago. As you know, he has got business responsibilities in Chicago; and I suspect he is between Washington and Chicago for the moment.

Q His mission, when he goes to the Middle East --

A Well, --

Q Given the President's weekend order about the ships and the Secretary's remarks at the news conference, what is the purpose of his making the rounds?

A I think the purpose would be unchanged. The purpose would be to move forward the President's Middle East peace initiative.

Q Going back to the Secretary's news conference about 10 days ago, that paragraph about, "It's up to you fellows to move it ahead," are we getting --

A I'm not sure he phrased it quite like that.

Q -- are you getting any blips from Jordan or Saudi Arabia asking the U.S. to reconsider what was laid down, in an impromptu way, as current U.S. policy on the Middle East?

A To reconsider policy?

Q That is to reengage, you know, "Too bad about Lebanon, but hang in there; try for other things, keep at it," and so forth.

A Well, certainly, at the ambassadorial level -- and the Secretary has spoken on many occasions about the significance of using our good ambassadors in such countries as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere -- I would say that a very active dialogue continues.

Q John, about the Iraq-Iran war, do you have any comment on the willingness of Iraq to accept an impartial observer there?

A An impartial observer to do what?

Q To go there and investigate the chemical weapon usage, or anything, or who started the war?

A No. I haven't seen that so I don't have any immediate reaction to it.

It's an official, Iraqi Government --

Q That's what we are told, yes.

A No, I haven't seen that.

Q John, do you have any advice for a group of Senators today who may be voting on a War Powers amendment offered by Senator Leahy?

A No, I don't.

Q Don't, huh?

A No.

Q John, back on Ralph's questic the mining, do you have any comment on an informish protest about the mines and the free navigatiomt area?

A I'm really not going to get plomatic exchanges with allies; but I think it's reas to assume that they are very much aware of our thinkirt developments in the region, and we are, obviously, of their thoughts.

Q Doesn't that mining aspect ccte the anti-terrorism, anti-state terrorism speech Secretary?

A I don't think so. I don't that's a --

Q Could you separate the two? you say --

A I think they are separate; I they are very different situations. I think you havcuation in Nicaragua where you have an insurgency on th of people, or action on the part of people whohat they have been betrayed by their government and ir ideals which they all subscribe to -- is a very dif situation to state-sponsored terrorism.

-- MORE --

Q Mr. Haddad, the National Adviser of the Lebanese President, met with Secretary Shultz last Friday.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you have any readout or anything about this?

A I don't. No. Mr. Haddad was --

Q That was the first time after the abrogation of the agreement.

A I'm not sure. It may or may not be. He's seen Mr. Haddad on a number of occasions, both here and, obviously, when he's been in the Middle East.

Q Same subject, John.

A Sure.

Q Do you have any idea what -- or do you have anything to offer on what Soviet diplomacy may be up to in Beirut, contacting the various political factions at a high level?

A No. I really don't. No.

Q John, do you have anything on the United States joining Britain and France in a protest note to the Soviets about hindrance of civil air traffic on the Berlin corridor?

A Yes. There is something on that. The Soviets, citing their need for airspace to carry out military exercise activities, have reserved for themselves airspace in the Berlin air corridors, which is also used at times by Allied commercial flights to and from Berlin.

There's been absolutely no interruption of normal commercial or military flights to and from Berlin. However, in the interest of flight safety, Allied flights have avoided airspace in which the Soviets have said they would be exercising.

This has caused on some occasions alterations of normal flight patterns for descents into and ascents from Berlin airports. The Western Allies -- that's the United States, U.K., and France -- are responsible jointly with the

Soviet Union for managing air traffic to and from Berlin. This responsibility is based on our rights as occupying powers in Berlin.

The three Allied governments have made known their dissatisfaction with these requests to the Soviets in the Berlin Air Safety Center, and the Allies are pursuing the matter with Soviet authorities.

Although we cannot, of course, discuss the content of the diplomatic exchanges which are underway, we would point out that we have reiterated to the Soviets our firm intention to maintain free and unimpeded access to Berlin. We see no indication that the Soviets are interested in challenging these rights.

Q That sounds a little equivocal, as though the Soviets, too, although it's an inconvenience, are within their rights in doing what they have done.

A I think that is correct.

Q Okay.

Q They are within their rights.

A They are within their rights.

Q Could we get a copy of that, John?

Q Copy of that, John?

A Sure.

Q John, have they done this before?

A I'm not sure whether they have done this before, Bernie. I'd have to check on that.

Q Do you -- if it is in fact the first time, what sort of interpretation do you put on this?

A Well, if your -- underlying your question, is this linked to other developments or other exercises or other incidents between U.S. ships and -- no. We see no connection.

Q No. But I -- is there some sort of diplomatic signal emerging from that military decision at the U.S.? Certainly you must calculate why they would want to do it at this particular moment.

A Yeah. I'm not a very good analyzer of Soviet motives.

Q When did this happen?

A I do not have a timeframe on that for you, Marvin, but I'll be glad to -- it's been going on for some days, as I recall. Let me see what I can get for you on timeframe.

Q Do you know how long the request is that the Russians have asked for this --

A No. I do not.

Q John, back on the Secretary's speech, what is he suggesting in the sense of a pre-emptive or preventive action? Is he talking about an air strike on a headquarters of some group? Is he talking about assassination of certain leaders?

A Well, I think this is the kind of -- I don't want to mislead you, but I think this is the kind of thinking about the specifics of what you might do that is clearly going on. I think as the Secretary has said in public, these new techniques and tactics raise significant questions for us, moral questions especially, and I think he has said on occasion if you know that a truck loaded with dynamite is roaring down the road towards a building you occupy, is your position such -- must it be that you have to wait until that truck hits the building and blows you up, or are you able to take that truck out before it reaches you? That's the kind of thinking that's going on now.

Q What's his answer?

A Well, I think it's quite clear that the United States -- the mood is that you cannot lay back and be in a passive situation; that you have to take some actions to prevent the rising surge of terrorism.

Q Are there some limits to that type of --

A Oh, I think there are --

Q -- preventive action?

A I think there are obvious limits, but I think this --

Q Well, what would you suggest as a type of --

A Well, I can't give you that because this is exactly the kind of thoughtful thinking that has to go forward on such major issues.

Q John --

A That's what people are thinking about.

Q If -- I want to get an idea as to the principle of what distinguishes state-sponsored terrorism of the kind that he was speaking of and other forms that are ascribed to terrorism, and I guess my question is: If a state provides weapons, intelligence and logistical support to any insurgent group to accomplish military ends of that group and of that state, if there's a convergence, is that state-sponsored terrorism or is that distinguishable?

A That clearly is going to -- I mean, you're asking a very broad philosophical question. I don't think I can answer that. I think it depends on the state. I think it depends on the location. I think it depends on the circumstances. It depends on the target and the motivation. There are all kinds of factors that come into play.

Q Well, he omitted from his list yesterday, for example, Cuba and Nicaragua which have been accused of supporting insurgencies illegally in other countries. Did he -- does he or the State Department believe that those countries are guilty of state-sponsored terrorism or are they kind of in a different category because of a different set of circumstances?

A Well, we've said many times what we think about various Cuban and Nicaraguan activities in the area, but I can't give you a --

Q Well, you've never used the expression "state-sponsored terrorism" to ascribe to them. Are you exempting them from that?

A No. Not exempting them. Not including them. I'm simply not giving you any comment on that. Their records, I think, are rather evident, but just how you would categorize their regimes, I don't really have a comment on that for you.

Q Did the Russians say how long these exercises or maneuvers in the Berlin corridors would last?

A I'm not sure that I have anything on that for you, Marvin. I'm just not sure.

Q Are these military planes they're engaged in?

A I think they are.

Q And it is -- and both military and civilian Western airliners are avoiding the areas --

A Correct.

Q -- that they have indicated.

A Sure.

Q And this has been going on -- you're going to find out how long.

A I think several days. We'll check that for you.

Q Do you have any sense of the width of the corridor as you've both defined it?

A The width of the --

Q The corridor. The air corridor.

A Oh, the corridor.

Q Yes.

A No. I don't, but that's -- I'm sure that's a factual question. We can get an answer for you.

Q Going back to Mike's question on terrorism, he asked you what are you thinking of, air strikes or assassination, and your answer was then, "This is the kind of thinking that is going on."

A Well -- (laughter) -- I don't mean to suggest that thinking's going on about air strikes or assassination. As you know, we have very strict rules about assassination, so clearly that is one area that is not under consideration.

I really was -- what I was trying to suggest was that there are people thinking about the way you tackle this problem.

Q Can I get back to Soviet-American relations for a minute and ask you specifically whether the way is now clear for cultural and consular talks to take place, to resume?

A Well, I think that, obviously, talks are going on about a variety of subjects, broad areas, and clearly cultural talks or the possibility of beginning or moving or reopening cultural talks might be one of those topics. But I think you have to see it as one of a broad range of topics that would be under discussion.

Obviously, one would be looking at areas where you might remove some of the difficulties and some of the tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States, but I don't think you should look for sudden major breakthroughs.

Q The way is not clear for those talks to resume at this time.

A Well, I think I would see that as an evolutionary process, but I wouldn't back too much on decisions having been made about specific talks.

Q Can I ask also whether you have any comment on the TASS account today of a rather lengthy Chernenko statement in response to some European -- in response to some Europeans?

A No. I don't, Ralph.

Q John, could I have a point of clarification on the air corridor? Did you also say the Soviet maneuvers are interfering with Allied military air traffic as well?

A I think that is correct.

Q All right.

Q John, in view of the President's upcoming visit to Beijing, do you have any comment on the artillery shelling in North Vietnam and China?

A I do not have anything today. We may -- I guess we have not. Let me see whether we might have something for you later in the day on that.

Q Anything on the ANC bombing?

A We deplored it and regretted it yesterday, and, obviously, we --

Q I'd like to hear that, please.

A Would you like a little more specific language?

Q Sure. Anything you got.

A Okay. We deplore this violent incident -- that was the bombing in Durban, South Africa, and deeply regret the injury and loss of life which occurred. The United States is firmly committed to encouraging peaceful evolutionary change in South Africa. We are committed to opposing terrorism from whatever source and wherever it takes place.

Q Is there any evidence that this crime was committed across borders -- or this act had to do with crossing borders?

A I don't think we have any evidence of who has -- who is responsible or where the attackers came from.

Q John, you said you have no comment on the visit of the Russian delegation to Lebanon. I mean, they said they would help in the Israeli withdrawal. How can they help in your point of view?

A Well, I had some earlier guidance which I'd be glad to reiterate for you. It's -- obviously, we don't pretend to monopolize the Government of Lebanon's contacts with other governments, and it really isn't appropriate for us to comment on the reported visit of the Soviets to Lebanon. I think you really ought to go to those two governments.

However, just as a general observation, there's no indication that the Soviets have been or are prepared to play a helpful role in Lebanon.

Q But --

A It's their record.

Q But they said publicly that they would help in the withdrawal of the Israelis. How can they achieve that when the American involvement didn't achieve that?

A Well, I guess you ought to ask -- they have pledged to be helpful in Lebanon. I guess you ought to ask them how they expect to do that.

Q John, you talk -- going back to the corridor, you talk about it interfering with Allied military and civilian aircraft. Is it possible for the Soviets to conduct their operations in the corridor without there being such interference? In other words --

A I think it is -- you'd really have to ask a technical expert, Bernie. I think it is possible, but I think what we have done is taken what we consider to be a prudent course. I think it is possible, but to avoid the slightest possibility of a mishap, I think we have taken the action we have done.

Q To accommodate the Soviets?

A Well, it's not a question of accommodating the Soviets. I guess it's to stop people crashing into each other and getting killed. It seems a prudent thing to do.

Q But did they just lay down the rule? This is what we are planning to do as a fait accompli, an edict to the U.S., this is what we are doing, thank you?

A Well, it is not as though we have said, "Okay, go ahead and do what you want to do, fellows." We are pursuing this, obviously, in various capitals.

Q And there was no advance consultation with the Soviets about what they planned to do, or were you just--

A I am --

Q -- handed a sheet of paper saying that --

A -- not sure whether there was any advance consultation --

Q Could you --

A -- on this particular one. Yeah.

Q Can you tell us if they're pre-empting altitude levels or if they're using all the altitudes in the corridor?

A I cannot, but we'll try to get you an answer on that.

Q I'd like to know where their operations are taking place, at what altitude and how widespread in the corridor it is, and if they're having to leave the corridor --

A I hope the folks who are taking down the questions are getting this very technical stuff so we can try to answer it.

Q John, have we given any thought -- or any possibility of getting a technical expert to talk to us on this about the scope of the activities?

A It's -- let me make an inquiry and see whether anybody would be prepared to talk about it.

Q Are we sending in more flights than usual -- military -- because of this?

A No. Not that I'm aware of.

Q Okay. Thank you.

A Okay?

(The briefing concluded at 12:45 p.m.)

Bicker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Thursday, April 5, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #59

THURSDAY, APRIL 5, 1984, 12:09 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A couple of announcements.

First, to tell you that available in the Press Office is the prepared statement by Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Paul Wolfowitz before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Testimony will be on the Indochinese refugee situation. I'm not sure whether that's before the full committee or a subcommittee.

Secondly, a statement regarding agreements on U.S. defense facilities in the Bahamas which were concluded today: The Secretary of State, the Foreign Minister of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas and the British Ambassador to the United States today concluded agreements concerning United States defense facilities in the Bahamas.

The most important of these facilities is the Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center, or AUTEC. Related agreements with the United Kingdom were also concluded today concerning continued British use of the AUTEC facility.

AUTEC has been located in the Bahamas since 1963. During the past 20 years all three countries have enjoyed close and cooperative working relationships at this unique research and testing facility. Today's ceremony confirms these close ties of friendship and community of interest.

These agreements provide a firm foundation for continued cooperation in the use of these important facilities.

That's it for announcements. Happy to take questions.

Q Do you know why they're important?

A Well, these facilities, George, are -- let me just identify what they are. It includes the U.S. Navy Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center, which is AUTEC, which is used basically as a weapons and ASW testing facility, a long-range -- Navy long-range, or LORAC, navigation station, and an Air Force tracking station. So these are technical facilities, and I might note that they are operated largely by civilian contract personnel.

Q Alan, regarding the -- our close friends here, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliament has issued a report that the United States intentionally kept Britain in the dark about its plans for the invasion of Grenada; that, as a result, Britain had a rather passive role in this affair.

Have you heard of this report, and do you have a comment on it?

A I saw a wire on it. No. This question has come up before at the time of the operation in Grenada, and I think was addressed in various ways at that time, and I'll refer you back to the record on that. I don't have anything new to say about that today.

Q Alan, I would like to follow up on the bases in the Bahamas.

A Well, not bases.

Q Or military facilities in the Bahamas.

A You have to be careful. (Laughter)

Q What is the basis of the agreement? Is the U.S. going to pay the Government of the Bahamas money now for those facilities?

A Yes. There will be a payment of $10 million a year.

Q This is new, correct?

A The agreement is new. The facility, I think, has been used for some time. As I say, for the past 20 years there have been close relationships, working relationships, at the facility, but the agreement is new. It's a 10-year agreement with an option to renew for an additional five years.

Q But there was no agreement to pay any money before, correct?

A So far as I know, that is correct. Yes.

Q Alan, isn't one of the primary purposes of AUTEC to monitor the coming and going of Soviet submarines?

A Well, as I say, my understanding is that AUTEC is a weapons and ASW testing facility. If there were a monitoring facility, (a) I don't know about it, (b) I wouldn't talk about it, and (c) I'd refer you to the Pentagon. So I'm going to have to leave it at that.

Q Alan, why is the U.S. -- why did the U.S. feel it necessary at this point to begin making payments for the use of bases which it has used without payment for 20 years?

A I think this is an issue which has been under discussion for some time, Ralph, and it is a very complex arrangement, and it is just that it is at this point that agreement has been reached.

Q Did they demand payment?

A Oh, I don't think it's a question of demanding payment, Mike. It's a question of using the facilities and paying for that use.

Q Does that suggest they wanted something besides good will or --

A I'm not going to try to be drawn out on that. I think I've answered your questions on that.

Q Alan, do you have any reaction to the TASS reaction to the President's proposal on chemical weapons, a global ban, in which it is called "unacceptable," "propaganda trick?"

A Uh-huh. It's regrettable that the Soviet Union chose to attack the President's initiative before even seeing it. When the Vice President presents our draft treaty in Geneva in two weeks, we would hope the Soviet Union would give it the serious consideration it deserves.

As to the other Soviet charges about U.S. policies on chemical weapons, they are false and misleading and are obviously intended for a propaganda effect to divert attention from their own actions in this area.

Q But the charge about advocating a stockpile of such weapons by this -- advocating by this Administration -- that charge is not false and misleading, is it?

A Well, I think, again, that the President addressed this last night as to what the purposes of having your own weapons stock is. As he noted, the U.S. has not produced weapons, chemical weapons, for 15 years, and yet the Soviet Union has continued to expand and modernize its chemical weapons stockpile, and it has a huge investment in chemical warfare equipment and personnel.

Until the threat posed by chemical weapons is effectively eliminated by a treaty, the U.S. must have a credible chemical weapons deterrent. We have now asked for the funds, as you know, necessary to start the initial production at that -- on that, if necessary at some future time.

But, in any case, that -- the effective deterrent provides a major incentive to the Soviets to negotiate seriously towards an effective comprehensive ban as we are proposing.

Q What charges -- if it wasn't the charge that the U.S. is advocating its own stockpile, what charges that the Soviets made are, specifically, false and misleading?

A I think -- I'd refer you back to their statement. I don't think I'm going to go on a point-by-point rebuttal of it, but the fact is that they were charging purposes of the U.S. doing this and intentions, which are simply not squaring with the facts.

Q Alan, since you're talking about chemical weapons, there are all kind of signals coming out from Iran that Iran is already producing the chemical weapons to be used against Iraq in the war, and Rafsanjani, I believe, he didn't admit it, commented on television the other night, but he said that,"we could use this," and there are some indications that they are having some. Do you have any ideas about this, or do you have any indications that there are chemical weapons that are produced in Iran?

A I don't happen to have any. I don't -- I can't give you an authoritative answer, necessarily. I'm not aware of any suggestion, either in the Iranian statements or otherwise, that they have done so, but I think a number of scientists have pointed out, in commenting on this issue, that it isn't all that hard to produce certain kinds of chemical weapons. So I don't know that it's necessarily the case that one would have to assume they would have them in advance, greatly in advance, to produce them for use. But, in any case, the answer to your question is, I don't have anything on that.

Q Alan, do you have anything on a TASS report that Soviet journalists have been denied, or barred, from visiting Los Angeles?

A Yes. There seems to be some -- either misunderstanding or miscommunication or misinformation about it. Four Soviet journalists requested visas to attend a meeting of the Ski Club of International Journalists in Park City, Utah (Laughter) -- this is in the proletarian paradise -- in Park City, Utah, to be held March 24 to 31.

In their application they requested to stay in the United States only through March 31 and gave no indication of interest in visiting Los Angeles. The visas were issued for the length of stay and destinations requested.

To extend their stay to include a visit to Los Angeles, they should have applied to the local office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, INS, which has the sole authority in the United States to extend visas.

As far as the State Department is aware, they made no such application, and they left the country in accordance with the length of stay provided for in their visas.

Q Do you know that the organizers of that -- I happened to be there, so I know -- that the organizers of that group provided very cheap trips to several journalists attending that, and everybody could decide on the spot, so the Soviets were denied the decision on the spot. Because other people could make that decision on the spot.

A Well, they could have applied to the local INS office, and, so far as we know, they didn't do that.

Q Alan, do you have anything to tell us about the purpose of the Secretary's meeting with Tip O'Neill today?

A I could only tell you in broad terms. Speaker O'Neill requested that the Secretary come up, I think to talk about a number of issues, and so he is complying with that request.

Q Would it be fair to asume that the prospects --

Q He is going to the Hill?

A He's going to go up to the Hill.

Q Would it be fair to assume that the prospects for Salvador aid in the House side are high on the agenda?

A I can't speak for the Speaker. That's up to him to talk about. I wouldn't be surprised if the question of Central America was among those topics to be discussed. But I can't tell you in specific terms whether the prospects for the legislation would be something he would --

Q Was the Jerusalem issue discussed?

A It's this afternoon, Joe, and it's the Speaker's request for the meeting. Why don't you check with them and see what they are interested in discussing?

Q What time is the meeting?

A The meeting, I believe, is at 3 o'clock. I think it's on the public schedule.

Q A different subject: Do you have anything today on the Chernenko answer to Willy Brandt and the others on arms talks? Do you anticipate having any comment on that?

A I really don't anticipate an answer to that. I think that our position on returning to the nuclear arms negotiations is very clear. We're ready and willing to do that, to negotiate in good faith, to negotiate flexibly. But the point now is for the Soviets to return to the table.

Q I was just going to go back to that chemical weapons idea. Would you argue with the general proposition that if something is serious in diplomacy, it's done secretly?

A I would not argue with the fact that at times some things that are serious in diplomacy are done secretly, and sometimes things that are serious in diplomacy are not done seriously (sic). It depends on the issue; it depends on the circumstances.

If you're raising a question about how this was done in terms of announcing it last night, I would point out to you that the Secretary announced, in his Stockholm speech, that we would be doing this, that the terms of our treaty (that) are going to be presented at the negotiating table were not laid out last night. The fact is, this is a very important issue, to which this government pays a great deal of attention and about which it is very serious. And the fact that we are having the negotiations is something that is worth making note of. The specifics, however, would be carried out in negotiations.

Q And is it unusual for the Vice President to be doing this and not a senior State Department official?

A I think the Vice President has in fact had a role in arms control issues, a quite prominent role.

Q Has he been a negotiator at any point?

A I don't know if he's been a negotiator. I can't tell you what went on in his conversations. I suspect, or suggest, you might want to ask his office; but last year, he presented, for example, the Administration's detailed views at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, about how most effectively to ban chemical weapons, so his role in this is not new; and I don't consider that unusual in this respect.

Q Why isn't the Secretary doing it?

A Well, the President asked that the Vice President do it. As I say, he's had a role in this before. He's been at the CD before, he's talked about this before; and I think this underscores the importance which the Administration, including the Secretary, and, obviously, the President attaches to it.

Q Why does the President feel that we need our own stockpile of chemical weapons for deterrence? Certainly, we have a vast array of other weapons. If someone used chemical weapons against us, certainly we could deter -- you know -- we could retaliate in some other fashion.

A I listened to -- watched the press conference last night, and I thought that question was quite fully answered. So beyond what I said today, I really don't have anything more to give you. I think that that answer was quite complete that was given on the record last night.

Q On the veto of the Nicaragua resolution yesterday at the U.N., does the U.S. feel isolated at this point in its position on that issue?

A Oh, I don't have that kind of a characterization to give you. I think that you probably have access to the statement that was made up at the U.N. by the U.S. representative, Ambassador Sorzano, yesterday. The point that he made was that the resolution lacked balance and fairness and was not well suited to the purposes which it ostensibly was seeking to serve -- that is, peace in the area.

I think he noted that the U.S. would have no problem with the resolution if it were concerned with all of the violence in the region, and if its object were to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all of the countries in the region, and not just Nicaragua. But it didn't do that, and so that is why the United States cast its vote. But I would refer you to his full statement.

Q There isn't any doubt, is there, that the U.S. deplores the mining of harbors, though -- or is there?

A Ralph, we have gone through that issue many times before, and I don't intend to be drawn into a discussion of it again today.

Q Alan, the general who "resigned" in Honduras, Mr. Alvarez, is he coming to the United States?

A I think I would have to check on that for you, Mike. I don't have anything.

Q (Inaudible) to Miami?

A It could be. Let me check and see.

Q Would you check on what basis he -- it's a matter of asylum, or a visit or what?

A Okay, let me check on that.

Q Alan, there are a couple of things dealing with Germany. First about -- the Hess case has come up again. Have we actually made any change in our position of releasing Hess, or what is the position?

A I'm not aware of a change in our position. I saw a wire just before I came in here about a report that Chancellor Kohl had supposedly made a request. I'm checking that out. I don't have anything for you on that.

Q You don't know?

A No.

Q Would you give us something later in the day?

A I'll see what I can find on it.

Q The other thing is, why do we have an ambassador in East Berlin, which is under four-power control?

A Joe, you've raised that question before. It's been addressed here before. Again, I'm not going to rehash it.

Q Not on East Berlin. I didn't ask you anything about East Berlin.

A Yes. Well, others have raised it.

Q What did I ask about East Berlin?

A I think you did. But others have, and I'm not going to go through that again. You're going to try and draw a parallel with Jerusalem. I'm not going to get drawn into that issue again. John answered you yesterday about that issue.

Q He talked about it Monday. He said I should do some research. Well, I have done some research.

A Joe --

Q You'll be astounded at the results. Can I give them to you?

A No. This is a briefing, not a --

Q (Inaudible) let me ask you another, though, one question about General Lahad.

A Well, I'll come back to you, Joe, in just a second -- I'll come back to you in just a second.

Q Alan, do you have anything on increased reports of anti-Semitism in Romania?

A Yes, I do have something on that. We are aware of reports of increased anti-Semitism in Romania, and are actively investigating them. These reports center on a book of poems published recently in Romania, especially one poem in the collection which attacks Chief Rabbi Moses Rosen personally, and Jews in general.

The fact that such a poem was published in Romania, a country in which the government controls the media, is of particular concern. We have unconfirmed reports that the unsold copies of the book have been recalled, and that officials of the publishing house which published the book have been reprimanded. Nevertheless, we would regard any recurrence of anti-Semitism in Romania very seriously, and have expressed our concern to the Romanian Government at high levels.

Q Can we have a copy?

A Yes.

Q Has the Ambassador been in?

A I'm not going to give more detail on that. As I say, we've expressed our views at high levels.

Q Alan, did Mr. Eagleburger mention that earlier this week when he was there?

A Again, I'm not going to go into details of how this was done. But as I say, it was done at high levels.

Copy, yes.

Q Do you have any comment on the Jerusalem Post criticism of the consulate in East Jerusalem, calling it a pro-Arab and pro-PLO activities place, which, according to the comment, "has overstepped the bounds of diplomatic decency by the *de facto* recognition of the Jerusalem West Bank entity while ignoring Jerusalem as the capital of Israel?" Do you have any comment on that?

A Well, staying away, again, from the question of "the capital of Israel is Jerusalem," to quote what you just said, and the whole issue of Jerusalem, I would say any charges about improper behavior or intentions on behalf, or on the part of, the Consul General or any of the personnel in the Consulate General are totally misplaced, and indeed irresponsible.

Q Why do you think these attacks are coming and going just about this year (Inaudible) last year?

A I can't tell you. You tell me -- not here -- but anyway, I can't tell you why, but they are totally wrong. And they are just not justified in any way.

Q So you have total confidence in your consulate in East Jerusalem in all of its operations and everything?

A Yes, absolutely.

Q Alan, anything to say at all by way of details about the arrest yesterday at Dulles Airport in connection with that espionage case?

A No.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:30 p.m.)

Baker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, April 6, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #60

FRIDAY, APRIL 6, 1984, 12:35 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I have one brief announcement. The Governing Mayor of Berlin, Eberhard Diepgen, will visit Washington April 9 and 10. He will meet with members of the Executive Branch, the Congress, and the private sector.

On April 9, Mr. Diepgen will call on the President and Vice President. On the same day, he will meet with Secretary Shultz. Deputy Secretary Dam will host a breakfast for him.

We anticipate discussions will center on U.S.-German relations, especially improving contacts between young people in our two countries, East-West matters, and the situation in and around Berlin.

That's all I have for you.

Q John, the meeting with the Secretary on -- which, both days or just the session here at the Department?

A I think that -- let me see if I can give you a little more detail on that, Mike. I guess the Secretary is going to meet with him on Monday. Is that the 9th? Okay, yes. That's it.

Q John, what can you tell us about the reason for revoking the visa for Mr. Ungo?

A Basically, that is the revoking of his multiple entry visa. Obviously, he can apply in the future on a case-by-case basis. But the reason is that FDR representatives residing in the United States and those visiting the United States are engaged in fund raising for the FMLN.

Q Let me make sure I understand you. He was gathering funds for the FDR, or a representative or -- can you spell that out?

A I think that I will leave you with the language about the fund raising activities of the organization.

Q What is the reason? Why is that a reason, that they're engaged in fund raising for the FMLN? What is there about "fund raising" that breaches some previous rule or --

A I'd refer you to various actions of the FMLN, not the least of which is the statements that they have made in connection with the assassination of Commander Schaufelberger in the past.

Q I guess what I'm trying to get at is the fund raising part. Their representatives are here, as you say, of the organization.

A That's right.

Q They're present. But is it the fund raising that is the thing that the State Department objects to, or is it the fact that they represent an organization which has made, some of who -- people have made these statements?

A There's a combination of the fund raising and the purposes for which they use those funds, and the atmosphere in which those funds are collected and the motivation for the collection of those funds. A combination of factors have caused us to decide that he should not be free to come and go on a multiple entry visa, but that we should be able to look at this visits on a case-by-case basis.

Q Let me ask it this way. Is there something about fund raising for a foreign organization that is encompassed in State Department regulations or policy?

A Certainly, the ends to which those funds may be put is a legitimate area of inquiry when considering an entrant into the country.

Q When did he raise funds for the FDR, or FMLN while in --

A Don't -- I don't have anything more for you.

Q But they denied that. Can we get an answer to that question?

A Let me see if we can develop something more for you.

Q John, also following up on that subject, you mentioned that the FMLN/FDR representatives residing in the

U.S. may also have been involved in fund raising. Are you also cancelling their resident status or expelling them?

A I think you'd have to go to INS for that kind of comment. What we're talking about is the multiple entry status of Mr. Ungo's visa, and the fact that that has been changed.

Q The Administration-supported FDN rebels -- Nicaraguan rebels -- also have fund raising efforts in the United States. Is it their goal that --

A I think I'll leave you with the language that I did, namely, the end use to which those funds may be applied.

Q Yesterday, someone told the New York Times -- a State Department; Mr. Weeks, I guess -- that his visits were used to collect money for the "terrorist activities" of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front. Is it specific terrorist activities that we object to or terrorist activities in general, to which these may be put; and how do you distinguish them from activities undertaken by the FDN in Nicaragua?

A I can't give you the specifics, but I certainly would refer you to the attitude of that organization to the assassination of Commander Schaufelberger.

Q It happened almost a year ago. I'm a little surprised that ten months later -- or eleven months later -- you get around to doing this.

A Well, we have a long memory.

Q While we're on this subject of Central America, do you have any comment on the reported offer by France to provide equipment to resist the laying of mines in Nicaraguan waters and their appeal to Colombia, I believe it was, to assist?

A What is your specific question, Don?

Q Well, the stories come out that Mitterrand has sent a letter, and there are quotations from it --

A Cheysson.

Q Cheysson, I'm sorry. -- have been published. The question is, does the U.S. have any comment on this?

Does it have any view of whether France should or should not go down this road?

A We have raised our concerns with the French. We have all along been concerned with the large Soviet and Cuban military relationship with Nicaragua, and we would not favor any nation's contributing to Nicaragua's ability to export revolution with impunity.

So, yes, we have raised our concerns with the French.

Q Well, John, does the French offer -- would the French offer contribute to Nicaragua's ability to export revolution, paraphrasing your phrase there?

A I have expressed our concerns with what is happening in Nicaragua, in general. And I have told you that we have taken up those concerns with the French, in particular, with specific reports of their possible involvement.

Q Can I just ask you one more on that? Two days ago this was a hypothetical situation. It's not hypothetical today?

A I think there is still -- I think there're still some areas of doubt about what the French involvement might be and what the French are prepared to do, and, indeed, what they are being quoted as saying. But I think it has moved along since I talked about it or did not talk about it two days ago.

Q If the French engaged in this, would that be -- does this offer go counter to U.S. interests in Central America?

A I think the fact that we've expressed our concern to the French speaks for itself.

Q John, if the French supply mine sweepers, that, in Department policy and in Administration policy, would be an extension -- giving the Nicaraguans an extension to "export revolution?"

A It might facilitate the export of revolution; that is correct.

Q Would you oppose the French directly and militarily to go ahead in doing that?

A I think we are now delving into the hypothetical. I will simply say that we have raised our concerns with the French.

Q I believe that Daniel Ortega has -- is, or has been in the Soviet Union recently, and one of the subjects that may have been discussed is sending Soviet mine sweepers to Corinto and other ports. What would the U.S. view be if, in fact, Soviet mine sweepers --

A I think I just indicated our concern over Soviet and Cuban involvement in Nicaragua.

Q Isn't it a risk that if the French don't that the Soviet Union will, and doesn't that open the door to a larger --

A I think you may take it as a given that our concern would extend to the Soviet provision.

Q John, are you suggesting by making this series of comments that the French are acting in the interests of the Soviet Union and Cuba by making this offer?

A I'm not making a series of comments. You've asked me a number of questions.

Q A series of answers.

A I've told you that we're taking this matter up with the French.

Q Do you feel -- your answer to the question about the Soviet mine sweepers suggests that if the French do it, they'll be acting in Soviet and Cuban interests.

A I didn't say that.

Q Well, what do you say to that implication?

A I think that's your thesis. I think you're trying to put words into our mouths.

Q Do you have any comment on Colombia's role? After all, it was Colombia which initiated this?

A No, I don't.

Q Under what conditions would the United States provide mine sweepers?

A I'm not aware of any.

Q Oh, so that they -- essentially, the mines will not be removed from Nicaragua -- period -- without the United States opposing such a move?

A You asked me whether the United States was considering sending mine sweepers to Nicaragua. The answer to that question --

Q No, I said under what --

A -- so far as I'm aware is no.

Q I said under what conditions would the United States undertake to send mine sweepers, or clear the mines from Nicaraguan ports?

A I have no indication of any inclination on our part to send mine sweepers to Nicaragua.

Q So any attempt by any nation whatsoever to remove those mines would meet with U.S. resistance of at least a diplomatic kind; is that correct?

A I'm not going to go beyond where I have gone today. I've told you about our concern with the Soviets and the Cubans. I have asked -- I have told you, in response to a question, what our position is with the French. Let's look at whatever developments they may be as they mature.

Q Who is laying the mines?

A I don't know.

Q Can you comment on the Wall Street Journal report --

A No.

Q -- saying -- you will not comment on the Wall Street Journal report?

A No.

Q Any reason that you won't comment on it?

A I think that the Wall Street Journal is talking about alleged intelligence activities, and I think you would be astonished if I broke our long-standing rule and commented on intelligence matters. I know you live in hopes, Jim, but I'm afraid it's not going to be today.

--MORE--

Q New subject? John, do you have anything on the shooting of an AID officer in Manila?

A Yes. I do. Because of the privacy problem, I can't give you a name, although a name has moved on the wires. But, yes, an AID employee was shot in the head in the vicinity of the Manila Country Club. We do not think that the shooting was an act of terrorism. We do not think it was politically motivated.

The officer was taken to a hospital at Clark Air Base north of Manila. We understand he's now in stable condition and out of intensive care. He was an AID officer assigned to the Manila office of the Regional Inspector General for Audit.

Q Why do you think this has no political motivation or connotation?

A I don't really want to go into the circumstances much more than I have, but we do not at this stage believe there was a political or terrorist motivation.

Q Was he alone at the time of this incident?

A I don't know. I can't answer that.

Q John, was the United States consulted by France prior to making the offer with regard to the --

A No.

Q It was not.

A No.

Q Was it mentioned at all during the -- discussed at all during the recent visit of President Mitterrand? As opposed to --

A Well, I'm sure --

Q -- being consulted about --

A I don't know the answer to that question, but I do know the answer to the first question, that we were not consulted, so I assume it was not raised. But, I mean, I can't answer specifically, because I don't know what was discussed.

Q France has said, apparently, that it will ask -- it would not undertake this thing unless other friendly nations in Europe agreed as well.

A Uh-huh.

Q Would it be correct to assume that the United States has made representations to other nations in Europe to --

A No. I don't know that that would necessarily be correct, to say the United States has already made representations. As I warned, there is a little vagueness about what France is saying and what France is suggesting it might do. So I think you'd be premature in thinking that we had talked to others about it.

Q Has France, though -- we have -- the United States has in fact talked to France?

A Yes.

Q And is there any indication that they are reconsidering whatever it is they may or may not do?

A Well, now we'll retreat behind our traditional defense that we don't get into the substance of diplomatic negotiations.

Q John --

A Let me take a few others, because you've been monopolizing the --

Q John, do you have any comment on the negotiations with Japan on beef and citrus and what the outlook may be on relations between the two countries?

A I think where we stand is that the meetings with the appropriate Japanese Minister have ended this morning, or came to a close this morning, and are to be resumed, Spencer. So I think that's where it stands.

Q Be resumed at a later date?

A At a later date.

Q An indefinite later date?

A No. I don't -- no. I think it's a meeting -- I can't give you a date, but I think it's -- a meeting will be set fairly soon.

Q Can you characterize the state of the negotiation at this point?

A I really can't, but maybe we might be able to produce something for you a little later in the day.

Q John, do you have any comment about Israelis setting a cemetery in the occupied West Bank, and do you believe that such a step will contribute to peace and stability in the West Bank?

A Well, I think I would simply make a general observation, not get into the specifics on that, and that is, that the United States cannot favor actions by any party which serve to render more difficult the search for peace through negotiations based on United Nations Security Council Resolution 242. But we've just seen the reports and don't have anything more specific, so I'd just leave you with that general statement of our position.

Q Any reaction, John, to Shamir's criticism of the -- our consular status and Embassy status?

A Nothing beyond the rather forthright language that Mr. Romberg used yesterday in defense of the Consultate General.

Q John, anything on the coup in Cameroon? Who's in charge? What is the status of Americans there?

A Yeah. Sure can. Don't have a great deal, but our Embassy there says, obviously, that there was gunfire in the capital city of Yaounde during the morning of April 6 in an apparent coup attempt. We understand that a group, possibly composed of junior officers, calling itself the Supreme Military Council, has taken charge of the government.*

The city now appears to be calm. American personnel are remaining at home until the situation becomes clear. We have no indication of threats to American citizens or injury to American property. I don't have any reports from elsewhere in the country outside Yaounde. We understand that international communications links with Cameroon are interrupted, and that the international airport of Yaounde is closed. There are about 1200 Americans in Cameroon.

*Editor's Note: Later corrected to read, "...Supreme Military Council, has announced over the radio that it has taken charge of the government."

Q Was this a coup attempt? I mean, is this -- is your judgment this fighting is still underway, that there's not going to be an overthrow?

A Well, it's early days, although, as I say, we understand that the group calling itself the Supreme Military Council has taken charge of the government,* but we don't really have much beyond that.

Q Has there been any contact with American representatives there?

A I do not think so, George, as yet.

Q Is Ambassador Frechette in the country?

A That one I can't -- anybody know whether our Ambassador is -- I can't answer that one.

Q Can I clarify one thing there? This Supreme Military Council has taken command or it's just apparent?

A We understand that that is the case. Yes.*

Q I want to go back on Nicaragua and just make sure I understood something. You said you do not know who is laying the mines, is that correct?

A That's correct.

Q So to your knowledge it may not be members of the Nicaraguan insurgency who are laying the mines. Is that correct?

A Well, I don't know who's laying the mines.

Q Okay. In times past you've alluded to the Nicaraguan insurgency in talking about things of this kind, but you are not doing that today, I take it.

A Well, I'm not -- I haven't gone down personally and checked the mines. I mean, I don't know who's laying the mines.

Q Well, as a building, however, not you personally.

A No.

Q Okay. And also the French --

---

*See correction on previous page

Q John, you haven't personally checked, have you, to see whether the U.S. has talked to France on the subject? I mean, you haven't personally --

A I have personally checked to see whether the U.S. has talked to France on the subject.

Q Well, have you personally checked to see whether -- who is laying the mines? I mean, have you asked whoever the kind of -- the level of person that you would ask about the contact with France?

A I have nothing for -- further for you on the mines.

Q In the letter, John, the French said that they would be doing this strictly as a humanitarian gesture.

A Uh-huh.

Q I take it from your comments that you would reject this as a humanitarian act. Is that correct?

A I think I will stand by our statement that we have expressed our concern.

Q John, there is a report in the Jerusalem Post yesterday, and it's quoted here in FBIS, that arms sold to Morocco and Iran, Indonesia and Malaysia by Israel in 1981, '82 and possibly 1979. Is the United States made aware -- has the United States been made aware of these sales, and can you look into this one?

A Not aware of that report.

Q Can you look into this, please?

A Let me see if we have anything about --

Q And I want to follow -- former Israeli Foreign Minister Mr. Abba Eban is visiting Egypt now, and he has been meeting -- high-level meetings with Egyptian officials. Do you see any significance of his meeting in light of --

A I guess you'd have to ask Mr. Eban and Egyptian officials.

Q I know, but you -- do you see anything moving towards -- there was -- why I'm asking the question because

Mr. Shamir the other day sent a congratulatory message to Mr. Mubarak about the fifth anniversary of the Camp David and the peace treaty, or the peace treaty.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you see any thaw in the relations between Egypt and Israel in this -- in light of this report?

A As you know, we favor an improvement in those relations, but I'm not going to have a day-by-day characterization of where they are.

Q John, there are reports that General Alvarez has been asked to leave Costa Rica. He apparently owns some property in the United States. Will he be coming here?

A I think he's already here. I think he arrived yesterday.

Q John, are there discussions with the Saudis concerning the lease of some Stinger missiles for the use and, I believe, the protection of King Fahd's yacht?

A Well, we certainly have talked to the Saudis and have in principle agreed to lease them, although no lease has yet been signed. We have on one previous occasion loaned Stingers to another country. Details are classified and involve another country's requirements. That's really about all I have for you, except that at the time we discussed the proposed sale of Stingers to Saudi Arabia, which project was thereafter withdrawn, we at the same time did raise with Congress the prospective lease of Stingers to Saudi Arabia to provide special sensitive protective services.

Q What type of special sensitive protective services?

A Not going to go beyond what I said.

Q Do you reject that report that their use will be in protecting this new yacht?

A Not going to have any comment on that.

Q What is the length of the lease and the value of it?

A I think it is -- I think the length of the lease is less than six months.

Q Is that the Super-Saver Package? (Laughter)

Q Just for the record, John, this is not a replacement --

Q What happens if that guy doesn't give it back to us? Suppose they fire it. What happens then? (Laughter)

A I don't think we have any doubt that unfired Stingers will be returned to us, Don.

Q Suppose there are -- no fooling, you're leasing them something which presumably, if there's some dangerous situation, they would fire.

A I think we would not quarrel with that thesis, but if you think that the situation you're lending them, or leasing them to, is serious enough to warrant that protection, I think one would necessarily have to accept the possibility that they might be used.

Q And if it's used, you don't get it back, right?

A Well, you wouldn't get that particular one back, I would think. (Laughter)

Q Would they have another one to give back? (Laughter)

Q They would buy one from the U.S. --

A I don't know that they're in a position to replace them, Don.

Q John, how many Stingers, and what is the value of the lease?

A I don't know how many.

Q Is this renewable, this lease?

A I'm not sure that anybody is projecting any renewal of the lease.

Q John, just for the record this is not a large-scale lease involving a similar number of Stingers as the proposed --

A No, no, no, no. This is for a very special, specific purpose.

Q How many are we talking about?

A I don't know.

Q What about American personnel to operate the Stingers?

A No.

Q Can we volunteer? (Laughter)

Q Was the lease signed already?

A No. The lease has not been signed yet.

Q Let me ask you a last question about the -- there was also a report in FBIS today that the Arabs in Israel who have been there since 1948 -- not the people in the occupied West Bank -- they have been receiving funds from organizations, Palestinians and others, in the United States, and there is an investigation going on by some sources inside Israel about these funds which will go to build infrastructures and clubs and --

A From private organizations in the United States?

Q Yes. Private organizations and Palestinian organizations in the United States, and there is an investigation going on now by the Knesset -- Israeli Knesset. In light of your concern about the well-being of the Palestinians, whether it's in the West Bank or in Israel proper from 1948, do you see such investigation on such funds --

A Let me take a look at that one for you.

Q Would you, please?

A Larry?

Q Do you have anything on the report that the United States is concerned about a supposed network of Iranian students engaged in terrorist activities?

A No. I don't have any comment on that other than to reiterate what is obvious, namely, that we are concerned about the rising level of terrorism around the world, and there isn't any question where some of that terrorism is coming from.

I think the Secretary in his speech on Tuesday specifically mentioned Iran as one of the countries from whence terrorism flows, but I don't have anything specific for you on that.

Q Anything on labor strikes or arrest of labor union leaders in El Salvador?

A No.

Q John, any information about the reports concerning Israeli-Syrian military buildup in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley?

A No.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:58 p.m.)

[illegible]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Monday April 9, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #61

MONDAY, APRIL 9, 1984, 12:11
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon everybody. I have a couple of housekeeping announcements, and then a longer statement.

Firstly, we gather that the refurbishing of the Newsroom over the weekend went relatively smoothly. That's due in no small measure of the cooperation of all of you, and we appreciate that. I also want to make special mention of the work and long hours that Joe Reap of the Press Office and Melvin Briscoe of the Bureau Executive Office devoted to this task. They certainly, I think, deserve credit and the thanks of all of us.

Q John, the Foreign Correspondents Association would like to underwrite that. Joe worked very hard; did an awful lot of coordination with all of us and for us. We appreciate it. He's got us covered, and we're sure that he's well beat by now. But we do appreciate it.

A Good. Joe, did you hear all this? You were just lauded, and you were lauded on microphone, across the capitol, across the nation's capitol. (Laughter)

This may be the end of the love feast.

Q (Inaudible).

A Have to wait for next year's budget for the ceiling.

Announcement number two: For the convenience of of correspondents here, we'll make available at 2:00 this afternoon in the Press Office a copy of the Department of Defense publication "Soviet Military Power, 1984." That's a Pentagon publication, the text of which is embargoed until 10:00 tomorrow morning -- 10:00 a.m. tomorrow.

And, finally, we have a statement on the situation of the International Court of Justice. The President of the International Court of Justice has advised the United States Embassy in the Hague that the Government of Nicaragua earlier today filed an Application with the Court naming the United States as Respondent.

He further informed us that Nicaragua has requested interim measures of protection with respect to its Application. Last Friday, the United States filed with the Secretary General of the United Nations a modification to its consent to the Court's jurisdiction, excluding from that consent for a period of two years any dispute between the United States and any Central American nation.

The Government of Nicaragua's Application, filed today, would appear to fall squarely within the matters to which the United States withdrew its consent to jurisdiction on Friday.

We believe, therefore, that the Court does not have jurisdiction over Nicaragua's Application. We will have no further comment on this matter until we have received and had an opportunity to examine Nicaragua's filings with the Court.

Q Copy?

A Sure.

Q John, on that matter, I'm told by a legal specialist that there is a six month advance notification requirement on filing a -- what the U.S. filed. In other words, the American filing on Friday would not be effective for six months. Is that true?

A I'm not a legal expert and maybe we should get a legal expert to answer that question. But I think the six months filing provision is in terms of termination, Bernie, rather than modification. This was not a termination; this is a modification. Very similar to that which has been offered by various other countries from time to time.

Q The six month provision doesn't say anything about termination as it's being handed out, at least, today. Can you get somebody to address this question, noting that you're not a legal expert, because the Nicaraguan Government says that it applies to any change in the U.S. acceptance?

A Okay. Let us see if we can set up a little backgrounder this afternoon for you.

Q John, in submitting this modification, by doing so, are we doubting that the Court could render an impartial judgment in these cases? Do we think they're biased in favor of --

A It's not really a question of that. I think, as our statement said, it's a question of being concerned, lest the Court hearing be turned into a propaganda area.

Nicaragua, presumably, would offer certain alleged complaints against the United States, but we and our Allies have a variety of legal complaints about Nicaragua. That could lead to lengthy litigation, and we think that there are other more appropriate avenues. The Contadora process for the settlement of the dispute on a regional basis is where we would like to see this activity take place.

Q Would that more properly be a concern of the Court that it not be turned into a propaganda arena --

A We had some concerns that the process of litigation would go on for a lengthy period, and that the Court could be used as a vehicle for propaganda; yes.

Q You have no confidence that the Court, which has rigorous procedures that have been set up over almost a forty-year history, can keep the case out of a propaganda arena and can distinguish between what is propaganda and which is judiciable facts?

A I think that we had a concern that one of the parties might exploit the situation and attempt to use it as a forum for propaganda.

Q I don't understand why we are the ones that would determine or would be our responsibility to say that it not be used as a propaganda forum. Wouldn't that properly be the Court's responsibility, to look after the --

A The action that we have taken is a technical option that has been used by a number of countries; and in the process of deciding whether to take this option, this was certainly one of the factors that motivated us.

Q Does the U.S. Government deny that in assisting the mining of the harbors of Nicaragua, it is in violation of international law?

A We have given you our views of what is happening in Nicaragua, about the export of revolution and our concern with Nicaragua's dependence on the Soviet Union and Cuba. We have offered you our concern about Nicaragua's destabilizing activities, and, indeed, aggression concerning a number of its neighbors.

We have offered you our concern about military build-up in Nicaragua far in excess of anything that could be legitimately reasoned to be necessary for the defense of Nicaragua. Those concerns are all there, and I'm not going to have any comment on --

Q Does the mining of their harbors, is that an appropriate response to your concern?

A Mining of harbors is something that has been attributed to intelligence sources, and I'm not going to have anything for you on that today.

Q I thought the issue was to be discussed last week regarding the French. Has there been any further development as to what they responded to the expression of concern from the U.S. regarding their possible sweeping of mines?

A I think that those discussions and consultations are continuing.

Q What legal measures is the United States presently taking to see that Nicaragua's aggression, as you put it, cease? What legal measures, and in what form?

A I think our efforts in the diplomatic field, our support of the Contadora process, certainly would be -- could be instrumental in reducing the level of these activities and hopefully eliminating them.

Q Why hasn't the United States gone to the OAS to seek invocation of Rio; why hasn't it gone to the United Nations?

A I think we're working along the measures I have suggested. Those are the chosen measures and those are the ones we're pursuing.

Q And one other one, the Contadora group yesterday denounce the mining of harbors in Nicaragua.

A Uh-huh.

Q Will you, as a result, take cognizance of that and respond accordingly? What is your statement?

A We take cognizance of the desire of a number of countries for the total elimination of violence and tension from the region.

Q Following up on that, you just said, "We support the Contadora process."

A Uh-huh.

Q The Contadora countries have denounced this particular action, and if they are in effect saying it is not supportive of the Contadora process, the fact that we were involved to this degree with the opponents of the Nicaraguan Government, if they say it's not supportive, and we say we support the process, is there not a contradiction there?

A Don't think so because the 21 points of the Contadora process, I think, make it clear that the goal is the elimination of advisers and military activity, not by one party but by a number of parties.

Q So we've taken it upon ourselves to enforce the Contadora process, apart from the wishes of the Contadora countries?

A I think what we are working with is the Contadora process and the 21 points that are in process of being worked out at an operational level, by the Contadora process.

Q John, the statement issued by the Department yesterday says that the action being taken in connection with the Court is being taken to prevent the Court from disrupting the ongoing regional peace process, by protacted litigation, counter-claims, and so on.

A Uh-huh.

Q Does the ongoing regional peace process include the mining of Nicaragua's harbors? And is it that disruption that obstructed that activity?

A I think the ongoing peace process involves our diplomatic activity. As you know, Ambassador Shlaudeman and Secretary Motley have just returned from Nicaragua. It certainly involves our cooperation and consultation with our friendly neighbors in the area and support of the Contadora process.

Q Does it include the mining?

A I think our position on Nicaragua is well known. I think we have made it clear that we seek the goals we seek in Nicaragua through a balance of efforts, which are encouragement to do certain things and disencouraging, shall I say, do certain other things.

Q Let me ask one more: Does this action taken by the U.S. mean that during the period of two years if a situation arises in which the U.S. would feel otherwise, that the Court might have a role in resolving a legal matter, that the U.S. will not go to the Court for another two years?

A I think I will leave that one for the legal expert that we can perhaps produce to give you a BACKGROUNDER.

Q What is the rationale for two years rather than six months or five years or whatever?

A Why don't I leave that one for the BACKGROUNDER?

Q What is the concern of not allowing us to be in the Court? Is it going to block all your other diplomatic efforts of the Contadora process that everything will go on "hold" if it goes into the Court? Why can't you just permit it to move simultaneously?

A I think it would be an irritant and a negative. I think that's the reasoning.

Q Aren't you, by this, a matter of default, leaving this, withdrawing from the Court here, in a sense?

A It's not withdrawing from the Court; we support the Court. No question about that.

Q What is your fear of allowing it to be played out in the Court? That you will be ruled against your role down there?

A Well, as I say, I think that the reasons that have gone into that decision are an unwillingness to have lengthy litigation which could be used, or attempt to be used, as a method to sidetrack other initiatives that are going forward, plus this factor of the Court possibly being used by, certainly, one side for propaganda purposes.

Q John, does this mean that the U.S. would endorse the other countries, among them the ones that the U.S. listed yesterday -- any time another country feels that the Court would be used as a propaganda forum, it could simply opt out of the Court process in a case which it didn't like?

A I can't answer that question because you're asking a specific question about a specific case; but there is nothing wrong, there is nothing inappropriate, and there is nothing improper about the legal action the United States has taken. This has been done by other countries.

Q No, I wasn't suggesting there was anything wrong with it. I guess what I'm asking you is, by doing this, does the U.S. endorse the idea that any country may opt out of the Court whenever a case arises which it doesn't like?

A I think you'd have to ask the legal folks that we hope to get here this afternoon; but I just would point out that a number of countries have done that, that not all countries -- I think less than 50 countries subscribe to the total authority of the Court, in any event.

Q The U.S. would not henceforth criticize the Soviet Union or any other country that chose to opt out of the Court in a case which maybe the U.S. might bring, for example, in the hostage case or something like that.

A I think it would depend on the issue. I mean that's a very sweeping suggestion.

Q John, are there any plans for Department officials to meet with Foreign Minister D'Escoto, who is in town?

A Not aware of any, George.

Q Along the same lines as back here, isn't the United States setting a precedent, or furthering a precedent for countries opting out of going to the U.S. World Court or meeting challenges in the World Court?

A It's not a precedent because it's been done on a number of occasions. Great Britain has done it.

Q But I mean, now that the decision has been made, wasn't that a factor in the decision of furthering a precedent for any country who doesn't want to be judged in the World Court decision --

A Why don't I let the legal experts take a crack at that one?

Q If I could ask that question on a broader political plane rather than the legal plane, do you consider that this action weakens the credibility of the Court, in the broadest sense? Was that issue considered in the deliberations you've referred to on the various U.S. options? And wouldn't it have simply made more sense to let the Nicaraguans go to the Court and tie them up procedurally?

I can't recall a case in which the Court has been used as an effective propaganda tool. Lord knows, it didn't get us anywhere in the Iranian situation.

A I'm sure that the pros and cons were considered, and obviously, in the making of this decision, it was decided that this was the better decision to make.

Q How about the broad political question of whether you consider this might weaken the credibility of the Court?

A I don't think there is any question of undermining the credibility of the Court by taking similar action as has been taken by, for example, India, Australia, Great Britain on previous issues, and as I say, when less than, I think, 50 countries recognize the all-embracing authority of the Court. So I don't see how that would be undermining its authority.

Q John, let me ask you the question that everyone is dancing around here: Isn't it a case where you decided not to allow the Court jurisdiction because you had a bad case?

A There are various elements, I think, Bernie, that went into the decision-making, not the least of which that in arguing the case, one party might have his hands tied behind his back in that it might be discussing, or not discussing, classified material.

Q John, which cases do you have in mind? Do you have any particular cases in mind that you said were the Court actually was asked to amend and accepted? And were those cases held without one party? Do you have --

A I don't, but it may well be that our legal experts this afternoon can answer that.

Q But you said you know of some. You don't know how many countries?

A I know which countries, I know that a number of countries have taken that action; but I don't know the specifics of the cases.

Q If I could follow that up, you seem to be affirming what I said, that you have a bad case?

A No, that wasn't what I was saying. What I was saying was that, on balance, the desirability of taking this action rather than arguing the case, the pros and cons of those approaches undoubtedly was weighed, and the decision was made to take this particular process.

Q Are you going to declassify after two years?

A Well, we'll see.

Q John, do you have any indication that the Contadora group supports the mining of ports as a furtherance of the peace process, the regional peace process?

A I know that the Contadora group supports a number of points that the United States supports.

Q No. What I asked you specifically about with respect to the mining of ports, which they mentioned yesterday?

A No, I don't.

Q You have no indication that they do support it?

A No.

Q John, just for the record, let's catch up with a couple of weekend reports, and ask you are U.S. Government employees supervising the mining of the harbors in Nicaragua?

A I don't know why you think that we might respond to a question we've refused to respond to on a number of occasions. Those reports come from intelligence sources, and we will not discuss reports from intelligence sources, or alleged to be from intelligence sources.

Q It sometimes happens that you respond to questions later that you didn't respond to sooner?

A Only when I'm tired. (Laughter)

Q I have one follow-up on this, you suggested, in answer to Bernie's question, that one reason you didn't want to go before the Court on these issues was that you would have to address intelligence issues.

A You might.

-- MORE --

Q And throughout the discussion of our support for the Contras in Nicaragua, we have -- from this podium none of the Spokesmen have wanted to answer the questions, citing intelligence reasons for doing so. But so much of the American activity is now out in the open through various forums, including information from the Congress.

Why do we continue to say that we can't talk about these things for intelligence reasons? Why can't we talk about them? Why is "intelligence reasons" an excuse here for not talking about them?

A It's not an excuse. It has been traditional, I think, on the part of this Administration and previous Administrations not to discuss matters involving intelligence methods and operations, and we will continue to abide by that line.

I would say, however, that you say a lot of this is out in the open. A lot of it may be correct, a lot of it may not be correct. I mean, you're making a very sweeping assumption that everything that has been attributed to unnamed sources represents fact.

Q On the contrary, some of it may be wrong, and I would think because of that there would be some interest in addressing the issues more forthrightly.

A Uh-huh.

Q You say it is tradition not to address intelligence issues, but you still haven't said why, and at this particular time I'm interested in why.

A Because, obviously, if you're involved in covert activities, if you discuss them, they are no longer covert.

Q Why wouldn't Nicaragua be obliged to do the same thing before the World Court? Why is it that only one party would have their hands tied behind -- or one hand tied behind their back?

A Well, maybe they would. I don't know.

Q Well, then why wouldn't the United States be interested in testing that?

A Well, because there may well be classified data that we do not wish to publicize.

Q New subject?

Q One follow-up on that. Does the U.S. action in this in fact prevent Nicaragua from pursuing its suit before the Court?

A That's a very good legal question, and I will leave that to the briefers this afternoon who will in fact be here at 2:00 o'clock.

Q Do you know if the U.S. could be tried *in* absentia any way?

A Why don't I let the experts answer that one for you.

Q BACKGROUND?

A It will be ON BACKGROUND.

Q Do you have any comment on the reports saying that American aid to the Palestinians are being diverted to the Israelis?

A No, I don't.

Q Can you look into -- can I follow this? Last Friday we asked a question about another area. I asked a question about money which was allocated or contributed by Palestinian organizations in the United States as being questioned by the Israeli Knesset.

In light of this report in The New York Times Saturday, there is -- it says here a tendency which is contrary to what Mr. Shultz's concern about improving the quality of lives of the Palestinians in the occupied territories. Will you please look into this more carefully?

A If that's the same question that --

Q It's different, you know.

A It's a different question?

Q You're talking about the people, the Palestinians, from 1948, and the Palestinians from 1967.

A So what's today's question?

Q Excuse me?

A What is today's question?

Q Today's question is what my colleague said about the people -- occupied territories -- that it's sparing a lot of concern that your funds are not -- you know, AID and Catholic Relief and other agencies --

A Uh-huh-huh-huh.

Q -- is not reaching, is not spending --

A Let us take a look at it.

Q Please.

MR. ROMBERG: John, if that's the Ben Venista study, there is some guidance on it.

MR. HUGHES: Oh. If that is the Ben Venista study, there is some guidance on it from last week. Is that what you're talking about?

Q Yes.

A Okay.

Q John, any reaction to the Soviet charges about U.S. -- allegations of U.S. misbehavior in the Olympics?

A Only to say that we find that rather surprising, Bill. As a matter of fact, we have been very forthcoming with the Soviets insofar as their involvement in the Olympics is concerned.

We have approved, as you well know, the charter flights for which they have asked; the question of the ship in Los Angeles harbor. The only area in which we have been unforthcoming is in the assignment of a particular individual as an Olympics attache -- Soviet Olympics attache -- and the reason for the rejection of that specific individual, we made clear at the time, namely, that we think anybody who is sent in that role would be an Olympics attache, and we did not think that the individual they were proposing fulfilled that particular description.

We don't object to the role. They can still have that attached, Olympic attache, but we will, of course, look at the individual. But that is the only area of which I'm aware in which we --

Q   How about the charge, John -- I think they're also charging that Soviet journalists are being interfered with, that they're not allowed to go to certain areas?

A   Let me take a look at that. I'm not aware of that. Let me take a look at that.

Q   And generally, John, do you have any feeling why the Soviets are making this kind of charge now?

A   No, I don't. As I say, we were surprised because we think that we have been really very cooperative.

Q   Would you take that question, John? Specifically, the Soviet National Olympic Committee charges that open threats of physical victimization and provocative actions are made to sportsmen and officials of the U.S.S.R. and other Socialist countries, slanderous --

A   Where? At the Olympics? They're being threatened should they come to the Olympics? Is that what you're saying?

Q   They are charging open threats are being made by the Administration and --

A   Well, certainly no threats are being made by the Administration, and the Administration, with the local authorities, will take appropriate steps, whatever steps are appropriate, to safeguard the security of all the participants in the Olympics.

Q   John, they further charge that Soviet emigre groups in this country with, I think their word is, "the connivance" of the U.S. authorities have made it known that they are going to encourage Soviet athletes to defect. What is your position on the specific charge, and what is the position of the U.S. on Soviet athletes who may wish to defect?

A   Well, certainly there is no -- it is ridiculous to suggest that the United States has a plot to cause Soviet athletes to defect. As we all know, defections occur, and they will be treated, should they occur, in the appropriate way and in the routine way that is provided for by United States law.

And as for the "ban the Soviets movement," it certainly does not have the support of the United States. The United States, as the host government, will uphold its responsibilities in all respects. That includes permitting athletes from all countries unhindered entry if they are properly accredited to the International Olympics Committee.

As I said, we certainly do not support ban-the-Soviet groups. However, the Soviets have to understand that, while there are certain emigre groups objecting to the Soviet presence at the Los Angeles Olympic Games, under the American system of freedom of speech such groups do have the right to express their views. Their views are in no way sanctioned either by the United States Government or the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee.

Q John, copy of that?

A Sure.

Q John, Israel has been asking for sort of special protection which they --

A I'm sorry. Who has -- the Soviets?

Q The Israelis --

A The Israelis?

Q There were reports that the Israelis were asking for sort of self-protection -- meaning that they take charge of their protection, the protection of their athletes at the Los Angeles Olympics.

A Uh-huh.

Q Have you been responding to this --

A I haven't heard of that, and I don't know how the Olympics Committee will work that out. I'm not aware of that.

Q John, there was a report in the front page this morning of The Wall Street Journal about tension between Syria and Israel and the imminent war breaking out any time. Do you have any comment on that?

A No.

Q Anything on the Chernenko -- over the weekend?

A No. I think the White House did something on that. I think Larry Speaks had a statement on that this morning. I don't have anything further.

Q John, do you have anything on Jaruzelski's comments in the Christian Science Monitor today, hoping that --

A No, I don't.

Q -- better relations with the United States --

A No.

Q Do you have any assessment of current Polish-U.S. relations, any improvements in the wind?

A Well, I could give you some general words. Yes, we obviously remain interested in the improvement of U.S.-Polish relations on the basis of the step-by-step policy outlined by the President on a number of occasions.

The United States has taken steps over the last few months regarding fishing and rescheduling Polish debt, designed to begin a process of improved relations. In addition, the United States is prepared to take further concrete steps leading to an improvement in bilateral relations if there are positive actions by the Polish Government which will contribute to a process of national reconciliation in that country.

Q What positive steps are we looking for?

A I think we've listed them on a number of occasions. They relate to the question of imprisonment of individuals, the question of reconciliation, and discussion between various groups.

Q John, do you have any comment on the reports that the Egyptians are going on with sort of military construction movements on the East Bank of the Suez Canal?

A No. I don't.

Q That report in FBIS today that Mr. Shamon Perez who is running for the Prime Minister of Israel from the Labor Party, made a statement saying that if Egypt proposed the application of autonomy in the Gaza sector first, he would be ready to discuss this proposal if his party won the coming parliamentary elections. Also, he said that he is ready to enter into negotiations with Jordan without preconditions and without a Jordanian commitment to accept the Camp David Accords. Do you have any comment on this?

A No. Sounds like an internal political Israeli matter.

Q Can you look into this statement --

A No.

Q John, anything on the fear that the Bahrainis are expressing these days of a spillover from the heightened tensions between Iran and Iraq, and that it's making their position increasingly untenable to maintain the bases or basing facilities for U.S. forces in Bahrain?

A No. Nothing on that.

Q General Alvarez from Honduras was -- went -- was reported to have met with Pentagon officials this weekend. Has he met anybody in this building?

A Pentagon officials?

Q Yes.

A Here in Washington?

Q Well, in Virginia.

A Alvarez has been here in Washington?

Q That's my understanding.

A Don't know anything about it. Why don't you try the Pentagon.

Flash from the front! The BACKGROUNDER will be at 2:15 instead of 2:00 o'clock.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:41 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, April 10, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #62

TUESDAY, APRIL 10, 1984, 12:11 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: I have a lean book, and anybody who comes late isn't going to miss anything, so we'll begin. Couple of housekeeping announcements.

There will be an ON-THE-RECORD press briefing by Ambassador Richard Kennedy at 1:45 p.m. tomorrow, Wednesday, on the Nuclear Energy Agency and its activities. NEA Director General Howard Shapar and Steering Committee Chairman Ivor Manley will be present to answer your questions.

Also available in the Press Office is the prepared text of a speech given by Ambassador Edward Rowny today before the Kiwanis Club of Atlanta. The subject of the address is the arms control process. That is all I have.

Q John, your Central America policy has taken a bit of a pounding on the Hill. The Speaker says that your $21 million request for Nicaraguan rebels is dead. I could go on and on, but do you have a general response to some of the criticisms coming out after the World Court --

A No. I really don't. I think we'll let the process evolve and see how it proves out.

Q Do you expect action on this request for $21 million before Easter recess?

A I can't -- I really can't predict.

Q Suppose you don't get the $21 million, is it clear that there's no other way the Administration could accomplish this same purpose through some other fund?

A I don't know how the Administration will respond. I think we will have to wait and see, as I say, how the process proves out.

Q John, is this mining operation an open-ended one?

A The mining operation --

Q Uh-huh.

A -- an open-ended one?

Q Yeah.

A I'm not sure I --

Q Is your time limit up?

A Well, as you know, Marvin, we don't discuss intelligence operations, stories, allegations.

Q -- trying to discuss the essence of the debate up on the Hill.

A No. Don't have anything on that for you.

Q What about the concern raised with the French? What has evolved from that?

A I don't know that -- I'm not, obviously, going to get into our discussions with the French, but, as I said yesterday, I think I would treat those reports with some caution. I think there was another development today which I think would probably steer you in that same direction.

Q When was that, John?

A Mike, I think I saw a report suggesting the Contadora nations would not make any request for mine sweeping by the French.

Q Are you suggesting that that's correct or not correct?

A I don't know. I'm just trying to be helpful in trying to help you evaluate the significance of the stories we have seen about this French initiative.

Q Has the U.S. been in touch with the Contadora countries regarding the mining operation and regarding the French offer or non-offer or whatever?

A I'm not aware of that, Ralph. I guess it's possible, but I'm not aware of it.

Q As you will recall, late last month the Soviet Union complained about one of their ships hitting a mine near Nicaragua, came here, I believe Under Secretary Eagleburger had a meeting with some Soviet --

A I think that's correct.

Q -- official of the Embassy to respond on the part of the United States. Have any other countries come to the United States with complaints regarding their ships being hit by mines?

A Not -- I don't think we have anything to offer you beyond what we have offered, which is, as you say, a factual account of that particular meeting, plus I think we have said that the British have made us aware of their positions in Central America, and we have made the British aware of our positions in Central America.

Q How about the Canadians? Have they discussed anything? MacEachen was here.

A I'm not aware of that. I'm sure that Central America would have been discussed, but I'm not --

Q I was thinking in the way of their expression of concern or complaint about mining.

A I do not know.

Q What about the Dutch? One of their ships got hit.

A I'm -- do you -- you got anything on that, Alan? I'm not aware of anything.

Q How about the Japanese? There was a Japanese ship.

A No. Not aware of that either, unless Alan has something beyond --

Q Panama?

A No. I'm not aware of anything other than what I've told you about the Soviets and the British.

Q I see. Could you look into it and see whether any other countries --

A Let me take a look at it.

Q -- have complained either that their ships were hit or that they don't like it because it's dangerous to their ships.

A Okay. All right. We'll see what we can produce.

Q On a related matter, a DC-3 apparently went down in northern Costa Rica, and there have been some news reports about it. Now the Costa Rican Government is indicating that they -- according to news reports, which I have no personal knowledge of -- that they believe that there were four U.S. citizens aboard but the bodies have been burned. Have they been in touch with you about this incident?

A I don't know whether they have been in touch with us. I know that we were aware of a report yesterday and were looking into it. I do not think we have anything beyond that. If we do during the day, be glad to let you have it, so I guess that's where we still are, looking into it.

Mike?

Q John, do you have anything on reports that Salvadoran rebels say a U.S.-trained brigade is responsible for the massacre of 23 peasants?

A No. Haven't seen that.

Q Will you take that?

A Is that a very recent report?

Q Yes. Today.

A Okay. I haven't seen that one.

Q Do you have anything on the Contadora countries' criticism of the mining operation?

A No. Except to refer you to the -- when I was asked about that yesterday, I hadn't seen the full statement, and there are a number of points made in the statement about violence in general. And I would think that if Nicaragua has concerns, this would be a good place to raise it, within the Contadora group.

Q I was just kind of curious about any reaction specifically to the Contadora group's criticism of the U.S. role in the mining --

A No.

Q -- because -- no? You have nothing on that at all?

A No. Sorry. Nothing specific on that.

Q It seemed that yesterday State Department officials were basing their entire explanation for the U.S. move to the World Court on saying that it really ought to work through the Contadora process. The countries composing that process are now critical of the U.S. actions.

A Well, I think we would not be averse to general discussion with the Contadora nations about the widespread violence and destabilization that is going on in Central America. That has been our position all along.

To pluck out a single issue, when Nicaragua clearly is involved in so many destabiling activities -- destabilizing -- I will get that word right eventually -- destabilizing activities, does not seem to us to be a reason.

Q Do you feel that the American role, whatever it might be that you can discuss in the mining operation, bears sufficient strategic fruit for you to take all of the heat on this issue?

A Well, you'd be asking us to get into substantiation of reports involving covert activities which we're not, obviously, and haven't been prepared to do and are not prepared to do --

Q I'm not asking you that. I'm asking you whether it's worth it.

A Well, that's a very sweeping question. I don't know whether it's your network, but one network last night ran a film of the impact of these activities on Nicaragua. There are all kinds of forces in play here. I suppose you could ask yourself whether Nicaragua has moved in any direction over the past few months, and then one would have to analyze the reasons for that movement that there might have been and make a broad judgment.

Q If we ask you that question --

Q You can't quite -- you haven't answered the question.

Q If we ask you that question and we give you an opportunity to answer that question in all the fullness you desire, will you answer the other question in all the fullness?

A Which is the other question?

Q The other question is the one that Marvin asked, which is, given your answer to the Nicaragua activities, is the answer to the U.S. question, about U.S. activities, worth it? Is it worth taking the heat?

A We're not going to discuss, for obvious reasons, U.S. activities, or alleged U.S. activities.

Q All you want to discuss is Nicaraguan activities; you don't want to discuss U.S. activities.

A I'm not going to discuss U.S. activities.

Q Speaking of Nicaragua, the *Post* story said today that there were rather massive arms flows sent from Nicaragua to El Salvador last fall to help the --

A Not last fall.

Q Wasn't it last fall? Maybe I misread that.

A Well, I think the story suggests that in preparation for an offensive this fall.

Q I misread that. Well, can you substantiate that?

A Well, there certainly is a continuing substantial flow of military materiel from Nicaragua to El Salvador, and there isn't any question that the elections and the success of the elections clearly must have put pressure on the guerrillas. Just how they will respond is difficult to say, and certainly we're not predicting offensives or predicting what course of action they must take.

But I would think the barrenness of their argument in the fact of this election that has just taken place, where people did vote despite all kinds of pressures from the guerrillas to prevent them voting -- including seizure of identity cards, such other activities which hardly seem cast within the framework of democratic procedure -- must have given them pause, and I would assume that they're examining how to proceed.

Q John, the importation of what you're saying is that since the election in El Salvador, that they have stepped up their arms shipment. Am I reading you right as to what you --

A I can't give you a -- you know, I can't give you a flow chart, Don, but there isn't any question of substantial passage of military equipment, but where it stands in terms of volume --

Q Well, what is the relevance of the election? I'm puzzled here.

A I would think that the relevance of the election is that that is a defeat -- surely a political defeat for the guerrillas.

Q But how does it affect the arms flow is what I'm getting at?

A Well, that's what I said. It's obviously not intelligent for us to predict how the guerrillas, having suffered a political defeat, will respond militarily. But there may well be some plans on their part to respond militarily.

Q Do you suppose they have their eye on our election?

A I suppose it's entirely possible.

Q You have no indications of a forecast of a major offensive being prepared?

A Well, I think we would prefer not to speculate on what they might have in mind.

Q Ambassador Kirkpatrick, on this question, said -- or was quoted as saying from London by the Post today -- that the guerrilla attacks during the March elections "were directed by Nicaragua." Does the State Department believe that they were directed by Nicaragua?

A Well, there certainly hasn't been any question about Nicaraguan support for the guerrillas. There certainly hasn't been any question about Nicaraguan sanctuary for various command and other elements of the guerrillas in Salvador.

Q No. But she's using a very specific word which has very specific connotations, and that word is "direct."

A Well, I haven't seen what she said specifically, and I don't have any comment on it.

Q On the arms flow question -- this is maybe beating a very, very dead horse, but two years ago we were promised from that podium a briefing on the arms flow.

A Two years ago. Did I do that?

Q No. I can't quite remember whether you were here or not. No. You weren't here, in fact.

A In this building? I could have been.

Q That's right. It was in the spring of 1982.

A Was it Mr. Romberg who promised that?

Q No. It wasn't Mr. Romberg either, although I think Mr. Romberg was an accomplice -- (laughter) -- and probably --

A Surely a valued colleague --

Q I'm sure he didn't direct the answer.

A -- and occasionally proconsul, but accomplice, never.

Q Well, he may have supported the decision. In any case, it was the time of the Tardencillas affair and the guerrilla in the White House and all that stuff. And I was wondering whether we might renew our request or --

A You certainly might renew your request.

Q And whether it might be taken very seriously indeed.

A It will be taken seriously. But I don't -- I'm sure you're not suggesting, Jim, that between that promise of two years ago and today we have not offered anything on this subject, because I personally have seen --

Q Very little.

A Well, that may be your assessment --

Q Well, you've never offered anything of a -- here we are -- well, essentially what we're confronted with, just to give one example, is two DC-3s -- presumably, that had something to do with the effort by the Contras' crash in just the last six months, and we still don't know of a single plane or boat that's crashed or been captured on the other side, and I think a lot of people have real questions as to just what the nature of this arms flow is, and they're having contradictory --

A Okay.

Q -- statements by Administration officials regarding this flow.

A Although it seems to me I've personally been present when a senior Administration official, who we cannot identify in this session, but within the past several weeks, it seems to me, offered something on that. But, anyway, I think it's a serious request, and let me pass it on to the folks who are expert in these matters.

Q Given the fact that your entire policy is based on this, I --

A Oh, I wouldn't say our entire policy is based on this.

Q Well, that's the core issue.

A But I'm sure, George, you're not questioning Nicaraguan involvement --

Q I'd like to see some proof.

A Yeah. Well, okay.

-- MORE --

Q Will the Secretary be coming down with the Dominican President today? Do you expect that -- and what time?

A I'm not aware of any plans on his part to come down. If he does come down, I think it would probably be just a walk-through. I don't think you could really count on him to --

Q Can you clear up something on the Soviet complaint on the Olympics yesterday?

Q I'd like to go one more on this Central American issue, if I can, going back to a question that was raised earlier.

A O.K.

Q Isn't there a contradiction, John? On the one hand, we're saying that we support the Contadora process, are referring the Nicaraguans to the Contadora process; and yet, when the Contadora countries criticize our activities in the region, we essentially ignore their criticism.

A No, don't ignore it. The point is that the Contadora process, to be successful, has to look at the destabilization of Central America, has to look at the arms flow, has to look at the presence of foreign advisers, and various other things -- the arms buildup -- in the entirety of those subjects. There just really is no future in taking a very small sliver of the activity or of the Nicaraguans running to Contadora and pinpointing the deficiencies of others, as they see them.

I think we have to look at the problems, the deficiencies, and the destabilization that is going on in its entirety in the area. And we have a lot of questions about Nicaragua's contribution to destabilization. So our point is that we cannot tolerate a Nicaraguan attempt to divert from the basic problem in the area -- and certainly, other countries have no question about that.

Q So the Contadora criticism of us, in this instance, is invalid?

A I wouldn't say it is invalid, but I would say there are other aspects of the Contadora statement which you also ought to look at. We are only being asked about one aspect of those. And if the question is, "Are we prepared to take up the overall question of military involvement in Central America?", of course, we are; but we see a limited future in succumbing to a propaganda ploy to focus on only one element of what is happening there.

Q All the rest of the world is caught up in this propaganda ploy but us? (Inaudible)

A No, I don't think it's all the rest of the world. I think you ought to read what the Contadora nations said, and see what they said in general about violence and destabilization in the area. There is certainly a great deal in there that refers to others.

Q Should the Contadora group, then, be broadened, and the process be broadened, to include the United States since the United States is not a party to these negotiations but appears, according to many sources, to actually be, if not a belligerent, at least close to a belligerent in this?

A I don't know, Jim. I haven't heard any talk of that. But, certainly, there isn't any problem about the United States communicating its views, or the Contadora nations communicating their views to the United States; there isn't any lack of a mechanism.

Q John, on the Olympics thing, the Soviets complained that the Embassy was requiring the Soviet team to request visas. I think we were told here yesterday, at least by State Department officials, that in fact the Soviets were not being asked to submit to visa requests.

A Uh-huh.

Q The head of the Los Angeles Organizing Committee said yesterday that there had been a snafu, and that the Embassy had in fact asked for visas. Can you clear this up?

A Well, I don't know whether the Embassy had, in fact, asked for visas, but I think our position is that those with the appropriate identification, the appropriate accreditation to the Olympics are going to have no problem about access to the United States. We are asking each of the countries to supply us a list of those who will be participating.

As we said yesterday, the United States, as host government, will uphold its responsibilities in all respects including permitting athletes from all countries unhindered entry if they are properly accredited by their respective national Olympic committees. We, obviously, have to take into account U.S. immigration laws and procedures, and so the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee, in conjunction with this government and with the approval of the International Olympic Committee, has devised a procedure applicable to all participants which satisfies the requirements of the Olympic Charter and U.S. immigration law.

Under these procedures, an Olympic identity card, validly issued by the respective National Olympic Committee, will constitute the necessary entry document into the United States. Secondly, the lists of names which we have asked each National Olympic Committee, not exclusively the Soviet Union, to submit to our Embassy is designed simply to ensure the smooth and efficient entry of such persons when they arrive in the United States.

Q May we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q John, on this point, there are reports that Palestinian athletes are planning to attend the Olympics in Los Angeles. What is the position of the United States toward this?

A I've seen those reports, but we have no knowledge whatsoever of that, and I understand the Los Angeles Olympic Committee has no knowledge of it either.

Q Nobody has any knowledge?

Q On another visa matter, has the State Department denied a visa for the Argentinian, Perez Esquivel, the Nobel Peace Prize winner?

A I don't know. Be glad to take a look at it.

Q There were reports that he was denied entry.

A Don't know anything about it. Be glad to take a look at it.

Q On a related question, you took the question about Ungo's having raised money while he was in the United States for the FMLN.

A Uh-huh.

Q And you posted an answer which said, "Without going into any details, we stand by our assertion that he has done so."

A Uh-huh.

Q Well, some might say that this was not particularly responsive to the question.

A Perish the thought! (Laughter)

Q Is this because it is an intelligence matter? Is there some standard reason why you can't give us a detail as --

A I don't know. I guess we developed as much on it as was available, but I don't have anything more, Jim.

Q Does the Spokesman ever grant an appeal of a posted answer?

A Oh, sure. Indeed, the Spokesman sometimes appeals himself.

Q Could you take an appeal or speak on my behalf or others' behalf?

A I doubt that we will have any more, but I will be glad to look at it; and if we do, we'll get back to you.

Q Thank you.

Q Another question on the mining: The United States, obviously, supports the mining, whoever is laying the mines. Does it support it as a way to cut off the flow of arms to the guerrillas or as a general measure to hurt Nicaragua's economy?

A Well, the United States is not in favor of Nicaragua's being able to pursue its export of revolution, and that is what underlies the entire U.S. current policy towards Nicaragua.

Q That's just what I said, and you disagreed with me before.

A I disagreed with you before?

Q So it's only on the arms? It's not on a general campaign to hurt Nicaragua's economy?

A Well, we're not in favor of the flow of weaponry from Cuba and the Soviet Union into Nicaragua when it is clearly being re-exported and used, for example, to kill people in Salvador who want to produce a democratic government and get on with the business of restoring their country.

Q John, is this Administration considering requesting the OAS to take actions against Nicaragua?

A I'm not aware of any such initiative. Obviously, never rule anything out, but I think, as I said yesterday, the focus of our activity is in the diplomatic field, and particularly involved with the Contadora process, which we think has been making progress.

Nicaragua does not seem to be active in various processes that the Contadora group now has underway. When it comes to translating specific broad statements into operational ground rules, the Nicaraguans seem to have indicated a lack of interest in pursuing this.

Q Do you think you have enough majority in the Council of the OAS to get such a motion?

A I don't know. I really can't answer that.

Q John, do you have anything on The Washington Post lead story today that the mining operation is merely a holding action pending the outcome of the election here?

A I think Larry Speakes had some forceful words to say on that at the White House and demolished that story completely.

Q Has the United States responded to the World Court, whatever the paper was that apparently came forth yesterday, notifying the U.S. that Nicaragua had lodged this complaint? Has the U.S. now taken some further step in that respect?

A I do not think we have received yet in Washington the document. I think we are waiting for the receipt in Washington of the entire document, Don.

Q Just let me clear one thing up and perhaps put it on the record since it was ON BACKGROUND yesterday: The question was asked at the briefing on the legal part of this, whether the United States would, basically, abide by a decision by the Court as to whether or not it had jurisdiction over this complaint lodged by Nicaragua.

A Uh-huh.

Q And ON BACKGROUND the representative of the State Department gave a reply which I, at least, interpreted to mean that the U.S. would abide by it, that the U.S. abides by competent courts or some --

A On the question of jurisdiction?

Q Yes, that the U.S. has its position -- it has said it's withdrawing this jurisdiction, but clearly, there may be a hearing on the matter before the World Court.

A Uh-huh.

Q Will the United States abide by the decision of the Court with regard to whether or not the Court has jurisdiction?

A I interpreted it in the same way as you did, that the answer was yes; and I stand by every word that the legal expert offered.

Q Does the United States have a position on a policy announced by the International Monetary Fund yesterday, which is a policy of excluding Executive Intelligence Review from covering its current Interim Committee Meeting and future meetings?

A Haven't seen the report.

Q Well, can you look into it? This is a direct statement by Hellmut Hartmann, who is the Chief Information Officer of the International Monetary Fund.

A I think it is more an IMF matter and an IMF decision, but I'll be glad to look at it.

Q Well, you have in the past commented on the New World Information Order and other attempts to suppress freedom of the press through multilateral organizations.

A Uh-huh. Well, obviously, we are in favor of freedom of the press, but I'm not aware of the specific circumstances involved in this case.

Q If you could look into it?

A Sure.

Q John, you said a little while earlier that the United States is not in favor of Nicaragua exporting its revolution.

A That's correct.

Q Is the United States in favor of Nicaragua being able to import materials other than war materiel?

A Is it in favor -- ?

Q Does the United States favor Nicaragua's ability to import anything other than war materiel?

A I don't think the United States has any objections to the importation of non-military --

Q And in pursuit of that, the lack of objections, is the United States taking steps to assure that Nicaragua is able to do that?

A Well, I'm not specifying in which manner -- Nicaragua imports whatever it wants to import. That's a matter for Nicaragua.

Q You're not specifying it, but you don't have any objection to their doing it?

A I don't see any objection to the normal traffic in commerce.

Q John, on the World Court decision, were the Congressional leadership of both parties informed in advance of the decision to file our amendment or modification?

A I -- They certainly were, on Friday afternoon, yes.

Q Both parties were informed?

A I'm sure.

Q O.K. And also, this wasn't raised yesterday at the legal briefing. Maybe you could take it. I didn't see the matter. Apparently, our declaration was filed with the advice and consent of the United States Senate.

A Uh-huh.

Q Is it acceptable legal practice for the U.S. Executive to modify a treaty that has been passed on by the United States Senate, without Senate concurrence?

A I thought that issue of modification was discussed yesterday, but maybe I'm wrong.

Q Well, only the question of time.

A I thought that was discussed, too. I thought that you were raising six months --

Were you here for the BACKGROUNDER?

Q No, I'm not asking about the time. I'm asking about whether a U.S. executive can unilaterally, without Congressional action, modify a treaty upon which the Senate has passed.

A Let me take a look at it for you.

Q O.K.

Q John, who was notified on Friday afternoon on that?

A I can't give you the specifics.

Q Well, you answered a moment ago the leadership was.

A Yes, the leadership was.

Q Did the leadership include the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee?

A I'm not sure -- I know some of the individuals, but I'm not sure all the individuals. I'll be glad to take a look at it and see if we can get that for you.

Q Thank you.

Q John, will there be a briefing sometime prior to the visit of the Thailand delegation Thursday?

A I'm sure there will. I don't know whether this --

Wednesday?

MR. ROMBERG: At the White House.

MR. HUGHES: The White House.

Q Thank you, John.

(The briefing concluded at 1:40 P.M.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Wednesday, April 11, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #63

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 11, 1984, 12:05 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: I have some housekeeping announcements up front.

Just to remind you there will be an ON-THE-RECORD briefing today by Ambassador Richard Kennedy at 1:45 on the Nuclear Energy Agency and its activities. NEA Director General Howard Shapar and Steering Committee Chairman Ivor Manley will be present to answer your questions. That's here, 1:45, this afternoon.

Q Is that ON BACKGROUND?

A That's ON-THE-RECORD, Bill.

Q The time is 1:00?

A 1:45.

Tomorrow there will be a BACKGROUND briefing at 11:00 o'clock in the morning here in the Press Briefing Room on the visit of the Thai Prime Minister, Premier Prem.

Thirdly, Secretary Shultz will address the South Carolina Bar Association's Centennial Celebration in State House Chambers of the Assembly in Columbia. That will be 10:00 o'clock in the morning, Saturday, May 5. Anybody who wishes to cover that event should be in touch with the Bar Association -- South Carolina Bar Association. The contact is Don Black. He's at (803) 799-6653. That's the Secretary's speech, South Carolina Bar Association, Columbia, South Carolina, 10:00 o'clock, Saturday, May 5. And if you want to cover it the contact is Don Black, (803) 799-6653.

Q Will there be a pipe-in here?

A I'm not aware of any on a Saturday from Columbia, South Carolina. You are taxing our expertise and I --

Q In compensation you'll give us an early advance text.

A Did I -- I'm quite right.

Q So we will get an early advance text. Maybe on Friday?

A As always, we'll be rushing to get that text out just as fast as we can, Mike.

Q Great.

A You know what our track record is on this --

Q That's why we asked.

A Yeah. That's why you're worried. (Laughter)

Q What will be the subject?

A I don't have a subject for you yet.

Q A mystery speech.

A Finally, the Secretary will visit Seoul and Tokyo on May 1 and 2 to hold discussions with and brief the Governments of the Republic of Korea and Japan on the President's trip to China. We're working out details on that. We're not putting up a sign-up list yet for press because there seems to be a very real prospect we will not be able to carry press on those legs. But I'll let you know about that as soon as we have anything a little more --

Q Is that because of the plane that he'll be flying?

A It's the question of it being a White House -- basically a White House trip and coordinating the planes and coordinating the Secretary's departure from China and his arrival in Alaska, on which plane he will travel from there, and so forth and so on. It's a complex logistical exercise.

Q That's the reason why.

A That's the reason why. Yeah. Sure. As I say, at the moment it's not looking likely, but, as always, I'm in there fighting on your behalf, and, should we get some seats --

Q We'll appreciate that.

A Okay. All right. We'll let you know. That's all I have. I have a very slim book today.

Q Can you tell us about Assistant Secretary Murphy's travels, and the purpose of his trip?

A Well, he is in the area. Unfortunately, we were offered some words on that early this morning, but as I came out there were some changes, so I'm afraid I'm unable to give you that until later in the day. That happens in the bureaucracy, but he certainly is in the area, or I think he's in Israel today, will be visiting a number of countries in the Middle East, but for obvious reasons of security we won't tell you where he's going. We'll tell you where he's been after he's been there.

Q John, when did he leave, and what's the purpose of the trip?

A He left, I think, a couple of days ago. I don't have the exact date in my head, Marvin, but, as I say, we will have some guidance for you later in the day on that.

Q Is the Middle East --

Q And the purpose of the guidance --

A Excuse me. Sorry.

Q -- can you tell us if, in fact, the United States does -- is putting together a plan in anticipation or in fear of an Iraqi collapse?

A No. We do not believe that there is the prospect of an Iraqi collapse. We believe that both sides have the capacity to fight more or less indefinitely.

Q To follow up on that, John, apparently the Italian news magazine Panorama is reporting this week that in the City of Bushir, Iran has begun construction of an atomic weapon of some type. Do we have anything on that?

A Haven't seen that one, Bill. Don't know anything about it.

Q John, is the U.S. working with France and Jordan, and perhaps other countries to try to get some more weapons to Iraq?

A As I say for the third or fourth time, Ralph, the guidance will be available later on, but our position is unchanged. As you know, we do not sell weapons to either side. That position we have made plain to a variety of governments. I'm not going to get into the details of those diplomatic exchanges, but we have made clear that we think a supply of arms to either side is not constructive.

We also have stressed that, particularly, we have the special emphasis at this time on discouraging the supply of arms to Iran.

Q So a supply of arms from whatever source --

A Yes.

Q -- to either side --

A Yes.

Q -- is not productive?

A Yes.

Q Do you have a comment on last night's Senate vote on Nicaragua?

A No. The President --

Q Can we finish up on this?

A Yes, sure. Hold on.

Q Do you have any information that any spare parts from the United States, in the form of either refurbishing or in new spare parts for U.S. weapons, are reaching Iran?

A From -- You mean military spare parts?

Q From the United States, yes, military spare parts.

A Not that I'm aware of. It certainly would run counter to policy.

Q More than counter to policy, is it also counter to law?

A   I don't know whether it's counter to law; it's certainly counter to policy, and so far as I'm aware, there is no such activity.

Q   You need a license, don't you?

A   I guess you need a license, yes.

Q   And wasn't there this case in -- Minnesota?

Q   Sorry. I was going to ask about a specific case in which, for example, what if a European subcontractor were to contract for the refurbishing of aircraft engines, let's say?

A   To the United States?

Q   Yes. And then --

A   For military use?

Q   Yes. And then to subcontract those repairs to the United States.

A   Before I make a snap judgment, I'd like to have some experts look at it; but that would seem to run counter to policy. It would seem to fall --

Q   Just to follow up your statement that we're discouraging the supply of arms to Iran, are we actively involved with some of the countries that had been supplying arms, to discourage them -- or supplying the wherewithall for them to purchase the arms?

A   We've talked to a number of countries about the supply of arms to both sides.

Q   But in particular --

A   But particularly to Iran, yes.

Q   Well, in particular, Britain and West Germany?

A   Not going to talk about specific countries, but our views are well known to a variety of countries.

Q Are you achieving anything? Is it successful in terms of discouraging? Because the nub of the problem here is the purchase of the oil which gives Iran the cash to buy the weapons.

Can you take the question and see whether --

A Yes, let me take a look and see whether we couldn't offer anything on that.

Q Any comment on the vote last night?

A No. The President addressed that last night; don't have anything more beyond what he said.

Q You mean that quote of his, "as long it's non-binding"?

A Uh-huh.

Q What about the report that Secretary Shultz had misgivings about the mining operation?

A Never talk about differences of opinion that might or might not exist within the Administration. It's the Administration policy, the President's policy. The Secretary supports that.

Q Is that the harassment policy you're talking about?

A Well, what's your specific question -- policy on what?

Q Well, misgivings about the use of mines is part of the harassment the Senate --

A You're trying to draw a "no comment" from me on two counts: firstly, we don't about alleged intelligence activities; and secondly, we never talk about the process of decision-making within the Administration.

Q John, same subject, what about the complaints of Senator Goldwater and Senator Moynihan and others that they had not been consulted?

A I guess that would be something you would have to ask the CIA about. Director Casey, obviously, has said what he has said, and Senator Goldwater said what he has said, and I guess you'd have to ask them.

Q What about -- is there any concern that a resolution will be made -- a smiliar resolution will be made binding? It seems to be that Senator Kennedy is talking about that.

A Let's meet that one when we come to it.

Q Was there a policy study made of the implications of mining before the mining began?

A A policy study on the implication of mines?

Q Yes, in the Department of State, where I think it was assigned to be done.

A Well, again, I think you're getting into an area of alleged intelligence activity that we wouldn't comment on.

Q John, you've spoken about --

Q Likely to be -- O.K. Ralph, go ahead.

A You guys fight with each other.

Q You've spoken about the mining in the past when mines exploded and hit a Soviet ship, so in that context, the context in which you addressed the mining there, has the mining stopped?

A Nice try, Ralph. No comment. (Laughter)

Q John, why won't you discuss the topic?

A I think your colleagues are getting bored with your endless attempt to get your question answered, which I'm not going to answer. I think we've --

Q I've only asked -- This is the second question today.

A I detect ripples of boredom, Ralph.

Q It's quite all right.

Q It appears unlikely now that there will be a conference on either the $21 million or the $62 million until at least after the Easter recess. Do you have any comment? And is it likely now that you're going to be going ahead, are you considering going ahead with emergency assistance?

A Well, we certainly hope that the resolution on that is not going to be postponed. As you know, we have been anxious for the speediest possible resolution of that. The Administration has made its case on the urgent need --

You're talking about Salvador?

Q I'm talking about both.

A -- of need for supplementary military assistance to allow the Salvadoran Army to protect the Presidential runoff. The Senate approved, by an impressive bipartisan vote last week, the funding for this need which daily grows more serious. We have noted a number of times in the past that we were faced with the limited alternatives of the exercise of options available to the President under existing laws for providing the Congress with this opportunity to act. So the immediate issue is whether the House will act on this issue, as the Senate already has, before adjourning for the Easter recess.

Q Can we get a copy of that statement?

A Yes.

Q The reason there being that the option of the United States -- the implication --

A Well, as I say, we will meet that when we come to it, Bernie, but we're urging the speediest possible House action on this matter.

Q How about the other aid bill? There is speculation that this latest flap severely menaces the $21 million in aid to the Contras.

A Uh-huh.

Q Is there any concern that --

A Well, there isn't any question. We have made clear our support of that budget item for covert activity, and that support is as strong as ever.

Q On that question as well, you had a -- and in view of your statement just a minute ago about the strong bipartisan support shown by the Senate last week, you had a rather strong showing of bipartisan support for something else last night. Will that be taken as seriously, or because it's non-binding, is that not regarded as --

A I'm not aware of any change in our position on the funding situation.

Q The $21 million again, does the Administration have the options that you mentioned in connection with the Salvadoran money, in connection with the covert aid money that you just referred to?

A That's a somewhat different -- I think we'll wait until we see what the outcome is, but that's a somewhat different matter in view of the covert character and the different way in which that budget is handled, and I don't think I'm competent to respond to that.

Q I'm curious to know why you chose to remind Congress of the fact that the Administration has the options on the Salvador money in order to pursuade them to --

A It's not a question of reminding. It's a question of having made that position plain from the very beginning, but having urged Congress to take the action that we were counseling to take.

Q So my question is, have you done the same thing in connection with the other resolution, the other month?

A As I say, I really can't -- I'm not really in a position to speak on the covert --

Q Could you look into whether the Administration has any options? I don't believe it does, and I think --

A I think you should probably address that question to the CIA. I think it's a CIA budget item.

Q No, no, funding options?

A I still think it's a CIA budget item.

Q John, does the Secretary support the President's policy of harassment of Nicaragua?

A   The Secretary certainly supports the President's policy on Nicaragua.

Q   I thought you came close a few minutes ago to saying that he did suport the policy of harassment?

A   I prefer not to couch it in that way. I think I would prefer to use the words that we have used on our policy in Nicaragua, and I think maybe yesterday or the day before I went over them again.

I think I would prefer, as I say, to use the words that we have used.

Q   Does the policy continue unchanged?

A   The policy continues unchanged so far as I'm aware.

Q   Can you take the question as to whether Senator Stone either was fired or resigned because he advocated a power-sharing, in a very limited sense, in the Salvadoran --

A   No, I won't take the question. I think Senator Stone made plain at the time of his resignation, which was a resignation, his reasons for that action, and I --

Q   Some new facts have come to light which seem to indicate that he was --

A   Then why don't you ask Senator Stone?

Q   I have.

A   Okay, what does he say?

Q   I'm trying to find out if his version is accurate.

A   No, don't have any comment on that.

Q   You won't take the question?

A   No.

Q   A follow-up on the previous question. You say that the policy continues unchanged. What about the policy implementation? Does that continue unchanged also?

A In broad terms, the answer to your question is yes. I'm not going to be drawn into specific operational or alleged intelligence aspects of that policy. But in broad terms, yes.

Q Do you have anything on the meeting this morning between the Secretary and the Argentine Foreign Minister?

A Yes. It was, I think, a very successful visit. The meeting between the Secretary and Minister Caputo was extremely cordial. They exchanged views on a number of bilateral and global issues of mutual interest, including some discussion of the economic debt problem. They also expressed an interest in both continuing and expanding this dialogue.

Q Any discussion of Central America?

A Not in great detail. But within the context of a broad discussion of hemispheric issues, yes, sure.

Q John, you have been plentiful in your description of what would happen to the Salvadoran military situation if Congress did not approve the money the Administration has requested. What would happen to the President's Nicaragua policy if Congress did not approve the money the Administration is requesting on that front?

A Oh, I don't have anything on that.

Q Do you have any guidance on either the report that was issued yesterday by America's Watch on displaced persons in El Salvador, or in Chile --

A No.

Q You have nothing on that. On Chile, do you have anything on the exiles of some opposition leaders in the head of the Human Rights Commission?

A Don't.

Q And the banning of a newspaper; or the closing down of a newspaper?

A No.

Q Can you look into both of them?

A Let me take a look and see what we might develop.

Q Do you have a confirmation that a deal has been worked out with Zimbabwe to provide them with $10 million worth of food providing they relax restrictions in Matabeleland?

A It's true that the U.S. negotiated an easing of -- I guess I shouldn't say it's true. I'm reading the question you were about to ask.

It's true that on April 9, the United States signed an agreement to provide 30,000 tons of maize to Zimbabwe. That agreement, like those signed with other nations, provided that food would be made available to all on the basis of need, regardless of political or other considerations.

The Government of Zimbabwe knows that the United States is concerned about the internal security problems in that country, and that we are also concerned about reports of innocent civilians in Matabeleland being caught between dissident and government forces. We were also aware of reports that food was not getting to some of the areas where it was sorely needed.

The United States welcomes the Government of Zimbabwe's decision to relax the curfew in those parts of Matabeleland where it was still in effect.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Has the United States received any words of thanks, or any communication from the Soviet Union regarding the rescue of a Soviet sailor near Iceland a few days ago?

A I'm not aware of that, Ralph. I guess it's conceivable, but I'm not aware of it.

Q Do you know if Mr. Murphy will visit -- if he goes to visit Beirut, Lebanon, while he's in the area?

A We have an obvious problem on Secretary Murphy's travels in that turbulent area. I'll be glad to tell you where he's been after he's gotten there.

Q Afghanistan: Any reports on the expulsion of an American diplomat?

A No, I don't.

Q Could you check into it?

A Take a look at it; sure.

Q Could I just go back for a second to Nicaragua. There have been a number of officials quoted as saying that unprecedented amounts of Soviet arms are still being shipped from Nicaragua to El Salvador. Is it possible to get a more detailed --

A We had such a request yesterday and have forwarded it. Don't have any response yet, but we'll see --

Q I thought we could get that this week?

A We'll see.

Q John?

A Yes.

Q On Salvador, again. Yesterday, a senior Administration official, briefing at the White House after the Blanco meeting, alluded to direct Cuban intervention in El Salvador upcoming, and command and control from Cuba, as opposed to any other country in the region. Do you have any -- can you elaborate at all on what he was talking about?

A No, I can't.

Q John, do you have any explanation to offer in light of Senator Goldwater's published questions about the President's Nicaragua policy? Questions about explaining the policy?

A I'm sorry, I'm not sure I'm getting the question.

Q Senator Goldwater, in a letter widely published today, asks, "I don't see how we're going to explain the mining of the harbors in Nicaragua," which Goldwater calls "an act violating international law, an act of war." Do you have any response to those --

A No. As I say, I think that gets back to an exchange between Senator Goldwater and Director Casey, and I guess you'd have to ask Mr. Casey.

Q John, going back to Lebanon. Are there any plans to withdraw the rest of the American personnel -- Embassy personnel?

A Oh, no, no. I mean, there's a very small, relatively small diplomatic cadre there and the same number of Marines there. I know of no plans to run those down.

Q Have the Europeans, who are there, talked to the United States about possibly withdrawing their people?

A Not that I'm aware of. Don't know anything about it.

Q John, on the Iran-Iraq thing, did I understand you to say that you're especially concerned about arms supplies to Iran?

A Yes.

Q Why?

A Because of the intransigence of Iran and the threatening posture of Iran right now.

Q John, have you taken a position on the possibility of Soviet ships sweeping mines from Nicaraguan harbors?

A Yes, we have had something on that some weeks ago.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:25 p.m.)

Becki

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Thursday, April 12, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #64

THURSDAY, APRIL 12, 1984, 12:26 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. Couple of housekeeping announcements.

Available in the Press Office is the testimony by Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Elliott Abrams before the Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees and International Law. The subject is Extended Voluntary Departure for Salvadorans.

An announcement on the spring NATO meeting. The Spring Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council will be hosted by the United States May 29-31. The meetings will take place at the Department of State in Washington and at the facilities of the Aspen Institute at Wye Plantation, Queenstown, Maryland.

That's all I've got for you.

Q You say May 29 --

A 29 through 31, Marvin.

Q Most of them here or most of them there?

A I think days one and three are in the Department. I think day two is mostly out at Aspen, but let me check that one for you.

Q Where will it be, downstairs or do you know?

A Well, because of the large number of people who will be here, a large part of the lower floors of this building. I guess the lower floor, street floor. No. I guess there are two floors -- will be taken over for various meeting rooms and so forth.

Q Will there be a press setup --

A Yeah.

Q -- out there?

A At Aspen? Don't think so. No. I think that's going to be the closed session.

Q Is that going to be the super-restricted?

A Yup.

Q Well, will there be briefings out there?

A There will not be briefings out there.

Q Hmm?

A No. Briefings -- all the briefings -- all your -- all the activity in which you're interested -- although I expect you are interested in what goes on out at Aspen -- but all that you're interested in that you're going to get your fingers on is in this building.

Q Ho, ho, ho.

A Ho, ho, ho. (Laughter)

Q Is this supposed to be a replay of La Sapiniere, or something like that?

A No, no, no, no. This is the --

Q No. I understand it's the -- but having it removed like that is unusual.

A I don't quite know why they have decided to have the super-restricted session out there. Maybe they feel they can get a little more privacy.

Q They're not going to spend the night out there, are they?

A I think they are in fact going to spend one night out there. I think maybe the -- I'll have to -- you're obviously pressing me for stuff I don't have in my head. I think it may be the Tuesday, the first day. Yeah. That's right.

Q John, do you have any comment on the agreement by the House leaders to cut the $62 million Salvador aid --

A No.

Q -- by two-thirds?

A No, I don't.

Q Have you seen that?

A No. I'm sure that those are under consideration right now, but I haven't seen it.

Q And also to cut all the aid money for the Nicaraguan covert operation.

A No. Don't have any comment on that.

Q John, are you hoping for a conference before the Easter recess?

A Congress is here throughout the day, and I'm sure that the various people you would expect to be involved in this are discussing it, and don't have anything for you.

Q No, but the Administration previously has urged quick action by Congress, and now they've decided apparently that they're going to meet, and they're going to try to give you a conference report --

A Yes.

Q -- on which both houses can agree before Easter recess. Do you welcome that development?

A Oh, we certainly welcome speedy action. Obviously, I'm not prejuding the outcome or giving a comment on the outcome, but in terms of early action, we welcome that. There is an urgency.

Q But the $32 million that the House would be willing to give you, would that satisfy the needs of the Salvadoran military at this time?

A Not going to get into discussion of the amount or discussions that might still be going on.

Q Before you have said that it's not enough, even the $61.7.

A Not getting -- there isn't any question about the overall amounts that we need, but I'm not going to get into discussion of how those events might be carved up over periods or what our position on that would be.

Q Would you tell us in what way the Secretary has been involved in this lobbying effort?

A Well, he certainly has been involved in support of the Administration's budget requests. To what extent he has been involved today, I'm not sure.

Q Would you tell me whether the effort is being done primarily through Congressman Wright?

A I cannot. I'm sure that the various people are talking to various people. I really can't give you a rundown of --

Q John, a report in The New York Times quotes sources in our Embassy in El Salvador, saying that some trainers have been accompanying bombing raids. Any comments on that?

A Well, I know that the Pentagon is pursuing that story very vigorously and considers it to be inaccurate, so I think you really should go to the Pentagon. But let me just say that we stand by the statement made by the United States Embassy in San Salvador that such activities would be contrary to U.S. policy and that no such incidents involving U.S. trainers have occurred. And I think if you go to the Pentagon, they will tell you that during all of 1983, there were only two U.S. flight instructors in El Salvador, for a total of 55 days, beginning August 15, and neither we nor the Pentagon know of any such incident. So I think basically we'll let the Pentagon respond to that, but I think you'll get a very strong denial.

Q Spain has formally protested to our Ambassador, Thomas Enders, in Madrid regarding the mining. Do you have any comment about that?

A Uh --

Q Can you confirm that the protest was made?

A No. I'm not going to confirm. As a matter of principle, we respect the confidentiality of private government-to-government communications, unless the other party makes them public and we feel that any comment is warranted.

We have previously acknowledged a protest over the mining received from the U.S.S.R. and an approach to us on this subject by the British. Naturally, we have discussed this issue with several other governments, and some have made public statements. We have no specific comment to make on the content of such discussions.

At the same time, we're responsive to other governments' interests in these issues. For example, State Department officials on April 11 held a briefing here for diplomatic representatives from OECD and Latin American countries on the subject of our decision to modify temporarily our accession to jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.

Q John, are you going to be able to say whether the mining continues or has been interrupted?

A No. Not going to have anything to say on that topic.

Q There have been two network reports that the mining has stopped. Can you --

A Well, there have been a lot of reports about the mining, offering a variety of scenarios, involvements, some of them contradictory, but we're not going to have anything to say on it.

Q John, on Dam's testimony yesterday, he raised the issue of collective self-defense in a hypothetical manner.

A Uh-huh.

Q Was he -- can you say whether he was saying that there is a right and perhaps a duty to collective self-defense in the absence of a collective security treaty?

A I think you'd have to go back to his words. I certainly don't intend to interpret them. He's a very capable international lawyer, and I don't -- I am not, and I do not plan to interpret the Deputy Secretary's view.

Q Can you take the question as to whether the United States believes there is a right to collective self-defense when a treaty is not invoked specifically?

A I will take a look at it, but I think in view of the action presently before the International Court, we probably are inclined to say less rather than more about this question.

Q John, do you have anything on the request made yesterday and the day before yesterday about some information on Soviet arms supplies to Nicaragua?

A No. I don't have anything.

Q Do you have any prospect of getting anything?

A It's with the experts in that area, and it's entirely up to them whether they want to say something.

Q Why is Eagleburger seeing Dobrynin today?

A Mr. Dobrynin -- Ambassador Dobrynin is coming in at our request. Don't have anything for you on the topic.

Q John, the Peking correspondent of the London Daily Telegraph reports --

Q Could we finish up with Central America before we go to China?

Q I thought we were. Excuse me.

Q Regarding the matter raised a minute ago about the legal question --

A Uh-huh.

Q Has the State Department legal office issued a legal opinion as to the legality of mining in the waters of other countries?

A I just don't know the answer to that question.

Q Could you check into that?

A I will check whether we are interested in saying something about that. Yes.

Q But I mean, if it is a legal opinion by the State Department --

A I will check into the -- our degree of interest in saying something about it.

Q My next question would be, would you please make it public?

A I think your second question follows logically from the first. Let us see what the degree of interest is.

Q Okay.

A I mean, this obviously is a question before the courts, and I don't know to what extent we will want to be forthcoming.

Q If you won't, I wonder under what grounds you would withhold it?

A I think probably on grounds that we're proceeding with a legal action.

Q John, on Nicaragua, do we still consider the $21 million that we want the Congress to approve important to our effort in Central America?

A Yes.

Q Are we still pressing to have that approved?

A Yes.

Q Do we consider it likely or unlikely that it will be approved now?

A Well, as you know, we tend to veer away from predictions, but we continue to believe it's important.

Q John, a number of Senators today, including Senator Baker I understand, have called on the Administration to remove the mines from the harbors. Staying aside for a minute from the question of how they got there, what's your reaction to the request to remove them?

A Don't have any. Don't know what the official reaction would be.

Q John --

A Yes. Lester.

Q Yeah. The Peking correspndent of the London Daily Telegraph reports that since August the People's Republic has executed more than 5,000 of the people with quick public trials in stadiums and semi-public executions.

My question -- I've got a two-part question -- while it's well known that President Reagan is a strong supporter of the death penalty, does his State Department approve of this many people being executed, and during the visit will there be any U.S. concern expressed about this rather massive death rate in the same way we're concerned about death squads from the right and the left in El Salvador?

A Can't answer the second part of your question. On the first part, I haven't seen the report in the London Daily Telegraph. Be glad to look at it.

Q Hugh Davies --

A I see. Be glad to take a look and see --

Q He doesn't clash with any --

A -- whether we have any interest in responding to that.

Q Could I ask one follow-up?

A Sure.

Q This is a copy of your Background Notes of the Bureau of Public Affairs. You're familiar with --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- the same form for each country, that it's the same. This identifies the Mongolian People's Republic. It says "Government type: Communist state." Now, this is the one on the People's Republic of China, and when you come to "Government type," it says "People's Republic."

A Uh-huh.

Q Why?

A And the question is?

Q Well, why? Why is there -- has the People's Republic suddenly stopped being a Communist state or what? Is it less Communist than Mongolia? Do we have --

A Well, I --

Q Is this --

A I don't know whether every document on every Communist country identifies that as a Communist country, Lester.

Q Well, I --

A I doubt that all of our documents on capitalist countries identify them as capitalist countries.

Q Yeah, but you identify Mongolia, and it certainly seems Mongolia is less prominent in the Communist world than Peking.

A So you're arguing that we should leave the reference to Communism in the Mongolian --

Q Not at all. I'm just wondering why you have this staggering inconsistency --

A Oh, I don't think it's staggering. Inconsistency, we have much of the time, but staggering, really --

Q I see. All right. Okay.

Q John, on matters of human rights, in view of the revelations which have come out of Guinea since the death of President Toure about large-scale imprisonments and killings, do you have any second thoughts about the statement you issued on March 27?

A What was the statement we issued on March 27?

Q On the occasion of his death and his --

A No.

Q -- standing and stature in the --

A No, no. We're aware that beginning in late 1980 -- I guess I am about to read from the wrong piece of paper which is in the wrong section, so hold on and I'll be right with you.

But, no, we don't have any reservations about that statement for these reasons: The past abuses of human rights in Guinea are well known, and during the period when these abuses were particularly flagrant, American relations with Guinea were restricted to humanitarian food assistance. In more recent years, beginning in the mid-1970s, President Toure's human rights record began to improve, and our relations improved correspondingly.

At the time of his death we had a modest food assistance program, and a small program to help Guinea develop its agricultural sector. We note with pleasure the new government's assurances that it is committed to the protection of human rights.

Q Could we get a copy?

A Sure.

Q Do you believe these revelations that are coming out of Guinea?

A Well, as I -- I don't know about the specifics of these revelations, but, as I say, we were aware of problems in the past and had discussed those with the Government of Guinea.

Q But on a broader question, if, as the 1983 human rights report says, there were no reported instances of torture of executions or politial disappearances during that period, does it suggest to you that maybe your information-gathering methods for the human rights reports are inadequate?

A Well, be glad to take a look at it and see why that was not made -- why that point was not made. It's -- I guess it's conceivable that you have a point.

Q Yeah. Would you take a look?

A Sure.

Q In connection with that, if I could follow up --

A Uh-huh.

Q Since we have had headlines this morning that Minister Farrakahn is a great admirer of Adolph Hitler, have we had any -- is there any news of the whereabouts of Idi Amin -- I think he's living in Saudi Arabia -- and do we think that he should be extradited or not?

A Well, I personally am unaware of Idi Amin's whereabouts, Lester, but I'll be glad --

Q You mean you've lost track of where he is?

A No. I, personally, am unaware, but I'd be glad to see whether the State Department has anything to offer on that.

Q See where he is.

Q Also on Africa, has the AWACS left the Sudan area now, as has been reported by FBIS?

A Yes, they have left the area.

Q Could you explain why?

A The mission is completed.

Q That means that the danger that was seen causing them to go there has diminished, or what?

A I don't know that the danger has diminished, but as you know, Egypt and Sudan have been taking measures to improve Sudan's air defense system. Those measures were taken while we were there.

As to whether the AWACS would return, in the event of a new crisis, I can't really answer that; but we certainly would, if such a request were made, we would take that request up speedily.

Q What has happened regarding the U.S. equipment or aid, military assistance program, that was sort of waiting to be --

A To the Sudan? I think we've had something on that in the past week or so. A little earlier than that, Alan?

MR. ROMBERG: (Inaudible)

A Yes, we've had some guidance on that, and there have been some deliveries.

Q Is it the feeling of the United States that now the Sudan is capable of air defense without any assistance from the outside?

A Oh, I don't know that we would make that sweeping statement. As I say, the air defenses have been improved, but I think that friends of the Sudan would continue to be interested in the security of their country.

Q And what about the situation internally? Your Deputy Assistant, Mr. Bishop, I think testified several weeks ago about the dangers of the internal situation. Has anything changed on that score?

A There may. I just don't have an update. It's conceivable that there may have been some change. I am not aware of any.

Q Is the review on the arms supply now concluded also?

A I don't know whether that is brought to a conclusion in the earlier guidance we had. I guess we'll have to dig that out for you and go over that.

Q Back to Nicaragua, yesterday Lawrence Smith of Florida, said in a closed session with Deputy Secretary Dam that --

A A closed session?

Q That's what AP had written -- that he had indicated that other countries were involved in the mining of the Nicaraguan harbors. What other countries were involved, and to what extent?

A I wouldn't dream of commenting on anything said in a closed session.

Q John, do you have any comment on reports saying that the Israelis are toning down their campaign for the transfer of the Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem?

A No, don't have any comment on that.

Q You don't have any further information on the developments of the Administration's efforts with the Congress and with the AIPAC?

A The Administration's position is unchanged. We are firmly opposed to the move of that Embassy, and there has been no change, no diminution, no dilution in that position.

Q Do you have any response to the Polish White Paper? The United States --

A Haven't seen the full document. Take a look at it when the full -- I guess it's 200-and something pages.

Q 270 pages.

A When that is to hand, and we've had a look at it, we may have something to say about it.

Excuse me.

Q Mr. Hughes, do you have any comment on the message of the Foreign Minister of Iraq to the United Nations?

A Which one was that?

Q Today --

A No.

Q -- implying that the U.S.-Israeli contacts are carrying on to target selected areas in Iraq.

A Haven't seen the statement, but if that's what it says, that is a ridiculous thesis.

Q Do you have any comment on the defection of a Chinese employee at the United Nations?

A Yes, I do have something on that, Ralph.

About 3 o'clock this morning, a Chinese national was found on top of the New York Telephone Building, on West 43rd Street, in New York City. That building is adjacent to the Consulate General of the People's Republic of China where the man was staying. He had a broken ankle apparently suffered from a fall, and he was taken to a hospital in Manhattan. That's really about --

Q Has he asked for asylum?

A Never get into that question, neither confirm nor deny whether a particular alien has applied for asylum, and the reasons for that are several: It may help to protect the privacy of asylum applicants and also allows the INS to adjudicate such cases rather than have them adjudicated in the press.

Q Will he be returning to the Chinese Mission?

A Can't answer that.

Q (Inaudible) U.S. while he's in the hospital, or anything like that, or was he just -- the U.S. provided an ambulance and took him to the hospital?

A I don't know whether local authorities are involved in any way, but there is certainly no hindrance to the Chinese authorities visiting him.

Q There's no --

A There's no hindrance, there's no obstacle to the Chinese authorities' visiting him. I mean, he's not protected in that sense.

Q Do you have the name of this guy?

A His name is Zhang Zheng-Ho. I'm not pronouncing that correctly, but it's Z-h-a-n-g Z-h-e-n-g hyphen H-o.

Q Do you know what his position was in the Mission?

A I do not.

Q Have the Chinese asked to see him?

A I don't know whether they have asked to see him. We have informed them of the incident and of his presence in the hospital. As I say, there's no hindrance to their seeing him, so I assume they would make their own arrangements to --

Q He had a broken ankle, you say --

A He had a broken ankle, yes.

Q -- that indicated he fell, or what? I mean --

A I think I'll let you make that --

Q Was he kicking something or --

A I think I'll let you make --

Q Do we have any --

A No, I don't have anything, really, beyond that.

Q John, did the Mission report him missing?

A I'm not aware that they have. I'm not aware that they have.

Q Did you say the hospital?

A I don't have a hospital, Greg; no, don't have anything on that.

Q Has he been questioned by any representatives of the U.S. Government?

A I can't answer that one. The U.S. Government? I don't know.

Q Is the U.S. requesting the same kind of interview with this individual that it requested of the Berezhkov boy in Washington?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q Who found him, John? How?

A I'm sorry, I just don't have that. I don't know who found him. As I say, it happened just this morning. I don't have any further --

Q Do you have anything there on what U.S. policy is on this kind of a case? If a Chinese diplomat requests asylum, is he granted asylum?

A I guess that would be an INS matter.

Q Is he a diplomat? Does he have diplomatic immunity?

A   Do we know whether he's a diplomat?

MR. ROMBERG: Don't know.

A   Don't know. Sorry.

Q   John, there are reports of heightened tensions between Israel and Syria? Do you have any --

A   Sorry. Height--

Q   -- heightened tensions on the border between Israel and Syria and some military buildup on both sides.

A   No. Don't know anything about it.

Q   Do you have any situation report on the Iran/Iraq war, in light of the Minister of Defense of Kuwait was, or is, in the United States? And at the press conference yesterday, according to Reuters, he was asked about if Basra will fall, and he said the picture will be changed, and that could lead to the involvement of other powers like the United States.

I would like your comment on this situation.

A   No. As you know, our position is one of neutrality in that war, want to see it resolved by peaceful means.

Q   John, do you have any update on -- and you may have answered this already, and if you have, forgive me -- any update on the reported nomination of Nora Astorga, I think that's the pronunciation, to be Ambassador. Has she been nominated, or is that just a report?

A   I'm not sure where that stands insofar as the Nicaraguan Government is concerned, and therefore, I don't have a response. As far as any reaction that we might have, I don't have anything on it.

Q   In other words, you have heard that she has?

A   We have heard. I have heard.

Q   O.K. Now, the question is, there are reports that she became something of a national hero to the Sandinistas because she seduced one of Somoza's generals, who was ice-picked to death and mutilated.

A Have heard those reports.

Q If that is reliable, will she be acceptable in the diplomatic corps here in Washington?

A That was the part of the response that I was not forthcoming on. In terms of our response to this, I don't have anything for you.

Q John -- Oh, I see.

Q John, do you have any comment, or can you give us any information on a meeting today involving a Mr. Eisner, in the ARA Bureau, with delegates of legislatures in Europe regarding Central American issues?

A I did hear something about that. Yes, I think there is such a meeting, but I --

Q What is the subject of the meeting or -- ?

A (To staff): Has anybody got anything further on it?

A Don't know. Sorry.

Q In general, can you say whether embassies here or foreign governments are being informed on the status of the mining?

A No, I can't say that.

Q In other words, are we -- You can't say whether we're even --

A No.

Q -- telling them what the situation is?

A No.

Q John, do you have anything on Chile today, the exiles, and the closing of the newspaper?

A No, I do not.

Q Also, do you have anything on a couple of -- visa stuff: One, Gabriel Garcia Marques of Columbia, was he denied a visa to come as part of the delegation to which Ralph referred? And two, Sergio Ramirez --

A Hold on. I'm checking with my valued aids here.

Check in the Press Office.

Q And Sergio Ramirez, of the Sandinista Junta -- he was given a conditional visa or something?

A Well, conditional visa -- he was given a visa for the purpose which he asked for it. I think that's about the situation.

Q Do you have anything more on him?

A Well, he asked for a visa for a specific visit to the United States, and he was issued such a visa.

Q But did it come with conditions? Could he travel anywhere under the visa that he was --

A Well, he didn't make plain at the time of applying for that visa that he wanted to do other things, so he has that visa and he could still come for that purpose. He was issued a visa for a visit, I think it was to the University of Kansas, 3-day seminar. He later came back and said, he would like to change, that that had been changed, "have changed dates for that seminar." We reissued the visa to cover the changed dates, and that's where it stands.

Apparently, he is now saying that he wanted to do all kinds of other things, that he wanted to make extended travels in the United States, and his visa doesn't cover those events -- that is correct -- because he didn't ask for a visa to cover those events.

Q Has he now requested such a visa?

A Not at the moment.

Q Mr. Hughes, a number of Congressmen have claimed that they have received telephone calls from the State Department to oppose a resolution in the Congress on the inhumanity of man to man dealing with genocide. Could you check on that? And they identified the man who called them as Mr. Frank Murray.

A   Let me take a look at it. I mean, I'm not quite sure what significance you're attaching to --

Q   That the State Department is against passing a resolution on genocide.

A   I see. Let me take a look and see what we can find.

Q   John, there is an article in a new edition of Progressive Magazine which goes into great detail, alleging past U.S. involvement in Latin American, specifically Salvadoran "death squads," although they weren't, apparently, called death squads at that time.

A   U.S. involvement in "death squads"?

Q   U.S. involvement. Do you have any comment? Have you seen that report?

A   Haven't seen the report.

Q   Would you investigate to see whether there would be any comment on that report?

A   Be glad to. Do you want to give us the issue date on that?

Q   I'll have to check, but I think it's the issue of the 20th.

A   O.K.

Q   Can I ask one more apropos of visas? Is there any change or modification in the policy of Salvadoran Presidential candidates coming to the U.S. following the general election, and now in the period pending the runoff election?

A   I don't know. I mean, I have to check on that, Ralph, but basically, it seems to me the campaign continues. Our position was that we thought that it would be not desirable for candidates to come to the United States during the course of the campaign. One round has taken place, but the campaign is continuing, and I would assume our position would be the same.

Q   Has there been any request, to your knowledge?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Can you take a question like, there is a plan that -- The Israeli Government is planning, in the West Bank, to build a massive highway connecting the City of Nablus with the City of Tulkaram on the West Bank. This highway, according to the people there, if it will be put together and it will be finished, it will deprive a lot of farmers, a lot of people who live in the small villages and towns in the neighborhood access to their villages and towns because this will create a situation which will turn things in a very drastic manner.

A And the question is --?

Q If you can look into this and see if you have any comment on this massive new highway, and what is the purpose of this highway, and who is going to finance this -- where is the money coming from?

A I don't know that we would be able to answer the question of what is the purpose of the highway. I think you probably ought to ask the folks who are building it. But I'll see whether we have any comment on it.

Q There was a report yesterday --

Q Anything on the Murphy mission to the Middle East?

A Excuse me. Both of you gentlemen are vying for (inaudible) --

Ambassador Murphy is in Cairo today. Nothing beyond that.

Q There was a headline in yesterday's Washington Times: "Mrs. Kirkpatrick, the Next at State." Secretary Shultz would have no objection -- he would, certainly, enthusiastically support that in the event that he decides to retire in the next -- isn't that true, John?

A I think it's a very hypothetical situation. I haven't heard the Secretary talk about (inaudible)

Q You mean you would neither confirm or deny? Would he be less than enthusiastic at Mrs. Kirkpatrick?

A I haven't heard him have any comment on it.

(The briefing concluded at 12:55 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, April 13, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC 65

FRIDAY, APRIL 13, 1984, 12:20 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. (I have) a couple of announcements:

Available in the press office are what are described as a limited number -- I think the translation of that is one per news organization -- of copies of Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume I -- General, Political and Economic Matters. The release of that historical document carries an emgargo of 6:00 P.M. Thursday, April 19. Attached to each volume is a summary prepared by the Office of the Historian.

Also, an announcement by the White House was made recently; a few minutes ago, the White House announced that President de la Madrid of Mexico will make a state visit to the United States May 14 to May 16. Next week, on April 17, Mexico's Secretary for Foreign Relations, Mr. Sepulveda, and Secretary of State Shultz will hold a meeting of the U.S.-Mexican Binational Commission to prepare for President de la Madrid's visit.

Q Is the visit here?

Q What are the dates?

A The Shultz-Sepulveda is April 17; on the de la Madrid, it's May 14-16.

Q And both are here?

A Both are here in Washington, that's right.

Accompanying Secretary Sepulveda will be Mexico's Secretary of Finance, Silva-Herzog, and their Secretary of Commerce and Industry, Mr. Hernandez. That's a meeting of the U.S.-Mexican Binational Commission to prepare for President de la Madrid's visit, April 17, and the visit of the President himself is May 14-16.

That's all I've got.

Q John, will that be just a visit to Washington, or is he going elsewhere in the United States?

A I do not have that, Mike. I'm sure the Mexican Embassy can give you a rundown on his itinerary.

Q Is that it on the announcements?

A That's it.

Q John, will you speak to the proprietary or the interests of the United States in acquiring funds from the Government of Saudi Arabia for the Contras' efforts?

A I've seen a story on that this morning, but know nothing about and have no comment on it.

Q You have no comment on it?

A No. Not aware of any -- I see a newspaper story on it, but I'm not aware of any --

Q Well, that begs the question --

A -- action by the United States Government.

Q I mean, were such negotiations or an effort under way, this Department would be aware of it and have an opinion?

A I think we would, and I'm not aware of any such negotiation.

Q The story is incorrect?

A Well, I'm not commenting on the story. I simply have no comment on it.

Q Would you take the question, then, as to what is going on, about Mr. Casey's --

A Well, I don't think -- no, I don't think we would make a comment about what some other government might do. I think we have to confine our remarks to our own government, and I'm not aware of any --

Q Well, will you take the --

A -- activity by our government.

Q -- question if this government is in any form of communication, negotiations, whatever you wish to call it, with the Government of Saudi Arabia insofar as funding for its efforts in Central America, etc.

A We'll take a look at that question for you.

Q Can you just tie that knot and rule out that there have been any funding from any other countries for the operation?

A No. How could I? I mean, I don't know what any other country might have done. I'm not aware of it, but I don't know --

Q John, can we ask, on that question about Saudi Arabia --

Q John, let's talk about the Salvador --

A Sorry. I've got two questions going.

Q -- that it's not limited to just Saudi Arabia, so that -- I mean, if you're going to look into the question, don't just limit the look into whether Saudi Arabia is involved.

A Well, you're asking me to look into something that I don't think is happening.

Q Good. Then you can refute it.

A Well, we will see whether we have anything to say on it.

Q Is there any reporting requirement or any requirement that the government disclose if other governments are contributing to such covert activity?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q Huh?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q John, you have a golden opportunity now to beat the White House to the announcement on emergency funding for El Salvador.

A No. I'm afraid I won't beat the White House. I'm sure that is something being considered, and the options are obvious. One option is to wait until Congress returns. The other option is to reprogram. The third option is to take emergency action, probably under 21(d). I'm sure the President is considering his options. I'm sure he will make a decision soon. Whether that will be today or not, I don't know. Why don't you keep in touch.

Q A corollary to that is that that option, as I understand it, is not available regarding special funding for the Central Intelligence Agency. Can you brief us on where that stands, and where the undertakings that come under that money are going, and what the prospects are?

A No. I really can't do any better than we have earlier this week on that, Hank, which is really not to respond on that question of the covert budget. As I say, I think our colleagues of that agency may have had something to say on some basis about that.

Q Do you have a response to the action of the House now, as well as the Senate, on the sense that no funds should be used for the mining of Nicaraguan waters?

A No. I really don't.

Q On the Salvador aid package, the way you formulated your answer suggested that somehow the three alternatives are mutually exclusive. Is that the State Department's reading? That is, that if one is adopted, the other two are out, or if -- is that correct?

A I don't want to mislead you. I'm not -- in a strictly factual sense, I'm not sure they're mutually exclusive, but I'm not suggesting that anybody is likely to come down on more than one option, in favor of one option.

Q And do you have any reaction to the offer that was formally proffered by the Majority Leader last night?

A Well, I think that would be factored into these options.

Q John, on the 28th of February, I guess, the State Department gave some committees of Congress a Department legal opinion on the use of naval mines in the exercise of self-defense. Some copies of an unclassified version of that legal opinion has now become available. Are you able to comment on it in any way?

A I'm not. We took that question yesterday. I don't have an answer for you on that. Still --

Q Well, I've got the opinion here.

A Ah-hah. Well, I don't. (Laughter) So I don't have a comment on it.

Q If I were to ask you some questions about it, could you answer them?

A No. I don't think so, because we took the question yesterday and are in process off working it, John. So I don't think I would answer when we have not given you the initial answer. I don't think I would give you supplementary answers to supplementary questions to something we haven't yet answered.

Q When do you think this answer might be forthcoming?

A Oh, people work around the clock on these things, John. Just as soon as we can.

Q John, on that, Congressman Kemp took basically this position that John just enunciated. Would you have any -- would you defend his and support his analysis, that this is a matter of collective self-defense?

A Well, Secretary Dam said what he did on that issue in testimony -- you have those words -- but I don't have anything beyond that for you.

Q John, on this earlier question, if -- on foreign funding -- if another country, any country, wanted to contribute to the covert activity, seeing that in their own self-interest, is there any reason why the United States would reject that?

A Well, I can't answer that specific question. If you're asking me in general to comment on funneling of funds from another country to an organization or a unit or whatever in another country, it seems to me that would be between that country and that entity, and I'm not sure that the United States would necessarily be involved in that or have a view of it.

Q Do you have anything on Kirkpatrick's statements regarding unilateral compliance or the resolution taken by the audience that she was addressing?

A No, I don't.

Q New subject?

Q No. I have one more on this subject. Anything on Mr. Rodino asking for a special prosecutor to see if the President has violated the Neutrality Act?

A No, I don't.

Q Would you enlighten us on the meeting yesterday between Secretary Eagleburger and Ambassador Dobrynin?

A I really can't. You know, we don't talk about the substance of those meetings, and therefore I won't in this instance.

Q Could you detail what they did not speak about since there was only one topic, we understand?

A No. I can't confirm what they did or what they didn't speak about.

Q Would you steer us away from believing the published report on that subject today?

Q Berlin?

A Let me say I'm not going to talk about Ambassador Dobrynin's discussions with Secretary Eagleburger.

New subject --

Q New subject. That's right.

A -- you're talking about Berlin air corridors, I think you may assume that the Soviets are well aware of our position on this, that we've communicated it to them on a number of occasions.

Q Did the harassment, whatever you want to call it -- the disturbances in the air corridors or the reservation of the air corridors -- become more severe after the initial protest?

A I'm not aware, John, that there's really been any change in frequency or activity since you had that background briefing, which was about a week ago, I think.

Q Could you check and see if he could give us -- in however form you want to present it -- a briefing or a message --

A Another briefing?

Q No.

A On Berlin?

Q Well, not necessarily -- if he wanted to be, come down, fine, but could he give us an update in your -- if there have been any --

A Well, I've just given you the update.

Q -- frequency or irregularities.

A I'm giving an update. There really is no change since --

-- MORE --

Q John, if I could go back to El Salvador --

A Sure.

Q -- just for a quick second. Apparently, even for emergency funding, Congress wants to attach new conditions such as reform of the judiciary, reform of the military and an independent auditor sent from here to there to control how the funds are spent. Have you any reaction to it, the additional Congressional --

A I don't. I'm sure the White House is looking at that in its entirely. The reform of the judiciary, of course, is something that we've been very interested in and argued for ourselves, but I'm just making that as a general comment.

Q John, on a kind of -- well, on a remarkable convergence of topics that come up here, El Salvador has announced it's going to move its embassy to Jerusalem.

A Uh-hum.

Q Do you have any statement about it? Did the United States encourage the Salvadorans to make that move?

A I don't think the United States would have encouraged El Salvador. That's a matter for the Government of El Salvador and the Government of Israel. Our position on our Embassy is very clear. There's been no change and certainly no dilution in the forthrightness we have expressed on the question before.

Q Did you express it directly --

Q That takes care of El Salvador's arms problem. (Laughter)

Q Did you express it to the Salvadorans? Did they ask you about whether you thought --

A I really don't know whether anybody has -- whether they asked us or whether we --

Q John, is there any follow-up on the Chinese diplomat in New York yesterday? What was the resolution of that situation?

A There really isn't a follow-up. I understand he's -- I presume he's still in the hospital, and there the matter stands.

Q Is the U.S. involved anymore in this case?

A In what respect?

Q I mean, is it basically at this point a case of a private or government, Chinese government, official who's in a hospital in New York and that doesn't involve any longer any diplomatic --

A Well, as I said yesterday, we don't get into the question of asylum, if that's where you're driving, and therefore have no comment either --

Q Well, are there any exchanges --

Q Is he a diplomat?

A I understand he's not a diplomat. I understand he's a member of a Chinese -- was it a trade commission? A business mission.

Q Are there any exchanges, diplomatic exchanges, going on -- without getting into what they are -- between the U.S. and China on this particular case? Or is this a case at this point of "the Chinese are taking care of it themselves and the U.S. is not involved?"

A This is a case where, as I said yesterday, there would be no problem if the Chinese authorities wished to interview this gentleman, provided that he is agreeable to that. If he is agreeable to them interviewing him and they want to interview him, that's perfectly in order. There's no problem.

As I understand it, the Chinese authorities have not asked to see him.

Q Who would they have to ask to see him? Couldn't they just ask him, or just walk into his hospital room? I mean --

A I don't know. You'll have to -- I guess the New York Police Department is involved in this. You'll have to -- I'm sure you have a bureau in New York.

Q We're doing it. Would they have to ask the State Department for permission to interview him?

A They might. They might raise it with us, but so far as I know, they have not.

Q John, I understand the Argentine Foreign Minister initially was supposed to have just one meeting with the Secretary, but I see he's going to be back in the building this afternoon.

A Yes.

Q Is there any particular reason for the second meeting?

A I think the initial meeting went well, and I think they suggested that at the end of the visit here he might like to come back for a second session with the Secretary to pursue the dialogue, and that's what's happening.

Q Is there any consideration to a trip for the Secretary to --

A A trip?

Q Yes, to Argentina?

A He's going to China with the President.

Q There are months and weeks, etc.

A Before? He's not going --

Q Is that under discussion?

A No.

Q It's not under discussion?

A I don't want to mislead you. I'm not aware that it's under discussion, and I'm not aware of any trip. What I want to be absolutely straight with you on is, obviously people come in from a variety of countries and say it would be nice if the Secretary came to visit their country. I do not know whether there has been such an exchange, but there's certainly no plan.

Q Speaking of Peking (sic), can you confirm the departure of Ambassador Kennedy?

A Yes, he left this morning.

Q John, has any retaliation been taken for the expulsion of the American diplomat from Afghanistan?

A I do not think we have anything more on that since -- no.

Q Given the -- to go back again to the original question -- given the apparent financial squeeze for covert activity, has any approach been made to any other country to help get the Administration out of the jam?

A As I said to Mike, not that I'm aware of. I'll be glad to see whether we'll offer any words on that later in the day, but I'm certainly not aware of it.

Q There are no discussions underway?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q Do you have a comment on the Israeli terrorist incident?

A Yes. Obviously, that is a very shocking incident. The United States condemns this wanton act of terrorism, which struck at innocent civilians. We remain relentlessly opposed to terrorism wherever it occurs and whoever the agent. Israel has too long suffered the outrages of such despicable acts. The United States has long maintained that only through negotiations, not violence, can progress be made towards a just and lasting Middle East peace.

Q Copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q Do you have any comment on the Progressive article that I asked about yesterday?

A No. You very kindly provided that to us with alacrity, Ralph, and we've sent it off to those who will be responding to it. I don't think there's any response yet. No.

Q Do you have any response yet to either the America's Watch report on Salvador or on what's going on in Chile?

A America's Watch report on Salvador? Still being worked. Chile? No, not really.

Q Do you have any comment on the decision by the Israeli Government to establish seven new settlements in the occupied territories?

A Our position on the settlements is well known. We do not consider them helpful and obviously are not in favor of any extension of them.

Q John, did the government send any notice of congratulations, or what have you, to Mr. Chernenko on his new post?

A I'm not quite sure whether the White House -- I think you ought to check with the White House on that. I think you'll find there was something.

Q Do you have anything on Kaunda's statements, and that he alleges --

A Sorry, on whose statements?

Q Kaunda, in Zambia. He says that things have stalled on progress.

A No, I don't. As you know, we continue to work that one.

Q John, you give the impression -- sorry, your answer to my question gives the impression that you see the latest seven settlements the same way as the first seven settlements. I think they are sort of an accumulation which means that the Israeli Government is completely neglecting the Reagan initiative and neglecting all the situation surrounding the West Bank and your efforts even to try to alleviate the standard of living in the West Bank.

A No, I think we remain very interested in the standard of living and the fate of Palestinians on the West Bank, but our position is unchanged on the question of the settlements. There's no change in that. We don't consider them to be helpful and moving forward with the peace process.

Q John, has there been any attempt by this Administration to look into the funds which have been spent by Israel in these settlements and try to possibly put a stop on these funds from the foreign aid that the United States is giving to Israel until the Israeli Government will comply with your request?

A I don't know whether any attempts have been made to look into that. I'm sure you're well aware of the history of our budget request on behalf of Israel to Congress. In some cases, those amounts have been increased.

Q Do you see any sort of a sharp contrast, or are you surprised that there is a sharp increase for the Israelis over what you are asking and now you are facing a situation in Central American, that they are cutting your budget -- how do you see this behavior?

A Our position on our budget request is that we're asking for what is necessary. That's what we went up to the Hill with; that's what we asked for.

Q John, where is Murphy, please?

A He's in Muscat today.

Q Where?

A Muscat.

Q Oh. I thought you said Moscow. (Laughter)

Q Thank you.

A Are we done?

(Press briefing concluded at 12:35 p.m.)

Becker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Monday, April 16, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #66

MONDAY, APRIL 16, 1984, 12:09 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: I have a housekeeping announcement and then a couple of statements.

First, the housekeeping announcement relates to the NAC meeting. Just to remind you that all press who plan to cover the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting -- that's May 29-31 -- need to apply for North Atlantic Council press credentials, either by phone or in writing, to the Department Press Office as soon as possible. During the NAC meeting, certain areas of the State Department building will be open only to press wearing the special credentials issued for the event.

In other words, the State/White House press pass will not get you into certain areas of the building because of tightened security. So we'd appreciate your getting your applications in for those NAC press passes early. If you have any questions, please be touch with either Kathleen Lang or Darlene Kirk in the Press Office.

I have an announcement on the death of a Foreign Service National in Salvador. It's with profound regret that we note that Embassy security investigator Alfredo Zapata was shot and killed in San Salvador at about 7:40 Eastern Standard Time this morning. According to our Embassy, Mr. Zapata and his wife, who was also seriously injured, were traveling in their car when the shooting occurred. We have no further details at this time. Mr. Zapata was a valued member of the Embassy staff. The Department of State condemns all such acts of violence and terrorism, and extends its sincere condolences to the family of Mr. Zapata, as well as our hope that Mrs. Zapata has a speedy recovery.

I also have a statement on the death of two American officials in Namibia. The tragic deaths of our representatives in Namibia this weekend remind us of the terrible cost of the conflict in southern Africa. Mr. Keogh and Lieutenant Colonel Crabtree were serving in the highest tradition of American dedication to the cause of peace. We extend to their families our deepest sympathy and our care in their loss.

The United States is committed to trying to bring about peace in southern Africa, and our liaison office in

Windhoek is there as part of that effort. The war in Namibia is nearly 20 years old. It will not be brought to an end through continued violence, but only through genuine efforts to achieve a peaceful, negotiated, internationally acceptable settlement under Security Council Resolution 435. Our commitment to that goal is undiminished.

That's all I have for you. I'll be happy to take any questions.

Q Do you have any idea what caused -- who caused the deaths of Keogh and Colonel Crabtree?

A No. We don't have any idea who caused the deaths, Jim. The reports have -- we frankly do not know. Reports have circulated. There have been some suggestion or allegations that SWAPO was involved. We understand SWAPO has put out a statement totally rejecting that and denying that the Americans were in any way targeted. So the investigation is continuing into the circumstances, but, as you know, there was an explosion at a gas station. Others -- or one other was killed besides the two Americans and others were injured.

Q In addition -- well, there have been reports that the bomb was just a random device that went off, and they happened to be close by.

A Yes.

Q Does SWAPO deny that?

A I have only seen a wire service report of the SWAPO statement, and what I saw was a denial that they were in any way involved with the incident, but I haven't seen their actual statement.

Q Do you have any biographical information here on these two gentlemen?

A I don't, with me, but it may be we can produce some during the course of the afternoon.

Q Do you know when the bodies will be coming back from there?

A I think they have -- they're already in Pretoria and will very soon be coming back to the United States. Maybe tomorrow.

Q What was the Colonel's role in the -- the press reports are calling him a diplomat. Obviously, he's not a diplomat.

A Well, he was part of the Mission. I think it's about a five-man mission, and from the very beginning it was said that there would be a military man in the Mission, and I think he was assigned to that Mission, and the Mission will be -- its strength will be maintained.

Q John, former Assistant Secretary of State -- not Assistant Secretary of State, but U.N. Representative Donald McHenry said the Achilles heel of this whole disengagement process was the absence of a truce between SWAPO and South Africa.

Is the U.S. going to press for a truce between SWAPO and South Africa in the immediate --

A Well, don't have anything specific on that, but, as you know, we have been very active in the area of diplomacy, and we're not going to be deterred by this particular incident.

Q Are you going to press for an agreement?

A Don't have anything for you on that.

Q On your first announcement on the death of Zapata, do you also have something on a U.S. national who was pulled out following threats?

A Well, I don't have a great deal on that, Jim, but I'll be glad to give you what I do have.

From time to time people in sensitive or high-visibility jobs at our Embassy in San Salvador receive threats. We take all such threats seriously and respond in accordance with the nature of each threat. For obvious reasons, we're not going to go into the specifics of any threats against particular Embassy officials nor the specifics of our response to those threats.

Q But somebody was pulled out as a result of threats?

A I guess you asked me about a specific individual, and the response is as I gave it. We're not going to get into details.

Q Well, generically, did -- has somebody been pulled out?

A I really am not going to get into that.

Q What about the official of the Elections Council who left the country -- he was a Christian Democrat -- after receiving a death threat?

A I don't have any --

Q You have no response -- you have nothing?

A Uh-uh.

Q It's the secret anti-Communist army that was apparently responsible, and they've been taking more and more responsibility for an upsurge --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- in violence. Do we have any statement in view of this upsurge?

A No.

Q John, about the National Security Decision Directive, which is published today in the newspapers, it's not clear at all what sort of countries the decision is directed against, because it talks about sort of hot pursuit against terrorist in countries, even in foreign countries. But say -- we know, for example, that Bulgaria, East Germany, those countries, are already accused of having camps of training terrorist and all that. Does this include such countries?

A Well, I don't have anything on that report. We don't talk about alleged Presidential directives, and I think Larry Speakes had some words on that this morning.

There isn't any question that, as you know, the Secretary outlined in a thoughtful speech our continuing concern about terrorism and the way to handle it, but as to the specifics of any decisions or alleged decisions or Presidential directives, I'm afraid I'll have to give you a blank response.

Q Can you give us --

Q The Directive is not an authentic thing?

A No. I'm just not going to respond to a suggestion that the President has issued an NSDD, which I think is what the story says.

Q Can you give us the names of anybody who will be replacing the slain diplomats in Namibia?

A I cannot. I think someone may have gone up to Windhoek from the Embassy in Pretoria today, but I don't have any names. I think they're really handling that from --

Q John, could you background us on the Glen Cove incident outside the Soviet compound?

A Really can't, but I'd suggest you go talk to the FBI about that.

Q Do you have any comment on the taking of a town in southeast Nicaragua by one of the rebel groups?

A No, I don't. I think there was some allegation of U.S. involvement, and I think the Pentagon has responded to that particular aspect, but, no, I don't have anything on it.

Q On a related matter, it's probably not the kind of question you like to field, but Ambassador Kirkpatrick --

A I probably should give you a list of those I like to field, and those I don't like to field, so you'll get it right. (Laughter)

Q You know I always defer.

A (Laughter)

Q Ambassador -- or The Washington Post printed excerpts of her speech last week to the International Law Group, and she makes a number of factual allegations, which to my knowledge are at variance with those that the State Department has made or the State Department has made them. And specifically with respect to, for example, the infiltration of rebels into Honduras and also the December exodus of Miskitos and coming under -- allegedly coming under strafing from airplanes, and so on.

My question is, can you give the State Department's account of both incidents, and to what extent does Ambassador Kirkpatrick check with the State Department on matters of fact when she makes public statements?

A Well, I don't have anything beyond what we said at the time on those incidents, Jim, and I really don't see much point in going back. Whatever we said was clearly the effective State Department position at the time and clearly continues to be.

Q Well --

A As to the extent to which Ambassador Kirkpatrick checks speeches, I don't know.

Q How do we -- how are we to account for differences between what the State Department says, what she says, what -- in the case of the Miskito incident, what the U.S. bishop who was involved --

A I would take as your definitive word on that the President's radio address on Saturday, which was very detailed on what we see wrong in Nicaragua. Beyond that, as everybody knows, since the time they took power in 1979, the Sandinistas have betrayed their democratic supporters, they have allied themselves with Cuba, they have looked eastward for trade and weapons, they have undertaken a provocative military buildup, they've called for wars of liberation in their region, they've welcomed Soviet-bloc advisers, they have voted with Moscow in the U.N., and they furnished arms and advice to Marxist insurgents in El Salvador.

Q John --

A That's all from The New York Times editorial yesterday.

Q They get their --

A (Laughter)

Q I mean, they may get it from Jeane Kirkpatrick, as far as I --

Q Would you like to read the rest of that editorial? (Laughter)

A Well, no -- I mean, no denying that philosophically there are diverse viewpoints about how you tackle this problem, but I don't think there really can be any doubt about the cause of unrest.

Q Does the Administration maintain that its policy toward Nicaragua is working at this time? Do you contemplate changes in direction, any kind of fine tuning as a result of the recent flap in Congress?

A Well, I think we would probably wait until Congress gets back and makes some decisions on budget levels before we answer that question.

Q John, you mentioned the President's address, and he used certain numbers, money numbers and numbers of Cuban advisers and otherwise. We should take those numbers and no others as that which the Administration --

A Well, I don't know that -- I mean, it depends what period -- if somebody else is using, we'd be -- we've had problems with numbers before --

Q Yes.

A -- as you well know, where someone has looked at a narrow segment of the spectrum and said over a period of time in a certain part of the country, thus and thus happened. But there's no questioning the veracity of the President's figures and the overall thrust of his statement.

Q Same subject. Do you have anything on the appointment of an American legal adviser to the International Court of Justice concerning the Nicaraguan petition?

A Well, I think Davis Robinson is our agent at the Court, and I think the deputy head of our Legal Department is the number two representative in The Hague.

Q What is their mandate?

A Their mandate will be to represent the United States at the deliberations. There will be, of course -- I guess I should let them discuss the procedure, but, presumably, there will be some discussion about the question of jurisdiction.

Q John, do you have any comment on -- a leader of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force was quoted in the L.A. Times this week as saying that, well, they'd have to turn to Israel now for aid.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you have anything on that?

A No. No comment. Saw the same report you did.

Q John, this morning the Toronto Star reported that President Reagan --

A Sorry. The which -- who is reporting?

Q The Toronto Star reported this morning that President Reagan has invited Prime Minister Trudeau --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- along with Mexican President de la Madrid to a meeting next month. Can you confirm that and tell us what the subject matter would be?

A No. I can't confirm it, and really don't have any specifics on that report, but I'd keep checking with the White House and see what they might have to offer.

Q Is Mr. -- or President de la Madrid scheduled to come to Washington or meet with President Reagan next month anyway?

A Well, we announced last week -- I forgot what the dates were, but we announced last week that he would. Yes.

Q Friday.

A And the Mexican Foreign Minister is here this week for the Commission meeting.

Q John --

A Yeah. Go ahead. Excuse me -- let me take one over there.

Q There were reports last week in Lebanon raising the question of the possibility of the Syrian forces returning to Beirut.

A Yes?

Q Do you have any readout or any --

A Clearly, that would not be helpful.

Q Excuse me?

A That would not be helpful in our view.

-- MORE --

Q There are reports of mobilization of the Syrian forces over the weekend.

A Mobilization?

Q Mobilization of forces of Syria. There is news that the health of Assad is deteriorating, or something, and on the other side there is the postponement of the conference between all the factions of Lebanon in Lausanne. Do you have any comments on these developments?

A No, not really. When you say "mobilization," you mean troop movements in Damascus?

Q Yes.

A No. We're aware of, as I think we've said before, the enhanced security measures that are being taken in Damascus, but that's been going on for sometime. Don't have anything beyond that.

Q Do you have anyting on the tension between Israel and Damascus?

A No.

Q Anything about Mr. Murphy's trip?

A He is in the United Arab Emirates today. Over the weekend, he was in Saudi Arabia and Oman and Qatar.

Q How can one see the difference between the mission of Mr. Murphy and that of Mr. Rumsfeld before?

A Mr. Rumsfeld did not, I think, necessarily go to all the same capitals, and his was a continuing mission in the light of his representation of the President as the President's special emissary.

Mr. Murphy is Assistant Secretary of the area, and visits the area from time to time; was there, I think, in February, and is making another visit to the area in the course of which, obviously, the tension in the Gulf will be discussed and there will be consultations with the various governments that --

Q Some press reports in the area call Mr. Murphy the special envoy of the United States Administration, so you don't agree to this characterization?

A Unless something has changed, and I don't think it has, he is still Assistant Secretary for the area.

Q Where is Mr. Silberman?

A I do not know. I guess he's in Washington, but I don't know.

Q He's not with Murphy or with Mr. Rumsfeld?

A Well, I don't think he is. I haven't seen him for sometime. I don't think he is there. Let me check that for you. I'm not sure where he is.

Q Back to Nicaragua. Ambasssador Kirkpatrick replied very clear yesterday that the United States won't accept whatever judgment, or whatever result by any judgment by the International Court in The Hague. Is that the U.S. Government official position?

A The official government position is that the Court does not have jurisdiction. We have withdrawn the Court's jurisdiction as far as we're concerned in that area for two years.

Q But even if the Court doesn't accept the exception taken by the U.S.?

A I think that you -- perhaps you weren't here for a background briefing by a senior administration official when he responded to just that question, and I guess I'd refer you to his words.

Q John, what was his response? He stopped just short of saying we would accept it and then Under (sic) Secretary Dam just said "I assume we would accept it." Would we accept it or not?

A I think you ought to go back and look at the words, and --

Q So you're leaving it vague?

A No, I'm referring you to what they said.

Q John, what is your reading of the statements out of Moscow today regarding Soviet involvement or non-involvement in the Olympics? Do you see anything, signals or clues that came out of there today?

A No, it's hard to read it. It's a little puzzling, Barrie, because we think that the United States has really gone to great lengths to facilitate Soviet attendance at the Olympics. There is just this one question of their attache that we challenge. We challenge the individual, and we are still perfectly agreeable to the Soviets having an Olympic attache at the Olympics so long as he is an Olympic attache and not performing some other kind of function.

Other than that, we are a little bemused. We do not see a continuing visa problem. There is no impediment as far as the Soviets are concerned.

The other question they raise is the matter of the organization which they allege is seeking to cause defections, and we have made it clear that there is no U.S. Government connection with that organization. We've also made clear -- and perhaps this is hard for the Soviets to understand, given the character of their own society -- but our society is a free society. And although there is no government involvement, we cannot prevent private groups from making their views known. But there certainly is no government involvement in that, so we're a little puzzled. We can't really understand what it is the Soviets are balking at.

Q Do you take from what was said in Moscow today that they are at least raising the specter of their non-involvement, and how would we respond to that?

A It's hard to read because they -- I notice that various correspondents pressed the Soviets to be unequivocal, and I don't think anybody got a very satisfactory answer. It's kind of hard to read what they're saying.

Q Do you have a comment on the Salvadoran Constituent Assembly decision to throw out the electoral register that the United States helped implement?

A Yes, I do have something on that. We understand, in fact, that no final decision has been made by Salvadoran officials on whether to use the registry in the May 6 runoff election.

The United States' concern in the upcoming presidential runoff, as it was in the March 25 election, is that El Salvador have a free and fair election. The procedures followed in the election, including an electoral registry, are entirely up to the Salvadorans.

It's worth noting that the election in March 1982 for the Constituent Assembly elections held while the Christian Democrats were in power, those elections were held without an electoral registry without any substantiated allegations of fraud.

It's our understanding that while the electoral registry may not be used for the May 6 election, the intent is to refine its use for the 1985 local and national legislature elections where the issue of precinct voting is of particular concern in the election of local officials.

Q Are you saying that it could possibly not be free and fair if they don't use the electoral registry or not?

A No, not saying that; saying that's up to them. As you know, there are other provisions -- the dipping of the finger in the identifiable solution, the presentation of identity cards and -- also, as you know, there was some criticism, including by some of you ladies and gentlemen, of the use of the electoral register in the election that's already taken place. So it's up to them.

Q Do you have any comment on the statement made by the Saudi Ambassador to Washington, saying that Saudia Arabia may seek to have weapons from other countries --

A No.

Q -- including the Soviet Union?

A No, that's their decision.

Q John, on the Saudi Ambassador, there was an item in The New York Times Saturday that the Saudi Ambassador hosted a dinner for the Russian Ambassador. Do you have any comment or reaction to that?

A No, no. Who he has dinners for is his own business and his right.

Q No, do you see that this is for the first time, hosting a dinner for --

A No, don't have any comment on the Saudi Arabia Ambassador's dinner companions.

Q You don't see anything --

A Don't have any comment on it.

Q Back on the Olympics. Is it in the U.S. Government interest for private groups to be encouraging the defection of Soviet athletes while they're here for the Olympics?

A I think that all we can do is to take a position as a government, and we're not involved in that but at the same time we can't muzzle groups that are behaving in a -- as long as their activities are legal and are carried out in pursuit of -- or within the framework of U.S. law, we don't muzzle people in this country.

Q John, do you have any reaction on the release of the two, French and American, people in Beirut?

A Obviously we're delighted by that. We're very grateful to Nabih Berri and the Amal for their role in freeing Professor Regier. I think he is -- Professor Regier is currently on the U.S.S. Nassau being checked physically.

Q You don't look at Shi'ite Lebanese factions as terrorists?

A It depends on the situation and depends on the instance, but in this case we're certainly grateful.

Q Meaning maybe they are terrorists yesterday and not terrorists today? I don't understand.

A Well, we're grateful for their help in getting Professor Regier released.

Q John, do you have anything on two Uruguayan newspapers being shut down?

A I do, Jim. We have been informed that the Uruguayan Government has closed the opposition newspaper -- I'll not do very well on this pronounciation; you'll probably do better than myself -- Cinco Dias -- is that it? -- okay. And the opposition magazine Frente Amplio. How is that, George?

Q Very good.

A Very good; okay. As we've stated before, we think that freedom of the press is an essential aspect of freedom of expression. Freedom of expression is a basic human right, one which is essential to on-going efforts to achieve the transition to democracy in Uruguay, and we deplore its abridgement in Uruguay or anywhere else it occurs.

Q Also, on yesterday's programs -- I know Kissinger doesn't speak for this Administration, but I guess, at least, to some extent Ambassador Kirkpatrick does. She was talking -- and so was he -- or hinting at really major threats occurring from two to five years to this country, to U.S. national security. And she talked about nuclear arms and chemical warfare, and things like that.

And he hinted that maybe U.S. troops will have to inevitably be inserted into the region unless we act now. Does this -- do these speculations and timelines, as they were alluded to yesterday by those two people, is there something going on here that you -

A I think you're being very unfair and inaccurate in saying that they "hinted of this." As I recall, they were responding to vigorous and perfectly legitimate questioning by correspondents as to what would happen if time runs out, and if the Congress refuses to authorize funds that the Administration has asked for. And I think they were both suggesting a kind of rationale, or a logical scenario that if you can't help people in the way the Administration is proposing to do, and as the Kissinger Commission has suggested, you risk obviously a deterioration of the situation, and you have to face the end prospect of that deterioration over a period of several years.

But nobody was suggesting -- in fact, I think they were rather explicit, certainly in the case of Ambassador Kirkpatrick who, as you say, was speaking for the Administration. I think they were rather explicit in denying the existence of any such plans. So what they were doing was being pressed for an end result, and they were offering their view of what that end result might be; but there was no hinting, there was no suggesting that this was in prospect.

Q Do we have any indication, in terms of this scenario, that nuclear weapons and chemical warfare is something that's presently being considered by either Nicaragua or the Soviet Union or Cuba in Central America?

A I'm not aware of that, but there have been developments in the area in the past, notably in Cuba which have posed problems, and certainly there has been discussion of the introduction of certain kinds of weaponry into the area which we have discouraged.

Q John, this Administration has very strongly praised the Kissinger Commission and its Chairman for achieving a bipartisan consensus on policy in the region. Now that some time has passed from the issuance of the Commission Report, and you've seen how effective the bipartisan consensus has been, can you refine your view of the work of the Commission at all?

A Change our viewpoint of how important it was?

Q Yes, are you still satisfied with the bipartisan consensus on policy?

A Very much so.

Q It seems to be targeted mainly at the Administration.

A No, I think that the findings were thoughtful, and are obviously still valid. And I think as Secretary Kissinger said yesterday, it's really ironic that we're involved in debate here -- about $30 million, or whatever it is -- when the need is far greater. He thinks, and certainly members of his Commission, think that Congress should get on with considering the much larger program that his Commission avocated.

Q This $30 million, has it already gone, the arms; have they already departed; are they down there now?

A I don't know.

Q How long will that amount last?

A I don't know.

Q John, do you have any information about deploying the UNIFIL in southern Lebanon, in Sidon -- in Sidon? There is an item in FBIS. Israel will not object to that?

A We're talking to a number of our Allies and friends about UNIFIL, but don't have anything for you.

Q You see any nearby withdrawal -- because Mr. Arens says in an item here in FBIS that they would like to get out of southern Lebanon. Do you have any indications that they're planning to do a withdrawal or something?

A No. I think you'd have to ask the Israelis about that.

Q One more question on the Olympics, please?

A Sure.

Q You say that you are not involved in activities of private groups opposing the Soviet participation?

A Uh-hum.

Q Could you tell us something about the meeting between Mr. Elliott Abrams and leaders of the "Ban Soviets" Coalition Group? What happened in that meeting?

A Sure. He went out to -- he went out somewhere on the West Coast and gave a speech and took a question afterwards, and somehow that has been -- I guess that was March 17; he was in Los Angeles. He delivered the dinner address at the Annual Conference of the Baltic-American Freedom League, one of the many such non-governmental organizations with which we maintain contact. An official of the Human Rights Bureau had addressed that group at its annual conference in 1982.

In response to a question about political asylum requests at the Olympics, Mr. Abrams replied that the usual United States Government procedures would apply.

Q There was no separate meeting between Mr. Abrams and (inaudible)

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:40 p.m.)

Becker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, April 17, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #67

TUESDAY, APRIL 17, 1984, 12:21 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon all. I have a couple of announcements. First, concerning a briefing on the U.S.-Mexican talks. There will be a BACKGROUND briefing this afternoon at 4:00 p.m. here in the Press Briefing Room on today's meeting in the Department of the U.S.-Mexican Binational Commission, which meeting was chaired by Secretary Shultz and the Mexican Foreign Minister, Mr. Sepulveda.

The Commission was established as a vehicle for discussing on a regular basis the full range of matters of mutual concern to the United States and Mexico. We consider it a very useful forum for exchanging views.

I have a --

Q Is that on the record?

A No, that's on BACKGROUND.

On the return of the bodies of Mr. Keogh and Lieutenant Colonel Crabtree, the bodies of Mr. Keogh and Lieutenant Colonel Crabtree are being returned to the United States today. They will arrive in New York tomorrow morning, April 18, accompanied by the United States Ambassador to South Africa, Herman Nickel. In New York, they will be transferred to an Air Force plane for transport to Andrews Air Force Base. On that flight they will be accompanied by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Frank Wisner; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Noel Koch; and Ambassador Nickel, who will have flown with them from South Africa.

There will be a brief ceremony at Andrews Air Force Base following their arrival at 10:00 with Under Secretary Eagleburger representing the Department.

A funeral service for Mr. Keogh will be held at 2:45 p.m. Wednesday with interment at Arlington National Cemetery to follow.

We understand that Lieutenant Colonel Crabtree will be buried in Colorado on Friday, April 20. For further details on that, you should check with the Defense Department.

I understand that from South Africa to New York, the bodies are being returned on Pan Am Flight 181, which arrives at Kennedy Airport at 6:50 a.m. They will then be transferred to, as I say, to the Air Force plane for transport to Andrews, and that flight will get in at 10:00 a.m.

I have a statement on Vietnamese attacks on border camps on the Thai border. The United States condemns in the strongest possible terms recent Vietnamese military action against settlements near the Thai-Kampuchean border containing tens of thousands of civilians. These people have sought refuge there from Vietnam's continuing occupation of Kampuchea, an occupation which violates the United Nations Charter and defies repeated U.N. General Assembly resolutions.

While details of the attacks are not clear, Vietnamese forces apparently attacked and apparently overran three separate civilian encampments on April 15, the last day of the Khmer New Year celebration.

Another large camp has been shelled and many of its residents evacuated as a precaution. Altogether, more than 75,000 Khmer civilians have been forced to flee the latest attacks, most of them to Thailand. The United States applauds the efforts of the Royal Thai Government, the United Nations Border Relief Operation, and private voluntary organizations in assisting those civilians who have fled into Thailand. We will continue our support for their efforts.

Such Vietnamese attacks along the Thai border highlight the threat to Thailand's security posed by Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea. In a similar attack last month, Vietnamese forces entered into Thai territory, where they were engaged by Thai forces defending their country's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The United States joins the Thai Government in urging Vietnam to respect Thailand's territorial integrity. The United States stands by its commitments to Thailand's security.

We call on Vietnam, as so many of the world nations have done, to withdraw its military forces from Kampuchea and to permit that country to choose its own government and finally live in peace.

That's all I have for you.

Q It doesn't affect in any way the U.S.-Thai security relationship?

A Affect it?

Q Will there be speeded deliveries?

A I do not know of anything at hand, and I do not know of any special Thai request, but should such a request come we would, as we have said before, treat it with warmth and compassion.

Q You don't expect this statement to have a negative impact on the efforts of this Administration regarding the -- those who are missing in action in Vietnam?

A Expect it to have negative impact? No, I don't.

Q Yes, on the Vietnamese attitude, I mean?

A No, don't see that the two are related.

Q One more logistical matter before we go any further. I understand the Secretary is going to be on this USIA Worldnet, or whatever it is, tomorrow?

A Yes. Tomorrow morning.

Q Are you making any provision for it to be viewed or heard here?

A Well, we're not. It's a USIA project, and I refer you to them. I do not know what their process is. As you know, they are constrained by law, by Congress, and what they can work out within those constraints, I don't know.

Q Usually they're available for viewing.

A Yeah, check with them.

Q We'll take it to the International Court of Justice.

Q Do you have anything on the Olympic statement by the Russians about their saying that they're not going to boycott games but --

A The statement or their press conference?

Q Press conference.

A No. I think we continue to be bemused today as we were yesterday, and as you all were yesterday, by what they said at their press conference. I did do a little research and discovered that a number of Soviet teams have recently been in the United States without any impediment or hindrance.

For example, there was a track and field team here in the second half of February, about 20 participants. Then in late February, early March, they sent a team of junior alpine skiers, about 12 in number. They have 14 figure skaters currently here. March 14 to 22, a gymnastics team of about 14; a shooting team of about 30 members, which is just completing a visit. Cross-country runners, numbering about 32, were here between March 22 and March 30. They had a team of wrestlers numbering about 30 here between March 26 and April 10. All these groups came. There were no reports of any problems, including defections.

On "Face the Nation" on April 15, U.S. Olympic officials several times referred to the good reception in particular the Soviet wrestlers got from American crowds.

I don't know that that's very responsive to your question, John, but it's a little stuff that I dug out that seems to indicate that they're coming and they're around and not suffering any great trials or tribulations.

Q John, the Interior Department is opening today for bidding a number of tracts in the Bering Sea, six million acres of which are still disputed.

A Uh-huh.

Q What has the State Department input on that been?

A There has been input. I think, basically, Interior is handling it, and there will be some guidance in the Press Office on that -- fairly lengthy guidance -- setting out that position. But, basically, I think that is going ahead without prejudice to the outcome of the case. That's basically the bottom line. But there is some guidance.

Q The thought here is that -- is what? I'm sorry, I don't understand.

A Well, that no drilling takes place, I think. As I understand it, those who are bidding on those leases will have a down deposit in escrow, and no action will take place until there is a resolution of the dispute between ourselves and the Soviet Union.

Q Were there questions raised here on it -- does it seem like a good idea?

A I'm sure the State Department was involved in that discussion. I'm sure.

Q In favor -- given the other points of dispute between the two countries?

A Well, I guess even if I knew, I would retreat behind our traditional position of not indicating who said what in the decision-making process, but I honestly don't know. I don't think it's a big --

Q One last thing on this: The Soviets say it's a mistake to raise another possible flash point now. Any response to that?

A I think the manner in which this is going forward indicates that there is no intention on our part to make it a flash point or a confrontational issue. And I think the way we are handling it underlines that.

Q John, do you have anything on the World Court meeting today?

A Not a great deal. I guess there was a meeting, Bill. They apparently did meet today, and the discussion was to revolve around the schedule for hearing Nicaragua's request for provisional measures; but as of now, I haven't heard any announcement of what that schedule might be.

Q To confirm that -- Go ahead. Let Al go.

Go ahead, Al.

A Sure. O.K. Someone.

Q The question is, on the capture of that town in southern Nicaragua by the Pastora forces, does the State Department have any comment on that or whether they would recognize a provisional government?

A No. Don't have any comment.

Q The American role in the World Court will be to outline the U.S. view that the Court should not have jurisdiction, is that basically --

A Yes, that's why our agent is there, to forward that case.

Q John, on that, a scholar in international law in the The New York Times Sunday suggested that if you want to withdraw for two years, you have to give them a six-month notice. Could you tell us what the law is here?

A No. I think that was covered by better legal minds than myself in a BACKGROUND briefing, and I think that relates to withdrawal rather than temporary withdrawal of recognition; but I think that was well covered, and I wouldn't attempt to go over it.

Q John, as I understand the state of play on this, what we have at the moment is a squabble over jurisdiction before the Court, is that right?

A Yes, that's right.

Q O.K. You can win or lose any sort of legal action.

A Yes.

Q Let's go back to day one on this thing. Should we lose, do we say that we are prepared to accept the Court's decision?

A I think both the senior official and, I think, Deputy Secretary Dam have expressed themselves on that point; and I think I'd like to go back, given the fact that this is before the Court, I think I would like to refer to their careful words.

Q John, the London Times published a report saying that the United States and Israel had already extended the Memorandum of Understanding between them for five years more and that the Memorandum had been even expanded somehow to give Israel more privileges. Nothing has been published at all in this country.

A Not that I'm aware of. I don't have anything on it.

Q John, there is a wire service report that the Soviets have bombers poised on the Afghanistan border for a possible spring offensive. Do you have anything on that?

A Be glad to give you what I have. In Afghanistan, there generally is a winter lull in the fighting between Soviet and Democratic Republic of Afghanistan forces and the Afghan resistance, which has done very well in keeping the Soviets from achieving their objectives in Afghanistan.

The Soviets control their military bases and major transportation routes and hold the balance of power in the major cities, especially Kabul. But the resistance controls about 75% of the countryside and operates in all cities, exercising significant control over some.

Usually at this time of year, the pace of the fighting picks up throughout the country, but so far we have had no confirmation that major offensives or operations have begun. Certainly, given the Soviets' lack of success against the resistance or mujahidin, one might expect them to try new tactics such as the high-altitude bombing described in the report you mentioned. This would be an escalation of destructive anti-civilian Soviet warfare. During 1983, we noted that the Soviets used increasingly brutal tactics against civilian targets in areas suspected of strong support for the resistance and of strategic importance.

The major point is that the struggle in Afghanistan continues unabated, the Soviets have not been able to defeat the resistance, and they may be considering new military tactics. Most importantly, the continuing struggle in Afghanistan highlights the need to achieve a negotiated political settlement for Afghanistan to get the Soviet forces out and to end the torment of the Afghan people. This remains the goal of United States policy.

Q Can we confirm the bombers?

A No, can't confirm.

Q Can we get a copy of that, John?

A Yes, sure.

Q John, there is a long story on the front page of the Washington Post this morning about southern Lebanon being cut out completely from other parts of Lebanon by the Israeli occupation. Do you have any comment on that?

A No, don't.

Q And going back to my colleague's question about the -- Is there a role, or is Israel destined to play a role in the implementation of the new anti-terrorist ordinance in the Middle East?

Will the United States be relying on the activities or the input from Israel more than before?

A Well, there are several parts to that. Firstly, I'm not going to comment on alleged Presidential directives on terrorism. You know our attitude toward terrorism; you know how the evolution of our thinking has been proceeding. The Secretary has made that clear.

You know what Israel does in the field of terrorism, but there is no link between our own plans and the way Israel handles its instances of terrorism.

Q You say "alleged." You don't recognize that it exists and that the President signed [illegible] April 3?

A No, I don't.

-- MORE --

Q So all of these front-page stories in the papers are hypothetical?

A Oh, we're used to seeing lots of front-page stories and still refusing to concede that documents exist or -- that's nothing new for us.

Q And there is no story of half a million dollars prize for the winner or something like that?

A We're not going to talk about Presidential directives that are alleged to have been signed, but I think our attitude on how to handle terrorism has been made very plain in recent weeks, and it should not surprise you.

Q In this regard do you have any comment on what happened in London this morning or today?

A Yes. It's scandalous behavior which absolutely violates all international norms and is part of the continuing state-sponsored terrorism that we've seen from Libya over a period of months.

Q John, to remain on the Middle East, you don't have any comment on the multi-sided Soviet diplomatic efforts with so many Arab countries at the same time now?

A No. No, I don't.

Q Do you have a judgment as to who is responsible for yesterday's killing of the security officer at the Embassy?

A No. Just before I came out I gathered that somebody has -- that there's a -- I haven't seen it, but somebody has claimed responsibility, but I don't have anything about it.

Q There's a report in the Post today that he'd received a number of death threats --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- prior to his assassination.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do we know who took credit -- or who took responsibility when they conveyed -- whoever it was that conveyed those death threats?

A I do not. No.

Q Can you look into -- is it possible to look into that question?

A I don't -- I mean, I don't think so. How would we know?

Q Pardon?

A I mean, how would we know who's threatening to kill him?

Q Well, sometimes they take responsibility -- you know, they attach their names to the threats.

A Well, then I'll let you do the research. If you're talking about some material that's in the public domain, I'll let you do the research.

Q John, on that, as a policy matter is it the position of the Department that it's okay for somebody like this to have a -- what we'd call in Buffalo a "second-front job" at the Sheraton Hotel?

A I don't know what the policy is.

Q Doesn't that raise a question of duality of allegiance or something that where his duties at the hotel might impinge on his duties at the Embassy?

A I don't know what the policy is, but I'm sure that is something that would have been taken into consideration by the Embassy at the time that Mr. Zapata talked about it to them and discussed that with them. I'm sure they would not permit any conflict, if that's your question, but I don't know what the regulations are.

Q John, is there any follow-up on the apparent nomination of Nora Astorga to become Ambassador to the U.S. from Nicaragua?

A No.

Q John, same question. Is there any change in U.S. position on the U.S. Ambassador, Bergold?

A No.

Q -- to go down there?

A No.

Q Has he been confirmed now?

A Let me check where that process is, Jim. I can't quite remember where he stands, but there's no change in our position.

Q John, nothing to be announced yet on the story of the monthly Progressive on the indulgence of U.S. in the death squads?

A You jog my memory, and I must confess I haven't seen anything on that, and that is a little while back, so let us give the machine that undoubtedly is even now, as we speak, whirring -- let us give it a little stimulus.

Q John, the Deputy Sheriff of Albuquerque, New Mexico, is of American-Arabic background -- his name is Mike Mansour -- was arrested by the Israeli authorities on April the 2nd, and he was put in military prison.

A He was enlisted?

Q Arrested.

A Arrested.

Q Yes.

A In Israel.

Q Yes. Are you familiar with the case --

A No. That's one that hasn't --

Q And could you look into this matter, please.

A I must confess --

Q Without any charges being, you know, filed against him. Can you take the question and look into this matter?

A Let me see whether we might provide something. I'm not guaranteeing to take the question, but let me see if we've got anything on it.

Q Okay. Thank you.

Q John, do you have something on South African actions against black townships?

A Yes, I do. The United States is somewhat encouraged by certain decisions on resettlement made by the South African Government as announced April 11 by the South African Minister of Cooperation and Development, Mr. Koornhof. The Minister said that St. Wendolin's black settlement of 12,000 people near Pinetown, Natal, is to become a black town with freehold rights and eventually will possess its own local authority. We hope that this decision will set a positive precedent. We also note the reply Minister Koornhof gave in Parliament -- that's the South African Parliament -- April 11, which affirmed that in the Cape Town area, "there was no intention to compel the residents of the existing black townships to move" to a new township.

The United States views this as an important, though initial, step toward halting forced removals of individuals in South Africa. Our position on forced removals is well known to the South African Government, and it is our strong hope that these announcements are an indication of the future direction of government policy in this area.

Q Copy, please?

A Sure.

Q John, do you have anything on Soviet amphibious landings off the Vietnamese coast?

A Yes, I do.

We've expressed our concern several times in the past few years about the growing Soviet military presence in Southeast Asia, particularly in Vietnam where the Soviet buildup continues. Vietnam depends overwhelmingly on the Soviet Union for military and economic assistance, which is in excess of $1 billion a year and has in turn provided the Soviets an important facility at Cam Ranh Bay projecting Soviet military power into Southeast Asia. The introduction of Soviet amphibious forces into Vietnam for the first time adds to the Soviet destabilizing influence in the region.

Q Copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q John, is the United States doing anything in addition to its usual to help the refugees who have flooded into Thailand from Cambodia?

A Let me check on that for you, Spence.

Q John, is the Vice President having any other discussions or carrying any letters from the President to any Soviet officials --

A I don't know.

Q -- other than the chemical warfare communique.

A I don't know. I really don't know what his schedule is.

Q Thank you.

A Okay?

Q John, do you have anything on the President's trip to China? (Laughter)

A That's a pretty broad subject. There have been numerous briefings.

Q Also, arms sales -- whether U.S. is selling arms to the Chinese or not?

A Whether we are selling arms to the Chinese?

Q And what kind of arms. Yes.

A Well, I think we've had a number of statements on aid to China and the framework within that -- within which that is transmitted, and you can do a little research on that in the Press Office.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:44 p.m.)

Becker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 18, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #68

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 18, 1984, 12:23 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, all. I have one statement up front on Cyprus: The April 17 exchange of credentials between the Turkish Government and the Turkish Cypriot community was a surprise and a disappointment to the United States. This development has caused us deep concern because it clearly could set back the United Nations Secretary-General's efforts to bring about a solution based on negotiations between the two parties in Cyprus.

In this connection, the United States reaffirms its support for U.N. Security Council Resolution 541 as well as our earlier condemnation of the Turkish-Cypriot declaration of statehood of November 15, 1983. The United States deeply regrets yesterday's action and is continuing to urge all parties concerned to support the Secretary General's positive efforts to find solutions to the Cyprus question.

That's all I have for you.

Q Question on that?

A Sure.

Q May we have copies, too?

A Sure.

Q The question is, will this affect the Administration's attitude on the pending foreign aid bill with respect to Turkey that Schneider said to Congress -- that a condition with respect to Cyprus on Turkey aid was a "killer amendment." Is this going to affect that --

A Not aware of anything, but let's see how it plays out.

Q Will you look into it?

A Yes, I'll take a look at it.

Q Is it going to affect the Administration's support for the aid package?

A Be glad to take a look at that.

(Pause)

Q Let's see, what will we talk about now?

(Laughter)

Q Do you have any comment on the reports that Americans were directly involved in that attack several months ago on the petroleum --

A No.

Q John, was there a report that the Soviets have accused the U.S. of using biological weapons in scattered parts of the world? Do you have something on that?

A I hadn't seen that one, Bernie, but it's obviously preposterous.

Q Can I go back to Jim's question on Nicaragua?

A Yes.

Q You commented a couple of weeks ago on the mining, that, in a sense, the United States supported --

A I commented on mining?

Q Well, you said it was good, in a sense, because it prevented Nicaragua from exporting -- it could contribute to the ability of Nicaragua to export weapons to El Salvador.

A Well, O.K. I understand your drift. I don't agree with the way you phrased it, but, sure, go ahead.

Q You didn't approve directly of it, but you said that it could have that effect, and that was a good effect.

Is it your view, as well, that the destruction of the oil pipeline and the attack on the oil tanks there have the same effect?

A Don't know. Can't answer that, Jim. Don't have a comment on it.

Q Is there any reason why you would indicate that -- is there any reason why you would treat the two questions differently?

A Well, I think, obviously, without talking about the question of mining, nevertheless, an impediment to ships bringing in arms, which then move from Nicaragua to El Salvador is rather clear-cut; but you're asking me to comment on something that I don't know anything about. I don't know what impact this particular incident had.

Q Would you suggest that this is less clear-cut?

A I don't know. I don't know enough about it.

Q I mean, I hesitate to ask this, but do you think you could give us an answer on that?

A I will see whether anybody is interested in commenting on that. I rather doubt it, but I will be glad to look and see.

Q John, has the United States had any discussions at all regarding the situation in London, and now in Tripoli, with British diplomats? What's our position on it, et cetera?

A I don't know of any such discussions, Barrie, but it wouldn't surprise me, I mean that we would have kept in touch with the British on that. But I'm not aware of any specific discussions.

Q Not even, John, along the lines of having been approached, or offering help, for a potential evacuation of the 8,000 or so British nationals in Libya?

A I'm not aware of that. Insofar as our own situation is concerned, I can just tell you what I know about Americans. There are about 500 to 1,000 U.S. citizens in Libya. They are primarily long-term residents or employees of U.S. companies. It is illegal for U.S. citizens to use their American passports for travel to Libya, and the events of the last two days illustrate the reasons which prompted the United States, in 1981, to urge American citizens to leave Libya. These reasons retain their validity to this day, and the United States continues to watch that situation closely.

Now, insofar as the events in London are concerned, just expanding on what we said yesterday, the firing from the Libyan People's Bureau in London is an outrageous and deplorable deviation from accepted international behavior, exacerbated by the measures taken in Libya toward the British and the preposterous claims of Radio Tripoli.

Q May we have a copy of that?

A You sure can.

Q Is there any substance in the reports that Soviet ships had landed some Nicaraguan troops in or around Costa Rica?

A I hadn't seen that one. I must confess I've been out of the building a little this morning, but I haven't seen that one.

Q Has the United States rejected Nicaragua's ambassadorial choice?

A Don't have anything for you on that, Jim.

Q John, anything on where the case at The Hague might go in the coming days?

A Not very specifically. Let me check that one for you, but I think I heard a suggestion that the case would come before the Court next week sometime. Let me check to see if we have a date on that.

-- MORE --

Q Mr. Hughes, could you tell us whether the United States has agreed on the resolution on UNICEF (sic), which is coming today in the Security Council?

A Well, discussions are going on with a number of our friends and allies in that connection, and, as you say, there may well be a vote, but I think until we see the resolution, no, we do not have a comment.

Q There are two points on which the United States is against. I am asking about that, the two resolutions, the formal resolutions, which ask for the withdrawal of the Israeli forces, and they said that this is unbalanced, whether they have given up this stand --

A As I said before, we will wait until we see the resolution.

Q UNIFIL, we are talking about.

A UNIFIL, right.

Q Supposing somebody will veto, what will happen?

A Maybe I am not getting through to you. We will withhold comment until we see the resolution.

Q Do you have any comment today on what the senior U.S. official said to some reporters last night with respect to the April 30 deadline on Contadora?

A Not really, Jim. I am not going to go into that in any detail. Our position is that we have consistently supported the Contadora process and the 21-point Document of Objectives as the best hope of resolving tensions in the area. The United States is not a participant in the Contadora group, however, and so any questions about the procedures to convert the 21 Objectives into firm treaty agreements should be addressed by the participants themselves.

Q Did that subject come up in the discussions he is asking about?

A I don't have anything more for you.

Q Do you have any description of the meeting?

A I don't. I guess you had a background session yesterday.

Q I thought you might want to put something on the record.

A No, I don't.

Q Do you have a situation report on the Iraq-Iran War? There are reports that two ships, or whatever, around the Kharg Island was bombed by Iraq.

A I have seen those reports, but I don't have anything for you on them.

Q Anything on Monterossa's comments about arms supplies coming in from Guatemala and Honduras?

A Sure. That is pretty much in line with what we have been saying. Substantial military supplies continue to flow into El Salvador from Nicaragua, arriving by air, sea and land. Overland routes from Nicaragua do pass through both Honduras and, to a lesser extent, Guatemala. As we have noted since last October, there is evidence of a shift in these supplies from arms to ammunition, and other supplies, so Colonel Monterrosa's assessment appears to be consistent with these facts.

Q I have a question. You said -- what you just read.

There is a land route that flows through Guatemala from Nicaragua, so that Nicaragua --

A To a lesser extent. We don't have any problem with the statement that there is some shipment from Guatemala.

Q But by land, and the Nicaraguans control it. Is that what you are were saying?

A I can't specify. You have got all I've got, Jim.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Did the State Department or the U.S. Government make a sort of rebuttal or an answer to former Secretary of State Alexander Haig that some sources stifled all efforts to bring about peace in Lebanon by the evacuation of all Arab forces?

A Not that I am aware of.

Q I mean, is the government going to stand still in front of this attack on -- former Secretary?

A Well, if your question is, has the Administration responded to former Secretary Haig, not that I am aware of.

Q Will the Administration respond in the case of his book, and the accusations?

A I do not know. I am not aware of any such plans. He is a private citizen and he has written a book.

Q John, any reaction to the Soviet comment on the U.S. chemical weapons ban treaty?

A Which one is that, Bill?

Q Yesterday.

A Oh, in Geneva, where they --

Q Yes.

A -- attempted to shoot it down before it was presented?

Q Yes.

A No. I think Vice President Bush had some comments on the Soviet rejection, and I think we will just leave it at that.

Q John, on the shipment of arms to El Salvador, are those various routes that you suggested all under, as someone asked, Nicaraguan control? I didn't get the answer.

A I can't answer that, Bernie. Let me do a little further checking for you.

Q One more on El Salvador, which is the killing of the security officer. Now, a communique purporting to be from the FPL took responsibility. Does the United

States have a comment, and does it have an assessment as to the authenticity of the communique? Has it made a judgment?

A Of their claim to have killed him?

Q Pardon me?

A Of their claim to have killed him?

Q Well, does the United States have an assessment as to who was the responsible party, and an assessment as to the authenticity of the communique?

A No.

Q John, there are reports that Israel provided arms to the anti-Sandinista group, filled a United States request or agreement. Do you have any comment on that?

A No, I don't. I am certainly not aware of it.

Q Excuse me?

A I don't have a comment, and I am certainly not aware of it.

Q Mr. Hughes, would you kindly comment whether the United States is willing to go along with the Secretary General's request that the UNIFIL be extended throughout Lebanon?

A Why don't we wait until --

Q No, this is something not with the resolution.

A I am not going to talk about UNIFIL until after the vote.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:35 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Thursday, April 19, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC#69

THURSDAY, APRIL 19, 1984, 12:25 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: I understand some of you were trying to get out of here early today; my contribution to that is to have no announcements and no news.

(Laughter)

But I'll be glad to take any questions.

No questions? Great.

Q Do it quick!

A Clean and quick! (Laughter)

Q You're ready?

A I've done my opening.

Q Could you elaborate on the reasons why you found Nora Astorga unacceptable as Nicaragua's Ambassador to Washington?

A All countries have the right to approve or disapprove ambassadors that they receive. The United States gave careful consideration to the Nicaraguan request for Miss Astorga and discussed this matter several times at senior levels with the Nicaraguan Government. That Government is well aware of the reasons for our actions.

There has already been considerable publicity about this case, and the United States believes it would not be appropriate or desirable to make any further public comment. We have, however, made it clear to the Nicaraguan Government that we would welcome another request for agrement.

Q Copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q And the matter of Mr. Bergold -- that is settled? There's no change in that?

A The Nicaraguan Government has given agrement to Ambassador Bergold, and there is no change in that situation.

Q Do you have any comment today on the death threats in El Salvador and its effect on the election?

A No, not really, Jim, except to say what we have said before and what we reiterate, namely that we deplore and condemn political violence from whatever quarter it may come.

Q Well, but this story suggests that the reason that the electoral register was abandoned was that at least two PCN candidates decided to vote to abandon it because they had received death threats, and then they left the country.

A Uh-huh.

Q Does that change our view as to the legitimacy of the action? And does it affect our view as to the freeness and fairness of the election?

A It doesn't affect our view that we deplore threats of political violence from whatever source they may come. It doesn't change our view that we support very strongly the process of elections for the May 6 runoff. It doesn't change our view that the mechanics of that election are an internal Salvadoran matter, and the Salvadoran authorities will proceed in the way they think best.

Q Well, you have said in the past that the guerrillas have attempted to disrupt the elections by, among other things, taking responsibility for assassinating one, two, or three -- I don't know how many the State Department believes -- Members of the Assembly. Now, these people have been forced out of the country.

Why would this not affect our view as to whether the election was being disrupted?

A Well, there is no indication that the election is being disrupted. The process is still going forward. Sure, there is a debate about the registry, but again, that is a matter for the Salvadoran authorities to decide. But I haven't heard any suggestion that the election would be invalid as a result of these incidents.

Q If I could just follow with one more, do you have any opinion now as to who may have been behind the killing of the chief security officer?

A No, we still do not.

Q Last week, when the Prime Minister of Thailand was here, we learned in our briefing that the President said that he was sending out a team to see which fighter plane would be best for Thailand. The reports from Thailand today are that the President was trying to convince the Prime Minister to accept the Northrup F-20.

Would you clarify that for us, please?

A I can't, because I don't know anything about it. I'm afraid I'm not aware of that statement if it was made in the briefing, and I'm just not aware of what the Thais may be considering.

Q Let me ask you -- I don't know -- you issued a statement last week and you may have answered my questions previously about the hijacking of the bus in Jerusalem where you condemned the wanton terrorism, et cetera.

A Uh-huh.

Q Now, some news has come up since then, one, the destruction of these four young, Palestinian hijackers' homes, and two, there is information coming out from Israel that one of the hijackers, a 19- or 18-year-old boy, was taken alive, with clear pictures showing that he was alive and handcuffed, and now he is dead and buried.

Do you care to comment on that (inaudible)?

A No. Certainly, our statements on the unpalatableness and the heinousness of that crime still stand. And I have no comment on the Israeli action against the homes of the terrorists.

Q You have no comment on the homes?

A I have no comment on the Israeli action against the homes of the terrorists, and terrorists they clearly were.

Have seen that latest report just this morning; don't have anything for you on the question of whether one of those terrorists was captured alive.

Q John, can I please follow up on this? Previously, such spokespersons as you issued some statements about collective punishments and something like that.

A Uh-huh.

Q Now, you're telling us that you will not do that. Is that something new, a new policy?

A I'm not saying we will not do that or we will never do that, but I'm saying I have no comment in this particular case.

Q Would you care to look at both issues and let us know later on if there would be a statement in this regard?

A No. There will not be a statement on the action taken against their homes. Let me take a look and see whether we will have anything to say about the -- I suspect we will not; I think that's an Israeli matter -- but nevertheless, let me take a look at it, on the prisoner who was allegedly captured alive.

Q John, could you --

A You've had about seven or eight questions, Jim. Why don't you let --

Q I was just following up --

Q Can I ask you two things here, John? One: Can you tell me whether a Soviet sailor who defected in Mobile is being brought to the building today for discussions with Soviet officials -- the circumstances?

A I really can't be very forthcoming about that, Mike, in order to protect the Soviet citizen involved and also in order to preserve the confidentiality of our diplomatic exchanges with the Soviets. It's a practice not to provide details on such meetings. I guess we will continue.

I've seen the wire service reports and the FBI discussion of asylum. As you know, we are "in a box" on that because we, traditionally, don't discuss asylum cases as a matter of policy. And in any case, it is an INS matter. But insofar as a meeting, no, don't have anything for you on it.

Q Well, if he elects to return to the Soviet Union and what-have-you, you would have a comment on that? You would say so?

A I'm not discussing the specifics of this case, but I assume that if someone in -- and I say, I'm not discussing the specifics of this case -- but someone in an asylum situation elected to return to the Soviet Union and that was voluntary, I presume he would return to the Soviet Union.

Q And you would let us know?

A I don't know whether we would go into an asylum case. I'd have to plumb 50 years of policy on our statements on asylum in that case, I guess, Mike.

Q On another matter, a Vietnamese official today said the United States should establish a special air charter to enable some 35,000 Asians and Vietnamese to settle in the United States, that the United States is foot-dragging on bringing these children home -- roughly, only a thousand per month. Have you --

A A special air corridor?

Q A special air charter service.

A Charter.

Q In other words, to bring up -- the official said something like 10,000 per month. Have you seen this?

A I don't have any response on that. I don't have any response on that specific apparently late-breaking story; but I think earlier this week we did have some data on the number of children --

You're speaking of the children now?

-- MORE --

Q Correct.

A Who have come to the United States, and that also has some figures on how many we think are still there who want come, and also has some data on the current flow, so we can let you have that. That's in the Press Office.

Q Do you have any data on why that figure of 1,000 or so was set, why it could not be increased?

A I'm a little hazy on the numbers, but there certainly is something in the Press Office on that from earlier this week.

Q Do you recall if it was in the neighborhood of 35,000, John?

A I'm really hesitant to give any figures because they're not in my head, Jim.

Q Margaret Hall of Mirror Newspapers, Great Britain. It's been reported here and in London now that American intelligence sources intercepted a message from Tripoli to London, in which Colonel Qaddafi evidently was saying, "We'd retaliate to the demonstration with force."

I wondered if you could give us a timetable of events, when you picked this message up, what it said, when you relayed it to Britain, to whom -- (laughter) -- what the response was, etc., etc.

A No, I cannot. No. I'd like to be able to help. Our position is that we never comment on matters related to intelligence, and we certainly aren't going to do that in this case. This is not ourselves speaking, but I just would refer you to a statement that apparently was made by the Foreign Office in London today which gives the British governmental view of that report, and I think we will leave it at that.

Q Yes. I wasn't aware of that.

A I'll be glad to -- I'm not speaking for the British Government, but I'll be glad to read you what the London Press Association is quoting the British Government as saying.

The British Government statement allegedly says: "No specific information which would lead us" -- that's the British Government -- "to believe that an incident of this kind would occur was in our hands before the incident itself. All relevant information has, as a matter of course, been made immediately available to the Home Office, the police, and all concerned."

And I just want to stress that all I'm doing is reading from a wire service report that purports to be a quotation of a statement by the British Foreign Office. That's just a help.

Q But you're not in a position to deny that in fact --

A Not confirming or denying.

Q No.

A Never talk about intelligence matters.

Q Thank you.

Q I would like you to comment on some statements made by George B. High, the U.S. Consul to Mexico, to one of our correspondents a couple of evenings ago at the Mexican Embassy. (1) Is it --

A This is ON THE RECORD comments?

Q These are ON THE RECORD statements that he made.

(1) Is it U.S. policy now to encourage the expansion of the Mexican National Action Party and the Socialist Unity Party in order to make Mexico more democratic?

A That's question number one. Go ahead.

Q Okay. Question number two: Is it the policy of the U.S. Embassy to attempt to cut off the influence of the Mexican Labor Party, which is a co-thinker party of Lyndon LaRouche in Mexico.

A That's question number two. Okay.

Q I'm not finished with that question.

A All right.

Q Through the specific --

A Kind of keep it short.

Q Through the specific tactic of describing the Mexican Labor Party as Gringo-controlled.

A Okay. Is that your question? Those are two questions.

Q (3) Does the State Department consider itself to be Gringo-controlled?

A Okay. You all done now?

Q That's it.

A Okay.

Q Are you going to look into those, John?

A I'm going to look into those. If we have anything to say, we will be back to you.

Q (Inaudible)

A Yes. I could answer the third question right off -- yes -- but I will take a look at it.

Q Will you look into reports that the Afghan Charge' in London has defected to the United States?

A I don't have anything on that for you.

Q Could you look into that, please?

A Let me see if there's anything available.

Q John, the helicopter shooting incident yesterday -- do you have any State Department view of that?

A Well, not a great deal more, I think, than the Pentagon would have, but I'd be glad to give you what we have. A U.S. Army UH-1 helicopter made a precautionary landing in Marcala -- if that's the correct pronounciation -- Honduras. That's about 55 miles west of Tegucigalpa and about 10 miles from the Salvadoran border. She went down at about 4:00 o'clock EST yesterday afternoon after taking at least three rounds of ground fire.

There were no injuries among the crew members or passengers. This was one of two helicopters transporting a congressional delegation which included Senator Bennett Johnston of Louisiana and Lawton Chiles of Florida and members of their party on a visit to a refugee camp at -- forgive my pronounciation -- Colomoncagua -- and, if you'll need the spelling, it's C-o-l-o-m-o-n-c-a-g-u-a.

When that incident occurred, both Senators were on that first helicopter which made the precautionary landing. The second helicopter was apparently fired upon as well, but, so far as we know at the moment, was not hit. There's some conflicting report about that, and I think the Pentagon is continuing to look at that, but certainly both were fired upon.

The passengers were returned by helicopter to the Honduran Air Force base at Palmerola to resume their itinerary. There were a total of six crewmen and nine passengers on the two helicopters. Investigation is going forward. We understand that the Salvadoran guerrillas in a radio broadcast have claimed responsibility for the incident, but I think we'd like to wait until the investigation is concluded.

The helicopter -- the first helicopter landed well within Honduras. As I say, the two of them were en route to a refugee camp which is located about four kilometers inside Honduras from the Salvadoran border. Don't have anything more for you on where the shooting -- where the firing actually took place. That will be part of the investigation.

And that really is about it. Senators Chiles and Johnston went on yesterday evening to Panama. There were some initial reports that Mrs. Negroponte, the wife of our Ambassador, was on the first chopper which took the rounds. That apparently turned out not to be true. She was on the second helicopter. And you've sort of exhausted my font of information on this.

Q If it turns out that Salvadoran guerrillas were responsible, would there be any response from this government in that case?

A Well, what kind of response?

Q That's what I'm asking you.

A Well, I -- you mean if we could find out who did it, would we --

Q Let me put the question this way: Has there been any communication between this government and the Honduran Government, the Salvadoran Government, any expression of concern?

A I don't know whether there's been any communication on this between the Salvadoran Government and ourselves, but I don't think anybody's suggesting the fire came from Salvadoran Government forces.

Q One more question: Is the State Department advising any further restrictions on congressional travel of this kind?

A Not that I'm aware of. No.

Q Is there any indication --

A Excuse me?

Q Were they in that region at their own request, John? Was the flight laid on at the request of the two Senators?

A I can't answer that. I guess our Embassy there could tell you how the itinerary was laid on. I assume it would have been in consultation -- it obviously would have been in consultation between the Congressmen and the Embassy, but who said we'd like to go to that particular camp, I don't know.

Q John, is there any indication whether the shots came from the Salvadoran side of the border or --

A No. And I don't know whether the investigation can pinpoint that, but I think not at this stage. I don't think anybody can be clear --

Q In this regard, the two helicopters in question, were they in Honduras as part of the Granadero maneuvers or are they permanently based in there?

A I don't know. I don't know how they were assigned. Obviously, the Embassy allocated these choppers to take these Congressmen, but I don't know what other duties those helicopters might have.

Q Do we have a permanent unit of choppers in the area in --

A I can't answer that. The Pentagon can tell you that, I'm sure.

Q There have been allegations for some time that the refugee camp to which they were going has been a haven for Salvadoran guerrillas. Do you have anything to say about that?

A No. But in light of what happened, that might well turn out to be the case.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:43 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, April 20, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #70

FRIDAY, APRIL 20, 1984, 12:22 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: One announcement and no news.

Ambassador Harry W. Shlaudeman, the President's Special Envoy to Central America, will leave Sunday, April 22, on his second trip to the region. As we've done in the past regarding travel of the President's Special Envoy, we will provide travel information on a day-to-day basis. Ambassador Shlaudeman's first stop will be Bogota, Colombia. His mission as Special Envoy remains an important part of the United States' effort to remain in close contact with and to support the Contadora countries as they strive to reach a peaceful solution to the crisis in Central America. His previous visit to the region was from March 29 to April 5 when he visited the five Central American countries.

That's all I have.

Q Is he just going to Contadora countries?

A As I said, Jim, we will tell you day-by-day where he's going.

Q How long will the trip last?

A I don't have a return date, Mike.

Q Who will accompany him?

A I don't know. I'd be glad to look at that for you. I'm sure he will have --

Q Does the State Department have any knowledge or any information about the group which claims to have set off a bomb in the Navy Yard?

A No. We do not.

Q Do you have any comment on it?

A Sorry?

Q Do you have any comment on the explosion?

A No. Don't.

Q You're talking about the Officers' Club now?

A Uh-huh.

Q I can't hear it back here.

A He's talking about the Officers' Club and the alleged Puerto Rican involvement.

Q The FBI now is saying FMLN. Salvadoran.

A I had heard there was some confusion about that this morning.

Q I just talked to them. They're now saying it's an American group, called the Guerrilla Resistance Movement in solidarity with the FMLN.

A Okay. Let us take a look and see whether we will have anything to say about it.

Q John, have you been consulted with the -- have you had consultants with the British Government on the events in -- around the Libyan Embassy?

A I'm sure we're keeping in touch. I'm sure that the British are keeping in touch with a number of governments, but in the sense in which you ask the question, I think not. I mean, obviously, we're very close, as the British are very close to a number of other countries, and I'm sure there would be normal kind of consultations, perhaps with a small "c." But if the implication behind your question is, are we involved in the affair directly, the answer to that is no.

Q No, I meant by my question, if you have a certain idea to give to the British Government regarding how to deal with the situation?

A No, I think as Secretary Shultz said, I think on Wednesday, the British are very sophisticated in their techniques in dealing with this kind of situation, and I think he said they obviously would handle it very efficiently.

Q John, anything on sanctions, the State Department opposing, endorsing sanctions -- economic -- against Nicaragua?

A No.

Q No, there's no considerations?

A No, there's no comment on a story I guess you're using as the basis for that question.

Q The Secretary of State -- the former Secretary of State, Haig -- has made charges against Weinberger and Clark, and he also said that Secretary Shultz is having the same problems with the White House that he had.

Looking at it from the Middle East standpoint of view, of course, I believe he's right. But what does the State Department have to say about it?

A Nothing. We are, of course, aware of Secretary Haig's interview last evening. But, as you know, the Secretary is on -- left for the West Coast yesterday with the President, and I'm not aware that he has any response to it.

Q He didn't make any comment -- the Secretary hasn't made any?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q You don't think that we can get into contact with him to make some?

A I don't think so.

Q May I ask something about Egyptian President Mubarak. There are reports, apparently on a high level, in Cairo, that he has made a decision to exchange ambassadors with the Soviet Union; and (2) he has withdrawn his ambassador, or is planning to withdraw his ambassador very soon, from El Salvador, which looks like a slap at U.S. policy in Central America and support for the guerrillas, as well as taking a rap at Israel, and so I was wondering if you had some comment on that?

A Well, don't have any comment on the latter part of your question.

Insofar as reports that Egypt and the Soviet Union will exchange ambassadors, that's been something that has been discussed for sometime, something of which we've been aware for sometime. That, of course, is a matter for those two countries, but should that exchange take place, we see no reason for it affecting the warm and friendly relationship between the United States and Egypt.

Q John, you say it had been discussed for sometime. You mean, between the Soviet Union and Egypt, or do you mean it had been discussed between Egypt and the United States?

A I think it's been in the public domain for sometime. I think the Egyptians have made clear for sometime that they were considering this.

Q John, do you have any analysis of the apparent agreement that has been reached in Lebanon, and the speculation as to who might make up the senior members of that Cabinet?

A No, really don't, Barrie. That's a question for those two governments. I'm sure our Ambassador in Lebanon is keeping in close touch with the situation, but no, we don't have any comment on the outcome of the talks.

Q It doesn't strike you as interesting or ironic that the three senior Cabinet people may turn out to be the three people who made it impossible for U.S. policy to succeed in --

A No. I guess we'll wait and see if that proves to be the case and consider whether we would have anything to say at that time.

Q John, do you have anything on The New York Times report that the CIA overruled the Secretary of State's desire to have Ms. Astorga here as ambassador?

A No. As you know, the Administration makes a decision on these things, and we do not talk about reports or allegations of different viewpoints held within the Administration.

--MORE--

Q There is a report from Tel Aviv talking about a U.S. plan to set up a special fund to finance Israeli aid to Central American and African countries. Do you have any comment on that?

A Are you talking about the Haaretz reports?

Q Haaretz report.

A I've seen that report, and certainly Mr. Kimche will be meeting with Mr. Eagleburger Thursday, April 26, and he'll be here meeting with other Department officials between April 27 and the 30th. As always, when Mr. Kimche meets with Mr. Eagleburger, they'll discuss a wide range of issues.

We're not going to get into the specifics, but if your question relates to the suggestion of Israeli involvement in Central America, I just refer you to the answer we gave on April 13, when a similar question was asked in connection with Saudi Arabia. At that time, we said what I've just said, that we're not going to get into diplomatic communications, but we can state that the United States has no intention of providing funds to third countries for the purpose of supporting covert activities in Central America, and of course, we're in no position to comment on any allegations of such activities pursued independently by other nations. So, basically, what I'm doing is not getting into the detail of those discussions but attempting to put what I think is the underlying question you have in perspective.

Q Do you have a copy of those remarks that you made, or are those ---

A I'm sure you can get a copy of the earlier guidance from the Press Office.

Q There is something of a debate up on the Hill about whether, if a country decides independently to step into the U.S. role in Central America, particularly with respect to the reports about Saudi Arabia, and so on, if that country receive foreign aid, there would be an automatic assumption that they were receiving U.S. foreign aid for those purposes.

Is there any judgment about that question in the State Department?

A I don't know that there is a judgment; there are, obviously, laws that relate to that situation, and we would observe them. There is no question or no intent not to observe them; but I mean, you raise a question that I can't answer about what a country can do independently in Central America.

Q John, if I could just translate what you said here a moment ago, is it that the U.S. has no intention of encouraging or of using third countries to finance covert operations in Central America?

A Yes, that was exactly the intent of what we said on whatever it was, April 13.

Q What about the Berman legislation that was introduced in the Congress for an American-Israeli program to assist countries in Africa and other third-world countries, by which the United States would supply something like $20 million in aid and the Israelis would supply the technicians and the know-how to third countries in the under developed world?

A So the question --

Q Do you have an opinion on that?

A I don't know whether we have ever expressed an opinion on that. Let me take a look.

Q John, do you have any comment on this report in The Washington Post attributed to American officials saying that Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick warned the Lebanese privately that Washington could not support the terms they had put forward earlier concerning the UNIFIL?

A I don't know that I'd cast it in that way. The United States has, obviously, been for a simple extension of UNIFIL. In fact, a compromise resolution was worked out yesterday, which the United States could support, with most members of the Security Council -- all except two, I think -- and we supported it. But that's all rather straightforward.

Q Do we have any comment on the book published in Poland on U.S.-Polish relations?

A I'm sorry. The book publishing --

Q The book published by the Polish Government on U.S.-Polish relations.

A There has not still -- you're talking about the large document?

Q That's right.

A I think we still do not have any reaction to that. We may, in time.

Q Thank you.

A O.K.

(The briefing concluded at 12:32 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Monday, April 23, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #71

MONDAY, APRIL 23, 1984, 12:24 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A couple of announcements: First, on Thursday, April 26, the Department of State and the Dallas Council on World Affairs are co-sponsoring a Regional Foreign Policy Conference at the Sheraton-Dallas Hotel, Southland Center, in Dallas. Ambassador Edward L. Rowny will deliver the keynote address on U.S. Arms Control Policy at the 12:30 p.m. luncheon. Embargoed copies of his address will be available on Wednesday afternoon.

If you wish additional information regarding the day's agenda, please contact Major General Willard Latham, Executive Director of the Dallas Council on World Affairs, at (214) 827-7960, or Jennifer Reid, media contact, also at (214) 691-4888.

Second, a statement which I gather was released over the weekend in Germany, and we are releasing it here, obviously, as well: German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher will be in Washington on May 7 and 8 for an official visit at the invitation of Secretary of State Shultz. In addition to several discussions with Secretary Shultz, Minister Genscher will also be received by President Reagan.

Also planned are meetings with other leading members of the Administration and the Congress. Topics covered in the discussions will be questions concerning bilateral relations as well as international developments. The visit of Foreign Minister Genscher will take place shortly before his planned visit to Moscow in the second half of May, and the NATO Spring Ministerial Meeting which will take place in Washington at the end of May.

That's it for announcements. Be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, does the State Department have any observations on the break in diplomatic relations between Britain and Libya?

A Not really anything to add, Jim, to what Larry Speakes already has said, I gather, from Air Force One. He talked about it, as I read the press. I don't have an official report back, but I saw quotation marks around the words "totally appropriate" and that "we support it without reservation." I have no reason to question that, but I would refer you, really, to his remarks as the comment as opposed to a comment coming from here.

Q How about the Americans who are still in Libya? Do you feel there is any potential threat to them?

A Well, we have been concerned about the safety of Americans in Libya for some time. You will recall when we took certain steps some months ago, we expressed some concern just as a general matter, not as a special circumstance; and I'm not suggesting today anything different from that. But the concerns that we have had remain.

Q Alan, to pick that up, have the Libyans done anything that would reinforce those concerns against the Americans, that is, has there been any harm or any pressures, or have they just allowed the Americans to go around doing what they're doing?

A Well, I don't know what the details of the circumstances of the people living in Libya may be, Bernie, but I'm not aware of any specific incidents at this point that I would cite to you as coming up recently that would suggest a higher degree of concern, but the concern that we have had remains.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the execution of two students in Libya?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q But the Libyans are doing nothing to harm any Americans; is that right?

A Well, I'm not aware of any specific incidents, but the concerns that we had -- and I would refer you back to what we said at the time, Bernie, that we announced that U.S. passports would no longer be valid for travel to Libya, and so on -- those concerns and the reasons expressed at that time remain.

Q Another subject, if I may, Alan?

Q Same subject. Do you have any information if the United States is taking any precautionary steps on the military side of it?

A I don't have anything, really, to offer you on that. I don't have any reason to suggest that particularly, but I think you would have to check with the Pentagon. I don't know what they've been saying. I think that they had some guidance last week about normal deployments, but I think that they do not get into details of operational matters and you'll have to take whatever they have on that.

Q Alan, are we taking any action or any measures whatever in support of Britain other than the words of Larry Speakes?

A I think that this -- we have condemned, obviously, what the Libyans have done, and we have expressed our support for the U.K.'s action. But beyond that, I don't have anything specific to add.

We always are alert to steps that we might take in opposing international terrorism and that remains an active concern and an active policy, but I don't have specifics to offer you.

Q How many Libyans are in this country?

A How many Libyans are in this country? You mean non -- obviously, they're not officials other than the U.N. I don't have a number to give you.

Q In light of what happened in England --

Q How many Americans are in Libya at this time?

A We had some guidance on this, I think, last week. If you check in the Press Office afterward, if it wasn't used in the briefing, I'm sure they can get it out for you.

Q 500 to 1000.

A Okay, Jim notes --

Q What's the difference between 500 and 1000? I don't understand --

A What's the difference? 500. (Laughter)

Q You said between 500 and 1000; why?

A We do not -- (a) we don't have an embassy there, and (b) U.S. passports are not valid for travel there, so I think it is very difficult for us to have a fix on precisely how many Americans may be there. Obviously, we do have some information and we share that with you to the extent that we've got it.

Q Does this mean there are Amercians who are residing in Libya without any knowledge of the U.S. Government?

A I suspect it's possible, if they're not -- sure. We don't keep track of all Americans who are travelling all over the world, no.

Q After Britain took the actions against the Libyans, according to an article this morning in Libyan "Green March" magazine. It said that Libya will join the British -- I mean, the Irish Republican Army against Britain. Do you have any comment on that?

A I don't have a specific comment. I'm not aware of that statement. It strikes me as being of a piece with their action last week.

Q Alan, in light of what happened in England and what's the situation now reached between England and Libya, are you -- besides being concerned -- are you issuing a call or caution to the Americans who are in Libya to watch out and possibly to come home, or something like that to the effect --

A I don't think there's anything new. At least to my knowledge, there's nothing new being done. And as I indicated in answer to Bernie's question earlier, I don't know of any specific instances that I could cite to you that would suggest that there's a particular heightening of concern at this moment. And I believe the British Ambassador in Libya indicated in an interview I saw that the Libyans had, indeed, said that U.K. citizens would be accorded proper treatment, and so on. So I don't have a specific reason to suggest to you that there's anything different.

On the other hand, I repeat to you what I said before, the cautions and concerns that we expressed some months ago remain as they were at that time.

Q So you are not alarmed by what happened -- I mean, to put it this way?

A Well, "alarmed" -- I think -- I refer you back to what we have said. In terms of do we see some indication at this moment of some imminent threat to Americans or other foreigners in Libya, I don't have indications of that.

Q Do you have any comment on the activities which the People's Student Bureau -- Libyan Bureau doing here in the United States?

A In terms of any official representation --

Q Any activities.

A -- they don't have any.

Q But the People's Student Bureau in McLean -- there are lot of reports about activity they are doing there.

A I don't have anything for you on that.

Q On terrorism, do you have anything to confirm or amplify on the report of this terrorist bomb in Angola that apparently killed a number of Soviet-Cuban -

A I don't. I'v seen the reports, Bernie, but I don't have any confirmation of that.

Q Do you have any comment on it?

A It's hard to comment in the absence of knowledge. Obviously, if it is indeed a terrorist-type incident, and that's hard to determine without real facts, we deplore all terrorist incidents, and that would apply in this case as well. But I really am not in a position to give you a firm comment, given the state of our knowledge.

Q Alan, in connection with the allegations about the Bechtel Corporation, and so forth, is the Justice Department in any way probing any actions taken by the Secretary when he was at the Bechtel Corporation? Do you have anything on that story?

A I don't have anything beyond what the Secretary said on Friday. I guess that was issued as a written statement from him which I think you already have, and I think that I would leave that there.

I think that Bechtel has indicated that they're not aware of any investigation going on. I think it would be inappropriate to comment from here on that.

Q It says the Justice Department spokesman denies that a probe was being made into the actions of the

Secretary of State and the Defense Secretary, and so forth. I just wanted to provide an opportunity for you to weigh as the spokesman for the State Department on that.

A I have no reason to contradict that.

Q Alan, I asked a question last week about the two Palestinians that were captured by Israel. Actually, at the time it was one; now it is, apparently, two.

There is an answer here saying, "We have seen the reports. I'm not in a position to comment." What does that mean? I mean, I don't understand it, really. What do you mean?

A This is with regard to those who were captured, presumably after the bus terrorist incident?

Q Right.

A I don't -- I wasn't here at the time that that was being drawn up, I guess. But the fact of the matter is that I think Mr. Arens talked about this on television yesterday, and I certainly don't have anything to add to what he said which was essentially that there was an investigation, as there always is, going on. So I guess it's where I would have to leave it. It's an Israeli investigation.

Q Pending the ending of that, or conclusion of that resolution, would there be a comment --

A I can't tell you. But at this point, clearly, there is not. There's an on-going investigation.

Q Alan, on Kampuchea, do you have any comment on the Indonesian Foreign Minister's statement that the Soviet Union shows strong interest in the Indonesian plan for a resolution to the Kampuchean problem but he's waiting -- the Indonesians are waiting on the reaction of other ASEAN countries and on the U.S., because, apparently, the U.S. especially hasn't signed off on the idea that a future Kampuchea should be neutral and non-aligned?

A I don't have anything specific on what may have been presented to Moscow by Foreign Minister Mochtar.

In general, the United States supports the efforts of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations -- ASEAN -- to achieve a political solution to the Kampuchean problem based on the total withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and the restoration of self-determination for the Khmer people through internationally supervised elections.

These efforts have been endorsed by the vast majority of United Nations members. The U.S. and ASEAN seek an independent, neutral Kampuchea at peace with its neighbors, including Vietnam. We will continue to support ASEAN's efforts to achieve that goal.

Vietnam, supported by the USSR, has rejected such a settlement and continues to seek a military solution which would consolidate its domination of Kampuchea as evidenced by its latest attacks on Khmer encampments along the Thai-Kampuchean border. Soviet support for a political settlement, consistent with the U.N. endorsed formula, would be a most welcome development, and we look forward to our continuing consultations with ASEAN on Kampuchea.

Q Can we get a copy, please, Alan?

A Copy.

Q Are you encouraged by this movement, the State Department?

A I again don't have anything specific on what may have been discussed between Mr. Mochtar and the Soviets, so I'm going to have to leave you with a general statement.

Q Do you mind these Vietnamese veterans going back and forth to Hanoi every three months to --

A I don't have anything on this, Bernie. I don't know if there was anything here last week. I think we have indicated before we think the most effective way of dealing with the issues that are outstanding on the POW-MIA question is in government-to-government channels, but beyond that I really don't have a comment to offer you.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the break in relations by Egypt with Costa Rica and El Salvador?

A No, I don't. I think that that's a matter between the various countries concerned, and I would leave it to them to comment.

Q You don't think we ought to defend the democracies like Costa Rica and El Salvador in view of the Egyptian action?

A I think our concern and support for El Salvador and Costa Rica and the issues that are involved in Central America are quite clear. In terms of the question of their relations with Egypt, as I say, I have no comment on that.

Q Alan, this is sort of between the question -- early or at the time of Sabra and Shatila you were reluctant -- the United States Government was reluctant to express its opinion when there was calls for -- inside Israel for an investigation -- formal investigation. Now I read that members of the Israeli Knesset, the Parliament, are calling for investigation in the matter of the two Palestinians who were taken from the bus accordingly.

Why aren't you coming forward and saying that if there is such a -- you know, ground for such an investigation, that you will welcome this investgation, or you want this investigation to be --

A I think I said before that, as I understood Minister Arens on television yesterday, he said that as a routine matter there is always an investigation of any terrorist incident and what happened, and, indeed, there is such an investigation going on now. And, as I recall what he said -- and I'm not speaking for him, obviously, but just as a viewer, he said that they would expect to know with 100 percent certainty what happened after they conduct their investigation, so I don't know why that's an issue.

Q Well, it's an issue because the experience that we people have about investigation -- committees investigating things inside Israel. Let's say the Karp report -- Judith Karp who was an Attorney General of the State of Israel -- it was buried for almost two years --

A Well, I've answered your question --

Q -- before it came out. This is why -- I mean, you know, the urgency of the matter that I would like to ask you if you will ask that this matter be done urgently, not just in a routine way?

A I have nothing for you beyond what I just said, and I have no reason to question what Minister Arens said on television.

Q Alan, the Director General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, David Kimche, is coming to Washington this week, both to say goodbye to Larry Eagleburger and to discuss the final stages of a special fund that the U.S. would finance for -- to improve Israel's aid-giving capability to Africa and Central America, but it's called the Third World, but the targeting, apparently, is Central America and Africa.

A Uh-huh.

Q And I was just wondering if there was any chance of getting a briefing about this special fund and the monies involved and instructions.

A Let me see what people have to say about that.

Q Could you address this special fund?

A I don't know whether -- I don't know anything about the special fund. I'm not saying there isn't one; I'm not saying there is one, I don't know, but I will look into the question of --

Q Alan, in that connection, I raised the question, I think it was Thursday, about legislation in the Congress for the approval of a $20 million fund for the use of technical assistance by Israel with Third World countries, and I don't know whether -- and I asked for an opinion on this as to whether the State Department approved this.

A Uh --

Q And there was a promise, I suppose, that there be something --

A Well, I doubt that there was a promise that there would be something, but, in any case, I'll look and see if there's anything forthcoming on that.

Q Alan, one thing also, there is a report, at least by Miran Ben Veniste, the former Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem, about "Israel frustrating delivery of U.S. aid to the West Bank."

A Right.

Q Have you seen it? Can you comment on it -- about this?

A We had a comment on this Ghassan, and it was posted several -- before last week, so I refer you back.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the Soviet's apparent rejection of our latest efforts on the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks?

A Yes. I guess as a general matter, I would note first that the -- unfortunately, for at least the last two years, the Soviets have tended to criticize U.S. proposals before examining them, and in both negotiations -- the chemical warfare and the MBFR negotiations -- we hope that the Soviets will negotiate at the table and not in the press.

As far as what happens next on CW, the current round of the 40-nation Geneva conference ends late this week, and when its next session resumes in early June, we expect the negotiations will intensify on CW issues.

As the Vice President indicated, we also look forward to serious bilateral consultations at that time with the Soviet delegation on a CW ban.

As far as MBFR is concerned, we would hope the Soviets would look carefully at our proposal during that period between now and the beginning of the next round, which is, I think, May 24. A serious and constructive Eastern reply would allow these important negotiations to make progress.

I would leave you with that thought.

Q You don't consider that knock-down in the press to be final, then?

A I think that we would, again, hope that they would negotiate at the table and not in the press, and we'll see what happens there.

Q Copy, please?

A I think I'm going to have to ask you to get it from the transcript.

Q Do you have any comment on a New York Times story that suggests the United States is now in a position to use military force in Central America if necessary?

A I don't have a real comment on it. It seemed to me that what the correspondent in that case was doing was taking a number of events and drawing a conclusion. I think we've talked about the nature of the various construction activities which have gone on. The Pentagon has talked about it, the U.S. is not constructing permanent bases or bases, indeed, for itself, other than facilities to be used during the exercises. I'd refer you back to essentially what we said before on this, and refer you also to various statements which have been made very clearly about the fact that the United States has no plan to use combat forces in Central America.

Q What about the part of the story that suggests the State Department is really out of the play on this, that the shots are being called once more by the NSC and the Pentagon, and the State Department does not want to go against the countervailing mood of the Administration?

A Well, it's very tempting to comment on a story like that, but I think I will control my temptation and simply decline to comment on interagency deliberations.

Q Indulge yourself, Alan.

A No. (Laughter)

Q Alan, sometime ago, about a year or so ago, there was a little controversy about the type of maps that were issued on the Middle East by our Government's agencies, including the State Department. It showed the West Bank as part of Jordan in the color of the map. Some four or five or six months ago I was told there was a memo circulated that would correct this. It would show the West Bank as something other than Jordan -- not Israel, but other than Jordan. So I was wondering if you could show us some evidence that this memo is being carried out?

A Well, I don't think it's my job to talk about either internal memos which may exist -- and I don't know that that one exists --

Q No, it's not a --

A -- or to show you evidence. If you want to go look at maps, Joe, you're free to do that.

Jim?

Q Do you have any comment for the record on the ABC and CBS and New York Times reports on ARDE that surfaced this weekend and this morning?

A Well, the basic answer, I guess, is no, because if you're talking about U.S. involvement, or alleged U.S. involvement with ARDE, we'd be getting into allegations of intelligence activites, and, obviously, I would not address any such allegations.

Q This may sound a little facetious, but --

A Heaven forfend.

Q -- we'll try it anyway. Last week ARDE's forces took San Juan del Norte in the south. Was -- at that time there was absolutely no comment coming from that podium.

A Uh-huh.

Q This puzzled man of us here. Is it because --

A I doubt that.

Q -- it was considered -- it wasn't raised in connection with anything having to do with the United States.

A The --

Q Was the -- can you tell us what the reason was that there was no comment?

A No. I don't have any -- I wasn't here, and I can't answer your question.

Q Okay. Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:44 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, April 24, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #72

TUESDAY, APRIL 24, 1984, 12:26 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have one statement on the Soviet offensive in Afghanistan.

We have confirmation from several sources that large-scale Soviet military activity in the Panjsher Valley has begun. It appears that on April 20 and 21, the Soviets began to bomb up and down the valley, which is located about 50 miles north of Kabul. There is also a large convoy of several hundred Soviet vehicles, which has started to move north from the mouth of the valley.

The Soviets have previously carried out six unsuccessful campaigns in the Panjsher Valley, the most recent of them in the summer of 1982 before a truce was worked out between the Soviets and the Afghan resistance commander in the Panjsher, Ahmad Shah Masood.

There are other Soviet sweep operations occurring in western Afghanistan near Herat and near Jalalabad, Afghanistan's second and third largest cities, and in areas in the north, close to the border with the Soviet Union.

There is also increased resistance activity in and around Kabul. Furthermore, the resistance or mujahidin, has been very active in raids and attacks on the main road from the Soviet Union into Kabul, south of the Salang Tunnel. The mujahidin have destroyed several important bridges, most notably the Mattock Bridge, which further complicates Soviet efforts to keep Kabul supplied with needed petroleum supplies and to stop the recurrent fuel shortages.

As we said last week, a springtime increase in military activity in Afghanistan is to be expected. The new elements this year are high-altitude saturation bombing by the Soviets and the presence of such large forces. These tactics are an escalation of the destructive and brutal tactics, anti-civilian Soviet warfare in Afghanistan, and will no doubt inflict increased suffering on the Afghan people, who have borne so much agony in their four year struggle against the Soviets.

That is it for announcements.

Q Copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q Can you put any numbers on those increases? For instances, how many airplanes are involved; is there an increase in Soviet troops in Afghanistan?

A Jim, I cannot. I don't have anything new on the number of overall Soviet forces in Afghanistan. I think you will understand that when we begin to look at more detail, we begin to get into more problems about intelligence and, therefore, I really cannot do that.

Q You still carrying the general number to be 105,000 in and around?

A I thought we had used a different figure from that. Let me check and see what our -- I'll check and see what our current figure is on that figure.

Q What will this increased Soviet attack do to -- by way of American military aid to the guerrillas?

A You're raising a question alleging U.S. covert activity, and obviously I would not address that subject.

Q Is there such activity?

A Bernie, I think I just said I would not address any allegations of such activity.

Q How large a bomber force are you talking about, Alan?

A Again, because of the sources and method problems, I cannot get into greater detail.

Q Have you ever been in contact with the Soviets regarding Afghanistan?

A Regarding Afghanistan?

Q Yes.

A Oh, I think we have raised with the Soviets numerous times our concerns about Afghanistan, surely.

Q Do you intend to make sort of presentations to the Soviets about these developments?

A That I can't tell you; don't know.

Q Alan, what can you specify that you are offering the Afghan freedom fighters, the mujahidin, aside from the reports that you are, through some other countries, offering some military assistance? What are the things that the United States is doing right now for the Afghan people?

A I refer you back to the record. There is an extensive record of description of our activity with the refugees and assisting refugees that have come out of Afghanistan, and so forth. But I just don't have anything new to say to you today about that subject.

Q Can you address the results of the bombing and the results of the sweep operation?

A Don't have anything on that.

Q Are there consultations with Pakistan on this situation now?

A Don't have anything for you, Spence, on that subject.

Q Following up an earlier question, was there any attempt to talk to the Soviets when you first realized that there was this build-up about such an offense?

A Jim, I don't think that it would be appropriate to get into the question of diplomatic consultations. As I said before, our concerns about Afghanistan and our policy, and so on, have been discussed with the Soviets numerous times over a period of years now.

Q Another subject?

A Go ahead.

Q Alan, any comment on the NBC report that the State of Israel, at Washington's urging, has armed a quarter of the Contras fighting the government in Nicaragua?

A Not really. First of all, I really have to refer you back to what John said on this last week. That is, you're talking about allegations of covert activities, and we don't address those without trying to lead you one way or another.

Specifically, on the subject of Israeli activity in Central America, that is not a subject which is appropriate for us to address. But as we indicated last week -- I believe on Friday -- the U.S. has no intention of providing funds to third countries for the purpose of supporting covert activities in Central America.

Q But that doesn't answer my question. My question is, at Washington's urging; that doesn't mean about intentions to provide funds, et cetera. What about Washington urging?

A Again, as I say, as a general proposition, it is both inappropriate to discuss Israeli activities, whatever they may or may not be. I'm not trying to suggest something to you here at all. But I also am not going to discuss what would come under the heading for us of alleged covert activities.

Q Also, you're not going to --

A Discuss what would come under the heading of alleged covert activities. I really don't have anything new to say on this subject.

Q Why is it -- I don't understand. Can you tell us why it is inappropriate for you to talk about any Israeli activities in Central America?

A It's up to them to address their own policies.

Q Well, I mean, with respect to other extra continental powers, you certainly have been outspoken. I mean, even the French -- you say things on the record about French activities or proposed French activities in Central America. I don't understand why you're drawing a distinction here between other countries, extra continental countries.

A I think they're of a different nature; the charges or stories are of a different nature.

Q Alan, can you speak to the Times report regarding the stepped-up offensive in El Salvador, Cuban-backed offensive in El Salvador this fall?

A Again, you're asking me questions which revolve around issues that would have to do with intelligence information, and I'm just not in a position to address questions of that sort from this podium.

Q Can I ask you a money question, then? The Administration said that -- when they asked for the $62 million for El Salvador -- said that wasn't enough; they expected to come back around May or so and ask for money even though they haven't got the first. Do you expect the Administration to go back to Congress and ask for more money in the early spring for El Salvador?

A I can't lay out for you a legislative strategy at this particular point. The action that was taken, about ten days ago I guess, was announced at the White House in providing emergency measures to fund El Salvador aid, that is what has been done so far.

I think that now that the Congress is back, obviously we would hope that they would take urgent action on the remaining part of the request. That request was, I think, somewhere in the total -- near the total of $178.7 or 8 million. That simply is the broad position. As to when we might do something different or anything of that sort, I just don't have anything for you at this point.

Q I want to take you back to the earlier story, Alan. Do you have anything to say about the CIA or Washington making available the cargo plane that was used in the airdrop and that the agency, the CIA, must approve every airdrop by the Contras into Nicaragua?

A Bernie, you're asking me about stories which touch on alleged intelligence activities. I'm not going to address them.

Q Again, on the same subject?

--MORE--

Q Yes. On the subject of Israeli activity in Central America, the Israeli press, Ha'aretz, Ma'ariv, and others say that the visit of Mr. David Kimche to Washington this week and his meeting with Mr. Eagleburger centers around the matter of Israel's involvement in technical aid and military aid to the Contras against Nicaragua and to give to the -- El Salvador and others.

Are the Israeli newspapers telling a story, a lie, or can you confirm, deny? What are -- what is the agenda of Mr. Kimche with Mr. Eagleburger, coming here this week?

A First of all, I don't have an agenda. We've talked about the nature of those talks in general before. This is not the first one. This is -- there's been a series of talks between those two gentlemen, and this fits into that series of conversations, so I'd refer you back to what we've said about it before. But we certainly have not addressed in specific ways what they talk about, and I'm not going to try to do that today.

Q How about the press reports that say this is what they are going --

A I think I've already addressed that issue. I don't have anything further to say about that.

Q Alan, will you --

Q I --

A Excuse me. Jim, did you have a question?

Q That's okay.

Q A follow-up to the same question, please. Would you confirm or deny the report about a special fund to provide Israel with enough money to put to Central American countries as assistance? There is a very specific piece of information here.

A Yeah. Well, in terms of -- I don't have anything for you on the general subject. In terms of anything which would be involved in providing financing to support covert activities, I've already addressed that today, John addressed it last week, and I don't have anything new to say about that.

Q At the risk of being obnoxious and persistent, which doesn't come easy, of course -- (laughter) -- you said that --

A No comment.

Q -- the reason -- I haven't asked the question yet. I just made an assertion.

A Oh. I was commenting on the assertion.

Q The reason you won't comment on Israeli activities versus, say, French activities is because they are "of a different nature." Can you tell us in what respect they are of a different nature; and specifically by refusing to comment, you're leaving open the interpretation that somehow this relates to U.S. intelligence activities.

A No. The stories relate to alleged covert activity or support to covert activity by Israel, and I'm not going to get into that kind of a question.

Q But why? I mean --

A Because we don't talk about intelligence-type activities.

Q But only with respect to the United States. You talked about others --

A No. When it is a comment, I'm not aware that we've talked about intelligence-type activities with regard to France, Jim.

Q I have two questions: Last night there was a Metromedia feature, and it charged some pretty -- it had some pretty stiff charges about a State Department coverup regarding the Holocaust. Do you have anything to say on that?

A I'm not aware of the items.

Q Could you look into the charges against the State Department -- they were very harsh -- and if you could take it, I'd --

A Well, I'll look into it. It sounds to me like you're talking about a historical subject, but I -- it may be if you could help provide some information, we can look into it. But I'm sure, given the -- I mean, I find it incredible to believe --

Q I would too. It's a two-hour documentary and --

A Fine. Okay. I don't have anything on that.

Q Can I -- I have one more. Did you have anything today on the UNITA bombing in South Africa?

A No. I think that what we've seen, in fact, is contradictory reports coming out about that situation, and so I don't know that we're going to have any clear idea about the attack or the circumstances surrounding it. So I don't expect to have anything further, really, beyond what I said yesterday.

Bill?

Q Alan, remember yesterday, going back to this special fund to improve Israel's aid-giving capability, I ask whether or not --

A Any briefing? I put it -- I don't have any -- certainly any positive response. I don't -- if there is something to say, I will volunteer it to you --

Q Okay.

A -- on this question. As I said, I can't confirm to you the existence of such a fund to begin with, but in terms of any briefings on the general subject, I haven't gotten any positive --

Q Alan, there is a report out of London today that Iran is moving to build a nuclear device, will have a nuclear-capable device within two years. Have you seen this report?

A I haven't seen it.

Q Can you take that? I can give you more information later if you wish.

A Well, it seems to me likely that it would touch on intelligence, but why don't you give us the information and see if we have anything that we can use on that?

Q Okay.

Q Alan, yesterday you gave us a statement on the Kampuchean-Thai border and the Vietnamese attacks there, and in which you mentioned --

A Well, I think that last week was --

Q Yes. Yesterday, too, there was a statement that you handed out.

A I don't think so. There may have been some guidance that was used.

Q It was Indonesia.

Q It was the Vietnam thing.

Q That was yesterday.

Q Indonesia.

Q Vietnamese, I'm speaking, Vietnamese attacks on --

A I'm sorry. All right. Go ahead. I think you're saying that something was a statement which I didn't view as a statement. Go ahead.

Q All right. Well, reports are that the Vietnamese attacks are increasing in intensity, in number. Is there anything that we are doing or apt to be doing to support the Thais in this matter?

A Well, I think that we've indicated before that we have worked very closely with the Thais, and we would -- if there were a need for some additional urgency in the assistance program we have, or something, we would look at that, certainly. But I don't have anything specific to give you on that today.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the Dominican Republic today?

A On the Dominican Republic?

Q Yes.

A Yes. A little bit about basically sort of a factual situation report. There were a sizable number of small demonstrations in Santo Domingo on April 23 in protest of price increases announced by the government last week. Incidents such as rock-throwing, tire burnings, disruption of traffic, and some attacks on stores occurred.

There are reports that one or two people were killed and up to 20 injured, and that there have been 100 to 150 arrests. There are no reports of injuries to Americans. By last evening, most of the demonstrations had been dispersed and the city was calm.

Q Alan, they seem to be -- these -- do you have any comment, themselves, on the -- I mean, a specific substantive comment?

A No.

Q They seem to be the result of these IMF measures that are being implemented now. Have we -- when President Blanco was up here, did we pledge our support to try to get more leniency from the IMF on --

A I'm going to have to refer you to whatever was said in the context of his visit, Jim. I don't have anything further to say.

Q Is that China nuclear U.S. deal a certainty now?

A The only thing I have on the question, Bernie, is, I think, what has been said before. That is, that when Ambassador Kennedy was in China in the middle of the month, considerable progress was made, but I don't have anything beyond that, really, and I would have to refer you to Larry Speakes in the President's party on that.

Q Alan, is it -- are we talking about a basic program that would involve ten nuclear reactors? Is that it?

A I don't have details on what would be involved. I think basically what has been talked about is a basic agreement which would incorporate sort of the basic framework in which any cooperation would go on, and so that is my understanding, that it is that nature of an agreement. But I really would at this point prefer that the White House address any other questions on that subject.

Q Alan, do you have anything new to say on the question of the military or at least belligerent activity in the Berlin air corridor?

A I don't have anything beyond what we've said before on that.

Q Is the sort of activity that's been going on continuing as far as you know?

A Don't have -- I don't have an update. I don't know the answer.

Q No deep concern.

Q Do you have anything on that Carnegie study the other day about the inequities in South Affica?

A No, I don't.

Q Alan, the former Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem, Meron Benvenisti, is in town to disseminate his findings about the West Bank. Are there any plans for the Special Task Force or the Special Unit, Mr. Kirby, and others, or any officials in the Department to meet with him to discuss the findings of his controversial reports?

A I don't know the answer to that question.

Q Can you take that, please?

A I'll look into that, sure.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the -- anything new on the situation between the British and the Libyans in London?

A No. I don't have anything new on that.

Q Alan, I understand the State Department has sent a representative to an ICAO conference in Montreal. Are we asking for anything specific there, are we doing anything, or is this a routine meeting?

A I'm -- well, I don't know the answer to that question. I'm not aware of anything that's special --

Q This is where we went to get sanctions against the Soviets after the Korean airliner incident?

A Well, I think it was where, also, there was a very detailed report drafted and done on that incident.

Q Can you check in and see if we're asking for anything specific?

A When you say "anything specific," you're talking about sanctions, or what are you talking about?

Q Sanctions. Sanctions.

A I'm not aware that we are, in fact, doing that.

Q Where is Shlaudeman today?

A He is in Central America. No, in fact, he's in Caracas, Venezuela.

Q Okay.

A He's going to be staying overnight there.

Q Okay. Yesterday, he, after meeting with the President of Colombia, the Foreign Minister of Colombia said that the peace treaty signing for Contadora would be delayed from the end of this month to the end of next month. Do you have any comment on that?

A I don't have anything.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:45 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Wednesday, April 25, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #73

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 25, 1984, 12:16 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have no announcements. Be happy to take your questions.

Q First, do you have any report on what is going on in the Dominican Republic -- any comment on what is going on?

A I have something of a situation report again today on that, Jim. Protests against government-ordered price increases again took place in Santo Domingo and other cities in the Dominican Republic yesterday, that is Tuesday, the 24th. There was not a single mass demonstration, rather numerous incidents such as tire burnings and looting of stores occurred at many different locations.

While confirmed figures are not available, we understand that between 10 and 20 people have been killed, 100 injured, and between 500 and 1000 arrests. There are no reports of injuries to Americans. The airport was operating normally, and Dominican security forces are continuing efforts to restore order.

Q We have a report that there were 42 killed yesterday.

A O.K. This is what I was given just before I came down here. I can only give you what I've got.

Q Inaudible

A I say, confirmed figures not available. This represents our best understanding as of this point.

Q Do you have any substantive comment on these developments? This is getting more serious, it seems.

A No, I don't have anything further on that, no.

Q Alan, earlier this month, did this Administration inform the Government of the Dominican Republic that imposing the IMF conditionalities would have a stabilizing (sic) effect on the nation?

A I wouldn't, as a general matter, try to talk about what we may or may not have said to the Dominican Republic or any other government about that; but I would also note that, as a general matter, we do not intervene in negotiations between the IMF and other countries.

Q But as a general mat er, the Administration has very strongly supported IMF conditionalities in Latin America and elsewhere?

A I think I'd prefer -- I don't quarrel, Stan, but I'd prefer to stick -- in terms of what we do with other countries -- to stick with the words I just gave you.

Q Alan, do you have a comment on the report that the Dutch may be deciding not to put missiles in?

A Well, the Dutch Government and Parliament must, obviously, decide this issue for themselves. In making this decision, the Dutch will undoubtedly consider their obligations under NATO's 1979 dual-track decision, which the other members of the Alliance are implementing; and we look to the Netherlands to fulfill its responsibilities to the Alliance on INF as on other matters.

Q Do you have any situation report from Afghanistan today?

A I don't really have a situation report on that, Jim, no. We've seen the reports about claims of the Soviets' having taken this Panjsher Valley -- the Radio Kabul report, I guess, is what was involved there. We don't have independent confirmation of that, and resistance forces have denied it; and I must say that we tend to view that report, as well, with considerable skepticism.

Marvin?

Q Back on the INF thing, did the Dutch Government tell the U.S. that it will deploy the medium-range missiles only in a crisis environment?

A Marvin, I'm not going to get into details of what discussions may or may not have been held with the Dutch Government. They have been consulting with the Allies, including the U.S., regarding the deployment of cruise missiles in the Netherlands. But as I say, I'm not going to be able to get into the specifics of --

Q Is the story inaccurate -- that they have informed the U.S. that they will deploy only in a crisis environment?

A You're asking me to comment on what I just said I don't really think I can comment on. I'm going to have to beg off on that one.

Q When you say "fulfill the responsibilities to the Alliance," does that mean responsibilities to deploy, period? Not deploy on a crisis basis?

A I'm going to just stick with the words I've used, and not try to define further.

Q Don't you expect the missiles to be deployed in the Netherlands in 1986 as stated in the NATO Agreement of '79?

A I think, again, I'm going to stick, Marvin, with the words I've used, both the initial point I made about the decision process and so on and also about the nature of Dutch consultations with -- or discussions with -- the Alliance.

Q Do you have any concern that the phrasing you use is a kind of meddling in Dutch internal affairs --

A No, I think --

Q -- about looking to the Netherlands to fulfill its responsibilities?

A No. I think the point I made at the very beginning was that it is up to the Dutch Government and Parliament, obviously, to decide this issue for themselves.

Q Alan, do you have any reaction to the report that Chernenko has some new ideas on the nuclear -- communicated them to the Italian -- ?

A No. I saw the report. I think that the point we have made numerous times is that we would be happy to hear new ideas at the negotiating table, and we are prepared to go back to that table whenever the Soviets are ready.

Q Is that the only place that we would be prepared to listen to their new ideas?

A I don't know it's the only place we would be prepared to listen, but that certainly is the place to negotiate the agreement, and I haven't heard a suggestion from the Soviets, particularly didn't see anything in this report, which suggested they were seeking a new framework to discuss that.

Q But we would not be opposed to that --

A I think I'll just leave you with what I said, John.

Bernie.

Q Do you have any response to the announcement that I've heard that the Chinese have disclosed that a senior, a very senior Soviet official, will come to Peking for a new round of Sino-Soviet talks?

A No.

Q No response whatever to that?

A No. They have had discussions before. I don't know why that would be a particularly startling thing.

Q Do you have a response to the Soviet press statements that the incident at the Libyan Embassy in London was orchestrated by the United States?

A That's absolute nonsense.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on a commentary in the East German Military Journal that the Four-Power Agreement over the Berlin air corridor is no longer in effect?

A I'm not aware of such a statement, and obviously, we would not agree with any such statement. But I'm not aware they've made one.

Q Can you look into it?

A No. I'm not aware they've made any such statement.

-- MORE --

Q Could you comment on a report in today's Post about American destroyers being deployed to the Gulf of Fonseca to interdict arms?

A Well, you put me in a somewhat difficult position because you're talking about a matter which would have to be discussed by DOD, and I would refer you to the Pentagon.

What I am willing to say, though, is that I know of no plan for deployment of U.S. naval craft -- destroyers, I think, were what were referred to in the article -- into the Gulf of Fonseca. Now, you'll have to check with DOD on what exercises may or may not be planned.

Q You're basing this --

A I think that -- also, a suggestion that we're getting into -- I'd just steer you away from that notion.

Q The Pentagon chose not to make any comment today on that report. You're basically saying it's wrong?

A I think I've said about as much as I really could say about it. I don't quarrel with your characterization. Maybe we can talk about it a little bit later on.

Q Alan, what is your response to the Nicaraguan charges laid before the World Court today?

A I don't have a lot to say about that, Marvin. The Court, though, in contrast -- looking at the New York Times piece this morning where, I believe, someone speaking on behalf of the Nicaraguan side suggested that the Court had rejected the U.S. arguments: the Court has not rejected U.S. jurisdictional arguments. It has merely determined, according to normal procedures, that it wishes, before making any decisions, to hold a hearing on Nicaragua's application for provisional measures.

As the President of the Court informed the Court today, at the hearing the Court will also hear any relevant arguments the parties may wish to make as to whether the Court has sufficient jurisdiction to indicate provisional measures. That hearing has already begun, and the U.S. on Friday will fully present its arguments that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the Nicaraguan complaint and request for provisional measures.

Q Copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Has the United States made the argument as alleged here, that there was a technical defect to the terms under which Nicaragua had subscribed to the jurisdiction of the Court originally?

A As I am sure you are aware, Jim, there is a standing procedure that the Court prefers to follow that it be the first to comment on any matters submitted to the Court, any submissions of any sort, and we intend to try to observe that procedure. So I don't have anything to say about any submissions which may or may not have been made.

Q Do you have anything on the Iraq-Soviet statement today condemning U.S. actions in the Persian Gulf?

A I don't. I saw the wire. I don't really have any comment.

Q Do you have anything on a protest from Czechoslovakia about that helicopter incident last week?

A No, I don't have anything on that. I believe that that is still under investigation, but I guess I'd ask you to check with the Pentagon to see where they are on that.

Q But you have not received a note from the Czechs?

A I'm not aware, Jim, of whether we have or haven't received a protest on that.

Q Two questions, please. Do you have anything today on the reports about Iran and an atomic bomb?

A That question was raised the other day, and there is an answer that will be posted on that so let me refer you to that posting.

Q Okay. Do you have anything today on that UNITA bombing in Angola?

A No. As I said yesterday, I don't expect to have anything more on that.

Q Do you have any comments on the resolutions of the Conference of the Committee on Jerusalem which -- they met on April 19 and 20 in Fez, Morocco?

A No.

Q Can you look into this because the resolutions were published yesterday, I believe?

A No. I think our position -- they were meeting on the issue of Jerusalem. Our position on the issue of Jerusalem is quite clear. It's on the record. I don't have any reaction.

Q How about the conditions on Capitol Hill between -- what's the status of this resolution in the U.S. Congress, do you know?

A You'd have to check on that with Congress on that.

Q Do you have any comment on the Iranian Ambassador to Kuwait's interview today in the Post which said that the insecurity in the region is because of superpower intervention?

A Yes, I do have -- also, I think, that he said something about the Gulf Cooperation Council being a vehicle for U.S. intervention, and so on.

The Gulf Cooperation Council is an organization independent states which are free to seek or not to seek alliances in cooperation where they see fit. The United States respects the independence and sovereignty of those states and is not seeking to dictate how they conduct their affairs. We expect the Iranians to show equal respect for their sovereignty.

Q Copy of this?

A Yes.

Q Alan, on another subject? Do you know if anyone on the -- any official on the Reagan trip intends to peel off at the end of the trip to brief the Taiwanese?

A I have no idea.

Q Do you know whether that is permitted under the Taiwan -- the relationship we have with Taiwan?

A I don't really don't have anything -- any way of commenting on that.

Q Can you take it?

A No, I'd refer any questions of what the officials on the President's trip would do to the President's party.

Q Any general comment about the column in the Post today in connection with Mike Armacost?

A Wiser and cooler heads have counseled that we should stick to our articulated position that we have come to, that that column is not one we are going to be commenting on anymore.

Q Alan, do you have anything on Kimche's schedule with Eagleburger?

A On Kimche's schedule with Eagleburger?

Q Yes.

A No. It is -- I've said before that this is a continuation of a series of meetings which has been held over time. It's a continuation of that.

The question was raised here -- I don't see Bill McLaughlin, but he raised the question about some sort of a briefing, perhaps, on a report that there's a specific proposal or agreement to do something in terms of joint aid. I guess the only -- I think there's not going to be a briefing because in checking this out I find that while there has been some interest, perhaps, in seeing how the U.S. and Israel might cooperate in various ways, which is not an unusual kind of thing, there really is nothing that has been arranged so there's nothing to talk about. So that's where that one is.

But in terms of Mr. Kimche's visit, we, as I said the other day, have been pretty consistent in not laying out any sort of agenda, and I think we're going to stick to that.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:30 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Thursday, April 26, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #74

THURSDAY, APRIL 26, 1984, 12:06 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. One announcement: A statement regarding the International Sakharov Committee hearings.

The Department is pleased to learn that the International Sakharov Committee is holding public hearings today and tomorrow in Copenhagen on the repression of human rights in Cuba over the last 25 years.

The main witness at the hearings will be Armando Valladares, the Cuban poet who was released last year after a long imprisonment in Cuba for his political beliefs.

As can be noted in the Department's annual Human Rights Report to the Congress on Cuba, the human rights record of the Castro regime has long been one of the poorest in Latin America. For that reason, we welcome public scrutiny of that record and hope it may result in improved respect for human rights by the Cuban Government.

That's it for announcements. Be happy to take your questions.

Q Copy of that, please, Alan?

A Sure.

Q Alan, do you have anything on a Saudi Arabian tanker being struck by a projectile in the Gulf?

A I have something on this, Mike. There are press and industry reports that at approximately 1:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time Wednesday, there was an incident in the Persian Gulf which involved a very large -- that is, 350,000 ton -- Saudi Arabian-registered tanker named the Safina al-Arab. We understand that the vessel was in flames. Its crew abandoned ship and was later picked up by a salvage ship on the scene.

We cannot specify what may have caused the damage to the ship, although we are aware of reports that ship personnel believe that the ship was hit by a projectile.

The ship reportedly loaded at Kharg Island and came into distress in or near Iranian territorial waters, some 50 to 100 miles south of Kharg Island.

We reiterate our well-known position on freedom of navigation in international waters.

Q Any indications of Iraqi or Iranian aircraft in the vicinity at the time of the incident, as you call it?

A Don't have anything for you on that.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A Copy? Surely.

Q What do you do on a thing like this, Alan? How do you follow up on a report? And when you get information, what do you do?

A What do we do? I suppose we would try in various ways to get as complete information as we can. But --

Q Were you contacted by the Saudis about this today?

A I don't have anything on any diplomatic exchanges with anybody on this subject.

Q Have the Saudis sought to contact, communicate with the United States about this?

A I said I don't have anything on any diplomatic conversations.

Q Do you have anything on reports of U.S. Air Force overflights of Nicaraguan territory?

A I don't have anything here, Bill, but I think the Defense Department has a rather strong denial, so I would refer you to them.

Q If I could just carry on to a different subject, Alan. Anything -- apparently, the Pentagon announced that that U.S. helicopter did stray into Czech airspace. What will the U.S. now do? Will it apologize to the Czechs? Will it protest being fired at? What would be the normal sort of diplomatic procedure to be followed?

A I really am not going to be able to get into, again, diplomatic discussions. There has been a discussion. I think that the Czechs indicated something in their own press, and there have been some discussions about this. But I'm not going to go into the substance of those discussions.

I think the Pentagon has something, as they talk about this, too, about the fact that this is not a one-way problem, that there have been problems coming the other way, too, on occasion, going across the border. So I just refer you to them for what information they have on it.

Tim?

Q Do you have any reaction to a report in the Washington Times this morning that the U.S. Embassy in Nicaragua downplayed almost to the point of ignoring a major anti-Sandinista demonstration last week?

A Yes. The Department has not attempted any blackout or downplaying of events in Nicaragua. The demonstration in question was the traditional Catholic procession on Good Friday in Managua which U.S. Embassy officers observed.

It was a religious procession, but because of the role of the Catholic church in Nicaragua and past confrontations between the Sandinista Government and Catholic Church leaders, the procession also had political overtones.

In this context, it's worth noting that the Nicaraguan Catholic Bishops issued on April 22 a detailed pastoral letter that, among other things, called upon the Sandinistas to enter a dialogue with the armed opposition. The Government's initial refusal on April 23 to allow La Prensa to publish the pastoral letter, coupled with the bitter official denunciation of it, has again revealed the gap between the Catholic Church and the Sandinistas.

Q Alan, copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q Alan, the Brazilian Government has instituted censorship of the press in Brasilia for radio and television and newspapers on any news about the vote of --

Q I can't hear you, Roberto. I heard the first part, but what is your question?

Q On any news about the censorship was instituted, about any news about direct elections vote in the Congress (sic). Do you have any comment about it?

A I'm not aware of the reporting of it, so I can't comment specifically on it. Obviously our position on freedom of press is clear, well known; but I don't have anything specific on that.

Q Now, Alan, in many opportunities in the recent past, the U.S. Government officials have expressed support for a full return of democracy in Brazil.

A Uh-huh.

Q There were specific expressions of support for direct elections. In this context, do you have any reaction to the vote by the Brazilian Congress earlier today?

A I don't have anything on it.

Q In Uruguay, there has been a more extensive press crackdown. Do you have anything on that?

A Yes, I do have something on it.

According to our Embassy in Montevideo, the Government of Uruguay yesterday banned publication of two weekly newspapers, *Somos Ideas* and *Busqueda* -- pardon my pronunciation if that is not accurate.

We understand *Somos Ideas*, an organ of the Blanco Party, was closed permanently. *Busqueda*, one of the most prestigious and widely read of Uruguayan newspapers, was forced to cancel publication of the next eight issues. The last time *Busqueda* was closed temporarily was in January of 1983.

As you know, elections are scheduled for November of this year, with inauguration of a new civilian government next March. We have encouraged and supported the return to civilian democratic government in Uruguay. A free press is one of the most important characteristics of a democratic society with a vital role to play in the election process, and we regret that the Government of Uruguay has decided to close these newspapers.

Q Copies, please?

A Yes.

Q The rejection of these direct elections by the Brazilian Congress came in the wake of extreme measures by the government, including censorship of the press; access to the capital city was closed by the military; there were also constant displays of force by troops. This was all seen as an effort to intimidate Congress.

Do you have any comment about that?

A I don't have anything on it, Roberto. Why don't I look and see if there is any comment to be forthcoming, but I don't know -- at this point, I don't have anything.

Ghassan?

Q Can I get to the Middle East --

A Go ahead.

Q -- for a question or two?

A Why not?

Q Yesterday you answered questions about the Benvenisti report.

A Uh-huh.

Q I would like to kind of follow up on two questions on it. You disagree with the conclusion. Now, do you think his findings, the data that he presents, is to the liking or what you, what the State Department or the American Government agrees with -- something that the American Government could agree with?

A I think we expressed in the statement that was posted our view on the question of the West Bank and Gaza, so that is our view on it. I don't know what more you are looking for, particularly, nor do I have anything more, really, to offer you on it.

Q I just said what I'm looking for.

A Well --

Q I said you expressed your views on the conclusion - you disagree with the conclusion. What I'm trying to find out is, does the data that he presents --

A Oh, I see.

Q -- the settlements, road systems, dual systems, is that something that the State Department or the American Government agrees with, or sees, at least, as correct?

A Well, I don't have a response on the specifics of the data. We have expressed before our concern over the continuing settlement activity as an obstacle to the peace process; but I'm not going to try to provide that sort of data or verification, or whatever.

Q Just then follow up one more, then, on the same -- maybe you'll say the same thing -- but in the answer you said, "We do not believe it is too late for a negotiated settlements," etc. Will facts on the ground created there make -- such as Benvenisti brings out -- would make a negotiated settlement at any point impossible?

A I'm not going to try to project that. I think our conclusion at this point is as expressed. Our view on the settlement activity and its relationship to the peace process is as I just expressed it and has been expressed many times before. I don't have anything to take you beyond that.

Q Alan, on this issue in a different way, I asked you a few weeks ago about the roads which they are building, which is part of the system of colonization, usurpation, whatever you want to call it, of the West Bank. You posted an answer about -- you said there are no major roads or highways built. And according to Mr. Benvenisti's report, they are cutting the whole area into four parts instead of -- you know, I know what you -- you know that, you know what I'm talking about.

A Well, look, two things about it: One is, we gave you an answer. Two is, it's hardly an area that is closed to journalists. If you have your own data, then publish your own data, but that's our view on it.

Q Do you have anything regarding putting Iraq again on the list of states supporting terrorism?

A No.

Q Has Mr. Burt completed his talks in Brussels this week?

A I don't know the answer to that. Don't know whether -- he was not back this morning, I don't believe, but I don't know whether he's completed it and on his way back or -- I don't have his schedule.

Q The guidance said generally that he was discussing East-West relations. Do you have anything more specific?

A No. Jim?

Q Magana's veto -- do you have anything on that?

A No. I guess in looking at the press this morning and so on, it appears that we got a bit ahead of the public facts on this in our statement yesterday in terms of having said that they had -- indicating that he had perhaps announced it. So our confirmation was based on his decision, which was being discussed openly among the various parties in El Salvador, and we assumed that it had been publicly announced. But we talked about that yesterday, and so -- anyway, that's really all I have on that. But we did talk about it yesterday.

Q Is it -- it's positively received here, is that correct?

A Well, we have not taken a position on that, and, indeed, we have scrupulously avoided making any statements which could be interpreted as favoring or opposing the legislation. This is a Salvadoran decision, so that is our position on that.

Q Will there be any readout on David Kimche's meetings with the State Department officials today or tomorrow?

A I don't anticipate any.

Q You don't?

A No.

Q Alan, when is Mr. Armacost due to assume his new duties?

A Well, he has to have hearings.

Q When will they be?

A I don't have a schedule. You might want to check with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and see what --

Q Have you anything on these reports that some right-wing Republicans in the Senate plan to oppose this?

A No, I don't.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:19 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, April 27, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #75

FRIDAY, APRIL 27, 1984, 12:17 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. One announcement: to note the availability in the Press Office of copies of a Department translation of the Nicaraguan bishops' pastoral letter on reconciliation. The pastoral letter was issued on April 22 and among other things called on the Sandinistas to enter a dialogue with the armed opposition.

As we said yesterday, the government's initial refusal on April 23 to allow La Prensa to publish the pastoral letter, coupled with bitter official denunciations of it, has again revealed the gap between the Catholic Church and the Sandinistas.

That is it for announcements.

Q Can you tell us about the talks with David Kimche?

A No, I don't have anything on that, Jim.

Q You don't?

A No.

Q Alan, apparently Israel has asked for an apology from the State Department about remarks made by Assistant Secretary Murphy in Kuwait.

A Well, I'm not going to get into the question of discussions one way or another, without suggesting a confirmation of that, that we might have had in our diplomatic channels. The point, as I understand the wire story on this, was with regard to the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon; and obviously our position, longstanding position, is that all of the foreign forces should leave Lebanon without regard to the circumstances of their entry.

Q Alan --

Q Wait a minute. Can we just follow that up?

A Go ahead.

Q Can you tell us whether Murphy said what is reported in The Washington Post, as attributed to the Arab press -- that is, that Syria was invited into Lebanon in '76, but that Israel invaded the country in 1982?

A I can't confirm what he did or didn't say.

We have noted before Syria's position, taking note of its view of the different circumstances --

Q You can't what?

A I can't confirm what he said.

Q Why not?

A For one thing, I don't know; for another, we don't --

Q Well, fine. You don't know. Yeh.

A But, you know, we have noted before that Syria has said that it came in under different circumstances. That's, as I say, not really our point. Our point is that all of the forces, regardless of how they went in, should get out.

Q So you really, actually, are letting this report stand as is, the way I hear you?

A No. Well, you can put it in any provocative way you want to, Bernie, but we're not going to comment on it.

Q Alan, do you have anything on who is responsible for the attack against the Saudi tanker in the Gulf?

A No, don't have anything further on that.

Q Are you going to check into that to see if you can determine which side is responsible?

A I don't know that we would have any way of finally confirming that, in any case. Our view, though, as I expressed it yesterday, on the international waterways and navigation remains.

Q Have there been new attacks since yesterday?

A Well, I have seen the reports, Jim, that the Iraqis may have claimed some further attacks. I don't have anything on that -- can't confirm that.

Q Alan, do you have anything new on the Soviet attitude toward the proposed chemical treaty?

A No. We had something the other day, Max. I don't know if you got that. If not, I'd refer you to the Press Office.

Q Nothing new?

A Nothing new.

Q Alan, anything on the report from Peking that major parts of the President's speech were dropped when it was broadcast on Chinese television?

A No. I saw the wire, but I don't have anything on it.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the reports of a new cabinet in Lebanon?

A Not specifically. Obviously we have consistently supported Lebanese efforts toward formation of a more broadly based government and internal reforms necessary to achieve reconciliation among all Lebanese, but I don't have any comment specifically. We obviously hope that the appointment of Prime Minister Karami and others as they are appointed will be steps in that direction.

Q I think you have known Karami for long years --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- so you almost have sort of reaction to his choice as the new Prime Minster of Lebanon?

A I don't think it's up to us to comment on specific individuals or characterize individuals as the press has done. As I say, we have supported and continue to support the broadly based government, and we hope that this will lead to possible reconciliation and enhance stability.

Q Do you have anything further on Soviet movements in Afghanistan?

A Don't have anything new today.

Q Do you have anything, Alan? (Laughter.)

Q Where's the beef, Alan? (Laughter.)

A You done? (Laughter)

Q Alan, a couple of days ago you said you would not look into reports that East Germany, through a government military journal, had announced that they consider the Four-Power agreement over the Berlin air corridor to no longer be in effect. Now Die Zeit, a West Germany periodical, has published a commentary saying that in their view the East Bloc rhetoric over Berlin is comparable to that in the 1961 Berlin crisis. Do you have anything to say yet on this situation?

A Well, I don't know -- first, I don't know about the comment. I don't know that they're referring to the same thing you were referring to. In any case, I don't have anything new on the Berlin air corridor from what we said the other day.

Q As a follow-up, is it the policy of this Administration to suppress discussion about any evidence that there is now a U.S.-Soviet military confrontation under way?

A No. There is no such U.S.-Soviet military confrontation now underway, nor is it the policy to suppress information. We deal with the facts.

Q How about the World Court case? Do you have anything on that?

A I don't. I think that the press has been reporting from the Court hearings on that, and I don't have anything new to give you.

Q Alan, are there discussions between the U.S. and members of the Gulf Cooperation Council on steps that might be taken mutually if the Iran-Iraq war overflows into the Gulf, into the smaller states?

A Well, I think -- I don't have anything new today to offer you on conversations with the Gulf. Obviously we have had conversations with countries in the Gulf, and we've had guidance on that before, and I guess I'd refer you back to that.

We've had visitors to the region. Ambassador Murphy was out there recently. But I don't have anything new on that.

Q Do you have anything on the large number of stories about intelligence flights over Nicaragua?

A No. I think that if you go to DoD you'll find their answer today is the same as it was yesterday. The fact that another couple of stories appeared doesn't change the facts.

Q Some speculation has left open the possibility of CIA flights.

A Oh --

Q They said no Pentagon flights.

A Well, I think that, again, now you're putting us into the situation where we can't comment --

Q Oohhh. (Laughter)

Q Okay. Thank you.

A -- on flights.

Spence?

Q Anything on negotiations with Japan on --

A The briefing is not over. Go ahead, Spence.

Q Anything on negotiations with Japan on economic measures?

A No. I don't have anything on that.

Q Alan, the President called that "a long journey for peace to China." Why not to Moscow? And also, at the same time, whether he's going to talk on human rights in China or not?

A Well, I think that the President's party doubtless is addressing all of that.

Q Now the briefing is over.

(Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the briefing was concluded.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Monday, April 30, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #76

MONDAY, APRIL 30, 1984, 12:24 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: I have one announcement, basically in the way of a housekeeping announcement. But to make sure you are aware and are reminded that the deadline for applications for credentials for the NAC Ministerial Meeting is this Friday, May 4. U.S.-based correspondents should apply to the Press Office by telephone or by filling in one of the forms available here at the Press Office or at the Foreign Press Center.

Even those holding State Department or White House passes must apply for NAC credentials if they wish to attend conference events. Each organization should assure that applications are submitted for all persons who might wish to be present since no substitutions will be permitted.

So I hope we don't have any problems with that. That's it for announcements. Happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, do you have anything regarding the state of emergency declared in the Sudan? Conditions there, and your impressions.

A Very little, Mike. No. Simply, that we're aware that President Nimeiri made the announcement over the weekend, and we're studying the matter but have no comment at this time.

Q Does that include a review on the arms supply situation?

A On the arms supply?

Q To the Sudan.

A No, I don't know anything beyond what we last said on that. I don't know if you've got the latest thing, Jim. You might want to check in the Press Office.

Q Alan, Colonel Qadhafi has offered the IRA the British diplomatic quarters unless they restore relations with London. Have you seen that report? Do you have any comment on his actions?

A Well, I've seen a wire of it. It seemed to me that there were some contradictory aspects to at least the statements that I saw quoted in that wire. I think I gave you a brief remark on that last week when were talking about it. But I think until the situation is clearer, I'll hold back on that. It wasn't clear to me quite what he was saying, frankly.

Jim?

Alright, go ahead.

Q When was the United States aware of the state of emergency in the Sudan?

A I don't have specifics on that.

Q Were there any consultations prior to the declaration of the statement?

A I don't know. I have no reason to believe that there were, but I don't know.

Q Alan, on Qadhafi, is there a plan afoot within the Administration to seek to orchestrate international pressure against Qadhafi?

A Obviously, we will continue the discussions with our allies and friends which have taken place whenever Libya has committed acts such as this shooting in London, or the bombing of the Sudan, the occupation of northern Chad, or when Libya has been involved in other terrorist acts.

The death of a London policewoman, who was shot from within the former Libyan mission, is another tragic reminder that Qadhafi has not chosen to alter his unacceptable behavior. The security implications of Libya's actions remain a matter of concern for the United States and we believe for all European and other nations.

I can't speak for other nations or what they might do. We hope that other nations will review the record of Libyan activities and that they will arrive at the same conclusions we have regarding the need to demonstrate to Qadhafi meaningful opposition to his policies; particularly, Libya's state-supported terrorism and subversion of its neighbors.

Q Does that conclusion --

A Go ahead, Bernie.

Q On the conclusions, do you mean that they should emulate the United States by expelling diplomats, encouraging their nationals to leave Libya, and bar the importing of Libyan oil?

A I think I -- in that respect, I'm going to leave it as I've just expressed it.

As you say, the U.S. has taken the strongest measures to date in response to the unacceptable Libyan actions. Our actions have been designed to demonstrate U.S. opposition to Libya's policies of support for international terrorism and subversion of other nations.

The March 1982 embargo on Libyan oil was designed to stop direct use of Libyan oil and to reduce the flow of U.S. dollars to Libya; that we've unilaterally imposed on Libya the tightest controls and categories of export controls that we have. And we've periodically approached our European allies and urged them in the light of Libya's actions, to join us in such measures. European nations have, however, been reluctant to take comparable steps, although from time to time individual countries have moderated, suspended or halted the sale of arms to Libya when Libya has been engaged in particularly egregious or aggressive acts.

Finally, as you noted, in the interest of protecting U.S. citizens, we have urged Americans to depart from Libya and invalidated U.S. passports for travel to and from Libya unless special circumstances pertain.

What they might do, and where the dialogue might go at this point, however, I really don't have anything to offer you on that.

Q What is the explanation, as you see it, for the allusion to European reluctance to act?

A What is the --

Q How do you explain that?

A Their reluctance?

Q Yes.

A I'm not going to try to explain it. I think that it's really up to them to explain their policies.

Q You've urged Americans to depart. That goes back quite a ways.

A Yes

Q Has there been any new urging?

A No.

Q Are you urging today Americans to depart?

A There is nothing new that we're saying. We're not -- as I said last week, the concerns we had before are still there, but there's nothing new that we're offering at this particular time.

Q You don't (inaudible) Alan, please?

A Excuse me? Yes.

Q You don't have a more precise figure than you had last week concerning the numbers of Americans, do you?

A I don't.

Q Alan, do you have anything on Cuba and the illegal drug traffic?

A No. I saw the story in the paper this morning on that. We have talked before quite openly and clearly about our concerns about Cuban involvement in international narcotics traffic, but I don't have anything new to offer on that. And if you haven't got what we said, I'd just refer you back to the Press Office, Bill.

Q Alan, can we have a copy of both statements on Qadhafi?

A Yes.

Q Can I ask, are there any study or any cooperation to make something substantial against Qadhafi; to take any measure, I mean?

A Well, other than what I've already said, I would simply reiterate the point we've made before, and that is that our policy toward Libya is always under review. But I don't have anything specific to offer at this point.

Q Alan, when you refer to "meaningful actions," all working together, coordinating or just -- you think you want everybody to take meaningful actions on their own?

A I suppose it's a matter of what is feasible, but I would guess that probably individual countries acting on their own but in the same direction is more likely to happen. That doesn't rule out the possibility of coordinated action, but I think that that's a more likely scenario and --

Q Is there a special review of our policy towards Libya?

A Well, as I say, our policy is always under review. I don't think I would want to characterize it beyond that.

Bobby?

Q Alan, most of the Libyan terrorism seems to have been directed against Libyans, Libyan exiles or dissidents.

Have there been any Libyan terrorist acts against American interests?

A Partially because, or largely because it would involved getting into intelligence-type information, I think I'm going to decline to answer your question. But I would point to the concerns which have been expressed in months past over that question but decline to add anything new to what we said in the past on that, Bob.

Jim, did you have a question?

Q Do you expect this issue to be anything more than an informal item on the agenda of the Ministerial Meeting at the end of this month?

A Can't answer that question; don't know.

Q Do you have any comment on what happened in Israel, the arrest of perpetrators who were going to blow five Palestinian buses?

A I don't have anything. Obviously, our opposition to any act of terrorism is quite clear, and we support and welcome actions by any government to thwart such terrorism, and obviously that applies in this case.

Q Let me ask in a different way. There are reports that most of these people who have been arrested by Israeli authorities are Jews of American citizenship; they carry citzenship and they live in that area, and they occupy the West Bank, and the settlers in Gush Emunim and other areas.

You see that -- since they carry dual citizenship, and they were caught in the act, or accused by perpetrating to blow the buses -- that you have to pay more attention to this issue than just, you know, a mere -- an act of terrorism perpetrated by some terrorists?

A I think that the Israeli authorities have paid quick and evidently quite successful attention to this particular incident. They've made some -- I don't know whether they've formally made arrests or detaining people, or what. That I don't have any information on, and I wouldn't comment on that. The fact that the individuals involved may or may not have American citizenship, I don't know that. I hear you -- I hear what you're saying; it doesn't affect the fact that we think that this is a very serious matter and that we support government action to thwart terrorism.

Q Well, excuse me. I want to follow this. Based on the report that Meir Kahane is involved in this, and he is an American citizen who is from Brooklyn and carries Israeli and American aid. Do you see that if this been proven in the courts that he will be stripped from his U.S. citizenship or he will not be allowed to come to this country and doing the things that he's doing, raising funds to emulate and perpetuate his terrorist activities in the West Bank (sic)?

A Now you're asking me a legal question about the basis for stripping someone of citizenship. I'm not aware that necessarily would be the basis, and I'd suggest you check on the legalities of that.

But, as I say, the fact that somebody is an American citizen, in terms of our deploring any action and seeking to have full justice done, the fact that they're an American citizen -- turning the question around the other way -- certainly does not weaken our concerns in that respect.

Tim?

Q Alan, back on Libya for just a minute, is the State Department considering restricting the ability of U.S. petroleum -- oil corporations from operating out of Libya?

A Again, I don't have anything new to say about where we are in our policy toward Libya beyond what we've said before, but, as I indicated, the policy is always under review.

Q Alan, is there a -- are there some high-level officials here who are looking for some way of meeting Congress halfway on this Jerusalem issue? I'm referring to the Post article.

A "Some officials" I can't tell you about. I can tell you what the policy is, and the Secretary articulated very clearly this morning, speaking about it quite directly as the President's policy, noting that he's not interested in a compromise; that his policy is quite firm, and I don't think he could have been more unambiguous about it.

Q Where did he say this, Alan?

A In Peking.

Q I have three questions on El Salvador. One is the increasing number of reports of incendiary bombs and possibly anti-personnel bombs that are being used by the Salvadoran air force, as reported by the Christian Science Monitor and National Catholic Reporter. Anything?

A I don't know. You might check with the Pentagon on the type of munitions they use, or check with Salvadoran authorities. I don't know.

Q One of the statements said that the napalm may be assembled in El Salvador and then used.

A I don't have anything on that.

Q Could you look into that?

A Why don't you check with the Pentagon and see --

Q Okay. The second is there have been two -- on Reuters and, I think, it was The Washington Post -- reports now that there is a special committee of the armed forces that are preparing a message for the next president with respect to his areas in which he may not -- I mean, he may be -- he may have to consult with the armed forces. Do you have any comment on that?

A No. I've seen a statement by a variety of people in El Salvador on this subject reported in the press, but I think we have indicated before that to our understanding the military has supported strongly this electoral process and agreed to abide by it.

Q Finally, apparently a -- this secret anti-Communist army took responsibility for the killing of the Salvadoran security chief at the Embassy. It's my understanding. Do you have any comment on that?

A I saw a squib in one of the papers on that, Jim, but I don't have anything to offer on it either in terms of comment or validating it or anything of that sort.

Q Do you have anything -- on this general area, do you have anything that would indicate when the President is going to give this Central American speech that has been talked about in the press for several weeks?

A I'm frankly not aware of the talk except for some advocacy in the press for such a speech, but, in any case, I'd ask you to address any questions about Presidential speeches to the White House.

Q Do you have anything on the Contadora process at this juncture, Alan, any difficulty with it, or seeming difficulty?

A No, not really. We're not a participant, obviously, in the Contadora process and don't have any insider's view of that. My understanding is that the nine -- that is, the Foreign Ministers of the Contadora Four, Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela, together with the five Central American states -- are meeting today in Panama City to receive recommendations from the three working commissions -- that is, security, socio-economic and political, and the technical commission -- on how the 21 points of the Document of Objectives agreed to last September could be implemented.

It is reasonable to expect that the Contadora Foreign Ministers might have a public statement today or tomorrow after their meetings, but I think we'd have to wait to comment until then. Obviously, we have been supportive of a verifiable and enforceable and comprehensive implementing approach to those 21 points. But I think we'd have to wait for a comment on their actions until they did something about it.

Q Alan, do you have anything on that story in the Post yesterday saying that, despite the public statements, the Administration really hasn't decided whether to try to reverse Marxism in Nicaragua?

A Oh, I think we've expressed ourselves before on our concerns there. Obviously, we have expressed our essentially four-point policy which includes seeking to have Nicaragua live up to the pledges that it made regarding democratic pluralism to the OAS, but --

Q I'm asking at this stage -- can you say the story is wrong?

A Well, you're -- "the story." I mean, I --

Q No, no. That that implication is wrong, that's completely --

A I think I will leave you with what we have said before about our policy and leave it as articulated from here rather than trying to comment on source stories.

Q Alan, on a taken question on Friday about the export license to Iran, and you said it's been lifted. Why?

A I think if you read it carefully, it notes that the restriction was lifted.

Q Yes. Why?

A I think it's -- it goes back, and if you refer back to earlier guidance, it goes back quite some time, about the connection of this with the Iran settlements. I think you'll find that that's --

Q Settlement of the hostages.

A Yes.

Q Do you have any schedule for Carlos Andres Perez while he's here, who he's going to be meeting with? The former Venezuelan President.

A I don't. I don't know that's he's here on -- obviously, on any official schedule. You might check with the Embassy and see.

Q Alan, do you have anything there on the World Court's decision?

A No. Don't have anything new. I'm not aware they've done anything other than hear the case at this point.

Q Also, is that -- by not accepting the World Court, the U.S. doesn't care any more for the U.N. or international institutions?

A The U.S. certainly does care for the U.N. and its constituent parts, but don't have anything further on the Court case at this point.

Q Alan, reports over the weekend that the Soviet Union is going to arm Iraq and give them more armaments and weapons to counter the situation in the war with Iran. Do you perceive the position of the United States asking now the China and other countries to stop arming Iran and trying to bring about a decisive victory, or something, in the war between Iran and Iraq?

A I'm not sure I understand your question. The position hasn't changed in supporting a negotiated end to that war, and our position on shipment of arms hasn't changed, so there's nothing new in any of that. And we've noted in particular, because of the circumstances which obtained, both the military circumstances and the intransigence on the negotiating front, that we have paid particular attention to try to stop shipments to Iran. But our overall policy remains as it has been.

Q Alan, could I follow that up?

Q Alan, do you have anything --

A I'll be back.

Q -- on the Soviet offensive in the Panjsher Valley in --

A No. I hope I can get something further, perhaps by tomorrow, but I don't have anything on that today, Spence.

Q Alan, the reports of that arms sale are large -- two and a half -- I've heard $2 billion, $2½ billion -- which the Saudis apparently are paying for, helping to finance. Does this government have no objection to the Saudis providing the oil or being in a scheme in which the hard cash, Western currencies, flows from Iraq to the Soviet Union?

A Well, I'm not confirming that story, and I don't have any comment other than on our general policy as I've just reiterated it to you.

Bob?

Q Yes. I was just wondering if you had anything more on what happened to that Saudi tanker last week? Has it been cleared up whether or not it was in fact attacked by Iraqi planes or --

A I don't have anything further on it.

Q Nothing more?

A No.

Q One more thing: There's a story in the Post this morning about talks having begun quietly at the State Department with the Soviets on consular exchanges and the Russians raising the question of Aeroflot. I mean, have actually talked resumed on these consular --

A I think what we've said before, and I would -- I think is fair as to say that we have said we are willing to talk about consulates and exchanges, and I think that's all I really have on that point. And I'm not going to go -- in terms of your question of linkage that was suggested in the story, I'm not going to go into the substance without trying to steer you one way or the other, but just to remind you on Aeroflot, Aeroflot flights to the U.S. were suspended in December 1981 following the imposition of martial law in Poland, and after the shootdown of KAL 007 in September, the sanction was reaffirmed.

In addition, the two Aeroflot offices in the U.S. were ordered closed, and the Civil Aeronautics Board ordered U.S. flag carriers to terminate their commercial arrangements with Aeroflot. These sanctions remain in effect, and we have no plans to lift them.

Q Could you answer the question about whether the consular exchange talks have started?

A I think what I've said is a valid characterization of the situation. We have said we would be willing to talk about those issues.

Q The Post story advances this story, and --

A Well --

Q Alan, you say you have no plans to lift them -- as I understand it, we're permitting 25 Aeroflot flights to bring the atheletes to the Olympics. Does that --

A That's a different matter. It's not related to regular Aeroflot flights. That's related to the Olympic situation.

Q The American delegation that was --

A I can't confirm the number, by the way, but I'm not arguing with you. I just don't know.

Q Yes. The American delegation that was recently in Moscow, and who may still be there, negotiating on the hotline -- has that been concluded?

A On the hotline, yes, the Soviet officials and a U.S. delegation from Washington met last week in Moscow to discuss possible improvements in communications between our two governments. This is part of the ongoing discussions on this subject that we initiated last summer, on the basis of proposals advanced by the President last May.

At the Moscow meeting we presented our views on the full range of the President's initiatives to improve U.S.-Soviet direct communications. At our earlier meetings -- that is, in August '83 in Moscow, and January '84 here in Washington -- we made progress toward agreement on technical improvements to the hotline. The latest round provided a useful opportunity for further clarification of the issues involved and a narrowing of the differences.

Q No agreement?

A That's correct.

Q At what level were these talks held?

A The head of our delegation was Warren Zimmerman, who is the Deputy Chief of Mission of the Embassy in Moscow, the Deputy Chairman was Stuart E. Branch, who was former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Communications and now a consultant to the Department, and it included other officials from State, Defense and the NSC staff. Just so you have a complete record on that, the Soviet delegation was headed by Mr. A. M. Varbanskiy, a Chief of Administration in the Soviet Ministry of Communications, and other members included officials of the Communications Ministry and the Foreign Ministry.

Q Is it accurate, Alan, that one of the unresolved issues is whether to use an IBM or an Apple? (Laughter) I'm serious.

A I haven't got the slightest idea.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:46 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, May 1, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #77

TUESDAY, MAY 1, 1984, 12:11 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. One announcement. On Saturday, May 5, Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam will deliver the keynote address in Chicago at the 40th anniversary banquet of the Polish-American Congress, the PAC. Mr. Dam will speak at the 7:00 p.m. dinner -- that is, 7:00 p.m. Central Daylight Time -- in the Conrad Hilton's International Ballroom. If you wish additional information, please contact PAC President Aloysuis Mazewski, Area Code (312) 272-8155. I expect that he'll begin speaking around 8:00 p.m., Central Daylight Time. There will be no Q&A, and we will try to have a text available Friday for you.

That is it on announcements. Happy to take your questions.

Q Could you bring us up to date on the Soviet mathematician?

A Yes. The individual's name is Sergei Kozlov. He is a scientific scholar in this country on one of our regular exchange programs with the Soviet Union. There was some evidence over the weekend that he had decided to curtail his study program here and return to the Soviet Union.

Yesterday he was interviewed extensively at Dulles International Airport by officials of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, which has jurisdiction over entry into and exit from the U.S. under American law, and by officials of the Department of State. Soviet Embassy officials were also present.

Mr. Kozlov was asked to state his intentions in circumstances where it was clear he could speak freely, and he repeatedly stated that he wished to return to the Soviet Union. However, he then declined to board a flight to Europe but stated instead that he wished to return to the Soviet Embassy.

He has a valid United States visa to permit him to complete his study program if he so desires, and we have ensured that his rights have been protected and will continue to do so.

Q What is your understanding as to his movements after the interview?

A As I say, he indicated that he wished to return to the Soviet Embassy.

Q Is it your understanding --

A I don't know where he is now.

Q There are several reports that he in fact transited in London and is in Moscow.

A Oh, no. I think I saw some, at least one wire report to that effect. I do not believe those reports are correct. No, I believe he is still in this country.

Q Have Soviet officials been cooperative throughout this episode?

A I would have no reason at all to quarrel with that characterization, George.

Q Was he under pressure --

A I'm sorry. Start again.

Q Was he under pressure from the Soviet officials he shall return to the Soviet Union?

A I think I would leave you with the statement that I gave in answer to the first question about his feelings.

Q You say you do believe he's still in the United States?

A Yes.

Q Can you tell us what it was that initiated the Department's interest and initiated the presence of the officials at Dulles? Was there an indication earlier that he might not have been moving of his own free will?

A Well, I think I'm not going to be terribly specific, but simply to note that in situations of this kind questions do arise, quite naturally, about the intentions of the individual concerned, and so in response to that kind of natural concern there was the activity which went on at the airport.

Q Did he ask for a meeting, Alan, before he went to the airport?

A I don't know the answer to that, Jim.

Q The indication that you had over the weekend that he might want to curtail his stay, was that a local law enforcement matter in California, or did he approach the U.S. Government, or how did that happen?

A I think that as I say, I'm not going to be able to get into a lot of detail, among other things, but -- there are probably a number of reasons for doing this -- but, among other things, he is still here. The question of his departure still is pending, and I think it's just prudent not to be saying too much. But the situation is basically as I have already outlined it.

Q Would you consider this matter essentially closed now, or is it --

A Well, I don't know if it's closed in the sense that he may well still go back to the Soviet Union, and we intend to ensure that if he departs the United States, that he does so voluntarily, and we will have the opportunity to talk with him again, so --

Q You mean after talking with him for five hours, you're still not sure of his intentions?

A I think we're sure of his intentions as of the time that he spoke, then he said he wanted to go back to the Soviet Embassy overnight -- the plane had already left, apparently, during the conversations he was having. And again, just to be sure that we understand his intentions, when he actually does depart, we will do that.

Q Does that mean there is some kind of watch put on at the departure points to make sure that he doesn't leave the country without your talking to him again?

A I don't know the answer to that, frankly, but I don't think it really is a situation of that sort, to go back to my response to George's question about working cooperatively with the Soviet Embassy officials on this.

Q Sir, this is not meant to be a flippant question: Did he seem to be in good mental condition?

A Again, I don't think it's up to us to characterize that sort of thing.

Shall we go on to another area?

Q May we have a copy of your original statement, please?

A Sure.

Q One last question: Have you received any specific assurances from the Soviets that you'll have an opportunity to see him again if he is to leave?

A I don't expect there will be any problem with that.

Q Do you have anything on the new Cabinet in Lebanon? Any comment?

A No, not in any specific way. Obviously, we continue to support the establishment of a broadly based government of national unity in Lebanon, and the Lebanese people need security and political progress, and we hope that the new government can move toward those goals.

Q Last night and again this morning, the former President of Venezuela, Mr. Perez, had some critical things to say about this Administration's support for Contadora, suggesting that the Administration is actually undermining it. Do you have any response, or can you talk about the U.S. support again?

A Well, as we have said many times before, we support the Contadora process, and we believe that the twenty-one objectives, document of objectives, agreed upon by the participant nations offer the best hope for a comprehensive, verifiable peace in the region. But as to Mr. Perez' statements specifically, his remarks as recorded in the press were an expression of his personal opinion, and I've not got any comment to offer you on those.

Q How is it that someone who has been regarded by this Administration and previous ones as a truly democratic leader in Latin America and a close friend of the United States could have this interpretation despite your repeated assertions of support for Contadora?

A Well, I suppose you would have to ask him that, Jim.

Q Would you have any theory about it?

A I don't try to articulate theories from here.

Q Alan, you talked about Libya yesterday. Do you have anything more on Libya today, anything we might be doing about Qadhafi?

A No, not --

Q Any specific steps?

A Going back to the kinds of questions we were talking about yesterday?

Q Yes.

A No, I don't have anything more, really, to say than I said yesterday on that subject.

Q How serious is the threat to the Sudanese Government? And is it largely internal or external in origin?

A Well, we talked in terms before of the concerns we've had about actions such as the bombing in Omdurman and so on. The situation within the Sudan, we recognize, could have serious implications, and we're reviewing the matter with Sudanese authorities; but until we have more information, I don't think I have any specific comment to offer.

But as I say, in terms of the Libyan dimension, which is perhaps the context in which you're asking your question, I don't have anything new to offer beyond what we've said before on the subject.

Q Anything on potential external sources?

A Don't have anything new on that.

Q Is there any consideration of moving U.S. assets to the neighborhood again, such as AWACS, that sort of thing, is that being discussed with them?

A Speaking personally, I'm not aware of it, frankly; but in terms of regular deployments, military deployments and so on, I guess I would have to refer you to

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the Pentagon. But the kinds of measures that we talked about before I don't think is what we are contemplating at this point.

Q Alan, there was a wire story overnight saying that the U.S. has failed to find proof that Nicaragua is funneling arms to the guerrillas, quoting American officials and military sources in San Salvador. Did you see that story?

A I haven't seen the story; I heard someone make reference to it. All I can do, really, Bill, is to refer you back to what we have said in this Government at virtually every level on this subject and leave you with the record on that.

Q How is our briefing request coming along now?

A I don't know of any briefing that is imminent.

Q Is it still being pressed by your office?

Q Vigorously? (Laughter)

A I cannot tell you, in all honesty, that I spend four or five hours a day beating on people's heads to have it; but we have made your wishes well known.

-- MORE --

Q Do you have anything at all today on Afghanistan, the situation there?

A Yes, I do. I promised you yesterday we would try to get you something.

The major Soviet offensive in the Panjsher Valley continues. The large Soviet/DRA column has advanced about half way up the valley, but adverse weather conditions have hampered Soviet air operations. No heavy resistance has yet been encountered as resistance strategy appears to be one of withdrawal to high ground, side valleys, and areas just outside the valley.

There are no reliable figures available on the intensity of the fighting or the number of casualties. The Soviets have suffered at least low levels of casualties and some helicopter and aircraft losses. Earlier reports of Radio Kabul that the entire valley had been secured were not accurate nor were regime-inspired rumors that Panjsher leader Ahmad Shah Masood had been killed or captured.

There are a number of reports that the Soviet forces are systematically destroying villages, livestock, and crops. All major resistance groups have called for cooperation with Masood in the present circumstances. We may be seeing the results of this cooperation and coordination between mujahidin groups in diversionary assaults outside the Panjsher.

Although Soviet bombing as well as resistance-instigated attacks in the Panjsher vicinity have apparently taken a heavy toll among the mujahidin, the will of the resistance has not been broken nor have they been defeated, and the current campaign is likely to go on for some time.

In other parts of Afghanistan, the level of fighting also is high. Resistance activity in and around Kabul during the last week of April increased over the recent high levels. From the regime's point of view the security situation in Kandahar remains virtually out of control.

The Soviet spring offensive begun in Herat Province in late March continues, where aerial and ground operations are concentrated to the west and south of Herat City with Soviet forces meeting stiff resistance. The fuel shortage in Kabul continues unabated, as a large convoy of fuel tankers and trucks carrying sugar and other foodstuffs was destroyed north of Kabul on April 20, although a smaller fuel convoy did arrive in the city on April 28. Only diplomatic, regime, and military vehicles are being supplied. Electricity is also in short supply.

Q Copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Were there any illustrations you may care to provide? (Laughter)

Q What sort of actions is the U.S. taking in Afghanistan at this time, Alan?

A I refer you back to what we've said about this many times before. I don't have anything new. We've talked about support for the refugee relief efforts, diplomatic support, and efforts to bring about a diplomatic solution in support of the various U.N. efforts and the four points that have been mentioned therein.

Q Do you have anything on Paraguay and the five attorneys who were detained and then expelled?

A The attorneys who were detained --

Q The mission. The --

A The Americans who were representing the Americas Watch Committee?

Q That's right.

A Yes. According to Embassy reports, five Americans representing the Americas Watch Committee arrived in Asuncion from Montevideo on Saturday morning. During customs inspection, literature was found in their luggage that the Paraguayan authorities deemed objectionable. The authorities attempted to review the material document-by-document. After some confusion, the five were taken to the Ministry of Interior where they refused to surrender the material or allow it to be copied.

The Americans then elected to return to the airport and take an afternoon flight to Rio. According to our information, no one was physically mistreated or abused during the incident. The Embassy became aware of the incident when the group failed to contact them as arranged, and an officer went to the scene and rendered appropriate assistance.

Q Was there any protest by the U.S. Embassy over the search procedures?

A Well, the Embassy -- I can't tell you whether it has taken place at this point, but as of the time that this information was provided to me -- the Embassy planned to raise the issue with Paraguayan authorities. That's all I have on that.

Q Do you know anything about an Israeli request that we readmit a number of black Hebrews who have settled in Israel but now wish to return to the United States?

A Brian, did we not have some guidance on this some time ago? All right, let me check and see if we've got anything on it. My recollection is that we did have something on that subject; but if not, I'll look into it and see what we can provide.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the Post story that many Third World countries request for chemical weapons; can you name some countries that who has requested for storing chemical weapons from the United States (sic)?

A Who had requested storage of chemical weapons?

Q That's right.

A I'm not sure I follow your question.

Q The U.S. wants to sell them or they want to buy chemical weapons?

A No, I don't ---

Q In last week's Post story.

A Well, I don't follow the question, frankly, and I don't have any information on it, so why don't we let it pass?

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:27 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

WEDNESDAY, MAY 2, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #78

WEDNESDAY, May 2, 1984, 12:27 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: O.K. Good afternoon. A couple of brief announcements: First, to let you know that available in the Press Office at 2:00 p.m. this afternoon will be the prepared testimony of Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Langhorne A. Motley before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. He will be up there today. The subject is "U.S. Central American Policy at a Crossroads." The statement is in response to some specific questions from the Committee, but it also includes a retrospective of the events of the past five years in the region and the U.S. response to those events.

Also available in the Press Office, I believe now, is the prepared statement by Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Elliott Abrams in his appearance before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Human Rights. The testimony is on "Religious Persecution in Iran."

I have here also -- and I'm not going to read it to you, but will make available in the Press Office -- information regarding obtaining press credentials for the President's trip to Ireland, Normandy, and the London Economic Summit. So I would ask that any of you who are interested in participating in that, please pay attention. There are some specific dimensions of that, as to where to go to get credentialing that are obviously important. It may not be quite as obvious as to where they are, but anyway, that information is available in the Press Office.

Be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, does the United States have a role in securing the release of the three Israelis that are in Syrian custody?

A Have a role in -- I didn't hear.

Q -- in securing the release of --

A Securing -- all I really could say about that, Mike, is that the Israelis have been in touch with us, and we are exploring how we can be helpful.

Q Do you know what role the Israelis had in Lebanon?

A I think I would have to ask you to check with the Israelis on that.

Q Do you have any comment on the statement made by President Mubarak of Egypt about transferring the embassies of different countries to Jerusalem?

A Well, not really any comment on President Mubarak's remarks. We determine our own policy based on our own assessment of our interests, and President Reagan has reiterated quite recently that he remains firmly opposed to the transfer of our Embassy to Jerusalem.

Q Do you consider this statement as reflecting his confidence that the U.S. Administration is not going to transfer the Embassy to Jerusalem?

A I don't know, and I don't think it would be up to us to try to explain why he made the statement. I really would have to refer you to the Egyptian Government.

Bernie?

Q Could you do anything more, Alan, on the U.S. explorations in connection with the three Israelis? You say we're exploring.

A Can't. Can't.

Q With Syria?

A I just don't have any more detail to offer you.

Q Alan, do you have any more comment on the Soviet mathematician, as to his status and any remarks? I understand Ambassador Hartman was called into the Foreign Ministry today to receive a complaint on this matter of harassment, of detaining the gentleman?

A Well, on the last point, I don't know that we have any reporting at this point, so I can't confirm it; but I have no reason, given the TASS statement, to doubt that he was called in, and I'm sure we'll be getting the reporting. It may be in and being processed at this point.

But specifically with regard to the comments that were made in connection with this case, we regret that the Soviets have seen fit to react in such a bizarre way at a time when discussions are continuing, and the well-being of a Soviet citizen is involved.

Our concern has been to ensure that the basic rights of the individual, an individual in trouble, are respected. The Soviet statement contains charges which are simply untrue and which naturally raise doubts as to whether the Soviet side has his well-being in mind.

Contrary to the TASS statement, Kozlov was not isolated and he was not prevented from leaving. And again contrary to the TASS statement, Kozlov was accompanied by a member of the Soviet Embassy staff throughout our discussions. There can be no question about the propriety of our actions and the good will which motivates them. The charge that we prevented Kozlov's departure from the United States is ridiculous.

Kozlov himself decided not to board the aircraft, a fact that the Soviets know full well. Precisely because of our concern for the individual involved, we will not comment on Mr. Kozlov's health. We urge the Soviet Government to dispense with false and self-serving accusations against the United States and to work with us to bring this unhappy case to a conclusion which protects the rights and interests of Mr. Kozlov.

Q Can we have a copy of that, please, Alan?

A Sure.

Q What discussions are underway with the Embassy regarding his future?

A I don't have any further detail at this point for you, Mike.

Q Where is he now -- Kozlov?

A I don't know.

Q You don't know?

A Don't know specifically where he is at this point. He has not left the country, though.

Q Is he in U.S. custody or Soviet?

A Well, I don't know if I -- I don't know how to describe -- you use the word "custody" -- he -- as I indicated yesterday, he said he wanted to return to the Soviet Embassy, and he did that. Now, specifically where he is, I don't know.

Q Is there any chance he could have gone out on another plane without you knowing about it?

A No, I don't believe so, Bernie.

Q Alan, how do you contrast the attitude, or the posture, of the Soviet officials here in regard to this TASS statement?

A I don't think it's up to me or that I'm in a position to explain that. I think our reaction to the TASS statement comes across rather clearly in what I gave you.

Q It does, but do you find the behavior or the courtesies or the actions of the Embassy staff here in keeping with the tone and the charges of that TASS statement?

A Well, I just don't -- I don't have anything further to say.

Bob?

Q On Kozlov's behavior, were there any indications at all that he had been on drugs?

A I don't have anything to say about his health, as I indicated in what I just gave you, and I don't think it would be appropriate for me to address that. I'm not trying to steer you one way or another on that, Bob. I just don't think it's right.

Q What about the Soviet charge that this is part of what they call an "intolerable atmosphere that's been created around Soviet nationals in the United States"?

A Well, again, I think that I'd refer you to what I said about the entirety of that statement and the characterizations in it, and I don't think we would accept any of those kinds of characterizations.

Q Did he at any time say why he didn't want to board that airplane? There were lengthy discussions with him, apparently.

A Yes. There was discussion with him, and I'm not really free to go into what that was about. It was his request that he not get on the plane at that time. It was his request to hold some further discussions beyond the initial discussions. It was his request, or determination, that once the plane had taken off, he would go back to the Soviet Embassy. So --

Q According to reports from Israel, the three Israelis were in Lebanese hands and the Syrian forces forced the Lebanese to yield the Israelis to them. Would you like to comment on that?

A I don't have any comment beyond what I've given you on that whole thing.

Q Or the Syrian description of the three as "terrorists," not diplomats?

A Again, I just don't have any comment, really, to offer you on this entire matter beyond what I've given you already.

Q Alan, anything specific about the meeting held this morning between Under Secretary Schneider and the Lebanese Ambassador, Bouhabib?

A No. I don't have anything on that.

Q Alan, around the 17th of last month I asked a question about the Deputy Sheriff of Albuquerque, New Mexico, Mike Mansour, who is an American citizen of Arabic background, and at the time you said that you are inquiring as to the reasons of Mr. Mansour's detention by Israeli authorities that was arrested April 1984, at Ramallah, West Bank.

There are also other cases which are coming. The American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee just issued a statement saying that Israel holds at least 140 Arab hostages, refuses Red Cross access. In light of your concern about the three Israelis and a few others, and I believe that you are concerned about everybody, could you please look into these matters and try to clarify the situation about these detainees and these missing people and these arrested people in a way that could put to rest this issue with -- you know, satisfy their families, at least, in the United States, because there are many American citizens involved here.

A I -- without specifics at hand, I don't know whether there's anything further we can say at this point, but I will put your question and see if there's anything further we can come up with.

Q Alan, have you looked over Mr. Brock's remarks regarding import quotas and guidelines, what have you, on Japanese auto imports? Is he speaking for this Administration and this Department as well as the Special Trade Representative?

A Well, our policy has been to monitor the state of the automobile industry and to determine its overall economic health. And Ambassador Brock believes, as reported, that the conditions at this time indicate the industry is healthy enough to allow the restraint to expire. As a general matter, obviously, the Administration supports the free trade system, and we would welcome a return to a healthy, competitive situation.

Q Have they been in communication with the Japanese on this issue since his remarks?

A I have no idea. I don't know that this issue arises at this particular time, in any case, in terms of the dates that are involved.

Q Does the State Department endorse his judgment on the matter?

A I don't have anything beyond what I've just given you, except, certainly, endorsement of the -- in support for healthy competition. Sure.

Q Do you know whether he was reflecting an Administration position?

A Well, I just don't have anything further. I think you'd have to ask STR about that.

Q When you say that the issue doesn't come up at this particular time, are you saying that because a new one-year agreement just went into effect April 1?

A Well, "agreement" is the wrong word, but, in any case, the --

Q Sorry. I'm sorry.

A I think that the action the Japanese took was recently taken, and my understanding is it does now -- it's now in effect and runs until next year.

Q It sounded as if Mr. Brock was suggesting that maybe it would be good to renegotiate that, whatever you want to call it.

A Again, you'd have to check with his office. I'm not sure that that's a correct interpretation to put on his remarks. It may be, but that's not my understanding. But why don't you check with USTR and see what they have.

Q Do you have anything on the Sudan today, and is Crocker going to Khartoum?

A I don't have a lot on that. I don't really have any new sitrep or evaluation of the situation in the Sudan. He -- Assistant Secretary Crocker is traveling. He is going to be in Europe, has left already. He'll be in London, Bonn, and Paris for consultations on a range of African issues, including southern African issues, but he also does plan to go on to Africa where he will be meeting with officials in the Sudan, and I believe also in Egypt.

Q You are confirming that he is going to Sudan and Egypt, is that correct?

A (Nods yes.)

Q Alan, do you have anything on The Wall Street Journal story about the two Koreas selling arms to Iran?

A I don't have anything terribly new on this. I think we've addressed this issue before, Bernie. That is to say, that our concerns over this issue and the serious view we take of the sale of military equipment to Iran and Iraq -- but we have stressed, of course, Iran, because of the circumstances -- remain. And we have made known those views to a number of governments and friends and allies, including the South Koreans, and specifically let be known our deep concern about the potentially destabilizing effect of arms sales. I'm not going to comment in detail beyond that. I would say we're aware that North Korea has been a major supplier of weapons to Iran for some time.

Q What about the possibility of the South Koreans using -- selling arms that were produced within South

Korea on the basis of co-production arrangements with the United States?

A Well, there would have to be, for any -- I haven't got all the regulations in my head, but for any categories where it would require U.S. permission to export or re-export, depending on the nature of the item of military equipment, we would insist, as we would anywhere else in the world, that those processes be followed.

Q And were they in the case of South Korea?

A We certainly have not approved any such sale.

Q Yeah. But forget what you've approved --

A Well, again, I don't --

Q -- have they sold co-production items without your approval?

A Again, without trying to steer you on this, Bernie, I really don't want to go into the question of the dialogue except to say that we've made our views known to a number of countries, as I say, including South Korea.

Q What is your problem about talking -- being a little more candid on this issue?

A It's just a matter of not violating the confidence of our diplomatic exchanges.

Q Alan, is Secretary Crocker planning to meet with Angolan officials at some point on his trip?

A Don, I don't have anything on meetings with other officials than the ones that I've given to you. I simply don't have that.

Q Could you find out whether he is?

A I can look into it. I don't know that --

Q Has there been a meeting with Angolan officials since the Angolan President went to Cuba about six weeks or so ago? That is, between United States and Angolan officials?

A Between U.S. and Angolan officials? That's fairly broad. Let me --

Q Well, there are not that many contacts, I don't think.

A Well, I'm wondering -- I don't know what the nature of the contacts is, for example, through the Windhoek liaison office, whether there's any indirect contact or anything of that sort.

Q Would you check on it?

A Anyway, I'll check on it and see what we can come up with.

Q Anything on the progress of the disengagement?

A No, I think that --

-- MORE --

Q Do you have any new guidance on Contadora today, Alan?

A Yes, I have a little something on that. I think that there was not a communique issued, but the Panamanian Foreign Ministry did release an information bulletin on May 1 which gave a general summary of the meetings and the progress to date.

We don't have the full text. Our understanding is as follows: that the Foreign Ministers commended the working commissions on political affairs, security, and socio-economic affairs for their reports, which had served to identify areas where more work is required to achieve a comprehensive peace proposal in Central America, or for Central America.

The recommendations of the commissions will now be studied by the Vice-Ministerial technical commission and the Foreign Ministers themselves in order to develop specific proposals for the consideration of the Central American Governments.

In our judgment, the Foreign Ministers' renewed commitment to a peaceful regional solution through the Contadora process, and their determination to focus on the remaining areas of disagreement, supplies the momentum in the continuing search for a resolution to the Central American conflict.

Q Copy, please?

A Sure.

Q Have you confirmed that Nicaragua objected to the arms limitation part, as was suggested by this statement yesterday?

A Well, I think that the -- it isn't a question of our confirming it; I think that there were statements made by governments who were at the -- represented at that session, and I --

Q (Inaudible) couched in a kind of conditional; this is his right, and so forth and so on?

A I don't have anything independent to offer beyond what they said. But I think that what they did say, what those governments did say, indicated that the Nicaraguans had, indeed, turned aside a number of the key suggestions made by the Central American Foreign Ministers, the three who had gotten together and issued a statement. And I think you probably have copies of that statement so you know what was happening.

Q If the Central American parties would accept it, would the United States be willing to abide by the provisions drawn up by the three countries -- El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Honduras?

A I think we have indicated on several occasions before, Don, that in looking at a comprehensive settlement, as contained in the Contadora 21-point Document of Objectives, that we would be willing to do the various things that were called for, including -- this is on a mutual, verifiable, enforceable basis -- including withdrawing any advisers, and so on and so forth. And that military supply and exercises, the various things that were addressed in that --

Q So, in other words, the answer is basically yes? If --

A I can't keep in my head specifically how it was addressed in that document. But, basically, I think the answer would be yes. But we have addressed it before, specifically in the context of the 21 points, and so I would couch my answer to you in that same context. I'm not aware of a contradiction. I'm not suggesting to you there is one, but I prefer to keep in that way.

Q Could I follow on that? You indicated just now that the Nicaraguans issued a formal statement with respect to the communique issued by --

A No, I didn't indicate that.

Q They did not issue a statement?

A I didn't indicate one way or another. I didn't address the question of what the Nicaraguans said.

Q What is your understanding? Isn't that what provoked the guidance yesterday? That the Nicaraguans had allegedly said something and then you issued a long statement?

A I think what happened was also that the government -- I don't know whether they actually issued a statement. They may have. But I think some of the other governments that were represented at that session made some comments explaining what had happened.

Q Alan, I find myself tempted to ask you again about this statement made by President Mubarak. Have you been informed officially, one way or the other, by such an attitude by the Egyptian Government?

A I don't think I would get into the diplomatic exchanges that we've had with the Government of Egypt or others. Our attitude on the subject, and our policy, determined through our own assessment of our own interests, has been articulated very clearly and very authoritatively, most recently by the President.

Q But you don't think that is an aggressive statement from Mubarak to say if America removes its Jerusalem -- its Embassy to Jerusalem -- they will cut relations with you?

A But I'm not aware that he put it that way, so I don't accept your words. I think you ought to look at it --

Q On El Salvador, do you have any comment to the accusation made two days ago by Roberto D'Aubuisson accusing Ambassador Pickering of favoring Mr. Duarte in the run-off; and, also, do you have anything to say about how the U.S. have been -- the preparations for the run-off in El Salvador?

A The U.S. preparations? I'm not quite clear what that means. But let me address the first part. And that is to say, we have clear several times, and I'm happy to do it again, that we -- the only thing we are favoring in that election is the democratic process, and we are not taking positions as between the candidates. That is for the people of El Salvador to decide. But we certainly are strongly in favor of the electoral process.

Q Alan, one more question about Kozlov. Are there any plans for discussion with the Soviets about his status? Is it our position that he's not to leave the country until he declares to state that that's his free choice?

A I think I indicated yesterday, and would refer you back to what I said yesterday, that he had indicated on several points in the conversations at the airport that he did want to return to the Soviet Union, and he never indicated anything contrary to that.

I think I also indicated that we would be speaking with him again, or ascertaining his views again, before he actually left. So there's no change in that situation.

Q Have you been given assurances by the Soviets you can do that?

A Well, I just would leave you with what I've said on that.

Q Any timetable on that, Alan?

A Sorry?

Q Any timetable on when you would --

A I don't have a timetable to give you.

Q Alan, on Chile, do you have any comment on the many wounded and detained yesterday in demonstrations in Chile?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q And on Colombia, do you have any comment on the announcement by the Colombian President on the fight, the war, against drug trafficants (sic) and how the U.S. may be helping?

A A couple of things on -- not on any question of U.S. -- a U.S. role. As far as the declaration of the state of seige, we haven't yet seen the texts, official text -- I think we've seen some wires reporting on them -- of the implementing decrees that had been issued under the nationwide state of seige declared by the government yesterday.

But we understand that the decrees give authorities -- the authorities -- certain legal capabilities relating to carrying arms; holding meetings or public gatherings; air, sea, and land travel; and establishing curfews.

We think that the Colombians are serious about their crackdown on drugs, but I don't have specifics as to what may be involved.

Q Alan, on the same thing. Forgive me if you said something on this yesterday, but do you have a reaction to the assassination of Lara Bonilla?

-1152

A Yes, I do. We are shocked by this wanton act of violence and extend our condolences to the Colombian Government and to the family of Minister Lara. We understand that the perpetrators have been identified.

In Colombia, it is widely assumed they were hired by narcotics traffickers. And we would note that the Minister was in the forefront of the Colombian Government's fight against narcotics trafficking and his life reportedly had been threatened.

Q Can you make a copy of that available?

A Sure.

Q Alan, there are news from the Middle East that some Western European countries are mediating between the British Government and the Libyan Government for re-establishing diplomatic relations. Do you have anything about that?

A No. I would have no comment on that.

Q On the same subject, more or less: the British apparently have declined to make any further inquiry of a deep nature into what happened with the Libyans. In view of the call here recently for nations to take action against Libya, do you have any comment on what the British have decided to do?

A No. I don't know that those are necessarily the same thing. But in any case, I don't have a comment on it.

Q Do you have anything on the May Day demonstration in Tegucigalpa yesterday?

A No.

Q Do you have anything -- apparently when Carlos Andres Perez met with House leaders yesterday, they suggested a meeting between House leaders and the four foreign -- Contadora Foreign Ministers. Do you have anything to say about that?

A No, I don't.

Q Alan, an Egyptian daily newspaper, *Ash-Sha'b*, in the last issue of FBIS of today accuses the United States of being behind the Embassy -- the Salvadoran Embassy was moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, and they give in the justification for this accusation, that it was done on the day that President Reagan asked for more aid to El Salvador based on the War Powers Act. What do you comment on that?

A My comment would be that that's very imaginative of the authors of that article and totally without foundation.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:50 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Thursday, May 3, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #79

THURSDAY, MAY 3, 1984, 12:07 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Okay, a few announcements:

First of all, available in the Press Office is a Resource Book on the run-off presidential election taking place this Sunday, May the 6th, in El Salvador. The book provides a good deal of information on the candidates and also on the electoral process itself.

Second: There will be a briefing, on-the-record, on religious persecution in Nicaragua on May 4 -- I guess that's tomorrow, right? -- 9:30 to 12:30 in Room 450 of the Old Executive Office Building. We have more details on that in the Press Office -- who's involved, who the people will be there -- and happy to make that available to you.

To make sure that we don't slip in letting you know about Ambassador Shlaudeman's plans, he's going to be leaving today to go to Mexico City on his third trip to Latin America which will conclude his initial round of consultations with all of the Contadora participants.

Q Can you say what countries he's visiting?

A Well, he's going to Mexico City.

Q After Mexico?

A Not going to do that except to note that, as I say, this will conclude his round of visits to those countries. He didn't -- he's been to all of them, I think, otherwise.

Q Alan --

A He was unable, as you may recall, to stop in Mexico on the last trip because of scheduling problems, but he did, in fact, I think, have extended conversations with Foreign Minister Sepulveda, or Foreign Secretary Sepulveda, during his visit to Washington a couple of weeks ago.

Q You're saying he's been to the other eight involved in Contadora?

A I think that's correct, George; yes.

And one, finally, on the arrest of a journalist for La Prensa in Nicaragua. The Sandinista Ministry of the Interior has announced the detention of Luis Mora Sanchez, a reporter for the independent daily La Prensa.

According to a communique published in the pro-government press, Mr. Mora was detained for "repeatedly violating the emergency law by disseminating anti-Nicaraguan information which affects the security interests of the country at a time when we are the victims of criminal aggression from U.S. imperialism."

We deplore the Nicaraguan Government's continued infringements on the freedom of the press. We find it particularly unfortunate and yet revealing that this latest incident occurs despite indications from the Nicaraguan Government earlier this year that it would ease restrictions on the press in anticpation of the November elections.

We are still waiting to see significant changes in the Sandinistas' attitude toward a free press as well as toward other freedoms that are essential for holding free and meaningful elections in Nicaragua.

Q Copy, please?

A Copy? Sure. That is it, and I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, where are we today on the standoff with the Soviet mathematician as to his plans to leave?

A There is not a lot new -- in fact, really nothing -- in terms of developments to add to what I've said before on this. We remain in touch with the Soviet Embassy about the matter, and we intend to have another meeting, as I've said before, with Mr. Kozlov before he departs from the U.S. if, indeed, that is what he wishes to do.

Q The officials who have been in the building here, who are they meeting?

A Don't have details on that, Mike.

Q Alan, yesterday you characterized Kozlov as an individual in trouble, but you neglected to tell us what kind of trouble he was in. Could you shed any light on that?

A No, I think I'll stick with what has been said on that already in terms of what his situation is.

Q To clarify, Alan, you say you intend to have another meeting if that's his desire. His desire to leave or his desire to have another meeting?

A Funny you should raise that since that that's exactly where I raised -- the question is, if he intends to depart, if he wishes to leave the U.S., we would intend to have another meeting with him.

Q For someone who repeatedly stated his desire to leave the country, which he did Monday night, he doesn't seem to be very eager to leave. This is Thursday, and you can't point to any departure time. Do you have an explanation for that?

A Nothing that I can share with you, George.

Q Has he been hospitalized?

A I'm not aware that he's been hospitalized, but I don't -- he is with Soviet Embassy officials, and I think you would have to rely on them to give you information on his latest whereabouts.

Q Are you sure he's not already left without you knowing about it?

A Yes.

Q Have they indicated if he is under any type of medication?

A Mike, again, I think it's improper to get into that sort of question just as a matter of principle, and I wouldn't do it.

Q Alan, the Soviets said yesterday that there were indications that the State Department had been informed earlier that he intended to leave the country earlier for health reasons. Was that true or false?

A Well, I think I gave you what I had on that on Monday, in terms of when we found out about his plans and what we did about it. I don't have anything to add to what I said the other day.

Q There was no plan for an early termination of the exchange program for him, is that what you're saying?

A Well, I think he still did have more to go, if you check on what the people in the program that he has been involved in have said. But I think they have already talked to that point. I don't have anything to add to what they said about it.

Q New subject, please?

A Sure.

Q One more question, please, Bernie. Has Ambassador Hartman been into the Foreign Ministry again?

A Again?

Q Yes.

A Since what we talked about yesterday?

Q Yes.

A I'm not aware that he has been. Is there as report that he has been?

Q No.

A No? You're just fishing. No, I'm not aware that he has been.

Q Do you have anything on the Helms and Ambassador Pickering and any intention to follow through on the recommendation of the Senator?

A Well, I think that the White House may have something to say about the President's --

Q They have.

A They have already said it, did somebody say?

Q Yes.

A O.K. -- about the President's confidence in Ambassador Pickering, and I wouldn't comment on a letter which has been addressed to the President and would leave that specifically to the White House.

However, we have previously addressed several of the points raised in the press accounts of such a letter, and I'm happy to do so again -- that is to say, while the U.S. is deeply committed to the democratic electoral process in El Salvador, we have been totally neutral as to the Presidential candidates, which is a choice for the Salvadoran voters to make.

On the issue of the decision to use the electoral registry for the upcoming Sunday election, no U.S. official exerted pressure on the Government of El Salvador.

Q New subject?

A New subject.

Q Do you have anything in the way of the U.S. playing any role in seeking the release of the three Israelis, number one? And any reaction to the allegations from Syria of the U.S. and Israel essentially being in cahoots on espionage activities in the Middle East?

A I frankly wasn't aware of the latter part of it, and I guess for a variety of reasons I wouldn't address it, although I am not trying to, by any means, lend credence to that story by not doing that.

As far as an updating of the situation is concerned, Bernie, I really do not have anything I can say about that. As I said yesterday, we had been contacted by the Israeli Government, and we have been exploring ways in which we perhaps could be helpful, but I really am not able to take it beyond that.

Q Alan, to follow up on that, do we have any legal or diplomatic position about the Syrian characterization of these three Israeli representatives as prisoners of war? I believe the Foreign Minister referred to them as such.

A Again, I think I'm not going to be able to comment on those aspects. I don't think commenting here is going to be helpful to the resolution of this problem, and so I'm going to withhold comment.

Q Have they been in touch, can you say, with any third-party -- Red Cross or any group -- to ascertain their conditions in which they are held?

A Has who been in touch?

Q The three Israelis -- through the Syrians, has there been in some contact?

A I would have to refer you to the other governments for anything they may want to say about it. I just don't have anything, Mike.

Q Alan, if the Syrians refuse to cooperate and they consider the Israelis as war prisoners, what will be the position of Washington in case the Israelis reacted in a military way?

A Well, I really have said everything I have to say about this case. As I said, I don't think we're going to help resolution of it by talking about it from here.

Dennis?

Q Back on El Salvador: John Kelly and some threats being issued. Do you have something on that?

A Yes -- flatly deny that Mr. Kelly made any threats as alleged. There is no basis in fact for those charges.

Q Also on Salvador, there are still increasing numbers of reports of bombing and the use of some form of anti-personnel weapon, such as napalm or phosphorus, around Guazapa, near the capital, and that the U.S. is using its planes to target them for the Salvadorean Air Force, and that the estimate -- the Archbishop's office said that at least 300 people have been killed, all of them noncombattants, since last month.

Do you have any comment at all on this?

A Again, this is the second time you've raised it. I'm not aware of those reports, frankly; and I've not seen anything to address that.

Q Also on Central America, Costa Rica reported an attack on its territory by Nicaraguan forces, and Nicaragua did the same, referring to Honduran forces. Do you have any comment on any of these announcements?

A Well, I have -- I think in terms of the Costa Rican charges, yes, we're obviously aware of this, the charges on -- there are two serious cross-border attacks by Nicaragua into Costa Rica, which are the latest in a series of such territorial violations, going back at least two years. On Sunday, the 29th of April, according to both public and official Costa Rican accounts, two Nicaragua propeller-driven aircraft rocketed two Costa Rican towns; and on Tuesday, May 1st, the Sandinistas mortared a Costa Rican observation post. So we're aware of those and take them seriously.

Q Are there any circumstances, Alan, or any treaty obligations or inter-American obligations by which the United States would be compelled to protect Costa Rican territory, especially since it doesn't have an armed force of its own?

A Well, I'm not aware that that issue has arisen, Bill, and I don't think I would try to speculate about that at all. I mean, we have -- I think that's an issue you would want to address to the Costa Rican Government, as to how they intend to deal with this problem that they've got.

Q Did you say that was the latest in a series dating back two years?

A Two years.

Bob?

Q Same area?

A Go ahead, Bob. I'll come back to you.

Q Well, it was the same area, but I was just wondering if you had any comment on The New York Times report today on the air strikes into Nicaragua, supported by CIA?

A No. Again, allegations of intelligence activities we wouldn't address.

Q Do you have anything on the seizure of a U.S. fishing ship in Brazilian waters three days ago apparently? It's a report on FBIS.

A No. I don't have anything on it.

Q Could you look into that, please?

A I can look into it. You might want to check with the Brazilian authorities, but I'll look into it.

Q Anything with respect to the incidents along the Guatemalan-Mexican border?

A Yes. I have a little bit on that. I guess in terms of the reported incident today, I don't have any information beyond what appeared in the press. We understand that the Guatemalan Government is interested in seeing that the refugees presently in the camps in Mexico returned to Guatemala.

General Mejia has been reported as saying that any resettlement would be carried out under U.N. auspices, and that all refugees would initially be placed in camps similar to the ones in Mexico until the Guatemalan government could determine from which villages they came.

Q I guess, since you say that, we support such an action.

A Well, I'm simply giving you a factual account of where things stand.

Q Do you have any opinion as to who may have been responsible for the attacks?

A As I say, I have no specific information on the incidents themselves.

Q Alan, Afghanistan -- there have been some reports of Soviet, I guess, parachute drops in a valley to the north, cutting off the Panjsher Valley. Have you got anything to confirm those reports?

A I don't have anything in detail today on the situation in the Panjsher Valley except that the Soviet action continues, but I don't have anything specifically on that, Bob.

Q Do you have anything on the story on Namibia today, not permitting U.S. lawyers to observe certain judicial proceedings nor the appeal of certain prisoners?

A The Mariental detainees' case? Is that --

Q Yeh. And the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights under Law.

A The South African Government is aware of our long-standing concern over the case of the Mariental detainees, which we have cited in our annual human rights report on Namibia as an example of arbitrary detention. The decision by the South African Government to block court action on the matter, which is concerned with non-South African citizens and events which did not occur within South Africa, does raise our concern about the rule of law in Namibia.

We note that subsequent to the decision by the South African Government to block the court action, the South African Administrator General of Namibia announced, on May 2, that it had decided to release all of the detainees in question "in due course." We welcome this expression of intent, and we urge the South African Government to implement the releases expeditiously. We believe that such an action by the South African Government, as was the case in their recent release of Toivo ja Toivo, a SWAPO leader imprisoned for 16 years, can do much to improve the prospects of achieving a peaceful resolution of the Namibian question.

Q Copy?

A Sure.

Q But, also, a visa was refused to a member of the committee that sponsored this particular case, a U.S. citizen. Did you have any remark on that?

A Well, simply that our views on freedom of travel are well known, and the South African Government is aware of our position.

Q Alan, another question about Kozlov. Has he at any time expressed a concern to U.S. officials about the health and/or safety of his family back in Russia?

A I'm going to have to stick to what I have already said about this. I think it is, again, as with the case of the Israelis, not going to help the case move along if I address it in any detail.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:22 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, May 4, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #80

FRIDAY, MAY 4, 1984, 12:27 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: I think we should all -- I expect all of you have joined in congratulating Mr. Gwertzman, but let me join in congratulating Mr. Gwertzman for his Wiental Diplomatic Prize award.

Q He's buying lunch today.

A Is he? All right. I have a couple of announcements:

The Secretary will deliver on-the-record remarks and then take questions and answers at the American Society Newspaper of Editors Annual Convention at the Sheraton-Washington Hotel Friday, May 11. That will be between 9:00 and 10:00 in the morning.

If you want to cover this event, please be in touch with Mr. Hendley of the Washington Times. That's 636-3202; that's Mr. Hendley, 636-3202. And barring any technical difficulties, we will broadcast the Secretary's remarks into this briefing room at that time.

There will be a BACKGROUND briefing on Monday at 10:30 a.m. here in the Briefing Room on the visit of President Masire of Botswana.

The Deputy Secretary met with the Irish Foreign Minister this morning, Mr. Peter Barry. Mr. Barry briefed Secretary Dam on the report of the New Ireland Forum, which was issued May 2 in Dublin. The Deputy Secretary expressed his appreciation to the Irish Foreign Minister for the briefing, and applauded the hard work and effort that has gone into preparation of the report. The Deputy Secretary assured the Foreign Minister that we will give the report full and careful study. He expressed our hope that the Forum process and the Forum report will strengthen Ango-Irish cooperation in resolving the Northern Ireland problem and in furthering reconciliation between the two communities.

And, finally, I guess, available in the Press Office will be a list of the official U.S. observers to the Salvadoran presidential election on Sunday. That includes two Senators and, I think, eight representatives, plus about fifteen other private citizens. So that's available in the Press Office. And that is the full extent of what I have to offer.

Q Do you have any update on the shooting which apparently took place on the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan border?

A I don't have an update on the action, Jim. Insofar as our response to it, we feel that Costa Rica's concerns about continuing incidents of Nicaraguan firing across its border into Costa Rica are entirely justified.

The attacks included two rocket attacks on Costa Rican towns this past weekend. As you're all aware, Costa Rica has no standing armed forces as such, so the public security forces made up of the rural and civil guard are responsible for national defense. They're ill-equipped to control the country's borders or to deal with the current attacks from Nicaragua.

Our Ambassador has been in active consultation with Costa Rican authorities. No decisions have been taken yet to dispatch emergency U.S. military assistance. That's a question that's under review.

The current FY-84 funds of $2.1 million have been obligated for equipment such as jeeps, uniforms and communications equipment and training. Some of this remains in the pipeline, and that certainly is being accelerated, the delivery of that is certainly being accelerated.

We've also requested some $7.8 million in FY-84 supplemental which would be of direct assistance in meeting Costa Rica's clear defensive needs at the moment. These funds would respond to their request for such things as small arms and ammunition and fixed-wing observation aircraft and helicopters.

Now, the FY-85 request for about $10 million would address similar needs and also would include several patrol boats. Under the circumstances, prompt Congressional action on the FY-84 supplemental request is clearly needed.

Q Copy of that?

A Sure.

Q And copy of the Irish statement?

A Sure.

Q Has -- you say no decision has been taken on U.S. emergency military assistance. Can we infer that Costa Rica has asked for that emergency military assistance?

A No, I don't think you can infer that, Jim. I think that's -- they're in the process of doing that, but no -- as I understand it, at this moment, no request has been received. I'm not -- I don't want to steer you away from the suggestion that we may get a request but I think physically we have not received such a request.

Q Could you please tell us what kind of equipment has been accelerated again in the pipeline, John?

A I don't know what is in -- it may be that the Pentagon could help on that. Jeeps, uniforms, communications equipment and training -- now I don't know whether jeeps, uniforms, and communications equipment, whether there's some of each of those items left in the pipeline; I'm not sure. Maybe the Pentagon could fill in that for you.

Q In the areas in which these events are alleged to have taken place, are there any other armed forces besides the Sandinista forces and the rural and civil guard of Costa Rica?

A I think we had some guidance yesterday or earlier on the area itself and suggestions that other forces might be in that area. So I'll refer you to that, Jim.

Q There was a radio report, John, of a late news conference held by Nicaragua, saying that the entire action is a fabrication on the part of Costa Rica; that they done their own firing. Do you have any observations to make?

A On the basis of the information we have and that supplied by the Costa Rican Government, and the statements they have made themselves, I think that's clearly nonsense.

Q Do you have any -- with respect to that -- do you have any information that is not -- with respect to that -- that is independent and not from the Costa Rican Government?

A Well, I'm sure that we've had reports from our Embassy, as well as statements made by the Costa Rican Government?

Q Were there any Embassy personnel who were in a position to witness these events?

A On the scene? I think we are satisfied that the Costa Rican Government's story is the accurate one, and the Nicaraguan suggestion that this all was manufactured and that Costa Rican forces were firing on Costa Rican forces is ridiculous.

Q How do you deal with the question of the sanctity from the ARDE point of view of the santuaries in Costa Rica, given the fact that the U.S. helps arm the Contras who then go back to their santuaries? To what degree is there some sort of American responsibility in this flare-up of action?

A Well, there are a lot of inferences in your question, Bernie, which will not surprise you to hear I'm not really responding to. But I think, in general, the question of military activity in the area in which these clashes have taken place, I think, was addressed in the guidance that was available yesterday, and I think we'll stand by that.

Q What is the scope of the aid being discussed. Since they don't have an army, would they create an army? Would the United States --

A I don't know.

Q -- any U.S. advisors go down there?

A I think you'd have to ask the Costa Rican Government how they plan to handle it, what forces would use the equipment.

Q Is there a need for U.S. advisors?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q How many are there, in fact, John? When you talk about training, under the FY and the various forms of U.S. military help, how does the training take place? Do we, in fact, now have advisors there?

A I can't answer that one, and I doubt that anybody with us can. Perhaps, again, the Pentagon can answer that.

Q Perhaps -- are major ARDE forces based in Nicaraguan territory or Costa Rican territory?

A I think, as I've said several times now, Jim, I think the guidance of yesterday responds to that question.

Q I don't believe it even remotely responds to that question.

A Well, I don't have anything beyond what was said.

Q So you won't -- that's a "no comment" then?

A That's a "no comment."

Q John, do you have anything on the three Israelis captured by the Syrians?

A No, nothing beyond yesterday's remarks.

Q You're still in contact with the Syrians in this regard?

A Nothing beyond yesterday.

Q John, after the release of the 747 to Iran, the jet which, I think, was --

A 707, I think.

Q 707? Whatever. Now the Iraqi Government accuses the United States of not just, you know, giving 707; also giving spare parts to the Iranian Government as a result of this deal (sic). What do you comment on that?

A Spare parts for that 707?

Q Spare parts for that 707 and other jets, and other things there. There is a spare parts agreement or some channeling of spare parts to Iran by the United States Government.

A Well, you know -- you certainly know our policy on the supply of military and military-related equipment to Iran and Iraq, and there's been no change in that.

I cannot guarantee that a spare part or piece of equipment for that 707 is not something that was involved in the legitimate contract, but I honestly don't know.

Q Can you look into this, about anything which is channeled --

A I'll take a look and see whether something comes easily to hand --

Q Another question. Evans & Novak column this morning -- I know that you have sort of embargoed answering anything about Evans & Novak, but his column is very interesting this morning because it's related to the mission of Mr. Poindexter from the National Security Council and Mr. Murphy, and about the success or the failure of their mission.

What can you -- can you give us anything or tell us something about what happened there in their visit to the Arabian Gulf?

A Well, on Evans & Novak's columns, it's really not a question of embargo so much as exhaustion; and I think we've sort of come to the White House point of view that we really don't respond to Evans & Novak columns.

Q Bear it in mind this, John; I would like to be a little bit, you know, repetitive about this. These are very interesting things --

A You can be repetitive, but I will, too. (Laughter)

Q Well, this is very -- you know, the subject is very, very interesting because we like if -- you know, not related to the topic of Evans & Novak but if someone from the Department could brief on this -- feelers and negotiations which started last year with Mr. Black going to the Middle East and going to the Gulf after the signing of the agreement between Israel and the United States and coming back, and now Mr. Murphy and Poindexter. What's going on between now, the negotiations with the United States and the Arabian Gulf and states there? (sic)

A I suspect that while I was in China Mr. Romberg gave you fulsome accounts of Ambassador Murphy's travels around the area, and I doubt that we would have anything more beyond that.

Q John, any comment on the --

Q As a follow-up to the same question, do you have anything on the nature of the tour made by the Director of the USIA in the Gulf area and other Middle eastern countries?

A No, I don't. I think USIA should respond to that. I think Mr. Wick either is or has been, I think, in the area. But I really don't know. I think USIA are the right folks to answer that.

Q John, same area. Radio Israel is broadcasting to France, has charged that the Iranians have actually set up to what amounts to concentration camps, where they are actually gassing prisoners, including Jews. Do you have any response to that? Will that be brought up with Mr. Genscher, since Germany has been really expanding its relationship with Iran?

A Uh, don't --

Q Can you look into this --

A Well, I doubt --

Q -- if you don't know, if I'm turning up something cold?

A I doubt that we would have any comment in advance on the agenda for Mr. Genscher's visit here; but on the factual situation you mention, I'm not aware of and don't have anything on it.

Q Can I ask you to look into it?

A Yes. But I doubt that we will be able to produce much more than I have. I mean, how would we know?

Q Because of lack of access to information? Or is that --

A I think that's the case, Bernie, but we'll be glad to take a look and see if --

Q But we do get a lot of information from the Israelis that we consider credible; and if the Israelis think they have some information, I'm simply asking if you would look into whether we've --

A Let's see whether we can produce something on that.

Q Anything new, John, on the Kozlov matter?

A No. We're still in touch with the Soviets. He is in the company of Soviet diplomats, but nothing new.

Q Do you think that the charge --

Q Speaking of Kozlov -- can I just continue to follow that up? Do we have any -- have the Soviets told us why he's still staying here? He did express apparently a desire to return to the Soviet Union as quickly as possible, and now it's several days now and he's still around.

A Well, I think you'd have to ask them, but I imagine it might be related to transportation or something like that.

Q Or health problems? Is that a possibility?

A I think you'd have to ask them.

Q Well, John, are we clear he is still here?

A I think we're clear that he's still here. We are clear that he's still here.

Q John, have you ever defined --

Q John --

A Excuse me. I think we're on the same --

Q A related question: Do you have a comment on the Soviet press charge that the United States has conspired with the Sakharovs in anti-Soviet activities that included getting Mrs. Sakharov --

A Sure.

Q -- asylum in the U.S. Embassy?

A Sure. Yeah. Certainly do. The -- I guess you're referring to that TASS statement, and our response to that is that TASS accusations that members of the United States Embassy in Moscow are engaged in improper activity in connection with Dr. Sakharov and Mrs. Bonner, his wife, are wholly unfounded.

According to TASS the United States Government has been involved in a far-reaching operation in which Dr. Sakharov would declare a hunger strike in Gorky, Mrs. Bonner would seek refuge in the Embassy and eventually would go abroad to lead unspecified anti-Soviet activities.

This is all false. Our Embassy officials have never discussed such a plan with Mrs. Bonner, have never offered her asylum in the Embassy. In addition, the United States has never encouraged Dr. Sakharov to engage in hunger strikes, either now or in the past.

We have maintained contact with Mrs. Bonner because we're concerned about her health and welfare and that of Dr. Sakharov, and because we share the concern of many others in the West who support the Sakharov's struggle for peace and human rights, and abhor the conduct of Soviet authorities in denying those rights to their people.

We are even more concerned, now that the Soviet authorities have stepped up their unfounded attacks on both the Sakharovs and the members of our Embassy staff who maintain contacts with Mrs. Bonner.

We urge the Soviets in the strongest possible terms to take a more realistic and humanitarian view of the current situation.

Q Is this possibly linked to the Kozlov affair, do you think?

A I'm not aware of -- you know, it's difficult to analyze Soviet motivation, but I'm not aware of such links.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q What does the last sentence mean? They let -- do something for the Sakharovs?

A I think that's obvious, sure.

Q Isn't there also some Soviet criticism of the U.S.-China trip? Do you have anything on that?

A Well, yes, there is, and we think that is a little far-fetched. We regret that the Soviets have chosen to overreact to the President's visit. The TASS article -- again, it's a TASS criticism -- has entirely mistaken the nature of the President's trip.

The purpose of the President's diplomacy was to deepen and develop the bilateral relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China. The

President has said that the visit was not directed against the interests of any other country; and, of course, it's up to China to speak for itself about references to itself in the TASS article.

Q Copy, please?

A Sure.

Q John, have you any comment on the characterization by the Syrians of the three Israelis captured as POWs?

A Not beyond what Mr. Romberg might have said on that yesterday, no.

Q John, do you have anything on the article that appeared in the Post about U.S. help to labor unions and other groups for Duarte?

A Sure. The United States Government has scrupulously avoided taking sides in the Salvadoran election. Secretary Shultz stated our neutrality regarding the candidates and support of the process directly to the candidates during his January 31 meeting with them in San Salvador.

Our emphasis has been on support for the democratic system. AID has provided $34 million* for this purpose, most of it for the development and use of a computer system to support the new national electoral registry.

Our involvement has been to support the fairest possible elections without aiding -- siding with any candidate or political party.

Concerning the AIFLD, AID through a cooperative agreement with the American Institute for Free Labor Development, an AFL-CIO affiliate, has provided about a million dollars in support of a project to strengthen the free and democratic trade union movement in El Salvador. The purpose is to increase the number of applicants under the land reform program, to educate the beneficiaries of their rights under that program, to assist the campesino unions in collaborating with the Salvadoran government agencies implementing the land reform, to train union board members in managerial and technical skills as union leaders, and to train co-op leadership.

The union movement has its own interests, and union leaders are undoubtedly supporting candidates who favor those interests.

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* Correct figure is $3.4 million (see Pages 11 and 13)

Now, concerning the charges about IVEPO, we note that IVEPO provided assistance to three different parties in the first round, and we also note the denial of the leader of IVEPO of any covert assistance.

And, finally, concerning the denial of the visa to Mr. D'Aubuisson, as you know and as we've made clear here before, we have asked that all of the Presidential candidates refrain from visiting the United States during the official campaign period.

Q Can we get a copy?

A Sure.

Q Do you have any -- would it behoove us to ask any additional questions, or you have no further guidance, I think?

A No need to ask any additional questions, because I don't have any further guidance.

Q Well, then I'll pass.

Q Are you concerned that if Mr. D'Aubuisson does lose, that he will be able to cite these allegations of U.S. influence in the election as justification for overturning the results?

A Well, it doesn't really matter what allegations are made; they are in fact unfounded. The United States has been very clear in its position that it is the process that we favor, and we have worked constructively and legitimately in support of that, but we have not had a bias or improperly sought to influence that election.

Q Would you check one figure in your -- my recollection is in your Resource Book it said U.S. financial aid to the elections is $3.4 million.

A Let me check that.

Q And you said $34.

A Yes. That's right. Let me check that.

Q Can I just try on this one -- just one attempt here? You took note of the denial by the head of IVEPO.

A Uh-huh.

Q And he says he receives money from certain kinds of other foundations. Are you simply taking note of his denial as saying that disposes of the question, or if I asked you, leaving his denial aside, is there any truth to any U.S. funding being used to support IVEPO, possibly through third parties?

A Well, when the man said what he said, the man made the denial. The allegation is that funds have, I guess, improperly gone from IVEPO into the campaign. There's a flat denial.

Q No, I don't mean that. I mean that there are U.S. funds that are being channeled to IVEPO for their use during the campaign --

A Well, I think the allegation was covert funds, and, obviously, we wouldn't get into --

Q It said either the CIA or the U.S. Government, not to suggest that they're any different.

A Sure.

Q What I'd like to know is, can you speak to the question of whether any agency of the U.S. Government, covert or otherwise, has provided funds to IVEPO? And, if you don't have the answer, can you look into it?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q Can you take the question?

A Might take a look at it, but not that I'm aware of.

Right back here.

Q Do you have any comment on Sharon's statement today in the Post in which he accuses the United States of being the architect of the Israeli failure in Lebanon?

A No, I don't.

Q John, do you see any forward progress in the North-South talks in Korea as a result of the President's trip or any other circumstances?

A Well, as you know, this was raised in China, and the Secretary had some discussions with Korean officials during his visit to Korea afterwards, and there was discussion of some of those confidence-building measures which we have urged on them and which are in the public domain -- the kind of things we have talked about like exchange of mail between the two countries, possibly family visits, perhaps cooperation in the area of sports.

Insofar as the larger and longer-term question of any negotiating table, our position is that the critical factor is the need to have North and South Korea talk with each other. In what kind of ultimate setting that might take place, it's a little premature to say, but our preference has clearly been expressed over the months for a four-party kind of forum.

Q John, is it the U.S. view that the --

A Excuse me. Let me go back and correct: $3.4 million is the right figure. Thanks, Jim.

Q Is it the U.S. view that the Contras based in Costa Rica have the right to have cross-border attacks into Nicaragua, and the Nicaraguans have no right for some form or other of hot pursuit?

A Well, I am not going to get into that question, Bernie, but I think insofar as these specific attacks are concerned, what we're talking about is Nicaraguan, apparently, attacks on Costa Rican forces, and that seems to me to be clearly totally inappropriate.

Q John, you have just said that presidential candidates in El Salvador are asked not to, or to refrain from, visiting the United States --

A That's correct.

Q -- during the presidential campaign, or --

A That's correct.

Q -- before the presidential election.

A That's correct.

Q Is this to be taken as a general rule, saying that, for example, if Mr. Sharon is going to visit the United States during the election campaign, does this apply to him?

A I think that we -- I think this was some months ago we made this clear in connection with El Salvador in relation to special problems in that particular relationship.

Q Wouldn't you consider his visit, that will create special problems for you or for people around here?

A I think we'll wait and see.

Q John, there were allegations two days ago by the Nicaraguans that Honduran forces had attacked their territory. Do you have any proof that -- to deny or confirm that?

A I don't. If it was some days ago, I don't know whether Mr. Romberg -- no. He's shaking his head. No, he didn't do anything on that.

Q And, also, do you have anything new on possible additional economic aid to the Dominican Republic?

A No.

Q Three rapid-fire questions:

A Okay.

Q Observer-delegations to the voting in Panama, in Ecuador -- official, that is.

A Sorry? Is there any --

Q Are there any official U.S. observer-delegations to Panama --

A I do not think there's a --

Q -- and to Ecuador?

A Let me take that one first. Don't think there's any official delegation. If appropriate representatives wish to go there, I assume that our Embassy would be helpful in that regard, but I'm not aware of any official observer team.

Q Ecuador?

A Nothing.

Q Okay. And, finally, the Nicaraguans say they protested to you about a mine that sunk a trawler a couple days ago.

A   Yeah. There was some guidance yesterday, and we confirmed a protest, Jim.

Q   John, will you take one last question on Kozlov?

A   Sure.

Q   We've had a noise removal laboratory remove extraneous sounds from a videotape that we made at Dulles Airport Monday of conversations between Consular Isakov -- talking in Russian -- and Kozlov. And we've had a Russian expert listen to those tapes, and he says there is nothing in the conversation to suggest that Kozlov is mentally ill or unstable or that he isn't thinking clearly; that, on the contrary, he appears to be somewhat fully aware that if he goes back to the Soviet Union, he's in deep trouble.

A   Uh-huh.

Q   The question is, to the extent that the State Department continues to refuse to comment on questions of Mr. Kozlov's health, is it not encouraging the Soviet suggestion that he is somehow irrational, that he is a very, very sick man?

A   I, having just gotten back, really can't answer that. I don't know whether Mr. Romberg --

MR. ROMBERG: Had no comment.

A   Mr. Romberg had no comment on the state of Mr. Kozlov's health.

Q   What is his comment now?

A   Well, I -- let me think about it. I've thought about it, and I'm not going to have any comment either. (Laughter)

Q   All right.

Q   John, can you characterize the aid that's being discussed to Costa Rica? Is this quite a large increase in aid?

A   I don't know that it's a large increase. These figures that are under consideration -- existing figures --

Q   But the talks of additional aid --

A   -- are not large.

Q -- the talks that are going on with the Ambassador.

A Well, I think we would have to wait and see what it is they request. I think where we -- it's a two-part thing. First of all, we're accelerating what's in the pipeline, what may be left there; and, secondly, I think we will wait and see what it is they ask for.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:55 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Monday, May 7, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #81

MONDAY, MAY 7, 1984, 12:10 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I've got a number of things for you. At the top, first, to either inform you or remind those of you who already know that today, Foreign Service Day, is being observed, and the only activity that is open to press coverage will be the memorial dedication in the diplomatic lobby at 5:30, the C Street Lobby. The Secretary will be there. He will be reading a message from the President, delivering his own remarks, and presenting the Secretary's award to the family of Dennis Keogh, who died in Namibia in April. Leamon R. Hunt, Captain George K. Tsantes, and Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Crabtree will also be commemorated.

Also to tell you that the Secretary will address the League of Women Voters Annual Convention in Detroit on Monday, May 14, at 3:00 p.m. at the Westin Hotel. Barring any technical difficulties, his speech will be piped live into the Press Room here. Anyone interested in covering this event should contact Sandy Risser or Ellen Dudley at the League's Washington office, at 429-1965.

Q Do you have the subject?

A Don't have a subject to announce to you at this point.

On various and sundry elections that have been held over the weekend, first -- in response to a number of inquiries as to the arrival time today of the U.S. Observer Delegation to the presidential election in El Salvador, I understand they will be arriving at Andrews Air Force Base this afternoon at about 4 o'clock.

Also tomorrow, May 8th, the Council of the Americas is having an all-day conference for corporate executives here in the Department, in the Loy Henderson Conference Room. The subject is U.S.-Latin American Relations in the 80s. The Secretary will be giving welcoming remarks at 8:40 a.m., and Assistant Secreta Motley will address the conference's main theme at 8:55 a.m. Other confirmed speakers include Secretary of the Treasury

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Donald Regan and Dr. Martin Feldstein, Chief Economic Adviser to the President. Questions during the Q&A session will be limited to conference registrants, but the overall session is open to press coverage. For further information, contact Mrs. Kathleen Lang in the Press Office. That's tomorrow.

Q Can we get copies of Motley's and Shultz' remarks?

A I'll have to check on that later -- ask you to check with the Press Office on that.

On the elections: As far as El Salvador is concerned, there are no official results announced yet, and we don't expect them for a day or two. The voting seems to have gone quite smoothly this time with the ballots, urns, and other election material arriving in most polling places without problem, and the polls opening on time. Voting lines were reported moving much more rapidly than in March.

There were still some instances in which persons were unable to vote because their name and cedula number did not correspond to that listed in the voter registry, but the Salvadoran Elections Commission believes that the percentage affect at this time was quite small. It appears, in fact, the turnout was quite high; but until we have the official results we won't know just what the figures are.

Guerrilla actions to disrupt the election included roadblocks, mining of highways, sabotage of the power system, and most significantly, an attack on the Departmental capital of San Miguel. The guerrillas were able to prevent voting at some 46 of the planned voting places, primarily in sparsely-populated areas. I believe the total number of voting places is around 450.

Two helicopters carrying U.S. observers and members of the press corps were fired on as they neared San Miguel, and the press corps helicopter was hit by one round, but it was not significantly damaged. Overall, however, the level of guerrilla disruption was less than experienced in the March 25 first round of the presidential elections, and in part, that was due to the strong protection effort made by the Salvadoran Armed Forces.

As far as Panama is concerned, we're told by our Embassy in Panama City that voting proceeded smoothly and without major incidents throughout Panama yesterday. The National Counting Commission will probably not announce official results until later today, at the earliest.

And there was a third election in Ecuador. We understand that, according to an unofficial vote count, engineer Leon Febres Cordero has won. It may be some time, however, before the official vote results are released. Again, the elections were carried out in a peaceful fashion.

We welcome all three examples of democracy, and look forward to working with the new governments in each of those countries.

Q Can we have a copy of all the statements?

A We'll see what we can do. I can't promise that I can give it to you early.

O.K. That's it for announcements. Happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on -- since you mentioned Cordero's apparent victory and unofficial returns in Ecuador, do you have any comment on the apparent victor in El Salvador?

A No. I think that the -- we're going to wait to comment on that until we have something more out of El Salvador on that.

Q Alan, on Saturday, U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica, Ambassador Winsor, was asked what the United States would do if there was an invasion of Costa Rica, and he said, and I quote: "If there was an invasion of Costa Rica, there's no question about what the United States would do if asked. That is, we would take care of the invasion; we would repel it, and we would probably make certain it didn't happen again."

Was he speaking for this Department and the government or was he speaking of his own opinion?

A Fred, what I would say about that is that the governments of Costa Rica and Nicaragua both understand that should Costa Rica be threated by an invasion, we would regard it as an extremely serious situation. Our support for Costa Rica is well understood.

But as to the issue of any plans to send U.S. forces, the reports themselves indicated that the White House has said, and we have said, that there are no plans to send U.S. combat troops to the region.

Q About Ambassador Winsor's statement, though, does this Department back that statement up?

A Well, I don't -- I hear what you're saying about his statement. I don't have it, but I'm telling you what the policy is and I'm going to leave it at that.

Q Alan --

Q Same subject?

Q Same related subject. This weekend several newspapers published parts of a confidential cable from Ambassador Quainton to the Secretary of State. The cable is entitled "The Gathering Storm" in which Ambassador Quainton predicts a major onslaught by the Sandinistas against the Catholic Church. Do you have anything on that?

A I don't have anything on it. I wouldn't comment on alleged leaked documents. I would note that we have commented before on problems which exists between the Church and the Government and criticism which has been leveled against the Sandinistas by the Church. We made available the text of the pastoral letter, for example. But I don't have any comment on a purported report by Ambassador Quainton.

Q Do you have anything on a story that said Costa Rica wants U.S. aid but they're trying to find diplomatic ways to be sure they don't get sucked into the wider war in Central America?

A No, not really. If you want, I can give you some sort of an update on where we are on the aid question, but I don't have a comment on that particular dimension of it.

Q Go ahead, by all means.

A You want me to give you what I've got? On the general question of requests and concerns, and so on, there are clear budgetary limitations we face when considering the current situation.

Of the available $2.15 million in FY-84 appropriated funds, by now all of this has been obligated or earmarked, including items which should be useful in present circumstances. The $7.5 -- excuse me, $7.85 million that the Administration requested in the FY-84 supplemental request has not been acted upon by the Congress and is therefore not yet available to assist Costa Rica. Prompt Congressional action on the supplemental would obviously allow us to respond in timely fashion to the current situation.

The Government of Costa Rica has made clear its concerns about the mounting level of Nicaraguan-initiated border incidents. While they have had to contend with such incidents for over two years, the frequency and intensity has increased recently and led to the current discussions.

We share those concerns and believe that all nations of the hemisphere share with us a common interest in assuring that a democratic country, which does not even have an army, is not victimized by military actions of a neighboring country.

The Government of Costa Rica has approached us to request immediate U.S. military assistance and this subject is under active review and discussion with the Government of Costa Rica. We would note that Costa Rican Foreign Minister Gutierrez is quoted in the press as indicating that his government has also approached several other governments regarding possible military assistance.

At this point, I don't have any further details on amounts, dates, or anything of that sort so I'm going to have to leave you with that.

Q Can we have a copy of your statement up there?

A Yes.

Q Back to Ambassador Winsor's statement, the Rio Treaty applies there, does it not, which authorizes U.S. military action in the event of any aggression against Costa Rica?

A I think that the question of invoking treaties is a question one could look at. I'm not addressing that at this point. I'm simply telling you what our general policy is in terms of our concerns about Costa Rica and the question of whether we have any plans to send combat forces to the region.

Q Is it our understanding that ARDE does operate with the consent of the highest levels of the Costa Rican Government?

A I think that's something you would have to ask the Costa Rican Government about.

Q Well -- but it's a related question because --

A It may be a related question, Jim, but --

Q But it's one that you're not going to answer; right?

A -- I'd refer you to the Government of Costa Rica.

Q The accused Israeli terrorists who were caught by the Israeli authorities are, according to Anthony Lewis' article in today's New York Times, are largely of American origin who want to pave the way for the Messiah by bombing the Moslem holy places on the temple mount in Jerusalem. What comment do you have on this?

A We've commented several times. I don't know what answer you expect from this podium. The fact is, we have condemned terrorists acts, including the planting of the bomb, the attempted blow-up of those buses. The Israeli authorities seemed to have taken swift action and they're moving ahead on that, and we think that is the right thing to do. So there's nothing further for us to say. It doesn't matter whether they're either currently or previously American citizens; any terrorist actions are to be condemned.

Jim?

Q Do you have anything on Sudanese refugees in Eithopia, and the defection of the Eithopian Charge here?

A Don't have anything on the refugee question. As far as the reports of the Charge having sought asylum, as you know, it is our standing practice not to comment on such stories, and I will not be doing that.

Q Can you look into the question of the refugees from the Sudan and whether these accounts are accurate as to the numbers and the dimension?

A I can look into it. But it seems to me that the U.S. is not going to have independent information on that, but I will check and see what I can for you.

Ralph?

Q Alan, I'm sorry -- forgive me, and cut me off if I'm repeating things that you've discussed in the past couple of days. but on this Costa Rica aid question, it seems to me that today you've said that the U.S. -- in so many words you've said the U.S. wants to send a lot more military aid to Costa Rica but Congress hasn't acted yet so Congress really ought to get off its duff and do it.

Costa Rica has asked for the money and the U.S. has told Costa Rica and Nicaragua how serious an invasion would be, but the U.S. is not willing to send combat troops.

Do you have -- is there --

A Well, you're putting a lot --

Q I'm putting a lot of things together.

A -- things together.

Q Right.

A And I'm not sure I'd put them together quite that way. The fact is on the assistance -- on the assistance, let me just simply say that we have the one funding budget which has been approved as being implemented. The supplemental has not been approved, so that's a request which went up before the recent increase in the pace of these incidents.

The question of the request which has been made in the last several days is something else again. I don't know how the funding would be handled and whether that would come out of the supplemental request or how -- I just don't have any answers for you on those kinds of questions at this point. But the urgency that attaches to that is because of the pace of events which are taking place on the ground.

Q Just to clarify one thing, since you made the point of saying the U.S. doesn't want to send combat troops to the region, has -- and you did say that Costa Rica has asked for aid -- immediate aide, has Costa Rica asked for any American troops?

A No. I'm not aware that they've asked for any American troops.

Q Wait a minute. What about the engineers?

A I think that the Pentagon addressed that the other day and suggested this is quite different from the question of troops. But in terms of the kind of exercise which has been discussed before, I don't know whether that's currently under discussion or has been recently under discussion, but we've talked about that before. But I think that Secretary Weinberger indicated, if I recall it -- maybe it was one of his spokesman -- but I think he may have on some occasion over the weekend, that that discussion was continuing. And I don't have an update on that. You'd have to check with the Pentagon.

Q Alan, do you have any comment or statement about the formation of the Lebanese national unity government, this -- an announcement which was made this morning, all the participation --

A Well, I don't have a confirmation that the government has been finally formed, but, obviously, our efforts have been in support of a more broadly-based government and for a national reconciliation, and if -- along with the other objectives we have had in Lebanon, including the withdrawal of all the foreign forces and security for Israel's northern border. And if the developments of the last couple of days represent steps in that direction, obviously, we welcome that.

Q By the way, do you have any situation report on conditions in Sudan, because I see the press reports saying about thousands of refugees leaving the country as a result of the war.

A That was what Jim asked about before. I don't have anything on that. I said I would check on the refugee question, though.

Q Alan --

A Barrie?

Q I'd just like to clarify something. Is it the United States' position that attacks on Nicaragua by Eden Pastora's group from Costa Rica in no way justify cross-border attacks by Nicaragua on Costa Rica?

A I think this was addressed last week, Barrie, and I would ask you to check back on that. The fact is that in each of the three incidents that I'm aware we have discussed in the last couple of briefings at the end of last week, all were attacks on Costa Rican forces. And, as I understand it, you know, it was Nicaraguans firing on Costa Ricans. So I'm going to have to leave you with that and what we said last week. I don't have anything new to update it.

Q Alan, anything on America's Watch report that came out over the weekend on Miskitos?

A No. I don't have anything on it.

Q Alan, appropros of Foreign Service Day, I was wondering if you would comment on remarks made by Alexander Haig last Friday -- he was awarded the Distinguished Diplomat Award by Georgetown -- in which he characterized the Foreign Service as playing the role, in conjunction with professional diplomatic journalists, of guarding against the excesses of our elected officials and their appointed -- and their political appointees.

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A No. I don't have any comment.

Q Would you say that that's a fair characterization --

A I don't have any comment on it.

Q -- of the role of the Foreign Service?

A I think the role of the Foreign Service has been articulated in many different places by many different people, and I'll leave you with those.

Q In other words, you wouldn't agree that they are treasonous?

A I -- (laughter) -- nc. I would not say they're treasonous, by any means, and I think that that is an outrageous sort of remark to make.

Q Well, that's what a former Secretary of State said --

A Any serious questions?

Q Good night.

Q Do you have any comments on Yassir Arafat's visit to China which came specially within President --

A No. I don't have anything.

Q Well, also, China has made it clear that they will continue to support the PLO in their struggle, even they said that by military ways or diplomatic or any political way.

A We've made clear what our position is.

Q Mr. Perez de Cuellar, the United Nations Secretary General, is conducting a wide-ranging tour and consultation in preparation for United States' efforts -- it's not a conference, it's, I believe, session -- which will solve the Palestinian question. Do you have any comment on that?

A United Nations' efforts you mean?

Q Yes.

A No. I don't have anything on that. Our general attitude towards a conference, I think, has been known, but, beyond that, I don't have anything.

Q Do you have anything on Afghanistan, Alan?

A No.

Q Anything on another closing of a newspaper in Uruguay?

A No. Don't have anything on it, Jim.

Bill?

Q Alan, do you have any reaction to The Washington Post report on Saturday that the United States, in resolving that prior consent disagreement over the China reactor material, relied principally on an oral assurance from Zhao Ziyang?

A Yes, I do. I think that many of you may have this, but why don't I go through this?

Only when the agreement for cooperation with the PRC on peaceful uses of nuclear energy enters into force, in accordance with the procedures prescribed by the Atomic Energy Act, will the export of nuclear reactors, their major components or fuel be permissible.

Licenses for each such export are issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the NRC, only after review of the application, as required by the Act, by the Departments of Energy, Commerce, Defense, State and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and after the NRC receives a positive recommendation from the Executive Branch.

That review includes an examination of the activities of the government of the intended recipient country relevant to its obligations contained in the agreement for cooperation in accordance with Section 123 of the Act.

The review also addresses activities of the government of the recipient country which are relevant to Section 129 of the Act which prohibits the export of any nuclear materials or equipment to any nation which is assisting, encouraging or inducing any non-nuclear weapons state to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices.

Thus, the Executive Branch could not recommend, nor could the NRC issue a license for, the export of any nuclear materials or equipment to any country which is engaging in any of these activities, and that provision of the Atomic Energy Act is made known to all governments with which the United States Government discusses possible cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The Administration also made clear to the PRC that no such cooperation would be possible unless its government demonstrated that it shared the same serious views regarding the spread of nuclear explosive devices to other nations.

Premier Zhao's statement, together with its authoritative elaboration to Administration officials, does just that. Any seeming ambiguity was resolved in the discussions which provided this elaboration.

Q Copy, please?

A Sure. Okay?

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:30 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, May 8, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #82

TUESDAY, MAY 8, 1984, 12:40 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon all. I have a couple of housekeeping announcements, and then a statement.

Available in the Press Office are copies of the opening remarks given by Secretary Shultz this morning before the Washington Conference for Corporate Executives, Council of the Americas.

A second housekeeping announcement: The President will be addressing the Council of the Americas Conference in the Loy Henderson Conference Room today at 3:00 o'clock. State Department and White House press pass cards will be honored on a first-come, first-serve basis. Press are asked to remain in the area near the camera platform and must be in place by 2:30, and we will also be piping the President's remarks into the briefing room.

I have a statement on Dr. Sakharov. The Department of State is strongly concerned about press reports that Andrei Sakharov has been on a hunger strike since May 2, and that his wife, Elena Bonner, has been charged with slandering the Soviet state, which could lead to as much as three years confinement.

The refusal of the Soviet authorities to reveal any information about the present welfare and whereabouts of the Sakharovs lends credence to these reports. Dr. Sakharov has been trying for many months to obtain permission from the Soviet authorities for his wife to travel abroad for medical treatment, something she has been allowed to do twice before. He has apparently been driven to this extreme action by the continued refusal of the authorities to even respond to his requests.

The Soviet handling of this matter has been inhuman and incomprehensible. Rather than simply allowing Mrs. Bonner to go abroad for medical treatment, the Soviets have placed criminal charges against her, threatened her with even more serious treason charges, and made totally false allegations about involvement in the current situation by the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

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The circumstances of Dr. Sakharov, a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize and numerous other accolades, is a legitimate matter of concern for all persons interested in promoting human rights and international peace. Soviet silence about Dr. Sakharov and Mrs. Bonner is totally unacceptable.

The United States urges the Soviet authorities to provide truthful information about the present situation of Dr. Sakharov and Mrs. Bonner. We also urge them as a matter of simple humanity to end Dr. Sakharov's exile and allow Mrs. Bonner to travel abroad for medical treatment.

Finally, we ask that all like-minded persons in the West press the Soviets for information on the fate of the Sakharovs, and for an end to Soviet persecution of these two brave individuals.

Q Copy, please?

A Sure.

Q That's it?

A That's all I have.

Q Do you have any reaction to the Soviet announcement that they will be boycotting the summer Olympic games?

A Well, we've just seen the wire service report of the TASS account of the statement by the Soviet Olympic Committee. We want to be analyzing that report. The Soviets did not inform us in advance of their intention to release this, although we have, since the wire service report, confirmed that this is -- confirmed through diplomatic channels that this is their intent.

As I say, we will be analyzing this statement, and we may have a more formal statement ourselves or perhaps even a backgrounder later in the day. But initially I would say that the United States clearly regrets the Soviet disregard for the views of people all over the world who had hoped that the Olympics would go forward in a non-political manner.

The suggestion, of course, that the Soviets have been hindered by the United States or hampered from participating freely in the Olympics is a charge utterly without merit. The United States has made every effort to cooperate in this regard. As you know, the only instance in which the United States has objected is in the case of the proposed Soviet Olympic attache', and even in that case the objection was not to the idea of the position or the idea of an attache', it was an objection to the specific individual who had been nominated, in this case by the Soviets, and we would have considered an alternate to that -- to the first person nominated.

So we think that this is a blatant political action for which there is no real justification by the Soviets.

Q How does this political action by the Soviets differ from the 1980 action by the United States?

A I think the difference is something called Afghanistan, and I think the reason the United States took that action at that time was because of the extraordinarily barbarous behavior of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, which has continued. There is clearly no comparable action in this case.

Q John, could we have a copy of that response you read, please?

A I don't think you can -- I think you'll have to get it from the transcript. It is not a prepared statement.

Q John, do you expect withdrawals or boycotting from Eastern European countries and some of the Third-World countries?

A I don't know about Third-World countries. There often is a relationship between actions of the Soviet Union and some countries in Eastern Europe, and I think we will have to wait and see. I do not know of any action at the moment.

Q When you mentioned earlier in your statement that you regret the idea that this won't allow the Olympics -- that the Olympics would not be able to go forward in a non-political manner, and you call this a political action by the Soviets, is it your view now that -- if this is in fact the case and the Soviets do not take part in the Olympics, that the Olympics will be able to go on in any way that would be respected by the rest of the world sports community?

A Well, I -- that's -- I presume the Olympics authorities will be taking a look at that, but I wouldn't see any reason why they wouldn't continue. The fact that the Soviet Union has taken the action it has, does not undermine the gains, and it doesn't undermine the trust and the confidence and the motivation that has been expressed by other nations. This seems to be a political action, and that is anathema to the Olympic ideal.

Q When you say it's a political action, what do you think the motivation of it is, because there are some people in this building arguing a few weeks ago that the Soviets would not cancel participation on the grounds that it was a political benefit to them to win medals here?

A Well, I think you have to -- It's difficult for us to analyze Soviet political motivations, and I think you have to address yourselves to the Soviets on that. When I say it is a politically-motivated act, I think the rationale for that is that we are convinced we have gone the last mile to counter Soviet objections, to ease Soviet concerns, to answer Soviet questions.

Our conscience is very clear in that we have done everything to facilitate the participation of the Soviets, and there are no hindrances. As I say, the only question about which there was some doubt was the person of an attaché some months ago. But clearly, there cannot be a legitimate objection to the arrangements that have been made by the United States.

Q John --

A Sure, Bill.

Q Some of the Soviets have been saying that one of their objections was to some kind of an emigre recruiting office to try to woo defecters, or to welcome defecters, if any should pop up.

A Well, as we have said before -- and we can understand how the Soviets, as they run their own society may have a little difficulty in understanding our society -- there has been no encouragement in that regard. There certainly is no government enticement or involvement; but the fact is, this is a free country, and there are many people in this country who happen to find many things about the Soviet Union abhorrent, and they express themselves. And that, presumably, might take place were the Soviets to have been here.

Q If I may, you said that "We've gone the last mile to counter Soviet objections and ease their concerns," something -- did that include trying to persuade these emigres to desist from this?

A This is a free society.

Q Yes.

A You cannot gag people who want --

Q No, I didn't mean gag, just --

A -- to express a viewpoint.

Q Just try to persuade them. (Inaudible) (Laughter)

A Well, I am not aware of any discussions that have gone on at any official level. The fact --

Q I know they've done that with emigres in the past when they wanted to persuade them to --

A Yes, well, I think we have done all that we could to guarantee the security of Soviet athletes, and I think we would have done that in accordance with the laws of our country very effectively, and the Soviets need not have had concern for their security.

As to whether people would defect, whether people would voice criticism of the Soviet Union when the Soviets were here, that's democracy.

Q John, does "the last mile" mean that this Administration will not engage in any additional or new diplomatic efforts to persuade the Soviets to change their minds?

A When I said "the last mile," Ralph, what I was saying was in terms of the United States official involvement in the preparations. Our conscience is clear in terms of the complete elimination of any hindrances -- and I think they were imaginery -- thrown up by the Soviets, any legitimate hindrances that might have prevented their participation. There are no such hindrances.

Q How about from this point on, will the --

A I don't know. We may be involved in some discussion with them, but I really can't say where we will go from here.

Q John, part of the Soviet statement issued by Tass alleges or says that, "Political demonstrations hostile to the USSR are being prepared, undisguised threats are being made against the USSR, National Olympic Committee, Soviet athletes and officials. Heads of anti-Soviet, anti-socialist organizations are received by U.S. administration officials. Their activity is widely publicized by the mass media."

Do you have any comment on any of that? Is any of that recognizable to you as something that has been going on?

A No, it is not recognizable, and certainly no demonstrations have the support or the blessing or the organizational capacity of the United States Government. That is absolutely untrue. And certainly, had there been demonstrations by private groups, I'm sure that the authorities in the area, the local authorities, and the government of the United States would, as I say, have gone to, done the utmost to protect the security not only of the Soviets, but of any delegation participating in the Olympics.

Q Could I ask a broader question? The Soviet Union has taken an extraordinarily dramatic sort of action by declining to come to the Olympics and issuing a very strong blast at the United States in so doing it.

You have here today reacted to the case of Sakharov and Mrs. Bonner with some pretty strong language.

A Uh-huh.

Q And in recent days, there have been a series of various things that have not been the most favorable in terms of climate between the two countries. Does all of this, the Russian action or actions, seem to you to forecast something about what is the likely course of U.S.-Soviet relations more broadly in the coming months, or what is its status now?

A Let me clarify one thing on a technical point. Our statement on the Sakharovs was not in response, or was not timed, in connection with the Soviet announcement on the Olympics. We were prepared to make this statement today as soon as we came into possession of the information, and it predated the Soviet decision on the Olympics.

It's hard to read the overall relationship, Don. As you know, our foreign policy is based on strength, realism, and the willingness to engage in dialogue, which we certainly have been prepared to do. We certainly have been ready to negotiate in a variety of forums, not the least of them the wide array of arms control talks. So I think that we have to analyze our motivations and not attempt to analyze the motives of the Soviet Union.

Q John, could you maybe consider that this statement from the Soviet Union on the boycott of the Olympics is in answer to Mr. Reagan's visit to China and because opening up a number of relations with China now?

A You would have to ask them. What the President said in China was no different, as the Secretary of State has said, to what he says in Washington, and what he says in any capital. He was not a man who said one thing in China and something different outside China.

Q Do you have anything on Libya and the shooting --

A I don't. We've seen the various reports, Bernie, but I don't have anything on the Libyan --

Q Filing break?

A Filing break? Sure.

Q About this emigre thing that you mentioned, that emigre recruiting office, can you say openly that the United States Government officially has no relationship or association --

A Yes.

Q -- or any assistance to these groups?

A Yes, of course.

Q And you're not encouraging or discouraging this type of (inaudiable)?

A Of course, not.

Q So you are taking a neutral stand on that?

A Of course.

Q What is the status of the Kozlov case, the man who was, when last we heard, presumably in the Soviet compound here?

A When last we heard, he was; and to my knowledge, he is still in that situation. There has been no change.

(To staff) Correct?

Still unchanged.

Q What is the U.S. attitude toward --

A Don't have any explanation.

Q What is the U.S. attitude about his case now?

A Well, we're maintaining an interest in that case.

Q But is he free to go, if he says he wants to go home?

A Oh, yes, of course.

Q Are you sure that he is still in the country?

A Sorry?

Q Are you sure that he is still in the country?

A I think we are reasonably sure that he is still in the country.

Q John, do you have anything on the Kissinger Commission being recalled?

A No, do not.

-- MORE --

Q Do you know if that's not a true report?

A No, I haven't heard that one.

Q On the Craxi call for a moratorium -- INF deployments -- have you had any formal indication he's going to put it on the agenda of the Foreign Ministers meeting; and have you heard from any other countries that might support it?

A We have not had any indication of any formal approach, but I do think there was some guidance from yesterday on that which you can pick up from the Press Office. I don't happen to have it with me at the moment, but there was some guidance on the Italian thing yesterday.

Q Anything, John, on the reports of mass killings of civilians in Afghanistan?

A No.

Q Anything on the article that appeared today in the Christian Science Monitor by Dennis Volman?

A Yes, do have something on that situation. We are not going to, as you know traditionally, respond to reports about alleged intelligence activities. However, I understand in this particular case, if you try the CIA, I think they may have some strong words denying this report.

Let me just say, in general, that as is fairly obvious, the United States deplores death squad activity. The United States has taken no action that would in any way further such activity. Quite to the contrary, we have been actively involved in the effort to eradicate such violence.

Our policy on the issue is very clear. Keep on saying it, and say it again, in our public declarations and in our private conversations with Salvadoran officials, we have repeatedly emphasized the need for Salvadoran authorities to take action against the death squads. Progress is being made. Death squad activity is sharply down this year. Armed forces officers who reportedly had links with death squads have been transferred.

The Minister of Defense, Mr. Vides Cassanova, has issued the order for the formation of a special investigative unit which will have the primary function of gathering evidence admissible in a court of law against individuals involved in the death squads.

We will continue to work with the Government of El Salvador to end death squad activity and to bring to justice those responsible.

But insofar as a specific response to this Christian Science Monitor story, I suggest you go to the CIA.

Q Can we get a copy?

A Sure.

Q And could I follow just for a second?

A Sure.

Q Is the State Department aware of the existence of something called the National Intelligence Agency in El Salvador, or it's acronym apparently is ANI? Is the State Department aware that such an organization exists?

A Don't have anything more for you --

Q Could you take that question?

A I'll take a look at it, but if it does involve intelligence, you probably won't get anything from us.

Q John, do you have anything on the kidnapping of a U.S. citizen in Beirut?

A Only probably what you already know. That is, that Benjamin Weir -- W-E-I-R -- an American-citizen resident of Beirut was abducted May 8 by three men. Mrs. Weir, who was not taken, was with her husband at the time his abduction took place, but she is free. Don't have anything further for you, but obviously the Embassy is monitoring this situation very carefully; seeing what it could do to secure -- to locate Mr. Weir and secure his release, and we certainly deplore yet another savage incident of kidnapping in Beirut.

Q Further on Lebanon, do you have any comment on a report that the United States is phasing down, or close to phasing out its assistance to the military forces in Lebanon; that there's been a great reduction in the numbers of American military people; that the military equipment which was suspended sometime ago remains suspended, and it looks like the U.S. is going to be out of the picture in that field?

A Don't think the situation has changed a great deal, Don, over the past weeks. I think, basically, we're looking at it case-by-case basis.

Specifically, the delivery of certain military items such as ammunition and spare parts continues. In addition, on April 20, 44 armored personnel carriers that had been turned over to the Lebanese earlier in the year arrived in Beirut. Future equipment -- furture shipments of military equipment, for example, tanks, artillery and other major weapon systems will be considered on a case-by-case basis. And I think as we have said, we will wait and see how the situation develops there and what the need is, and what the -- or what the stability is.

Q What about the American personnel advising the Lebanese forces? That numbers were shown to be greatly decreased.

A I don't have anything on that. But maybe the Pentagon can help you on that one.

Q And regarding non-military aid to Lebanon, you may know that there's been a proposal on Capitol Hill to use a great deal of it for an endowment program for American University of Beirut rather than for its initial anticipated purpose of reconstruction aid. Does the Department have a position on that, and what is it?

A I do not today. I don't know whether we've had anything -- no? -- in the past few days. Be glad to take a look at it for you.

Q John, are you involved in the negotiations for the three Israelis and 300 Syrian prisoners between Syria and --

A I don't know about negotiation. I think, obviously, in the question on the matter of return of those captured, we would attempt to be helpful, and I'm sure we are being as helpful as we can but I don't have anything specific for you.

Q Did I understand you to say before that you have absolutely nothing on the events in Tripoli this morning?

A Yes, don't. Do not.

Q On Mr. Weir, there's no government connection at all?

A No. He's a -- I think he's a Presbyterian missionary.

Q John, would you confirm the reports coming from Israel that Mr. Arens, the Defense Minister of Israel, will be coming to New York and maybe to Washington for negotiations?

A Coming to Washington for when?

Q For negotiations?

A Hadn't heard that. Be glad to take a look at it, but I'm not aware of it.

Q Or anything about the same sources saying that joint military exercises between Israel and the United States are going to be undertaken after two months or three?

A No, don't have anything on that for you; sorry.

Ralph?

Q Do you have anything on the tanker being hit in the Gulf near Kharg Island?

A No. Seen the reports, but we can't confirm those reports.

Q Going back, John --

A Sure.

Q -- to Tripoli for such second, and not necessarily in reference to this morning's events, but over the last several months there have been a series of things over there and I'm wondering what the State Department's view of Qadhafi's control of that country is at the moment?

A   Oh, I don't think I can give you a horseback assessment of Mr. Qadhafi, or even a non-horseback assessment.

Q   Anything on the situations in the voting results in either Panama or El Salvador?

A   Yes. I'll give you Salvador first. Is that the last one? Okay.

Q   The last question.

A   The last question? He's had enough of me? Alright.

According to unofficial results, provided by the Christian Democrats, Mr. Durate is maintaining his lead over ARENA candidate, Roberto D'Aubuisson. No official results have yet been released. What is important to note at this point is that the substantial voter turnout is another indication of the desire of the Salvadoran people for democracy.

The official United States delegation commented, "This election was fair and honest. It provided a clear and undeniable mandate to whichever candidate is elected to begin to grapple with the manifold problems that confront this country -- that's Salvador -- after five years of turmoil and unrest."

Insofar as Panama is concerned, I'll just give you a little sitrep on what we understand to be the situation. The party of each of the two leading candidates, Nicholas Barletta and Arnulfo Arias, each of them claims to be slightly ahead based on its own unofficial tabulation of partial reports from party observers of over almost 4,000 individual polling places. And that's about where we stand.

Q   Thank you.

A   Okay?

(Press briefing concluded at 1:05 p.m.)

1-1208

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Wednesday, May 9, 1984

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1-1209

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #83

TUESDAY, MAY 9, 1984, 12:30 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. Just have one housekeeping announcement up front. A reminder that there will be an ON-THE-RECORD briefing on Central America by the White House Outreach Group in Room 450, the Old Executive Office Building, 2:30 this afternoon. Speakers will be Mr. Robert Searby, Deputy Undersecretary of Labor. He's the U.S. representative to the International Labor Organization Governing Body. He will speak on "Freedom of Association in El Salvador." Also speaking will be Dr. John Silber, who is the President of Boston University. He, of course, was a member of the Bipartisan Commission on Central America, and his topic will be "Thoughts on the Situation in Central America."

That's all I have for you.

Q John, Colonel Qadhafi says the attackers yesterday were Sudanese trained by Americans. Any comment?

A No, no comment at all. There are a lot of conflicting reports on that situation, and we have seen the claim by an organization to have been responsible for it. I understand that is a Libyan opposition group, but I'm unaware of any further details.

Q John, Senator Helms is charging today that Ambassador Pickering used a State Department and CIA covert fund, I think he called it, to finance Duarte's campaign.

A Insofar as allegations about the CIA are concerned, obviously one never talks about alleged intelligence activities, and I'd refer you to the CIA on that.

Insofar as the State Department is concerned, there's absolutely no funding to Mr. Duarte or, indeed, any party. As we've said many times before, we have provided funds and technical assistance in support of the overall electoral process. I think that primarily -- maybe exclusively -- went through AID.

And on the political side, obviously as an embassy operates normally, there's been the traditional contact with the various parties, but this is quite distinct from supporting one party over another. Again, as we have said consistently, the United States has played a neutral role in El Salvador's elections, so those allegations are untrue.

Q Just clarification, John: You said "absolutely no funding."

A In the sense of improper -- in the sense of funding for -- in the sense of funding to a particular party.

Q You're including the CIA in "absolutely no funding?"

A What I'm saying is -- obviously, we can't speak for the CIA, and obviously never refer to alleged intelligence activities. But as far as the State Department is concerned, we have supported the process and there certainly are, I'm sure, AID funds in terms of computers, and that kind of thing. But what I'm doing is refuting the allegation that the State Department has funneled money to the parties, or to any party, or several parties.

Q But you're not speaking for the CIA?

A No, I can't speak for the CIA.

Q And you're not speaking -- in the latter part of your statement, you said the United States has not supported any candidate, has not taken sides.

A That's correct.

Q Does that mean that the CIA has not taken sides?

A I can't -- I don't know. I can't talk for the CIA. I don't know what the CIA does. I can't speak for them, but I'm telling what the State Department position is and what the State Department involvement is.

Q Why do you think Senator Helms is making these allegations?

A I don't know. You'd have to ask him.

Q John, to clarify what you're saying, you're saying that the funding of political election campaigns is an intelligence activity that comes under the purview of the CIA?

A No, I'm not.

Q Then why can't you deny that it's gone on?

A What I'm saying is I'm not responding to an allegation about funds from another agency. I'm telling you what the State Department position is and what the State Department has done.

Q Can you speak -- you often speak for the Administration. Can you speak for the Administration --

A Only at my peril, Ralph.

Q Are you only speaking for the State Department today?

A I'm speaking for the State Department.

Q Thank you.

Q John, I think you've steered us deliberately to the CIA, and you've hinted that they may have something to say on this. (Laughter)

Is it your impression that they may have something to say on this?

A I don't know. I haven't been in touch with the CIA, and I don't know with what degree of enthusiasm one might approach some statement on this, but you can give them a call.

Q Well, have you encouraged the CIA to be forthcoming on this, because otherwise there does seem to be a bit of a cloud --

A Oh, Jim, I have enough to do to encourage this building to be forthcoming. I cannot speak for the CIA.

Q John, you're just saying one part of the U.S. Government did not use covert funds, you're not saying --

A What I'm doing -- there are allegations, as I understand it, in reading the press this morning, that the

CIA and the State Department improperly sought to finance Mr. Duarte and perhaps other parties as well. I, obviously, cannot speak for the CIA -- never have done and never will. But as far as the State Department is concerned, what I'm saying is that those reports are untrue and while there certainly is -- certainly has been support for the process in terms of the mechanical things -- computers and the voting procedure and that kind of thing -- but there certainly has not been financing of any one or more than one party.

Q John, then you withdraw the latter part of your statement, when you say the United States Government has not taken sides?

A Well, of course, the United States Government. The United States has supported the process, and has not taken sides in that election.

Q But the agency is part of the Government.

Q Is the CIA outside the Government?

A I'm not going to respond. And I don't know why you should be surprised that I'm not, because I never have to the question of what the CIA might or might not have done and I'm not steering you in any way.

Q Isn't the Secretary usually -- should be sitting on such decisions whereby the CIA does certain things? You could say that "we don't want to answer that part, of course," but one must assume that the Secretary is informed as the person that conducts U.S. foreign policy?

A What I'm saying is that we have not sought to manipulate that election. We have supported the process. We have not supported candidates.

Now you're asking me to comment on a specific allegation involving covert activities by the CIA, and I obviously cannot do that.

Q Who is "we" in that case -- on that last answer, "We have not sought to manipulate" -- who is "we?"

A The United States Government has not sought to manipulate those elections.

Q And all agencies thereof; is that correct?

A (Laughter).

Q Don't you understand our --

A I understand, but I also don't think you're understanding what I'm saying, that I'm not making statements on behalf of the CIA. You have to go talk to them.

Q I guess the presumption is that when you say the U.S. Government does such-and-such, the presumption is because the CIA reports to the President of the United States, you're speaking effectively for the CIA?

A Well, I'm telling you what the position of the United States has been in this particular election and, indeed, in elections in general. And that is that we support the process and have not worked for any particular candidate.

Q Have you got anything more on the Olympics?

A Not a great deal. We have not -- we are obviously following carefully the question of whether any other countries are going to make any decisions about participation, we have not officially had any such indications. We've had no further discussions with the Soviets.

I did get the appropriate people to pull out a list of what we have done, if that would interest you.

Well, for example, the President personally and publicly assured the International Olympics Committee that the United States would live up to the Olympic Charter. Those reassurances have been repeated publicly and privately to the Soviet Union.

The United States authorized the Soviet request for at least 25 Aeroflot charter flights during the course of the Olympics.

We assured the Soviets by diplomatic note and privately, as agreed by the International Olympic Committee, that all Olympic participants could enter the United States on the basis of their Olympic identity cards without visas.

We authorized a month-long port call from the Soviet cruise ship to serve as the Olympic headquarters of the Soviet delegation. We assured the Soviets privately that after the initial customs and safety inspection of that vessel, subsequent searches, or any subsequent searches of the ship, should they take place, would be only for a specific cause. For example, if there were a bomb threat, and that any such subsequent searches would not be for the purpose of harassment of the Soviets.

We authorized entry of representatives of the Aeroflot Airline and shipping personnel in advance of the games to do preparatory work for those special flights and for the ship.

We indicated our willingness to receive an Olympic attache from the Soviets with full diplomatic status. But as I reminded you yesterday, we certainly did object to the individual originally proposed but would not necessarily have objected to a subsequent individual.

We informed the Soviets that we would be ready to rent them vehicles, an action which is normally prohibited -- that we would rent vehicles to Soviet officials during the Olympics.

We told the Soviets publicly and privately that emigre groups opposing Soviet participation, organizing demonstrations or inciting defections, that they would have no United States Government sanction whatsoever.

We opened all areas containing Olympic sites, hotels, airports to Soviet travel from June 1 to August 15.

We undertook full responsibility for the security of the Soviet ship in the harbor, and the preliminary estimated cost of those security measures to the United States was $500,000.

Security measures for the games are extraordinary. And we told the Soviets privately that every possible security precaution was being undertaken and would be undertaken. So that's a --

Q Can we have a copy of that, please?

A I think we can make a copy of that available after the briefing, sure.

Q John, does that meet their request for guarantees of the safety of their athletes, do you feel?

A We think so.

Q John, Mr. Ueberroth, who's been on television several times yesterday after the White House, said that he would make every effort he could to persuade the Soviets to reconsider their decision.

What is the U.S. Government's position on whether there's any room for discussion on this?

A Well, as I say, there's been no discussion by ourselves officially since the Soviet decision. I think our position would be that we have done everything to make possible the Soviets participation. That still stands. We are going to continue to do everything to make possible the safe and satisfactory participation by any delegation from any of the Olympic countries. That continues to be the case for the Soviet Union, but I'm not aware of any negotiation, certainly, that have taken place -- that has taken place -- or that we have pending with the Soviets. What the Olympic Committee might do, of course, is up to them. They might engage in discussions.

Q John, in your communications with the Soviets yesterday, when they said they were not going to come, was that in any sense conditional? Did they give you any signal that if you were to do something additional that they might change their mind?

A No, not that I'm aware of. They have listed the areas of complaint. Obviously, we think we have done all that is reasonable. I think they listed the various complaints that they have made to the United States Government, and I think they had some that they had made to the Olympic Committee in Los Angeles. I think that included smog and various things like that.

Q But as far as you're concerned, there were no steps that you -- additional steps that you were contemplating to alleviate their --

A No, no. We think, as I said yesterday, I think we feel that we have done all that could possibly be done.

Q What you listed today was already done?

A Yes, sure. That's all old stuff, yeah.

Q John, just by way of the list, would you be willing, so that we can compare what you've done and what the Soviets have asked, to make available the comparable list of requests made by the Soviets?

A Well, I'm talking about the points that they made in their statement. That's what I'm talking about.

Q I see. But what about the --

Q John, you mentioned --

Q Well, what about the ones that they've made to the Government as opposed to the ones they made in their statement, or are they the same?

A I'll be glad to look at that, but I doubt that we would make -- (a) I doubt there's much difference, and I doubt that we would make available --

--MORE--

Q John, you mentioned --

Q Did the United States at any time receive a request from the Soviet Union to return any Soviet defectors who might defect during the time that they were here?

A I can't answer that, Barrie. I don't know. I honestly don't know.

Q John, you mentioned that -- you had said the emigre groups would not get any help from the Government.

A Correct.

Q Was any effort made to dissuade the emigre groups from further activity?

A Well, in the sense that I'm not aware of any contact between the -- I mean there have been charges that U.S. Government officials have encouraged this, and that's absolutely not true.

I don't know what discussion there might have been about controls with local authorities and that kind of thing. Certainly we would have supported controls in terms of our security arrangements to make sure that nothing happened to the Soviet athletes, but I don't think we could have deterred a legal demonstration conducted properly nor am I aware of any move to have prevented such demonstrations or --

Q You didn't try to --

A -- statements.

Q -- talk them out of it?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q John, one of the spokesmen for the emigre last night, I believe, or this morning, said that this is the refusal or the boycott of the Russians of the Olympics -- is "a great day for America" or --

A "A great day for America"?

Q Yes. Do you share this feeling since he said something to this effect? That they really are not coming and, you know, he said that this almost is a moral victory for them -- or whatever?

A Well, I think the President has made clear that we support the Olympic ideal; and in that sense certainly we had hoped the Olympics would go forward in a nonpolitical manner, I think.

Q But the thrust of what I'm asking is that you don't consider it "a great day for America" -- that the Russians are not coming to the Olympics? This is my question.

A Well, I mean, if the point of your question is did the United States work to prevent the Soviets coming here, the answer is absolutely not. We worked --

Q Yes; this is what I ask.

A -- to enable them to come, but this is their decision. They have decided not to participate, and I guess they have to live with that decision.

Q John, another subject?

A Yes.

Q Can you expand a little on your posted statment of today on aid going to an AUB endowment -- how much money was going to go, from what funds, and why you don't like the idea?

A I can't expand on that, but I'd be glad to -- do we have something posted?

MR. CARLSON: Nothing posted. That's where AID comes in.

A AID.

Q O.K. You don't have a monetary amount to answer the question?

A No, I don't. I'll bet AID might. I'm sure they could flesh it out.

Q Can I go to Libya?

A Sure.

1-1219

Q Is the United States still conducting a review of its relations with Libya, in light of what happened? And when will the results of this review be made public -- if it will ever be made?

A I don't know. There's a review and I'm sure that a number of countries concerned by the behavior of Libya from time to time discuss that, but I don't have anything further on it.

Q John, I'm asking this because I saw somewhere in one of these newsletters published here in Washington that the State Department said something to the effect that they would like to create a military confrontation and there is sort of --

A The State Department would like to create a military confrontation? (Laughter.)

Q Well, I mean some people -- some people at the State Department -- would like to put something --

A Some people in the State Department would like to create a military confrontation?

Q Yes. A split or something like that, to the effect that they might create -- and there are objections to this -- there is a split between the leaders here.

A Don't have anything on it. Sorry.

Q The wire services are carrying reports from Beirut that the Islamic Jihad is claiming responsibility for the kidnapping of Reverend Weir and Mr. Buckley and Mr. Levin of CNN.

A Yes.

Q Do you have any comment?

A No, we've seen those reports, as you have. Don't have anything to confirm that, and our position is that whoever is responsible for the abductions should take speedy steps to release them and return them to safety.

Q You said you can't confirm it?

1- 1200

A No, I can't. I mean it's a call by an anonymous caller who says this organization did it, but we don't have any confirmation.

Q John, Reverend Weir's family in California said that they have been told that the United States is negotiating with the kidnappers at this time for his release. Do you have anything to say on that?

A No, I don't, but I would caution you against such a story.

Q What about Mr. Kozlov?

A He's still here.

Q Can you discuss what the problem is?

A No. I guess you'd have to ask the Soviets.

Q John, there's this delegation of the Latin American Parliament in the United States currently. They've issued some statements critical of U.S. policy, and I'm wondering if you might have any comment on them.

One, they said that IMF conditionalities create more problems for Latin America than Soviet subversion right now.

A No. I haven't seen the --

Q No comment on that?

A No.

Q Two, they said that no debt has ever been collected by strangling the debtor -- again referring to IMF conditionalities policies.

A Uh-huh. No.

Q And this Administration obviously supports the policy of collecting the debt by strangling the debtor.

A By strangulation?

Q Yes.

A Collect of debt by strangulation? That's our policy?

1-1221

Q Yes. Didn't you read the speeches at the Council of the Americas conference yesterday?

A I think there was support there in the concept of the collection of debt, but I think "by strangulation" sounds a little extreme.

Q It's a paraphrase.

Q John, do you have --

Q Just on some real quick ones -- anything now on elections in Panama or anything on elections in El Salvador, and anything on the Nicaraguan --

A Hold up, hold up, hold up! (Laughter.)

Panama?

Q Well, Bernie Kalb isn't here. I forgot. Otherwise it would have gone much smoother, most likely. (Laughter.)

A The first stop was Panama. What else is it?

Q Salvador.

A Salvador.

Q Honduran/Nicaragua helicopter.

A O.K. (Laughter.)

Panama -- just a little sitrep. The party of each of the two leading candidates, Mr. Barletta and Mr. Arias, each continue to claim to be slightly ahead, based on their own unofficial tabulations of reports from party observers at almost all of the 3,900 individual polling places.

The official raw results from 14 of 40 electoral circuits -- I was going to say "electrical" circuits for a minute -- electoral circuits announced by electoral officials as of this morning give Mr. Barletta 118,000; Mr. Arias 101,000, with lesser figures for five other candidates.

That's really about all I have for you on Panama.

Moving right along to Salvador, don't expect official returns before the end of the week. According to unofficial party estimates based on 99 percent of the vote, Mr. Duarte received 54.1 percent of the vote.

Procedurally the election went much smoother than the first round, with only a few Salvadorans unable to cast their vote due to administrative problems.

The substantial voter turnout of over 1.4 million -- greater than the 75 percent turnout for the March 25 first round -- demonstrates the desire of the Salvadoran people for democracy despite guerrilla calls for a boycott.

And that's really it -- simply to underline the view of the official U.S. delegation that the election was fair and honest and went forward in a straightforward way.

On the chopper, nothing really beyond the wire service reports you've seen. That's obviously a matter for those two governments.

We did get, just before I came out, a kind of rough translation of a Honduran response to the Nicaraguan communique. I don't know that it takes us a great deal further, except to make the point that the helicopter was unarmed, left the air base at Tegucigalpa with a destination of Ampala and it was transporting a commission of the armed forces which was going to undertake an inspection of the construction of the Honduran naval base there.

That's a fairly lengthy statement, which I guess you can get from the Hondurans.

Q And do you know whether this helicopter was one that was on lease to the Hondurans or one that was provided -- they were provided ownership outright by the Hondurans?

A I do not know. I cannot answer that myself, but I understand the Pentagon has looked at that --

Q O.K.

A -- and has made it very clear that there is no U.S. involvement with that kind of chopper and it was a Honduran chopper and on a straightforward Honduran mission.

Q On the El Salvador elections --

A Sorry?

Q On the question of the El Salvador elections --

A Yes.

Q -- do you have a response to Senator Helms' charge tht Mr. Duarte has been aided and supported by the Central Intelligence Agency and his campaign has --

A You must have come in late, Don, and missed --

Q Oh, I'm sorry. I guess I did.

A -- my comprehensive response to that story.

Q All right. Well, I'm sorry. (Laughter.)

Q John, another election --

A It will take you about 15 minutes to read the transcript on that, Don. So --

Q Another election inquiry. What is the U.S. position on the Philippine election, and will we have observers there? I think it's a few days hence.

A I'm not aware of -- I can't answer the question on observers. Obviously we're for free elections in the Philippines, and there is some good language in the Press Office to which I refer you on that which we issued earlier.

Q John, may I ask you, please, one thing? You may have answered it, as you did. So I'm trying to confirm it.

Last week there was a statement made by Yassir Arafat to a group of journalists, and it was quoted by AP, where he called for "direct negotiations" with Israel to resolve the Middle East problem. Were you asked the question, and, if you were not, would you care to tell me if you see that as a step forward, if you would check into it?

A Well, the question is -- so, the question is what? The question relates to our readiness to talk with Mr. Arafat?

Q No, no. Arafat was saying that the way to solve the Middle East problem is, he said, through direct talks or negotiations -- the way he used it -- with Israel.

A Uh-huh.

Q Now, I'm asking: Are you aware of the statement, and would you comment on it? Do you see it as a step forward, coming from Arafat -- or just any response?

A We are not aware of the statement, but I would think the first thing for Mr. Arafat to do, from our point of view, would be to recognize the sovereignty and independence of Israel and support the two appropriate UN resolutions on which we're basing our readiness to engage in any discussion.

Q Now, he actually does touch on this. Maybe I could provide you a copy of what I have from AP and not from -- he does touch on this problem of recognition. He says that "We know Israel is there. It is not an image. We're fighting somebody, so it is there."

A Uh-huh.

Q So he does -- would you then look at it and give us some total answer?

A Well, no, I don't think so, because Mr. Arafat has said a number of things and has seemed to come up to the brink of formal statements on a number of occasions and then has backed away from them.

The conditions, as far as we're concerned, are very clear. They're set out; we're available. And when Mr. Arafat makes a clear, unequivocal acceptance or endorsement of those conditions, then I think we would have a changed situation.

But I think until then we won't respond to remarks which may be open to various kinds of interpretation.

Q John --

Q Do you have anything further on UNESCO as it begins to consider American withdrawal plans?

A No, no. Our position is unchanged. We're very serious about our intent to withdraw at the end of this year if appropriate reforms are not undertaken.

Q John, do you have anything about an Uruguayan by the name of Roslik -- R-o-s-l-i-k -- who is reported to have been tortured to death by Uruguayan authorities?

A I certainly don't today. I don't know whether that is anything we've touched on in the past. And Mr. Romberg is shaking his head "No", so I guess we don't.

Q Could you check to see?

A Sure.

Q John, can you explain the United States Government motives behind what is reported in the media that the United States will vote against any United Nations Security Council resolution calling for the withdrawal of Israelis from southern Lebanon?

A Sorry. Where has this report appeared?

Q It appeared in a Jordanian newspaper and it appeared somewhere (inaudible) that the United States will not accept any request -- or the United Nations Security Council action -- to call on the withdrawal of Israelis from southern Lebanon.

A Well, I think our position on UN resolutions is we'll look at them as they come up -- look at the form and text of the resolution and make that decision at that time. But the position on Israel's troops in southern Lebanon is very clear -- that we understand Israel's need for appropriate protection of its northern border.

Q Which means that --

A That, obviously, would have to be taken into consideration in the context of any withdrawal plan.

Q You mean if the Security Council resolution will call for this type of language to guarantee the security of Israel or whatever it is and to work it out with the Lebanese, you will have no objection to that?

A Well, no. I'm not prejudging Security Council resolutions and say we'll look at that on a case-by-case basis. But, clearly, the question of security on Israel's northern border would be a factor which we would have to take into account in a very significant way in how we would --

Q And you yourself -- you see that the presence of the Israeli forces into southern Lebanon as securing or guaranteeing this security element that you are talking about?

A Our goal is for the removal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. But in the process of that removal, when the Israelis come to remove their forces, we would expect there to be appropriate measures undertaken for security of Israel's northern border.

Q Including the presence of these forces right now there?

A I'm not saying what those measures might be. But we understand and indeed that has been a consistent part of our policy.

Q John, just one more question. I understand that the Chinese have announced that that senior Russian official is not going to China.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you have any reaction to that?

A No, don't have any U.S. reaction; no, no.

Q John, do you have any response to a press report that the Russians had a mass firing of SS-20s?

A Was it the Evans and Novak column?

Q I didn't mention the name because I know that it's --

A Because he knew I wouldn't respond. (Laughter.)

Well, let's see. We wouldn't respond to that because it's an Evans and Novak column and we wouldn't respond to it because it relates to intelligence.

Q It's a double whammy.

A It's a double whammy, yes.

Q Thank you.

A Sure.

(Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the briefing was concluded.)

1-1227

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Thursday, May 10, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #84

THURSDAY, MAY 10, 1984, 12:45 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: A couple of housekeeping announcements up front.

I think everybody in the Press Office would like to thank Dennis Troute for his swift action this morning in apprehending some suspicious looking folks in the correspondents' room.

Q Is there a medal that comes with this, John, or just a cash reward for stopping terrorism in its tracks? (Laughter)

A There's no medal; there's no cash award. There's just general recognition of the fact that Superman flies out of telephone booths but ABC flies into them. (Laughter)

Q That's without ambiguity. We take that as a thorough compliment.

Q He must be really suspicious to stand out in the Press Room. (Laughter)

Q The question is who is going to tackle who.

A Just to remind you that Secretary Shultz will be up at the American Society of Newspaper Editors Convention tomorrow morning. He'll be ON-THE-RECORD, although, as I recall ASNE rules, I think only ASNE members can ask questions but that's obviously their call.

Due to a variety of scheduling problems, we will not have a regular Daily Press Briefing tomorrow, but Brian Carlson and his team of eager and enthusiastic press officers will be happy to take any questions during the day --

Q What time is that -- 9:00?

A The Shultz thing is at 9:00; yes, that's right -- and attempt to answer them.

Sorry? Yes, tomorrow.

1-1229

Have a statement on the International Court of Justice action this morning.

As the Department's Legal Advisor Davis Robinson's statement in The Hague indicated earlier today, we will have to withhold full comment on the decision until we've had an opportunity to review the lengthy opinion and its implications. As a matter of fact, we haven't even received the full text of the statement in Washington yet.

However, at this point, we would like to make some preliminary observations.

The first is that the United States respects the Court and the rule of law and intends to act accordingly.

The Court has not made a decision regarding jurisdiction, and we regret that the Court has denied the United States' request that the case be dismissed at this time. However, we call attention to the fact that the Court noted that a number of issues which merited examination had been raised with respect to jurisdiction and that the Court intends to pursue that issue. And, of course, there was no decision on the merits or judgment on Nicaragua's allegation that the United States had done anything illegal.

With respect to the provisional measures enumerated in the decision, we'll need to examine them carefully, but we note that the decision refers to the rights of all states to be free from the threat or use of unlawful force and that the Court called on both the United States and Nicaragua to refrain from actions which could extend or aggravate the dispute before the Court.

The principles articulated are based on the United Nations Charter, to which we subscribe. Our initial reaction is that nothing contained in the measures indicated by the Court is inconsistent with current United States policy or activities with respect to Nicaragua.

We will be asking the Court quickly to decide the fundamental issue of its jurisdiction. We will be meeting with the Court tomorrow to develop a schedule for further proceedings in this case on that issue of jurisdiction.

The United States continues to believe that the best prospect for resolving the political, social, and economic problems that plague the nations of Central America, including Nicaragua, is through serious negotiations in the Contadora process. We hope that the Government of Nicaragua will respond to the Court's decision by making a serious effort to advance the regional negotiating process in cooperation with the Contadora process.

That's all I have for you.

Q John, you've left me confused, which may have been your intention, but what you're saying is that the only thing you believe the Court dealt with today was the U.S. decision to remove itself from jurisdiction for two years?

A It has not ruled instantly on the matter of jurisdiction, that is. It is obviously going to consider that in due course, we hope speedily.

Q It was my understanding that when you made that announcement that you were removing yourself from jurisdiction for two years on decisions involving Central America, it was a unilateral decision not to be dealt with by the Court but an announcement that the United States would not accept jurisdiction?

A Well, we were notifying the Court of that action, and we are taking -- have taken our case to the Court and are going to continue to argue that with the Court.

Q And what you're saying is that the only issue which was dealt with today was that jurisdiction?

A There were these provisional measures indicated. And, as I said, we do not consider that those are inconsistent with current United States policy and activities with regard to Nicaragua.

Q John, isn't -- the decision said that the U.S. should stop essentially interferring in Nicaragua. It's a sort of restraint order. Isn't that the thrust of it?

A Well, the -- I refer you to the Court and statement. As I say, we've seen what you have. We don't have the full text. I understand it's about 40 pages or so.

Q There's nothing in that restraint order --

A That we consider to be inconsistent with current United States policy and activity with regard to Nicaragua.

Q With respect to that, John, the first unanimous judgment says, and I quote: "The United States of America should immediately cease and refrain from any action restricting blocking or endangering access to or from Nicaraguan ports," et cetera.

I take what you just said as meaning that the United States is in no way pursuing activity that is inconsistent with that at the present time. And my question is, if that correction -- if that interpretation is correct -- my question is, will the United States abide by that ruling pending the settlement of the jurisdiction issue at least?

A As I say, we haven't seen -- we wanted to give you some provisional and early response, and we haven't seen the full text, and we want to take a look at it. But I think that our words speak for themselves. I've told you the United States respects the Court and the rule of law and intends to act accordingly. I think that statement is quite clear.

Q John, you're accepting, then, that judgment?

A I think our words are quite clear.

Q Yes. Let me just -- I'm sorry. So, in other words, even though you said that, in your initial statement to the Court, that you did not want to accept any Court ruling on Central American issues --

A Well, we have taken our case on jurisdiction to the Court.

Q Yes. So (inaudible) .

A It is not a question of saying we don't accept jurisdiction or not making that case for the court.

Q You're not saying, whatever they decide, you're not going to carry out?

A I'm not saying that, no.

Q John, are you stressing the fact that the ruling is not inconsistent with current U.S. policies in regard to Nicaragua because, as a matter of simple fact, the mining has stopped?

A As you know, we have not responded to questions relating to mining and alleged covert activity, but I think you might read the statement concerning current activity in conjunction with allegations that have been made.

Q Is it consistent to continue to seek additional funds for the Contras?

A Yes, it is.

Q John, are you saying that if the Court decides that it has jurisdiction, that you will then abide by its decision?

A I'm saying that we respect the Court and the rule of law, and we intend to act accordingly. And what we're going to do now is press for resolution on the matter of jurisdiction.

Q John, when did the phrase "current policy and activities" begin? Can you give us a date of what "current" means -- when that started? We understand that means today, but --

A I can't. This is today's statement and speaks for itself.

Q So, it's at least as of today, but you're not making any comment as to how much before today the U.S. policy was consistent with the ruling?

A No.

Q John, on the question of jurisdiction, are you saying in that statement that the United States now recognizes the World Court's right to refuse to accept the unilateral statement made previously by the United States?

A What we're saying is that we are arguing the case on jurisdiction before the Court, and we fully expect that that argument will proceed expeditiously.

Q And by arguing it in the Court itself, is that not implicitly accepting the Court's right to accept or reject the U.S. unilateral statement?

A We respect the Court and the rule of law and we expect to act accordingly.

Q Do you still reserve the right to ignore the Court, John, to ignore the Court's findings?

A I will leave you with our statement concerning respect for the Court and law.

Q I have a question which perhaps you should clarify with respect to, I think it was Barrie's question. He asked you, is it consistent with seeking additional funds for the Contras, and your reply was, "Yes." Do you want to stick with that statement?

A There is no change in the Administration's request for funds in connection with that particular activity. There is no change in that.

Q Another area.

Q Wait a minute. The Court ruling today used the phrase "paramilitary activity" in connection with Nicaragua. Is it your -- I'm not sure I'm phrasing the question properly here -- but is it your view that your statement about consistent U.S. policy covers, and the continuing to seek money for these activities that you just mentioned is consistent with that phrase, "paramilitary activity?"

A Yes. Well, what I'm saying is -- what I do not want to do here is argue the substance of the case which clearly may or may not be argued somewhere else. But the fact is, I just refer you to arguments that have been used, position that has been stated in terms of collective self-defense in the past, and I would just reiterate our statement that our activities and policy are not inconsistent with what the Court is asking.

Q John, do you have any idea at all as to how long it will take before the Court decides the jurisdictional issue -- any notion?

A I do not have an idea, but we certainly intend to proceed with dispatch, and we think there is a clear obligation on the part of the Court to proceed very expeditiously.

Q If the Court decides that it does have continued jurisdiction despite the U.S. statement, you will then accept the further judgments of the Court on the substance of the issue?

A   Well, I think that statements we have made in the past tend to lead one in that direction, and I'm going to ask you to stand with the language that we have offered you today, namely that we certainly respect the Court and the rule of law, and we intend to act accordingly.

I cannot outline a scenario that would take place under every conceivable possibility, but I think that is the thrust of what we're saying.

Q   But your earlier statement last month was that you would not accept judgments by the Court in the area of Central America for the next two years.

A   Well, I don't think that's correct. I think what we were talking about was jurisdiction. That doesn't mean that we're not prepared to argue the case for jurisdiction and, hopefully, win it.

Q   John, how do you feel about the fact that the Court has come up with this interim finding before resolving the jurisdiction issue?

A   I guess we'll have to leave that for the international jurists to analyze and comment upon.

Q   John, would you say you're backing off your previous position on this?

A   Not at all.

Q   What difference does it make any more if you're saying you're going to act in accordance with the rule of law and that you respect the Court.

A   Uh-huh.

Q   Why bother to go ahead and argue the jurisdictional issue?

A   It's an important one.

Q   It's an important one because it deals not -- in the way it deals not with Central America, but in the way it deals with future --

A   Well, we're arguing it in this particular case, but it's an important one in general; but certainly, in this particular case it's important.

Q John, when you announced this last month, you cited the example of other nations that have done similarly in the past. Do you have any information as to how those cases came out and whether the countries which did that accepted the Court's rulings?

A I don't. I'm sure that's a matter of record, but I don't happen to have it with me.

Q I'm sorry -- one more time: Would it be possible to, when a reading is available and you have read the full text, to put up some guidance or have a briefing which would go over the four judgments that were accorded in the Court's summary today?

A Carry that request to the appropriate folks, sure.

Q Thank you.

A I mean I don't know what the outcome will be.

Q Do you have any comment on the reports that the leader of the so-called Libyan Opposition Front is in Washington?

A No, I do not. We know nothing about it, and he certainly has no appointments scheduled with anybody in the State Department.

Q Aside from having appointments or not, is he in Washington now?

A We are not aware that he is. We are not aware that he is.

Q Are you ready to provide him with assistance, literally or financially?

A Well, I don't even know that he is here, so it's kind of an academic question.

Q John, can we have a copy of that World Court statement?

A Sure.

Q John, could I just go back to the World Court to make sure I understand this? Are you saying that if you loose the case for jurisdiction, and the Court comes up with a ruling that is unfavorable to the United States, still the United States is prepared to abide by that ruling?

A Well, I'm saying once again that we respect the Court and the rule of law, and we intend to act accordingly; and certainly, everything in that statement tends to support the conclusion you're directing.

As I say, I cannot totally rule out or foresee every possible scenario, but I wouldn't quarrel with the deduction that you're making.

Q What is the next step from now on, John, in terms of procedures? Is the Court --

A Tomorrow we talk to the Court about scheduling, and we move from there.

Q Let's say the Court decides against the United States on this jurisdictional matter. Is there any appeal? Is it possible to appeal it? What is the procedure?

A An appeal of that --

Q -- of that decision on jurisdiction?

A I don't know. You've gone beyond my expertise.

Q I just wanted to have an idea of how much time it is going to take.

A As I say, we think the jurisdictional question should be disposed of rapidly.

Q John, going back to Libya for a second, do you have any comment on the charge by Mr. Qadhafi of British and U.S. involvement in the attack?

A Have to let the British speak for themselves, which I think they already have done.

Q Right.

A   But any suggestion of U.S. involvement is totally false. The United States was not aware in advance of these events and certainly was not a participant or involved in any shape or form.

-- MORE --

Q John, do you have anything on the Libyans arrested in Philadelphia?

A I think the FBI may have something on that, and, basically, I guess I'd refer you to them. But I understand the Philadelphia office of the FBI has announced the arrest of two Libyan nationals. They hold student visas. I probably won't do a very good job of pronouncing the names, but anyway the two individuals are Mr. Bashir Ali Baesho, B-a-e-s-h-o, and Mr. Mehdi Belgasem Hitewesh, H-i-t-e-w-e-s-h. I am told that is the phonetic pronouncement.

They were arrested in Philadelphia for violation of the National Firearms Act. I don't have any more details.

Q Do they have any connection with the shootings in Tripoli?

A I don't have anything more for you. Talk to the FBI.

Q John, there are reports that Mr. Arens is in town, Mr. Moshe Arens --

A Mr. Arens?

Q Yes.

A That's right. You asked me that a couple of days ago, and we were checking that out. I'm not --

MR. ROMBERG: There's a posted answer on it.

MR. HUGHES: There's a posted answer.

Q Well, we saw the posted answer, but my --

A You have the advantage of me.

Q -- information this morning is that he's in town, and he will be meeting with officials. On this --

A I don't know. What does the posted answer say?

Q The President, in his speech last night about Central America, repeated a theme which has been sort of central in -- somehow about the PLO involvement in Central America or Nicaragua, and they said it was last year in a paper put out by some organization here in the -- it had some association with the White House -- that the PLO is involved in training and other things in Nicaragua and Central America and other areas.

Can the State Department or this Government specifically put out a White Paper about the PLO involvement in Central America, to put to rest all of these charges, whether it's from the President or the State Department or other areas, to show that there is real involvement there. It concerns so many people in the Arab world to know if they are really involved or they just, you know, are hearsay or some charges which are not justified?

A Okay.

Q Can you look into this?

A I don't know about a White Paper, but let us look and see whether there's anything that we might be able to --

Q Why was Ambassador Dobrynin here today?

A He was to have seen, and I assume he did see, the Secretary.

Q Was it at our -- the American request, or --

A That was a Soviet request of some days ago.

Q (Inaudible)

A I don't know.

Q No subject matter or anything like that?

A No. It was their request.

Q (Inaudible)

A But I think you should see it within the context of the ongoing meetings between the Secretary and Mr. Dobrynin, if you're groping for something special. I'm not aware that it was anything other than those continuing discussions, and all kinds of subjects might have come up.

Q Anything on Mr. Kozlov today?

A I understand he's still as he was yesterday.

Q Are you saying that the Olympics were not a subject?

A No. I'm not saying that. What I'm saying is that I think you should see the request for this meeting in the context of the continuing meetings between the Secretary and Mr. Dobrynin. I also said, obviously, all kinds of questions could come up.

Q John, would you characterize the people who made the attack in Tripoli as freedom fighters?

A I don't know any more about it then you do. Just seen the same reports you have.

Q You don't have a particular or a very defined attitude towards those people?

A No. We don't have a very full account of it. We've seen the same reports that you have.

Q Are they from the army, or are they opposition?

A I don't know.

Q John, on the Iran-Iraq war, do you have anything on the latest Iraqi attacks on the --

A I don't, Bill. No. I'm sorry. No.

Q Is there any feeling that those attacks could interfere with freedom of navigation in the Gulf?

A Well, our position on freedom of navigation remains one of concern and commitment, but I don't have anything new for you.

Q John, can you describe what the jurisdictional issue is? Is it whether the Court accepts our contention that we should suspend their judgments in Central America? Is that what you mean by the jurisdictional --

A I think I'd ask you to go back to some of the earlier text and BACKGROUNDER on that because I'm really not up to speed on what has been said before on that, and I'd ask you to go back to it.

Q John, do you have anything on the Costa Rican request for aid, military aid, and the article in the Post this morning?

A   Well, it's something that is under discussion.

Q   It's still under discussion?

A   I don't have any decision.

Q   There's been no official request on -- by the parties?

A   We're in touch with the Costa Rican Government on this and talking with them about it.

Q   Can you clarify the U.S. policy with respect to Costa Rica's declaration of neutrality --

A   Sure.

Q   -- in the context of this --

A   They're a sovereign country.

Q   I'm sorry?

A   They're a sovereign country, and their foreign policy is their business.

Q   Just to cross the t's and dot the i's on that, what you're saying is that there's no wish on the part of the Administration to change that neutrality?

A   Costa Rica is a sovereign country and pursues its own foreign policy, and that's not our business.

Q   John, you are always saying that the Costa Ricans do not have their own armed forces, so how are you going to channel the military assistance to Costa Rica?

A   I think they have a police force, and I think it's called a Civil Guard. I mean, they have a law enforcement body, but they don't have an army, as I understand it.

Q   So it is going to be channeled to the police --

A   Oh, yes. It seems so. Yes.

Q   -- force.

A Sure.

Q John, there were a couple of stories in the last --

A When I say "police," I may -- you know, I may have my terminology wrong. I think it's Civil Guard --

Q Rural Guard.

A Rural -- whatever. I mean, the existing law enforcement agency, I assume, would receive this -- would receive that material.

Q There were a couple of stories in the last issue of the Jerusalem Post, which I need your comment on. One story says about -- that there is a split in the State Department regarding the Jerusalem bill between the Counselor for the Department, Mr. Derwinski, and Mr. Murphy, and there is a compromise going on, or discussion about compromise.

A I am not aware of any change in the Administration's position. The President's been very firm on this issue, the Secretary has been very firm on it, and I'm not aware of any change in that posture or in the firmness of that posture.

Q And the second story is about a report that U.S.-Israeli joint military cooperation will begin within two or three months, with the replacement or stationing of medical supplies and other things. This is a front-page story.

A Medical supplies?

Q Yes. And later on which will lead to complete cooperation.

A (To staff) Anything on that? Don't know -- haven't got anything on that for you.

Q Can you look into these stories?

A We'll take a look at it.

Q John, do you have any comment on developments in El Salvador where the ARENA Party is charging fraud and has withdrawn from the vote counting?

A Well, yes, although I guess there's a little confusion about what in fact was said. The unofficial vote-count of the Christian Democratic Party shows Mr. Duarte winning by 54 percent to 46 percent. These are, of course, unofficial figures, and we'll all have to wait for the official count to be completed by the Central Election Council.

Our understanding is that ARENA is not at this time claiming overall victory in the election, although arguing that the PDC unofficial vote-count is inflated and misleading. According to the FBIS transcript of his May 9 press conference, ARENA presidential candidate Roberto D'Aubuisson stated that ARENA won a majority of the vote in ten of El Salvador's 14 Departments. PDC figures also show ARENA winning those ten Departments by a margin of 52 percent to 48 percent. However, these ten Departments account for only 37 percent of the total vote.

The vote-count by the Central Elections Commission resumed Wednesday evening. In an effort at fairness, the CCE has excluded the PDC from participation in the vote-count since ARENA is boycotting the count. Legally, the presence of neither party is required for the count to proceed, and each will have full opportunity to question the count if it desires.

Q Well, do you have any comment on statements by Mr. Duarte in this morning's Washington Times that ARENA is not democratic and is not qualified to participate in the democratic process in El Salvador?

A No. Don't have any comment on that.

Q John, do you have any comment on the Danish Parliament decision today on funding for the installation of the missiles in Europe?

A No, I don't, Ralph. Sorry.

Q Could you take that question?

A Let me take a look at it.

Q Back on El Salvador, The Wall Street Journal amplified certain charges that were made by Senator Helms today.

A Uh-huh.

Q Provided numbers. Do you have any comment on that, or the report that Senator Leahy has protested --

A No, I don't.

Q -- any involvement to Secretary Shultz?

A No.

Q In other words, you stay by exactly what you said yesterday?

A Sure do. Okay?

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 1:11 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Monday, May 14, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #85

MONDAY, MAY 14, 1984, 12:40 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. Two announcements.

First, to tell you what you may know already, that available in the Press Office is the text of a speech to be delivered today by Ambassador Edward L. Rowny in Cleveland at a leadership meeting co-sponsored by the Department and the Cleveland Council on World Affairs. The subject of the speech is "Arms Control and Current U.S.-Soviet Relations." It is embargoed until delivery, which I think is in about 20 minutes, but you might check that. I don't know whether that's 1:00 p.m. Eastern time or Central time.

Also, the Secretary's speech has been made available to you, I believe, on an embargoed basis, and the -- all the Fates willing, it will be piped in here at about 3:00 p.m. Let me pre-emptively say to you that I do not expect that he will read all portions of that speech, for reasons of time, but that he stands by the text. So we've run into this before, where he's cut down in order not to be speaking for as long as the text would have him, but he stands by what is in the speech.

Q Is there Q&A in that?

A I don't know the answer to that. Sorry. Maybe we could find out and let you know.

Okay. That's it for announcements. Happy to take your questions.

Q Do you know anything about the American couple who had been kidnapped in Sri Lanka?

A I don't have very much for you at this point. We cannot confirm as of this point the wire story that they have been found. We're aware, obviously, of those reports, and we hope that they are either correct as of this moment or will prove to be correct shortly. But I really am not going to have any further comment until we get reporting suggesting that that's appropriate.

1-1297

Q Do you know if any ransom was paid?

A I don't have anything on any aspect of it. Our policy on -- U.S. Government policy on ransom is quite clear -- we do not pay it -- but in terms of any details, Jim, on this case whatsoever, I simply don't have anything for you.

Q Alan --

Q Do you have any comment on --

A Marvin?

Q On the Olympic issue, it's alleged today that on April 27 there was a meeting here in the State Department between U.S. officials and Soviet officials --

A That's right.

Q -- which is described as a rather critical one, and on the basis of which the Russians made their decision not to participate. Do you have any background on that?

A All right. Let me give you some, and we may have something for you also later in the day. First --

Q Did you say April 11?

A No, 27th. First of all, let me say I saw some wire accounts quoting Mr. Gramov in discussing concerns the U.S. Government might be involved in activities such as mind-affecting chemicals, kidnapping, that he was concerned about death of his athletes, and so on. I think that this is -- these charges are outrageous and totally inexcusable.

As far as a meeting is concerned, yes, there was a meeting. It was between Counselor Derwinski and Mr. Isakov of the Soviet Embassy. It was the first opportunity, actually, we had officially to present to the Soviets the various things that we've already told you about, which had been presented through the Los Angeles Committee before. We had sought to present them through our Embassy in Moscow, and the Soviets had declined to have the meetings.

But Counselor Derwinski did present the various points we're talking about, and maybe we can get you some more detail on that, Marvin, looking into that.

Q Is that in the form -- the more detailed will come in the form of a handout?

A Possibly.

Q Was that an angry meeting, Alan? How would you describe that?

A I don't have -- I wasn't there, and I don't know, but my recollection of accounts I've seen of that meeting would not suggest it was an angry meeting. I think that the Soviets raised their points, and we responded to those points. Although, in fact, we invited them to the meeting to make clear what our position was on the various concerns that had been raised.

Q Was that a -- was it a reassurance meeting? In other words --

A I think you'll see if -- let's hold off on this, Bernie, until we can try to get you something to give you in writing, which would provide you some better perspective on what it was that we said in that meeting.

The answer is -- essentially the answer is we provided them the information that we have already given out here on the security measures which are being taken, and so on and so forth, so that they were officially informed of our efforts in those areas.

Q What was the problem with the Soviets declining to accept comparable reassurances from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow?

A I guess you'd have to ask the Soviets.

Q There was a flat rejection of that offer?

A Well, I don't know what the dynamic of it was, but we had wanted to do this through the Embassy, and they had not wanted to do that. They have been primarily trying to deal only through LAOC.

Q Only through --

A The Los Angeles Organizing Committee.

Q Alan, can you tell us, is the U.S. concerned that the Dutch may renege on their commitment to deploy these cruise missiles?

A Well, I think we've addressed this before. I don't have anything specific beyond what we have said before, that these decisions were taken, obviously, in 1969. They were Alliance decisions, and --

Q 1979.

A -- '79. Excuse me. '79. They were Alliance decisions, and they were things to which all the governments addressed themselves and which all the various governments, I think, expected the arrangements will be completed. But --

Q Would we accept a staggered installation --

A Well, you're going back over something which is now several weeks old, and I would ask you, if you would, to look back at what's been said on this.

Q Alan, getting back a second to the Olympic question, at the meeting on the 27th, was there -- did the U.S. receive from the Soviet Union anything more than questions about security? Did it -- or questions about arrangements for the delegation, or did it receive an indication at that time that the Soviets were planning to announce they would not come to the Olympics?

A Oh, I don't think that there was any specific indication that "If you don't do the following things, that we're not coming to the Olympics." Obviously, they have been raising their concerns. They've raised them in public previously, and, I suppose, one could say that that always is something that lies in the background when one raises a question about those kinds of issues. But was there a suggestion in the meeting that "If you don't fulfill our conditions, we won't come," no.

Q I guess I'm getting to the idea of, did the U.S. realize on the 27th, after that meeting, the depth of problem the Soviets were having? I mean, did you think at that time that they were just raising issues, raising questions here, to be -- to see what they could get, or did you have the feeling after that meeting that that may have been -- the answers provided at that meeting may have been a make or break situation for the presence at the Olympics?

A I can't really answer, not having been there. But I think that the fact is that the answers provided on that occasion and on other occasions through the Los Angeles Committee and the various meetings that have been held made it clear that the United States was making every effort to assure that the games could go forward with the free and open participation of all of the athletes. We've given you the list of the things that were and, indeed, are continuing to be planned in the security area.

We've talked about the fact that while we do not step on free speech in this country, nonetheless the demonstrators would not have been allowed in certain areas, the Olympic venues, or in the area around the Soviet ship, and so on. So all of those points were made.

Q Alan, did the -- when that meeting took place on the 27th of April, were the Russians at that point making it clear to the U.S. that they would not join in the Olympics?

A I think that's what Ralph just asked. The answer is, no, they were not saying, "If you don't do these things, we're not coming to the Olympics."

Q Do you remember any other specifics, Alan, from that meeting?

A No. I think that we ought to hold off on further discussion of this and see if I can get you something later on.

Q Alan, do you have anything on an allegation in the Saturday Times, I guess it was, that USIA involved itself in the Salvadoran elections to the extent of subsidizing some journalists?

A Well, USIA -- I think that the article actually talked about -- also talked about CIA, which --

Q I didn't ask you about CIA.

A That's fine, and I don't intend to respond to that part of it. (Laughter) However --

Q You won't respond to the part of the question that wasn't asked?

A That's right. USIA-sponsored and funded journalist tours are a legitimate and open function of the U.S. Information Agency, and the two foreign journalists' trip to Central America, which were discussed, were programs of the U.S. Information Agency's Foreign Press Center in

Washington. The participants traveled to Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. There was nothing secret or covert about the trips. The correspondents were exposed to the full spectrum of political opinion in each of the countries.

A third trip for Venezuelan journalists, in which a Colombian journalist also participated, was proposed by the USIS office in Caracas and took place in March 1984. It was intended, as were the previous trips, to acquaint the reporters with a full range of issues and U.S. policy in Central America. In every instance, participants had ample opportunities to seek interviews independently. Any additional details should be sought from USIA.

-- MORE --

Q   Copy of that?

A   Sure.

Q   Alan, a related question?

A   Spence?

Q   We have asked for free and fair elections in the Philippines, and yet there has been no U.S. delegation to go there to observe. Was this a government decision, or why haven't we sent observers?

A   Well, as you say, there is no official observer delegation. As I understand it, the Senate and House were invited by the Philippine Parliament but they declined because of a heavy legislative schedule. But our Embassy in Manila is, of course, covering the election and has observers throughout the country.

Q   Do you have any comment generally on the elections --

A   Thus far, obviously it's early. They've just gone through the day. But our Embassy in Manila reports there was a heavy turnout and generally peaceful conditions. There were a few reports of violence in areas where the communist NPA -- the New People's Army -- is active; and there have also been some reports of ballot box snatching by the NPA. Also there have been scattered reports of irregularities such a vote buying and illegal voters.

We had made clear our commitment to free and fair elections everywhere in the world. On these particular elections, it simply is too early to make judgments. As I say, there have been scattered reports of irregularities, but we don't have anything more at this particular point.

Q   Alan, do you have any reaction to a story that came out Sunday from Mexico about the Mexican concern with three countries that support the United States sabotaging the Contadora efforts? This is El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica supposedly had not cooperated in that effort.

A   No. It seems to me that those governments have already spoken somewhat to that issue, and we had the Foreign Minister's statement, which we made it -- I guess it was made available when they left here. But I suppose that in the course of President de la Madrid's visit that he will be speaking to the press and perhaps that -- his concerns could be addressed at that point. But I don't think we would agree that the three states have been an obstacle in any way. Certainly, they have their own concerns to see that the 21 point document of objectives is implemented. So I think -- other than saying that we continue to support that process very strongly, I don't really have anything further.

Q Alan, is the Department planning to put out information backing McFarlane's statement yesterday that Cuba is going to double its effort in El Salvador?

A No. We get into the problem of sensitive sourcing, and I think I will not go beyond what Bud said yesterday.

Q What about the documenting the arms flow from Nicaragua to El Salvador?

A I don't have anything new to give you on that, but I think that -- we've made various statements on that recently. I think Ambassador Pickering has talked to that, but I don't have a report to offer you.

Q There's no plan to release documentation to support that?

A I don't know of any plan to do so.

Q Alan, back to the question on the kidnapping in Sri Lanka. Did Vice President Bush make any effort to secure the release while he was in India; and what does it do to Indo-U.S. relations, coming at a time when he was there?

A I think that I would withhold any comment at all on that event until we are sure that the Americans are safe, and just simply as a matter of prudence to not complicate the situation. I think that the Indian Government, and the government of the state opposite, Sri Lanka, has issued statements appealing for their release, and we certainly have welcomed the efforts that have been made in that regard. But I don't have anything beyond that to say.

George, I gather you think that there are plans being made to release something. I haven't heard of that, so -- that may be correct. I don't know.

All right, go ahead, Carolyn.

Q Would you comment on possible CIA involvement? There are reports.

A Involvement in what?

Q In the Sri Lankan kidnapping?

A No, I wouldn't comment on any CIA alleged involvement in anything.

Jim?

Q On this Tet question, I don't understand exactly what's being said. Is the notion here that the Cubans have under their control, outside of Salvadoran territory, twice as many Salvadorans, or as many again Salvadorans as are fighting in Salvadoran territory? I mean, is it a matter of arms supplies, a matter of bringing people in; what's being talked about?

A I'm not going to get into detail. I think, again, you had it from an authoritative source yesterday, the general dimensions of what we're talking about. But the obvious point, and the essential point, is that there is reason to believe that an effort is underway for a significant effort being made this fall.

Q Can I follow up for just a second?

A Uh-hum.

Q You're not going to like this question. The President mentioned communism --

A Then don't ask it. (Laughter)

Q -- or communist -- that's not an answer to a question. The President mentioned communist or communism many, many times in his speech, and that, in some respects, is a departure from other -- from previous speeches in describing the situation in Central America, although it may be a departure only of degree and not of kind.

What I'd like to know is, does the State Department have a definition of what it means when it warns against this communist or communism in the hemisphere?

A Oh, you're right. It's not a matter of not liking the question. I'm not going to answer a question about a President's speech which was more than clear in what it said, and I'd refer you to the text.

Q I'm not saying that you should comment --

A Yes, you are. You're asking me to try and pick apart points, and I'm just not going to start getting into that or into philosophical dialogue with you about what communist is.

Q Alan, the Minister of Science and Technology, Yuval Ne'eman, last week made a very dangerous remark that he almost justifies and rationalize the acts of terrorism and bus-bombing and other things.

Another statement coming out in FBIS today, on Page I-1, says that he makes some differentiation between terrorism on colleges and buses and assassination attempts on the West Bank mayors; this statement coming from a responsible Minister in the Israeli Cabinet. Do you have any comment on that?

A Yes, we had some guidance on this last week. It's in the Press Office, and I refer you to it. Obviously, we do not in any way condone terrorism. We condemned the attacks on the mayors when they took place, and we certainly don't back away in any way from that. But let me refer you to that guidance.

Q My second question. Mr. Uri Lubrani, who is the coordinator of Israeli activities in Lebanon, on the same page of I-1 today of FBIS, says that the three Israelis which were captured by Lebanon and were handed over to the Syrians a few days ago acted irresponsibly in their behavior in Lebanon. Do you have any comment on that.

A I think I've indicated before that commenting from here is not going to be helpful to resolution of that problem, and I don't intend to do that. But obviously we would hope that that problem would be resolved quickly.

Bill?

Q Do you have any assessment of the Lusaka meeting on Namibia?

Q Alan, could you give a filing break to those who want to watch the President at 1:00?

A Yes. Filing break. Okay.

The question was on the Lusaka meeting on Namibia. While we were not involved in that meeting, we shared the hope that -- may I go on?

While we were not involved in that meeting, we shared the hope that it could help overcome some of the distrust between the parties to the Namibia conflict and thereby contribute to a climate of mutual confidence in southern Africa that would permit the earliest possible resolution of the issues standing in the way of implementation of Security Council Resolution 435.

From the accounts we have received, the meeting did provide a forum for the sort of frank, direct talks among the parties that has been lacking. And that's really my reaction to that.

Q Copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q Do you have anything on the arms sales report by the Congressional Research Service?

A I have a little bit on that, Jim. It basically is to invite your close reading of that report. The Congressional Research Service report tends to confirm what we have said about arms sales to the Third World in the August 1982 special report. That is, that the "ever-increasing upward spiral" is a myth. In fact, the Congressional report points out that the real value of all Third World arms transfers in 1983 was the lowest since 1976.

The Third World arms market has become increasingly erratic -- as our 1982 report indicated -- on a year-to-year basis. Large, multi-billion dollar arms sales can radically skew supplier rankings. It just happens that both France and the Soviet Union had particularly low years in 1983, thus raising the apparent U.S. share of the Third World market.

In addition, the U.S. dollar figures include substantial amounts of military construction, in which the Soviets and others do not engage to any significant extent.

So, as I said, one hopes that that report will be read closely.

Q Copy, please?

A Yes.

Q Are there any "if asked only" on that guidance?

A Nope.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 1:00 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, May 15, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #86

TUESDAY, MAY 15, 1984, 12:33 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: I have a housekeeping announcement up front, and then an annoucement of somewhat greater significance.

Firstly, the Arms Control Agency's annual report, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, which covers the period 1972 to 1982, is available in the Press Office. For those of you wishing a BACKGROUND briefing on the current report, you might want to be in touch with the Public Affairs Office of ACDA. That's 632-8714; 632-8714.

Secondly, we have some good news relating to Mr. and Mrs. Allen, the Americans who were taken captive in Sri Lanka. Just a few minutes before we came out here, we got word that about 45 minutes ago Mr. and Mrs. Allen -- I think their first names are Stanley and Mary -- were released at a house in Jaffna Town. That is at the northern end of the island. They were released at 8:15 p.m. local Sri Lanka time, which was about 11:45 -- which was 11:45 this morning our time. They are presently in the protection of the police and with an American Embassy officer. They are in good spirits. They are in good health, and obviously overjoyed to be alive and free.

They will have to spend the night in Jaffna, it being dark there now, and then they will be brought by airplane to Colombo first thing tomorrow morning.

The United States offers its heartfelt thanks to the Government of Sri Lanka, to the Government of India, and to the Government of the State of Tamil Nadu for their close cooperation in freeing the Allens, and we have notified their families in this country.

That's about all I have for you because we just got word by phone on this just before I came out.

Q On that subject, was there any wherewithall, ransom, or other demands met, or given to their kidnappers?

A I don't know for sure the answer to that question, Jim. But we have nothing to indicate that a ransom was, in fact, paid. I cannot answer the question with total knowledge because, obviously, things are going on at the scene, but we have no indication that such a ransom was paid.

Q What role -- can you tell us what role the Governments of India and the State of Tamil Nadu played?

A They were helpful.

Q But were they ever in Indian territory?

A I really, in the interest of giving you this just as fast as we got it, have given you all I've got. I really don't have any more. Probably -- possibly during the day, although it is night there, but should we get more during the day, I'll be happy to move that along to you.

Q John, do you have anything to say about the report that Iran may have attacked that Kuwaiti ship the other day; and what this means for this general situation?

A Can't -- you know, we've seen those reports, Bernie, and we've seen the reports of eyewitnesses who claim that the attack was made by Iranian aircraft. But that's really about the extent of our knowledge. We're naturally deeply concerned that the recent attacks on international shipping in the Persian Gulf represent a dangerous escalation of the Iran-Iraq war and a growing threat to freedom of navigation in the Gulf. We call on both belligerents to desist from such hostilities and to implement the United Nations Security Council Resolution 540, which reaffirms the right of free navigation and commerce in international waters and calls on both parties to cease attacks on economic targets.

We reiterate our belief that there can be no military resolution of the conflict between Iran and Iraq, as well as our strong, long-standing commitment to the principle of freedom of navigation and the right of innocent passage through the straits.

Q Copy?

A Sure.

Q John, do you have any comment on the Philippine election at this point?

Q Can we finish up with this?

A Let's take Jim first.

Q Yeah, what is the United States prepared to do to guarantee the freedom of navigation?

A I think we've made statements about our concern in the past and we won't go beyond those, Jim. I refer you back to the language which we have used, which underlines the commitment but does not become very specific.

Q In the past when this subject has come up, it's usually been in the context of possible naval mining, which is one thing. Do you have -- does the government have plans to deal with this sort of threat?

A What do you mean?

Q In aircraft and missiles?

A I don't think we will get into what -- basically, what you're asking, Jim, is operational plans, and I think we won't get into that.

Q John, one aspect of this that hasn't come up is that we've talked about the closing of the Persian Gulf due to military action, whereas the new fear is that the Persian Gulf may, in effect, be closed to much of the world's traffic simply because of the way the marketplace reacts, which is to say fear added to far higher insurance rates; has that been taken into account as --

A It's obviously something that's being considered, and you're aware of what's happening in the area of insurance rates, but I'm not aware of any suggestion that the flow is about to dry up.

Q John, do you have anything on the developments regarding the Egyptian proposal for ending the war in the Gulf?

A No, I don't.

Q You still have -- you are still in contact with the Egyptians in this regard, or just --

A I'm not answering your question specifically, but I'm sure we are in touch with a lot of people about the Gulf situation. It's something that we're concerned about.

Q John, for the last couple of months you are never sure who hit this tanker or that tanker. You want to tell us that you don't have any surveillance there? I mean, who hit that one or who is responsible for that one? You never confirm at all, really; why?

A I'm not sure. I think we have once or twice given you all the information we have which would tend to confirm specific attacks, but I think in general we have not been able to confirm the targets; that's correct.

Q Why?

A Simply because of the information we have available.

Q John, there are reports in the Gulf that after the trip of Mr. Murphy and Admiral Poindexter from the National Security Council to the Gulf, and the talks with some Arab leaders there, that the United States was coming with a proposal to station members or forces of the Rapid Deployment Force, which is now U.S. Central Command, and this is one of the reasons that the mission, as the reports say, failed and there was no coordination with the Gulf states about trying to protect the area, because you put the condition that we would like to station all forces (inaudible) in the Gulf; what do you comment on these things?

A Well, I don't have any comment on that. That mission, obviously among other things, was to discuss the situation in the Gulf and the deterioration and the increasing danger there, but I don't have anything on specifics of discussions between ourselves and the various countries.

Q John, you made reference to "dangerous escalation," in reference to this latest attack. I'm not quite sure I understand why this is dangerous escalation, whereas the attacks over the past two months or three months are not or is at all --

A I think the frequency of the attacks and the involvement of -- the alleged involvement -- of two countries, I think clearly is an escalation in that sense; it's a danger.

Q Does it also escalate the U.S. interest in preserving the freedom of navigation or is that --

A I don't think that could be escalated. I think we've always been very clear about that.

Q Has there been any step-up since the Kuwaiti Defense Minister was here, I believe last month? Has there been any step-up in American aid to Kuwait?

A Aid to -- ?

Q Kuwait.

A I'm not aware of any, but I guess if you're talking military aid, I guess you'd have to ask the Pentagon, John.

Q Is there anything new regarding the so-called rapid deployment forces of Jordan for the Gulf area?

A No, I don't.

--MORE--

Q John, do you have any comment on the reports published in Paris about Syrian aircraft carrying weapons to Iran?

A Syrian aircraft carrying weapons to Iran?

Q Yes.

A No, I don't.

Q Philippine elections, John?

A Sure. Not a great deal, I'm afraid. Obviously, the reports are -- that we're getting are still fragmentary. There appears to have been a large turnout. Initial reports indicate that opposition candidates have done well in various parts of the country. While there are reports of irregularities and some violence in certain locations, in many areas the election appears to have been conducted in an orderly fashion, and, obviously, it's too early to say what the final results will be.

Q Does it appear to be a free and fair election at this point?

A I think we'll wait until the more final results are to hand, Spencer.

Q What about a filing break, John?

A Sure. Filing break.

Q Do you have any reaction to the Prime Minister of Jordan's statement on television, which is published in FBIS today on page F-1, that Jordan bought air defense systems from the Soviet Union so they will diversify their weapon system so they will not come under political blackmail like they were -

A No, I don't. That's Jordan's decision to buy those weapons where it wishes.

John?

Q Could you just -- on another subject, are there any ongoing negotiations with the Soviet Union? Cultural, consulate, those old -- is there anything ongoing?

A Well, there are discussions at a number of levels on a variety of topics, John, as the Secretary has said.

Q Well, can you be more specific? Are there any scheduled resumptions of those negotiations?

A I can't give you a shopping list, but there certainly are contacts between Secretary Shultz and Ambassador Dobrynin and at other levels on technical matters.

Q The -- just to be more specific, I mean, on consular and cultural agreement negotiations, are those continuing?

A Well, there certainly -- I'm not quite sure as of today, you know, what the state of play is, but there certainly has been discussion on that particular subject.

Q When did the Secretary last see Dobrynin?

A I think he saw him last week.

Q What is the status of the discussions on the hot-line?

A I can't give you an update on that, Barrie. Those have been ongoing, but I'm not quite sure where they are.

Q There were talks in Moscow a couple of weeks ago.

A I think that's where they are.

Q Do you mean there's been nothing since?

A I think that's where they are -- in Moscow.

Q Do you have anything on Mr. Kozlov?

A No. Nothing on Mr. Kozlov.

Q You don't -- you don't anticipate or perceive a freezing of contacts by the Soviets with this government across the board? I mean, I --

A One doesn't anticipate. I think one looks at -- in terms of -- as the Secretary has on many occasions said, one of the cornerstones of the Administration's policy is realism, so I think one looks at the facts as they develop with a realistic viewpoint.

Q John, in that vein, though, do you have any comment on the announcement yesterday by the Soviets of the deployment of additional missiles in East Europe -- East Germany?

A I do. I don't think there is very much there that is new, Ralph. The Soviets announced last year their intention to deploy additional nuclear-capable missiles to East European states, purportedly in response to U.S. LRINF deployments. In the view of the United States, there is no justification whatsoever for any Soviet counterdeployments in view of their current nuclear and conventional advantages.

The Soviets have long deployed nuclear-capable ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads for these systems in Eastern Europe, and they've long planned to modernize their nuclear forces in Eastern Europe and the Western U.S.S.R. The development of many of those systems began long before NATO's 1979 dual-track decision.

Q Copy of that, please, John?

A Sure. Yes, sure.

Q John, the Syrians are talking about what they call one of the largest Israeli military movements in the Bekaa Valley since 1982. Do you have any information about this --

A No, I don't.

Q -- situation there?

A No, I don't.

Q Do you have anything on these alleged secret talks between Syria and Israel?

A No, I don't. I guess you'd have to ask those two countries.

Q John, do you have anything on the meeting today between the Secretary and Dr. Salem of Lebanon?

A I don't. Dr. Salem, as you all know, was Prime Minister of Lebanon and is a Presidential adviser, and this is part of an ongoing dialogue between ourselves and the Government of Lebanon. I think -- in fact, Mr. Salem, I think had asked for this meeting and arranged it some time ago.

Q John, is it possible, to go to the Soviet thing for a minute, for you to take the question about what is ongoing in the -- in relation -

A Let me see whether this --

Q In view of the -- you know, the decision, apparently, by some Soviets last week not to even have lunch with American officials.

A Uh-huh.

Q I think it would be interesting to find out what --

A Okay. Sure. Let me take a look at it for you.

Q Afghanistan, John? Anything on that?

A Afghanistan? No. Sorry.

Q John, there are reports from Israel that the Israeli Embassy will pretty soon launch a campaign to influence the United States Government not to sell military refueling planes to Egypt, and this will be the first time that Israel will go on record having a public campaign against selling any arms from the United States.

A Uh-huh.

Q What do you comment on that?

A No. Don't have anything on that.

MR. ROMBERG: We have some guidance.

Q I mean, what's the status of this?

A Alan is telling me there was some guidance yesterday.

Q You have guidance?

I-1268

A Yes.

Q Do you have any guidance with respect to a prisoner exchange that was carried out last week in El Salvador between the military and the guerrillas?

A I don't.

Q Do you have anything on D'Aubuisson's formal challenge?

A Well, no more than recognition of what has happened. We understand Mr. D'Aubuisson lodged a formal appeal of the election results with the Central Election Council. In accordance with the provisions of Salvadoran electoral law, the appeal will be decided by that Commission. It's an internal matter.

Q Follow-up on that, John: Do you have anything -- there's a report out of San Salvador today that President-elect Duarte is coming to the U.S., perhaps as early as Sunday.

A I think -- this certainly may be the case. Insofar as any White House involvement, I think you should ask the White House. I think, as Alan may or may not have said yesterday, there was a suggestion that Mr. Duarte had had a private invitation to come to Washington, and I think he may well accept that, and the timeframe may well be this week, as early as this weekend.

Q But you would certainly be -- I mean, the Secretary would be informed about and be involved --

A Well, as I say, I think in terms of any official announcement involving the White House, you should ask --

Q Oh, I see, for the official --

A -- them. Well, I think I saw a report this morning saying that there was a White House invitation, and I think the White House should respond to that. Of my own knowledge, I think Mr. Duarte had mentioned a private invitation and had expected to be in Washington and probably will be.

Q John, same area: Do you have any update as to when the World Court may now hear arguments on the jurisdiction question?

A I don't, unless Alan has something from yesterday. No, apparently not.

Q Is the U.S. Administration --

A I'm sorry. Go ahead.

Q Is the U.S. Administration observing the coming general elections in Egypt, the same way as in Salvador and Philippines?

A Observing them?

Q Yes.

A Do you want to be a little more specific? (Laughter)

Q As observers.

Q I'll have to stick to the same word.

A Well, he's beginning to sound like a spokesman. (Laughter) I'm not aware of any suggestion that observers, as such, are going to Egypt. If you mean that our Embassy there will perform its usual vigilant reporting --

Q Observer role.

A -- I'm sure that they will.

Q Do you consider these elections as of particular significance in the history of democracy in Egypt or just one of those --

A I'm afraid you have caught me without a response to that. (laughter)

Q John, the Israelis are announcing about building two more settlements in the West Bank at the time that Rabbi Moshe Levinger was arrested, who was leading the Gush Emunim and also settlers in the area.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you have any comment on adding more settlements to the West Bank?

A No change in our position about the unhelpfulness of settlements on the West Bank.

Q And you consider these two settlements unhelpful then?

A Well, I'm not responding to that specific --

Q These two settlements that --

A -- inquiry, because I'm not aware of the specifics, but there's no change in our policy regarding settlements, which is that they are unhelpful to the peace process.

Q John, last Friday the Secretary said that the U.S. will continue its diplomatic presence in Lebanon, and that the U.S. is very much engaged in Lebanon and would like to continue to help to bring a sovereign Lebanon that will -- that is -- would be in accordance with the security arrangements for Israel.

A Uh-huh.

Q Is this a change in position from before, like when the Secretary said that those who abrogated the May 17 agreement are responsible to find a new arrangement?

A No. I don't think there's any contradiction. We have always said that the United States would remain engaged and would remain in a helpful posture. I don't --

Q This is a different vibration, different attitude.

A Don't think so. I wouldn't read anything into that. There's no change in position.

Q The Canadian Government filed a protest note yesterday over the offering of sales of exploration leases in -- off Alaska and British Columbia. Is there any comment on that?

A I'm sorry. Did who file a --

Q The Canadian Embassy -- the Canadian Government filed a protest yesterday with the State Department.

A Ah-hah.

Q Claiming Canadian jurisdiction was being infringed.

A Okay. I'm not aware of that. Sorry.

Q Thank you, John.

(The briefing concluded at 12:52 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Wednesday, May 16, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #87

WEDNESDAY, MAY 16, 1984, 12:21 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: One little announcement up front. Available in the Press Office is the prepared statement by Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Elliott Abrams. That was before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations. The subject of the testimony was "The Problem of Torture." That's all I have.

Q John, on the Persian Gulf, there is another reported attack on a ship. Do you have anything on that?

A We believe that Iranian aircraft conducted the attack on the Saudi tanker, Yanbu Pride. The vessel was well away from the Saudi coastline at the time of the attack. The Yanbu Pride was enroute to the Saudi port of Jubail to take on fuel before completing loading at the Saudi oil facilities at Ras-Tanura. Based on preliminary reports, we believe the vessel and its crew are safe.

The United States deplores this continued series of attacks on international shipping. We refer you to our statement of yesterday concerning other recent attacks. The United States reiterates its firm belief that the attacks on international shipping in the Persian Gulf represent a dangerous escalation of the Iran-Iraq war and a growing threat to freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf.

Q Do you have any thoughts on possible Iranian motives for cutting off shipping, an important part of their economic lifeline?

A No. I think I'd leave that explanation to them.

Q On what do you base your belief that the latest attack was Iranian?

A I don't think we'll get into the basis for our information, Jim.

Q Are we in contact with the various states, or are we willing to do anything to help out?

A I think, Bernie, you can take it as a given that we have been and are in touch, not always directly, with both sides, but with others who are concerned with other governments, and that certainly, both sides have been and are well aware of our concerns.

Q Does this represent, John, these two attacks within a few days of each other, a major new phase in the war, as far as the U.S. Government is concerned?

A Well, I don't know that it's a major new phase in the war, but it certainly is a deterioration of the situation in the Gulf and it's very worrisome.

Q This is a deterioration that this government holds the Iranian Government to be solely responsible for, is that correct?

A Well, both sides have been involved, but certainly the latest incidents, apparently, are caused by Iran.

Q Will Ambassador Murphy be going back to the region, or other senior officials to consult in person?

A I have the feeling that Ambassador Murphy is with the Vice President -- I'm not sure. I think he's already traveling; I think he is with the Vice President.

Q Does the U.S. still have, or are there still American AWACS planes in Saudi Arabia?

A Yes, have been since 1930.

Q Are they engaged in any way in connection with this flow of events in recent days, the attacks on the tankers? Are they assisting the Saudis perhaps, or other countries, with information?

A Well, they have been there since 1980. They are fully operational; they are providing aerial surveillance data for eastern Saudi Arabia and the adjacent Persian Gulf to the Saudi Air Force, to enhance the Saudi Air Force's defense capability. They do not operate outside Saudi air space.

Q John, can they -- they don't operate outside Saudi air space, but are they able to provide assistance to eastern Saudi Arabia in connection with these attacks which occurred off the Saudi coast?

A I think for operational -- the operational capacity of the AWACS, I'll ask you to go talk to the Pentagon, and what they will say I don't know. But as I said, they are providing surveillance of eastern Saudi Arabia and the adjacent Persian Gulf.

Q How many are there --

A I don't know how many there are.

Q Four, is it?

Q (Inaudible)

A I'm told by a reliable network that it's four.

Q Was there any Saudi attempt to intercept the aircraft?

A I guess you'd have to ask the Saudis.

Q A follow up to that, John. Is there any concern that Saudi Arabia, which has a U.S.-equipped Air Force, that the war will spread to Saudi Arabia? Are there any calls, specific calls, for U.S. help coming from any of the Gulf states?

A On the first question, I don't know about the war spreading to Saudi Arabia. You have rising concerns, I think, on the part of various countries. And, clearly, the more of this kind of activity there is, I guess, there is that danger of escalation threatens to draw other people in. That's not really a very direct answer to your question about Saudi Arabia, but the more activity there is, the greater danger for spreading of the conflict.

Insofar as our own back-and-forth with countries in the area, I guess I really am not going to get into any detail on those conversations.

Q John, why only eastern Saudi Arabia?

A Sorry, I can only take one at a time.

Q Can we have a copy of the answer on that -- AWACS?

A Sure. I'll get it.

Q Why only eastern Saudi Arabia?

A I think that is the area agreed upon for their flight path.

Q Could this be because of Israeli objections to other areas of Saudi Arabia --

A I think this is an agreement; these are the operating conditions that were agreed to at the time they were sent there.

Q Do you now believe the Iranians were responsible for the attack on the Kuwaiti tanker, that you cited reports and eyewitness reports for yesterday?

A Don't have anything further on that for you.

Q So as far as you know, there's not confirmation yet, that that's true?

A I don't have anything further on it.

Q John, in the wake of the attack on the Saudi ship, do you care to issue any kind of a statement cautioning Iran or Iraq against a direct attack on Saudi Arabia, or its oil fields, and so forth?

A I don't know about such a statement. But I think that the tenor of what we have said today indicates our increasing concern.

Q But is the United States -- would the United States do anything if Saudi Arabia were attacked?

A I think we won't get into what the United States might or might not do. The President, as you know, has made firm and clear the United States' commitment to freedom of navigation in that area and in the Straits, protection of the Straits, but I don't think we're going to offer a scenario of what that might be.

Q Is that as far as the American shield goes -- to the freedom of the Straits, protection of the passage -- or does it extend as well to protection of the oil fields in Saudi Arabia?

A I think our existing commitments clearly apply. The President has said what he has said, and I don't think I'll go beyond that.

Q John, in that connection, when the President speaks about freedom of navigation, and he has spoken of this

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many times and Larry Speakes talked about it again today, it is clear from what we know so far that a number of shipping companies are reducing the number of ships they're sending into the Persian Gulf, which is already an infrigement of freedom of navigation. So we are dealing already with a matter of degree.

Will the President take action only when there is a total cutoff of access to Persian Gulf oil? Because you are already into a point of infringement of that freedom that he talked about.

A I can't tell you what decisions the President will take at what particular time, Marvin. The fact of the matter is the -- well, I'm not attempting to diminish the seriousness of the situation but the fact is, the Straits are open, and the fact is, that ships are moving. But I don't dispute what you say, that there may well be a reduction of shipping to that area.

Q Have American ships been warned not to go there?

A I can't answer that question, Jim. I'll be glad to take a look at that.

Q Can you be more helpful in terms of whether these two attacks on the Kuwaiti ship and on the Saudi ship are part of what this government believes is a new Iranian effort to target -- specifically target -- other countries that are supporting Iraq, namely, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia?

A Well, I mean I think the facts there -- I can't analyze what the Iranians have targeted, and I can't analyze their motivitations, but I think the facts speak for themselves, and, clearly, you have an escalation of danger in the area.

Q The AWACS, to my knowledge -- and I saw the AWACS here at an Air Force Base a few years ago -- it has a radius of 30 miles and the hit was on the ship around Ras-Tanura, and you say that's in the eastern part -- the eastern coast of Saudi Arabia.

A Uh-hum.

Q Where was the AWACS at the time that the hit was made on the ship?

A Where was it?

Q Yes.

A I think you'll have to ask the Pentagon.

Q The second question is about -- besides your offering what you offered on the negotiations and the talks of Mr. Murphy, that I asked yesterday, and Mr. Poindexter, what is the United States offering now besides these statements coming out? Now that the Gulf Cooperation Council is meeting, or trying to meet -- about to meet -- to discuss the gravity of the situation, what can you offer them?

A No. I don't think we're going to get into what actions the United States might take. The President has made certain statements and made certain commitments. The Gulf states are aware of those commitments.

As you say, we have had a mission in that area, exchanged views. I think there's a clear understanding on both sides of the threat, but I think we're not going to get into discussions of what they might do and what we might do until and if they do such things.

Q John, do you know what military forces we have in the Persian Gulf area? The British have two warships, I think. Do you know offhand what we have?

A Yeah, I do, but I think the Pentagon would have to respond to that.

Q Have there been any AWACS sent out, John, do you know, any additional from --

A I'm not aware of any additional AWACS, John.

Q Has there been a request for any additional?

A I'm not aware of any.

Q John, is it your understanding that the ship that was hit was in Saudi territorial waters or in international waters?

A I'm not -- I can't answer that specifically. I understood that it was between 30 and 40 miles offshore, but I can't answer. I don't know what the territorial -

Q And so the question might depend on the territorial lines.

A It might depend on the territorial lines.

Q Your initial statement left that ambiguous. Could we have --

A It didn't intend to.

Q Could we have a copy of the initial statement, incidentally?

A Sure.

Q John, while still on the same region, do you have any information more than what we're reading about the south Lebanon -- Sidon and Ayn al Hilweh -- affairs?

A Not really. We've seen those reports and we're looking into that question.

Q John, Mr. Ariel Sharon, as you know, he's in the United States and he was on a lecture tour, still on a lecture tour. He spoke to a Jewish synagogue in Kentucky a couple of days ago, and he told his audience that the United States knows that Israel has been selling arms and spare parts to Iran.

The Israeli Government denounced such statements and utterances. What's the position of the United States on such a case?

A Let me take a look at that for you.

Q Just to refine that a bit, does the United States know whether, at this point -- not in the past but at this point -- whether Israel is selling arms to Iran?

A Let me take a look at that for you.

Q What about Syria selling arms to Iran; can you look at that?

A Let me take a look at that for you. (Laughter)

Q John, another subject?

A Sure.

Q Any comment on the completion of the first -- apparently the first major bank credit to the Soviet Union by a West German bank --

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A No, I don't.

Q -- since the invasion of Afghanistan?

A No, I don't.

Q Do you have any comment on the Hungarian decision to pull out of the Olympics?

A No. I think it's something in line with what we have seen as a variety of nations who, one would think would have no particular reason to fear for the security of their athletes have followed the Soviet line.

We are -- as I recall, 17,000 people will be involved in security in Los Angeles, and the United States Government alone, I think, is expending $50 million; would have spent a half million dollars on the security of that Soviet ship in Los Angeles harbor, so as the Secretary has said clearly, the reason for the Soviet Union and others who are following their lead in not coming is not security.

--MORE--

Q John, did the Secretary see Mr. Ueberroth today?

A He has not seen him yet. I think he will at 2:00 o'clock.

Q And that will be at the White House?

A I think it will be at the White House.

Q There is not a separate meeting here?

A No.

Q John, do you have anything new on the elections in the Philippines?

A No. There's no official tally yet, so we don't have any comment on that.

Q And Panama?

A Just an indication from their Ambassador today of what the situation is. The Panamanian Ambassador to the United States has informed us that his country's Electoral Tribunal announced at 4:30 a.m. today -- that was 5:30 this morning our time -- that Nicolas Ardito Barletta is the winner of the presidential election held on Sunday, May 6.

We understand that his announced margin was just over 1,700 votes, out of a total of just about 700,000 votes cast. We are awaiting confirmation and the text of the official announcement from our Embassy in Panama.

Q Do you have any comment --

Q Anything on the Duarte visit, John?

A Duarte visit? Yes. I can go a little -- be a little more informative on that than I was yesterday. Mr. Duarte has accepted the invitation of the World Affairs Council and the Foreign Policy Association to come to Washington to make an address before a joint meeting of the two organizations. As it stands now, he'll be arriving this weekend, but the Embassy or El Salvador can provide the details.

We're pleased that Mr. Duarte will be visiting Washington. This provides an excellent opportunity for him to meet with the Administration and members of Congress and to present his views to the American people. He will be meeting with the President and the Secretary of State, and, as I say, for other details, I guess the Salvadoran Embassy is the place to go.

Q John, I understand that Mr. Moshe Arens will be in town next week, I believe next Tuesday. Do you have any details about where will he be meeting, who he's going to be meeting, in the United States Government?

A I'm not aware that he's meeting -- I mean, I'm not aware that there are any meetings set, but, as always, if Mr. Arens is in Washington and wants to see people in the Government, I'm sure he'll be welcome.

Q Can you post possibly a schedule of meetings?

A I'll look to see if the Secretary has anything scheduled.

Q Can I ask you, with reference to the Duarte visit --

A Sure.

Q -- just a general question about American policy. Does the United States see any need in the wake of this election for another election to be held at some indefinite time in the future that would be internationally supervised and might include opponents of the government who refused to participate in this election?

A Well, (a) that is a matter for El Salvador to decide, but I'm not aware of any thinking in this Administration along those lines. The results of the election were clear cut. Mr. Duarte has been certified, I understand, or is about to be certified. The appeal against the election results has been rejected. That all seems to be fairly clear cut, and I would think would pave the way for El Salvador to go forward with the business of economic development and the other pressing demands upon it.

Q So even if the guerrillas were willing in the future to lay down their arms and participate in an internationally supervised election, this government would not --

A I don't know.

Q -- see such a necessity.

A That's a sort of hypothetical question, but our position on the guerrilla activities up to date has been rather clear.

Q John, do you have anything on the --

Q On Panama, do you have any comment on the opposition complaints of fraud?

A No. No comment.

Q Same area: Do you have anything on the march in San Jose, and what The New York Times claims that it was officially inspired with respect to pressure -- a counter-pressure against the United States?

A No. Our position on Costa Rica's foreign policy is clear. That's a sovereign, independent country, and, as far as the demonstrations are concerned, that seems to be a vibrant expression of Costa Rican democracy.

Q John, do you have anything on the Jewish Congress being held in Morocco?

A Yes. We welcome the action that Morocco has taken in that connection. The United States welcomes that development. The Congress of the Council of Jewish Communities in Morocco is a biannual private event organized by the leaders of Morocco's Jewish community, who this year invited participants from Jewish communities outside of Morocco.

The Moroccan Government, which has traditionally maintained a good relationship with its minority communities, has apparently played a welcoming role to this internationalized meeting in aid of fostering dialogue on a range of questions of interest to countries of the region, and as I say, the United States welcomes that development.

Q Copy, please?

A Sure.

Q Do you have any late word on the Sakharovs?

A I'll give you exactly what we understand to be the situation, but did you have a more specific --

Q Well, there are continuing reports that the hunger strike is going on.

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A Yes.

Q Do you know that to be true?

A We understand that to be true. As far as we know, Dr. Sakharov has been on a hunger strike since May 2. There are unconfirmed reports that his wife, Mrs. Bonner, may have joined the hunger strike on May 12. The United States is extremely disturbed by the present situation, and we're doing what we can to avert a tragedy.

Soviet handling of this matter has been inhumane and virtually incomprehensible. Dr. Sakharov is one of the Soviet Union's greatest living scientists, whose only crime has been to insist that the Soviet Union live up to its pledges to uphold the human rights of its own people.

Mrs. Bonner is a physician and a Soviet patriot who was wounded three times defending her country during World War II.

Q Copy, please?

A Sure.

Q John, any information about U.S. participation in this Jewish Congress in Morocco?

A No.

Q John, you've said that the U.S. is doing everything it can to avert a tragedy?

A Yes.

Q Something like that. I forgot the words. Right?

A Yes.

Q What are you doing?

A Well, I think, in terms of the rather strong statements we've made, in terms of discussions with other governments and, I think, welcoming the attention of various people and governments around the world. And I think in earlier statements we have encouraged protest about the Soviet handling of this case.

Q Have you talked to the Russians directly about this?

A I won't get into the details, but I think you may be assured that they are well aware of our position.

Q And what did they tell you?

A I won't get into details of our discussions, Marvin.

Q John, do you have anything on the Administration role in a U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade Council meeting?

A Yes. That meeting is going forward, as we understand it, Bill. That's the meeting of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council in New York, May 22-24. The policy of the U.S. Government is to support non-military relevant trade with the Soviet Union, conducted on a commercial basis, and on the basis of mutual benefit. We've supported the activities of USTEC, which promote this type of trade. We fully endorse the USTEC plenary in New York as well, and we expect that meeting to take place as planned.

So far as we know, the Soviets are proceeding with preparations for the meeting. Deputy Secretary of Commerce Brown, Deputy Secretary of Agriculture Lyng, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Mark Palmer will address the meeting, and we expect that the Soviet Deputy Minister Sushkov will meet with Secretary of Commerce Baldridge and Deputy Secretary of State Dam.

Q John, we didn't get a chance to ask you yesterday, do you have any comment on the Foreign Relations Committee's rejection of that Deputy USIA Director?

A No. I think that's -- I think the White House had some comment on it.

Q Do you have any comment on the wider issue raised there, which is the increasing complaints of increasing pervasiveness of politics in the USIA?

A No. I think USIA would handle those questions.

Q John, are you talking with the Soviets concerning the Gulf developments?

A I think you may be assured that they're well aware of our concerns.

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Q Can you tell us anything about Mr. Shultz's meeting yesterday with Dr. Elie Salem of Lebanon?

A I don't have a readout on that meeting, I'm afraid. As I said, that was a meeting requested by Dr. Salem some time ago, and I think was conducted in the -- within the framework of his visit to the United States for private -- for personal reasons.

Q John, there were press reports in Lebanon the last two days that the U.S.. is refusing a request by the Lebanese Government to help negotiate new arrangements with Israel. Do you have anything on this?

A Refusing to help?

Q Yes. Refusing to help -- to have new, indirect talks with the Israelis.

A Don't have anything on that in specific terms, but I don't think there's any reluctance on the part of the United States to be helpful to bring about the kind of goals that we have frequently articulated in Lebanon.

Q John, any comments -- I don't suppose you would have any comment on de la Madrid's speech to Congress today?

A No. I think that there will be briefings at the White House on that, being a presidential visit.

Q And could I also ask whether there has been any change in the Costa Rican aid request situation? Has a formal request been received?

A I think that -- there is a little guidance in the Press Office on that, but I think it's a request that is being processed within the existing framework, the existing allocation -- the existing budget allocation.

Q John, do you have any comment on news report that there was a meeting two months ago in Jordan between U.S. officials and General Vernon Walters and PLO members?

A (To staff) There is some guidance on it? I'm delighted to say there is some guidance on that.

Q What? You're confirming it?

A We're certainly not confirming it. (Laughter)

Q Okay. Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:45 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Thursday, May 17, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #88

THURSDAY, MAY 17, 1984, 12:18 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. Just a brief, upfront announcement. Available in the Press Office is the prepared statement by Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Paul Wolfowitz. That's before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this morning. The topic of his testimony was U.S.-China relations, and that's all I have. Be glad to take a few questions.

Q John, on the Persian Gulf, has the United States offered to supply air cover to protect shipping?

A Well, Jim, we have talked with -- had consultations with the Gulf states, various of them, over a period of some months about security problems, but no specific U.S. offer of direct military support has been made, nor has any been requested by any of the Gulf states.

Q What do you mean by "specific"? Was there a general one?

A Well, as I say, we have discussed in general with the Gulf states over a period of months the obvious security problems in that area, but we are not in receipt of any specific request to act militarily, nor have we made such a specific offer. As you know, that is an area of vital interest to us. The President has made clear that we are prepared to defend our vital interests, but as to a question about specifics, the answer to that is no.

Q Would the United States be prepared to supply such air cover?

A Well, the President has said what he has said about the importance of the area and our commitment to maintaining navigation on the high seas, but it will be up to the President to (a) make such a decision, and (b) to announce it.

Q What about protecting the oil fields of Saudi Arabia? I asked you yesterday. I'd like to repeat the question as to whether the American commitment extends to protection of the oil fields of Saudi Arabia or any of the other Gulf states.

A Well, I --

Q I mean, against attack. To some extent, I suppose, we're doing that by providing AWACS to the Saudis already, but in the event of an attack on one of the oil fields, would there be an American response?

A I think, again, that is something -- a question that the President would have to address. There are no treaty obligations, if that's underlying your question, but our relationship with Saudi Arabia is well known. Our concern for our interests in that area is well known.

Q John, if there were an attack, presumably it would be too late for the President to address the question since the attack would have taken place.

A I don't think it's a question of the President addressing the question at the point of attack, I think it's a question of my telling you before such an attack what the President would do, which I'm not prepared to do.

Q Well, has there been exploration with the Gulf states of military contingencies, joint U.S.-Gulf contingencies, in the event of such an attack?

A There's been discussion of military -- of security problems in the Gulf area, as I said.

Q What security options have you discussed with the nations in the region?

A Well, I don't think we're going to get into that. Perhaps that answer will not totally surprise you.

Q John --

Q John, do you have any reaction to the Gulf Cooperation --

A I'm sorry?

Q Do you have any reaction to the Gulf Cooperation Council today announcing --

A I haven't heard what the outcome of that meeting was.

Q They announced they'll be going to the U.N. and to call an emergency meeting of the Arab League to deal with the problem.

A Uh-huh. No, don't --

Q Do you think that's an appropriate --

A I don't have any reaction to that.

Q John, it's quite clear from your statement that the Gulf states are very cautious not to be forthcoming to the United States' attitude, or United States' attitude to give military assistance to them. How do you explain this?

A Well, it is a question of the perceived need at a given point in time, and what I'm telling you is that there is no specific request as of now from any of those Gulf nations, nor has there been such a specific overture on the part of the United States. What we are engaged in at the moment is a vigorous diplomatic round.

We continue to urge Iraq and Iran to seek peaceful resolution of this problem. We are talking, clearly, to a number of our allies. We are talking, clearly, to people with particular access to Iran and Iraq, and I think the proper posture for the United States is to be in this concerned but calm round of diplomacy at this stage.

Q Do you believe that some of them at least are somehow suspicious about who did it? The Iranians --

A I don't know -- you'd have to ask them -- but I'm not aware of any suspicions. I think the record is fairly clear as to who's doing what.

Q How do you explain, then, the reluctancy of the Gulf states to accept United States' military interference?

A Well, I'm not addressing something that might occur down the road; I'm telling you where we are at this particular point.

Q (Inaudible) the Japanese apparent invitation to ministers from Iran and Iraq to a --I guess a sub-summit, or whatever you want to call it -

A I haven't seen that one, Ralph.

1-1791

Q John, do you know of any determination on our part of whether the Saudi air force is sufficient to fly air cover over the Gulf?

A No. I think that the Pentagon -- you've gone to the limit of my expertise. I think the Pentagon would be the place to ask for that kind of --

Q John, when you talk about allies -- consultation with allies vigorously --

A Uh-huh.

Q Can you name those allies?

A No. I don't think so.

Q You don't want to name them?

A No.

Q John, in light of a statement made by the Iranian Foreign Ministry about these attacks, do you have any clearer sense now of the Iranian motive?

A No. I do not. I mean, I think I would have to leave you to analyze that on the basis of any talks you might have with Iran. I don't think we should analyze their motivation.

Q John, does the U.S. have any plans to bring this up in a substantive way at the NATO Ministerials?

A I'm not aware of any plans. It could well come up, Bill, but I'm not aware of a specific plan to raise it.

Q Are there circumstances under which we would take military action in the Gulf region without an invitation by the nations of that area?

A Well, that's a pretty hypothetical question, but, again, the President has talked of our commitment to the area, and that would be a decision that the President would have to make.

Q Well, that's my concern. In other words, on the one hand, the President said, "We will protect our vital interests." On the other hand, the statements are that we won't go in, or the suggestion has been that we won't go in unless we're invited in, and it seems that those conflict a little bit.

A Well, I don't think there's a conflict, and also I'd remind you that the President has said that he would not signal in advance what the action the United States might take in that area.

Q Is there a beefing up of the U.S. Naval force in that general area?

A Try the Pentagon, Bernie, but I'm not aware of any special activity beyond what we have there at the moment.

Q John, can you clear up how far the vital interest extends? I mean, that's where I'm still a little bit confused. Does it extend just to the defense of the sea lanes, of the -- the freedom of navigation?

A I think I'd refer you back to the President's own words, but I think if I paraphrase them, which I perhaps shouldn't do -- but I think he spoke of traffic through the Gulf and the Straits.

Q When did he say that he would not signal any action in advance?

A I can't give you a date on that, Don, but it's certainly -- but I have read it within -- oh -- we have an expert. What is the date, Bernie?

Q October 20th.

A October 20th. Okay. I am ashamed that The New York Times should have that date in its head, and I do not.

Q It's the newspaper of record. We expect it to keep up with these things.

A (Laughter)

Q Can I ask one more question regarding this general situation? Has the United States given any advice or indication to U.S. commercial ships or U.S. trade in through the Gulf following on the recent developments? Is there any new advisory of any kind going out to our own people?

1-1293

A   Well, I think in terms of the -- you're probably talking about a shipping advisory, and, yes, there is. That is not, however, a new --

Q   Yes. There's a new one.

MR. ROMBERG: The Press Office has something.

A   We posted it, but I think it is not in fact a new --

MR. ROMBERG: There was something on the 16th.

A   Okay. All right. That's available.

-- MORE --

Q John, how do you characterize the position taken by the Arab Gulf states as a unitary (sic) stand, or they are having different positions towards the offer of the United States?

A I don't know. You would have to ask them.

Q John, did the Jordanian-American military talks that were supposed to be held in May in Washington, did they start?

A Not aware of that, but let me take a look at that for you.

Q In connection with that, John, there's a report that American forces have been in maneuvers with Jordanians. It was published. I can't at this moment tell you where it is, but it was -- I was reminded by the question. Have you seen anything on that?

A U.S.-Jordanian? Doesn't come immediately to mind, but I'll be glad to take a look at it for you.

Q Please.

A Sure.

Q Did you have anything on the House Arms Services Committee's action yesterday in cutting back the RDF budget?

A No.

Q John, how would you characterize the situation there? Some U.S. officials are saying this is not a crisis and that too much is being made of the attacks in the Gulf. How do you characterize it?

A I think we are concerned about what clearly is an escalation of violence. But, as I say, I think the mood is -- I'm not trying to diminish the concern or what is happening there, but I think we are trying to proceed calmly and weigh the true impact of the situation. I understand, for example, that some shipping companies have indicated that they may not lift oil in the northern part of the Gulf, but that apprarently does not apply to the lower Gulf. That activity continues to go on. The Straits are open. So I think you have to sort of look realistically at what is happening there, plus you have to look realistically at the world market in oil, the abundance of oil.

You have to bear in mind our own strategic supplies. So, I think you have to, as we have tried to consistently do, look at what is happening there with a fairly realistic attitude. I'm not -- as I say, I'm not for one minute suggesting that there are not problems there; there are.

Q John, the White House Spokesman yesterday said that the President wanted the oil flow through the Gulf to continue unabated. "Unabated" was his word.

A Yes.

Q Is the oil flow continuing at this time unabated?

A I suppose you would have to measure the impact of what any cancellation of tanker calls will do, and I can't do that as of the moment. I think I'm right in saying no ship has been sunk and no cargo has been lost.

Q You don't have to have a ship sunk in order to have the flow stopped.

A That's right. And, as I say, I'm telling you what we understand to be the case about some cancellations of ships operating in the northern part of the Gulf.

Q There are reports that dozens of ships are literally waiting outside the mouth of the Gulf --

A Don't know about that.

Q -- just sort of standing by.

A Don't know.

Q John, there are also reports of Iranian aircraft delivering materiel to an island in the Straits. Do you have anything on that?

A No. Seen -- I think that was on one of the wires. Seen that, but really don't have anything on it.

Q How would that impact the situation? Would we step up our surveillance of that region?

A Well, I think we'd have to wait and see whether the report turns out to be correct.

Q John, is there -- can you tell us whether in the wake of the attack on the Saudi ship there is any heightened degree of concern on the part of the Gulf states that's been communicated to us?

A I think that is obvious, John, I think there's clearly a heightened degree of concern. The Saudi Arabian Ambassador, as you know, was in to see the Secretary this morning. He asked for that meeting last night; came in to see the Secretary, spent about 20 minutes with him. I think some news organizations got the Ambassador making some comments after that meeting.

Q Would it be logical, then, to assume that the United States is engaged again in discussions about the security problems with these -- with Saudis --

A Oh, I think the discussions about security problems continue, but I also think the United States is most interested in trying to resolve this problem through diplomacy as, indeed, many nations are. We're not alone in wanting to resolve this peacefully.

Q Did Prince Bandar bring a message from the Government of Saudi Arabia or from King Fahd?

A I think I'd leave that to him to indicate, Bernie.

Q John, does the Gulf area come under the NATO umbrella?

A Under the NATO umbrella?

Q Yes.

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q Let me be more direct -- if you expect the Gulf crisis to be high on the agenda of the next meeting of the NATO Council?

A Well, I don't know whether it'll be high on the agenda. I don't know whether it would even be raised. You asked me whether I thought it was possible, and, yes, I think it's possible. Obviously, members of NATO are countries -- some of them -- are countries very concerned with the Gulf and are themselves active in diplomacy. So whether it would be raised at the NATO meeting, I can't say.

Q John, also on the Middle East, it was one year ago that the May 17 agreement was signed Lebanon. Do you have any observations to make on this date?

A No, except that clearly our goals for Lebanon are as they were, and we continue to work for them.

Q John, a quick question on another topic? I saw the guidance yesterday on Kuanda and Angola, but I want to go beyond that.

Has the United States changed or softened its position any on the issue of Cuban presence in Angola?

A Our position is that there are certain realities in the area, and one of those realities is the presence of Cuban troops in Angola. And I'm not aware that, for example, the South African Government has changed its attitude towards that, so you have to look, I think, at the question on a regional basis. That is one of the factors that has a bearing on Namibia and how you resolve the Namibian problem. But I'm not aware of anybody's changing their position on the withdrawal of Cuban troops.

Q Are we taking our cue from the South African Government?

A I think we're responding to the realities in the area. It's a reality. There are Cuban troops in Angola, and --

Q To follow that up, John, has there been a discernable hardening of the South African position on the Namibia question in the last several weeks?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q Can you take the question?

A Well, I thought I answered it.

Q Do you have any comment now that most of the returns seem to be in regarding the Philippines election?

A No, I don't have the official returns yet, so don't have any comment, Don.

Q Is there any change in the AWACS deployment in and around Saudi Arabia since yesterday?

A Not that I -- no.

Q John, there have been some incredible stories, as I've been told, coming out of southern Lebanon about massacres, worse than -- worst since Sabra and Shatila; 30 people killed, troops firing on crowds. And the other side of the story is that the press was taken to these places, and they found nothing -- virtually nothing. They found munitions and weapons, and two people were slightly wounded resisting arrest. What does the State Department have on this?

Q As I told you yesterday, we are looking into that question. Let me say today that we remain concerned about the recent incidents in that area, including the destruction of private property by the Israeli Defense Force, an action that is prohibited by the Geneva Convention. We urge all parties to refrain from further actions that harm the security of the area.

Q Have we done some similar -- do we feel the same way about the killings further north?

A I don't think you --

Q (Inaudible)

A I don't think you would find any divergence or discrimination in our attitude towards -- but I'm not responding to a report about killing. There's some discrepancy about whether, in fact, a killing has taken place. But certainly destruction of property has taken place.

Q There is -- you feel there is a discrepancy on the reports of the killing?

A I think there is some confusion as to whether people have been killed in that incident, yes. I think that is not yet established.

Q Isn't it true that the Beirut radio station is controlled by the Shi'ite sect?

A Don't know.

1-1299

Q You don't know about that? Can we find out? Would it be worthwhile?

A Why don't you -- I mean, how would we know? Why don't you find out.

Q Well, I mean, the papers -- there are some papers that reported it.

A I'll leave that to your investigative, journalist thrust.

Q Thank you very much.

Q Do you have any comment on the Nicaragua-Costa Rica agreement reached yesterday?

A No, I don't.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:37 p.m.)

1-1300

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, May 18, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #89

FRIDAY, MAY 18, 1984, 12:32 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, one and all. I have a few announcements up front. A couple of housekeeping announcements first.

Available in the Press Office is the prepared text of the speech to be given by Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Elliot Abrams today at Marymount College. The subject is "Religious Suppression in the U.S.S.R." Additionally, Assistant Secretary Abrams will address the National Assembly on Global Perspectives in Education. That's here in Washington today. The subject of his speech is "American Values in World Politics." The text is embargoed until delivery at 4:15 p.m.

I have a couple of other statements here. The first relates to a Libyan assassination campaign announced yesterday.

The United States has noted the threats to Libyan exiles which yesterday were made by the official Libyan News Agency. We condemn such threats and are prepared to deal vigorously with any such acts in the United States. This is another indication that Qadhafi is prepared to use terrorism as an instrument of Libyan policy. Qadhafi has a long history of support for such acts of international terrorism, a history which has earned for him the opprobrium of the international community.

Q Copy, please?

A Sure can. I also have a statement on the G.C.C. meeting yesterday.

The United States notes the strong denunciation of attacks on Persian Gulf shipping made at the May 17 session of the Gulf Cooperation Council Ministerial Council.

We deplore the continuing attacks against neutral shipping which represent a dangerous escalation of the Iran-Iraq war and constitute a growing threat to freedom of navigation in the Gulf. We consider the G.C.C. Ministerial Council's reaffirmation of the principle of collective security and its expressed determination to confront threats to the security of the G.C.C. members with joint action to be an important and appropriate development.

1-1302

The United States has long urged Iran to agree, as Iraq has agreed, to a cease-fire along the lines of last October's U.N. Security Council Resolution 540, which reaffirms the right of free navigation and commerce in international waters, and calls on both parties to cease attacks on each other's ports and other economic targets.

The United States continues to support all efforts to reduce and to halt the fighting. We are prepared to work with others, particularly the states of the region, in common efforts to contain the effects of this tragic war.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q And on that, do you have anything to confirm the reports that -- from Iraq that two "large naval targets" were hit?

A No, we don't. We've seen the Iraqi claims, but don't have anything which would confirm them.

Q Ever since the Saudi tanker the other day, have there been any attacks that you can confirm?

A Not that we are aware of, that we can confirm.

Q John, given the President's October 20 pledge to ensure the freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- and your statement today that the actions taken in the Gulf represent a growing threat to such freedom --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- what will the U.S. do to fulfill the Presidential pledge?

A Well, as I told you yesterday, we are engaged in a vigorous round of diplomacy, and that clearly is the initial way to go. Nobody wants to see escalation of violence; nobody wants to see wider conflagration. Many other governments are of that view, and we are working with them to see what we can do to defuse the situation diplomatically.

Q John, is that what you mean by common efforts in that statement -- common efforts, diplomatic efforts?

A I'm sorry. I didn't get the first part.

Q You made a statement about common efforts involving G.C.C.

A Yes.

Q What common efforts are you speaking of? Diplomatic common efforts?

A I think in their statement they talked of common efforts on their behalf, and basically what we're doing is supporting that.

Q John, in a posted answer which started out with whether the U.S. knew whether Israel was selling arms to Iran, there is some wording here which is not consistent, I don't think, with past U.S. statements. I just want to make sure you're not indicating a nuanced change in policy.

It says, "The U.S. Government remains neutral with respect to the Iran-Iraq war, and as a consequence sells arms to neither belligerent. We also do not permit the transfer of U.S.-licensed arms to Iran by third parties." It goes on to say "the U.S. favors a negotiated end to the war;" and then it says, "Since we are persuaded that Iran is the intransigent party, however, we have asked our friends and allies, including Israel, to join us in helping staunch the flow of arms to Iran, in an effort designed to persuade Iran to agree to mediate an end to the war."

There is nothing in here about the U.S. not permitting the transfer of U.S.-licensed arms to Iraq.

A No. I think there is no change in policy, Bernie. As we have said before, we are opposed to the supply of arms to either side. But in view of the intransigence of Iran and the fact that Iraq has clearly indicated a willingness to come to some agreement and Iran has not and is taking a particularly belligerent stand, although we oppose the supply of arms to either side, we are particularly sensitive to the supply of arms to Iran. That's the thought that was intended.

Q Yes, but when you say -- I don't see the half-way -- Either you approve third-party transfers to a country or you don't.

1-1304

A No, there's no change in that.

MR. ROMBERG: The question referred to Iran.

MR. HUGHES: Yes.

Q But, in other words, there is no change in not allowing Jordan, for instance, to sell U.S. arms to Iraq?

A No.

Q John, what about the 747 which Iran uses in military operations, and you are now exporting spare parts?

A Well, you keep on asking that question, and Mr. Romberg keeps on telling me that we've given you guidance on that, so --

Q Yes. The guidance said that under the hostages agreement, you are continuing to supply them with spare parts.

A Talk to you about it later.

Q John, on Libya, is there any evidence beyond the Libyan News Agency's statement that the Libyan regime is prepared to use terrorism overseas?

A Is there evidence?

Q Yes.

A Oh, I think there has been in the past, and I think there's continuing --

Q I mean new evidence that would, such as this --

A I think there are grounds for there are continued terrorist -- continued hostile terrorist intent of Libya is still there.

Q But does your statement today reflect heightened concern by the Administration?

A Yes, I think it reflects heightened concern, particularly in light of the rather bellicose Libyan statements.

Q For instance, the two Libyans who were arrested last week near Philadelphia.

A Uh-huh.

Q Does the Department think that they are part of this --

A Well, that's a continuing legal matter, Jim, so I think I won't get into that.

Q Do you have anything on the -- it's the same, or it's related -- Belgian-Libyan nuclear agreement that was announced yesterday?

A No, I don't.

Q John, on the Gulf, G.C.C. again, there is an announcement today that some of the G.C.C., or some or all of the G.C.C. representatives will be coming to Washington Sunday for talks with the Gulf State Ambassadors here.

Are there any plans for discussions with the U.S. next week?

A Not aware of any, but on the other hand, I wasn't aware of the announcement either, so I'll be glad to take a look at it for you.

Q John, what effect is the activity in the Gulf now having by way of affecting normal oil traffic? Can you give us an update on --

A No more than I gave you yesterday, Bernie -- namely, that there are some indications that various companies are not going forward with plans to sail into the northern part of the Gulf. So far as we know, plans to operate in the southern part of the Gulf are apparently not affected.

Just how those reports of ships not moving into the north really will prove out, whether this is simply not a question of announcing arrival times and so forth and so on, or whether it is really question of the ships not sailing there, I guess we'll have to wait and see.

Q At what point does the President's commitment to keep the Gulf open get triggered? In other words, it seems that the hostile activity is having the effect of cutting back on traffic into the Gulf.

A Again, as I said yesterday, Bernie, I think you have to see the situation in its entirety -- and we're not suggesting for a minute that there are not serious problems in the Gulf; clearly, there are. But also, as I said yesterday, as far as we know, no ship has been lost, no cargo has been lost; there is a glut of oil on the world market. There are substantial strategic reserves in this country and other countries.

I note, you know, the dialogue among various experts on various networks this morning suggesting that this will not move through to the American market very soon should there be a serious impediment. So I think one has to look at the situation day by day and see what the impact of these decisions is.

Q Do you see this as a crisis?

A I'm not sure that anybody has used the word "crisis." We certainly have talked of an escalation of violence and being concerned about it. But I haven't heard any Administration official use the word "crisis."

Q John, your deep concern lately, as if the cause of it, because the two tankers were hit. (Sic) That's what we understood.

A Uh-huh.

Q I mean the deep concern. Before that you didn't have a deep concern about the Iraqi --

A Yes. Yes, and have expressed it.

Q John, can you say, on a different subject, what the rationale is for Ambassador Kennedy not briefing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the nuclear agreement with China?

A There is something on that which we got just a few minutes (ago), very late, before we came out, and I haven't had a chance to read it, so I'll refer you to the Press Office on that. They have some guidance on that.

Q Has the U.S. asked the Gulf States, or suggested that they use their financial leverage on Iraq to get them to stop attacking the shipping?

A I'm not aware of any such request.

Q Can I follow up on Bernie Kalb's question about the commitment? As I understand it, the United States does not have any military treaty or agreement of that nature with any of the countries that is involved here.

A I think that's correct.

Q Is it the position of the Administration that a declaratory sentence or statement by the President to the effect that the U.S. will keep the oil lines open is a commitment on the part of the United States of America to do this, or what is it actually, in legal terms?

A Well, I don't know that there is any legal clarification needed of the commitment the President gave. I think the words are rather clear. I think you're right in the sense that there is not a treaty obligation and that there is not an activation of a treaty that triggers action. I think that is a Presidential decision.

Q And then to what extent has this decision-making been shared with the Congress? In other words, has Congress approved the making of such a commitment?

A Well, I --

Q Does the Administration feel that it is necessary for Congress to approve it?

A I think you may be assured that that is a matter that has been given attention and is being given attention; and should there be the need for any action in that area that would require informing Congress, the President clearly would do that.

-- MORE --

Q But is it the position of the Administration that the President, acting alone, by announcing a commitment is then free to take action in pursuance of that without getting some kind of authorization from Congress?

A As I said, I'm sure that the President would act in accordance with law and would communicate any impending decision to Congress that required consultation.

Q Is there anything beyond the statements of the President at several press conferences to indicate what exactly is the nature of this commitment?

A You mean in the public forum?

Q Yes. Yeah.

A I'm not aware of anything in a public forum, no.

Q Is there anything that the Administration might be willing to make public to indicate its nature?

A That would be a Presidential decision, whether the President wants to -- I mean, he has said that he's not going to trigger, not going to signal in advance what action the United States might take, and I'm not aware of any feeling on his part that he's changed his mind.

Q Can I just follow up Don's question? If it came to a situation where there was a decision by the White House to trigger this action and there was Congressional reluctance to endorse it, would the President feel bound or could the President legally move ahead and follow through?

A Well, that's a pretty hypothetical question, Bernie.

Q Well, because you're doing an end-run around Don's question --

A No, I'm not.

Q Does the President's October 20 statement commit the U.S., period?

A It was a Presidential statement which made clear the President's concern and his intention to safeguard vital U.S. interests in that area. What action he would take, under what circumstances, to implement that commitment, you know, it's clearly unwise and certainly impossible at this stage to speculate on.

1-1309

Q John, does the visit of the Commander-in-Chief of the Jordanian armed forces currently to Washington have anything to do with the Gulf or to sales of arms to Jordan?

A I'm not quite sure where we stand on that. I think there is such a visit pending, but I'm not quite sure who he is seeing, whether in this Department or at DoD. Be glad to take a look at that for you.

Q Thank you.

Q John, do you have any reaction to the reported expulsion by the Greeks of a U.S. Embassy --

A No, don't have any comment on that.

Q Anything new on the Sakharovs, John?

A Not really, other than to note with appreciation that a number of other governments are very active on behalf of Doctor Sakharov, and this seems to be coming much to the fore in terms of public opinion. Various individuals and various governments are making their views known and we think that is very much to the good.

Q John, at the outset you talked about the U.S. being engaged in a vigorous round of diplomacy to see what it could do to defuse Iran-Iraq, etc.

A Uh-hum.

Q Can you give us some sense what is being achieved or if nothing is being achieved, or you're running into a blank wall or what?

A I think it is a question of our conveying to Iran and Iraq, either directly or indirectly, our continuing concern, of our discussing with various of our allies who feel as strongly as we do the ways in which they would express their concern, and are expressing their concern. And then I think a third phase is passing these messages and facilitating the passage of these messages through others who have particular access to one or other of the key parties.

Q But so far you have nothing to show in the way of defusing as a result of this vigorous round of diplomacy?

A Well, the facts speak for themselves. You have an Iraqi claim of further action this morning, but no confirmation that that action in fact caused any damage as yet. I leave it to you to make the same kind of deductions we might.

Q Have you found in your dealings with members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, for example, that there has been any reluctance to deal with the United States because of the strategic cooperation agreement with Israel?

A No reluctance to deal with the United States or discuss security problems in the area; no.

Q On that strategic cooperation, the Israeli military radio, I guess it is, is carrying a report saying that the United States and Israel have agreed to step up that level of cooperation and have contingency -- military -- contingency plans for military co-action in case of an emergency. Do you know of any such --

A No. I don't really understand that report.

Q I don't either, but that's what they're carrying. (Laughter)

A No, don't understand that one.

Q John, is your response to Bernie that --

A I mean, as you well know, there is the question of the joint political/military organization which meets every six months or so. Whether that's a reference to that, but -- I really don't understand the report.

Q There has been no raising of the level of cooperation?

A No.

Q Is that -- were you implicitly claiming that as a result of our vigorous diplomatic initiative, the Iraqis claimed but didn't carry through, or failed to --

A No, no, no. I was just saying, you know, I think it's difficult to read -- you have a round of diplomacy urging reduction of tension, and it's anybody's guess or analysis whether there is any reduction in tension. Fact: You have Iraqi claims of further military or air force action today. Whether those -- whether that is correct or not, I don't know; and how that fits in, I don't know.

Q Does Israel have any role to play in the Gulf area, do you think?

A In what sense?

Q I mean, through the -- following up the question about the Israel-American cooperation, strategic cooperation, is there any role --

A Well, as I say, I'm sort of bemused by that report. I don't understand what that means.

Q But do you envisage any role to Israel in the Gulf area?

A I'm sure they're as concerned as anybody about the stability of the area, but I'm not aware of anything that they're --

Q John, just for the record, any specific requests from any of the Gulf States for specific U.S. military assistance?

A No.

Q And any change in the AWACS deployment?

A No.

Q Did Prince Bandar meet with the Secretary again today?

A Not that I am aware of. There was a report that he was coming in, but I'm sure he has not so far, and we're not aware of any appointment for him to see the Secretary. But I know there was a report floating around out there.

Q John, do you have anything on the visit of the Pakistan Foreign Minister?

A On the visit of the -- I don't, really. I don't know whether we will have a briefing on that next week. Do you happen to know, Alan?

MR. ROMBERG: No.

A I'm sorry. We'll do a little checking on that for you. But it is next week, obviously.

Q Do you have anything on the elections in the Philippines?

A No. No comment still. We're still awaiting the official tabulation.

Q Are you aware of the fraud that's been claimed by the opposition party?

A We're aware of the allegations of fraud, yes.

Q John, do you have any assessment of the Soviet role in Iran-Iraq? That is to say, do you think they share the U.S. view to seek to defuse tensions?

A Don't know, Bernie.

Q Anything on Mr. Koslov?

A No, no change on Mr. Koslov.

Q John, do you have any reaction to The New York Times article which suggests that the Administration has been bypassing the Congressional appropriations process in Central America?

A Is that the piece relating to intelligence sources? No, don't have anything for you.

Q No, it doesn't specifically relate to intelligence sources; it relates to Administration sources in the GAO.

A No.

Q You have no comment about it?

A No.

Q It's true. (Laughter)

A I didn't say that. I hasten to add, for the purpose of anybody listening, that was Mr. Kalb who said that, not Mr. Hughes.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:57 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Monday, May 21, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #90

MONDAY, MAY 21, 1984, 12:19 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A couple of announcements. The Department of State and the St. Louis Council on World Affairs are co-sponsoring a regional foreign policy conference at the Chase-Park Plaza Hotel in St. Louis this Thursday, May 24. If you wish to cover the event, please contact Barbara Boller or Eileen McCormick in the Office of Public Programs, 632-2134, or Helen Morrin at the St. Louis Council on World Affairs, 314-361-7333. And I think there is a press release which is available in the Press Office which gives you a little more detail on that.

For your information and guidance, the Secretary will come down to the diplomatic lobby for a photo opportunity with President-elect Duarte of El Salvador. When the President-elect arrives, it will be curbside -- the two will be stopped briefly for the photos. I think that the public schedule indicates that the lobby will be frozen from 2:15, so please schedule yourselves accordingly so you don't get stuck.

Q Q and A or --

A I don't anticipate that they will be talking.

Q How about the departure?

A After the meeting with the Secretary, President-elect Duarte will be meeting with AID Administrator Peter McPherson, so he will go from that one meeting to the other, and then Mr. Duarte is expected to exit via the Diplomatic Entrance at about 4:15. Check with the Press Office on details, but I understand that the stakeout will be set up all afternoon, therefore.

That is it for announcements. Be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, can you bring us up to date on what is going on in the Persian Gulf? Any attempts or any signs that the Iranians are retaliating for that ship over the weekend?

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A I don't have anything on that, Jim, to suggest that there has been any further attack at this point. I think we made our views known last week, on Friday, the statement on our deploring of attacks on neutral shipping, and we continue strongly to urge an immediate adoption of the provisions of the U.N. Security Council Resolution 540 which reaffirms the right of free navigation and commerce in international waters, and calls on both parties to cease attacks on the economic targets.

With regard to the Arab League's action, we have repeatedly made clear the U.S. view that Iranian intransigence is the main obstacle to halting the fighting between Iran and Iraq. And we have also deplored the recent series of attacks on neutral shipping. Of course, we welcome any diplomatic action aimed at bringing the fighting to an end, and we reiterate, as I said, our support for the provisions in the Security Council resolution.

Q Will any U.S. officials be meeting with the Gulf Cooperation Council people coming to New York?

A I'm not aware of any specific plan at this point. I can't tell you there won't be somebody, but they're coming there, I think, mainly in connection with the proposed action that the Council took with regard to the U.N addressing of the issue.

Q What is Mr. Murphy doing?

A He has gone to Saudi Arabia. The Vice President completed his recent trip by accepting a long-standing invitation to visit Oman, and from there Assistant Secretary Murphy proceeded separately to continue the ongoing dialogue with the Saudi Arabian Government.
As far as I know, there are no present plans for him to visit other capitals before returning to Washington.

Q When did he get there?

A When?

Q Yes.

A I don't have an answer to that, don't know.

Q Could you find out when he got there and how long he's anticipated to stay?

A Sure.

Q Alan, Japan is reported to have offered mediation. Are we in consultation with Japan or backing up their efforts in any way?

A I'm sure we are discussing the Gulf questions with a number of governments, including Japan. I'm not sure that that characterization is accurate, Spence, of their action and I would refer you to them to describe what they're doing. But I would caution you, I'm not sure that that is a correct characterization.

Q Do you have any contact with the Soviet Union over this Gulf situation?

A Don't have anything to offer you on that.

Q Do you have any response to the statement by the Iranian President, I believe it was, charging that the United States was behind some of these actions, and warning the United States against any attack on Iran?

A I think that was last week, but in any case, I don't have a specific response. Obviously, the United States is not behind the problems or the actions. As I said, the problem right now on the diplomat front essentially is Iranian intransigence regarding a diplomatic solution to the fighting.

Q Could I follow up on this one before you -- You made the point twice now that Iranian intransigence is the main obstacle in the halting of the fighting.

A Yes.

Q But most of the military attacks in the Gulf have been from Iraq. What is the United States' attitude at this time toward the continuing Iraqi attacks on shipping in the Persian Gulf?

A Well, as I indicated before, we deplore, continue to deplore attacks on neutral shipping in international or neutral waters from whatever country those attacks might come.

Bernie.

Q In other words, you're not critical of attacks on shipping in non-neutral or non-international waters, which leads me to the conclusion you're not critical of any attacks in Iranian waters?

A Well, I'm going to have to leave you with the statements that we've issued on this so far. I don't have anything further to give you.

Q Alan, why did the U.S. issue a statement of concern on the attacks on shipping in the Gulf only after the Iranian attack and not after the aerial Iraqi attacks?

A Again, I think that this issue was addressed, the whole question of attacks was addressed last Friday, and I don't have anything new to take you beyond what we said at that point.

Q The Washington Times newspaper has a story saying that President Reagan is sending a message to King Fahd reaffirming our military support and asking for use of Saudi facilities in case the situation worsens. Can you discuss that? And is Ambassador Murphy taking that matter up with the Saudis right now?

A As far as any letter is concerned, I wouldn't be able to get into the question of a diplomatic exchange, so I'm going to have to set that one aside.

As far as Ambassador Murphy's stop in Saudi Arabia is concerned, obviously, this would be -- the question of the situation in the Gulf would be something that he would be discussing along with a number of other issues.

Q Alan, is there any information about what the Gulf states are doing now militarily to protect their shipping?

A I think I'd have to refer you to them.

Q Do you welcome the announcement by some of the Ministers, especially the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kuwait, saying that we will take, within a week, our protection by having the strategy of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the military forces ready within a week, that we don't want the interference of the United States and we don't want anybody to come from the outside -- that we want to protect ourselves in the area?

A I think that we have indicated before that what we are doing at this point is stressing diplomatic activities to try, together with others, to bring about a resolution of this problem, and so I don't see any particular inconsistency between that and what you're suggesting.

Q From what I've seen in the reports that have been published in the last couple of weeks here in the United States, that the United States wants to help by asking the Saudis to give them facilities for your air lines and your jets and everything -- boats and bases? Is this --

A I don't think we've said that.

Q Alan, do you have any figures; can you supply any figures? And how much is this costing Iraq and Iran -- this war is costing Iraq and Iran in terms of the revenues that they are able to get from their oil in -

A No, I don't have anything on that, Joe.

Q Alan, I see the Kuwaiti Oil Minister here is quoted in the wires saying, "The Arab states are looking with astonishment to the indifference of the United States toward the war." Has the United States been asked for any particular help in either resolving the war or resolving this problem with the oil shipments that we have not agreed to, by any Arab state at all?

A I'm not sure I quite follow the thrust of it. They are upset because we are not doing what?

Q The indifference of the United States toward the Iraq-Iran war, quoting the --

A Well, I think everything we have said over the last couple of weeks, at a minimum, demonstrates that that is not the case, as well as our actions.

Q Have we been contacted --

A Well, I'm not going to get into the diplomatic exchange, but I think what we have said publicly is an indication that we are not indifferent to that. We'd like to see that war brought to a negotiated, peaceful conclusion.

Q Alan, wh[illegible] specifically you referring to when you're talking abou[illegible]anian intransigence on the diplomatic side?

A Well, the Iraqis have indicated that they would be willing to talk, try to bring about an end to the war. The Iranians have rejected that.

Q Alan, do you have any comment today on any specific requests by any of the Gulf States for specific U.S. military assistance in connection with protection of shipping in the Gulf?

A No.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the Soviet statements over the weekend on submarine missile deployment?

A Mr. Ustinov's statement?

Q Yes.

A In his TASS interview of May 20, Defense Minister Ustinov reiterated a familiar litany of Soviet assertions and threats. His comments on so-called Soviet military countermeasures, including Soviet submarine deployments off U.S. coasts, are familiar and represent no significant change in the strategic situation. Minister Ustinov spoke at length of his concern for the threat to peace posed by high levels of armaments but totally ignored those recent Soviet actions -- in particular, the massive deployment of SS-20s both before and throughout the course of the INF negotiations -- which have caused such concern in the West over the stability of that peace and prompted the NATO Alliance to adopt the 1979 decision on INF negotiations and deployments. The United States is prepared to resume INF negotiations at any time and without preconditions and calls upon the Soviet Union to return to the negotiating table.

Q Copy of that, Alan?

A Yes.

Q As you just said, or you've indicated there is nothing new in it, why do you think the Soviets would have come out with this statement at this time?

A I think I'll stay away from trying to speculate on their motives.

Q Alan, there is an item in The Post today that says that the United States has gone to the Soviet Union -- it doesn't say when -- with the idea that we would keep at a symbolic level the number of missiles in Western Europe if the Soviet Union would return to the negotiating forum. Is that correct?

A Let me simply say on that, Marvin, that we have made clear that we are prepared at the negotiating table to continue to negotiate in good faith and to find mutually agreeable solutions. However, we have also made clear that we are not in the posture of trying to "buy" the Soviets back to the table. We think that our negotiating posture is a sound one, that we have already demonstrated flexibility in the proposals we've put forth, and that the place to negotiate an INF agreement is at the negotiating table and not by trying to make some concessions ahead of time.

Q So it is not true that the U.S. went to the Soviet Union and said it would keep the missile deployments at a symbolic level?

A I think that my answer -- I'd rather use my words, but I don't argue with what (inaudible) --

Q Let me just pick that up, if I may, because it doesn't seem to me that you're really denying the thrust of the story. Let me ask --

A I think I just -- if you'd listened to the end of my answer, I don't think you would have necessarily --

Q Let me ask you the question in another way: Has the United States, in any forum, made clear to the Soviets that there is, in fact, no new deployment of Cruise and Pershings planned until the fall, and that if the talks were to resume, there would, in fact, be a *de facto* freeze until those deployments resume in the fall?

A There is no plan to change the deployment schedule.

Q If that's the case, then, the deployment, the way I was told in December, was that the deployments would continue at the latest in May.

A I don't have the schedule to give you; but I simply will tell you there is no plan to change the deployment schedule. I can't tell you when they're coming in, Marvin. Don't have that.

Q The southern Lebanon -- I want to go to that subject: Uri Lubrani, who is in charge of the Israeli activities in Lebanon, at the news conference he held in southern Lebanon, he said that he believes that the spirit of the May 17th Agreement still exists and will continue to exist despite its unilateral abrogation in response to pressure applied by a foreign country.

Do you share these feelings about the May 17 Agreement?

A I have no comment on that particular report. I think that we have made clear our objectives remain as they were in Lebanon. Our attitude on that agreement is obviously well known, but our objectives including the removal of all foreign forces and security for Israel's northern border as well as a strong central government exercising sovereignty throughout the territory of Lebanon, those objectives have not changed.

-- MORE --

Q Alan, do you have something you can tell us about the escalation of the Sakharov case in view especially of the _Izvestia_ piece, and Mrs. Bonner?

A I really don't have a great deal. We've talked about this quite a bit in the last week or more. We don't have any independent confirmation. That is, of information that would come from other than Soviet official-controlled sources that Dr. Sakharov has been moved to a hospital, so we don't know -- we don't have independent confirmation of that.

It wouldn't be surprising if he has been, because this happened at the -- I believe it was the 13th day of his previous hunger strike. Likewise, we don't have any independent information regarding Mrs. Bonner's whereabouts or health conditions.

Q Are we doing anything, or is anything being done on an international basis, to persuade the Soviet Union to desist in this harassment of the Sakharovs, especially Mrs. Bonner at this point?

A I think we've done quite a bit of discussing of that issue already here from the podium and indicated what we have done. You've seen other governments and other private bodies similarly take up this question and seek the same things that we are seeking.

Q Alan, on this point, regarding the Sakharovs, a story came out of the Embassy in Moscow on Friday regarding some papers from Mrs. Sakharov, or Mrs. Bonner -- whatever you want to call it -- that were given to U.S. Embassy officials. It seemed to suggest, in some of the news accounts at least, that the U.S. had some -- much greater knowledge of this whole matter than was disclosed when TASS made its charges, or maybe it was _Pravda_ -- whoever it was -- later.

Could you clear up what it was that the United States learned, and why the U.S. did not make clear earlier that it had some information regarding her plans and her husband's plans?

A Don, I think there is some guidance on this that's in the Press Office. It's been there since late last week, and I'd refer you to it. I think that the -- I don't know what the sequence of events was in Moscow. I saw those same reports that you did, and, as I say, we have some guidance which talks to those points.

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One thing that I would emphasize is that nobody in the U.S. Government ever discussed with Mrs. Bonner those letters that she left since she apparently left them as she was going off to Gorky, and therefore there wasn't even any opportunity to discuss it with her. So that is where that stands. But let me refer you to the Press Office in terms of what we have to say about it.

Q It doesn't clear up the question as to why the U.S. didn't say anything about this before. Could you please respond to that?

A I'm not sure that we necessarily would go into that. The charge was made that the U.S. was conspiring with Mrs. Bonner to carry out some activities. As I'm saying to you, we did not discuss these points with Mrs. Bonner. So the question of conspiracy, obviously, doesn't arise and this is a specious charge.

Q Alan, could I just follow up, please? Following on the same thing, Evans and Novak this morning in their column say that on April 23 -- this is about 11 days, I guess, after the incident regarding these other papers that we were referring to. As I understand it, she gave these papers over on April 12, and they say that on April 23, two senior State Department officials went to the Soviet Embassy to warn that if Sakharov died because of this hunger strike, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union would grow still worse.

Could you please clarify what -- if officials did go there on April 23; is there some particular message at that stage that the United States was giving to the Russians regarding our overall relations in the Sakharov case, or is there some particular message now about it?

A I don't think I would get into the question for both the fact that it came from that particular column which we have not been commenting on, and also because it gets into the question of the specifics of diplomatic exchanges. At the same time, the concern of the United States over the fate of the Sakharovs is well known, has been articulated in several statements and answers to questions from this podium and elsewhere, and is not secret. The importance with which the fate of the Sakharovs is viewed by a broad spectrum of people, including the government, but also private citizens, is also well known and should be very clear to the Soviet Union.

Q Alan, in that connection, there was -- at the end of a story that was in a local newspaper, should we say, it said that the Embassy in Moscow was undermining the Sakharovs by their action. Did you see --

A I don't recall that, but obviously that would be something we would totally disagree with.

Q Alan, a different subject.

Q Can we stay --

A All right. go ahead, John.

Q Can you be at all more helpful about whether a message along those lines, whether it was written or oral or conveyed on the 21st or 23rd, whatever it was, conveyed to the Soviets --

A No, I'm not going to get into that.

Q -- that it would affect the overall relationship?

A I'm not going to get into the question of specifics just on a matter of principle as opposed to trying to duck any specific question. But the importance of this issue, as I say, both to the Government and to the American public and to other publics around the world is quite clear.

Q But you're not denying the story?

A I'm not addressing it, John. Don't go out of here and write I didn't deny it. I'm not addressing it.

Q Alan, on the Ustinov thing again. If what he said yesterday concerning the Soviet submarine deployment is not new, have there been this kind of submarine off U.S. shores for a long time, and could you tell us when you first got knowledge of it, what --

A I'm not -- I think I would have to refer you to -- partially to the Pentagon. You're asking me to get into questions which would inevitably touch on intelligence information. Won't do that.

The story of Soviet submarines deployed off U.S. coasts has been in the press, the media, for sometime following the reported new deployments following the breakoff of the INF talks. But I don't think we have addressed them -- didn't address them at that time, and I'm not going to address it now.

Q But I'm pleased that you send us to read the newspapers.

A I knew you would be.

Q Yeah. But is it a fact that since December of last year, when the INF talks were broken off, that the Russians have increased in some new and significant way their deployment of submarines with missiles that could hit the U.S. within ten minutes?

A Again, I don't have any response because you're asking me to get into intelligence matters. If the Pentagon is willing --

Q What you're saying is nothing. It's not new.

A I will leave you with that characterization, and I stand by that characterization but I don't have a specific response nor would I get a specific response to that question because it would get me into intelligence matters.

Q Alan, a different subject. Over the weekend, there was a revival of the story about the United States asking officialy or unofficially Saudi Arabia for assistance in funding the Contras. Do you have any comment on that story?

A Well, I'd refer you back to what we said about this subject before. John addressed it some weeks ago, and there's no change in that.

Jim?

Q Anything on the Amnesty report on Salvador?

A Yes, I do. The Amnesty report is based on information compiled nearly a year ago and is retrospective over the previous five years. It would be unfortunate if it were seen to represent the current situation.

The Administration has dealt with the human rights situation in El Salvador on a comprehensive and continuing basis and has reported to the Congress on a number of occasions in the fullest possible detail.

The charge that officials in the Salvadoran Government have been involved in death squad activity is not new, but it is our belief that the Government of El Salvador has made real progress against political violence. Since

Vice President Bush visited El Salvador in early December, a number of concrete steps have been taken, and death squad activity has dropped sharply.

President-elect Duarte has pledged to do all in his power to put an end to death squad activity in El Salvador. He said yesterday that he intends to name an independent presidential commission to investigate current death squad activity as well as past cases of political violence.

As I said, the Salvadorans have made real progress against political violence, and we are confident that progress will continue under the new democratic government there.

Q Can we have a copy, please?

A Sure.

Q Could I follow so?

A Uh-hum.

Q When you say that it's a "retrospective," do you believe that is an accurate retrospective of this state of affairs up to the time that the report was compiled?

A I haven't seen an analysis of it, and I think that our attention, in policy terms, Jim, will be on where we are heading. Nobody has hidden the fact that there have been problems in El Salvador, but I think that the kind of progress that we've talked about includes not only the fact that since December, since the Vice President was there, that armed forces officers who reportedly had links with death squads have been transferred; but, also, that there was a new arrest procedure instituted requiring security forces to notify the ICRC, the Government's Human Rights Commission, and the family following an arrest, and we understand these procedures are being implemented.

A Special Investigations Unit is being established to focus on crimes of political violence.

The number of press-reported incidents of political violence, which declined from an average of 177 per month in the first half of 1983 to 104 in the second half of that year, has been at 100 or below for the first four months -- excuse me, for the first three. Revise that: Has been at 100 or below for three of the first four months of this year. I don't know which three.

Disappearances, which averaged 39 per month last year, have dropped sharply to 18 per month this year. And activity by the two most prominent death squads, the Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez Brigade and the Secret Anti-Communist Army, which targeted a number of academic and labor figures last year, is down dramatically this year.

So, again, we believe that real progress has been made and will continue to be made.

Q Can we have a copy of that also?

A Sure.

Q But now I wonder if I could repeat my question --

A Well, I'm not going to try to give you a historical analysis.

Q No, no.

A The focus will be on improvement in the situation and on the future.

Q Could I just follow, just once; make just one more stab --

A Why not.

Q -- and possibly taking it. Thank you. If it's true that the focus is on the future, nevertheless, an analysis of the past would be helpful in focusing on that.

It was Jorge Santayana that said that said "Those who do not remember the past are condemned to relive it," I believe.

A Let's get the question out.

Q The question is simply this: A year ago this kind of report the Administration could not have accepted as -- based on its own statements at the time as representing an accurate picture of the situation in El Salvador, and I want to know whether the State Department has changed its mind.

A I'm not going to try to address it in those terms.

Q Do you expect that the human rights reforms will be the chief topic of the meeting today with the Secretary and President Duarte?

A I don't know what will be the chief topic. Why don't you ask Mr. Duarte when he comes down.

Q Alan, did Amnesty International make any outcry when Ernesto Liebas (sp?) was murdered in cold blood in El Salvador by the so-called human rights group called The Left?

A Don't know, Joe.

Q You don't know? Well, this is very important to put into --

A You might want to --

Q -- retrospective review, if you will.

A You might want to check with Amnesty. Jim ought to do that, too.

Q Over the weekend, Israel raided some parts in southern Lebanon, I believe, over the Bekaa. Has Israel consulted with the United States about these raids, and were there any information to justify such raids, and --

A As far as any consultation with the United States about carrying out such raids, this is -- we were not consulted. This is an independent Israeli action, obviously. I've seen the reports of the raid; don't have any particular comment on them.

Jim?

Q Excuse me. Based on your concern for human rights, Israel blew up 20 homes in Ayn al-Hilweh and they arrested so many people, and they are talking about, oh, at least 150 hostages taken in order to force exchange of prisoners with Syria. You have any concern about blowing homes of people who have been living in refugee camps, and other things which is --

A I think that there was some confusion over exactly what happened in those -- at that time, and I'd refer you to the guidance we had last week on the subject. I don't think we have a definitive readout. But, as I say, I think there was some confusion, disagreement among various sources as to what actually happened.

Q Such steps -- I mean, are you concerned about such steps which is escalating the situation there in southern Lebanon much more than --

A I'm not addressing such steps because that suggests that I accept what you said as fact, and I don't necessary do that, so -- obviously, we're concerned with the human rights situation, but in terms of what happened there and our response to it, let me refer you to the guidance that's in the Press Office.

Q A prominent student leader disappeared in Guatemala City on Friday. Can you -- will you -- can you tell us whether Shultz will take this up with the Foreign Minister today and could you take a question as to what we know about this? His name is Carlos Eduardo Cuevas.

A I'll look into it. I doubt that we will talk about what the Secretary takes up with the Foreign Minister, but let me look into it.

Q Will you have, or do you have now a report on the conversation between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Mochtar of Indonesia?

A I don't have one.

Q Will you?

A I'm not sure that we'll have anything to report, Don. I will check and see, but our usual practice obviously is not to comment on such conversations.

Excuse me, one other question.

Q Alan, back to the Gulf, if I may. Do you know of any upgrading of Soviet naval force on the Gulf area?

A I think you'd have to check with the Pentagon on that.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:50 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, May 22, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #91

TUESDAY, MAY 22, 1984, 12:11 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon all. I have a housekeeping announcement, a personnel statement from the Secretary and a lean book.

The reminder is that the list for accompanying press, the sign-up sheet for the quick trip to El Salvador for the Presidential inauguration there, comes down at noon tomorrow.

The personnel announcement is a statement by the Secretary, an announcement by the Secretary, in his name: "Air Force Lieutenant General John T. Chain, Jr. -- that's C-H-A-I-N, Jr. -- has agreed to take over as Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, effective July 1."

"General Chain, who is currently the Air Force's Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, brings with him a wealth of knowledge and experience, and I look forward to working very closely with him." This is the announcement in the name of the Secretary.

The Secretary goes on: "I want to express my great admiration and gratitude to Admiral John Howe for the outstanding service he has performed as Director of Politico-Military Affairs over the past two years. Admiral Howe has served with distinction, and I wish him every success as he returns to his naval duties." That's an announcement in the words of Secretary Shultz.

Q You spell "Chain" as in command?

A Spell it C-H-A-I-N.

Q But not as in "command?" (Laughter)

Q As "Chain" in command.

Q Do you have a biographical sketch there you can hand out?

A Yes, I do. Sure. Well, it's a DOD biography which you can get from the Press Office afterwards. General Chain has a very distinguished career.

Served in Vietnam, among other places; flew 225 hours out of Tan Son Nhut Air Base. He's a master parachutist, he's made 66 jumps and he's got a lot of other very impressive biographical data.

Q He'll need all of that. (Laughter)

Q On that same subject --

A That same subject -- parachuting? (Laughter)

Q This is a civilian operation here?

A This is a civilian operation here, that's right. This is a civilian operation.

Q Why does the Secretary choose to have two military officers successively running that Politico-Military Bureau?

A I think that clearly Admiral Howe's service in that position has been extremely impressive. The Secretary has remarked upon that, and he's chosen a very impressive military-oriented successor for an assignment which obviously works very closely with the military.

Q Could we anticipate that we'll have the same warm relationship with the incoming man as we had with the --

Q Outgoing? (Laughter)

A As always, this entire department is committed to the speediest dissemination of facts in as forthcoming and fulsome manner as possible.

Q Check the definition of "fulsome." (Laughter)

Q I'm just waiting for you to get struck by lightning. (Laughter)

A Okay, that's all for today.

Q Can you bring us up to speed on the diplomatic efforts in the Persian Gulf?

A Continuing. Assistant Secretary Murphy is in Saudi Arabia. I do not have any indication that he will make any other calls in the area before he returns to

Washington. Don't have a return date for you to Washington. I think he saw King Fahd this morning.

Q And did he deliver a letter?

A I'm not going to get into the question of Presidential letters, Jim. I mean, try the White House, but I think they will be as forthcoming as I am on that.

Q Some Saudi officials have been saying that they will take care of the defense of the kingdom by themselves and will not require any outside help. Is that in line with the way this Administration would like to see things happen?

A There's been no change in the way we've been tackling this serious problem. Now our accent is on diplomacy. As we've said before, no specific offer of military assistance or assistance in the security area has been made and no such request has been made of us.

Having said all that, we have discussed with various Gulf States over a period of weeks security problems in the area, but basically there's no change.

Q John, in a more general sense, not specifically related to the attacks in the Gulf of recent, in the last couple weeks, has there been an exchange with Saudi Arabia on additional Saudi military equipment requests, separate for a moment from the question of assistance with U.S. personnel or anything like that? Speaking of equipment requests, for example, have they renewed the request for the strength -- for the Stingers or other --

A I don't have anything on Stingers for you, r on any specifics. I'm sure that talks continue with the Saudis. I would expect them to continue routinely on the question of Saudi defense requirements, but I'm not aware of anything specific at the moment.

Q There's no decision-making process at the moment or at the verge of conclusion, let's say, with regard to --

A No, not that I can give you. Don't have anything on it.

Q Do you have the name of the British delegation that's due here, or are they here already?

A I do, Bernie. I've got them here. On our side, the U.S. team will be led by Deputy Assistant Secretary Placke, and Deputy Director Kanter of PM. The U.K. team will be led by Keith Haskell - H-A-S-K-E-L-L -- who's the head of the Middle East Department at the Foreign Office.

I do have a full list of the participants. You can get them from the Press Office afterwards.

Q When is this going to be?

A They are meeting today and tomorrow, Don, and it's part of a continuing discussion on issues of mutual interests related to security in the Gulf. That's about the extent of what I have.

Q Is that here?

A Yes, here in the State Department.

Q Will Ambassador Fairbanks be part of those talks, John?

A I don't think so. He's certainly not listed as participating.

Q Is this being done because of the recent threat to shipping in the Gulf -- these talks?

A I can't tell you because I don't know. I can't tell you when this meeting was scheduled, Greg. I don't know.

Q John, can you tell if the security in the Gulf has been raised during the meeting of the Joint Committee, the U.S.-Jordanian Joint Committee?

A I do not know the answer to that question. I would think it would be very likely it that it would be raised, but I don't know specifically the answer to that question but I wouldn't see why it wouldn't be.

Q Is there any thought of going to Congress and asking approval for a Stinger sale -- renewing the Saudi issue -- but only for use in the Gulf to escape the --

A Don't have anything for you on that, Bill. Can't take that any further for you.

Q Anything on Mr. Sakharov's situation?

A No, nothing fresh today.

Q John, could I ask a couple about the Salvador joint communique that was issued yesterday between the U.S. and El Salvador?

A You can although basically the briefings on President Duarte's visit were at the White House.

Q I was just curious to know, do you -- are there many occasions on which the U.S. signs joint communiques between the President of the United States and a man who is not the president of another country?

A Well, I think that's a little hair-splitting. I mean, he's about to be president of the country.

Q If President Reagan -- would it be -- would it have been all right for an American president-elect to sign a joint communique with El Salvador?

A It would be all right with me, (Laughter) but I guess you would have to consult the Constitutional experts. But I wouldn't personally object to it.

--MORE--

Q I have another question. The communique referred to "military assistance to defend against violence of the extreme right." In what way does the United States envision its military assistance to El Salvador being used by President Duarte's government --

A That's in the communique? You're quoting from the communique?

Q It's from the communique -- it's from one of the three points that were major objectives that were listed.

A I guess I'll stay away from interpreting the communique.

Q John, following on that, last week in the briefing, following the visit of President de la Madrid, a senior official who deals with Latin American affairs in particular, when asked about a joint communique, he said it was not normal nor traditional practice for us to issue joint communiques. Why was it done this time?

A Don't know. I can't explain why he would say such a thing. I mean, I just don't understand that statement.

Q Well, if you go back, it's a very relevant --

A O.K. But I mean I can't answer the question.

Q Do you have any comment or response to the appeal by a number of leaders from different parts of the world for the United States and other nuclear-weapons powers to stop the production and deployment and I think whatever else they call for?

A Well, it's basically a freeze; they're asking for a freeze. The United States respects the sincerity of purpose and commitment to peace of the six world statesmen who have issued that Joint Declaration. We also fully share the primary objective of the declaration -- that there never be another world war. This has been an overriding goal of U.S. foreign policy since 1945, and remains our top priority today.

Arms control can play a vital role in this process. Accordingly, we call once again on the Soviet Union to join in negotiations for real reductions in nuclear weapons. It is unconscionable that the Soviets continue to boycott negotiations unless they are in effect granted a veto power over NATO's security decisions.

In our judgment, however, the specific first step proposed in the Joint Declaration -- a comprehensive freeze for all nuclear powers -- would not enhance stability or reduce the risk of war. It would perpetuate the dangerous disparities which the massive Soviet nuclear build-up has created, and would undercut efforts to move to a more stable strategic balance. Rather than paving the way for reductions, it would make achieving them much more difficult.

Q Copy; please?

A Sure.

Q Do you have any comment on the Genscher-Gromyko visit yesterday?

A I don't really think so. I think Mr. Genscher spoke directly and effectively in response to Mr. Gromyko's criticisms, and we saw nothing that was new or particularly constructive in what Mr. Gromyko reportedly had to say.

Q John, the recent developments in U.S.-Soviet relations, how do we interpret these? Does that appear to reflect, would you say -- could be characterized as reflecting a worsening of U.S.-Soviet relations?

A Well, I think it's unwise to characterize the relations from day to day. Clearly, they have been better in the past; clearly, they are not particularly good at the moment. I think for us to analyze the Soviet motivations, though, is probably unwise. I think what we must do is continue to base our foreign policy on steadfastness, and realism, and strength.

As you know, we have a variety of offers out on the table in various fora, particularly in the nuclear arms reduction area; and we think those are offers that the Soviet Union should be prepared to talk about at the appropriate negotiating tables.

Q John, do you have any comment on the reports from Islamabad that the Soviets completed their control on the valley that was the theater of their operations?

A I do not. I don't know whether we have any update on that -- It's Afghanistan, Panjsher Valley.

No, sorry.

Q John, referring you to the statement on the nuclear freeze that you made -- I may have missed it, but I wasn't quite sure I understood what was unconscionable, the boycott or a veto of --

A The Soviets' refusal to discuss at the arms control talks.

Q If I could follow up on that, to this six-nation appeal: as I understand it, they are planning to go on to make presentations to the U.S. and the other countries, including the Russians, at the United Nations; and they are talking about having a summit meeting of their own as a step toward trying to negotiate with the nuclear powers.

Given your negative initial reaction to what they are proposing in specific, to what extent would the United States be willing to negotiate with them, or even talk to them, about their ideas regarding what should be done in the nuclear field?

A Well, I don't know that we have any specific proposal from them yet to meet, and I guess we would have to wait until we get that to see how we would respond.

As I said, it's not a question of disagreeing with them on the goal. We're very much in sympathy with what they ultimately want to achieve. It's the tactics; it's the freeze-now tactic that we consider to be not practical.

Q So do you think that the U.S. Government would be willing to talk to them?

A I don't know. I think we have to wait and see what request or suggestion they make.

Q John, on Iran-Iraq: the U.S. emphasis at the present time is on negotiations -- diplomacy, I should say -- with a view toward defusing. You've been at this now for a couple of weeks on a more accelerated tempo. Is there anything that you can point to that would produce some sort of hope that diplomacy can, in fact, work?

A Nothing I can tell you, Bernie, except that a large number of governments are involved in this, and a large number of governments see the point and the validity of the arguments that we and others are making in pursuit of peaceful resolution of this matter, and all that proceeds with vigor.

Q John, President Zia, after Vice President Bush left his official visit there, said that they had agreed to "coordination of our viewpoints on the international level."

Does this translate into policy talks with Pakistan on what can be done in the Persian Gulf area toward Libya and other Islamic-U.S. relations?

A Well, the Pakistani Foreign Minister, as you know, is here today, and just what the course of his discussions with the Secretary, what course they will take, I don't know; but I think it would be logical that the Gulf issue would be something we would discuss with Pakistan. I don't know, as I say, specifically about today's agenda; but it seems to me logical that that is a subject that would be discussed between Pakistan and ourselves.

Q Why is there a reluctance to officially disclose a Presidential letter to King Fahd?

A I think, as a matter of general principle, Bernie, the White House tends not to discuss Presidential correspondence.

Q John, do you have anything on the article that appeared in The Times today about a meeting between South Africa and Angola to which it suggests the United States was not invited in Lusaka?

A Very little. Don't-- the meeting was to have taken place -- haven't had an opportunity; we assume it did, but haven't had an opportunity to discuss that meeting with all the parties involved. Our impression is that this disengagement continues to proceed, and that there are prospects of it being completed in the near future.

Q Do you know why -- Did the United States have an observer at these talks? From what you say, it doesn't seem --

A At this meeting?

Q Yes.

A I'm not aware of that.

Q Do you know why the United States --

A I do not; no.

Q Can you tell us anything about the meeting today between the Secretary and representatives of the MPC in Namibia, and what that's about?

A Well, as far as the Secretary is concerned, that is a very brief meeting. I think Chet Crocker, Assistant Secretary Crocker, is meeting today -- probably has already met -- with a delegation of the Namibian Multi-Party Conference. I think they are going to see Secretary Shultz very briefly later this afternoon. That's really about all I have for you in the context of our role in the Namibia negotiations.

We seek to stay in close touch with as many of the Namibian parties as possible. And so this is taking place within that context.

MR. ROMBERG: They saw Crocker yesterday.

A Oh, Crocker yesterday. Beg your pardon. I'm off a day on the meeting with Crocker.

Q And do you know who the parties are who are here -- who are represented?

A I don't. We can probably get that for you.

Q And finally, this Times article essentially repeats the suggestion that South Africa is kind of going off on its own. Do you have any --

A No, don't have any basis for believing that.

Q Okay. And finally, do you have any readout on the Guatemalan Foreign Minister's talks with Shultz yesterday?

A I don't, no. I'm sorry.

Q John, do you have any comment on this report attributed to Ha'aretz of Israel, saying that the State Department is asking Israel to change the status of the West Bank?

A No, I don't. Haven't seen it.

Q Nothing whatsoever? Will you take the question, please?

A I think it's a very fanciful-type report.

Q Back on that Persian Gulf: Last week when you were talking about American diplomatic efforts, you mentioned three things that the United States was doing -- expressing its concern, passing messages, and maintaining contact. At what point do you think the Ayatollah is going to be affected by American concerns?

A You mean give you the day and the time?

Q Yes. What is it about your expression of concern that you think is going to deter the Ayatollah from doing what he is doing?

A Well, I think it's a question of -- I would hope that the arguments of reason and humanity would prevail. Ships are getting attacked; people are getting injured; and the outcome of what seems to be happening is not beneficial to either side.

Q And you think he will be persuaded by the force of your logic?

A Whether he would be or not is no argument, it seems to me, for not attempting to persuade him, hopefully, of logic.

Q And presuming, just for the sake of argument here, that it doesn't succeed? (Laughter) What then is the United States prepared to do?

A Well, I think we won't predict the end of the diplomatic initiative. We are sturdy and patient, and we will continue to work at it.

Q John, there haven't been any attacks on ships since Friday.

A That's right.

Q Do we read anything into this?

A I think it's a little early to read anything. Obviously, one is grateful that there have not been more attacks, but I think it's a little early to draw conclusions.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:32 p.m.)

1-1343

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Wednesday, May 23, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #92

WEDNESDAY, MAY 23, 1984, 12:13 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: I have a couple of announcements up front. Available in the Press Office is the prepared statement by Deputy Secretary Kenneth Dam before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations. That testiony is on the Kissinger Commission Report.

Secondly, there will be a press briefing on the upcoming North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting. The meeting takes place in the Department May 29-31. The briefing will be in this Press Briefing Room Friday, May 25, at 2:30.

And a statement on the trip that the Secretary of State has asked the Attorney General to undertake -- the Secretary has asked Attorney General William French Smith to head the U.S. Delegation to the Second International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa. That will take place in Geneva, July 9-11. This conference will undertake a wide-ranging review of the needs and impact of the more than 2,000,000 refugees in Africa, out of the world total of some 7,000,000 refugees. The first such conference took place in Geneva in 1981, at which time Ambassador Kirkpatrick headed the U.S. Delegation.

The Secretary of State is delighted that Attorney General Smith has accepted this assignment. The Attorney General has been the principal Administration spokesman in the annual Congressional consultations on refugees. The appointment of a Cabinet minister to head our delegation to the conference affirms the importance that the President and the Secretary of State attach to sustaining our commitment to join with other nations in assisting refugees in Africa.

In 1984, U.S. contributions to African refugee assistance will be not less than $75 million in multilateral and bilateral aid, including Food for Peace, and obviously beyond that there is the U.S. food aid for drought victims in Africa.

That's all I have for you.

Q John, do you have any comment on the acquittal in El Salvador of the officer accused of the murder of the labor advisers?

A Yes, I do. A Salvadoran court has decided that the time for submitting additional evidence in this case has elapsed, resulting in the dismissal of the charges against Lt. Lopez Sibrian. Lt. Lopez Sibrian has been charged in the murders of Michael Hammer, Mark Pearlman, and Rodolfo Viera. This is not a final disposition of the case. There are serious grounds for questioning the most recent court action under Salvadoran law, and the United States is informed that the Attorney General of El Salvador will file an appeal. We are confident that the Salvadoran authorities will pursue this case vigorously.

Q Copy?

A Sure.

Q Based on what?

A On the grounds I've just outlined.

Q What is the status of the man who was supposed to testify against Lopez Sibrian, Captain Avila? He was reportedly released about six weeks ago over U.S. objections.

A I don't have anything on that, Jim.

Q You have nothing?

A No.

Q What does this say to you about the chances for a fair trial for the National Guardsmen accused in the murder of the churchwomen?

A Well, as you know, that trial was to have started -- and I assume may now have done -- this morning. We have fragmentary reports that the appropriate number of jurors are present, and so presumably, the case began this morning, but I don't have any comment on it while it's underway.

Q Will you release -- upon a verdict in that case, will you then release the Tyler report?

A As we have said, Judge Tyler's report was not released earlier for fear that it would prejudice the outcome of the case.

Q When will you consider the --

A I don't know when, Jim, but what we have said on that stands.

Marvin?

Q Where is Murphy?

A Well, he may be back today; may be back. Don't have a precise time, but might be back.

Q He's still in Saudi Arabia?

A Well, I think he's on his way back.

Q That was the only place?

A That was the only place.

Q Can you tell us anything about the meeting yesterday with the British team?

A I really can't, Jim, no. Don't have anything on that.

Sorry, Marvin, Cut you off at the pass.

Q On El Salvador and aid, would the Administration be willing to abandon its effort to get aid for the Contras as a way of assuring that it will get the aid for El Salvador?

A I haven't heard any such suggestion. The Administration's position on that is fairly clear and firm.

Q What is that?

A That the aid is necessary, and the Administration still is arguing very strongly for it.

Q For the aid to the Contras?

A Of course.

Q Why is it considered that necessary?

A Oh, I don't think I need to go over the ground again. The President has talked about it at length; the Secretary of State has talked about it at length. It's an important aspect of our foreign policy. And the Secretary and the President are arguing strongly for it.

Q Is the idea that it would be better for the Administration to lose on both than to gain one?

A I don't think the Administration is conducting the campaign it is conducting in the belief that it will lose. I think the Administration is conducting a campaign to win, given the importance of these funds.

Q On both?

A Certainly that is the effort.

Q Do you have any explanation for why the President indicated yesterday that he had been misinformed about the amount of money available to the Contras?

A No, I don't.

Q Do you have anything today, on the same area, on the collapse of the peace commission in Guatemala and the recent disappearances of student leaders there?

A No, I don't.

Q Do you have anything on the arrest of a Hungarian nationalist in Czechoslovakia that took place last week?

A I think we had something on that yesterday. Why don't you check with the Press Office. One out of the three.

Q Do you have anything on reports that the Soviets may be seeking a truce in Afghanistan?

A No, don't.

Q How about the defection of the Afghan Charge?

A No, I don't.

Q Can we have a copy of the answers?

A (Laughter) I'm sorry.

Q On the Euromissiles, the President made a reference yesterday about the smaller country who could follow Holland, if they decided not to deploy. Do you know what country he meant?

A Well, I think there have been some mistaken assertions that the President was referring to Belgium. That is not correct. It's a complete misreading of the President's remarks. The United States Government is well aware that the Government of Belgium is carrying out its commitments under the 1979 decision -- that's the dual-track decision. The U.S. Government recognizes the great importance of these commitments and has full confidence that the Government of Belgium will continue to carry them out.

The President's remarks did not refer to other INF-basing countries, but rather to certain well-known political debates in non-basing countries.

Q John, do you have any comment on the stories coming frequently from the Middle East that Israel gave a guarantee not to attack the pipeline project supposed to be extended between Karkuk and Aqaba, I think, in Israel?

A Don't have anything specifically on guarantees, but there was some guidance on pipeline plans and thinking a few days ago, and you can pick that up in the Press Office.

Q John, do you have any comment on the Kuwaiti Oil Minister Ali al-Khalifa, when he said that the Arab states are astonished that the United States has adopted an attitude of "spectator" --

A Attitude, sorry, of what?

Q -- of "spectator" with regard to the Iraq-Iran war.

A No, I don't have any comment on that specific alleged statement, but I think the position of the United States on the Iran-Iraq War has been clear, is clear, and continues. There is no change in it.

Q Why the Arab countries consider you as "spectator"? I mean, they don't know that you are involved in diplomatic -- vigorous, as you said, diplomatic --

A Oh, I think they are well aware of our involvement in vigorous diplomatic activity, along with many others.

Q John, the President said that progress was being made in negotiations with the Soviet Union, but didn't say what particular negotiations. Do you have a rundown on those?

A I think I'll stand by what the President said.

Q On the subject of what the President said, he gave me, at least, a distinct impression that he was talking about other smaller countries which were scheduled to take the missiles, not about which were discussing them.

Can you tell me, apart from Belgium and the Netherlands, what other small countries are scheduled to take --

A Might have a chat about that afterwards.

Q I'd rather have a chat now while -- Since he was --

A No chat now.

Q Since he was ON THE RECORD, and since he --

A No. Well, ON THE RECORD, I have nothing to add to what the President said.

-- MORE --

1-1350

Q John, when was the last incident in the Persian Gulf?

A I think Friday.

Q Last Friday?

A Yeah.

Q Nothing since then?

A Nothing since then.

Q What sort of interpretation do you put on that?

A I think we would be cautious in making interpretations. Obviously, the fact that there hasn't been another attack is welcomed by the governments involved, and certainly by the people who are sailing on those ships. But I think it's a little premature to draw sweeping conclusions.

Q John, this morning, at least our time, the President of Iraq, Saddam Husayn, is quoted by the Iraqi News Agency as saying -- as announcing, they say -- that Iraq will soon possess weapons capable of destroying Kharg Island and saying Iraq will not go back on its decision to tighten the seige on Kharg Island and strike at any tanker within the prohibited zone Iraq has set.

A Uh-hum.

Q Do you have any idea what kind of weapons he's talking about?

A No.

Q Is the United States doing anything to prevent Iraq from acquiring more devastating weapons than it already has?

A I think the United States already has done a great deal in terms of talking with Allies and pointing out the considerable dangers of arms flow to both Iran and Iraq, as you know.

Q In the past, though, I think that you or Alan had made a distinction between the energy with which the U.S. was pursuing this question of weapons regarding Iran and the somewhat lesser energy regarding Iraq.

A Well, I think there's a little misunderstanding about that. It's not a question of "lesser energy." The position of the United States is absolutely clear, that it does not itself supply arms to either Iran or Iraq. I think that the point -- I should not interpret what Mr. Romberg has said, but -

Q What is the State Department position anyway?

A I think the point that has been made is, despite that even-handed approach, we are particularly and would be particularly concerned about additional arms flow to Iran because Iraq, after all, is a country which has said it would sit down and talk about peaceful resolution of the matter.

There has been no such indication from Iran. Quite the counter, and so Iran is particularly intransigent. So obviously one has a special concern about Iran acquiring such weapons.

Q Well, at this particular moment, Iraq, at least -- judging by this report from the Iraqi News Agency -- is more concerned with not sitting down but destroying the oil-loading facilities in Iran.

A Well, I don't -- I mean, I don't want to interpret what the Iraqis say from day to day. But perhaps they are exhibiting frustration.

Q John, what's your reading of -- I'm sorry.

Q What do you mean by that?

A Perhaps they're exhibiting frustration because nothing has happened on the Iranian side.

Q What is your reading of the visit to Tehran by Khaddam?

A Nothing on that. Nothing on that. I've seen the same reports you have.

Q Would you see it as a positive or as a negative, or do you have any indications as to what --

A I guess it would depend on how the visit turns out. It could be a positive development.

Q Do you have any information to confirm the reports that the Iranians in the Bekaa Valley area had already left the area there?

A No, I don't have anything on that for you.

Q A couple of stories from the Middle East. One from Tel Aviv saying that the United States postponed or withdrew secretly its plan to finance what was called the Jordanian Rapid Deployment Force, task force, or whatever, this year. Do you have any comment or statement to this effect?

A As you know, that's a classified program. The Administration has requested Congress to defer action without prejudice on that classified item in the Fiscal '84 Defense Supplemental. Our request to Congress followed close consultation and agreement between the Governments of the United States and Jordan. It was agreed that the program should be reviewed again and its costs re-estimated.

The United States expects to continue to work closely with Jordan on peace and security issues of mutual interest. Our relationship continues to be close and cooperative as befitting friends.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q When did the Administration request Congress to defer this?

A I don't have a date on this, Don.

Q Can you find out?

A Could try to get something for you, sure.

Q What's the reason --

Q Is that part of the same decision as the Stinger?

A On this particular question? As I say, we're going to continue to talk about it with Jordan and that decision -- but I don't want to mislead you. I don't want to suggest that it may not be resubmitted. But the fact is that following that consultation, it's agreed that the program should be reviewed and its costs re-estimated.

Q John, what's the matter with the costs? Why do they have to be re-estimated?

A I assume both sides felt that it would be a good thing to take another look at it.

Q Yeah, but what --

A I don't have any more light on it.

Q Both sides meaning Jordan and the U.S., not Congress and the --

A Jordan and the U.S., sure.

Q Don's question, don't you have a reason to offer about why "defer?"

A It's a matter of consultation between the Governments of Jordan and the United States.

Q I heard you. But is there a reason?

A We're looking at the costs; taking another look at it.

Q Was there advice from any of the appropriations committees that the matter might fall on hard times?

A Not that I'm aware of, Bernie.

Q John, is that why the Commander-in-Chief of the Jordanian Army is here -- one of the reasons?

A No, I don't think so. It may well have been discussed while he was here, but I do not think that was the reason for his being here. I think that was a visit that was scheduled as part of a routine series of consultations.

Q John, can't you --

Q Did the Jordanians initiate that decision, John?

A Don't -- can't tell you how the initiative was taken.

Q Had the Israelis been objecting to it, the way that they were objecting to the Stingers or was the objection, or the -- you know, the Israeli position on that that was more give-and-take --

A Looks like you'll have to ask the Israelis.

Q What was their position about --

A You'll have to ask the Iraelis.

Q I want to ask a second question about another report.

Q Same question. Is it that Jordan took the initiative to drop out, or has the U.S. decided to lean on Jordan because of the King's observations about U.S. policy?

A Just don't have anything, Bernie, on how this was decided.

Q John, was the consultation process also including Israel on this decision?

A Don't have anything for you on our talks with Israel.

Q John, can you characterize the U.S.-Pakistan consultations that took place yesterday, and particularly if it has any bearing on the Middle East situation?

A I really can't. I don't have a readout on Pakistan. Is there any after-the-fact briefing? Afraid I don't, Spence, no.

Q Follow up to that? Yesterday, the man who's in charge of the Pakistani nuclear program, Abdul Qader Khan, published an article in a thing called The Defense Journal in which he said that Pakistan has now made tremendous nuclear breakthroughs, especially in the uranium enrichment process, and that it is now possible, theoretically possible, for Pakistan to produce not only atomic but hydrogen weapons. Do you have anything on that?

A No, not beyond what we have said earlier about nuclear development in Pakistan, but nothing new.

Q No concern about that?

A Well, concern, but I think you will find in our earlier statements that concern underlined.

Q John, I want to go back to the second report from the Middle East, and I think this might require that you read the whole item in the FBIS today on Page F-1 about the new Middle East peace initiative that might be undertaken and it will be made public after the Israeli elections.

A By whom?

Q The United States and --

A Be glad to read it, but I would look with skepticism on such --

Q Austria -- with the blessing the EEC. If you can look through the whole details of that and give --

A I'll take a look at it, but I think I'd steer you away from any suggestion --

Q Anything on the Philippines today? Anything on the Philippines today?

A No, I do not, Jim. Sorry.

Q You never have made any comment about the Philippine election, have you?

A No. Still waiting for those official results.

Q When the official returns come some year, are you going to comment on it? (Laughter)

A Well, we'll wait and see when we get them.

Q John, when will the text of the nuclear materials agreement with China be made public?

A Anybody got any light on that? Don't have a date, sorry.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:30 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Thursday, May 24, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #93

THURSDAY, MAY 24, 1984, 12:22 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon all. I have a couple of announcements up front.

Available in the Press Office is the prepared statement by Deputy Secretary Kenneth Dam before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation. The testimony is on domestic content legislation.

Also available are the remarks by Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Mark Palmer yesterday before the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council Meeting. The topic covered was U.S.-Soviet relations.

I have a statement on the Salvadoran court verdict. The Department of State is pleased that justice has been done in the case of the four murdered American churchwomen in El Salvador. The administration of justice is an integral part of the building of democratic institutions. This case demonstrates that the civilian justice system can work in El Salvador. The United States is fully committed to assisting the Government of El Salvador in the strengthening of the Salvadoran judicial system.

We're also pleased to announce that the report of Judge Harold R. Tyler on this case was declassified this morning. The Department of State classified the report when it was received last December because we did not want to risk prejudicing the Salvadoran judicial process. At that time we expressed our intention to declassify the report once a verdict was handed down. Copies of Judge Tyler's report have been sent to the families today. Concerned committees of Congress to whom copies of the report were made available on a classified basis have been informed of the declassification. Copies for the press will be available in the Press Office, we hope, shortly after the conclusion of this briefing.

I should note that you will observe in that report that there is a deletion to a footnote and to an annex. The material deleted contains the names of FBI officers, officials -- agents who were involved in compilation of the report -- and two other sources which must remain confidential. That is the only deletion from the report. So that's --

Q Copies?

A Sure. That's all I have for you.

Q On that -- on a parallel issue -- do you have any comment on the House action on the Salvador aid bills -- or the Central American aid bills?

A The -- which action?

Q In which the 62 million was approved but not the Nicaraguan funds.

A No. No, I don't, Jim. Not in this case.

Q John, is the Department satisfied that justice has been served, complete, in El Salvador in the nuns' case or would it support an inquiry into possible higher-up involvement to support those allegations?

A Well, there are charges of complicity, and without pronouncing on those charges, those charges certainly merit further consideration.

Embassy officials, I think, have discussed with President-elect Duarte the report. I do not believe he in fact has received a copy of the report, but we certainly will make that report available to him and we'll discuss with the Salvadoran Government the various charges and allegations and comments that are being made.

Q You have no position at this point? Isn't there a valid --

A No, not at this point. But certainly the allegations that are being made, as I say, are certainly worthy of further discussion and we're prepared to go into that.

Q There's no fear then that release of the Tyler report now could prejudice possible future judicial action against those who may be accused of covering up? (Laughter.)

I don't mean that as facetiously as it might sound.

A I think insofar as the judicial action that is being completed -- and, at least, in it's primary form, in that the five have been found guilty -- we are not concerned that the report prejudices the outcome of that particular trial.

Jim?

Q But, surely, the Salvadoran authorities have seen it already.

A I do not know whether the Salvadoran authorities have seen it. I do not think President-elect Duarte has seen it in its entirety. I don't know.

Q How come?

A I don't know. That's classified information.

Q Well, he would have been an interested party; right?

A I can't answer that question as to why he has not seen the full report, but I think the issue of classification may have something to do with it.

Q Has President Magana seen the report?

A I do not believe that he has, but I cannot of my own knowledge answer that question; but I think the same provision would apply.

Q John, President Duarte at his press conference said that he will not have any investigation of a cover-up because he's already made his own investigation and knows that General Vides Casanova was not involved. So you're saying that you think it is worth discussing further?

A Well, I think that President-elect Duarte was referring to a specific period when he was himself personally involved in the matter; and, clearly, he said what he said in connection with that.

I'm not leading you in one way or another; but if there are continuing allegations, I do not think that we would feel inhibited about raising them with the Salvadoran Government.

Q Has the U.S. Administration considered that file of this case is now closed after this conviction?

A I'm sorry. That the file -- ?

Q Is closed for good now as the conviction had been upheld?

A   Well, I don't want to interpret the Salvadoran law. There are certain steps that the defense may take. I think they may file an appeal. I think it has to be filed within three days. And there are certain actions that the defense, presumably, could take.

And then insofar as other allegations of other involvement, as I say, we would be prepared to discuss those.

Q   Can you just pin those other allegations down for those of us who have not seen the report? It's been suggested that Judge Tyler did say that Vides Casanova may have been involved in the cover-up. Is that the issue we're talking about?

A   I think what we'll let you do is read the report and then be prepared to answer any questions about it later this afternoon after you have had a chance to look at it rather than my attempting to paraphrase the report.

Q   As I understand it, under Salvadoran law the verdict itself can't be appealed but the sentence can be appealed; is that correct? Or are you saying that there is --

A   I think that is correct, Jim, but let me hasten to say that I really am not going to try to interpret the Salvadoran law; but I think that your assessment is correct.

Q   John, you said in your statement that this case demonstrates that the civilian judicial system in El Salvador can work.

A   Yes.

Q   You're not holding up the way this case was handled as an example of a good civilian judicial system in El Salvador?

A   I'm saying that it has taken a long time and that it's been a terrible ordeal for a lot of people. It's a very good thing that you now have a verdict, and this particular instance shows that, as we have consistently said, the system surely is lacking in efficiency as we see it and as we would like to see it; but, despite the ordeal that we've all gone through on this particular case, the outcome proves that the system can work.

Q   It eventually can come to a conclusion.

A Well, in this cse it has been made to work.

Q Has there been a certification sent to Congress or what do you have to do to free up that money for the aid?

A I don't know that certification is necessary, Bernie. I think that it becomes automatically available. And that was in the amount of 19 million dollars, something like that.

Q Do you have anything on the Stinger sale to the Saudis?

A Yes, I do.

The Saudi Arabian Government has never withdrawn its request for Stinger missiles. The Administration is actively considering the sale of Stinger missiles to Saudi Arabia. We have been in contact with the Congressional leadership on this subject. No final decision has been made, and won't get into any further details until a final decision has been made.

Q When do you expect a final decision to be made?

A Can't give you a time on that, Ralph.

Q Would you expect a letter to be sent from the Pentagon in the very near future?

A I think this is a decision in which, clearly, the President would be involved. Just what the mechanism would -- I guess you'd have to wait for the decision first to find out what transmittal might be required.

Just how it will go forward, if it goes forward, I can't tell you, Ralph.

Q What about the Jordanian request? Have they withdrawn it or is it still on?

A The Jordanian request --

Q Request for Stingers?

A -- for --

Q Stingers?

A -- Stingers?

MR. ROMBERG: (inaudible)

A Yes. I think we gave you something on that a month or two ago and that we pulled that back.

Q John, you're saying --

Q Well, this --

Q -- that no decision was made.

A No final decision.

Q No final decision.

A I mean I'm not steering you away. I'm not suggesting that the Administration isn't seriously looking at it. I don't mean to suggest that at all.

Q Because the answer which was prepared and available yesterday came much closer to saying that, in fact, the Administration is going to go ahead.

A I can't recall the answer that was prepared yesterday, but today's answer is a very good one. (Laughter.)

Q John, do you have anything to substantiate the Iraqi claims (that) they hit two ships today?

Q And a third claim, John --

Q Yes.

Q -- that another ship hit on the Western side of the Gulf.

A No. I don't have anything to substantiate the Iraqi claims that they hit something. There was some evidence of Iraqi air activity at the time; but as to what, if anything, was hit, we're unable to confirm.

On the latest report, I think it probably is fairly good information that a Liberian tanker was hit, probably about 10 o'clock this morning our time, by an Iranian F-4. I think that a Saudi plane or planes scrambled, chased the Iranian plane to I guess the mid-point -- the mid-line. No contact that we're aware of.

First reports seem to suggest -- do suggest that the Liberian registered ship is sinking; and there were reports, I think, that the crew had abandoned the ship but there are later reports that that's not so. So I can't really question it.

Q Do you know where the ship was when it was hit?

A I don't have a position. We may be able to do a little better for you on that during the --

Q Was it off the Saudi coast or --

A It was on the Western side of the Gulf.

Q But you don't know off where --

A I don't know how far off the coast.

Q What is the attitude of the United States toward this latest exchange of attacks on shipping in the Persian Gulf?

A Well, it underlines, clearly, the need for a peaceful settlement of this problem.

--MORE--

Q What is being done to help bring that about?

A Continuing with our vigorous round of diplomacy.

Q John, what conclusion do you draw that the Saudis have twice now scrambled to intercept or pursue Iranian aircraft, and twice have not caught up with them, apparently?

A I think I would defer to the military experts and see what they would say about that. I mean, I can just give you the facts, but it is a very short distance across the Gulf.

Q Was the tanker leaving or arriving or coming into the Gulf?

A I don't know, Jim. I say, we might be able to improve a little on the information during the day.

Q Can I go back to the Stingers for Saudi Arabia? Is the Administration going to go through the request in the normal procedure or is the President going to be using some extraordinary or emergency power, since it is related to the emergency situation in the Gulf? The report says -

A Why don't we wait until the President makes his decision and then I am sure part and parcel of that decision would be how.

Q Bearing in mind that the request, the first request, was withdrawn, based on the Israeli lobby objection, what do you expect to have, an easy going with the Israeli lobby about the Stingers to Saudi Arabia now in this case?

A I told you, that is, I think, one of the reason -- not one of the reasons -- but what is happening is the fact that the Administration is conferring on the Hill now with those people.

Q I would like to ask you about the withdrawal of the RDF for Jordan. There were reports this morning in the papers that the main reason for the withdrawal of -- to put it at ease until after the elections -- was the constant Israeli lobby objections to it. Will you comment?

A I would refer you to the language we used yesterday, and I would steer you away from the thesis you are mentioning.

Q Do you have any comment on the story in the Christian Science Monitor yesterday saying that the Saudis are more than furious about the U.S. policy of arming the Saudis?

A More than furious about our policy of -- ?

Q About the Administration's policy regarding arms sales to Saudi Arabia?

A The Saudis are furious about our policy of arms sales?

Q Yes.

A In what respect?

Q This is the conclusion one comes out of the story in the Christian Science Monitor yesterday.

A But I mean what aspect of our arms sales? What are you suggesting?

Q In general. It is a --

A I don't have any indication the Saudis are furious with us.

Q Filing break?

A Filing break.

Q John, on the basis of these new attacks in the Persian Gulf, are you saying that there is so far no change in American policy? It continues to be diplomacy, vigorous diplomacy.

A That is -- we have consistently said that force is clearly undesirable and the resort that is least acceptable. The President has said what he has said on that issue, and we are engaged in continuing diplomatic endeavors.

Q John, in connection with the Gulf, also, do you have any comment on reports that the Soviet Union has delivered a series of 50 new SS-13s to Iraq?

1366

A No. Saw that -- heard that report, but don't have anything at all to confirm that, Ralph.

Q John, why do you confirm --

A Excuse me.

Q Do you have anything on the reports that the U.S. Ambassador in Madrid has filed a protest to the Spanish Foreign Minister on the re-exporting of military materiel to Iran?

A Well, I don't think we should get into the details of our diplomatic discussions with Spain, but certainly Spain is one of those countries that is very much aware -- we have certainly made known to Spain our feelings that weapons should not be supplied to either side. So the Spanish Government is certainly very aware of our feeling on that.

Q John, do you have anything on the reaction of the East Bloc to MBFR today?

A No, I don't. No.

Q John, is the Stinger the only defense system being considered by the President to Saudi Arabia?

A Well, as you know, in terms of our relationship with Saudi Arabia, various systems and pieces of equipment are being discussed all the time. I am not aware of anything else specifically at this time, but I don't want to delude you, and I am not suggesting anything else is in the works, quite the contrary, but I don't want to suggest that there aren't talks going on about other pieces of equipment.

Q John, can you confirm whether there are any joint patrols by the Kuwaitis and the Saudis of the Gulf waters?

A No, I cannot. I guess you would have to ask them.

Q John, about the Gulf, you confirmed just now about the Liberian, that the Iranian hit the Liberian, and before that, only when the Iranian hit something you confirmed it most of the time, while the Iraqi, you never confirm it except after a couple of days. Why?

A Doing the best we can. Giving you the information we have got. I have told you, we are aware of Iraqi air activity. Not aware, or don't have any way to confirm their claims that they hit two ships. Maybe they did. Not suggesting that they didn't. Not suggesting that they did. It is simply that the resources available to us are unable to confirm that. Today, our resources were available, were able to confirm the Iranian strike on the Liberian tankers. So, giving you the best information we have got.

Q John, can I ask two questions? On your statements on the missiles, what was your first sentence? Back here it sounded like you said that it was withdrawn.

A Never withdrawn.

Q Okay, thank you.

A The Saudis have never withdrawn formally their request for the Stingers.

Q Did they ask us if we could reactivate it?

A I guess we are not going to get into the details of our diplomatic exchanges, George. Sorry about that.

Q Sorry, I had one more question, if I may?

Q The Jordanians never withdrew the --

A I think we withdrew the Jordanian request from the Hill.

Q Did you have anything on the indictment of the terrorists in Israel?

A No, I don't. Sorry.

Q Why not?

A Just one of those bases we didn't get to cover. I'm sorry. Let's take a look at it for you.

Q Do you have anything on the Foley amendment that passed last night in the House on forbidding U.S. combat troops in or over Nicaragua or El Salvador?

A No. The President has made clear the United States' position on the dispatch of combat troops to Central America. Don't have anything further on that.

Q You don't consider it unreasonable restraint on the power of the President.

A Well, I mean, you raise interesting -- as you raise it, Jim, yes -- you raise interesting constitutional questions which undoubtedly you would want to pursue, but the President has made clear that there is very little possibility that U.S. combat troops would in fact, as a matter of pragmatism, be sent to Central America.

Q So I take it the Administration will not fight this in the Senate -- in the Congress?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q And one other, do you have anything on the Senate Intelligence Committee action?

A Well, that was in a closed, classified hearing, so whatever action they took, I guess from our point of view, would have to remain classified.

Q John, do you have a comment today on the presence or the visit of Khaddam to Tehran, and in connection with that perhaps any comment on the oil supply to Syria these days?

A No, don't on the latter, really no more on the Syrian initiative or overture or however one would characterize it than yesterday. We clearly would support anything that would lead to the de-escalation of violence and if Mr. Khaddam's visit had that effect, it would be welcome.

Q But do you have any indication whether -- what the thrust is?

A What has happened? No, I don't.

Q John, mindful of the fact that you haven't made a decision yet on going ahead with the Stinger sale, what would be the rationale for it since the Saudis already are loaded down with Sidewinders and Sparrows, and the means with which to fire them?

A Well, I am sure that the military justification is one of the arguments that is being weighed, and, as I said earlier this week, I think there was nothing in the light -- there was nothing extraordinary being talked about in light of the Gulf situation, but clearly the changed situation in the Gulf, I think, would be something that one would take into consideration, while the Stinger thing, which, as I say, has been on the stove, perhaps not the front boiler all this time, has been under consideration.

Q If the Administration did decide to go ahead with the sale, would it do so through the usual 30-day advance letter, or would the President invoke the -- as he has done on a few occasions -- that aspect of law which allows immediate shipment?

A Well, as I say, I think, Bernie, we will wait and see what the President's final decision is, and I think at that time we would probably be aware of how he will proceed.

Q John, Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams delivered a speech on May 21st to the American-Jewish Press Association, and on page 2, in the last paragraph he is saying -- and I would like very much your Department answer to this -- he says about the anti-Semitism, and he says, "On the one hand, and the anti-Semitism of the left wing Arab extremists of the Libyan or the PLO variety on the other." I would like very much to know, first, if there is any evidence to the State Department that there is anti-Semitism among the left -- whatever it is -- in the Arab World, and, second, if this is a reflection, this speech, of all the feelings of the State Department officials from the State Department Secretary of State down to his department, because it contains so many things which really, I would like very much if we could get a chance to sit with Mr. Abrams to discuss these things with him, because it is bordering to accusations which are unfounded. Please.

A Let me take -- see what I can do about your questions, and I gather the last was a statement, and let me take all that and present it to Mr. Abrams and see --

Q Could you confirm a report coming out of Israel that the United States has expressed to Egypt its concern with the deterioration of relations between Egypt and Israel?

A I am not sure whether there is any late activity or communication on that front, and probably wouldn't talk about it, but there isn't any -- I mean, there isn't any question that the United States would like to see a better relationship between Egypt and Israel.

Q Do you have any comment on King Hussein's remarks in an interview with La Figaro in which he said that he deplored the U.S. position on Israeli settlements in occupied Arab territory as a big obstacle to peace --

A Uh-hum.

Q Your position becoming now a big obstacle to peace, and he said that there is no peaceful settlement without the Soviet Union. Can you comment on this?

A Well, as you know, our view has consistently been that the Soviet presence in the Middle East has not been constructive, so I don't think you would find much enthusiasm on our part for involving the Soviet Union in any kind of international conference, if that is what your question implies. Don't have any comment on his -- haven't seen it -- but our position on the settlements is unchanged. Clearly we consider their presence not helpful to the peace process.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:45 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, May 25, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #94

FRIDAY, MAY 25, 1984, 12:26 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A couple of brief announcements, and a statement. A reminder that there will be a BACKGROUND briefing today at 2:30 here in the Briefing Room on the upcoming North Atlantic Council Ministerial which takes place, as you know, here in the Department next week, the 29th through the 31st.

Another reminder: Journalists who have applied for press credentials for the NAC Ministerial may pick up their passes today at the 23rd Street lobby until 4:00 p.m.

A statement regarding the death of Oleksiy Tykhy.

Q Who?

A Just listen and you'll find out.

Q The son of Kon-Tiki. (Laughter)

A We have recently learned that long-time Ukrainian human rights activist Olesksiy Tykhy died in a Perm labor camp earlier this month. He was 57 and had suffered from ulcers and other ailments exacerbated by the harsh conditions of the camp.

Tykhy's dedication to the cause of Ukrainian national culture and human rights stretched back over more than 25 years. From 1957 to 1964, he was imprisoned on charges of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" for his activities in defense of Ukrainian language and culture.

In November 1976, Tykhy and nine others founded the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, whose purpose was to monitor Soviet compliance with the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. Barely three months later, in February 1977, he and the Group's chairman, poet Mykola Rudenko, were arrested and charged with, again, "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." They were tried the following June, and Tykhy received the maximum sentence possible under that charge, ten years in a labor camp and five years of internal exile.

Tykhy's sad end is but the latest reminder of the failure of the Soviet authorities to respect the elementary human rights of their country's citizens. Even as news of his death has become known, world attention has been focused on two other Soviet dissenters, Nobel Laureate Andrei Sakharov and his wife Yelena Bonner, who themselves may be near death.

More than three weeks ago, Dr. Sakharov began a hunger strike to obtain permission for his wife to travel abroad for necessary medical treatment. Mrs. Bonner herself has reportedly been on a hunger strike since May 12. It is our hope that the Soviet authorities accede to the Sakharovs' simple request and prevent the needless deaths of two more individuals who, like Tykhy, have sought nothing more than the exercise of their basic human rights.

Q Copy, please?

A Sure.

Q Are there any indications that the Sakharovs are worse?

A Do not have any new information at this point.

Q You said "may be near death."

A Well, I think that's based on, again, the length of time that they have been engaged reportedly in this hunger strike.

That's it for announcements. Be happy to take your questions.

Q Can you bring us up to date on what's going on in the Persian Gulf? Can you confirm the attack on six ships which is claimed by Iraq?

A Cannot, Jim. We are aware of the claim, but we have no confirmation that any ships have been hit. Again, as always, we're not saying they didn't but we don't have any evidence that they did.

Q Is it the same for yesterday's two ships they claimed?

A Well, I think it was the day before, and we addressed that. I don't think there were two more ships. I count the same --

Q Yesterday -- no, yesterday, Iraq claimed it hit two ships --

A Yeah, and I don't think we had any --

Q -- two naval targets.

Q That's right, two naval targets. I think it was from late the day before. In any case, we don't have anything on those either.

Q Do you have any Iranian attacks to report today as you did yesterday?

A Today? No.

Excuse me, Jim?

Q There were repeated threats by the Iraqis against Kharg Island itself. Has this Government in the last 48 hours asked -- specifically asked Saddam Hussein or the Iraqis not to take an action that would widen -- obviously widen the war?

A I think I will stay away from, without leading you one way or another on this, John, stay away from sort of minute-by-minute or day-by-day diplomacy on this. The fact of the matter is that we have made it clear, directly and indirectly as possible and appropriate, to the parties that we hope that this war will not be widened and that the conflict will come to a peaceful solution. And so that is a continuing goal and continuing part of our vigorous diplomatic effort.

Q Could you add to that the Soviet Union -- that we've discussed this more fully with the Soviets?

A Again, I don't have specifics to offer you on what we may have discussed with the Soviets.

Bernie, go ahead.

Q Alan, could you bring us up to date on the report that the Administration is about to, or has authorized an emergency dispatch of the 200 Stingers to Saudi Arabia?

A I don't have anything new to give you on that. Consultations are continuing.

Q "Nothing new" -- what does that mean?

A Beyond what I've said on this previously.

Q You haven't said anything on it previously.

A I said that we are consulting with the Saudis on the situation, and what their requirements might be and I don't have anything beyond -- go ahead.

Q This would be a specifically different sort of thing of sending up to 200 Stingers without going through the Congressional process on an emergency basis.

A I understand that; I just don't have --

Q That has not been addressed before. That's why it's --

A Oh, I'm sorry. On the overall question --

Q No, on this specific --

A I just don't have anything to give you on it.

Q Secretary Weinberger said on television this morning that the Administration officials were going -- were discussing this this morning, I guess. Have they reached any decision?

A I just don't have anything on this. The consultations are continuing, Bernie.

Q What was Mr. Rosenne doing yesterday here at the Department, and do you have any readout on his visit? I understand that he made the statement objecting to any sales of any sophisticated weapons to the Gulf.

A Don't we have something -- did we get something on that earlier -- Ambassador Rosenne?

1-1376a

He was in, and I think yesterday we had something, and that's about -- I think that was available. Am I right? Do you all have --

Q He was in yesterday.

A I know he was in, but I think we had something on this and I don't have anything new. There wasn't a lot. I'm not going to talk about what he may have said. The fact is, he came in, he saw Mr. Armacost and that's --

Q The subject?

A I don't think I'm going to get into the subject.

Q Alan, has the United States made up its mind as to what its position will be in the Security Council on the Persian Gulf resolution?

A As always on that, Barrie, we would want to wait until the actual vote came to express ourselves because resolutions are constantly being revised, and it's not part of our practice to try and talk about drafts before they come up for a vote.

Q Except that are you willing to sign onto something which only condemns the Iranians?

A Again, I think that rather than dealing with a hypothetical, we'll wait until we see what the actual resolution is and then obviously we will take a position.

Q Is it safe to assume that in that connection, that that's the connection of Perez de Cuellar's appearance this afternoon at the State Department?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q Alan --

A Excuse me.

Q Back on the Stingers, can you explain the mechanics of why it would be possible for the Administration to send 200? Is that because it would come under the $25 million limit?

A I think until we have something to say -- and I don't at this point -- I'm not going to try to explain what may or may not happen in certain circumstances. Obviously, if we take a course of action "A" we'll explain what that involves; and if we take a course of action "B" we'll explain that, but I don't think ahead of time I'm going to try to analyze that.

Q A few days ago -- excuse me.

Q The insurance rates are --

A No, excuse me. Go ahead.

Q A few days ago, from this podium, the situation in the Gulf was described as dangerous, maybe very dangerous, but not a crisis. Do you still stick to the same characterization, or do you find that it's more of a crisis than a dangerous situation?

A I think we'd stick with what we've been saying about it. It's a very dangerous situation, and we are very concerned about the continuing violence.

Q The insurance rates are going up for shipping in the Gulf, and there's some speculation that there might a cancellation of insurance altogether. How do you address yourself to that problem? Do you have -- is there some alternative arrangement that might be made? Could the United States or other countries guarantee insurance?

A I don't think I'm going to get into speculating on that. I don't think that this -- there is a cutoff. There are still ships loading, and I think that the world market is not in a difficult situation at this point. So I don't have anything to say about specifics, and I guess -- I don't know whether the Energy Department does or doesn't, but I don't have anything.

Q My question was on insurance --

A Yeah, but I just don't have anything to say about insurance.

Q Alan, the policy has been that we would keep -- the United States would keep the Straits open and the oil flowing. I think it's also been said from there that we would do nothing unilaterally without --

I-1377

A I think it was said from a Presidential podium.

Q That we would not do anything unilaterally?

A Yeah.

Q Okay. Question: Why isn't that a watering-down of our commitment to keep the Straits open?

A Well, I don't -- the President has articulated his policy on several occasions about the importance of the Strait and the flow of oil and has not changed that policy.

What he did the other day, if you look back at his press conference, was to answer questions about the circumstances under which we might get involved or how we saw that, and I don't consider that a watering-down.

Q Alan, is your inability to confirm the Iraqi claims of yesterday, and again today, the fact that you believe that they are not ships of any other country other than maybe Iran?

A No, it's simply a lack of information that would allow us to confirm it.

Q But does that -- but does it lead you to believe that it may simply be Iranian ships rather than any other international flag?

A I can't explain why we don't have information specifically, Barrie. I suppose there are a number of ways you can look at it, but the fact is we just do not have any information to confirm it and I can't do anything other than report that fact to you.

Q Well, if they were Liberian freighters, or Kuwaiti planes, or Saudi planes, or some other flag, presumbably, you would have some means of finding out about the matter?

A I would think so. But I -- your question presumes that if they're Iranian ships, for example, that we would not have a means of finding that out, and I don't know if that's true.

--MORE--

Q Is there any other consideration being given to help some of the other Gulf countries with military equipment or trainers?

A Well, again, I don't want to get specific. I think the point we have made is that we have had consultations and discussions with various countries in the region about the military situation there, and those discussions continue. But I don't have anything specific to offer you on that aspect of it.

Q Also on the Middle East, there is a report in a Beirut newspaper that the United States has offered to serve as middleman or mediator between Lebanon and Israel to work out security guarantees for Israel's northern border, leading to an Israeli troop withdrawal. Do you know anything about this?

A No, I don't have anything on it.

Q Can you look into it?

A Well, I think that in terms of what the Lebanese and Israelis might be thinking, you really should go to them.

Q It's quoted by Ambassador Bartholomew, as I understand it, isn't it?

A As saying what?

Q As reporting what Jim just asked about.

A Well, I haven't seen the quote; I can't verify a quote, and I --

Q And also that the United States is planning to send another special envoy to the Middle East.

A I think at this time I'm not aware of any plan to do that.

Q Alan, while you're on speculative stories, an Israeli newspaper is reporting that the United States would welcome some kind of an international conference that would reinvolve the Soviet Union in the Middle East --

A I think John addressed this yesterday and dumped on that.

Q He did what?

1-1379

A Dumped on that.

Q President Mubarak made a statement to Al Ahram, Al-Akhbar newspaper, that he is not against Iraq or against Iran; he is against the war. And this is a shift from his earlier position. Do you have any comment on that?

A No.

Q Do you have anything at all on Derwinski's travels in Eastern Europe, what he's doing there?

A Yes; if I can find it, I do have something on his travels. Counselor Derwinski was invited to attend three meetings of Parliamentarians in Europe, and prior to the meetings he paid a brief visit to Romania. In Bucharest he discussed bilateral matters with Romanian officials. In Luxembourg, he's attending the spring meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly; in Paris he will address the Preparatory Conference of the International Parliamentary Group for Human Rights in the Soviet Union; in Salzburg he will address a seminar on the Soviet Union sponsored by the German Marshall Fund and former members of Congress. He left on Tuesday; will be back a week from then -- next Tuesday.

Q Is he taking press?

A I think the sign-up sheet was up. Did you miss that, Bill? (Laughter)

Q On travel, where is Secretary Crocker and why? (Laughter)

A Where is he and why? I think we had something on that before; I don't have it with me, Connie. Why don't you check the Press Office.

Bill?

Q The question was asked earlier in the week about the arrest of a Hungarian nationalist in Czechoslovakia on human rights charges. Have you had any --

A I thought we had some response to that. We posted something --

Q Did you post something?

A Yes.

Q Did.

Q Any comment on the Romanian Olympic decision?

A Yes, we are pleased to learn that the Romanian Olympic Committee decided to attend the Olympic Games, and we look forward to seeing the Romanian athletes in Los Angeles.

Q On another subject, Philip Habib was in the building today. Is he still working for the U.S. Government, and in what capacity?

A I don't know if he's got a technical arrangement as a consultant, but he does come to Washington from time to time. He's got other business that he has here, and he is obviously still valued for his views very highly.

Q Is he involved in the Gulf developments at all, particularly?

A He may have talked about it, but getting back to a question raised before about a special envoy going out there or something like that, I mean, I'm not going to go projecting long-distant future about anything. But in terms of that sort of thing, no. I think the point was that the Secretary and others value his counsel, and they take advantage of his trips to Washington to get it.

Q As we have been back to the Gulf again, it's quite clear that President Saddam Hussein of Iraq is talking more belligerent the last few days.

A Uh-huh.

Q Are you encouraged by this development, or you are condemning it, or what? (Laughter)

A Well, I don't have a specific comment or characterization of his remarks, but obviously, we are concerned by the continuing tension and the continuing violence in the Gulf, and indeed in the Iran-Iraq war, and we'd like to see that come to an end.

Q John, we see that Khaddam is somehow saying that Syria is trying to avoid expansion of the war in the Gulf, as if they are taking the same stand you are taking.

A Well, that would be nice. (Laughter) I think that John addressed this the other day. He said that if there is an effort to do this, and if it is successful, we obviously welcome any effort to try to reduce the tensions and end the fighting.

Q Even the Syrians?

A Sure.

Q Alan, can you tell us anything at all about Dam's meeting with the Soviet trade official this morning?

A I can't, really. That meeting was part of the regularly scheduled series of events that was connected with that visit, and I think that they did discuss the commercial and technical exchanges, whatever that group deals with. Frankly, I don't have, obviously, a detailed readout. But it was, as I say, part of the scheduled program that has been laid on for a long time.

Q Alan, do you have any kind of feeling about the status of, particularly, the trade and economic relations between the two countries?

A I don't have anything to give you on that.

Q The meeting did actually take place?

A Yes.

Q On the U.N. Secretary General meeting with Secretary Shultz at 5:00 can you tell us anything about that?

A No. I told you before I couldn't. Nothing on that.

Q Do you have any comment on the Heritage Foundation story that the world would be better without the U.N., but the spokesman at the U.N. said the world would be better without the Heritage Foundation?

(Laughter)

Does this foundation have any connection with this Administration or (inaudible)?

A Well, it certainly has no official connection. I'm sure people -- there's interchange as there is with many organizations.

Q Alan, on the Gulf, does the U.S. Government currently believe that the Persian Gulf is open to shipping?

A Is it open to shipping?

Q Yes.

A There's certainly shipping going on.

Q There is a report from Jerusalem saying that Mr. Arens, the Defense Minister, is considering a proposal to split the civilian administration and the military government in Judea and Samaria into two separate authorities, one to --

A Don't have any comment on that.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the upcoming visit by President Gemayel that was reported in --

A No, I don't have anything --

Q -- next month?

A No, I don't know anything about that.

Q Is the Secretary going to be here this weekend working, or is he taking off for the weekend?

A Well, I think we can talk about that later. I don't think I'm going to talk about his schedule on the record.

Q Anything on the FBIS report that Oman has warned ships to stay out of the Gulf of Oman?

A I have not seen that, Bernie.

Q Alan, do you have any reaction to the House votes yesterday on aid to Salvador and Nicaragua?

A Yes. We're pleased with the House vote to provide the most urgent portion of assistance needed for El Salvador. The issue at stake in the second vote will have to be pursued further. These are, in our judgment, parts of the same issue, that is El Salvador's ability to resist an externally supported insurgency must be strengthened, and the external support must end if President-elect Duarte is to succeed in his program of democratic and economic reform.

Q Are you talking by any chance about the money to support the Contras when you're vaguely referring to the second part of whatever it is?

A Well, I'm talking to -- I don't think I've ever talked about that question --

Q The second part you're talking about.

A The second part is the part which I believe is a classified program.

Q Are you saying the second part is related to Duarte's efforts at political reform in El Salvador?

A Talking about the fact that the external support to the Salvadoran guerrillas is certainly a hindrance to Mr. Duarte's efforts, or the Salvadoran Government's efforts as a whole, to carry out their programs.

Q And what's the connection? Could you be more specific about the connection?

A I think the logical connection is obvious. I'm going to leave it at that.

Bob?

Q Alan, a couple days ago Brzezinski said he thought that arms control agreements had come to the end of the road. Do you have any reaction to that?

A I haven't. Frankly, I missed that, but I think it is very clear that that is not the position of this Administration, that the President talked the other day, for example, about the MBFR, or issued a statement on the MBFR talks which have just resumed. We have made very clear that we want the Soviets to come back to the START and INF tables; we've tabled a CBW draft treaty, and so on, so there are a lot of arms control efforts that are either underway or we certainly hope could resume. So that to suggest that arms control has come to the end of its usefulness would not be in line with the Government's view.

Q Do you have any comment --

A Excuse me. Jim, go ahead.

Q On El Salvador, in light of the Tyler report you put out yesterday, which says that the man who is now Minister of Defense quite possibly served to cover up the evidence in the murder trial, do you have any second thoughts about supporting a government in which he is a member?

A Don't have any second thoughts on supporting the Government of El Salvador. As far as that report and that particular dimension of it is concerned, I'd refer you to what Deputy Assistant Secretary Michel said last night on the talk show. I think he handled that more than adequately, and I don't think I'm going to try and paraphrase what he said; but I refer you to that.

George?

Q On MBFR, do you have any comment on the Warsaw Pact reaction to the NATO proposal?

A Yes. I would point out that, contrary to the way I saw it reported in the press this morning, an Eastern press spokesman, asked if he was rejecting the proposal, was careful to reply that it wasn't a matter of rejecting or not rejecting it.

Beyond that, as to the Eastern reaction and our comment on it, we're disappointed that the Eastern participants claim to have found nothing new in the Western proposal; but we remain convinced that if the East examines the proposal on its merits, substantial progress is possible. We plan during this round, to explain to the East in detail the compromise aspects of our proposal.

Q Alan, anything on reports that Ethiopia has staged some sort of attack on Somalia?

A Don't have anything on that.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:50 P.M.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, May 29, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #95

TUESDAY, MAY 29, 1984, 12:30 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: O.K. I've got a few announcements for you. First, I want to extend a warm welcome to Patrick Kelly, who will be joining the Press Office as a summer intern. Patrick will be a senior this fall at Marquette University.

Patrick, why don't you stand up so they know who you are.

Second, to advise you that there will be a BACKGROUND briefing on Tuesday's Ministerial, the North Atlantic Council Ministerial, in the Dean Acheson Auditorium at 10:30 a.m. on Wednesday. I think that the NAC credentials are required -- Is that correct, Brian? -- for admittance to that.

Q Tuesday or Wednesday, Alan?

A This is on Wednesday. Wednesday. The North Atlantic Council credentials.

Q Briefing on what?

A This is on the Tuesday -- Tuesday Ministerial. In other words, the briefing will be on Wednesday on the meeting which took place on Tuesday.

Q You mean it's tomorrow on what happens today?

A That's correct -- tomorrow for the meetings today. God, you have a way with words! (Laughter)

O.K. I have two announcements to make with regard to supply of military assistance and sales to Saudi Arabia. With regard to tankers, the United States is augmenting the aerial refueling tanker unit assigned to Saudi Arabia from three tankers to four tankers to enhance support operations of the U.S. AWACS and Saudi F-15s.

One additional aircraft, a KC-10 EXTENDER, has been deployed to supplement the three KC-135s already present. The United States has deployed aerial tankers in Saudi Arabia as part of the AWACS operations since 1980. The additional tanker aircraft could be used to fuel U.S. AWACS aircraft stationed in Saudi Arabia, or Royal Saudi Air Force F-15 aircraft.

U.S. aerial tankers have operated with Saudi F-15s in the past as part of our training program. We approved the sale of KC-3 aerial tankers to Saudi Arabia in 1982. The Saudi tankers will be delivered beginning in 1986.

There has been no decision as to the length of stay of the additional tanker aircraft.

As to an emergency sale of Stingers, in recent days, neutral shipping has been attacked with increasing frequency and in an ever-widening area in international waters in the Gulf. Further escalation could threaten Saudi Arabia and oil supplies on which much of the free world depends. In view of the urgency of the situation and our long and close relationship with the Saudi Kingdom, the President has authorized the immediate sale to Saudi Arabia of 200 Stinger short-range, air-defense missile systems (i.e. launchers and missiles) and an additional 200 missile reloads. Due to the current emergency circumstances, which require an immediate sale in the national security interests of the United States, the President acted under his special authority in Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act to waive the normal 30-day waiting period after Congressional notification.

The Stinger launchers and missiles are being transferred immediately. Saudi Arabia has agreed to strict safeguards to ensure the security of the missiles and will pay the full cost for the system and its transportation. Because the Stinger system can be deployed in the field shortly after delivery, its immediate transfer will quickly contribute to Saudi Arabian air defenses. By providing a deterrent against hostile actions, this transfer lowers the risk of broader conflict. The President's determination reflects United States grave concern with the growing escalation in the Gulf and its implication for the security of our friends in the region.

In light of the unstable situation in the Gulf, we also are advancing, by about three months, initial delivery of conformal fuel tanks (CFTs) for the Saudi F-15s. These

CFTs are part of an order for 120* tank sets which were sold to Saudi Arabia in 1981. Finally, we are expediting delivery of some ammunition and spare parts for items already in the Saudi inventory.

That is it for announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Copy, Alan?

A You can have copies of both of those announcements.

Q You say they have been transferred. Are they now on the way, the Stingers?

A The Stingers have arrived. They have been shipped to Saudi Arabia, and they will be transferred from U.S. custody to Saudi custody shortly.

Q So they are physically in Saudi Arabia now?

A They are physically in Saudi Arabia.

Q And what does this do to the larger existing order of 1,200 Stingers that the Saudis had already put in?

A Well -- Let me get you a formal answer to that. I know what they --

We believe that the emergency Stinger shipment announced today adequately meets immediate Saudi needs. We continue to believe that the Saudis have a legitimate requirement for 400 launchers and 1,200 missiles, but no decision has been made on when to resubmit Congressional notification for the balance of the Stingers.

Q Alan, the additional tanker, will an American fly that plane?

A The KC-10 is to be handled on the same basis as those existing, that is Americans. I'd refer you, I guess, to the Pentagon for the details on how that will be handled; but this is not a transfer in the same sense that the Stingers are at all.

Q Will there be a training program for the Stingers, and will that be handled by U.S. personnel?

* Later corrected to 101

A Yes. As usual with the sale of equipment, a small group of trainers, that is six to eight, and support personnel, approximately 20, will accompany the missiles for a short period of time to train Saudi personnel. We expect the number of support personnel to diminish rapidly, and of course, the U.S. personnel will not be involved in combat.

Q What is the training period?

A Well, I'd ask you to check with the Pentagon on that. I think it is a relatively short period. I think it would be measured in days.

Q Alan, will only Saudis operate the Stingers, or are the Saudis free, since they own the Stingers, to hire mercenaries, to hire people from other countries to do the firing for them?

A Well, I believe that these are being sold to the Saudis for use by the Saudis.

Q What is the risk, if any, to the American tankers that will be flying and refueling Saudi Aircraft?

A The tankers are -- first of all, they're not, obviously, equipped for combat, and we don't expect them to be subjected to attack; and they will be, in any event, protected by Saudi forces. So we do not anticipate that those tankers will be --

Q Not by American forces -- not by American fighter planes?

A Excuse me. No. The protection will be provided by --

Q -- by the Saudis.

A By the Saudis.

Q Alan, remember we had a briefing here with, a press conference with Secretary Shultz, and the question was posed whether we would, you would submit to Congress under the War Powers Act in Beirut, and he said there was no expectation that U.S. troops would become involved.

Now in this case, you're saying that you don't expect them to be involved in combat, but they're certainly in geographical area where there is a rising amount of air combat. On what basis was it decided that it was not necessary for you to go to Congress under the War Powers Act, in this case?

A Well, the issue, obviously, in every case is, "What is the deployment expected to consist of?" -- where will it be deployed, how will it be deployed. And obviously, a judgment in each case. The judgment in this case is as I've described it to you.

Bernie.

Q Do you have guarantees from Iran that while the U.S. tankers are refueling combat F-15s, the Iranians will not attack the U.S. tankers?

A I think I have just described to you, Bernie, what our expectation is with regard to combat.

Q Yes, but you are going into an area where this is very possible. To just say, "We don't expect these tankers to be subjected to attack" it seems to me would be the ultimate in optimism.

A No. I think what it reflects is the nature of the deployment, how they are to be used -- and I'm not going to give you a lot of detail for obvious reasons on the operations, but the judgment is that the way they will be used will not subject them to attack. And as I said, in any case, they will be provided Saudi protective cover.

Q A follow-up, please: On what basis is this "rush" equipment being made available to the Saudis? That is to say, is there a definitive intelligence estimate that the Saudi Air Force or the Saudi oil installations on the Saudi mainland will, in fact, come under Iranian attack? Are you working on that assumption?

A I think that what we have seen is, within the last few days, as I indicated in the statement, a dramatic escalation of the war in the Gulf. As I say, for recent days the attacks have come near key petroleum and other facilities which require additional air defense protection. We believe that there is a demonstrated threat to shipping and a potential threat to facilities. So that threat could materialize in the form of additional attacks, during which would otherwise have been a 30-day waiting period, which explains why it is viewed as an emergency and the President has exercised that authority.

Go ahead, Bernie.

Q Have the Saudis told the United States definitely that they will use the tankers to refuel their planes, or is this still in the discussion stage? Is this a possibility or is it definite?

A Well, I think my problem in trying to address that is that it gets me into the question of Saudi military operations, and I don't think I can do that. But the request was to have available refueling capability for Saudi F-15s, so that's why the additional capacity has been sent there.

Q Has there been any discussion with the Saudis about the possibility of American F-15s going to Saudi Arabia and having base facilities there?

A Well, I think that gets us back to a discussion we had sometime ago about what we might or might not do in given circumstances, and I don't have anything to advance the discussion on that.

Q What ever happened to the request of the Saudis to, say, give them bomb racks for the F-15s?

A Well, the question of bomb racks is -- there has been no sale, no approval of bomb racks, and I guess that, basically, answers the question.

Q Alan, how was the number 400 derived, when the number that was being talked about on Capitol Hill last week was half that?

A Well, various options were discussed, and I think that one of the reasons you got different readings from your sources on the Hill and so forth was that, as I say, different numbers were being talked about, but after discussion, it was decided that the 200 launchers were needed to protect key facilities based on current circumstances and the ability rapidly to train personnel for those missions.

Q Alan, can we have a filing break?

A Does anybody disagree? Let's hold off on a filing break.

Q Where are the Stingers coming from and where will the Saudis deploy them? Will they be used on the tankers themselves?

A In terms of where they are --

Q Are they coming off American ships off Lebanon?

A You'll have to check with the Pentagon as to where they are coming from. As I said, they will be used to, presumably, be deployed at key military and other facilities. I think it would be up to the Saudis to discuss in any detail they wanted to where they specifically would be deployed.

Q Alan, let's have a filing break.

A Hold it. Let me just see if there is any objection to a filing break.

Q In the discussions --

A O.K. Filing break.

Q -- was the potential target for all of this limited only to Iran, or could it also include Iraqi aircraft attacking oil tankers?

A The purpose is defense and deterrence, and it applies to Saudi facilities and so forth; and it is addressed in those terms as opposed to whom it may be used against, if there happened to be an attack. It is a defensive deterrent measure to protect Saudi interests.

Q But is it aimed only at Iran or Iraq, as well?

A Well, it's aimed at protecting Saudi interests.

Q What can you tell us about a so-called "protective zone" in the Gulf, the Saudis are saying?

A We have seen no announcement of a new "protected zone" from the Saudis. They have, of course, protected their territorial waters and air space. As other countries do, they maintain a zone for interception and identification of aircraft, but it's somewhat farther out than their territorial air space. But I'm not aware that we've discussed that with them. You might want to talk with them about what plans they might have. But that's the extent of our knowledge at this point.

Q Had the Saudis, Alan, asked for the bomb racks? You said there was no sale. Had they asked for them, and there was no sale?

A Well, I think that all was covered three years ago and would refer you back at that point. The fact is that at this time, there is no sale of bomb racks that's included in this.

Q But did they recently ask for bomb racks?

A I don't think I'm going to get into the question of the specifics of what we have talked about with them. As we indicated several days ago, we've been talking with them about what their requirements might be; but I don't intend to get into specifics as to what items they may have requested that we have not approved.

Q Have you got a price tag on the Stingers?

A I don't. You might check with Mike Birch.

Q As far as Radio Israel this morning saying that the --

A I'm sorry. As far as --

Q No, what I'm saying is a different thing. As the Stingers go, Radio Israel is reporting this morning, or yesterday, that the United States advised the Israelis before actually it went on with the decision to supply the Stingers to Saudi Arabia. Can you confirm that?

A Well, as usual, we don't discuss details of our diplomatic exchanges. Obviously, we do discuss with Israel regularly a broad range of issues of mutual concern. As far as their reaction and their views on this, obviously, I would refer you to them.

Jim.

Q I would like to deal with how you -- what would be a fair way to describe the kind of role that these tankers have been potentially placed in? Would it be correct, do you think, to describe that role as a direct combat support role for the Saudi Air Force?

A Well, I think that the point -- I'm not a military expert, and I can't tell you what -- I tend to think that is not what I would tend to define it as, but I leave to others to define it. What they are doing is, they have been asked to be there, or that the Saudis have asked for additional capability.

capability to refuel in the air their F-15s, with the obvious purpose being one, as I say, of defense and deterrence. I don't know the answer to what their specific operational plans are. So that is the role, and I would have to leave it at that.

Q Well, I want to deal with that a little bit. If the Saudi planes, the F-15s, are flying combat missions and we are refueling them, why isn't it fair to say that we're in a direct combat support role, in your judgment?

A Well, you're predicting that they are going to necessarily be engaged in combat. Obviously, they are determined to protect the territory and shipping; but in terms of whether they will be engaged in combat, I think that is something I'm not prepared to predict at this point.

Q Alan, I may have missed it in the original statement, but you explained the role of the tankers. Did you explain what role in protecting shipping the Stingers would have, or are they not related to protection of shipping?

A In terms of how the Stingers are to be used specifically by the Saudis --

-- MORE --

Q What role that they have?

A How they are to be deployed, I think I said that this referred to shipping -- we talked, obviously, about shipping being attacked increasingly in international waters, so it's clearly related to that as well as to the on-shore facilities.

How they intend to deploy them, you'd have to talk to the Saudis.

Q How does this three-mile range Stinger come into play in shipping protection? Do they take them on --

A As I say, how they are to be deployed and in what way they might be used in that role, you'd have to ask the Saudis. They're being transferred to the Saudis for their use.

Q Alan, how far off the coast of Saudi Arabia will the U. S. tankers be authorized to refuel F-15s of the Saudi Air Force?

A How far off the coast?

Q Yes; how deep into the Gulf?

A I'm not aware that they would operate off the coast. You would have to check with the Pentagon on that, but I'm not aware that that's intended.

Q Alan, have you received any requests for air defense weapon systems from Kuwait or the United Arab Emirates?

A We have been discussing with a variety of people the situation in the Gulf and what -- how we all might best meet those circumstances. I don't intend to get into specifics with regard to others at this point. But, certainly, we've had over a period of time discussions about this situation.

Don.

Q There's a significant difference between a tanker refueling an American AWACS and a tanker refueling a Saudi interceptor or fighter plane.

In the first case, a tanker is responding presumably to the commander of the AWACS saying he needs more fuel. What is going to be the guideline for the American pilots or those who command the tankers as to when they will or possibly will not fuel a Saudi tanker? I'm sorry, fuel a Saudi fighter plane, or F-15?

A I think I'd have to defer to the Pentagon as to any specific rules on that, but, again -- if your question is one of getting involved in combat -- as I say, our expectation at this point is that they will not become subject to attack; that they're not equipped for combat. If circumstances arise which would suggest that they may be, in some interpretation, be involved in some way, obviously we would look at the War Powers considerations again in light of the circumstances at that point.

Q Alan, do you have a legal opinion from the Legal Office that it does not require reporting to Congress under the War Powers Act?

A I think you can take that what I'm saying to you reflects a considered view.

Q Could you make available --

A No, I'm not -- I'm giving you the rationale and the explanation for it.

Q The use of the tankers, does the United States retain an option to veto any individual mission in some way, or are these simply at the Saudi disposal for --

A You're getting into a lot of operational details that I don't have. I don't know what Mike Birch has at the Pentagon, but I would suggest that's the kind of thing you might check with him.

Q In your statement you said supplying these arms to Saudi Arabia would prevent escalation of war, while Iran considers supplying arms to any party in the Gulf is escalation of war.

A I'm not quite sure what you have in mind in the latter part. But the fact of the matter is that -- what we're talking about here, as I've said several times now, is a defensive and deterrent mission. I'm not talking about anybody going out and taking the offense. So I think that there's no question that that does not represent an escalation unless you assume that when somebody defends himself or tries to deter an attack that's an escalation. I don't accept that particular judgment.

Bob?

Q On the role of the AWACS, when the AWACS operators vector Saudi aircraft towards Iranian fighters, aren't they coming very close to being in a combat support mode?

A I think I would question specifically the way you phrased your question, Bob. The AWACS -- again, these are military kinds of questions and you ought to go to the Pentagon -- but the AWACS are not involved in directing aircraft that are engaged in combat. So, again, they're not involved in combat. We don't anticipate that they will be.

Q Wait a minute, what do you mean they're not -- well, if Iraqi or Iranian planes are incoming and they tell the Saudis where they're headed, what speed and so forth, that's directing an attack.

A No, I think that -- again, I'm going to stop after I finish this in terms of talking about AWACS operations. But the fact is, while they may have information available to them from the AWACS, the point that I'm making is that the AWACS is not involved in directing aircraft that are engaged in combat.

Q Alan --

A Tim?

Q Can you elaborate on the security precautions that the Saudis have agreed to on the Stingers?

A I can't really. There are security considerations involved here. All I can say to you is that they are implementing a stringent safeguard regime which meets U.S. guidelines on this.

David?

Q Alan, what is the status of current American discussions with the British and the French about coordinated moves in the Gulf in the event of further developments, and will this subject come up today during the Ministerial Meeting?

A I don't know that we've talked about coordinated efforts. We have indicated that we have been in touch with various parties concerned, obviously including a number of our European Allies about the situation and what we might do to deal with it.

I don't have anything to offer you beyond that at this point. In terms of the discussions today, I don't know the answer to that. I would suggest that you put your question to your BACKGROUND briefer tomorrow when he gives you a readout on that session.

Q At this point there is no formal understanding or agreement with these European countries about what would be done in the event of further developments?

A I don't think it's appropriate for me to go into the details of what may or may not have been discussed.

John?

Q Just to pursue two questions. That one, first of all, have the French told us that they will not be involved in any joint action that might --

A John, I think I just said, it's not appropriate for me to get into the details of the discussions and that includes that question.

Q All right, because that's my understanding. The second question I want to ask you, on the stringent safeguard regime, Israeli officials are saying that they told the State Department that within six months these Stingers will be in the hands of the PLO. Is there any -- are the safeguards such that you are sure that they will not be transferred to a third party?

A As I say, we are confident that the safeguards are adequate, and we're not aware of any diversion of equipment that's been supplied to Saudi Arabia. In the past, there have been charges that have been made; we've checked it out, we have not been able to verify those charges.

Bernie?

Q Most of the discussion has been about the threat of Iran to Saudi Arabia. Does the U.S. Government have any views at all on the -- on whether Iraq should cease what it's been doing? After all, Iraq has been the country carrying out most of the air attacks on tankers in the last several weeks.

A I don't have anything to add to what we've said before on that, Bernie. Obviously, our hope and our efforts are devoted to a negotiated settlement of this war. That is the fundamental answer to these problems. But I don't have a new answer to give you to take you beyond what we've said before.

Q Alan, do you expect the tankers to supply the fighters with fuel over the air space of the national country of the Gulf or in the international space, air space --

A No. I think I answered that before. I don't have any indication that they're going to be outside of Saudi space, but I really would have to refer you to the Pentagon to see what they would be willing to say on that.

Q Are you able to come up with any information to substantiate the Iraqi claim of eight ships last week, last weekend -- Friday, whatever day that was?

A I don't have any new information on that.

Q I just want to be -- we have no information to substantiate their most recent claim of eight ships, I guess it was, last Friday?

A I'm not aware of any at this point, Barrie. I also think probably, as a matter of prudence because trying to keep up with all of these when things happen, and also we do eventually run into a problem of sources and methods, I'm going to probably stand down from confirming or not confirming on it.

To stick with this question, however, I don't have anything new to offer you from what we've said before. But I don't know that we're going to get into each time doing --

Q You very quickly confirmed a couple of them last week and then we very unquickly didn't confirm the rest.

A Well, I agree, and that was the state of our information and I'm not backing away from that.

Q Is this your information or the state of the policy?

A No, it's the state of our information. Quite explicitly not the state of any policy, if you're suggesting a slant in the information.

Q Two questions. Is it the U.S. understanding that the Saudis are continuing to provide money to Iraq to proceed with the war?

A I don't have any information on that to give you, Bernie.

Q To the contrary, or at all?

A I don't have any information. I'm not addressing the subject. You'll have to ask the Saudis what they're doing.

Q And a follow-up. Did the United States ask of the Saudis to go to the Iraqis and tell the Iraqis to knock off the air attacks on oil tankers?

A Again, you're asking us to get into the details of diplomatic exchanges. I'm not going to do that. We had indicated before that we've been in touch with, either directly or indirectly, with the parties in the war in the hope that we could help achieve a peaceful solution, and that's what we --

Q Are you saying the Saudis failed in that effort?

A I addressed it the way I'm going to.

Q I want to go back to the question of how these Stingers help to protect shipping. Will any of the Stingers, for example, be put aboard ships?

A You'll have to ask the Saudis how they intend to deploy them.

Q Is your answer you don't know?

A My answer is that I don't speak for the Saudi Government.

John?

Q I just wanted to pin down one thing. Does this in your view in any way broaden the American commitment to protect the freedom of navigation in the Gulf? Does this not broaden it to the point of protecting the oil fields as well as the Gulf?

A No, I think that the -- you go back to the initial deployment, for example in 1980, of the AWACS which was specifically because of a potential threat against the oil fields, so I don't think you should look at this as a change in the nature of commitment.

Q Wait a minute. Aren't you then saying -- aren't you going beyond what the President has said in the last several months, that we are committed to defend the oil fields as well; is that correct?

A No, I didn't say that.

Q Alan, you said we had three tankers in Saudi Arabia prior to the addition of this one; right?

A That's my understanding, yes.

Q Have they ever, under whatever circumstances -- perhaps for training, or whatever -- refueled the F-15s before this?

A Yes, they have, in training circumstances.

Q Alan, over the weekend, the former Under Secretary of State, George Ball, has a piece in the Washington Post with an idea about establishing an oil consumers' association, like John Foster Dulles established in 1956 during the Suez crisis. Do you have any comment on such an idea?

A No, I don't.

Can we continue and finish off on the Stingers, and so on?

Q Going back for a second to the bomb racks question, there is a new type of fuel tank combination bomb rack that is either under development or completed in its development. Can you say that the type of -- I'm not a military expert. Can you say that the type of fuel tank that you've described as being conformal fuel tanks are not inclusive of any additional weapons-carrying capability, and are not of a design that would accommodate that additional capability?

A Let me address it this way, but I think it should answer your question satisfactorily. The tanks, which were notified to the Congress, as I said before, in

1-1402

1981, permit increased on-station time but they do not enhance the F-15s ground attack capability.

Q Alan, as a follow up, do you expect the Saudis --

Q Could I have a copy of that?

A I think that you can pick up what I just said. As I say, they do not -- they permit increased on-station time but do not enhance the F-15s ground attack capability.

Q As a follow-up to this, do you expect the Saudis to use the Stingers to protect the U.S. tankers?

A To protect U.S. tankers?

Q Yes.

A I think that they're using them for their self-defense. That is what they're using -- how, again, how they're specifically going to deploy them, I don't know. But I -- if you're suggesting there's some deal where they would be providing defense for U.S. tankers in return for provision of them, or something of that sort, I'm not --

Q I don't mean --

A I have no reason to take you down that particular road.

Q Just in case the tankers are under attack, aerial attack by the Iranians or whatever, do you expect the Saudis to use the Stingers to protect them?

A Precisely how the Saudis intend to use the Stingers -- in other words, in what circumstances where an attack might come -- I think it's for them to speak to. And I don't want to try to get into that.

Q Alan, are there any plans to put any more tankers there? I'm just kind of reflecting the two versus one additional tanker. Is there another one in the pipeline, or --

A Not at this time, no.

Q Alan, on the safeguards for the Stingers?

A Yes.

Q The terms of the earlier sale that was withdrawn in March or so were that the missiles and the launchers were to be stored separately, and that was supposedly the reason why they were going to be safe from terrorist use. Are those terms going to be held up in this sale?

A I think -- I don't have to offer you the specifics of the safeguard arrangements. I think that they would involve a number of things, as I say, a number of procedures.

As I say, the safeguards being implemented by the Saudis meet U.S. guidelines, and I think that you can take it as a given that the same safeguards will apply.

George?

Q Can we move on to something else?

A Sure.

Q Do you have any particular comment on remarks made by Reverend Jackson yesterday in Mexico City?

A No.

Q Alan, going back to what you said about being in consultation with the Israelis about the arms in the area, have you received any complaint before or after, or are you expecting any opposition or complaint from the Israelis after you deploy the Stingers?

A Well, I think I would let the Israelis speak for themselves on this.

Q Do you have any comment on the Israeli announcement about the two Palestinians who were detained by the Israeli security forces and were killed in cold blood after -- later on?

A Yes. We have positively noted the statement issued by the Israeli Ministry of Defense and commend the efforts of the Government of Israel to make a thorough investigation of this matter.

Q Alan, I want to go back -- I asked about this speech of Mr. Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary. The answer that was posted on the bulletin board is, to my knowledge and to my reading, is worse than the speech which was given, or the portion of the speech which was given. Because from one point here, at the end of the answer, you're going back to something that happened in 1974-75, and making it as a cause celebre to accuse the Arab left of being anti-Semitic --

A Well, let me just cut off the question. We've provided the answer that we're going to provide to that. If you have further questions of Mr. Abrams, you might get in touch with his office and see what he has to say.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the events that happened during the day of elections in Egypt?

A No. I think that you've only got initial returns, and so on, and I don't have any comment.

Q Do you have anything else regarding that Palestinian matter?

A No.

Q That was complete; you do not deplore the action itself?

A I think we -- if, assuming that there was a violation of law -- obviously, an act of violence -- clearly as the Israeli Government has done, we would deplore that. But I don't think we're going to get ahead of the Israeli investigation of this issue.

Q Alan, on the Hill last week they didn't know anything about this tanker deal. Were the leaders of Congress -- I know they're in recess -- but were the key committee chairmen consulted on this?

A Discussions have been held with them, yes.

Q When?

A Over the weekend.

Q Gary Hart last night, on Channel 13 in New York City, speaking from New Jersey, said that -- when he was asked about the settlements in the West Bank, that the legal

1-1405

adviser of the State Department told him that settlements are not illegal.

My first question is about, if this is true, that this is the opinion, the legal opinion of the State Department; and the second part of the question is, there are many statements coming out from Israel now saying that they're going to be building more settlements in the West Bank and intensifying the people which are living there, increase the population there. What do you comment on this?

A As far as the latter part is concerned, obviously we have indicated that we think that continuing settlement activity represents an obstacle to the peace process.

As far as the question of legality or illegality, I'm going to say to you what we've said many times before, which is that the issue really here is not legality or illegality. The issue is that indeed this continuing settlement activity is an obstacle to the peace process. And I refer you back to what the President said about it in September and what we've said about it many times. We think it should stop.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 1:10 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Wednesday, May 30, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #96

WEDNESDAY, MAY 30, 1984, 12:20 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: A string of housekeeping announcements. A lot of briefings today. So therefore no news.

Available in the Press Office will be the prepared statement by Under Secretary for Economic Affairs Allen Wallis before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. That testimony was given today. The subject is "The Administration's Objectives at the London Economic Summit."

The Department of State has released a compendium entitled Realism, Strength, Negotiation: Key Foreign Policy Statements of the Reagan Administration. This is a 156-page illustrated anthology, contains 40 major addresses by the President, the Vice President, and the Secretary of State. It covers every region of the world, arms control, human rights, the United Nations, and the world economy. Copies are available in the Press Office.

Q Free?

A They're very limited. You have to work very hard to get one of those.

Yet another briefing. There will be a White House Central American Outreach Group briefing, Room 450, Old Executive Office Building, today, 2:30. The briefers will be Bruce McColm, Director of the Center for Caribbean and Central American Studies at the Freedom House, New York City. He will be speaking -- he will be giving an update on Soviet and Cuban Strategy in Central America.

Mike Ledeen, who is a senior fellow at Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, will speak on the final results of the Grenada Documents. That is at 2:30, Room 450, Old EOB. And if you want any further details, call Sue Mathis at 456-2910.

Yet another briefing. A BACKGROUND briefing will be held today at 5:30, in this briefing room regarding the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting at the Wye Plantation.

A little housekeeping twist here. Because the briefing will begin after normal building working hours, the attendees will be limited to those who are bearing State, White House or NAC press passes.

And, finally, because we have swamped you with briefings today, and because the Secretary will be having his final NATO Press Conference around 1:00, 1:00 to 1:30 tomorrow, there will be no regular briefing here tomorrow.

Q Any backgrounders tomorrow; is there also a White House briefing?

A I do not think there are any backgrounders tomorrow. I think the Secretary's press conference -- I think Secretary General Luns will have a press conference immediately preceding the Secretary's, then he will have his press conference. There may well be briefings or press conferences -- that will be up to the various countries involved, how they want to categorize them -- by various countries, I'm sure.

Q John, can you tell us about the incident in Leningrad, where the consul was apparently beaten up, and can you suggest any Soviet motives?

A No, I really can't. Mr. Harms, Roland Harms, was beaten up. This took place April 17. I think he was leaving a restaurant in Leningrad when he was beaten up by a group of young men. He is a Consular Officer in Leningrad. He's still there; will serve out his -- we expect him to serve out his regular tour.

The day after that, we protested strongly to the Soviet Union both here and in Moscow. That is really about all I have on that. These incidents have occurred from time to time over a period of years. They are unfortunate, to say the least. They are unconscionable, but they're -- this is not a particularly isolated incident. They have occurred from time to time. There's also no rash of such incidents in recent months, I should --

Q Does the -- did the protest suggest Soviet Government involvement?

A I cannot give you a readout on what was said, and probably even if I could, I guess I wouldn't. But it was clearly behavior that we consider to be unacceptable.

Q What I'm trying to get at is, what were you protesting -- a lack of protection given the U.S. diplomat or a Soviet involvement?

A I think we were protesting this lack of protection, if you want to put it that way -- or certainly that this could happen to a diplomat in the Soviet Union, which is a pretty controlled society.

Q How come it is now -- only now -- coming out, some five weeks later?

A I don't know what triggered the news story on it. We have tended for rather obvious reasons -- the fact these officers remain at their post -- not to make any announcements about this kind of thing, but to deal privately with the Soviets on such a matter.

Q How badly was he hurt?

A I understand he was not -- he did not require hospital treatment.

Q John, when you talk about this not being an isolated incident, can you give us any -- four or five of these over the last ten years, or five years?

A I don't know whether that's something we could put our hands on easily, John. But that's the kind of thing we're talking about, over a period of years. I'm not misleading you; I don't want to suggest that there have been incidents recently and this is a pattern.

Q What did the Russians say to your protest?

A I don't think we can get into that, Bernie.

Q Did these young men act on their own, or who was directing them if they were not acting on their own?

A No, can't give you any -- your guess is as good as ours.

Q When you say "Soviet behavior," how do you characterize that?

A I think we go to great lengths to protect Soviet diplomats in this country, and it's a little ironic, the question of the security of Soviet athletes having been raised at the Olympics, and we certainly went to great lengths, and would go to great lengths, to protect those Soviet citizens, so I guess it's a little ironic that an American diplomat in Leningrad could not be protected in that society.

Q John, did you receive any apology from the Soviet authorities?

A I don't think we'll get into what we said to them and what they said to us.

Q John, I don't understand the rationale for not announcing these incidents when they occur.

A Well, the individuals continue very often to serve at their posts, and I suppose you might raise questions about their continuing security.

Q Had he been subject to previous harassment? How would you --

A Not to my knowledge.

Q To clarify it, John --

Q Who was he with at the restaurant, do you know?

A Don't have anything for you on that.

Q There was a report that he had been meeting with dissidents.

A Yes. Just don't have anything for you.

Q Was there any personal aspect to it -- I mean, any words exchanged or anything?

A Not that we're aware of.

Q John, do you see the incident, or on the basis of the conversations with the Soviets, see the incident as a reflection of the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations?

A That's very hard to analyze, Bernie. And as you were told this morning, there are various theories as to why the Soviets are behaving as they are. I think it's very hard for us to put this within the context of one of a series of possible theses about current Soviet behavior.

Q Were there any charges leveled against him by the Russians?

A No, not -- no.

Q John, on the Soviet Union, I think it's TASS claims that Sakharov is doing just fine. Do we have any new information on Sakharov?

A No, we do not; have absolutely nothing to confirm that he is doing just fine, and I think one of his relatives, a daughter, I think, or daughter-in-law, somewhere in Western Europe cast great doubt on those reports already -- on the TASS reports.

Q On that case, according to a report, the Australian Foreign Minister raised it with Gromyko, and was practically shown the door --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- when he brought it up. Has this happened before, to your knowledge?

A That other --

Q For instance, did Genscher raise it --

A I think -- I don't know in what setting it has been raised by other governments and whether that has necessarily always been with Foreign Minister Gromyko, but certainly it has been raised, I think, with the Soviets by other governments and indeed by private organizations.

Q What I'm getting at is that you seem to be resisting the temptation to put all this in some kind of context or pattern. You don't see any pattern in this Sakharov case, the beating up of the consul?

A Well, there clearly is a pattern to Soviet behavior in that they are not going to the Olympics, they are not prepared to talk at a number of negotiating tables. However, they are, as the point was made this morning, prepared to talk in some other fora. But certainly, there is a question that has been raised, and don't see much doubt about the answer to that, that the Soviets have withdrawn from a number of activities in which they might negotiate with the West.

I don't think what we can do is give you a clear-cut motivation for that view. You had some theses outlined this morning, but which of those is the right one, I guess we'd have to be inside the Kremlin to know that.

Q John, have there been any incidents in this country involving Soviet diplomats being harassed, that might suggest this as retaliation?

A I do not have anything on harassment of Soviet diplomats, but I don't think -- I would lead you away from the idea of retaliation for harassment.

Q What was Harm's specific assignments (sic) in Leningrad?

A He is a Consular Officer in Leningrad.

Q Did he handle dissident affairs or anything like that?

A I think he certainly has touched on the area of human rights, but I'm not sure what his overall responsibilities are.

Q Wasn't there a fire-bombing of some Soviet cars in New York about that time?

A A fire-bombing of Soviet cars? Doesn't spring to memory.

Q Or a bombing of an apartment house?

A It doesn't spring to my memory.

Q John, Bolivia has declared a moratorium, a four-year moratorium, on the payment of its foreign debt. Do you have any comment about it?

A No, sorry I don't.

Q Do you expect to have this afterwards?

A   Take a look at it and see whether we might have something later on in the day.

Q   John, anything new on the Gulf?

A   No, nothing on the Gulf.

Q   Could you clarify whether the United States is planning to send more than one refueling aircraft to the Persian Gulf? President Reagan, in speaking to an Irish television interviewer, suggested that the United States was going to send two more, but you announced one more.

A   I think our announcement is the correct factual assessment of where we are, and I think the White House had something to say about this this morning. The figures are, in fact, three KC-135s and one -- What is it, KC-10?

Q   KC-10. And is there expected that another plane, whether it's one or the other type, will be going?

A   Obviously, you can never rule out anything in the future, but no plans along those lines.

Q   And do you have a response to the statements by -- I forget whether it was the President of Iran or some high-ranking official from Iran saying that if the U.S. wants to get involved in that way to its own detriment, go ahead.

A   No, no comment.

Q   Do you know anything about additional AWACS?

A   Additional AWACS?

Q   Additional AWACS to (inaudible)?

A   No.

Q   Do you have anything to back up the President's assertion about the flow of arms into El Salvador through Nicaragua?

A   Well, the President, I think, was specific about a Bulgarian ship, I think it was, and a Soviet ship. And there obviously is continuing evidence of that, but I don't have anything beyond what I said.

Q   Can you make that evidence available?

A Well, you know, this has been a question that has been raised from time to time, Bernie, and we do have that proposal before the experts, but I don't have anything for you today.

Q Do you have anything about the attack on the Gulf ships?

A No.

Q Iraq claims that it hit another two.

A No, don't have anything on that. Sorry.

Q O.K. Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:35 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, June 1, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #97

FRIDAY, JUNE 1, 1984, 12:29 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I don't have any announcements. I will be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, have you read -- seen of the decision in The Hague today on the cruise missiles? Do you have a response to that and tell us what it means?

A We don't at this time, Mike. We want to take a look at the report. We've only, you know, seen some wires, and we've gotten a report by phone, but I think we want to wait until we've actually had a chance to look at what has been done, and maybe we'll have something later this afternoon.

Q You were not aware of this decision during the visit of the Foreign Minister this week?

A Well, I believe that they announced they took a decision at the Cabinet meeting today, so it would have been a little difficult.

Q You were not informed in advance?

A I think they took their decision today, Mike. The Secretary spoke to it yesterday, and I'd refer you to his words.

Q Alan, just to follow that, I realize you just said you are going to look into it, but the Administration until yesterday had been saying that it expected the Dutch to step up to the mark, to fulfill their responsibilities and so on; and then yesterday Secretary Shultz appeared, at least to me, to change the language a little bit when he said that the U.S. expected the Dutch to play a "proper role."

A Uh-huh.

Q Is there any -- am I just making too much out of that --

A Well, I'm not going to go --

Q -- or is there a change in what the expectations are?

A I'm not going to try and do that sort of analysis. The fact is that the Dutch Cabinet has now taken a decision. We want to look at that decision, and we will try and get a reaction for you, if possible, this afternoon.

Q To what degree do you think the decision, since it obviously falls short of original expectations, could have some sort of ripple effect throughout the Alliance and encourage the Soviets to keep the pressure on to force concessions?

A Again, I think we're going to have to wait until this afternoon, Bernie, to see if we have some reaction for you.

Q Alan, is there any reason to believe that any of the other members who have agreed to accept missiles will show any reluctance, back away -- the Italians, the British, the West Germans -- any reason to believe that they'll back away now?

A As a general matter I would say no, but I -- let's again leave this, our reaction to the specific Dutch decision, until this afternoon.

Q We don't have any indications that their continuing deployment of those missiles was based or contingent in any fashion on what the Dutch decided?

A Well, again, I refer to what I just said to you about whether we have any reason to believe that they would back away. The answer to that is no.

Q Alan, do you expect a statement or reaction to follow Secretary Shultz's arrival? Are we waiting that long, perhaps?

A No. I hope not. I hope we can get something for you in a reasonable time this afternoon so you can use it.

Q Will it be posted, or in what fashion?

A We will certainly let you know that it's around. Okay?

Bernie?

Q New subject, please?

A Yes.

Q A wire report, Alan, quoting a Kuwaiti official, I understand --

Q Defense Minister.

Q Defense Minister? Saying that the U.S. has given initial approval to provide Kuwait with Stingers, which would seem to be something of a variation. What's --

A Well, I'm aware of that wire report. The fact of the matter is, as we have said before, that we have been examining, together with the Kuwaitis, what requirements they might have, and we are aware of their interest in Stinger, but there have been no decisions.

Q Has there been a preliminary decision or acknowledgement that they will be granted their request?

A I would not steer you in that direction.

Q Alan, the Israeli reports are giving every impression that the opposition of Stingers to the Kuwaitis is because of the Israeli position.

A Opposition --

Q To sending Stingers to Kuwait.

A Oh, I'm not going to respond to that particularly. I mean, we have taken the action we've taken with regard to Saudi Arabia. We've said what we have to say at this point about Kuwait, and that's just where we are.

Q On the --

Q Are there other requests -- excuse me --

Q Sorry.

A I'm not going to --

Q Are there other requests from United Arab Emirates or Bahrain or --

A I'm not going to get into the question of what requests there are or are not for any particular weapons system. I think that, as I've indicated before and other spokesmen have, we have been examining, together with a number of the states in the region, how we can best meet the situation as it exists, and we will continue to be doing that. But I'm not going to get into the details of what sorts of requests may or may not have been made.

Bernie?

Q I'm sorry, I lost you on "not steering." What was that about, please?

A The question was, has there been some sort of preliminary decision, and I said I would not steer you in that direction.

Q You're not ruling out the possibility that the U.S. may in fact, if not today, if not an hour from now, in fact approve a Stinger sale to Kuwait?

A Well, you know, "not ruling out." I try never to rule out things which are not able to be ruled out forever and ever. But I'm telling you that where we are is that there has been no decision, and I am steering you away from the suggestion that there has been a preliminary decision, that somehow we're playing games with words here.

Q Do you have any reaction to the report that several days ago the Iranian navy boarded and searched a ship near the Straits of Hormuz?

A Well, not really. The fact is we've seen the reports on that. I don't have anything to add to the press reports that you have, and I think I'm going to have to leave it there. I gather, from conversations I've had, that the legal situation on that is very complicated.

Q Well, does that mean that press reports that you've seen -- that you believe those press reports to be accurate?

A I don't have anything --

Q That you have anything to add to them?

A I don't have anything to add or a comment on the basis of them.

Q Alan, how would you distinguish our policy towards Kuwait, rather than towards Saudi Arabia? Is there some distinction made there in terms of --

A Well, I don't have a policy statement to issue on every country in the world. Obviously, we have had very good relations with Kuwait. We've had a lot of discussions about this situation with all the countries in the region. It's just that we examine each situation and make decisions individually.

Q And the second question --

Q Alan --

A Bob, go ahead.

Q Just a second. The President yesterday seemed to tilt towards Iraq in what he said.

A Well, I saw interpretations which suggested that. I think what I saw of his words were basically what we have been saying before, which is that Iraq has indicated a willingness to have a cease-fire and to negotiate an end to the war; Iran has not.

Q We still don't have an Ambassador in Kuwait, do we?

A That's correct.

Q Alan, is it the U.S. view that the Stingers that will be going to Saudi Arabia are for the purpose of Saudis providing regional defense for that area with those Stingers, and that Stingers would not go to other countries in the Gulf?

A Well, I don't have any -- we talked about this the other day, and I have nothing new to add to this, and I think that Mike Burch talked about it at the Pentagon. I don't have anything further on deployment.

Q Alan, the speed of which the State Department, or the United States Government, responded to the request of Kuwait is quite staggering, because I believe it's less than 24 hours that the answer was no.

A First of all, I haven't said the answer is no. Second of all, we haven't talked about what specific requests were received or when they were received, so I can't address the question in the terms you've put it.

Q The next question that I want to ask is about the military correspondent of the Jerusalem Post says in the front page of the international edition today, "It could be that a week or two before the elections on July 23rd we will be informed of a wide-range strategic agreement with the United States." Would you have any comment on that?

A Yeah. It's the same comment that you've been getting every time you raise that question, which is that I would steer you away from that story. It's the same story.

Q Alan, does the -- you don't have an Ambassador now in Kuwait, is that right?

A Yes. I just --

Q Does that have anything to do with postponing or being reluctant to be speedy on giving Kuwait the Stingers?

A Without accept your characterization of how we are or are not dealing with possible supplies to Kuwait, the decisions on how we might react there have nothing to do with the question of whether there's an ambassador in place.

Q Alan, in general terms, are the Saudis asking -- well, in specific terms -- they've asked for military assistance. Now the Kuwaitis have.

In general terms, can you say whether or not other Persian Gulf states have requested any military assistance from the U.S.?

A I think I'm going to stay away from that question in general also, Rick. I think that the point -- I will have to simply repeat what I've said -- that is, that we've been discussing with a number of the states in the region how we might best -- "we," collectively or individual, or however -- might meet that situation, and in some cases, obviously, that already has involved supply of military equipment or acceleration of military equipment that was already due to go on. But I don't have anything to take you beyond what we have already said.

Q What about the Allies -- either the French or the British -- have they stepped up their military supplies to either the Omanis or any of the others?

A I'm afraid I'd have to ask you to ask them that question.

Q Alan, was there a similar study of the Saudi needs before the United States decided to go on with the 200 or 400 to Saudi Arabia like the one you said now is taking place with the Kuwaitis?

A First of all, I haven't talked about studies. We look at -- obviously, we look at the requirements and requests --

Q You said "look," not study?

A We do that in each case, sure.

Q Okay.

Q Alan, new subject?

A New subject. Go ahead.

Q Do you have a view as to the assassination attempt on Eden Pastora Gomez, who may have been responsible?

A No, I don't have a view on who was responsible, except to reiterate what the Secretary said in very flat terms yesterday: that any suggestion that the U.S. Government was in any way responsible is absolutely untrue.

But my understanding is that nobody has claimed responsibility. The circumstances aren't at all clear, and I think we'd have to just hold off any speculation in that respect.

Our information, just in general, is still sketchy, but we have confirmed -- it won't be great news to you -- but we have confirmed that Linda Frazier, an American citizen reporting for the San Jose English-language newspaper, the Tico Times, died on May 30 as a result of the explosion which injured Eden Pastora, and our condolences go out to the family of Miss Frazier.

Our Embassy in San Jose has also confirmed press reports that two other American citizen journalists were injured in the blast. That's Reid G. Miller of the Associated Press and Tony Avirgan, cameraman for ABC. And, as reported in the press, the wounded were evacuated to Costa Rica and treated there. I don't think any of that is new.

Q Alan, do you have any -- in that respect -- with regard to this speculation about ARDE and FDN allying itself, does the United States support such an alliance?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q And just for the record, can you state a reason why you don't?

A Don't have anything on it.

Q Pastora has accused himself the CIA of planning the attack. How do you see now the future relations of the U.S. Government with his group since you've called him right now a liar?

A I've seen a press report which says that he said that. In any case, I have simply noted that any suggestion that the U.S. Government was in any way responsible is absolutely untrue, and I will leave it at that.

Q And how do you see now the future of the anti-Sandinistas, of the groups and the movement and the fight against the Nicaraguan Government?

A I think that the concerns which led those groups to oppose the Nicaraguan Government haven't changed. But in terms of what they're going to do together, and so forth, that's not for me to comment on.

Chris?

Q The swiftness with which the Costa Rican Government whisked Mr. Pastora out of Costa Rica to Venezuela seems to indicate that they are very serious about this new agreement with Nicaragua for neutrality of the border region.

Do you think that agreement is a useful -- you probably answered this a few weeks, but do you --

A I think we do have some language on that, and let me refer you back to it. I would note, though, that it may be --

Q Can I finish my question? Is this -- do you view that agreement as a useful thing, and is it -- could it be a precedent for other border relations in the area?

A Yeah. I'll give you the same answer -- that is, we had some words on this before. Why don't you go back and check it.

But in terms of what they have done -- it may be that he's going to Venezuela, but the reports that he had been put under arrest and was being forced to do this or that at this time, according to our Embassy in San Jose, the Costa Rican Acting President denied yesterday reports that he had been put under arrest or detained. Obviously, some months ago they did ask him to leave the country, and for humanitarian reasons he and the other wounded have been allowed to receive medical treatment in Costa Rica. But I cannot confirm the report in this morning's paper that they're sort of forcing him out at this moment.

Obviously, they're general request that he leave the country may still be in effect. I guess you'd have to ask them. But in terms of trying to force him out while he's just gotten to the hospital, I would ask you to check that.

Q I wasn't trying to indicate that he was under arrest or being forced anywhere. But, apparently, he has gone to Venezuela and they assisted him in getting to the airport, and so on, after he received medical attention.

Are you saying that you don't think they did --

A I'm not aware that they sort of -- the reports indicated yesterday that he was arrested and he was going to be tossed out of the country, and I'm not sure it happened that way. But anyway, I'll leave you to get the facts on the ground.

But in terms of the attitude towards the arrangement on the border, let me refer you to what we did have before.

Q Do you have any comment on the policy statement of the new government in Lebanon that was presented yesterday?

A No, I don't.

Q Alan, do you have a comment on the Times report of CIA and Navy cooperation in their homemade mine operation?

A No, I don't have anything.

Q Alan, have you received anything from your Embassy in Cairo about the -- how things were going on during the elections?

A I think that there is some, actually some guidance that existed on that -- I don't know if it's precisely in the terms that you're asking, but about the elections -- that's in the Press Office. Let me ask you to check on that.

Q I came a little bit late. But the Dutch Government has reached an hour ago --

A Yes, I said I think that we may have some reaction to that later on this afternoon. I don't have anything on that right now.

Q Do you have anything on the Sudan and the application of Sharia law, the amputations and so forth, to non-Moslems?

Q What was the question?

A The question was about the Sudan where there have been some reports of amputations of hands, and so on, as punishment under Islamic Sharia law.

Since Sharia was incorporated into the penal code of Sudan last September, several convicted thieves have undergone this form of punishment. No foreigners have been so sentenced. We understand that three southern Sudanese, all Christians, who were convicted for theft in the Khartoum area where Sharia is applied, recently underwent hand amputations in al Kober prison in Omdurman.

The U.S. position is that physical mutilation is a form of cruel and unusual punishment and a clear and serious violation of human rights.

Q Copy, please?

A Yes.

Q Do you have anything on the recent publicity about the Ahmedis in Pakistan?

A Don't have anything on it.

Q Alan, can we ask you to go back on the Middle East on one more thing? There are reports that Fadi Frem, the leader of the Lebanese Forces, is coming to the United States. Has he, in fact, applied for a visa, and was he granted entry here in light of denial of entry to Mrs. Allende, for example, and others to enter this country, and D'Aubuisson for that matter?

A I don't know what the situation is. Let me check and see if there's -- if we have anything on Fadi Frem.

Q A follow up. I understand that he will be speaking June 14 at the National Press Club -- Fadi Frem.

A As I say, I don't have anything on it. Let me check it, and I'll get back to you.

Q I understand that --

Q Do you have any comment on the reports coming from Beirut that there was a sort of coup d'etat attempt against the Gemayel Government?

A I'm not even aware of the reports. The answer is, no, I don't have anything on it.

Q The Egyptian Ambassador, Ashraf Ghorbal, was this morning in the Department. Do you have any readout on his visit?

A No. He came to see the Acting Secretary at his -- that is, the Ambassador's -- request, but I don't have anything on the substance of the discussion.

Q What about the visit -- I think the Lebanese Ambassador was here this morning, too.

A Don't have anything on that.

Q Botha's invitation to Nujoma to Windhoek -- anything on that?

A No.

Q Also, can I -- just two other ones. Do you have anything in Haiti, either the arrest of the people in Louisiana or the recent riots?

A Or the what?

Q Recent riots?

A I certainly don't have anything on the arrest. Do we have anything on the riots here at all? I don't recall it, frankly. Why don't you check and see. There may be something but I'm not sure of that.

Q Anything on the dissolution of the Peace Commission in Guatemala?

A No.

Ralph?

Q You posted an answer yesterday on the Bolivia debt decision, basically saying that you're going to check into it. Have you been able to determine what the true meaning of that decision is and what the implications of it will be?

A I will ask on that. I don't have a follow up on it.

Larry, did you have something?

Q Do you have anything on further U.S. food aid to Haiti?

A I don't. When we check on this guidance, let's see if there's anything further to give you on that.

Q Thank you.

A Okay, you're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:50 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Monday, June 4, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #98

MONDAY, JUNE 4, 1984, 12:07 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have a couple of brief announcements and one statement.

Under Secretary Armacost is scheduled to meet with the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations tomorrow, beginning at 11:00 a.m., scheduled in Dirkson 124. It is unclear at this point how much of it will be open and how much will be closed. My understanding is that it may start open and then may close, but in any case you might want to check with the Committee. The subject is "Iran-Iraq War."

Available in the Press Office are a limited number of copies of the Foreign Relations of the United United, 1952 to 1954, Volume 15, on Korea. Please note on the press release the embargo until 6:00 p.m. on Thursday, June 7. One copy per organization. A summary of the volume prepared by the Office of the Historian is attached to the press release which is included with each volume.

And, finally, a statement on Turkish Cypriot settlement of Varosha. We now have evidence that the Turkish Cypriots are permitting settlement by some of their people in a formerly closed sector of the city of Varosha or Famagusta.

The area involved is in a portion of the city which has remained uninhabited since the Turkish military intervention of 1974. The settlement by Turkish Cypriots in the area establishes a precedent which we believe will prove unhelpful to the search for a fair and final settlement to the Cyprus question.

We have urged the Turkish Cypriot communities' leaders not to proceed with this action and urged all parties to the Cyprus question to avoid any act which might complicate the situation as the U.N. Security Council prepares to consider renewal of the U.N. peacekeeping mandate for Cyprus, which expires on June 15.

We are hoping that mandate can be renewed with minimal debate, and that the Secretary General can then proceed with his good office's role in the search for diplomatic progress.

Q Copy?

A Copy? Sure. That's it on announcements. Happy to take your questions.

Q Do you have any (inaudible) with respect to Turkey there, Alan?

A I do not.

Excuse me? Go ahead, Jim.

Q I'm sorry, if there were more on this Turkish Cypriot thing, why don't you go ahead on that?

Q Yeah. Was this brought up with the Foreign Minister who was here last week?

A I'm not going to go into details to how we have raised it. As I said in the statement, we have raised this question.

Q The time?

A Excuse me?

Q The statement that you made today regarding this development.

A Not going to get into the details of it. As I said, we have urged all parties to the Cyprus question to avoid any act which might complicate the situation.

Q Alan, you made special -- specific reference, though, in that statement to "Turkish Cypriots."

A Uh-hum.

Q Getting them to stop taking the actions they are taking. Do you have any reason to believe that Turkey endorses or is -- you know -- well, endorses this particular action or does not endorse it?

A I really don't have anything to give you beyond the statement. I think that it'll stand on its own.

Q Can you bring us up to date on what's going on in the Persian Gulf and whether the -- can you confirm the sinking of this Turkish ship?

A As I said last week, I'm not going to get into the question of confirming sinkings. I think that the news reports on that are rather full, Jim.

Our basic reaction, obviously, is that, as I've said and others have said many times before, we are hopeful for a peaceful resolution of this conflict as soon as possible and we continue our efforts toward that end.

Q Do you have anything today on the possible sale of Stinger missiles to Kuwait?

A No, don't have anything to advance it beyond where we were before.

Q There's a report on the Reuters wire quoting an official as saying that there has been a message from Khomeini to his troops indicating that tomorrow may be the big invasion of Iraq.

A Uh-huh.

Q Putting aside that, are there any signs that such an attack is imminent?

A Well, I think that that report comes from sources and presumably would be based on some sort of intelligence, and I think I'm going to have to stay away from it. We have indicated before that the danger of an attack is present, has been present for some time. I don't have anything to update you, however, in respect of a date or indeed whether there is a determination at this point to actually go ahead.

Q The Iranian Ambassador to the U.N. this morning seemed to categorically deny that Iran had launched any attacks on any vessels in the Gulf. Do you care to address that at all and --

A Yes. I refer you back to what we've said before. I don't have anything new to offer on that.

Ralph?

Q On that sinking of the Turkish tanker, but not related to the Turkish tanker, do you have any information about any retaliation or any Iranian attacks that followed it?

A I don't have anything.

Q Can I ask you one more on the Iran message? There is, either in that same message or in an accompanying one, and repeated in New York, apparently was an offer to negotiate on the subject of keeping the Gulf open, but not on the subject of the war in general. Do you have any comment on that Iranian offer?

A No, not really. This seems to be consistent with the position that Iran has taken previously, so --

Yes.

Q Do you have anything --

A Excuse me. I have --

Q Do you have anything new on Sakharov's health, and also according to some report, that he had died in the hospital?

A No, we don't have anything new on it. I think that we can't confirm those reports. I think that the reports --

Q -- that there is doubt that he's alive.

A -- the reports that he had died and so on, I think that -- Well, simply that, so I can't take you anywhere on that.

Q Do you have any comment on the reports saying that the attack by Iraqis against the Turkish tanker is straining the relations between Iraq and its allies in the Gulf?

A No, I have no comment on that.

Q Do you have any specific comment, substantive comment, with respect to the attack itself? I mean do you deplore it or -- Just no comment?

A Well, we've indicated -- As I said, our hope is that this whole situation will be resolved peacefully as soon as possible.

Q So can you confirm that the Turkish tanker was struck by an Iran --

A I think I said at the beginning that I wasn't going to be in that business, Jim.

Q -- of confirming --

Q Are there any information about the new instructions or directions to the U.S. Fleet in the Arabian Gulf, in that neighboring area, because I understand over the weekend that there were some special movement and showing the flag, the U.S. flag on some of the ships. (inaudible)

A You'd have to check with the Pentagon on that.

Q To go back to the Kuwaiti Stingers, have there been any new requests from Kuwait for those Stingers?

A I'm going to stay away from not trying to lead you in the direction that there have been or that there haven't been. I'm going to stay away from generally the question of requests and the detailed nature of the dialogue.

We've indicated before that we've had discussions with Kuwait and others about how we might face the situation. I think we have indicated before that we're certainly aware of the Kuwaiti interest in Stingers, but I don't have anything in terms of any decisions and I don't have anything in terms of specific requests that have been made.

Q Last week it was announced that Israel had been permitted to open an Interests Section within the U.S. Embassy in Sri Lanka.

A Uh-huh.

Q Did the U.S. exert any pressure on the Sri Lankan Government for the opening of this Interests Section? And was this a requirement by Israel, that the Mossad was to train the Sri Lankan intelligence against the northern separatists?

A Well, two or three points on this: One is that I don't happen to have with me guidance which is prepared and which is available in the Press Office, so I refer you to that. It has a number of points which you might be able to ask about.

I would say, in terms of the last part of your question, a deal -- I have no information on that, and it isn't a question we should address from here. It would be a question you should address to the two governments concerned.

As far as did the U.S. put any pressure on, the answer which you will find in that guidance is that this was something that we have done in response to requests by the two governments, so it's not a question at all of our putting pressure on somebody else. It's a matter of being approached and agreeing to be helpful.

Q Can I follow?

A O.K.

Q When was the request made by the two governments to open an Interests Section?

A I think all of this is covered in the guidance, so let me refer you to the Press Office for that.

Q Can I ask you whether you have any comment on the report that there is a fairly high-ranking Iranian official visiting in Moscow this week?

A No, I don't have any reaction to that.

Q In that connection, do you have any comment or confirmation of the reports of new weaponry arriving in Iraq from the Soviet Union, whether it be missiles or tanks?

A I don't have anything on that, and still would not be able to confirm the question of SS-21s, if that's your question.

Q Do you know anything about a trip that James Goodby made to Moscow in (inaudible)?

A I think that that's an erroneous report, Jim. I checked on that, and --

Q What was the question?

A The question was about a trip that was reported this morning in a wire story -- I think from Dublin, actually -- suggesting that Ambassador Goodby had recently been in Moscow. The fact is that the latest trip that he took, as I was informed this morning on checking on this, was April 27-28, which I think you probably already know about. So I don't know what that particular story is based on.

Q On that trip in April, did he go to negotiate anything, or just to work out the procedures in Stockholm or --

A Well, it was before the next session, the succeeding session of the CDE, and so he went there to consult with his Soviet counterpart as part of the preparations for that meeting, and it was a period in which he engaged in consultations with a variety of other CDE participants, so --

I would note that at that time, Ambassador Goodby and Ambassador Grinevskiy, his Soviet counterpart, discussed the full range of issues under discussion at the CDE, but I don't have details to offer you.

-- MORE --

Q Alan, there is a report attributed to a Kuwaiti newspaper, saying that the United States is training Libyans who are opposed to the Libyan regime of Qadhafi on Soviet-made aircraft.

A Well --

Q Do you have any comment on the report?

A I don't have anything on that -- no -- nor would I.

Q Would it be possible to request a briefing by Ambassador Shlaudeman about the weekend's journey?

A I don't think that's going to happen, Jim. The things that were said by the Secretary's party at the time I think takes it about as far as we intend to at this point.

Q There's a lot of confusion about whether this represents a new policy initiative, or whether it's the same old thing, or whether there's no change. And from -- one example, Don Oberdorfer wrote on Sunday that the U.S. said that it wanted to negotiate with respect to four items all at the same time, which seems to be a change from the April '82 suggestions.

A Well, I think --

Q Can you confirm that's the case?

A I'm not going to address a specific story. Our objectives in Nicaragua have been four -- as enumerated, four, a number -- including the end to assistance to subversion and guerrilla warfare outside of Nicaragua, reduction of the Nicaraguan military establishment to re-establish a regional balance, the removal of the Cuban and Soviet security people, military people, from Nicaragua, and cutting of that particular tie, and the Nicaraguans living up to their own pledges of democratic pluralism. That hardly should strike you as a new list of items which we are concerned about with regard to Nicaragua.

Those specific items remain of concern. The purpose of this discussion and of the follow-on is to help advance, as best we can, the Contadora process, and that is indeed what this is all about.

Q Can I just follow again? In April of '82, which is the last time the United States put forward a bilateral set of issues that it wanted to talk about, it said very explicitly that the sine qua non of any future negotiations or progress was the cessation in alleged arms support from Nicaragua to El Salvador.

A Uh-huh.

Q This seems to be contradicted by this particular account. That is, that these are -- the issues that you just enumerated are to be taken up all at once without any one necessarily being dependent upon the other.

A I'm not trying to give you a scenario for how a discussion might proceed. I'm telling you what our objectives are and what are purposes are, and I think we'll let that process go forward.

Q Alan, any prospective timetable for Shlaudeman?

A I don't have anything to give you on that at this point.

Q Will you be announcing his visits there, or their visits here?

A I don't have the answer to that.

Q What about the Nicaraguans' insistence that a third party be involved? Anything on that?

A Well, no, I don't think I have anything on that. Saw their communique on it, but I really don't have anything to add to what was said about all of this at the end of last week.

Q Can we just make a special plea just once, you know, to see if we -- you know --

A I'm reasonably sure what I'm talking about, Jim.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the situation in Punjab in India?

A No, I don't. Obviously, it's a very difficult situation, but I don't think I'm going to help it by making a comment from here.

Q Anything on the Ortega suggestion of a summit meeting?

A No. I think this essentially is a process that will proceed in sort of a step-by-step manner, and I would think that discussions between Ambassador Shlaudeman and Vice Minister Tinoco will be the first order of business here.

Q Alan, do you look at that Thursday visit as a success?

A The visit to Nicaragua?

Q Yes.

A Well, I think that the purpose of that stop was to engage in a dialogue, and I think that the Secretary and the Nicaraguans both indicated that they thought that was a useful discussion, so I'll leave it at that.

Q Does the United States have any role in the indirect talks between Israel and Syria which Mr. Arens over the weekend said in a news conference, and about the permission to the Syria Jews to leave Syria?

A I'm not aware of what he had to say, and I don't have any comment on it.

Q On Friday -- on the Pastora bombing, on Friday ABC News reported, mentioned sources in the government that some terrorists, Basque terrorists could be responsible for the bombing of the Pastora press conference.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you have any indication that could confirm or steer us away from that report?

A I don't have anything on that. I'll take a look at it and see if I can get anything, but it may be a matter of intelligence kind of information, but I will take a look and see if there's anything.

Jim?

Q Anything on the Guatemalan Peace Commission dissolution today?

A Yes, I do. The situation continues to be in flux for a number of the members planning to or having resigned from the Commission. The government has indicated that the Commission will continue its work, and we're hopeful that there will be a resolution of the current problems which would permit the Commission to develop as an effective instrument to help the country address some of its basic problems.

Q Is there any ground for being hopeful?

A I think I will leave it --

Q Okay.

A -- with the statement.

Q Also --

A Excuse me. Abu Salam?

Q Do you have a situation report on the conditions in Lebanon with their Mr. Lahad is trying to build up security arrangements for Israel?

A No. I don't.

Q And all the demonstrations there that's going on?

A I don't have any comment.

Q Was the visit between General Walters and the Pope this weekend related to Central America?

A I don't have anything on that particular conversation.

Q Can you look into it and see if you can say?

A I'll see if I can get something on it. Yes.

Q Follow-up. Anything on the riots in Uruguay? The police are arresting in Uruguay.

A No. I don't.

Q And then also in -- President Reagan has said repeatedly that the NATO Alliance is (inaudible) at this moment, and yesterday there was in Spain a demonstration off 200,000 people demanding the exit of Spain from NATO.

Do you have any comment to these demonstrations, or what they mean for the Allies?

A I don't really have any comment on it, but as a point of information, a couple of things I might note: First of all, there are no U.S. bases in Spain. There are only Spanish bases at which U.S. military units are stationed which supports Spain's national defense.

By mutual agreement of our two governments, U.S. forces are present on some Spanish installations to contribute to the common defense of the West. We welcome Spain's decision to join NATO, and we strongly believe that full Spanish participation in the Alliance is in the best interests of Spain, NATO and the common defense.

Q Copy?

A Yes.

Q How does the United States Government feel about the Israeli Liaison Office in Beirut that the Lebanese Government is asking to close, and the Israeli Government says they are not going to close any (inaudible)

A I think that that subject is obviously one which is out in the air, it has some sensitivity to it, and I think I would leave it to the Governments of Lebanon and Israel to address that office.

Q Are you in favor of such an office?

A As I say, I think I'll leave it to those two governments to address that office.

Q Alan, according to some reports, some of the U.S. arms from Pakistan are going to Punjab in India. Do you have any comment on that?

A I don't have any information on that.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:28 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, June 5, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #93 [997]

TUESDAY, JUNE 5, 1984, 12:30 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A couple of announcements. First, available in the Press Office is the prepared statement by Under Secretary for Political Affairs Michael Armacost before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations this morning. The subject of his testimony was the developments in the Persian Gulf.

Also available at 3 P.M. will be a prepared statement by Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Paul Wolfowitz before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. He will be testifying on U.S.-China relations preceding -- Is that right? --"preceding the President's recent trip?" That's what this says. We can check on that.

Why don't we just try "U.S. China relations"? (laughter) -- take a look at it.

A statement regarding the CSCE Semiannual Report: On behalf of President Reagan, Acting Secretary Dam on June 4 transmitted the Sixteenth Semiannual Report on implementation of the Helsinki Final Act to Chairman Dante Fascell of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. These reports are submitted to assist the Commission in its function of monitoring implementation of the Helsinki Accords. The present report covers the period December 1, 1983 to March 31, 1984. It provides a factual survey of developments in the areas covered by the Final Act -- human rights and humanitarian concerns; security; economic, scientific, and technological cooperation; and educational and cultural exchanges. The report concentrates on Soviet and Eastern European compliance with the Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document. Although the record of compliance varied among the Eastern states, performance was, in general, flawed in the human rights and humanitarian area. The report documents the persecution which many Soviet citizens, including Nobel Prize-winning scientist Dr. Andrei Sakharov, have suffered for focusing attention on and attempting to alleviate the violation of human rights in the Soviet Union.

This report is an important element in the U.S. Government's effort to assess th progress and shortcomings in achieving the Final Act's goals of strengthening security, expanding cooperation, building mutual confidence, and protecting human rights.

Copies are available in the Press Office, one per organization, please. That is it for announcements.

Q Alan, can you bring us up to date on the Persian Gulf? Particularly, do you have anything to confirm the Saudi claim that they shot down at least one aircraft?

A On the incidents reported this morning, I will simply note, Jim, that the Saudis, as I'm sure you're aware, have announced that their aircraft shot down an unidentified aircraft which intruded into Saudi airspace, but I'm going to refer you to the Saudi Government for further details.

Q Was the AWACS involved in that incident?

A I think that anything concerning the operations of the AWACS, you would have to check with the Pentagon. I think this may have been covered already in Mike Burch's briefing this morning, but I refer you to him.

Q I didn't hear exactly what you said. Are you confirming that --

A I'm simply saying, they have announced this and that they will have to comment on it.

Q Do you have anything on a report in The Times this morning that the United States is taking to the London summit a plan for oil sharing?

A Yes, I do have something on that. The story does not accurately reflect a discussion of these issues to date. We have carefully reviewed our own situation and have concluded that we are well prepared to meet potential energy disruptions. We have also been engaged in discussions with a number of consuming countries about energy emergency preparations or preparedness measures in the context of the International Energy Agency, the IEA.

These continuing discussions represent an attempt to refine existing IEA procedures and deal particularly with oil stocks in IEA member countries. No conclusions, however, have been reached in these discussions and no plan has been prepared for presentation at the summit. I'd say given the situation in the Gulf, I would expect that energy-related issues might well come up at the summit; but as I say, no plan has been prepared for presentation there.

Q Copy of that, Alan?

A Yes.

Q Could I follow that up with a -- there's a Reuters story today quoting shipping sources in the Gulf saying that U.S. naval ships are now escorting Arab and other oil tankers.

A No, I think that that -- well, I'm unaware of the report, and as far as --

Q It's a report out of Bahrain.

A Yeah. I have not seen that. There is no policy to escort commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf. But in terms of the report that appeared this morning, what the Navy is doing with charters and things like that, I guess I'd refer you to the Pentagon on that.

Q Is there a policy to escort vessels carrying U.S.-owned fuel, or U.S. Government fuel?

A That's what I just said. I think that I'll refer you to the Pentagon as to -- I understand that's the story that appeared this morning. I think they have some guidance on this.

Q The Reuters story, Alan, if you could take that question. The Reuters story specifically refers to Arab-owned oil tankers, not U.S. -- not with U.S. fuel but --

A Yeah, and I think I would steer you away from that story.

Q Any further information on the long-anticipated assault by the Iranians on the ground in Iraq?

A No, nothing.

Q Can I follow this up. There's a story in FBIS today from Tel Aviv, in Ha'aretz, that the United States expects a massive Iranian attack on Iraq and is considering a possible reaction, do you have any comment on this?

A I said before that there are indications that there are lots of troops along that border, and there's the danger that that could happen. But as I just said, I don't have any indication that there has been an attack, and I don't have therefore any comment on it.

Q Can I follow, please? There is another part to the story that Israel will be asked, or that Washington is going to ask Jerusalem to give it a promise that the Iraqi oil pipeline, which will be expected from Iraq to Aqaba not to be attacked by Israel. I think you were asked about this question before, and now it's coming again. Can you elaborate on this promise from Israel that you're asking for?

A No, I don't think I would get into that question, specifically. I think, actually, the Israelis have addressed themselves to that question, and I would refer you to what they have said about it.

As far as the pipeline, in general, is concerned, we certainly have seen utility to the pipeline, and we have some existing guidance that goes back sometime which explains a number of reasons why that is the case. So I'd refer you back to that.

Q The AP quotes Iran's news agency as saying that Iraqi jets bombed an Iranian celebration, that more than 300 were killed, hundred of others wounded, and Iran is threatening retaliatory bombings against eleven cities in Iraq, warning their inhabitants to evacuate.

Do you know anything about that?

A Don't have anything beyond that -- the press reports on this. No, can't confirm it.

Q Alan, should one expect a statement from the U.S. Government regarding the death of the Egyptian Prime Minister?

A Obviously, we are aware of the Prime Minister's death this morning in Cairo, and we are extending to the Egyptian Government and people our sincerest condolences.

As far as any messages are concerned, I don't have anything from here to give you about that, but there may be something.

Q Alan, in his testimony this morning, Under Secretary Armacost said that, yes, an Iranian -- a massive Iranian attack seemed to be building up; it was expected, but that if it did happen, it would not -- the U.S. did not believe it would change the stalmate in the region.

I'm just wondering if that is supposed to lead Capitol Hill and us to believe that the U.S. believes that Iraq can withstand the offensive?

A You have an advantage on me in having followed his testimony this morning, and I think that, without knowing specifically what he said, I'm going to hold off comment, but let me look into it and see what he said and what I can say to address your question on that, Bill.

Q Alan, why do you -- why does the Administration feel it's necessary to send these new AWACS planes to the Persian Gulf? I understand they're sending four eventually.

A I, again, would have to refer you on a military question of that sort to the Pentagon. I think it was addressed this morning in the briefing over there, so they should have that.

Q Isn't that a policy question?

A Excuse me?

Q Isn't that a policy question?

A Questions of what kind of capability such aircraft have or what deployment patterns there might be, and so on, it's a military question.

Q Anything on Sakharov?

A On what?

Q Sakharov?

A No. We don't have anything new on Dr. Sakharov.

Q Alan, are we concerned that Iran may eventually go to Kuwait as a target? Do you have anything on that?

A I don't have anything specific, except that obviously there is a danger that this war is expanding to some extent, that we have had it move into a phase in the Gulf which was not previously the case. And as I've said many times before, our feeling is that the solution to this is for the fighting to come to an end and to have a negotiated solution.

As the Secretary indicated this morning, there has simply been too much killing.

Q Alan, are you prepared to give a visa to Roberto d'Aubuisson?

A Yes. He has, I think, actually been issued a visa, if I can find that for you.

On May 31, our Embassy in San Salvador issued a single-entry B-2 visa, which is a visitor's visa for purposes of private travel, to Roberto D'Aubuisson. He plans to enter the United States soon for a stay, we understand, of between one and two weeks.

Q What were the reasons for the decision to give him a visa?

A We look at each application each time, Jim, and sometimes the decision is yes and sometimes the decision is no.

Q I don't think that was an answer. I asked what the reasons. You've cited reasons in the past for why he shouldn't be permitted to go in, such as when he was a presidential candidate.

A We always look at it case-by-case in light of the law, and that's what was done in this case.

--MORE--

Q What is the expected port of entry?

A I don't have that. You'd have to check with him on his travel plans.

Q Is that the extent of your guidance? I mean, you don't have any elaboration at all on why this change in policy --

A It's not a question of change in policy. He's been issued visas in the past, and he's been denied visas in the past, or sometimes visas haven't been issued to him in the past, but not with a formal denial. We've made statements about whether we thought travel was appropriate or not appropriate at given times and given circumstances. The fact of the matter is he's been issued a visa.

Q Why this time?

A I think I just said that it's always examined case by case --

Q Well, yeah, but --

A -- and I don't have a reason to give you why give somebody a --

Q But what is the reason this time "yes"?

A He applied for it, and there was no reason not to give it to him.

Q If it's not a change of policy --

A Jim?

Q You did go further before, and said that because of allegations of death squad involvement, the visa had been denied.

A Uh-hum.

Q Those allegations still stand, don't they?

A As I say, we look at it each time in light of the circumstances which apply. The decision was made this time to go ahead and grant him the visa. It's very simple.

Q Alan, isn't the 31st also the day that Jesse Helms met with Major Bob?

A I don't know. I have no idea.

Q It was the day that Secretary Shultz arrived and Jesse Helms was part of the delegation?

A Well, I have no idea, but one would have to draw a conclusion that a decision was made before it was issued, so I would be careful about drawing too many links between all of that.

Q On that, General -- who's the General? Walters. That's the guy. He met with d'Aubuisson two weeks ago. Did they discuss his entry into the United States now after the election was concluded?

A Well, I don't want to steer you in the direction of thinking that he did or didn't, but I don't intend to discuss General Walters' conversations. He engages occasionally --

Q Well, if it's --

A -- in missions that he is asked by the President to do. He did that on this occasion, went down there. Don't have details on whom he spoke with, but --

Q Well, d'Aubuisson said he spoke with Walters.

A I don't deny it.

Q Will he visit Washington?

A Sorry?

Q To your knowledge, will he visit Washington?

A I don't have any information suggesting he's planning to come to Washington, no. But you might check with him.

Q Is he not expected to campaign for money donations this time, during this visit?

A I think, as I say, we will check -- in each case we would examine the purposes of travel, and how it accords with U.S. law, and would make a decision based on that, so I'd leave you to draw your own conclusions on that.

Q Have you ever in the previous turn-downs cited the allegations that link d'Aubuisson to --

A I'm not going to get into that kind of detail.

Q It's not a detail; it's a fact.

A With him? Is what was discussed with him?

Q Right. No. Did the Administration ever cite the allegations that link him to death squads?

A I refer you back to the record on that, Bernie.

Q If it's not a change of policy, Alan, is it a change of circumstances? And, if so, what are the change of circumstances?

A I'm going to leave you with the fact that he's been issued a visa. It was reviewed, a decision was made, and that's where we are.

Q Does the B-2 private visit preclude him from giving public speaking and things like that, or is that -- can that be part of a private visit?

A I'm not aware that he has any plans to engage in public speaking, so I'm not sure that that question arises. I don't know that there's a particular restriction on that, but I think you ought to -- my understanding of the nature of his visit is somewhat different from the way your questions are leading.

Q Alan, according to this, can you tell me what was the rationale for the State Department issuing a visa entry to the United States for Fadi Frem, who is the leader of the Lebanese Forces, and he was, according to ABC a couple of years ago, involved in the massacre in Sabra and Shatila, a few other officers there?

A Well, I've looked into that. I haven't been able to get anything at this point. The fact is that he is in the country. I think he's coming here to Washington next week, but he's not here this week.

Q But, I mean, you still --

A Well, I don't -- I think, again, I would simply leave you with the point that each case, if there is a question, is examined and decisions are made, and so that's the best I can do for you.

Q So he's been given a visa?

A He's here.

Q Here?

A In the United States "here." Not in Washington.

Q Alan, did you have anything on the kidnapping of the brother of General Vides Casanova?

A Don't have anything on it.

Q Do you have anything on Pastora's alleged --

A Excuse me. Bill?

Q I'm sorry.

Q Just two totally separate questions: Do you have anything on a Nicaraguan offensive against the rebels in Nicaragua?

A No.

Q Do you have anything on a U.S. delegation, either including or led by Mr., or Reverend, Farrakhan in Libya?

A I saw the report -- I guess it was in FBIS -- but I don't have anything on it beyond that. No.

Q If he went there on an American passport, would that be legal?

A I think there is a regulation against using an American passport to travel to Libya except in certain circumstances, I guess --

Q Do you --

A -- and I don't know the circumstances of his travel, and I don't know whether he used his passport to travel, so I can't really comment on that. The regulations exist for everybody to see, but I just don't know the answer to that question.

Bernie?

Q Can you do anything by way of amplification on what the Secretary said about the possibility of more meetings with Nicaragua?

A Oh, I think he indicated, following his meeting with Mr. Ortega, that there would be follow-up meetings, and that Ambassador Shlaudeman would be our representative, and I think that the Nicaraguans later announced that Vice Minister Tinoco would be their representative. Beyond that, I cannot take you. The fact is that, however, it was agreed there would be follow-up.

Q Alan, anything on the investigation of the possible assailant of Pastora at this point? Has the United States been asked to cooperate in finding out the whereabouts of this person carrying the passport of a Dane?

A Well, there are -- I've seen that report, Jim. I don't have any details on it. There are the other reports, one I was asked about the other day, about an ABC story that some Basque terrorists had been seen in Nicaragua and were supposedly involved.

I think the fact of the matter is we don't really have any hard information on who may have been involved, and I'm not -- I think as a matter of law enforcement, that I'm not going to get into.

Q No. But I'm just curious. The Costa Ricans said that they've kind of put out an international search warrant.

A Well --

Q Can you confirm that's been conveyed to the United States?

A I don't have any information on it, but, again, I think it would not be something that we would want to comment on from here, but would probably be a Justice Department matter.

Q Alan, there is a report from Tel Aviv, saying that Israel refused the entry to occupied territories of the United Nations Civil Rights Committee members who were going there to investigation the situation of occupied territories? Can you look to this and give --

A I'll take a look at it. Don't know anything about it.

Okay?

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:54 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Wednesday, June 6, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #100

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 6, 1984, 12:22 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Okay. Good afternoon. Just one announcement to make that -- you've all been interested in the case of the Soviet mathematician, Sergei Kozlov, who has been staying in the Soviet Embassy -- to inform you that Mr. Kozlov departed the United States yesterday evening aboard an official Soviet flight, which was taking Soviet Embassy personnel back to the Soviet Union.

State Department officials met with him prior to his departure, and he assured them he was returning to the Soviet Union of his own free will.

Just to give you a little detail on that, Mr. Kozlov departed from Dulles International Airport aboard the Soviet special flight at about 7:15 last night. Before leaving he was interviewed by Mark Palmer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs. A State Department doctor and an official from the Immigration and Naturalization Service were also present, as were some Soviet Embassy personnel.

The interview took place at the Page International Airline terminal, lasted about five minutes, and during the interview Mr. Kozlov indicated unequivocally that he desired to return to the Soviet Union.

Q Was there any pressure from the Soviets, from the Embassy, during the departure?

A I think that there was -- he said he was going back of his own free will, and the U.S. officials present agreed that he showed no evidence of duress.

Q What took so long for his departure?

A I think I'm going to have to refrain from trying to get into that, Bernie. As you know, he was due to go at one point. He said that he wanted to go back, and then just before getting on the plane -- I think this was on April 30 -- he said no, he didn't want to go at that point, and that he wanted to go to the Soviet Embassy instead, which he did, and he stayed there until yesterday.

Q Copy of your announcement, please?

A Yes.

Q What kind of health would you describe him in?

A I don't think I'm really able to give you any sort of detailed reading. I can only say that during the interview he was calm and composed.

Q Did he stay in the Embassy throughout that April 30-through-yesterday period?

A Well, he was with Soviet Embassy personnel throughout that period. Yes.

Q In the building?

A I think you'd have to ask the Soviets specifically about that.

Q Can I ask you something about the Soviet flight?

A Sure.

Q There were reports that the American Embassy was not able to get its usual flight into Moscow.

A Right.

Q Has some agreement been worked out that now facilitates both sides having flights?

A There was a brief interruption, but support flights have been resumed. Ambassador Hartman, for example, has used support flights on two occasions over the past few months.

Q Can we go to the Gulf, Alan, now?

A Let's be sure we're through with this one. Okay?

Q Alan, when was the State Department informed of his departure yesterday?

A Oh, I don't think I'm going to get into the details of the back and forth with the Soviet officials on that.

Q How often do the Soviet flights come in here?

A This, I think, was the first flight this year. Normally, I understand, their flights come in during the summer, and that's when the Embassy personnel rotate or take vacation, so any further questions about their scheduling I guess you'd have to ask them about, but that's my understanding, but it was the first flight this year.

Bill?

Q Alan, given the action in the Gulf yesterday and whatever role the U.S. may have had, has the State Department and its Legal Office been taking a new look at the War Powers Act to see if we are -- if it applies in any way, or if we're inching toward it applying?

A Well, I think that Under Secretary Armacost indicated yesterday in his testimony we were going to be doing that. The fact is we're still evaluating reports concerning the incident, but we would note that U.S. military aircraft and personnel in Saudi Arabia are not equipped for combat, have not been introduced into hostilities, and have not been put in any danger of hostile action.

Obviously, we will continue to monitor the situation and keep Congress appropriately informed.

Q So what you're saying there, Alan, is that no U.S. tanker extenders were involved in refueling yesterday.

A Well, I think I'll stick with the language I've used. U.S. forces do cooperate with Saudi forces by providing intelligence and logistics support, but U.S. personnel do not direct or accompany Saudi forces on operational missions, and they avoid entering areas where they might be in danger of hostile action, as I said. So we believe, therefore, that they are not in a situation of actual of imminent hostilities for War Powers purposes.

Q But wasn't the question, Alan, sorry to pursue this, but --

A It's all right.

Q -- I want to make sure I'm not confused. Wasn't the original question that the use of tankers to refuel in the air during a combat mission would put the U.S. into a direct combat support role --

A No.

Q -- which might then require War Powers --

A We -- I don't think we ever said that. I think what we have indicated is that as situations develop, including one such as yesterday, we would, obviously, want to take a look at the War Powers reporting requirements to see what was required under them.

As I say, we will continue to be consulting with the Congress, and I don't have anything definitive to say beyond that at this particular moment, but that is the judgment as of this time.

Q As of now the War Powers Act, if I understand you, does not apply?

A Well, we have not made any determination that the reporting requirements of the War Powers Resolution applied, but we are looking at that and we are going to be keeping in touch with Congress on that. I think until we have gone further in our discussions with the Congress, it probably would not be appropriate to say anything further about that from here.

Q Alan, I understand from somebody in here -- this building -- that in the encounter yesterday that the AWACS were more deeply involved than ever before. I wonder if you could possibly say -- indicate if that's so, and give us an idea of just what they did to direct the F-15s?

A I'm going to have to disappoint you on that, Max. The question, even the specific question, really, that Bill raised before about refueling, and a question about the AWACS, all those are operational questions. So I would have to refer you to DOD or to the Saudis. I'm not confident that you will get a comment from them, but it isn't appropriate in any case for us from here to be getting into that sort of operation.

Q Alan, the Congressional Research Service just came out with a report stating that Stingers are really ineffectual and of no use to the Saudis for the type of combat in which the Saudis may be engaged.

Why pursue the matter? Why would Assistant Secretary Armacost want to testify in favor of perhaps sending more Stingers? Are Stingers really necessary?

A I'm going to refer you, instead of trying to answer that question substantively refer to what General Gast and Under Secretary Armacost and Assistant Secretary Armitage said yesterday. But I think that -- I was able to watch, for example, a bit of it and saw General Gast addressing that specific question about the utility of Stingers, and I would refer you to what he had to say about that.

Q Alan, has there been any further action in the Gulf since the shooting down of the planes yesterday? Do you have anything beyond that, what the situation is like?

A I have nothing new on it.

Q Are you saying that despite the refueling and despite the AWACS intelligence role of pinpointing the incoming Iranian planes, that the U.S. has no combat support role for the Saudis?

A I'll stick with the words I've used on this, Bernie.

Q Can we get a copy --

Q Just a second.

A I'll stick with the words I've used. I prefer to put in my terms instead of your terms, and I'll give you the words I've used and you can spend time looking at the nuances.

Q What are those words? I don't understand them.

A What I gave you before. You'll have to spend some time on them.

Q There have a number of FBIS reports that U.S. Naval vessels are escorting, or at least the ships perceive that they are being escorted without requesting that they be escorted in the Persian Gulf.

A Commercial tankers?

Q Yes, commercial, non-U.S. flag vessels.

A Non-MSC?

Q Kuwait, specifically, is mentioned in this FBIS report, but --

A I would advise you to check with the Pentagon, but I think what I said and what Mike Burch said yesterday is unchanged. We don't have a policy to escort commercial vessels in the Gulf.

Q There's another FBIS item quoting a Japanese source -- I mean, it's a Japanese press item -- saying that the U.S. and Japan have reached an agreement by which, in an emergency, U.S. naval vessels would escort Japanese tankers in the Gulf, and other means they discussed on oil supplies. Is there anything to that?

A I don't have anything new to say about the oil supply issue. As far -- we talked about this a little bit yesterday. As far as the report of some agreement, or so on, there is no agreement. Obviously, in light of what the U.S. Government, including the President, had to say about keeping the Straits open and so on, we've had discussions with a variety of people about that subject.

But there has been no offer, as that one report seems to suggest. There has been no agreement, and obviously we're talking about hypotheticals so I can't really take you beyond that.

Q Alan, to what degree is there the possibility, as you see it, of the U.S., because of the AWACS role and the refueling role, being dragged into this war?

A I don't know of any reason, Bernie, to suggest a qualitative change in what the U.S. is doing. That is to say, we've had the AWACS there for four years. They continue to function. So that is a fact.

We recently responded to a Saudi request that there be refueling capacity to refuel their F-15s so they could maintain a continuous patrol, if they chose to do that. We reponded to that request and dispatched a KC-10.

That is what we are doing. And, as I say, I have no reason to believe that there would be a change in that.

Q But if you talk about the AWACS being there four years, they were there in a different context. This time, they're providing real-time intelligence to the Saudis. That's quite a --

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A Well, what do you think they've been doing?

Q But for a quick response and for military use. That's quite different from the previous situation.

A I don't agree with that. The purpose of their being there was to assist the Saudis with information relating to their defense, and that is what they are doing and is what they have been doing, and it is what they will be doing in the future.

Q Is there a greater risk, Alan, in that they're now advising planes in combat, whereas before they were providing general information?

A You're asserting that they're advising planes in combat?

Q Sending information to planes in combat.

A I think I will -- I'm, again, going to have to refer back to the language I used before, and be happy to provide it to you, but that's beyond the general characterization I just gave you. I don't think I can take it beyond that.

Q No greater danger is the step that you take?

A No, I don't see it.

Q You don't see any change in the U.S. role; is that what you're saying to us?

A The U.S. is continuing to do what it has been doing, other than -- there was a change in the sense that we provided this additional fueling capacity when we deployed the KC-10.

Q A question about that specific refueling capacity. That is, I hadn't heard you specifically say that the KC-10 was for the F-15s, whereas the ones that there already are for the AWACS, in other words.

A No, I can't say to you, and that's, I guess, a Defense question as to which aircraft might be used --

Q The purpose that we provided it for?

A The purpose of the additional capacity -- and we did say this -- was in response to a request so that there could be capacity to fuel F-15s for -- as they wanted to fly continuous patrol.

Exactly which aircraft fuel which planes, I can't say.

Q Alan, when I asked you before about being dragged into the war -- the U.S. -- you're answer was, "I don't know of any reason to suggest a qualitative change."

A Uh-hum.

Q That is not an answer to my question. My question --

A I think it is.

Q No, it is not. My question is, is there a possibility of the U.S. being dragged into the war because of the AWACS and KC-10 actions?

A I'm going to stick with what I just gave you on that.

Q Alan, some Arab diplomat on BACKGROUND said yesterday that you should give the Kuwaiti these Stingers because they asked for them and they are essential for their security, if you are worried -- concerned about the security of Kuwait. What do you think?

A I don't have anything new to add to what we've said about that before. There still is no decision to do that, and I refer you back to what we said before.

Q But, Alan, you said always they haven't requested it?

A No, I haven't said that. I said I haven't, myself, addressed the question of request or not. Obviously, we are aware of their interest. I think others may have talked about it in harder terms. But in any case, I certainly have not said they didn't request it, but I haven't really talked --

Q Alan, on the Kuwaiti Stingers --

A All right, Jim?

Q -- are we not in a situation where in a time-urgent case like this, no decision is, in fact, a decision?

A The fact of the matter is we haven't made a decision to do that, and I'm not going to be able to interpret that in those terms.

Q Well, it does amount to a negative decision in a time-urgent situation, does it not?

A I'm not going to try and interpret it for you. I'm simply going to tell you what the facts are in terms of the decision at this point.

Q But, Alan, to follow up on Jim's point, the Kuwaitis and other Arabs in the area seem to perceive that as being -- as the U.S. having written off Kuwait, in effect, and that should Iran proceed with some sort of air or ground attack on Kuwaiti installations, that this would be the major turning point there.

A I'm not going to try to take the issue beyond where I have, except to say that some -- if you're suggesting in some way, to take your phrase "we've written off Kuwait and we don't care what happens there," obviously that would be serious misreading of the situation.

But with regard to the specifics of any consideration of Stinger or other kinds of supplies, I just don't have anything to offer you on that today.

--MORE--

Q Alan, one more crack at Bernie's point, are you saying there is no qualitative difference between the AWACS for four years scanning the horizons, generally just observing what's going on in the area in the Gulf, and the new situation of actually being up there when attacking Phantoms, Iranian Phantoms, are in the region, and from what I understand, directing them and telling them exactly how to hit them?

A Well, I'm not going to address your supposition --

Q O.K. Take your supposition.

A I'm not going to address your suppositions about what AWACS may be doing. You're going to have to take those questions to the Pentagon and to Saudi Arabia. I think it would be -- Clearly, there is a change in that the Iranians have come in and have attacked ships in that area, and the Saudis identified an aircraft coming into their zone yesterday and went after it.

But in terms of what the AWACS is there for, in terms of providing the information, that role has been consistent.

Q You say there is a change. Would you say it's a qualitative change?

A Not in the U.S. role, no.

Q Are you saying there were one or two planes that were shot down?

A I don't have information on whether it was one or two planes, Bernie. You're just going to have to check with the Saudis on that.

Q Well, they claim two.

A Well, I don't have anything on that.

Q Alan, how are your relations, the United States relations, now with Kuwait after your "no-decision" about the Stingers? Does the matter of the United States Ambassador who was rejected by Kuwait play a role in your consideration in assisting Kuwait?

A I think you asked me that before -- if you didn't one of your colleagues did -- and the answer is no.

Q Same area, different subject: Fadi Frem, the commander of the Lebanese Forces, is supposed to be in town. Have any arrangements been made for him to meet with anyone in the Department?

A Yes -- I think we've said this before. He's going to be -- He is not in town this week, I don't think; I think he is in the United States, but he doesn't come here until next week. I guess I don't have the details with me. He will be meeting with officials in NEA.

Q Alan, South Africa's Mr. Botha is said to have proposed that the five Contact States take over responsibility for Namibia from the U.N. Do you have anything on that?

A Well, we don't have any reason to believe that the South African Government has altered its long-standing views on the basis for a settlement and on the U.N. Security Council Resolution, i.e. 435, so I think I'll just leave you with that.

Q Nevertheless, this statement was made. Are you saying this statement is consistent with what South Africa said before?

A I'm going to leave you with that statement that I just gave you, Jim.

Q On what he said?

A I'm going to leave you with the statement I just gave you.

Q You're not addressing the question, is that fair?

A No, I don't think it's fair. I think I'm giving a response in terms of our understanding of the situation. So I think it's a direct answer.

Q Could you take the question as to whether or not they have made this offer or this statement previously?

A No, I won't take that question.

Q Why is that?

A Because I'm giving you our understanding.

Jim?

Q Can you tell us if you have contacted the South Africans and they've told you no change?

A I'm not going to get into the question, without leading you one way or another, on diplomatic dialogue. I simply am giving you our understanding.

Q Alan, could I try it from this angle: Is the United States prepared to make a qualitative shift in its responsibilities towards Namibia?

A Our position remains that 435 is the internationally accepted basis for settlement of the Namibia issue. There is no change in that.

Q Do you believe that the South Africans, on the basis of this statement, are also committed in the way that they have always been to 435?

A I think I just said to you, if you'd listen to what I read, we have no reason to believe that the South African Government has altered its longstanding views on the basis for a settlement.

Q Alan, do you have a statement to make on the Egyptian Prime Minister's death?

A I addressed that yesterday. Let me refer you back to the record.

Q This morning, at the Center for Strategic International Studies news conference, one of the participants made this statement, that your raising the profile of the American envolvement in the Gulf is unnecessary. How do you answer this?

A Well, I don't have a specific response to that. We've addressed our concerns. I would refer you back to the statement that was made at the time of the announcement of the Stinger sale and the KC-10 deployment, and I think that will take care of it.

Q The decision not to sell Stingers to the Kuwaitis --

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A   I'm sorry. I didn't hear.

Q   The decision by the United States was made not to sell Stingers to the Kuwaitis after the statement by the Israeli Prime Minister that all the sales the U.S. is making to the Arabs will fall in the terrorists' hands.

A   I have not said -- Excuse me, excuse me. I did not say, and I am not aware of any spokesman who has said, that a decision has been made not to sell Stingers to the Kuwaitis. That is an incorrect statement, so I don't accept the basis of your question.

Q   Any kind of pressure from the Israelis?

A   I think the Israelis can talk about their own views on it. Our judgments are made on the basis of what we think needs to be done.

Q   Will you tell us about the Latin Ambassadors who came in this morning?

A   I can give you something on that, yes. The Ambassadors met with the Acting Secretary to deliver a letter, which was addressed to President Reagan, from the Presidents of Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.

The message urges the United States, on the eve of the London Economic Summit, to address a number of their nations' concerns including interest rates, the difficulty of obtaining new financial resources, and protectionist measures. In particular was their urging for a constructive dialogue among debtor and creditor countries to identify concrete measures to alleviate the burdens of the external debt, taking into account the interests of all interested parties.

This is not the message of a debtors' cartel, and we don't regard the group as such. Acting Secretary Dam said he would transmit the letter to the President. He outlined the steps the United States has taken to alleviate the effects of the world-wide recession and noted that the debt issue is on the agenda for the Summit.

Q   Copy?

A   Sure.

Q Who are the countries?

A The countries are Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.

Jim?

Q Do you have any response to the apparent agreement reached in Philadelphia regarding Mexico's debt, the repayment thereof?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q Is it possible to get a copy of the letter that they delivered, as well?

A It's a letter to the President. I don't know that we would release that here, even if it were to be released. Let me check on it and I'll see if I can provide something on it.

(Beeper.)

Wait a minute. Let's turn off the beeper. Good.

Q Is that letter urging U.S. actions or Summit actions, Summit consideration?

A Well, as I think, as I said, they are urging the U.S. on the eve of the Summit to address a number of those concerns. I think that it's in a Summit context. Why don't I see if we can get the text of that letter, and if we can, maybe that will help you analyze it.

Q The Government of Jordan filed a complaint to the Security Council, or to the United Nations Secretary General, about an Israeli excavation under the Al-Aqsa Mosque in East Jerusalem.

Are you aware of this or -- (inaudible)

A I'm not, and I think you'd have to address that in the U.N. context if that's where they put it.

Jim?

Q Do you have any confirmation of Oberdorfer's report today on Korea and U.S. communication?

A Well, as you know, we don't talk about details of diplomatic exchanges, but I can say that in the course of discussions in China the President reiterated our belief that the best way to seek a possible reduction of tensions and a long-term solution to the hostility between North and South Korea would be through direct talks between the two parties.

There are issues that the U.N. Command has long advocated, or measures, rather, that they have long advocated, tension-reducing measures such as mutual notification of major military exercises and Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission investigation of incidents in the demilitarized zone.

In addition, the Republic of Korea has produced some 20 projects to build confidence and to reduce tensions between North and South. These include recently reiterated proposals for direct telephone communication between Seoul and Pyongyang and the exchange of mail and family visits.

Q Does the United States have any position with regard to this three-and-a-half formula?

A To what?

Q To the three-and-a-half formula, with U.S., South Korea,and North Korea, and China acting as the conference moderator?

A Well, I think we have indicated before that, as I just said now, the key thing is to get the North and South together, and that has been the point we have stressed. There are various formulations which were discussed. Our position is that our preference is that it should be bilateral; and if it is not bilateral, it should be quadripartite. But in any case, it would be premature to discuss other formulas.

Bernie is getting very anxious here and is trying to cut this off.

Does anybody else have any other questions?

Q I agree with Bernie. Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:50 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Thursday, June 7, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #101

THURSDAY, JUNE 7, 1984, 12:00 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: A couple of housekeeping announcements. Available in the Press Office is a prepared statement by Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs, Mark Palmer, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee Task Force on International Narcotics Control. The subject of his testimony was "Allegations of Bulgarian Involvement in International Narcotics Trafficking."

Also available is the prepared statement by Acting Under Secretary for Management, Willard DePree, before the House Foreign Affairs Commitee, Subcommittee on International Security and Scientifc Affairs and the Subcommittee on International Operations. He testified on "International Terrorism."

That's it for announcements, and happy to take your questions.

Q Do you have anything to support the report that a ship was hit by a mine in the Persian Gulf?

A The answer to that essentially is, I really don't. We're aware of that report, Jim. It is unclear -- there apparently -- I can't confirm it officially -- but apparently there was an explosion, but we can't confirm what caused that explosion and would not be in a position to confirm, for example, that mines have been laid in that area or anything of that sort.

Q Are you -- is anybody sweeping that area of mines?

A I think you'd probably better check with the Pentagon. I'm not aware, again, that there's any suggestion that mines have been laid. Whether -- mines occasionally may have drifted down from areas up in the northern part of the Gulf. I just don't know. That's a possibility. But it's not clear at all that what happened with regard to that ship was a mine. It may have been an internal explosion, for example.

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Q There's a story out of London quoting Larry Speakes -- at least the AP version -- that the U.S. is involved in diplomatic negotiations with the Russians on Sakharov's release. Is there anything you can say on this, or is this a little bit hyped up?

A I haven't seen what Larry said. We've indicated before that we have made our very serious concerns known to the Soviets on many occasions, not only through the public statements here but otherwise, but I don't have any details to give you to supplement what Larry said.

Q To be honest with you, the story has the implication that there is some big action underway to free him.

A I just don't have anything further on that story, Bernie. I'm sorry.

Q You're not steering us away from the fact that Sakharov is the subject of discussion of diplomatic negotiations?

A I am not confirming negotiations per se -- I can't use that term; I don't know what information Larry has so I really can't comment on what he said. But the fact of the matter is, we have certainly made our views, as have others, very directly known to the Soviets about this case.

Q Following that up, Alan, isn't it a fact that the French have been involved seriously in that case, and that in fact the decision to go ahead with the Mitterrand State Visit is a clear signal that something is going on fairly --

A I'm not prepared to give such an interpretation, or really to comment on the French involvement. I think you'd have to ask them. But I'm not prepared to give an interpretation of that sort.

Q As I recall the last public statements, Mark Palmer about ten days ago told a group on the Hill that the Russians tell us to "fly a kite" whenever we raise the Sakharov thing.

A Well, I just, as I say, don't have anything to add to what has already been said.

Q On this subject, do we have any information on Sakharov's whereabouts or his condition or --

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A Nothing that is independent or from other than Soviet-controlled sources that we have any -- Obviously, there are the reports that came out of Italy. We can't confirm the validity of that phone call, for example, so we don't have any valid information, basically, about their situation. And we think that the Soviets have a responsibility, given the nature of this case, to make such information available.

Q Do you have any comment on the violence in India in the Sikh case?

A Well, only briefly. We believe the matter must be settled by the Indians themselves. We regret the loss of life and hope that further violence can be avoided.

As we have said on the record before, the United States strongly supports the unity and territorial integrity of India.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the request by the Prime Minister of Lebanon, Rashid Karami, for U.S. Administration support for his efforts for reconciliation of his country?

A I don't have a specific response, no. The fact of the matter is that, obviously, we have been supportive of the idea, and in various ways, over a very long period of time of national reconciliation. So the basic principle of support is a long-standing one, but I don't have a specific response to what he said.

Q Does this mean you didn't have a formal request for support from the Lebanese Government?

A I don't have anything to give you on what we've -- that may have been discussed between us on it.

Q Alan, what prompts the expression of support for unity and integrity of India? How does that fit in, from your point of view?

A I think I'll just leave it as a statement.

Q But what about -- I mean does that mean that you are opposing any of the demands by the Sikhs for greater autonomy?

A Well, I think the words speak for themselves. I'm going to leave those words on the record.

Q Alan, there are charges and countercharges by the Lebanese Government against Israel imposing economic sanctions on the people in Lebanon, and southern Lebanon especially, because of the request to close the Israeli liaison office.

Has Israel informed you about the steps that they are undertaking in the south or all over Lebanon, about what's going on now in Lebanon?

A Well, I don't think I'm going to get into what diplomatic conversations we have had. Obviously, the situation in Lebanon, both as I was asked before regarding reconciliation on the political level or what's happening elsewhere, is of interest to the United States. We've obviously expended a great deal of effort and lives, indeed, in Lebanon, and so we have an interest, and we continue to be active in our diplomacy, but I don't propose to comment on specific aspects. They're being worked out between the various parties.

Q It's very important that you really make your point clear on this matter, because since June the 4th, or the 5th, there has been a lot of demonstrations inside of Lebanon and going on a strike for over a week to end Israeli occupation and other things. So what do you comment on the whole situation?

A I just don't have a comment to offer you on that.

Okay?

Q Any comment on executions in Libya?

A No, I don't. I haven't seen -- is there a new report of executions?

Q Yes. There are --

A Okay. Sorry.

Q -- almost daily reports.

A Well, that we've commented on before, but I don't think in great extensive detail.

Bernie?

Q Do you have anything more on the Farrakhan visit to Libya as reported by the Libyans, and how that squares, if there was such a visit, with the U.S. advisory on non-use of passports for Libya?

A Well, I don't have more detail, really. Obviously, as I said before, I'm aware of the press reports coming out of Libya. I'm told that Privacy Act constraints, in any case and in such a case as this, would prevent disclosure concerning American citizens without their express authorization, and I don't think we have such an authorization from Mr. Farrakhan.

Regarding passports, as I indicated before when I addressed this, U.S. passports are not valid for travel to, in, or through Libya and may not be used for that purpose unless they have a special validation for that purpose. I cannot tell you whether Mr. Farrakhan was there; I cannot tell you whether, if he went there, he used his passport; so I'm just going to have to leave that.

Q Alan, I just need to follow up a question.

A Excuse me. I'll come back to you in a second.

Greg?

Q On Iran-Iraq, we've been seeing reports for some time now of an invasion by Iran or a new offensive might be imminent. Do we have any information that that is about to happen? Do we have any other situation report there?

A No. I don't have a situation report, and I don't have anything new today to offer on the question of whether Iran is about to launch its long-awaited offensive.

Q Do you have anything to offer on Jack Anderson's column this morning in The Washington Post about the dangers which are inherently coming out of this war, if it will prolong --

A No, I don't.

Q Alan, those people who are executed in Libya are executed by being convicted of working for the United States --

A Well --

Q So it sounds very strange that you don't have a comment on that.

A Well, I'll look and see if we have anything new to say on the subject. Okay?

Q Okay. Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:12 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, June 8, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #102

FRIDAY, JUNE 8, 1984, 12:09 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have no announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, before we get to other business, maybe we can clear up something on Tuesday. On Tuesday we asked you about this story in the Times about a plan for sharing oil.

A Uh-hum.

Q And you said, "No plan has been prepared for this Summit." Today we read in the paper that a plan was submitted by the United States at the Summit --

A I don't believe that's correct --

Q -- for sharing of oil.

A -- and I think if you look at the accounts coming out of London today, they made very clear that they are not tabling any plan; they're discussing the issue, so I don't quarrel with that. You may, but I don't have a quarrel with it.

Q Well, it's a very precise use of the word "plan."

A Oh, I think it -- the question was also, as originally reported in The New York Times, very precise.

Q Well, I think we disagree on that. Do you have anything on the Persian Gulf, with what's going on there?

A I don't have any sitrep to offer you, no.

Q Alan, would the confusion over this plan be explained by the general plan that the IEA has put together and that they're discussing now? Would that --

A No. I'll refer you to the party, and they can address this. The fact of the matter is the story in

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the *Times* suggested that there was a plan to be tabled at the Summit. My understanding is that that is not what has been reported from the Summit, but I'll refer you to your colleagues there.

Q What plan do you think is being referred to?

A Well, as I say, I'll refer you to your colleagues there, but I don't have a quarrel with the guidance that I was given and used.

Is that it?

Q Is there anything further on a meeting with Nicaragua?

A No. Don't have anything further.

Q What about U.S. help in bringing the Nicaraguans to the Olympics?

A Sorry? What is --

Q There's an indication they need help in getting their team to the Olympics --

A I see.

Q It was appropros to that last question. You have nothing to say?

A I have nothing on that.

Q Do you have anything on the OAS report?

A Yes, in general. Obviously, we haven't seen the -- had a chance, anyway, to examine the report fully. It's just been received, or released anyway. Press reports indicate that the Commission noted repeated violations of the basic rights of the Miskitos living in Nicaragua, including instances of killings and torture, and many of these human rights violations, of course, have been reported previously by representatives of the Miskitos and press, but it is significant to have a highly respected and independent organization of the OAS confirm them.

Q Could we have a copy, please?

A Sure.

Q Can I follow on the question? They said that "significant advances" have been made over the past year, and they cite about ten, pursuant to their own recommendations. Do you recognize that "significant advances" have taken place?

A Well, let me just say this: Over a thousand Miskitos fled Nicaragua in late December, and about 600 fled as recently as April. About 10,000 Miskitos remain in detention camps far from their homes. Over 15,000 have sought refuge in Costa Rica and Honduras. Miskito refugees continue to report cases of torture, killing, and arbitrary arrest by the Nicaraguan security forces. So the situation of the Miskitos remains one of concern to us.

Q Can we have a copy of that also?

A Uh-hum.

Q So, in other words, you differ with the notion that there were "significant advances," is that correct?

A I think I'll let my response speak for itself.

Q And, finally, if I could have one more on this issue: The Commission concluded, and I quote, or paraphrase it: Friendly settlement had proved impossible "in part due to circumstances beyond the control of the Nicaraguan Government."

What is your reaction to that statement?

A I don't have anything to offer you on the report beyond what I have given you at this particular point.

Bernie?

Q Anything on Sakharov? U.S. contacts with the Soviets, etc.?

A Well, I don't have anything terribly new to offer you on that. I think that the Secretary made the position quite clear this morning. Obviously, the Soviet authorities have been assuring everyone for weeks that Dr. Sakharov and Mrs. Bonner are alive and well, and they have published numerous articles in the press to this effect.

However, disturbing reports and rumors to the contrary continue to appear, and the Soviet authorities have not allowed independent observers to confirm their assertions by having direct contact with the Sakharovs.

Our position has been and continues to be that until such contact is allowed, we will not know for sure what their condition is. We call upon the Soviet authorities to allow this contact to take place.

Q Alan, what does the word "disturbing" mean?

A Well, I think that, as I say, they are disturbing because they are to the contrary -- that is, questions, reports, rumors that they are not well and their condition -- and so we don't know what the facts are. And that's what we think we need to -- and that people have a right to know.

Q Alan, one other question, please: On India, what do we say about the action taken by the Indian troops against the Sikhs at the Golden Temple, with all the killings that took place?

A Well, Bernie, that -- my response yesterday was taken, I think, after that action had taken place, and I refer you --

Q Nothing to add by way of a response to all that?

A No. That was a response yesterday to that.

Q Do you have any comment on how --

Q Excuse me. Can I just follow up? Are we in touch with India on something like that?

A I don't know whether we have discussed the situation with them or not, frankly.

Q Do you have any comment on House leaders' letter to Secretary Shultz concerning aid to Sudan?

A Yes. I do have something on that.

This was the letter from Chairman Fascell. The letter apparently was given to the press before it could be forwarded to the Secretary, who is, as you know, traveling with the President, and the Secretary has not had time yet to respond.

The Government of Sudan has stated publicly its desire to negotiate an end to southern dissidence. It has stated publicly it does not intend to try to resolve this problem militarily. The Sudanese Government has taken a number of political initiatives in response to southern grievances. While it has, as necessary, defended itself against dissident attacks in the south and on occasion has sought the release of hostages captured in the south, it has not embarked on a policy of military repression.

As evident most recently in the Libyan attack on the Omdurman radio station, the Sudanese Government faces a dangerous external military threat. Our military assistance program is intended to assist the government in meeting that threat.

Q Copy?

A Sure.

Q Where --

Q Do you have any --

Q Do you know where the threat comes from? Could you be more specific?

A Well, I said, as evident mostly recently in the Libyan attack on the Omdurman radio station, it faces a threat. I don't think I'll take it beyond that, though, Rick.

Q Can you confirm what's reported regarding the shipments that are cited in the article?

A Shipments?

Q Of jets and armored -- armor.

A In terms of delivery schedules and things like that?

Q Yes.

A I'm going to have to refer you to the Pentagon, Jim.

Q Will you confirm reports that oil exploration is being resumed in southern Sudan?

A I don't have anything on that. I think you'd have to check with the companies on that.

-- MORE --

1-1484

Q Could you tell me why the -- based on what the members -- some members of the Congress or the Senate were objecting to the idea of sending weapons to Sudan? What were their reasons?

A I think I'll refer you to -- apparently on the Hill, some people put that letter out. It was referred to in an article in the paper this morning, and I will refer you to that. I don't think -- we're not going to reveal this letter. As I say, the Secretary hasn't even had a chance to respond to it, so we're certainly not going to put it out at this point.

Q Alan, what is your understanding of the South African view of independence for Namibia? Are they still sticking by 435, or is there an interim plan that they're pushing?

A I have no reason to change what I said the other day about this, Bill, that we have no reason to believe that they've changed their view.

Q Alan, any reconsideration of Stingers for Kuwait? And then I have another question.

A The situation is as it was; that is, there has been no decision.

Q And have you had any updated reports on kidnappings in southern Lebanon --

A No, I don't have.

Q -- in the zone controlled by Israel?

A Yeah. I don't have anything.

Q Do you have any communication from the Lebanese Government about the Israeli liaison office in East Beirut, that they are asking you to possibly intercede on their behalf, or something?

A As I said the other day, this is a matter between Lebanon and Israel, and I'm going to leave it that way.

Q They haven't --

A I'm not going to address the question.

Q Did the U.S. pass onto Iraq an Israeli offer to let the pipeline go through Israel?

A I'm not going to get into -- without going one way or another on that, Bernie, I'm not going get into the question of the diplomatic exchange that might have taken place on that or other issues. I think we've talked about that before. The Israelis have addressed their attitude, I think, publicly before, so I really have to refer you back to that.

Q Alan, are we getting any reports about the possibility that the Iranians, in the wake of Iraq's military activities, may resort to terrorism as a way of retaliating?

A I don't want to get into the question of what reports we may or may not have gotten. We certainly are aware that Iran has in the past been implicated in terrorist activities, and so we, I think, would simply factor that into our considerations.

Q Do you have anything about -- is there any extra urgency about that situation, Iran triggering terrorism?

A I think I'm just going to have to leave it at that.

Q Alan, does the meeting today of the Kuwaiti Ambassador in the State Department have anything to do with the Stinger decision?

A Well, anything to do with -- I can't tell you whether the subject would come up. I don't think that the meeting was specifically relating to any one particular item.

Q Alan, twelve o'clock noon, we come in here, there was a report on CBS saying that Israel has communicated with the Government of Iraq through a third party about allowing Iraq to use the Israeli space for the pipeline, the proposed pipeline. Do you have any comment on that, or what can you comment on that?

A I think, in terms of pipeline, I just addressed it when Bernie Gwertzman raised that before. I don't have anything to add -- I don't have a specific response to that particular report.

Q Chilean cluster bombs to Iraq or the Appropriations Committee freeze on military aid to El Salvador?

1-1486

A In terms of the cluster bomb, the Chile selling Iraq cluster bombs story, we're aware of the report but can neither confirm nor deny its accuracy, particularly as regards the inclusion of U.S. components. Since calendar year 1975, the United States has had an arms embargo on Chile, which is vigorously enforced.

I can confirm that no items which require a munitions control license and which could be used in the manufacture of cluster bombs have been approved for Chile.

Q Could you repeat that?

A I can confirm that no items which require a munitions control license and which could be used in the manufacture of cluster bombs have been approved for Chile.

I cannot say whether items which do not require a license and which may be freely available without a license have been exported.

Q Copy?

A Sure. As far as --

Q Well, just on that also. Are there discussions between the U.S. and Chile or is some looked to with regard to the supply of Iraq in this matter, or do you have any guidance on that?

A I don't have specific guidance. Our attitude on shipment of weapons, and so on, to Iran and Iraq has been stated many times in the past, and I refer you back to that.

As far as -- you wanted to know about the Foreign Operations Subcommittee action?

Q Yes.

A This is not the final step in the legislative process and our requested assistance for El Salvador, and we continue to seek approval for the full $117 million request in addition to the already approved $61.7 million by the full House Appropriations Committee.

Such full committee support would be in keeping with the spirit of the full House's authorization vote just three weeks ago, which provides for the full Administration request for supplemental military assistance for El Salvador along with full funding for the economic and military assistance to Central America as recommended by the Bipartisan Commission.

Q Pursuant to that, do you have any guidance with respect to the election of the new Attorney General in Salvador, and the appointment of two commanders which were not --

A I think there was some guidance on part of that, anyway. Maybe the first part, and I don't recall what it was the other day, so if you check the Press Office on that.

Q Alan, there is a report in FBIS today that the Israelis refuse to let the International Red Cross representative visit the security prisoners held in detention in southern Lebanon. Can you look into this and see what --

A I don't think we would particularly comment on a specific report from here. Our view on treatment of prisoners, and so on, has been addressed many times in the past, and I'd refer you to that.

Bernie?

Q Do you have anything today on Farrakhan and Libya?

A No.

Q Nothing?

A No.

Q Over the last several days there have been reports out of Iran about an exclusion zone which ships from various places, all the way from the northern Gulf to the Strait of Hormuz, and so on. Does the United States recognize, as we have implicitly recognized an Iraqi exclusion zone? Do we recognize any kind of Iranian exclusion zone?

A I'm not going to accept the various premises stated in your question.

Q Let's get rid of the Iraqi exclusion zone premise.

A I think that -- let me just put it this way. There are -- we've seen the reports, obviously, regarding a zone in which the Iranians might be seeking to board ships. We've seen reports that, in fact, ships have been boarded although I think those reports mainly come before that was -- that report came.

We are looking into that situation, but I don't have anything further for you on that.

Q What would our reaction be if an American flag vessel -- I don't mean a Navy ship, of course, but a commercial ship -- was boarded in such a zone?

A As I say, we're looking into this question, and I just don't have anything further for you at this point.

Q Anything on the mining incident that was alleged to have taken place near the entry?

A No. I addressed that yesterday, and I don't have anything new to say about it.

Q Thank you.

A Okay.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:25 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Monday, June 11, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #103

MONDAY, JUNE 11, 1984, 12:19 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Just to start out with a housekeeping announcement. Available in the Press Office at 2:00 will be copies of Assistant Secretary Murphy's testimony before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, and that is on the Middle East update.

That's it. Happy to take questions.

Q Do you have anything to confirm this -- who shot up the Kuwaiti tanker over the weekend?

A No. I really don't. We're aware of the press reports, but that's --

Q And do you have any comment on the apparent agreement between Iran and Iraq to spare civilian targets?

A Yes. We note that a similar understanding between the parties developed earlier this year, and that the cease-fire lasted only a short time. Nonetheless, we welcome any act by Iran and Iraq that serves to de-escalate the fighting and which could serve as a first step toward a general cease-fire.

We support the U.N. Secretary General's efforts toward this end.

Q We can't hear you back here, Jim.

Q Copy, please?

A Copy. Sure.

Q And anything else to report from the Persian Gulf? Any situation reports?

A No. I don't have a general sitrep to give you.

Q Alan, on the Gulf, why the difference between the statement which the Summit had published and what Reagan said before he left? I mean, there are a lot of differences between the two.

A I don't think there's any difference in the intent of any of that. I will leave it to you to do the textual analysis, however.

Q Alan --

A But I would be careful about seeing too many differences there.

Q This fellow MacMichael cited in the Times today --

A Yes.

Q -- has told a couple of different agencies that the U.S. systematically misrepresented Nicaraguan involvement in supply of arms to Salvadoran guerrillas. Any thoughts on that?

A Well, obviously, we don't comment on intelligence activities, and we're not in a position to address the reported employment background of Mr. MacMichael.

On the general issue, however, our position on the ongoing Nicaraguan support for the Salvadoran guerrillas remains as we have stated.

As to the period 1981 to 1983, which was covered in the article, we would refer you to the May 13, 1983, report issued by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives which noted in part that the guerrillas in El Salvador "are well-trained, well-equipped with modern weapons and supplies, and rely on the use of sites in Nicaragua for command and control and for logistical support." Continuing the quote, "The intelligence supporting these judgments provided to the Committee is convincing."

I'd simply add to that that the evidence indicates that these activities are continuing.

Q That was old information. And, also, do you have any update for us on the possibility of getting a briefing on that, on the substantive information?

A No. No update on the briefing. I don't think that -- as I said at the end, the evidence continues to indicate that that is the case, and that's not based on old information, nor do I think the Committee in 1983 was addressing old information.

Bernie?

Q Can you make any of that -- a question we've asked you before -- could you make any of that available to us, the evidence that you cite?

A Well, that's what Dennis just asked, too. I -- everybody is aware of the interest. The problem is, quite obviously, sourcing, and so that request remains on the table. I understand, but I don't have any great hope to offer you at this point that that can be provided.

Q Well, but during Secretary Haig's tenure he put out that document, long document --

A Well, there have been various documents that have been produced, and I think that that all stands. There was also a very extensive briefing that was provided in which special efforts were made to declassify a number of things, including photographs, if you will recall, but I'm not aware of any inclination at this particular time to continue a briefing.

Q You're concerned about sourcing?

A Sources and methods.

Q Alan, both -- two things: Both the things that you just alluded to, the briefing that was given I believe in March of '82 by Mr. Inman and the White Paper, all dealt with evidence that wasn't any more recent than when this fellow indicates the arms flow ended.

A Well, I have indicated to you, and I'm not going to keep on repeating it, that the evidence continues to indicate that the conclusions reached by the House Intelligence Committee and referred to as convincing evidence -- that evidence continues to -- the evidence continues to indicate that that is the case.

Q Thank you.

Q Can I follow up, please? First of all, can we get a copy of that statement that you read to us?

A Sure.

Q When you say, your statement is a little curious because it doesn't in of itself say that the State Department is saying that there is a flow at such-and-such a level, whether -- refer to a variety of things in the past as to ebbs and flows --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- peaks and valleys, and so on. You say, "It remains as we have stated it." Are you speaking only for the State Department or do you wish to associate yourself with remarks, say, of President Reagan, who says that there is a "flood" of weapons or supplies going to --

A You're quoting the President. We can go back and quote lots of different things. I am going to stick with what I've just given you, which is the quote from the House Report and then the conclusion that the evidence indicates that these activities are continuing.

Q When you say "we," to what are you referring? To what agency of the United States Government are you referring? There have been so many agencies who have commented on so many different things about this.

A Well, I'm not sure where you see the "we." The "we" would only, in referring, be in referring you to the House Committee Report, so I don't think we'd have to get interagency clearance on that, Jim.

Q Alan, is there any way to quantify at all, to suggest that the Salvadoran guerrillas are getting 50 percent of their arms through Nicaragua? Are there any figures at all that you could give us?

A Well, I think there have been some figures that have been discussed. Beyond those, I do not have anything to give you on it.

Q Are you suggesting that the White Paper issued during Secretary Haig's tenure is still relevant?

A I'm not trying to quantify the levels of flow and so on at this point, but the kind of support that was talked about in the House report, after they had received an extensive briefing, that kind of activity, continues.

Q Alan, could you date that House report, please?

A I gave you that date. It was May 13, 1983.

Q And nothing has changed since then?

A I didn't say nothing was changed. I said that the kinds of activities which were carried on and referred to in that report are continuing. I think that even the questions have indicated we have said that levels vary from time to time, and I don't have a reading to give you on levels at this point.

Q Do you know, Alan, at this point what Mr. Ortega said when this matter was brought up by Secretary Shultz?

A I don't have any readout to give you beyond what the Secretary said about his meetings.

Q When MacMichel says that there have been no arms shipments interdicted between Nicaragua and El Salvador in more than three years, is that correct?

A Well, I just don't have have anything that I think I can give you from here on the question of interdiction.

Q On this general subject, is there anything to report on the next meeting, or a meeting, between Mr. Shlaudeman and his Nicaraguan counterpart?

A No.

Q What is happening there?

A I think the fact is, obviously, that it was announced that there would be follow-on meetings. I don't anticipate announcing such meetings ahead of time, and so I think that --

Q Why not?

A That's the way it was agreed that they would be handled.

Q In other words, they are going to announce them after they've been held?

A Well, I don't know if they'll be announced or quite how it's going to be handled, Don, but there certainly is going to be no prior announcement anyway.

Q Was the meeting to be here in Managua or --

A I don't have anything to give you on -- I don't have anything on that kind of detail.

Q Do you know if that's been agreed to, the site? As I understand, --

A I don't have anything to give you on that.

Q You don't know (inaudible)

A I said, I don't have anything to give you on that.

Q In April 1983, the State Department said officially in a posted answer that the arms flow or the supply flow was at an ebb, that is, that not much had gone over in the past few months according to the written guidance at that time.

Does that continue to be the case?

A I don't have a readout on the volume, Jim.

Q Are we at an ebb or at a --

A I don't have a readout to give you on the volume, Jim.

Q Can you take the question?

A No.

Abdul Salam?

Q I came across something which comes from the "Outreach Working Group on Central America." Can you explain to me what's this all about, an "Outreach Working Group?" Is this a group --

A That, I believe, is a --

Q White House?

A -- White House, and I would check over there.

Q Do you have anything, Alan, on the report by the Italians that link the Bulgarians to Agca and the plot against the Pope?

A   Well, yes, but it doesn't really take you beyond where we've been before, that is to say, we have seen the press stories, but the Italian Government has not yet made the report public, nor so far as we know have they made a final decision on whether to bring any of the accused in this case to trial.

The United States cannot interfere in the internal judicial proceedings of another country. We have tried to avoid taking any public position on the merits of the case throughout the Italian investigation into alleged Bulgarian Government involvement. We want to ensure that the investigation and any possible proceedings in the Italian courts go forward without the slightest hint of outside interference or pressure.

At the same time, the United States offered the fullest possible assistance to the Italian authorities investigating the case, and we will continue to do so if asked. We are confident that other concerned governments will do the same thing.

There should be no mistake as to the gravity with which we view the attempt on the life of the Pope. The United States condemns all acts of terrorism, whatever their source, and views the attack on the Pope as one of the most terrible and cowardly of all such crimes.

Q   Is there any consideration being given to reviewing our relations with Bulgaria?

A   I will leave you with what I've just said on that.

Hold on, one second, please.

Q   May we have a copy?

A   Copy? Yes, you may have a copy. Just hold one second.

-- MORE --

Q Also on Italy, do you have any comment on the passing of the head of the Italian Communist Party, Berlinguer?

A I don't have a substantive comment about the implications or anything of that sort, Jim. I simply would note that we extend our sympathies to Mr. Berlinguer's family.

Q Alan, I have a series of South African questions. First of all, anything to report on a meeting between Nujoma and Crocker?

A No.

Q Anything on Nujoma's charges, spurning South Africa's offer about Namibia?

A No.

Q And this other, there's a story about Gerhardt in the Post, and says that he was sharing NATO information with the Soviets. How is South Africa privy to NATO information?

A I think that the story -- I don't have anything to give you from here, but I think the story talked about this a little bit. But in any case, it's not something that I would be addressing from this podium particularly.

John?

Q Alan, we're running written responses from Chernenko, who was sent a set of questions in which the Soviet leader proposes immediate negotiations on anti-satellite moratorium. What's the Administration's position?

A I haven't seen it. I have heard about that, John. I think we'd have to look at what he said. But as a general matter, I think we have indicated before that concerns over verification issues make negotiation at this point a difficult thing to contemplate.

On the other hand, we've also indicated a willingness -- I think the President did -- to talk about these problems. Not to negotiation, but to talk about the problems. But I think before we give you back a formal response to that response that he gave to Mr. Kingsbury-Smith, we would want to take a look at the text.

Q You might also note that he welcomes any discussions on verification, including the national and international --

A Let us take a look at it, and then we'll try and respond to it.

Q Another on southern Africa. Do you have anything on the arrest of SWAPO people in Windhoek, or outside Windhoek?

A We are aware of the reports. I understand that SWAPO officials were arrested this weekend. We're looking into it, but I don't have any further comment at this point.

Bob? Excuse me, Bob?

Q Going back to John's question, have you any indication why the Soviets did not pick up on the offer to begin exchange of views on ASAT?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q Can you confirm information in the press today that the U.S. refused the request by the Lebanese Government to mediate with the -- to help Lebanon mediate with Israel on new security talks?

A I don't have anything specifically on the question of mediation. I think we have indicated, without suggesting that we necessarily would get into mediation at all, that we would try and be helpful in facing these various problems that exist, but I don't have a specific response to that article.

Q So can we say you are not refusing?

A No, I don't think -- I think all you could say is that at this point I don't have any response to give you on that.

Q Okay. Do you have any comment on the shelling in Lebanon today?

A No, I don't.

Q Alan, do you have anything at all on the arrest in Poland of Bogdan Lis, who is a dissident who's been underground?

A No, I don't.

Jim?

Q Anything on the Contadora tour, the present Contadora tour?

A Yes, we -- as you're aware, last January the Contadora participants created three working groups on political, security, and socioeconomic affairs with the objective of producing recommendations as to how to implement the 21-point Document of Objectives which was agreed to on September 9, 1983.

The working groups completed their task on schedule, that is, on April 30, at which point the nine Foreign Ministers of all of the Contadora participants asked the Contadora four governments to "organize, systematize, and integrate the recommendations into a single document." That work was completed this past weekend, at which time the Foreign Ministers of the Contadora four governments made a quick tour of the five Central American capitals to present the document for consideration of those governments, or by those governments.

Simply, in terms of response or reaction, we are pleased with this further indication that the Contadora's regional diplomatic effort, which is fundamental to our policy in the area, is moving forward.

Q And on a related issue. There were reports this weekend that the United States did not intend any further large, joint maneuvers in Honduras for the balance, or the period between now and the Presidential election here. Can you confirm that's the case?

A I can't. You'd have to check with the Pentagon on exercise schedules.

Q Do you have any information on Chester Crocker's meeting with the South African Prime Minister in Rome?

A No, I simply have -- I think we've indicated before that he is in Rome, that he will be meeting with South African officials; but I don't have more detail on it.

Q Alan, at the time that there was a prisoners' exchange between Israel and the PLO back, I believe, in

1-1500

November or December last year, there was information that the whole structure of Ansar concentration camps and war prisoner camps will be dismantled. It looks like, from reports now, the camp in southern Lebanon is still being used. Can you check into this, if this is still being used or dismantled?

A You could check with the Israeli Government. But in any case, I will take a look, but I can't promise you they will have anything specific to say about that.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the Golden Temple in India?

A No, I don't have anything beyond what we said the other day on that.

Q The Indian Army discovered a large number of arms and explosives when they entered the temple. Now, some of them were made by U.S. and some Chinese and British. Can you comment on this triangle's hand in the internal affairs of India?

A Oh, I think that I would reject the suggestion that your question carries, that somehow the fact that somebody may have -- and I can't confirm to you the facts that you've just cited to me -- but somehow that somebody has U.S. arms means that the United States Government is interfering in internal affairs. There's a very large world market.

Q Can I follow one more, please? Would you grant political asylum to the Sikhs -- at the State Department -- on the basis of what's happening in India?

A I think that there are -- the process -- I don't know that that issue has even arisen, and I don't think --

Q But it does.

A Well, I don't think I'm going to address a hypothetical question.

Q Do you have anything on the Honduran-Argentine arm sales to various forces in Central America.

A I don't.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:40 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, June 12, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #104

TUESDAY, JUNE 12, 1984, 12:25 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A full house, yes.

A few announcements: First, the Secretary will be testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee at 10:30 a.m. tomorrow morning. The subject is "International Terrorism," and because of that appearance, we will not have a daily press briefing here. My understanding is -- but you should check on this -- that the room number has been given to us as 2172 Rayburn; but as I say, you might want to double check on that.

Also available this afternoon at 2:00 in the Press Office will be the testimony of Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Paul Wolfowitz before the Subcommittees on East Asian and Pacific Affairs and International Economic Policy. The subject is "Japan."

On the Secretary's plans, he has accepted a longstanding invitation from the Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Fleet, Admiral Wesley McDonald, to visit an aircraft carrier, and he will go down Friday, spend Friday night -- this Friday, that is June 15 -- aboard the USS John F. Kennedy at sea while she is off the east coast for regularly scheduled operations. He may also visit a nuclear submarine in port at Norfolk, but I don't think that's been put in final form yet.

Q Are reporters not accompanying the Secretary?

A No, there will be no press coverage. I mean, I'm sure there'll be some press when he lands or something there, but no press on the carrier.

Q He's leaving Friday night?

A He's leaving Friday afternoon, go down there and spend Friday night there, spend Friday night on the carrier, and come back on Saturday.

A statement on the fiftieth anniversary of the Reciprocal Trade Act: Today is the fiftieth anniversary of the Reciprocal Trade Act of 1934, with which the State

1-1504

Department has a particular connection. The Act marked the start of fifty years of United States trade liberalization. Remarkably, the Act came only four years after the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which raised average U.S. tariffs to 55 percent and which is credited by many economists with turning a minor recession into the Great Depression. Recognizing the damage being done both to our economy and to our international relations, Secretary of State Cordell Hull persuaded Franklin Roosevelt to change course.

The trade liberalization which began with the Reciprocal Trade Act enabled world trade to grow almost 50 percent faster than world production from 1948 to 1973, raised world exports to today's level of $2 trillion, and will see average industrial country tariffs reduced to 3-4 percent by 1987.

As modern technology brings the world closer together in ways both beneficial and threatening, trade ties become ever more important. When we exchange goods and services, we also exchange ideas. If a man builds a better mousetrap, the world beats a path to his door not merely to buy mousetraps, but also to find out the secrets of his success. As U.S. trade has grown in importance to our economy, others have realized that in fields such as agriculture and high technology, much worth emulating lies behind our abundant output. And as imports have challenged traditional U.S. industries, we, too, have learned that in areas as diverse as inventory control, employee relations, and quality standards, there is much abroad that we can adapt to our benefit. The lowering of the barriers among nations in this way benefits us all.

We have come far in the fifty years since passage of the Reciprocal Trade Act of 1934, but we still have far to go. Tariff and other trade barriers still limit the world's trade, and challenges in new areas such as services trade and high technology remain to be taken up. We hope to build on the past fifty years' accomplishments, so that in another fifty years our successors can look back on the 1980s as having marked an equally important beginning in world trade liberalization.

Q May we have a copy?

A Be happy to take your questions.

Mike, yes, a copy.

Q On Beirut, you're not able to report what the situation is like today?

A I don't have a sit-rep to give you on that, Mike. Simply, I would note that we regret that the level of violence in the Beirut area has increased sharply, and we deplore the loss of innocent lives, and support the efforts of the Lebanese Government to achieve national reconciliation and to restore security.

Q What effect do you think this fighting has on the viability of the government?

A I'm not going to try to make that kind of judgment from here.

Sir?

Q Can I have a comment on the Parliament vote of confidence?

Q What was the question?

A The question was, any comment on the Parliament's vote of confidence in the government, in Mr. Karami's government. I don't have a specific comment to offer. Obviously, we are in favor of any step which will move the process forward towards the objectives, which we have laid out, of reconciliation and progress. Obviously, if this is a step and moves it in that direction, we welcome that; but I don't have a specific response to that action.

Q Alan, some sources in Beirut make sort of linkage between the fact that Mr. Fadi Frem is here in Washington and the flare-up of fighting in Beirut.

A Well, I don't know how to comment on that. If the suggestion is that somehow the United States is involved, I reject that. Other than that, I don't have a response to that report.

Q This is a follow-up to the Stinger sale to Saudi Arabia.

A Uh-huh.

Q Does the State Department now share the White House view that was reported in the Post this morning that Saudi Arabia has an impeccable record on non-transference of American-supplied weapons. I ask this in regard to the transfer of 70 American tanks to the Sudan three years ago without notification.

A Well, we've addressed this before, and I don't have anything new to say about it. The fact is that we -- the question has arisen before regarding illegal or unknown transfers of U.S. equipment from Saudi Arabia, and I think we've indicated we don't know of any. We've looked at the charges that have been raised. They were raised in connection with the Lebanon invasion and so on, and we just don't have any confirming evidence of that.

Q Can you confirm that the "cease-fire" order is holding in Iran and Iraq, with a view on that success?

A Well, it appears that the cease-fire has gone into effect, but I would caution you that we are not going to get into giving sit-reps on this. We're not, as I've said many times before, we're not a news agency. You all have people who are as able to report on that as we, and who can go to the Governments of Iran and Iraq and get their judgments on that, so I think I'm going to not get into that on a daily basis, Mike.

I'd repeat what I said yesterday. We welcome the effort by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and we hope that it will lead to de-escalation of the conflict.

Q Alan, new subject?

Q Can we stay on the Middle East?

A Stay with the Middle East? O.K. I'll come back to you in a minute.

-- MORE --

Q There is a statement attributed to Mr. Arens, Defense Minister of Israel, that a joint exercise in medical cooperation was carried out recently in our region.

A That a what was carried out?

Q A joint exercise in medical cooperation?

A A joint exercise in medical cooperation.

Q Between the United States and Israel.

Do you have anything to confirm or to deny this?

A I don't have anything on it. You might want to check with the Pentagon if we're talking about a joint exercise. I just don't have anything on it.

Q Alan, Murphy yesterday said that Kuwait asked formally for the Stinger. Can you now confirm that?

A Well, if he said that, I will -- I don't know what he said specifically, but obviously he was testifying in open session and I'll leave you with his words. But I don't have anything to advance the issue on any decisions on supply.

Q The Israeli press quoted Mr. Arens saying that the U.S. is refusing to supply Kuwait with the Stingers.

A Well, I don't know what Mr. Arens said. I'm telling you that there is no decision that I have to convey to you.

Dennis go ahead.

Q On Solidarity, Alan, can you tell us what the level of U.S. support is for Solidarity, if any? Is there any --

A U.S. support?

Q -- logistical -- any U.S. Government support, logistical? Anything aside from moral support.

A Yes. That's a little hard. I don't know of any programs specifically to support. I suppose that there may be through support of AFL or something like that. I don't -- you'd have to talk to the AFL-CIO about what their funding situation is. I just don't know about that. There's nothing that I know of -- beyond that, I mean.

Q No funding.

A Well, not that I'm aware of -- no.

Q Is Solidarity looked at as an opposition party of the kind that fosters democracy and that we would tend to support?

A Oh, I don't have a characterization to offer on that or a judgment to offer on what would be done in the case of that kind of funding.

Jim?

Q Anything on the Namibia arrests?

A Yes. We understand that the SWAPO officials arrested this weekend were detained under the provisions of the Prohibition and Notification of Meetings Act which prohibits political meetings inside Namibia by more than 20 people. We're continuing to follow the situation.

I have no further comment at this time other than to emphasize our concern worldwide over restrictions on the rights of peaceful assembly and association.

Q Also on --

A Excuse me. Mike?

Q I'm sorry.

Q Alan, will Secretary Shultz come down with Reverend Jackson?

A I don't know that we've said there is a meeting with Reverend Jackson. We can talk about it a little bit later, but I'm not aware that there has been a meeting scheduled.

Q Thank you.

A Jim?

Q Anything on -- two economic things relative to your initial statement.

The ITC just suggested that quotas be imposed with respect to certain kinds of steel imports, and there's a copper import decision that's coming up on Thursday. Does the State Department have anything to do with this?

A Well, I don't think we'd get into agency positions.

Q All right. And anything on Argentina's position vis-a-vis the IMF?

A Well, a little bit -- not a lot.

We haven't had an opportunity to examine a copy of the Argentine document. It's our understanding that negotiations between Argentina and the IMF are continuing, and it is our practice not to comment on negotiations between the Fund and another member government. It is in everyone's interest that agreement be reached as soon as possible, and we are hopeful that a mutually satisfactory accord will be reached.

Mike?

Q Pardon me if this has been asked yesterday, but do you have any response to President Chernenko's call regarding the anti-satellite weapons talks?

A I did yesterday. I can give you something on that.

Q Anything more?

A Yes.

We have indicated our willingness to discuss these and related issues but not to engage in formal negotiations at this time. Mr. Chernenko's statement is a reiteration of the well-known Soviet position.

As we have said, we do not see how a truly comprehensive ban on all means of damaging or destroying satellites can be effectively verified. In addition, we continue to have reservations about an agreement which would leave the Soviet Union with the world's only proven ASAT capability.

1-1510

We are continuing to study the problem intensively to determine whether constraints on ASAT systems and activities can be identified which would be equitable, verifiable, and contribute to our security.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Jim?

Q Do you have anything on the exchange in El Salvador and/or reports or rumors that Shlaudeman will meet with Tinoco on the 26th of June?

A I have nothing on the latter; and I will not be, as I indicated yesterday or the other day, commenting ahead of time on any scheduled meetings between Ambassador Shlaudeman and Mr. Tinoco.

As far as the release yesterday, I don't have anything specific. Obviously, we're pleased that Vides Casanova's brother has been released unharmed.

Bill, did you have a question?

Q Yes. In relation to Argentina, a number of Latin American countries are having a sort of debter's summit next week. Does the Department have any statement or any feeling about this meeting or what you'd like to see or not see?

A I don't have anything on it. I will pass back an interest in any possible statement we might have.

Q Alan, did Daniel Ortega's statement that Shultz' visit was not sincere cut off that effort to start new meetings?

A Well, we have not seen confirmation of what Mr. Ortega might have said. I've seen various press reports about it.

In any case, we're not going to try to interpret Nicaraguan spokesmen on the question of meetings and dialogue and so on. I would simply reiterate something that we have said before, and that is that the dialogue initiated by Secretary Shultz on June 1 was to reaffirm and to give impetus to our continuing support for peaceful resolution of the problems of Central America and the Contadora document of objectives. Our basic objectives in Nicaragua are wholly compatible with the Contadora 21 points.

Q I know tht you've already attached a statement saying you're just not going to comment on how this dialogue is pursued --

A That's right. You got it.

Q -- so in that regard there is just nothing further to ask, is there? (laughter) --

A That's right.

Q -- such as whether a meeting already fell through once.

A You're right. There is nothing further to be asked or be answered.

Q Oh, O.K. (Laughter.)

A All right?

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Whereupon, at 12:38 p.m., the briefing was concluded.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Thursday, June 14, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #105

THURSDAY, JUNE 14, 1984, 12:28 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: It's the coolest room in the entire State Department! Goodness, what influence you guys must have! (Laughter)

Have a housekeeping announcement and then a statement. There will be a press BACKGROUNDER on the visit that is taking place June 16-23 by Sri Lankan President Jayewardene. That BACKGROUNDER will be Friday, 11:00 here in this briefing room, not the White House briefing room -- 11:00 tomorrow morning.

I have an announcement on attempts to oust Israel from the Universal Postal Union. The Nineteenth Universal Postal Union Congress will be held in Hamburg from June 18 to July 27. Regrettably, some Arab countries are sponsoring a move to expel Israel from the UPU, continuing the ill-considered campaign against Israel's participation in the United Nations system that we've witnessed in other U.N. forums during recent years.

The United States will oppose this move with all available diplomatic resources. We know that many other countries will likewise oppose this inroad against the principle of universality underlying the United Nations. The United States has repeatedly declared that an attack on Israel's right to participate in any United Nations organization, if successful, would have grave consequences for its own continued participation and support.

I haven't finished yet.

The U.S. policy was fully explained by Secretary Shultz on October 16, 1982. The United States wishes to make it clear that Israel's expulsion from the UPU at the Hamburg congress would immediately cause us to pull our delegation out of the Congress, to suspend our participation in UPU activities, and to withhold payments to the UPU.

1-1514

The suspension of our participation and the withholding of our payments would continue until the illegal action was reversed. This stand reflects the strong sentiment of the American people and is embodied in Public Law 98-164, passed by the Congress in November 1983.

That's all I have up front.

Q What's the size of the U.S. contribution?

A I don't have that to hand, but let me see if we can produce that for you, sure.

Q John, can you tell us what are the conditions in Angola where a number of Americans, I believe, have been seized and some other nationals?

A I can't do much more than say that we've seen the same reports that you have, Mike, and obviously, we're particularly interested in reports that some of the foreigners said to be captured are of American, Colombian, and Portuguese nationality. We're particularly interested in the Americans.

This is a matter into which we are looking on an urgent basis. I don't have any further information -- don't have any information, as a matter of fact, on the numbers or the identities of the captives at this time.

Q What diplomatic contacts do you have regarding this, since we do not have --

A Can't tell you how we're pursuing that.

Q How many Americans are in Angola and what are they doing there?

A I don't have that, Larry, to hand.

Q Do you have any idea whether there were any organized groups, whatever, AID programs or --

A Not that I'm aware of. I don't know what there might be in the way of commercial --

Q A group of individual Americans?

A This group?

1-1515

Q Yes.

A I have no idea what they are. I mean all we've seen is reports that some Americans have been captured. Don't know anything about them.

Q John, do you have any comment on the frequent reports on a conflict between Secretary Shultz and Mr. Arens of Israel regarding the aid, U.S. aid and, Saudi Arabian aid to Palestinians of the West Bank?

A No, I don't.

Q Nothing?

A No, I don't.

Q Do you have anything on an American, I guess a seaman, said to be held in Vietnam?

A Well, that is something that we have looked into over a period, Bill. I really can't take it much further. Somebody said that since the first news of the Glomar Java Sea being in distress reached us, we've actively sought the help of other governments in locating survivors, and that has included contacts with the Government of Vietnam.

We have followed all the leads and we will continue to pursue any which offer hope of locating possible survivors, and so we are checking on this very latest report that a Vietnamese refugee has information about survivors.

The United States Government has, in the past, interviewed this particular individual, and the reports, the information that we acquired at that time was not encouraging, did not seem to bear out the stories that somebody might still be alive. However, we are in process of talking with the individual again.

Q John, there is a piece of very interesting news that the Libyans decided to establish a bureau for combatting international terrorism.

A The Libyans --

Q Yes.

A -- have decided to establish a bureau for combatting international terrorism? (Laughter)

Q Yes.

A Where did they plan to locate it?

Q In your office.

(Laughter)

Q I don't know the answer for sure.

A (Laughter)

Q If they are serious, are you ready to cooperate with them in this, or are you considering --

(Laughter)

A I must say that on the basis of the record up to now, one would have to take protestations of Libya's seriousness about combatting terrorism with a grain of salt, to say the obvious. But we will, obviously -

Q So would you characterize this as anti-anti-terrorism?

A Well, I hesitate to characterize it. Why don't we wait and see what they perhaps have in mind.

Q John, do you have anything on the meeting of the chief of the Iraqi Interests Section with Armacost?

A I'm not quite sure what time he was meeting Mr. Armacost today, but he either has or will meet Mr. Armacost, and this is within the framework of our continuing dialogue with Iraq. I think it is the first time he has met Mr. Armacost, who as you know, is new in his present position.

Q Who is (inaudible)

A The head of the Iraqi Interests Section.

Q John, did Fadi Frem meet with anyone in this Department, and if so, who?

A That one I cannot answer, being --

MR. ROMBERG: He was to meet with NEA.

A He was to meet with NEA. Whether he did, I don't know. My --

Q It was mentioned in The Washington Times two days ago that he visited the White House. Does this mean that he could meet President Reagan?

A I'm not aware of it, but why don't you ask the White House.

-- MORE --

Q John, he said today in the National Press Club that he thinks that a joint commission, American-Lebanese commission, will be a constructive way of solving the problems of Lebanon, and he said you haven't given negative -- he told, with the meeting here, he told you about his suggestion, and he didn't have a negative attitude.

A An American-Lebanese commission to do what?

Q Coordinate things -- relations between Lebanon and --

A Well, don't have anything specific on that report. Obviously, we remain involved in Lebanon. If the various parties asked us to perform some specific function, we would look at that. We have continued to be helpful.

Q John, a couple of points about what my colleague asked about -- the aid into the West Bank. The Mayor of Bethlehem, Elias Freij, when he was here in town, I believe he was given a $1 million present from the Saudi Ambassador and the money was not approved to be disseminated to the City of Bethlehem. Do you have any information --

A I don't.

Q -- if the money is forthcoming or the approval by Israel to come?

A No.

Q Could you look through this, because --

A I think you probably ought to talk to the Saudis or the Israelis or the Mayor of Bethlehem about that.

Q The second thing is about -- the statement about the UPU. Are there any special -- specific charges against Israel from any of these Arab countries, and who are the Arab countries who are sponsoring --

A I don't know what the Arab case is, but this is within the pattern of attacks on Israel in the U.N. system that have taken place over a period of time. I don't know what the specifics of any allegations might be, but we consider it to be a part of the same pattern.

Q If I may follow this. How cooperative in the -- of not on a scale of 1 to 10, or whatever -- how cooperative has been Israel all along in implementing United Nations resolutions and Security Council resolutions and other things?

A I can't give you a horseback opinion that. But the fact is we support the principle of universality, and we do not think that Israel should be excluded from the U.N. system.

Q John, to follow on that, and also on your announcement on the UPU, if other organizations within the U.N. system in the future threaten to expel Israel, can we expect the United States, in that case, to withhold payments and suspend participation in those organizations?

A Other U.N. organizations?

Q Other agencies within in the U.N. system?

A Within the U.N.? I don't want to signal our intentions but, I think, if you look at the consistent attitude of the United States plus the legislation under which we operate, plus Secretary Shultz' statement on this, I think that is a logical conclusion.

Q John, is there any change in the Administration's requirements for a summit, aside from the two points that are usually -- cooperation and expectation?

A No, I think various Administration officials have spoken on that subject in the past several days, and I don't really have anything to add, Bernie.

Q Do you have any reaction to the INF vote in the Dutch Parliament?

A Yes, I do. It basically is to reaffirm, Bill, what we said before. We've made clear our position on Dutch INF deployments. We made that clear at the time of their Cabinet decision, which was taken on June 1. And, as we said at that time, we are disappointed that the Netherlands has not decided now to go ahead with full implementation of its part in the December 1979 decision, and as we also said at that time, we do expect the Netherlands, as we do all other Allies concerned, to implement fully that decision.

Insofar as the other INF basing countries are concerned, we are certain that the other basing countries share our view that the December 1979 decision should be fully implemented as planned.

Q Copy, please?

A Sure.

Q That's the same statement, isn't it, verbatim that you issued?

A I don't know whether it's verbatim, but the thrust is certainly the same.

Q You have nothing to add beyond quoting the earlier statement; is that it?

A As you know, Bernie, the Parliament has confirmed the Dutch Government's decision. Our position is the same; we're disappointed.

Q To follow Bernie's question on the summit, have the thoughts of Senators Percy and Baker had any influence or impact or caused any rethinking?

A I think the Secretary had some comment on that at his luncheon yesterday, and --

Q Anything that you could add, expand --

A Anything that I would add to that? Heavens no.

Q John, Jack Anderson, this morning, claims that the State Department through Mr. Schaffer is launching a campaign to possibly abort any Congressional attempt to aid the Afghani freedom fighters in some legislation. Do you have any comments on this?

A No, I'm not going to respond specifically to that newspaper column or to the issue involved, but I would just say that the underlying assumption that there is a difference of opinion between the State Department and the White House on this issue, that is completely untrue.

Q John, do you have anything on the El Salvador reorganization of forces to control the death squads?

A Yes, I do. Our Embassy in San Salvador confirms that the Intelligence Section has been disbanded as part of President Duarte's move to improve the human rights situation in El Salvador. That's the Intelligence Section of the Salvadoran Treasury Police.

1-1521

Other moves include disbanding security units at some government agencies and ministries. And, of course, prior to Mr. Duarte's inauguration, several officers reportedly connected to rightist violence were transfered abroad.

President Duarte pledged during his campaign and to members of Congress during his recent trip to Washington to correct the "climate of violence" in El Salvador in order to create the security in which dialogue can proceed. The United States applauds President Duarte's efforts to accomplish this goal.

Q Copy, please?

A Sure.

Q Would the U.S. applaud more loudly if any of these people were brought to trial as opposed to transfered?

A Well, I think our view on the manner in which the death squad issue has been handled and the overall rejuvenation of the judicial system in El Salvador has been made plain over the weeks and months.

--MORE--

1-1522

Q On that same issue, does the United States know of any coming trials with respect to human rights violations in El Salvador?

A I don't. As you know, I've been away for some days. Unless Alan has been made aware of something while I was away, I don't. No.

MR. ROMBERG: No.

MR. HUGHES: No.

Q Okay, also, Duarte and other Christian Democrats have now made pretty clear in statements to the press that any talks with the rebels at this point should hold fire until the human rights situation improves and a climate of security is established.

Does the United States agree with that strategy, that any talks should be on hold pending that situation?

A I'm not aware of that position, Jim. Is that something that has been spelled out publicly in the past?

Q Pretty clearly in the last two -- well, since his inauguration. Yes.

A No. I'm not up to speed on that.

Q Could you look into that?

A I know that he has consistently set his face against power-sharing, but has in the past talked about willingness to engage in dialogue.

Q Could you see whether you might be able to produce a statement on that, if the Administration shares that that's what he and Ray Prendesson --

A Why don't we take a look at it and see whether we would be interested in saying something.

Q Thanks.

Q Do you have anything on the activities of Mr. D'Aubuisson? He told us he was coming to --

A No. He was granted a visa. I do not know whether he's in the country yet. I don't know what his schedule is.

Q Well, he did go to Florida. I'm just wondering whether he might have come up here --

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q And, if so, did he talk to anybody?

A No. Well, I certainly don't think he talked to anybody in the State Department. Not that I'm aware of.

Q Do you have any reaction --

Q John, is there any new agreement between the U.S. and Egypt concerning the use of Egyptian facilities regarding the situation in the Gulf area?

A Egyptian facilities. What do you mean by that?

Q Ras Banas.

A Uh-huh. Okay. I think we had some guidance on that yesterday you can get from the Press Office.

Q Okay. There is a statement made by Mr. Kamal Hassan Ali, the Acting Prime Minister of Egypt now, saying that the United States is not serious about undertaking a military adventure, because --

A Not serious about undertaking military adventures?

Q Yes. Adventure.

A Adventures?

Q It's a single, not plural.

A Uh-huh.

Q Because it is unreasonable for the United States to look for problems. Do you have any comment on that statement?

A What area are we talking about -- what area are we discussing.

Q He's speaking about the Gulf area.

A Oh. The Gulf area. Well, our position on the Gulf is very clear, that, as the President has said on a number of occasions, we seek not to become involved militarily in the Gulf, and we seek to move that situation to a resolution by diplomatic means.

Q John, are you detecting any shift in the Iranian strategy in the Gulf? That is to say, do you sense any awareness that they may be shifting a little in the direction of a negotiated conclusion?

A I don't see any signs of it.

Q John, I see Senator Moynihan now says that the Intelligence Committees have been given no hard evidence of Nicaraguan supply of weapons to the rebels in El Salvador.

I wonder if it's possible that, as Secretary Shultz said, they know what's happening, everyone has to know what's happening, but in fact there is no proof, there is no interdiction of arms that would be solid proof that this happened.

Q Well, as everyone knows, interdiction is very difficult in that particular terrain -- everybody understands that -- but I don't think there's any questioning among most people of the flow. As we have said in the past, there are cycles, it's up and down. Don't quarrel with the suggestion that when the guerrillas need supplies, that it flows more freely than at other times, but I don't have any specific response on Senator Moynihan's statement.

Q If there's not an interdiction, is there other evidence of some kind so it is not just an assumption that --

A Well, I think we have made it available over a period of time.

Q Is there an intention to make anything new in the way of evidence available?

A Well, as you know, the Secretary, I think at his luncheon, said would take a look at that, Bernie.

Q Take a look at the possibility of a White Paper? Is that the idea?

A Well, I don't think he phrased it in quite that way.

Q Well, take a look with a view toward making evidence --

A I would go back and look at -- I can't remember just how he phrased it, but I don't think he said he would take a look at the idea of issuing a White Paper. I don't think that's what he said.

Q Do you have any response to the extended remarks made by Pastora in the Monitor today --

A No, I don't.

Q About the United States?

A No, I don't.

Q John, could I reopen your statement on the Postal Union?

A Uh-hum.

Q I suppose the text will be made available.

A Yes. Sure.

Q The other thing is whether or not you can give us the names of the nations that have opposed the -- that want Israel ousted from the Union?

A In this forum? In the UPU?

Q Yeah.

A I can't. Maybe we could -- maybe somebody could dig that up for you, but --

Q Could you do that?

A Well, we'll take a look and see if it --

Q Now, what nations are supporting us on the position that the United States has taken?

A Again, I don't have that for you.

Q And you'll have the contribution -- U.S. contribution?

A We'll try to get that for you.

Q You'll get that?

A Uh-hum.

Q Where do we stand on UNESCO, from which we withdrew?

A The position is unchanged. We're very serious about our withdrawal from UNESCO, short of the required reforms that we want to see.

1-1526

Q You'll forgive me for continuing the questioning. Secretary Shultz testified yesterday in the House, as you know. What is the circumstance now of procedure on the terrorism bill, or anti-terrorism bill?

A I can't give you a timetable for a consideration --

Q Will there be a discussion between the key figures in Congress and the State Department as to the --

A There usually is between Congressional liaison and the State Department and the White House and Congress. I would think that would be the way to go.

Q The feeling that I was given a -- that it will take a long time before an anti-terrorism bill finally is legislated.

A Well, I don't know how long it will take to get the legislation effected. As you know, the Secretary said that the bills were divided up in order that we could get perhaps more urgent action on a couple of them, at least.

On the overall question of terrorism, there is no doubting the Administration's concern about this, and its intention to move with dispatch.

Q Right. The Wall Street Journal had a long article yesterday dealing with aid and arms sales abroad.

A Uh-hum.

Q I presume that you're aware of it.

A I guess you caught me off balance on that one. I didn't read that one.

Q Oh, you didn't. Well, I'll put the question off.

A Okay.

Q There was a -- do we have any comment on the Secretary General's conversation with the Israeli Defense Minister regarding the allegation that the U.N. force in southern Lebanon is snubbing the militia?

A No, I don't.

Q No comment?

A No.

Q Thank you.

A Okay.

(The briefing concluded at 12:50 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, June 15, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #106

FRIDAY, JUNE 15, 1984, 12:25 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: O.K. Have a couple of announcements up front. The Secretary will address the Jonathan Institute as the opening speaker for its second Conference on International Terrorism. That will be on Sunday night, June 24, 8:00 P.M. That meeting is in the ballroom of the Four Seasons Hotel, in Washington. If you want to cover that, please be in touch with Marthina Cowart or Store Shem -- that's at 265-9701. That's the Secretary speaking to the Jonathan Institute on terrorism, Sunday, June 24. The contact is 265-9701.

Available in the --

Q Will you have a text of that available?

A As always, we will make that text available in just as timely a fashion as we can.

Q Well, if it's available on Sunday, there would be some provision for leaving it at the guard post? I mean, if your office is closed.

A The mechanics we'll let you know. As always, our well-oiled, coordinated speech-making machine will be in operation.

Available in the Press Office is the text of an address given this morning by Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Langhorne A. Motley before the National Center for Export-Import Studies. The speech addresses the topic of "Future Opportunities for U.S.-Latin American Trade, the U.S. Perspective." That's all I have up front for you.

Q John, can you bring us up to date on what difficulties the Administrtion may be having in preparing to notify Congress of the nuclear technology agreement?

A Well, I certainly can tell you where we stand.

Q And what role the apparent nuclear arms research program in Pakistan has on that?

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A O.K. Despite the fact that we have initialed the text of an agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation with the People's Republic of China, the President has not yet authorized signature and submission to the Congress.

Our negotiations on nuclear issues with China covered two subjects: Firstly, the agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation itself, which sets forth the conditions and guarantees governing the transfer of peaceful nuclear equipment and materials; and secondly, China's non-proliferation policy. Our law does not require any specific non-proliferation commitment in the bilateral agreement itself, but we made clear throughout the negotiations that peaceful nuclear cooperation has to rest on basic shared non-proliferation principles and practices.

We have now completed the review of the text of the agreement itself, a process which involved a number of different government agencies, including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. That review has reaffirmed our view that the text of the agreement fully meets the requirements of the law.

However, before submitting the document to the President to authorize signature and before submitting it to Congress, we want to be sure that we have taken all of the necessary steps to ensure a full, mutual understanding with the Chinese on matters relating to the implementation of the agreement.

On the question of China's non-proliferation policy, we have welcomed its statements that it does not engage in proliferation and does not assist other countries to develop nuclear weapons and that it will require International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on its nuclear exports to non-nuclear weapons states. We see these as indications that a positive evolution of Chinese non-proliferation policy is taking place.

We have been vigorous in seeking to understand similar policies of other governments over the years because non-proliferation is a critical principle to the United States, and we have consistently sought the fullest possible understanding by both sides in any peaceful nuclear relationship we have had. We have done so with China and we will continue to do so.

Q So what is the problem? That you do not share basic principles of non-proliferation, or are you seeking greater assurances from China that they do?

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A This is a serious question. We feel strongly about the issues involved -- we take them seriously -- and we want to make sure that before that legislation, before we ask the President to sign that legislation, before it goes to Congress, that everything is in order and everything is right and everybody understands clearly what the implementation of this is.

Q John, is this just something that has arisen since the Peking initialing, because at that time it was thought that everything was on track. Zhao Ziyang's comments on his non-proliferation objectives were hailed as meeting our requirements, and now suddenly this seems to have cropped up at a later point.

A Well, China has made those statements. As you know, during his January visit to the United States, the Chinese Premier said, "We do not engage in proliferation ourselves, nor do we help other countries to develop nuclear weapons." The Premier repeated this statement in May to the Sixth Peoples' Congress.

We view these statements by the Premier as welcome developments. At the time the Premier made his January statements, senior Chinese officials confirmed that the Premier's policy statement encompasses the acquisition of any nuclear explosive device. So those statements are out there; they are on the record. But as I say, this is an important matter, and we want to make sure that there are no "hitches," there are no stitches that we haven't stitched, and make sure that everything is right before it goes up.

Q Specifically, what else do you require?

A Well, I'm not going to get into our discussions with the Chinese on this question.

Q John, would you comment on the fact that some members of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission disagreed that the text meets this requirement, and expressed some reservations about it?

A No, I wouldn't comment on that. And we are satisfied that the text meet does meet them all.

Q John, are you still, then, in discussions with the Chinese, or are you trying to unilaterally satisfy yourself that such things as their arrangement with Pakistan have been --

A Well, really not going to get into the detail of our discussions on when we're talking with the Chinese and where we're talking with the Chinese, but we have talked with the Chinese over a lengthy period about this whole question.

Q Is there still an issue of wording in the agreement?

A It's not a question of wording; it's a question of implementation and understanding.

Q John, could we have a copy of your statement?

A Yes, you surely may.

Q What concrete commitment or concrete steps do you want from the PRC with regard to the safeguards issue of non-proliferation?

A Well, as I say, I don't think we're really going to get into the detail of our discussion with the Chinese Government on this.

Q How many sessions did you have with China after the initiation of this agreement?

A Oh, we talked to the Chinese frequently, but as I say, I'm not going to get into the detail of --

Q After the initialing of the agreement?

A We have talked to the Chinese since the initialing of the agreement, yes, sure.

Q Was this something expected or -- I didn't quite get, was this something that was expected or is this a snag that's cropped up since the President was there in April?

A As I say, we want to be clear that there is total understanding about the implementation of this agreement. We want it to be right; we want there not to be any problems that would arise later.

Q Have the talks with the Chinese gone smoothly?

A I don't think we're going to get into that characterization.

Q Is Monday a deadline? And if it is, aren't you "dead in the water" now?

A Well, we're going to send that legislation up there when it's ready.

Q Is that realistically possible this year now, because sixty days is difficult to find?

A It's really hard to speculate because one doesn't quite know when Congress will end; but if you're suggesting the possibility that it will not make it this year, I guess that possibility is there.

Q A new subject, please?

Q One more, please? To what degree is the Pakistan reported development of nuclear weapon technology complicating this matter with the Chinese?

A Well, we remain concerned about unsafeguarded nuclear activities in Pakistan. We've made our concerns known to the government in Pakistan at every appropriate opportunity. We have welcomed President Zia's repeated statements that Pakistan will not acquire a nuclear device of any kind. Those statements are on record.

Q What involvement did the Chinese have in that program?

A Don't have anything on that.

Q You're unaware of any reported Chinese --

A I assume that if you're, I mean, if you're asking a question like that, it would have to relate to intelligence-derived information, and we wouldn't respond to that anyway.

Q To what degree do the Chinese understand and accept our position on the points that you've just read on Pakistan?

A I don't think there is any Chinese misunderstanding on what we are presently doing and the steps we are taking before that goes up to Congress.

Q Do they understand and accept our position on that?

A Not -- I just really am not going to get into our discussions with them.

Q How would you characterize this in terms of U.S.-Chinese relations? Is this becoming a serious issue? Is it a technical issue? How would you characterize it?

A I guess I really wouldn't. It is something that we have initialed, that we intend to proceed with in the proper way. We are obliged by law to meet certain requirements, and we're going to meet those requirements.

Q John, you've raised the possibility of there being no submission to Congress this year. Now, if --

A It's not a question of no submission. The question was, can the sixty-day period take place? Obviously, if it goes up beyond the deadline, and Congress adjourns before the 60-day period, there would be no enactment this year.

Q Let me carry that a step further and ask if these discussions do not proceed in the way you would like them to, is there the possibility that the initialed agreement might just be tabled indefinitely?

A Well, I think that would depend on the satisfactory conclusion of the discussion of the various points that we are presently engaged in.

Q In the absence of a satisfactory conclusion, what then?

A Well, we will continue to keep working at these points that need to be resolved.

Q John, are we any closer to a summit today than we were last night?

(Laughter)

A I thought the President addressed that comprehensively last night, Bernie. Don't really have anything more on that.

Q Do you view what the President said to be a policy change?

A Don't see any need to comment on what the President said. I think he devoted probably 75 percent of his news conference last night to the summit question. I think Larry Speakes may have had something, or may not have had something to say on that this morning. I don't have anything more to say on what Larry Speakes has not said.

-- MORE --

Q One last -- in light of what the Secretary of State said publicly earlier this week, should what he said last night be regarded as an election year ploy (laughter) by the press or the Soviet Union?

A You'd have to refresh my memory as to what the Secretary of State said earlier this week that leads you to this extraordinary conclusion.

Q Earlier this week the Secretary of State, addressing an organization called the Overseas Writers --

A Yes.

Q -- was asked a question about summitry.

A Yes.

Q In the course of it, among other things, besides saying he didn't like the idea of "getting acquainted," he said, "I suppose the President could, by pressing, get or arrange a meeting of this sort with Mr. Chernenko." But if he did -- he then looked out at the audience and he said, "I also suppose all of you would immediately write it off as an election year ploy, and I believe the Soviets would probably regard it as such." Also, I think you were sitting beside him at the time. (Laughter.)

A Yes, but I didn't remember it in the colorful way you represent it.

No; I don't think there's any contradiction in what the Secretary said nor any division between what the Secretary said and what the President said last night.

Q That statement is not inoperative?

A That statement is not inoperative.

Q Nothing -- no division in what the President said, the Secretary said, and, say, in the last two years or so regarding a specific agenda and hope for a concrete --

A No.

Q -- substantive result?

A No. I think if you read carefully what the President said last night and read carefully what the Secretary has consistently said and what the President has consistently said, no, I don't see any inconsistency.

Q Shultz has talked about the two points: careful preparation, expectation of results. The President certainly dropped the second half last night.

A No. I really think that the President's remarks were comprehensive, but I don't see any contradiction in what you're suggesting.

Q You don't see any division either between the State Department and the White House on this?

A No, not at all.

Q Have those preconditions now been dropped?

A Not going to attempt to interpret or expand upon what the President said last night.

Q Last night, ABC had the close --

Q Let's stay on this; will you, please?

Q John, are there any discussions taking place at the working level with State Department officials and Soviet counterparts on a summit? Any discussions taking place now or any arrangements being made?

A Well, there certainly are discussions with the Soviets at a variety of levels, which indicate the willingness of the United States to engage on a broad variety of subjects.

Q Has an offer been made though to the Soviets to sit down at a summit?

A I think the President covered that ground last night. What you're asking is in terms of a specific invitation. I think the President covered that last night.

Q Has there been a specific invitation?

A Maybe I'm not getting through to you. I think the President covered that fully last night.

Q John, it was suggested at the White House this morning that the President had been using State Department guidance to discuss the conditions for a summit, tangible results and that sort of thing, and that last night when he spoke his mind off the cuff his true feelings came through. (Laughter.)

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A It sounds like an heretical suggestion to me. I can't imagine he would have made such a suggestion. (Laughter.)

Q What kind of suggestion?

A Heretical. H-e-r-e-t-i-c-a-l. (Laughter.)

Q The State Department reported that. (Laughter.)

A No. The President determines foreign policy, and the President has been consistent.

Q What kind of contacts has the Secretary had with Ambassador Dobrynin recently and on what issues have they been working?

A The Secretary saw Ambassador Dobrynin this week.

Q When?

Q How long?

A Tuesday.

Q Did they discuss the summit possibility?

Q How long?

A I'm not going to get into their discussions.

Probably about 50-55 minutes, something like that.

Q At whose request?

Q And can you tell us how frequently they have been meeting over this, last month or so?

A I really can't. I think you are really abreast of most of those meetings. They take place on a fairly regular basis when Ambassador Dobrynin is in town. I'm sure we made you aware, or you made us aware, of the previous visit between the two. I can't just recall when that was.

Q Could you tell us what day they met?

A They met on Tuesday.

Q Tuesday.

A Uh-uh.

Q Before or after --

A Was it on Tuesday?

Q -- the lunch?

A Tuesday -- Tuesday morning.

Q John, either in the Shultz-Dobrynin talks --

A Let me check. Is that correct -- Tuesday? I think I'm right on Tuesday.

MR. ROMBERG: Tuesday.

A Yes.

Q Either in the Shultz-Dobrynin talks or in anything that Zamyatin said publicly yesterday dealing with the summit, do we detect any change in the Soviet position or any new nuances that make us more interested or more hopeful?

A Well, I don't think we're really prepared to offer up any analysis of that at the moment. As the President said, I think the yardstick is quiet diplomacy, from here on in, as it has been; and I think we just really don't have any characterization of Mr. Zamyatin's comments in public.

Q How can you claim "quiet diplomacy" when the President spends most of a press conference talking about it?

A Well, I'll bet, maybe you prevent reporters from asking him about the summit. I don't know. I mean how can you say? That's a sort of a contradiction in terms.

Q Is there any consideration being given to a meeting between the Secretary and Mr. Gromyko?

A Not that I'm aware of. As you know, the Secretary has mentioned what has been the fairly traditional meeting at the UN between the Soviet Foreign Minister and Secretaries of State. Don't know of anything other than that prospect.

Q Can we change the subject?

A Everybody ready for a change of subject?

Sure.

Q Has there been any response from the Soviets to the President's speech in Dublin dealing with the treaty on no use of force?

A Well, there have been some public -- you've seen some public utterances from various Soviet news organizations.

Q Do we regard those as rejection of the President's --

A Don't think anybody has characterized them.

Q Well, I'm asking you now to characterize them.

A No, no; I don't think we will.

Q Do we regard them as positive, negative?

A Don't have any assessment of where it stands beyond what the President said last night.

Q In an allied field, John, do you have anything on the U.S. walkout from the Conference on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space?

A Yes, I do have something on that.

That's the COPUOS Conference in Vienna.

The United States has expressed serious concern about the future role of this Committee -- in particular, the introduction of disarmament under the Committee's agenda, and the UN General Assembly's rejection of the Committee's consensus principle.

We have made our position quite clear regarding the consideration of disarmament in this Committee and did so again during general debate. We will not participate in a disarmament debate in this Committee, and the proper forum for this matter is the Conference on Disarmament.

The involvement of this Committee is a serious mistake, which will detract from the Committee's appropriate functions -- namely, scientific and technical work -- which was the principal focus envisaged for the Committee.

Q A copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q Does that really fall into their purview, John? I mean --

A Well, we think not.

Q John, last night, ABC, Peter Jennings, said the statement by the end of the show, on "Closeup" on Syria, that officials of the State Department -- and he included former Under Secretary Mr. Eagleburger and Mr. McFarlane and White House officials -- refused to be interviewed for that special show.

A Uh-hum.

Q Do you have any reason for the refusal to be interviewed?

A No. As you know, we make those judgments almost on a daily basis. And the judgment in this instance was that the Secretary -- at least, insofar as my knowledge is concerned -- chose not to be interviewed.

Q A second question about -- how do you describe the current Egyptian-Israeli relations? I've seen the Israeli press, and according to FBIS today, that there are a lot of complaints -- the possibility matter (sic). For instance, Ha'aretz is saying -- a daily newspaper -- that things are getting from bad to worse and relations in Egypt are --

A I don't have -- you know, I don't have a fresh analysis for you. We would like to see an improvement in those relations, but I don't have an update of our analysis as of today.

Q Can you please look into it? This is a very important story which is in today's paper.

A Well, we'd like to see those relations better than they are.

Q On that --

A Jim. Excuse me -- Jim?

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Q Do you have anything either on the copper decision by the ITC yesterday and on a certain amount of tension that seems to be growing in Uruguay in anticipation of tomorrow's --

A Don't have anything on Uruguay, but I have probably more than you want to hear on copper.

The finding is one step in a long process. The USITC must now draw up a recommendation for a course of action for the President; a vote on such a recommendation is scheduled for June 27. The USITC must forward its report to the President no later than July 26 and has established an earlier administrative deadline, July 9, for submission of the report. After receiving the USITC report, the President will then have sixty days to decide what action, if any, he will take under the relevant statute, which is Title II of the Trade Act of 1974.

As far as the substance of the finding is concerned, we don't have any comment; and we really don't, traditionally, comment on the decisions of independent government agencies, such as the USITC.

The finding should not be read to mean that the President has decided, or will decide, to restrict imports; and it's inappropriate at this stage to predict what actions will be taken. In the twenty-five cases under Title II of the Trade Act of 1974 where the USITC has made injury determinations, the President decided to impose import restrictions in only eleven cases. In five other cases the President decided on trade adjustment assistance; in the other nine cases, no action was taken. In 1978, the USITC recommended restrictions on copper imports, but President Carter did not restrict them.

The statutory obligation of the President is to decide whether restrictions would be in the economic interest of the United States, and he will take into account such factors as

-- the probable effectiveness of import relief as a means to promote adjustment;

-- the effect of import relief on consumers;

-- the effect of import relief on the international economic interests of the United States;

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-- the economic and social costs which would be incurred by the taxpayers, communities, and workers, if import relief were or were not provided.

He'll be receiving advice from the various Federal agencies on these points as the process moves forward.

Q On that response, I wondered if you could give us a copy of it. (Laughter.)

A I certainly can. I did not make that all up as we went along.

Q Can I have a copy of the committee on --

A Nothing, really, on the -- Yes, sure. also? Yes, sure.

Q Do you have any --

A I don't have any answers, but go ahead and ask the question.

Q You don't have any tea-leaf reading on the Rafsanjani statement today?

A Let me see. I have a few words which might move that forward, but not very much.

We regard any development which reduces the fighting as positive. However, Iran's intentions are not yet clear on this point. If Iran would agree to a reciprocal cease-fire against all shipping and port facilities in the Gulf, explicitly including those of Iraq, we would warmly welcome and support the development. But I think we'll have to wait and see what it really means.

Q A copy of that too?

A Sure.

Q John, there was a report in The New York Times today about two hours of fire exchange between Israel and Syria, from inside Syrian territory. Do you have any comment on that?

A No, don't have anything on that.

Q Thank you.

A O.K.

Q John, on the question of the peaceful uses of outer space, does that augur for us leaving that Committee permanently?

A I don't think that's what we're suggesting here. What we're suggesting is that we will not participate in debate on that topic in that Committee.

(Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the briefing was concluded.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Monday, June 18, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #106 /107/

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MONDAY, JUNE 18, 1984, 12:17 P. M.

MR. HUGHES: Good morning, all. Should not need to detain you long this morning.

One housekeeping announcement: Available in the Press Office is the text of an address today by Acting Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs William A. Brown. That was before the U.S.-Asia Institute. The topic covered was "U.S.-Asia Security: Economic and Political Dimensions."

That's all I have.

Q Do we have anything on the Polish elections yet?

A No. Nothing on the Polish elections.

Q Do you have anything on the Mexican announcement or confusion over a supposed announcement that it was going to sit in on the talks?

A Well, I don't think that needs to be taken any further. I think the Mexican Foreign Ministry has made clear its position on that. Don't have any quarrel with the way they have characterized it.

Q Was it made clear what the American view is of Mexico's role?

A Well, as we have said at an earlier stage, Mexico has been helpful in this regard, but I'm not going to get into the circumstances surrounding or the participants or the date or the location of any meetings between Ambassador Shlaudeman and Mr. Tinoco.

Q No, no. Just -- do they have a role as a facilitator or as an intermediary of any kind?

A Well, I think the Mexican Government has made plain its position that it will not be at such talks.

Q Is there a third party involved, John? I'm sorry, I missed the first part. Is there a third party?

A I don't want to get into the details of Mr. Shlaudeman's activities, or pending activities, but I think I'd steer you away. There has never been a U.S. position that there would be a third party in the negotiations.

Q No disagreement from the Nicaraguans on that score, so far as you can gauge?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q Daniel Ortega had said they wanted a third party involved, and so I'd assume from that that the United States is the one that told Mexico that's not what the situation would be?

A Well, I'm not aware of any problems on that score, but I'm not going to get into the detail of planning.

Q Overall, what does this mean to the effort to-- started by Shultz during this trip to get new talks started?

A I don't think it has any impact on it at all.

Q Are those still proceeding and talks should come soon?

A We are as we were when we finished that session with the Nicaraguans, that we would move to the next stage, which would be a meeting between our side and the Nicaraguan side, and that we wouldn't -- I think the Secretary said at that time we wouldn't talk about those meetings.

Q But is the effort on track, though, and efforts are being made, and there should be a meeting?

A Not going to talk about meetings projected or planned, but we are where we were when we came out of the session, that we're convinced there will be further meetings.

Q John, why does the U.S. not favor any third-party witness or participation in this?

A That is an unnecessary factor.

Q And why is it -- if one party believes that it is, why do you consider --

A I would be careful about characterizing one party's position.

Q So it's your understanding that Nicaragua does not, in fact, necessarily support a third-party witness or mediator, is that correct?

A It's my understanding that the Secretary of State and the Nicaraguans at the meeting in Nicaragua agreed that there would be further meetings between the two sides. The negotiators were announced, and all that is proceeding on track.

Q Do you have anything on Uruguay and the arrest of Wilson Ferreira?

A I do. The factual situation, as we understand it, is that Mr. Ferreira, Wilson Ferreira, and his son were arrested by Uruguayan authorities last Saturday as they returned to Uruguay from Argentina. The United States would expect that their cases will be processed expeditiously with all the guarantees of due process of law.

As you know, elections are scheduled for November of this year in Uruguay with inauguration of a new civilian president next March. The United States has encouraged and supported the return to civilian democratic government in that country, and we would hope that this incident does not jeopardize that process.

-- MORE --

Q Do you have any position with respect -- well, Ferreira heads one of the major, traditional major parties, and his party has nominated him to be a candidate for the Presidency. Does the United States have any position with respect to whether that nomination should honored by the military government?

A No, I think our position is that if Mr. Ferreira is thought to be guilty of a crime, then he should be charged and that process should go forward expeditiously.

Q Can we have a copy of that statement?

A Sure.

Q Do you have any thing on the renewed clashes between the Israelis and the Syrians in the Bekaa Valley?

A No, I don't.

Q Have you been relaying the warning coming from Israel to Syria?

A Relaying the warning from Israel to Syria?

Q Conveying the warning coming from Israel to the Syrians?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q Do you have on the Gulf anything?

A Not a great deal. I'll give you what slender words I have. Seen a variety of reports and rumors purporting to describe Iran's intentions. We have not seen anything that indicates the rumored offensive has begun.

And insofar as Iraqi claims on Iranian violations of the agreement they worked out, we have no independent confirmation that any violations have occurred. To our knowledge, the U.N. observers accepted by Iraq are not yet in place.

The United States reiterates its support of U.N. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar's call for a halt to attacks on civilian population centers, and the United

States hopes that a limited agreement such as this will lead to a further de-escalation of the conflict.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q And does the de Cuellar meeting with the Secretary today have to do with the Gulf or with the Middle East alone?

A Is that meeting today? Okay. Obviously, he's back from the area, but it was meeting, I think, originally scheduled within a broad framework, but I'm sure the Gulf will come up.

Q Anything on the meeting between the Secretary and the Israeli Ambassador two days ago?

A No.

Q John, on voting in Europe, (1) do you have a view regarding the voting in Poland in which the leadership says that it's going to crush Solidarity? Solidarity said there was a major boycott and it was successful.

A No, no comment on the Polish elections.

Q Do you have a view as to the voting in the European Parliament?

A No, no comment on the vote today.

Q The Greens say the Italians --

A Sorry.

Q Do you have anything up there today?

A (Laughter) Sorry, no nothing on the European Parliament.

Q Angolan charges about failure to -- well, against Pretoria on the disengagement agreement?

A Sure. As far as we are aware the complex agreement reached between Angola and the South Africa Governments in Lusaka last February remains on track.

Both parties have been working together and have already achieved a South African pullback from most of the area in southern Angola, formerly occupied by the South Africans. We remain convinced that this disengagement represents an important step on the road to a peaceful resolution of the security problems that have plagued that region, and towards the settlement in Namibia based on implementation of U.N. Resolution 435.

Q Copy?

A Sure.

--MORE--

Q Do you have anything on those 11 Americans or 11 --

A No. Haven't had anything further on that. Let me check on it, and see if we've produced anything.

Q John, last Friday, a senior U.S. official said that the United States is not expecting any military cooperation or strategic agreement, or whatever it is, with Sri Lanka. This morning the Washington Times has a story which implies to the contrary, that the Sri Lanka Government would be relying possibly on the presence of U.S. forces in the area. Can you elaborate on this?

A I don't. I think you either have had or will have a readout --

It already took place?

(STAFF: Yes.)

It already took place at the White House on the meetings with Sri Linka.

Q John, do you have any reaction to the British magazine's allegations that Korean Flight 707, or whatever that flight number was --

A 007.

Q Yes, 007 -- was deliberately flown into Soviet territory to activate their air defense systems so that we could monitor it with one of our satellites?

A Well, simply to reiterate what Secretary Weinberger has said this morning, that such a suggestion is totally without foundation and seems to be following the Soviet propaganda line on that incident.

Q Do you have any comment on Israeli defense forces transferring the control of Sidon, in south Lebanon, to Colonel Lahhad, General Antoine Lahhad? Does this go along with the security arrangements that Israel is trying to establish? How do you feel about this (inaudible)

A Don't have any comment on it.

Q Thank you.

Q I have a question.

A I'm sorry. One more.

Q Do you have any comment on this Libyan office tower in New York? Has the State Department decided whether the Libyan explanation for its use is satisfactory?

A I do have something on that. On June 15, in response to a request from the Department of State, the Libyan Mission to the U.N., described in a diplomatic note how it intends to use its new 23-story building in New York City. The State Department is now carefully reviewing this note, and hopes to be able to provide an expeditious response to the Libyans.

When the Department completes its review and the requirements of the City of New York are met, the Libyans will be so informed. The Department of State is most appreciative of the assistance and close cooperation of Mayor Koch and his staff in ensuring that both federal and municipal requirements are met with respect to the use of this building by the Libyan mission.

Q Has Mayor Koch asked for specific assurances regarding that Libyans will not use it for terrorism purposes?

A I don't think we're going to get into the detail of our back and forth on the possible uses of this building. The Mayor has been very cooperative in enabling us to pursue it.

Q John, what federal regulations are applicable?

A We could probably do a little research on that for you -- give you the citation.

Q What about the municipal requirements you referred to? What are those?

A I guess Mayor Koch would do a little research on those.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:30 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, June 19, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #108

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
TUESDAY, JUNE 19, 1984, 12:17 P.M.

MR.. HUGHES: Good afternoon, all. I have one housekeeping announcement up front. On July 5, Secretary Shultz will leave for Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand. In addition to meetings with the leaders of these countries, he will participate in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations -- that's the ASEAN post-Ministerial in Jakarta -- July 12 and 13, and the Annual Australia-New Zealand-U.S. (ANZUS) Council Meeting in Wellington, New Zealand, July 16 and 17.

En route he will stop in Hong Kong. He will conclude his trip in Honolulu, where he plans to address the Honolulu Committee on Foreign Relations. Just for your information, there will be no media coverage of that event. The Secretary will return to Washington on July 19.

A sign-up list for correspondents who would like to travel with the Secretary will be posted after this briefing, and that will be taken down at noon on Friday, June 22.

Q What date does he leave, please?

A He leaves on the 5th.

Q What is the group in Honolulu to which the press is not invited?

A It's not a question of being not invited. It's their call. It's the Committee on Foreign Relations. I think that title is correct. Committee on Foreign Relations? Okay. Honolulu Committee on Foreign Relations.

Q You mean the press will be left in Honolulu for a day without an assignment to do; is that what you're saying, John?

A I know this is an awesome burden --

Q It's a penalty.

A -- and your dedication, I think, inclines to smash your way into that meeting.

Q That's right.

Q And they no doubt feel the Secretary will be more forthcoming if we're not there; is that correct?

A Now, if you smash your way into that meeting, you will have to get out of your bathing trunks and you'll have to wear a jacket, tie and all the regalia.

Q You'll help us get in, won't you?

A Be careful, I may hold a BACKGROUNDER on that session afterwards.

Q John will be on the beach also.

Q Enough of this folderol. Down to serious business.

Q At the Geneva Disarmament Conference today, the Soviets again made a call for immediate formal negotiations on an anti-satellite ban. Do you have a few words to add; do you have a response to that?

A Not a great deal more than what the President has said before. As you know, the President has indicated that we're flexible on this issue. We've indicated our willingness to discuss space/arms control issues with the Soviet Union, but we don't minimize the problems of achieving agreements that are equitable, verifiable, and that are compatible with U.S. security.

The Soviet Union currently has the world's only proven ASAT capability, and we must take this into consideration when approaching ASAT limitations. We're also concerned about the problem of verification, which is extremely difficult. And as the President noted, we're continuing to study this issue carefully. We have not closed the door on the possibility of negotiations.

The Administration is currently looking into areas that might offer possibilities for discussions at a later date.

Q Copy?

A Sure.

Q If I may just -- you say you're looking into possibilities to discuss at a later date.

A Yes.

Q Have you talked to the Soviets at all about some of these possibilities?

A We wouldn't get into that, Barrie, but I wouldn't want to steer you into the suggestion -- into the direction that we have. But, as always, we don't get into the detail of our discussion with the Soviets.

Q You're looking to hold preliminary discussions about -- that might lead to negotiations, or are you considering just stepping into negotiations?

A I think we'll stand on the President's words, that this is a difficult area but we're willing to look at the situation, and there is this possibility of discussions.

Hank?

Q John, which reminds me to ask, has anything happened on the whole front of a summit meeting since the sort of semi-public exchanges of the last few days?

A Nothing more to offer you on that, I'm afraid.

Q John, do you have anything on how the Administration does not, in fact, plan to sell Stingers to Kuwait?

A Yes, I do. No final decision has been made, but we do not contemplate a sale at this time. As a result of a survey of Kuwait's defense needs, we're looking at more immediate and effective ways of improving their air defense. Our willingness to offer improvements in their defenses demonstrates our concern over the security situation in the Gulf, and our policy of support for the self-defense efforts of the Gulf States.

Q Have you received a formal request from the Kuwaitis?

A I'm sorry?

Q Are you, in other words, saying that you have received a formal request from the Kuwaitis?

A Well, I don't know that we're confirming the receipt of a formal request. I think we'd let them specify how, in fact, they moved this proposal along. But the fact is, we're not going to sell Stingers to Kuwait at this time.

Q You're not swayed by the public appeal of the Defense Minister?

A Looking at alternative ways in which we can help Kuwait, and that review is under way.

Q Can you suggest what some of those might be?

A I really can't at this stage, Hank. I think it's something that's being looked at, and obviously, at the appropriate time, we would be talking with Congress about it.

Q To what extent is the reported unavailability of Stingers a factor in this decision?

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A I think there are a number of factors that have gone into the decision, but I'm not going to roll them all out.

Q Well, John, you said that you were looking at more immediate ways to help improve the air-defense system. Does that mean that if you had the Stingers available and could make them available immediately, that you might do that, and that you're looking at ways that you could get there faster?

A There is the question that Barrie has raised, but also there is the question of training people in the use of Stingers, which takes time.

Q You have ten days to two weeks here that we've been told.

A Sorry?

Q We've been told that it's ten days to two weeks before the --

A I'm not suggesting that we might not come to a decision soon on alternatives.

--MORE--

Q John, do you have information --

Q So we could expect an -- perhaps an announcement within the next few days on some other weapons system like this?

A Well, I've learned never to expect anything, Ralph, but I -- I mean, one wouldn't rule it out.

Q Why is it taking the Administration so long a time to decide regarding Kuwait on the same question -- the same question like that of Saudi Arabia?

A Look at those requests on a case-by-case individual basis.

Q John, can I have a copy of the statement you gave?

A Sure.

Q And, second, Richard Murphy, in one of the hearings, said, yes, they requested that, and since now you haven't even said they requested it.

A Well, I'm not totally sure of the background of the specific request -- that's why I hedged on that -- but if Mr. Murphy said that we have received a formal request, then, of course, that's correct, but I just wanted to be, as always, scrupulously accurate in responding to your question.

Q Was there concern that the Stingers might fall into the hands of terrorists?

A I'm sure that a number of factors were taken into consideration.

Q John, why was the Assistant Secretary of State for Middle Eastern Affairs, or Near Eastern Affairs, meeting with the Ambassador of Sweden today?

A I don't know. (To staff) Does anybody know?

Q Could we get an answer to why that --

A If we've got anything. It wouldn't really be normal to give a readout on such a meeting, but if there is anything, be glad to produce it.

Q John, do you know if the Kuwaitis failed in their approach to the Soviet Union to get sort of weapons -- similar weapons to the kind they sought?

A I think you'd have to ask them about that.

Q John, there are lots of reports that because of the constituency of the Kuwaiti army, that's why you refused, because there are a lot of foreigners in the Kuwaiti army. Do you give any credence to these reports?

A Really just not going to get into the details. Looked at a number of factors that were involved in the decision, and that's the decision.

Q Are the AWACS flying in Kuwaiti airspace?

A No.

Q Are they going to send any information to the Kuwaitis?

A Let me see what we might have on that for you during the course of the day.

Q John, do you have anything on the meeting yesterday between Secretary Shultz and Mr. de Cuellar?

A No. I'm afraid I don't.

Q John, the House Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control has issued a report critical to the State Department regarding international drug production and trafficking. It is recommended that a suspension of economic and military aid be invoked on any country that fails to reduce drug production.

Have you seen the report, and do you have any comment on it?

A I haven't. Let me take a look at that.

Q Thank you.

Q John, on Kuwait, there was a story, I think, that -- considering improvement of the Hawk missiles and also fuel tanks for, I would guess, what? F- -- some kind of fighter planes to improve their loiter time. Is that true?

A Well, as I say, I think this is -- I'm not leading you in that direction, but I think the overall question of how their defenses might be improved is something that's under review.

Q John --

A Excuse me.

Q John, I got a couple of quick questions connected with the Secretary's trip.

A Uh-huh.

Q Could you explain why he is going to stop over in Hong Kong, and what will be his activities there? Is it connected with the future of Hong Kong, the return of sovereignty to China in 1997?

A No. The question of Hong Kong -- the future of Hong Kong -- is a matter for the British Government and the People's Republic of China. The Secretary might pay a courtesy call on the Governor of Hong Kong while he's there; but also, it's a long flight from Washington to Kuala Lumpur. Got to stop somewhere.

Q John, does the Reagan Administration support the idea of the Israelis' withdrawal from the south of Lebanon?

A Well, within the context of our overall goals for Lebanon, yes. It supports the ultimate withdrawal of all foreign forces.

Q So it means that you oppose unilateral withdrawal from the Israeli side?

A Well, as you know, we've traditionally not gotten into that particular game. We've continued to express our overall goal for Lebanon.

Q John, yesterday on the Gulf you didn't confirm any report of violation of the recent agreement of not shelling civilians. Do you have -- can you confirm today?

A No. Don't have anything more on that today. Still as we were.

Q Do you have anything on the Congressional action or the proposed action on Central America? Specifically, the debate last night and the voting, and also the indications that Baker may be willing now to drop the Contra package from the domestic programs?

A No. I really don't. That all is going forward and is being worked, even as we meet here. Don't have any comment on it.

Q Do you have anything today on the fate of Mr. Ferreira and his son in Uruguay. Any U.S. --

A Not a great deal beyond what I gave you yesterday, Jim. Mr. Wilson Ferreira Aldunate and his son have been taken into custody for hearings on pending charges. They're being held at two separate military installations.

The government has announced that he and his son are at the disposal of the military justice system, and a prompt resolution of the charges against them is awaited.

Q Have we made any direct representations to the government about the urgency with which we view -- or the importance with which we view the expeditiousness with which this is handled?

A I cannot answer that question specifically of my own knowledge, but I know that we are seeking additional information from the Embassy there on reports that the police have arrested 17 members of the Blanco Party. So I would not be surprised if the overall question is under discussion.

Q Do you have any other guidance that -- if I asked about Uruguay today?

A No. You've got the whole works on Uruguay.

Q Thank you. Thank you.

Q John, over the weekend there was a story in The New York Post about a -- Soviets shooting SS-20s over the Pole toward the United States, or to the United States. This is confirmed in some sense at least by an official of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, according to the story.

Do you know anything about that? Can you explain what --

A No, I don't.

Q Can you look into that?

A I can look into it, but I don't know anything about it. Sure.

Q John, there was a report from West Germany this morning that stated on -- this may not be new, but stated that the Soviets now have deployed SA-12 anti-missile missiles capable of stopping Pershings at a range of about 100 kilometers.

Do you have any comment on that deployment?

A Let me take a look at that for you. Okay?

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:31 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Wednesday, June 20, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #109

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 20, 1984, 12:16 P.M.

MR. HUGHES: Good morning, everybody. A couple of announcements up front. Available in the Press Office is the prepared statement by the Director of the Politico-Military Affairs Bureau, Rear Admiral Jonathan Howe, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. His testimony was on arms control. Also available is the prepared statement by the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Elliott Abrams before the House Committee on Rules. He testified on extended voluntary departure for Salvadorans.

I just remind you that in the Press Office is available a schedule on a briefing that will be held in Room 450 of the Old Executive Office Building this afternoon at 1:30 by the White House Central American Outreach Group basically on Nicaragua.

That's all I have up front.

Q John, can you bring us up to date on your discussions with the Chinese on the nuclear exchange agreement? I ask because China today said the United States is stalling on this cooperation agreement.

A No, I really don't have anything, Mike, beyond what we said, I think last week or maybe earlier this week on that. There has been no basic change in that position.

Q What have we got on the Nunn Amendment?

A On the Nunn Amendment? Well, as you know, that is still working, but our position, the Administration's position on that, has been made plain. We would be and are opposed to any legislation that would unilaterally commit the United States to withdraw forces from the defense of our vital national interest in Western Europe.

The United States believes that all allies should make greater effort to contribute to NATO's defense and is pleased to note the steps which the allies are already taking towards this end.

Q Does the State Department share the disquiet of the Pentagon that allied spending has increased last year only by about one and one-half percent in real terms?

A Well, I don't think there is any question about the record we have made in public about our desire that the allies should do more, but I think our words today express appreciation for what is being done.

Q Has the Secretary been in direct touch with Senator Nunn?

A He may have been. I do not know of my own knowledge whether he has talked with him, but it wouldn't surprise me.

Q John, is the Administration planning to sell Hawks to Kuwait?

A Don't have anything to take that story beyond what we discussed yesterday.

Q John, do you have any comment on the bombing outside the Turkish Embassy in Vienna?

A No, I don't. I might have something on that later.

Q What have you got on the appointment Ambassador Dobrynin has with the Secretary today?

A Never talk about meetings between the Secretary and Ambassador Dobrynin in advance of those meetings.

Q Who is Jesse Jackson seeing in the building today?

A I think he will see Under Secretary Armacost.

Q Who?

A Jesse Jackson. He may -- in fact, I would expect him also to see probably people in the ARA area, too, but I'm not sure just who.

Q What time is that?

A I don't know.

(TO STAFF: Do we have a time on --

STAFF: Around 2:30.

A Around 2:30 -- Jackson-Armacost.

Q Do you have anything on the apparent protest by China regarding the sale of the C-130s to Taiwan? Has the U.S. received such a protest?

A Yes, we have received a protest, but our position on that is quite clear. We consider the sale to be entirely within the terms of the August 17, 1982 communique. The C-130 is a transport aircraft of 1950s vintage, which will gradually replace the C-47s and C-119s now in Taiwan's inventory, which are no longer produced.

Q Has the U.S. considered the C-130, in addition to being of the same vintage, to be of the same qualitative type?

A I think there hasn't been much change in the capacity of that aircraft.

Q John, on your announcement of the trip, the ANZUS trip yesterday, will the Secretary try to meet with New Zealand officials even though that will be two days after their elections?

A I don't have a schedule on his New Zealand visit yet. Obviously, the focus is the ANZUS meeting, but I would think it would be expected that he would meet with the government officials.

Q Do you think those elections will distract from the ANZUS session?

A Well, obviously, the Government of New Zealand doesn't think so because it has decided to go ahead with the ANZUS meeting.

Q What about Australian officials, will you hold bilateral talks there?

A I think -- I'm sure he will. Yes, I'm sure.

Q Thank you.

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Q John, a British defense journalist made a fairly good, at least circumstantial, case this week for the U.S. space shuttle being involved in operations which ultimately resulted in the shoot-down of KAL 007. Do you have any guidance concerning that?

A Well, as we've said, I'm not sure that I agree that it made a good case. In fact, there's one story in The Washington Times this morning which suggests it might have been a promotional gambit; (laughter) but we think the content of the story was nonsense.

Q John, tomorrow some Foreign Ministers of Latin America will start a meeting in Colombia to discuss the debt question. How do you see this increasing politization of the debt question?

A Well, our concerns about the debt question have been made clear. Don't have any additional comment for you today on that.

-- MORE --

Q Is anything going on the Nicaragua talks; any schedule for their commencement?

A No. As we have told you, we're not going to give you a kind of advance blow-by-blow on Ambassador Shlaudeman's whereabouts. He is in the area. He has met with officials in Guatemala and Honduras, but I don't have anything on the Nicaraguan question that you raise.

Q Can you just tell us whether or not -- regardless of whether you'll tell us the date, can you tell us whether a date has been set for the talks to begin?

A No, I really can't. I can tell you no meeting has taken place as of today.

Q Any discussion with the Soviets about the possibility of a summit?

A No, nothing beyond what the President has said on that, Bernie.

Q Will that be a topic of discussion between Mr. Dobrynin and Mr. Shultz?

A I really am not going to get into any possible meetings between the Secretary and Ambassador Dobrynin.

Q Who requested this meeting?

A Just not going to get into this one until after the fact.

Q Is it accurate that you have not had any official response yet from the Soviet Government about the summit idea -- I mean, the President's --

A Any official response?

Q Any response, either through Hartman or in the way of a note or private official response from the Soviet Government?

A Well, I think we'll rest on the President's words. I think he made it clear what his position is, and I think he made clear what the status of an invitation was at his press conference last week.

Q What was that?

A Why don't you go back and --

Q Well, I know what he said; I know what he said, but I'm unclear of what you're saying.

A I think what he said was that we're not at the point where an invitation has been issued, but I'm not paraphrasing the President.

Q Are we at the point where it's appropriate to begin talking about what would be talked about?

A It's not appropriate for me to talk about what would be talked about.

Q John, can you confirm the meeting with Dobrynin today?

A I really can't, Bernie, at this stage.

Q Anything on Baena Soares' statement at the OAS today?

A I'm sorry? On --

Q Is there anything on Ambassador Baena Soares of Brazil taking over the OAS?

A No; nothing.

Q Any comment on the Vietnamese -- further Vietnamese troop withdrawals or claims thereof from Cambodia?

A I don't have anything on that, Ralph. But as a sort of guideline, I think I'd just remind everybody of past Vietnamese troop withdrawal stories, and the fact that they've turned out to be rotations rather than withdrawals.

Q Now, can I ask another question in the region? There was a report from Japan this morning of a third sighting in two years, or something, of Backfire bombers, Soviet Backfires in the Sea of Japan? Do you have any comment on that?

A No, we don't. We saw the reports.

Q Any indications?

A No.

Q Thank you.

A Okay.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:25 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Thursday, June 21, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #110

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
THURSDAY, JUNE 21, 1984, 12:11 P. M.

MR. HUGHES: Good morning, all. We have an announcement of congratulation. We're very pleased at the swearing in yesterday of Mr. Joao Baena Soares of Brazil as the new Secretary General of the Organization of American States. We look forward to working closely with him. It should be noted this is the first time ever that an OAS Secretary General has been elected by unanimous vote. He has been elected to a five-year term and is the sixth OAS Secretary General to serve since the Organization's founding in 1948.

Q Why weren't you so happy yesterday?

A I'm sorry? That's all I have. Mike?

Q John, would you like to enlighten us on the meeting between Secretary Shultz and Ambassador Dobrynin yesterday? Do you have any comment on the substance of those talks?

A Well, not really. You noted the time that Ambassador Dobrynin went in, and you noted the time that he went out. During the intervening time the Secretary and Ambassador Dobrynin reviewed the full range of issues between the United States and the Soviet Union, but we're not going to have any further information on the talks or on the substance.

Q Are there any plans for another meeting before the Ambassador returns to Moscow?

A Not aware of -- I mean, I would say two things: One, we don't flag those meetings in advance, but as a matter of guidance, I'm not aware of any meetings set.

Q Was there any --

Q Would you --

Q Do you have any reaction to what Zamyatin had to say today with reference to U.S.-Soviet relations generally, but also on the question of a summit when he said he didn't think the American position had really changed?

A Yes. I really don't have any reaction to that, Barrie. I think the President had some response to that in the Rose Garden this morning. Our position on the

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question of a U.S.-Soviet summit remains as the President explained it last week. We are engaged in an ongoing dialogue with the Soviets with the goal of finding ways to achieve substantive progress on the various issues currently dividing the two countries.

In connection with our efforts to further that dialogue, the President has indicated that the door is open for a summit with Mr. Chernenko and will remain so. But, insofar as Mr. Zamyatin's remarks today, no, I don't think we have anything beyond what the President said.

Q Is it the U.S. position that progress has to be made on some of these substantive issues before the question of a summit can even be addressed?

A I'd just leave you with the President's words, John.

Q All right. Let me ask you one other thing. Do you know whether a meeting between the Secretary and Mr. Gromyko was discussed yesterday?

A I do not know whether such a meeting was discussed.

Q In connection with the door being open and closed, is the door more than open for a -- something less than a summit, like a Shultz-Gromyko meeting? I mean --

A I think the door is open at about the same posture it was when the President said it was open last week.

Q But he said it was open for a summit.

A Uh-huh.

Q I'm asking about whether there is any more likelihood or -- I guess "more likelihood" is the best phrase I can use -- for something less than a summit at the moment? I mean, Zamyatin's remarks --

A "Less than a summit" being what?

Q Excuse me?

A "Less than a summit" being what?

Q Shultz-Gromyko.

A I'm not aware of anything moving in that direction. As the Secretary has said on a number of occasions, it's traditional for him to meet with Mr. Gromyko at the U.N. for the last week in September, first week in October. Whether that will take place or not, I don't know, but that's obviously a possibility.

Q John, talking about engaged in an ongoing dialogue with the Soviet Union --

A Uh-huh.

Q Is a summit part of that agenda?

A I don't think I'll try to break out how that dialogue goes forward, Bernie.

Q Do you know whether it was even raised yesterday, John?

A I don't have anything more for you on his words.

Q John, when you say "the full range of Soviet-American relations," does this include such areas like the Middle East, Central America, and all that?

A Those are certainly issues that lie between the Soviet Union and the United States. But I think Ambassador Dobrynin and Secretary Shultz yesterday agreed that they would not talk about the substance of their talks, so unfortunately I can't give you anything on that.

Q New subject, John. An Israeli paper is saying that the Egyptians have informed the State Department a couple days ago that they plan to re-establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union; and the story, if I have it correctly, says that the U.S. had suggested in that conversation that Egypt might reconsider, or that the U.S. would like to see Egypt return its Ambassador to Israel. Do you have anything on that?

A As always, don't get into our diplomatic exchanges, but the Egyptians have been saying for, actually for about two years, that they would eventually resume ambassadorial level relations with the Soviets. And not getting into our discussions, but as a general point, yes, it's been a long-standing U.S. position to favor the return of Egypt's Ambassador to Israel, and that hasn't changed.

Q How about the Soviet Union -- relations with the Soviet Union?

A Well, that's the decision for Egypt and the Soviet Union.

Q On this point, one Israeli paper has a report from Washington saying that the United States will oppose the Mideast Conference proposed by the United Nations. If there will be such a conference, which eventually is going to come out, will the United States boycott such conference or will you send some observers there?

A I don't know which -- I don't know what conference you're talking about.

Q Well, the conference, talking about -- discuss the Arab-Israeli conflict with the participation of the Soviet Union and European Community.

A I don't have anything specific on that, but, in general, we have not favored a conference involving the Soviet Union on grounds that the Soviet Union has not played a helpful and constructive role in the Middle East.

Q Is the Soviet Union playing a helpful and constructive role in your dealing with them in the way of trying to bring about -- you know, you are trying now to have a conference between the two Presidents of the United States and the Soviet Union, and now you have no room to be in the area to try to possibly ease off the tension.

If you are favoring the Egyptians to have normal relations with the Soviet Union --

A I didn't say we're "favoring." I said that was a matter for Egypt and the Soviet Union.

Q But you have no objection to that?

A Didn't have any comment on it.

Q John, about the Gulf -- about the Gulf, there was a report today in The New York Times that the Saudis told you that they are extending their airborne surveillance beyond their territory -- beyond their 12-mile zone, or something like that. What do you say about that?

A I think you'd have to ask the Saudis.

Q But they said the Saudis -- the report said that the U.S. State Department published a statement about that, and the Saudis told you about that.

A Published a statement about it?

Q Yes.

A No, I think that's not correct.

Q Published the text of the report in The New York Times today.

A Published a statement about a Saudi intention?

Q Telling you, yes, that they are extending --

A No, we haven't published a statement on it.

Q John, for the record, the Secretary is about to leave the country for two weeks. Could you pass on that we would like -- if you could arrange a news conference before -- the sooner the better --

A I'll pass on that request. I doubt that he is going to have a press conference before he leaves, but I certainly will pass on that request, surely.

Q You doubt that he will have one before he leaves?

A I doubt that he will have one in view of his schedule, but I will certainly pass on the request.

Q John, can you tell us what Mr. Dam is doing? Everyday the schedule says "out of the city."

A I think he's on vacation.

Q John, Prime Minister Shamir yesterday said he would like to have talks with Jordan apart from the Palestinian autonomy talks. Could you comment on that?

A No, don't have anything on it today.

Spence?

Q John, what assurances has Pakistan given the United States on building the atomic weapon?

A Well, we have sought those assurances on a number of occasions and been given them. We remain concerned about unsafeguarded nuclear activities in Pakistan.

We've made those concerns known to the government on a number of occasions, and we have welcomed President Zia's repeated statements that Pakistan will not acquire a nuclear device of any kind.

Q John, do you know Senator Cranston said that Pakistan received a bit of help from China in developing nuclear capabilities. Do you have anything on that?

A Not really. I think we'll wait and see what Senator Cranston said. I think we'd like to see the full text of what he said.

Q Can we get a copy of the Pakistan statement?

A Sure. It's not new, Bernie, but you're welcome to it.

Q Will you make a copy of that Pakistan statement available?

A Sure.

Q Do you have anything on the Congressional move on the Threshold Test Ban, the unratified treaties?

A Yes, I do have something on that. The Administration has carefully reviewed these two treaties on several occasions. Each time we've concluded that the TTBT and the PNET are not effectively verifiable in their present form, and therefore that we need to seek verification improvements to them.

On several occasions last year, we unsuccessfully sought Soviet agreement to open discussions on verification improvements to the two accords. Since then, we've been actively examining the possibilities for next steps in this area, but our task had been made much more difficult by the repeated Soviet refusals even to discuss our concerns.

While we don't want to prejudge the outcome of our current review process, we, nevertheless, want to reaffirm our continued commitment to achieve meaningful progress on nuclear testing issues. We would regard the Soviet agreement to discuss verification improvements as an important initial step in this field.

Q Copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Do you know whether it's ever been proposed to the Soviets that the ratification process and talks to tighten verification occur simultaneously?

A I do not know that, John.

Q Can you take that question?

A I don't think we'd get into how we're involved in discussions.

Q Their position is, absolutely no talks on verification until the treaty is ratified?

A We seem to have had no success in nudging them.

Q Well, maybe I missed a point. During Kenneth Adelman's hearings, he went to the Senate with a statement that they would press ahead except that verification was the big hang-up and --

A That the Soviets would press ahead?

Q No, no. The United States.

A Well, sure, but I think it is in this verification area that we have problems.

Q John, back to the Gulf, do you have anything about a request for U.S. arms from the United Arab Emirates?

A No, I don't.

Q About the Gulf, in your taken question you said that Saudi Arabia is giving information gathered by the AWACS to the Kuwaitis now.

A I think there was some guidance on that yesterday, which you can get from the Press Office.

Q No. We got it as a taken question you just posted. That's what --

A I'm sorry. I'm not getting your --

Q You are saying in your answer that Saudi Arabia is giving some information given by AWACS to Kuwait.

A   Yes, that's the guidance I'm talking about from yesterday.

Q   Does that mean Saudi Arabia is extending its surveillance beyond its borders?

A   No, it does not. The planes are flying in the same circuit.

Q   At both the MBFR talks and the security talks, our European security talks yesterday, East-bloc spokesmen strongly criticized the U.S. and Western positions. Do you have any reaction to that?

A   No, I don't.

Q   Do you have anything on the territorial dispute with Canada about the Machias Seal Island?

A   I do not have anything on that, Bernie. You fox, you have caught me unaware. (Laughter) Sorry.

Q   Will you have something later?

A   I certainly will look into that.

Q   Is there such an Island?

Q   Are there any plans for Ambassador Hartman to return to Washington soon, in the near future?

A   Not that I know of -- it's possible -- but I'm not aware of any.

Q   I was just wondering whether Dobrynin and Hartman would be crossing paths in early July.

A   Don't know; I really don't know.

Q   Have you had anything to say about the U.S. interest in tightening up the conditions under which the United States would provide nuclear technology to China?

A   Have we had any discussions?

Q   Have you had anything to say about that. I mean the story has been running for several days.

A   Nothing beyond the careful words we used a few days ago, and on which we stand.

Q   John, is the Lebanese Government informing you about the Syrian mediating efforts that took place on Monday?

A   The Syrian mediating efforts?

Q Yes, the security plan.

A No, don't have anything on that for you.

Q You have nothing about Mr. Khaddam's efforts in Beirut?

A Oh, Mr. Khaddam's visit? Well, I'm sure the usual reporting process is going forward, by our Embassy.

Q Do you have any information on the shooting of the car of the U.S. Ambassador yesterday?

A No, not really beyond what you all have seen, except we do not believe that Ambassador Bartholomew was the target of that incident. I think there was firing in the vicinity at the time he was passing through the checkpoint, but we do not think that he was the target.

Q John, would you confirm the reports about the so-called medical joint exercises between Israel and the United States published in The Washington Post?

A I think the Pentagon is the place to talk to about exercises. They may have something.

Q But I would just refer to the fact that the Israelis already announced it about this exercise three weeks ago.

A O.K. On exercises, I think the Pentagon is the place to go to. If you're talking about activities within the framework of the Joint Political-Military Committee, as you know, the agreement with Israel was that those would be kept, any discussions or outcome of those, would be kept confidential, and we're keeping them confidential.

Q Well, the Israelis didn't keep them confidential, by any means. Mr. Arens himself told about the medical joint exercises.

A Well, the agreement was that we would keep those confidential, and we are keeping them confidential.

Q Thank you.

(Briefing concluded at 12:27 P.M.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, June 22, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #111

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
FRIDAY, JUNE 22, 1984, 12:11 P. M.

MR. HUGHES: No news. A lean news day, as distinct from all the other days.

Good Heavens! It's Mr. Gwertzman in person! Welcome back.

Q It's one of those rare cameo appearances. (Laughter)

A John, would you bring us up to date on --

Q Hold on, hold on, I haven't made my announcement yet.

The copies of the latest Annual Report to the Congress on the implementation of the Foreign Missions Act of 1982 are now available in the Press Room. There will be a briefing on this report, and the official unveiling of the new diplomatic license plates this afternoon at 3:00 here in the briefing room. James E. Noland, Director of the Foreign Missions Office, will conduct that briefing, and it will be on the record.

Q What time was that, again?

A That will be 3:00 this afternoon.

Q Here?

A Here. Right here. Cameras, bells.

Q Can you give us some idea of what that's about, please?

A Well, I know you'll have your cameras here for the diplomatic license plates.

Q But what's the subject?

A It's the Foreign Missions -- there's a story on that in the Post this morning.

Q Protection --

A Sorry?

Q Protection of, and so forth?

A Yes, yes, that's it. And, now, Mike?

Q John, can you bring us up to date on submission of the nuclear cooperation pact to Congress with the Chinese?

A No change.

Q Is there to be a change?

A No, there's no change from the time we last discussed that a few days ago.

Q Is it still your intention to submit it this Congressional year?

A It certainly is our intention that it will go up when we've signed off, when the President has signed off, and when we're satisfied that it's ready to go up to the Hill.

Q John, did you say the 3:00 (briefing) is on the record?

A It is on the record, yes.

Q Thank you.

Q Did Mr. Shultz meet with the Saudi Ambassador this morning?

A Yes, he did; he did.

Q Can you tell us for how long, and what were the talks about?

A I really can't. It was a meeting requested by the Saudi Ambassador, and the Secretary saw him. I think the Saudi Ambassador saw Assistant Secretary Murphy after he had seen Secretary Shultz.

Q The subject, and so forth?

A The Middle East, I think, Bernie.

Q Right. (Laughter)

Q Let's try it again. The subject? (Laughter)

Q You mean there was no mention of the Gulf?

A The Gulf may have come into the conversation. I don't know.

Q Anything of any particular urgency, above and beyond the obvious?

A Not aware of any, Bernie, but as I say, I think it was requested by the Saudi Ambassador.

Q Anything to do with Stingers to Kuwait?

A No. I'm sorry. Do I have anything on it, or was it in the --

Q Was that in any connection --

A I don't have anything on Stingers to Kuwait, but I'm not aware of what they discussed.

Q Would it be on the issue of Jerusalem and the Embassy?

A I'm not aware of any suggestion that it was. Our position on Jerusalem is very plain and was made very clear by Under Secretary Armacost in his testimony yesterday. There is no change in the Administration's position on Jerusalem.

Q Do you have anything on the "big bang" in the Soviet Union?

A No, I don't, Bernie.

Q John, there was a report in one of these newsletters published here in Washington that former Assistant Secretary of State Mr. Eagleburger came to an agreement with Thomas Dyne of AIPAC, which is the Israeli lobby here, that the Administration will try to understand some compromise in the position which is contrary to the thoughts of Mr. Shultz. Can you comment on that?

A Don't know anything about such discussions, but let me underline to you that there is no change in the Administration's position on Jerusalem. That's been made very clear. The President is very firm on that; the Secretary is very firm on it. There is no change, no hint of change; and I would recommend you disregard rumors to the contrary

Q John, do you have anything on the Nicaragua-U.S. meeting Monday?

A Sorry, on the Nicaragua?

Q Apparently, the Nicaraguan Embassy says there will be a meeting, a U.S.-Nicaraguan meeting, Monday.

A Well, I've seen those reports, but as you know, we're not going to talk about Ambassador Shlaudeman's upcoming travels, if any. He has been in Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Panama within the past few days, and we're going to hold with that revelation.

Q Do you have anything on their request for Mexico to sit in as a witness?

A I don't. As I say, we're not going to discuss in advance the location or timing of U.S. meetings with Nicaragua. I'd just refresh your memory as to what the Mexican Government said in clarification on that issue a few days ago, that Mexico would not be a participant.

Q Yes, but the Nicaraguans repeated that they would like to have one. Why is the United States opposed to that? Why not have a witness?

A I think the position of the United States has been made plain in the past. Secretary Shultz has said that a one-on-one meeting is perfectly direct and satisfactory, and the United States hasn't seen the need for a third party to be there.

Q John, excuse me if I came in late. Did you have anything on the nuclear agreement with China?

A No change, Jim, on where we have been over the past week or so.

Q Do you have anything to say about President Mitterrand's visit to Moscow?

A No.

Q About the tone of the remarks?

A No, no.

Q Thank you.

A Okay.

(The briefing concluded at 12:18 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Monday, June 25, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC 112

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MONDAY, JUNE 25, 1984, 12:39 P.M.

MR. HUGHES: Good morning, all. No announcements.

Q John, on the Persian Gulf, can you give us an idea of what it looks like on the chance for an offensive? Have you seen a worsening of the situation of the Iraqi attack on the Greek tanker?

A Really can't. Seen the same reports that you have, but don't have any confirmation or otherwise of events.

Q Well, any "concern" or anything?

A Not going to take it any further. As I say, I haven't seen any confirmation, but we continue to be in favor of a peaceful resolution of that conflict.

Q Any sense that an Iranian invasion of Iraq is imminent?

A No, nothing on that for you.

Q John, any concern over a potential influx of Soviet weapons into the region, particularly to Kuwait?

A Do you want to phrase that a little -- be a little more specific for me? What had you in mind?

Q Well, the Kuwaitis are reportedly seeking Soviet weapons, and purchases may be substantial. Do you feel that this will give the Soviets any larger toe- or foothold into the area?

A Well, obviously, one has concerns about Soviet weaponry in the Middle East in general, but insofar as this particular visit is concerned, it's not a new visit. Kuwait has full diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Senior Kuwaiti officials periodically visit Moscow and vice versa. We view the visit of the Kuwaiti Defense Minister to Moscow in this context. He was invited to visit the Soviet Union in 1983, and the

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arrangements were finalized earlier this year prior to his visit to the United States. We knew about them at that time.

As you know, we have a longstanding military supply relationship with Kuwait and are in process of going forward with a package to improve its air defense capability, but it's certainly true that in the past, Kuwait has also purchased weapons from the Soviet Union, France, Great Britain, and a number of other countries.

Q Could you flesh out that package about the defense package that --

A I can't at this stage, Bernie. I'm sorry.

Q Could you be any more specific about how quickly the process will go forward?

A I really can't. I know that it is moving along expeditiously, but I don't know when it will become available and in public form.

Q Has it gone up to the Hill?

A I do not think it has, but let me check on it for you.

Q Does it include Stingers?

A I think we've said all we have had to say about Stingers before.

Q -- which is what?

A I think the thought was they were not getting them.

Q For the time being.

A At this time, I think.

Q I'm sorry.

Q re (inaudible) getting improved missiles?

A I really can't give you anything on the package until that moves along a little more.

Q John, do you have anything on Mr. Jackson's call for a 20 percent cut in the package?

A Twenty percent cut in the --

Q Defense Budget.

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A No, I think our Administration's position on the Defense Budget is well known.

Q John, can you do anything with the GAO report that the Pentagon used military exercise funds in Honduras illegally?

A Happy to refer you to the Pentagon on that one. (Laughter)

Q May I ask if Mr. d'Aubuisson is going to be welcomed officially in Washington when he gets here by any member of the State Department or the Administration?

A Well, he has not asked, so far as I'm aware -- I think that's pretty good information -- so far for an appointment with any official of the State Department. I think he is due to arrive in Miami today, and I think is due in Washington on Wednesday; but so far, there has been no request for --

Q Is he less welcome in view of the attempt, the reported plan to assassinate the American Ambassador?

A Well, we're really just not going to get into that story for obvious reasons, namely that it is derived from intelligence sources, and so we never --

Q From what?

A Intelligence sources. I think all the stories suggest that, Bernie.

Q Isn't it a fact that Ambassador Walters went down to see Mr. d'Aubuisson?

A It is a fact that Ambassador Walters went to El Salvador. As always, we don't talk about who Ambassador Walters saw and what the purpose was of his trip.

Q Will any member of the Administration be at the reception for Mr. d'Aubuisson that Senator Helms is planning on Wednesday?

A You catch me unawares on that one. I didn't know there was such a reception, and therefore, I don't know whether any member of the Administration will be there.

Q John, just to clarify, you said that he hasn't asked for an appointment with anyone. Would the Administration meet with him if a request were received?

A I think if he asks, everybody would look at his schedule and their schedules, and see what the possibilities were.

Q It's a matter of scheduling, in other words?

A I think it's a matter of scheduling.

Q Did d'Aubuisson come to the United States after it was announced from that podium that he had been granted a visa? Between then and now, has he been here once?

A I'm getting a "yes" from a member of the press here, but I'm not aware that he has been here.

Q Is it possible to find out whether in fact he has?

A Let us check on that.

Q If he has --

A We do not think that he has been here, but I hate to cross swords with someone who may be better informed than myself; but I don't think he has. It was a single-entry visa; I don't think he has, but let's see what we can see about it.

Q He hasn't gotten, to your knowledge, a new visa, apart from the one which you mentioned --

A To my knowledge, he has not.

Q O.K. And with respect to this question of a possible assassination plot, is the Administration aware of any arrests in El Salvador having to do with an alleged conspiracy to assassinate the Ambassador?

A No, I'm not. I guess everybody is aware that our Ambassador there, as do all American officials, have high visibility in that situation, and that there are security risks and threats in that country, as there are in others; but I'm not aware of any arrests in connection with those threats.

Q D'Aubuisson, on the 18th of May, himself said that he knew of a plot to kill the Ambassador, and he announced at that same press conference that he was meeting General Walters later that afternoon.

A Uh-huh.

Q In view of that statement, did the United

States talk to him about what information, or any agent thereof, what information he had about such a plot that he was referring to?

A Well, as I say, the rule is that General Walters undertakes various missions, and we don't talk about the purpose of those missions, which are made at the direction of the President usually, nor whom he met, and we're not going to in this particular instance either.

Q I'm sorry. I just meant when d'Aubuisson said that he knew of a plot to kill d'Aubuisson (sic) at this press conference, apart from any Walters visit, d'Aubuisson announced on the 18th at a press conference that he knew of a plot to kill the Ambassador.

A Well, I'm not --

Q Did the United States take steps to talk with d'Aubuisson to ascertain what he was talking about?

A I'm not going to respond to your specific question, as to conversations between d'Aubuisson and United States officials. I think you may be sure, however, that the United States has followed up, is following up, and will follow up reports of threats against its Ambassador or officials in El Salvador -- and indeed in any other country.

Q John, does it follow that the fact that d'Aubuisson is being allowed into the United States means that the intelligence reports that linked his name to this alleged plot are nonsense?

A Don't think we're going to get into the question of discussing or evaluating those intelligence reports?

Q It goes beyond the question of intelligence. If there was a plot to kill an American Ambassador, it seems to me you've got to go beyond your fallback, your refuge in intelligence reports --

A No, I --

Q Here is a man who is being linked, and he's coming into the United States, and you're saying, "We can't get involved in it."

A No, I disagree with you, Bernie. I think that if there is a threat against the life of an American Ambassador, that's exactly the situation in which we would not discuss the background of it.

Q Would you let the man in who has been linked to the threat, into the United States?

A I think we're just not going to get into the reports --

Q Does it mean that d'Aubuisson is inaccurately being linked, the fact that he is being admitted into the U.S.?

A I'm not going to offer conclusions for you.

Q What is the U.S. policy on this kind of a situation -- if there were any known terrorists? This Administration has made a major issue of terrorism.

A Uh-huh.

Q The Secretary spoke about it just last night.

A Uh-huh.

Q Would the Administration, as a matter of policy, forget what country, forget intelligence sources, would it admit a known terrorist into this country?

A Well, I'm not going to get into the specifics of how you would respond to a known terrorist threat or a reported terrorist threat, but I can tell you that the Administration takes very seriously indeed both reports of, and rumors of, assassination threats against American officials, and indeed American citizens.

Q So one could presume that in this case, there was nothing to be worried about?

A I'm not going to be drawn on that. I'm going to stand where we are.

Q What does it mean "take very seriously?" Does it mean that one would take a normal defensive measure which would be to keep a known terrorist away from American officials?

A Not going to get any more specific than I have.

Q Regardless of country?

A Regardless of country.

Q So if a Libyan "hit squad" were headed here, we'd issue visas?

A You can fish and you can probe, but you're not getting any more.

Q What was the logic behind issuing Mr. d'Aubuisson a visa this time when he was denied previously?

A I don't have anything for you on that.

Q Can you provide us --

Q There is no policy explanation for that?

A No. Those are considered on a case-by-case basis. As you know, when Mr. d'Aubuisson was a presidential candidate, at that time we decided that a visit by all presidential candidates would not be in the best interest of either El Salvador or ourselves. That election is over. His request was made, and in this instance his request was approved.

Q What about Mr. Borge who was denied a visa on the same day?

A Don't have anything for you on Mr. Borge.

Q May I just follow on that? Each time d'Aubuisson has applied for a visa and it has become public knowledge, you have put out an explanation as to why it was being granted or denied. There has always been an official statement.

A I don't think you're right, Jim.

Q Well, sometimes he came in illegally, but that came later. I can give you the guidance on every one, and I'm absolutely -- If there is anyone in this press room who has followed d'Aubuisson closely, it is I; and I can assure you that each time, there has been some explanation given, and I was wondering if you could give it to us this time.

A I'll be glad to take a look at it, but don't hold your breath.

Q I won't.

Q Can you tell us anything about Ambassador Shlaudeman's current status in travel?

A Again, at the risk of frustrating you, as you know the Secretary and the Nicaraguan officials agreed that we would not signal or announce those meetings in advance of having taken place, so I really am not able to give you anything on the reports that --

Q Mexico?

A I really can't give you anything. As we have said, Ralph, we'll talk to you about the meetings after they have taken place.

Q But you can tell us where he is, can't you, after he has arrived?

A Sorry?

Q You can tell us where he is after he's arrived, can't you?

A Just don't have anything on --

Q Do you have anything to say about these reports of a meeting in Manzanillo, Mexico, not involving Ambassador Shlaudeman, but U.S. and Nicaraguan officials?

A Well, I've seen those reports, and can, in all conscience, not steer you away from them, but as a matter of fact, we're not going to confirm or deny that Ambassador Shlaudeman is meeting with Nicaraguans until the meeting has taken place.

Q Look over this way once in a while?

A Why don't I look over that way when I answer a question? Go ahead.

Q John, can you give us any concrete illustrations of Soviet support for or involvement in international terrorism?

A Well, I presume you're following up on the Secretary's speech last night.

Q Yes.

A I really don't have any specifics, but it is well known that the Soviet Union has close relationships with countries that are engaged in terrorism, such as Libya, Syria, and others. We have also spelled out in the publication, Patterns of International Terrorism, which we'll be happy to make available for you later on, what we know about Soviet activity in this field.

The Secretary's remarks were meant to underscore our deep concern about all countries that directly, or indirectly, support or engage in terrorism.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q What is that you're going to be releasing later, John?

A It's a previous publication, Patterns of International Terrorism.

Q But that's been out before?

A Right.

Q John, what the Secretary said last night was certainly consistent with what he has been saying for several months now on this subject. Can you tell us what specific steps the U.S. Government has taken to implement the general program that he outlined?

A Well, as you know, Marvin, there is the legislative package. There was also the activity at the Summit. I'll be glad to go over that again for you.

Q The activity at the Summit?

A The London Summit. There was that discussion between the various --

Q Yes, and then there was a piece of paper put out about --

A Piece of paper.

Q What has followed all of the papers?

A Well, I can't give you specifics, but I think certain steps were certainly hinted at in that London Declaration, and the Secretary, in London, I think amplified, insofar as he is prepared to at this stage, those discussions.

-- MORE --

Q Could you tell us whether there is a single official in this Government who is in charge of what might be called an anti-terrorism operation?

A Well, there certainly is in the State Department. I can't speak for other agencies.

Q There is at State?

A Sure.

Q Who is that?

A Well, there's Ambassador Sayre, of course.

Q Ah --

Q John, on this same --

Q Of course, that's been the case for a long time.

A It's been a problem for a long time.

Q That's true, but there has been a government effort, an Administration effort, for the last several months to talk about it publicly and to try to direct people's attention to the problem. And I was wondering in what way again -- perhaps you don't have an answer -- in what way anything concrete has been done above and beyond the public statements?

A No. I think we really are not prepared to go into anything more concrete at this stage.

Q John, it seems that there is a dearth of hard evidence on some of these countries whom you allege are conducting state-supported terrorism -- Libya, Syria, for example -- at least I haven't seen it -- yet there is considerable evidence about Bulgaria's supporting terrorism in terms of the Italian court. Yet the Secretary didn't address that, and you haven't addressed it from here.

Do you have any idea when you will address it?

A I can't give you a scenario, but I would think that the Administration in general, and the Secretary in particular, would want to wait for a conclusion or certainly a more public emergence of those charges in the Italian investigation. It is an investigation that's going through their court procedure, and, unless that document has been made -- the one to which you refer has been made public recently, I guess it's still a -- in theory a confidential document. So I think it's unlikely that the Secretary would comment on that until it moves along somewhat.

Q But the prosecutor in an interview did confirm the substantial --

A I've seen that.

Q -- accuracy of it.

A Sure. Yeah.

Q But you're still going to wait?

A Well, I think one would wait to see the court procedure followed as it moves through the system.

Q Can I ask a theoretical question? Do you think it's conceivable that there could be a summit with a Soviet leader if the connection was ever proved that he had been behind an attempt to assassinate the Pope?

A It's a very, very hypothetical question. I mean, it's a good question, but it's a hypothetical question that I really can't answer.

Q John, could I go back to d'Aubuisson for a minute? I remember when I was at our Embassy in Iran and they were shooting up our people, that it had an effect on morale. (Laughter)

A That's probably the understatement of the week.

Q Yeah. You know, Fred Chapin, when he was the Charge there, remember, publicly said when they shot up the Embassy it was a d'Aubuisson operation. I mean, this guy's record is long and well documented.

Don't you think this Department owes some explanation, at least to the employees of this Departmentand surely the public, about why the kid-glove treatment of this particular individual?

A Well, that's your characterization. I mean, the fact of the matter is that Mr. d'Aubuisson has been here in the past on visas. During the campaign he was denied a visa. On this occasion the Administration has decided to grant him a visa, but I don't --

Q Why?

A Let me, as I promised your colleague over there, see whether we might produce something on this for you, but, as I also cautioned your colleague over there, I wouldn't hold your breath.

Q Just for the record, John, he was also denied a visa before the campaign actually began.

A I think that's correct. Yes.

Q May I go back to the terrorism thing for just a second. Do you have any specific comment on Ambassador -- on former Prime Minister Rabin's comment at the same forum about a formal international organization of nations dealing with terrorism in which the U.S. would take a chair position?

A I think as in the case of the Secretary, his words speak for themselves, but I think that is something that we would consider as we move forward with our own thinking on this question.

Q I mean, more discussion of that subject, specific subject, in the meeting with Rabin today? Is that the --

A Oh. That I don't know. I don't know whether that would come up today.

Q John, to follow up with the same question, please, there is a statement attributed to the Minister for External Affairs of Libya. He says that Syria affirms that Libya did not export terrorism and was ready to dialogue -- for dialogue with the United States. Do you have any comment on that?

A No, I don't. I have no comment whatsoever. I'll let you ponder the import of those words.

Q John, can you tell us --

Q I mean, the other parts of the question, I think, this is something new coming from a Qadhafi man, I mean, is ready for a dialogue with the United States. It's the first time being said on such a level.

A I think the way to engage in dialogue with the United States is to change methods of operation and manners that are reprehensible, but I don't have any specific comment on our readiness to engage.

Q John, do you have any comment on the changes made by the Lebanese Government regarding the army and the replacement of General Tannous by another commander, Michel Aoun?

A Not on the question of a new commander. That, clearly, is a matter for the Lebanese Government, but in general we've consistently supported efforts to bring an end to the violence in Lebanon. We welcome the decisions announced by the Lebanese Government as a significant step in this direction, and we hope that all Lebanese will provide the support and cooperation necessary for the implementation of these decisions.

Q Did you receive any formal or informal protests from any of the Arab Governments on the joint exercises with Israel?

A Well, let me do two things. Let me, first of all, state our usual pass so that we don't get into our discussions with various other governments, but I'm not aware, having said that -- I'll now go on to say something I shouldn't -- but I'm not aware of any specifics on the question you raised.

Q Do you have anything on these reports coming from the Middle East? All the press in Jordan and Egypt and in Gulf States are protesting against that.

A No, I don't.

Q Do you have anything to say?

A No, I don't.

Q John, have you reacted already to the conclusions of this meeting of the Latin American debtors in Colombia?

A No. But we could do that instantly for you if you like. (Laughter) Just as soon as I can put my hand on the piece of paper.

The Cartegena debtors' meeting, which was attended by the representatives of 11 Latin American countries, concluded with the adoption of a declaration, summarizing the consensus views of the attendees. The document calls for a reduction in interest rates, maintenance of open markets, and increased assistance for debtor countries, among other things.

Many elements of the declaration are consistent with the industrialized countries' agreed five-point strategy for dealing with the debt crisis.

The meeting did not result in the formation of a debtors' cartel. The delegates agreed to meet again, possibly in September, to consider their common concerns further.

We were pleased that the Latins reaffirmed their commitment to meet their financial obligations to continue their efforts to adjust their economies to changed economic realities, and to treat each foreign debtor situation on an individual basis.

Q Copy, please?

A Sure.

Q John, they also said that the present system that was constructed by the developed countries to deal with this problem is not working. At least it's not working to these countries.

Do you have anything to say?

A No, I don't.

Q John, there were reports --

Q Do you have anything on Reverend Jackson's overseas activities at the present time -- Central America and Cuba -- as to whether the Administration views it as a campaign candidate participating in U.S. diplomacy?

A Well, I don't think so, Bernie. Reverend Jackson has been in, as you know, to see Under Secretary Armacost a couple of times before he left. He's not carrying any messages. He's made it clear he's not negotiating. We're following mainly through press reports his itinerary. I don't think there have been any breakthroughs at this stage.

Q Can I talk to that specifically, if I could? He apparently got the leaders of the FDR/FMLN with whom he spoke to agree to a possible cease-fire in advance of negotiations. That seems to be a substantive change in their position.

A Well, I think that --

Q Does the United States have any reaction?

A Well, I think it was -- that was the particular topic that I was raising when I said I don't think there have been any breakthroughs yet. He, I think, has not yet arrived in El Salvador to discuss this with the Salvadoran Government, President Duarte, but there did not seem to be any breakthrough.

Q But you don't -- then the State Department doesn't believe the position that was set out by him and by Ruben Zamora with respect to a cease-fire represents a change in the FDR/FMLN position?

1-1601

A I'm afraid I really can't characterize it for you. I think President Duarte has made abundantly clear his position on talks with the left.

Q John, there was also a comment yesterday by the Secretary about the -- at the conference on terrorism, mentioning the PLO, just for the record, as aiding Nicaragua.

Is there any new information in that area that you could tell us about what was the Secretary relying on?

A I don't know that there's any new information, but I think the presence of PLO members and activists in Nicaragua is something that we have discussed before.

Q One more thing, please. The Secretary also mentioned terrorism in West Jerusalem in the shopping mall, as he called it. Does the United States Government see terrorism -- that terrorists are being tried now in Israel -- Jewish-Israeli terrorists. Do you also see them as organization -- as an organization of terror, and do you think the Secretary just -- omission was simply because he didn't want to go through the whole list?

A I'd like to go back and refer specifically to what he said rather than giving you a kind of horseback interpretation.

Q Would you, please?

A Sure.

Q Could we get back to Cuba again for just a second, John? Can you -- do you have any comment on the report over the weekend that the U.S. and Cuba have in effect agreed to resume negotiations or to begin negotiations on the exchange of Mariel and that sort of --

A Well, it's not a question of agreeing to begin negotiations. At the close of the Carter Administration there were two rounds of bilateral talks in which the United States requested that Cuba accept the return of persons from Mariel boatlift who were ineligible to remain in the United States for substantive reasons, such as people involved in the commission of serious crimes.

Although these efforts were unsuccessful, and although the Cuban Government did not indicate that its own position had changed, the Reagan Administration in May 1983 made a new approach to Cuba on this issue.

1-1602

The initiative has been pursued to the present time. Cuba, unfortunately, was not willing to respond affirmatively to our proposal for prompt talks on the issue. The United States has made it clear that it will be prepared to re-establish the normal processing of preference immigrant visas in Havana in the context of an agreement on the excludables.

The Cuban Government has recently stated that it would be willing to discuss this issue after the November elections -- after our November elections. Thus, while there can be no negotiations on this issue prior to November 6, there is a prospect for talks after that date.

Q John, do you have any comment on this story in The Washington Post --

Q Also on Cuba --

A Excuse me. Let me take Cuba over here first.

Q Reverend Jackson has indicated he expects to bring some Cuban political prisoners home with him. This would involve a decision, presumably, by the Administration here to let these people in.

Have you been in contact with the Cuban Government on this subject?

A No. I think this question was raised in a very general sense when Reverend Jackson was in seeing Under Secretary Armacost, and, obviously, if the Cubans decided to move on this issue, we would be helpful and would move expeditiously also.

Q John, can we have a copy of the statement on the Mariel --

A Sure.

Q -- matter? Thank you.

Q Any comment on the --

A Excuse me. I've been criticized for not moving over to this side a bit, so let me move over.

Q Please.

Q The United States has been trying to encourage dialogue between North and South Korea, and the Administration says it's premature for the U.S. to be directly involved. What's the reaction to Kim Il-song's invitation to members of the U.S. Congress to visit North Korea?

1-1603

A I haven't seen that one. Be glad to take a look at it.

Q John, can you tell us something about who will Rabin and Arens see while they're here? Are they going to discuss the terrorism problem, or will there be other subjects for discussion?

A I don't know who else in the Department, if anybody, they will be seeing. I think Mr. Rabin is in seeing the Secretary today, and Mr. Arens is seeing the Secretary tomorrow. But I -- and they may well be seeing others, but I don't know.

Q Is a Shultz text going to be published in the State Department Bulletin, by the way, to let our people know just exactly what he said?

A I'm sorry. The Shultz --

Q The Shultz speech of last night?

A Sure.

Q That will be published?

A Sure.

Q There is --

A In fact, if you don't have a copy of it, we could make one instantly available.

Q Thank you.

Q John, to go back to one more question about d'Aubuisson, was the decision to give him a visa -- did that take place after any conversations with Senator Helms?

A I'm trying to go back in my mind over the sequence and the exact -- I just can't answer that. I just can't quite remember when that visa was issued.

Q Do you know the --

A Oh, yes, I can. As a matter of fact, I can tell you when that visa was issued. The visa was issued -- B-2 visa was issued in San Salvador May 31, '84.

Q When was the decision made to issue the visa? On that date, or previous to that?

A I can't answer that. I just don't --

Q But in that context --

A -- have it in my hands.

Q In that context were there any conversations between the State Department and Senator Helms? Did he intervene, in other words?

A Well, as you know, Senator Helms was part of the Congressional delegation that went to San Salvador for the inauguration of President Duarte, so, sure, Senator Helms was in the plane and talked with the Secretary on frequent -- on numerous occasions during that --

Q About a visa for d'Aubuisson?

A I just can't answer that.

Q John, do you have anything about the Palestinian journalist who was denied an exit visa, I presume, of some sort --

A Not a great deal --

Q -- in relation to the --

A That's something we're looking into. And, without having any information about the specifics, and maybe USIA might have some more on the specifics, nevertheless, the State Department's position, the Administration's position in general, and as a matter of principle, is in favor of freedom of movement. So we're taking a look at that.

Q Thank you.

A Okay.

(The briefing concluded at 1:05 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, June 26, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #113

TUESDAY, JUNE 26, 1984, 12:17 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: One housekeeping announcement and very little news. Available in the Press Office is the testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Elliott Abrams. He appeared today before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to discuss the problems of torture. His testimony touched on various difficulties of obtaining information about and dealing with torture in both closed and open societies, and that's all I have for you.

Q Can you tell us what you'll be doing, John, for the rest of the year to get some money for the Contras?

A I think Larry Speakes basically addressed that question this morning, but, nevertheless, we will continue to move forward with the request. I don't know how that will be translated into action, but for the passage of the Central American program in its entirety.

Q It'll move forward this year, of this session?

A I can't give details on how I think the White House -- as I say, I think Larry Speakes had something to say about that this morning, and I think the White House might be --

Q We wanted to offer you this opportunity to help us.

A No, I think we'll let the White House --

Q What do you mean "in it's entirety"?

A It means that we are not abandoning our thoughts about the overall program despite the vote, and that we will come at that in another way.

Q John, the Contra program has been a main component of U.S. policy in Central America. If you don't get the money before it runs out, and it's running out very quickly, is there discussion that's been going on here as to adjustments that will be necessary to make up for the loss of that military, paramilitary component of our policy?

A Well, as I say, the Administration feels strongly about the desirability of the whole Central American program. Just how it will seek to achieve those ends, I will leave to the White House to indicate.

Q John, would you expect that that part of the program would wind down while the Administration decides how to go about funding it, or would you anticipate that action by the Administration will take place in such a way with such a timing schedule so as to keep the program active?

A I can't predict, Ralph. I've seen the same reports you have about the funding in place, and when that funding will run out, and so forth and so on; but I can't give you a scenario.

Q Do you have anything on the talks yesterday in Mexico between the United States and Nicaragua?

A No. In accordance with the agreement that the Secretary of State made with the Nicaraguan officials, we're not making announcements or indicating the substance of those talks.

We did, as did the Nicaraguans last night, confirm that the meeting had been held, confirmed that it had been held in Mexico, and confirmed that Ambassador Shlaudeman heads our delegation, and Mr. Tinoco heads the Nicaraguan delegation, and those were the points that were agreed upon.

Q Are they continuing their talks today?

A I don't have anything for you on where we are today.

Q John, can you clarify the role, or the lack of role, of the Mexicans in the conversation?

A I really cannot. You've drawn your attention before to the Mexican Foreign Ministry's clarification of the role it would play, and the statement, I think, by the Mexicans that they would not be at the talks. And I think there have been reports, which you probably have seen today, namely, that Mr. Sepulveda, who was there at the initial stage to introduce the American and Nicaraguan delegations and then return to Mexico City.

Q But there were some reports that there was a Mexican reporter present, not participating in the discussions. I don't mean a news reporter; I mean a government official who was there listening and taking notes, or something of that nature.

A No, don't have anything on that for you.

Q Could you take that?

A I think -- I know how frustrating this is for you and for me, but I think that the Secretary's rule will prevail, that we really aren't going to be very forthcoming about what, in theory, are supposed to be private kinds of talks.

Q But, John, on Barrie's question, can you either confirm or deny the presence of any foreign national at that meeting besides the Nicaraguans and --

A No, I cannot give you anything further on the -- other than those facts that are agreed on between ourselves and the Nicaraguans.

Q Could you be any more forthcoming on mere detail such as the size of the delegations?

A No. I put that very -- question very specifically, and I'm afraid I have to operate within the guidelines agreed upon.

Q (Inaudible)

A Can't even tell you what the shape of the table is.

Q Can you comment on --

A Don't know if there is a table. (Laughter)

Q Can you comment on the impact of yesterday's vote in the Senate, the impact that it will have on these negotiations?

A No, I can't.

Q You mentioned before, in connection with the vote on the Contra, that -- I didn't get your exact words, but it's something like "we'll go about it in another way." How do you go about getting money in another way except by going through Congress?

A Obviously, we're going to operate within the confines of the law. In general, yesterday's action reflected a procedural decision which recognizes that we continue to have substantive interest in the region, and that the issue remains to be dealt with at a later date.

The Administration remains strongly committed to securing passage of all elements of its Central American program.

Q But when you said "in another way" before, did you in any way mean to imply that you would use funds from some other source to take care of this particular problem?

A No. What I meant to imply, and what I think I said, was that the Administration feels strongly about this; seeks to ensure passage of the total package. But how that will come about, I can't spell out for you.

Q Can you say -- are you referring, when you say that you want to deal with this at a later date, to the $21 million '84 Supplemental, or are you referring more generally to the survival of the program in Fiscal Year '85?

A I think the former. I think basically that's what we're addressing.

Q John, earlier, when this issue was discussed about the Contra, money to the Contra, there were talks -- I think the report was in The Washington Post that the United States is asking some friendly countries to possibly sponsor this or foot the bill for the Contra. Do you still have this under consideration, or --

A I didn't see that story in The Washington Post, but let me go back --

Q A few months ago.

A A few months ago?

Q Yes.

A Well, then, let me also refer you back a few months ago, I think, to some language which we used very specifically on that point about suggestions that the United States was involved in an approach to other countries, and we denied that story.

Q New subject?

A Sure.

Q John, what role does the Department or the Interests Section in Havana have in talks between Mr. Jackson and Fidel Castro, specifically in regard to the release of some political prisoners?

A I cannot answer that question, Mike, as to what role, if any, they're playing on the ground. As you know, Reverend Jackson was in seeing Department officials, I think specifically Under Secretary Armacost, twice before he went; the question of prisoners was raised in a very general sense. No numbers were mentioned, no specifics were mentioned. But I really don't know what role the Interests Section is playing.

Q Is the Department or the Interests Section prepared to act speedily to bring these people out if they are released?

A If there should be action by Cuba, as I think we said yesterday, sure, we would act speedily to help them.

Q What are you doing to prepare for that possibility?

A I don't have any thing for you on that, Mike.

Q John, these are Cuban political prisoners?

A It is my understanding that they are Cuban; that's correct.

Q And are they Cuban political prisoners deemed to have some relationship with the United States before?

A I can't specify, Marvin, what they're being held for.

Q Isn't -- aren't some of these Americans? If not all of the 21, Americans?

A I'm aware of that report, Bernie, but I -- the information I have is that -- it's a little difficult because no specific numbers or individuals were discussed during Mr. Jackson's visit here. But of this 21 figure that is being mentioned, our information, or the information that was given to me, is that there are no Americans among those, but I'm not being final about that statement. That's the information we have at the moment, because we don't know which prisoners are being talked about.

Q John, do you have any statistics that gives us a better handle on the prisoner question? That is to say, the number of American prisoners that are being held, for whatever combination of reasons, in Cuba?

A I don't in my head, but let's see if we could pull something together for you on that.

Q John, none of these people is a hijacker?

A Are any of them hijackers? I honestly don't know.

Q You don't know about it?

A I really don't.

Q John, you're prepared to act expeditiously on the release of "X" number of prisoners -- Cubans, Americans, what-have-you?

A What we assume to be Cuban political prisoners.

Q What does that mean? You give them visas to come to the United States?

A I think we would facilitate their entry.

Q Do you have anything more on Mr. d'Aubuisson's schedule? Has he asked for any meeting with American officials?

A He certainly has not asked any -- that I'm aware of -- he's not asked anybody in the State Department, and I'm pretty sure that would include anybody at any high level. I don't think he's asked anybody, period, but there are a lot of people in the State Department. One cannot always rule out the possibility he's asked somebody that we don't know about.

Q Any d'Aubuisson guidance at all today?

A Nothing beyond the -- nothing beyond our discussion of yesterday.

Q John, can you --

Q John, go back on the Cubans, please. Is this just an open number you're prepared to deal with?

A Well, I think we will look at the specifics surrounding particular individuals.

Q You're prepared to open -- meet them with open arms?

A I think it will depend on the character of their alleged crime and what we know about them.

Q But you're not -- a moment ago you indicated that there would be what amounted to automatic visas of the Cuban political prisoners to the U.S. Is that what you mean to say?

A I'm not suggesting that this is a blanket, open admission for everybody in Cuban prisons who is released, but I'm suggesting that of this group that Reverend Jackson is describing as a group of 21, it's our understanding -- obviously, we would look at those individuals, but it's our understanding that in that particular group that he's talking about, we would be helpful in facilitating their entry.

Q On Jackson's trip, with respect to El Salvador --

A Uh-hum.

Q In looking at the FBIS reports of what happened, I still have the impression that the FDR/FMLN representatives said that they would be willing to negotiate a cease-fire, and that that is something new.

How does the United States feel about that and Duarte's apparent rejection of that possibility?

A Well, I think -- I don't think we are going to parse President Duarte's response. He said what he did. He alluded to the problems that continue to persist in El Salvador and reiterated his position on talks with the folks who are out there in the jungles with the guns.

Q But as I understand it, according to State Department guidance provided late last week, your understanding of Duarte's position was that he was rejecting any dialogue with guns on the table. That's his expression that you also quoted.

Now, my understanding of what the FDR/FMLN said earlier this week was that they were willing to take the guns off the table in a cease-fire which would remove the preconditions set by Duarte. I don't understand -- does the United States have a position as to whether that's a step forward?

A Well, I think we're obviously going to rely very heavily on President Duarte's appraisal of the situation. He just won election. He has the mandate of the people. He is aware of the perils. He is aware of the history of these folks who are now making these statements, and statements and counter-statements they've made in the past, so I think we will lean very heavily on his analysis.

Q John, if d'Aubuisson requests a meeting with senior Department officials, would senior Department officials be willing to meet with him?

A I think that's a little hypothetical at this stage, Greg, and we'd have to wait and see if he asks anybody and who he asks and what their schedule might be.

Bob?

Q Did -- I wasn't here yesterday, so maybe you've answered this question, but has anyone asked why the United States granted him a visa, in view of the --

(laughter) -- reports about him?

A That did crop up yesterday. (Laughter) Yeah, yeah, yeah.

Q On d'Aubuisson again --

Q Wait a minute.

Q I'm sorry.

Q Wait a minute. He's ready to go today.

Q Oh. He's going to go.

Q What is it that --

A Let me say, Bob, that I was so pleased with the way I answered that yesterday that I think I'll stand on the words today.

Q On -- I assume you've now disposed of the question to Bernie's satisfaction.

A I thought I detected total satisfaction on Bernie's face. Yes.

Q Well, he's smiling. I can see that. What I was wondering is --

Q I'm admiring the acrobatics.

A (Laughter)

Q Did - when did Ambassador Pickering and his wife leave the country -- leave El Salvador?

A Uh --

Q Was it before or after Walters arrived on the scene, and did Duarte leave at the same time?

A Well, let me try to remember the --

Q Pickering left with us.

A Yeah. But I'm trying to -- but there have been a number of trips. Is your question basically when did he come back to the United States for the visit on which he is now present? Is that your question?

Q No. This isn't d'Aubuisson; this is --

A Well, he came -- it seems to me that he was here, obviously, with President-elect Duarte on that trip; and then after the inauguration he came back, and I'm not sure that he's been back to -- I think he's still on leave, and I think he's not been back to Salvador since he returned on the Secretary's plane.

Q Is there any suggestion that part of the reason that Walters went down there related not just to a threat with respect to our Ambassador in San Salvador, but also to a threat on the life of President Duarte?

A Well, let me say what I said about the trip of the Presidential emissary yesterday, and that is, obviously, we're not going to get into that substance. But I'm not aware of the other matter you raise, Jim. I'm not aware of anything on that.

Q There's a story today quoting Senator Helms as saying that he had seen information of some kind suggesting that the orders for the assassination came from another country. Is that correct?

A I don't --

Q Can you tell us which country?

A I don't -- I assume if Senator Helms is correctly quoted, that he would be referring to classified information, and therefore I wouldn't want to get into that.

Q Oh, well --

Q Should he be?

A Did you say, "Should he be?"

Q I said, "Should he be?"

A I wouldn't respond to that question.

Q John, question on the Gulf: Can you tell us whether the U.S. is considering supplying the same sort of communications between Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States as it is considering supplying for Saudi Arabia and Kuwait regarding the dissemination of AWACS information?

A I'm not aware of that, Ralph, and certainly don't have anything on that for you today.

Q What about the Egyptian thing, that they are preparing for a new initiative in the war -- to end the war? Do you have any idea about that?

A I've seen those reports, and, obviously, the United States would welcome any initiative that has the effect of bringing that war to a conclusion.

Q John, there was an answer posted to a question yesterday about Kuwait has a request from the United States Government for arms. Is there a request from the United States Government to --

A To the United States.

Q Excuse me?

A From Kuwait -- a request to the United States from Kuwait?

Q To the United States. Yes. From Kuwait to the United States.

A Yes. I think we've had discussions with Kuwait and suggested that that's something we're working on. Sure.

Q Thank you.

Q John -- wait a minute, wait a minute. I understand that --

Q This better be good.

Q I understand that Ruckelshaus has announced that the U.S. and the Soviet Union are reinvigorating, or reopening, an agreement on an exchange of environmental information.

I was wondering if you had anything on that, and also any reaction to TASS's denunciation of Richard Burt's performance yesterday?

A I don't have anything on the -- I saw the Ruckelshaus report. On Secretary Burt's testimony

J-1617

yesterday, I don't have any response to the TASS pronouncement. I did talk with Mr. Burt this morning, and he made it clear that he was reiterating U.S. positions. There was no shift in what he had said in his testimony.

Q John, do you have anything, briefly, on Guatemala, with the election at the end of the week, and the withdrawal --

A I'm afraid I don't.

Q Nothing.

A No.

Q Could I pick up Barrie's question? Isn't there some significance in the fact that, notwithstanding the current strain, the U.S. and the Soviets have gotten together on this environmental package?

A Well, I think, Bernie, as various officials in the Administration have made the point, there are -- the problem is not avenues of communication. There are talks and discussions going on at various levels about various things. Some of them, perhaps, you would consider rather mundane, and, certainly as we have said on the major questions of nuclear arms reduction -- INF and START -- there is no movement, but there are certainly discussions.

As you know, the Secretary and Ambassador Dobrynin had discussions -- long discussions -- three hours of talks on a variety of issues between the two countries, so it isn't as though there is no discussion and no movement. There is some movement on some issues, but perhaps are not considered of extraordinary significance.

Q John, does the United States Government have any position or comment about the Israeli Government appointing four mayors in the West Bank as replacement to the four mayors who were elected democratically but were expelled by Israel?

A I'm afraid I don't.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:37 p.m.)

I-1618

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Wednesday, June 27, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #114

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 27, 1984, 1:00 P.M.

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, all. I have a couple of housekeeping announcements, and a short statement on the Indian situation.

First, Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, testified today on human rights abuses in Cuba before the House Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations. That testimony is available in the Press Office.

Second, next Monday at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon there will be a briefing here in the Briefing Room on the forthcoming meetings of ASEAN -- the Association of Southeast Asian Nations -- and ANZUS -- Australia, New Zealand and the United States. That briefing will be ON BACKGROUND.

Q What time is that?

A 2:00 o'clock, Monday.

Finally, a statement on the Indian situation. The Press Trust of India has alleged that the Central Intelligence Agency has been training Sikh separatists at bases in Pakistan. There is absolutely no truth to these reports whatsoever. They are irresponsible.

As we have said many times before, the United States strongly supports the unity, the integrity, and the stability of India. Turmoil in India is directly contrary to our well known and longstanding interest in South Asian regional stability.

Q Copy?

Q On that statement, have we raised that matter with the Indian Government as well, because I think Prime Minister Gandhi has accused foreign governments, with a strong implication of the U.S., in this whole business?

A Well, I'm sure the Indian Government is well aware of our position and our rejection of these charges as nonsense and irresponsible.

Q The Indian Government has raised this matter with this government?

A I'm not getting into the back and forth on it, Mike, but I'm -- if the question is, are they aware of our viewpoint and our total rejection of these ridiculous charges, the answer to that is yes.

Q Was there a back and forth on this?

A I said I'm not getting into our back and forth, if there was any.

Q Oh.

Q John, do you have the names of the prisoners who are going to be released in Cuba?

A I do not have the names of the prisoners. As you know, Reverend Jackson has announced that 22 will be released, but we do not know which they are. For your information -- I was doing a little research, which is one reason we began the briefing late -- according to the latest information we have, there are 35 Americans currently being detained in Cuba. Of that number, eight are dual nationals holding both Cuban and American nationality, and they're being held on charges ranging from drug offenses to homicide -- those eight.

Cuban authorities regard these dual nationals as Cuban citizens, and U.S. consular access to them has not been permitted.

Four of the remaining American prisoners are being held on hijacking charges, but we don't have anything on the identity of the specific ones.

So we start off, on the basis of the latest information we have, with 35 Americans. Eight of them are dual nationals. That gets you down to 27. Four of those are hijackers. That gets you down to 23. And what the discrepancy is between the 22 that are announced and the 23 that we think are there, I just can't help you. We don't know the answer.

Q John, yesterday the Department said there were 36, so maybe that's part of the --

A No. That's not -- we are -- I'm giving you a 35 figure as of today, so I'm telling you where we are as of today.

Q John, for clarification of the thing -- I'm a little confused -- you say 35 Americans detained. Eight are dual nationals --

A Right.

Q Then you said they're being held on charges ranging from drug offenses to homicide.

A Yes.

Q Does that refer to the 35 or to the subgroup of eight?

A That refers specifically to those eight. Now, I'm not suggesting that those aren't the same charges that some of the other 23 are being held on -- indeed, they are -- but I don't have those charges. We don't know what the specifics are on those.

Q Normally, the U.S. -- well, I guess they're American citizens, but are there any charges pending against any of these Americans in this country?

A There are warrants for the arrest of some of those 23, and how that will prove out --

Q 23?

A Well --

Q 23?

A They say they're going to produce 22. I'm giving you the best figures we have on who we think is there.

Q But you're saying --

A Of that 23, and, therefore, presumably of the 22, a number of them have warrants for their arrest, and you, I guess, ought to go the Department of Justice to see how that particular situation would be handled.

Q John, you don't know at the moment, if I understand you correctly, whether the 22 are simply the 35 minus the 12 that you mentioned, or some of the 12 --

A We don't know --

Q -- dual-nationals --

A We don't know what the 22 -- even as we speak, our Interests Section in Havana is working, presumably with Cuban officials and with members of Reverend Jackson's staff, to determine who these 22 are. And, as soon as they can get to the processing of them, they will, and that could be as early as today.

Q How many would you say legitimate political prisoners are there in this group?

A So far as we know, there are not political prisoners. That is the disparity between what I told you yesterday and what is happening today. When Reverend Jackson came in to talk with Under Secretary Armacost, while he did not discuss numbers and while we had no lists of names, nevertheless, he was talking about Cuban political prisoners.

What apparently has happened is that there has been no action on those Cuban political prisoners, but instead Mr. Castro has agreed to release a number of Americans held on various charges or sentenced and having been processed and being held in Cuban jails. And, naturally, we regret that there hasn't been any action on the political prisoners.

Q Political prisoners -- you're saying that none of the 35, as far as you're concerned, could be both American and political prisoners?

A So far as I am aware, John, yes.

Q John, a couple of questions, if I may: all of those released, 22 or 23, will be given visas to return to the U.S.?

A Well, they don't need visas. They are American citizens, so it's automatic. There is no problem about their reentry.

Q What is the point you're making here, that Jackson failed to carry out what he had explored as the subject with Armacost? Because, are you suggesting that in his talks with Armacost, Jackson never raised the question of the pursuit of the American prisoners in Cuba?

A I'm not aware that he did, Bernie. I'm not saying there's a failure. I'm saying, naturally we are always pleased when an international humanitarian effort succeeds, and we are pleased that families will be reunited in the case of these Americans. We have an interest throughout the world in the fate of Americans held in jails in various countries, particularly in sub-standard jails, which certainly Cuban jails, I think, would be presumed to be, in relation to American jails. So that's a broad interest we have. Having said that, of course, we're regretful that there was no action on the political prisoners.

Q Can I follow up, please? What is the State Department's view on the involvement of Jackson in this whole area of what might fall under the broad headline of American foreign policy above and beyond the agreement, going beyond the prisoners -- the agreements or the announcements he made following his meeting with Castro?

A Well, as you know, Rev. Jackson was in the State Department before he went to Cuba and to other countries in Central America. He was briefed and informed us of where he was going.

He has been in touch with our Interests Section in Havana, and presumably would want -- we would certainly be interested in talking with him when he gets back.

Q Are you suggesting that he has advanced Cuban-American relations?

A No, I'm simply stating the fact that we're always happy when a humanitarian effort succeeds, and as I say in the case of --

Q John, on a couple of specifics: One, what is the State Department reaction to his proposal, which Castro accepted, pending U.S. Government approval, of an immediate exchange of ambassadors? And, two, Castro seems to have altered the Cuban message that he had sent to the State Department a couple of weeks ago. He seems now willing to discuss these migration questions, including the Mariel undesirables before the elections.

Do you have any comments on that?

Q Yes, on the question of an exchange of our ambassadors and indeed even on the broader question of the suggestion of a visit here by Mr. Castro, I think what we have to do is to take into consideration Cuban actions. We would like to see Cuba return to the family of nations in Latin America and Central America. We would like to see Cuba pursue policies that would be good for the Cuban people, that would be good for Central America, and good for the United States; but I think we would want to see some concrete examples of a change in Cuban behavior.

The fact is that Cuba does support violent political change. Cuba does act, has acted, as a surrogate for the Soviet Union in such places as Angola and Ethiopia; and the fact is that Cuba does export subversion and revolution in Central America, and we would like to see a change in that kind of behavior, and that's the kind of change I think that we would like to see take place before we get to the question of an exchange of ambassadors or visits.

On the question of the Mariel boat people, yes, that does seem to be a change in position. We, of course, have said that we are very interested in discussing this. It is the Cubans who have hitherto said that they did not want to raise this with us until after the election. If Mr. Castro is now saying that he is ready to sit down and talk with us about that right away, well, we're certainly ready. Indeed, I think you'll find that the head of our Interests Section in Havana, Mr. Ferch, raised this with Mr. Castro after the press conference that was given by Reverend Jackson and Mr. Castro.

Q Can we get a copy of as much as you can give?

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A I'm afraid you can't because you're listening to me, and not to written words.

Q You say he raised it directly?

Q -- on the answer to the first question it seems --

A On the numbers?

Q No, no, no, with respect to what you expected from Cuba.

A That's what I say, I'm afraid you can't because you're listening to me; I'm not reading.

Q John, can we --

Q One more clarification, please? You talk about -- as I say after you weed out the dual nationals, you come down with a figure of 23.

A Uh-huh.

Q Now, did I understand you to say that of your number of 23, at least some of them, or is it all of them, or what, have arrest warrants pending against them in this country?

A No. Some of them have arrest warrants pending against them.

Q How many?

A I can't give you that figure. We're still working on getting that.

Q Are a large number of them drug-related?

A Some of them are drug-related.

Q (Inaudible)

A We might, but we haven't seen -- I mean, we've got to look at the names of who they're --

Q Your intention is to do so, when you --

A We'll do the best we can as this moves along. Our communication with Havana is not of the swiftest from the State Department. As you know, we have only an Interests Section there. It takes quite a while to get even a phone call.

Q (Inaudible) -- list of names. If you're looking at the list to try to figure out who's got charges against him, it seems to me you must have a list of names of -- which varies at most by one name from the Cubans' --

I mean, I'm not sure how you can say, on the one hand, that you don't have a list of who is being released, and on the other hand --

A No. What I'm saying is that I do not have for you a list of who is being released. When that --

Q -- only because your list differs from their list by one name, isn't that the case?

A Not necessarily. This is an area fraught with some uncertainty. There are privacy considerations in the case of some of them, so we're not going to give you a list of everybody we think is in jail in Havana.

Q I was trying to get at the question of, how do you know, if you don't have a list of names of who is being released -- how do you know any of them have charges or arrest warrants pending against them -- either you do or you don't?

A Maybe our deduction is wrong, Ralph. We think we know who 23 people are, and maybe you don't accept our view; but of those 23 -- and we assume that a fair number of them would be among the 22 released -- we are confident that there are some charges against some of them. But if you don't want to accept that, fine.

Q Can you tell us whether in the conversation Mr. Armacost had this morning with Havana there were any exchanges of names in that conversation?

A I do not think there were. Mr. Armacost talked with Reverend Jackson this morning, and I do not think there were any names given.

Q John, can you address this question of the Logan Act and how it might apply to this situation?

A I really can't. As I say, Reverend Jackson conferred with the State Department before he went, has kept in touch with the Interests Section, and I don't have anything -- there doesn't seem to be any contravention of legislation.

Q John, can you clarify one thing? You obviously -- you have made clear that the United States has its own agenda -- Cuba stopping its export of revolution, arms to Nicaragua, et cetera --

A Uh-huh.

Q Are you saying -- this is where I'm a little bit unclear -- that if Mr. Castro were willing to discuss that agenda, the United States would be willing to participate in higher-level talks?

A Well, "discuss that agenda" is a little --

Q Well, to talk about what we want to talk about.

A I think we are interested in a change of behavior. The problem with Cuba is not one of communication. People say, "Well, why don't you restore diplomatic relations?" There is an Interests Section there; there is communication. Mr. Ferch has good communication with Cuban officials there, and we have channels of communication elsewhere. The problem is not the channel of communication; the problem is Cuban behavior.

Q What you're saying then, in effect, is that the behavior has to change before there can be any higher-level talks?

A I'm saying that when you raise such questions as exchanges of ambassadors, the restoration of diplomatic relations, visits by Mr. Castro, I'm saying that for that kind of activity to take place, I think we would have to see a change in Cuban behavior.

Q John, following on that, when the interests sections were first opened, which was in the Carter Adminstration, the then U.S. Government listed three conditions -- three or four -- for the raising of this to full exchange of diplomatic relations, and I have not heard anybody, to my knowledge, since the Administration changed, contradict them. The other two that are -- the other conditions involved agreement on the status of Cuban forces in Africa, which seems to be covered by yours, the settlement of all U.S. claims against Cuba of a financial nature, and the third one was the improvement of the human rights situation within Cuba.

A Uh-huh.

Q Does what you say meet, encompass, all those conditions?

A I think all those conditions --

Q All those conditions still stand?

A I think those are all still appropriate. There certainly are claims against Cuba by U.S. citizens. I'm not specifying a priority list in which certain things have to be done, at which times there would be a certain action taking place. But certainly, that claim of U.S. citizens against Cuba would have to be borne in mind.

Q -- recognized by the Foreign Claims Commission?

A Yes.

Q Do you think this release is the beginning of a change in the Cuban behavior? What do you think Mr. Castro's motives are?

A I think it's very early to judge. I think Mr. Castro has released a number of Americans who are serving sentences in Cuban jails. That is the fact of the matter.

Q Could you just be a little more helpful on this business of the political prisoners? Was it the State Department's impression that he was going to try to obtain the release of some Cuban political prisoners and has not; or that was the State Department impression, from what you learned from Mr. Jackson before he went, that he was going to obtain the release of these Americans?

A Well, certainly, the question raised with Mr. Armacost was political prisoners, and I don't want to speak for Reverend Jackson and what he hoped to do, but I think that certainly was a factor that was raised.

Q Cuban --

A Yes, political prisoners; Cuban political prisoners.

-- MORE --

Q Filing break?

A Filing break? Sure.

Q Can I take you back to an earlier question? Do you have any kind of assessment on this personal diplomacy that Jackson has undertaken?

Does it -- to what degree does it affect, negatively or positively, U.S. foreign policy, U.S. policy specifically toward Cuba?

A No, I really don't, Bernie. As I say, we have set out the kind of scenario that we think ought to unfold for us to embark on the kind of dramatic change that's been suggested here, namely, restoration of diplomatic relations, and that kind of thing. And I think you have to look at each piece on a case-by-case basis; and what we have seen -- well, we haven't actually seen it yet, but what we're talking about, is the release of a number of Americans in Cuban jails.

Q John, was Jackson in touch with anybody at the State Department or the upper levels of government yesterday in advance of his press conference in Havana? In other words --

A No, I don't think so. I think he placed a call and I think that call was -- or we attempted to return it but he had already gone into his meeting with Mr. Castro by the time that call got through.

Q So he was never able to consult with, say, Armacost on whether you'd want these people and the modalities, the whole -- the change in the nature of the prisoners he was going to bring back?

A Well, he certainly didn't speak with Under Secretary Armacost yesterday, and I do not think he -- I'm fairly sure he did not speak with Under Secretary Armacost in Cuba -- while he was in Cuba.

Q John, do you have a range of how many years, how far back the 22 or 23 might have been imprisoned?

A I don't, Bernie.

Q You don't?

A I don't. What we will do is work on that in the course of the afternoon, and as we get anything for you, we'll --

Q Could you tell us whether the United States has regularly, or whatever, interceded with the Cubans to bring about the release of these prisoners over the years? Have we tried to get those men out of jail?

A I really can't answer that, Bernie.

Q You cannot answer that?

A I do not know of my own knowledge.

Q Could you take that, please?

A Sure.

Q Again, let me clarify something following Bernie's question. You don't know the range of years that the people who are being released are -- have been in Cuba. Do you know the range of years the people the U.S. knows to be in prison in Cuba?

A I'm sure the appropriate officials do, yes.

Q Is that something that you could make available?

A No.

Q Why not?

A We will do the best we can in terms of the information available and also in connection with the Privacy Act, which is a big factor here. It's not awfully easy to get releases from people in Cuban jails.

Q Do you have anything at all on, apparently, an incident in which a number of American reporters accompanying Jackson were detained --

A No, I don't.

Q -- and locked in their room by Cuban authorities.

A No, I do not. I must say, you have introduced a fascinating note into the briefing of which I was totally unaware. (Laughter)

Q I wonder if they were the political prisoners that --

A I haven't heard that one.

Q Could I ask a question about D'Aubuisson's visit this afternoon with Mr. Motley?

A Sure, yes.

Q Is he being received this afternoon as a representative of the Salvadoran Government? Is he being received as a private citizen from El Salvador? In what capacity is he seeing the Assistant Secretary of State this afternoon?

A He's being seen because the request came through Senator Helms's office for Secretary Motley to see him. That request came late yesterday afternoon, and I think that meeting will be 5:30 this afternoon.

As you know, he holds a key role in Salvadoran politics and in the leadership of the opposition. We are much interested in the evolution of that process. And I think you should see his visit and his appointment with Mr. Motley within that framework.

Q He is travelling with a diplomatic passport?

A That I cannot answer.

Q Does he have bodyguards with him that were --

A That I cannot answer. I guess you better talk to him on it.

Q Well, has the United States -- did the United States approve the entry, the visa applications of those people who he said would be arranging security for him while he was here?

A I do not know who's with him or we --

Q Can you look into that question?

A I don't promise you very much on it. I mean, we're not going to give you a rundown of every Salvadoran citizen who applies for a visa to come to the United States.

Q The question is, apparently, that Vice President Bush wrote a note to George Miller, who had been threatened by one of -- a Representative in the U.S. Congress who had been threatened by one of Mr. D'Aubuisson's bodyguards, that they would never let anybody in who would in any way threaten -- could carry out such a threat, and there's some notion that he may be bringing just precisely that person with him.

A I think probably you'd best ask him this afternoon if you're going to be seeing him, or ask those who are arranging his program here.

Q Will General Walters be meeting with D'Aubuisson tomorrow, and what time?

A I think he might. I do not know what time. Do you have a time? As a matter of fact, it may not be set, but I think General Walters will meet with him tomorrow.

Q What do you have on the Soviet journalists refusing to meet with --

Q Could I stay with that same subject, please?

A Sure.

Q On the Washington Post story about concern in the Administration of the plot possibly being launched against Pickering here, do you have anything on that?

A Not a thing.

Q Additional guards for Pickering?

A Not a thing.

Q In that connection, any unusual security precautions being taken in connection with Mr. D'Aubuisson's visit to the State Department today and tomorrow?

A Not that I'm aware of. I don't know.

Excuse me, yes?

Q Do you have anything on the Soviet journalists refusing to meet with the Secretary today?

A   Well, that was an American Society of Newspaper Editor's Exchange program. Their visit here was sponsored by the ASNE. We regret that the Soviet journalists chose to rescind their request for a meeting with the Secretary, since we believe that the scheduled interview would have been useful in gaining a better understanding of each side's concerns and approached to problems to problems confronting U.S.-Soviet relations.

As the President and the Secretary have stated, we are open and willing to talk with the Soviets in any number of channels. We regret this latest rebuff of our attempts to establish a deeper dialogue.

Q   Can we have a copy of that?

A   Sure.

Q   Could we get that time for our press corps here?

A   I'm sorry, Bernie, could you --

Q   Could we get that time for some of the members of the press here that the Secretary had set aside? (Laughter)

A   I suspect, given the Secretary's schedule, that that time has already been gobbled up, Bernie.

Q   John, what can you tell us about Eden Pastora's visit to the United States? I understand he came in late last night or early this morning in a private plane into Florida?

A   I don't -- okay?

Q   Is he going to be seeing any members of the Administration in the next --

A   I do not think anything is set for him to see anybody in the Administration. I really don't have any details on his arrival. If you tell me he's here, so be it. Obviously, he is welcome in the United States, but I don't have any data on any appointments. I do not think any appointments have been set in the State Department for him yet.

Q Do you have any reaction to his expulsion from ARDE?

A No, I don't.

Q On the Cuban prisoners, some of them have declined to sign waivers on the Privacy Act. Does that mean that their identities might never be released by the U.S. Government?

A Well, that poses a real legal problem for us. And I'm sure that even as we speak, our legal experts are looking at that.

Q You're not sure yet?

A I'm always very hesitant in areas of international legal affairs.

Q I'm intrigued that Pastora is always welcome here, but leaders of the Sandinista government are not always welcome. How do you explain that discrepancy? That is a government with which we have relations.

A I think it is a somewhat different situation. I'm just telling you what our attitude is towards Mr. Pastora.

Q John, can you tell us, in connection with the people in Cuba, whether any of them on you list of people who are in jail were ever employees of the U.S. Government?

A I don't know. I have no idea.

Q Could you take that question?

A I really don't -- I think you've got to bear with us on tracking this story today under very difficult conditions.

Q At whatever time, I mean, in the near future that --

A I think I'll let you do the research on whether they were -- where they worked before they were sentenced.

Q Just for the record, would it be possible to get a readout on the D'Aubuisson visit with Mr. Motley?

A I don't -- let me take a look at that. I'm not sure that we would have a readout. Mr. D'Aubuisson, of course, might well decide to say something.

Q Can you tell us what the meeting is going to be about?

A I don't know. It is at his request. The request came through Senator Helms's office, and Mr. Motley has a tough schedule today, but, nevertheless, has set it for late this afternoon. But I don't know what they'll talk about.

Q Did Senator Helms have anything to do with the visa being granted to D'Aubuisson? Was that at his request?

A No, it was not at his request.

Q Are you prepared to tell us now? I know you've said yesterday that you didn't have anything to say about that, about why that was granted.

Q As I have said, Mr. D'Aubuisson is an important opposition political party leader in Salvador. We have gone through an election in Salvador. Salvador is nudging its way to a more enduring form of democracy. We certainly hope that all the political parties will play the appropriate constitutional role in that process; and I think it was looking at Mr. D'Aubuisson's activities and role in that regard that -- but certainly it must have been one of the factors in the visa decision.

Q John, just so this question doesn't hang over us, can you say whether any of these prisoners were accused of espionage in Cuba?

A I do not know that of my own knowledge. But I do not think so. I think they are -- I think they're all criminal charges, and a lot of them are in the area of drug trafficking.

Q Do you have anything today on any change or new expression of support for the continuing quest for Congressionally mandated aid to the Contras?

A Nothing beyond what I said yesterday.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 1:30 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Thursday, June 28, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #115

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
THURSDAY, JUNE 28, 1984, 12:42 P.M.

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A couple of announcements. Available in the Press Office is the prepared testimony by Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Elliott Abrams before the United Jewish Appeal of Greater Washington. He is speaking on the subject of government persecution and restrictions on religious freedom in Nicaragua.

Also available is the prepared statement by Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs Joan Clark before the Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law. The testimony was on grounds for excluding and deporting aliens.

There will also be available later today a statement regarding the case of Leonard Peltier, who is an American Indian. It is a case which TASS has tried in recent publications to equate with the Sakharov case. It is a pretty sorry attempt and I'd refer you to that. I don't think that is going to be available immediately after the briefing, but we will try and get it to you as soon as we can.

That's it for announcements. I will be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, will you just bring us up on what arrangements are being made to greet Jesse Jackson's plane tonight, as far as reception of political criminals, prisoners being held in Cuba?

A Let me give you what I can on the whole situation and try to answer most of your questions that way.

First of all -- let's go to the American citizens first. We will make available after the briefing a list of the names of American citizen prisoners whose names have already appeared in the press, therefore under the Privacy Act we can do that, and who, according to our information, that is, based on Reverend Jackson's staff, are scheduled to be released.

I would stress to you that as we have indicated, John indicated yesterday in the briefing, all this has got to be regarded as tentative until we have got people on the plane, and so on.

One point contrary to the information we had yesterday: one dual Cuban-American national is among those to be released. Therefore, taking the arithmetic, apparently two American-born prisoners will apparently remain. As to who they are, because of Privacy Act waivers -- that is, the lack of Privacy Act waivers -- I cannot give you further information on them or possible reasons for their being held.

As to arrival, the indications are that in terms of the Americans, that they are going to be released today, and that, according to our information, they will arrive at Dulles in Reverend Jackson's plane some time this evening, 10:30 - 11:00, but I ask you to be attentive to that if you plan on covering that, because I think that is still very tentative, and we hope to keep up with it ourselves, and we'll try to help you with that.

On the procedures, we are working with the Department of Justice, with the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the FBI, and other agencies, to arrange for the entry of these individuals into the United States.

Q Are those the Cubans?

A I am sticking with the Americans at the moment, but generally they may arrive together. I don't know how that is going to work out in the end, Bernie.

For the American citizens, other than for evidence of citizenship which the returning Americans will have, no further documentation will be required for an American citizen to enter the country.

Those prisoners who have outstanding warrants against them in the United States will be taken into custody by federal law enforcement officials when they arrive, and we have been, in terms of general procedures, we have been contacting the next of kin in the United States and also we have been in touch with the Department of Health and Human Services to facilitate the return to the U.S. and onward travel.

I am told that the contact with Health and Human Services is basically precautionary to deal with anybody who may be destitute or needs medical care and doesn't have other ways of making arrangements.

As far as the Cuban political prisoners are concerned, as far as the general reaction, for humanitarian reasons, we of course welcome this new development of the release of these 26 political prisoners, all of whom appear to be individuals who have been incarcerated for many years because of their opposition to the policies of the Castro regime.

We regret that not all political prisoners held in Cuban jails will be released. Arrangements are now being made for processing these political prisoners. We -- I say --I am not quite sure what the travel arrangements are going to be, but at this point, there is an expectation that they will be coming to Dulles again this evening. I am not sure what the final plans are, and maybe Reverend Jackson will be talking about that, but possibly on his plane, possibly on another plane, again this evening at the time I indicated, 10:30 or 11:00, whatever that is.

Why don't I just stop. I think, in terms of a sitrep, that is basically what I have for you. We will make that list available of the political prisoners.

Q Can we also get -- to the point you can there -- the statement you just read?

A No. I don't know -- can we do that?

Q Make the list available --

A I think we are going to have to let you get that later, because I picked up a bunch of pieces to put together.

Q Will you please go over that again, please, regarding the procedure on identification of American citizenship?

A Well, they have -- I think the Embassy has been working with them -- or not the Embassy, our Interests Section has been working with them, and they will, presumably, have evidence of citizenship with them, and that is all they will need, the American citizens, tha is all they will need to enter the country, is to show tnat citizenship.

Q And the others who have entered --

A Let me go back to John for a second, and I will come back to you, Mike.

Go ahead, John.

Q What is this you say? Did you say something about a list of the Cuban prisoners?

A We will make both lists available.

Q Right after this briefing?

A Yes.

Q On that, did I understand you to say you will make only, as far as the U.S. list is concerned, only those names that have already been publicized?

A Well, no.

Q Will you have all the names?

A The list we are going to make available is what we understand to be the list of the 22 American citizen prisoners who have been released, or are being released. What I am saying to you is that covering the legal problem in terms of Privacy Act, those names already have appeared publicly, so we are permitted to do that. That is my only point on that. But, again, I would caution about the tentative nature of this stuff. As you see, our information keeps changing, so --

Q Alan, can you give us a breakdown on the numbers, or approximate numbers, of people who will be arrested and of the Americans who will be allowed to just go?

A No. I don't have anything further on that, beyond what John said yesterday.

Q Do you know how many there are charges pending against?

A No, I don't. I have heard different figures which I don't feel free to give you, but there are different figures, and that is one of the reasons, again, why I don't want to get into this.

Q Can you give us the proportion?

A No. I don't think it is appropriate for me to do that. That is a law enforcement matter and I really don't want to do that.

Q What do you know about a separate plane -- do they need a separate plane? Do they have enough room on one plane?

A No, I think they do not have enough room on one plane for the party, the accompanying press, the American citizen prisoners, and the Cuban political prisoners. So, assuming that everybody is coming today, I think there is an assumption that indeed there will be a second plane.

Q Will provision be made to provide a charter, or would this be a plane provided by the Castro government?

A Well, I understood that the Castro government had offered a plane, and so I think that is probably what would happen.

Q You could accept that landing problem?

A That wouldn't be a problem.

Q What is your number on the Cubans now? How many Cuban political prisoners?

A Are being released?

Q Yes.

A Twenty-six.

Q Twenty-six, and twenty-two Americans.

A Correct.

Q Is that including Mr. Vargas, one of the original twenty-two?

A No, I don't believe so.

Q He would make twenty-seven, wouldn't he?

A Well, he was not a prisoner, still, was he?

Q No, he was released in '82 December.

A No. I think that is an additional number.

Q So he is the twenty-seventh Cuban, but not a twenty-seventh political prisoner?

A Well, I am going to leave it to you to put the categories. He is not one of the twenty-six, and he is not one of the twenty-two. Okay.

Q What are the requirements for the political prisoners coming into this country in terms of documentation and our acceptance of them?

A Well, I don't have a great deal of detail on that. We are simply doing further checking at this point in terms of -- I indicated we are processing at this point for their entry. We are checking all the information available to confirm, indeed, that they are political prisoners, and, as I say, we think that that is indeed the case, and so arrangements are being made. I cannot give you detail as to exactly how that administratively is being done.

Q Is there any circumstance under which any of those people might not be allowed to come?

A I think the indications at this point are that that is not likely, but I can't give you hard and fast, tonight, eleven o'clock, kind of answers, but that is not the indication that I have at this point.

Q Alan, do you happen to know, by any chance, how they will confirm they are who they are? I mean, will they be carrying any kind of papers?

A I don't know how the documentation will proceed. A list of names has been provided, and that list is being checked out by various agencies in terms of their own requirements.

Q On the numbers, Alan, yesterday's and today's? Are you saying that when the twenty-two are released, there will only be two U.S.-born Americans, I suppose --

A Well, other than those who are being held for hijacking. I refer you back to what John said yesterday, okay? I think he referred you, when he did the math, we ended up with twenty-three non-hijacking, non-dual national Americans, who were being held, and we expected twenty-two of those to be released. Since now we understand that one Cuban-American dual national is being released, that is where we are, with two.

Q Do you have a number, or the number, of Cuban prisoners that are still in jail?

A I do not.

Q Or some idea of what --

A I don't have any idea.

Q Alan, what will happen to the prisoners when they arrive, the Cubans?

A I don't know precisely what will happen to them. I guess you would have to check with the Immigration authorities, but I am sure that people are concerned with the arrangements. I think a number of them have famlies, and so on, and so they will probably want to be rejoined with those families rather quickly. There is no question of detaining them, or anything of that sort. I am not aware of any pending warrants for any of them, for example.

Q A follow-up question, Alan. Yesterday there was a suggestion both here and at the White House that Jackson had failed in his mission because he hadn't obtained the release of any political prisoners. Are you prepared to offer your congratulations or otherwise qualify yesterday's remarks?

A Well, I don't think that we said that he failed. I think John simply took note of the fact that he had sought the release of political prisoners, and we regretted that that hadn't been successful.

As a general comment on the significance of this act, we don't think that it reflects any basic change in Cuban policy. Our concerns about Cuba, as we indicated yesterday, relate to their behavior in support of revolution in this hemisphere and their role as a military surrogate of the Soviet Union in various places around the world.

We see the release of these prisoners as essentially a humanitarian accomplishment by Reverend Jackson, rather than as a politically significant event.

We are indeed pleased by the report which we talked about yesterday that Fidel Castro has agreed to our longstanding request to begin discussions on the return of the Mariel excludables, and we are seeking an early date for these talks on migration procedures.

Q Alan, can I follow up on that policy situation?

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A Yes, you will get a copy of that.

Q On the policy, there was a suggestion from Cuba that Jesse Jackson also reached an agreement on the withdrawal of troops from Africa, Cuban troops from Africa. Have you had a chance to look into that? Is there anything new there?

A Well, we had some guidance, which I'll refer you to, yesterday, but the basic point is that I think that there was nothing new in what was said in terms of Cuban troop withdrawal, and there is nothing new in our position on that.

Q Nothing new to follow up on that.

A I think if you look at it, the suggestion made there was that first you have to get implementation of 435, and only after that would Cuban troop withdrawal be addressed, and that is not the position we have taken.

Q Alan, on the question of the humanitarian gesture, I am not sure I heard you correctly. Are you saying that it was a humanitarian accomplishment by Reverend Jackson? Are you also saying that it is a humanitarian gesture by Cuba, and do you see it as any kind of a gesture by Cuba to the U.S. as opposed to Jesse Jackson?

A Well, I think the second part of what I said was that it was a humanitarian accomplishment by Reverend Jackson rather than a politically significant event, and I think that addresses the second part of your question.

As to what Mr. Castro's motives were in releasing the twenty-six, I am not going to try to guess that.

Excuse me, Mike, you have been trying to get one in.

Q What provisions have you made for some people aboard the plane whom you are unaware they will be coming -- "undesirables," or whatever you want to call them. What is your attitude on that?

A I am not aware that that is an issue, so I don't have anything to say about that. Barry?

Q Alan, are you saying this doesn't open a possible line of communication with Havana, the Jackson accomplishment?

A I think what we emphasized yesterday is that the issue is not channels of communication. Those exist. The issue is Cuban behavior, and that remains a problem.

As far as the Mariel excludables are concerned, we are pleased that the Cubans have apparently changed their position from an unwillingness to discuss the issue until after November to moving it to now, and we are going to pursue that, because we think that is a very important thing to get to very early.

-MORE-

Q Well, apart from just humanitarian considerations, is this a practical example of the kind of human behavior you're looking for from Cuba?

A Well. I think that the kinds of concerns that we talked about yesterday were what I mentioned also in that earlier statement. That is, we are concerned about their behavior in support of revolution in this hemisphere and role as a Soviet military surrogate elsewhere in the world.

Q Could this be in any way the beginning of the end of the 22-year-old severed relations between Cuba and the United States?

A Well, I think I'll refer you back to what I said about not seeing this as a politically significant event at this point. You know, if Cuba were interested in doing the things we're talking about, that might be something different. But let's see a change in that behavior.

Q Is Reverend Jackson going to be received by anyone here at State, or how is he going to be debriefed?

A Well, at this point there has been a back-and-forth between the Department and Reverend Jackson's staff about a meeting here tomorrow with Under Secretary Armacost. As you know, he -- Under Secretary Armacost met with him two times before Reverend Jackson went on the trip and has talked with him since he's been down there.

And I can't tell you that that's firmly set. They were working on a time for tomorrow morning, and that's as far as I can take it at this particular point.

Q Alan, you're saying the staff -- not Jesse Jackson himself?

A He did not -- when they talked on the phone, they did not discuss meeting; they were discussing other things, so that the talk about arrangements on time and so on for a meeting has been held at the staff level.

Q Alan, has the Jackson staff asked for a meeting with the Reverend Jackson and Secretary Shultz?

A Well, what I've seen in the press is that there was a request that he's indicated he wanted to meet with the President and Secretary; and I think I'd have to refer you to the White House on that.

But I think that the first step that we've talked about is we are looking forward to getting a readout from Reverend Jackson in that meeting tomorrow morning.

Q You have nothing on him asking for a meeting with Shultz, is that right?

A Well, I'm not aware there's a pending request at this point.

Q Could I ask -- to what degree do you think Castro's action was motivated by a desire to enhance the political future of Jackson?

A I wouldn't begin to comment on a political matter.

Q Just -- I couldn't hear back here when Bernie asked earlier whether you had a number for the number of political prisoners in Cuba --

A No.

Q -- that remain.

You have no idea.

A No idea.

Q And, also, if I could -- John, when he went through the criteria in the changes in the behavior by the Cuban Government that the United States was looking to yesterday included something about repression by the Cuban Government against its people.

Now, would you say that that doesn't fall under the category --

A No. I'm not trying to change what we said yesterday. I think that there was a question -- I think John Goshko may have asked that yesterday -- talking about some statements that were made at the time that the Interests Section was established in 1977 and whether those concerns remained valid. And I think that he indicated that they did and that they should follow policies which -- I refer you back to what John said; I'm not trying to change what he said.

Q Well, let me rephrase it then. Is it not -- is the change in behavior that we're looking to toward Cuba to ameliorate ties between the two countries confined to Cuba's foreign policy -- or export of revolution, subversion, et cetera --

A I'm not going to --

Q -- and not so much to alleged repression of the Cuban people?

A Well, I'll refer you to the various statements which were made. I'm not going to try and give you a nice checklist for you to work against.

Q I wonder if you have anything on any representations you made to the Greek Government about terrorists and the so-called "suitcase bombing."

Q We can't hear.

A The question -- I'll repeat the question. There was a disturbance in the back there.

It was a question of whether we had anything to say about representations we may have made to the Greek Government about terrorists and bombings in Greece. Is that right?

Q Can we have a filing break, please?

A Filing break? Any objection? O.K., go ahead.

Q One quick question.

A One quick question. Then let's hold the filing break too.

Q Is there a judgment here whether today's Supreme Court decision would have been a barrier to the kind of trip Jackson just made?

A My understanding, Barry, is that -- and I may be wrong on this -- but my understanding is that the provisions of the Treasury regulations were in effect during the appeal process so that they obviously --

Q They're not State?

A -- were not a barrier. They were in effect; that's what I'm told. While the case was on appeal that the regulations remained in effect is what I was told.

Q Well, I hope that you won't consider it a hypothetical question, but would the State Department have liked to have had the Supreme Court decision in its pocket before Jackson's trip?

A Well, I don't think that's an issue.

Q I'd like to follow that, if I may. On what basis was Jackson traveling to Cuba? As a private citizen or what, if those regulations were in fact in place?

A He was a private citizen. I think you'd have to talk with his staff about arrangements that they made.

But they were certainly in touch with us. We were aware of the trip. There was no -- I think you're looking for -- I don't know what they may have done specifically and what was required specifically, and that's not something I'm qualified to speak to.

Q Well, the regulations talk about travel for official business, seeing relatives or members of the press.

A Or if there is --

Q Or if there's a waiver.

A Yes.

Q Is there a waiver?

A Well, I don't know if there's a formal procedure or not, but I don't think there was any question involved here about that.

Q Alan, still it's not clear. If you consider the steps taken by the Cuban Government, as a gesture towards Reverend Jackson or a gesture towards the U.S. --

A Well, I think I'm going to stick to --

Q -- people.

A -- I think I'll stick with what I said on that.

Bob? Let me go to your question about Greece.

You're referring to -- there's a story in The Wall Street Journal this morning.

Q Yes.

A Let me say in general I'm not going to comment on the details of the article. I can confirm though that an individual who was held by the Greek Government for an alleged act of terrorism was subsequently released and we have made our serious concerns about this known to the Greek Government.

Q But you're not saying anything about whether or not there's a new and increased threat to airlines, airliners, now?

A Well, apparently the FAA did issue a notice on May 4th warning airlines serving Athens that they could be the target of a sophisticated suitcase bomb, but I think you'd have to go to the FAA to get further details on that notice.

Q Could I go back for just one second on what happens tonight? You said that agents would be there to make arrests for those who have outstanding warrants.

A Right.

Q Presumably, those people will be taken to some detention facility. Can you tell us what facility that would be?

A Ralph, I don't have anything on any of that. I think to whatever extent that can be obtained, you'll have to check with Justice and see.

Q And for the non-arrestees, are there any arrangements being made for housing overnight or for two nights or something for any -- either the Americans or the political prisoners -- in the Washington area, in the event transportation is not available?

A As I said, Health and Human Services Department has been contacted for precisely the kind of thing -- in case there were not family arrangements or people don't have money or whatever. There's obviously attention to that issue.

Q Following that up, the charges -- will we honor the charges against them that they bring with them from Cuba?

A No. The issue that would be addressed, in terms of detention by U.S. law enforcement officials, are charges pending in the United States.

Q So charges the Cuban Government has against these individuals will not be acknowledged by us?

A Well, I think that they've -- the Cubans have released them from prison.

Q O.K.

Q On Syria, do you have any comment on the exchange of prisoners that took place today between Israel and Syria? Did the U.S. contribute any efforts to this achievement?

A Well, I think basically we would welcome -- we do welcome -- this development on humanitarian grounds, and also because we believe that it will help to lower tensions in the area.

So far as a U.S. role, this was an arrangement worked out between those governments. You'd have to talk to them about the details.

Obviously, we've been concerned about the prisoner issue, and we've talked about it before and so on. But this was not something which we worked out; it's something they worked out.

Q And any information on the meeting yesterday between Secretary Shultz and Minister Arens?

A No. I don't have a readout on that.

Q On The Wall Street Journal article, Alan --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- do you have anything on this May 15 group that it refers to?

A Well, a little bit on it, I guess.

There is conflicting information regarding the whereabouts of that group, and I would note that the article I think talked about it being based in Iraq. I think the Government of Iraq has denied it, the group, has been present in Iraq in recent months.

The group had apparently remained inactive between 1982 and the recently reported operations.

We don't have any evidence to suggest that the Government of Iraq was involved in this or in other operations of that group.

Q Alan, on Lebanon, do you have anything on the bombings in northern Lebanon?

A No. I don't have anything for you on that.

Q To what country was this individual released, and did the U.S. have any evidence -- any independent evidence -- supporting charges against him?

A I don't have anything on the question of to what country the individual was released. We did provide evidence to the Greek Government, but I'm not going to be able to go into that.

Q Alan, on the Gulf, any comment on the deaths that occurred on the Swiss or Swedish ship? I've forgotten which it was.

A Well, in general, I can't confirm the reports of the attack. I've seen them, and I don't question necessarily what the press is saying; but the reports remind us that the tragic war between Iran and Iraq has claimed tens of thousands of victims.

We deplore the continuing violence and believe that this attack underscores the need to bring this war to a negotiated end.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz's letter to the United Nations Secretary-General that the Iranians are concentrating their troops inside cities, and they mention the cities. Do you have any comment on that?

A I don't have any comment on that, no.

Q Do you have a readout on d'Aubuisson?

A A little bit, Bob.

I don't have anything on his meeting with Ambassador Walters, which was at 11:30 this morning.

As far as his meeting with Assistant Secretary Motley yesterday, only briefly to note that the meeting lasted approximately 30 minutes. It focused primarily on questions related to the role of democratic political party opposition in El Salvador -- specifically, the National Republican Alliance, ARENA, which gained some 46 percent of the vote in the May 6th presidential runoff elections and which Mr. d'Aubuisson heads.

Mr. D'Aubuisson indicated that his party intended to support the democratic process and the government of President Duarte within the constitutional framework.

Q Did the subject of whether or not he was linked to these death squads come up? Did he give some assurance that he was not connected, or was there any conversation along that line?

A There was no discussion of that.

Q No discussion?

A No.

Q This morning he said that he was in Hot Springs, West Virginia -- Warm Springs, whatever it is -- he was in Virginia (laughter) -- on September 9th of last year.

A You're sure that's the state that you're talking about? (Laughter.)

Q No. Actually, he said he was in Virginia. But I know that geography is sometimes confusing.

What I'd like to know is: When did he enter the United States? Was he given a visa to enter; what kind of a visa was it?

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A Well, we've talked about the visa before, and I have nothing new to add.

Q September 9th -- it's never come up publicly before. He's talking about the September 9th visit -- September 9, 1983, visit to the United States.

A Oh, I'm sorry. I don't know anything about that.

Q Could you look into it, please?

A 1983?

Q Yes. It was just about a month and a half before he was denied a visa to enter the country.

A Uh-huh. Well, I'll look into it. I don't know what we have on it, but I'll look into it.

Q And, also, he indicated, with considerable enthusiasm last night -- as perhaps you saw -- that he really would like to see all of these classified documents --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- implicating him in certain kinds of activities relating to death squads made public. Do you think we could grant his request, since he is a key leader in El Salvador and so on? (Laughter.)

A I have a piece of paper here which, I will be happy to make available afterwards, which explains to you the problems in declassifying documents (laughter): and I will post it and I will let you spend a lot of time analyzing it. (Laughter.)

Q Mr. Shamir, the Israeli Prime Minister, said four days ago that Taba is part of Israel despite Egypt's claim that Taba belongs to it. In addition, Ma'ariv newspaper reported that Israel has recently refused an Egyptian proposal to hold the Taba negotiation in Washington. Do you have any comment on that?

A Don't have a comment on it. Obviously, we have been in favor of an improvement in Israeli-Egyptian relations; and we hope, indeed, that will take place. But I don't think it's going to be helpful to comment on specifics of that sort.

Q Just -- can we get a copy of your statement on d'Aubuisson?

A Yes. It may not be exactly the words, but it will give you -- I don't know what you want, Bob, but I'll get it. Which?

Q The one about our policy view on the --

A Yes. We will seek to expedite it.

Q Any readout on the Tinoco-Shlaudeman talks? Any readouts about that?

A No. I really don't have a readout on that, Jim. Ambassador Shlaudeman is back in Washington. He's met with the Secretary. He will be meeting with the President, I understand, in the next day or so. But, as we have indicated before, we have emphasized that we are committed to maintaining privacy and confidentiality in these discussions and we're going to stick with that. So we're not going to be talking about that specifically.

Q On another related, has --

Q Do you know of any Arab government that was invited to send representatives to the conference on terrorism and refused?

A No, I don't know. Sorry.

Q Can you tell us whether those talks will continue -- I mean just whether the process is ongoing -- or whether it's ended, or --

A I just don't have anything specific on the continuing process.

Q Alan, do you have any response to President Raul Alfonsin's speech on economic policy in Argentina?

A No, no.

Q If I could just follow up, as I understand it, the delegation of Argentine --

A Excuse me.

Q -- and United States --

A I said I didn't have a comment, so I really don't want a speech on it.

Yes.

Q   Has Pastora made contact with any Administration officials since his talks with --

A   I don't know whether he's made contact with Administration officials, but it's quite possible he'll meet with somebody in the Department. But nothing is set on that at this point.

Q   Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 1:12 p.m., the briefing was concluded.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, June 29, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #116

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
FRIDAY, JUNE 29, 1984, 12:20 P. M.

MR. SLADE: Could I say something before we get started?

MR. HUGHES: Sure.

MR. SLADE: As President of the State Department Correspondents Association, I just wanted to say our friend and colleague, Louis Nevin, will be leaving very soon for new responsibilities in Paris. He's been a big help to all of us. Most of all, we will miss him as a friend, and we'd just like to say, "Godspeed."

Q Here, here. (Applause)

MR. HUGHES: Those of us on the other side of the podium certainly reciprocate those feelings and those well wishes and that sadness that Louis is leaving. We have met his successor, and we assure his successor of the same unstinting cooperation that we have given Louis.

I have a couple of announcements up front:

President Reagan has designated Senator Charles Mathias as his personal representative to the inauguration of Richard von Weizsacker as President of the Federal Republic of Germany on July 1.

Kenneth Adelman is visiting a number of countries in Asia. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Kenneth Adelman departs July 1 for a 12-day visit to three countries: Japan, the Peoples' Republic of China, and Thailand.

In Japan, Mr. Adelman will be discussing with the host government issues of mutual interest in arms control and regional security. In China, he will meet officials to continue the dialogue begun during President Reagan's visit in April on issues related to Arms Control and Disarmament. In Thailand, Mr. Adelman will meet with Thai and American officials to discuss the problem of the use by Soviet surrogates of chemical and toxin weapons against people in Southeast Asia.

Finally, available in the Press Office is a release on the extension for ten years of the U.S.-USSR Agreement to Facilitate Economic, Industrial, and Technical Cooperation. Copies of the Agreement itself are also available.

That's about all I have for you.

Q Before you leave that, can you say whether or not Mr. Adelman will be conducting some negotiations on the Sino-American nuclear agreement which seems to be running into difficulty?

A No, that's not the purpose of his trip and he would not be negotiating on that particular topic. It may well come up during his visit to China, but that is certainly not the central purpose.

Q That fact sheet that was put out with the President's speech two days ago said that that agreement was -- we're waiting for Soviet response, I think.

A The U.S.-Soviet?

Q Yes. Have the Soviets just responded, or what?

A I guess they responded, Bernie. I can give you a date -- well, perhaps I can't. I don't have that with me, but I think we can give you the date on which they responded.

Q Is there any date set for -- that same fact sheet said --

A You're talking about the US-USSR?

Q Yes. That same fact sheet said that that could lead to a reconvening of the Joint Economic Council. Any date set on that?

A I don't have any dates on that. Why don't we poke around and see what we can get for you on that.

Q Can we get a readout, to the degree that you can, on the Jackson/Armacost meeting?

A To the degree I can, that meeting began late, and I understand Reverend Jackson came out about 10-15 minutes ago. That would mean that that meeting lasted about an hour and 15 minutes. Reverend Jackson reported on his trip to Central America and various conversations that he had had with Mr. Castro and others.

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Among other things, he expressed appreciation for the facilitation by the United States Government of processing of various documents and so forth and so on, and the parole in the case of the Cuban political prisoners; expressed his appreciation for the authorization of landing rights for the Air Cubana plane that came in.

There was discussion of various points of disagreement which we have with Reverend Jackson as he elucidated his positions in various press statements he had made during his trip. He reiterated his desire to see the President and other high Administration officials, and that's about all I have for you. I think there were about six or seven people on Reverend Jackson's side in the meeting. I don't have the names of the other participants

Q John, you've got the situation now where Jackson is challenging the Administration to seize the moment. You have the emerging image of Castro as someone who has just released some 50 prisoners. Isn't the Administration now on the defensive, against this development, in taking the position that we will not negotiate with Castro because his behavior is, as the Secretary says, subversive?

A Well, it's not a question of not negotiating with Castro; it's a question of how discussions at various levels go forward. For example, on the Mariel situation, in general while we welcome the release of political prisoners and the repatriation of American citizens, we don't believe these actions should be considered as a gesture toward the United States. After all, there should have been no political prisoners in the first place, and Cuba has given up very little in these actions other than to relieve themselves of the care and feeding of 48 people.

In the deliberations over the release of the Cubans, we did ask the Cuban Government if they would be willing to accept the repatriation of some of the Mariel boatlift people on the returning Air Cubana flight. We made clear that we thought this would constitute positive action on their part. Unfortunately, they refused. However, the possibility of talks soon on this issue was left open, and we would welcome that. But under the circumstances, the release of political prisoners should be regarded as a one-time event rather than as an indication of any meaningful change in Cuban policy.

Q You don't see yourself --

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A You sure can have a copy.

Q You don't see the Administration on the defensive in the face of these developments?

A I see the Administration hewing to its policy of realism, looking at the actions of the Cuban Government which appear to be unchanged in terms of the export of subversion, the export of Marxist governments, and certainly the involvement in various parts of the world as a Soviet military surrogate. Don't see any change in those positions.

Q Can I be sure I understand what you just said? You said that the U.S. Government asked if the returning Cuban plane could be used to take back some of the Mariel undesirables?

A Correct.

Q How many of them did the U.S. propose? to send back?

A I think that probably, as we got 22 of our prisoners back, I think -- I don't know that very specific numbers, whether there was an attempt to negotiate specific numbers, but I think certainly the feeling on our part was that 22 would be a good number to send back. I'm not suggesting we would cast into that number, but I think we suggested that number.

Q Was that done through the Interests Section in Havana?

A Yes.

Q Was that the result of -- was that what happened after, when Ferch went up and talked to Castro?

A I can't tell you, because I don't know, just when that was done. I do not think it was in that initial conversation with Mr. Castro.

Q Was it before the Cuban plane came here? I'm trying to get a feel for whether the U.S. granted permission --

A "Was it before the Cuban plane came here?" I would think so. Don't hold me to that, but I'm fairly sure it was.

Q Jesse Jackson said that there was an agreement with the State Department to have discussions with Cuba in two dates in July over the Mariel situation. What are the dates? And what would the talks cover?

A I can only speak for our side; and as I say, we hope that those discussions would begin early -- early in July -- but I do not think the Cuban Government has responded on those dates, so I certainly cannot confirm those dates. Maybe Reverend Jackson knows something we don't know, but we're not aware of that.

Q And what would the talks cover?

A On the question of Mariel --

Q Only?

A Yes.

Q And also migration matters?

A Possibly.

Q John, can you tell us something more about the points of disagreement between the Reverend Jackson and Mr. Armacost? You alluded to discussion of the various points of disagreement with Jackson when you discussed the various press statements made during his trip. Can you talk about those?

A Well, Reverend Jackson did make a number of statements which are on the public record, and I think that insofar as the repatriation of prisoners is concerned and the movement of political prisoners, Cuban political prisoners, we have said that we certainly welcome that on humanitarian grounds.

There are a couple of other issues that have been raised concerning Reverend Jackson's trip. There is this question of whether he was negotiating. He has made it plain that he did not consider himself to be in a negotiating posture, and it certainly is our position and the position of the United States Government that he was not in any way authorized to negotiate on behalf of our government.

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Having said that, I guess you then come to the question of statements and comments made by him; and I think it basically has been the tradition that politicans and Presidential candidates may discuss foreign policy and argue -- we argue among ourselves as Americans, within this country -- but basically, I think, the tradition has been not to criticize the United States from foreign platforms, especially from hostile countries, from countries hostile to the United States. So I suppose that some of Reverend Jackson's remarks about the United States Government, particularly those made in Nicaragua, may raise questions as to whether what he did was in the tradition that has long prevailed; and I assume that that kind of discussion may have come up in Mr. Armacost's meeting with him. I don't know; I wasn't in the meeting, but I assume that would be the kind of disagreement.

Q Beyond disagreement, does the Administration intend to take any legal action to pursue that matter?

A It's not a question of legal action. As I said, Reverend Jackson has made plain that he was not negotiating -- he has underscored that -- and we have made plain that he was not negotiating, but there are some statements critical of the Administration and the United States Government with which we clearly do not agree.

Q Would you single out which ones in Managua you found particularly objectionable?

A I don't think I would go beyond what I've said.

Q You indicated that there was a departure of tradition to criticize the United States from foreign platforms, particularly from hostile states, and then you referred to Managua, so I take it from that that the United States' State Department considers Nicaragua to be a "hostile" state. Is that correct?

A Well, I was making that as a general comment, but certainly relations between ourselves and Nicaragua are not all that they might be.

Q So you're moving away now from saying whether it's a hostile state?

A No, I'm not moving away; I'm saying that I don't think either Cuba or Nicaragua are particularly friendly platforms from which a Presidential candidate would direct criticism at the United States Government.

Q John, is it your view that he negotiated or not?

A We have made it clear that he had no authority to negotiate, and Reverend Jackson has similarly declared that he was not negotiating, and I think made that clear in a number of points along the route.

Q You're saying, you've made it clear that he is not negotiating on our behalf, but did he negotiate?

A Well, he says he wasn't negotiating. He says he made that clear to the people he talked with. We say he wasn't authorized to negotiate. I assume that means he wasn't negotiating.

Q That means this is all propaganda, as Secretary Shultz called (sic), and also that the State Department is not happy?

A I think that if you looked at the decisions that Mr. Castro has made, you would come to the conclusion that there were elements of propaganda surrounding the actions, yes.

Q Do you see any breakthrough between the U.S. and the Cuban relations diplomatically or economically?

A Well, as I say, it wasn't the signal that we would like to see. The Secretary had some remarks about what we would like to see in the way of a change of behavior on the part of the Cuban Government; and the releasing of these individuals, though we welcome it on a humanitarian basis, doesn't seem to change the Cuban Government's policy or attitude.

-- MORE --

Q John, is that Air Cubana plane still on the ground here, and is it possible it could remain here long enough to take 22 --

A I can't answer that. That one I can't answer. I'm sorry. I don't think it's still here, but I don't know.

Q Nobody is contemplating the possibility of a quick kind of 22 back there and then negotiate for them?

A I think the Cuban authorities have made plain that they rejected that suggestion.

Q John, on that score, may I ask, is there an agreed Cuban-American list of the Mariel excludables, or have we conveyed to the Cuban Government a list?

A That's one we will have to do a little research on, and we will.

Q John, has the criticism that Jesse Jackson leveled against the United States Government policy in Managua, Nicaragua, was different from his criticism during the election campaign, because he has been a critic, a sharp critic, of the foreign policy of the United States (sic). Has it gone beyond that criticism that he has sounded here?

A Well, as I said, there's certainly a tradition that politicans and Presidential candidates, Congressmen, whoever, we argue -- that's the nature of our society -- we argue strongly among ourselves within this country. But I think the tradition has been not to criticize your country from a foreign base or platform.

Q John, where would this meeting take place between the United States and Cuba?

A It'll be something that the Cubans and ourselves would have to work out.

Q Under your proposal, have you proposed a place, and who would do it?

A I'm not going -- I don't think I'll get into the proposed locale until there is agreement.

Q Do you then, I take it, have preconditions before there can be the start of any serious discussions leading to a rapprochement -- preconditions that Cuba must do certain things? What must they do?

A As I say, on this particular issue, on the question of the Mariel, we have long been in the van on this issue, suggesting talks. And it is the Cubans who said that "Well, we won't talk about that until after the election." Now they've moved up, and that's welcome; that's a welcome development. So at that kind of level, this kind of discussion could go on.

I think when you're talking about the larger question, are we getting a major political signal from Cuba, the kind that would cause us to re-examine our relationship with them, re-establish diplomatic relations, we would want to see a much more significant action from them.

Q Such as?

A Like a change of behavior; like the end of the exporting of subversion; like the bringing back of troops that are being used as surrogates for Soviet troops in Africa.

Q John, has there been a change of mind on the part of the President or the Secretary to see Jesse Jackson, Reverend Jackson, or --

A I don't think there's been a change of mind because I don't think there is any decision. I think they have not decided yet whether to see Reverend Jackson.

Q So the reports of this morning were incorrect? Because there were reports on networks everywhere that the President -- that Reverend Jackson did ask to see the President and the Secretary.

A Oh, I think the Reverend Jackson has asked to see the President. I'm not suggesting that's not correct. I thought your question was whether the President has decided to see the Reverend Jackson.

Q Okay, the answers were, to the request, that the President had turned down such request. So that's incorrect?

A I think the position is that the Administration wanted to have this morning's meeting between Secretary Armacost and Reverend Jackson proceed

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and see how that meeting went and what the outcome was, and undoubtedly there would be recommendations coming out of that meeting.

Q Can you tidy up -- sorry.

Q Yeah, I'm sorry. The recommendations obviously haven't been released?

A No, the meeting just concluded.

Q Could you tidy up the political status of the Cuban political prisoners here in the United States, and will they be debriefed by the U.S. Government? Will the returning Americans be debriefed?

A I guess you really ought to go to INS which has the lead on that, Bernie. But, as I understand it, I think the primary emphasis is on reuniting them with their families. But just what the -- how that will proceed, and where they are, I think INS is really the --

Q The debriefing?

A I don't know whether there will be any debriefing.

Q The INS for both the Americans and the Cubans; is that correct?

A Not the Cubans? The Cubans.

Q They're doing the Cubans.

A On the Americans?

Q Who's doing the Americans? Will the Americans be debriefed?

A Well, those who -- I presume that those who were not arrested, because warrants were outstanding, I assume they have gone their own ways.

Q But they will not be debriefed?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q To find out about human rights conditions in jails in Cuba or anything?

A I don't know. Maybe somebody will work something; or maybe somebody has talked to them about it, but I'm not aware of it.

Q Can you shed any light on this: one of the prisoners apparently has disappeared?

A Are we any further along on our one missing --

MR. ROMBERG: Have to go to Justice.

MR. HUGHES: We have to go to Justice. On the one that landed and is missing -- that one?

MR. ROMBERG: (Inaudible)

A No, that one you have to go to Justice on. I thought you were still going back over our arithmetic of who is still held there.

Q The U.S-Cuban -- the question, and what kind of a gesture is regarded -- the former Head of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, Wayne Smith, says that in the spring of '82 the Cuban Government informed him that they had ceased all arms supplies, both with respect to El Salvador and to Nicaragua as well.

Now, is that the kind of gesture that you're looking for? And what was -- how did the Administration react at that time when that message was passed?

A A Cuban announcement that they had ceased their subversion?

Q No, they did not announce -- they passed you a message, according to --

A Passed us a message that they has ceased subversion?

Q No, no, no. That they had ceased sending any arms to Nicaragua or to --

A Verification is a very important aspect of all of our negotiations, I think --

Q So, in other words, this wasn't true? They had not done so?

A I think we would look for more than a Cuban statement of cessation of arms flows.

Q Well, could you look into -- I mean, you list a bunch of things that they're doing that you're looking to change Cuban behavior. The man who was the Head of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana suggests that one of those criteria was transmitted to the United States in the Spring of '82, and I'm wondering how you reacted to it --

A I don't know. I don't know what the reaction was, but I assume the judgment was that that was not considered credible --

Q John, --

A -- especially in the light of later evidence.

Q The Times has a story today, based on an interview with the Secretary, in which he characterizes the Castro decision to release the prisoners as a propaganda victory.

Does that, by extension, suggest that the Reverend Jackson was used by Castro to attain what the Secretary is calling a propaganda victory?

A I think Reverend Jackson addressed that question himself and gave his own view of that on one of the networks --

Q But what about your view?

A -- this morning. Well, I think what we have said is very plain, that we don't see basic movement in the Cuban Government's position, and we don't see this as a significant gesture or signal, and therefore I suppose, as I have said and as the Secretary said, you have to look to see whether there were not propaganda overtones to it.

Q And what?

A Propaganda overtones to the decision that the Cubans took.

Q Does the Administration have any regret -- it looks like it -- that these prisoners were freed, and they are here in the United States because of the propaganda elements that you are talking about?

A No. As I say, on humanitarian grounds, we're always happy when Americans come home, reunited with their families. And we have a broad interest in the removal of Americans from substandard prisons. And I assume that -- you'd better talk to those who were there -- but I assume they would argue that the Cuban prison is a substandard prison.

Q There's an item in the paper that says next week the Soviets are sending a delegation here for further talks on the hot line. Can you confirm that?

A No, I cannot confirm that, Bernie, of our own knowledge. Over the past year, we have had several meetings in both Moscow and Washington to discuss improvements to the hot line; and we have proposed to host follow-on session with the Soviets for sometime in July.

We have not yet received any official confirmation when a Soviet delegation would come for those talks, but we will, of course, welcome (them) when they do.

Q Copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q John, can I have one more question on Cuba, please?

A Sure.

Q In fact, Castro desire to have good relations with the United States (sic). Now, don't you think that it could be an indication that Castro wants to lean toward the United States by releasing the prisoners?

A As we have said, we would welcome Mr. Castro leaning towards the United States. We would welcome the re-entry of Cuba into the family of Latin American and Central American nations, and we would welcome his pursuing policies which would be more agreeable to us and certainly more beneficial to the Cuban people and to the people of Central America.

But one of the basic foundations of this Administration is to look realistically at what people do,

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and so we're looking at the activities of Cuba with a continuing sense of realism. And we don't see the kind of basic change in direction that we would like to see.

Q Is anybody in the State Department going to see Eden Pastora while he's here?

A Yes. I think he's seeing Assistant Secretary Motley this afternoon.

Q Does Motley have any particular message to deliver to him?

A I don't know. I think it was a meeting requested by Mr. Pastora. I honestly don't know.

Q Do know what time that is?

A It's late afternoon -- 5:00, 5:30, somewhere around there.

Q Could you tell us something about the Dobrynin meeting today?

A Ambassador Dobrynin came in; saw the Secretary. He was here for about 45 minutes. I know this will continue to be frustrating, but in line with the Secretary's traditional posture on this, we really are not going to get into the substance of the discussions.

Q Who requested that meeting?

A Don't have anything for you on that.

Q Could we assume this is a follow-up to the -- I mean, was he bringing in some answers?

A You have gone beyond my mandate, Bernie, I'm afraid.

Q John, may we have a filing break?

A Filing break? Sure. I thought you might be right at the end, but -- I was hoping you might be right at the end.

Q Anything special about that meeting, John, even if you can't get involved in the specifics?

A Came in, met with the Secretary for 45 minutes, Bernie. I don't really have anything --

Q Have the Soviets protested --

A I think he came in the front door.

Q Have the Soviets protested in an official way the Secretary's comments at the terrorism conference?

A Not that I'm aware of. As you know, the -- you say "in an official way." As you know, the group of visiting Soviet journalists withdrew their request to see the Secretary, and I think you'd have to ask them for their reasons. But I understand they made no secret in various meetings around town that his Sunday-night speech had a bearing on their decision. I think they made that decision after they visited the Soviet Ambassador here.

Q In other words, there's nothing after Dobrynin's meeting that says anything about the hot-line talks or the --

A No, nothing beyond those --

Q Thank you.

Q Can I ask you about -- on the Gulf for a second, please?

A Yes, sure. Ralph?

Q The Kuwaiti Ambassador is coming in this afternoon. Has the decision been completed in the Administration on what arms package to forward?

A You've got me unawares. I didn't know the --

Q It was announced two days ago.

A It was announced two days ago the Kuwaiti Ambassador is here?

Q No, that the arms package --

Q The arms package was announced two days ago.

Q I think the Pentagon has talked about the $83 -- is it $83 million or $81 million?

A Yeah.

Q And also talked about its relationship to other on-going considerations where Kuwait is concerned. But I don't know whether -- (a) I didn't know the Kuwaiti Ambassador was in this afternoon, but I don't know what they're discussing.

Q He'll be here at 3:15 this afternoon, according to his schedule.

A Who is he seeing?

Q Mr. Murphy.

A Okay.

Q The Costa Rican Government --

Q You're welcome.

Q Sorry. Has the Costa Rican Government asked the United States to seek to dissuade members of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force to enter their country?

A To enter their country?

Q To begin operations from their country?

A I have no idea.

Q Can you look into it?

A Sure. I'll take a look at it.

Q John, you said that Jesse Jackson's behavior violated the tradition of not speaking out against our country from a foreign soil. Was his behavior and statements in any way disloyal?

A Oh, I don't think we would attempt to characterize them. I was just trying to respond to a question that somebody asked, making the point that what he had said, I think, tended to run -- or the manner in which he had said it tends to run counter to, I think, what we have generally tried to maintain in terms of a bilateral foreign policy and relationships with other countries on the part of this country. But I'm not saying it's disloyal.

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Q In today's --

Q Could I follow on that, please?

Q Yes, go ahead.

Q Are you saying that's a violation?

A No, I was not saying it was a violation.

Q Are you saying it undermines U.S. foreign policy toward those countries?

A I think you'd have to make your own judgment about that.

Q In today's FBIS, on Page I-2, there is an item from an Israeli newspaper saying that despite its denials and its promises to the United States, Israel is continuing to supply arms to Iran. Could you please look into this item, because it's coming from London.

A Nothing beyond what we gave you on that a couple of week ago. Be glad to refer you to the Press Office on that, but there is no change that I'm aware of.

Q It's a new revelation from London sources that possibly you could want to look.

A If there is a new revelation and we have anything to say about it, we'll do so this afternoon.

Q Any comment on the Supreme Court ruling yesterday on travel to Cuba?

A No, it simply regularizes regulations that have been in effect by this Administration. What underlies your question?

A What underlies my question? Well, an intern in my office got the story out too late last night to meet the deadline so we're looking for a peg for today. (Laughter)

A Oh, I see.

(Press briefing concluded at 1:10 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #117

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MONDAY, JULY 2, 1984, 12:34 P. M.

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. One announcement or a reminder, really, that at 2:00 p.m. there will be a BACKGROUND briefing here in the Briefing Room on the forthcoming meetings of ASEAN and ANZUS.

That's it for announcements. Happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, just so we can clean up where the exchanges with the Soviet Union are. Where do you think the situation now stands vis-a-vis these talks that had been proposed by the Soviets in Vienna?

A Jim, as you know, we've said we're prepared to meet with the Soviets in September. We have made an official statement on the U.S. position. We've also provided a backgrounder, the transcript of which, I think, has been made available at the White House, and we can try to make it available here as well.

Beyond that, I think all I can really say is that we're pursuing these discussions in diplomatic channels to arrange for a meeting, and don't have anything further to say.

Q These pursuits in the diplomatic channels have occurred since the Soviet statement -- when was it? Saturday, I think.

A Well, as I say, we are pursuing. I'm not going to be specific about how or when or with whom we are pursuing these discussions.

Q Would the United States be willing to sit down and talk with them only about ASAT?

A That's exactly the kind of issue which was addressed in the background, and I'm going to refer you back to the text of that transcript.

Q Could you clarify one thing, Alan? Would the United States show up more or less regardless of what the agenda is?

A Again, I'm going to refer you, John, to the transcript. I will point out one thing that was said. The senior official noted that "at the meeting the Soviet Union may raise what it wishes, the United States will as well, and we hope for a fruitful exchange in both areas."

Q In other words -- I mean, just to --

A There was a further exchange in that a questioner asked, "In other words, they don't have to listen, but we do intend to talk about those issues, and if they choose not to listen about one, we'll still show up." The senior Administration official said "yes."

Q Will the U.S. go if the Russians don't show up?

Q That's what I just asked.

A You will be our chief delegate in that case, Bernie. (Laughter)

Q Alan, has the U.S. decided on the size or the status or level of the delegation?

A Again, I think all of this was addressed in that backgrounder. I really would refer you to it. It was, although not an extensive background in time, I think it was quite comprehensive in terms of these kinds of questions.

Q Alan, are all --

Q Does that mean that we can take it that the substance of that backgrounder stands at this time, regardless of the fact that it occurred prior to the Soviet announcement --

A Yes.

Q -- rejecting any U.S. counterproposal?

A Well, all right -- I'm not going to characterize the U.S. -- excuse me, the Soviet TASS statement. We had something on that yesterday. But, in any case, it stands.

Q Alan, did the Secretary have a substantive discussion with Mr. Dobrynin last night on this subject?

A I don't have anything for you on their discussion last night.

Q Will there be a U.S. statement today in response to the latest Soviet news agency statement?

A Well, we had a statement yesterday.

Q Another one today?

A I don't anticipate one. Never can say "never," but I don't anticipate anything.

Q Alan, this Administration has frequently expressed a preference for conducting private diplomacy, yet in the past several weeks the President and his people have more than once gone public with very sensitive questions, the President talking on his feet at some length at his last news conference about summit diplomacy and Mr. McFarlane coming out before cameras late Friday in response to the Soviet ASAT negotiation offer.

What is the mix as seen from here on public versus private diplomacy, and how does that fit into the 1984 political schedule?

A Well, (1) I don't have an analysis of the mix to give you, (2) I'm not going to get into questions relating to the 1984 political schedule, and (3) I think it's obvious that the reason for our going public with the response on Friday was because we were addressing something that was already, you know, public.

But, as I said, the pursuit of discussions is going to -- the continuing pursuit of discussions will be in diplomatic channels, and that's where we intend to keep them.

Q Have you had an official Soviet response to what was said on --

A I'm going to leave you with exactly what I have on this, John. I'm not going to be able to take it any further. Sorry.

Q Well, the statement yesterday addressed itself to the TASS statement. Is that where you want to leave things?

A I don't have anything to add to what I've just said. How ever you want to characterize that as leaving things --

Q New subject, please?

A Please.

Q Anything on the Post story about the Pentagon and the Latin airlift?

A No. I'd refer you to the Pentagon.

Q Do you have anything on the Mexican former Chief of Police? Has he been transferred to California?

A No.

Q Have you received any request from the Mexican Government to extradite him?

A You'd have to check with the Justice Department, I'm afraid.

Q Israel is holding nine passengers who were aboard the Cypriot ship last week. Do you have any position or comment on the continued arrest of these people?

A Well, only really to say as far as the facts are concerned, we understand that a ship was diverted to Haifa on the morning of June 29 and allowed to depart that evening. Nine people aboard the ship -- it's little confusing -- as far as we understand it, are still being detained by Israeli authorities, but five of them are scheduled for release. Our indications are release tomorrow, but that may be out of date. I've seen some wires indicating an announcement on their release. In any case, we are seeking further clarification from the Government of Israel.

Q Alan, what do you characterize this act of -- some people call it like kidnapping this ship, or what do you characterize it?

A I don't have a characterization to give you. Obviously, each case is different and must be viewed in light of the circumstances. As a general matter and general principle, we support freedom of navigation in international waters. But, as I say, you've got to look at each case differently, and I'm not going to try to offer you labels for them.

Q A follow-up? There's a report from Israel that one of the people being held is the terrorist Carlos. Will that change the American reaction at all?

A Well, I don't have anything on that, so I can't really comment on it.

-- MORE --

Q Do you have anything on the detention of the former Israeli President by the Soviets?

A Not a lot. The former President of Israel, Ephraim Katzir, was recently detained by authorities in Leningrad. He has since been released. Katzir, a scientist at Israel's Weismann Institute, was in the Soviet Union to attend a scientific conference. We currently have no further information on that incident.

Q Alan, Mr. Pelletreau is in Lebanon. Do you have any readout about his visit and why is he there?

A I don't have a readout on his visit. His responsibilities, as you know, encompass that area, so it's perfectly natural that he should go out there for a routine visit to the area.

Q Just a routine visit?

A Yes.

Q It's not because of the new formation of government, or whatever it is, with the agreements that are coming out with the militia to take part --

A I think that this is in the nature of consultations.

Q Alan, Eden Pastora this morning put forward what he called a "political initiative," asking for free and fair elections in Nicaragua and enumerated a number of pre-conditions including freedom of the press and the expulsion of 3,000 Cubans and other foreign military forces as condition for his groups' participation in the elections.

A Uh-huh.

Q Does the United States have any comment on that initiative? Is it supported?

A Don't have -- I don't have a specific response to what he has said and I haven't seen the text of what he may have said. A number of the items you described in terms of free and fair elections, obviously, is consistent with what we have been talking about, but really I think I would have to refer you back to what we have said before rather than trying to comment on his program per se.

Q He said he was here in part seeking American political support for his position.

A All I really can say about that is that we've described his meeting with Ambassador Motley already last week. He did meet with Under Secretary Armacost over the weekend -- they met for about an hour. They had a discussion which could be called friendly and useful, but that's really all I have for you.

Q Just to clarify, is it the American position as well that the elections as now envisaged in Nicaragua, are, to use his term, "fraudulent?"

A I think I'd best refer you back, John, to what we've said before. We've had rather extensive commentary on that and I'd like you to look at that.

Q Was there a meeting today with Dobrynin -- with the Secretary?

A No.

Q No meeting at all.

Q Is there one scheduled?

A I don't have anything for you on the schedule.

Q On the Israeli former President who was detained, you haven't characterized it as good, bad, indifferent? You've just given us facts.

A Well, I think what we've said is that we're looking into the matter, trying to find out what the facts are; we try to do that before we pronounce upon things.

Q Will you have something later today on it?

A I don't know.

Q Two others on South African-related stories that came up over the week, has the U.S. asked Ambassador Nickel to look into and try to protect Rev. Simon Farisani?

Q Don't have anything for you on that.

Q Can you get us --

A I'll look into it. I'm not sure what we might come up with, but I'll look into it.

Q And is there anything on the case of David Goldberg who has been denied permanent entrance into the United States because he was once a member of the Congress of Democrats in the fifties, in South Africa?

A I don't have anything on that either. I'll take a look and see if there's anything on that.

Q Do you have anything about the planned visit to Moscow by Jesse Jackson and his reported plan to obtain the freedom of Soviet dissident Sakharov?

A No.

Q Do you have anything, Alan, on events in the Gulf? Are we concerned about the renewed Iraqi attacks on shipping there?

A I missed the first -- any comment on the --

Q Events in the Gulf, and specifically shipping?

A Not really. We are aware of the various reports, but can't confirm them. We reiterate, obviously, our concern about bringing this conflict to a peaceful resolution.

Q Alan, have you any comments on movements from Honduras Government expelling Contras? (sic)

A No, don't have anything on it.

Q And anything about Bolivia?

A Well, I have a little bit on Bolivia, partially in the way of a situation report. President Siles Zuazo was released by his captors Saturday afternoon nine hours after his abduction. Following his release, the President made a statement over the national radio calling for national unity, and thanking the United States, Spain, and others for their support.

I would note that the Bolivian political parties and military were strongly opposed to the coup attempt

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and reaffirmed their support for the constitutional government. I understand that some individuals have been arrested, but we don't have details on that.

Q Copy of that?

A Yes, we can do that.

Ralph?

Q I just wanted to come back one more time to this Soviet thing just to see if I can figure out where things are. On Friday, during the backgrounder and immediately after the backgrounder, the assumption seemed to be quite clear that the meetings were on, that it was not clear as to what was going to be discussed, but that the U.S. would be going to these meetings.

A I'm not going to try and interpret for you how you interpreted the comments made on Friday. The fact is, as I said, we're prepared to meet with the Soviets in September, and I would refer you back to the statements we've made on it. I really can't take you beyond that, Ralph.

Jim.

Q Alan, is the Administration still considering whether to support Pastora's conditions or is your statement today it?

A I don't expect to have anything specific, but if we do, we'll be happy to make it available.

Q Alan, back on the Persian Gulf, you say you're aware of the report, but you can't confirm these attacks.

A Uh-huh.

Q Didn't they occur in the area of coverage of the AWACS?

A I believe they occurred at the extreme, according to the Iraqi account, at the extreme northern end of the Gulf.

Q -- which would be out of the coverage area?

A Well, it would be up near Bandar Khomeini. I think there are some things you can do -- and I'm not going to get into the question of what AWACS capabilities are. There are some things you can tell and some things you can't tell, and I think the question of whether we can confirm these ships being hit and so on and so forth, just can't do that.

I think the Korean Government has announced, if I understand it correctly from press reports, announced that one Korean ship was hit. I wouldn't question that. But as far as the rest of the reports about five ships total and airplanes being shot down and so on, I just can't confirm it for you.

Q But, Alan, you don't think there is a shift now by the Iraqis that from hitting tankers to hitting ships, I mean --

A You're saying that's a shift. I'm not so sure that's a shift, if you go back over history of whether they've hit ships up there heading towards Bandar Khomeini.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:48 P.M.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #118

TUESDAY, JULY 3, 1984, 12:22 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon all. I don't have any announcements, so I'll be glad to take a few questions or we can all go to lunch.

Q Okay, before we go to lunch, tell us about the meeting this morning between the Secretary and Ambassador Dobrynin.

A Ambassador Dobrynin came in at the Secretary's invitation to have breakfast with him this morning. That meeting lasted a little over an hour and a half. I think Ambassador Dobrynin is very shortly going back to the Soviet Union, and there had been discussion about such a meeting taking place before he leaves.

Q When he left the building, the Ambassador talked about the -- one of the subjects was the demilitarization of the cosmos, which translates to mean the anti-satellite warfare talks. Was that a principal topic?

A Well, Jim, you understand the problem we always have about talking about these meetings. Just to go back over the ground, in a general sense, the Secretary and Ambassador Dobrynin have been meeting over a period of time, and several of those meetings have taken place within the past several weeks.

They have been reviewing item-by-item the issues that affect U.S.-Soviet relations. There has been a general discussion of that relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Clearly, during those meetings, Secretary Shultz has been making plain that President Reagan continues to work for a constructive relationship with the Soviet Union; and the United States, in the course of working for that constructive relationship, has clearly not lessened its concern about such matters as Soviet activities in Afghanistan, Soviet behavior in Central America, and in other parts of the world. Nor have we lessened our concern about the Soviet treatment of individuals such as Mr.

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Sakharov, Mr. Shcharansky, and Mr. Orlov. And also we have continued to express our views and our general attitudes concerning immigration -- Jewish immigration from the Soviet Union. That's in general.

That's the kind of atmosphere that has pervaded these talks in general.

Now, insofar as the most recent Soviet proposal to take up matters related to the militerization of space, the United States has accepted the Soviet proposal to meet on this subject. We have indicated our willingness to discuss any subjects that the Soviets put forward. But we've also expressed our intention to put forward subjects of our own that we want to raise, including offensive weapons that go through space.

Obviously, arms limitations in space have a direct impact on deterrence. These matters are interrelated. So that is the general framework within which these discussions have been held, and that is our response and our position on the specific Soviet proposal for a meeting, which we have accepted.

Q As of now, do you expect there to be a meeting in September in Vienna?

A Can't tell you how that will come out. The Soviets, as you know, have made certain proposals; we have accepted, and we will see how all that unfolds.

Q One more detail. Who else was present at this meeting?

A I think Mr. Armacost was present on our side, and I think there was one other Soviet official with Ambassador Dobrynin, but I don't know who that was.

Q John, can I just come back to your statement here, so there is not a semantic mystery? The Soviet proposal, at least as it was made public, called for the U.S. and the Soviet Union to appoint special delegations to go to Vienna to begin discussions on preventing the militerization of outer space. I think that's almost word-for-word.

The U.S., on Friday, said it was willing to discuss -- have talks anyplace, anytime, in September and said the U.S. thought the following things should be discussed, and then it listed two specific items. One,

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ways of resuming the START and INF talks, and two, taking up -- looking at feasible ways of having discussions on anti-satellite weapons, which is less -- which is more restricting than the Soviet proposal, and anything else the Soviets wanted to discuss was okay with the United States.

Is that still the basic proposal?

A That's the position, and that is as was enunciated by a senior Administration official on Friday, and there's no change in that position.

Q That is somewhat less, I think, than the flat statement that you said, that "the U.S. has accepted the Soviet proposal to meet." Because, as I understand the Soviet proposal, it is not to meet but to have delegations on this rather specific subject.

A Well, as I said, we expect to listen to anything that they want to raise, and we expect to put forward some subjects of our own.

Q John, do you have any thoughts yet on what level such a meeting might be conducted?

A I don't, no.

Q You don't mean by listing the things that have come up in the discussions between the Secretary and Mr. Dobrynin that you would intend to bring up such questions as human rights --

A No. What I was trying to do was to give you the kind of framework within which the Secretary's discussions with Ambassador Dobrynin had taken place. What I was trying to do in the first part of my remarks was to kind of recreate that atmosphere and then to go on to Jim's specific question about this specific proposal.

Q Do you have any comment on Mr. Gromyko's remarks yesterday which did not have much positive to say about the United States?

A You mean the ones that were sort of particularly critical of the United States?

Q Yes.

A Well, I don't think -- just looking at the words on paper, I don't think we can take very seriously such allegations and accusations about the United States. I think the record of the United States in world affairs is plain, and it's difficult for us to take such charges very seriously.

Q John, in the White House statement on Friday accepting -- or whatever it did -- the responding to the Soviet proposal -- it did the one and two bit which suggested that (1) i.e., discussion of START and INF took precedence over the ASAT talks and space talks. Is that a correct interpretation --

A I wouldn't --I don't think I would direct you in that -- down that road, Bob. I think that is not a correct impression.

Q But you would consider those points as equal or --

A It's not a question -- I don't think it's a question at this stage of setting out the agenda, giving weight to various -- agenda items. I think what we're saying at this stage is the Soviets have issued an invitation to meet and discuss certain subjects. We have accepted that invitation to meet and discuss that subject. We will listen to additional items that they want to bring up, and we will have some items of our own that we want to bring up.

Q John, you said that some of the -- you mention in your statement that the nuclear weapons negotiations are interrelated with the subject of weapons that go through space. But at other negotiations, that the U.S. is currently engaging with the Soviet Union in -- particularly MBFR and other forums -- does the U.S. bring in -- mention everything that is interrelated at those negotiations?

A No, I was --

Q Why is it choosing to do so in this case?

A Well, I was simply making -- and I don't want to go very far down that road -- but I was simply making a general observation, that when you're talking about deterrence, there is more than one weapon, more than one system involved in deterrence.

Q That's true in a lot of other forums as well. My question is, why is the Administration in this particular forum deciding to bring in interrelated matters rather than doing so in other fora where there already are negotiations?

A I think because it's the President's feeling that if you're going to talk about one, it's logical to raise the other.

Q John, what's --

Q This morning, Dobrynin characterized talks with Shultz as useful. Do we have a characterization?

A I don't. As you know, we have tried, sometimes with more success than on other occasions, to keep the substance of those conversations confidential and to engage, as the President said, in quiet diplomacy rather than a kind of back-and-forth rhetoric that there has been in the public domain. And I think it's the Secretary's desire, really, that we not talk a great deal about those meetings.

Q Secondly, is Dobrynin carrying back any sort of message to the Kremlin?

A Well, as you know, the President, I think, said at his session in the Rose Garden that Ambassador Dobrynin would be carrying a message back to the Soviet leadership, but I'm not going to get into the form of that message, or how it's being carried.

Q John, what is your reading of the Soviet decision to refuse Hartman air time for his 4th of July message this year?

A Well, we regret that, Barrie, and find that kind of difficult to understand. The Soviets have, indeed, refused to allow Ambassador Hartman to make the traditional 4th of July address. They gave a lame excuse about it "not fitting in" with their programming.

It's always difficult to know what leads to such decisions. Presumably the Soviets are concerned about having their people hear our views on the American political process. This isn't the first time they've turned down our effort to speak directly to the Soviet people on this occasion. You recall they cancelled Ambassador Watson's planned speech in 1980 because of its reference to Afghanistan.

They have also refused to allow Ambassadors from other countries in Moscow to make the traditional national day comments on television when the Soviets objected to the contents.

We regret the Soviet refusal to allow Ambassador Hartman to make the speech, and, as you know, Soviet spokesmen have frequent access to American television. This has traditionally been one of the few opportunities Americans have to speak directly to the Soviet people.

We will make available to you the text of Ambassador Hartman's speech when we get the final version from our Embassy in Moscow.

Q Did he have to submit it in advance to the Soviets?

A I think that is the traditional --

Q Could we get a copy of your statement?

A -- procedure. Sure.

Q John, do you have anything today on the detention, the brief detention, of the Israeli -- the former Israeli President in Leningrad?

A No, afraid I don't have anything for you on that.

Q Yesterday Alan said you were going to study the issue before coming to some judgment on it.

A Is that what Alan said yesterday? Then I guess we're still studying it. (Laughter)

Q Do you have anything on that Senate vote on no money to be used for trade with Bulgaria?

A No. Might have a little something later in the day on that, Bernie.

Q John, anything on the new joint meeting of the military-political committee of the U.S. and Israel?

A Well, that meeting did take place. It took place June 28 and 29. As you know, the Joint Political-Military Group was established last November to continue discussions with respect to political and military cooperation between Israel and the United States.

The group met, as I say, expressed its satisfaction with the progress being made in all aspects of that cooperation, and agreed to meet again in December.

Q Where was that meeting?

A That was in Israel.

Q John, any update on the situation in the Persian Gulf?

A No. I don't have anything up to date.

Q Excuse me. Can I have a copy of the --

A Sure.

Q -- statement on the --

A Sure.

Q Going back to your original words on the U.S. position on these talks, just so we can slice it a bit finer, is it the U.S. position that because ballistic missiles go into outer space as part of their trajectory, that they, therefore, should be included in that part of the arms control spectrum?

A I think it's a logical argument behind our reasoning that these should be raised in the overall context.

Q John, can I -- in the Dusko Doder story from Moscow today, he quoted a Soviet source as saying that the formal U.S. written response to the Soviet response -- the statement on Friday -- was much less forthcoming than what was said orally by spokesmen such as yourself, I guess. Is there any difference between the written text of what was handed the Soviet Union on Friday and --

A Well, I'd caution you --

Q -- what was said by Mr. McFarlane?

A I'd caution you -- I'd do two things: I'd caution you about such deductions, and I'd say that I think we're going to try to put the emphasis on, as the President says, "quiet diplomacy," rather than public back and forth with the Soviets.

Q When are you planning to do that?

A We'll do it quietly, Barrie.

Q I still want to come to that same question. And you said flatly, "We've accepted the Soviet proposal."

A Uh-hum.

Q You've just accepted -- you've just agreed that it's a good idea to meet.

A Uh-hum.

Q You haven't accepted the language of the Soviet proposal.

A Well, I think in the process of acceptance we've offered our own views about that meeting.

Q John, a couple of southern African questions. There's a report that the -- South Africa has stopped its withdrawal of troops from Angola because SWAPO is reportedly moving into that area. Do you have anything?

A No. I don't have anything new on that.

Q Did you have anything on that at all or --

A I thought you were going to ask me whether the South Africans and the Angolans had met, and I would have said, "We understand they have."

Q Yeah. Well, this is much more important. Could you look into that, please, because I have a filing --

A I'll take a look at it and see whether we might find anything.

Q Then there were two I raised yesterday, one on this Reverend Farisani --

A Yes. I think something was -- either was or is about to be -- was posted on that, Connie.

Q David Goldberg. Was there something posted on that?

A Also posted.

Q Sorry. I didn't look yet.

Q John, on the talks in Lusaka between --

A Sorry?

Q Did you have any readout?

A No, I don't.

Q Also, on the same -- in the same area, a member of the South African Confederation of Trade Unions was killed with her daughter this past week in Angola by a mail -- by a bomb that came through the mail.

Do you have any --

A Was that Miss Schoon?

Q Yeah. That's the one.

A We deplore such acts of terrorism and reiterate our strong belief that they impede the resolution of the problems which have plagued southern

Africa. We have no indication who was responsible for those murders, but we are hopeful that the killers will be brought to justice expeditiously.

Q Do you have any reason to believe --

Q Copy, John?

A Sure.

Q Do you have any reason to believe that it was South Africa, in view of other -- of similar kinds of --

A Don't have any indication of the killers.

Q To change the region briefly -- do you -- has Costa Rica formally protested to the United States about violations of their airspace and --

A That is the Vollman story in The Christian Science Monitor? That's incorrect, and they have not.

Q Pardon?

A That is incorrect, and they have not. The story is incorrect. False.

Q John, do you have any comment on the purchase of Soviet military aircraft by the U.S. Government for training purposes?

A Soviet military aircraft?

Q Chinese. MiG 21s.

A Yeah. The Chinese?

Q Yeah.

A I don't know whether Alan did anything on that yesterday.

Q No.

A I certainly don't intend to do anything on it today. (Laughter) Might want to go talk to the Pentagon.

Q John, can we go back to this Soviet-American exchange?

A Sure.

Q Just on an intergovernment thing. There's supposed to have been a study underway on anti-satellite -- on the anti-satellite issue: verification and the kind of proposal that we might find acceptable.

Have you got anything on that? Can you say when this study might be finished? Can you say what direction it's moving in?

A The President's March 31 report to Congress highlighted the considerable work that has already been done in this area. Since that time we've continued our studies of ASAT arms control options which should be equitable, verifiable, and compatible with U.S. security. Our preparations for September discussions are on track.

Q John, what does that mean? Does that mean that "on track" there will be a proposal ready by September?

A It means that our preparations for that meeting in September are on track.

Q Wait. That suggests that the preparations were underway before the Soviet proposal to meet in September --

A It isn't any secret that we've been looking at this whole problem for some time.

Q Right. But were you targeting to have a proposal ready --

A Oh, no, no, no. Don't misunderstand me. Don't -- if your question is, "Were we working towards a September date before the Soviets invited us to go to a September meeting," the answer is no.

Q Well, then how -- you mean they're -- all of a sudden they're on track in three days?

A I mean -- what I'm saying is that we have been working at this for some time, and at that meeting in September, if it takes place, we will be ready.

Q John, you'll be ready with what?

Q You tempt me to ask whether the proposals -- whether this U.S. study would have been on track had the Soviets proposed talks next week.

A You said you are tempted.

Q Tempt me.

A Yes. But I'm not. (Laughter)

Q John --

Q Can we pursue this, or is that as far as you're going to go?

A That's as far as I'm going to go.

Q I mean, you won't talk about high altitude, low altitude --

A No. No, I won't.

Q John, what will you be ready with?

A I'm sorry?

Q You'll be ready. Ready with what? For what?

A Ah, that would be telling. (Laughter)

Q John, could I ask one quick one before you change the subject?

Q John, make sure I understand the state of play, because I'm trying to catch up on all this.

A Okay.

Q We have accepted the Soviet condition that the meeting center on anti-satellite -- weapons in space.

A Well, I'd rather refer you to the considered words that the State Department and White House have used on this over the weekend, and also to the --

Q But today's language seems more flexible somehow. I don't --

A Well, there's no change in our position, but I also would refer you back to the BACKGROUNDER which has a lot of good stuff in it.

Q But, I mean -- but we are not imposing any preconditions of our own?

A It's not a question of preconditions. We have received an invitation, we have accepted that invitation, and we have indicated that we would consider what the Soviets raised, and we have some things we want to raise ourselves.

Q We're not saying that we -- you know, we won't go to the meeting unless they allow these subjects to be raised.

A We're saying what we're saying.

Q Okay.

Q John --

Q John, on another subject, is the State Department putting out some report -- the word "White Paper" springs to mind -- on Nicaraguan arms flow?

A Well, I think a draft went up last week to some members of Congress, but I don't have any word for you on the release of that document.

Q John, I know we've had a lot of background material on ANZUS. Do you have anything on the record about this controversy over the Wolfowitz speech?

A No. I didn't know there was a controversy over the Wolfowitz speech. Sorry.

Q Thank you.

Q Before you close it, would it be possible to ask for a copy of the considered words you offered at the beginning of this briefing in which you listed the various background context, if you will, for the discussions and things?

A You flatter me by saying they were "considered words."

Q No. You just called them that.

A It came from me, so I guess you'll have to get them from the transcript. It's not a written statement.

Q Ah ha. How about the recent proposal portion of that statement?

A I'm afraid that's -- those are also my considered words.

Q How about on the ASAT?

A ASAT? Got it on paper.

Q Okay. Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:44 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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DPC #119

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
THURSDAY, JULY 5, 1984, 12:20 P. M.

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. Trip's still on. We leave tonight. (I'll) turn over the podium to Mr. Romberg. I know you'll treat him with the same gentleness that you treat me during the two weeks we'll be away....(Laughter)

Q Can't hear you.

A I have a statement on the Guatemala elections. The White House released a statement July 4, noting the record turnout of Guatemalan voters for the July 1 Constituent Assembly elections and underlining the report of the U.S. observers that the elections were conducted in an exemplary manner: fair, open and orderly.

Copies of their report, I think, are available in the Press Office.

OAS election observers also favorably characterized the elections as free and honest. The State Department applauds this important step in restoring the democratic process equally. We applaud the response of the people of Guatemala who reaffirmed their strong commitment to and belief in democracy.

Guatemala's Supreme Electoral Tribunal has released provisional figures indicating a broad range of democratic political parties will be represented in the Constituent Assembly. This Constituent Assembly will meet in August and will be charged with drafting a new constitution, paving the way for presidential elections expected in 1985.

That's all I have in the way of statements up front. Be glad to take any questions.

Q You say that was a White House statement you were --

A White House statement, issued yesterday.

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Q You're just repeating the White House statement of yesterday?

A We're underlining it and amplifying it. I just wanted to amplify this White House --

Q Correcting the grammar?

Q Will you take a question on it?

A Sure.

Q There is a controversy in Guatemala about whether this Assembly should have the right to appoint an interim government, which is opposed by the _de facto_ president, General Mejia.

A Uh-huh.

Q Does the United States have a view as to whether the Constituent Assembly should be -- should have -- should be a sovereign assembly and be permitted to permit an executive?

A Be glad to look into that for you.

Q Thanks.

Q Do you have any information on the reported missile attack on a freighter in the Persian Gulf?

A Not a great deal, Jim. We understand that the Liberian-registered tanker _Primrose_ was attacked by unidentified aircraft today in ~~the Gulf~~ east of Qatar. The vessel, which was slightly damaged, is apparently proceeding to its destination.

The United States continues to deplore attacks on vessels in international waters. We don't -- we aren't able to give you a view on who was responsible for this attack.

Q Why is that? Is that not within the AWACS coverage?

A I do not know whether that is within the AWACS coverage, but I know that we are unable to give you a view on who is responsible.

Q John, going -- sorry --

Q The reports from out there suggest that it was in -- that eyewitnesses aboard the ship said the aircraft was Iranian. Do you have any reason to doubt that?

A I don't have any reason to doubt it, but I don't -- also don't have any reason to confirm it.

Q And does this suggest any new escalation, any new qualitative change?

A Well, I think you'd have to -- I mean, I think we'd have to know a little more about it and who is responsible.

Q Is there something about this attack, John, that -- which occurred apparently on the Saudi side of the Gulf from others that have occurred on that side of the Gulf -- that would make it more difficult to have a view on who was responsible, or is there --

A No. We're doing the best we can in giving you what information we have, whenever we have it, and right now I can't give you anything on the source.

Q John, just go back to Central America for a second. Have you got anything on a -- there's a Baltimore Sun and a Reuters report -- Baltimore Sun of today and Reuters of yesterday -- about the El Salvador rebels and SAM-7 missiles? Have you got anything on that?

A I do have something on that. This is the suggestion that the rebels are dealing with the PLO and Libyans to get missiles? Sure.

We've addressed the general question of Palestine Liberation Organization and Libyan support to the Salvadoran guerrillas, generally through Nicaragua, in the past. As far as the current press reports are concerned, we are not able to confirm what contacts the Salvadoran guerrilla organization may have had with the PLO or Libya.

While we've seen the unconfirmed reports over the past year that FMLN guerrillas have acquired SAM-7 missiles, we cannot confirm the information, but to our knowledge none has been fired against a Salvadoran air force plane or helicopter to date.

Q Do you have confirmation beyond the press reports that -- or other indications beyond what the public press has reported, that they have these weapons?

A No. Do not. We -- if they get them, of course, we'd regret any escalation in the level of conflict, but I can't confirm that they have them.

Q Copy of that?

A Sure.

Q John, mildly related topic: The President seems to be working under the assumption that the Reverend Jackson could be prosecuted for his trips to Cuba and Central America as violations of the Logan Act.

I gather another opinion was expressed here at the State Department, 27the-8the. Could you clear that up, the whole Logan Act and --

A Well, I -- yeah. I don't think you're correct in saying the President is talking about prosecution. I think -- but it is true the President had some remarks about the Logan Act yesterday, but I don't have anything beyond what the President said.

Q Saying that he might have been in violation of U.S. law. Is that the State Department view that he might have been in violation of U.S. law?

A I leave you with the President's words. I think we have nothing beyond the President's words.

Q Apropos of the President's remarks, John, Jackson said today in response to those remarks -- a Presidential warning about going to Moscow -- that if his passport was not taken away or interfered with, he would go to Moscow and he would try and get the release of some dissidents, and he would try and seek a meeting with the President, and would try and seek a meeting with the Secretary.

A Uh-huh.

Q Have you seen anything about that?

A I know of no approach by Reverend Jackson to anybody in the State Department about the possibility of travel to the Soviet Union. That, of course, is a matter for him.

Q So -- but the State Department, then, has been made aware of the President's position -- or is aware of the President's position on, say, a trip by a Presidential candidate like Jackson to the Soviet Union to carry out personal diplomacy?

A Well, if you're talking about a question of a trip to the Soviet Union --

Q Yeah. He's saying he's going to do it, if his passport is --

A Reverend Jackson --

Q If his passport -- he says if his passport is valid and remains valid and the Soviets don't say no, he's going.

A Uh-huh.

Q So then if he does that, what would be the position of the Department?

A Well, the State Department certainly would not stand in the way of a private citizen traveling to the Soviet Union, but I think the President was speaking specifically of contacts on the question of Mr. Sakharov.

Q Which would be supported or opposed or what?

A I think we'll leave you with the President's words. The President expressed himself on that yesterday.

Q Couldn't a private citizen make contacts with regard to the Sakharov case if he did not do so with the Government of the Soviet Union?

A I don't know that private citizens have had much luck at making contact in the Soviet Union with the Sakharovs.

Q Not with the Sakharovs. On the Sakharovs with other non-government sources and contacts and so on, such as --

A Well, there are -- I mean, there are a number of factors here. You're asking me in general about travel to the Soviet Union, and, of course, a private citizen is free to go to the Soviet Union. You'd have to take into consideration what the President said yesterday, and there is the question of how the Soviet authorities would react to all this.

Q He spoke about quiet diplomacy, John. Could you amplify that at all?

A No.

Q The Reverend Jackson expressed doubts about the possibility of that working, or that it was being applied properly --

A Uh-huh. Yeah.

Q Paraphrasing.

A No. Don't have anything more on --

Q Speaking of contacts in the Soviet Union and the two American diplomats who were detained in the Soviet Union, were they in fact having a dialogue or interacting with Soviet dissidents or --

A Talking to a Soviet citizen. Mr. Purnell and Mr. Glass, both Foreign Service Officers assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, were detained for about two hours on July 4th. They were talking with a Soviet citizen on a Moscow street. Their detention was totally unjustified. It was in violation of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which states in Article 29, "The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention." That's a quotation.

This violation of the immunity of our diplomats was compounded by the Soviet refusal to permit them to contact the American Embassy in Moscow immediately as they requested. The Soviet Union's action also represents a violation of Soviet pledges at Helsinki and Madrid to facilitate freer contacts between the citizens of their country and others.

It's part of an increasing drive on the part of the Soviet authorities to isolate their people from foreign contacts and to repress legitimate expression of differing political and social views except under conditions which are under the complete control of the Soviet authorities.

Soviet conduct in this case has been reprehensible and totally uncalled for, and we condemn it. We have protested to the Soviet Union, both in Moscow and here. We're absolutely satisfied that Mr. Purnell and Mr. Glass were not involved in any impermissible activity.

Our Embassy in Moscow has established that neither at the time of the detention by Soviet authorities on July 4th nor on any other occasion were their activities inconsistent with their status as diplomats. In other words, they were engaged in their normal diplomatic duties and consular duties.

Insofar as documents are concerned, the Embassy officers were given a number of documents by the Soviet citizen with whom they were talking, but they had no time to examine them before they were detained, and therefore they still have no knowledge of the contents of those documents.

Q John, was that a prearranged meeting with that Soviet citizen?

A I don't have anything more for you on the circumstances.

Q Had they met with that Soviet citizen --

A With this particular citizen before? I don't know the answer to that.

-- MORE --

Q Could you take that?

A Let me take a look and see what we might have on that.

Q Can we have a copy of the previous statement?

A Sure. Uh-huh.

Q John, when you (inaudible) the initial part of the statement referred to talking to a Soviet citizen on the street, and then at the end you talked about documents being given by the citizens with whom they were speaking. Were they speaking with -- was it each one speaking with one citizen or --

A No, they were both speaking with one citizen.

Q So where do the documents --

A Don't know what happened to the documents.

Q The documents came from one citizen?

A The documents came from one citizen. They were seized immediately, taken to a militia station, and the documents were taken from them.

Q Were the documents --

A Along with other possessions -- other items in their possession.

Q Other items given to them by the Soviets, or --

A No, no, no. Other items of their own.

Q I'm sure they must have expected a particular content in these documents, to have arranged receipt of them, no? What did you expect to get in the documents?

A Well, we're satisfied that what they were doing was within the normal range and acceptable range of diplomatic activity, so they were not doing anything that was improper in their meeting with the Soviet citizen.

Q John, are you implying they were set up?

A I'll leave that to your own deduction. They were arrested awfully quickly after conversation with this Soviet citizen began. Obviously, they had had no time to look at what they were given.

Q The language the Soviets use in denouncing the activities of the two American diplomats is often the kind of language used as prelude to expulsion. Have you any fears or concerns that the two will be expelled, or have any threats been made specifically that they would be expelled by the Soviets?

A Don't have anything on that particular aspect.

Q Apart from the protest, does this government plan any form of retaliation?

A Don't have anything for you on that, Jim.

Q John, in addition to taking the question about whether they had met with this particular Soviet citizen before, and whether this was a prearranged meeting, could you also take -- could you also provide us with the name of the Soviet citizen?

A Let me see whether we are in a position to do that.

Q John, can I ask you something back on the Middle East on this --

Q On this subject, one related question on this issue. Do you have anything on a Carlton Philips, an Hofstra University professor who was apparently picked up by the Soviet police and expelled?

A I don't, Greg, no.

Q I understand you were asked --

A Was that in Moscow?

Q In Leningrad.

A He arrived back in he States today.

Q No, don't have anything on it.

Q You or Alan were asked Thursday or Friday about the capture of that boat in international waters which was suppose to go into Israel, and at the time I understand you or Alan didn't have much to say.

Can you tell us now what -- there is conflicting information as to how many people remained in Israel. Do you know as of now as to how many people --

A I don't. You're right, that was Alan responding to that, but I don't have anything -- is there any further update on that, Alan?

MR. ROMBERG: No, the Israelis announced how many were released.

MR. HUGHES: The Israelis have announced how many were released.

Q And let me ask you also, in light of the Conference on Terrorism two weeks ago, and the legislation on hijacking by the Administration which is now being debated in Congress, how do you see this act? Is it hijacking; is it -- I mean, how do you see the act as such?

A I don't have anything new today, I'm sorry, beyond what we said last week.

Q Okay, John, a boat in international water was taken. In light of legislation now pending in Congress on hijacking of airplanes -- not boats, really -- do you see this as an act of hijacking or do you not see this -- does the Administration see it as?

A You asked the same question a second time, I'll give you the same answer a second time: I don't have anything for you today beyond what we said last week.

Q But he didn't touch this -- nobody asked you about this issue at all.

Q Do you have any reaction or a comment on the improved security situation in Lebanon?

A Well, we're pleased with the direction in which it seems to be going, and we hope, obviously, that there will be a peaceful resolution, a peaceful outcome.

Q Do you have anything on the visit of Mr. Pelletreau to Lebanon? Is he still there, or --

A I don't. No, I don't.

Q John, can I come back for just a second to the Jesse Jackson comments made by President Reagan? I'm trying to sort out whether or not the import of the warning about contacts on the Sakharov case, whether those comments are to be read also in connection with the visit to Cuba, or whether you're trying to draw some distinction and say that basically the President is warning Mr. Jackson about the trip to the Soviet Union and is not referring, when he talks about the Logan Act, so much to the Cuba/Central America trip?

A Oh, I don't think I can be in the position of interpreting what the President said. The President made remarks, and we stand on them.

Q Well, but the State Department also made remarks. Do you stand on those as well as Jesse Jackson's trip to Central America? The question wasn't raised --

A I stand exactly on what the President said yesterday.

Q On that question --

Q Is that a revision of the -- of what the State Department said last week on that --

A Don't think so. The President said there's no -- I think -- I mean, you have to go back and read what the President said, but I think he said there was no question of prosecution.

Q No question of prosecution, but the State Department also last week was saying that there was not only no question of prosecution but that there was no -- that the State Department did not believe that he was negotiating in Cuba and therefore there wouldn't be any question at all raised about that?

A Well, don't have anything beyond where we are.

Q Leaving aside the question of prosecution for a moment, can you say whether the State Department has an opinion, or whether it has been asked to form one, or whether it is in the process of doing so, as to whether the law was violated by Jackson?

A I do not think the State Department has been asked for an opinion on that.

Q John, last week the distinction was that Reverend Jackson came to this Department prior to his trip to Central America and Cuba and had, I believe, two meetings with Under Secretary Armacost. Is that a distinction in your mind which separates him from any prosecution or violation of the Logan Act? And would Mr. Jackson be afforded the same courtesy if he decided to go to the Soviet Union and get a briefing from --

A I think you have to see his visit to Secretary Armacost in -- within the framework of the State Department not approving or disapproving, or taking a position on that trip.

Reverend Jackson announced that he was going to make that trip; asked the State Department for some briefings which were gladly given. And I think that was the substance of those meetings, pointing out various problems in the area and pointing out our views about those problems and giving him general background on what he might encounter.

Q Would you afford Reverend Jackson the same briefings should he undertake a trip to the Soviet Union?

A I would assume that if he asked for some kind of meeting with State Department officials on travels, that we would look at that favorably, but it's academic because to my knowledge he has not asked for such a meeting.

Q Could you inquire as to whether the Reverend Jackson was cautioned about possible violation of the Logan Act when he had those meetings?

A I don't think we would really get into much more detail than we've already given on his talks with Mr. Armacost which were, after all, confidential.

Q Do you assume that he was not cautioned when he went?

A I just don't know. I wasn't at those meetings. I really don't know.

Q One more on this, please. In the State Department's recollection, has anybody ever been prosecuted under the Logan Act?

A I guess I'd have to do a little research on that. I think there may have been a couple of instances, Jim, but let me take a look at that for you.

Q John, the Vice President said yesterday that he was using these foreign visits to criticize U.S. foreign policy. Is that what he is doing, in the State Department view, and is there any --

A I think we had some thoughts about some of the comments that Reverend Jackson made about the United States when he was in Nicaragua, and pointed out that we did not think that was in the previous tradition of withholding criticism of your country from a foreign platform, particularly one that is not particularly friendly to the United States. So I think we've already pronounced on that.

Q Is that the distinction that's made between his trip to Damascus earlier this year? Does the Administration and the State Department have a view as to the distinction between his trip to Damascus and his trip through Central America?

A Oh, I think there are many differences between the trip to Damascus and the trip to Central America.

Q Among them the one you just mentioned?

A Well, you -- I mean, you'd have to go back and do the research. I'm not aware of comments that he may have made in Syria critical of the United States?

Q Has any date been set yet for those negotiations with the Cubans?

A I do not think we have got anything firm on that, Bernie.

Q Do you have anything on this American who's being held in Nicaragua and supposed to go on trial on espionage charges, self-admitted, self-claimed involvement with the U.S. Embassy officials?

A Well, we can confirm that Mr. Luther is an American citizen. And as the press reports indicate, American Embassy officials have been allowed consular access to him. Provisions of the Privacy Act, which apparently have not been waived by Mr. Luther, prevent us from addressing any specifics about those conversations. And that's about all I've got.

Q Do you have any comment on the possible motivation he may have had for making these allegations?

A No, I don't.

Q Any concerns about the fairness of the trial?

A Any concerns about --

Q Concerns about the fairness of a trial?

A No, just don't have anything --

Q Can you tell us whether or not he is or has been an employee of the United States Government?

A Let me look into that and see what we can tell you about that.

Q John, have there been any -- you finished this?

Q Well, I just wanted to ask -- can you offer us anything about this Mr. Amori, or however you pronounce his name?

A I cannot. I think the Embassy there had some responses to specific questions about Embassy officials, but I don't have anything beyond that.

Q Are there any plans with respect to the new, so-called White Paper that you can you give us?

A No, don't have anything on that.

Q John, has there been any change in the position of the United States regarding convening the

United States -- United Nations conference on the Middle East in light of the movement and the visits of Mr. de Cuellar here and his meeting in Geneva pretty soon with Yassir Arafat and others?

A No. You mean an international conference on the Middle East involving the Soviet Union?

Q Yes.

A No. We've made very plain our position on that and have not changed our position.

Q My second question. Evans and Novak, in their column yesterday in the Post, wrote, quoting authoritative sources in Jordan who said that if the Likud wins the elections July 23, the West Bank will be absorbed into Israel and there will be an Israeli effort to drive the Palestinians out. Do you have any comment or position on such thing that might happen?

A I really don't.

Q John, did you ever get a reaction to that Senate vote on Bulgaria?

A Yes, I do have something on that. That is the Helms resolution?

The attempted assassination of the Pope was an outrage. We strongly support the ongoing Italian effort to determine who may be involved. For that reason, the State Department has serious problems with the amendment. Insofar as the amendment stems from reports from Rome concerning the so-called Bulgarian connection to the Papal assassination attempt, the United States Government believes it's premature to take a position pending completion of the Italian judicial process.

Our chief concern is that action by the United States in advance of the Italian decisions could harm the credibility of their process.

We would add that the United States Government's modest trade promotion program in Bulgaria is in direct response to the needs, interests and requests of the U.S. business community which often finds it needs assistance in dealing with a centrally planned economy. For example, the United States exported $14 million worth of tobacco to Bulgaria last year. (Laughter)

Q Copy of that, please, John?

A Sure.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:45 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #120

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
FRIDAY, JULY 6, 1984, 12:27 P. M.

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I don't have any announcements. Happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, a couple of South American questions. One, has the Government been asked to accept a new ambassador from Nicaragua?

A I don't have anything on that, Jim. I think, in any case, we would not comment until any process -- whether we're asking some other country or they're asking us -- we would not comment until the process had been concluded. So I'm afraid I don't have anything for you on that.

Q Okay. Can you tell us anything about the role played by the U.S. Ambassador in Bolivia during the coup?

A Yes. This question, I think, was raised in a report this morning in the New York Times. Clearly, credit for continuation of the constitutional order in Bolivia and the failure of a small group to stimulate a coup belongs to the Bolivians themselves.

It is true that as soon as news came in that President Siles had been kidnapped early on June 30, the United States Government moved quickly to ensure that those in Bolivia and in the hemisphere as a whole were aware of the oft-repeated U.S. policy of support for the constitutional processes of that country.

Ambassador Corr was authorized to make a public statement, and he contacted a wide spectrum of Bolivian leadership to assure that the United States position was understood. We understand that governments in neighboring countries made similar approaches.

Q Did he, or did anybody in the government, have any advance notice of the coup, or indications?

A Well, I don't have anything specific to offer you in terms of advance notice of a particular activity.

Our position, though, I think -- I guess I'm going to have to stay away from it because it would involve obviously a question of intelligence information.

But, again, our position in favor of the -- in support of the constitutional processes and our statements, as they were made, are quite indicative of our approach to that question.

Q Can we get a copy of your original statement, Alan?

A Yes.

Q Also, on this same -- on the same area, or on Bolivia also, can you say -- did Ambassador Corr say, in calling around, say that relations between Bolivia and the United States would be cut if there was a coup?

A I don't have the specific quotes that he may have --

Q And do you have any comment with respect to the alleged involvement of the Leopards and -- that is, that's a military unit -- and the impact on the drug-fighting program?

A Jim, we had some guidance on that the other day. I don't happen to have it with me. Let me ask you to check it in the Press Office.

Jim Anderson, did you have some further question?

Q Yeah. How --

A Let me just say -- let me just go back to one question. As a general matter, we don't see a reason that this would have an impact on the drug program, but there is some more extensive guidance on that.

Q How does a U.S. ambassador phrase such a warning without straying across that line of involving the United States in domestic politics in another country?

A Skillfully. (Laughter)

Q How --

A But I don't have words for you in terms of what he said; I don't know what the specifics were. But there's no secret, as I'm repeating today, of our support for the constitutional processes, and there is nothing untoward about making sure that that is known.

As I say, we've said it here, and there's no reason the Ambassador wouldn't make that known. And, as I say, other countries in the region apparently made similar kinds of statements.

Ralph?

Q Alan, the Soviet Union issued a new statement today on the proposed talks in September, insisting again that the U.S. was establishing conditions for those talks. Do you have a comment on the TASS statement?

A Yes. There is a TASS statement, obviously, that was issued today that says the Soviet Union's offer to talk with us in September is still valid. That is good news.

We accepted their proposal for talks a week ago, which was the same day that the Soviets made their offer. Our position has not changed. We accepted, and we have placed no preconditions on acceptance of the offer of talks. We will, however, continue to discuss details of the talks with the Soviets through diplomatic channels because we feel that these quiet channels offer the best prospects for results, and we will keep those channels open.

Q The statement indicated the Soviets would not agree to our discussing -- as we apparently have told them we intend to do -- our discussing INF and START, and that the only talks they were willing convene would be talks to discuss space weapons.

A Well, I'm aware of that. As I say, Jack, the fact of the matter is that we think that the best way of handling the approach to these talks and continuing discussion with the Soviets is through diplomatic channels, and so I'm going to refrain from extensive and detailed comment on this statement.

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Q Would you quarrel with the suggestion that there still seems to be a difference of opinion on the shape of the agenda, looking ahead?

A Well, I would simply say that I think that we obviously need to keep on talking about the details of possible talks through diplomatic channels, and we will do that .

Ralph?

Q The TASS statement also chastises the U.S. for side-stepping the question of the moratorium which was a part of the original proposal by the Soviet Union a week ago -- a moratorium on the testing and deployment of space weapons effective with the start of the negotiations. The U.S. did not respond to that in its formal statement last week. What's the position on that?

A We've addressed ourselves, I think, to the question in general, and I'd refer you back to what we've said in the past about testing and the Soviets' position in terms of having a system, as opposed to our not.

But, again, I think that, in terms of responding to this TASS statement, our position is really going to have to be, beyond saying what I have said, that we would intend to pursue this through diplomatic channels and not continue to go back and forth publicly.

Q Can I ask you whether you view this statement issued today as being -- as taking into account the diplomatic exchanges which have occurred since the formal U.S. response was issued last Friday?

A I'm not going to try to speak for the Soviets, so I can't answer that.

Q I was asking for your view of what the statement --

A I don't think -- as you know, we don't generally try to assess Soviet motives and what they may or may not have done. We talk about what we do and what our policy is, so I'm going have to beg off that.

Q Alan, are you prepared to offer today anymore details about the allegations against two American diplomats?

A I don't have more, Fred. I'm still trying to see if we can provide the kinds of detail that you asked about yesterday, and I don't have any responses to those questions that you raised.

Q Well, the Soviets have provided a name. Would you confirm that that's the woman that the two diplomats --

A I cannot at this point. Again, we'll pursue that and see if there's anything further we can say.

I will note that we did, again today, make a strong protest against the violation of diplomatic immunity. Our officials did nothing wrong. They were not engaged, as I say, in any improper activity, and we do insist on a right to maintain normal contact with Soviet citizens.

Q Why did you have to issue a new statement today, a new protest today?

Q Just a second, Ralph. Was there an exchange of money?

A An exchange of money?

Q Uh-huh. Or just an exchange of documents, or just a transfer --

A I'm not aware of an exchange.

Q -- just a transfer of documents? Was there any --

A To my knowledge, the only thing that was passed was this -- was what John said yesterday, this document or documents -- whatever it may have been -- that never got examined by our officials, that were then seized by the KGB.

Q But do you know whether there was a conversation about monetary value of these documents?

A I'm not aware that there was any suggestion that there was any purchase being made here.

Q Alan, was this a second protest or was this a formalization of your earlier --

A I think one could properly use the word "again."

Q Why? Why is that necessary?

A I can't tell you the specifics of why, except it was viewed as a serious matter, and I guess as part of the dialogue that it was simply lodged again today.

Q Has something else been done to the Americans since the original detention that would prompt a second protest --

A I'm not aware of it.

Q -- or is it a protest over the same incident?

A No, it was the same incident.

Q It would be unusual, wouldn't it, Alan, for a second protest?

A I think that the matter was considered to be worthy of assuring that this didn't happen again. It's a serious matter in terms of allowing our diplomats to operate freely.

Q Have they responded to any of our protests, given us assurances?

A Well, I understand in fact that they may have issued some sort of a public statement at this point. I don't have the text of it, so --

Q What were the mechanics -- delivered to the Ministry in Moscow, or how was this done?

A I don't know if there's anything in writing, Mike. I can't confirm that. I simply don't know. But it was -- the protest was made in Moscow from our Embassy to the Foreign Ministry, yes.

Q Are we going to continue to press for assurances that there won't be a repetition of this kind of incident?

A I can't tell you specifically how a dialogue will go on from this point, Greg. But, clearly, we are concerned that there is not a repetition of this

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interference with legitimate diplomatic function, and I can't predict to you how the conversation may continue.

Q But they haven't yet provided such assurances; is that fair to say?

A I think that it is fair to say that we hold different views on what happened, and we're just going to need to continue discussing it.

Q Why is this considered so serious when the Consular official in Leningrad was physically beaten up last year and nothing was said about it for a month or two or more?

A Well, I'm not going to try to go , John, into the question of how we decide when we do something public or don't do something public in these terms. Obviously, there are times when we do and times when we don't.

Q Nobody was hurt here, and you're doing a second protest.

A Well --

Q And you can't give the details of the second protest -- who did it and where?

A As I say, it was done in Moscow from our Embassy to the Foreign Ministry.

Q This morning the Washington Times has a long story about the proposed Soviet Embassy in Northwest or Northeast Washington, the new building. It looks like, according to the story, there are some apprehensions about the building, which is coming to seven floors, and there could be a listening device or something like that on the top floors --

A I don't have anything to offer you on that. I don't have any specific comment on that story.

Q Alan, any reactions to reports of the Iranians sinking a tanker in the Gulf? And do you see that
as necessarily an escalation of the military --

A Well, John addressed this yesterday, and I don't have anything new. He really didn't have any details on it other than that we were aware that there was a ship that was hit. But I can't take you beyond where he was.

Q Does this necessarily change the situation, to the best of your knowledge?

A We are concerned that these attacks on ships in international waters stop, but beyond that I don't have any words to offer you.

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Q Alan, about the visit of Pelletreau to Lebanon, did he have any connection with the first phase of the disengagement, or whatever it is? What is happening in Beirut now?

A I don't know whether it was discussed with him. Obviously, that is a Lebanese matter, so whether the subject came up in his conversations I simply don't know.

Q What was the main mission? I mean, why is he there?

A You continue, or you and your colleagues continue to ask about this. It's not a very mysterious thing. He has responsibility for U.S. relations with a number of countries in the region, including Lebanon, so it's not unusual that he would visit Lebanon.

Mike.

Q Has the Department, has the Government acted on the nomination by Nicaragua of a new ambassador?

A I was just asked that by your colleague --

Q Oh, really? Well, who?

A -- Mr. Anderson.

Q O.K.

Q Can I go back for just one second --

Q Can I ask you another question?

A I'll come back to you, Mike. Go ahead.

Q Can I come back for one second to the diplomats. Just for the record, do you view any connection whatsoever between the dialogue on the diplomats and the dialogue on the talks? Is there any link that you see there, the way that's going?

A I can't draw that link, Ralph. I think you have to ask the Soviets. But I can't draw that link.

Q Alan, last week, I asked you about the ship which was seized by Israel in the international waters, and you said you were waiting for clarification from the Israeli Government.

A Don't have anything new for you.

Q You haven't got anything on it? Well, I have another question. Do you have any detailed information about the reported hit on a Japanese tanker? This is not the story of yesterday; it's today's story.

A I think it's the same story. I think it's a Japanese-owned tanker. I think that's the same -- I believe it's the same story.

Q Is it?

A I believe so.

Jim.

Q Yes, just a couple brief ones: Do you have anything on the U.S. position now on the Constituent Assembly in Guatemala and its powers?

A Yes, I do. We'll post it, but let me read it to you quickly: "The United States firmly supports the process of democratization in Guatemala. The highly successfull July 1 Constituent Assembly elections represent an important step in the process of restoring civilian, democratic rule, and we believe these elections underline the commitment of the Guatemalan Government and people to this process.

"It is inappropriate for us to take a position on the specific authority granted to this Assembly which has been charged with drafting a new constitution and paving the way for general elections in 1985."

Q Will you post that?

A Yes, we will post it and make it available to you.

Chris.

Q Alan, have you seen the Christian Science Monitor article on Soviet MIGs in Cuba awaiting delivery to Nicaragua?

A I've seen the story. What's the question?

Q Well, a general question is whether you have any comment on the facts of the question -- that is, have these MIGs been there for the last year? And I'll also ask, have pilots been training in Bulgaria and other places to fly them?

A O.K. As far as the presence of MIGs in Cuba, I just don't have anything to give you on that. I think it would get us, to address it one way or another, into the question of intelligence.

As far as the general issue is concerned, we have indicated on a number of occasions in the past that the addition of combat aircraft to the Sandinistas' powerful military arsenal would be a seriously destabilizing development in the region and would increase the threat that Nicaragua poses to its neighbors. It would alter the balance of power in the region, and both the Soviet Union and the Cuban Governments are well aware of our position in this regard.

As far as any preparations to receive aircraft and so on, we're not prepared to speculate on the motives, but the fact remains that as early as 1981, the Nicaraguan Government began to upgrade several airfields for jet combat aircraft use and has sent personnel to Bulgaria for pilot training and maintenance in MIG aircraft, and I believe that the Nicaraguan Government has even talked about the return of such trained personnel.

Q Could we have a copy of that?

A Yes.

Q Could I follow that up? What would the United States' reaction be to the introduction of several high-performance aircraft in Nicaragua?

A I don't think I'm prepared to be very specific at this point. I would simply note that our concerns and our position are well known to the various governments concerned.

Q Alan, several other Administration officials have been specific about the introduction of high-performance aircraft into Nicaragua. Would you be saying at this time that those statements of the past that such aircraft would not be tolerated -- are we to take that as a backing away from past statements?

A You're -- what statements are you referring to?

Q One by Secretary Weinberger, for instance.

A Well, if you've got on-the-record statements, fine. I refer you to those statements. I'm not trying to change the position, but I don't have anything to offer you in terms of what the U.S. might do about it.

Q Do we have any indication of a change in status of Rifaat Assad or of his special defense companies which patrol Damascus?

A No, don't.

Jack.

Q Sorry. This was on the question of the airplanes in Nicaragua. Would we be willing to take them out, if they were delivered, take them out with an air strike as was suggested in a quote from a Western diplomat in the story from Managua?

A I think I just answered your colleague that I'm not prepared to describe what actions we might be willing to take.

Q Are you taking a closer look at Nigerian diplomatic baggage these days in and out of this country?

A I really don't have anything, Fred, on that rather bizarre set of events in the U.K.

Q On Nicaragua again -- well, or related. Shlaudeman, in Caracas earlier this week, ruled out the possibility of any Cuban participation in any final peace agreement or talks in Central America, and that drew a rebuke by the Foreign Minister of Venezuela yesterday or two days ago -- I'm sorry.

Is that the U.S. position, that the United States rejects, *a priori*, any Cuban participation in the peace process?

A I'll have to look at that, Jim. I'm not aware of the Ambassador's remarks or of the alleged rebuke that's carried in the press.

Q Can I just do one other?

A All right. Go ahead.

Q O.K. This isn't a hostile question, but -- (Laughter)

A I see.

Q -- in view of the U.S. interest in democracy in Central America --

A Yes.

Q -- why does the United States consider it inappropriate to take a position as to whether a democratically elected organ of government has sovereign power as opposed to a de facto government which took power through a military coup? Why is that considered inappropriate to comment?.

A They're in the middle of a democratic process, Jim, and I think the statement speaks for itself on that. They've gone through a democratic election; they're in the process of commissioning a constitution, and so on; and I don't share what apparently is the basis of your question, which I can't quite fathom. But in any case, the fact of the matter is that it is a democratic process, and it would not be appropriate for us to try and talk about how they are, within a representative system, a democracy, that is moving forward, going to share among the institutions of government that power as they move ahead.

Q There was a report earlier this week that Israel's presence in Lebanon cost her about a quarter of a million dollars a day. Had Israel ever requested the United States to defray the cost of its invasion of Lebanon? And do you know where the money comes for Israel for this purpose of staying in Lebanon?

A You would have to talk to the Israelis about what their budget is because I don't know, and I'm not aware that the Israelis have requested any financing ot the costs that they specifically incurred in Lebanon.

Q Thank you.

A O.K.

(The briefing concluded at 12:48 P.M.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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DPC #121

MONDAY, JULY 9, 1984, 12:29 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have no announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, can you explain to us what the U.S. Government is doing about the sale of F-5 surplus aircraft to either Greece or Turkey?

A The only thing I really have on that is an explanation of sort of the background to sales and disposal of surplus items, Jim. Occasionally, major items of U.S.-origin equipment are declared surplus by their current users and become available for transfer to other countries. And in such cases, the U.S. examines the world-wide needs of our allies and friends and makes the most appropriate distribution of that equipment. But I don't have anything for you on the specifics of the stories that were in the press this morning on that subject.

Q Well, without reference to the aircraft, has the United States complained to Greece about the release of an alleged terrorist by the name of Shara?

A I think we've addressed this previously, and I refer you back. I don't happen to have that guidance, but the stories -- there were stories which appeared on that before, and I did address it, so I'd ask you to look back at the record.

Q Okay. And, just to clean up the aircraft, is the United States contemplating the sale of these surplus -- or permitting the sale of these surplus F-5s from Norway to Turkey?

A As I say, I don't have anything on the specifics of the stories on that subject that were in the press this morning.

Q Do you have any response to the statement by the Greek Government today that they are considering reassessing the totality of the relationship with the United States in light of this projected sale?

A Well, not a -- no, not a specific response to that. In terms of our overall relations with Greece, I would note that Greece is an important ally of the United States, and our relatonship has endured because it's based on common values, such as a commitment to freedom, to democracy and to human rights.

Greece is also an important member of NATO, and we value our relationship with Greece. And while at times we have significant differences, there must be considered -- or these must be considered in the larger context of the relations between two democratic allies whose perspectives can differ but also can coincide.

Q Then why is there a flap going on?

A Well, as I say, John, don't have a specific --

Q What are they mad at, then?

Q If you don't have any comment on the specific stories, can you say whether or not a transfer has been authorized? Has a transfer been authorized?

A I'm not aware of the specifics of whether any final decisions have been made on a transfer, so I can't tell you.

Q Well, who would be familiar with that? Is that --

A Well, I think there are a lot of people familiar with it. I don't know who's prepared to comment on it.

Q Alan, could you tell us whether this has already been raised between the U.S. and Greek Governments, explaining --

A I can't, Marvin. I think I'm going to have to fall back on our usual reticence to talk about -- about talking about diplomatic conversations.

Q You said that at times there are -- what did you say -- "significant differences"? Is that what you said?

A At times.

Q Is this one of those times?

A I think I'm going to leave you with my words of this morning, but also refer you back, in response to Jim's earlier question, to what we had to say before.

Q Alan, what is the attitude of the United States on the Greek Government's handling of this alleged terrorist?

A Again, I've addressed this before and refer you back to that. I just don't happen to have that guidance.

Q You say no specific --

A Well, when did -- it appeared in a couple of newspapers, I would guess, a week before last. That would be my recollection. It's easy enough to dig it out, and the Press Office will be happy to do that.

Q Alan, today's FBIS reports quote the Athens News as quoting the main opposition leader saying Mr. Papandreou has adopted pro-Soviet policies. Does the United States have any comment on that?

A Well, I don't have any comment to offer on that from here at this point. I've just given you one statement. I think that Assistant Secretary Burt has been up on the Hill recently and has talked about our relations, so I'd refer you to the record as it exists. I don't have anything new to add to it.

John?

Q You said before that no final -- you're not aware that any final decisions have been made on a transfer. Does this mean that it's still possible that we might somehow find some used F-5s, or something like this, that might go to Greece?

A I'm not trying to steer you in a particular direction such as that, John.

Q To follow up on that --

A I'm just not commenting at all on this story.

Q Well, first, could we have a copy of the statement, the statement you just now made?

A Yes. Part of it. I'm not sure I can give all of it.

Q And, second, then you would not preclude a third party providing the aircraft to Greece should that come about?

A Well, I refer you back to what I said originally in terms of the procedure. When there is U.S.-origin equipment, we then get involved in the decisions on what happens to that equipment. So I think that's responsive to that question.

Q You're not ruling it out either?

A I'm going to have to leave you with what I've just given you.

Q Are there any surplus F-5s in Norway at this time?

A I'd ask you to check with the Pentagon. I'm not saying they're not; I just don't have details to give you on that.

Q It's been a couple of weeks now. Do you have anything more substantive by way of reaction to the Israeli seizure of the Cypriot ship beyond the general statement on freedom of navigation?

A No. Why don't I take a look and see if there is. There was potentially a little more that we were going to be able to offer, but I don't have it with me so let me see if we can get it. If so, check with the Press Office later this afternoon.

Bill?

Q On the question of the transfer of the planes, it wouldn't be a sale, would it?

A I don't have the details on what would be involved in it; don't know. I'm sure that the Pentagon can address in general terms what would be involved in this.

Q On that same subject, the Greek press has been making references to an interview between Richard Burt and the Greek Ambassador in which Burt is quoted as describing U.S. relations with Greece as frustrating and difficult.

Is that an accurate description of what he said.

A   I have nothing to offer you on any conversations between U.S. officials and Greek officials on that or other subjects.

Let me take Ralph and then I'll come back.

Q   Another subject: Have there been any export licenses approved for defensive weapons to China recently?

A   I'm not aware of any, Ralph. I'll check, but you might also want to check with the Pentagon. You're talking about -- Yeh, I'm not aware of anything beyond what we've said before on this subject. But I will check.

Larry?

Q   I'll pass.

Q   Alan, anything on the strikes against the military bases in Greece?

A   Yes, I do have a little bit on that. A strike by Greek base employees against U.S. facilities has been going on since July 3. Operation of the bases continues largely uninterrupted. The U.S. has expressed concern and is attempting to reach agreement with Greek authorities to provide adequate police protection at the facilities.

There have been occasional incidents between strikers, on the one hand, and non-strikers and U.S. personnel on the other. There have been no serious injuries.

Q   What's your understanding of what prompted the strikes?

A   I don't have anything further for you on that. Sorry.

Q   Copy?

Q   On the China question, has there been a formal request from the Chinese Government for defensive weapons?

A I don't have anything to update you on that. I would suggest you might want to check with the Pentagon. But I'm not aware of it. But again, you might want to check with them.

Dennis?

Q Why are you trying to reach agreement on adequate protection? Because it has not been provided up to this point or -- I don't understand that statement.

A Well, as I say, there have been some occasional incidents, was, I guess, the phrase, and so one wants to be assured that there is adequate protection in that circumstance.

Q To follow on that, you said there were no serious injuries, but there were -- there have been injuries in these incidents?

A I'm going to have to stick with what I've got. I don't have any more details.

Q Well, why the use of the word "serious," then?

A I understand the logical point you're making; I just don't happen to have information to answer your specific question.

Q Still on this other terrorist incident in Greece, or the alleged terrorist release, a Greek Embassy spokesman says that a U.S. Government employee went into the apartment of a British citizen --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- took out a suitcase with a detonator device in it.

A Uh-huh.

Q And the Greek Embassy says that this amounts to interference with Greek justice and meddling in domestic affairs. Do you have any comment?

A Well, again, Jim, I think that all of this was addressed, generally speaking, in the previous guidance so -- it may not have been addressed in quite --

Q This specific point?

A It might not have been addressed in quite the detail that you would like, but I think that the idea of improper activity and all the rest of that was generally covered.

Maybe we could dig that out.

TO STAFF: Is that possible to dig it out now and I could try and look at it from here?

Q Do you have anything today on the situation in Lebanon?

A On the -- I'm sorry. I can't hear you.

Q Lebanon?

A Lebanon? Well, a little bit. There appears to have been some further progress over the weekend toward establishing security in the Beirut area, and we hope that the situation continues to improve.

Q Any comment on the airport opening?

A I don't have a comment on the airport opening per se. Obviously, we have been in favor of resuming normal activities and are in favor of improved security throughout Beirut.

As far as the concerns expressed by people about the kidnapped, we, too, remain extremely concerned about those who have been kidnapped in Beirut, including of course, three Americans who are still missing. But, as I say, we continue to support all measures to improve security for the people of Beirut.

Q Alan, do we see any particular significance in the reports of reconciliation between Arafat's wing of the PLO and several of the other PLO factions recently? Does this portend anything?

A I don't have any comment for you on that.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the Sakharov situation and the apparent Soviet decision to place Mrs. Bonner on trial?

A I don't. We've seen the reports suggesting that, but we don't have any independent confirmation regarding those reports.

Q Is Mr. Pelletreau back from Lebanon?

A He's, I believe, still in the region on his consultations, as I've indicated at least twice before. He is on routine consultations in the region. He has responsibility for various countries in that region, and so he is continuing --

Q Can you give us the names of the countries?

A Well, I've asked if we can get the names of the countries he's visiting, so I'm trying to get that for you, but at the moment I haven't got it. I will try. Promise.

Q Anything on Kuwait's purchase or projected purchase of Soviet surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles from the Soviet Union and armored vehicles, as well?

A Not in specific terms. I think we've addressed this before, though, when the reports first were in the press regarding the Kuwaiti Defense Minister's trip to the Soviet Union, which is now apparently underway. I think it was in June, and we indicated that, obviously, Kuwait has full diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, and senior Kuwaiti officials visit the Soviet Union from time to time, and we view the visit of the Defense Minister in this context.

I think we also indicated that we understood that this visit was initially set up, or at least the invitation was extended, in 1983 and that arrangements for the visit were made final earlier this year, that this was prior to the Defense Minister's visit to the United States, and that we were -- that was in April -- and we were aware at the time of his visit, of his plans, to go to Moscow.

-- MORE --

Q It's not a reply to their inability to get Stingers here?

A Well, I think those words speak for themselves, and I will leave you with those.

Ralph?

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the status of the Soviet-American cultural exchange negotiations? Have the Soviets agreed to begin those -- resume those talks?

A We have -- well, the President stated on June 27 that we had told the Soviets we were prepared to initiate negotiations on a new exchanges agreement. We have provided to the Soviets a proposed text, and we expect formal negotiations to begin in the near future.

Q Any date set?

A Well, I don't have specific dates at this point. We would expect that those talks would be carried out in Moscow, though, from our side under the leadership of Ambassador Hartman.

Let me go back to the questions --

Q Copy of that?

A Well, I don't have it in exactly that form, so I'm going to have to let you take it from what I said.

As far as the articles, Jim, if you go back I think there were some articles that appeared in the -- I guess the first article was in The Wall Street Journal. This is Greek terrorism, and that issue that you were talking about before -- or the terrorism in Greece, excuse me -- and the question of whether Americans had taken appropriate action or not taken appropriate action.

The guidance is not terribly specific, but it indicates, first of all, we're not going to comment on the details, but we can confirm that an individual who was held by the Greek Government for an alleged act of terrorism was subsequently released, and we had made our serious concerns about this known to the Greek Government.

Again, this was all several days ago. This was more than, I guess, ten days ago that we made this point known here in the briefing room. So that's really the extent of what I've got on that. We're not going to comment in detail -- sorry?

Q You're talking about a Journal piece. What day is that?

A June 28. And I think there was a subsequent article in the Journal the next day and also in the New York Times, and then I think that there were other articles following on that, but --

Q Alan, in that connection, when you let the Greek Government know of your concern, did you let them know in the context of the pending request for transfer of surplus planes?

A Oh, I don't think that that would be the way we would address the issue, in a context where something is ongoing and they're holding somebody and we're concerned with the terrorist aspect of it.

Q Alan, you zipped along very quickly -- excuse me -- on the cultural exchange, and you --

A Yeah.

Q -- said something about June 27?

A That's when the President said publicly, I think, that we had indicated, or told the Soviets, that we were prepared to initiate negotiations on a new exchange agreement. We've talked about that, I think, several times.

Q When he set out the whole list of things, that's when --

A That's correct. And I think we talked about it several times before that as something we were willing to talk about --

Q Right.

A -- and we would see when talks began. What I'm saying to you now is that we have given them a proposed text, and that we expect that those talks, that actually would focus on that text, would begin in the near future.

Q Is this proposed text that the U.S. gave to the Soviet Union in response to one they gave to the U.S.?

A I don't believe that's the case.

Q Okay. And what about the consular agreements that were also talked about in the spring of this year?

A Right. I don't have anything to update you on that. As I said, and others have said, we have indicated a willingness to move forward on that issue, but I don't have anything to update you.

Q Alan, when you say that you expect the talks to begin, is that expectation based on some response from the Soviet Union, or is it that you feel that from the U.S. side, at least, the talks are ready to go?

A I don't think we're just talking about our own feelings about this.

Q Was this passed on to Dobrynin by the Secretary, this proposed text?

A Marvin, I'm afraid I'm going to stay away from who said what to whom on this.

Q When was the proposed text given to the Russians?

A As I say, I think I'm going to stay away from the specifics of how it was transmitted.

Q Subsequent to the 27th?

A Yes.

Q Alan, can you confirm a decision by Thailand to buy F-16As and -Bs?

A I can't. I don't have any information on a final decision on that. Obviously, that subject has been --

Q In the works?

A -- in the works. It's a question of what their decision is, and I don't have that. I think there's been some previous guidance. If you don't have it, Spence, you might want to check on that.

Q Thank you.

Q Any response -- speaking of talks and whether they will expect to begin, can you say that you expect the talks to begin in September with the Soviet Union on space weapons?

A Don't have anything new for you on that subject.

Larry?

Q Alan, is there anything new on the U.S. attitude toward the travel by private American citizens to Bulgaria?

A Private American citizens?

Q Or any Americans.

A I don't think there is anything with respect to travel by private Americans to Bulgaria. There was, I think, a report in today's *Washington Times* regarding a memo on U.S. Government travel, or government employees' travel, to Bulgaria, and there was a communication to all agencies. It was routine -- an interdepartmental memorandum -- but I'm not going to be able to get into either what it said, because I don't have it here, or the rationale behind it.

Q What's the whole point of it? (Laughter) I mean, that they shouldn't travel or should?

A Let me see --

Q Are you encouraging travel to Bulgaria?

A I would not put it in those terms, no. (Laughter)

Q Is this a memo that says no U.S. personnel can travel to Bulgaria?

A Well, let me ask you to take a look -- I will see if I can get something further on the actual language that was used, but you might want to look at the Washington Times of this morning.

Q Any further word on the detained American diplomat situation in Moscow? Have they -- has their --

A No.

Q -- status been clarified one way or another by the Soviet Union?

A I don't have anything further to give you on that.

Q Okay.

Q Okay. Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:49 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #122

TUESDAY, JULY 10, 1984, 12:09 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: O.K. Good afternoon. Just one announcement that I think has probably already been on the wires, that is that today at 2:30, here in the briefing room, Peter McPherson, who is the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, will hold a press conference. The subject will be his upcoming trip to famine-stricken Africa. It will be ON THE RECORD for sound and camera. If you need additional information, please call Sara Tinsley, at 632-4200. That's it for announcements.

I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q What is the schedule for the Soviet delegation coming here to talk about the Hotline?

A Jim, the Soviet delegation has arrived in the U.S. for talks which are scheduled to begin tomorrow, July 11. They will be meeting to discuss possible improvements in communications between our two governments. As you know, this is part of ongoing discussions which have been held on that subject, which we initiated last summer on the basis of proposals advanced by the President in May 1983.

So, that's about all I've got.

Q Do you expect an agreement to be signed?

A I can't really speculate on that, Jim. The fact is, the talks are about to take place. I think we ought to let those go forward. Obviously, an agreement on the eventual upgrading of the Hotline is our objective. But as I say, the talks have to begin yet tomorrow -- this latest round -- so we'll let that go forward.

Q I don't know the exact date or text, but my recollection is that the Secretary said that, essentially, an agreement is together, just about ready for signing.

A Well, we would hope to make good progress, but let's let the talks happen rather than trying to predict their outcome before they take place.

Q Do you know where and when?

A I don't have details other than in Washington. I don't know, Marvin.

Q Who heads the U.S. group?

A The U.S. delegation is going to be headed by Warren Zimmerman of the State Department, who was until recently the Deputy Chief of Mission of our Embassy in Moscow. The Deputy Chairman on our side is Stuart Branch, who was a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Communications, and is now a consultant. The delegation will include officials from State, Defense, and the NSC staff. The Soviet delegation is headed by Mr. A. M. Varbanskiy -- V-a-r-b-a-n-s-k-i-y.

Q Try it again.

A V-a-r-b-a-n-s-k-i-y, a chief of administration in the USSR Ministry of Communications, and other members of his delegation will include officials of the Communications Ministry and the Foreign Ministry.

Q They are in New York now?

A I don't know where they are, Mike.

Q And how many sessions have we had previously?

A I don't -- Oh, I guess what I've got here is that they met in August '83 in Moscow, January '84 in Washington, April '84 in Moscow.

Q And you said you didn't know where they were going to meet here in Washington?

A I don't happen to know where they are going to meet.

Q Could you take that question?

A Well, I'll take it, but I'm not sure that we're going to necessarily provide that information, frankly. I think that the hope here is to be able to conduct talks in a businesslike manner and not surround them with a lot of press attention, which would distract from the businesslike atmosphere, as I say, we hope to maintain.

Q Do you think the Administration is opposed to conveying an impression of good relations now with the Soviet Union?

A No, I wouldn't say that, Marvin, at all. I think the point is that it's just a matter of getting on with these talks, which we think have a serious objective, and we'll let that happen.

Q Why would a picture of these people arriving and leaving interfere with their secret negotiations?

A I'm not suggesting that there necessarily won't -- you won't be able to do that. I just don't know. I'll check and if I have anything further to say, I'll be happy to provide it to you.

Q Would Secretary Burt or the Acting Secretary meet -- have any communication with this group?

A I'm sure there will be other officials who will be meeting with them. I just don't happen -- I don't have details on that.

Q Is there a time limit for the talks, Alan?

A I don't have anything on duration, no.

Q Alan, in your original answer, my notes have you saying "possible improvements in communications between" --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- we were talking about the Hotline, right?

A The Hotline. This is the proposal that was developed in close cooperation with Senator Nunn and the late Senator Jackson and other Congressional leaders.

Q Anything else besides the Hotline?

A Well, I think that we've talked about this before. I really am not going to go beyond this at this point.

Q But, Alan, you said --

A I think that, basically, what we are talking about is the delegation coming for talks on the Hotline.

Q You suggested just now that this is the proposal that was developed with Nunn and so on --

A Uh-huh.

-- MORE -

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Q But the proposal has been substantially changed, has it not, in the -- I mean, what's going to be discussed tomorrow is not the original proposal in --

A Well, I think this is -- has been part of it all along.

Q What?

A Been part of it all along.

Q Alan, what kind of political or diplomatic significance would you like to ascribe to this --

A I --

Q -- to this -- to the cultural exchanges, to the Star Wars talking about talking?

A I'm not going to try, Marvin, to draw those kinds of conclusions. I think the fact is that we're going to have these talks, we think that's a good thing, and we'll go forward with that.

Q I want to make sure I understand you. You say that the talks will concern basically the Hotline, but you're not ruling out that they will get beyond that into --

A I don't have any more detail to give you on what might come up beyond that. The basic subject, obviously, is improving communications, and the Hotline is the thing that has been talked about most, and -- so I don't quarrel with that.

Q Alan, on another subject, if I may?

A Please.

Q When Ambassador Wilson's -- when it was recommended that he -- that the whole thing be upgraded and he be the Ambassador to the Vatican, was the Department aware of the role that he had played in trying to organize meetings between U.S. officials or finding out information from the U.S. Government about Marcinkus?

A Marvin, I'm aware of the stories which have appeared on this subject. I don't have anything on those stories to offer you.

Q Is this -- Ambassador Wilson, we are told, is here in Washington having discussions with the Department today.

A Well --

Q What can you tell us about that?

A No, I understand it somewhat differently from your understanding, that Ambassador Wilson is in the United States on a private visit. Don't have anything on his specific whereabouts. I'm unaware of any meetings that are scheduled between Ambassador Wilson and officials.

Q To follow that up, if I may, we have a report that there was a -- that he held a series of meetings with the former Libyan Ambassador to the United Nations, during which there was supposedly a discussion of spot oil contracts, and we have a report that he was rebuked by cable by Secretary Eagleburger once word reached the State Department that the meetings had occurred.

Can you comment on that?

A Don't have anything on that. Sorry.

Q Alan, when you say that you're not aware of any meetings scheduled with officials --

A Uh-hum.

Q -- do you mean Administration officials or State Department officials?

A I -- my understanding -- and it may be incomplete -- but my understanding is any USG officials.

Q Can you explain the lid that has been put upon you on this subject? Is there anything the Department is concerned about revealing here?

A Well, I think that the questions revolve around subjects which, if they were being looked at inside the Government, would be things that would be private, essentially, within the Government. That is to say, you're asking about diplomatic communications with our

Ambassador -- to get back to, I think it was Bob's question -- or questions which were raised about communications with the Justice Department, and I wouldn't get into that.

Q Fair enough. But could you find out whether in fact the Department has the same kind of total confidence that it normally has in all of its Ambassadors?

A Well, I don't think I'm going to try and make proclamations. I have no reason to change -- to expect that that isn't the case, Marvin, but I'm -- basically, I have nothing to say about those reports at all, and I don't think I'm going to address any particular aspect of the report.

Q So I understand it, are you saying that the communications with Ambassador Wilson regarding any possible discussions that ought not to have been held are diplomatic communications?

A I'm not saying any --

Q If they're not related to his representation to the Vatican.

A I'm saying communications with our Ambassadors are generally privileged communications. As a normal routine operational point -- yes, that I'm saying.

Mike, did you have a question?

Q Not now.

Q Is there an inquiry, Alan, into any of these allegations?

A I just don't, as I said, have anything to offer you on this subject at all, so I'm going to stay with that.

Q One final question --

A Sure.

Q Well, not necessarily a final question -- will you -- if Mr. Wilson, Ambassador Wilson, does come to the Department, does have discussions with Department officials during his trip to the United States, will you at any point have anything to say about it?

A I don't know. That's a very hypothetical question, since as of this point he has no --

Q We have reason to believe that he's here in the Department today, but you're saying no.

A Well, I have reason to believe that he's not, so --

Q Alan, will the kind of communications of which you're referring to be the sort of communications that will be made available at the request of Congressional committees, to them?

A Uh --

Q Or are they privileged on that ground too?

A I'm not suggesting that there are communications, but the stories talk about them and the questions are based upon those stories, and it would necessarily involve communications. And I can't tell you on a hypothetical basis whether I would -- that would be true or not.

Q Well, can you tell us whether those cables were sent?

A Again, not going to get into the question of what cables may or may not have been sent.

Q No, no. I didn't -- you don't have to go into the detail of the cables.

A Not going to get into the question, Marvin, of what cables may or may not have been sent.

Q Do you think that it fits into an Ambassador's work to deal with kind of private connections or --

A Well, you're asking -- you're asking a question which you're, on the face of it, abstracting from a particular case, but it's obviously asking a question of these reports, and I simply am not going to have any response for you.

Q Can you deny that the reports are true?

A I'm not going to address the reports.

Q You can't even address them?

A No.

Q You can't even tell us whether they're false or accurate?

A Not going to address the reports. That's correct.

Q Alan, can I ask a question based not on the reports but on Ambassador Wilson himself, quoted in The Los Angeles Times? He said that any of his actions before he was confirmed as Ambassador fell under a different ethical rubric because at the time he was not a paid employee of the Government of the United States.

Could you enlighten that? That is, do you share that view?

A I saw that quote in the press. I don't have a comment to offer on it.

-- MORE --

Q Would those be considered diplomatic communications also?

A I don't think he suggested they were communications.

Q No, no, but you were saying that the --

A I don't have anything further to say about it, Ralph.

Q Alan, as a general principle, this is going to come up again. Does someone who represents the United States, even if unpaid, have a right to claim private communications when dealing with other parties?

A I'm sure there are lots of people who deal, who -- even Government employees who have private communications --

Q What I'm saying, is there -- does it make a difference in his status whether he is paid or unpaid?

A Well, I don't have anything to offer you on that, Jim. I understand your point; don't have anything to offer you on it.

Q Does the United States Government share the opinion expressed by Lord Carrington, the Secretary General of NATO, about the need to get the United States and the Soviet Union in the peace process in the Middle East, as expressed in the --

A I think that we have expressed ourselves several times on the question of how we approach the peace process. I refer you back to the President's September 1 speech.

Q I'm specifically asking because he's Secretary General of NATO.

A Fine; I'm specifically referring you back to our policy, so I think I have to be responsive in that way.

Q All right, another question. Do you have any comment on Donald Neff's article in today's Washington Times about the Soviet Union gaining more in the Middle East through the repeated mistakes of the United States in policy affairs regarding the Arabs?

A No.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the expulsion of the foreign priests from Nicaragua yesterday?

A Yes, I do have something on that. This is on the reports that ten foreign Catholic priests were expelled from Nicaragua.

We've seen the initial press reports, including the rather vague explanation of the Nicaraguan Government. Without getting into the substance of the expulsion or the Nicaraguan Government's allegations, since the details are still scarce, I would note the obvious fact that the expulsion is consistent with a long pattern of harassment and intimidation against the Catholic Church by the Sandinistas.

This pattern includes the outrageous insults to the Pope in March 1983; mob attacks instigated against churches, including one in Managua last month; previous expulsions of foreign priests; and numerous other events that are all a matter of record.

Q Can I have a copy?

A Sure.

Q Can I also follow on that? As I understand it, though, the actions by the Archbishop were in abeyance of the Sandinistas' state of emergency issued in 1982.

Would we consider this -- you say, "it's consistent with a long pattern of harassment." Do you think that the Archbishop's actions were a provocation to the Sandinista Government?

A I'm not going to try and make a judgment on that. I think I'll simply stand on what I've given you on this.

Ralph?

Q Any comment on the British tanker incident in the Gulf today?

A Not really. We've seen the reports, but don't have any information beyond that -- we've seen the press reports.

Q Can you confirm who hit it, or with what it was hit?

A No.

Q Have you any reaction today to the statements made yesterday by the Greek Government's spokesman about the possibility of U.S. bases and Voice of America relay stations being in jeopardy?

A I really don't have anything new on that. As far as VOA is concerned, I would note that although the formal arrangements governing the operation of the VOA stations in Greece lapsed in 1977, the stations have continued to operate based on mutual consent and on verbal and written assurances.

Early this year, we held a round of negotiations in Athens on the VOA stations, and we're prepared to resume those negotiations at a mutually convenient time. But I really don't have anything further, and I refer you essentially to what I said yesterday. Don't have any particular update to give you on that.

Q Has this Administration made any decision on the sale of aircraft to either Greece or Turkey?

A Don't have anything new on that subject, Jim, to offer you today.

Q Can we have a copy of that statement on the VOA?

A Sure.

Q Can we have a copy of that statement on Ambassador Wilson? (Laughter)

A I refer you to your tape recorder.

Yes?

Q Do you have any comment on the reports out of Malaysia today that Secretary of State Shultz feels that letters to some Olympic committees purporting to be threats against black Olympic athletes may have been the result of Soviet disinformation?

A No, I don't. I've seen the report, and that's -- I guess I'd let the Secretary's words speak for themselves.

Marvin?

Q Do you have anything on the Jane's Defense Weekly story about that explosion in the Soviet Union a month or two ago being apparently much worse than earlier reported?

A Frankly, I'm not familiar with the story. I think we have said, Marvin, about what we have to say about that particular event, though.

Q Do you have anything to comment on the resumption of relations, diplomatic relations, between Egypt and the Soviet Union?

A I think that's not a correct assumption of the question, if I may. I think that Egypt and the Soviet Union have had diplomatic questions. They've not had ambassadorial level relations.

Q Ambassador exchanges?

A Not really. We've indicated sometime ago, when this story was most recently surfacing again, that that's something that they had indicated, the Egyptians certainly had indicated, that they anticipated doing, so I don't have any comment.

Q The individual statement, which was in the paper this morning, or an item about the United Arab Emirates is entertaining the idea of having diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, do you have any comment on that?

A No.

Q The improved relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union, to get back the Ambassador to Cairo, is a result of the improved relations between Moscow and Washington?

A No. I think that I'll pass by that, maybe with what I said before.

Q Has there been any fruitful result of any sort in the last couple of days on the kidnappings in Lebanon with regard to U.S. personnel? Any --

A Regarding the three U.S. personnel being held?

Q Yes.

A Don't have anything new on that subject.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:29 p.m.)

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DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #123

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
WEDNESDAY, JULY 11, 1984, 12:09 P. M.

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. One announcement:

We are most pleased with the decision reached today at the Governing Board of the International Energy Agency regarding coordinated allied draw-down of oil stocks and other complementary measures in case of a major oil supply disruption. This Department and the Department of Energy have worked together for some time on this important aspect of our energy preparedness policy.

Secretary Hodel is releasing a statement on the agreement this afternoon, and both the text of that statement and of the agreement itself will be available in the Press Office this afternoon.

That's it for announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Where is this going to be released, Alan?

A The statement will be released at Energy.

Q There as well?

A Yes.

Q Can we have a copy of this?

A Of this? Yes. Sure.

Q Alan, does this Department have any reason to believe that these letters which have been appearing in some Asian and African countries are the product of Soviet disinformation?

A These hate leaflets which have thus far appeared in Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka, South Korea, Malaysia, and reportedly in the PRC, bear all the hallmarks of a disinformation campaign.

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The matter is still under investigation, but we can give a preliminary opinion that the leaflets sent to Zimbabwe, of which we have the original, was not written by a native English speaker and contains errors in grammar and syntax that a native speaker would not make.

We should also point out that the leaflets spell Ku Klux Klan, for example, with a hyphen between the first two parts that doesn't appear in standard English usage.

Also, as a general rule, material published by the Klan groups usually contains the full name of the organization and not simply Ku Klux Klan alone.

The thrust of the leaflets, that a threat exists for Olympic athletes from U.S. extremists, dovetails neatly with the Soviet justification for their withdrawal.

The sophistication involved in obtaining the addresses of national Olympic committees also bespeaks a campaign characteristic of active measures and disinformation activities.

Q Copy of that?

Q Can we have a copy?

A Yes.

Q Could you make available that -- a copy of that Zimbabwe -- or the letter received in Zimbabwe?

A Yes, I think we could do that for you.

Q We'd like copies of what you said.

A Yeah. I think we can do that.

Q And who --

A Excuse me. Let me let Jim finish up.

Q I just wanted to say, have you brought it up with the Soviet Union or anybody else?

A I am not aware, Jim, of what action may have been taken with regard to that, and I think probably we

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would not get into that matter. But, as what I've given you indicates, the preliminary analysis is that it may well be disinformation.

Q Do you -- have you found that the leaflets or letters have had any adverse impact on the receiving countries' desire to go to Los Angeles?

A I think you'd have to check with those countries. I'm not aware of any changes in plans by those countries, but I think you'd have to ask them to get an authoritative response.

Q Alan, are you making your position known in the various capitals of the countries receiving the letters?

A I don't know quite how that's being handled.

Q Can I just ask, in addition to making the document available, if you have any other material such as the envelopes in which they were mailed or anything of that sort?

A Uh-hum.

Q Could you make that available all at the same time?

A I think we could in this case do that, yes.

Q When are you going to make them available?

A We'll do that after the briefing.

Q Alan, there was a threat, I believe, from some African countries, Third World countries, that they will not participate in the Olympics as long as the Soviet Union is boycotting. Do you have the actual number of Third World countries?

A No. I think you -- I'm not aware of any widespread feeling of that sort. I think there was one country which may have announced that; but, in any case, why don't you check with the Olympic Committee and see what they have on that.

Q Alan, a report from Beirut today indicates that the Lebanese Foreign Ministry Secretary says Lebanon

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is ready to strike a deal with Israel on security arrangements through indirect negotiations. He doesn't name a third country.

A Uh-hum.

Q Can you say whether the United States is involved in indirect negotiations between Lebanon and Israel on security arrangements for southern Lebanon?

A We've had some words on this before, Ralph. I don't have anything new to offer on that, and I think I'm not going to pronounce. I'll see if we can get out the previous things we've had to say, but I have nothing new to say about that.

Q Would you steer us away from concluding that Pelletreau had -- Pelletreau's mission there this time had anything to do with this subject?

A That he was involved in such an effort, for example?

-- MORE --

Q That he was involved in such an effort, for example, to strike a withdrawal on a security arrangement deal indirectly between Lebanon and Israel?

A Yes, I would steer you away from that suggestion. I would not say that the subject of withdrawal of various foreign forces from Lebanon wouldn't have been a natural subject to have come up and how that might be worked out; but in terms of any involvement of the sort that you're raising, I would steer you away from that; yes.

Q With regard to that May 15 group, terrorist group, that came up in the Greek incident, are we satisfied that that group is not based in Iraq?

A Again, I had guidance, I think, which we used on this before, and I'll refer you back to that.

Q Can you say where they are based?

A I don't recall what the specifics are.

Q Alan, can you tell us anything about the Hotline talks?

A No, not really. The talks are taking place here. They're ongoing, and we really are not going to have anything to say about them until they're concluded.

Q Alan, do you have any reaction to the bombing of the Libyan Embassy in Beirut?

A I don't. I've seen the press reports on it. I'm not aware of any other reporting, but though I'm not aware of it, we obviously have condemned all terrorist acts, so assuming the facts, that would apply. But I just don't know enough about the facts of what's involved in that.

Marvin?

Q Alan, do you have anything at all on the World Bank population group study?

A I do not.

Q And the apparent conflict between the Administration's position on the birth control issue and that of the World Bank?

A Well, I think we've indicated -- you say "conflict," I'm not sure that that --

Q Apparent difference of opinion as to how to resolve the problem.

A We've indicated before that the question of our position, as it will be taken at the upcoming Mexico conference, is being developed, and that remains the case. So I don't have anything -- anyway of responding to you at this point.

Q Well, there is, in the various reports this morning on the World Bank study, long quotations from a draft, what is called an "Administration draft," on the Administration's position.

A Well, there have been various drafts, as you know, that have been published -- Congressional Record, so on and so forth.

Q But this one sounds remarkably consistent with the Administration view.

A Well, until we've got a policy, Marvin, I'd rather not comment on the basis of supposed drafts. So when we have something -- obviously, we know that that is an important issue and one which is of interest.

Q One other question, please. Is there anybody in the Department who is specifically working on that problem?

A Oh, I think there are a number of people in the Department who are working on that problem.

Q Is that McPherson's group that's working on that?

A I don't know about a McPherson group, but AID has a major interest in this subject; but there are a lot of people who work on this problem.

Q Alan, do you have any comment at all on the reports that Sakharov has been given mind-altering drugs in a hospital in the Soviet Union?

A I don't. We're aware of those reports.

We're aware that they're circulating in the Soviet Union as well as elsewhere, but I have no way of confirming any --

--MORE--

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Q You haven't had any contacts with people there who would confirm that that is indeed the case?

A I don't think we have any way of getting any independent confirmation which would be something on which we could base a statement that we think this is right or wrong. The point that we have made before remains one we would emphasize, and that is that the uncertainty which surrounds Dr. Sakharov and Mrs. Bonner could be cleared up if independent observers, correspondents or others could be allowed access to them.

Q King Hussein with President Mitterrand, in visiting Jordan, said to the effect that all of the efforts of peaceful solutions in the Middle East have gone nowhere, and so to take all the whole issue of peace to the United Nations and let the United Nations deal with it. (Sic) Do you have comment on that?

A No, I don't.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the report from Israel today that goes into some more detail on the results of the alleged terrorists who were taken off the boat --

A No.

Q -- and a plot for terrorism at sea or anything?

A No.

Q Is there any development on the Norwegian F-5s?

A No, don't have anything further on that.

Q You did mention that Pelletreau, you said that you would not, you don't think that the subject of withdrawal may not have come up. (Sic) What is the United States policy now on withdrawal from Lebanon? I mean, once --

A That we think all foreign forces should be withdrawn from Lebanon. If you go back -- there is no change in the policy, in our objectives, in our goals in terms of either the authority of the central government or the withdrawal of all foreign forces, or indeed satisfactory arrangements for Israel's northern border. So there is no change in any of that.

Q Are you also in touch with the Syrians or is it -- if the subject had come up, would have come up only with the Israelis or --

A I would not get into the question of what conversations, what subjects came up. I think we did indicate that he had been to Syria; Mr. Pelletreau had, as well. But I'm not going to try to lay out an agenda of what he talked about at each stop. But we posted, I think, information on what his stops had been.

Q Alan, anything further on Ambassador Wilson and his travel plans, his -- Did he have any meetings?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Anything on the Gulf? This may have been asked -- the newly reported Iraqi attacks today?

A I don't have anything on that, Ralph.

Q How about the British tanker, any further confirmation or anything on that?

A No.

Q O.K. Thank you.

Q Do you have any comment on the Washington Times story regarding alleged secret arms control agreements that the Administration reached in '81 or '82 with the Soviets?

A Just simply to note that allegations of a secret executive agreement reported there in that article are without foundation, that the U.S. policy on interim restraints remains as it was stated by the President in May of 1982.

Q Could there be any sort of understanding that these Senators might have misconstrued to be an agreement?

A Well, again, I think the policy has been articulated several times, and I would refer you back to what we said on that before.

(The briefing concluded at 12:20 P.M.)

Becker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #124

THURSDAY, JULY 12, 1984, 12:15 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. One announcement regarding a BACKGROUND briefing tomorrow. We're arranging for a BACKGROUNDER tomorrow, here in the briefing room at 11:00, on the Secretary of State's determination on El Salvador, which we expect to forward to Congress this afternoon.

The President has delegated to the Secretary the authority to make the determination required in PL 98-332 that the Government of El Salvador has demonstrated progress toward land reform, free elections, freedom of association, the establishment of the rule of law and an effective judicial system, and the termination of the activities of the so-called death squads.

We'll try to make copies of the report available tomorrow prior to the BACKGROUNDER.

That is it for announcements. Happy to take your questions.

Q Can you tell us anything about the Hotline talks?

A Not very much, Jim. The talks are continuing in a businesslike atmosphere, but I don't have anything beyond that to offer you on them.

Q They were here today?

A Yes.

Q Can you explain this almost absolute secrecy about these talks?

A I don't think there's anything different about not talking about these talks while they're ongoing than talking about any other talks while they're ongoing. We have tended not to do that. It usually isn't helpful to talk about talks while they're in process.

Q Yes, usually you say when they begin, when they end, and other such things.

A Well, we don't know exactly when they're going to end. We did indicate they were going to be held starting yesterday. So we said when they were going to begin.

I indicated yesterday they were being held here. So, anyway, that's where we are on that.

Q What I mean, yesterday, for example, the Press Office wouldn't even say what the duration of the talks were.

A Well, we don't know what the duration of the talks will be precisely.

Q I mean, yesterday, how many hours --

A Oh, I see. Well, okay. We're dependent to some extent -- to a large extent -- on what we can find. I'm not sure when the sessions actually ended, so I don't know that they had -- that that information was even available. In any case, that is the information we have on it at this point.

Q For example, if we were to ask late today, would you be able or willing to tell us if they'll resume tomorrow morning?

A We can try, okay, but I can't promise you that because I don't know.

Q Surely, you --

A We may not have anything further to say tonight on it. But anyway, stay tuned, and we will try to give you as much information as we can on it.

Q Surely, it's not beyond the ingenuity of your Press Office to place a telephone call to the person who's --

A I don't accept the tone you're taking in terms of ingenuity of the Press Office. We are presenting, in terms of an Administration and a Department, what we can and if it's not enough for you, I'm sorry.

Q What precisely is the policy regarding ambassadors retaining positions on corporate boards? Why was an exception granted to Mr. Wilson, and have such exceptions been granted in the past?

A Well, in terms of the policy, I have some information. There was in May of 1981 a set of decisions taken by the then Under Secretary for Management, Richard Kennedy, on retention of corporate directorships by persons appointed to positions requiring Senate confirmation, and we'll make that available to you instead of going through it. It's a page of various points.

It is permitted. Obviously, there are exceptions. Most ambassadors don't have corporate directorships, so that it's not a frequent issue. It doesn't rise very frequently.

I'm sorry, your other questions?

Q The Government Ethics Office reported to the Senate that an exception was taken in Wilson's case from a general policy against it. Why was the exception granted, and has it ever occurred before?

A Okay. In terms of -- as I say, it's infrequent but it has been permitted. So the answer to the second part of your question is yes.

Q Have you any examples?

A Well, that, you're going to have to do a little homework on your own. The Department doesn't maintain files of exceptions for employees who have been permitted to retain directorships on corporate boards. But individual financial disclosure statements, which include such information, are on file in two different places -- the Office of Government Ethics in the Office of Personnel Management, and also in the Department of State's Foreign Affairs Information Management Center. So I would say that you'd have to go to them and get -- those, as I say, are publicly available. I don't know precisely what their procedures are, but you can get that information there.

In terms of Ambassador Wilson, yes, there was an exception made. The issue was reviewed and approved by the State Department and the Office of Government Ethics. Documentation is on file in the State Department. At this point, I can't make that available to you. There are Privacy Act considerations.

If we can do more on that later, I'll be happy to do that. But, in any case, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was informed of the exception prior to Ambassador Wilson's nomination hearings.

Q Prior to -- can you say anything about why the exception was granted?

A No, that's what I say. There are Privacy Act considerations. And if we can do better for you, in terms of details, I'll be happy to do that, but -- well, that's where I'm going to leave that.

--MORE--

Q One other point, is there also a policy regarding ambassadors' stock portfolios, whether they can, must they divest themselves or place them in a blind trust or anything like that?

A Well, I'm not sure, in terms of stock. I think that there are -- I'm just not sure what the rules are. You might -- This all relates to directorships. In terms of anybody who has submitted a financial disclosure statement, that information in terms of holdings is available, and I simply would refer you to those documents. Don't have that -- There was a suggestion in the story today that somehow the Department was withholding information. I reject that, but we'll let it go at that.

Ralph.

Q Alan, maybe I missed something or I'm just confused. You say that it has been permitted and yet an exception was granted in this case. Is there a rule --

A Exceptions have been permitted --

Q Okay.

A -- and one was permitted in this case.

Q Okay, but it requires an exception?

A That's correct.

Q Alan, same subject. I'm sorry. We're told that Ambassador Wilson resigned from the Jorgensen board in March. Was the Department informed of that, and was that resignation at the Department's behest?

A I don't know about the resignation in March myself. I can see if I can find anything out. That may get us back into Privacy Act considerations. I'll check on it. I, again, am not aware, since the exception was granted in the first place, why there would have been a request. If I have anything further on that, I'll provide that, too.

Q Alan, in this case, the former Under Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger, was mentioned as someone who interfered in Wilson's alleged interference in the Marc Rich case.

A Uh-huh.

Q Given that Eagleburger is now the president of Kissinger Associates, and Kissinger is a business partner of Marc Rich, is there any investigation into the possible impropriety of Eagleburger sticking his nose into this matter?

A There certainly -- I'm not -- I've not addressed, when the question was raised before, about former Under Secretary Eagleburger's alleged involvement in this. I did not comment on it. I don't intend to comment on it in this case, but I will say there certainly -- whatever action was taken, there was no impropriety and no suggestion of it.

Q Can I follow up? Alan, can I follow up on it?

A Yes, go ahead.

Q -- and ask a more general question? At one point, you expressed some anger at the suggestion that people employed in the Department who were formerly associated with Kissinger may still, in some sense, be under his sway. In the particular case of Eagleburger, who has now gone and accepted a very high-paying position with Henry Kissinger, is there any investigation into the question of whether there may be other people in the Department who are operating under the influence of some future plum being promised to them by Kissinger?

A I think that the suggestion that there was some future plum promised in the case of Mr. Eagleburger is wrong. I know it is wrong, and I think that the suggestion that you are raising is an improper one. There is no suggestion that there is such plum --

Q No. For instance --

A No for instance. I've answered your question.

Q I have another question. In the past --

A Well, let's come back to you. You've had two. I'll come back to you.

Go ahead.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the consultations that were made by the Egyptian Ambassador, Mr. Ghorbal, before his leaving to Egypt?

A I don't.

Q You don't have anything on that?

A I don't have anything on the subject.

Q Any further information about the trip by Mr. Pelletreau to the Middle East area?

A No, I think we've provided you, basically, everything we can. We put up the other day the countries which he had visited, and I think -- again refer you back to the fact that this was routine consultations, nothing unusual about that trip at all.

Q Can you tell us if the talks with the Cubans regarding the Marielitos have already begun in New York?

A I don't have anything beyond what we said the other day on that.

Q Have you anything on F-5s for Greece?

A Nothing new. Nothing new to say on that.

Q On the Cubans, I think you said the other day, they were starting shortly, or did you give a date?

A I don't think I addressed that in the briefing, but I don't have a -- I think the fact is that we said we had -- or what we were prepared to say is, we had been in touch with them, and that we expect the talks to begin shortly, and I have not provided any dates or any other information on it.

Q Would you, or would they happen?

A Well, if I have something to give you, I'll be happy to give it to you.

Q I mean, are you going to hold these roughly in the same status as the talks with the Soviets, I mean as something you won't talk about until they're over?

A That's a possibility.

Q How about a venue, Alan?

A No, don't have anything on venue.

Q Can I ask you about the TASS warning to West Germany today on the use of certain weapons by West Germany?

A Yes. I think it was a question, if I recall, not of the use of certain weapons but the suggestion there might be restrictions lifted on the manufacture --

Q Construction, yes.

A -- of certain weapons. And I don't think any decision, as I read the press stories, any decision had been made to manufacture. It was just the matter of a policy decision.

The fact is, the Soviet Union has raised the issue with us in diplomatic channels. The WEU (the Western European Union) is an organization which has, since 1954, worked in close cooperation with NATO. The current effort on the part of the seven European member states to revitalize the WEU is aimed at improving European defense cooperation in the NATO framework, and the U.S. supports such efforts.

No aspect of the planned revitalization would affect the purely defensive orientation of the Western Alliance. The Soviet charges that the decisions made by the WEU would violate post-World War II agreements are without basis.

Q Copy?

A Yes

Q Alan, regarding Greece again, would you endorse the characterization of The Washington Post of today that there is a sort of ease of tension between the U.S. and Greece?

A Well, I think that I would -- Ambassador Stearns did meet with Prime Minister Papandreou yesterday. I'm not going to comment, obviously, in detail on the meeting, but it was a full and useful discussion of the issues affecting U.S.-Greek relations.

As we have said before, while we have some differences, we value our ties with Greece and want to have the best possible relationship. We believe we have common interests, and as Ambassador Stearns said, we will try to reconcile these and the differing perspectives of our two governments.

Q Copy?

A Yes.

Q Have they, at any time during the consultations, threatened to reconsider the bases agreement?

A I don't want to lead you in a particular direction on this, but I think it would be unfair to start addressing details. We have not done that in our conversations, and I don't want to; but I'm not leaving you with -- I'm not trying to suggest something to you by refusing to comment. It's just a common matter of not commenting on the details of our conversations.

Q Do you have any comment on the three Israelis who allegedly were involved with the kidnapping of a Nigerian ex-official in London?

A No.

-- MORE --

Q Alan, do you have any comment on The Washington Post report this morning that suggests that many Polish applicants for U.S. travel visas are being turned away by the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw, and that they're being disappointed, and so on?

A Well, I do have something on that. Facts: U.S. Consular officers in Poland and elsewhere decide each non-immigrant visa application on a case-by-case basis in accordance with U.S. immigration law.

The law regarding non-immigrant visas is designed to facilitate travel, and visa denials occur only when the applicant is not eligible under U.S. law.

I might also emphasize that the criteria for visa issuance under law apply to applicants worldwide, not in any single country, and they have not changed in recent years.

Q Only when they don't qualify, they are denied.

A That's correct.

Q The Post implies in its story that the number of denials has increased. Is that because the number of people who don't qualify has increased, or is it because the criteria are being applied more stringently or what?

A Well, as I say, the criteria for application of the law have not changed in recent years, so I think that it isn't a question of any more stringent application; it's a question of the laws existing and people applying the laws, although, indeed, they must strictly follow the law, and that has always been the case.

I don't have precise figures available on the number of applications, but I gather that there has been some relaxation to some extent on travel restrictions imposed by the Polish Government, and, therefore, the volume of applications is somewhat higher than in the recent past.

Q Alan, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak joined King Hussein this morning, in an item in the paper about the need to convene a United Nations conference on the question of Palestine. Do you have any comment on it?

1-1784

A I don't have anything on that. No.

Q To follow up with this, please, Alan, is King Hussein of Jordan expected to come to this country within a few weeks, or something?

A I have no indication of that. I don't know what his private plans are, but I have no indication of other plans.

Yes?

Q Alan, do you have anything on the Hedrick Smith story today in the Times about this alleged defector from the Salvadoran guerrilla army and his contention that they received arms from Nicaragua?

A Well, I think we've expressed ourselves on the question of Nicaraguan arms supplies frequently.

Q Right. But have you talked to this gentleman specifically?

A Oh, I think people have talked with him. I don't have a readout on his conversations, but I think he was -- my understanding is that that story stemmed from a briefing given over at the White House that was open to press coverage, so I would perhaps go to your colleagues who covered it, if you didn't have the opportunity to do that.

Q Is that related to the pending report, or whatever you want to call it, by the Administration, on arms flows from Nicaragua to El Salvador?

A Is it related? I don't --

Q I mean, is that part of the Administration's evidence-gathering effort?

A I think we have -- I don't have anything new on that report. A draft, as you know, was sent up to the Hill, and I just don't have anything to update you with regarding that report.

Obviously, we have made efforts to gather as much information as possible all along, and to the extent that

1-1785

that information has been releasable, we've released it. But I don't quite know how to relate that to your questions.

Q Well, I mean, are the interviews with this particular individual related to the preparation of this draft report and its release and availability?

A Well, my recollection -- and I saw a copy of that draft report as it was sent up to the Hill. My recollection is there was some reference, in fact, to some interviews with him, so --

Q Uh-hum.

A -- I refer you, if you've got a copy of that draft. Some were made available from the Hill, I gather.

Q How will the Department in the future treat such cases as the Wilson case, if it doesn't maintain records to look back on what it's done in previous instances? Is there not an ethics officer who overseas this type of situation?

A Sure. There are, and, as I said, I will give you that sheet of what the exceptions are, and any individual application would be judged against those criteria, or, if the criteria change in the future, against future criteria.

Q But independently, without any ability to look back on previous cases and say, well, in this case we did this and it's related --

A I think it would be judged against the criteria primarily. There has been, I think -- the fact of the matter is, I think, that there has been some degree of stability in the people involved, but that really is not the issue. The issue is, are there criteria? There are criteria, they're laid out, they're in written form, and one can judge each individual case against those criteria.

Q Couple of items from Syria. First of all, Syria is not allowing training camps in Al Biqa', according to the FBIS today, and, on the other hand, Israeli forces have conducted maneuvers in western Al Biqa'. Do you have any comment on both items?

A No, I don't.

Q I'd like to come back, if I could, to the announcement you made at the beginning of the briefing.

A Uh-hum.

Q Is there anything you can tell us that would dissuade us from the conclusion that there's no reason to believe the Administration plans to say anything other than El Salvador's doing just fine on all of the things you listed?

A Well, I wouldn't want to scoop the briefing on that, Ralph.

Q Well, you --

A I hesitate to do that. (Laughter)

Q You said the report was going to the Hill this afternoon.

A Well, that's right. There's a report required, in any case. The question is what goes in it. It isn't a question of if you were going to say a certain thing, then you submit a report; if you're not going to say that, then you don't submit the report. The report has to go forward.

Q I see.

A Alan, is the United States playing any role in the proposed prisoners' exchange between Israel and some Palestinian groups, according to stories today?

A I've seen those stories on that, and my reading of the stories and my understanding of the situation is that's being worked out by those groups and Israel and perhaps other parties, but I don't --

Q Other --

A Other than a general interest in prisoners, I don't --

Q You have no role --

1-1787

A No real role in that.

Bob?

Q Do you have anything further on the hate mail? Have you determined -- has anyone determined its source or --

A No. That -- but, as I indicated yesterday, an investigation of that is continuing, is ongoing and that is fact, and that's as far as I can take it.

Stan, I promised I would come back to you.

Q I'd just -- many agencies in this Government have regulations involving people who go to work in industries related to the industry they were dealing with in the government afterwards.

Why are you so upset at the suggestion that similar scrutiny might be applied to the Foreign Service?

A Well, I guess what I'm upset about is the suggestion that we should bring every employee of the State Department down and have them grilled on what conversations --

Q Not everyone. I can give you a list if you want.

A I'm not aware of this -- of anybody who has a plum job that has been offered for, following government service, from Kissinger and Associates, and I guess you'd want to ask them whether they've offered any, but I'm not aware of any.

Q Well, you said a little while ago that you knew that there was none; now you say --

A In the case of Larry Eagleburger.

Q You are privy to every discussion that Eagleburger ever had between himself --

A Well, I happen --

Q -- and representatives of Kissinger?

A Well, I think I will leave in terms of what I've said --

Q You must stick to him pretty close.

A I think it's fact that that was -- Larry Eagleburger's behavior in office was with -- in total conformity with any ethical standard that you want to apply.

Q Going back to the hate mail, I saw that the letter which was sent to Zimbabwe dated from Virginia, somewhere in Virginia. What city? Do you have an indication what --

A I don't -- I don't have any information beyond what we handed out to you yesterday.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:38 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #125

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
FRIDAY, JULY 13, 1984, 12:26 P. M.

MR.. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. Two announcements:

First, today at 2:30 here in this briefing room there will be a BACKGROUND briefing by a State-AID official on the upcoming International Population Conference in Mexico City. It will be, as I say, for BACKGROUND only.

Second, to tell you that we now have the text of the Secretary's speech at the ASEAN post-Ministerial meeting, and we will be reproducing that and making it available to you as soon as possible. That process is underway at the moment.

Q When was that speech given, or when will it be given?

A It has been given, and it was reported, I think, by the wires this morning, so I think it was given on the 13th, Indonesia time.

Q With the -- on the briefing on population, will there be a -- will we see the document or the position paper that's been alluded to?

A We can talk about that later, Bob. I think that I'd rather not try and talk about that from here.

Q Do you have any comment on reports that an agreement is near on the hotline talks?

A I don't have too much to say about that, Jim. As usual, I'm not going to get into the substance of the negotiations or make predictions since the talks are still underway. The discussions of the past two days between the U.S. and Soviet delegations have been businesslike and productive. The two delegations met again this morning at the State Department and will meet again on Monday.

1-1791

The Soviet Charge' d'Affaire will host a luncheon for the U.S. negotiators at the Soviet Embassy this afternoon.

Q Is there a negotiating session this afternoon, or there's nothing else this afternoon except for the lunch?

A That's my reading of this, that they met this morning and will meet again on Monday.

Q Is it anticipated the talks on Monday will extend on to Tuesday, Tuesday to Wednesday, or how does that go?

A Well, as usual, I'm not going to try to project the talks.

Q Alan, how do you explain the fact that this, being about the only arms control measure you've been able to accomplish in four years, that the Administration is making so little of the headway in what, after all, is a confidence-building, tension-reducing mechanism?

A Well, without accepting your preamble -- (laughter) --

Q I haven't seen any signings lately --

A Well, as I say, without accepting your preamble, the point that I've made here the last several days -- and I'm afraid we haven't had the pleasure of your company, Barry --

Q I've been in --

A This is a fourth session in a series of talks we've had on this issue, and if we have some specific results to tell you about, we'll be happy to tell you about them.

Q Hope --

A But it's an issue that's under discussion, so we're just handling it in a businesslike fashion.

Q Well, maybe I ought to be a little more candid. There have been suggestions that at the behest of the Soviet Union the Administration isn't making as much as it would like to of this agreement, not wanting to sort of make it seem that the Soviets are being more forthcoming than they want to be perceived as being.

A Well, I think --

Q Is there any advantage --

A -- this issue has been raised before. As I've indicated before, the approach that we're taking, the businesslike approach to this, is something that we and the Soviets have agreed on.

Q Alan, can I just go back. They're going to meet again on Monday.

A That's correct.

Q Is there anything of significance to the word "meet" as opposed to talks that have occurred over the past three days? (Laughter)

A Uh, let us -- (Laughter)

Q Should we assume that the meeting on Monday -- they're meeting this afternoon at the Embassy, too.

A I suspect when they meet, they probably will talk. That often happens. (Laughter)

Q Alan --

Q Alan --

A I wouldn't try to draw fine distinctions between the words here.

Q Will the hotline be used to announce the agreement? (Laughter)

A Can we return to serious questions?

Q Will agreement be announced after the Democratic convention is over or during the Democratic convention? (Laughter)

A As I said, can we return to serious questions?

1-1793

Q Alan, new subject?

A Sure.

Q What can you tell us about the progress in the talks in New York between the American and Soviet delegations on the Mariel matter?

A Uh, saw --

Q Cuba. America and Cuba.

Q Pardon me. American and Cuban. I slipped that in.

A Saw reports this morning on that, Mike. I have nothing on the subject of discussions between the U.S. and Cuba on that subject beyond what I've said before, which is to say that we have talked with them and we will be talking. But I don't have anything to say to you to address those reports today, and when we have something to say on that subject, we'll be happy to volunteer it to you.

-- MORE --

Q Are you aware that there is a Cuban delegation in New York?

A John, I simply have nothing to say about those reports that I read in this morning's paper.

Q Why don't you just make it a flat "you're not going to comment on it." I mean, this is --

A Well, I think I'll choose my words --

Q Don't you really feel foolish standing here and talking and saying things like that?

A No more than having you sit there and ask the questions like that; no. Go ahead.

Q The position before was the Administration was saying that the Cubans didn't want this negotiation to start until after the elections. Is this to be interpreted as a Cuban comment on the -- the elections are all over, or what is this? (Laughter)

A Why don't you ask the Cubans on that one.

Q Alan, earlier this week at this briefing you said on the record that the talks would begin in the near future.

A Uh-huh

Q Will the talks begin in the near future?

A As I say, I have nothing to add to what I've said before on that.

Q But what you've said before still stands?

A Well, I have nothing to add to it, and I won't.

Q Alan, why are you afraid to talk about this subject?

A I'm not afraid to talk about it.

Q Why is the State Department --

A John, if you want us --

Q -- afraid to talk about something that everybody knows is going on?

A If we have anything further, I'll be happy to answer questions.

Q I mean, -- no -- this is an extraordinary kind of guidance.

A No, it isn't.

Q Yes, it is.

A We frequently conduct talks in confidentiality. Sometimes, we talk about --

Q But you are not even conceding that there is a delegation there --

A I was about to finish. Sometimes we talk about talks that are going on. Sometimes we don't talk about them while they're going on. There are all sorts of different ways we handle them. What we choose to do is what we think would be most conducive to progress on those talks. And so that's what we do across the board on a variety of kinds of conversations. And we will have to make the decision as to what we think is most productive. If that's frustrating, I'm afraid we're --

Q It's frustrating. I mean it just --

A Okay. I think we can drop it.

Q I have a follow-up, if I might.

A I'll come back to you. Go ahead.

Q It's a new subject. Is there any State Department reaction to the reports out of Kuwait that that government and the Soviet Union might come into some sort of an arms deal?

A Yes. I would point out a couple of things to you. First of all, of course, we have indicated before we knew that this visit was going to take place. And as far as the results of it are concerned, we have only really seen the press accounts, and so it would be premature to comment in any detail.

1-1796a

But, as we have said before, Kuwait historically has purchased arms from a number of countries, including both the Soviet Union and the United States. We would be concerned were Kuwait's purchase of Soviet arms and equipment to be on such a scale as to upset possibly the existing balance which that country has traditionally maintained among its sources of military supply.

Q So you're talking about the balance between U.S. and Soviet arms and not necessarily the arms balance in the area? That's not a matter of concern to you?

A Which the -- they're talking about the supply balance. That's correct.

Q I mean, what if they end up with a whole of arms from the Soviet Union and you give them a like amount? Would that be upsetting?

A Well, I'm not going to try to define it further, Barry.

Q Have you been in contact with the Soviets --

A Sorry?

Q Have you been in contact with the Soviets concerning their deal with the Kuwaitis?

A Well, I don't think I would get into the question of what we have or haven't talked about with the Soviets?

Q Alan, to follow up, please? Is there any tacit understanding between the Soviet Union and the United States regarding shipments of arms to the Middle East?

A I don't think it would be appropriate to say there's a tacit understanding. I think, however, that our concerns about tensions in the Middle East, and in the Gulf area, have been discussed with the Soviets on a number of occasions, but I don't think I could take it beyond that.

1-1796b

Q Alan, do you think now that Kuwait has more military arms from the Soviet Union will call for more advisors coming to Kuwait, Russian advisors (sic)?

A Well, we just simply don't know is the answer to that.

Jim?

Q Alan, would $200 million worth of Soviet arms purchases be enough to upset the balance?

A I don't have any specific judgment to offer you on what might fall within the area of concern. I simply am expressing a policy concern about that issue, but I'm not going to try to draw conclusions.

Q Do you see any cause-and-effect relationship between the U.S. decision to deny Kuwait Stinger missiles and Kuwait's decision to go to Moscow?

A Well, I think we indicated before that we knew about the decision to go to Moscow before the Defense Minister came to the United States in April.

I might note -- I'm not sure that we actually have done it, although in fact it was true a little while ago that we have, in fact, reached agreement in principle with the Government of Kuwait on measures to improve its early warning air defense command, control and communications capabilities, and we would anticipate the specific sales agreements would be concluded in the near future on those things.

Q Alan, what is the total of that sale?

A Excuse me, let Jim finish.

Q Have the Kuwaitis finally been told definitively that they will not be getting Stingers?

A I don't have anything of that sort to offer you except that the proposal, as we have indicated before, does not include Stingers.

Q Alan, could I follow up on the advisors question for just a minute?

A Sure.

Q In your original statement on the Kuwait thing, you said you would be concerned if the scale of the weapons sale were to upset the balance.

Would you be concerned if Soviet advisors were sent to Kuwait to man the new equipment and remain there, as opposed to going there to train Kuwaitis in operating the equipment?

A I don't want to try and parse it that finally, Ralph. The fact is that Kuwait would not be the first country in which the U.S. and the Soviet Union both had military personnel engaged in simultaneous security assistance programs.

In such instances, we take appropriate measures to assure that U.S. military equipment and technology are not compromised. And, indeed, we already have Kuwait's agreement to protect classified U.S. systems and information from unauthorized disclosure to third parties, and we have every reason to believe that the Kuwaitis will respect this agreement in the future as they have in the past.

Q Can you give an example?

A Sorry?

Q Can you give us an example of such countries?

A I can't, but why don't I see if I can get one for you.

Q Yemen.

A Okay, Barry says Yemen. (Laughter) Alright, I'll see if we can find something on that.

Excuse me. Mike?

Q Alan, you have no figures there on the source of supply, the balance, the figures of equipment?

A I don't.

Q Can you take that, then, since you did raise that as a --

A No, I don't think I would take that. I think that probably we would be able to provide some figures on our own, but I'm not prepared to try to provide Soviet figures.

Q Well, then, will you take that please; if you could provide that here on --

A U.S. figures?

Q Yes. On some years of supply, please?

A Well, I'll see what can be done on that.

Q Alan, do you see that as a shift of some Arab moderate countries towards the Soviet Union? Now we have Kuwait, tomorrow we have Jordan, and yesterday we have so-and-so?

A Oh, I'm not going to try to draw sweeping conclusions of that sort.

Q Does this change the arrangements, such as they are, for Saudi Arabia to share with its Gulf friends, including Kuwait, some of the security information that it's obtaining through the use of American-provided or American-controlled AWACS?

Does it make you more leery of Kuwait hearing from Saudi Arabia what they see with our equipment?

A Well, I guess I would refer you back to what I said before about Kuwait's agreement to arrangements to protect U.S. equipment and information, so --

Q Any further information on the meetings now held in Beirut between the U.S. and Lebanese, chaired by Prime Minister Karami, regarding the relations between the two countries?

A Between the U.S. and --

Q Yes. The U.S. Ambassador. It's chaired by the U.S. Ambassador and Prime Minister Karami on the other side.

A No, I don't. The U.S. Ambassador meets frequently with Lebanese officials, so -- but I don't have anything on whatever report it is you're specifically referring to.

Q These are being reported as specifically for the reconsideration and the studying of the relations between the two countries and the aid, the U.S. aid, to Lebanon.

A I think that, as I say, it is a fact that Ambassador Bartholomew frequently meets with Lebanese officials. So I just would have to leave it at that.

Q Do you want to comment on the Los Angeles Times story about the State Department having been asked to draw up a plan for U.S. air strikes in El Salvador?

A Well, I saw a story this morning -- I guess I didn't see it in the L.A. Times. The fact of the matter is that the U.S., as the President has said and other officials have said, has no intention to deploy combat forces to Central America; and indeed, there has been no request to do so.

As far as contingency plans, I guess you ought to ask the Pentagon, but I don't think anybody ever talks about contingency plans. But in terms of U.S. policy, I refer you to what I just said.

Q Is there any distinction between combat forces and U.S aircraft or Honduran aircraft accomplishing the same goal on behalf of the U.S.?

A You're asking about Honduran aircraft, I can't answer. In terms of -- and I'm not trying to be cute about it -- but in terms of U.S. aircraft, if they were to be engaged in combat activity, that would be incorporated in what I've just said.

Q To go back on Kuwait, you said "tip the balance." What balance? I don't understand. Balance between what and what?

A There has been a traditional supplier-purchase relationship between Kuwait and a number of countries, including the U.S. and the Soviet Union. What I'm talking about is the balance in those purchases, to get back to the point that Barry Schweid was making before.

Q Can you give us any idea --

Q Can I take it one further step? If Kuwait has decided, as a sovereign country, that for its defense, considering the situation in the Gulf, it needs to purchase such weapons, and it appealed to the United States and the United States turned it down, and then it went and purchased something that you may think as tipping the balance -- so, I mean, what are you telling the Kuwaitis?

A Well, we have, as I said, agreed in principle on some measures, so that is a fact. The Kuwaitis have apparently, according to reports -- we can't confirm that, but according to reports -- reached agreement with the Soviets for further supply of equipment --and indeed they have purchased equipment before. So, if that's true, that's a fact, too. All I'm doing is pointing out that there has been this relationship with both countries before, and that if it were to get out of balance -- which I'm not going to try to define further -- that would be a matter of concern to us.

Q Just one little -- one more thing, Alan: According to what you're saying, the Kuwaitis and American interests have been, let's say, assured of security through this supply and United States guarantees, and yet they still went and bought these weapons from the Soviet source.

A I'm not going to try to discuss Kuwaiti motivations. I think you'd have to ask them about what they feel their requirements are and why they have made particular purchases.

Barry.

Q Do you know what kind of arrangements Gromyko will be allowed to use this year for going to the U.N.? The Times has Administration sources saying he'll be able to come in like a normal diplomat.

A Yes. I don't have any details on that. I would simply point to the fact that the Secretary has said that he would expect to meet with the Foreign Minister at the U.N. I'm not aware of any specific plan that has gone forward at this point on that, but in any case I wouldn't anticipate a problem with that.

Q Do you have any comment on, I think it was, a TASS report yesterday that suggested that the projected talks are still in doubt next fall?

A I don't really have any comment beyond what we've said before. We made our position clear. There is no change. We accepted the Soviet proposal to meet; we've set no pre-conditions. We said we would hear what they had to say, and we are carrying on conversations in diplomatic channels about arranging that, so that's how we think it would be most productively addressed.

Q Do you have any -- doesn't this seem to raise some question as to whether they are willing to meet under the same --

A As I say --

Q They asked for, obviously, limiting the talks to more narrow subjects.

A As I say, we're trying to talk about this in quiet, diplomatic channels, and if we get into the business of commenting on their various press accounts, that takes it out of those quiet, diplomatic channels and we don't think that would be productive.

Q But is it still your position that the talks are to take place and are being arranged?

A Well, our position is that we have accepted that invitation to go there; we have set no pre-conditions; we're preparing to go to those talks, and we're having discussions in diplomatic channels.

Mike.

Q Alan, Iraq is reporting two strikes on large naval targets today at Kharg Island. Have you seen those reports? Do you have any confirmation?

A I've seen the reports, but I don't have anything on it. I've just seen them, that's all.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on reports coming from Lebanon that Arab newspapers are being banned by the Israeli authorities in South Lebanon, and they are even arresting or detaining Arab correspondents?

A I haven't seen that. Sorry.

Q Will you take that question, please?

A Well, I'll look into it. I don't know that we will have anything on that.

Q Do you have any comment on the Post story today which stated that the U.S. has failed to convince its allies not to sell arms to Iran?

A Well, the position -- I missed the first part -- that we have failed to advise our --

Q Yes.

A No. I think that our position on that has been quite clear. We continue to view seriously the sale of military equipment to Iran and Iraq, which contribute to Iran's intransigent refusal to a cease-fire or other steps to end the fighting. We have made known to a number of allies our deep concern about the potentially destabilizing effect of such arms sales.

So far as the United States is concerned, we maintain our policy of not selling arms to either side.

Q May we have a copy?

A Sure.

Q Do you have anything on the previous policy on the settlements, because there are reports of eight new settlements being established there?

A I saw those reports. I don't have anything new, but certainly it remains our position that continuing settlement activity is an obstacle to the peace process.

Q Alan, anything on the Norwegian F-5s?

A No, I don't have anything new on that.

Q There was a report on the FBIS yesterday that said Egypt had offered to Washington and to Beirut to act as a mediator in security negotiations with Israel. Is Washington considering any such proposal from Egypt? Would it consider a mediation effort at this point, as opposed to direct negotiation?

A Well, I think we've expressed ourselves on that before, Ralph, and our position hasn't changed, and we have certainly not proposed that we play a mediation role, so I guess I would leave you with that.

Excuse me.

Barry.

I'll come to you in a second.

Q Are there any new letters from the Klan received by other countries or any further analysis on whether or not it is a disinformation effort?

A I'm not aware of new letters. That isn't to say there aren't others, but I'm not aware of any, and I have nothing new on the analysis question.

Q Does the U.S. share the same position the Lebanese President expressed a few days ago to the British Sunday Times, calling on Israel to withdraw from Lebanon unilaterally?

A Calling for --

Q -- on Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.

A I'm not sure what it is you're saying he said. We have said before that --

Q No, no. no.

A -- our position is that all foreign forces --

Q President Gemayel said, called on Israel, actually, to withdraw from Lebanon unilaterally.

A Unilaterally?

Q Yes.

A Well, I think we've expressed ourselves on that before, and don't have anything to add to that.

Q Are we -- to follow up Ralph's earlier question, are we aware of Egyptian efforts to mediate, or offers to mediate an arrangement between Lebanon and

Israel -- a security arrangement?

A Well, I think it's up to Egypt to talk about its own policies; it's not up to us to talk about them.

Q Do you have any responses --

A That's not to lead you one way or another, but it just isn't appropriate.

Bob?

Q Do you have any response to the West German Defense Minister's complaint about U.S. pressures on West Germany?

A No, I don't. We, I think, talked about our position on the proposals which were up on the Hill before, and so in terms of substance, refer you back to that.

Nadia?

Q There was a report from Vienna in the FBIS today in which it said that the Vienna office of Agence France Press had received a letter from an Israeli terrorist group which has sworn death to King Hussein and his family. Do you have a comment on that?

A I can't -- I've seen those reports, and I can't confirm the authenticity of them, but obviously we would condemn any such threats.

Q Thank you.

A O.K. You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:50 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING /DPC #126/
MONDAY, JULY 16, 1984, 12:16 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I don't have any announcements, so I'll be happy to take your questions.

No questions? (starts to leave)

Q Can you give us an update on the Hotline talks, and what the prospects are that they'll be completed today?

A I really can only say very little about that, Fred. The talks have continued through the end of last week, as we told you, in a productive and businesslike fashion. There will be a session this afternoon, and that's about as far as I could go with that.

Q Is there any possibility of any conclusion today?

A I don't want to try to project where these talks will go and so on, as I have, to your frustration, not done. So I just can't do anything on that.

Q Is the session this afternoon a negotiating session or is it a luncheon at the Embassy, or some other function?

A We're not talking about a luncheon; we're talking about a meeting, but I'm not going to try to characterize it beyond that, Ralph.

Bob?

Q Could you comment on the New York Times story concerning the meeting in Luxembourg of Western nations, controls on --

A Nuclear issues?

Q Yes, nuclear --

A Yes. It was thought useful for countries with significant interests in the civil nuclear sector to compare notes on matters of mutual concern and on respective approaches to the forthcoming international meetings, such as the 1985 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, which I understand is scheduled for Geneva in August or September of 1985, the U.N. Conference on Peaceful Uses in Nuclear Energy, which I understand is scheduled for 1986, and the IAEA-sponsored Committee on Assurances of Supply which meets periodically.

The meeting was an opportunity for the governments concerned to informally assess the established nuclear non-proliferation system. The participants discussed their common interests in that system and how it could function most effectively.

As I say, they discussed the role of non-proliferation treaties, the confidence-building role of safeguards and national export policies, and the important role that IAEA plays.

Q Can we have a copy of that, Alan?

A Yes.

Q Who are the participants?

A The participants were Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K., and the U.S.

Q Why was the Soviet Union not invited? They are members of --

A The Soviet interest in non-proliferation generally parallels that of the Western suppliers. In this instance, however, the Western suppliers simply preferred to conduct an initial round of discussions among themselves before moving to what may be a broader, more long-term process in which it is anticipated that the USSR and other countries could be involved.

Q Who were the American representatives?

A The U.S. delegation, I don't have it here, but I'm sure it was led by Ambassador Kennedy.

1-1808

Q Has the broader round of negotiations been scheduled yet?

A No, I don't have anything on specifics on what might follow in that respect. But I mentioned that there are other fora in which discussions on related topics will take place.

Q Can you be more specific on the agreements that the Times talks about? The suppliers agreed they had to do more; what were some of those agreements?

A No, not really. The only thing I really could -- well, the participants were not looking for specific results or decisions. They had a very useful exchange of detailed views, and they confirmed their determination to pursue common non-proliferation objectives.

They identified a number of matters requiring further consideration, such as the strengthening of IAEA safeguards, and they expressed their will to continue the dialogue with other concerned countries.

--MORE--

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Q Was this prompted by any particular concerns, any particular developments, for example, will Pakistan -- or any of the other recent changes?

A Well, no, I think that what happened, basically, was that in consultation with a number of other governments over recent months, the U.S. decided that it would be useful to broach the subject of a meeting on nuclear export policy, and we did so and we're pleased that other governments were equally interested in discussing the issues, including the Administration's proposals for comprehensive safeguards as a condition of supply. But I don't think I have anything more specific in terms of what I've already given you on that.

Q Alan, just for the record on that same subject, China was not listed as one of the participants. Would they fall in the same category as the Soviet Union in the sense that you'd be interested in talking to them, but only at a later point -- supplier (inaudible)?

A Well, I think we have -- I can't tell you how they would fall under these various meetings that I mentioned, for example, but surely we have had discussions with them on nonproliferation issues -- it's been an important subject -- and I'm sure we would intend to continue those discussions.

Q But that would be bilateral as opposed to --

A I can't tell you. As I say, I don't know quite how they would fit into this international scheme.

Q Was there any consideration given to or any decision reached on expanding the Nuclear Suppliers Club to include Third World countries such as Argentina, which are expected to be entering the suppliers --

A Well, I don't think -- you've talked about the Nuclear Suppliers Club. I don't think I've addressed it in the context of -- it goes back to what? to some meetings several years ago -- and that isn't the framework in which I have addressed this. So --

Q You wouldn't characterize this, then, as a meeting of the London Nuclear Suppliers Club?

A No. I would not.

Q Alan, you've talked about the possibility of a broader process with Soviet participation. Would the Administration like to see that get underway before the Geneva review, which is more than a year off?

A I simply don't have anything to take you further on this in terms of the Soviets, and so on.

Q Alan, do you have any reaction to the rush to build settlements on the West Bank just prior to the Israeli elections?

A I don't have anything beyond what I said the other day, which was to reiterate our standard and sincere but standard position that continuing settlement activity is an obstacle to the peace process.

Q But it seems that there is more of the same. I mean, are you discussing --

A That doesn't change our policy. Our policy remains what it was.

Q There was a report over the weekend in a London daily newspaper that Secretary Shultz will visit the Middle East after the Israeli elections in order to revive the Reagan peace plan initiative. Do you have any comment on that?

A Well, one learns never to say "never," but so far as I know, there is no plan at this point to have him do that.

Q O.K.. I'll follow up with, how do you comment on the story from Damascus and Beirut that there might be an Israeli forces withdrawal and an expansion of the role of the United Nations in Lebanon?

A Don't have anything for you on that.

Q A third question: Do you have any feedback about the proposed European initiative in the Middle East which was master-minded by President Mitterrand?

A I think this was asked about last week, and I indicated that our position on an international conference is as it has been, but beyond that I don't have anything specific.

Spencer?

Q Alan, does the United States plan to change its ANZUS policy, particularly regarding nuclear-powered vessels entering New Zealand ports as the result of the New Zealand elections?

A Spence, I think that that question is best left to the Secretary's party. As you know, he is in New Zealand at this point attending ANZUS meetings and meeting with New Zealand and Australian officials, and I think that it would be imprudent, at a minimum, to try to address it at two different places at the same time.

Q Has the State Department asked conservative organizations such as the Conservative Caucus to give humanitarian aid to Honduras?

A I'm not aware of what conversations may have been held. My understanding of the press stories is that the various groups which have been referred to in the press, the indications have been that they have been seeking to give humanitarian aid. But I don't know specifically. Can't answer your question.

Q Do you have any comment on an item that appeared in Parade Magazine over the weekend about an alleged treaty between the U.S. and Israel, a defense treaty?

A I think we've indicated before that that is not something that is in the works. I saw that. It looked to me like a rehash of the same issue we've dealt with before, so the answer is the same.

Q Did Syria express recently about its willingness to help to hold indirect negotiations with Israel concerning withdrawal from southern Lebanon?

A Did Syria indicate anything regarding --?

Q -- holding indirect negotiations with Israel?

A Again, I thought this was addressed last week. Not going to get into the question of what conversations we may have had with the Syrians. Just as a matter of general principle, we have not, as you know, ourselves offered to mediate, and our objective is that all of the foreign forces in Lebanon leave, along with the other objectives we have consistently maintained.

Q Thank you.

A I called it, Jim. Go ahead. Sorry. Caught you off guard.

Q Yes, I'm out of practice.

On Guatemala, do you have any statement with respect to the apportionment of seats and the fact that the parties that took third place in the voting have a plurality of seats in the Constituent Assembly?

A Don't have anything on that.

Q Would you look into it?

A No, I don't think so. Various countries have various rules about voting. I think if you look at our own country, in certain circumstances you find that there are some interesting facts.

Yes.

Q Do we have any indication that Athens and Nicosia have, in any way, replaced Beirut in the last two years as the possible headquarters for international terrorism in the Middle East?

A No, don't have anything on that.

O.K.

(The briefing concluded at 12:27 P.M.)

Becker

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #127

TUESDAY, JULY 17, 1984, 12:00 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I don't have any real announcements. The reason for doing this quite so promptly, or making a specific and extra effort to do it, is because there is going to be, as I think the White House has announced, a BACKGROUND briefing at 12:30 which we are going to have piped in here. So we wanted to get through with this briefing and so on before that.

Q About what?

A About what? I saw a wire which said it was on the subject of the Hotline, but I can't predict what these briefings are about, Mike.

Q You wouldn't want to "steal the thunder" or knock down somebody's story! (Laughter)

A I wouldn't want to "steal their thunder."

Q I don't mind stealing their thunder. (Laughter) What about -- Could you give us any background at all, not on the details of the Hotline, but what took place today and the procedures that took place today with Mr. Isakov, Ambassador Goodby, and Secretary Burt?

A Fred, I really can't. I have not tried to get all that detail because I knew there was going to be a BACKGROUNDER and I have not tried to track all that down. The delegations did meet this morning and so on, but I think there will be that BACKGROUNDER and those are the kinds of questions which I'm sure will be asked to some extent, or I would ask you to ask your colleagues to pursue, if you would, please.

Q Alan, do you have anything, since you are ON THE RECORD and that's a BACKGROUNDER, do you have anything to say about the initial --

A I'm going to, again, leave all of that for what is going to happen at the White House.

Bill?

Q Do you have anything about a meeting between Mr. Shlaudeman and Mr. Tinoco (inaudible)?

A Not beyond -- You got what we had on this last night?

Q No, I didn't.

A You didn't? O.K. By the way, to go back one second to Bob's question, I think there will be some ON-THE-RECORD language for use at that time.

As far as that meeting, just to repeat what was put out -- and I'm sorry you didn't get it -- Ambassador Harry W. Shlaudeman, the President's special envoy for Central America, met Monday with Nicaraguan Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Victor Hugo Tinoco in Atlanta, Georgia. This was the second meeting in a series of talks initiated by the Secretary's June 1 visit to Managua.

At the request of the Nicaraguans, yesterday's meeting involved discussion of procedures and groundrules by which future meetings will be conducted. Future meetings are -- Excuse me: Further meetings are anticipated.

Q How soon?

A Don't have anything for you on that.

Q Why was it in Atlanta -- any particular reason?

A Well, it turned out to be a mutually-convenient place to meet, so they met there.

Q Why is he here in this country?

A I don't know whether he has other business or not, can't tell you. You'll have to ask the Nicaraguans.

Q Any third party present?

A No.

Q No, you're saying?

A No. (Sic)

Q Alan, do you have anything on the actions in Poland regarding possible better terms of amnesty or what-have-you for dissidents?

A I don't, Mike. I saw a wire report on that. I think we would want to take a look at precisely what is involved before we commented, if we have something to say. But I will look into that and see if we can give you something further later in the day. I can't promise that. It depends on a number of things.

Q Pardon me. I was not here yesterday, but did you have anything regarding the verdict of that trial, the youth who was severely beaten?

A You're talking about Poland?

Q Yes.

A No, I don't have anything on that.

- MORE -

Q President Saddam Hussein of Iraq, in a story in the Washington Post this morning about the Iraqi pipeline proposed to be established or initiated through Jordan, sounded a lot of fears that Israel might attack or destroy the pipeline, and he was not satisfied with the oral -- what you call it, the oral guarantees or oral words that the United States said that Israel will not attack. (sic)

Do you have any comment on that, and will there be anything of substantive significance that you could assure the Iraqis that they're not going to be attacked?

A I think we've talked about that before, and I've stayed away from suggestions of guarantees. But I refer you back to what we have said in the past. I'm not going to get into the substance of our diplomatic exchanges. But as we have said, we do support the construction of addition oil export facilities, such as the proposed pipeline to Aqaba, which by-pass the Strait of Hormuz.

That Aqaba pipeline project, however, is still in its preliminary stage, and it would be premature to speculate about hypothetical situations which might arise. So I don't have anything new to give you today on those reports that you're referring to, but we have addressed this subject before, and the reasons we support it and so on, and I would refer you back to the record.

Q A copy of that?

A Yes, I can give you a copy of that.

Q Alan, I want to follow this. Going back to the experience of Israel attacking the nuclear facilities in (inaudible), and the fear which is now, you know, the Export-Import Bank approved $500 million of a loan for Iraq to do this; and there is, you know, some first steps which were done. The Iraqis are still fearful they will begin, I believe according to the story in the Post, to start this project unless they will have some guarantees, assurances -- more than oral -- that Israel will not attack --

A As I say, I just don't have anything to add beyond what I've already said.

Q Do you have anything further on ANZUS?

A No, I don't. I would, as I did yesterday, refer you to what the Secretary and his party have said.

Q What's the question, please?

A The question was, anything further on ANZUS.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the COCOM restriction of computer sales to the Soviet Union?

A I have a little bit on that. I can confirm that the U.S. and its COCOM partners have reached agreement on a new computer definition as part of the recently completed list review which defines those products and technologies to be controlled to the East Bloc.

The computer definition covers hardware, software and telecommunications switching equipment.

Since by mutual agreement of its members, all COCOM deliberations are confidential as are the details of the list of products and technologies controlled. I can't comment on the specifics of the new definition, apart from noting that the U.S. considers it to constitute a balanced and reasonable agreement.

Fred?

Q A copy of that?

A Yes.

Q Alan, two weeks ago you applauded the participation and the help of the American Ambassador in Bolivia in rescuing the Bolivian President.

The press reports this morning say that the -- at least, members of the Embassy down there have been embarrassed that that coup came about from those members of the police force that were financed by the Drug Enforcement Agency in this Administration. Do you have anything further on that situation?

A Well, simply to note -- I don't recall whether we did at the time -- but we were informed that a few individuals from a police nacotics unit were among those individuals involved in the abduction.

The Commander of the National Police has condemned the abduction, as have other Bolivian leaders and military commanders. The unit is a police strike force created under the 1983 narcotics control agreement between the United States and Bolivia. Under the agreement, funds for the unit's personnel and equipment are provided by the United States, but the U.S. played no role in selecting members of the unit.

I might add that narcotics control in Bolivia is a pressing need. The Bolivian Government has committed itself publicly to narcotics control and joined the United States in a five-year narcotics control agreement in August 1983.

Irrespective of the misguided involvement of isolated individual members of the narcotics unit, we will continue to work urgently with Bolivia on narcotics control.

Q It's generally considered that that entire program, though, has been a failure; that it's just not working. Is there a review underway by this Department, by the Drug Enforcement Agency, by this Administration?

A I don't have anything to offer you on a review, Fred. As I say, it is a pressing issue, and we are going to continue to work on an urgent basis on that problem.

Q Can we have a copy of that statement?

A What I originally said, yes.

Q To follow up on that, two weeks ago, when you addressed this issue, you said that you didn't see any reason that the events of that Saturday would have any effect on our narcotics program and their narcotics program.

A Well, that's essentially the same point I'm making.

Q So you're saying there's no -- that this incident shouldn't in any way affect the actual implementation of anti-drug trafficking program?

A I think this is -- it's the same statement that I've just given you, actually, if you go back and look at it. Well, I think it is, Jim.

Q My question is, these people have been confined to barracks. How does that -- it doesn't hurt our --

A I think the point is that, according to the information I have, these are -- we're talking about a few individuals who were involved in this program, but that this program, as a whole, will continue to be pressed on an urgent basis.

Q Just to clarify, you're saying, then, that your understanding is that the Leopards as a unit have not been confined to barracks but just a few individuals have?

A Well, as I say, my understanding is that a few individuals have been involved in this. I can't tell you how many out of the entire unit, but that that effort continues.

Q Thank you.

A Okay, you're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:10 p.m.)

Becker

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #128

WEDNESDAY, JULY 18, 1984, 12:03 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. Just one brief housekeeping announcement. That is to note that the State and Defense Departments will be issuing today a report on Nicaragua's military buildup and support for subversion in Central America.

I understand that copies will be available in the Press Office at about 3:00, so why don't you check then?

That's it. Happy to take questions.

Q On the subject of Nicaragua, are you going to be putting out the Middendorf speech to OAS today?

A I don't know the answer to that. Why don't we check, and -- we'll try and have an answer for you later. I haven't looked into that.

And while we're in that part of the world, do you have any assessment of the current military situation in El Salvador following an attack on -- when was it, Sunday or Monday -- which killed 21 security people?

A No, I don't. I'm trying to think back whether we had anything at that point. I don't recall that we did, Jim. You might want to check, but I don't have a general assessment.

Bob?

Q On the document that is to be released this afternoon, I have seen it. There's a change from the draft. The draft had said that the arms flow from Nicaragua to El Salvador had become sporadic and that the guerrillas had basically all the arms they needed. And in the new document, these things vanish for no apparent reason. Is there any evidence to support the elimination of these findings?

A Well, I'm not going to talk about drafts. We didn't release a draft publicly. One doesn't normally do that. A draft, as I indicated before, did get sent to

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the Hill; but as we also said, it was a draft. I think there are a number of changes that are made; we always hope to impove the product as we go along. And so I simply will refer you to the officially issued version rather than trying to do an analysis for you of corparison between texts.

Q But you don't know -- my question really is, is there any evidence? I mean, what is the basis for the change in the --

A I'm not going to try to discuss textual changes. Take it as a given that the conclusions cited -- the facts cited are based upon evidence.

Obviously, because it's a public document, it relies very heavily on citation of news articles and Sandinista documents, and public comments by defectors and other open-source kinds of materials. But it is consistent, obviously, with all information that we have. It's just that it's sourced as best we can source it.

Q Well, Alan, let me follow up on that. Does that mean that the -- that if the -- if there is -- if there was a text previous to today, prior to today, which said that the arms flow was sporadic, that that text has been improved by a new one that no longer says it's sporadic and therefore it wasn't sporadic in the past, or what?

A I frankly haven't looked at the various changes that may have been made between any particular draft, including the one that was sent up to the Hill, and this version. I simply, as I say, would refer you to this as the version which we -- which is final.

Q To address the question of substance, does the Department have a view as to whether the arms flow is now sporadic --

A Why don't you read the report instead of having me characterize it for you? It's a fairly thick document, and I think you'll find it interesting.

Q Not having seen the final report, I don't know whether this is still in it or not. But in the draft report there was the same photo of the truck with the top peeled back and the weapons that appeared in the 1981 book, and the draft made mention of the fact that this was a 1981 photo.

What was the Department's reason for including that again in a 1984 report?

A Well, again, I'm not going to discuss the report particularly. You've got it there to read. It tells -- it goes back; that report covers a period of time. It's not meant necessarily to be only what's happened in the last six months, as you will clearly find when you read it. And so it's a fairly comprehensive document, but I'm not going to try and comment on specific aspects of it, Ralph. I'm just not prepared to do that.

Bill?

Q Alan, do you have anything on a report that guerrillas in El Salvador have taking advantage of U.S. military training?

A No, I don't have anything on that.

Q Have you seen the report?

A I saw a wire on that this morning; yes.

Q There was a story in the Post this morning that McFarlane was saying that maybe the Soviets and the Kuwaitis had not agreed to, or had not initialed, a major arms sale. Do you have any indication that they have not initialed that kind of an agreement?

A Well, I think what we know is the following: We understand that Kuwaiti-Soviet discussions about arms sales have been underway for over a year, but we don't have any independent or official confirmation that any formal sales agreements have been signed.

In addition, press reports that the size of the Kuwaiti buy is valued at over $325 million are unconfirmed. But I would point to the obvious, and that is, that any decision about what arms to buy and from what supplier is obviously a matter for the Government of Kuwait to decide.

Q One other. What is the -- can you say what the value is, and what might be included in the U.S. -- the upgrading of an air-defense package that the U.S. is considering for Kuwait right now?

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A I don't have that information.

Ralph?

Q Could I ask you to take the question on the Salvador guerrillas? To what extent does the U.S. -- is the U.S. aware of U.S. training facilities and training personnel being used to train Salvadoran leftist guerrillas?

A I'll look at it. I don't know that -- what I can get on it, or whether this is the right place to address it, but I'll look at it, sure.

Q Alan, do you have any reaction to West Germany resuming aid to El Salvador?

A Resuming aid to El Salvador?

Q Uh-huh.

A Yeah, we are aware of the announcement, obviously, that the Federal Republic has lifted a five-year-old ban on aid to El Salvador along with an $18 million package of assistance. Don't have any specifics on it.

We applaud this decision by the Federal Republic of Germany, and we hope that this step would be followed by other democratic governments as a concrete expression of support for the progress toward democracy in El Salvador.

--MORE--

Q Have you any comments on the possibility of a visit of Mr. Napoleon Duarte next week here?

A Well, not really. Obviously, for his travel plans, you ought to check with the Salvadoran Embassy. We do understand that he plans to visit New York City early next week to receive an award from the America Society, but my understanding is that his itinerary is tentative, and that's all I really have on it, in fact.

Q Has he asked for any appointments at the State Department --

A I'm not aware that there is anything --

Q -- or the White House?

A -- set up at this point. Obviously , if there is, we would let you know; but there isn't, I don't think, at this point.

Q Do you have anything about the Polish athlete who apparently has asked for asylum in New York?

A Very little, Larry. The Department policy, as you know, is not to comment on applications for asylum, indeed whether there have been applications for asylum. And in the event that we were to receive an application, it would be routinely handled, and we would provide the INS with an advisory opinion, so I guess I have to suggest that maybe you ought to check with INS regarding any possible existence of such an application.

Q Another subject: Can you shed light on the designation of September 18 as the starting day for ASAT space talks in Vienna?

A Well, simply, that that was a specific date that was mentioned when the proposal was originally made, and that was the date that, when we said we accepted the idea of a meeting or the proposal to meet in Vienna, that was the date that we accepted. The situation remains as we have described it before.

We have accepted the proposal to meet without pre-conditions; we are moving ahead with preparations for that; we're in diplomatic discussions with the Soviets on this issue; and that's where we will leave the matter.

Q But the Soviets still have not accepted talks as such because of arguments over the agenda.

A I'm not going to get into the question of what the diplomatic dialogue consists of, I'm afraid, so I'm not able to help you with that.

Q I'd like to ask you about that New York Times story this morning on the shredders in Iran. Perhaps I just haven't noticed it before, haven't seen it before; but obviously, these books have been published for some time. And now there is this photograph of people piecing together shredded American documents, or allegedly American documents.

A Uh-huh.

Q Does the Department have any concern, or has it taken any steps to shore up the kind of security that is implied by shredding documents so that they can't be pieced together again in the future?

A Well, as you're not asking about the specific story, and I'm not going to respond on the specific story. On that, I think as a general matter, Ralph, the best I can do for you is to say that the government as a whole and the Department, are always cognizant of what might be problems, and try to find remedies. But I don't have specifics for how we would handle various kinds of security issues, and that would be a security kind of an issue -- regarding information.

Q How about the question of these -- the likelihood apparently, if they are going to piece all of these together in Iran -- the likelihood of these documents coming out over years and years?

A I can't speculate on that.

Q No, not speculation; but what does it do for -- I mean what steps, if any, have you had to take, or can you take, to counter the effects, if any, of release?

A You're asking me in effect to confirm that those are genuine, and that I won't do; so I'm not going to address the specifics of that story as regards Iran.

Q Alan, is it true that research on this problem is being done at Lorton?

(Laughter)

Q Any comment on the French Government change?

A Yes. As you're aware, we have established a cordial and cooperative relationship with the Government of Prime Minister Mauroy, and we look forward to continuing to work closely with President Mitterrand and with the new government of Prime Minister Fabius.

Q I have one more on another subject -- I'm sorry. The Department of Energy yesterday announced that some seismic signals had been recorded in the Soviet Union on the thirteenth in the morning, July 13, at a town in Siberia whose name I cannot pronounce.

A Uh-huh.

Q Is there any indication that this is an underground nuclear explosion?

A I don't know that we talk about underground nuclear explosions, Ralph. I'll be happy to look at it and see if there is anything we can say, but I don't promise to come back to you with an answer on that.

Yes.

Q Could you give us any indication how close we might be to a negotiated settlement in the dispute concerning the Navarin Base off of Alaska -- the maritime boundary negotiations that are going on or will be going on next week?

A There is some extensive guidance on the subject of negotiations. There is to be another round of negotiations -- I believe it's the 23rd and 24th. I don't happen to have with me the guidance, but I think if you check in the press office, you can get that.

Q Do you have anything on the withdrawal of the so-called augmentation force of Marines in Lebanon?

A Yes. As the security situation in the Beirut area improves, and as we take additional steps to provide alternate means of security for our personnel and facilities in the greater Beirut area, we anticipate the U.S. Marine augmentation force presently on the ground in West Beirut will, in a phased manner, eventually return to the Sixth Fleet units presently conducting routine operations in the Mediterranean.

To anticipate the question as to schedule, I simply don't have anything on what the schedule of that would be.

Q That was about, what, 90 people?

A My understanding is, personally, that that's correct, but I just don't know officially, and I think I would have to ask you to check with the Pentagon. I think they would have that.

Q And these alternative security arrangements -- that's the move to this new building?

A Well, we are planning to move out of our temporary Embassy facilities into a new multi-building site in West Beirut; but as an interim measure and pending completion of those facilities, we have temporarily moved some of the Embassy functions and offices into a northeast suburb of Beirut, which will, therefore, make consular services available in east as well as west Beirut, so --

Q Can we have a copy of the statement?

A The initial thing, yes. And obviously, we will maintain the usual Marine security detachment, but I don't have details as to how that will be distributed.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:19 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #129

THURSDAY, JULY 19, 1984, 12:14 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. No questions -- no announcements.

(Laughter)

MR. ROMBERG: Are there any questions? No questions? O.K. What can I do for you?

Q Alan, reports of Iraq hitting another large naval target near Kharg Island -- have you got anything for us on that -- any considerations?

A I don't. I don't have anything on it.

Q Can you check into that?

A No. As I've indicated before, I don't think we're going to get into the reporting mode on that, but I just don't have anything on it.

Q Do you anything on the DEA allegations that several senior Nicaraguan officials are involved in the cocaine --

A I don't. It would be a matter which would properly be addressed by either DEA or Justice, and I just don't have anything on that.

Q What would it mean, if this is true? Is this part of a --

A I don't think I'd want to speculate on that, Joanne.

Q ...pattern -- can you link it to a pattern?

A As I say, I don't think I'm going to speculate on it. Comment would appropriately come (from) elsewhere.

Q Do you have anything for us on Poland regarding the dissidents' trial that was set back and on any effort -- what do you perceive as the mood there regarding amnesty?

A Well, I don't have anything specific with regard to the apparent adjournment of the trial. As far as the possibility of an amnesty is concerned, we would welcome any steps toward national reconciliation in Poland. We hope that all political prisoners are released because we believe that genuine national reconciliation is the best way to solve Poland's problems.

As to our own reaction, in accordance with the President's step-by-step approach toward relations with the Polish Government, our specific response will take into consideration the scope of any amnesty.

Q Let me refine Mike's question: Do you have anything for us?

(Laughter)

Q Do you have anything on the story by Gelb in the Times about Mexico shifting in your favor?

A Not a --

Q Who's favor?

A (Laughter) The question was, "Who's favor?" Not a great deal on that. I'm not going to comment specifically on the article, Jim. In our view, Mexico is playing an active and positive role, along with the other three Contadora countries -- that is Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama -- in the effort to find a peaceful resolution of the problems in the area. And we have repeatedly expressed our support for the Contadora process.

Q So you detect no shift in the Mexican position?

A We don't see any fundamental changes in the important and positive role that Mexico has been playing in the Contadora peace effort. Its actions seem consistent with the

Contadora effort to find solutions satisfactory to all of the countries in the region, and we are encouraged by the progress which the Contadora process has made in that regard.

Q Copy of that -- I assume that was actually prepared guidance that you are reading?

A Why do you presume that?

(Laughter)

Q It was just so mellifluous in the way that you delivered it.

A I think I take that as a personal insult, but in any case (laughter), I'll consider whether I will provide you with anything in writing.

Q Alan, where is Ambassador Shlaudeman today? And I have a follow-up.

A Well, I'm not normally going to tell you where he is, but the fact is, he is here.

Q How many meetings did he hold in Atlanta with the Nicaraguan Vice Minister?

A I don't have anything to offer you on his meetings with Vice Minister Tinoco beyond what we've already given you. You're going to have to hold on --

Q Can you say he held more than one meeting in Atlanta?

A He met with him in Atlanta. As I say, I don't have more details to provide.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the closure of the Israeli Liaison Office in Beirut?

A Yes. We don't have confirmation of those reports at this point, but if the reports are true, this would be regrettable. The Liaison Office in Dubayyah provides a useful mechanism for communication between the Governments of Lebanon and Israel and for solving practical problems, which we have consistently urged.

Q Can I have a copy of that?

A More or less, yes.

Q Alan, what's the usage of this Liaison Office if, till now, the Lebanese cannot reach an agreement, new agreement, for the withdrawal of the Israelis? I mean, in light of the failure to reach any agreement, what's the use of being there? What's the usefulness of it?

A Well, I suppose you ought to ask the Lebanese about whether they have sought to use that particular mechanism for that purpose; but in any case, as I say, we find it a useful -- and I think the Governments of Lebanon and Israel, for them, it would be a useful means of communication and for solving practical problems, so --

Q Alan, do you have anything on the Indian Army's chief of staff's visit, official visit, and also does it have anything to do with recent events in India? And also, what does the State Department have to do with his visit?

A Well, we had some guidance on that the other day. I'm sure it's in the Press Office. Let me ask you to check with them.

Q Alan, on Poland again, would an amnesty lead to a reassessment of the sanctions against Poland?

A I don't want to go beyond what I said on that, George. Our response to the amnesty would depend upon the scope of that amnesty.

Q Alan, the Yugoslav News Agency, TANJUG, has a dispatch from Moscow, temporarily exclusive -- it may turn out to be permanently exclusive -- that Walter Mondale will visit Moscow in September. Do you have any information?

A I don't. I saw the wire, but I don't have any information on it.

Q Do you have anything on reports that a Roman Catholic priest in Romania was beaten to death by Romanian security agents?

A I don't have anything on that. I'll check and see if we've got anything, but I don't happen to have anything on it.

Q On Nicaragua again, was any statement conveyed from the U.S. Government to the leadership with respect to the fifth anniversary? And can you make it public, if there was?

A I will check on it, Jim. I'll see what we have.

Q Also, with regard to Nicaragua, has any communication been sent to the Nicaraguan Government, or is any planned, regarding the DEA allegations of cocaine traffic?

A Well, I think I'll go back to what I said before. I don't intend to have any comment on those stories. Any comment would come out of DEA or Justice.

Q No, no. But does the United States --

A I don't intend --

Q -- through the State Department --

A That's fine. I don't intend to have any comment on the story.

A I was just asking you if there's any schedule at all for either a new meeting with the Nicaraguans, here or there; and also, will the Cuban Immigration conference go ahead somewhere else or here?

A Don't have any thing new for you on the Cuban question.

In terms of the Nicaraguan meetings, I think we indicated, in what we put out following the Atlanta session, that we anticipated future meetings, but I didn't have any specifics, and I don't have any specifics to offer you on that.

Q There was something else on Nicaragua, and that was, I just wondered if, for the record, we could, in light of the publication of yesterday's background paper, renew a request for a real briefing on this issue?

A That request is standing. No.

Q Thank you.

A Go ahead.

Q There was a report this morning that Israel intercepted another ship coming to Lebanon, or to the area.

A Uh-huh.

Q What do you have on that?

A Well, we can't confirm the report, but we note that, in this particular case, the vessel's captain has reportedly admitted involvement in terrorist activities directed against the State of Israel.

Q I mean -- this is the second time in about two or three weeks, and it looks like Israel is imposing a blockade, a sea blockade over the movement of ships coming into that area.

A I don't have a --

Q Isn't this interfering into national waterways, or something like that?

A Well, I'm not going to try to give you a specific response to that. We've said before that while -- as a matter of principle, we support freedom of navigation in international waters, we also strongly oppose terrorism, and we look at these situations case-by-case.

Q In the case of the first one, Alisur Blanco, according to FBIS today, Israel claims that it was done in self-defense. Is this an acceptable norm of international --

A Well, I think I've basically given you what I have to respond to that.

Yes?

Q Alan, do you have any comments on three Pakistan nationals who were arrested by the customs officials in Houston on the charges that they were shipping nuclear parts, and they were working on the instructions of the Pakistani Government? They're under arrest now.

A I don't recall whether we had anything on this or not.

Q And also, now, where do the Pakistani -- that nuclear deal stand, the nuclear bomb?

A I don't have anything new to say on the latter question. On the former, I'm not sure that we had anything. If we do have anything, why don't you check later in the Press Office and see. But, obviously, they've been arrested, so I'm not sure that we would have anything further to say on that.

Q On the report that you put out yesterday, "Background paper on Nicaraguan Military Build-up", on Page 22 there is a mention here -- Palestine Liberation Organization has helped ship arms to Salvadoran guerrillas, and that the PLO has connection with the revolutionary movement throughout the world, including Salvador.

And also later, that you're saying something about -- that the PLO has sent pilots to Nicaragua. Are these some things which are not in the norm of international relations between countries and movements and revolutionary movements, and other things, that they help each other and support each other? Or do you see anything out of the norm that this is in contradiction to the United States position in that area. What's your comment on that?

A I will leave you with the words in the report. It's a statement of fact as to the kind of role that's being played by various organizations in Nicaragua. So it's there as a statement, and people can reach their own judgments about whether that's a good, bad or indifferent thing, or inappropriate thing to do, but I think that I'd ask you to read it in the context in which it's presented.

Q Alan, how can you say facts that all -- when you are, in fact, depending on reports by journalists or by the Houston Chronicle or Al-Safir, or whatever? I mean, you don't have any substantiated fact. If you publish a report by the State Department, we expect more than --

A Do you really? Well, what I said yesterday -- I refer you back to what I said yesterday, which is that what is published in that report is consistent with all of the information that we have. Obviously, we have a problem with certain kinds of sourcing, intelligence information, or diplomatic information. So we cannot violate the ground rules on making that public, but we have put out what reflects the totality, as best we can, of our information.

Q Can I just follow on that -- just on the previous point, on the PLO presence? There's this note in the middle of the text which indicates that since 1982, the PLO has been prevented from the initiation of new activities during '83 and '84.

Does that mean that it's the State Department's judgment that the PLO is not presently militarily active in either advice or training or other role, other than its diplomatic mission in Nicaragua at this time?

A Jim, I'm not going to try to expand upon the report. What is available is in it, and I will leave you with those words.

Q I want to take the devil's advocate in this matter. As a matter of fact, this has been -- the PLO has been portrayed in the last couple of months, or three months, by speeches of U.S. officials, State Department officials, as sort of maybe looking for a scapegoat in order to show that a failing policy in Central America, or in that area, you have to find some scapegoats, and this is your --

A Well, that's your interpretation. I'm not --

Q Well, this is what --

A -- aware that Administration officials ever said that.

Q Mr. Elliott Abrams has attacked it several times and he called them all kind of names.

A Yeah.

Q You know, this is a situation which needs a clarification by this State Department.

A I don't think anybody is looking for scapegoats. I think what we're trying to do here is to put out the facts as best we can, given the problems that we've got with classification; and so you have the report.

Q But last week you said you can't confirm that the PLO is still supplying Nicaragua with arms after '82. Last week you have said that.

A When did I say that?

Q About when the story about Jose Napoleon Duarte saying that the PLO assisted in giving SAM-7s to the guerrillas somewhere in the area; that you have no indication that SAM-7s were fired on some of the areas.

A That was a specific reference to SAM-7s. I'm not going to try to interpret the report. It's a long report; it's there; it's what we can say about it.

Q Can we have someone who could talk to us on this --

A As I say, I think that you can pursue this with various people, and the question about a briefing is a standing one, but we've got a report which just came out yesterday.

Yes, go ahead.

Q Yes, Alan, I'd like to ask you about -- there was a report yesterday from the Middle East dealing with the Iraq and Iran war. I'd like to know -- the reports say, or indicate that the Iranians came to realize that there should be a negotiation between Iraq. Do you have any more on that?

A I don't. I think that it would be up to the countries who would be directly concerned to comment on that.

Q Do you have anything on the Captive Nations Week that President Reagan announced, and also he said that we will -- we're condemning the dictators of the world who do not recognize citizens -- the human rights of their citizens. Now, what sort of steps is this Administration going to take not only against communism but also against dictators?

A Well, I think that the President spoke out quite forcefully on that.

Q On human rights --

A The President spoke out quite forcefully on this, and I refer you to his words.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:30 p.m.)

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Friday, July 20, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #130

FRIDAY, JULY 20, 1984, 12:15 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. Two announcements, or one announcement and one statement. The announcement is basically that, as you know, the President spoke to a White House ceremony this morning, marking the National POW/MIA Recognition Day. Vice President Bush, Secretary Shultz, Secretary Weinberger, and other senior officials also attended.

In that connection, I wanted to call to your attention two other events on the program of this weekend's Fifteenth Annual Meeting of the National Families of POW/MIAs, and that is the annual dinner tomorrow night at 7:30 at which Senator Byrd will make the first award of the newly created Congressional Commemorative Medal and at which George Will will be the guest speaker; and also a Commemorative Candlelight Ceremony on Sunday morning at 9:00. Both events will be held at the League's meeting site at the Stouffer's Crystal City.

Further information could be obtained from Ann Griffiths or Ken Henterman of the League, at 979-6800.

Secondly, a statement on the tenth anniversary of the coup and intervention in Cyprus.

Ten years after the summer of 1974, Cyprus remains tragically divided. Throughout the past decade, we have worked with others to try to establish an environment conducive to dialogue between the two Cypriot communities, for it is only they who, ultimately, will find solutions.

We are encouraged to see the United Nations Secretary General about to resume his efforts to bring the sides together under the mandate given him by the Security Council. We hope all Cypriots can renew their determination to bridge their differences and move toward establishment of a reunited Cyprus.

That is it for announcements. I'll be happy to take questions.

Q Copy?

A Copy? Sure.

Q Alan, what are the Secretary's plans regarding this dinner? Is he attending that?

A He is not going to be.

Q And is he involved in any of the activity over --

A No, not over the weekend. As I say, he was at the ceremony at the White House today.

Q Alan, what can you tell us about this agreement with Laos to look at a crash, an apparent crash site of Vietnam era for MIA bodies?

A Chris, I don't have details in my head. I think that Larry Speakes does have details which he will be giving at his briefing, which is going on now, so let me ask you to have your colleagues over there get that.

Q Do you have a response to Nicaragua's announcements yesterday?

A Yes. The few cosmetic changes in the electoral process fall far short of what is necessary to achieve free and fair elections in Nicaragua.

Contrast what was offered by Daniel Ortega with the conditions that the democratic opposition, including independent labor unions, the private sector, and three political parties, the Social Democrats, Social Christians, and Liberal Constitutionalists, have spelled out on several occasions -- most recently July 7 -- as the measures that it considers essential to having free elections.

These include the suspension of the state of emergency, an end to press censorship, and a general amnesty law that would permit the participation of all Nicaraguan citizens in the electoral process.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A Sure. Yes?

Q Why is it, for example, that if you consider the suspension of a state of emergency to be critical to a free and fair election in Nicaragua, that you wouldn't have considered the same with respect to El Salvador?

A I think that the question that we -- what I've said to you is to take a look at what the democratic opposition has called for. So I think that is where you should turn your attention. The fact is that the question is partially one of actual ability to operate freely and the other is a question of atmosphere.

Q But my question goes to the enthusiasm that this Administration, as opposed to the opposition in Nicaragua, has greeted El Salvador's elections in '82 and '84 as opposed to your statements and the President's statements about what the Nicaraguans are offering now. I was asking about a specific point.

A I don't think that on the basis of the observers who were in El Salvador, both -- not only in the actual casting of votes but also during the election campaign -- there is much question that those who were campaigning in El Salvador waged a vigorous, open campaign.

The point here -- and it's as far as I really can take you on this, Jim -- is that those who would wage a campaign if they were allowed to do so freely in Nicaragua have said that there were certain things that were necessary to allow them to proceed, and that they would consider appropriate. Those were not addressed yesterday.

Q Then, let me just ask you this: Is it the Administration's position that until the opposition or the Coordinadora, which is the opposition in Nicaragua, until their conditions for free and fair elections are satisfied, the Administration will defer to their judgment on the matter?

A Well, I think that we attach great importance to their judgment on this matter. I'm not going to be able to take it further than that. But, certainly, that weighs very heavily with us.

Fred?

Q Do you have anything to add today about the allegations that Nicaraguan officials are involved in drug smuggling into the United States?

A No, I do not.

Q Did you have anything yesterday or do you have anything today on the meeting Hartman had with Gromyko?

A No, I don't, Bernie.

Q Alan, what's the focus of Richard Murphy's testimony next week on the Hill, and will any of this tie in with resumed efforts to get the Jerusalem bills out on an open floor fight on that?

A I don't know specifically what is going to be involved in his testimony. My understanding is that it's a Middle East update next week, so I guess that's about as much as I can do for you. It's going to be an open session, so --

Q What committee?

A Why don't we talk about the Hill schedule afterwards instead of trying to do from --

Q Do you have anything about secret talks held in the Gulf area about the Gulf war, which were being denied by Iran?

A No, I don't.

Q Do we see any special significance in the restoration of diplomatic ties between Lebanon and Iran now, especially for Lebanon's internal politics?

A I think that is a matter for those two governments, and I would not have a comment to offer you on that.

Q Alan --

A Could Jim go ahead?

Q Oh, anything on Duarte's visit here?

A I think that Larry Speakes announced, or the White House anyway, announced this morning that he does have a scheduled meeting with the President on Monday. So, obviously, he will be coming here. I don't have any details beyond that particular meeting as to what else he will be doing, so we'll just have to --

Q After the briefing, will you?

A No.

Q You don't know how many days he will be here?

A I don't have details on it at this point.

Q Has the United States Government issued a warning to the Kuwaiti Government about buying arms from the Soviets, as it was reported yesterday by the Jewish Telegraph Agency?

A I have addressed the question of our attitude towards, reaction to the reports of the Kuwaiti Defense Minister's trip to the Soviet Union, and the reports that he would -- he had concluded an arms deal which, as I said yesterday, our indications are -- had not, or the day before, had not been concluded during that visit. I don't have anything new to add to that.

Q But the word "warning" was not --

A As I say, I have nothing new to add to what I said about that before.

Q Anything on the Liaison Office or the closure of the entry into southern Lebanon; do you have anything on that today?

A Yes. Nothing new on the closure of the Liaison Office question. As far as the reports that the Israelis are closing off the access to southern Lebanon, don't have any comment on that action if, indeed, it in fact has taken place. I can't confirm that. But we have consistently urged all the parties involved in southern Lebanon to take into consideration the humanitarian impact of their actions.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded 12:25 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #131

MONDAY, JULY 23, 1984, 12:10 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: O.K. Just a housekeeping announcement: The Department of State, the Department of Commerce, the Overseas Private Investment Council and India International will hold a joint press conference tomorrow at 11:00 A.M. in Room 1107 of the State Department to introduce a study on doing business in India. Senior officials from sponsoring organizations will participate in this ON-THE-RECORD briefing.

State Department correspondents are welcome to attend. Copies of the Executive Summary will be available in the Press Office after the briefing.

And I'm afraid that's all I have for you today.

Q Has the State Department looked into the implications of the amnesty declared by the Polish Government and is it prepared to do anything in response?

A I think, as Secretary Shultz said this morning on a television interview program, I think we welcome this development, Jim. It's a positive move. We hope the amnesty will lead the Polish authorities to take further steps to meet the aspirations so clearly expressed by the Polish people. Lasting political, economic, and social stability in Poland can only be achieved through genuine dialogue between government and people.

As far as the United States is concerned, before deciding on any next steps, we will need to study the announcement carefully, and of course, we'll be consulting with our allies.

Q You say you will need to study the announcement. Is what you're saying you want to see if they actually do what they say they're going to do?

A Need to take a little time to consider the full implications of what they have said they are going to do.

Q Hello, John. There is an announcement on TASS this morning saying that the Soviet Union has proposed to the U.S. --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- that a joint communique be published regarding the space talks in September. Do you have any comment on the idea of publishing such a joint communique to clarify the positions of the two countries?

A Well, when pursuing that story, I think if I were you I'd keep in touch with the White House on that. Just in response to your question, such arrangements have been traditional on the eve of various arms control talks. They have usually been conducted through diplomatic channels.

Q John, on that point, the Soviet statement referred again to a moratorium on any deployment or any testing, and I was wondering, the way it's stated it seems to be something of almost a pre-condition that the moratorium be agreed as well as the subject of the talks. Is it a pre-condition? Have they said it's a pre-condition?

A I think, as I say, I'd refer you to the White House. I think they will address that point in anything they might be saying about it.

Q Is this a usual situation or is this an unusual situation?

A I'm just saying that usually such joint announcements have been negotiated through diplomatic channels. You asked me if it was unusual. I'm just telling you what the norm has been.

Q I just want to be clear. A joint announcement that would what -- announce the opening of talks?

A TASS is out there, as I understand it, reporting that they have approached the United States with their draft of a joint announcement, and I think the White

House may want to pursue that further during the day. I think they're briefing at about 1:30

Q Do you, John, have anything on the story quoting Ceausescu as saying that the Soviets will agree to talks on arms control if the U.S. ceases deploying?

A Well, as the Secretary said when he was asked that question by a television correspondent this morning, Bernie, there is nothing particularly new in that suggestion. As the United States and NATO have repeatedly made clear, the United States remains ready to return to the INF talks any time without pre-conditions, and the United States calls on the Soviet Union to do so. A halt to our deployment of Pershing II and Cruise Missiles, absent concrete negotiating results, would simply reward the Soviets for walking out of the Geneva talks.

In December 1979, NATO decided to deploy U.S. Pershing II and Cruise missiles in response to the unprovoked Soviet buildup of intermediate range SS-20 missiles. The United States and NATO have repeatedly made clear that in accordance with the terms of this decision, these deployments will go forward on schedule in the absence of a concrete negotiating result.

Q John, even apart from your response, do you see a shift in the Soviet position? Had they heretofore insisted on dismantling and removal of the Pershing and the Cruise, in contrast to this report that they are calling for a cessation of continued deployment?

A Well, I think once again, Bernie, I'd draw on Secretary Shultz's response this morning, that he sees nothing particularly new in this --

Q Incidentally, you know, the Soviets have denied that interpretation.

A Well, and I also would draw your attention to statements made by Soviets -- I think Mr. Tikhonov had a statement in Poland which is somewhat at variance with this, too -- somewhat at variance with this report.

Q Do you have any comment at this point on the Israeli elections?

1- 1851

A No.

Q On this point, the newspaper Ma'aretz says that the United States hopes for alignment victory --

A I'm sorry. Hopes for --?

Q The United States hopes for the alignment victory for the comeback of Shimon Peres. What do you comment on that?

A It's an internal Israeli matter. We have no comment. As Secretary Shultz said this morning, we will be happy to work with whatever government emerges in Israel and fully expect to do so comfortably.

- MORE -

Q John, the other day the President predicted that the Nicaraguan elections were going to be a Soviet-style sham. In the meantime, Arturo Cruz has announced he, or let it be known that he might be going back to Nicaragua to take part in the elections. Do you still regard it as a Soviet-style sham, or is it possible that it might be a real election?

A I think it would inappropriate for us to comment on specific candidates. But as we understand it, the Nicaraguan opposition has unified behind a slate headed by Arturo Cruz. The candidates on this slate have made clear their willingness to stand for election provided the Government of Nicaragua allows free and fair participation in the elections.

In this regard, the candidates have reiterated the demands put forward previously to include full suspension of the state of emergency, elimination of press censorship, release of political prisoners, and separation of the Sandinista Front and the state apparatus.

The few cosmetic changes made so far in the electoral process have fallen far short of what is necessary to achieve free and fair elections. We believe the formation of this unity slate provides the Government of Nicaragua with an excellent opportunity to demonstrate whether it is prepared to reconsider this important issue and move on to truly democratic rule.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q As well as the Soviet remark before?

A Sure.

Q In other words, if they accept this -- if they agree to the demands of the opposition group, that it will be a real election and will not be a sham election?

A Well, that's -- I mean, one always has to be careful in analyzing the difference between professions and reality in Nicaragua. But if the promises were carried out, that would be clearly positive.

Q Can you lay out specifically, does the United States essentially back the demands made by the

1-1853

opposition grouping, and does it associate its current efforts to gain more money from Congress with specifically those demands?

A The United States certainly has favored free elections in Nicaragua, and continues so to do.

Q Well, what is the relationship between free elections in Nicaragua and the Administration's pending request before Congress?

A I don't see a contradiction.

Q Well, I wasn't asking whether you saw a contradiction. I was asking what the relationship was. In other words --

A Well, I don't really understand your question.

Q Well, apparently there's a request pending that's being renewed this week before Congress with respect to U.S. activities in Nicaragua.

Do we identify that request with the opposition demands as opposed, say, to arms interdiction?

A Are you talking about alleged covert activities?

Q That's one interpretation.

A I'm afraid I cannot give you anything further on that.

Q Do you have anything more on the reports last week of high-level Nicaraguan participation in drug smuggling to the United States?

A I don't. I think Mr. Romberg -- whatever we did last week is about all we're prepared to stand on today.

Q John, President Duarte said this morning at the White House that he is aware of arms shipments coming from Nicaragua to El Salvador by sea. Do we have any evidence to confirm the specific shipments of arms by sea to El Salvador?

A   Oh, I don't think there's been any question of such shipments. I don't know what he is specifically referring to, but as we have said on a number of occasions, those shipments come in by sea and air and land.

Q   John --

A   Yes.

Q   Has Iraq shipped American warplanes -- I'll restart that. Has Turkey sent American warplanes to Iraq, with or without our knowledge?

A   To Iraq?

Q   To Iran.

A   You're talking about the London Observer story?

Q   Yeah, right.

A   Iran.

Q   Iran?

A   Yes.

Q   Thank you for helping me out. (Laughter)

A   No, that story is absolute nonsense.

A   I got it garbled.

Q   Well, it's a garbled story to start with, so you're perfectly in order to get it garbled. No factual basis to the story.

The United States Government has not approved or licensed under the Export Control Act the sale of munitions to Iran since the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war. We have no knowledge of the purported F-5 deal reported in the Observer of London, and we are aware of only one pending shipment of F-5 aircraft from the United States to Turkey.

Four Military Assistance Program F-5B aircraft are to be shipped to Turkey in September or October of this year in conjunction with appropriate offer and acceptance letters executed earlier this year. As in all transfers of this sort, the Government of Turkey has provided us with assurances that the aircraft will not be transferred to a third nation without U.S. Government concurrence.

Q Copy?

A Sure.

Q John, do you have anything on the Adelman state visit to China? And in connection with that, or all by itself, anything on these reports of covert Pakistani attempts to acquire bits and pieces of atomic weaponry in the U.S.?

A Nothing new on the Adelman mission. However, I think that's somewhat passe, isn't it, Bill.

Q About ten days ago.

A And I'm sure you did something on that, Alan. Insofar as the second part of your question, I guess, basically, Justice is handling that. But also I think there is some guidance from yesterday on that. But, in essence, it says, go see the Department of Justice.

Q John, another British newspaper, The London Sunday Times, quotes that President of Cyprus, Kyprianou, in a statement claimed that the United States is building in the Turkish part of Cyprus a military base, and that was quoted in a Syrian newspaper. Do you have any comment on that?

A Haven't seen that one, but it sounds very fanciful.

Q John, can I take you back to these F-5Bs for a second?

A Sure.

Q I tuned in a little bit late. I'm not sure. Are these the -- these are not the aircraft that we're talking about from Norway, are they?

A No, they're not, and there's absolutely no decision on that; so it's not that batch, and it is not this new batch of four, or whatever it is that is going, so this story is absolutely wrong.

Q John, when you were talking before about the Ceausescu story, you were knocking it down; you were saying that the deployments will go forward on schedule.

A Uh-hum.

Q Have they been going forward on schedule since the initial start in December?

A I think we have not given dates of those deployments, Marvin, but within that rather cautious response to your question, I have no indication that they have not been -- that anything has happened to the original --

Q Putting it in a positive way rather than a double negative?

A That's right.

Q I mean, have the deployments gone forward since December when it started?

A So far as I know, on schedule. But, as you know, we don't talk about that schedule.

Q Yes. Well, "on schedule" could be that the next batch goes in in 1989, so that doesn't help any.

A I don't think there is -- if your question is, "Has there been any change or postponement," I do not think so.

Q No. I'm trying to get at just as clear an answer as I can.

A Uh-hum.

Q Since December --

A Keep trying.

Q Okay. Since December, when the missile deployment began --

A Uh-hum.

Q -- have there been -- has there been a continuation of those deployments, so that if you had one and you then went to two, one could logically assume that you've increased the number of missiles now in Western Europe?

A The deployments have gone forward on the schedule that was proposed at that time, which we declined to outline for you.

Q So that there are now more missiles there --

A I think --

Q -- than in December.

A I think that's a fair presumption.

Connie?

Q On the Secretary's comments this morning on the Asian and Pacific region, he said the trends are favorable for the United States, but he didn't say anything about the nuclear port call issue.

A Uh-hum.

Q Does the Secretary still consider those to be a favorable trend?

A I think he said in his interview this morning that he was optimistic about the outcome of that particular issue.

Q Have there been any further talks this week between American and New Zealand officials on that?

A I am not aware of any here, but I think there may well have been in New Zealand. I should think there probably have.

Q John, do you have any situation report on Iran-Iraq war in light of the -- some reports circulating that Iran is willing to ease the tension about the Iran-Iraq war and possibly prevent it from spreading? There were a lot of communication and a lot of diplomatic movement in that area between Iran and some other areas.

A No. I really don't.

Q John, has the U.S. completed its review of the first round of talks with Cuba on immigration matters, and has a new round of talks been decided upon?

A Let me see how we will respond to that later in the day.

Q Do you have any readout on the meeting today between Caputo and Shultz?

A I'm sorry? With?

Q Caputo and Shultz.

A No, I don't. I'm sorry.

Q Also, do you -- one other on Peru. Last night Ambassador Kirkpatrick said that Cuba is supplying weapons to the guerrillas in Peru. That's a new charge not made previously by the Administration, to my knowledge.

Does the State Department have -- agree with that assessment?

A I don't have anything for you on that.

Q Could you look into that?

A I will look into it.

Q Thank you.

A Ambassador Kirkpatrick, as you know, was correcting a number of inaccurate statements in that interview.

Q A leading Israeli newspaper over the weekend published a report that the United States, President Reagan, will try to hand out the Israelis a -- what he calls election gifts, and he begins with moving the Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem by October -- an announcement. Do you have any comment on that?

A I would think that report is extraordinarily inaccurate. (Laughter)

Q That's different from "inaccurate"?

A I just wanted to underline my depth of feeling about its inaccuracy.

Q John --

Q Anything on --

A Excuse me.

Q I'm sorry, I came in late. Will you have a reaction today on the Israeli elections after the voting is complete?

A It is possible. Let us see.

Q Do you have anything on events in the Philippines?

A No.

Q Thank you.

A Okay.

(The briefing concluded at 12:29 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #132

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
TUESDAY, JULY 24, 1984, 12:07 P.M.

MR. HUGHES: Anybody who's got an early lunch date today should be in good shape. (Laughter)

Have one housekeeping announcement. Available in the Press Office is the prepared statement by Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs Richard Burt. That was before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East this morning. That testimony was on Bulgaria's involvement in illegal narcotics and illicit arms trade.

That's all I have for you.

Q John, have you had any chance to look closer at the Polish amnesty?

A Don't have anything more for you on that, Jim.

Q John, do you have anything on -- more today on the U.S.-Soviet cross talk on a communique?

A Yes. We have responded to the Soviets on their proposal for language on a joint announcement on the Vienna meeting. We have done that privately in diplomatic channels. That was a conscious decision to take that route rather than make a press announcement or do it through public channels, because the United States wants those talks to succeed, and we believe that handling our response through diplomatic channels offers the best opportunity for the success of those talks in Vienna. So that's the way it was done.

Q Are you saying that you are prepared to have a moratorium on testing?

A Not going to get into -- if I got into the detail of what we had told the Soviets, Jim, we wouldn't be carrying out our mandate to deal privately and through diplomatic channels, so I'm not going to talk about what we told them.

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Q John, you say that you want those talks to succeed. Precisely what talks do you want to succeed?

A The talks in Vienna.

Q On what subject?

A On the subject suggested by the Soviet Union, which invitation we accepted.

Q On the subject suggested by the Soviet Union.

A Well, we have said, as you know, that we're going to those talks without preconditions. No change in our position.

Q If you are going through private channels, how do you explain Larry Speakes' less than private comments yesterday?

A Never attempt to explain White House statements, but I don't think there is a contradiction between what we have told you about the latest we have said and the announcement that was made yesterday.

Q John, is there any change in the American view on what these talks should consist of?

A Just really not going to get into how we responded, Bernie.

Q John, did you say when you responded?

A I didn't, but we did this morning.

Q Would a ban on testing be a precondition?

A Really not going to get into any further discussion on this.

Q Did we respond here or in Moscow? Can you give us some --

A We responded here.

Q Did you respond by sending a -- your own version of the draft of such a communique, or did you respond by telling them not to do anything in public?

A Good try, but I'm not going to go any further.

Q Well, what, then? Let's pick up Ralph's question. Is it a counter-draft or an amendment, a variation of what the Soviets offered, or what kind of response is this?

A Well, that's why I say there's no contradiction between what I have told you today and the statement that Larry Speakes made yesterday. Larry characterized, I think, what the Soviets had done. Today we have responded, and that response is a private response through diplomatic channels, and it's --

Q To whom did you respond?

A To the appropriate Soviet officials in Washington.

Q John, there's one -- could you clear up one thing? In the White House statement yesterday, it suggested that the Soviet proposed statement was in fact a reply to an American proposal that there be such a statement.

A Uh-hum.

Q Do you know when that American proposal was first --

A I can't give you a date on that, Bernie, no. I'm sorry.

Q In the President's letter to --

A I just can't give you a date on it. I'm just not -- I just don't know.

Q John, you say the American position has not changed. How far back can one take that, because early on in this "ping-pong game" we've had the United States saying that it would feel free to bring up other subjects, then the whole question of --

A Well, I think that is correct. We have embarked on this venture without pre-conditions, but we have consistently said that we would feel free to raise --

Q Can I follow that, just to see --

A Sure.

Q Do you still feel that it is desirable to have an agreed joint statement regarding the purpose of the meeting before the meeting happens?

A That has been fairly traditional and, obviously, both sides are working at that. Yet, I can't take your question really far down the road, "Could the talks proceed without such a joint announcement?" I don't know that anybody has addressed that because we're working on such a joint announcement.

Q John, since you're engaged now in a dialogue or a monologue with the Soviets which could be important for, you know, the eventual talks, have you yet begun to get involved in this phase of the operation, whoever will lead the delegation and whichever people will be -- ?

A No, I think that's a little premature for us to be talking about, who would lead our delegation.

Q Are you not even sort of beginning to shape a team, that is to say --

A Oh, I'm sure somebody in this building is giving thought to that.

Q There's no choice? We're not near an announcement?

A No.

Q What is the purpose of the joint announcement?

A It's fairly traditional, I think, in such meetings to offer an announcement ahead indicating the substance of the, or the areas for discussion.

Q John, just out of curiosity, yesterday you said it was historically the case that these joint communiques or joint announcements on talks like this had been arranged through diplomatic channels.

A Uh-huh.

Q I'm curious to know why is -- what's wrong with doing something that's not in conformance with historical precedents? What's wrong with doing it a different way?

A You mean, what's wrong with negotiating a joint announcement publicly this time around?

Q In a different way. I mean it implies criticism when you say it's historically the case that it's done privately.

A I suppose that those who tried to do this through diplomatic channels in the past felt that sometimes you're able to make more progress through quiet discussion than engaged in a kind of public forum, where obviously there are dangers of posturing and propaganda and so forth and so on.

Q Also, offer each side the opportunity to make concessions which it would not have to make public?

A Oh, I don't think that there is a question of secret understandings, Ralph. I think there's a question of agreeing on words.

Q Are you suggesting that the Soviets are posturing by going public yesterday?

A No. I'm just saying that in the past this has traditionally been handled diplomatically, and we think it's a good way to handle it this time round.

Q Are you suggesting that they are not serious?

A No. Ralph was asking me why I thought it wouldn't be a good idea to negotiate this through UPI, for example, and I said that I thought one of the dangers of such public negotiation is that people might tend to take positions that they perhaps would not take through more quiet channels.

Q Yeah, but you have negotiated -- on this very issue, you have been negotiating in public.

A Negotiated joint announcements?

Q Well, you've been making your position -- now, you're splitting things. When the Soviets came up with their proposal, you came back with yours. You call it what you want; you then engaged in some sort of public exchange. Why the decision suddenly to put it under wraps?

1-1866

A It's not a question of putting it under wraps. I think communiques and announcements have traditionally been negotiated between parties. Not only between the Soviet Union and the United States, but I think that's fairly traditional diplomatic behavior, and I'm a little astounded that you're astounded.

Q I recognize stonewalling. (Laughter)

Q Do you have any comment you dare on the Israeli election?

A I think you already have what we said late last night. Be glad to repeat it. Today's election, or yesterday's election in Israel has reaffirmed the value of a democratic society and its institutions. While we await complete election results, we're certain there will be no change in the traditional close cooperation which has existed between the governments and people of the United States and Israel.

The United States looks forward to working with the next Government of Israel regardless of which party emerges victorious at the polls.

Q What if neither party emerges victorious at the polls?

A We'll work in harmony with whatever government emerges.

Q Do you have a comment on -- there's a TASS statement today that responds to Secretary Shultz' statement yesterday on NBC about who is putting obstacles or preconditions on the resumption of medium-range and strategic nuclear missile talks.

The Soviet response specifically says that Secretary Shultz was, in effect, being disingenuous when he said that it was the Soviets who are presenting an obstacle to the talks.

A Well, I don't want to -- I mean, I don't want to comment specifically on a report that we haven't examined in detail, but I think the record is quite clear. The United States has presented a number of proposals. The Soviets have left those talks. We have indicated we're ready to resume anytime, anyplace. So I think the record of who has walked away is rather clear.

1-1867

Q John, can I ask you one thing about the -- there's a report of a new Soviet, a major Soviet offensive in Afghanistan, the Logar Valley. Do you have anything fresh on Afghanistan?

A I don't, I'm afraid; no.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:20 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #133

WEDNESDAY, JULY 25, 1984, 12:06 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: I have no news, so I thought as this will not be a totally pointless journey for you, I might offer two or three electrifying housekeeping announcements up front.

Q Can we go live with this? (Laughter)

A Available in the Press Office is the prepared statement by Under Secretary for Science and Technology William Schneider before the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance. His testimony -- that was this morning -- was on international communications satellite issues.

At 2:00 this afternoon, we will have the prepared statement by Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Richard Murphy, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. That testimony is basically an update on the Middle East.

I'd just like to remind you that over in the White House, EOB Room 450 at 2:30 this afternoon, there are some events marking the 31st anniversary of the Cuban revolution, and there will be remarks there by Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. I understand also present will be Juanita Castro, the sister of Fidel Castro, and three recently released political prisoners from Cuba. That's this afternoon, 2:30, EOB, Room 450. And that sort of completes the show.

Q John, do you have anything on the United States lifting the restrictions on fishing by the Soviet Union in U.S. waters?

A I don't, Jim; no, I don't.

Q Do you expect anything?

A You might keep in touch with us.

Q Do you have anything fresh on the Sakharovs, following the Congressional request for more information from the --

A No, I don't. I don't have any further information on that.

Q Have the Soviets responded to the latest demarche on the September talks?

A No, nothing further. Don't have anything to take that further, Bernie.

Q The Israeli liaison office?

A Nothing beyond what we have said earlier -- namely, that we regret that -- but the statement we made about a week ago.

Q What liaison office?

A Lebanon -- the Israeli liaison office.

Q SWAPO-South African talks?

A SWAPO-South African talks? We are not involved in that meeting, but I understand that -- so we can't give you any specific comment, but certainly aware of those reports that representatives of SWAPO and the Administrator General of Namibia are meeting.

We have always held the hope that direct contact among the parties to the Namibia conflict might help overcome distrust and thereby contribute to a climate of mutual confidence in southern Africa that will permit the earliest possible resolution of the issues standing in the way of implementation of Security Council Resolution 435.

Q Can we have a copy?

A Sure.

Q Anything -- the President indicated that he was studying the sanctions question with Poland. Any likelihood, you think, this week of any action?

A I don't know. I think you'd have to check with the White House on that. My understanding is it's perhaps unlikely this week, but I'd keep in touch with them on that.

Q Did you have anything more on Namibia, or the withdrawal from Angola?

1-1872

A No.

Q You have no additional information to give us?

A No. You've drained me dry.

Q John, do you have a comment on the New York Times report about the Administration no longer pursuing its request for $21 million for certain activities in Central America?

A No, other than to say that the President is very serious about all of his program in Central America. There are very obvious national security -- questions of national interest and national security involving the United States. And so he remains committed to the overall program. Realistically, we understand that parts of it are going to be difficult to get through, but work continues on the entire program.

Q Parts will be difficult to get through, but the Administration will pursue getting those parts through?

A The Administration is continuing to work on the whole program for Central America, but recognizing that it's an uphill battle with certain aspects of what the President wants.

Q The story is correct, John?

A No, I didn't say that. I think the White House addressed this subject early this morning in about the same vein that I did, and that's where we are.

Q You can't give us any idea of what your tactics are on getting the entire appropriation?

A No, no.

--MORE--

Q John, you said -- you've been a little more positive than that in the recent past -- I can't specify a date, because I can't remember it at the moment -- but the last time I think you were asked about it, you made it clear the Administration would pursue those $21 million. You're not able to say that at this time, is that right?

A No. What I'm trying to do is be realistic and recognize that there's opposition and that parts of the program face an uphill fight, but the President continues to push and move forward with the overall program.

Q Is this the same kind of realism that --

A Characterizes our foreign policy.

Q -- that dealt with the Stingers' withdrawal? I mean, that kind of realism about Capitol Hill?

A Just realistic about the mood on the Hill.

Q How do you characterize that mood?

A I wouldn't characterize it. (Laughter) I'm just saying we're being realistic about it, whatever it is. (Laughter)

Q Do you have anything on -- in the same area, do you have anything on Cruz's statements in Nicaragua? Arturo Cruz.

A No. I really don't. No.

Q How about the Administration's evaluation of the Kuwait arms deal with the Soviet Union? Any --

Q Another Nicaragua question.

A (A) I don't have anything on that; (B) another Nicaragua question.

Q Would we be in favor of a cease-fire in Nicaragua along the lines of what Cruz said he would try to negotiate?

A Well, I think that what they're talking about, and what he is talking about, is a cease-fire, given the kind of changing mood or changed mood, that they would expect to see on the part of the Nicaraguan regime, and that ties to the kind of change that we have suggested we want to see in Nicaragua.

So I don't think there's any contradiction between their requirements for the kind of situation which would bring a cease-fire and the kind of goals that we've been adhering to.

Q Do we think it could be worked out in time for the election, as Cruz seems to suggest?

A I don't know. Can't answer that.

Q Were there any contacts between Cruz and the Administration before he left for Managua last Monday? Or Sunday, actually.

A I don't know whether he saw -- I don't know. I'm sorry.

Q Would you look into that, please?

A We'll take a look at it. Sure.

Q Do you have any comment on The Washington Post editorial today, putting the blame on the United States for creating circumstances and situations in Israeli current policies in the West Bank and other places? You know, the last paragraph in the editorial today.

A Criticizing us for doing what?

Q Yes. You know, creating this atmosphere of bringing Israel to this point of holding onto the occupied West Bank and other things? If you want to have a look at the last paragraph of the editorial, possibly you want to comment on that.

A Yeah. It sounds rather a broad question. Let me take a look at the last paragraph of the editorial.

Q Another question, also. The United States State Department, through the offices of its Consulate in Jerusalem, is again stirring up events in the occupied territories. This is a statement which was published in

Hadashot daily newspaper on July the 4th in response to initiative by the United States for coordination between the foreign organizations and fund projects in the occupied territories without asking for opinion of the Israeli Government.

A Uh-hum.

Q Do you have any comment on that? Or do you want to look through this?

A I don't. No.

Q No comment?

A No.

Q Nicaragua again: Anything on the report that the United States is seeking West German and Israeli support for the Contras?

A No. We've had words to offer on that before, and I'd refer you back to them. I may have them to hand here, but it's simply a reiteration basically of what we have said before. No, I guess I can't put my hand on them, but we do have them in the Press Office.

Q John, yesterday the Secretary apparently had lunch with Prince Bandar.

A Uh-hum.

Q Do you know what that was about?

A I don't. No.

Q Could you find out?

A I think it would be unlikely that we would have a readout on that. You know, he sees the Saudi Ambassador from time to time. I don't know whether it was the Saudi Ambassador's request or whether it was something that had been set up for some time, but we usually don't give you a readout on those conversations.

Q John, last time we looked at the Persian Gulf situation, the U.S. position was that it was Iran that was being intransigent about negotiations. Is there any change in that situation at this point?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q In the U.S. view, there has been no softening of the Iranian position on whether to join the negotiations?

A I've seen various reports to which you've referred from time to time, but I don't know of anything concrete that has developed to change that position.

Q One more on Nicaragua: The President pointed out that the green pamphlet that was distributed here a couple of weeks ago --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- last night in his press conference. Prior to that, in June, a draft was sent up, which was called an advance copy in a cover letter by Mr. Bennett, up to the Hill.

A Uh-huh.

Q And there was a change between the draft and the final copy that was officially released.

A There very often is change; there very often are changes between drafts and final copies, yes.

Q In this particular instance, I believe it was on page 18 in both drafts, there was a characterization of arms and other supplies between Nicaragua and El Salvador. In the draft it said "sporatic"; in the final copy it said "steady."

Can you tell us why this initial draft was sent out to Congress if it was inaccurate and -- ? That's my question.

A No, I really can't, but I'm sure you would welcome the production of final documents which are as accurate as we could possibly make them.

Q Undoubtedly. We'd welcome even more -- a briefing on the subject by a real, live official.

A A "real, live official"? (Laughter)

Q Yes.

A   That's tough. (Laughter)

Q   It was a critical element of the Administration's case, and it did seem to be very different. One official told the foreign press corps yesterday, at the Foreign Press Center, that the Bennett letter and draft had been "inadvertently" sent to Congress.

A   Uh-huh.

Q   Can you confirm that it had been inadvertent?

A   I cannot, no. I'm aware that the draft went up. I'm sure there was discussion of it, and there may have been other drafts within the Department -- I'm sure there were before that. Just what the process was involved in producing a final report, I don't know. But it's a process that is not totally unfamiliar to me, having been two-and-a-half years in the State Department now. There is a drafting process, and it does seem to go on for a long time sometimes.

Q   John, is the Administration considering lifting restrictions imposed on the Soviets regarding commercial fishing in U.S. waters?

A   I think that was basically Jim -- the question raised by Jim -- and I said, why don't you sort of keep in touch with us on that one.

Q   Can you say anything about the talks this morning between Secretary Shultz and the West German Economics Minister?

A   I'm afraid I can't. I don't have a readout on that.

Q   John, does the United States Government have any opinion on the apparent thaw in relations between Syria and Jordan?

A   No, don't have any comment on that.

Q   John, have there been any further contacts in the last few weeks on arranging the Gromyko-Shultz U.N. talks?

A   No. I think specifics on that -- no. I think the Secretary has said that in the way of things, a

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meeting is possible at the U.N. between himself and Mr. Gromyko. As you know, it is fairly traditional at the U.N. But I'm not aware of anything in concrete that has moved things specifically forward. I think it is an expectation rather than something planned.

Q But we're not saying it's impossible?

A What? Oh, I think it's certainly possible.

Q We will let his plane land?

A Sorry.

Q We will let his plane land?

A (Laughter) I don't think we'll -- I think the Secretary said there would be no problem, that we understand about his plane landing.

Q It was reported today that there are preparations apparently for a visit of the President of Argentina to the U.S. Do you have anything on that?

A I don't.

Q It was a State Department official who was being quoted.

A Really?

Q Yes, indeed.

A I don't have anything on it.

Q You have nothing?

A I don't. I mean, it's conceivable, but I don't know anything about it.

Q Could you find out, please?

A Let me check and see if we do have anything on it.

Q Did you have any readout on the Caputo-Shultz talks yesterday?

A Yes, I think there was a piece of guidance yesterday which is -- the day before -- in the Press Office.

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Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:21 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #134

THURSDAY, JULY 26, 1984, 12:27 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. Just one brief announcement. Available in the Press Office is the prepared statement by Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations Gregory Newell, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on -- I guess it's Subcommittees on Human Rights and International Organizations. Subject of the testimony was the UNESCO withdrawal.

That's it for announcements. I'll be happy to take questions.

Q Alan, following up your announcement yesterday on the fishing -- partial lifting of the fishing restrictions on the Soviets in U.S. waters, the announcement didn't say what the original purpose of the sanctions were. What were they?

A I think it did indicate -- I haven't got a breakdown of what sanctions were applied when, but I think that this particular sanction was in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Q Has anything changed in Afghanistan, or anything changed in the Soviet policy toward Afghanistan?

A Well, I think that the fact is that the war in Afghanistan has continued for years. We believe that our sanctions have made their point: that the international community will not tolerate such actions without response. And while our sanctions policy remains in place, we should be willing to take actions which are also in our interest, such as this one is.

Q But by imposing sanctions you're making a point. Does not lifting sanctions also make a point?

A I don't think so. As I say, the fact is that, if you go back and compare the allocations which were made previously and this one, there is a significant difference. There are two main purposes of this action. One is to assist U.S. fishermen, and others who are connected with the fishing industry in the northwest region; and the other is that it is indeed consistent with the President's policy of promoting constructive dialogue with the Soviet Union and facilitating non-strategic trade exchanges.

Q Can I just finish? Will the same criteria be applied to the sanctions which are still in existence against Poland?

A I think that that has been addressed a great deal in recent days, Jim, and the question of what action may be taken on those sanctions remains to be seen. Don't have anything for you today on that.

Q Alan, to what degree was the lifting, the partial lifting of the sanction prompted by political considerations in search of the fish vote? (Laughter)

A I don't tend to answer political questions from here. But the fact is, as you know, the President has reiterated on numerous occasions his commitment to establishing a dialogue with the Soviets on subjects of mutual benefit, and the Administration has taken a number of steps to increase mutually beneficial cooperation with the USSR, such as signing the long-term grain agreement last summer. This is another example of that, and, as I say, it is one which is mutually beneficial.

Q Alan, I've got some specific questions which were left very fuzzy last night.

A Yeah, I'm sorry. We didn't -- as you know, the announcement was late, and we were unable to help you as much as we might have been had it happened earlier in the day.

Q How -- there's some guidance you put out last night that American fishermen have been gaining $30 million a year or so from this, and now they'll get $8 million more. How will this be?

A Okay. Let me explain what happens essentially with this. There is at this point, only one joint venture operation in that region between the U.S. and Soviet fishing industries.

What happens is that that joint venture, which is involved with Soviet processing on Soviet ships in that area, buy fish from U.S. fishermen. Obviously, the

Soviets have been prevented from fishing in U.S. waters, or the U.S. zone, since 1980, so -- but they weren't prohibited from engaging in processing and in this joint venture.

They had indicated that they really couldn't do more processing because of problems during rough weather when the smaller fishing boats, the U.S. fishing boats, had to go back into shore. And so they couldn't justify keeping, or expanding their processing capacity out there because there was too much down time.

So that what will happen, in this case, is that their allocation, their directed allocation -- let me step back one step. That joint venture has been processing -- taking about 167,000 tons of fish from U.S. fishermen.

Q Was that per year?

A The last couple of years. The price, or total sales -- purchase value from those fishermen has been between $24 - 25 million, something like that.

Having processed those fish, the value to the joint venture in selling it -- and I don't know what the processing costs are, and so on, so I can't tell you about profits -- but the total sales from the joint venture were $29 million last year, and were expected to be somewhat over $30 million this year.

Now, the Soviets will have a directed allocation of 50,000 metric tons. It has been discussed, this issue of an allocation has been discussed with the joint venture and with the Soviets, otherwise, over a period of time.

The joint venture indicated that if the Soviets obtained a directed fishing allocation of about 50,000 tons, it expected to be able to increase sales, that is, U.S. fishermen, in their own take, selling to the joint venture in addition to that 50,000 tons, a similar amount. So the Soviets will take 50,000 tons, but it is expected that because of this greater amount of processing capability they'll have there because of being on-station longer -- perhaps, having more ships -- that they would also be able to take more from the U.S. fishermen -- a similar amount, commensurate amount. And we have made that point clear to the Soviets that we are operating on the understanding that that is going to take place.

Q So, in other words, what the Press Office was knocking itself out to deny last night was true -- the Soviets will take 50,000 additional tons?

A I can't address what was said last night; I don't have the specifics. But in any case, the point is that they will take an additional 50,000. That is the expectation. That is the understanding, and that has been made clear, and we will obviously be concerned to monitor that.

Q Well, if this was a gesture --

A Excuse me. Let me follow up, because you asked me where the $8 million comes from. It comes from the purchase of that 50,000.

Q The purchase of the 50,000.

A There is also an additional financial benefit, which is that we understand there is a multiplier effect throughout the economy in the region. I can't give you an exact measure of that, but it benefits the economy of the northwestern region by more than that amount -- by some multiple of that.

Q Alan, you said that one of the reasons motivating this gesture by the President was the pursuit of expanding the dialogue with the Soviet Union. Can we expect the lifting of some of the other sanctions that are still in place because of Afghanistan? And can you itemize for us, please, the sanctions that are indeed still in effect?

A I can itemize the sanctions. What I can't do, unfortunately -- I had tried to, but I haven't been given the information -- is to try to indicate which sanctions are related to Poland and which to Afghanistan. So these may all be Afghanistan, but I simply don't know, Bernie, and I will try and get that squared away.

But, the sanctions which remain in effect: All Aeroflot service to the United States is still suspended; the negotiation of a new U.S.-U.S.S.R. maritime agreement remains suspended; the sale of certain categories of oil and gas equipment and all unpublished technology must be licensed; no licenses for equipment requiring validated export licenses for the Kama River or Zil truck plants

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will be approved; and the U.S. continues to follow a "no exceptions" policy with respect to exports to the Soviet Union which require full COCOM review.

Q Can we get a copy of that, please?

A I'll give you a copy of that, and if I can get a breakdown of that later, I'll be happy to --

Q And you have no sense of when some of these may be lifted in the same spirit?

A No.

Q Alan, you say that this is in the spirit of dialogue, but were the Soviets consulted, or were they informed?

A Well, I say it is consistent with the President's policy of promoting constructive dialogue.

This subject has been under discussion for some time, Jim. It is a U.S. decision, essentially, to do it, so they were informed late yesterday of the decision; but the fact is that the issues involved and the arrangements were not a surprise. They had been under discussion for some time.

Q So, do you have a commitment from the Soviets that they will indeed buy those 50,000 tons from U.S. fishermen?

A Well, I have not -- There are a few things: First of all, the Soviets have, to my knowledge, not yet responded. They only got the official word last night. I believe that, in the normal way of doing business in the fisheries area, there would be an exchange of notes. We would explain in our note what it is that is being permitted, what the requirements are, and so on, including costs for the 50,000 directed allocation, for example.

It may well be that there would be some reference to this in there -- I don't know; and that they would then have to come back with a note which acknowledged all of these terms -- what kind of fish, what the tonnage is, and where they are, and so on and so forth. I can't tell you, for sure, whether this would be referred to in those notes. As I say, it may well be the case. In any case, there is no question that the expectation, the firm expectation that there would be a commensurate purchase

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from U.S. fishermen is understood, has been conveyed to the Soviets, is understood by them, and will be followed by the United States to assure that that indeed is taking place.

Q So that, Alan, if I may just put it this way: We're allowing them to fish for 50 tons.

A 50,000.

Q 50,000 tons, and they buy 50,000 -- that's worth $8 million to the U.S. fishermen. So, in effect, it's for the $8 million that we've cleared the project?

A Well, I think I'd prefer to go back to what I have said about the fact that there are direct benefits to the fishermen, there are derivative benefits, with some multiplier, throughout that region.

There also, as the statement last night made clear, some benefits in terms of learning technologies of fishing -- the specific kinds of fish -- by new U.S. fishermen who will come into this market. And in addition to that, it is a decision which is indeed consistent with the President's policy on constructive dialogue.

Q Can we change the subject?

A Let's finish this one off, if there is anything more.

Q Can I ask one more on the fishing?

Q You say it's a gesture and helping towards dialogue, et cetera. Do you expect any reciprocal gesture from the Soviet Union in response to this? And if so, what kind of gesture would you be looking for?

A I'm not going to try to speculate on it.

O.K. Let's finish --

Q This morning there was a press report from Israel that --

A Excuse me.

Q I've got one more. There was a question asked me, "Why is there no fishing rights given the Soviet Union on the East Coast?"

A I don't know the answer to that. I don't know that that's been an issue of discussion. But in any case, this is a specific amount. It's, as I indicated before, a lot less than they used to get, so it seems to me that it probably was hard --

You had a specific situation where you have a joint venture operation going and where you, obviously, have a situation where you could do more. The Soviets have their processing ships there. This doesn't mean that this joint venture necessarily will be the only operating entity there. But they are there; they're doing it; it's a matter of their saying they can't justify keeping those processing ships, or partially a matter of their saying they can't justify keeping those processing ships on station to take more fish from U.S. fishermen if they aren't able also to fish during the down times because those Soviet ships are larger ships -- they can fish and stay out there when the U.S. ships have to go back to shore.

Q One more thing: If you do this again, with some technical agreement, please have an expert on hand--

A Well --

Q -- because it was total disaster last night.

A Yes. I hear you.

O.K. New subject.

Q This morning, there was a report from Israel that Rabbi Meir Kahane was traveling and roving through East Jerusalem with his supporters and threatening the Palestinians in East Jerusalem with violence and expulsion, and all kind of things.

A Uh-huh.

Q My question is, is the State Department or the United States Government looking into the matter of revoking or voiding his passport, because there were some stories about this, to this effect, and not allow him to come to the United States even if he is a member of the Israeli Knesset?

A Well, on what basis are you saying that we would revoke his passport?

Q Because of the avowed language of terrorism and actions of terrorism that have been perpetrated by him on the occupied territories and other areas?

A First of all, on the substance of the issue, obviously, we believe that the Palestinian problem and a just and lasting Arab-Israeli peace can only be achieved by negotiations among the parties concerned; and the kind of rhetoric which you're talking about does not advance the efforts to resolve the Palestinian problem or achieve an Arab-Israeli peace.

As far as his passport is concerned, there really is no basis for withdrawing American citizenship for somebody for saying something of that sort, so that's not --

Q How about the specific legal issue of serving as an officer of a foreign government?

A O.K. Can't talk about the specifics of any individual case, but I can give you a little bit of general doctrine. That is, in general, under Section 349 (a) (4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, "accepting, serving in, or performing the duties of any office, post, or employment under the government of a foreign state" may result in the loss of U.S. citizenship under certain conditions. Loss of citizenship is not automatic in such cases, however. The Supreme Court has held that in order for the loss of citizenship to occur, it must be established that the U.S. citizen acted with the intention of relinquishing U.S. citizenship. Such an intent may be demonstrated by a person's statements or conduct.

That's a general statement of how it would be approached.

Q What is the mechanism? Does it only come into play when he tries to use a passport? Or is it lifted if he remains in Israel, or what?

A Well, my understanding is the decisions are reached case-by-case, as always, in accordance with the law. Review of a case would routinely commence within the Department of State upon receipt of information of a potentially expatriating act, such as serving in a foreign government, when such an act has occurred. So I can't tell you whether anything has happened. We've only had an election. I don't think anybody has been sworn in. I can't tell you whether something is going on at this point with respect to that. But that would be one way that it would start.

I would also note, though, that in the past, in terms of precedence, there is the case of at least one U.S. citizen who was found to have forefeited his citizenship, or lost his citizenship, and one other who was found to retain his citizenship, despite service in the Knesset. So I suppose it really does depend upon the specific circumstances of the case, and I cannot begin to talk about this case.

Q Do you have names on them?

A No, I don't.

Q I'd like to follow on this. Reverend -- whatever-his-name-is, Rabbi Meir Kahane, he didn't just make statements yesterday. He threatened people, terrorized people in Hebron and the West Bank, in Nablus, East Jerusalem, and other places, was arrested several times, convicted, has spent some time in jail. Now, he is under like (inaudible) or this French guy who came, and he took citizenship in Israel and became a --

A Well, what's your question?

Q The question is that you say that based on his conduct in this, you know, does this conduct, roving through the East Jerusalem yesterday, justifies that you look at the matter in a closer look -- much more than just, you know, a mere going by the statutes of the United States --

A Well, we're talking about conduct with respect to expatriation, and not conduct of a criminal sort. Again, I think that the question is, do U.S. citizens who go abroad and either say outrageous things or commit crimes, does that deprive them of their citizenship? I think the answer to that is clearly no, it doesn't.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A Copy of the general points I made.

Go ahead, Bernie.

Q Do you mean to suggest that the activity he is engaged in, that is to say to be a member of the Knesset, is potentially of a repatriating nature --

A Expatriating.

Q -- expatriating nature?

A Potentially. As I say, the quote again -- let me just read it quickly. The quote from the Immigration and Nationality Act is that "accepting, serving in, or performing the duties of any office, post, or employment under the government of a foreign state" may result in loss of U.S. citizenship under certain conditions. Okay?

So, yes, it does raise the question, but it doesn't determine the question.

- MORE -

Q Alan, still on the same subject, please. Is the U.S. Administration considering the Jewish Defense League as a terrorist organization or not?

A I don't think we've attached labels.

Q Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy said that Syria is helpful in Lebanon.

A Uh-hum.

Q As far as I remember, for the last year you never said that. You always said Syria is unhelpful. Is that a change of the American policy toward Syria or a change in Syria itself?

A Well, we have previously noted some encouraging developments in Lebanon in recent weeks. The various Lebanese political factions appear to have recognized the need for re-establishment of law and order in greater Beirut, and there has been a notable improvement in the security situation.

The number of crossings between East and West Beirut has increased, and both the airport and the port of Beirut are now operating. We hope other areas in Lebanon will soon benefit from this process.

A number of factors have led to these recent improvements in the Lebanese situation. In recent weeks the parties concerned have found it in their interests to encourage stability.

First and foremost, the Lebanese themselves have clearly played an essential role in the progress that has been achieved thus far. The actions of others have also lent support to this process. It is clear that Israeli leaders across the spectrum wish to resolve the security problem in Lebanon and bring their troops home.

Syria, too, in recent weeks has begun to play a more helpful role in the security situation in the Beirut area and assisting the process of reconciliation in contrast to its actions in the past.

Our policy has not changed. We support a strengthening of the Central Lebanese Government, Lebanese national reconciliation, a Lebanon free of external forces, and security for Israel's northern border.

Q Copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q Alan, I want to go back to -- if I might, I want to go back to the -- not labeling the JDL as a terrorist organization, and you said you don't put a label on anything.

What is the yardstick or the measurement that you use in the Department?

A There have been briefings and testimony, and so on, on terrorism, and I'm not going to try to --

Q About this -- especially, this case of the JDL --

A I'm not going to try to --

Q -- bombing offices in New York and destroying things, property all over, harrassing people, all of these things.

A There are various organizations that commit terrorist acts that we have refrained from labeling "terrorist organizations." The JDL is perhaps an example you would cite. I think others in this room have picked other organizations which we have not so labeled.

Yes, Bernie?

Q Alan, can you provide us with any examples of Syria's helpful role, where it's helpful to Lebanon and not to Syria?

A I'm not going to try to break down what I've just said into specifics, but it clearly is our judgment that there have been some helpful acts, and it is a change.

Q Alan, can I pursue that with regard to the Persian Gulf? Would you also say at this point that Syria has been helpful in any respect in the Persian Gulf situation?

I'm thinking particularly of the round of high-level exchanges that have taken place in the last two, three, four months --

A I don't have any --

Q -- between Syria and Iran.

A I don't have any judgments or comments to offer on the role of any of those parties. Obviously, there are efforts underway by various parties to try to do something, and I think the question about Syria's role is one that came up a couple of months ago. I don't have anything new to say about that.

Q Well, could you take that question, please?

A No. I'm not going to take the question.

Q The question of Syria's role in Lebanon also came up several months ago, and --

A No. I think that what we have seen in Lebanon is a change in that situation, and we've talked about what has changed and why it has changed. That's what my statement today is designed to address. The fact is that there's ongoing diplomacy, there are ongoing efforts by various parties to try and deal with the situation in the Gulf, and it's not going to be helpful while that process is underway to try to examine each party's role.

Bernie?

Q Alan, in the assessment on Syria as being helpful, are there areas where Syria is not being helpful with respect to Lebanon --

A Well, I'm going to stick --

Q Or is all you have a positive assessment on Syria?

A Well, all I have to say is what I've said on it, so I'm going to leave you --

Q Alan, why the change?

A Excuse me. Jim?

Q On Lebanon: If you -- your clear, consistent policy is -- includes the removal of all foreign forces from Lebanon.

A Right.

Q Why, then, does the State Department express regret at the closing of the Israeli Liaison Office in Beirut?

A Well, I don't think that that consists of foreign forces. As we've indicated before, we thought that was a useful mechanism for contact for resolving some practical kinds of issues, and we think that the removal of that office is therefore regrettable.

Q Alan, do you have anything else on those SWAPO talks in southern Africa?

Q Can we stay on the same subject, please?

A Let's stay on the same subject. I'll come back to you, Connie. Go ahead.

Q Alan, what prompted the Syrians to be helpful?

A I think you'd have to ask the Syrians. I think -- I gather Under Secretary -- excuse me, Assistant Secretary Murphy addressed this subject to some extent yesterday, and I'd refer you to his testimony.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the closure of the Liaison Office of the Israelis in Beirut?

A Well, as I just said to Jim, and as we said the other day, we regret that situation, and it is regrettable that it has been closed. I'm just repeating myself. It provided a useful mechanism for communication between the Governments of Israel and Lebanon and for solving practical problems, and that we have consistently urged.

Q Is this on a theoretical basis, or you think that it practically exercises such a positive role?

A We think it provided a useful mechanism for that.

Q Alan, on the Gulf again, if I may, there's a new Ambassador appointed to Kuwait and --

A Well, I've read wires about that. I don't know whether there's been any White House announcement. I don't make announcements --

Q Well, could I ask whether there's been any resolution of the problem between Kuwait and the U.S. regarding the naming of the earlier Ambassador?

A Well, if --

Q In Texas yesterday.

A There has been, and I just -- I'm sorry. Jim confirms that from Texas there was an announcement that Ambassador Quainton, I believe, was nominated and that there is going to be an Ambassador going back.

Q Well, but the question is not about the Ambassador going back. But the point the State Department made several times, at the time Kuwait objected to the -- to Ambassador Grove's nomination --

A Uh-hum.

Q -- was that the U.S. did not think it was proper to make the decision [illegible] basis, and so my question deals with the policy of changing nominees. Was there -- for what reason did the U.S. feel that it was now proper to change nominees?

A I don't have a list of reasons to give you, nor am I going to look into that, but the fact is that there's been some time since there's been an Ambassador there, and the judgment was made that it was appropriate to do this, so it was done.

Q Did you have anything on this situation in Northern Yemen where an American plane went down?

A I have very little on that. I do understand, though, that Mike Burch briefed extensively on that this morning, so I'm going to refer you to it. Why don't I just do that instead of trying to repeat a little bit of it.

Q Any more on --

A Connie?

Q Anything on the SWAPO talks today?

A Not a great deal, but I can give you some. Not having participated in the meeting, it's difficult for us to comment on what was accomplished. Our position is that the continuing dialogue among all of the interested parties in the region is an important, positive element in the search for a settlement.

We find it encouraging that this meeting took place and hope that the dialogue will continue.

Q That's the same as yesterday, isn't it? I mean --

A Uh -- (laughter) -- I think that meeting hadn't concluded yesterday.

Q Is there anything else --

Q What is Mr. Wisner doing there?

A What is Mr. Wisner doing there? He -- Deputy Assistant Secretary Wisner met with Angolan representatives in Cape Verde Islands as part of our ongoing dialogue with all of the parties that are connected with the southern African negotiations.

Q Well, then he had nothing to do with the other talks?

A I think as we indicated -- John indicated yesterday, he -- no, he was not there for those talks, to participate in those talks. I don't know whether he met outside of those talks, perhaps, with some of the participants. I just can't tell you that. But he was not there to participate in those talks.

Q Do you know who from Angola was there?

A With Wisner?

Q At what level was the Angolan Government represented?

A It was the Minister of Interior, Kito Rodriques.

Q Is this our first meeting with Angola in some time?

A I don't recall when the last one is. I think it was -- I think I'd refer you back to the record. I don't know whether there have been any other meetings that have been unannounced, Bernie.

Q New subject?

A Yeah.

Q Is there anything new, Alan --

Q Can I have one on this subject before it is closed? South African officials are saying that Frank Wisner may have contributed to the collapse of the talks because his presence had led to disharmony between the two sides?

A Well, I know of no basis for such a statement.

Q Alan, would you confirm the nomination of a new Ambassador to Syria?

A I don't confirm nominations of Ambassadors. Let me refer you to the White House. Seriously. I don't -- I can get myself in trouble in a lot of ways in taking the White House's march on it. Stealing the White House's march on things is one way of doing it.

Bernie?

Q Anything new, Alan, on the U.S.-Soviet exchanges in connection with Vienna, September?

A On Vienna?

Q Yeah.

A No. Don't have anything new on that.

Q Alan, maybe you could look into the story which is in FBIS today on Page I.8 -- it's from Ma'ariv daily newspaper -- I don't want to read the whole story, but it's very important about -- (laughter) -- military --

A Your colleagues have expressed appreciation that you're not going to read the whole story. (Laughter)

Q Military equipment going through Israel to Syria to Al-Qunaytirah to Turkey and then to Iran --

A Going through Israel to Syria?

Q From Syria -- from the Syrian border to the Turkish border and then goes to Iran, and then -- an agreement which was signed last June, or last month, between Ya'aqov Nimrodi, Rif'at al-Asad, and the head of the Iranian intelligence service --

A Okay. Let me stop you.

Q No. I would like for you to look at this story.

A No. I have nothing -- there's nothing new on this situation. We have addressed it many times before, and I refer you back to what we've said about it.

Q Alan, do you have any congratulatory words to the Soviet astronaut making a new record? (Laughter)

Q Can you comment on negotiations between the United States and Austria about transfer of high technology?

A No.

Q Alan, has the United States received a request for political asylum from two pilots who have defected from Laos?

A The quick answer to that is -- we've seen reports that two Lao pilots -- the press reports that two Lao pilots defected to Thailand. We understand the aircraft and the two individuals are now in the hands of Thai authorities.

Asylum, which you ask about, is the duty and the responsibility of the country where the individuals have sought refuge, and we have not been informed of any request by these individuals to settle here.

Q Alan, have you got anything on the, I guess union pact, between ARDE and FLN?

A No. I don't.

Q Anything on the Spanish expulsion of the Iranian diplomat who was apparently tied in with the terror group in Madrid?

A No. Don't have anything on it.

Q Anything cooking with the Soviets in Geneva?

A Anything cooking with the Soviets in Geneva?

Q There was some talk on the Hill that Shultz made reference today to meeting the Soviets in Geneva.

A I don't know what the reference is, and I can't help you. I'm sorry.

Q On the press report, Alan, about Pakistan making more progress toward atomic weapons. Do we have anything?

A Have what we said before on the subject. If you want me to read it, I'll read it.

Q No, thanks.

A George?

Q Anything on the withdrawal of Arturo Cruz as the -- from the election process in Nicaragua?

A Yes. We are disappointed that the Government of Nicaragua chose not to address the concerns of the opposition and refused to change the electoral conditions for the elections called for November 4. And we had indicated -- I'd refer you back to what we said on

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July 20th -- that the few cosmetic changes made by the Government of Nicaragua on the 19th of July fell far short of what was necessary to achieve free and fair elections.

And the formation of an opposition unity slate, in our judgment, provided the Government of Nicaragua with an excellent opportunity to demonstrate whether it was prepared to reconsider this important issue -- that is, the Coordinadora demands -- and to move to truly democratic rule.

The Government of Nicaragua appears to have rejected that opportunity.

Q Can we get a copy of this, please?

A Yes.

Q Thank you.

A Anything else?

Q Okay. Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 1:01 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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DPC #135

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
FRIDAY, JULY 27, 1984, 12:24 P. M.

MR. ROMBERG: Okay. Good afternoon. I don't have any announcements. Happy to take your questions.

Q I don't have any either, so -- (laughter) --

A Okay.

Q TASS has put out a story, and one sentence of that story says that the U.S. answer has frustrated negotiations on nuclear armaments in Geneva, and now it makes -- now "it," the United States, makes the beginning of negotiations on outer space impossible.

Do you see that as an absolute rejection of the Vienna talks?

A Jim, I'm going to defer questions on that to Larry Speakes' briefing at 1:30 at the White House.

Q Why is that, Alan?

A Because that's the way we decided to do it. (Laughter)

Q Uh-hum.

Q That's the royal -- "we?"

Q Thanks, Alan.

Q Alan, why don't you take the rest of the day off?

Q President Fidel Castro's speech --

1- 1903

A I missed the beginning.

Q President Fidel Castro's --

Q Alan, hold it. Can you at least confirm part of the TASS report which talked about the wording of our message to them?

A No. I'm not going to do that. I'm really going to refer all the questions to Larry. There's no point in trying to address the same issue from two different places, and that's really why we're doing that.

Q That's a new wrinkle.

A Oh, no. We try to --

Q Alan --

A Go, Bernie.

Q -- did you have any views on -- does Weinberger's statement that there is no point going to Vienna if the Soviets insist on limiting the discussions to space weapons represent the overall Administration view about that issue?

A Again, you're -- it leads us back into the same set of questions, and I'm just going to frustrate you and stay away from that whole issue so that it can be handled at one time and one place.

Q Is that also a Speakes' question?

A I think it relates to the entire question of where we are vis-a-vis Vienna, and I would prefer to defer that to Larry.

Q If I can get back to the Fidel Castro question, if you have any reaction to the speech yesterday in Cuba apparently in a conciliatory way offering to resume conversations with the U.S. on the Mariel issue?

A Well, we haven't seen the full text of the speech, but based on press reports we understand that Cuba -- that Castro confirmed our understanding Cuba is prepared to continue talks with the U.S. on migration matters, including the return of the Mariel excludables to

1-1904

Cuba.

Obviously, we remain interested in an early resolution of that issue.

Q When will we have the text of that?

Q Do you know when the talks might resume? Do you have a date, or --

A Don't have anything for you on that, but we do anticipate those talks will resume.

Q Also on the Castro speech, do you have any comment on his announcement about the nuclear power plant construction?

A Yes. Apparently, this is an old story. It's been public knowledge for some time that the Soviet Union is constructing a nuclear power plant in Cuba at Cienfuegos.

Q Do you have any comment on it vis-a-vis the U.S. and Soviet joint interest in nuclear non-proliferation?

A Addressing it generally, in 1980 Cuba entered a -- into a bilateral agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, relating to safeguards on a plant to be supplied by the Soviet Union.

This agreement was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in April 1980. The Soviet Union is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the NPT, and is a strong supporter of nuclear non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards.

Cuba is not a party to the NPT and is the only Latin American country which has refused to sign the Treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin American, the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

We hope that Cuba will adhere to the NPT and/or the Treaty of Tlatelolco so as to provide the international community with a binding commitment that it will not acquire nuclear weapons.

Q Copy of that, please?

I-1905

A   Sure.

Q   Alan, isn't the bilateral agreement the functional equivalent of the NPT?

A   Well, I'll leave you with the words that I just did. Obviously, we are hopeful that they would sign on.

-- MORE --

Q But in the meantime, --

A Well --

Q -- have they signed a paper which commits them to not move ahead on developing a nuclear weapon?

A They, the Soviets, applied to the IAEA on this; there is a bilateral agreement. The safeguards are to be in place -- not questioning that. And indeed, there is no evidence that Cuba is seeking to develop nuclear weapons; and the IAEA safeguards on this power plant are designed to prevent misuse for nuclear explosives development.

Q I'm sorry, Alan. Did you say there is no question that they are not developing or there is no evidence that they are not --

A No evidence.

Q Thank you.

Q Alan, can we have a copy of that last answer?

A Yes.

Q Alan, --

Q Your reply on Cuba seemed to confine the agenda to the migration question.

A Yes.

Q Do you mean -- Are you prepared to go into a broader discussion and larger agenda with Cuba?

A We've addressed that before. There -- A broader look, a review consideration of the relationship would depend upon a change in Cuba's actions in a variety of areas -- and I'll refer you back to what we said about that before. At least, just looking at what reports we have from Mr. Castro's speech, in addition to what we've seen in terms of action, we don't see that there is a change there. But in any case, that's not what these talks are about.

Q Yes, the migration. But his appeal seemed to me more broad spectrum; and you're turning it aside.

A Well, we've addressed before what our concerns are with regard to Cuban policy.

Q Alan, a related angle of that question is that apparently President Castro did mention in his speech that he would be willing to cooperate, or be more cooperative, on the issue of Namibia and Central America.

A Well, that would be good.

Q There is a report in The Wall Street Journal today that says a committee of the House has approved $50 million in military aid to Afghanistan rebels. Did the Administration seek that money and is there more to it than that?

A I think that -- as I recall that report this morning, Ralph, it referred to an alleged covert program, and obviously, I would not address that issue.

Q Alan, any comment on Secretary Weinberger's interview in the *Post* this morning, in which he states there is no point in going to Vienna unless -- if only to talk about space weapons?

A I'm sorry. The question got raised before. As I said, I'm going to defer any discussion of the Vienna talks to Larry Speakes' briefing. Since he will be talking about it, I don't want to try and address it from two different places.

Q Alan, a follow-up on the Cuban thing. You said that you welcome all discussion. What's the mechanics of that? Is it our move, his move? How can we, you know, get to the next step in that process?

A On what?

Q On discussing immigration/migration situations.

A I don't have anything specific to give you today. We have, as you know, had one round of talks; anticipate that there will be further talks, but I just don't have anything specific to offer you on that.

Q Any reaction to the Libyans pulling out of the Olympics?

A No.

Q Another Olympic question?

A Yes.

Q In view of reports of possible violence by the JDL against Arab athletes at Los Angeles, is the State Department coordinating any special security arrangements for them as it is for the Israeli team?

A You have to check with the security officials to see what arrangements there are. Obviously, there are mammoth security arrangements that are being imposed in Los Angeles, and I'm not prepared to talk about them. I don't know what they are, and I don't think it's my function here to talk about security arrangements. But I'm sure that the -- well, I don't know what the security officials are prepared to say, but, anyway, I'll refer you to them because I'm not going to address security at the Olympics, other than to say -- to refer you back to what we've said before in a general way about the amount of attention that's being paid to it, the amount of money that's being devoted to it, but I'm not going to get into the specifics about the JDL or the Israelis or anybody else.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on a report of an Iranian plot to destroy a Saudi official's airplane in Madrid which was uncovered now with the arrest, I believe, or the charges posted against four Iranian diplomats in Spain?

A I think this question was raised yesterday. As I said, I don't have any comment on it.

Q Can you say anything about the turning away of two Soviet ships from Los Angeles this weekend? I understand they're not going to be allowed to dock until after the weekend.

A Yes. I have heard that two Soviet cargo vessels -- and I can't be sure whether it's one or two actually -- but, anyway, have been informed they've got to wait for clearance to enter the Los Angeles Long-Beach Harbor until July 30. It is for national security reasons, but it is not related to the Olympics.

Q Can you say what it is related to?

A No, I cannot. I cannot do that.

Q What does that mean?

Q Is it related to President Reagan's visit tomorrow?

A I think I've said as much as I can at this point about that.

Q Beyond what was said, in an answer to your question yesterday, do we have specific examples of Syrian helpfulness in Lebanon in recent months?

A I don't have anything to say beyond what I said yesterday.

Ralph?

Q Alan, do you have any comment on McGovern's meeting with Gromyko in the Soviet Union, which was announced today by TASS?

A Didn't know anything about the story.

Q Do you have any comment on whether or not -- well, has the Soviet Union announced to the U.S. that Gromyko will come to the U.N. in the fall?

A I think that's something that the Soviets will need to talk to. I don't think we're going to talk about their Foreign Minister's travels.

Q Did McGovern carry a message from the President? (Laughter)

A Since I didn't know anything about the travels, it's a little hard to answer that question.

Q Could you look into the Logan Act question, of the Jesse Jackson Act question, vis-a-vis McGovern?

A Sorry.

Q You said yesterday that Syria began to play a helpful role in Lebanon, and that the Israeli leaders wished to solve the security problem in Lebanon.

How do you characterize the Soviet role now in Lebanon? Are they being helpful like the Syrians?

A I don't have a characterization to offer you.

Q Do you have any situation report on the Iran-Iraq war in light of a report that was not confirmed by Tehran shooting down any Iraqi advanced plane?

A Yeah, that report is not confirmed, as far as I know. I don't have an update to give you on the long-awaited offensive.

Q Alan, do you mean that the Soviet Union is now becoming helpful like the Syrians or not?

A I said I wasn't going to address the question. I have no characterization to offer you.

Q But you always say that their role is not helpful.

Q We're told that Secretary Block has met Secretary Shultz unusually twice in a week. Is there anything cooking on Poland -- agriculture embargo?

A Well, I can't tell you why they're meeting. I don't happen to know. But in any case, we, I think, have indicated there will be -- the issue of Polish sanctions is going to be looked at, and when we have something to say, we'll say it. I don't have anything for you today on that subject.

Q The Lebanese have been talking recently about military assistance from the Soviets. Are they doing th ., do we think, to leverage some aid from the United States of funds that were frozen?

A I don't have any comment to offer on that.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:37 p.m.)

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MONDAY, JULY 30, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #136

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MONDAY, JULY 30, 1984, 12:00 Noon

MR. ROMBERG: O.K. Good afternoon. I don't have any announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Have you seen the statements attributed to Foreign Minister Gromyko by Senator McGovern saying in effect that there will not be a Vienna-September negotiation?

A I have seen the wire stories on that, Jim. I don't have any particular reaction to them. I think that you're aware of what we said on Saturday that, as White House Press Spokesman Larry Speakes said on Friday, we have accepted the Soviet proposal, we're serious about substantive talks in Vienna, we're prepared to go there and talk about outer space, including anti-satellite weapons, and we have no preconditions. We believe that the US-USSR exchanges on this subject should return to confidential diplomatic channels. So that's where we will leave it.

Q Can we get a copy of that, please?

A Yes. It's the same thing we had over the weekend, Bernie.

Q Have you had a reply to the message sent Saturday, the clarifier?

A A response?

Q Yes.

A Well, again, I think, as I say, we're going to return it to diplomatic channels if we can, so I'd prefer not to try and get into a day-by-day assessment of where we are, but I think that, essentially, is where it

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lies in terms of what we have said.

Q Do you regard the Gromyko statement, or those statements attributed to him, as a reply?

A As a what?

Q As a reply.

A I don't know whether they would have taken into account our latest statements and exchanges on that. Can't tell you.

Q Alan, some of us came in a bit late, because your punctuality today was overwhelming. Is the Gromyko assessment regarded as an obituary for the Vienna talks?

A What I said, Bernie, is that -- I repeated what we had said on Saturday about this. That remains our position. I cannot tell you whether Mr. Gromyko had taken into account our most recent statements and diplomatic exchanges when he talked with Senator McGovern. My impression is that he's met with Senator McGovern before the weekend, because I thought those reports were out there even on Friday. But I can't tell you what lay behind his statement.

Q The meeting between Gromyko and McGovern and Gromyko's remarks that he sees very little happening if Reagan is reelected, is this seen in any way by the State Department as even more direct Soviet intervention in the U.S. election process?

A Well, I don't really have any comment on Mr. Gromyko's remarks as reported by Senator McGovern. Our attitude, our seriousness of purpose is clear, on the record, and I'm not going to try to go beyond that.

Q Do you have any thoughts on the proposal that a new Middle East conference should be convened with the United States and Soviet Union taking part?

A The U.S. position on that is unchanged. We don't see why that or how that could be a fruitful avenue; and I would refer you back to the President's September 1 initiative as explaining where we stand on what we think would be the most fruitful approach.

Q What's the purpose of the timing of the Soviet proposal?

1-1914

A You'll have to ask them.

Q It was reported today, I think, that the Honduran Government has expelled five U.S. -- what is it -- labor advisers and one U.S. journalist for interfering with internal affairs of Honduras. Do you have anything on that?

A I do. Simply a report, basically, on what that was about, as we understand it. On July 28, six U.S. citizens who are affiliated with the AFL-CIO were arrested and deported from Honduras. The gentlemen were deported to Nicaragua where they would be reunited with a larger group of U.S. unionists who are touring Nicaragua on a fact-finding mission regarding labor-related issues.

It is the Department's understanding that the six men were arrested and deported due to their participation in a political rally in Tegucigalpa on July 27. Honduran law prohibits the participation of foreigners in political activities. Therefore, when foreigners who have been admitted as tourists engage in such activities, their immigration status is placed in jeopardy, and the Government of Honduras takes steps to deport them.

After the Embassy was made aware of the arrest, a consular officer visited the men and remained with them at the airport until shortly before the flight departed for Managua. The Embassy in Tegucigalpa will request, via diplomatic channels, a report from the Government of Honduras regarding the circumstances surrounding the arrest and deportation of these six U.S. citizens.

At no time were the gentlemen jailed. After their arrest, the six men were taken directly to the international airport where they remained until their flight for Managua departed.

Q Could we have a copy of this, please?

A Sure.

Q You said that the Embassy would request a full report.

A That's right.

Q I mean on what terms and what basis?

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A   Excuse me.

Q   On what basis? On which basis?

A   I think we want to know precisely what it was that the Honduran Government saw happening and so on, so we'll find out what happened.

Q   Alan, you say these people were affiliated with the AFL-CIO or representatives of?

A   The language I've got is "affiliated with." I don't know more than that.

Q   Not AIFLD or -- ?

A   I simply don't know more than that. They were on a tour, so you might want to check with the AFL-CIO. I would expect that when they get back, they probably would have something to say, in any --

Q   I understand you to say you're waiting for a full report. --

A   Uh-huh.

Q   -- but in light of -- there have been increasing reports from Honduras about the government there distancing itself from the United States. Do you regard this as an essentially friendly act?

A   I don't think it's a question of being a friendly act or not. At this point, based on our knowledge, or our understanding, they participated in a political rally, and that's against Honduran law. So they took action. But anyway, as I say, we're checking it out.

Q   Alan, do you have anything new on the Iran-Iraq conflict? And do you read anything into reports of new mobilization of Iraqi forces?

A   I don't have anything new on it, and I don't have anything on new mobilization or the long-awaited offensive.

Q   Do you have any reaction to a report that the Nicaraguan democratic opposition never had any intention of participating in the elections?

A   I have something on that, Jim. As we -- we have previously stated in our own assessment, and that goes back to the 20th of July, that the few cosmetic changes made by the Government of Nicaragua on the 19th of July fell far short of what's necessary to achieve free and fair elections.

The December 1983 list of electoral changes required by the Coordinadora offered an opportunity for the Government of Nicaragua to demonstrate whether it was prepared to move to truly democratic rule.

Those changes included a complete suspension of the state of emergency which has been in effect in Nicaragua since March 1982, an end to press censorship, and a general amnesty law that would permit the participation of all Nicaraguan citizens in the electoral process.

The Coordinadora's decision not to register for the election was their own, and their leadership, Mr. Cruz, has been quoted as indicating that they were not prepared to participate in an election to legitimize a plan for totalitarian rule in Nicaragua.

It's our understanding that the Coordinadora opposition's decision was based on the willingness of the Government of Nicaragua -- or, excuse me -- it was based on the unwillingness of the Government of Nicaragua to address the electoral law, demands which were a matter of record since December 1983, and that they would reconsider their decision should the government position change.

Beyond that, I would refer you to the Coordinadora to explain their position.

Q Can we get a copy?

Q Copies?

A Sure.

Q Can we follow on that, also?

A Go ahead.

Q The understanding that we have here -- and maybe you can clarify that -- is that the Coordinadora demanded that there be a national dialogue that would include leaders of the rebel groups, or the anti-Sandinista armed groups.

Is that your understanding? And if that is your understanding, how does that differ from the decision by the Salvadoran Government not to go ahead with elections despite the two opposition parties' refusal to take part in them?

A I'm not going to try to explain the details of their position, Jim. I will say that my understanding, reading the press, is that the opposition leaders have said that they would participate actively in the election process if they were allowed to do so under circumstances which made it clear it was a free and fair election.

I'm not aware that the guerrillas in El Salvador have made such a statement.

Q Wait. Hold on for just a sec. You said that it's your understanding that it was -- the opposition leaders would take -- that their conditions were designed to make the elections free and fair, and that conditions were such that they could not do so. Is that correct?

A Well, I said -- [illegible] go back and look at what I've said instead of trying to rehash it.

Q No. I'm just trying to clarify it. It just [illegible]

A Well, you can look at the words and see it.

Q Alan, the last troop, Marine, pullout from Beirut, does that preclude any possible use of U.S. forces in the event that they should be needed now that the mission is being split-up between East and West Beirut, should personnel, the American personnel come under any kind of an attack or anything?

A I guess the President always retains his right anywhere in the world to take certain kinds of actions, but the fact of the matter is that -- I've got guidance which if you need it I'll make available as to what's happened. In terms of the movement of our Embassy since the bombing in April a year ago, and that they are now moving into other buildings, and as the security situation in the Beirut area improves and we take additional steps to provide alternate means of security for our personnel and facilities in the greater Beirut area, the Marine augmentation force on the ground in West Beirut is returning to the 6th Fleet units which are engaged in routine operations in the Mediterranean.

So it is simply a reflection, this movement is simply a reflection of that situation.

1-1918

Q Yeah, because the figure quoted in reports was 15 Marines for the Embassy, but it didn't specify whether it's going to be in the one section or whether they were going to split --

A You mean the Marine, the usual Marine security detachment that will remain as the Marine Guards?

Q Yeah.

A I don't know what the numbers are or how they're going to be deployed. And I guess I really, for security reasons, couldn't get into that in any case. But that is not part of the augmentation force. That augmentation force, due to this changed situation, is now returning to the Fleet.

Q Can we have a copy of that, please?

A Well, I'll give you part.

Q (Inaudible).

A Yeah.

Q Alan, but there will be this for the Marine security force?

A Sure.

Q Alan, just back on Nicaragua for a second. Two election officials were killed when registration began, do you have -- apparently by rebels. Do you have any statement with respect to that?

A We don't -- we've seen the press reports, and we can't confirm what happened or how it happened. But in any case, the fact of the matter is that we do not condone and, indeed, we would condemn any attacks on innocent civilians.

Q What about on the election process itself? Is that -- do we consider it so fraudulent that -- I mean, what's our -- I'm trying to get an idea of how the United States Government now views these elections that are proposed to take place on November 4th?

A I refer you to what I said the other day on that, Jim. I don't -- you may not have been listening carefully. I don't think we --

Q I did, I promise.

A I don't think we've indicated we felt they've gone so far down the road as to, at this point, to warrant a judgment that they will necessarily be free and fair elections. Indeed, I think the words suggested something else, but I refer you to those words.

Q Do you have anything new on those Norwegian F-5 aircraft?

A No, I don't

Q On the Vienna, the space weapons, what's your -- what's the latest formulation on raising other issues? I mean, the U.S. is going there without preconditions, but has it reserved the right or intend to raise other issues?

A We've said what we have to say, and you can look back at the record in terms of latest formulations. The positions remain as they have been, and expressed in those statements. But, as I say, we're going without preconditions.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:15 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #137

TUESDAY, JULY 31, 1984, 12:11 P.M
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED).

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A couple of announcements up front. First, available in the Press Office is the text, embargoed until 2:00 p.m., of a prepared statement by Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Langhorne A. Motley for his testimony this afternoon before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee . The subject is "Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean."

Second, we have received some questions about a July 29 article in the Japanese newspaper Yomiuri, which said that the U.S. Government recently transmitted a message to North Korea to the effect that if North Korea agreed to direct dialogue with the Republic of Korea that the U.S. might subsequently agree to hold direct talks with the DPRK of North Korea.

Just to set the record straight, the report is not true. There has been no such message. Our publicly stated position on this remains unchanged. That is, that the future of the Korean Peninsula is primarily a matter for people of Korea to decide. In this regard, we strongly support the Republic of Korea's efforts to engage in a constructive dialogue with the North, and would welcome a positive response from Pyongyang to Seoul's initiatives.

And, finally, just a note on the hijacking --

Q Can we have a copy of that statement, if possible?

A Sure. On the hijacking incident, which has been brought to a happy conclusion, the U.S. Government position -- as one of your wags up here noted, except for the hijackers; true enough. The U.S Government position on international terrorism is well known. In that context, we congratulate the Governments of the Netherlands Antilles and Venezuela on the successful end to this hijacking.

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We also want to emphasize the extensive international cooperation that was involved in the outcome. This kind of cooperation clearly is paying off in developing better understanding among police and other security officials of how to deal with a hostage negotiation, in training national forces to conduct hostage rescue operations, and in sensitizing key government officials to what should be expected in dealing with this kind of crisis. Throughout the episode, officials and technicians of our respective governments were in close consultations with each other at the scene, and cooperation was excellent.

That is it for announcements.

Q Copy of that, please?

A Copy? Yes.

Q What's a "technician" in that context?

A I don't have specifics, and I don't think I'm going to be able, Bob, to provide you with details of what sorts of technical advisors were involved. We did have people on the scene, technical advisors, at the request of the Netherlands Antilles. Obviously, we responded to this request for assistance to support the effort of that government to deal with the situation. And, of course, we wanted to assist in securing the release and rescue of the American citizens who were involved.

Q How many --

A Don't have details for you. How many --

Q How many American --

A American citizens involved? There were --

Q How many American technicians involved?

A That, I don't have. And I don't think we're going to be able to provide that.

Q Did they play a direct and active role in the actual takeover?

A No, they did not participate in any action in that sense. They were -- they performed an advisory role. The decisions, obviously, were the decisions of the Government of the Netherlands Antilles, but they were there as advisors. They did not participate.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on reports saying that there were U.S. aircraft intercepting the hijacked aircraft?

A No, I don't have anything on it. I don't think the aircraft got off the ground from Curacao in that last -- I mean, they made an attempt and went out and I think they were blocked. But I don't think it was a question of intercepting them.

Q It was said in the -- during the first stage of the whole episode.

A Again, I just don't have anything further on that.

Q Alan, on the same thing. Are you suggesting, or maybe not suggesting, that these Americans did or did not play an advisory role in the assault on the plane?

A I'm not talking about the assault, per se. I'm talking about the whole situation. We had people who were there as advisors; they performed --

Q Advisors in what context?

A In the context of advising the Government of the Netherlands Antilles on this situation. I'm not going to be more specific than that. What I am saying, as I understood Barrie's question, was, did we participate in the action boarding the plane, and so on, and the answer to that is no.

Q You're not ruling out that they advised on the assault?

A Well, I'm not trying to steer you in the direction -- by not addressing it -- that they were. All I'm going to do is stay away from it because obviously, unfortunately, it's the kind of situation we may get into in the future, and I don't think it's prudent to talk too much in detail about it.

Q What agency did they represent?

A Don't know. Don't have anything.

Q Can you describe what the State Department does back in this country as far as notifying relatives, keeping them in touch with what's going on, passing information, that sort of thing?

A I don't have the details here. There was an effort, I know, yesterday, as we had names, to be in touch with relatives. That was done. There was also, I think, a question of whether there might have been a fifth American. I think there were only four, and that was being tracked down. So efforts are made. I can't tell you who does what, but efforts certainly are made to contact relatives.

Q Can you describe the extent of those efforts?

A No, I can't. Okay, can we move on? Bernie?

Q New subject?

Q Do you have anything on the resumption of talks between the U.S. and Cuba in New York on the migration question?

A The U.S. and Cuba have resumed talks on the migration question, including, of course, the Mariel excludables issue. That's all I can really --

Q In New York?

A In New York.

Q Today?

A Today.

Q Sorry -- yesterday, today?

A No, not yesterday. Today.

Q Will they go indefinitely or have we got an agenda, a timetable?

A Well, I think that -- let's let them finish, and I'll tell you when they're finished. But I don't --

"indefinitely" sounds awfully extended to me.

Q Who's leading the American delegation on it?

A I think that the last time we indicated that it was led by the Deputy Legal Advisor, Mr. Kozak, and I think that's the case this time as well.

Q Have you already had a comment on the Soviet proposal for a general conference on the Middle East?

A Yes, we already commented on that, Dan. I said, we didn't think it was a very good idea.

Q Also, resumption of the talks between the United States and Nicaragua today?

A Say it again?

Q Resumption of talks between the United States and Nicaragua in Manzanillo today?

A Yes, that is correct.

Q Can you say who's there?

A I don't have a list of people who might be there. I'm not sure there are that many, but, certainly Ambassador Shlaudeman is our representative.

Q Is there anything more you can tell us about those talks?

A Really not; no.

Q When did they resume?

A Today.

Q Today, as well. At where?

A Manzanillo, Mexico.

Q Where? I'm sorry.

A Manzanillo, Mexico. Same place they were held the last time.

Q Alan, regarding the Soviet proposal for the Middle East, you said you see it as a not very good proposal.

A Well, we talked about it before; right.

Q Oh, so I'm sorry.

A We talked about it also in the past.

Q If you see anything new in the proposal, if you have been in contact with the Soviets regarding the proposal or not; these are details one needs to know.

A Well, I don't know if we've been in touch in the last two days about this. I can't tell you. I haven't done a textual analysis, or gotten one, on whether there might be some particulars that might be new. But the basic idea of an international conference of the sort that is proposed is something we've spoken about many times before. We don't think that that's a fruitful approach to the Middle East problems.

Q In light of the inconclusive elections in Israel and the results which were not known yet -- results are known but the government is not formed yet. What is the strategy of the United States now in pursuing the peace process? What are the mechanics that you are working with?

A Well, I don't -- I think at this point, if you're suggesting that we should some way be working with the various governments, the appropriate thing to do is to let the Israeli Government be formed on that, but in terms of our basic approach and strategy and policy, again I would refer you back to the President's September 1 initiative. That remains the policy of the United States.

Q While we are on the subject, do you have any comment on The Washington Times story this morning about the closing of An-Najah University in Nablus in the West Bank for another four months because of the display of Palestinian artifacts and cultural things?

A Yes. We really don't have any specific reports on the facts. All we have are the press reports, so we can't comment in specific terms. As a general matter, as we have said before in circumstances of this sort, we regret anything that would affect the educational process on the West Bank.

In our view, disruption of that educational process can only harm the interests of those who genuinely seek educational opportunities, and we hope that An-Najah University will be reopened as soon as conditions permit.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A Can we provide a copy?

STAFF: Yes.

Q Another question on the same story, there was also the story that your Consulate in East Jerusalem could not gather any real charges against the Palestinian journalist Radwan Abu Ayash who was invited by the United States Information Agency last month to visit the United States for one month to observe U.S. elections.

Do you have any comment or anything to add about why Israel prevented him and put him in house arrest for six months, and he has to report all month long every day?

A Yes. I don't have anything on that. I'll check and see if there's anything we can say.

Q Alan, on the Cuba talks. What's Mr. Kozak's first name, please?

A Michael.

Q And is Mr. Alarcon, the head of the Cuban delegation, listed?

A I don't have that, George. I think that you'd have to get that probably from the Cubans.

Q Is there anything new on U.S.-Soviet, September-Vienna?

A No.

Q Nothing?

A Nothing new.

Q Why did Druze militia guard the Marine -- the final Marine evacuation the other day from Beirut instead of Lebanese army forces?

A I guess you'd have to ask the Lebanese authorities why they set up whatever arrangements there were. You're saying that, and I saw a press report to that effect, but I can't confirm what the specific arrangements were.

Q Do you know who will guard the new Embassy installations in Beirut? Lebanese army forces or militia?

A I don't know what specific arrangements have been worked out. I think that would be something, again, to address over there and see. It's a host government responsibility, however it's done, but we, obviously, have our Marine guards performing their usual function.

Q Do you have anything, Alan, on Poland today? The Government said a total of 450 political prisoners have been released. Have you got anything for us regarding possible lifting of sanctions?

A I don't.

Q Any forecast on when you may move on this?

A No. I don't. I don't. When we have something, obviously, we'll be happy to let you know.

Q Alan, do you have anything to say on the case of the kidnapping of Patricia Londono in Bogota?

A I don't know anything about it.

Q Okay. If you could look in on it. I know that it's a case that ARA is very familiar with. They also have been involved in misinforming congressional offices and the public on the case by --

A Well, that's a very serious charge. I hope that you are prepared to provide us with some details so we can look into it.

Q I can.

A Okay. Well, why don't you give it to us afterwards?

Q Do you have any comment on the complaint filed by the Libyan Government against the United States in the United Nations?

A No. This is on the Gulf of Sidra?

Q Yes.

A No. I think that Mike Burch at the Pentagon addressed the other day what was involved in that exercise, and -- so I'd refer you to what he said about it. Perfectly legitimate exercise.

Q That was before the complaint. If you are going to deal with the complaint in any way, or --

A I don't have anything on the specifics of the complaint. I'm just referring you back to our explanation of what we did and the legitimate exercise of our forces in the international waters and airspace.

Q The Washington Post has a story by David Ottaway this morning about Iraq plans to build three new pipelines and triple the export of oil to the world. Does the United States have any role in facilitating the Iraqis to conduct their plan of expansion?

A Well, I've talked about this before, and John has, and I don't have any new words to offer you on the pipeline issue. We have indicated that we favor the pipeline. I don't know about the specifics. I think these are things that would have to be worked out by those who would be directly involved.

I think that Ex-Im has taken some action, at least on one where there's an American firm involved, and so on, but I -- the support of the idea of pipelines has been talked of. It's not a new idea.

Q It looks like this is something new. Besides the pipeline you're talking about, it was through Jordan to -- it talked about three new pipelines that are going to be --

A I think that these have all been talked about, at least I've seen them talked about in the press before.

Q This same story --

A My understanding is it's the same.

Q On the Manzanillo talks, do you have anything in there, maybe from the last time, as to a statement about the purpose or goals of them?

A I'd refer you back to what we have said about -- going back to the Secretary's June 1 stop in Managua where I think we probably talked the most about what the purpose of the Secretary's stop and the follow-on talks would be, and I don't have anything new to add to that.

Jim?

Q I wonder if you could take a question? There's an investigative piece in the latest issue of The Nation regarding the death of Father Carney. He's an American Priest who was killed in Honduras or who may have starved to death in Honduras as part of that guerrilla column that went in that you commented on?

A This is an old story.

Q Well, this new investigative piece suggests that U.S. personnel were -- had actually interrogated Father Carney prior to his reported death, and I wonder if you could issue a flat denial?

A Let me take a look at that.

Q Alan, do you have any comments on the Chinese criticism of the Administration's position on the nuclear agreement?

A Is there something new? I guess I missed that.

Q Yes. I think it was in The L.A. Times today.

A No. We've said quite a lot about that, and I don't have anything new to add to it.

Q How do you describe the relations between the United States and Egypt these days? There are some stories in European press that there is -- there are crises undergoing?

A Crisis?

Q Yes.

A No. I would certainly not describe U.S. relations as crisis.

Q How do you -- can you give a statement about the relations?

A They're important relations, and they're very good relations, and I don't know why anybody would even begin to think remotely in terms of crisis. Just not true.

Q Alan, do you have any comment --

A Excuse me. I'll come back to you.

Q Do you have anything on reports of explosions in the Gulf of Suez, and whether or not any ships have been hit?

A And -- I'm sorry. The last part?

Q And whether or not any ships have been hit or damaged?

A Well, there have been reports of explosions in the Gulf of Suez that may have been mines, and we are seeking details on that. As to whether anybody, or any ships were hit, as I say, our information is limited, but we understand there have been no injuries or major damage, but I don't have other details beyond that.

I guess a Notice to Mariners of some sort has been issued through the normal procedures -- broadcast, just cautioning ships about these reports -- unconfirmed reports so that they will be aware of that.

Q Alan, the major damage -- is this to ships or to ground installations?

A No, no. There has been -- our understanding is there has been no major damage to ships, and that there have been no injuries. These are to ships.

Q In other words, there have been some hits, then, of the ships in mind?

A Well, I guess there is an inference in that, but we don't have very much information, and I don't have anything further here on it at this point. We're still checking out the specifics of it.

Q What? Is that a -- are you confirming that there have been some ships and mines that have made contact?

A I am only confirming that we understand there have been no injuries and no major damage. I can't confirm specifically what happened -- whether there were mines or were not mines. We're looking at all of that.

Q What timeframe are you talking about?

A I don't have a timeframe to offer. I guess -- I think the reports have indicated that it had been recently, but I can't really pin it down, George, much more than that.

Q These reports are what, press reports that you're talking about?

A Press reports.

Q Alan, the Chinese Ambassador said he thought it was -- that the Chinese Government thought it was insulting to ask for specific assurances on the nuclear proliferation thing rather than accept the general statement of the Chinese Government.

A Well, as I said before, Bob, we have expressed ourselves on this. I've said what we have to say at the moment, and I'm going to have to leave it at that.

Q Have they responded yet?

A As I say, we've said what we have to say. I just don't have anything to update that situation.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the protest filed by the Israelis regarding the remarks made by Under Secretary -- I mean, Assistant Secretary Murphy in connection with Syria's cooperation in Lebanon?

A I've got to tell you that personally I'm not aware of the protest, but, in any case, I think that we have said what we had to say on that subject. Ambassador Murphy said something, I had something here, and I think we'll leave it at that.

Q In case there is an official protest, would this mean that the U.S. Administration will give an answer to the Israelis in this regard?

A I don't know, but I don't think I'd get into the diplomatic dialogue in any case.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:30 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 1, 1984, 12:25 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A few announcements.

First, available in the Press Office is a prepared statement by Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs Mark Palmer before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He testified on the creation of a commission on the Ukrainian famine.

Second, to remind you that there will be today at the White House a session of the Central American Outreach Group in Room 450 of the Old Executive Office Building at 2:30. There will be remarks by Senator Denton on the Central American drug connection and by Ambassador Santamaria, who is Director for International Information of the Government of Honduras, and he will speak about Honduras and the situation in Central America.

Q What time is that?

A That's at 2:30. Contact on that, if you're interested, is Sue Mathis, 456-2910.

There will be on Thursday, August 2, tentatively at 4:00 p.m. -- and I'd ask you to check back with the Press Office later on this -- a briefing by -- a BACKGROUND briefing by a senior Department official. The subject will be the Bilateral Investment Treaty with Zaire which will be signed on Friday at 11:45 in the Treaty Signing Room at the White House.

The signers will be Ambassador William Brock, the President's Special Trade Representative for the United States, and Foreign Minister Umba di Lutete for Zaire.

Q Could you spell that? (Laughter)

A The briefer will discuss recent improvements in the Zairian economy, which indicate that the

Government of Zaire is having success in addressing its economic problems. The briefer will also be prepared to address broader questions in U.S.-Zairian relations, if asked.

Yet another briefing: AID Administrator M. Peter McPherson (laughter) -- little order here -- M. Peter McPherson will hold a press conference on Thursday, August 2, at 2:30 p.m. in the State Department Press Briefing Room here, room 2118. The subject is a breakthrough in malaria research. Briefing with Mr. McPherson will be scientists and other U.S. Government representatives. It will be ON THE RECORD for sound and camera.

A statement on the exchange of notes, concluding a U.S.-Soviet Consular Agreement: On August 1, 1984, representatives of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and the Consular Division of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs exchanged diplomatic notes concluding the latest round of the U.S.-Soviet Consular Review Talks.

The agreement brings to fruition a series of discussions on consular matters conducted in 1976, 1979, 1983 and 1984, and resolves a number of issues relating to visas and the functioning of the diplomatic missions of the two countries.

The issues involved were essentially technical ones, to be resolved on the basis of mutual benefit. The agreement will facilitate the travel of participants in educational exchange programs, expedite the issuance of certain categories of visas, and improve conditions for the travel of diplomats in the two countries by allowing them to enter and leave through two additional cities beyond the three currently provided for.

The talks were proposed by us as part of the President's effort to expand contacts and to move forward on bilateral issues that can be resolved to our mutual benefit, as he mentioned in his June 27 remarks on U.S.-Soviet exchanges, and it seemed to us that the Soviet side approached them in the same spirit.

The U.S. delegation was led by Raymond F. Smith, Officer-in-Charge of the Bilateral Relations Section of the Department of State's Office of Soviet Union Affairs. The Soviet delegation was headed by Ivan Gorokhov, Deputy Chief of the Consular -- excuse me -- of the Consular Administration of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Q Copy?

Q Copy, please?

A Copy. To anticipate a question you may have on other Soviet-related issues, I don't have anything here basically to respond -- or not basically, but to respond to the articles which were in the Soviet press and reported in FBIS this morning, but I think that there will be a briefing on this on the West Coast, perhaps about 1:30 our time.

If all of that comes to pass, we are making arrangements to try and have that piped in here. So stay tuned.

Q What are those other articles -- what do the Soviet articles say?

A Well, I refer you to the wires. I think there have been various wire reports on that, Jim, and I'm not going to try to characterize them, but it was -- the subject is the Vienna talks.

Q Do you have anything on Mr. Bessmertnykh's comments --

A That's what --

Q Is that what you're talking about?

A Yeah.

Q Alan, this consular agreement has nothing to do with the opening of consulates --

A No.

Q -- has it?

A No.

Q Where does that stand?

A I don't have anything new on that. As I think both sides have indicated, there's a willingness in principle to go ahead with that, but I don't have anything new to --

Q Are there ongoing talks about the opening of a U.S. consulate in Kiev and a Soviet consulate in New York?

A I don't know that we've gotten to that stage, George. I think we're where I said. That is, there is -- we would expect to do something with that, and there's a -- I think that I'm right in saying that we've -- that there's agreement in principle, essentially, to talk about that and to resume those talks, but they have not been resumed.

Q Weren't there talks this week also, Alan, in Moscow, bilateral, on the Bering Sea boundaries?

A That was last week, if I recall correctly.

Q 23 and 24.

Q That's still an ongoing sort of thing?

A Well, I think those talks concluded. There were a couple of days of talks, and we've got guidance not on the results of those talks, Bill, but on the issues that are involved, and so on. If you're interested, that's in the Press Office. I don't have a readout on the talks.

Q Another area?

A Please.

Q Can we stay --

A All right. Let's go back to Jim.

Q Do you have any more mature consideration about the Polish lifting of sanctions and any possible U.S. reaction to --

A Don't have anything on that today, Jim.

Q Do you expect anything this week?

A Well, I think we'll have to wait and see.

Q What are you waiting to see?

A Whether we have anything to say on it.

Q Well -- (laughter) --

A No. I don't mean to be facetious. When we have something to say on that, we will say it, but until then I'm not going to try to pre-empt the process by --

Q In the meantime --

A -- answering questions about it.

Q In the meantime have you been able to determine that their claimed release of some 450 prisoners is in fact accurate?

A I don't know that we have a particular way of verifying that, but, in any case, we obviously are paying attention to that amnesty and how it is being implemented.

Q Alan --

Q How important is the advice of the Vatican in this matter?

A Larry Speakes addressed this yesterday, Barrie. I don't have anything to add to what he said. I think he indicated that we would want to take seriously what concerns they would have, what they would want to say. But I refer you to his remarks on that.

Q Alan, regarding the Soviet consulate business --

A Uh-huh.

Q Is -- you described this as the end of a round, if I'm not mistaken.

A Right.

Q Is it thought that there's going to be another round, and does that deal with the opening of the new consulates, or was that discussed in this round?

A No, --

Q It's very confusing to me. Are we talking about two different sets of negotiations, essentially?

A Yes. These are not -- these were technical talks about visa matters and points of entry, and things like that. The opening of consulates in Kiev and New York, I guess it is, were -- is a separate issue, and it was not addressed in the agreement.

As I say, the U.S. -- to more precisely state what I did before, perhaps, and make my colleagues upstairs happier -- the United States has made clear to the Soviet Union its willingness to consider the issue of new consulates, and as we understand the Soviet position, there are no basic obstacles to moving forward. But that's where we are on that at this point.

Q What are the points of entry and exit that are now added on?

A Okay. Well, the points which are currently entry and exit points -- let me just give you those -- are Moscow, Leningrad and Vyborg on the Finnish-Soviet border for our people, and Washington, New York and Rouses's Point, New York, on the U.S.-Canadian border for their diplomats.

The added points are Brest on the Polish border and Nakhodka in the Far East for U.S. diplomats assigned to the U.S.S.R., and Baltimore and San Francisco for Soviet diplomats assigned to the United States.

Q Could you spell Nakhodka?

A Nakhodka?

Q No. Baltimore. (Laughter)

A It depends how you pronounce it, George.

Q I resent that. (Laughter)

A Point of order, huh?

Q New area?

A Please.

Q I have no further question on that.

A Okay.

Q Did I understand you in your statement to be saying that the Soviets responded to the President's call to be more forthcoming on this issue? That the President's recent statements had had a specific, positive effective on Soviet attitudes in this area?

A I'd prefer to stick with -- rather than trying to judge their motives, I'd prefer to stick with the language I used, which was -- let me repeat it for you: That the talks were proposed by us as a part of the President's efforts to expand contacts and to move forward on bilateral issues that can be resolved to our mutual benefit, as he mentioned June 27, and it seemed to us that the Soviet side approached them in the same spirit.

I'm not trying to judge whether they're responding to the President or not, but that they were approaching these talks, as we judged it, in a way which could move forward bilateral issues of mutual benefit.

Q Alan, when you say the talks were proposed by us, you're referring to the most recent --

A This round.

Q -- round. The '84 round, not the '83 round?

A Well, I can't -- I frankly can't parse it that finely. I don't know.

Q Could I take --

Q I think that --

A Well, go ahead.

Q Can I take another crack at getting you to spell those three cities?

A Happy to do so. You want the three which were previously -- well, you got Moscow, Leningrad and Vyborg -- V-y-b-o-r-g -- on the Finnish-Soviet border.

And the two cities which were added for our diplomats stationed in the Soviet Union are Brest -- B-r-e-s-t -- on the Polish border and Nakhodka in the Far East -- that's N-a-k-h-o-d-k-a. Okay?

Q Alan, do you have any further information on the explosions in the Gulf of Suez?

A I don't have anything. The question was, anything new on the explosions in the Gulf of Suez? I really do not have anything new on that at this point. We still don't have any further information on what may have been involved.

-- MORE --

Q Do you believe there is any link between what's happened in the Gulf of Suez and what happened inside Egypt in two or three of the arsenals?

A I don't know what the specifics are of the arsenal matter, but I don't have any reason to connect -- at this point not knowing what happened and who may be responsible -- to connect whatever those explosions were that were reported to have happened in the Gulf of Suez and anything else. I just don't have a way of doing that.

Q Alan, on the agreement, just to go back for a second --

A Sure.

Q -- could you -- are you able to say how it will improve cultural exchanges, as I believe you suggested?

A Well, what it will do is facilitate travel. The only connection, really, between the two is that the Consular Review Talks agreement provides for expeditious handling of visas for exchanges under official programs, but otherwise these are separate issues.

Q Alan, is the U.S. military any closer to sending a survey team to the Gulf of Suez to assist in the investigation?

A I'd have to ask you to check with the Pentagon on that.

Q Any indication of military security, a military security step-up or additional measures being taken around the Abu Rudeis oil fields in Egypt, to the best of your knowledge?

A (a) I don't know, and (b) it would really be something for the Egyptians to address. I would not address it.

Q Well, in your consultations with the Egyptians, has there been any indication of a need for it?

A Well, I wouldn't address it. Sorry.

Q Alan, would you consider that the navigation in the Suez Canal is as safe as it was before the explosions or are you --

A I can't give you a personal judgment, but I've seen statements by the officials who run that Canal who have made it very clear that they don't see a danger to ships going through the Canal. And, as far as I understand, what we're talking about are reported explosions outside of the Canal, not in the Canal.

Q Do you have anything more on these three men who were held up from entering the U.S. by INS officials in Toronto last week?

A I don't. I saw reports of that in the press, but I guess you'd have to check with INS.

Q Alan, I was going to pursue the issue of the Suez, Gulf of Suez: If the British and French Governments have felt a need to send any of their experts in consultation with the U.S., to preclude any U.S. involvement in this?

A Well, I haven't -- as I say, I haven't got any information on what we may or may not be doing at this point in that respect. I guess you'd have to check with the British and the French in terms of what they're doing. I don't think I could speak for them.

Don?

Q About three weeks ago, UNITA, the guerrilla force in Angola, announced that it had attacked an oil pipeline, evidently the Gulf Oil pipeline in Cabinda, the northern area of Angola. And it seems as though their claim was acknowledged by the Angolan Government, though in a slightly different numbers, and so forth.

A Uh-huh.

Q Now, they have issued a new communique which contains a threat against multi-national corporations, apparently aimed at the Gulf Oil Company.

Does the United States believe that the Gulf pipeline was attacked; were any Americans hurt or killed, and does the United States have any words for, or has it had, for UNITA about American corporation or American targets for their guerrilla effort?

A On the pipeline itself, we've had some guidance on that in the past. I'd ask you to look at it, but there were no Americans who were hurt in that reported incident, but let me ask you, Don, specifically, to check back with the guidance on that.

A As to the general question, we take very seriously any explicit or implied threats against American citizens or property overseas. We also feel strongly that U.S. business participation in Angola is in the long-term interest of both our nations and of all Angolans. With few exceptions, the various parties involved in the Angolan internal conflict have refrained from attacking American citizens or property, and we obviously believe the situation should not change.

Q Can we get a copy of that, Alan?

A Sure.

Q Do you have any information regarding the claim yesterday of UNITA to have attacked two ships in the harbor of Luanda and sunk one of them?

A Not a lot. We've seen several reports of such a bombing during the past few days. Some question as to national registry of the ships which were involved. UNITA has claimed responsibility for bombing Soviet and Cuban vessels, while the Angolan authorities have reported the ships as being East German and Angolan.

None of the reports indicated injury to Americans or damage to American-owned property.

Q I'm sorry, the Angolan Government news agency claims that it was American-made mines. Do you have anything to say on that?

A Well, I don't know -- I can't talk about the manufacture of mines, but I can talk about the involvement of the U.S. Government.

As we have stated repeatedly in the past, we are scrupulously adhering to the provisions of U.S. law which prohibit assistance to any faction in Angola. The U.S. does not provide any munitions or other materiel or support to any force in that country. We reject the reported Angolan accusation of CIA or any other U.S. government involvement.

Q Did the statement that you made about how seriously the U.S. takes threats or attacks on American companies, has this been passed on to UNITA?

A I don't know whether it has or hasn't been passed on to UNITA, Don. I'm sure that if UNITA is not already aware of the seriousness with which we take such threats that they will be aware of it.

Q On the same -- in the same general area, there was a meeting reported a few weeks ago between representatives of UNITA, the United States Government and South Africa. Did you have anything on that, and was this discussed at that meeting?

A Was what discussed at that meeting?

Q The question of UNITA targeting U.S. installations?

A I don't recall what we've said about reports previously of meetings, Jim, so I'd ask you to look back at it. But I don't -- well, I guess I'll leave it.

Q Anything on the meeting itself?

A I frankly don't recall. There have been so many meetings both held and reported that I can't --

Q Could you -- in case --

A Why don't you check back in the Press Office and see -- do a little research and --

Q I will, but how else, if in fact it was raised at the time, will it be raised?

A Let's see what's there.

Q Okay. And also one other on the same area. Anything in the wake of the talks between SWAPO and South Africa in Cape Verde, and the apparent halt to the disengagement?

A I addressed this the other day. Let me refer you back to the record.

Q Nothing new?

A Nothing new on that.

Q The reaction of the Egyptian Government and several other Arab countries to the latest Soviet proposal regarding the Middle East looks to be very different from that of the U.S. Administration. Do you have any comment on that?

A No. I've expressed our view on such a meeting before.

Dennis, did you have something?

Stan?

Q Alan, why is the Colombia Desk of the State Department telling Congressional offices and other inquirers that the kidnapping case of Patricia Londono is closed, although they know that that's not true and they know that that position is at odds with the official position of the Colombian Government and the position of Mrs. Londono's family?

A I have looked into the question since you raised it yesterday. We have an answer which we will post today giving you what we know about it. It doesn't quite square with your description of it, but, anyway, it's what we have on the subject, and we did check it out since you raised it.

Q Do you have anything on the op-ed piece that appeared in the Times today about Uruguay?

A Yes, I do. The piece -- so the people who may not have read it -- charged, in short, that the U.S. cares more for elections than for democracy in Uruguay.

The United States cares deeply about democratic elections in Uruguay. Our primary goal in Uruguay is to help assure a successful transition to democracy.

The transition process is under way, characterized by an active negotiation between government and opposition leaders. All parties are supporting these negotiations, although the Blancos are not actively participating, in protest over the detention of Wilson Ferreira.

The government has made a number of concessions, including deproscribing all parties but the Communist Party and permitting some 6,500 previously proscribed politicians to participate in the politics of the nation. The nature of the transition, including the role of Wilson Ferreira, is for the people of Uruguay to define. As Ferreira indicated on his arrival in Argentina, before he returned to Uruguay, he never considered the possibility that the Argentine Government could intercede to have the ban against him lifted because "this is a question for Uruguayans."

We would like to address one of the misleading statements in the article: We do not favor the candidacy of Mr. Sanguinetti or any other candidate. We favor the democratization process as negotiated by the Uruguayans themselves.

Q Can we have a copy of that, Alan?

A Yeah.

Marvin?

Q On the Times story about Nicaragua and the Archbishop?

A I do. What is your -- just want a reaction to it?

Q Yeah.

A Let me see if it's in the nature for reaction to it. (Laughter)

Q If I ask you a specific question, you wouldn't --

A Probably wouldn't have anything on it; that's right, Marvin. We try and hide it all.

Q Try to do the best you can.

A Yeah. We have discussed a number of times the situation of the Catholic Church in Nicaragua, the courageous stand it has taken in support of religious freedom and human rights, and the harassment it has suffered from the government as a result.

We can't confirm the details of the story, but it shouldn't come as a surprise that the church is resisting government persecution, especially if one recalls the Church's Easter Pastoral letter and the government's hostile response.

The expulsion of ten foreign priests is simply the most recent illustration of the Government's attitude toward the church.

Q Copy, please?

A Sure.

Q I just wonder, Alan, did you have anything -- if asked, or follow-up questions to the Uruguay thing because you left some stuff unanswered there?

A No.

Q Also, do you have anything on this report that the national, the Commission of the National Security Council of Honduras as recommended that no further Salvadorans be -- no additional Salvadorans be trained on Honduran territory?

A I don't.

Q And do you have an answer to the taken -- to the question that you were going to look into about Honduras and Father Carney yesterday?

A I think we do have -- no, not yet? Okay, we're working on it.

Q Okay, thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:50 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #138

THURSDAY, AUGUST 2, 1984, 12:10 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A few announcements. Available in the Press Office is the prepared statement by AID Administrator Peter McPherson before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The subject he testified on was "Hunger and Population."

At 1:30 p.m. today, Ambassador James L. Buckley, Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the International Conference on Population to be held in Mexico City August 6 to 13, will give an ON-THE-RECORD briefing here in the State Department Briefing Room.

Also, to remind you of a couple of other briefings. At 2:30 here, Peter McPherson will hold an ON-THE-RECORD briefing on Malaria Vaccine; and there will be a BACKGROUND briefing at 4:00 p.m. here in this room by a senior Department official on the Bilateral Investment Treaty with Zaire.

That is it for announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Do you have any reaction to the House vote on military assistance to El Salvador, and the Nicaraguan funds?

A And the what?

Q Nicaraguan funds?

A No, I don't, Jim. The President put forth his proposals. He stands behind those proposals, but I don't have any specific comment on those votes.

Q Do you have any comment on the U.S.-Cuba talks? Has there been any -- have they ended?

A The talks are continuing in New York. Don't have any way of giving you a readout on that. I think I may have said yesterday that those talks are -- I would characterize as serious, but beyond that I wouldn't have any characterization to offer.

Q They're continuing today, so they're in third day today?

A Yes.

Q And didn't you suggest that there --

A No, I didn't suggest .

Q You didn't suggest anything? A senior official, did they think --

A I don't know what a senior official did or didn't do, but I didn't suggest that.

Bernie?

Q Alan, in view of the latest exchanges -- U.S.-Soviets in Vienna in September -- where do we stand now? What is your assessment of the state of play, the state of relations between Washington and Moscow?

A I don't have a general characterization to offer you, Bernie. The briefing that was given yesterday was fairly extensive, and I don't have anything to add to what was said either in Bud McFarlane's statement or the background briefing that was provided.

Q Alan, can you confirm the reports that there were some American citizens, and perhaps a diplomat aboard the Air France plane, which is now apparently safe, and so on?

A I gather that -- from the wires -- that that event is over, and our understanding is that, in fact, the people may be on their way to hotels.

As far as citizens are concerned, according to our latest information -- and obviously we're going to be somewhat at the mercy of those who can tell us things indirectly, or our sources are indirect -- anyway, two American citizens apparently were on board the hijacked plane. They were a father and son, a minor son. The Privacy Act prevents us at this point from releasing names.

As far as the reports yesterday that there somehow was perhaps an American diplomat, or somebody holding a diplomatic passport, we have no information to confirm those reports. That's all I really have for you on that.

Q Do you have some comment on the back-and-forth between East Germany, Hungary and the Soviet Union regarding the -- their relationship with the West that has been taking place over the past several days?

A No, I don't.

Lester?

Q Alan, *Time* Magazine this week featured a story with a photograph about the new Canadian Prime Minister's habit of patting women on what President Reagan calls the "keister." Is Prime Minister John Turner presently scheduled to make any visits to the United States? And when he does, will the Secretary of State, or will it be the Chief of Protocol, who will discuss with him the problems of this behavior which he justifies as saying "I'm a hugger, I'm reaching out to people?"

A I don't have any comment on your second question, Lester. On the first, I'm not aware of any present plans to travel here. You might want to check with his office.

Q I mean -- here's the thing, he's defended it --

A I know what you mean by that, but I don't have any comment on it.

Q Suppose he pats Selwa on her keister, or maybe Mrs. Reagan, what will you do? I mean, is he --

A Well, my mother always told me not to answer "what-if" questions, Lester, and I think I'll --

Q You mean it's a hypothetical question?

A I think it probably would be that, yes.

Q Could you give us that status report on the Manzanillo talks, the U.S. and Nicaraguans?

A Yes, a little bit, but not a great deal there either, in accordance with our standing procedures on that. As we confirmed earlier in the week, Ambassador Shlaudeman was in Manzanillo; had his third round of discussions with Vice Foreign Minister Tinoco. The discussions ended yesterday, this latest round. They were, in this instance, of a substantive nature --

Q Sorry?

A Of a substantive nature as opposed to the last round we indicated was procedural, and we do anticipate that there will be future meetings, but I don't have any details to provide on that.

Q What was the substance?

A As I -- I don't have any details to provide on that either.

Q Is it a characterization similar to the one that you gave on Cuba?

A I don't have a characterization to give you.

Q Alan, there was a report today quoting a Mexican official as saying the talks were substantive. What's the role of the Mexican official in these talks?

A I guess you'd have to ask the Mexican official what his specific role is. I don't know who it was who made that comment. The Mexicans, obviously, played host. The talks were at Manzanillo. There was no third country represented in the talks, if that's what you're getting at.

Q Yes.

A So, obviously, they have played a hospitality role, and we have appreciated that. But there was no role in the talks per se.

Q Alan, there was also a report right afterwards from Managua, saying that Ortega had requested a meeting with Reagan. Is there anything --

A I'm not aware of any plan for any meeting.

Q Alan, does "substantive" mean progress or issues of substance were discussed?

A It means issues of substance were discussed, as opposed to issues of procedure.

Q Does this mean that there have been -- there has been an agreement on an agenda?

A I don't have any specifics to offer you, George, on the discussions.

Q To clarify, the Mexicans or no third party was present in the talks, or you said "involved," I think.

A Yeah. Present. There was nobody else in the room, actually is what we're talking about.

Jim?

Q Do you have any remarks on Gorman's testimony yesterday, and particularly his desire for 125 trainers?

A Yes. He, as he said, was expressing a personal view that the optimum number of trainers for El Salvador would be higher than the current self-imposed -- I would emphasize self-imposed -- limit of 55. I think the number actually there is below that at this moment. You might want to check with the Pentagon.

But there are no plans currently to increase the number of trainers, and I would point out the obvious: there are also no plans to introduce U.S. combat forces.

Q And --

A I might -- well, go ahead, Jim.

Q No. Please.

A As I was going to say, there was also some suggestion in the story that there was some -- that General Gorman was seizing the action and the architect of the policy, and so on, which he, of course, made very clear was not the case.

I would point out that we in this building have the highest regard for General Gorman and his abilities. He's a good soldier in a tough job, and, as he said, he follows his orders.

Q Did he write the guidance on this? (Laughter)

A Do you have a serious question?

Q Yes, I do, actually. I thought that was reasonably serious, but --

Q I thought so, too. I thought it was terribly serious.

Q I take it back.

A All right. I refrain from responding to that, because it would be -- it's very tempting. Go ahead, Jim.

Q On the -- there is an additional story today in the Times about plans by the Christian Democrats, quoting Rey Prendes, that the left would not be included in any local elections scheduled now for 1985, and that -- because conditions would not be such that they could take part at that time.

Do you have any reaction, given the fact that U.S. officials have said that that was part of the game plan?

A Well, I don't know what -- I'm not sure what you're referring to in terms of U.S. officials saying it's part of the game plan, but, in any case, I don't have a specific response to it. I would note that one of the points that was apparently made in those statements that were made was that the security situation was one that was of concern to the left -- something I believe you, yourself, have raised on numerous occasions -- and I thought that was the thrust of what they were saying in terms of the security situation.

I can't -- I don't have a comment on that, but I observe that that was an important part of the remarks.

Q Could -- I'd like to --

A You raised -- you have raised many times --

Q Yeah, yeah. I know.

A -- the security situation for candidates.

Q I --

A That was a part of what was said if you read that article carefully --

Q I did.

A -- which I'm sure you did.

Q I did. I understood the point that was being made, but my --

Q If this is a private conversation, couldn't it be held after the briefing?

Q I'm sorry. My question --

A Yeah.

Q -- with everybody's forbearance is --

Q Not mine.

Q -- does the United States support local elections which would -- and dialogue leading to the left's participation in those local elections in 1985?

A Well, I'm not going to talk about specific elections. We have made clear our position in favor of bringing the left into the electoral process, if they will, indeed, do that. But we've also -- and dialogue for that end. We've also indicated we don't see at this point a willingness on their part to do that.

Lester?

Q Is my friend finished? I mean --

A I've asked you if you have a question.

Q Sure. Has the State Department, Alan, explained to Israel why the federally funded National Public Radio broadcast nationally this week a speech by a disgusting, murderous bigot like Farrakhan, and does the State Department believe it was good for the international reputation of the United States that all those American reporters who belong to the National Press Club not only invited this anti-Semite but honored him with a gift?

A I don't have any comment on the National Press Club or NPR.

Q One very quick follow-up. To the State Department's knowledge -- to your knowledge, Alan -- did the National Press Club in the 1930s ever have any of Hitler's Nazi's as their honored guest speakers to whom they gave a gift?

A I suggest you ask the National Press Club.

1-1957

Q I will.

Q Okay. Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:22 p.m.)

1-1958

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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1-1959

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #139

FRIDAY, AUGUST 3, 1984, 12:16 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Sorry to be a little late here. I have a few announcements, but I will also try to move reasonably quickly because we'll be piping in at 1:00 o'clock a statement from the Western White House, from Larry Speakes, and then at 1:30 here we will have a BACKGROUND briefing on the question of Polish sanctions. So if we can get through with the rest of it, you will have some expertise to address your questions.

Q On that same subject, will the White House be doing a briefing out there?

A No. They will be making a statement, and the briefing will be done here, and we will pipe out to California.

Q Will you have a copy of the statement here?

A We will certainly have one by 1:30. I don't know if we'll have one by one o'clock.

Okay, going on. A sad note: to bid farewell today to Joanne Reams. It's her last day in the Press Office. She's going off to London. She has been in the Bureau of Public Affairs for some time, but only came to the Press Office late last year, but she quickly became an integral part of the operation, and she will be greatly missed, I would say both in the Press Office and in the Bureau. So, all good wishes.

An announcement on the Secretary's Advisory Panel on Overseas Security: I tell you what I will do with this is simply read you the first paragraph and then make available as an announcement the rest of this so we can move ahead.

In July the Secretary asked a distinguished group of Americans to form a non-partisan advisory panel on overseas security to study and make recommendations concerning the security of our diplomatic personnel and facilities abroad.

This panel will be chaired by Admiral Bobby Inman, USN, Retired, who is currently President of MCC Corporation in Austin, Texas.

In the statement that I'll make available, it has the names and positions of the other members and indicates what kinds of questions they are going to be addressing. The panel did meet here on the 27th of July, and they intend to issue a report on or shortly after January 1, 1985.

That's it for announcements. I'll be happy to take questions.

Q Alan, what can you tell us about the Marine being roughed up?

A Probably not much more than you already have from reports out of the Soviet Union, Mike, but I'll be happy to give you what I do have.

First, I would note that there have been several serious incidents in the Soviet Union over the past few months involving American tourists and officials that show a disturbing pattern of official involvement in a campaign to harrass and isolate Americans in the Soviet Union, and we have brought this matter up with the Soviets on numerous occasions. We have not received a satisfactory response.

With specific regard to your question, on August 2 there was a serious incident in Leningrad involving one of our U.S. Marine guards. The Marine in question, who was off duty, had left the Consulate building to investigate a suspicious vehicle that had been circling the Consulate.

Two blocks from the Consulate he was surrounded by militiamen and plainclothesmen, beaten, and taken to a police station. He has since been released by the authorities and does not require hospitalization, but the incident was a clear set-up and was without any provocation whatsoever.

We have protested this incident strongly, both in Moscow and Washington.

1-1961

Q Have you ever received an apology from the Soviet Union in such incidents?

A As I say, we have not received a satisfactory response to our complaints.

Q Alan --

Q Copy?

A Yes.

Q The Soviets said he was -- the Soviets allege that the gentleman -- can you identify him?

A I cannot identify him.

Q -- that he was intoxicated. What is your response to that charge?

A The answer is that we reject that charge. I don't have further details to give you here. I think maybe I can help you in terms of getting some more details later if you want, but I don't have them with me.

Q Can you find when the Washington protest was made?

A Yesterday.

Q Alan, have you any speculation on the purpose of this pattern of harrassment?

A No.

Q Is there any retaliation possible?

A I don't have anything on the question of retaliation at this point.

Q Alan, in the case of the U.S. citizen of Arabic background, Mike Mansour, that was arrested in April in Israel for 22 days, you had some guidance which --

Q Could we just stay on this subject?

Q Yes. This is related to this subject. Excuse me. You got -- you said in the guidance that you brought vigorously your concerns to the attention of the

1-1962

Government of Israel.

A Uh-hum.

Q Were you satisfied, as you want to be satisfied in the same corollary, from the Israeli answer like you want to be satisfied with the Russian answer to your complaint?

A I'm not going to try to compare the cases. Whatever we have put out on that -- I think there was some guidance, if not yesterday, then the day before -- that's what I've got.

Q I'm sorry. He is a U.S. citizen.

A Yes.

Q And you are concerned about U.S. citizens in Russia --

A Correct.

Q And I would like to know if you are concerned about U.S. citizens in Israel itself?

A I think we --

Q The same way.

A May I answer?

Q Yes.

A I think we indicated it in the guidance, and I said what we have to say about it.

Q Alan, after all these incidents, do you agree now that relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union are at the lowest level?

A Oh, I wouldn't try to characterize the relationship.

Q Alan, do you have -- can you make available these series of incidents and harrassments over the past few months? Do you have any roster that you could share?

A I don't have a roster --

Q Is that possible?

A -- to give you. Well, I think we've made known our concerns on a number of occasions, Bernie, and I would refer you to what we've said. I think in other cases it has involved, sometimes, private American citizens, and I don't think we have necessarily been able to provide you with --

Q Have you dealt before with the question that Bob Toth raised about what it is that motivates the Soviets to carry out what you call a set-up?

A I haven't -- I'm not going to try to do that. I think that's a question for the Soviets to answer, not for us.

Q But if you make the accusation of a pattern of harrassment --

A Well, we're making an observation of what's happening. In terms of motivations, you'd have to ask the Soviets.

Q What is the future -- how are you going to solve these problems in the future?

A Well, as I say, I don't have anything further today on that subject.

Q Who delivered the protest and to whom?

A Where?

Q Here.

A Here in Washington it was delivered yesterday by Under Secretary Armacost to the Soviet Charge', Mr. Sokolov.

Q Here?

A Here. This was Mike's question. I don't have the specifics of the protest as it was delivered in Moscow, but we can probably help later on.

Q What would --

Q On this protest you have heard nothing by way of a response?

A No.

Q What did they say?

1-1964

A I'm not going to get into the details of the exchange, but we made our protest rather strongly, and I'll leave it at that.

Q Is the key evidence that it was a set-up the fact that the car was continuing to drive, I guess slowly, around the building?

A I think the entire circumstance of it. As I say, why don't we talk a little bit later and maybe we can get some further information, but the entire circumstance made it clear that's what it was.

Q Have you had any sort of indication that the Soviets have identified any of the guys who beat the Marine up, or is that part of what is lacking in a satisfactory response?

A I don't know what they have done in terms of identification, but since they took him to a militia station, it shouldn't have been very hard to know who took him in.

Q Did you say how long he was held, in that original statement?

A Did I say what? I said he was --

Q How long he had been held?

A No, I didn't. I didn't. But I think that I saw something in the wires from Moscow that indicated he was held a couple of hours, so I don't quarrel with that.

Jim?

-- MORE --

1-1965

Q Three short Latin ones.

A No. Wait a minute. Let's finish this subject.

Q Oh, I'm sorry.

Q Do you know whether he was beaten on the street, or whether that took place at the militia building to which he was taken?

A He was beaten on the street.

Q Was he in uniform?

A No, he was off duty.

Q Are we not going to get his name?

A I think not.

Q Alan, one more. Now, in the past, there were some diplomats, now this guard, next could be the U.S. Ambassador.

A I think that we're obviously attentive all around the world to providing adequate protection or our ambassadors.

Jim? Go ahead.

Q Do you have any status report on the Cuba-U.S. talks? Anything on this question of Fort Gulick and the Canal zone facilities in Panama, and --

A Let's do one at a time.

Q All right.

A In terms of Cuba -- although I think many of you were aware late last night we got something -- let me read you what I have.

Representatives of the Governments of the United States and Cuba met in New York City July 31 to August 2 to discuss immigration issues, including the return to Cuba of those persons from the 1980 Mariel boatlift who are ineligible for substantive reasons to remain in the

United States.

The talks followed an earlier round of discussions in New York on July 12 and 13. As in the previous round, the U.S. delegation was headed by Michael G. Kozak, Deputy Legal Advisor of the Department of State, and Ricardo Alarcon de Quesada, Vice Minister of Foreign Relations led the Cuban delegation.

Once again, the issues involved in these talks concern the return to Cuba of the Mariel excludables and the resumption of normal immigration from Cuba to the United States, which was suspended after the Mariel boatlift in 1980.

The process is continuing, and further exchanges on these issues are anticipated.

I might just note, beyond that, there have been some stories which continue to appear which suggest that in some way the framework of these talks has changed. That simply is not the case. And I think we put out some time ago for you the chronology of this question of the Mariel excludables and immigration issues, and I think it's quite clear from that, that that was the nature. It wasn't narrower nor was it broader, and that is where it remains.

Q Copy of that please?

A Copy of what I originally read.

Q What have you reached in the talks --

A Not able to characterize substance or anything beyond that.

Q Do you expect them to resume -- is that what you said? I didn't --

A I said, we expect that there will be further exchanges on these issues.

Q Do you have a number on the Mariel excludables?

A I don't have a number beyond what we've talked about before on this, George. I'll refer you back to the record. I don't remember how much we provided on numbers, frankly, and I don't have any numbers to give you.

1-1967

Q Alan, the characterization yesterday, you said "serious." I assume that applies --

A Sure.

Q Okay. Also, then, do you have anything on the Panama question, the return of the Canal zone facilities to Panama?

A Yeah. The Panama Canal Treaty of 1977, and related agreements, specify that five years after their entry into force, the authority of the United States to conduct schooling of Latin American military personnel in the U.S. Army School of the Americas -- also known as USARSA -- shall expire unless the two governments otherwise agree, and that Fort Gulick, where the school is located, will be transferred to Panama except for specified housing and other facilities.

For over a year, the United States and Panamanian authorities have been negotiating concerning an agreement that would allow the U.S. Army to continue training in Panama in a successor operation to USARSA for which Panama would make facilities available at Fort Gulick.

Such agreement has not been completed and it is possible that these negotiations may not be successful. If they're not, the U.S. will comply fairly and in good faith with its obligations. As provided in the treaty package, USARSA would, in this event, cease operations by October 1. Fort Gulick would in any case be transferred to Panama on October 1.

Other questions concerning operational matters relating to the school should be asked over at the Defense Department.

Q Could we get a copy of that statement?

A Sure. Bernie?

Q New subject, please. Is there anything new on U.S.-Soviet in Vienna?

A No, I don't have anything new. I'd refer you simply to the briefing that was held the other day.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the New York Times story today about the divisions within the Administration, specifically --

A I'm sorry, about the --?

A Divisions within the Administration on the ASAT issue?

A No, I don't.

Q That means, it's useless to pursue this? You don't have -- yeah. (Laughter)

A In a word.

Barrie?

Q Alan, I gather there have been some additional ships hit in the Gulf of Suez, or the Red Sea area, and there's one report that one ship was actually sunk. What's your latest on that?

A Okay. As far as latest incidents, the last explosion in the Gulf of Suez -- the one which we have information -- was July 29. I think there have been some incidents reported in the Red Sea area since that time.

We have received several reports of explosions causing minor damage to several ships in the -- near Bab el Mandeb, the southern entrance to the Red Sea. The information is imprecise, but we did on August 2 issue a warning to ships in that area, similar to the one that already had been sent out for the Gulf of Suez.

There is a DOD survey team that met with Egyptian authorities on August 2, and will do so again today. I don't have word on their findings, and we don't have any information, firm information, at this point on the cause of the explosion nor do we have anything on who may be responsible. So I can't speculate about that.

Q You haven't see that Lloyds of London report about a ship actually being sunk?

A I think -- well, I must confess I was not paying a lot of attention this morning. I saw a wire this morning, but I don't have anything in official channels on this.

Q Do you have the identity, the nationalities of the ships that have suffered some damage?

A I don't.

Q Do you have any evidence that -- the same subject, please. You don't have any evidence that the U.S. ships were targeted in this accident?

A We don't know what the cause of the explosions is at this point. There have been reports which talk about mines. We haven't really determined yet what this is all about. That's why we have a team out there, among other things, to try and help with this. So I think that we're not in a position to speculate about the nature of the explosions or what caused them or what pattern there might exist, so I think we'll have to withhold comment until we have some assessment.

Q The team is only for investigation or just to assist the Egyptian Government clearing the way of the Gulf --

A At this point they're consulting. In terms of what steps might be taken afterwards, I suppose that will depend on what everybody concludes.

Q Any U.S. ships involved?

A I don't have the answer to that.

Q Even on U.S. ships, you don't have the answer?

A I don't know what the answer is. Shipping circles may have that, Bernie, but I just don't have anything on it.

Q The initial report was that very early in July some Libyan and Iranian ships passed through the canal, the Suez Canal, and that area, and some reports say that they possibly laid these --

A Well, I've seen those reports, but I'll stick to what I've said.

Q But there is no credibility on that?

A I can't confirm anything, or indicate in any way what may have happened or who may have been responsible. I don't have it.

Chris?

Q You've used the term "mines" a number of times. Have you now concluded that they are mines?

A No, I said that we can't conclude -- I'm talking about explosions, and that there are reports that there may have been mines; that's one of the things that's being looked at.

Q Has the State Department come to any determination in the case of nationality for Rabbi Meir Kahane?

A No, I don't -- I think I indicated the other day that the -- a look at that would really be precipitated by an act which would potentially be expatriating. I don't think that that has happened as of this moment, or at least I'm not aware of what's happening. But I think that one example cited in that guidance, as I recall it, was participating in another government. Obviously, they haven't been -- the members newly elected to the Knesset haven't been sworn in yet, for example, so --

Q (inaudible) should he be sworn in, and --

A Well, let's wait and see what happens with that.

Q On the Nicaraguan talks, the Nicaraguan news agency is reporting that there is a possibility of a meeting between Ortega, Daniel Ortega, and President Reagan, and that this is not only the direct results of the meeting with the Nicaraguans in Mexico but also of the meeting with the Cubans. What can you share with us?

A I think there's a lot of distortion in that. There are no plans for a meeting with Mr. Ortega, between Mr. Ortega and the President. And there was no connection between that subject at all and the discussions on the Mariel and other immigration issues, or migration issues with the Cubans, so I don't quite know what the story is all about.

Q On the talks with the Nicaraguans, can you --

A Mr. Shlaudeman -- Ambassador Shlaudeman?

No, that's not the subject of those talks.

Q Alan, just to go back to Kahane for a second. You mean that if a person voluntarily runs for office and is elected into a foreign parliament, that is not constituting holding office in a foreign government, a foreign --

A It is constituting it. But let me refer you back -- it's a very complicated subject, Bob. You may not have been here the other day when I had something specifically on it. It's hard to lose your citizenship, and there's guidance which talks about the parameters of this. There are examples of previous members of the Knesset who have lost citizenship, for example, just to use Israel as an example; and, on the other hand, a member who didn't lose citizenship, so it's a complicated question.

Q Alan, on the same subject, please. Does Mr. Arens, the Minister of Defense of Israel, carry a dual citizenship of Israel and the United States?

A I don't know. You'd have to ask him.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

Q (Press briefing concluded at 12:55 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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MONDAY, AUGUST 6, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #140

MONDAY, AUGUST 6, 1984, 12:10 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. One announcement, a short one, and then a longer item.

The announcement is to tell you that available in the Press Office is the embargoed text of the address by Deputy Secretary Dam before the American Bar Association today. The subject of his address is "Europe Versus Asia: Is Diplomacy a Zero-Sum Game?" Note the embargo, I believe, is until about 2:00 o'clock, or a little thereafter, Washington time.

Second, with regard to a travel advisory that is being issued on travel to Leningrad. The Department of State advises that during the past few months there has been a noticeable increase in the number of incidents of harassment involving Americans in the Soviet Union. The majority of serious incidents has occurred in the Leningrad area.

There have been several cases of unlawful detention of tourists by the Soviet security organs following innocent contacts with Soviet citizens. During detentions Americans have been denied their rights under the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Consular Convention to communicate with an American Consular Officer and to be visited by him without delay.

American tourists have also been subjected to arbitrary and, in many cases, unjustifiably embarrassing searches of their personal effects when arriving or departing from Leningrad's international airport.

The Soviet authorities have not responded in a satisfactory manner to our urgent requests that they act immediately to correct this situation. Americans traveling to the Leningrad area should be aware that their rights as foreign tourists and the protections afforded them under the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Consular Convention are not being respected by the Soviet authorities.

The second paragraph of this advisory is a one-line note that it is an indefinite advisory; that is, there is no expiration date.

Q Copy, please?

A Sure.

Q Alan, is that the first time that the State Department has ever issued such an advisory about an individual Soviet city?

A I'll have to check on that, Jim. I don't know the answer to that.

Q One more possible action: Has the State Department made any decision about whether to permit Soviet newsmen to go to Dallas to cover the Republican Convention?

A Soviet journalists on permanent assignment in the -- excuse me, just to start off on it:

The State Department has no intention of denying Soviet journalists or diplomats access to the Republican Convention in Dallas.

Soviet journalists and diplomats on permanent assignment in the United States are required to file a travel notification with the Department of State, just as their U.S. counterparts in the U.S.S.R. must do.

Because certain areas in the Soviet Union are closed to travel to U.S. officials and journalists, Soviet journalists and officials assigned to the United States must request that an exception to these restrictions be made by the Department of State if they wish to travel to a closed area. Dallas is located in a closed area.

No such requests have been received by the Department, but, if made, they will be considered promptly and without prejudice.

Q "Without prejudice" mean they will get a flat okay?

A Well, I'll repeat to you the first line: simply that the State Department has no intention of denying Soviet journalists or diplomats access to the Republican Convention in Dallas. But they will be

1-1975

considered. They'll have to be filed, and they'll have to be considered.

Q Alan, is there any suspicion of anti-Semitic activity in the incidents in Leningrad?

A I don't know that in these particular incidents that we are referring to that has been a particular feature. I can't speak, though, as a general matter to that question.

I addressed last week, you'll recall, the problems that we had in terms of the Marine guard and noted that there had been several serious incidents. There have been some others. I would note, for example, that on July 28 an American IREX -- that is, International Research and Exchanges Board -- professor was picked up by plainclothesmen as he was going to a meeting with a Soviet scholar who specializes in 18th century literature.

The American was detained at the police station for two hours and not allowed to contact our Consulate. In fact, he was told by militiamen that a new Soviet law which took effect on July 1 did not require that foreigners be granted access to their Consular representatives unless they were being deported.

This is a dangerous attitude for the Leningrad authorities to take, and one which clearly is in gross violation of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Consular Convention.

Q Alan, you obviously --

Q Copy of that, too?

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Alan, this is a fairly serious charge that the government is making. Is it possible for the Press Office to help us out and give us, you know, some dates, names, of violations?

A I don't think we can go into further details, because we've in the past documented some of these, Bill, or made them known --

Q Yeah

A But they involve private individuals, and there are sensitivities, and we're giving you as much as we can. We're obviously not trying to hide it. We consider it a serious matter. But I've got about as much as I think is going to be possible.

Bob?

Q Alan, Jim's question before was rather narrow on precedent. Is there any precedent for barring any area of the Soviet Union? I mean, of putting --

A A travel advisory for any area of the Soviet Union?

Q Yeah.

A Let me put that in with the same request.

Q Alan, why Leningrad? Is this thing repeated in other cities in the Soviet Union, or just Leningrad was made as a cause celebre?

A We have noted that the problems in Leningrad have been particularly severe.

Q But there are other cases in other cities?

A There have been other cases of harassment, sure, but this -- the problems have been particularly severe in Leningrad.

Q And you don't have any explanation for the severity of it in Leningrad?

A No.

Q Alan, getting back to Bill's question, I recognize there are sensitivities here, but can't you give us an idea of how many incidents there have been in -- without giving the names?

A Well, let me see if I can get any further information for you. But, as I say, there are some Privacy Act concerns here, but if I can get a broader picture for you, I'll do that.

Q Because the only things that have been publicized, really, are those that have involved Embassy --

A Well, I just mentioned one, for example --

Q Yeah. But I mean --

A I understand that. I think you also understand that there are some difficulties in terms of pinpointing people who, if you gave details, could be identified not only by you but by the Soviets, and that doesn't help their case at all.

Q Alan, can you address the question of what it is that might prompt the Soviets to take such action?

A I would ask you to ask them.

Q Is there -- just a follow-up, please? Has there been an acceleration of such incidents that coincides with the new tensions between the U.S. and the Soviets over the past few months?

A Well, I don't know that I would describe this -- or accept a characterization regarding the "last few months" or otherwise, Bernie. I would not try to relate this to some specifics in our relationship. I think that this particular phenomenon seems to be, at least in terms of its intensity -- although there are incidents elsewhere -- but in terms of its intensity, seems to be related mostly to Leningrad and to the authorities there.

Q If I may change the subject, could you talk to us a little bit about the Iran-Iraq war and our view of the seeming attempts by the Iranians to try to get some negotiations going? Also, I might add, perhaps, the fuss about U.S. exports to Iran.

A Okay. Well, first of all, I leave it to Iran to explain what its policy is regarding whether, indeed, it has changed its attitude in its refusal to date to negotiate. We're aware of reported statements by the Iranian Minister for Revolutionary Guards, suggesting, perhaps, that Iran would not attack tankers in the Gulf or widen the war.

It isn't clear whether these reported statements accurately reflect the Government of Iran's policy or a decision to accept a cease-fire against shipping or port facilities.

1-1978

We would, of course, welcome any actions which were aimed at limiting the attacks in the Gulf or bringing the war to an end, but I can't make a judgment on it beyond what I've just said.

As far as the shipments are concerned, this is the story that was in the Post this morning that you're referring to, Dana?

Q Yes.

A The U.S. has not authorized the sale of arms -- that is, munitions list items -- to either side since the beginning of the war. Efforts to gain the cooperation of other countries in controlling arms shipments to Iran have focused mainly on items already controlled by the United States.

It is dual-use items, those which are not arms, but could support a war effort, such as parts for transport aircraft, for which there are no current Iran specific controls. However, the question of additional controls on these items is under active review at senior levels in the Administration.

I can't give you anything further on that at this point, however.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Yeah.

Q Of both?

Q Alan, do you have a situation report on the mines in the Gulf of Suez?

Q No. Could we stay with Iran for a minute?

A Yeah. Go ahead. I'll come back to you on the mines. Go ahead, Bernie.

Q Does that mean that it is wide open for Iran to get anything in the U.S. and cleared by the U.S. Government that falls short of what you suggest could be additional controls that is not arms? What's this statement you read before, "additional controls?"

A Well, there are certain controls which are in effect.

Q Yeah.

A Under the law as it presently is administered and the regulations which are presently administered, there are limits on those controls, and I think we have made those available in the past at such times as we've announced it. And they're in the regulations. They can be checked.

But, as I say, there are no current Iran specific controls for certain items such as transport aircraft spare parts.

Q So that stuff in fact has gone, the $27 million worth?

A Well, I don't know whether it has or hasn't gone, but I think that you would have to check with the Commerce Department, except to say that of the items which were apparently licensed last year -- this $27 million that is reported, apparently -- and I would ask you to check with Commerce -- but apparently at least $18 million worth were not actually delivered.

So I would have to refer you to Commerce for the export statistics, but I would note that fact.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the interview with Bani Sadr, and specifically whether or not Khomeini was ill?

A I don't. There have been a lot of reports over the last year or so regarding Khomeini's health. I noted that the Iran news agency apparently issued a report this morning about a meeting he held with the Prime Minister, but I don't have anything specific on the Bani Sadr piece.

Q Alan --

A Excuse me. Yes?

Q Do you have any comment on Jack Anderson's column on Saturday that the Soviet Union is tilting towards Iran nowadays?

1-1980

A No, I don't.

Q Okay. Can you talk about a --

A The mines?

Q The mines. Yes.

A Well, I have a little bit which doesn't take you too far. The Government of Egypt has requested U.S. assistance and we're considering what measures we can take to assist.

The occurrence of explosions in the southern Red Sea had broadened concern about shipping in the area. Both the U.S. and Egypt have been in touch on this subject with the governments of littoral states and European allies, but I can't get into the content of those discussions.

There were reports, as you're aware, that a Liberian tanker was sunk. Our most recent information is that the Liberian tanker did not, in fact, sink and is being towed into the Saudi Arabian port of Jiddah, and we have received no other reports of explosions in the Red Sea area since August 2.

Q When was the Egyptian request received here?

A I don't have specifics to give you on that.

Q Alan, don't you have an indication of from where these mines came? Any --

A No. Nothing.

Q -- thing now?

A Nothing further.

Q Do you think in the week you will have something specific on that?

A I don't. Sorry.

Q Is Israel expected to play any part in the operations in the Gulf, in the Suez Gulf?

A I'm not aware of any particular role that Israel would play.

Q But you have been in consultation with the Israeli Government --

A Well, we've talked to a number cf states in the region. I don't think I'm going to get specific, but --

Q Can we get a copy --

A It's not unusual to be in touch with countries that might be affected.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Alan, what is the status of the helicopter minesweepers which are currently on the ground in Norfolk?

A You'd have to check with the Pentagon, Barrie. I don't understand -- I understand there's not been a decision at this point to deploy. I gather from press reports over the weekend that they -- such helicopters may have been loaded on board aircraft, but I'm not aware of a decision to deploy. But I ask you, please, to check with Mike Burch and his colleagues.

Q An Egyptian official overruled that these mines could be left over from the cleaning of the Suez Canal. What do you make of these --

A From --

Q From the cleaning of the Suez Canal -- you know, with the opening of the Suez Canal -- that they said something that these --

A Well, I don't have any judgments to offer. I'm not trying to suggest I'm contradicting that, but I just don't have any judgments to offer about what's involved here at this point.

Q Alan, on reports that suggest possibly Iran or Libya --

A I can't help you on that.

Q Do you have anything on that?

A I don't. Jim?

Q On Iran, are the senior levels considering revising the hostage agreement to limit what can be sold to Iran?

A I'm not aware of any effort to limit -- to change that agreement.

Q Alan, on Iran also, would you characterize the Syrian Government attitude as helpful regarding the Iranian relations to the United States?

A I don't have any characterization to offer you.

Q Alan, on the review on Iran sales, can you tell us how long this review has been going on, and what prompted it?

A No. I don't have any details on how long it's been going on. I think I'm just going to have to --

Q Can you tell us how long it's likely, and how close it is to completion?

A No. I can't. Let me leave it at that. I just don't know at this point.

Q Alan, under provision of the hostage agreement, you are obliged to send Iran transport airline -- I mean, planes.

A Uh-huh.

Q Are you still honoring that?

A Well, I'm not going to try to parse this here, or analyze here the specifics of that agreement. As I indicated before, I don't know of any intention to amend that agreement, so I suppose one would have to see what the future regulations are, and how they would affect it, and whether exceptions would have to be made, or something of that sort. But at this point I'm not prepared to address it since there is no decision on that.

Q Alan, did you say why the question of additional controls is being looked into?

A I did not.

Q Why is it, then?

A I don't have anything to give you on that. I thought we had addressed this in the past, and I want to be careful about the words I use. Let me see if I can get back and get you some words on that.

Q Alan, Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi has over the past been making some vague statements about a foreign hand in recent events in Punjab, but yesterday for the first time in a rally in Himachal Pradesh, at a political rally, she said that -- she spoke of an espionage group based in Washington as having a hand in these problems.

Can you comment on this allegation, and also was she referring to the NSA or the CIA, since the latter is based in Langley?

A Well, I guess you would have to check with the Indian Government, but my understanding is that there has been no charge raised against the United States Government or any part of the United States Government by Mrs. Gandhi. And you might want to, as I say, verify that with the Indian Government.

Q Anything further on the Egyptian request for assistance --

A Excuse me. Let me go back and say -- and, of course, we have made very clear that there is no U.S. Government involvement. But in terms of any charges, I would suggest you might go back and recheck that with the Government of India.

Q What kind of assistance did the Egyptians ask for?

A I don't have details to give you at this point.

Q Alan, French Smith told the ABA today in Chicago that apparently the Soviet Union had sent letters to 20 countries, making them appear as if they were written by the KKK, threatening their participation in the Olympics. Are you aware of that?

A We've addressed this before.

1-1984

Q Have you?

A Yeah. I refer you back some, I guess a few weeks ago now, to disinformation efforts.

Q Good.

A Yeah.

Q Alan, last week you said you have no comment on the response -- the positive response of mostly the Arab Governments to the Soviet proposal regarding the Middle East.

Do you still have the same answer to the same question?

A Sure. Our position is clear, and we've articulated it several times, and I don't have anything to add to it. I'm not going to comment on the fact that other governments may have taken other positions with a greater or lesser degree of ambiguity to them, but that's up to them to express their own views. We'll talk -- but our view has not changed.

Q These could be taken as an indicator to different views between the United States and Arab Governments that are considered to be friendly and allied even to the United States.

A Well, I don't know about allied, but, in any case, the fact is that our position is as it is. I think that we have explained it many times to those governments. You'd have to ask them what their position is, but that doesn't mean that we can't have differences view either. That's always quite possible.

Larry?

Q Do you now have more specific information that enables you to say that those purported KKK letters did indeed originate in the Soviet Union by Soviet authorities?

A I don't have anything to take you beyond what I said when I had that original leaflet to give to you.

Q Has the Attorney General gone beyond the original guidance on that subject?

1-1985

A I don't know whether he has or not. I'm not aware that he has, but --

Q He says flatly the KGB did it.

A He says "flatly the KGB did it." Okay. Well, I guess I'll refer you to his remarks.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the steps being taken by the East Germans and the West Germans to move toward some sort of rapprochment against the background of the new West German loan?

A I don't have any comment to offer on -- beyond what our very standard position is. That is, we have supported the inner-German dialogue, and so that is a matter of record and policy.

As far as the loan is concerned, our view of a specific loan would depend on the terms -- that is, the interest rate and so on -- regarding that loan. But I don't have anything to offer you with respect to the most recent loan.

Q Do you have anything to say about the Kremlin's reaction to this process?

A No, I don't.

Q Okay. Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:30 p.m.)

1-1986

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #141

TUESDAY, AUGUST 7, 1984, 12:20 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. Just one brief announcement to welcome Don Hibbard to the Press Office. Why don't you stand up and let them get a look at you? Don's been in the Executive Office in PA for two and a half years and will be going back there, but he'll be with us for the next several weeks as a Press Officer.

Q Did you level with him? (Laughter)

A As much as with you, Bernie.

Okay. Happy to take your questions. Jim?

Q Radio Tehran had a broadcast this morning in which it attributed the mining of the Suez, or the Red Sea to the same organization which blew up the Marine barracks in Lebanon.

Do you have any reason to believe or disbelieve that?

A Don't have anything on responsibility on this, Jim. I would also refer you to a briefing that was held this morning over at the Pentagon on the subject of the explosions and what's being done in terms of deployment of counter-mine people, and so on. I think that there's a fair amount of detail that was provided over there.

Q And the fact that this approving broadcast over an official Tehran radio station, does that tell you anything?

A Well, I think that it is noteworthy, and what I would observe about that is that praise for random acts of terrorism is really outside the norms of civilized behavior.

Q And does this hasten your consideration of the trade regulations on dealing with Iran?

1-1988

A I don't know if it hastens it, but I'm sure people will take note of it.

Q Alan, just when did the Egyptian request arrive for help?

A I think on all of that, Mike Burch talked about it this morning. Let me refer you to his briefing.

Q Did he give an exact time?

A I think he talked about it when it came in. Yes, I think he did.

Q Last night you mean?

A I think that's what he talked about.

Q Just a clarifying issue: Does that mean that the United States has decided that there are mines out there --

A No.

Q -- and that those mines constitute an act of terrorism?

A I think that the best thing for you to do is to get a hold of the transcript of Mike's briefing, because I think that you will find that he addressed these various subjects.

Q The second question?

A Whether it constitutes an act of --

Q Of terrorism.

A Terrorism?

Q Yes.

A I think --

Q Whether you're referring specifically to them -- to whatever's going on in the Red Sea --

A It's in a situation where you -- as far as I know, it's outside of any war zone. It's random. If it's

1-1989

-- in fact -- if it in fact is mines again, we haven't reached any conclusions. So if it is somebody purposefully doing something to attack civilian shipping in that area, I suppose that one would have to draw appropriate conclusions.

Q Now since it was found out that there are loopholes in the Commerce Department rules and regulations for Iran that, you know, some material was sent which could be strategic material, are there any attempts or some thoughts in the Administration to possibly stem or shut these loopholes, and try to change it?

A Well, I think that's the effect of what I said yesterday was that that question of the regulations on exports to Iran is under active review at senior levels. So --

Q Alan, has there been another incident with the bombing of a ship by the Iraqis? Are you aware of --

A There's -- aware of the reports of that. I can't confirm that. I gather that there are -- I have no reason to dispute it, but I can't confirm it.

Q Alan, did the Saudis contact you about Red Sea, about more minesweepers, or something like that?

A The Saudis?

Q Yes.

A Not going to get into the question of our diplomatic exchanges, but, as I indicated yesterday, we have been in touch with a number of states about this, so there is an active dialogue going on among various countries.

Q The states on the Red Sea -- I mean Sudan, Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia. Can we say that?

A I'm not going to try to specify the countries that we've been in touch with.

Q Alan, does this Iraqi incident break any tacit understandings that there weren't supposed to be any more, as far as you know?

A I'm not aware of any tacit understandings to that effect, Barrie.

1-1990

Q Alan, Israeli reports indicate that Israel has indicated to the United States that it is willing or would like to be involved in any arrangement for the Gulf area or the security of this area, and it was a couple of days ago, or over the weekend, a story that the Ambassador here in Washington had expressed his desire to the Administration that they would like to know what the Administration is planning with the rest of the countries in the area about securities and any arrangements. What do you say to that?

A Again, we're in contact with a number of countries that are concerned, both in the region, and also we've been talking with various European countries. But I don't have specifics to offer you.

I think that in his briefing this morning, Mike Burch indicated that he had seen nothing which indicated an active role per se in trying to search for any mines that might be there or involvement of that sort.

Q Besides the mines, because a story of Leslie Gelb last week in The New York Times talked about that, the strategic agreement between the United States and Israel is now geared towards stemming the flow of Communism in the Middle East.

A Well, I have nothing to add to what I've said in respect to that -- the operations under the Joint Political/Military Group. We've talked about that before, and I refer you back to what we've said on that.

Q Alan, would you take the incidents in the Red Sea as a new factor reinforcing the U.S. demand or request for bases in the area?

A I'm not aware that we've made demands for bases in the area. What are you referring to?

Q Well, let us call it "facilities." You like the word "facilities" more.

A I don't have anything to add to what we've said before. I'm not aware that this has stimulated something new other than concern about the immediate situation to find out what it is, and, if there's something that's correctible about it, to try and help correct it.

1-1991

Q Alan, have you heard anything from the Soviets about your travel advisory of yesterday?

A Not to my knowledge. I'm sure they're aware of it.

Q Alan --

Q And what about the reports on Sakharov and Mrs. Bonner?

A We're not in a position to confirm that, Barrie. We've seen the press reports today about the Sakharovs, but we have not been able to confirm them.

There has been no verifiable information on the situation of those two brave individuals in more than two months when they separately began their hunger strikes to obtain permission for Mrs. Bonner to travel abroad for medical treatment.

Recent reports that Dr. Sakharov is now being subjected to psychotropic drugs are particularly disturbing. We have repeatedly expressed our profound concern for the Sakharovs to the Soviets and have called upon them to permit a credible, independent observer to confirm the Sakharovs' current status.

Q What do the Soviets tell you?

A Well, nobody has seen them, so far as I know, in this category.

Q Well, what do the Soviets say when you --

A Well, I'm not going to get into the dialogue. Suffice it to say, Bernie, that we still don't feel we have independent information about their condition.

Q Can we get a copy of that statement, please?

A Sure.

Q In the event that part of the report is correct then, that she, in fact, is going to be tried for anti-Soviet activities, what is our response to that?

A I don't have anything on that at this point.

Q On the Vienna talks, Alan, has there been any diplomatic exchange this week?

A There's been diplomatic back-and-forth since the last -- since last week, but I'm not going to get into the specifics.

Q But are the U.S. and the Soviet Union still talking to each other about the general subject of Vienna?

A There has been diplomatic discussion, but I don't want to characterize it.

Q Alan, you might have expressed this before, but if you could look into the matter of what action the United States Administration will be taking about the American citizens serving in the military forces of a foreign country, particularly when that foreign country has been in a military-aggressive situation with the United States?

A I have addressed it before. I'm not going to take it. I refer you back to what we've said. You're talking about citizenship and --

Q Yes.

A -- that is not in and of itself an act of expatriation. I refer you back to the record on that. There's a long record of what we talked about, and if you want to get in touch with some experts, I'm sure we can help you do that.

Q My information -- I'm asking because my information says that about 2,000 American citizens served in the Israeli forces last year and there are about 4,000 this year, and this is my question --

A That doesn't change the nature of the response that I've given you, though. I understand your question, but it doesn't change the facts.

Q In Lebanon, U.S. peacekeeping forces became a target. What is the danger that these helicopter mine sweepers and the U.S. forces with them might become inadvertently a target over there; and is there a risk that that -- if that should happen, that we might be more heavily involved?

A Again, Mike Burch addressed that this morning, and I refer you to his words on that subject.

Roy?

Q You said that you were in touch with countries in the area. One of the countries bordering the Red Sea is Ethiopia. Does your statement apply also to Ethiopia?

A I'm not aware that we're in direct touch with Ethiopia, but I can't absolutely say that for sure.

Q Alan, on the visit of the Speaker of the Egyptian Parliament to this country, and if he is going to be in contact with the State Department or not?

A I think he has been. I'm correct, he's seen Assistant Secretary Murphy. I don't think there's anything out of the ordinary. I think it's in the nature of our routine dialogue with Egyptian officials and prominent citizens.

Q Can I ask, who is he meeting with?

A I said Assistant Secretary Murphy. I don't know beyond that who else he might be seeing.

Q Do you have anything on -- I think the Washington Times report -- that does a comparison of alleged Soviet violations of nuclear agreements?

A This was from some time ago, or a few days ago.

Q I see it in today's --

A I missed that. There's been a lot of reporting on the so-called GAC report, and I refer you back to the guidance we had on this, Bernie. That's not a governmental report. It is classified, although I gather there was some effort to get an unclassified version, but there is guidance so if you would check that, please.

Q Alan, now that charges have been lodged in the case of the abduction of Patricia Londono, will you take the question that you refused to answer last week --

A No, I've given you --

Q -- namely -- no, no, no. Wait a minute.

A Go ahead. Finish.

Q You have issued public statements as well as informal statements on this case quoting press reports and unnamed police officials. Lee Peters of the Colombia Desk knows that those reports that the Department has been quoting have been untrue.

Now that you've had time to establish that Mrs. Londono was kidnapped, drugged, and probably tortured, why haven't you changed your position that no abduction took place?

A Well, we have given you the information we have. The fact that you don't happen to agree with it doesn't make our information wrong.

Q It's not a question of agreement --

A I'm not here to argue.

Q You know that you're issuing lies. If you can't explain --

A Excuse me, are there any questions? Yes?

Q Do you have anything on Uganda, and the reported expulsion of the military attache?

A Of the military attache, I don't.

Q Anything on Nicaragua, and the events of the last 24 hours?

A That's what I call a vacuum cleaner approach to questions. (Laughter)

Q The "if asked" part, too --

A The "if asked" part, too? I see. (laughter)

In response to the reports of an easing of restrictions, while we would welcome any steps the Sandinistas might take toward fulfilling their 1979 promises to respect political pluralism and human rights, the limited measures announced so far do not address fundamental issues.

They certainly do not meet the demands of the main opposition group in Nicaragua, the Democratic Coordinadora, for a complete suspension of the state of emergency, an end to press censorship, and a general amnesty law that would permit the participation of all Nicaraguan citizens in the electoral process.

Because of the Sandinistas' failure to guarantee free and fair elections, the Democratic Coordinadora has decided to boycott the November elections. Moreover, these new limited steps were announced only after the deadline by which opposition candidates could register, a deadline the Sandinistas refused to extend.

In addition, we must remain skeptical about the sincerity of the Sandinista government's pledges, since on the very day Mr. Ortega announced an easing of press censorship, the independent daily newspaper La Prensa was gutted by the censors to the extent that it did not publish on Monday. Every article, photo and commentary related to the Democratic Coordinadora and any person or party associated with that organization was deleted by the censors.

It remains to be seen whether the Government of Nicaragua will demonstrate that it is truly prepared to move to democratic rule.

Q Copy, please?

A Sure.

Q Did you have anything on the article that appeared in the Post today about alleged atrocities committed by --

A No, we can't confirm those reports. I think it's the same report you asked about a few days ago, same incident. But in any case -- well, I thought you did -- in any case, I would note, obviously as we have made clear in the past, we condemn the killing of innocent civilians; but I can't confirm or give you any information on that report.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the developments regarding the formation of the new Cabinet in Israel?

A No.

Q Alan, sometime ago this Administration withdrew funding from the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in Vienna. Right now, it's my understanding that officials of the government, however, are meeting with IIASA officials to discuss a report on withdrawing parity price supports in agriculture.

Can you look into that, whether there's any policy that the government has regarding accepting recommendations of IIASA?

A Let me check on that.

Q Thank you.

A Okay. You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:35 p.m.)

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Giannon/Becker

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #142

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 8, 1984, 12:21 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I've got a few announcements for you. Available in the Press Office is the embargoed text -- that is, embargoed until 3:00 p.m. -- of testimony by Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Paul Wolfowitz before the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. The testimony will be on the efforts to account for Americans still missing in Southeast Asia.

Also available -- will be embargoed similarly until 3:00 p.m. -- the text of testimony by Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs William Brown before the Senate Finance Committee, International Trade Subcommittee. The subject of his testimony is "The Waiver Permitting Most Favored Nation Treatment for China."

Finally, an announcement regarding a briefing at 1:30 this afternoon here on El Salvador. There will be a briefing at 1:30 p.m. today here in the Briefing Room on some recently-declassified intelligence information regarding the Salvadoran guerrillas and their arms supplies. The briefing will be ON-THE-RECORD for sound and cameras. The briefers will be Ambassador Thomas Pickering, the U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador; and General Paul Gorman, Commander of the U.S. Southern Command in Panama. We hope to have a limited number, at least, of press kits available for you by the time that briefing begins.

The briefers -- just to tell you what's going to happen -- they will present and explain some recently declassified material, including a video tape from a reconnaissance flight which adds additional reinforcement to the U.S. beliefs about the source of guerrilla arms.

A caution before a question arises: "Is this the definitive briefing; is this going to tell all?" It isn't purporting to be that. Many of the intelligence sources and methods which have led us to our conclusions that the arms flow from Nicaragua to the Salvadoran guerrillas is continuing are still too sensitive to make public. And

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so that is simply a fact. But we can provide some additional data and pieces of information from -- for the public which we believe offers further evidence to support the conclusions that we have drawn.

That is it for announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, what discussions is the government having with Uganda regarding the apparently suspended IMET program, and the fact that Colonel Baker is not welcome in the country?

A I can't give you too much detail on this, Mike. We have just received notification of the suspension, from the Ugandan Government, of the IMET program, along with a list of questions. So we are discussing that subject with the Ugandan Government in an attempt to clarify the issue for both sides.

So far as the question of a defense attache is concerned, we, as you probably know, do not have a defense attache in Uganda; an attache in Malawi is accredited to Uganda as well, and the Ugandan Government has advised our Embassy that it is withdrawing its agreement to accreditation.

Again, as with the IMET question, we are reviewing the issue with the Ugandan Government. Communication with both the Ugandan Government and our Embassy has been hampered by a power outage in Kampala so we have not been in a position to confirm or deny press reporting on recent events.

Q Efforts by --

A Sorry?

Q Effort by a --

A A press -- excuse me, a power outage in Kampala, so that has hampered our ability to respond to questions. But in any case, that is where we are. We are discussing both of these issues, and that's about all I really have.

Q In Washington and in Uganda? And who's leading those discussions?

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A I can't tell you where the conversations are taking place, Mike. I don't know.

Q Can we have a copy of that, please?

A Yes, I can give you a copy.

Q Alan, have you said anything from the platform, your platform, about the reports of all the killings in Uganda?

A I can't recall whether we have or we have not. I would note that there are serious problems with -- both with the human rights situation and with the related issue, that is, effective control of the military. And both of these questions will be addressed in depth by Assistant Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs -- or Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs -- Elliott Abrams, tomorrow in Congressional testimony. For your information, that is at 10:00 a.m. in the Rayburn House Office Building. There is a joint hearing of the Subcommittee of Human Rights and the Subcommittee of African Affairs on human rights practices in Africa, and the countries to be covered, I understand, are Uganda, Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia.

Q You have nothing to say about the killings?

A Well, what I had to say was what I have --

Q You have nothing --

A I don't have anything further to say. I refer you to what Assistant Secretary Abrams will say about that tomorrow.

Q Alan, do you have anything today on the contradictory claims coming out of Tehran, on the one hand, applauding the Islamic Jihad for mining the Red Sea; and, on the other hand, blaming the U.S. and Israel for doing it?

A Well, I think that your question, in a sense, speaks for itself. I think I addressed yesterday the question of the Iranian praise for that attitude towards random terrorism, and I would refer you back to what I said on that.

Obviously, it is fanciful to suggest that the United States is in any way responsible for that. And while I don't speak for Israel, I'm confident they would make a similar statement.

Q Alan, there's a report that a mine has actually been recovered now, intact --

A Sorry, I don't know anything about that, Barrie. Not really.

Q Alan, can you reconcile President Reagan's statement in May that the mining of the harbors of Nicaragua was much ado about nothing, with the Administration's rather harsh attitude toward the mining of the Red Sea?

A Well, I got asked about this, I think, at the time about contradictions which some people saw between different events that were happening at the same time.

First of all -- or even maybe last of all -- I'd refer you back to what we said at the time. There were some distinctions drawn. I think -- we didn't comment much about the mining in Nicaragua, as you may recall. But we also pointed to our concern, in particular, about navigation in international waterways. But, George, I really have to refer you back to what we said at the time. I think to the extent that I could address it now, it really was addressed then.

Q But how do you distinguish in that respect, between international and national --

A Well, as I say, I refer you back to what we said on that subject.

Q Alan, do you see that this mining of the Red Sea has anything to do with the pilgrimage which will happen soon -- I mean, against the Egyptian or against certain Islamic countries to navigate freely? Can you see that --

A Pilgrimage --

Q To Mecca?

A To Mecca? The Hajj?

Q What is happening?

A I have no way of making such a conclusion. Obviously, if there were such an attempt, that would be a reprehensible activity. But I have no way of indicating what purposes might have been involved, nor, again, do we have specific information as to what is involved here. We're still not really able to confirm, going back to Barrie's question, that -- to my knowledge -- we're not able to confirm that we're talking about mines, specificially, as opposed to something else. But I refer you to what Mike Burch said about that yesterday.

Yes, Mike?

Q New subject. TASS, today, said -- accused this Administration of launching a "slanderous campaign" in regard to the -- Sergeant Campbell, accusing that the travel advisory on Leningrad was prompted by a desire to complicate relations with Moscow. Have you seen that report or have further comment?

A Haven't seen it. I would refer you to what I said the other day on this. We certainly stand by that, and there certainly is also no intention to complicate relations. But we're also -- we also take very seriously the events which have taken place, in Leningrad in particular, regarding mistreatment of American citizens, official and private citizens. And obviously that is the basis on which we took the action that we have taken.

--MORE--

Q Have you received any other reply from the Foreign Ministry whatever regarding the travel advisory? Any response or complaints?

A I have not, but I'm not sure that I would have been kept absolutely up to date on that, Mike, so --

Q Do you have any comment on the threat made in Geneva yesterday by Australia's Foreign Minister Bill Hayden to review the presence of American bases in Australia if Washington didn't show a real commitment, as he put it, to nuclear disarmament?

A The only comment I really have on that is that I understand there is a press report from Canberra which indicates that Prime Minister Hawke has said his government is not reviewing, and will not review, the question of joint facilities. So I can't verify what Mr. Hayden did or didn't say, but I simply would point to that other indication.

Q Do you have anything new on the status of Rabbi Kahane?

A No.

Q In relation to the mining--

A I'm sorry?

Q In relation to the mining of the Suez, when did the U.S. ask for permission of Spain to use the base of Rota?

A I don't have the details on what dialogue there was with the Government of Spain. I guess I would have to refer you to the specifics of what the deployment involves, and what use of Rota there is, to the Defense Department, but I can assure you that there was appropriate consultation.

Obviously, this was all decided and done quickly, in the last analysis, although there were preparations made ahead of time, and there's been a lot of conversation. But in the end the deployment was as was described by the Pentagon, I believe, yesterday. So I don't have details, though, on the dialogue.

Q Do you know if they were willing to accept the use of Rota, because according to some diplomat

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officers that the Spanish Government was very nervous yesterday, so that --

A I don't have a comment on the Spanish Government or its mood, or any other government's mood, but, obviously, we take seriously the appropriate procedures and follow them.

Bill?

Q Alan, have you got any comment on the Evans and Novak report this morning that the real reason the Chinese nuclear treaty was laid aside was because of pressure from Israel or groups in the United States that support Israel because Israel felt that fissionable material would go to making a bomb in Pakistan?

A I suppose sort of a two-part answer: One, is I'm not going to comment on Evans and Novak. Two, as a general matter, I'd refer you back to what we've said before on the question of the Chinese agreement, and I would not give credence to reports that there was a pressure from another government that was responsible for how we have handled that agreement.

Bob?

Q Just go back to the question on Rota: Are you confirming that the plane stopped in Rota?

A I'm leaving it to the Defense Department to talk about what deployment pattern there has been.

Q Alan, I think Leonard Sussman of Freedom House apparently had a news conference this morning in which the question of the U.S. policy on UNESCO was raised --

A Uh-hum.

Q -- and he said that the Administration did not consult with the U.S. National Commission on UNESCO, and that the Administration manipulated the press in its portrayal of the situation at UNESCO and its presentation was flimsy and one-sided. You probably don't have a reaction, but if you could come up with some during the course of the afternoon --

A Well, let me give you the general reaction. I don't think I'm going to respond to all the specifics that may have been raised at that press conference. I leave it to you to decide whether the press was manipulated. We certainly don't think so, and there was no effort to do that.

Q I was.

A You were, huh?

Q Yes.

A Well, what can I say, George? (Laughter) But, as a general matter, with respect to that report, the members of the National Commission's Executive Committee who prepared the document in question have done a serious report which conveys their previously expressed belief that we should remain in UNESCO.

We are disappointed that the report focuses mainly on the author's view that the withdrawal decision was unwarranted, rather than on how to eliminate the serious faults in UNESCO which all of us agree need correction.

We're currently focusing much of our own efforts on UNESCO's reform, and it seems indisputable that without the shock of our withdrawal announcement, the reform activity which now pervades the organization would not have occurred.

Whether the U.S. goes or stays, this reform effort will in all probability generate changes which will improve UNESCO. Whether UNESCO will make sufficient changes this year to induce us to reconsider our withdrawal remains to be seen.

Although we remain dubious that the will exists to effect substantial and lasting reform, we are working diligently to encourage the kind of basic change we believe is required.

Meanwhile, two other governments, the British and the Dutch, have publicly told UNESCO that they intend to reassess their own participation if substantial improvements do not occur soon, thus adding to pressures on the organization to change.

Copy, please?

A Sure.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on reports that Egypt and the Soviet Union may be preparing for an arms deal?

A No, I don't.

Q In case such an agreement was reached between the two countries, would this be met by the United States as an unfriendly action from the Egyptian Government?

A Oh, I think it's a decision that the Egyptian Government would have to take on its own. I don't think I would offer that sort of a judgment on it.

Jim?

Q Anything on The Wall Street Journal article today on Salvador and the surveillance flights?

You didn't read it.

A Yes. I surprised you. Yes, I did read it. So did other people. I guess a lot of that, perhaps, should be deferred until the briefing this afternoon when, indeed, reconnaissance activity is very much to be discussed, or at least the results of it.

But -- so I won't get into the intelligence aspects of this, and I'm not sure that your briefers this afternoon could do much for you.

On the suggestion, though, in the report that increased Salvadoran air strikes have met more civilian casualties, it is our view that increased coordination between the Salvadoran army and air force is an important element in the recent successes of the Salvadoran Government forces.

Obviously, the guerrillas are interested in spreading stories about civilian casualties to prevent such combined operations. The Salvadoran armed forces have enacted strict ground rules covering their operations, and we have seen no evidence to date to corroborate guerrilla claims of increased civilian casualties.

Q Copy?

A Yes.

Q Alan, if we could just go back briefly to the Hayden statement, in Geneva yesterday the Foreign Minister said that Australia's association with Washington over the bases had to be seen in a context of working towards a nuclear arms freeze and eventually disarmament.

Is that the United States' view of the agreement under which those bases stay in Australia?

A Well, I don't have a direct response to that, but, obviously, the Australian Government attaches, at the highest levels, importance to the role of the joint facilities with respect to arms control verification and monitoring, effective deterrence, mutual security, and to the maintenance of stability in the global strategic balance. We concur in that assessment.

That's all I really am going to say about that. In terms of efforts to move on arms control issues, we have made very clear, the President and the entire Administration have made clear, that we're prepared to meet with the Soviets any time, anywhere, to resume negotiations on the range of arms control issues. So that is the policy, so I'd leave you with those comments.

Bernie?

Q Is the possibility of a Vienna meeting with the Soviets now regarded as a dead issue in this Administration?

A I don't have that characterization to offer you, Bernie. We have expressed ourselves. I'll refer you back to the briefings last week. As I indicated yesterday, there has been some diplomatic dialogue since then, but I don't have a characterization to offer on that.

Jim?

Q Do you have anything on Pinochet's reported comments, ruling out elections for Congress and other elected positions?

A No, I don't

Q You have nothing to say?

A I don't have anything.

Q Alan, it seems that the discussion in the Congress about the strategic cooperation between Israel and the United States is reactivated. Do you have anything and a sort of updating on this subject, or --

A No, I don't. There's nothing new to say beyond what we have said about that in the past.

Q Follow-up on his question --

Q Filing break?

A Filing break? Any objection? (No response) Okay. Filing break. Go ahead.

Q The Administration is in favor of the free trade area for Israel. Is there any response formulated yet on the reported possession by the Israeli lobby of the classified document dealing with U.S.-Israel trade matters?

A I don't have a response. I think that there have been other comments made from elsewhere in the government, but I don't have a comment on that. Okay?

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:40 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #143

THURSDAY, AUGUST 9, 1984, 12:03 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. Available in the Press Office is a prepared statement by Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Elliott Abrams before the Subcommittees on Human Rights and African Affairs. His testimony was on human rights situation in Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia and Uganda.

That's all I have for announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Do you have any update on the mines in the Red Sea?

A I don't have anything specific to say. As I indicated previously, I believe, it's not going to be possible really to give a daily readout on what's happening out there. I think that Mike Burch and his colleagues will try to do what they can for you on the actual deployments, but I'm not sure that that's going to be possible daily. It's also, as I indicated before, going to be some time before the operations actually begin, and the process may well be quite protracted. So I think the likelihood of being able to give you something frequently is not going to be high.

I would also point out that the two bodies that have been identified -- bodies of water, that is, the Gulf of Suez and the Red Sea itself, are large bodies of water, and there's obviously difficulty in locating and destroying or retrieving mines, and there's no guarantee that we would be able to identify the origin of the explosions even if they are mines. I'm not confirming they are, but -- so all of that adds up to not being able really to give you anything today and to caution you that that may well be the case for a lot of the time.

Q Can you say which countries we're consulting?

A No, I don't think I'm going to go beyond what I've said before on this, Jim. I think a number of countries have indicated their own response to conversations they've had with Egypt or other countries. I saw the U.K. has said something about this, and others may have. But I don't think it's up to us to try and do this. This is not a U.S. effort, and I don't want to leave that suggestion by trying to give you a round-up of that sort.

Q Alan, in his long testimony on Uganda, Mr. Abrams has several colorful descriptions, as you know -- worst human rights problem, massacres, etc, army engaging in looting and rape, murder. Never once does he cite a statistical figure. Never even an ballpark figure of how many people -- 1,000, 5,000, 100,000, 200,00. No figures. How come?

A I don't know. But I also don't know in his testimony up there whether that issue came up, so I would ask you, I guess, in the first instance to see what happened up on the Hill during his -- he's finished and you've got a readout on that. Okay.

Q You don't have a figure?

A I don't have figures. I'm sorry.

Q Alan, you don't have anything on this story about the problems with the computer sales to Japan, do you?

A Yes. Surprise, surprise.

Q What a shock.

A The Cray Computer Company has an export license request before the Commerce Department. The license is going through the normal review procedures for super computers which are somewhat more stringent than for other export licenses.

We are expecting some information from Japan and fully expect the license will be approved. We're not holding the license hostage to any negotiations with Japan.

Q Copy?

A Sure.

Q Anything on Vienna?

A No. Nothing.

1-2012

Q Alan, do you have anything regarding the group of Afghans that came in for medical treatment, and what role this government played in their -- in this treatment?

A There is some guidance. I don't have it with me, Mike. I also saw something which indicated the Pentagon had said something about waiving fees -- medical fees. And I think that -- you can check and see what we've got in the Press Office, but that aspect of it is basically what we're involved with. Americare is, I guess, the private organization that's been involved in bringing the Afghans here.

We certainly are supportive of that effort. They will, I understand once they've gotten medical treatment, go back to Pakistan.

Q But there is no official government involvement in bringing them over? This is a private enterprise?

A My understanding is that their having been brought over was -- their transportation was paid privately. Their medical treatment fees will be waived. There may be a few more words which are in that guidance. Why don't you look at it.

Q But nothing that speaks to the role of the United States Government in support, or, if you will, care of rebels in Afghanistan?

A No. Not in a general way. I'd refer you back to what we've said before, but, obviously, we have had concerns about the humanitarian aspects. That's been central to our approach to this issue, and I think that what is happening here largely in the private sector, but, nonetheless, with government involvement, is fully consistent with that.

Is that it?

Q Alan, you might have had this last week. New Zealand's Prime Minister Lange was quoted as saying that he expects no U.S. nuclear ships will visit New Zealand during his entire term.

A I think I addressed that some time ago.

Q Yes.

A I don't have anything new to say about that.

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Q Okay. Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:10 p.m.)

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Glennon

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FRIDAY, AUGUST 10, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #144

FRIDAY, AUGUST 10, 1984, 12:12 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. Before I take questions, I just wanted to take note of the fact that today is the last day for our summer intern, Pat Kelly, who is going to go back to Marquette University, his senior year. Pat arrived in sort of a baptism of fire during the NATO conference, on the first day of that, so he had to and did adapt quickly to the office and was a real help to us, and we thank you.

MR. KALB: Alan, may I just say something, too, because there's another event we should be celebrating today. This is David Gollust's happy moment, since this will be his last attendance at a State Department briefing. David, as you know, has been reassigned to Israel, and I'm sure that his vast radio audience will miss the talents he's displayed here at turning State Department ambiguities and nuances into comprehensible English.

We will miss David's wit. I will recall only one -- revive only one: That on the trip to China David, with some of his colleagues, visiting the Ming Tomb, spotted a Coke machine, and David promptly coined the phrase, "Ming's go better with Coke." (Laughter) Good luck, David. (Applause)

MR. ROMBERG: All the best. Okay, let's get on to the nuances. Jim?

Q First, I think the record should show that Bernie Kalb made that speech. (Laughter)

Q I see the Egyptian Chief of Staff is in seeing Secretary Armacost today. Is that about the mine clearing?

A I simply don't know. I don't know whether it is or not.

Q Can you bring us up to date on what you know; what you think about that situation?

1-2016

A Don't have a new situation report to give you, Jim. As I indicated yesterday, it's an ongoing process, which is going to take some time, so I don't --

Q Have you seen the Khomeini speech in which he denies involvement of Iran in the laying of the mines?

A I've seen that reported, yes.

Q And you don't believe it, or what?

A I don't think we have talked about who might or might not be responsible, so I don't have any comment to offer on that either. No.

Q Did the (inaudible) with the Egyptians before they made that charge?

A Oh, I don't think I would get into the question of our diplomatic discussions with the Egyptians on that or other subjects basically.

Q Just for the record, just so we can get you pinned down, have you now come to the conclusion that the laying of mines is an act of terrorism?

A I think we indicated before that in -- implied that, certainly, in talking about that radio broadcast which expressed approval of it, that expressing support for a random act of terrorism was outside the norms of civilized behavior, so I think that's a fair judgment, pending a further definition of, indeed, what is going on there.

Q And that goes for this hemisphere as well as the Gulf of Suez?

A Well, again I refer you back. I'm not going to rehash the issue, Jim. I'd refer you back to what was discussed at the time that issue arose. There was also, as you recall, a parallel issue about attacks going on in the Persian Gulf, so it was discussed in the context of things going on elsewhere in the world. I have nothing new to say about that.

Q Alan, who pays for the use of the minesweepers in the Red Sea?

A I'd ask you to check with Mike Burch on that.

1-2017

Q Mike Burch? Okay. Do you have something to say about Malaysia and the Hebrew Rhapsody?

A No. I don't.

Q No comment at all?

A Well, I don't have anything on it. I think that, mainly as I understand this, to the extent that there was U.S. Government involvement, which, as I gather, rather minimal, it was a USIA project.

Q Do you think this is something that those people who are protesting the American intention to withdraw from UNESCO will go see the people in Malaysia and say, "Here, here," when you need some education?

A I don't have anything for you on the whole subject, so --

Q Do you have something on the fact that a State Department Assistant Secretary named Mr. Newell was personally castigated by those who are protesting the decision made by the President and Secretary of State on the withdrawal from UNESCO?

A Well, I have addressed the UNESCO question before, the day that the report was released, and I'll refer you back to that. I think, actually, there is some further guidance which I'd refer you to, and certainly the decision that was taken was an Administration decision, so that should be appropriately referred to.

Q But the further guidance refers to the criticism of Newell --

A It doesn't address the personal criticism. Obviously, as you're pointing out, it was an Administration decision, but I will leave you to the guidances there.

Jim?

Q On Jim's question, when you referred us back to what you had said previously about mining in this hemisphere, I did -- I undertook a comprehensive review of those statements and I couldn't find an answer to any question with respect to whether the United States considered such acts an act of terrorism. Could you respond as to whether you consider that terrorism or not?

A Well, I'm going to refer you back to what was said at that time. Well, what was said is what we have to say about the subject.

Q So you -- so under no circumstances will the U.S. Government respond to that simple question as to whether that could have been an act of terrorism?

A I refer you back to what we said at the time. That was raised in that context; it was addressed. Whether you were satisfied or not is not really my concern. It was -- that specific question was raised and addressed.

Q Do you have a report that you can supply us on the proceedings of the Postal Union's meeting?

A I'm sorry, at the what?

Q The Postal Union's meeting, that long one that (inaudible) a lot of issues that were in dispute; the United States is taking different positions.

A Sorry, I don't --

Q The Soviet Union was accused of tampering with the mails and so on?

A I don't have anything on it.

Q You don't have any -- well, can you check into it; can you look into it?

A If you could formulate your question more precisely --

Q Let me ask you this. Will the United States -- will the State Department issue a report on the proceedings affecting the last meeting of the Postal Union?

A Alright, I'll check on that for you.

1-2019

Q Anything on the Jack Anderson report today on the reentry of the PLO to Beirut?

A Not a lot. Obviously, we don't comment on alleged intelligence information, and that's what that report is based on, as he puts it.

Our overall assessment is that the Government of Lebanon is committed to providing adequate security in the Greater Beirut area, and is moving to strenghten the ceasefire and to implement a broader security plan. One aspect of that plan is to enable the government to prevent a resurgence of influence from outsiders in Lebanon.

Beyond that, I cannot take --

Q Can we have a copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q Do you have anything in there today on Soviet grain purchases?

A Soviet grain purchases? No, I don't.

Q Have we yet received a reply from the Soviets about the U.S. draft on cultural exchanges, cultural agreement?

A I don't think those conversations have begun beyond having presented something, but I think there will be conversations that would be anticipated in a few weeks, but I don't have anything specific for you at this point.*

Q In a few weeks?

A Yes.

Q Would that come up, for example, at the U.N. when the Secretary may or may not --

A I don't know whether --

Q Nothing on those meetings, no exchanges?

A I don't have anything on those meetings.

Q Or on Vienna?

A No. I don't have anything new on Vienna.

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* Later corrected by the following posted answer:
"Yes, the Soviets have replied to our draft on cultural exchanges. Talks began earlier this week.

1-2020

Q Is there anything new in assurances or discussions with Iraq regarding the pipeline, the Iraq-Jordan pipeline to Aqaba?

A No, nothing new on that, no.

Q Do you have anything to bring us up to date with respect to talks now between Uganda and the United States?

A No. Those talks will continue, but I don't have anything on the content or what has gone on so far.

Q Can you tell us is there a hold or a suspension on the military aid program?

A I addressed the other day the fact that they have indicated to us certain things and that we are clarifying information and positions and so on. I refer you back to what I said. I don't have anything to update you beyond what I said at that time.

Q Alan, what's the protocol on ambassadors' writing private citizens accusing them of various things inimical to his country, as he alleges? Is that within the (inaudible) of ambassadorial duties?

A That's a rather sweeping point. I can't address it in those terms, Joe.

Q Well, how would you address this? Supposing an ambassador sent a letter to --

A An American Ambassador?

Q No, no; a foreign ambassador.

A Yes.

Q -- to an American.

A And did what?

Q Well, he said that "You're blackening the image of my country," or something like that.

A I guess that there are letters written to editors all the time which talk about, complain about articles that are written so I don't know whether that would be substantively different. I don't really have a comment to offer you on it.

Jim?

Q Any response to the front page article in The Times today about an area of Salvador which may have been subject to a sweep in which civilians may have been killed?

A No, don't have anything.

Q Thank you.

A All right. You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:29 P.M.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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1-2023

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #145

MONDAY, AUGUST 13, 1984, 12:10 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. One announcement regarding the Secretary's address next week at the VFW Convention. The Secretary will address the VFW Annual Convention on the occasion of receiving its 1984 Dwight David Eisenhower Distinguished Service Award and Citation, in Chicago on Monday, August 20. The banquet will be held at the Conrad Hilton Hotel and the Secretary's speech is expected at around 8:30 p.m., Central Daylight Time, which is 9:30 p.m. our time.

Anyone interested in covering this event should contact Wade Ladue of the VFW. He may be reached in Chicago from August 13 to 17, at area code 312-922-3773 or 3774. Starting August 18, the Beverly Room at the Conrad Hilton becomes the organization's press headquarters, and Mr. Ladue may be reached there through the hotel's general number which is area code 312-922-4400. I understand there will be no Q&A following the speech and I do not have a title for you at this point.

That is it for announcements. Be happy to take your questions.

Q The text will be released here in the morning, afternoon, evening?

A When we are able to, we will be more than happy to give it to you.

Q Alan, do you have anything regarding Poland today, the further release of other political prisoners; any easing of conditions you see there; any response?

A What I have for you is simply an update on what we know about political prisoner releases to date. That is to say, as part of the amnesty announced on July 21, the Polish Government indicated that 652 people convicted or accused of political crimes would be released within a month. As of August 10, according to official figures of the Polish Government, 545 political prisoners had been freed from detention. In addition, the last member of the "Solidarity Seven" in jail, Jan Rulewski, and the last member of the "Kor Four" still held in custody, Henry Wujec -- pardon my pronunciation --were released over the weekend. And that's all I really have at this point.

Q Copy?

A Sure.

Q Alan, anything on a couple of Polish sailors who jumped ship at some sort of exhibition, who might have asked for asylum?

A Don't know anything about it.

Q Have you heard from the Soviet Union on the President's -- what is described in the papers as "joke" in connection with the sound-taping test over the weekend?

A I'm not aware of any discussion on that, Bernie, but also I would think if there were discussion, it would be in diplomatic channels. So if that is the way it is handled, if there is anything, that's the way we'll leave it. But in any case, the answer is, I'm not aware of anything.

Q Do you have any updating on the developments in the Suez Gulf?

A Not really a lot. There have been a lot of reports, obviously, about various parties who have indicated they might join in the operations. In terms of what the Egyptians have done, I would ask you to be in touch with the Egyptian Government. They clearly have taken the lead in the effort to clear the Gulf of Suez.

I also don't have anything in particular on the reports of what the Saudis may be doing with others. They, obviously, have an interest in providing for security in neighboring waterways, and we're supportive of that effort. So, as we are prepared to work closely with Egypt, we're also prepared to do that with Saudi Arabia, but I don't have --

Q Any comment on the presence of a Soviet minesweeper in the area?

A I don't have a particular comment on that. I'm aware of those reports. I don't know whether the Soviets are actually engaged in minesweeping activity or not. I suppose you'd have to check with them.

Q Is the U.S. sending minesweeping helicopters to the Saudis?

A At the request of the Saudi Government, the United States is sending three mine-counter measure helicopters and support personnel to Saudi Arabia. The effort would concentrate on the channels into the main Saudi Arabian ports on the Red Sea, but details are still being worked out and will be developed in the next few days.

Q Do you have any comment on the fact that -- was the fact established that it was the visit of some Iranian and some Libyan ships through the Suez area that (inaudible) the situation?

A I don't have any -- In terms of responsibility?--

Q Yes.

A -- I don't have anything new on that.

Q How long did the U.S wait between the Saudi request and the U.S. positive response? Can you help us on that?

A I don't have a date for when those things took place. I guess I would ask you to check with the Pentagon because I think they would have whatever details there were.

There has been some back-and-forth on what might be appropriate or what might not be appropriate and how it would be done, and so on, over a few days; and I don't know when an actual request was made, so I can't answer your questions.

Q Will there be any access or have the Saudis made available any facilities for these ships?

A Again, I think that how this will be done should be addressed to the Pentagon because they will have whatever answers there are available on that.

Q Just in very general terms, is it -- are we providing them in the same way that we are for Egypt, or are the Saudis paying for them, or what?

A Again, let me ask you to -- I don't think all the details have been worked out, but to the extent that there are details available, please ask the Pentagon about that.

Q Does the Treaty permit Egypt to bar a country that it suspects -- bar its ships from the canal, or does it have to be a war situation before they can legally bar anybody?

A I'm not a legal expert on that. I can't answer that, Don.

Q Alan --

Q Have ships left already for the Saudi area?

A Again, check with the Pentagon. I'm not sure it's a question of ships in this case. I think there's a different -- it's not quite the same as what's being done in the case of Egypt, so, again, to repeat myself, ask the Pentagon, if you would.

Q Alan, Egypt through its official newspaper, Al Ahram, seems to be pointing the finger at Iran and Libya.

A Uh-huh.

Q Could you be a little specific as to whether the U.S. concurs with that view?

A No, I couldn't be --

Q -- any more details on that?

A No. The question came up last week, I think, because they'd already indicated some -- there were reports of such beliefs. And, as I said at that time, I don't have anything to offer you in terms of the question of responsibility.

Q But not as of this week? Not any new reports --

A No. I don't have --

Q -- to indicate --

A I don't have anything new on it.

Q Alan, over the weekend there was a story in The Washington Post about Saudi Arabia's request for more missiles and arms from the United States.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you have anything on that?

A Yes. There was some guidance we had over the weekend to respond to that. We have a continuing security assistance relationship with the Saudis. Among weapons the Saudi air force already has in its inventory are both the AIM-9L and P which are mentioned in the story that appeared on Saturday.

Further sales of these and other defense items are a matter of continuing consultations. No decisions have been made. Notification to Congress will be made when and if a sale is decided on. In the meantime, we prefer not to discuss consultations with a foreign government.

Q The timeframe that was put there in the story talks about that the Reagan Administration will submit the request after the elections -- U.S. elections. What do you make on it for this --

A Well, I'd say two things on it. One is, as I say, there's been no decision taken, so notification to Congress would have to follow a decision to go forward with something. So I can't predict that.

As far as the suggestion that it was -- it is being withheld -- some notification to Congress being withheld for political reasons, that is not true. First of all, security assistance sales are a matter of regular and routine consultations, and, if necessary, as I say, the notification to Congress will follow.

But, given the short time that's remaining in this session of Congress, taking into account the total number of days anticipated before the end of the year, there is no question of a notification going up, even if a decision were to be made. There simply isn't time.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A I can give you a copy of some of it. You'll have to get the exact text from the transcript.

Q Alan, do you think there is any connection between the Saudi request and the developments in the Gulf of Suez?

A Well, I haven't said there's a Saudi request. I've said that we're in consultations with them. So I'm going to have to leave the question of what may be done unanswered at this point because I don't -- there is no decision. So I don't have an answer.

Q Do you have anything on the upcoming first planned visit to Japan by the Korean President, Chun Doo Hwan? And what are the chances to see the U.S., Japan and Korea alliance --

A I'm sorry?

Q What are the chances to see some form of U.S.-Japan-Korea alliances in security for Northeast Asia?

A I don't know anybody who has raised a question of some sort of alliance of that sort, so I would set that aside. But, as far as the visit is concerned, President Chun's visit will be the first official visit to Japan by a Korean Head of State, as Prime Minister Nakasone's visit to Korea last year was the first official visit to the Republic of Korea by a Japanese Prime Minister.

We welcome this manifestation of deepening relations between two of our closest allies.

Jim?

Q Do you have anything on the Ortega interviews over the weekend with the Post and the Wall Street Journal today?

A Well, what is your specific question?

Q Anything, for example, with respect to joint patrols between Honduras and Nicaragua, and characterization of the talks with the United States, or the allegations against the CIA?

A Well, okay. As far as the border patrol is concerned, the Sandinistas have mentioned joint border patrols on several previous occasions. Our view is that the persisting problems of border incursions in the area can be dealt with conclusively and once and for all only in a comprehensive, regional, verifiable and enforceable agreement that is arrived at through the Contadora process.

As far as the allegations of assassination attempts, that allegation is preposterous. Executive Order 12333, which was issued by President Reagan on December 4, 1981, explicitly states, "No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in or conspire to engage in assassination."

All U.S. Government officials comply with the terms of this Executive Order.

The third part of your multi-part question was what?

Q It was about the discussion --

A Oh, the nature of the conversation?

Q Yeah.

A I don't have anything to say beyond what I said before on this, and I refer you back to that record.

Q Anything on Peru, and the article that appeared today in the Times?

A No, I don't.

Ralph?

Q Meir Kahane was sworn in today. Any update on his citizenship review?

A No. I wasn't aware that he was sworn in. I don't have anything specific to offer you at this point. Maybe we could get something on that later.

Q Alan, anything on the Ugandans who apparently broke off the -- suspended the agreement? Are those four military people, have they left the States?

A I don't know that. I guess you'd have to check with the Ugandans.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the support--

A Excuse me, Bill?

Q Are the cultural talks still going on in the Soviet Union?

A Well, I think "still going on" is a description of something which may -- I don't know if there's been another session. There was one session as the correction indicated last week. Sorry that I didn't have that. But it isn't a sort of daily meeting, so I don't know if there's been a further meeting. I'm not aware that there has been. If there were, it would have been today, but I'm not aware of it.

Q So at this last meeting, we would have received, then, the Soviet reply to our draft?

A That's right.

Q And what is -- do you know what is the state of play?

A I'm not going to try to give you a blow-by-blow of how that's going, but I think that both sides have indicated a desire to move forward with such an agreement. So it's very complicated and long, and so on, so I don't know how long this set of talks would go on before it would be successful. But anyway, that is the current state of play.

Q Alan, there is an important broadcast by the Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew saying that U.S. Administration officials have recently expressed indignation about what they term Israel's intervention in the internal affairs of the United States? Do you have any comment on that?

A Well, I don't know what it's referring to, so I can't --

Q Will you take the question?

A No, I don't think so. That's a very sweeping question, and --

Q Because it's broadcast by the official radio of Israel?

A But that doesn't change my answer, I'm afraid.

Jim?

Q Anything on the Archbishop of San Salvador's statement against further military aid to the army this weekend?

A No, I don't have any comment on that, or on his reported comment that people should stop aiding the guerrillas either?

Q Are you aware that Israel is planning to withdraw from Lebanon according to a report in the Washington Post again over the weekend, and they submitted the plan to Mr. Arens?

A I'm aware of the reports. I'm also aware of reports that Israeli officials have denied it. I'm not really going to address that subject, though.

Ralph?

Q Getting back to the Suez again for a second. Are you aware of a report from Lloyds saying that a Soviet ship was hit by a mine on August 6? Is that related in any way to the question that was asked earlier about a Soviet mine sweeper?

A I don't know what ships have been hit, Ralph, and I guess you'd have to check other sources. It's just -- I'm not going to try to be an authority on what ships have been hit.

Q Thank you.

A Okay, you're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:27 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #146

TUESDAY, AUGUST 14, 1984, 12:03 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. One statement at the beginning on the attempted bombing attack on the Turkish Olympic Team.

We are very thankful that the attempted bombing attack on the Turkish Olympic Team at the Los Angeles International Airport yesterday did not have tragic consequences. We understand the Turkish Government has issued its own statement praising the diligence of the Los Angeles Police Department and condemning the incident as another example of international terrorism.

We would like to join in this expression of recognition and strongly reaffirm the United States Government's condemnation of terrorism wherever it occurs.

That is it for statements.

Q Copy?

A Sure.

Q Do you have any idea of who planted the bomb?

A Don't have any idea on that, Jim. I would refer you to the L.A.P.D. or the FBI on that.

Q Senator Specter is quoted as saying that the United States now knows who has planted the bombs in the Gulf of Suez. Is that true?

A I've seen the reports of that, Jim. I, however, will stick with the position that we have taken before, which is that we don't have anything to say about that; have -- and so I don't have any specific comment on the Senator's remarks.

Q Alan, an anonymous television network last night said that the Soviet Union had told the U.S. that it knew Libya was responsible. Do you have anything on that?

A No, I don't have anything on that.

Q Do you have anything -- do you know whether it's so or not?

A If I don't have anything on it to give to you, Bernie, I guess I can't really address your follow-up question.

Q Why is that? I mean why -- ?

A We'll have a seminar afterwards to explain all this stuff.

Yeah?

Q Why -- go back to the earlier question -- Jim's question -- you have no specific comment on what Senator Specter said. What point is served by shielding the identity of those who -- ?

A It's not a question of shielding. It's a question of basically not being able to draw firm conclusions, and we've been very careful not to accuse people when we are not sure who's responsible.

Q Have they actually found a mine and been able to analyze -- ?

A No. No, there's been no mine found. I'd ask you to keep up with the Pentagon on that. But I just checked -- was speaking with them a short while ago and despite the reports that mines had been found, the answer is that that is not correct.

Q Do you know if the name "Islamic Jihad," which is being used in this and the Red Sea mining, is really just a cover for other terrorist groups, established older groups, or foreign countries?

A We've addressed that before. I don't think we really know who this so-called Islamic Jihad is, or if there is one organization or more than one organization. There are other terrorist incidents that have been claimed by the Islamic Jihad, and it just isn't clear what that refers to, in fact.

Q Alan, it seems that the idea that the -- that Israel may be, and even the United States, may be behind the mining of the Red Sea, is gaining support in the Arab press, even in countries that are really friendly to the United States. Do you have any comment on that?

A Well, it may be gaining currency. I haven't seen that, but it would be irresponsible to give it further currency.

Ralph?

Q I want to know whether, in the discussion yesterday with the Ambassador from Sudan here at the State Department, whether the U.S. discussed any further shipments of equipment or personnel, or any further -- any coordination with Sudan on the mine-sweeping operation in the Red Sea?

A Ralph, I don't know what happened in that conversation. I think, though, that beyond -- what I've indicated before, which is that we've dealt with Egypt primarily in terms of working in the Gulf of Suez; and I indicated yesterday that we were responding to a request from the Saudis.

We have discussed the issue with other governments in the region, but I think that the coordination of the actual efforts at this point, in terms of our deployments, rests where I have said. But I just don't know what happened yesterday in terms of that conversation.

Q Are there -- so you're saying that basically with those two countries, those two -- ?

A They're the ones who are organizing whatever efforts are going on in terms of their areas. There may be other countries who are also doing something, but in terms of cur efforts and where we are sending helicopters and ships, and so on, those are the countries at the moment that we are -- whose requests we're responding to.

As I -- to repeat, we've also, obviously, discussed this issue with other governments.

Q Have there been other requests?

A I'm not aware of other requests at this point.

Q Alan, did the meeting with the Sudanese Ambassador have something to do with the Hatfield case, Senator Hatfield of the -- ?

A Oh, I doubt that very much.

Q Does the State Department have any position on a trans-African pipeline?

A There is guidance that's existed on this for some time, Don. You might want to check in the Press Office on it. But let me ask you to do that. I don't happen to have it with me.

I'll come back to you, Ralph. Go ahead.

Q At one time or the other, you were asked about consultation with Israel in the arrangement for security of the Gulf. You said that you had been talking to a lot of countries in the area.

A Uh-huh.

Q Have you been talking, or has Israel requested, without going into all of these, you know, routine diplomatic things, requested that it will have a role in the, or to be informed about, any security arrangements for the Gulf area?

A I think in terms of what Israel wants or doesn't want, I would refer you to the Government of Israel. We have discussed this with a lot of governments in the area, including the Government of Israel. But in terms of what they want and their approach to it, I think you should ask their spokesman, not me.

Q Another question: This morning, the Washington Post has a story that SWAPO -- Southwest Asian, whatever, Southeastern --

A Africa.

Q -- African.

A Yes.

Q -- accusing the United States of helping South Africa to keep Namibia. What do you comment on that?

A Well, first, we haven't seen the full text of that statement, but the United States continues to encourage negotiations to bring Namibia to independence on the basis of U.N. Security Council Resolution 435. We note that the SWAPO statement as reported also indicated SWAPO's willingness to pursue a negotiated solution.

Excuse me. Bill, I think is (inaudible)

Q Yes. Alan, can you bring us up to date on the legal status or what's being done about Meir Kahane? He has now taken an oath of loyalty, or sworn loyalty to a foreign government --

A Yes.

Q -- so where does that put him?

A All right. There is a fairly long guidance which I think basically reviews things that have been said before; but to take it up to date, as in other cases where a potentially expatriating act has occurred, we will undertake to look into all the relevant circumstances. So that is being done. But I would not look here for a sort of day-by-day updating on that, as my understanding is that could be a very long process -- it's very complicated. And as I say, there is other guidance if you want to refer back to the Press Office. And we've talked about the law and so on.

Q Can we have a copy of that long guidance you have?

A Well, I don't know that I'm going to put out everything. I think it depends on what your questions are, but it just explains -- If you want, we can put out a section which explains the procedure for loss of citizenship.

Let me just do here on the timing, so we get rid of that: The time required to complete the procedure varies a great deal from case to case, and takes several months or longer. Great care is taken to assure that the American citizen concerned has full opportunity to present his case. The matter is then thoroughly reviewed and objectively adjudicated in accordance with the law and in light of all circumstances.

So as I say, it may be some time before we would see anything come out of all of that. There also is --

Q The final adjudication, Alan, who does that here, DOS, or Justice?

A Well, let me just read this to you, and then we'll get -- I'll give you what I've got instead of referring you back, and let's get this out of the way.

On the review procedure, Section 358 of the Immigration & Nationality Act outlines the procedures for determining loss of citizenship under the INA Section 349. According to Section 358, whenever a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States has reason to believe that a person has lost his U.S. nationality while outside the United States, the officer shall certify to the Department of State the facts upon which such belief is based. In preparing this report, the U.S. officer will solicit pertinent information from the American citizen involved. The citizen has the opportunity to submit whatever information he believes is relevant and is advised that he is free to seek advice of legal counsel. The Department of State then makes a decision regarding loss of nationality, in accordance with the law and based upon the report and all circumstances. That decision is made within the Bureau of Consular Affairs.

There is then an appeals process. It involves the Board of Appellate Review, which is described in Title 22, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 7. The board is an autonomous body within the Department of State and is composed of three members from outside of the Bureau of Consular Affairs. Appeal to the Board may be made within one year of a decision by the Bureau of Consular Affairs that loss of citizenshiip has occurred; appellant may appear in person and may be represented by legal counsel.

The decision of the Board of Appellate Review is binding upon the Department of State. The individual appellant before the board, however, has recourse to a further appeal to the U.S. District Court.

Q Copy of that, Alan?

A Sure.

Q Alan, since you don't want to give a day-to-day update, could you volunteer information as developments warrant, if the interest -- ?

A "As developments warrant" would mean if there is a decision taken. I'm not going to try to follow this in its internal proceedings, George; but if a decision is taken, yes, but that will be, as I indicated, potentially a very long way down the road.

Q What about letting us know if Kahane is called into the Embassy and -- ?

A No, I don't think that's up to us to get into his business.

Q The other thing is, the whole procedure starts, it says, with a diplomatic or consular official bringing this to the attention of the Department.

A Uh-huh.

Q Has this been done?

A I think at this point, it is fair to say that a review process has begun.

Q Do you know whether Kahane has been notified that that process has begun -- ?

A I don't know the answer to that.

Q -- has begun on whether he will or will not lose citizenship, is that -- ?

A On that question, yes.

Q The process begins in Tel Aviv or here?

A Well, in terms of reviewing the issue, I think that there has been review back here. Whether -- specifically, what step was taken in order to trigger that off beyond his having been sworn in, having been elected and then sworn in, I don't know.

As I have indicated to you before, this is not the first time the issue has come up with a member of the Knesset, so it's not a unique experience, and it isn't as though there is some new and different procedure that is being followed here.

Q This has come up before with members of the Knesset?

A Yes. I indicated when I first talked about this that there were at least two cases in the past, one of which resulted in the person keeping citizenship and the other which resulted in the person losing citizenship.

Q Is there someone in the Department, Alan, who could provide us the historical data on that?

A No. I checked on that, and we can't provide the individual cases.

Q Taking into consideration the background of Meir Kahane who has been accused, even by his "colleagues" in the Israeli Knesset, of being a racist and being a demagogue and all kind of things, is the procedure for hearing and appealing going to be taking the same normal procedure, or is there going to be any tough consideration for his activities?

A It's taken in accordance with the law. You've asked this, I think, before, and the point is, whatever one may think about his statements in terms of the dimensions you're raising, I don't think that those are relevant to citizenship.

The question is whether he has taken an act which is expatriating, and that is a legal question, so that will be looked at from a legal point of view.

Q Another point, that Kahane himself said that he is going to fight, you know, withholding or withdrawing his citizenship because the passport that he will be having, as an American passport, will help him to raise funds in the United States -- this is his only consideration, so would -- ?

A I don't think I would want to get into the merits of the case, in terms of what the legalities of that may be. I think that is something which, in totality, without addressing that specific point, should be left to this review process.

Ralph?

Q Can I get back for just a second to the mines? You said earlier that no mine had been found. I just want to make sure there isn't some distinction between a mine and some other kind of explosive device.

A No. I'm aware of nothing --

Q There's been no -- ?

A -- nothing that's been found on that.

Q And on that same point, Alan, although the first few times you ducked the questions, you finally -- ?

A I beg your pardon? (Laughter)

Q -- did say that you are not able to draw any conclusions --

A I think that's --

Q As to the --

A We're not articulating or expounding on that subject, because we are not able to draw conclusions.

Q Identity --

A That's correct.

Q In other words, Senator Specter would be wrong, then?

A Well, I've seen press reports. I don't know specifically what he said. I'll speak for what our position is. I'm not going to try and comment on his.

Q (Inaudible)-- said the United States has evidence as to whom.

A Well, I'll leave you to draw the "ifs." I'll state what our position is, which is that we have not made firm conclusions. There are all sorts of reports. You've seen reports that have come out of the region, but I'm not going to try to give weight at this point. I think we'll wait until we have something firm to say.

Q The U.S. Consulate in Madras was attacked by Tamils who alleged that the U.S. had been helping the Sri Lankan army. Have you officially protested this? And, also, what comments do you have on the reported revenge killing of Tamils by the Sri Lankan army?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q Still with the Red Sea, do you confirm reports that Egypt had already cancelled the joint exercises with the United States called Bright Star?

A Cancelled the what?

Q The military exercises, joint military exercises.

A I'm not aware of any joint military exercise that's been cancelled. No.

Q Are you --

A You might want to check with the Pentagon, but I'm not aware of any. Which one are you talking about?

Q Bright Star.

A Well, you ought to check with the Pentagon. I'm not aware there was a Bright Star that was scheduled.

Q Alan --

A But you'll have to check with the Pentagon.

Q Another follow-up with this. Are you resuming talks with Egypt about the Ras Banas facilities, or base?

A I don't have anything new on that subject.

Q Alan, after a month, more than a month now, what's happened in the Red Sea -- until now, you can't confirm it is a mine or bombing or whatever it is?

A No.

Q Alan --

A Don?

Q Do you have now any reaction, either in terms of the U.S. Government's decision or anything to say, about the reports from Poland that all of the main people of the Solidarity and the KOR group have now been released? Where does that stand?

A Well, I had a little bit on this yesterday, Don, which was mainly an update in terms of numbers. It does appear from the information we have that all of those 11 people have been released.

Our information from official Polish sources as of Saturday was that 545 of the political prisoners had been released. I think the number they announced was 652 for total release. They also, I think, indicated that that would take place within a month of the announcement, so that was the 21st, as I recall it. So that time period.

Q You're waiting now to hear from them, that all of these 600, whatever it is, are released before the U.S. follows through on the IMF?

A If you look back at the statement that was issued, I think that, yes, that would be right. Complete release, I believe, was the --

Q And can I ask another question having to do with a totally different place? What is the latest between the United States and Uganda? Have the U.S. military attaches, whoever they are, still been barred from Uganda? Have the Ugandan students from U.S military schools gone home? What is going on here?

A I don't know what's happened with the military students here. You'd have to check with the Ugandans, or possibly the Pentagon would have some information on that.

As far as the attache is concerned, who, as you know, is not resident in Uganda, I'm not aware there's been a specific change in that situation since the Ugandans first notified us. But, as I've indicated before, those questions are under discussion with the Ugandans, and I just don't have a further update at this point.

Q Is there some -- you say they're under discussion. Is there some active talk with them about what our relationship is going to be in the future?

1-2044

A There has been discussion trying to clarify precisely what the issues are and what the positions are. I don't think I can really take it further at this stage.

Q Alan, could I come back to Poland for just a second? I may have missed something last week that you may have said, but I think it was over the weekend or perhaps a couple of days before the weekend, both Lech Walesa and Cardinal Glemp made statements saying the U.S. should lift all of the sanctions now.

A Well, I don't think --

Q What -- ?

A Listening over the weekend, also, to various people who are close to Mr. Walesa speaking, I don't know that that's quite what they understood him to say, and I'm not going to try and interpret what he said.

I will simply refer you back to what was said here last week. I think it was a White House statement, and then we had a briefing, a background briefing, here, and I really can't take it beyond that at this point.

Q Have you heard from the Russians on the President's one-liner?

A Bernie, I'm just not going to be addressing that question. I think that the White House has indicated that whatever is off-the-record is off-the-record, and I don't intend to take it any further or address that issue.

Q But a protest wouldn't be off-the-record, if there were one.

A Well, you're talking about an issue which was involved, presumably, in an off-the-record situation, and I'm not going to take it any further. If the White House wants to address it, that's up to them, but I'm not going --

Q The White House has now confirmed --

A I'm not aware that on-the-record anybody's confirmed anything. I saw a statement which said "some official" had said something, but I'm not aware of any confirmation. Anyway, that's where I'm going to leave that.

1-2045

Q With four countries, or three or four, involved in this Red Sea effort, I wonder if you could tell us if -- how it's being controlled on an overall point of view? Is there any thought of an overall commander? What's the -- ?

A You're talking about the operations in the Gulf of Suez and the Red Sea?

Q Yeah. Is there any overall command or control of this whole thing?

A You'd have to check with the Pentagon, but, as I indicated before, the Egyptians are responsible for the operation that we're involved in, in any case, in the Gulf of Suez, and we have responded to a Saudi request regarding a couple of ports on the Red Sea, and so we will be working with them.

In terms of whatever arrangements they may have established for any sort of coordination, or whatever, I would refer you to them.

Q Well, how are we -- they always say to go back to you, of course. How do we -- ?

A I'm sorry. It's their call. It's not ours. We're responding to their request.

Q But how do we decide who has which area in terms of sweeping? And how do we coordinate between Saudi Arabia and Egypt in this?

A As I say, I'll refer you to those countries for any explanation of what they may be doing on that. Bernie?

Q Alan, is it two or three countries that have asked for U.S. help on mine clearing?

A I'm only aware of two. What's the third one you have in mind?

Q Well, the two and what? Egypt and Saudi Arabia?

A Yes.

Q Sudan, no?

Q Sudan has not?

A I'm not aware of a request from the Sudan.

Q You seemed to mention that before.

A I'll check it. A question was raised here about the Sudan, and I'm not aware of a request from them.

Q Joseph Kraft's column in the Post this morning had a line that Iraq has carried the war to Iran -- to Iranian soil. Can you confirm any Iraqi military action on Iranian soil -- not talking about the tanker war?

A And you're not talking about 1981?

Q No, new. Current.

A I don't have any information on that.

Q Do you have any further information that confirms the Daily Express of London report that -- ?

A Excuse me. To go back to the previous question, obviously there have been charges on both sides. There have been attacks, air attacks, and so on and so forth, but I assume that's not what you're talking about.

Q Land -- no. New land attack by Iraq at this point --

A I'm not aware of any new offensives at all that are involved there.

Q Do you have any confirmation of the report published by the London Daily Express that four Libyan diplomats have been executed by the Qaddafi authorities?

A No, I don't.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:26 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

/DPC #147/

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 15, 1984, 12:16 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, all. (Applause) Back from two weeks in Paradise. Went cold turkey without The Washington Post for 15 days.

A That must have been fun.

Yes.

Q (inaudible) do you remember when you were in school, "Home is the sailor"?

A "Home is the sailor." Yes.

Q "Home from the seas," and the hunter, "Home from the hills"?

A Well, I don't know that I'm home but I'm back. (Laughter)

Q You maybe have some news.

A No news. I'm back; no news; no announcements.

Q Same as always, eh?

A (Laughter) Picking up just where I left off.

Q Do you have any comment on the statement put out by TASS today on the President's remarks on that radio test?

A I don't, Jim, but we might conceivably have something that we might make available later in the day, but I don't have anything at this time.

Q And have you heard from the Soviets directly on that?

A Not that I'm aware of. I think it's simply the TASS and I believe there was something in Pravda as well.

Q And do you know anything about a deal which has been signed now, apparently between Kuwait and the Soviet Union?

1-8049

A No, I don't.

Q Are you going to post something later, John?

A We might, yes.

Q Do you have any comment on the Moroccan-Libyan accord?

A Well, they are sovereign nations, of course. We haven't seen the text of the treaty based on the communique released after the meeting. The treaty will not enter into force until it is ratified by the two governments. It's a little hard for us to respond to specifics until we've seen the text. However, we do note that the Libyan record for international mischief-making stands for all to see, and we have seen no evidence that Mr. Qadhafi is seriously trying to moderate his behavior, and we would obviously be concerned should any steps be taken which would serve to legitimize his position in any way.

Q Copy?

A Sure.

Q John, do you expect the U.S. Administration to try and find the point of view of Morocco about this?

A Well, insofar as our relations with Morocco are concerned, they've been good and of long-standing and we expect that to continue. We will want to study this agreement. We were not informed in advance that it was to be signed, and so we are discussing this issue with the Government of Morocco now.

Q Could it be that this treaty, John, intended, possibly on the part of the Moroccans, is bring Qadhafi to the realities of, you know, international politics to take away these things that you have been criticizing Libya all along, on Qadhafi's behavior?

A Well, that's one interpretation, a charitable interpretation -- but that certainly is one interpretation.

Q At what level are the discussions underway -- with whom? You said you are discussing this matter with the Moroccan Government.

A The manner in which we are --

Q Yes, ambassador or --

A I think Ambassador Reed happens to be here, as a matter of fact, in town. I think the Secretary is seeing him today. But that was something that was arranged prior to this, so the Ambassador is here. Where this is being followed up, I don't know. Maybe in both places. Maybe in Rabat and here.

Q John, there are reports that there is some frustration in Morocco about your position towards the Western Sahara, and there are some reports say that that's a reaction, a Moroccan reaction, to these frustrations, whats your position?

A You know, I don't think we're in a position to speculate on the motives that these two sovereign nations had when they went into this.

Q Would you consider Qadhafi's moves as one of the conditions put by the United States for the improving of relations with Libya?

A I'm sorry.

Q Would you see Qadhafi's moves in the North Africa as part of the conditions pre-set by the United States for good relations between Libya and the United States?

A I'm not sure what moves you are referring to.

Q Trying to get into good terms with the so-called "moderate" Arab countries.

A I just really can't. There are, I'm sure, many diverse interpretations of why Mr. Qadhafi has done this and why Morocco has taken this action but I don't think we can speculate on those motivations. I think this is the sixth time Mr. Qadhafi has embarked in a union with another Arab country.

Q John, notwithstanding your criticism of Mr. Qadhafi, does the United States Government welcome the possibility of having such a union between African countries and possibly even to come to the point of federation, confederation, whatever they are planning to do?

A Well, I don't think it's a question of unions with other countries and I don't think we should respond to that or speculate on that. The fact is that Mr. Qadhafi has made and continues to make, a lot of trouble around the world and much of it in a violent form, and the way for him to achieve a better relationship with the United States is to change his actions and change the actions of the people he has assigned to carry out these offensive activities. That's what we want to see. We want a change of heart, a change of actions, not words and protestations.

Q John, do you have anything on a New York Times story about an $80 million fund in the UNESCO organization which may have been, or may be, in the process of being diverted?

A Yes, I do have a little on that, Jim. That fund existed apparently to account for exchange rate gains or losses during the budget period in question. The judgment is that UNESCO's financial regulations clearly allow the return of these monies to member governments during the current year, and it is our intention to reclaim the United States' share of these monies, which clearly are owed to the United States.

Q You think it's still there?

A We hope it is.

Q Do you fear that it may be spent to make up the deficit which would be caused by the United States' withdrawal?

A I can't answer that. We're going to go after the money, we're going to recover it.

Q What's involved in going after the money?

A Well, I'm not going to get into the specifics, but we're serious about it.

Q John, on Morocco, how would you characterize relations between the United States and Morocco today?

A Well, as I said, they've been good, they are long-standing, and we expect to keep them that way.

Q John, does the United States have any sort of position on the stability of Costa Rica right now with the change in cabinet there and last night's announcement that twenty-five Ambassadors have been asked to resign?

A I don't have anything to offer you on that today.

Q John, has Ambassador Shlaudeman gone off to meet again with Mr. Tinoco?

A Yes, they are meeting today in the next round of the talks between Ambassador Shlaudeman and Mr. Tinoco. The meeting place is Manzanillo, Mexico, and we expect that meeting to go through for a second day tomorrow.

Q End tomorrow?

A I think it may well end tomorrow. I think that's the expectation, but as always, you can never be very precise about these things.

Yes, Dana.

Q Have you any financial or logistical details on the Saudi purchase of missiles or the Saudi lease of U.S. planes for searching mines?

A I don't, but I think the Pentagon either may be able to offer that or may already have offered that data. I'm not sure. I know Mike Burch has been very forthcoming on our involvement in that operation, and I think that would be the place to get that.

Q Are the search helicopters, are they really rented to Saudi Arabia?

A I'm not sure. Just to be safe, I won't speculate, especially having come back from vacation. But I know the Pentagon is prepared to lay all this out for you, if they haven't already done.

Q Do you have anything on the search for the mines?

A No.

Q -- at least an update?

A Seen the latest report involving a Soviet vessel today, but can't confirm it. We've simply seen the report.

Q John, do you have any reason, or have you been notified by the Egyptian Government why President Mubarak is singling out Libya as the only accused of the mining of the Suez?

A No. I think that, as Mr. Romberg has said previously, we are not in a position to indicate where those mines came from or who laid them, although various people have speculated and have their ideas and suspected parties.

Q Does this mean you consider what Mr. Mubarak said as just speculation?

A Well, I think we will simply stand on our position. That until we can give you something specific, we will stay where we are.

Q Have the Egyptians given the United States

Government the information that they're basing their statements on?

A I don't know what -- I mean, I'm sure that a lot of discussion has gone on between the two governments, but just what it has been, I don't know.

Q John, do you know of anything about -- there's a report that United States is helping to build an air strip or base -- not a base in that sense of the word, but an airport in that part of Cyprus which is controlled by Turkey, or by the Turkish Cypriots?

A I don't know anything about it.

Q Could you look into it?

A Be glad to take a look, sure.

Q This is a follow-up of an earlier question. Regarding the sale of, proposed sale of Stingers to Saudi Arabia and possible -- and Sidewinders, and possible renewed sale of Stingers to Jordan, can you tell us if those are being actively reviewed right now, where the process stands?

A I cannot. I'm a little rusty on this. I mean, I just come back, and I haven't checked into that since I got back.

Q Nothing beyond --

A Nothing beyond what Mr. Romberg said the other day which I'm sure was comprehensive.

Q And a follow-up to that. Are those major arms sales now completely separate from any sort of participation in an Arab-Israeli peace process?

A Well, I think that the reason for the movement of that material to that area was based on the threat, not other considerations. It was a specific need and a specific time.

Q John, one of your colleagues came up to the Foreign Press Center in the Press Building several weeks ago and said that this Administration, through his office of combating terrorism, was cooperating with the British in their efforts to combat the IRA Provisional Wing, IRA terrorism.

Does that -- could you spell out what it is that we're doing, or give us a general idea?

A I cannot because I don't know. But I

suspect that even those knowledgable would be reluctant really to give very much detail on anti-terrorism activities that we're engaged in.

Obviously, we -- as Secretary Shultz has indicated, we are cooperating with a number of governments and working closely with them, but I don't think there would be much enthusiasm for revealing just how we are working on it.

Q Does that mean, though, that essentially we come -- this Administration comes down on the side of the so-called unionist forces in Northern Ireland?

A Well, that's not changing or attempting to modify our position on Northern Ireland, all of which has been set out and is unchanged. But I was referring specifically to your question about terrorism. And in the area of terrorism, certainly, we're pursuing that vigorously.

Q The situation there does appear to be getting a lot worse. Is there any new look being taken by the Administration at it or any new --

A I'm sure those involved are following it very closely.

Q Anything on Vienna?

A No, nothing on Vienna.

Q Anything new?

A Nothing new.

Q El Salvador is going to announce -- Duarte announced yesterday he was going, or they have intervened in the International Court and have made representations against Nicaragua in the International Court -- in the World Court. Do you have any guidance on it?

A Well, yes. President Duarte did make an address to the Legislative Assembly yesterday, and he discussed Nicaragua's claim against the United States before the International Court of Justice in the Hague. He said that "Nicaragua had made the malicious and unfounded statement that El Salvador was not involved in the issue because El Salvador had never claimed to be a victim of Nicaraguan armed aggression." He said that this was untrue and for that reason the Government of El Salvador had decided to presented its views to the ICJ.

Referring to recent comments by Mr. Ortega to West German television, that Nicaragua would continue its support of the Salvadoran guerrillas, Mr. Duarte said that "subversion in El Salvador was organized by and directed from Nicaragua." He also argued that the Central American problem should be dealt with in the fora such as Contadora and not in the International Court.

Q Can we get a copy, please?

A Sure.

Q Does this affect, in any way, however, the U.S. position that the World Court has no jurisdiction over United States with respect to the Central American issue?

A Not at all. We've taken our position before the Court, and this is a Salvadoran initiative and intervention, and they are saying what they want they want to say before the Court.

Q And do you have any idea when the jurisdiction issue is going to come up now? It's been some months.

A I don't. I don't know what the schedule is. Any light on that, Alan? No, sorry.

Q John, can I get back to terrorism for just one second? I think -- I'm just interested in completing the record on something. Yesterday, the Department made a statement in connection with the pipe bomb in Los Angeles, and events subsequent to that statement changed the appearance of that situation.

Did the Department at that time, yesterday noon or at this time, have any evidence to suggest that the incident was one of international terrorism, as the statement yesterday said?

A I can't quite recall the phrase in the statement that you're quoting.

Q I didn't bring it --

A Was there a presumption in the statement that it was an international act of terrorism?

Q The statement said it was -- called it "international terrorism."

A I don't know what evidence that was based on, but obviously there was a bomb.

Q What I'm getting at is, does the U.S. think that this police officer who has been accused was in anyway connected with international terrorists?

A I don't know. I think that's a Los Angeles Police Department investigation. I'm sure they're investigating that very vigorously, not the aspect you mentioned, but, certainly, the motivation of the individual.

Q John, Ambassador Buckley yesterday, in Mexico City, publicly criticized the U.S. delegate for not flagging down the passage concerning occupied territories at a preparation conference in March.

Did the State Department at that preparation conference make some sort of mistake, and, if not, what justified his making that statement?

A I can't answer that specific question. But there is some guidance in the Press Office that was prepared yesterday in connection with -- I don't know whether it responds specifically to that point, but you might want to dig it out from yesterday and see what it says.

Q John, about the statement made by, or attributed to Secretary Shultz regarding Syria considered at this time as an obstacle to peace. This looks very much to be contradictory to the statement made by Assistant Secretary Murphy a few weeks ago. Do you have an explanation for it?

A No, I don't think it is contradictory. I think what both Assistant Secretary Murphy and the Secretary are saying is that the record in the past of Syria has been clear. Syria's role in obstructing the implementation of the accord between Lebanon and Israel is quite clear, but that Syria's aims in Lebanon perhaps have changed, the tactical situation is changed. I think that, in essence, was the theme of the remarks of both of them.

Q So how do you characterize the Syrian situation now? How do you characterize the situation?

A Well, as I say, in the past, there have been occasions when Syria has been obstructive. There are changed conditions, perhaps, on the ground in Lebanon which have caused Syria to change its tactics in certain areas.

Q Are you in contact with Syria now -- nowadays? Faruq al-Shar, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in an interview with a London-based magazine, said that we are not going to close the doors on dialogue and negotiations with the United States.

1-2057

A I don't know what the contact is, but I think that question is a little bit puzzling because even in those days when we have had some harsh words to trade with Syria, the channel for communication was there and was used all the time, and it clearly is being used today. There's no problem about communicating.

Q (inaudible) changed circumstances on the ground a result of Syria's successful obstruction of our policy previous?

A Well, I don't want to get into a sort of detailed discussion with you, but I think you refer to some obvious events that are taking place.

Q John, it's now two weeks since I first charged that this -- that officers of this Department had deliberately misinformed the public and Congressional --

A That "lied" was the word you used, if I read the transcript. I think "lied" --

Q Fine, lied, deliberately lied to the public and Congressional officers in the case of abduction of Patricia Londono. Do you yet have any explanation of those lies?

A No, I don't have anything for anybody who charges that spokesmen at this podium are liars.

Q Well, to clarify, is it still the position of this Department that there was no abduction that took place even after they have medical evidence of her post-release examination available to them?

A I don't have anything on your specific question, but my eye was caught by the intemperate language that you used.

Q Let me ask another question related to this case. Can you explain the relationship between the Labor attache of the U.S. Embassy in Colombia, Jim Bell, and the attorney, Arturo Cortes Cadena, who is implicated in the kidnapping?

A The Labor Attache is performing the assignment for which he was sent to that area.

Q Including the kidnapping of Patricia Londono?

A I don't think kidnapping is generally within the assignment.

Q Look, the facts are on the public record. The statements of this Department contradict the facts charged. You refuse to explain it.

A I think we have come to the end of this briefing. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:35 p.m.)

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Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #148

THURSDAY, AUGUST 16, 1984, 12:20 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: No announcements. With a little bit of luck, you could all be on the golf course by 12:30.

Q John, regarding the Reagan joke, did we ever send any communications to any of our allies or Moscow explaining that in any way?

A I'm not aware of anything further on that, Greg. I think we had some discussion with the Soviets in Moscow yesterday. They drew our attention to the TASS statement. I think that's about the strength of it.

Q What is that about Moscow?

A I think at the -- I think in Moscow yesterday Soviet officials drew the attention of our Embassy there to the TASS statement which is fairly standard operating procedure, but I'm not aware of any exchanges beyond that.

Q You said "discussion." Was it the Soviets just drawing the U.S. attention, or was there an exchange of views on the subject?

A I'm not aware of any exchange on it. I think they were simply making sure we had seen the TASS statement.

Q Has any American diplomat been instructed to explain the sequence of events in any way to any U.S. allies in Europe especially?

A I think the sequence of events were very -- were clear and are clear, and as our short statement said yesterday, we think the Soviets are blowing this entirely out of proportion.

Q But there's -- no diplomatic explanation effort has been --

A I think the facts of the matter are very clear; don't need any amplification.

Q Was this a protest from the Soviets?

A I don't think I would say it was a protest, Jim. I think it was simply, as I say, pointing out to us, as they do on numerous occasions. You know how they indicate their views, and I guess in this case they chose TASS and then drew our attention to the TASS statement.

Q And who was the Soviet official --

A I'm not sure at what level it was.

Q Not at the Foreign Minister's level?

A I think it was at the Foreign Ministry, yes. But it was not at the Foreign Minister level, no; no, no, no. But I'm not sure what level it was.

Q What impact do you think this will have on the perception of the President among the Western Allies?

A I think it will have no impact at all. The President's views on the overall question of arms control are very clear, and I see no reason why it would have any impact on the perception of the strong position the United States has taken in this field.

Q John, what is the status of possible Shultz-Gromyko discussions at the U.N.?

A I don't know that they have moved forward at all, Barrie, since the Secretary last spoke of the possibility and, indeed, perhaps probability of such a meeting. But I don't know that anything has happened to add any more substance to that expectation. I think that's about where it is.

Q And has the whole question of Gromyko's plane and where it lands, and so on, has that all been smoothed out of the way?

A I think the Secretary said -- I can't quite remember where he said it -- but I think he said that we were assured there would be no problem about Gromyko's plane landing this year.

Q Do we know that he's coming?

1-2062

A I do not know that we know that as of this date. I think it's an expectation --

Q We're assuming that?

A I think it's an assumption; that's right.

Q John, did anybody ask you yet about the kidnapping and killing of Jews in Beirut by people, presumably (inaudible) of the other organizations in Lebanon?

A No. Is this today's report?

Q Well, there was a Jew killed -- abducted, and his body was found in West Beirut or in the suburb of West Beirut last month. Yesterday morning, a rabbi who was in the synagogue in Beirut was abducted.

A Uh-huh.

Q And they don't know where he is. Is this the way -- have we made any representations or investigations or inquires about this?

A I just am not informed on this, but be glad to take a look and see what we can --

Q Would you look into it? The other thing is about the weapons that Kuwait is buying from the Soviet Union.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you have something to add to what has already been said about this?

A Well, seen the --

Q Has it been noted that Kuwait is the only Arab country that has relations with the -- the only Arab country on the Gulf, I guess it is, that has diplomatic relations, or among the six -- Gulf six -- excuse me, I'm a little bit confused about this.

A It's all right, we'll wait.

Q (inaudible) in a speech. You get old, you

1-2063

forget things. About the -- in the Gulf Council that has relations with the Soviet Union, and that the government is largely dominated by Palestinians?

A Well, we're certainly aware of the relationship with the Soviet Union. In fact, there's been a relationship in terms of arms purchases, which we understand, over the years. This is not the first time that Kuwait's been involved in such a purchase.

We do think that the figures that have been cited are exaggerated. I think the figure that is being used, was used, is $327 million. We do think that figure is considerably exaggerated. We understand that Kuwait's agreement with the Soviet Union may include additional surface-to-air-missiles to supplement the SA-7s which are already in their inventory, as well as certain yet unspecified other equipment.

As we've indicated before, we and the Kuwaitis have had a long-standing security assistance relationship, and we have agreed in principle on a number of new measures to improve Kuwait's defense capability. Our discussions regarding implementation of those proposals are continuing. We will of course be looking carefully at how Kuwaiti purchase of Soviet arms, especially of air defense equipment, might impact on our own program. But we do not believe the reported sale portends any significant shift in Kuwait's traditional policy of purchasing weapons from a variety of sources, including the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union and the United States.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q What about the fact that this is the first time that a Soviet advisory group will be in Kuwait? Doesn't this have some impact on the relationship between the United States and Kuwait, some impact on the traditional relationship?

A Well, it's not the first time that -- in a country where Soviet and U.S. advisors will have been in the same area. We understand a small number of Soviet training personnel -- I understand that's in the area of about five or six -- may be used to provide advice and training on equipment already or soon to be in the Kuwaiti inventory. Don't have any further details on those numbers.

1-2064

Kuwait would not be the first country where U.S. and Soviet military personnel are engaged in simultaneous security assistance programs. In such instances, we take appropriate measures to assure that U.S. military equipment and technology are not compromised. We already have Kuwait's agreement to protect classified U.S. systems and information from unauthorized disclosure to third parties. We have every reason to believe that the Kuwaitis will respect this agreement.

Your next question will be, "In which countries have U.S. and Soviet advisors worked together?" And those countries are Jordan, Peru and the Yemen Arab Republic.

Q Will Egypt be involved the same way?

A I'm sorry?

Q Will Egypt be involved the same way with Russian and -- with Soviet and American military advisors?

A In Egypt?

Q Egypt, yes?

A I'm not aware of any Soviet advisors in Egypt at the present.

Q A copy of that last statement?

A Sure.

Q John, how many Americans in Kuwait?

A That's the one little piece of information I don't have with me, but I'm sure the Pentagon could --

Q Do we have a military group in Kuwait?

A I'm sure there is a U.S. military group in Kuwait.

Q John, in that list of weapons, are there any shoulder-fired missiles that would replace the Stingers that were not sold by the United States to Kuwait?

A I don't know about shoulder-fired missiles. I'm not sure specifically -- because we're not aware of the details yet -- but I think it's logical to assume that the purpose of what the Soviets, the purpose underlying what the Kuwaitis are trying to buy from the Soviets, obviously relates to the fact that they were not able to purchase Stingers from the United States. I think it's in the air defense area that they're trying to boost their defense in the areas where the United States was not able to help.

Q John, is the United States Government aware that the -- Kuwait, and now it's Jordan in line to buy arms from the Soviet Union; the Chief of the Jordanian Armed Forces have resulted in this thing, and they went to the Soviet Union to buy arms after they were rejected by the United States?

A We've seen the same reports you have about the possibility of Jordanian purchases from the Soviet Union.

Q But you are aware that, you know, Kuwait went to the Soviet Union after they were rebuffed by the United States; you know that?

A We're aware of the request Kuwait made of us, and we're aware of this development. So, yes, we're aware of the sequence.

Q John, this might be going over old ground, and I'm sorry if we are. But did we ever give a reason why we were not selling Stingers to Kuwait?

A I can't remember the language, and I'm loath to come up with language on the spot. I guess I'd prefer to go back to the guidance we used at the time.

Q We did tell them no, we didn't --

A I think we told them we were not prepared to sell at this time, I was the -- I think I'm pretty close to the phrase.

Q John, that $327 figure, which you say is exaggerated, how far off is it? Do you have your own figure?

A No, we don't have our own figure.

Q John, the American --

Q What does "considerably" mean?

A Greatly. (Laughter)

Q Yeah.

Q John, the American -- these American advisors in Kuwait that you mentioned, what specifically do they give advice on? I mean, what program are they involved in?

A Well, maybe I misspoke. I guess we'd have to go back to the Pentagon and make sure. It's my impression that there are American advisors in Kuwait in connection with the equipment that is being supplied to them.

--MORE--

Q What kind of equipment?

A Well, for example, we have provided air defense equipment to them in the past.

Q Do you know how long they're going to be there?

A Well, I think what I prefer to do is to have you go to the Pentagon, and I'm sure Mike Burch can (a) confirm that there are Americans there, tell you how many, tell you how long they are likely to be there.

Q Sure.

Q John, back on the President's remarks, you said that you did not think it would have any impact at all on the relationship between the U.S. and the Western Allies. What impact do you think on the U.S. and Soviet relationship?

A I don't know quite what you're groping for, Bernie, because the policy of the United States and the policies of the President, which have been very explicitly articulated, particularly in this area of arms control, are very clear; and I don't see why this incident would, in any way, have any impact on those (inaudible).

Q What about the possible impact on Vienna, the possibility of the U.S.-Soviet -- (inaudible)

A I haven't heard this incident linked with the Soviet unwillingness to take "yes" for an answer on Vienna.

Q John, on the Soviets, does the State Department have any view on the apparent controversy between the East Germans and the Soviets about further contacts with the West Germans?

Q We can't hear those people in the front row when they whisper. Use the microphone --

Q It doesn't involve Israel, Joe.

(Laughter)

Q That's a nasty remark, Jim Anderson, and it's not worthy of you or your --

1-2068

A Well, let me slice through this by saying, no, I'm sorry, Jim, I don't have anything on that.

Q Then, if you have any updating on the situation in the Red Sea?

A Not really, other than to say that we are able to confirm 18 underwater explosions. There is an awful lot of confusion about those figures, and you probably will say, yes, there are more reports than 18, and there certainly are, but the State Department is able to confirm 18 such explosions.

Q Including the Cypriot ship this morning?

A That does not include the report on the Cypriot ship, I think.

Q Does it include the Soviet?

A I'll have to do a little research on that, Greg.

Q Have any mines been found by the sweepers?

A No, not so far.

Q John, what about the efforts or the attempts by the Western World to get sort of multinational efforts by France, England, and other countries to get involved in cleaning that Red Sea area -- Arab leaders --

A I think there is such a multinational -- I mean, I think the French are involved; I think the British are involved; we are involved, and I think the Italians may be involved. I'm not sure about that.

Q Are they planning to expand that -- (inaudible) may have more participation?

A I'm not aware of any plans to expand that. I think the countries in the area, obviously, are in the lead on this and would be responsible for inviting others to be involved in coordinating that. I'm not aware of any expansion beyond those countries at the moment.

Q John, who has command and control for all of this? I mean, you can't have all those ships, you know, running around in the Red Sea without someone up there saying, you know, "You take this section, you take that section."

A Sure.

Q How was this decided?

A I don't know. I think Mike Burch -- again, I hate to keep ducking this, but I think they really are in control of this story, and I think you probably really have to ask the Pentagon.

Q Is the U.S. any closer to concluding which country is responsible?

A No. We're as we were yesterday. I mean, there are the obvious reports and the obvious -- the fingers pointed at suspects, but, no, the United States is not, at this stage, able to --

Q Have you been notified by the Egyptian authorities why they are now pinpointing their accusation to Libya?

A I think we have to say where we are, and we're not able to confirm what kind of mines they are and what their origin is and who laid them.

Q John, do you have any State Department interpretation of the change in the political structure in Tehran --

A No.

Q -- the firing of ministers and so on?

A No, afraid we don't.

Q Any comment on the Bekaa Valley attack by Israel today or the --

A No.

Q -- guerrilla attack on the Israeli troops yesterday?

A No, no comment.

Q Any comment on the report of two human rights groups accusing the Salvadoran security forces of indiscriminate attacks on civilian populations?

A Yes. First of all, we would note that we regret any deaths of noncombatant civilians, and while our own data has indicated a consistent downward trend in politically-motivated civilian deaths, no one can be satisfied until such incidents no longer occur.

We haven't seen any official report by the two groups, and it is our understanding that the press reports are based on a briefing yesterday by those organizations, so we are unaware of the evidence or the methodology used to support the specific allegations.

We have previously addressed earlier allegations of indiscriminate air attacks on civilians, noting that we did not accept the contention that the Salvadoran Army and Air Force engage in widespread indiscriminate bombings --

Q Copy, please?

A Not finished. -- as well as artillery shellings or attacks on civilian targets. Indeed, El Salvador's Army and Air Force policy goes to substantial lengths to prevent incidents of this nature.

Nonetheless, we are aware that there have been instances in which civilians have been caught up in combat situations, and we've urged the Salvadoran Armed Forces to exercise maximum care to avoid civilian casualties. They are in full accord.

We would note, finally, that the Salvadoran human rights organization is reportedly restructuring its statistical methodology and has not yet released its July reports. Also, on June 15, Archbishop Rivera y Damas, in his first homily after an extended absence from the country, qualified a report on air force bombing deaths with the remark that the victims could not be identified as guerrillas or civilians.

Q Copy?

A Sure.

Q John, are you finished with this one?

A I think we probably are, Connie.

Q Two things: Did you have anything on the Soweto bombing today?

A No, I'm afraid we don't.

Q And does the U.S. have anything today on the U.N. action regarding South Africa, any position on how we're going to vote?

A The U.N. action --

Q Well, there's a debate on --

A You mean the Constitution?

Q Right.

A Had some guidance on that yesterday, on our position.

Q Right. Anything --

A Nothing further on the way we will vote. As always, we'll look at the resolution, the text of the resolution. But if you're interested, if you weren't here yesterday, there was some guidance yesterday --

Q Right.

A -- on our thinking about that constitution.

Q Right. I just wondered if there was anthing new today on it.

A No.

Q Will the U.S. participate in the debate?

A I don't know.

Q Do you have anything on the British comment that there is no independent evidence to corroborate the massive civilian deaths in Uganda?

A Sure do. I guess you're talking about the remarks by Assistant Secretary Elliott Abrams. He gave the U.S. Government's assessment of the human rights situation in Uganda -- that was in his August 9th appearance before the Human Rights and Africa Subcommittee of the House of Representatives. His testimony was based on the best information from all sources available to us, and we really don't have very much to add to that.

Insofar as the Ugandan Government is concerned, we've made it clear that in expressing our concerns about the human rights situation in their country, we want to work with their government rather than against it in seeking improvements.

Q Copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Do you have any comment on the Israeli occupying forces in Lebanon?

Q Same subject. How do you explain the fact that the British, working on the best sources available to the Foreign Office, have reached a different conclusion?

A I guess you'll have to ask them.

Q The same subject: Is it to be expected that U.S. assistance to Somalia would be affected by the information included in the statement by Mr. Abrams?

A I don't have anything on that one for you. Sorry.

Q Do you have any comment on the Israeli occupying authorities in Lebanon are again cordoning the Ayn al-Hilweh refugee camp where 25 Palestinians were arrested and where one of these detainees died during arrest yesterday?

A No. Don't have anything --

Q Can you look into this?

A I'll take a look.

Q Do we have any view on the civilian opposition in Nicaragua dropping their demands that the Sandinistas negotiate with the guerrillas?

A Don't have an update on the progress or lack of progress towards an election in Nicaragua. I don't know whether we've had anything in the past several days. No, don't have any -- nothing beyond where we were a few days ago.

Q And I have one other question: Do we have anything to say about the closure of The Observer in Windhoek?

A Yes, we deplore that kind of activity. The United States' position on press freedom, of course, is well known. Suffice it to say that we deplore actions which lead to any restriction on press freedom, and this is particularly true regarding Namibia, which is at a critical juncture in its evolution toward independence.

Q Anything new on the Nicaraguan talks in Manzanillo?

A No, I don't have anything. I guess those are continuing today, but I don't have any readout for you.

Q John, is there anything between the United States and Portugal dealing with the Archbishop Trifa case since the announcement by the Department of Justice?

A Is there anything on it? That's a pretty broad question.

Q Well, I mean, do you have anything to comment on the fact that -- Well, the Portuguese are saying that apparently he has a six-month residence visa in Portugal, and that he slipped through the net, and there was nothing against him in the Trifa record. And the inquiry as to U.S. participation was rather vague from the source that I talked with, but they indicated that maybe there was some talk.

A Well, in connection with that case, the Archbishop reached a settlement with the Department of Justice in which he agreed to depart the United States to a country of his chosing.

Trifa's departure to Portugal was the result of arrangements worked up by Trifa himself or his representatives, and the United States Government was not involved in those arrangements. We're not really the lead agency on this, as I say. It's the Department of Justice; and if you want to pursue that, I would talk to Mr. Schearer, who is at the Office of Special Investigations at the Department of Justice.

Q Neil Schearer?

A I don't -- Yes, it is Neil. That's right, yes.

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Okay?

(Press briefing concluded at 12:44 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #149

FRIDAY, AUGUST 17, 1984, 12:20 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. Just like to remind you that on Monday at 8:30 P.M. Chicago time, 9:30 P.M. our time, Secretary Shultz will address the VFW Annual Convention, and at that time he will receive the 1984 Dwight David Eisenhower Distinguished Service Award and Citation. That dinner will be at the Conrad Hilton Hotel in Chicago. The subject of the Secretary's speech will be "Diplomacy and Strength." If anyone wants to cover that, they should be in touch with Wade Ladue, of the VFW. Mr. Ladue's number today is 312-922-3773, and as of tomorrow his number will be 312-922-4400. That's on Monday, the Secretary at the VFW.

Q When is the text supposedly --

A Just as soon as we can make it available.

Q Do you expect it Monday?

A Certainly expect it Monday, yes. Sure.

Q What time is that speech?

A 9:30 our time.

Q Monday evening?

A Monday evening.

Q P.M.

A P.M., yes. That's all

Q Is that it?

A That's it.

Q Have you had a chance to study the note from Poland about easing the sanctions?

A We've received it, Jim. It's eleven pages, an eleven-page note. We do have it under study and don't have any comment at this time or any characterization of it.

1-2077

Q In general, I'm told that the Poles are asking for compensation for damages incurred when the airline sanction was imposed. Does the United States have any view about whether it will consider such compensation?

A Well, as I say, we're looking at it and really aren't going to have any comment until we've had a chance to study the note.

Q When do you expect the IMF to take any action on the Polish application?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q Any reaction to the litigation in The Hague this morning? I'm not exactly sure what was said, but it concerns the mining in Nicaraguan harbors.

A Well, you mean Salvador's intervention? Yes, I do. On June 30, Nicaragua filed a brief on the question of the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the case and related questions. Pursuant to an order of the Court, the United States filed its response today with the Court on these same questions. And insofar as the timing of when the Court will hear the cases concerned, Davis Robinson, who is the State Department's Legal Adviser and our agent in this case at The Hague, and the Nicaraguan agent will be meeting with the President of the Court later this month to discuss the question of further proceedings, including the scheduling of oral hearings.

As you know, El Salvador filed an intervention in the case to enable it to argue that the Court does not have jurisdiction over Nicaragua's application. The Court has fixed September 14 as the time limit for the United States and Nicaragua to present written observations thereon.

Q Copy, please?

A Sure.

Q Also on Nicaragua, do you have any reports that Nicaragua may be activating its new large airfield?

A Well, we do. It's not a new story. We stated as recently as July 6 our concern about Nicaragua's militarization, which is totally out of proportion to its defense needs. The building of this airport, as well as the improvements, and the lengthening of several other military airfields in Nicaragua would not appear directed, at least potentially, against Nicaragua's armed opposition as much as against Nicaragua's neighbors.

We've indicated before that the addition of advanced combat aircraft to the Sandinistas' powerful military arsenal would be a seriously destabilizing development in the region and would increase the threat Nicaragua poses to other countries in the region. It would alter the balance of power in the region. Both the Soviet Union and Cuba are well aware of our position in this regard.

Q Copy of that?

A Sure.

Q How about the announcement in Nicaragua that they are going to, that the Contras are going to withdraw their demand that they be included in negotiations between the --

A Don't have anything on that for you.

Q Excuse me. On the airfield again.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you know where these modern aircraft are and how many are involved?

A No, I don't have anything for you on that.

Q John, another subject? In today's op-ed page of The Times Senator Cranston observed that Pakistan has continued to move ahead with its nuclear development despite a large American aid program including F-16s, and he suggests we ought to withhold aid or F-16 delivery.

Are we doing anything along that line or considering --

A No.

Q -- anything along that line?

A No, we're not. Our position is well known, hasn't changed. We remain concerned about unsafeguarded nuclear activities in Pakistan. We've made those concerns known, as you know, to the Government of Pakistan at every appropriate opportunity.

We have welcomed President Zia's repeated statements that Pakistan will not acquire a nuclear device of any kind. Don't have any comment on specific details of Pakistan's nuclear program as related in the op-ed piece.

As far as the F-16s are concerned, our present five-year security assistance program for Pakistan -- under that program, 40 F-16s are scheduled for delivery. About half of them have been delivered to date; the remainder are scheduled to arrive early in 1986. And that's all on track.

Q Copy, please?

A Sure.

Q In what year?

A '86.

Q On the very subject that Greg has just raised, if there is a delay in proceeding with the nuclear agreement with the Chinese because of various U.S. concerns, why doesn't the U.S. remain concerned about the possible destination of the leakage from China?

A Well, there are two separate issues here, but there is no change in our position on that agreement and the safeguards that are in the agreement; also, beyond that, the statements that China has made on nonproliferation. There is no problem with the language of that agreement.

As we've said before, what we're doing is taking some extra time to make sure that the implications of what that agreement involves are thoroughly understood. We want to be absolutely certain about the understanding of that agreement.

Q Is it language rather than leakage?

A It's not language, no. That's what I'm saying. Language is -- there have been one or two stories suggesting there is something wrong with the language in the agreement. That's not correct.

Q But John, the point that Bernie is making and I was alluding to earlier, if we are, in sundry, holding up an arrangement with China because we are concerned that they are assisting a nuclear program in another country, why would we not put leverage on that other country which is the beneficiary of whatever China is doing?

A Well, you're making a number of far-reaching assumptions which I don't think we can accept. This is a very significant issue for us. There are laws which we want to abide by -- and will abide by -- and we want to make sure that as the agreement goes forward, everything is in order.

But I think you're making some assumptions that go beyond the issues that we're checking out. You're making assumptions that certain things have taken place. We are simply pursuing our inquiries into some of these areas.

Q So the allegations of Senator Cranston about specific assistance being given by the Chinese to the Pakistanis you would deny?

A Well, as we have said before, we have accepted the Pakistani assurances; as we've told you before -- and we can go back to that language -- we have had certain undertakings from China, and that's where we are.

Q New subject, John?

A Sure.

Q Anything more on Red Sea, the operation? Have we found a mine?

A Not a great deal, Bernie. I'll be glad to give you -- We have not found a mine, no.

There was a report that the Egyptian Navy had discovered and detonated a mine. Don't have any comment for you on that, really, but I'd be cautious about that story.

As far as the United States is concerned -- well, the Pentagon really should take the lead on this. I understand the operation is going forward about as planned. The Shreveport is now on station in the Gulf of Suez and will start mine-sweeping momentarily, with it's four Sea Stallion Helicopters. Three more of our helicopters already are sweeping the port area of Jidda, in Saudi Arabia. But I think Mike Burch will be happy to give you any further details on that.

-- MORE --

Q John, do you accept the characterization of the U.S. position in the Red Sea now as more imprivileged than it was before the mines?

A More in privilege? I'm not quite sure I understand that.

Q More privileged, let me say. I mean, in an advantageous position than before?

A Is this -- are you talking about the preposterous Libyan suggestion that there are no mines in the Red Sea and that is a ploy by the United States to take over the Red Sea; is that the question?

Q No. I have in my mind the story, the main story of the Christian Science Monitor yesterday.

A Okay. What's that one?

Q It says that the United States is in a better position now than it was before the mines.

A I don't know that -- in a better position in regard to what? I guess we would just as soon not have any mines there and therefore not have to be involved and take the risks that are involved in mine-sweeping. But they are there, and I think we're performing an operation we've been asked to perform, with others.

I don't know that that gives those -- the British, the French, the Italians who, along with ourselves, are engaged in mine-sweeping -- I don't know that that gives any of them any particular privilege.

Q John, anything new on Senator's Specter's, Arlen Specter's assertion that he knew who the perpetrators might have been and --

A No. No.

Q John, does the visit of the Djiboutian official here today have anything to do with the mining operation -- the mine-sweeping operation?

A I must confess I wasn't aware there was such a visit. I don't know.

Q John, Yassir Arafat, last night --

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Q Could you take that question, please?

A I'll try. Who is he seeing; do you know?

Q He's seeing Crocker. It's on the public schedule.

A Okay. Sure. You caught me; I haven't read the public schedule.

Q John, you appeared to have some guidance on Greg's question about the op-ed piece in today's Times. Would you have anything on the op-ed piece in the Times yesterday by the Mayor of Boston?

A No.

Q Relating to the -- (Laughter)

A And I didn't have anything yesterday on it, either.

Q You ought to know him. He's your neighbor.

A My friend?

Q Would you take the question?

A Why don't you tell me what he said?

Q Basically, what he said was that the U.S. through the State Department, should bring its influence to bear on Great Britain and the government there, relating to the New Forum Report recently --

A We have offered some words on our position on the New Forum, but that's it.

Q That's it?

A That's it. There's no addition to that.

Q That's the end of the story?

A Well, I don't know that that's the end of the story, but if you want the State Department's position on the New Forum Report, I'm sure the Press Office would be delighted to pull it for you.

Q John, last night Yassir Arafat on CNN with Sandy Freeman was asked about the possibility of negotiation with Israel and others. He reiterated his interview with Nouvelle Observateur in May. He said, "I am ready to negotiate directly with all the parties concerned in the Middle East conflict, including Israel." Do you have any comment on that, or do you want to look through this?

A No, I don't have any comment on his offer to negotiate with Israel. As far as any contacts between the United States and the PLO, our conditions have been out there. They are very clear; they're very explicit. And at such time as those conditions are met, then the situation might change, but at the moment there's not much prospect of talks between -- there's no prospect of talks between Mr. Arafat and the United States.

Q Do you have any explanation for Senator Buckley's use of the word "misguided," about State Department policy at the Population Conference?

A No, I wouldn't attempt to explain why he used that.

Q Do you have any comment on it?

A No, don't have any comment, other than what we had. I think we had some yesterday. I don't have anything.

Q On that?

A I don't know whether it's on that particular aspect. There's been a slew of guidance on the U.N. Conference.

Q Well, was the State Department policy misguided?

A I think there is some guidance on the involvement of the State Department mentioned by Senator Buckley prior to his own involvement, but I don't have anything new today.

Q John, several -- going back to the question of China and Pakistan and nuclear weapons development, several Pakistani nationals were arrested in the U.S. recently on charges of trying to get triggering devices for nuclear weapons.

A Uh-huh.

Q Are we satisfied that President Zia's disavowal of nuclear weapons development programs is conclusive, or is that public relations?

A Well, I think we had some words at the time of the trial, and I think conviction, of those individuals, specifically related to that case. In general, our position concerning Pakistan's assurances is as I've underlined it again here today.

Q John, the Iranians threatened to retaliate if any of their ships were searched in the Suez Canal. Do you have any response to that --

A No.

Q -- or whether any U.S.-- either installations or ships might be threatened at all?

A I don't -- I'm sure you can imagine, I think, U.S. vessels and installations in that part of the world are obviously exercising particular vigilance, and have been for some time, but I don't think we'd get into any special steps that might be taken.

Q John, how does the United States Government characterize the Israeli air strike in Lebanon yesterday which resulted in the killing of four people?

A Didn't have any comment for you yesterday, and I don't have today either.

Q John, getting back to the Red Sea for a second. If you were asked about the reports in the last couple of days from Egypt, Egypt released -- issued some statements about a Libyan registered vessel that went into the Red Sea and spent more time than normal operations of that type would take place, and so on.

A Uh-huh.

Q The Egyptians said, in issuing that statement, that that was the reason for their pointing the finger at Libya. Do you have anything to say about that kind of evidence or that kind of conclusion drawing in this?

A No, and I'm not -- we're not disputing the suspicions of others and, indeed, even our own suspicions. But I think you would be the first to criticize if we pointed the figure at anybody; and you would say where's the evidence for it, and we could not produce the evidence. So until some of those mines are to hand, or until other evidence linking their laying with a specific country or organization is available, I think we are being prudent in simply saying there are obvious suspicions but we don't have any evidence.

Q John, any update on the cultural talks with the Soviet Union?

A Sorry, on the --

Q Cultural talks?

A Cultural -- no, nothing further, Bill.

Q How about Chernenko's -- anything on Chernenko's statement to the Japanese people in preface to a book about compromises with the U.S.?

A No. I saw the -- this is the Japanese language version of his speeches?

Q Yeah.

A No, I don't.

Q And the Baltimore Sun, in a piece -- I think it was yesterday -- said that the U.S. expects communications from the Soviet Union on arms control talks before Shultz and Gromyko meet in September, or at the U.N. -- mid-September communication?

A I'm not aware of anything specific, but one obviously never rules out -- there certainly is communication on a variety of issues, and there may well be. But I'm not aware of anything specifically in mind.

Q Anything new on Vienna?

A Nothing new on Vienna.

Q Is there any communication on the subject of nuclear arms negotiations?

A I'm sure it comes up in our discussions with the Soviets.

Q What are your thoughts....

A Sure, Barrie?

Q What's the reaction to the new developments with the Government of Honduras, and do you feel that in any sense jeopardizes the U.S. position there?

A No, we don't. It's obviously an internal matter for the Honduran leadership. We don't see any reason why it would jeopardize the present relationship with the United States. And so far as we can tell, the situation is perfectly calm and orderly there.

Q Do we not feel in any sense that the political difficulties that are taking place there relate in part, at least, to the significant American presence?

A I don't know of anybody who is suggesting that the reshuffle, or whatever it is is taking place there, is attributable to the relationship with the U.S.

Q Don't you have anything on what's going on in the Government of Iran?

A We've seen -- we don't have terribly good contacts with the Government of Iran. We've seen the same kind of reports that you have.

Q Okay, thank you.

A Okay.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:40 p.m.)

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Gleason

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #150

MONDAY, AUGUST 20, 1984, 11:58 A. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: One announcement; one statement.

The announcement is just housekeeping, to remind you of the Secretary's speech this evening at the VFW annual convention in Chicago, where he will be receiving the 1984 Dwight David Eisenhower Distinguished Service Award and Citation. A copy of his embargoed speech will be available in the Press Office after the briefing. The speech again is entitled "Diplomacy and Strength." I'd remind you again, please observe the embargo.

A statement* on the August 21 anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia:

"Tomorrow we mark the 14th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. On that day 14 years ago President Johnson noted what a sad commentary it was on the Soviet perception of the world that 'a sign of liberty in Czechoslovakia is deemed a threat to the security of the Soviet system.'

"That observation remains valid today. We need only observe how the martial law regime in Poland under strong pressure from the Soviet Union seeks to repress the popular aspirations of the Polish people, or to look at the people of Afghanistan who are still suffering under the weight of Soviet armies.

"Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland and Afghanistan today, stand as cruel reminders that the Soviet Union is still unwilling to abide by the standards of international behavior embodied in the United Nations Charter and in the Helsinki Final Act."

Q It's 16, not 14 years.

Q Copy?

Q Is that a two-year-old statement? (Laughter)

A You are correct.

---

* See footnote on following page.

Q Copy, please?

A You are correct.

Q Two-year-old statement? (Laughter)

A Two-year-old paper. (Laughter) Okay. We can provide a copy of the corrected version of that statement.* Thank you, George. You're hired. (Laughter)

Q Alan, also on the subject of the Soviets, do you have anything on the denial of a visa to visit this country to a man who works for Novosti named Makharov? He was to attend a U.S.-Russian press convention in Providence, Rhode Island.

A Don't know anything about it.

Q Could you look into that, please?

A Sure.

Q Also on the Soviets, Radio Moscow broadcast something this morning, I guess, saying that Sakharov is alive and well. Do you have any comment on, or anything -- any confirmation?

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* The Department Spokesman was inadvertently given the statement issued in 1982 on the anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The proper text of this year's statement is as follows:

"Sixteen years ago tomorrow, armies of the Soviet Union and most of its Warsaw Pact allies invaded Czechoslovakia and suppressed the aspirations of its people and leadership. By this brutal and cynical act, the Soviet Union sought to deprive the people of Czechoslovakia of the right to determine their own destiny. Those of us who are privileged to enjoy the blessings of freedom ignore at our peril the tragic loss of liberty suffered by the people of Czechoslovakia."

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A No, other than to repeat what we have said before, which is that we think that an independent observer who might go and see the Sakharovs would be perhaps the best assurance we would have of what their condition is.

Q One more detail question on the Soviets. You may not have an answer to this. Does the State Department have any evidence that the Soviets are violating the International Postal Convention by withholding mail or --

A Well, I think we had some guidance on this before, did we not? Have you checked in the Press Office?

Q I haven't. No.

A Okay. (To staff) Do you have something on that? I recall that we did. If we don't, I'll see if we can get you something on that, but if you would check afterwards. I thought this issue had arisen before.

Q Alan, anything on the Greek Government's cancellation -- unilateral, I think -- of the joint maneuvers with the U.S. in northern Greece?

A Not really. My understanding that this is similar to action they've taken before on an exercise that involved a disputed island. My understanding also is -- and you might want to check with DoD -- but my understanding also is that they will be participating in other exercises and joint maneuvers, so that it's not as if there were some sort of total pullout from exercises.

Q Do you have anything on China's complaints about textile exports?

A Yes. China has passed to us its views on the proposed new rules of origin, including its concern that the rules will adversely affect its textile exports.

As you know, we're in the midst of a 60-day comment period, during which we're accepting comments and the views of all concerned parties.

China's views, along with the views of other concerned governments, will be passed to the U.S. Customs Service and other concerned agencies for consideration, and, if necessary, modifications will be made in those rules.

Q Copy of that, please, Alan?

A Yes.

Q Also on China, do you have any information to the effect that the Chinese are buying West German nuclear equipment rather than the American equipment they would be eligible to buy under the new agreement?

A Well, I saw a press report on that last week, Jim, but I don't have anything specific on that.

Q Do you have any comment on the deal between China and Brazil?

A No.

Q Does the U.S. Government have any concern at all about it?

A Well, I understand there was some sort of a brief press announcement last week on this, and I'm not aware that details details have come out, so I --

Q Does not our non-proliferation policy have some concern about this?

A Well, I think we obviously would be interested in what non-proliferation provisions there were, but I don't have --

Q We're not going on the basis of press releases, are we?

A Well, I'm not aware what the specific state of this is, Don, and whether --

Q Could you see if there's some comment about the deal?

A I'll look into it, but in the absence of any detailed announcement of what is involved, I think that we probably would not have a specific comment on that. Our concerns about non-proliferation obviously apply.

Q You don't suggest that we wait for some announcement?

A To do what? To comment publicly?

Q No, to --

A We might, yes.

Q To decide whether or not there was some concern about it. I mean, a lot of things are not announced, especially in this field.

A The question of what we say publicly might be affected by what they've said publicly. But, anyway, I'll look at it.

Yes?

Q Could you tell us if any other countries have submitted reports on the textile regulations?

A I don't know the answer to that. I've seen various and sundry press reports of other textile interests who have commented. I'm sure that there are others who have said things, but I don't know what they are. And in any case, they will all be put together or passed on to customs and other interested agencies and they will --

Q Do the official reports go to the Department or to --

A I don't know. I'm sure some will come here. I'm not sure they would all come here.

Q I see.

Q Do you any further information on the developments of the multinational efforts in the Red Sea for hunting mines?

A No. The mine-hunting effort continues, but there have been no mines found to date. For details, obviously, I would refer you to the Pentagon -- Mike Burch.

Q Alan -- excuse me -- anything on King Hussein's renewed call for an all-inclusive Middle East peace conference, and particularly since the Soviets seem to be trying to get on the good side of the Saudis?

A Nothing new to say about it. Our position on that has been expressed several times.

Q Following on the mine thing, is there any coordination involved between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, now that the two Soviet minesweepers have arrived in the region as well?

A Well, I'm not sure what the Soviet minesweepers may be doing, whether they are actually sweeping or not. I just don't know the answer to that. In any case, my understanding is they're operating -- if they are operating, they would be in an area away from where we are currently doing.

I'm not aware that there is specific coordination. I think that the concerns that we have and an explanation of what we might be doing would be a natural topic of conversation between us; but I don't think it necessarily would extend to the point of the kind of coordination I sense your question is getting to.

Q Do you have any comment on the Libyan -- they said that John Hughes' statement is interference in Libya's affairs on their agreement with Morocco.

A No, I don't have any comment on that.

Q Do you have any comment on the Prime Minister of Lebanon, Rashid Karami, complaining this morning in the paper that the United States has not done anything to help Lebanon standing in the way of Israeli practices in southern Lebanon, and they are going to complain to the United Nations, especially the situation of closing the area in the south?

A No. The only comment -- I don't have any comment on his remarks, which I think actually were made a few days ago. But I don't have any comment on them.

Q Do you have any comment on the Israelis closing off the south?

A Not specifically, other than to reiterate the concerns that we have expressed before about the humanitarian aspects of the situation in southern Lebanon.

Jim?

Q Do you have any follow-up on the Morocco-Libya, after seeking clarification?

A I don't have anything further.

Q Was clarification, in fact, given?

A Well, I don't have anything further to give you on that. We continue to be interested in that agreement.

Q There was a report in a London paper, The Sunday Observer, I believe, about Israel using poisoned gas in jails where there are Palestinian prisoners. Can you look into this?

A Well, it sounds to me like a charge I've not seen documented anywhere, so that would be my only comment on that.

Q The paper has this --

A Well, papers say lots of things, but I've not seen any documentation of -- poison gas in a jail?

Q Yes. This is according to the headline of the story.

A Well, why don't you ask the Israeli Government. I think they would be prepared probably to address that.

Did you have a question?

Q Did you ever get any reaction to Pinochet's comments over the last couple of weeks on no elections and so on?

A On what?

Q No elections until '89?

A No, I don't have anything.

Q Anything new on the School of the Americas, in Panama?

A No, I don't have anything new on that. I think that the Southern Command had something to say about that last week and their actions, but I don't have anything new from here.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on Fred Hiatt's story in the *Washington Post* a few days about the United States is preparing with Israel to place arms and equipment on Israeli territory as part of the strategic cooperation between the two countries?

A No, I don't.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The Press Briefing concluded at 12:11 p.m.)

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Story / [illegible] /
[illegible]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #151

TUESDAY, AUGUST 21, 1984, 11:59 A.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Okay, happy to take your questions.

Q You have nothing?

A I have no announcements.

Q That was a good question.

A The more general judgment needs to await the remainder of the briefing.

Q I have a question.

A Sir?

Q What role does the Secretary of State intend to take during the Presidential campaign?

A What role does he intend to take?

Q Yeah.

A I think he intends to continue his role, as he has been all along, as principal articulator, other than the President, of foreign policy, and he will continue his diplomatic activities.

Q Has he made any policy about whether he will indulge in partisan defense of the Administration's policies?

A I think that it has been traditional for certain members of the Cabinet, including the Secretary of State, and I believe Secretary of Defense and some others, not to do that; although they, obviously, as I say, do continue in the function of articulation of as well, obviously, as formulation of foreign policy.

So, in terms of strict partisan, political activity, I think the answer to that would be no. But the question of continuing to state American policy, the answer, obviously, would be yes.

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Q Can I follow on this, please?

A Uh-huh.

Q The U.S. News has a sort of whisper, saying that Secretary Shultz is one of five top officials who are -- supposed to be away from the Presidential campaign because of the sensitivity maybe of their roles. Do you have any comment on that?

A Well, I'd refer you back to what I just said about the Secretary. I can't speak, really, to others, and I'd think you would want to maybe check individually with the various agencies or the White House. But there has been, as I say, a traditional position that Secretaries of State, and certain other members of the Cabinet and leading officials, have not gotten involved directly in campaign-type activities.

Q New subject?

A Go ahead, Bill.

Q Alan, anything new on the prospective meetings between Shultz and Gromyko at the U.N.? Has there been any communication between the U.S. and Moscow about this?

A I can't say whether there's been any communication, Bill. I don't know whether there's been, in that broad sense, any communication. I'm not aware that there's a specific plan at this point, however. But to repeat what we have said very frequently, and it remains true, we certainly are operating on the assumption that a meeting of that -- between them would normally take place, and we would have no reason to assume that that would not be the case this year.

Q Could I rely on your historical memory on this? Is it normal that this -- a month away or so -- we still would not have had a communication between Washington and Moscow on this meeting?

A Well, I -- as I say, I'm not being as sweeping as "a communication." I can't say that this subject hasn't arisen. It may well have arisen in various ways.

Let me check and see if I have anything further for you, but I -- if the implication of your question is that somehow we think that there is a problem, or something of that sort, I would not support that implication. We have no reason to assume other than that there would be a meeting.

Q Do you know for certain yet whether Gromyko, in fact, is coming to the U.N.?

A I don't know. Somebody else may know. I don't know.

Q Could you tell us that if you -- ?

A Well, I think that's something for the Soviets to talk to. I don't think it's for us to talk about Mr. Gromyko's plans. If we can talk about the question of the meeting --

Q You talked about it last year.

A If we can talk about the question of a meeting, I'll be happy to do that, Barrie, and I will check further to see what we can get on it.

Q I read that the President's joke had been submitted by the Soviets to the documentation in connection with the possibility of Vienna. Do you have any observation to make about that?

A No. I saw the wire on that but I don't have any observation on that, other than what we have said before.

Q Is there anything new on Vienna?

A No.

Q Anything more on the cancellation by the Greeks of those military maneuvers?

A Well, there was -- yeah, yesterday, I was addressing principally the question of some naval type maneuvers. The Greek Government, following a public statement, informed us that it had cancelled a previously scheduled bilateral exercise called "Zeus", which involved both Greek and U.S. forces.

We regret the Greek Government's decision to cancel the exercise which we believe would have been of benefit to the forces of both nations. We, of course, do not agree with the reasons put forward by the Greek spokesman justifying the cancellation.

Q Copy, please?

A Sure.

Q The head of the Iraqi Interests Section was in the building yesterday. Has he met with any officials, do you have any readout about that -- Mr. Hamdoun?

A I don't have a readout on it. Sorry, no.

Jim?

Q A couple of Latin questions. One: Do you have anything on recent killings of relatives of a Guatemalan legislator and a trade union leader?

A No, don't.

Q Do you have anything on the order of freeing Ferreira's son in Uruguay?

A Yes, I do have something on that. Our Embassy in Montevideo has confirmed that Juan Raul Ferreira was released yesterday. We, of course, welcome his release as a further step towards the normalization of the election year environment in Uruguay. This is another sign of progress toward the successful transition to an elected democratic government.

Q Does the United States expect similar treatment to be accorded his father, so he can run for president?

A Well, we reiterate our hope that Wilson Ferreira will receive expeditious legal due process, and look forward to an early resolution of his case.

Q Could we get a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Alan, recently, some Arab leaders did an interview with CNN, and all of them said that they favor an international conference on Middle East, and recently also the Soviet Union put forth some proposal.

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Can you outline why the State Department rejects, I mean, or the Administration rejects completely any international conference on Middle East?

A Well, we've addressed it many times in the past -- and I'd refer you back to the record -- but the basic reason, without getting into a lot of detail, is that we don't think that is a productive way of approaching resolution of that problem. We don't think it would work.

Q On the minesweeping operation, is the U.S. considering any further expansion of the U.S. role in the minesweeping operation in the Red Sea?

A I'm not aware of a specific plan at this point to do that, Ralph. I would say, obviously, one would always have in mind what the situation is, and what requests might be coming in, and what others are doing; but I think we have indicated that (a) what we are doing -- and you know what those activities are -- that others have joined in at the request of other governments, at the request of the Government of Egypt or Saudi Arabia, and so on, and I don't have any reason to believe at this particular point that we would be about to expand, nor am I trying to suggest that we have something in reserve that is just waiting for a particular signal. But obviously, I can't rule something out when we don't know what circumstances may be down the road.

Q Could I ask a followup to a question I asked last week about the Djibouti meetings here. Edward Derwinski apparently is in Djibouti now.

A Uh-huh.

Q Is that related to the minesweeping operation?

A No. I think we had some guidance on Mr. Derwinski's trip, and I ask you to check on that. It is in the Press Office. It is not related to that situation. I can't say the subject won't come up, but that's not the reason.

Q Can I ask one more follow -- Would the United States consider taking the -- in the event that a culprit were found, with sufficient evidence to satisfy the U.S., would the U.S. consider taking that culprit to the World Court to protest the mining of the Red Sea?

A All right. You're getting me into a hypothetical situation. Let's try and find out what we can about what the mines are, or whatever it is, and try and determine what we can about who is responsible.

Q But would you consider that an appropriate forum --

A I don't --

Q -- for resolution of that issue?

A I think until we know what the facts are, it's hard to say what one would or wouldn't do.

Bernie?

Q Do you regard Ambassador Kirkpatrick's portrait of U.S. foreign policy last night as being an accurate statement of this Administration's foreign policy?

A I think that Ambassador Kirkpatrick is obviously a senior Administration figure, and speaks for the Administration, and I refer you to her remarks.

Q On the mining (inaudible), is Libya still a prime suspect in that case?

A We have been careful not to try to assign responsibility. There has been information, obviously, which has come out about possible culpability. Libya's name has been mentioned in that connection, but we have not made any accusations at this point, and I don't intend to today.

Q Alan, to follow -- ?

Q Libya's name mentioned (inaudible) --

A I think I've seen the press quoting various and sundry officials and other countries, and so on.

Jim?

Q Following on Bernie's question, is it the Administration's view that Kirkpatrick was speaking last night for the Administration, or was speaking as a private person?

A I think in terms of -- I can't tell you what her capacity was. She was speaking, I assume, as a person with -- who was asked by the convention to speak there. In terms of whether her views, though, as expressed in terms that represented the policy of the Administration, I refer you back to what I said about that.

Q What is the difference between Kirkpatrick and Shultz, whom you just said would probably take no partisan position, strictly partisan position?

A I don't know what the tradition has been with respect to the U.N. I can't speak to that.

Q Alan, going back to your answer --

Q Can I just follow up on that? The Secretary is going to be in Dallas.

A That's correct. He is.

Q What is he going to do there?

A I don't have a complete schedule on his activities down there, Jim.

Q What is he going -- It is a political convention, partisan convention -- .

A Well, that's --

Q -- what will be his role, if he is playing a non-partisan role?

A He, basically, is going down there because he wants to be there. I believe that he was asked to go down by the President, and he's happy to go down there.

Q And will he make similar defenses of the Administration's foreign policy as Ambassador Kirkpatrick did?

A He certainly is not going to make a speech, but I can't tell you that he won't make any remarks on any occasion.

As I said to you at the beginning when you asked the question, he will be continuing to articulate U.S. foreign policy.

Q I thought he was going to make a speech to foreign delegations.

A There is a group that is meeting there, but that's not -- He's not speaking to the convention.

Q But he will be speaking to this group?

A He will be speaking to a group, yes.

Q Another question, the line is a little vague on when Mrs. Kirkpatrick is functioning within the State Department, and when she functions as a separate (inaudible)

A I'm not going to try to --

Q Do you clear her speeches on a situation like this?

A No.

Q Would this speech have been cleared by the Department?

A No.

Q I still don't understand -- and I wish you'd clarify --

A I know you do.

Q -- was she speaking as a representative of the Administration?

A Why don't you ask Mrs. Kirkpatrick's spokesman to clarify it for you?

Q Well, let me ask it in -- Let me try just a different tack: Is her speech something we could look forward to being reproduced by the U.S. Government or the State Department, and circulated to us, or would the Republican National Convention have to do something like that?

A I would think that a speech at the Convention is not likely to be reproduced as a State Department document.

Q Alan, going back to your answer to my colleague's question about the conference -- international conference on Palestine or on the Middle East conflict, Mr. Philip Klutznick, the former U.S. Secretary of

Commerce, suggested at the conference in Chicago in March to convene a United Nations special protocols like the protocols for these armament which were held between the United States and the Soviet Union and other countries in early 40s, 50s, I believe, which were proved to be very fruitful, in order to solve the Middle East, you know, such protocol to be held.

What would be the position of the United States that such protocols will be called for, since you don't like the idea of a conference on the Middle East?

A I'm not familiar with those particular proposals, so I can't comment in response to your question; but in terms of the Administration's position and what the President, the Secretary, the Administration, believe would be the most effective way of moving toward peace in the Middle East, I'd refer you back to the President's September 1 speech.

Q If I might follow, his caveat about the President's proposal and other things stem from the fact that there was no movement in this direction, and he was offering something that all parties concerned will be taking decisions that they will be implementing instead of just, you know, resolutions after resolutions with no impact.

A Well, as I say, I'm not aware of the specifics of his proposal, but I can assure you that in terms of the policy, that the policy remains as articulated on September 1. In terms of procedures, I can't tell you how we're going to proceed at this point, but I just can't address that specifically, not being familiar with it.

Q Just one more -- ?

Q Alan, are you undertaking consultations with Israeli Government regarding the Kahane case?

A I'm not aware that that would be something which would involve the Israeli Government *per se.*

Q Will you take the question?

A No. I think I'll leave it at that. That's a question of Mr. Kahane and the United States Government.

Q Still, the legal side of the research is continuing?

1-2106a

A Oh, I indicated to you, I think, when I talked about this before, that this is going to be a very long process we're talking about.

Q What do you mean by "very long"? It takes years, or -- ?

A I can't specify how long, but I think it -- you know, asking on a weekly basis isn't going to get it.

Q The Moroccan Government has now made public the text of the agreement between Morocco and Libya. Do you have any further comment beyond what you had last week?

A Well, the text has been published by FBIS. I don't know that we have yet ascertained -- in fact, I think we have not yet ascertained -- that this is a complete and official document as carried by FBIS. So we are studying the document that we have on hand; but at this point, that's about as far as I could take it.

Q The -- Ambassador Jorio of Morocco, the new appointed Ambassador, did not give you the text?

A Well, as I say, this is the -- I think we're studying the text as we understand it, and we just don't -- I don't know whether he's handed over a text or not. I've seen the one that Ralph's talked about. We're looking at that.

Q But he had a meeting with you today -- two days or three days ago --

A Well --

Q So he didn't hand the agreement to you?

A I think I will stay away from what he did or didn't do, and refer you to my response. I think you can draw some conclusions from my response.

Q Did you express concern to him about the agreement with the Libyans?

A I'm not going to get into the question of the diplomatic dialogue with Morocco on the question. We talked about it before, I made some comments on it, and I'd refer you back to what we've said.

1-21066

Q Alan, just for the record, the platform of the Republican Party is not considered an official articulation of U.S. foreign policy. Is that correct?

A I should think that's correct.

Q One more on that general subject: In his speech yesterday in Chicago, the Secretary says this Administration in the past four years has restored the confidence of our friends and allies around the world, that America can be trusted to confront challenges, not wish them away.

That last phrase, to whom or what is that a reference to?

A I'm not going to try to analyze the Secretary's speech, Jim. I think that the Secretary's words are quite clear and speak for themselves.

Joanne?

Q What is the latest, if anything, on the talks with Cuba?

A I don't have any update to give you on that. I think we've indicated before that we anticipated there would be continuing dialogue on the subject of the migration matters, including the Mariel excludables, and that remains the situation. That process --

Q When was the last talk -- last --

A I don't know, but I don't think I'm going to get into -- do you mean in terms of actual bilateral meeting? I think the one that we talked about that was held in New York.

Q Any more scheduled?

A I don't have anything for you on that.

Q Anything on Nicaragua?

A Well, Ambassador Shlaudeman and Vice Minister Tinoco just met a few days ago, and I would anticipate that there would be --

Q Is that the end?

1-2107

A Oh, I anticipate there would be further meetings.

Q Alan, going back to Kahane, he made a statement a few days ago that all the Lebanese in southern Lebanon ought to be expelled so there will be no harassment of Israeli soldiers and army there. Do you have any comment on such statements?

A Well, without addressing Mr. Kahane, because I don't think we want to get into a position of addressing everything he says, our position on Lebanon and our hopes for Lebanon and for the authority of the Lebanese central government being spread throughout the country and for unity and reconciliation and for the withdrawal of all foreign forces, as well as for the security of Israel's northern border, remains unchanged.

Q What about this specific statement that he made? Do you have any comment on that, because he's still a dual citizen -- U.S. and Israeli citizen. It's very important that, you know, to be addressed, you know, since, you know, you have share of him.

A Whether we think that the Lebanese should be expelled from southern Lebanon?

Q Yes.

A No. We certainly would not share that view.

Q Okay. I just want to hear about it.

Q Did you receive any complaints from the Prime Minister of Lebanon regarding the -- what he claims -- the Israeli new measures in south Lebanon?

A I'm not going to get into the question of our diplomatic dialogue with the Government of Lebanon. I think I expressed our continuing concern over the humanitarian aspects of the situation in southern Lebanon, but I don't have any comment on it beyond that.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:20 p.m.)

1-2108

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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1-2109

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #152

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 22, 1984, 12:16 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A couple of announcements. First, regarding some consultations on CDE:

Ambassador James Goodby, head of the U.S. Delegation to the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, the CDE, is completing two days of useful between-round consultations today with his Soviet counterpart, Ambassador Oleg Grinevsky, in Washington. Ambassador Goodby visited Moscow in April for similar consultations between the first and second rounds of CDE.

The third round of the CDE will begin on September 11 in Stockholm. NATO has introduced a set of specific measures designed to enhance security and minimize the chances of war in Europe through surprise attack or miscalculation. The United States is prepared to engage in serious negotiations that will lead to significant progress in this round toward adoption of these measures.

Q Copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Secondly, with regard -- excuse me -- with regard to Australia-American relations and ANZUS, we understand from press reports that concern has been expressed in Australia over the importance the United States attaches to ANZUS and to our relationships with Australia. We wish to make clear, as we have done repeatedly, that the United States Government attaches the highest importance to ANZUS and to our excellent relationships with with the Government of Australia, including the personal relationship between President Reagan and Prime Minister Hawke. As President Reagan said during his meeting with Prime Minister Hawke last year, "Australia is a great nation that plays a vital role in regional and world affairs. It's a key ally upon whom we can count. Ours is an alliance of trust and friendship."

That's it for announcements.

Q What gave rise to that?

A As I say, there are press reports apparently expressing concern about this, so we want to make it clear that those are not well-founded.

Q Australian press?

A Apparently.

Q Could you develop a bit -- excuse me, Jim -- on this first announcement of yours --

A Yes.

Q -- about the nature of these talks and so forth?

A On the Grinevsky conversations?

Q Yes.

A I can give you a little bit of that. As I said, they are routine, between-round consultations. Both NATO and the Soviet Union have introduced proposals in Stockholm; both sides have reviewed their positions during these meetings here in Washington. We hope that agreement can be reached during the upcoming round in Stockholm on procedures for balanced discussion of proposals so that significant progress may be made toward adoption of measures which would enhance security in Europe.

The Soviets have shown interest in a reaffirmation of the pledge of non-use of force. NATO's concrete measures are intended to build effective barriers against the use of force in Europe. As President Reagan said June 4 in Dublin, "If discussions on reaffirming the principle not to use force, a principle in which we believe so deeply, will bring the Soviet Union to negotiate agreements which will give concrete new meaning to that principle, we will gladly enter into such discussions."

Q Can we have that?

A Sure.

1-2111

Q And have these "in between" talks, as you've called them between Goodby --

A "between-round talks" --

Q "between-round talks," yes. That has been completed here today, already?

A Ambassador Goodby's conversations are being completed today, yes. I think he is also seeing officials in other agencies as well.

Q Does the U.S. have some new proposals to make at this conclave when it gets back underway? Is that what you're telling us?

A No, I'm just keeping you up-to-date on the fact that there have been these consultations and generally what they are about. I'm not in a position to go beyond what we've said before about our objectives at the next round.

Q As I understand it, these things got practically nowhere in the last round. What is giving rise to your optimism that maybe they'll go somewhere now?

A I don't know if it's a question of optimism, as much as it is a question of determination and belief that this is the appropriate thing to do and the necessary thing to do, and we want to try to do it.

Q Alan, are the talks in the building today?

Q And is the Soviet Ambassador here today?

A I believe that he -- that Ambassador Grinevsky, not -- when you say "the Soviet Ambassador"--

Q Exactly, yes.

A I believe that the meetings have been in this building, yes.

Q Today?

A I think so, yes, today -- completing those rounds today. I don't have timing on that.

Q Alan, just let me clarify something you said in that second answer. As I understood what you said, you hoped that agreement can be reached basically on a format for discussing both the Soviet desire to reaffirm the no-use of force and the NATO proposals. You're saying that during the third round, maybe you can come to an agreement on how to discuss both sides' proposals, as opposed to --

A Let me again go over the last sentence of the opening statement that I made on it: "The U.S. is prepared to engage in serious negotiations that will lead to significant progress in this round toward adoption of these measures."

Q Read again the thing you said in the second answer.

A Well, the point --

Q You hoped that agreement --

A "That agreement could be reached on procedures for balanced discussion." I don't think anybody's necessarily -- obviously, it would be desirable to get agreement on the specifics as quickly as possible. What has been difficult, obviously, is to decide what to talk about, and I think that what the President indicated in June in the quote that I gave you is that we're willing to take up the Soviet approach to this in terms of reaffirming general principles, if that, in fact, will in turn give rise to addressing the more concrete aspects.

Q The optimism for this next round is optimism over agreeing on procedures?

A I haven't used the word "optimism." I think that the question included the word "optimism." We hope.

Q The "hope" is for agreeing on procedures?

A For procedures, and then I would think -- I can't try and lay it out for you, Ralph. I'm not prepared to do that in terms of how much progress we might get beyond procedures at this point.

Hank, did you have something on that?

Q I think you've answered it. It's simply that as I understand you here, you're saying that we're ready to talk about the declaration on the non-use of force in direct context if the Soviets are prepared to discuss more specific measures.

A As a general approach, I would agree with that. We've talked about this before, and I don't want to try and create new words on this, and that's why I want to be careful about it; but the answer to that essentially is, we would certainly be willing to look, as the President said, at their more generalized principle -- approach in principle -- if that will open up the door to talking about something which will give concrete meaning to those principles.

MORE -

Q Can you find out for us, please, when those talks will end here today?

A I will try to do that, sure.

Q Alan, could you give us a basic chronology on that? When was the Soviet proposal brought forth?

A I don't have that information in my head, Jim. All of that, I think, has been discussed in briefings, and we can maybe help you if you don't have that in your files.

Q Is that the proposal that's been around for quite a long time, the Soviet "non-use of force," and in the past hasn't the attitude of the Administration always been that's it a somewhat meaningless --

A Well, I think we have expressed our concerns about that, but I'm referring you back to the statement that the President made in June, in which he expressed a willingness to look at the reaffirmation of those principles if that would lead to giving some concrete meaning to them as well.

Q We should assume, therefore, that Mr. Goodby and Mr. Grinevsky have been discussing that relationship during the last couple of days?

A I think that that's fair, that we have been discussing both sides' approaches to the talks over the last couple of days.

Q Doesn't the Soviet approach include the principle of no first use of atomic weapons?

A Well, I'm not going to try here to give you a briefing on CDE. There is a lot on the record on this, and I refer you back to that record. I'm not prepared here today to do that. I haven't tried to go back and see what who has said when. But that's all pretty much -- no, more than pretty much -- it's all on the public record.

Q Can you amplify the use of the word "useful" to describe the discussions?

A Not beyond what I've said, no.

Bernie?

Q Where do we stand on these talks about non-militarization of outer space?

A The Vienna proposal?

Q Yeah.

A There is nothing new to say beyond what we last said about that, which was now, I guess, a couple weeks ago.

Q Another area?

A Yes.

Q Well --

A I'm sorry. Go ahead.

Q One more thing on this. Anything on a Gromyko meeting?

A On a Gromyko-Shultz meeting?

Q Yeah.

A There -- as I indicated before, the Secretary has said he looks forward to a meeting at the U.N. General Assembly with Mr. Gromyko. We are in communication with the Soviets about that topic, but there have been no arrangements yet made.

Q Alan, anything new regarding the situation in the Red Sea?

A I really don't have anything new on the Red Sea, no.

Q Alan, how do you explain the widening distance between the U.S. position and the Egyptian position regarding the part played by Libya, or supposed to be played by Libya, in the mining of the --

A Well, I'm not sure that I would agree with the characterization. The fact is, we share Egyptian concerns over possible Libyan involvement, but we have no independent information. So that is where we are, and that's where we're going to have to remain until we have something about it.

Q They are talking about Libya in quite different terms as the only and the sole accused of committing the mining.

A Yeah. Well --

Q Why you are refraining to say anything about this?

Q Alan, do you have anything on the recent decision taken by the Chairman of the American University in Beirut to close the off-campus programs that's been going on for some time in East Beirut?

A I wasn't aware of that. Let me take a look at what --

Q And one more thing, please, because some concern has been voiced in Beirut that they have been taking it as a pretext, the transfer -- or to close the University in Beirut completely and transfer it to Jordan.

A Again, let me take a look at that and see what I can get on that.

Bernie?

Q Alan, there was a report that the Administration was thinking as well that if there were a meeting between Gromyko and Shultz, an effort would be made for there to be a meeting between the President and Gromyko.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you have anything on that?

A No, I don't. (a) I guess it would fall in the realm of the speculative, but (b) in any case I don't address Presidential-type meetings, so I'm going to stay away from the subject altogether.

Q Alan --

A Bob, you had a question? Okay. Rick?

Q On the Red Sea again, what actions would the U.S. take if Libya is found to be responsible for sowing the mines?

1-2117

A I think that falls into the realm of the hypothetical, and I'll leave that one.

Q What actions would we suggest the Egyptians take if Libya is responsible?

A I think that falls into the same realm. Sorry.

Q There are reports from Israeli press that the United States, especially the State Department, is planning a massive United States economic aid to Israel to alleviate their economic situation. Can you elaborate on what plans are in the making?

A The U.S. has traditionally been concerned for Israel's economic well-being, and our two governments consult periodically on Israel's economic problems and on other aspects of the U.S.-Israeli economic relationship.

As for a plan or some sort of activity of that sort regarding Israel's economy, we would expect that the Israeli Government would take measures necessary to deal with its economic problems, and we would expect to continue close consultations with the Government of Israel on that subject.

Q Has the State Department taken a specific stand on the Cranston Amendment to the Foreign Aid Act?

A On the Cranston Amendment?

Q Which provides that U.S. aid in the future will always exceed the repayments of past aid?

A I'm not aware of the status of that. Why don't I take a look and see if we've had anything to say about it, Jim.

Q Could you --

A Sure.

Q Do you have a copy of that?

Q Alan --

A Yeah, more or less.

Q Alan, do you have any comment now, after two weeks, on the Morocco-Libya federation?

A Not beyond what we've said before on that subject, no.

Q Have you seen the agreement yet or not?

A The question was raised the other day whether the Ambassador, the newly-arrived Ambassador, presented a copy of that agreement when he called on Deputy Secretary Dam. The answer to that is no, that his purpose in coming to call was to present his letters of credence. So that was not --

Q Does that mean you don't have an official text of the Morocco-Libya --

A I can't take you beyond where we were yesterday in terms of the FBIS text, that's right.

Q Alan, can we stay on the Middle East? Do you agree with the Israeli procedures giving control in the south of Lebanon to the so-called border mini-state of the late Haddad?

A I don't have, as I have not when -- as this issue has been discussed over time, any specific comment on the arrangements there, other than to repeat what we have said before, that we continue to have concerns about the humanitarian aspects of the situation there.

Q There was a report that there will be referenda held in Morocco and Libya on August 31 to confirm this union, or merger. Do you have anything on that?

A No. I've seen, I think, in the documents or surrounding announcements, that date has been announced, but I don't have anything specifically on it.

Ralph?

Q Comment on either the Soviet or the Chinese objections to the GOP platform or the Democratic platform, for that matter? The Chinese say that they submitted an ambassadorial-level complaint to the U.S. about that.

A No. I think they've said, as I read the papers, they submitted something to each of the parties, and I'd refer you to the parties.

Q Alan, you have nothing to say about the two reactions, the Soviet or Peking?

A No.

Q By way of criticism of the GOP platform?

A Not particularly.

Q The Lebanese Cabinet decided yesterday to launch, or lodge, a complaint against Israeli practices inside Lebanon --

A I'm sorry. Could you --

Q The Lebanese Cabinet decided yesterday to lodge a complaint against Israeli practices in the south. What will you expect that the United States' position will be, if any deliberation will be taken in the Security Council about this?

A Well, I, again, don't have anything on that, and I suppose if the issue comes to any sort of a vote, at some point we would then have to decide what we'd do, but we don't usually announce ahead of time what we would do in a U.N. situation.

-- MORE --

Q Would you support Lebanon's position on that, or --

A I'm not going to get into the diplomacy of this.

Q Alan, do you have anything on Mexico's request for the extradition of their former Police Chief?

A Yes, I have something on that. This has to do with the former Mexico City Police Chief, Mr. Durazo, I gather.

Mr. Durazo was provisionally arrested in San Juan, Puerto Rico, on June 29 in accordance with the 1978 U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty. He's currently being held by U.S. Federal authorities pending an extradition hearing.

His extradition is being sought for alleged violations of Mexican law relating to extortion, weapons violations and smuggling.

The Government of Mexico submitted, on August 21, documentation supporting its extradition request within the required 60-day period set forth in the Treaty. Any further questions should be addressed to the Department of Justice.

Q Alan, what is Secretary Shultz doing in Dallas? What is his plan there today? What is he going to do when he's down there?

A Well, I don't have -- I think we got to this yesterday, Don -- I don't have details of what his itinerary are. He's speaking, I think it's today, to a group of foreign visitors down there.

Q Isn't there a Republican group, a Republican international cooperative project, or something?

A I don't have the details of it. But John is down there, and if somebody's got questions, they can -- I don't think -- It's going to be covered by some press down there, so --

Q And he is just there for the day?

A No. He'll be down there; he's going to stay down. He was asked to go down by the President, and he went down. He's going to stay down through the acceptance tomorrow night and then will leave Friday.

Q He will come back here? Vacation?

A Well, I don't think I normally would get into his plans on the record in terms of travel. We can talk about that later.

Q But he isn't coming here, right?

A As I said, I don't think I'm going to get into the question of his plans on the record.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the voting in South Africa and the arrests there?

A The voting?

Q The arrests of opposition --

A I don't have a specific -- in terms of the outcome, and all of that?

Q No, well, there is no outcome yet unless you know something we don't. But, no, they're voting today, as I understand it, the elections to the Chamber; and they've also arrested about 40 people in the last 24 hours. You have nothing to say about that?

A Well, on the detention, we are very concerned about the detention of some 35 leaders of the United Democratic Front, the UDF, by South African police. We are in touch with the South African authorities to seek information.

Such a step, on the eve of the election for colored and Indian chambers of a new parliament, does not further the goals of reform which the South African Government says it has been seeking to achieve. If those arrested are believed guilty of crimes, we would expect indictment and trial in accordance with the right of due process.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q You said "if they're guilty of these crimes, you expect" . . .

A "If they are believed guilty of these crimes....".

Q Oh, I'm sorry. Okay. Also, you don't have anything on the voting itself?

A No.

Q Do you have anything on the letter to the editor which appeared today in the New York Times, by Peter Bell, on the U.S. position on Ferreira in Uruguay?

A No.

Q Alan, the Washington Times has been running a series on Morocco in which it stated that, among other things, the U.S. Ambassador had more access to King Hassan than any other diplomat in Rabat, and at a time when King Hassan is trying to establish himself as the last of the true Arab leaders as far as the -- as North Africa is concerned, do you think that that might undermine his position, the fact that --

A Well, I'm not going to try to speak to his position.

Q No. Well, no, no. The fact that the U.S. Ambassador is --

A Yes, if that's what's you're -- no, there's no question that there has been a good relationship, but I'm not going to try to analyze for you the effect of that relationship on his -- on the King's situation.

Q It's being viewed rather negatively in a number of --

A Huh?

Q It's being viewed rather negatively in a number of areas?

A I don't think that's for me to comment on.

Q How do you evaluate this good relationship if you are the last one to know about even the text of the agreement between Libya and Morocco?

A Well, I think we've had to say -- we've said what we had to say about that particular agreement up to this point.

Yes?

Q The Republican Party's platform, which is a reflection of the, I believe the Reagan Administration and this Administration here in the State Department, did not say anything about the matter of moving the Embassy, the U.S. Embassy, from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in the Middle East section. It only talked about Jerusalem being unified, and negotiations in the future, etc., etc.

Why, why the issue of moving the Embassy has been dropped from -- to reflect the Administration's position --?

A Don't ask me about party platforms. That's not my responsibility, or my job.

The Administration's position on Jerusalem is clear, expressed many times; refer you to the record on it.

Jim?

Q Anything on the events in the Phillipines yesterday?

A Don't.

Ralph?

Q Please forgive me for being one to ask this, but I do want to see what comment, if any, you have on the report that the State Department opposes CNN's use of a satellite to transmit Soviet television pictures to the United States.

A Yeah, I can give you something on that. The Turner application to the FCC sought authorization to receive the Friendship Games for the period August 15 to 30 utilizing the INTERSPUTNIK system. We advised the FCC in regard to the extraordinary provision of the coverage of the Friendship Games via INTERSPUTNIK that if there were any commercial arrangements to utilize space segment facilities for international telecommunications facilities, they should be made with INTELSAT or coordinated with INTELSAT in accordance with Article XIV of the INTELSAT Agreement.

The State Department did not object on foreign policy grounds to TBS use of INTERSPUTNIK for this service. Our letter noted that we welcomed the opportunity for the American public to have access to coverage of the Games, but also pointed out that if any commercial arrangements were to be made to utilize space segment facilities for international telecommunications, as I've said, they should be made with INTELSAT or coordinated with INTELSAT in accordance with Article XIV of the INTELSAT Agreement.

Q Was there any objection to the fact that an American company was using a -- receiving free services from the Soviet system? Was that part of the objection?

A I think the concerns that were expressed are as I have given them to you.

Q So coordination was the issue?

A Well, the issue -- I'm not going to try and characterize it. I think that the explanation as to what is required under the INTELSAT Agreement is what we were concerned with. And, as I said, the State Department did not object on foreign policy grounds.

Q Can we get that from you?

A Sure.

Yes?

Q Alan, have you any comment on the former Spanish Prime Minister, Adolfo Suarez, ordered to leave Uruguay two days ago?

A Don't have anything on that, no.

Bob?

Q A moment ago you characterized reports of a Gromyko-Reagan meeting this fall as "speculative." Are there any plans being made here for such a meeting?

A Well, as I say, I don't get into the question of Presidential plans. It's not for us to address from this podium. And I don't think that the White House has announced anything about the President's schedule at all. I'm not trying to lead you one way or another, but anyway I would refer --

Q I believe the CBS report last night cited "State Department officials" planning.

A I am aware of what the CBS report said, but that doesn't change what we do.

Q Alan, could you take the Spanish correspondent's question on the throwing out by the Uruguayan Government of former Prime Minister Suarez; and the reason I ask is because he is, as I understand it, on a team of lawyers for Wilson Ferreira, and you've spoken at great length about how you hope he receives due process.

A Well, I will look into it, but I won't promise you to come back with an answer on that.

Q Thank you.

A Okay.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:45 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #153

THURSDAY, AUGUST 23, 1984, 12:24 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. One announcement and one statement.

Announcement: Available in the Press Office is the embargoed text of a speech which Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Elliott Abrams will give before the annual meeting of the Cuban-American National Foundation tonight in Palm Beach, Florida. Please note it is embargoed until 7:00 p.m., Eastern Daylight Time this evening.

Also, a housekeeping note: There will be no noon briefing tomorrow, Friday, August 24, but the Press Office will, as is customary when we've had this happen before, be prepared to respond to questions by about noon.

On the statement --

Q What about the reason?

A The reason? You don't have a briefer available to you.

MR. KALB: How can you tell? (Laughter)

A How can you tell? The record will show Mr. Kalb. (Laughter)

On Afghanistan: On a number of occasions over the course of the past week, aircraft, artillery and rocket launchers based in Afghanistan carried out a series of brutal violations of Pakistan's territorial sovereignty which cost the lives of nearly 50 innocent persons, injured a large number, and destroyed property.

The United States deplores these attacks on Pakistan, a nation whose independence and territorial integrity we have long supported. We call upon the Soviet Union and its Kabul clients to put an end to these actions.

These attacks once again highlight the tragedy and suffering caused by the Soviet Union's effort to subjugate the Afghan nation and people, and to intimidate Afghanistan's neighbors. These actions have brought death, misery and exile to millions of innocent Afghan men, women and children. We believe it is vital that an orderly withdrawal of Soviet forces be achieved, thereby ending the repression in Afghanistan.

We call upon the Soviet Union to permit genuine progress in the talks about to resume in Geneva so that Soviet forces are withdrawn from Afghanistan, and Afghans may be permitted to establish their own government. This would create the conditions in Afghanistan for the citizens of that country, including the millions who are now refugees elsewhere, to return to live in peace in their own land.

Q Copy?

A Copy? Sure. And that is it for announcements.

Q On that, Alan, about a year ago the United States announced the sale or lease, or whatever, of a lot of anti-aircraft equipment to the Pakistanis. Has that actually been sent?

A I guess I would ask you to check with the Pentagon, which would be implementing that, Jim. I think that -- I don't know about specific deliveries under specific agreements. Let me ask you to check on that.

Q Did you describe --

A Excuse me. I'm told that I said 7:00 p.m. for the embargo (on Abrams' speech); 7:30 p.m. is the correct time.

Q Did you describe, if I heard you right, these as attacks from aircraft based in Afghanistan territory?

A Correct.

Q Do you know whether these are Soviet aircraft, Afghan aircraft, or what flavor are they?

A I don't know that we know for sure, Don, but I think the indications are that they are probably Afghan aircraft.

Q Afghan?

A Afghan aircraft. But the Soviet role, in terms of military operations in Afghanistan and from Afghanistan, is not really at issue.

Q There have been, from time to time, as you're aware these border attacks by aircraft and so forth.

A Uh-huh.

Q Is this the most serious or more or different from before? You say "a number of." Do we have any idea or further idea of the details of this?

A I don't, in terms of comparisons. It is, however -- as I say, there has been a series of attacks, and they have been particularly serious. I cannot, however, say to you that compared with an incident or a series at some previous time, this is absolutely the most devastating. I just don't know the facts on that.

Q Alan, do you know the kind of planes that were used, please?

A I don't have anything on the detail on that.

Q Alan, what is the status of these talks regarding -- the Soviets, the Pakistanis -- regarding withdrawal?

A I don't have a detailed reading to give you. As I said, the --

Q Are tney current, are they scheduled --

A As I said, talks are about to resume in Geneva. We obviously don't have a direct role in that. It is mainly talks, as I understand it, in which the U.N. is playing a very deep role and involves

Pakistan, the Soviet Union, and Afghanistan. But I don't have some sort of status report as to where those negotiations in general lie at this point.

Q Do you know when they were last held or --

A I don't have the details on that. Sorry.

Q Was any kind of return fire mustered from the Pakistani side of the border, Alan?

A I do not know.

Q Alan, would you consider it invidious to ask whether the --

A Excuse me, do you mean into Afghanistan or at the attacking aircraft?

Q At the attacking aircraft.

A Yeah, I don't know the answer to that.

Q Is it an appropriate comparison to ask whether the Afghan attacks on Pakistan are in any way similar to U.S. attacks in parts of Cambodia during the Vietnam war to attack areas where support for rebels were coming?

A Well, I'm not about to go back and try and address the Vietnam war, Ralph. I'm just not going to try and do that, or address any other situation. The situation here is that you've got several million Afghan refugees in camps in Pakistan; you've got attacks that have been launched against Pakistan territory, sometimes -- and I don't know the specifics of this particular case -- but clearly against, sometimes against the refugee areas, and it is a clear violation of sovereignty and has no justice in terms of international law. I'm not aware of -- well, I'll just leave it at that.

Bill?

Q Alan, has this protest been made to the Soviet Embassy here? Has anyone been called in, or has any protest been made by the U.S. Embassy in Moscow?

A I don't know if on this specific occasion there has been a specific protest, Bill. Can't tell you. Obviously, our concerns about Soviet activity in Afghanistan and also about the cross-border activity are things that we would normally raise.

1-2130

Q Could you take the step of making an announcement --

A I understand that.

Q -- or are you going to call anybody in?

A I don't know the answer to that, and I don't know that we would want to specifically say that we've done that. I'll look at it and see if we can get you something.

Q What is the relationship, in your opinion, between these attacks across the border by airplanes and the widespread reports that the resistance forces or rebel forces, or whatever name you want to call them, within Afghanistan are being supplied with weapons and other materiel from these same areas of Pakistan?

A Don, I'm not in a position to try to analyze that situation. I think that, as I said, though, you've got fifty -- I refer you to the words of the statement -- "fifty," or "nearly fifty innocent persons" who were killed, a large number injured. It is a clear military, overt military attack on the territory of Pakistan.

Q "Overt military," you said?

A Well, sure.

Q Well, how do you --

A I don't think aircraft coming over and artillery being launched and rockets being launched is anything other than that.

Q What I'm getting at is, do you believe this has any relationship with the less-than-overt military aid being given from these areas to resistance forces in Afghanistan?

A Well, I can't address the question of covert assistance. I understand your question, but I just couldn't address that question.

Q Could I just follow that? Given -- I understand what you just said, but the timing of it, coming -- I don't remember exactly how many weeks; but perhaps two or three weeks after -- four weeks after widespread reports of Congressional approval of a large sum of the money by the United States to supply the

1-2131

resistance in Afghanistan, do you see any relationship in the timing there?

A Well, I don't -- I'd repeat what I just said to Don. I can't get into the question of alleged intelligence activities of any sort, so I can't really talk to that. I can't try to give you an explanation why the Soviets and their friends in Afghanistan carry out attacks against Pakistan. In any case, we do not feel they are justified. And the answer to the question is for the Soviets to leave Afghanistan, and let the Afghan people run their own country.

Yes?

Q Do you have any confirmation to reports that inside Afghanistan complete villages of Afghanis were razed to the ground by Russian forces inside the country?

A I saw those reports. I'm not in a position to confirm them, but what I -- those specific reports. I would call your attention, though, in this statement, to what I've said about the efforts of the Soviets to subjugate the Afghan nation: "... have brought death, misery and exile to millions of innocent Afghan men, women and children." That includes, obviously, activities within Afghanistan.

Q (inaudible) civility of a situation like this, and now your condemnation of the attack on Pakistan, is the United States going to be taking this as a serious effort to -- bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union if the Geneva talks will convene or -- to put this as a condition to normalize the relations with the Soviet Union?

A Well, I don't think it's a question of normalizing relations with the Soviet Union.

I think -- as I said before, and I said to Bill that I would try and get more information as to whether we could say whether we've raised this specific situation with the Soviets.

But there's no question that the Soviets are aware of our attitude, concerns, objections to what is going on in Afghanistan and to the cross-border activity.

Q Another topic? Red Sea?

Q No, same one.

1-2132

A Go ahead, Bernie.

Q Do you have any sense of whether there's been an increase in the tempo of military clashes inside Afghanistan between the two sides in recent weeks?

A I don't. I don't know.

Q Do you have any comment on what the Defense Minister of Saudi Arabia, Prince Sultan, said: that the situation in the Red Sea is normal?

A First of all, I'm not aware of what he said. I guess it's been -- I can't remember when the last mine explosion was, but there was this series, and I suppose there have been many less recently, but obviously the concern is still there, and the activity continues. No mines have been found to date. I'd note in that connection, by the way, our understanding that the Italians, at the request of the Government of Egypt, are participating in mine-clearing efforts, and we welcome the broadened international involvement.

Q You also welcome the presence of the Soviets?

A We have observed an increase in the Soviet presence in the Red Sea during the past week and we are monitoring the movement of the Soviet vessels and assessing the import of that increased presence.

We assume, of course, that the increased activity reflects Soviet interest as a major maritime power to maintain freedom of movement in international waterways. And so to the extent that that is the case, and as I say, we assume that is the case, those mine-clearing efforts are consistent with our own approach to that problem.

Q Those mine-clearing efforts -- you've drawn the conclusion that the increased presence there is Soviet mine-clearing efforts?

A That's what it appears to be. And, as I say, that's what we assume this is related to.

Q Could we have a copy of that, Alan?

A Yes. Don?

Q Three representatives of a Jewish organization have been to Nicaragua, held a press conference, as I understand it, today saying that they have found no indication of anti-Semitism on the part of

1-2133

the Nicaraguan Government despite periodic charges made in Washington. Do you have any comment on their --

A I don't, Don, have a specific comment. But we've address this question before. Let me refer you back to what we've said about the question. It's not the first time, obviously, this issue has arisen, and I think that the assessment that we made previously would still hold. I don't think the situation has changed.

Q Do you want to point out when that assessment was, or whatever?

Q That was about a year ago, Alan. I think that perhaps an updated assessment might be useful.

A I think that the fact is that there are not very many many Jews in Nicaragua, so that the problem, as it existed, probably is about the same as it was then. But we'll take a look at it and see if there's anything to update. But in any case, if it's not, we'll get out that previous guidance for you.

Q And, further, as I understand it, they also said they were told by one of the senior junta people that Nicaragua would be prepared for -- I believe the word was -- "reciprocal initiatives" to establish a relationship with Israel.

Does the U.S. have any view of that?

A I'm not aware of that. I guess that would be a matter between Israel and Nicaragua. I don't think I'd have any comment on that.

Jim?

Q Alan, I just want to be clear on the guidance to which you're referring. There are public reports of Ambassador -- a cable from Ambassador Quainton in which he also concluded there was no anti-Semitism.

A Well, I've --

Q Do you consider that part of the public record to which you were referring?

A We had some -- in the context of the press reports on that, we had something to say. That was the time when we had some guidance available, and that's the guidance that I would refer you to.

Q Alan, same issue?

A All right, go ahead, George.

Q Any comment on the New York Times story on the U.S.-Nicaraguan dialogue?

A Yes. As we have indicated a number of times in the past, we intend that these be serious private conversations with a minimum of official comment. We have indicated that following the third meeting, these recent talks have been of a substantive nature and that we anticipate there will be future meetings.

Beyond that, we have nothing to offer.

On the issue of the Contadora process raised in that same report, we made clear following the Secretary's June 1 visit to Managua, which initiated the current bilateral talks, that the primary reason for the dialogue was to reaffirm and give impetus to the Contadora process and the Contadora Document of Objectives.

That remains the policy, and anything that might emerge from the current bilateral talks would be folded into the Contadora process.

Q Copy of that, please?

A Sure. Rick?

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the tape of Andrei Sakharov that is being seen?

A Yes, I do. The videotapes were reportedly furnished by Victor Louis who, as you recall, supplied Bild Zeitung with a number of still photos of Dr. Sakharov and Mrs. Bonner in mid-June. The surfacing of these videotapes would appear to serve two Soviet purposes. First, the Soviets seem to be attempting to bolster their claim that Dr. Sakharov is alive and well. Second, they are probably trying to divert attention from other developments in the case.

With regard to their first purpose, these tapes, if they are authentic, prove nothing about the Sakharovs' present condition. The tapes appear to be over a month old. We will still not know definitely what the Sakharovs' mental and physical condition is until reliable observers are allowed to meet with them and talk with them.

With regard to the second purpose, I would note that we have a report that Mrs. Bonner was tried last week and that she may have been sentenced to as much as five years of internal exile. Such stories would normally be cause for great outrage in the West, and the virtually simultaneous release of these tapes would create a diversion and thereby serve Soviet aims.

So far as Yelena Bonner's trial is concerned, we have a report that it ended on August 17 and that, as I noted, she was sentenced to five years internal exile for "slandering the Soviet state." While we have no confirmation of this report, if true, it would indicate the continued resolve of the Soviet authorities to restrict the freedom of movement of one of their country's most outspoken and outstanding citizens. No only would this action go against Soviet pledges at Helsinki to uphold freedom of movement and expression, but, in light of Bonner's deteriorating health, it would also reflect the Soviets' disregard for basic human decency.

Andrei Sakharov began his hunger strike on May 2 despite his own poor health, to press the Soviets to allow his wife to go abroad to obtain the medical care she desperately needs. Although the Soviets have continually asserted that the Sakharovs are in satisfactory condition, in the absence of independent confirmation we have no way of verifying these reports. We are outraged at the Soviet treatment of the Sakharovs. We are concerned by reports of Bonner's trial and will continue to demand that the Soviet authorities allow independent observers to contact the Sakharovs.

Q Can we have a copy, please?

A Sure.

Q This internal exile, does that mean that she is going to be again restricted to Gorky or someplace else?

A I can't tell you what it would involve, Jim. Don't know.

Q Can you say what the source of the information is that you have?

A No, I cannot.

Q How would you evaluate it? You say you can't confirm it.

1-2136

A Can't confirm it, but I think we are concerned enough by it to treat it the way we have in this statement.

Q So it's pretty good information --

A Well, we can't confirm it. I don't want to mislead you on that, but we're concerned by that report.

Q Do you have any observations to make about the intermediary role by Victor Louis, some assessment of his role?

A No, I'll leave you to assess Victor Louis.

Q Do you have anything on the reports about Chernenko not being seen?

A Do not.

Yes.

Q There is a report in the New Statesman this week, a report that talks about British War Cabinet documents, and the documents show that the British Navy deployed a Polaris missile-carrying submarine with nuclear armed warheads on it to the area of the fighting around the Falklands.

I was wondering if you could -- and it also had orders to prepare for attack if too many British Navy ships went down. I was wondering if you could give me an idea if the British had spoken to the Americans about this and whether there was what was supposed to have been a talk between the two of you as to who could "press the button" and who wouldn't?

A I can't. In terms of what British deployments there are, I cannot speak to that. That is, obviously, up to the British to talk about. I wasn't aware of any suggestion that the United States was involved in pressing nuclear buttons, and I don't think that question --

Q They were made by the Americans, I think, who put out the Polaris submarines.

A I don't think the question ever arose. I'm not suggesting that it arose in the British case, but it certainly never arose in the case of the United States. So I'll leave that (inaudible)

1-2137

Q Was the government here ever aware that there was a Polaris submarine --

A As I say, that is not for us to address. I'm not trying to suggest one thing or another to you, but that is a question to be addressed to the British Government.

Q Well, could you find out for me--

A No, I could not.

Q -- and give me an answer?

A No, that's a British Government matter, not ours.

Q Can I pose -- does the United States have any attitude or concern one way or another toward the use of nuclear weapons in this hemisphere?

A I refer you back to a lot of things that were said at the time of that crisis, and I'm not going to try and reopen it.

Q These were Cabinet documents.

A Those are alleged to be Cabinet documents, and the British Government will announce or address themselves to it; I'm not going to.

Q Thank you, Alan. Now that this round of South African elections are over, do you have any comment on it?

A Yes. The elections on August 22 and 28 for so-called "colored" and Indian chambers of the new South African parliament continue a process that will result in the inauguration in September of limited power sharing with "coloreds" and Indians in a three-chambered parliament. However, the black majority remains excluded from this process, and we therefore consider this new constitution to be flawed. We nevertheless hope that this election, marking a departure from an all-white franchise, will accelerate the process of reform which the Prime Minister has said is underway. The goal of such reform, however, must be a system of governance based on the consent of the governed, and we will be looking at future developments in this light.

Unfortunately, these elections were marred by widespread arrests of individuals noted for their opposition to the constitution and to the elections.

These detentions by the South African Government are greatly disturbing to us; they appear to undercut the commitment to reform we consider so vital, and they represent a violation of fundamental human rights and political liberties. We have made our concerns known to the South African Government and have urged them to reconsider the full implications of the detentions in the overall context of their efforts to offer political alternatives to violence.

Q Copy, please?

A Sure.

Q Can I follow up on that?

A Please. Go ahead, Connie.

Q The protests that the U.S. has lodged this week on both the UDF arrests and the squatters' removal, have they done any good? Do you know if there has been any progress?

A I don't have anything to offer you on that. Sorry.

Q May I follow on South Africa?

A Yes. Go ahead, Jim.

Q Do you have any comment with respect to the high level (of) abstentions as to whether you think this is now a viable, that this is meaningful, or potentially meaningful system of transition to majority rule or whatever your goals are?

A I'd refer you to what I've said. I think I addressed it to the extent I can in that statement.

Q You have nothing to say at all, then, about the high rate of abstentions, is that correct?

A No.

Q Do you have any confirmation that the Lebanese Army Chief of Staff was killed?

A I don't, Jim. Seen the wires, and I know people were trying to see whether there was any confirmation, but I didn't get any word on that before I came out.

Q Do you have today any reaction on the Lebanese decision to bring South Lebanon to the United States -- the situation there?

A To the United Nations?

Q To the United Nations.

A Very little. We don't have anything official from the Government of Lebanon on that question, and as I think I indicated the other day, it would be premature to speculate about what our position would be, should it come to the United Nations.

Q Why this lack of communication, Alan?

A Sorry?

Q Why this lack of communication between you and the Lebanese Government?

A Why the assumption that everything that they do necessarily will have been communicated to us?

Q But yesterday we asked you -- that they were taking it to the United Nations without your knowledge, without your consultation.

A Anyway, as I say, we don't have anything official from the Lebanese Government on that.

Rick?

Q Back to Chernenko for a moment, what is the present U.S. assessment of his health, and do we believe that it has gotten worse in the last several weeks?

A We have not addressed ourselves to the health of foreign government leaders, and I think I'm going not to violate that general practice.

Q Do we see the Soviet Union on the verge of a new shake-up in its leadership?

A I have no analysis of that sort to offer to you.

Q Do you have any comment on the report that the United States Government will not be providing Saudi Arabia any more with Stingers, and whatever happened to the request of the Saudis put to the United States Government to buy more missiles?

A To buy more --

Q Missiles. You know, the request (inaudible)

A I don't have anything beyond what we've said to you before on this subject on either Stingers or the general arms supply relationship. Obviously, we continue to have discussions with them about their requirements, and as decisions are made, then appropriate action would be taken, but I don't have anything new to suggest to you today.

Q But there was no decision taken not to supply the Saudis any more Stingers by this government?

A As far as I know, there was an affirmative decision taken to supply them the Stingers that were supplied, and I refer you back to what we said at that time.

Bernie?

Q Alan, anything on the increased reports that the U.S. is exploring the possibility of a meeting between the President and Gromyko?

A No. I don't have anything to say about that.

Ralph?

Q Are they looking into such --

A As I say, I don't have anything to say about it. You're asking about Presidential meetings; I don't address Presidential meetings.

Q Has there been any direct contact with Billy Graham about his projected trip to the Soviet Union?

A Yes, we have been in contact with the members of Graham's staff and have discussed the various aspects of that trip, but it is being arranged completely by the Graham organization, so it really is up to them to comment on it.

Q What is the U.S. part in it? Why have you been in contact with him?

A It is -- I think he made a trip previously.

Q Yes.

A We were in contact on that occasion, and we have discussed, as I say, various aspects of the trip, including problems that might arise. But the organizational aspects, we're not involved in that. It's between the Graham organization and the Soviets

Q Alan, any comment or confirmation of the Iraqi attack in the Gulf today or any comment on the explosion in Tehran today?

A No, no.

Q No, no. (Laughter) Not even to deplore international terrorism or violence (inaudible)

A Well, I don't know. All I've seen are reports of an explosion. I can't really characterize them.

Q You just wouldn't happen to have anything on the Pope's statement on liberation theology, would you?

A No, I wouldn't happen to have. (Laughter)

Q On the Sakharov tapes, can you be at all more detailed as to why you believe that tape is a month old?

A I think that there was some evidence of that tape being -- an attempt to make that tape available, shall we say, some time back. So it's based on that sort of thing.

Q Has the Department viewed a copy?

A Haven't seen it yet. Haven't seen it yet.

(The briefing concluded at 12:52 P.M.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #154

MONDAY, AUGUST 27, 1984, 12:12 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTE)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I just want to draw your attention to the fact that there will be a briefing in connection with the first anniversary of the Korean airliner shootdown. That will be tomorrow here in the State Department Briefing Room; tomorrow at 11:00 a.m.

Q On that very point, why is this being done as a backgrounder, if you are calling attention to the first anniversary of the KAL shootdown?

A I think the collective wisdom is that that has been the way to proceed on this one, Bernie. (Laughter)

Q That's the answer?

A Did you have a follow-up?

Q He's speechless.

Q John, I will back up what Bernie obviously is asking. We'd like to have this on the record. I see no reason for it not to be on the record.

A Let us pursue that a little and see whether we could get that changed.

Q Do you have anything on the latest tanker being hit in the Persian Gulf?

A No, not really, Jim. We've seen those reports. Can't offer any confirmation of them.

Q I'm curious about that. That's within the AWACS coverage area, isn't it? It's just off the coast of Qatar.

A It may be. I mean, it's simply a mechanical thing. We don't have confirmation yet that we could give you. At least I don't, not in the State Department.

Q John, do you have any comment on the Soviet announcement by their Defense Ministry that they have now successfully tested a land-based cruise missile?

1-2144

A Yes. The testing, reported in TASS, comes as no surprise. We are not going to be able to comment on the intelligence relating to the reported testing. But we can say that the Soviets have long had an active cruise missile program, and have already deployed a substantial force of shorter-range cruise missiles.

This program was under development long before US Pershing II and GLCM deployments began. NATO has begun deployments of the Pershing II and GLCMs in Europe as a response to unprovoked Soviet deployments of the SS-20. Those SS-20s now number 378.

In the INF negotiations in Geneva, the United States and NATO attempted for two years to negotiate an agreement with the Soviets that would eliminate deployments of all long-range INF missiles. Failing that, we have proposed that both sides reduce their long-range INF missiles to the lowest possible equal levels, and we have urged the Soviets to return to the negotiating table if they seriously want to reach agreements to strengthen stability and reduce the risk of war.

Q Copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q When you say that "preceded the deployment of the Pershings and US missiles," you're talking about years in advance of that, or what?

A I think so, Jim. This is not a new project; it is documented in Soviet Military Power and other -- the Pentagon report, and various other pieces of paper that have been around for a long time. It's not a new development.

Q Why do you suppose the Soviets are raising it in this way at this time then?

A Well, I guess you'll have to ask them. I guess it's the same old scare tactics.

Q Can we go to a different subject?

A Sure.

Q Do you have any comments on Walid Jumblatt's interview as it appeared in the Los Angeles Times this

1-2145

morning calling the Lebanese Government to negotiate directly with Israel and guarantee security agreements for it in the North, and the cancellation of the PLO agreement?

A No, afraid I don't. Haven't seen that one.

Q Can you look through that?

A I'll take a look at it, sure.

Q Excuse me. Minister Ariel Sharon of Israel said that Jordon belongs to Israel; that eventually it will be under Israeli control; it will become part of Israel. Any comment on that?

A No comment on that, but our position on the integrity of Jordon is well known. We've stated it many times in the past, and I'd refer you back to that specific language.

Q Two Mideast ones: There is a report in the Washington Times about Israeli military ineptitude. Is there anything from here on that?

A No, I don't have anything on it. You might try the Pentagon.

Q I tried them. Do you plan to look into, or --

A I don't plan to look into it, no.

Q Another report, too, about the US --

A There's a chorus from the front here saying they cannot hear your questions. They're getting my answers, which they appreciate, but they'd like to get your questions.

Q Thank you. The other report about Israel asking for $700 million in emergency military aid. Is the US going to act on that?

A No, no. Don't have anything on that.

Q Do you have anything new on the situation in the Red Sea?

A No, I really don't. We have -- the position remains that we have not recovered a mine so far, if that's what underlies your question. No, there's no change in that situation.

Q John, do we have anything on this French ship that was carrying nuclear waste, and it was sunk, and apparently the nuclear waste was destined for the Soviet Union?

A Yes, I do have something on that, Bill. That is the Mont Louis, I think she's called. We understand that this vessel was carrying about 246 tons of uranium in the form of uranium hexafloride to the Soviet Union. This uranium is only slightly radioactive. It does not present a health or environmental hazard in this situation.

According to French authorities the shipping containers were not damaged in the accident, and they're designed to remain sound for a year. However, salvage crews will have to take certain precautions during recovery operations because hexafloride compounds are highly corrosive. We have not received any request for assistance, and would not normally expect to receive a request in this type of accident.

Q There's nothing alarming in the shipping of this material from a political member of NATO to the Soviet Union?

A Well, in that connection, the uranium is to be enriched for use as power reactor fuel by Western European utilities. This shipment to the Soviet Union is under long-standing commercial contracts with Western European utilities and nuclear fuel fabricators. After enrichment to several percent U-235, the material is then returned to Western Europe for fabrication use in civil nuclear power reactors.

We have not approved -- this is non-US origin. We have not approved the use of US-origin to the Soviet Union for toll enrichment.

--MORE--

Q How does the US feel about that program, that long-standing program?

A Well, we've not opposed the shipment of non-US-origin uranium to the Soviet Union for commercial enrichment under conditions which insure that it will not assist Soviet military activities. The Soviet Union routinely provides commercial enrichment services to Western European countries for uranium to be used as fuel in civil power reactors.

As far as the United States is concerned, and US-origin, the US has not approved shipment of US-origin natural uranium to the Soviet Union for commercial enrichment as power reactor fuel because the bilateral agreement framework required by US law has not been developed.

Q Can we have a copy of all those, please?

A Sure.

Q Does that by extention mean that you don't approve of the French shipment?

A No. It means that that's a normal commercial transaction which has gone forward in the past and is going forward insofar as non-US-origin is concerned. As far as US is concerned, we do not ship -- We would --

Q But does that suggest that the bilaterals between France and the Soviet Union fall short of the safeguard standards insisted upon by the US?

A No, I don't think so, Bernie. I think it's a question of our not having negotiated our own agreement.

Q So that you really have no objection to that shipment?

A We have not opposed it.

Q John, does the State Department play any role in the -- I mean, the report on the military and the press that came out from the Pentagon?

A No. I think that was primarily the Sidle Commission. I think that the Pentagon primarily worked with the journalists who served on that committee, and I don't think there were any State Department officials on that Commission. I think I'm right on that.

Q Is there anything new on the probability of a meeting between the Secretary and Foreign Minister Gromyko?

A No, no change in what has been said --

Q Any change on Vienna?

A No change on Vienna.

Q John, anything to offer on the story in the New York Times yesterday about the Morocco-Libya rapprochement or proposed agreement?

A No, nothing beyond what we offered last week.

Q Is the United States Government still not in the clear -- the State Department is not in the clear -- about the text of the agreement?

A I do not know whether we have received the text yet. I'll be glad to check that one for you.

Q This morning the Moroccan Ambassador was meeting with Mr. Murphy. Do you have a readout on that?

A I don't. I don't know what they were talking about.

Q The Sikh hijackers of an Indian Airlines aircraft have been reportedly given about a week's asylum in the United Arab Emirates, and that government has assured them that they would be given -- that they would be helped to come to the US.

Has the US and the UAE Government been in touch? And will the hijackers be permitted to enter the US, and if so will they be given asylum here?

A Well, the United States certainly has talked with officials of the UAE, and obviously the Indian Government as well is an interested party. Those discussions are continuing and are sensitive, so I'm not going to be able to get into any detail on them.

In general, -- let me just remind you that not referring specifically to these individuals, but in general, let me just point out that in terms of law, any hijackers who end up in the United States are subject either to extradition or prosecution.

Q Do you consider as international terrorism, as Mr. Reagan is talking about, that he is against the terrorist activities? (Sic)

A I'm sorry. Is President Reagan against --

Q -- international terrorism. They come under international terrorisms?

A In this particular case?

Q Right.

A I don't know what the legal definition would be. It's clearly a case of hijacking. Where the line between hijacking and terrorism is drawn, I can't give you an --

Q It is understand (sic) that when U.S. aircraft hijacked or an Indian airliner hijacked, it comes under terrorism?

A No, I'm not sure that's correct. I'm not sure that's correct.

Q John, is OPEC keeping --

A Excuse me.

Q John, I just wanted to clear up one point. When you make the note that "in general, hijackers are subject to extradition or prosecution," is there any reason to believe that that would not apply in this case as well?

A No, there is no reason to believe that that would not apply. As I say, what I don't want to do is to talk specifically about this case. But nevertheless, I

1-2150

want to point out --

Q -- that's the policy.

A That's the policy, and draw your own conclusions.

- MORE -

Q Would you give political asylum to any Sikhs in this country if they applied today?

A Well, the question of asylum, as you know, is a delicate one. We don't talk about asylum applications.

Q Well, what I mean really is what is this Department's policy on the Sikh situation as far as the --

A Well, as I say, asylum cases are treated on a case-by-case basis, and we very rarely talk about them, but the State Department is involved in making recommendations in asylum cases.

Q But does this Department support the Sikhs or not?

A Uh --

Q Or their activities?

A I'm going to reiterate what I said, which perhaps you didn't understand. In the case of asylum cases, they're treated case by case, and we don't talk about them.

Q Are OPEC members effectively working together now to keep production below the established quotas, and can we expect any take-off in gasoline prices in the near future?

A I can't answer that one. Don't have anything on it. Sorry.

Q John, could you tell us about the Secretary's visit to Fort Bragg, is it, today?

A Yes. He's going down to Fort Bragg today. As you know, he's been out to visit a carrier, and I think went to a submarine. So he's visited the Navy. He's spending part of the day today with the Army, and I'm sure he'll be looking at various units there; and I think he hopes in the fall to spend some time at an air base.

Q Is he planning to switch jobs? (Laughter)

A I don't know that he is. (Laughter)

Q Late last week Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams made a speech to a Cuban-American group somewhere in Florida, I believe, which contained a number of rather personal attacks on American citizens for their views on Cuba which he does not agree with.

I'd like to ask if this speech, or at what level of the State Department this speech was cleared, and to what degree personal attacks by a senior State Department official on American citizens represents some new trend in the way the State Department deals with --

A Okay. I'm unfamiliar with that particular speech, but be glad to take a look at it.

Q Would you look at it?

A Sure.

Q John, is anybody here concerned about the safety aspects of these international shipments of nuclear materials? Is there an international body that sets standards for air and sea transportation to which we're a member?

A I don't know about the international body. This is a relatively harmless and fairly routine shipment. In the case of more significant shipments the United States is very deeply involved and much more stringent precautions are taken.

Q John, there are reports from the Middle East saying that the American-Israeli joint military/political committee is in a state of continuous meeting, or it's meeting continuously.

Do you have any comment on this report?

A I'm speaking without any knowledge, but that doesn't sound right to me. The committee, as you know, I think, is due to meet twice a year, and I think has done so. We generally haven't announced it. We've told you about it after it has met, and I'm sure that is still on track. So I -- without any knowledge, I tend to discount this report.

Q As far as I understand, following the reports coming out even from the State Department itself, the committee had been meeting for four times since November, which is not semi-annual.

A Let me take a look at that, because there may be several things in play here. But as far as the Joint Political/Military committee is concerned, I'm not aware that it's met more often than once every six months. But I'll be glad to inquire.

Q John, is it expected to meet in the close future?

A I don't know what the next date is. I'm sorry.

Q John, there was a wire service report this morning out of Lima, Peru. It talked about armed bands of terrorists that were raiding policemen and farmers in this upper -- you can forgive my pronounciation -- Jualaga Valley where this --

A It's a fine pronounciation.

Q Okay. It's close. (Laughter) Anyway, it's this joint anti-drug program with AID, State and the Drug Enforcement Administration, and they were talking about how that program has been affected by these armed raiders.

Do you have anything on that?

A I don't. No. Sorry.

Q Do you have anything on a neighboring country, the cease-fire in Colombia?

A No, I don't. Sorry.

Q Do you have anything on the unrest in the Philippines?

A No, I don't. I'm sorry.

Q Nineteen people have been killed.

A No. Sorry. You've exhausted me.

Q Okay, then. Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:30 p.m.)

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Olennor

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #155

TUESDAY, AUGUST 28, 1984, 12:04 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: I know this large audience is here for the previous speaker, which is just as well, because I have no announcements and very thin gruel. But then, as Bernie Kalb always says, "No news is good news."

Q John, do we still have American military trainers in Lebanon that you know of? I ask because there's a report on one of these clandestine radios, which reliability is very questionable, but claiming there was a fire fight today between some U.S. Marines in Lebanon and some five militia --

A I do not think we do, Bill, but I think I'd have to defer to the Pentagon on that. But it's my impression there are no U.S. trainers left in Lebanon. I may be wrong, so let's try the Pentagon on that one.

Q John, do you have any comment on the decisions in the -- by the South Pacific Community, or whatever their names is, to try to establish a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific?

A There was some guidance available on that yesterday, Don. In essence, it says we will wait 'til we see a firm resolution from them that we look at the text before we take a position on that. But we also made available to you yesterday a list of the factors that we take into consideration when we make up our mind on the nuclear-free zone issues. Many of them derive from U.N. resolutions.

Q That is in the guidance also, this -- ?

A That is in the guidance.

Q -- these lists of -- ?

A Yes.

Q -- of things?

A That's right.

Q Is the U.S. in communication somehow about its attitude toward this with the people involved?

A I don't know whether they have been in touch with us yet. I think not. There was a group meeting, as you know, and a group decision, I think --

Q - On a related question, what is the status of the U.S. discussions with New Zealand regarding ship visits and their military policies, and that sort of thing?

A Oh, I'm sure that discussions continue in diplomatic channels. Our Ambassador in New Zealand, I'm sure, is talking with various government officials.

Q Is it expected that the Secretary will meet with Mr. Lange this fall at the U.N. or some other place?

A Uh, I wouldn't rule it out, if Mr. Lange is at the U.N. I certainly wouldn't rule it out.

Q John, do you have any comment on the report of an American-manufactured plane being shot down in Nicaragua last -- yesterday?

A No, I don't. I think the Pentagon was asked about it and had very little to say about it. It wasn't a U.S. plane.

Q Do you have anything on -- go ahead --

Q Was it a U.S.-supplied plane?

A I'd refer you to the Pentagon on that.

Q Do you have anything on Soviet troops massing in Eastern Afghanistan near the Pakistani border?

A No, I don't.

Q John, anything on the Iraqi paper charging that U.S. supply of arms to Iraq continues?

A Which report is that?

Q In an Iraqi paper, on the FBIS.

1-2157

A I haven't seen that particular report, but our position and our actions with respect to Iran and Iraq are quite clear. We don't supply arms to either side.

Q Are you -- ?

A But I hadn't seen that specific report. I'm giving a general answer.

Q If you could take a look possibly on the fact that they're reporting that there is secret trial taking place in Turin, Italy, of a number of CIA experts in relation to this deal?

A I don't need to look into it. We don't supply arms to either side.

Q Do you share the view by that Congressional Committee on the balance shifting toward Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war?

A We're not really going to have any very specific comment on that report, Bernie, but I'll just underline our position. The U.S. position in the Iran-Iraq war has not changed. We wish to see the earliest possible end to the fighting, but we do not wish to see either party dominate the other. We have supported all mediation efforts. In particular, we have repeatedly called for the implementation of U.N Security Council Resolution 540.

Iraq has publicly stated its willingness to accept an immediate and verifiable cease-fire. Iran remains intransigent and continues to pursue a futile strategy of military victory. We believe that arms sales fuel Iran's refusal to negotiate, and we have urged others to stop the flow of arms to Iran. We, ourselves, sell arms to neither belligerent.

We support all efforts by others to persuade Iran to come to a cease-fire and to resolve its differences with Iraq through negotiation. If both sides accept a cease-fire, the cycle of violence will be broken and an important step toward negotiations will have been taken.

Q Copy, please?

Q On this statement, it makes no reference to the fact that it was Iraq that started that war.

1-2158

A I think that the history of the conflict is quite clear, but I'm giving you an appraisal of how we see the respective belligerence on each side at this time.

Q Copy, please?

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q John, is that the same guidance, really, I believe you've been saying for some months? Has that changed at all?

A Our position is unchanged. That's correct.

Q One of the points in the Foreign Relations Committee report was that -- where they say the United States has tilted toward Iraq -- was that over the recent months around a billion dollars of American agricultural credits have been granted to Iraq - according to them, anyway.

Is that correct; and, if so, what is the rationale for that?

A Let me -- I think I have a little piece of guidance on that. Over the course of the past two years, the Commodity Credit Corporation has provided commodity credits to U.S. exporters in order to promote agricultural sales to Iraq; but for details, I guess you really ought to go to the Department of Agriculture Export Credits Division.

Q Well, you say over the last two years?

A Uh-huh.

Q Is that -- are you trying to tell us that before two years ago they weren't doing it, or is -- why have they started now?

A That -- I'm afraid you've gone to the limit of my knowledge, Don. Maybe at Agriculture --

Q Can we get that one as well, John?

A Sure.

Q John, don't -- since you also recall that there were also some trade transactions between some American companies and Iran, including the Commodity Credit Corporation last year, and some construction credits in Iran --

A In a non-military area?

Q Yes.

A I mean, I'd refer you to the record. There may have been.

Q Okay. I want to ask a question about this. When you say "we don't want either party to dominate the other. . ."

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you have an indication that Iraq wants to dominate Iran, or is it the other way around, because of the importance -- the -- you know, the importing revolution to -- by Khomeini to other countries?

A Well, I think the tide has ebbed and flowed, but I think as of the past few months there has been the threat of an Iranian large-scale ground offensive by Iran, which has not materialized.

-- MORE --

Q But you have no proof or indication that Iraq wanted to dominate Iran in this?

A Our position is that we hope the outcome is such that neither country dominates the other.

Q John, (inaudible) there is a report this morning that the Lebanese with Syrian incentives have asked the Americans to replay a role, mediating role, between Lebanon and Israel. Can you tell us what is the role the U.S. is playing, if any, in Lebanon now, in terms of Israeli withdrawal?

A I'm not aware of that specific report. As you know, since our involvement with the May 17 agreement and the aborting of that, the United States has continued to be helpful in a diplomatic way but, nevertheless, has favored direct negotiation between Lebanon and Israel.

Q And, to follow up, there is also in the same report, states that Jumblatt, who is a Minister now in the Lebanese Government, and the leader of the Druze faction, is willing to provide Israel with security guarantees with Syria's support also.

A Uh-huh.

Q If Israel accepts to withdraw, how -- would you have any comments on that?

A I think we had a little response that was posted. We got that question yesterday, and we posted some response yesterday afternoon on that.

Q Do you happen to have that?

A I don't, Bernie, no, but I guess it's in the Press Office.

Q Has the United States made up its mind to veto any Security Council resolution calling on Israel to withdraw?

A I think, as always, Jim, we'll wait and see what the text of any resolution is.

Q John, what is the status of the citizenship of Meir Kahane?

A Sorry, citizenship of --

1-2161

Q Rabbi Kahane?

A I don't know that anything has moved on that since last we talked about it, or since last you and Mr. Romberg talked about it. That is a process that will take some time to go through, and I don't think there's been any --

Q What do you mean by "some time"?

A Well, I think it was a question of months, I think, Mr. Romberg said.

Q John, do you have anything on the upcoming visit of the Dalai Lama of Tibet?

A No, I do not.

Q Does the United States Government still stick with President Reagan's peace initiative of September 1, 1982?

A Of course.

Q Because Mrs. Kirkpatrick, at the Republican National Convention last week in Dallas, Texas, said that the Reagan peace plan is no longer existing, and that it was no longer suitable?

A Well, I don't think that's what she said.

Q Excuse me?

A I don't think that's what she said. There were two factors, or two misstatements of what she said. One related to Jerusalem, and one related to the peace process; but I think you should go back and listen to the tape, or read the transcript of what she said, rather than rely on reports of what she said.

Q Since this issue is creating confusion or not, it's a lot of concern in the Arab world, and there's been attacks, of course, severely in the press in Jordan and other Arab countries. Could the State Department, although you don't deal with political parties' platforms and other things, could we get a complete text of her speech, and if this is the intent of the -- ?

1-2162

A Yeah, you can get that from Ambassador Kirkpatrick's office, by all means. Sure. In fact, I suggest you do that. I think that --

Q But these two contradictions, or these two points -- ?

A Well, I've told you, they're not contradictions. That's exactly what I'm telling you: that on the question of Jerusalem and on the question of the President's peace plan, she did not say what she was reported to have said.

Q Who stated this misstatement, what the misstatement was by those who reported here?

A I forget who carried the original misreport.

Q Do you have anything about the state of health of Chernenko? There have been reports on TV --

A No, I don't. No.

Q Do you have anything, John, on Colombia today, on the cease-fire?

A Yes, I do. The Government of Colombia signed cease-fire agreements with the Army of Popular Liberation and the M-19 guerrilla movements August 23 and 24. The agreements are to go into effect on August 30. The United States very much hopes that they will contribute to the rule of law in Colombia.

A similar agreement was signed with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia on May 28. The one major group that has not accepted a cease-fire is the Army of National Liberation.

Q Can we get a copy?

A Sure.

Q I assume you don't have any further guidance on Colombia?

A I don't.

Q Do you have anything on the latest arrests in Liberia, the number two guy?

A I don't have anything there. Insofar as a demonstration in Washington, that the Liberian Embassy here was concerned, I understand the Union of Liberian Associations in the Americas and Canada held a sit-in demonstration at the Liberian Embassy here in Washington August 27. They were demonstrating to protest recent events in Monrovia, including arrests on the closure of the University of Monrovia.

At the request of the Liberian Embassy, the uniformed division of the Secret Service sent officers to the Embassy. We understand the demonstration was peaceful, lasted about three or four hours, and that the demonstrators left voluntarily.

Q On Thursday, Lufthansa will start service between the two Germanys.

A Uh-huh.

Q I wonder whether you have a comment on this apparent winding-up?

A No.

Q John, --

Q Two, in the back, please?

Q Yesterday's Washington Times story that -- with the Pentagon source that the Israeli military was -- work in -- action in Lebanon was considered seriously flawed or inept. Is there a State Department view on the reliability of the IDF now?

A Same position today as yesterday, nothing to say on that.

Q John, I have one. I understand you didn't want to comment on the Tuvalu Resolution now. But, in general, do we find nuclear free zones to cause difficulties for U.S. policy?

A Well, I think what we do is look at them on a case-by-case basis. As you know, where we have supported the nuclear free zone in Latin America, there are certain other areas where we do not.

1-2164

Q John, just two brief ones. Anything that you might have on the shootdown of the, or alleged shootdown, of the DC-3 in Nicaragua, or anything on the elections today in South Africa?

A I'm sorry, I didn't -- sorry?

Q A plane was reportedly shot down --

A Yeah. No, I think the Pentagon --

Q Okay. Anything on the elections of the Asian population in South Africa today?

A No. I'm afraid not.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:20 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #156

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 29, 1984, 12:00 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. Well, I just have one announcement and that is to remind you that the White House Central American Outreach Group will be having a briefing in Room 450 in the Old Executive Office Building this afternoon at 2:30. There will be remarks by Mr. William C. Doherty. He's the Executive Director of the American Institute for Free Labor Development. He'll be speaking on "Central America and the Free Trade Union Movement." And also Mr. Bruce McColm -- he's the Director of the Center for Caribbean and Central American Studies at Freedom House, and he will be talking on "The Strategy of the Sandinistas in Conjunction with the Salvadoran Guerrillas." That's all at 2:30 this afternoon, Room 450 in the Old Executive Office Building. The contact, if you want any further information on that, is Sue Mathis, and she is at 456-2910 -- Sue Mathis at 456-2910.

That's about all I've got for today.

Q Can you bring us up to date on the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Suez and --

A No real change, Jim. We still have not discovered any mine. As you know, the Italians, I think, are now involved. That's in line with our feeling that there should be a broad-based international effort to assist. Obviously, all of these -- each of these countries are there at the request of Egypt and are working with Egypt.

Q Are the Soviets operating?

A I don't know whether the Soviets have actually done any mine-sweeping, Jim. There've been mixed reports as to whether they were asked to help or not asked to help and whether they did or didn't.

Q And on the Persian Gulf, has the U.S. Government identified the last attacker? Was it Iran, as suspected?

1-2167

A Nothing beyond what we had earlier this week, in that we knew that there had been an attack, but we did not identify -- we were not able to identify the attacker, no.

Q John, yesterday you were asked about the AP report of Soviet and Afghan troops massing on the border with Pakistan. Do you have anything on that today?

A Yes, I do have a little elaboration on that. We've been aware of increased fighting in the eastern part of Afghanistan for several weeks. The fighting in Afghanistan is often intense, but it is sporadic, and Soviet/Afghan offensive operations tend to move about the country.

In late April and early May a major Soviet effort was made in the Panjsher Valley, to the northeast of Kabul; following this, the Soviets conducted a major sweep operation in the western city of Herat and surrounding areas. The major part of the fighting then moved back closer to Kabul, in the Shomali area north of the city, and in Logar Province to the south.

In August, the Soviets began to turn their attention to the eastern provinces of Paktia and Paktika, where heavy fighting had also taken place at this time last summer. The Soviets appear to be trying to open the road to Ghazni and to relieve Afghan units in several garrisons in the east beseiged by the resistance.

All during the spring and summer, Soviet forces have taken a larger part in the fighting than ever before, relying less on Afghan forces. Therefore, we see any buildup of Soviet forces in the east of Afghanistan as part of Soviet strategy against the Afghan resistance and not as preparation for a major ground incursion into Pakistan. Of course, continued limited violations of Pakistani territory are possible.

Q John, today at the U.N., they released --

Q Copy, John?

A Sure.

Q -- they released four letters from Pakistan to the U.N. Secretary General complaining about Soviet cross-border raids --

A   Uh-huh.

Q   -- indicating a -- Do we see a pattern in the Soviet raids, that is to say, the Soviets are attempting to embroil or embarrass the United States this close to the election?

A   I don't know that it's a -- As I say, I think we have to differentiate between what we've been talking about here, which we do not see as an invasion threat to Pakistan, versus the other kind of thing which you're talking about, which certainly we have spoken about and are serious.

I don't know what the Soviet and the Afghan motivation is. I suppose they're pressure tactics.

Q   Why do you think the Soviets are relying more on their own troops and less on the Afghan forces? Does that indicate lack of trust in the Afghan forces?

A   I don't know whether it indicates lack of trust, but it seems to be an indication of a lack of success in their operations. The Soviet involvement seems to be heavier and larger.

Q   Can you confirm the report that a large number of Soviet troops were shot by their own helicopters --

A   No, can't confirm that; seen that report, but can't confirm it, Barrie.

Q   On Afghanistan, there has been before Congress for some time a resolution calling for effective, more effective aid to Afghanistan rebels on the part of the United States.

A   Uh-huh.

Q   -- signed by, I don't know how many, but quite a few Senators and House members.

A   Uh-huh.

Q   What is the State Department position regarding this?

A   Let me take a look at that for you.

I-2167

Q Would you?

A Yes.

Q John, could I just follow up that question about the "no increased threat to Pakistan"? On July 1, the Russians sent a note to the Pakistanis accusing them of direct complicity in supplying arms to the rebels and warning that continued actions would henceforth be considered aimed against the Russians themselves and would not go unpunished.

A Uh-huh.

Q In light of that note and the fact that I understand there have been six bombings since August 13 of the refugee camps, why is the Department confident that there is no increased threat to Pakistan itself?

A Well, I think -- I'd like you to be careful with differentiating between the kind of attacks that you're talking about, plus the suggestion that there's a major ground buildup for an invasion of Pakistan. I think that's the line we're trying to draw here, and we're giving you our best estimate.

-- MORE --

1-2170

Q Is there a concern that Soviet pilots would actually become involved for the first time in the bombing of camps in Pakistan?

A Well, it is difficult to indicate what the nationality is of the pilots who have already been involved.

Q John, is the United States Government, in light of your concern in the last few weeks about the escalation of the attacks of the Soviets in Afghanistan and on Pakistan -- is the United States Government in consultation with your allies, European allies, and with the Islamic Conference about bringing a new campaign against the Soviet Union to bring about maybe an end or to cut down on all of their intrusions on the Afghani people?

A Well, I don't -- I'm not sure I understand the thrust of your question. We've made claims --

Q The diplomatic process of consultation and possibly protestation and possibly recruiting other allies in Islamic Conference countries who are concerned about Afghanistan -- are you launching a new campaign about this or just leave it to the statements?

A I'm not aware of a new campaign, but our view of what the Soviets are doing in Afghanistan and how repugnant and repulsive that is, is very clear, and we certainly have talked with a number of other governments who share our view of what is happening there. And there is an exchange of views ongoing, but I'm not aware of any new campaign.

Q You are not planning to take anything in the next General Assembly of the United Nations possibly to bring about another condemnation of the occupation of Afghanistan?

A I have no idea how the Afghan thing will fare at the U.N.

Q Another area?

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you have any comment on the continuing attacks by the Israelis on the Bekaa Valley?

A No.

1-2171

Q And anything on the deterioration of the situation in Lebanon?

A No.

Q Different cities?

A No.

Q In that connection, any comment on the Lebanese attempt to bring that to the attention of the United Nations?

A Well, that is before the U.N. We haven't seen the text of any resolution. We'll look at it when it's available. We hope for a constructive outcome of that debate.

Q John, do you have any comment on the report in The New York Times that the Lebanese accuse Israel of diverting the Wazzani River, or water, and possibly even taking it out of there?

A No, I don't.

Q John, what would that "constructive outcome" be?

A I think one that observes the realities of the situation.

Q John, but along those lines, is there not any concern that the very terrorism that the Israelis are trying to counter along their border by cutting off most of south Lebanon, will only increase by their very action?

A Well, I think there's continuing concern about the presence of all foreign forces in Lebanon.

Q Yes. But there seems to be quite a concerted effort on the part of the Israelis to antagonize the local populace, and much to everybody's consternation in the region.

A Well, as I say, we -- our goal is to see the removal of all foreign forces from Lebanon.

Q The only foreign forces there now seem to be the Israelis.

A Well, I think you'll find there are other foreign forces in Lebanon, unless there's been sudden withdrawals of which I'm unaware.

Q John, on the Red Sea, you talk about mixed reports about Soviet participation in mine clearing.

A Uh-huh.

Q Would the U.S. welcome? That would be one question. And the other is, the U.S. has, I take it, been in touch with other countries, the Italians and the French. Have we been in touch with the Soviets?

A I don't know whether we've been in touch with the Soviets. We did offer some language on our view of any Soviet participation, Bernie, and I think I'd like to refer you back to that specifically.

Q John, do we have any idea of the topic or purpose of the Assad-Qaddafi talks this week?

A No. You'd have to ask them.

Q John, going back to Lebanon, can you say that what Israel is doing in southern Lebanon is in the best interests of the Lebanese people, or that -- to improve the situation there, or is it exacerbating the situation?

A Well, I'm not going to respond to a question couched in those terms. Obviously, Lebanon has been and is a very tortured country with all kinds of problems, and to a large extent those problems are caused by the presence of foreign forces of different nationalities.

Q You know, I'm asking this question because Mr. Shamir yesterday in The New York Times, saying that, you know, they have been assisting some villages with water, and what they are doing there is not to interfere in their freedom, or whatever it is, to guarantee their security, and all of these claims of Mr. Shamir.

A Uh-huh.

Q I mean, you know, he's coming with some statement like this. I would like to know your response to it.

I-3173

A Well, obviously, as I say, we want to see the removal of all foreign forces in tandem with the various other objectives we have, which is security for Israel's northern borders. That is a factor that has to be considered as part of the withdrawal of Israeli forces.

Q John, any response to claims by some of the European allies that there's not as much coordination between the U.S. and them in clearing out the mines in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Suez, and that there have been some misunderstandings?

A I'm not aware of those. Obviously, the various countries are there at the invitation of primarily Egypt, I think, and, obviously, Egypt is taking the lead in this. But I'm not aware there has been any problem in coordination between the various countries.

Q John, does the United States find it curious that not one single mine has been discovered?

A I don't know whether we find it curious. We've certainly been doing the best we can to find one. Haven't found one.

Q You don't read anything into that?

A Well, maybe -- I don't know. I guess, I mean, one interpretation may be that everything that is there has been exploded, and I think -- was it 18 incidents? I can't speculate.

Q John, any further information on the Moroccan-Libyan agreement?

A No. I think we offered a little comment on that earlier this week when we did receive the text of the agreement.

Q John, are you studying the text?

A Sorry?

Q You have nothing on the announcement from Morocco that Libya has recognized --

A No.

Q Nothing on that.

Q Are you studying the text now, and you will have a response?

A Oh, I'm sure we're studying the text.

Q Will you have a response for us?

A I think we had a response earlier this week. I'm not sure that we have anything -- I am sure that we have nothing beyond that at the moment.

Q In light of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report which was yesterday and this morning in the papers, there is -- are there any evidence or fears that Iran might close the Strait of Hormuz or, as the report said this morning, in its part which was not --

A No. I don't -- we haven't changed position on that, no.

Q New subject, John?

A Sure.

Q In less than a month the President and the Secretary of State will go to New York to take part in the U.N. General Assembly. Have we yet had any successful contact with Moscow about a Shultz-Gromyko meeting?

A Well, I don't want to get into the -- into the substance, as always, of diplomatic exchanges. I think where we are is that it is the Secretary's expectation that if Mr. Gromyko comes, there will be a meeting, or meetings, between the Secretary and Mr. Gromyko.

The Soviets, I think, have not yet announced whether their Foreign Minister is going to the U.N. We have to wait for that announcement from them.

Q John, nothing on the reports about the request from Israel for emergency aid?

A No, I don't.

-- MORE --

1-2175

Q John, could you just please stay on the Gromyko thing for a minute?

A Sure.

Q Do you have any assurances that, or any indication at all that he is coming?

A No, assurances, no.

Q Was there a response to the note that was sent assuring him that his plane could land, and that all diplomatic courtesies would be extended to him?

A I'm not going to get into an exchange of notes, and so forth and so on. But as the Secretary has said, we understand, and certainly the Soviets understand, that there is no problem about Mr. Gromyko's aircraft landing in --

Q Have you talked to the Port of New York Authority about that?

A I think we are convinced that there is not going to be any problem.

Q Is there a consideration, if he does come, of a meeting with President Reagan in New York, with the President?

A Well, there have been speculative stories about that, and it is pure speculation.

Q Regarding the Red Sea, we've noted in one of the stories this morning that the U.S. Ambassador in Cairo, Mr. Veliotes, has refused to see any American reporters regarding what is going on there. He is a usually pretty voluble fellow. Is he acting under some kind of instruction from the Department in refusing to talk about this?

A Not that I'm aware of. And, in fact, you surprise me because I thought that -- in fact, I know -- there had been access to the vessels involved by the press. You surprise me, frankly. I was not aware of this, but I'm sure he's not acting under any instructions.

Q John, will there be any obstacles in Meir Kahane's way if he chooses to come to the U.S. this week as he has announced, in light of the review of his citizenship?

A Any obstacles? No, I wouldn't see any obstacle in his way.

Q Am I using the wrong word? Will the passport review -- citizenship review -- in any way affect his trip?

A I don't see why. He's been informed of the action pending against him. We've seen reports that he may come to the United States. He has made no approach to the Department, no request to see anybody here. So certainly nothing is planned.

Q Has the Department -- the Government has not requested him to come in for a meeting to discuss his citizenship matter?

A No, no, not at all. That process is proceeding.

Q Do you have anything today on the vote in South Africa, or the arrests in Liberia?

A Only really to reaffirm what we've said before about the South African election. Namely, those elections for "colored" and Indian chambers of the new South African Parliament continue a process that will result in the inauguration next month of limited power-sharing with "coloreds" and Indians in a three-chambered Parliament.

However, the black majority remains excluded from this process, and we therefore consider this new constitution to be flawed. We nevertheless hope that these elections marking a departure from an all-white franchise will accelerate the process of reform which the South African Prime Minister has said is underway.

The goal of such reform, however, must be a system of governance based on the consent of the governed, and we will be looking at future developments in this light.

Insofar as the recent events are concerned, we are still concerned by the detentions which preceded last week's "colored" elections, and we are similarly deeply concerned by the deplorable violence which accompanied yesterday's Indian election.

Q Can we get a copy of --

1-2177

A   Sure.

Q   And, also, could I follow? The State Department hasn't said anything yet about how it views the participation in the elections; that is, I guess, both elections combined account for roughly twenty percent of those registered to vote, maybe slightly higher.

A   Uh-huh.

Q   Does this -- how does the U.S. view such a high abstention rate in view of the implemention of reform? Will it, itself, accord any recognition as a representative force to these new assemblies?

A   Well, you know, the United States has not proposed a plan; it's not offering a blueprint for the direction in South Africa. We have certain broad goals which we have stated, and what we see going on is, hopefully, movement in the direction of achieving those goals. But we have not offered a specific plan. It would be inappropriate for us to do that, and -- nor are we making any pronouncement on the validity of those elections. I think that's not for us to do.

Q   In terms -- can you say whether these goals, in the American view, are closer after these elections have now taken place with the high rate of abstention?

A   Well, in the sense that you have participation of "colored" and Indian South Africans in the process, yes. But that's not to suggest that there isn't a long way to go.

Q   Do you have anything on Liberia?

A   Sorry? On Liberia? Sure. All of the seven arrests that have taken place up to now of political figures are in the context of an alleged coup-plotting against the government. After the arrests of the first four, the Liberian Government publicly promised that they would be accorded a fair and speedy trial.

It's the expectation of the United States that this will apply to the others arrested as well, and that all will receive the full due process of law.

Q   How will this affect the upcoming elections, in view of the fact that these were leaders of their parties?

1-2178

A Well, as you know, the United States strongly supports the steps that have been taken to return Liberia to constitutional rule. The Government of Liberia has reaffirmed its commitment to the transition process, and we continue to observe the situation and expect due process.

Q Can we have a copy of those two statements?

A Sure.

Q John, on South Africa, one more follow-up. Is Chester Crocker going back to the area and, if so, why?

A Yes, he's in the area, and I think he may even be in South Africa. If he is not in South Africa, he will be shortly.

Q What is the main purpose of this visit?

A I think, clearly, the focus will be the Namibian situation.

Q Is this a key time? Does it seem to be coming to a head on the Namibia talks?

A Well, I think I'm loath to offer such a characterization. It's something that we and others have been working at for some time, and we continue to work at it.

Q Is there anyplace else that he's going that you can tell us, besides South Africa?

A No, I don't. I think he's -- I'm sure he will be visiting a number of other countries, I think mainly in southern Africa, but I don't have his itinerary.

Q Do you have anything on the latest Contadora meeting in Panama?

A No, I don't. Sorry.

Q John, do you have anything on the reported attempts --

A We might have something a little later on that for you, George.

1-2179

Q Do you have anything about reported attempts of a compomise with the United States Government initiated by the sponsors of the U.S. Embassy bill -- the story in The New York Times this morning?

A I'm sorry, I missed that one.

Q The sponsors of the Embassy bill --

A Oh, the Jerusalem Embassy?

Q Yes.

A There's no change in the position of the President or the Secretary of State, both of whom are strongly opposed to that move and have said so, and continue to be strongly opposed to it.

Q Do you have anything on the Hedges article today in the Monitor on the alleged massacre that took place in El Salvador in mid-July?

A Did have a little guidance in the Press Office earlier this week.

Q On that particular incident?

A Uh-huh.

Q John, any comment on the reports that there are differences between the two governments of the United States and the Sudan?

A That's a pretty broad question. (Laughter)

Q Regarding the new roles and -- or, you know, the developments, the internal developments of the Sudanese Government is well known to everybody, I think.

A No, I'm not aware of anything I can offer you on that issue.

Q I just wonder. Anything on the plane that went down in Nicaragua today -- yesterday -- I mean Monday, but then we asked about it yesterday -- (Laughter)

A No, not beyond -- (Laughter)

Q Thank you, John.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:25 p.m.)

1-2180

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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Thursday, August 30, 1984

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1-2181

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #157

THURSDAY, AUGUST 30, 1984, 12:45 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: I don't have any housekeeping or other statements for you, so it's been nice meeting with you, and -- (Laughter as he starts to depart).

Q John, a couple of questions about Iraq, and the various planes. One: Do you have any comment on the Iraqi Government's action in (1) not returning and apparently not prosecuting these hijackers, and --

A No, I don't.

Q You don't?

A No.

Q Is it something that you accept or --

A It's not a question of accepting it. It's a question, I think, of waiting until we have a little more information on the situation.

Q Well, from the information available, according to the Iraqis, the hijackers are being treated as "guests."

A Uh-huh. I've seen that report, and I know the sources you are citing and don't dispute them and respect them, but I think we'd still like to pursue our own inquiries.

Q However, as a general statement, you always urge receiving countries to either prosecute or extradite?

A Certainly, in terms of hijackers, in the legal sense of the word, there isn't any question about the position of the United States.

Q Aren't these hijackers, in the legal sense of the word?

A That's why we would like to pursue our inquires a little further rather than leaping to conclusions.

Q And on the other plane, do you have anything to confirm or -- the report that an F-4 from Iran --

A No. Don't . Again, seen that report; don't have any grounds for disputing it, but I'm not in a position to confirm it.

Q John, where do we stand on negotiations with Cuba on the Mariel people?

A Well, if that is a comment -- is that referring to the Washington Times story this morning?

Q Yeah.

A Okay. We're going to be as tight-lipped as we traditionally have on that, Bernie. We regarded these as serious and businesslike talks. And, as we've said before, we believe the substance must be maintained in confidence. I'm not going to have any comment on the substance of those talks.

We would just say, as a matter of guidance, that there are inaccuracies in the Washington Times story. Although we are engaged in a serious effort to resolve the Mariel issue with Cuba, it would be premature to speak of any agreement.

As you know, there have been two rounds of talks. Both of those rounds took place in New York. And as we said at the end of the second round of talks, further exchanges through normal diplomatic exchanges are foreseen. No third round of talks has as yet been scheduled.

Q Well, you said it's premature to speak of an agreement; is he wrong when he says that the two sides are close to an agreement?

A Well, as I say, I think we have felt, and the Secretary has felt strongly, that the best way to pursue these talks in the hope of coming to some fruitful conclusion is to not discuss them publicly. So I'm afraid we're going to be uncommunicative.

Q John, can you confirm or deny the figures cited in that story?

A I'm not going to get into details other than the general comment I've already offered.

Q John, the agreement, if it exists, or if the framework exists, as reported by the Times, sounds, at least to an untrained observer like me, as an incredible swap of 20,000 prisoners for 2,700. Would you care to be any more specific about the inaccuracies?

A No, I wouldn't.

Q Would you care to comment on the -- on that suggestion that it would be --

A No, I wouldn't.

Q -- an incredible swap that way?

A No, I wouldn't.

Q Do you have anything to say on the subject?

A No, I don't.

Q Why is that? (Laughter)

A Because I think, as you know, the Secretary is rather an expert in the area of negotiations, and I think his strong view is, in the case of these negotiations with Cuba, our talks with Cuba -- and a similar pattern, I think, exsists in the case of our talks with Nicaragua -- his feeling is that we should not discuss the substance of those negotiations in public if we are serious about coming to some fruitful conclusion. So I'm sorry to disappoint you but that's --

Q Discussing the timing is not the substance.

A Well, we'll discuss the timing -- we won't discuss the timing of the meeting; we'll tell you when we meet again.

Q New subject?

Q Would you tell us before?

A I don't think we will tell you before. I think our pattern has been to confirm when the meeting is taking place.

Q John, again on Cuba. How about -- is there any State Department position on travel to Cuba by journalists, businessmen, etc?

A There is no change in policy. But insofar -- I guess you're talking about the story this morning and the suggestion there is some specific inquiry, I guess I'd refer you to Treasury on that; but there's no change in the policy that has been in existence.

Q John, on the pocket veto, the ruling by the Court of Appeals, do you have any comment on that?

A Yes, I do, although I'm just going to give you -- this is a fairly technical question, so I'm going to give you the words and not really be very responsive to further questions.

There are a couple of points here I'd like to make. First, this is a complex legal and constitutional situation, and I don't feel competent to address that one. And, therefore, on that I'll refer you to the Department of Justice.

Insofar as the practical implications are concerned of this Court ruling, let me read you what I have. The State Department has not yet seen the Court's opinion, so we're really not in a position to make a definitive comment. However, the preliminary judgment is that the Court's decision will not affect the El Salvador program.

The bill, which the President pocket vetoed last November, would have continued the conditionality requirements under the 1981 certification statute until the end of Fiscal Year 1984, or until the Congress enacted new legislation imposing conditions on military assistance to El Salvador.

As you know, the second condition was met when the Congress included conditions on military assistance to El Salvador in both the urgent and general supplemental bills. Those conditions apply to the $70 million on the general supplemental bill and the $61.7 million in the urgent supplemental bill, and they required an initial Presidential determination, which has already been made, and another one before October 1.

These conditions cover essentially the same matters as the 1981 requirements, as updated to reflect current circumstances; and the funds prior to these two supplementals have, in any event, already been obligated.

So, in practical terms, there does not seem to be any impact on the Administration's El Salvador program.

Q Can we get a copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q John, new subject?

A Sure.

Q Does the revelation that that French ship was carrying enriched uranium change the U.S. view of trade with the Soviet Union?

A No, it doesn't change our view of trade with the Soviet Union. The same conditions pertain insofar as U.S. origin material and non-U.S. origin material.

I think the French Government itself is making a statement today, and you might want to be in touch with the French Embassy. I think they have in mind a fairly comprehensive statement on the cargo.

Q Yet, another subject, John?

A Sure.

--MORE--

1-2186

Q There are some rather intriguing stories out of Libya today concerning American involvement in the irrigation project there. An American official of one of these companies is quoted as saying the government approved the necessary licenses to make this project possible.

How does this mesh with the Administration's campaign to reduce American involvement in that country?

A Well, as a general observation, the United States Government, particularly in light of Libya's reprehensible and objectionable activities and behavior around the world, approaches any U.S. involvement with Libya with a great deal of caution, and that's a general, philosophical approach. Specifically, on this particular project, we're taking a look at various aspects of it.

As of now, we are not aware at this stage of any violations of United States law. The export controls that we have on exports to Libya were established in response to Libyan aggression and subversion and Libya's support for terrorism, and they are among the tightest we maintain for any country. For example, they are much tighter than controls on exports from the United States to the Soviet Union. But the fact is that certain exports of peaceful, non-sensitive, non-military goods and technology are subject to approval and are approvable in terms of our regulations.

Now, as far as individuals are concerned, it's illegal to use a United States passport for travel to Libya unless the holder of that passport has special validation from the Department of State. That validation is normally given only to professional newsmen, to Red Cross workers, and in the case of compelling humanitarian considerations. And the penalty for misuse of a passport under Title XVIII of the U.S. Code, Section 1544, is a fine of not more than $2,000 or imprisonment of up to five years, or both.

Insofar as the number of Americans currently in Libya is concerned, we believe there are between 500 and 1,000 U.S. citizens in Libya. Before passport controls were instituted and before we urged Americans to leave Libya, there were about 6,000 Americans there, so the number has gone down very considerably. We remain concerned about the safety of Americans in Libya, and we continue to urge Americans not to travel there, and we think it is unwise and imprudent for Americans to visit Libya.

1-2187

Q A follow-up to that. Were we aware that this project was underway and of the American involvement in it? And did we make any attempt to discourage that?

A Well, by law, I'm precluded from discussing specific export license cases because that's proprietary information. I think you may take it as a given that we are and have been aware of the project, and as I say, there are certain aspects of it that we are looking into, but there is no suggestion at this stage that there is any violation of law.

Q Are you suggesting that in some cases there could be -- that passport violations have occurred here?

A It's possible. I'm not leading you in that direction; I'm not suggesting that we have any specific suspicion or information, but it's possible.

Q John, if the Libyan Government doesn't require an American to use his or her passport to get into the country, then one would not be in violation of that --

A That's a good legal question; and I suppose in terms of legality, the traveler to Libya might be protected under the law, but certainly not in terms of the spirit of what we would prefer Americans to do -- and I'm not sure about legality. I think others would have to argue the --

Q The Supreme Court decision, the Staughton Lynn case in '68, forbids the United States to use the passport itself as a means of punishment.

A Our legal counselor, Mr. Wallach, here is --

Q John, I'm not sure I understand your answer to Greg's question. You've just offered a portrait of Libya.

A Uh-huh.

Q And to the question, "Did you try to discourage this arrangement?" the way I get it, the answer is no.

A Well, what you're asking, Bernie, I think is, "Did we grant permission for specific companies to do specific things?" and unfortunately by law -- or fortunately, by law, whichever way you want to interpret the law -- we're not able to get into the question of what was granted. But as I say, our approach to Libya in general and American involvement with Libya in general is a very cautious one. There are aspects of this that we will look into, but we are not aware of any violation at this stage.

Q What does it mean that you can't tell -- you're not able to get into the question of what was granted? Why can't --

A I don't know what the specific law is, Bernie, but --

Q Yeah.

A -- but there is such a legal prohibition.

Q So that you can have this portrait that you've done of a terrorist nation, and the United States can do nothing to stop commercial dealings with it? Is that what it comes to?

A No, I don't think that's what it comes to.

Q Well, that's what you're saying.

A No, no. What we're saying is, there are provisions under which you can export non-military equipment to such a country, and there is provision under our law for that, and it is not necessarily illegal to have done that.

Q John, when you say there are aspects of the program that you're reviewing, are you reviewing the program to determine whether the government should change those restrictions to prevent certain types of non-military humanitarian projects from going ahead in the future, or are you saying that there are projects like this that will be reviewed in the future? Or are you saying this particular project is being reviewed to see if everybody complied with (inaudible)?

A Specifically on this project, this is the kind of thing we would want to take a look at to make sure that there has been no violation of the law. I am also saying that we are looking at this within the general context of our philosophical approach to Libya, which is to approach any kind of U.S. involvement -- any kind of U.S. involvement in Libya -- with a great deal of caution.

Q John, picking it up again, when the company needs various non-military items to carry out this project, and they apply for licenses, and because it is non-military, you apparently make it clear you cannot stop it.

Am I right up to that point?

A You phrased that question in an interesting way, Bernie, and I'm not quite sure what degree of latitude there is there. You've turned the question around. What I have said is, it is permissible; I think what you're groping for is, within the parameters of the act, how much flexibility do you have to turn down such exports? That I'd have to do a little research on.

Q But do you tell a company -- the word was "discourage." But do you advise a company that the United States Government would prefer that you, as a U.S. contractor, do not engage in this project?

A I don't know about advising a specific company, but I don't think there should be any doubt about what I have said here today about our general approach to U.S. involvement with Libya, the fact that we've asked Americans to leave Libya, and the fact that this Administration views the activities of Libya in the world abroad with a great deal of revulsion.

Q How long has the Administration been reviewing this project in the way that you --

A I can't give you a reading on that, Ralph. I don't know.

Q Well, has the Administration done anything to hold up the American involvement at any point?

A I can't answer that one either.

Q Could you look into both of those questions?

A I think -- Let me see what we might have on those. I don't guarantee a (inaudible)

Q On a country related to Libya rather closely, if no other way, do you have any comment on the reports of recent military action in the Sudan?

A No, I don't have anything beyond what we've given you in the past, Don.

Q And is there anything new in the United States aid relationship with the Sudan? At some time ago, if you remember, there was a question whether the U.S. was going to supply aid, certain kinds of aid --

A That's right.

Q -- would be supplied, not other kinds of aid.

A That's right.

Q There was concern about the fighting in the southern part of the country.

A Let me see if I can get you a little update on that.

Q Okay.

A Do you have anything about this report about the Saudis being involved in the illegal export of falcons from Montana?

A I am going to refer you to the Department of Interior on the falcon investigation.

Q John, on this, in the same area, please --

Q Montana. (Laughter)

Q A week ago there were a group of Americans and some Arab-Americans here talking to Secretary Murphy and others in the NEA department about the closing of Al Najah University in Nablus.

Has anything been taken? My understanding is that the Department were looking into things. Is there anything that you can tell us about now of what (inaudible) --

A There isn't. I don't have any update for you on that, I'm afraid.

Q Can you please take the question?

A Let me see if there is anything available.

Q Can we have a copy of that Libya -- the long legal statement on Libya?

1-2191

A I think you really have to get that from the transcript because that is not all crafted language.

Q John, is the Secretary going to see the Nicaraguan Ambassador when he presents his credentials?

A I'm sorry. Which ambassador?

Q Is the Secretary going to see the Ambassador of Nicaragua --

A Don't think he has any plans.

Q John, on Libya again, would the shipper of the non-military goods be entitled to have special permission to travel to Libya?

A Well, within the -- you're talking about an American citizen?

Q Yes.

A Does he have a special --

Q Would it entitle him?

A Well, he would need to have his passport validated, and there have been instances, I understand, in which businessmen have had their passports validated. But basically the validation was intended to apply to newsmen, to Red Cross workers, and, as I said, to instances where there's a compelling humanitarian need -- a divided family or something like that.

Q Were there any passports validated for this project?

A I am not -- I guess I can't answer that, Bernie.

Q And I take it that actual material has actually arrived, the way you understand this, in Libya?

A Well, I think you need to be careful if you're talking about physical items or whether you're talking about expertise, and I guess the line has to be --

Q Physical items.

A I'm not sure of that.

Q Could you take those two questions?

A Let me see whether we might have something.

Q Do you have anything on the new reports of disturbances in Liberia?

A I don't really have a great update, but I will give you our thinking about the Liberian situation as it currently exists.

The United States continues to be strongly supportive of the transition process leading to civilian rule which has been initiated by the Government of Liberia.

We've been encouraged since the lifting of the political ban on July 26 with the enthusiasm and vitality with which the Liberian people have responded to the formation of political parties.

We're concerned that no action should be taken that could prejudice that process. We're also concerned about the arrests and detentions which have taken place and the subsequent violence which has occurred at the University of Liberia -- I think that was on August the 22nd.

Regarding the arrests, we welcome the Liberian Government's assurances that any who were charged will be given a prompt and fair trial. We expect that they will be given the full guarantee of due process according to Liberian law.

Insofar as last week's disturbances are concerned, we deplore any outbreak of violence, especially in a period when the ban on political parties and activities has been lifted and Liberians are preparing for elections and a return to the constitutional norms.

We particularly regret the casualties and damage to University property that resulted from last week's violent confrontation at the University.

Head of State Doe's recent assertion that the transition to civilian rule will go on is reassuring. We trust it will continue according to the timetable announced by his government.

1-2193

Q Yesterday in this statement you put out on Liberia, you used the term "alleged coup attempt."

A Uh-huh.

Q There have been suspicions voiced by some people -- not in the State Department, but I wonder if you concur in them -- that there was no coup, that this is an attempt to slow down or reverse the transition to constitutional rule?

A No. I don't have any comment on that.

Q Do you know if there was a coup?

A Well, I think we stand on the language we used yesterday. There certainly have been allegations in Liberia that it was involved -- that it was as part of an involvement in a coup, but I think --

Q Alan, about Libya, will you review your military and economic relations with Morocco if the union between Libya and Morocco after two days becomes effective?

A Well, I don't think the "union," as you put it, changes our view of Libya, and it doesn't change our view of Morocco. Morocco's been a firm, steadfast friend of the United States. As we said at the time, we were not aware of the impending announcement, and we were surprised by it. We continue to look at it, but the ties of friendship are there. And as for our attitude toward Libya, I think that's well known.

Q John, on -- I believe it was Monday when you told us that those containers that sank had uranium hexafloride --

A Uh-huh.

Q Now apparently from Belgium it comes out that it was much more highly radioactive material that was included. I realize the French Government's going to have something to say, but I wonder if you couldn't just clarify how this lack of full information emanated from here? Could you tell us from whom you got your information on what the ship contained?

A Well, if your question is, do we feel that we were misled by the French Government, the answer to that is no. We feel that we were informed as to the contents and have been aware.

You have to careful, and we are moving in a technical area where, as you all know, I am very "improficient." But you have to be careful, I think, about the specific contents of each of those cannisters, and that is a technical matter, and I think the French are addressing that today.

But be careful before you make sweeping conclusions about the contents of those cannisters.

Q John, do you have a current estimate of the loss to Cuba in foreign currency, hard currency, meant by the restrictions, the U.S. restrictions, on travel to the island?

A I don't, I'm afraid. It's possible that someone -- you might try the ARA press office. They might be able to come up with a figure for you.

Q Do you have any more on Pakistan today and the Soviet buildup in Afghanistan?

A Nothing more. As we --

Q Anything on Gromyko?

A Nothing on Gromyko.

Q John, there's a report that the People's Republic of China has signed a deal with a Jordanian firm for the provision of two nuclear power plants. Do you have any comment on that?

A With a Jordanian firm?

Q Yes.

A No, I don't.

Q Do you have any comment on --

A The People's Republic of China --

Q That's right.

A -- has signed an accord with a Jordanian --

Q That's what the report says.

A --company for the supply of nuclear power plants? No. That's -- haven't seen that one!

Q Do you have any comment on when the U.S. nuclear agreement with China will be --

A No.

Q -- when the review will be completed?

A No.

Q Could you say whether -- that it would be completed before November 6th?

A Can't give you a cutoff date, I'm afraid.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 1:11 p.m.)

1-2196

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #158

FRIDAY, AUGUST 31, 1984, 12:14 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, all. I have a statement on the anniversary of the shooting down of the Korean airliner:

One year has passed since the tragic shootdown of Korean Airlines Flight 007. 269 innocent people from 13 nations lost their lives on this day one year ago. We wish to express our sympathy to the families and friends of those who were killed on that day.

America, which lost 61 of its citizens in this senseless and unjustified action, shares with the families of victims from Japan, Korea and ten other countries deep sadness and shock over our common loss. These sentiments have not been diminished by the passage of a year.

We share with them also a continuing sense of outrage at the brutal attack on an unarmed civilian airliner. This act is an international issue of concern to all nations and is not primarily a U.S.-Soviet problem.

We share the sentiments expressed in the resolution, which was adopted on March 6, 1984, by the International Civil Aviation Organization Council, which condemned the use of armed force against the Korean airliner.

The resolution also reaffirmed that such use of armed force constitutes a violation of international law and is incompatible with elementary considerations of humanity.

There can be no real compensation for the loss of life in this tragedy. Nevertheless, we're deeply troubled by the fact that the Soviet Union has never apologized for its action nor offered restitution to the families of the victims.

Finally, we must do what we can to ensure that such an event never happens again. To that end the United

1-2198

States calls upon the Soviet Union to join the international community in observing accepted practices with regard to the safety of civil aviation. The world simply will not accept the repetition of such a senseless tragedy.

Be glad to take any questions.

Q Can we have copies of that?

A Sure.

Q Appropos, have you heard anything from the Soviets about a meeting in New York with Gromyko?

A Well, I think the fact of the matter is, Jim, that we expect Foreign Minister Gromyko to travel to the United Nations next month and are involved in the preliminary arrangements for that visit.

But I have to point out that the Soviet Union has not yet made a formal announcement of the Foreign Minister's plans to attend the U.N. General Assembly meeting. So it's more or less where we were. We are anticipating that he will be here; we're expecting that he'll be here; and, as the Secretary has said, he expects that there will be a meeting between himself and Mr. Gromyko, but there's been no formal announcement by the Soviets.

Q John, as long as we're on this general subject, I wish to lodge a protest. It stems from the backgrounder that we had on this subject earlier this week.

We were told at the time that the person who was giving the backgrounder preferred it that way, that he didn't wish to be on the record. However, that same individual was on an interview today on CNN where he very willingly was answering questions on camera and for the record.

We'd like to have an explanation for this, in addition to our protest.

A Okay. We'll take that.

Q John, is there any information that the U.S., South Korea and Japan is holding on the KAL that happened one year ago today that you are not making public, what really happened to the flight 0C7? (Sic)

1-3199

A No. Quite to the contrary. I think the -- I don't want to go over this because it has been discussed at great length, especially this weekend, indeed over the past year. But the fact is that I think an extraordinary amount of material has been made available in this case, material that under ordinary circumstances would not have been made available.

So I think that the governments involved have gone to unusual lengths to provide the information that is available and that in some instances has compromised intelligence-gathering operations.

Q I'd just like the record to note that many of us share Greg's statement to you.

A All right.

Q John, do you have any comment on the government of national unity in Israel?

A No. That's a matter for -- that's an internal affair of Israel. We don't have any comment on that.

Q Tomorrow will be the second anniversary of the President Reagan initiative. Is the U.S. Administration still committed to it?

A Absolutely. The positions in the President's September 1 initiative remain as valid today as when they were presented. The President's initiative represents a set of fair and balanced positions on key issues which the negotiating parties will have to resolve. These remain the positions the United States will support whenever the parties themselves are ready to engage in negotiations.

Acceptance of our positions by the parties is not necessary in advance of the negotiations and is not a prerequisite for a U.S. mediating role. We expect the parties to bring their own ideas to the table. On the other hand, the failure of the parties thus far to accept our positions has not lessened our confidence in their validity.

The United States intends to continue to pursue its goals throughout the region, foremost among which is a just and lasting peace between Israel and all its neighbors. We, therefore, remain committed to a speedy resumption of negotiations based on Security Council Resolution 242, and we remain committed as well to the Camp David Framework.

We are convinced that the President's initiative, which is based squarely on both Resolution 242 and the Camp David Framework, can point the way to a lasting agreement acceptable to all the parties.

Q John, copy, please?

A Sure.

Q John, but are you still opposed to an international conference for the Middle East?

A I don't believe that that is a particularly constructive or helpful way to approach it.

Q So how can you go from here? I mean --

A On the basis of the President's initiative.

Q But it didn't go up. I mean, from two years ago it didn't move an inch, so --

A Well, just like to remind you all that at the time the President launched that initiative, he made the point that we are in this for the long haul. Americans are often accused of being impulsive and having a short attention span, and the President made it very clear at that time that he would stand by his initiative, and the United States and his Administration would continue to work at this. Peace hasn't come to the Middle East for a long time. We knew what a backlog there was, but, nevertheless, he announced that he would be there for the long haul.

Q John, do you have any indication that Israel, under the new government, maybe will change its attitude towards the Reagan plan?

A No. I wouldn't have any comment on that.

Q How do you characterize the rejectionist attitude by the Israelis towards the plan?

1-2201

A Difficult problem. People been fighting with each other for a long time. Lots of antagonisms; lots of problems. It's a major obstacle to bring peace to them.

Q John, today in FBIS there is a report from Israeli paper. They said that a senior U.S. Administration official that told this magazine, Hadashot, that elements in the Administration are involved in the internal political moves in Israel.

I mean, you've been repeating for the last three weeks the reverse, that that's an internal matter in Israel. Why is Israel reporting that?

A That's correct. The reverse is correct. Any American unnamed official who says that the United States is interfering in the internal affairs of Israel is clearly wrong and is not expressing the opinion and the actions of the United States Government.

Q John, on the September 1 plan, although there are critics who accuse the government of -- there are critics who accuse the government of not pursuing it; that it was a good plan, but it's simply left to lie there without pushing it with either party.

A Well, I don't think that's a fair appraisal of the situation, Jim. The fact is that we have had a very major diplomatic effort. Obviously, there are problems. You have to face certain realities. You had upheavals in Lebanon and all kinds of other events that have proved difficult and injected new obstacles, but the fact is that the United States has pursued it.

Q Where was this major diplomatic effort taking place?

A Well, it began at the time the President launched the initiative, and it has continued. I'm not suggesting that there is movement. I'm not suggesting that I can report any breakthrough or any imminent breakthrough, but that doesn't alter the fact that peace is worth pursuing, that nobody else has come up with any other kind of alternative that seems to make a great deal of sense.

So the alternative would be to do nothing and sit back while people kill themselves in the Middle

East. That is not the position of this Administration. The position is to continue to work at it, however hard the assignment may seem to be and however long the road.

Q John, the Libyan version of a parliament today approved this federation arrangement with Morocco, and I think it was announced either last night or this morning that King Hassan would be making his first State visit to Libya in connection with this deal.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do we -- does the U.S. yet have a position on whether it thinks this is a good idea or a bad idea?

A We don't have anything to offer beyond our initial comment earlier this week.

Q Can you tell us anything about U.S. consultations with the French -- France's comings and goings, with Mitterrand going to the area and Cheysson, both at the same time? Are you in consultation about this?

A No. I don't think we would discuss our talks.

-- MORE --

Q I'm not asking for a substantive statement about those talks, but just whether or not there is a procedural consultation going on?

A I don't think I'd respond even to that one, Jim.

Q Not even -- Why? Is there something special about this situation?

A Well, you know how diplomats are about diplomacy. They have this odd idea that it should be conducted privately.

Q Is there new concern -- I'm sorry; just to follow up real quick, -- is there new concern about Chad, John, because, just to follow that up, the French President is in Morocco, the French Foreign Minister is in Algeria, and the French Defense Minister is in Chad.

A Uh-huh. No, I don't have any comment on that.

Q Back on the Libyan-Moroccan thing, does the Treaty of Union, or whatever it is called, have any impact on this Administration's plans for continued economic or military assistance to Morocco?

A Not aware of any change in thought about that.

Q Can I --

Q John, are there any views on the fact that Chernenko did not turn up yesterday at the farewell for the Friendship Games?

A I'm sure that Kremlin watchers in and out of government and in journalism and in think tanks are all looking at that report and evaluating it.

Q So am I, but I'm putting the question to you. I mean, does the U.S. have any views on that, or are you getting --

A It's not a question of having views on it, Bernie. I think, like yourself, we have remarked upon that report.

Q John, do you have anything new on the Sikhs who hijacked the plane in Dubai? Are they still pushing to come to the U.S.?

A Nothing more on that. That is an ongoing and a sensitive situation for the moment, and I think we won't have anything to say on that until there is some kind of resolution.

Q Do you have an idea on what basis the Dubai Government made the decision that they will be given permission to enter the U.S.?

A I'm afraid, specifically on that particular thesis you've offered, I guess you ought to ask the Government of Dubai; but I'm not commenting on what you've just said.

Q I did, but --

A And I'm not giving any validity to it.

Q Unofficially I was told by the Embassy that they had some talks with the U.S. officials, but you don't --

A We certainly have been involved in that. We simply want to be helpful; and wherever there is a threat to human life, the United States has a concern. We've talked with Indian officials, and we've talked with officials in Dubai. But I guess we're just, frankly, not going to go beyond that at the moment.

Q Would you like to mark the end of summer with some bulletin or something?

A No. I mark the end of summer with some relief, Bernie, but I don't have any -- (laughter)

Q John, can I come back to the Gromyko-Shultz meeting for just a second? The Bonn government this morning announced that Gromyko would be meeting on September 25 with Genscher --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- in New York. Apparently, the West German Government decided to make that announcement without a formal Soviet announcement of Gromyko's trip.

A Uh-huh.

Q Is the U.S. Government able to make an announcement that such a meeting will occur without a formal Soviet announcement of Gromyko's trip to New York?

A I think we would wait for the Soviets to announce the travel plans of their Foreign Minister.

Q How about the meeting plans?

A Well, I don't have anything to announce for you today.

Q O.K.

Q John, have the Soviets told you informally that Gromyko expects to be there?

A We obviously are discussing this prospect, have discussed this prospect, with the Soviets, but don't have anything to take it any further for you.

Q Do you have anything on Kahane's visit to the United States?

A In what respect? What's your question?

Q If you are expecting him to arrive; if you are expecting him to talk to --

A I thought I saw reports that he was here or that he was about to arrive today.

Q He's here already.

Q Oh, he's here already? Is he expected to try to influence the decision of the State Department regarding his citizenship?

A I don't know. There has been no request on his part to meet with anybody in the State Department.

Q John, how about --

Q John, in case he will -- sorry, I just need to follow up -- in case he will ask for such a feeling (sic) or a presentation or something, is he going to be --

A I'm not sure -- I guess the fact of the matter is, he has not asked so it's academic, so it's a little hypothetical; but I'm not sure what the process is insofar as it involves him in the legal question.

Q Has the U.S. asked him to come in, as opposed to his asking the --

A No, the U.S. has not. The U.S. has informed him of the action pending against him, as it is obliged to do; but it hasn't asked for a meeting.

Q Do you have anything on disturbances in South Africa today, that have been reported?

A No, I don't. No, I don't.

Q If I could just do a couple fast ones: a radio station in Costa Rica that the USIS is apparently underwriting in northern Costa Rica that is being signed today?

A Underwriting? I don't know what USIS may have in the area, but I think you should ask USIA about that.

Q O.K. But you don't have any guidance on it?

A I don't have any, no.

Q Has Nicaragua now protested to the United States regarding --

A Yes.

Q And have you made any reply at all?

A Same situation as yesterday; I don't have any comment on our reaction.

Q The State Department called elections for "coloreds" and Indians in South Africa a step in the right direction.

A Uh-huh.

Q There was a massive boycott by both populations calling it tokenism. Have you got any comment on this? And do you consider this election as legitimate, in the wake of such a massive boycott?

1-2207

A I have nothing beyond what we gave you on that either yesterday or the day before, in which we gave you a reaction to the elections, but why don't you get that wording from the Press Office afterwards.

Q John, do you have anything on the anniversary of Solidarity's foundation?

A No, I don't. No.

Q Also, on another point, do you have any comment on the Iranian charge that Iraq keeping that airbus which was hijacked to Baghdad is a violation of international law?

A Well, you asked me what the U.S. position was on that yesterday, and I said we wanted to just pursue that a little, not basing our thinking on the initial news reports. And the position of the United States is, insofar as the civilian aircraft, that whatever the motivation of the individuals who seized the Iran Air aircraft, the safety of its passengers and crew was placed at risk, so we regard these individuals as hijackers and we deplore any action that needlessly jeopardizes the lives or safety of innocent people.

As a general policy, we believe that any country which is a signatory to the Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, which entered into force in 1971, has certain obligations under the Convention.

A central obligation under that Convention is to extradite or prosecute hijackers found in a nation's territory.

Q If Iraq doesn't, then it would be remiss?

A Well, you know it's hard for me to make any legal pronouncement, but the fact is we consider them hijackers, and the obligation is to extradite or prosecute them.

Q And the plane should be returned?

A I think that is the case. I think that is the case, Jim, but I'm talking here about the people.

1-2208

Q John, just one other question with respect to Nicaragua: This week Ortega invited one of the Miskito leaders who has been in exile, Brooklyn Rivera, to return, and he has indicated that he may do so. Do you have any statement on that?

A No, don't have anything on that. Got something on the confiscation of La Prensa, if you're interested in that.

Q Sure. Go ahead.

A Our Embassy in Nicaragua has confirmed the press reports of the confiscation of the August 29 edition of La Prensa which carried an article on a recent anti-draft demonstration by 1,000 Nicaraguan youths in the City of Chinandega. Pardon my pronunciation.

As you know, this is only the latest in a long series of Sandinista crackdowns on La Prensa. In this case, the government appears to have gone beyond its usual reliance on censorship of selected articles and seized thousands of copies from the street. In so doing, it has once again demonstrated its unwillingness to permit free expression in Nicaragua. We've made clear on numerous occasions that we deplore such attacks on the freedom of the press.

Q Copy?

A Sure.

Q I have something related to Salvador: Are any special precautions being taken in U.S. installations in El Salvador in case of a major guerrilla offensive in the fall?

A I don't know that any special precautions are being taken. As you know, security preparations are generally fairly stringent at our installations in El Salvador. I don't know whether anything in addition is being done.

Q Is there a feeling that if there is such an offensive, U.S. installations might be (inaudible)?

A I just don't have any means of leading you on that. It's always a possibility.

Q Yes. The offensive is still considered as a possibility, or a likely one?

A I think the offensive is considered still a possibility, yes.

Q And I have something else -- Cuba. It seems that there is some suspicion, although no knowledge, in the Administration that there might be some missiles, SAM-5, of the same kind that the Soviets did deploy in Syria, in Cuba.

Do you have anything on that?.

A I don't have anything on that, no. Be glad to take a look at it.

Q Would you?

A Sure.

Q Thank you.

Q Can I ask you something about the Middle East, back -- In the answer about the Najah University, you say that we hope the situation would be resolved.

Can you tell us if you contacted the Israelis at all? Is it an expression of hope, hoping that the Israelis would hear about it? Or did you contact the Israelis expressing --

A I'm sorry. I missed the beginning. I'm not quite sure what the issue is we're --

Q About the closure of the University on the West Bank.

A Oh, the closure of the university. I think you may take it as a given that the Israelis are well aware of our opinion on the question of academic freedom.

Q But you did not reaffirm it because of this particular case this time?

A Well, you know we're always reluctant to get into specific exchanges.

Q John, one of the columns in the *Post*, I think, today had a story about Immigration moving against various Polish refugees here. Do you have anything on it?

A I don't. The White House might have something on that.

Q O.k. Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:37 p.m.)

Petersen
Glennon/Pattison

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #159

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 4, 1984, 12:11 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: No announcements. Be glad to take any questions.

Q John, I guess this came up during the weekend, but maybe you have more now. Can you supply any information on the two people who apparently are Americans who were downed in or near Nicaragua, and if they have any connection with the U.S. Government?

A Well, that's a question we're looking into. We haven't yet established that they are Americans. They very well may be. I'm not steering you away from that. There are a number of questions, but we're still making inquiries.

What we can say is that no U.S. Government personnel were involved in this event. We've checked with our Embassy in Managua as recently as this morning, and the Government of Nicaragua has still not provided any information with respect to the identities or the nationalities of the individuals killed in the crash so we're going to have to wait for that.

We are continuing to make inquiries, both here and through our Embassies in Tegucigalpa and Managua, but we really don't have anything much firmer to offer.

Q The Nicaraguans say that they have issued a formal protest. Have you received that?

A Yes, they have issued such a protest, and we have received that, yes.

Q And does the protest list no names or other information?

A I do not believe it does. In fact, I'm sure it does not.

Q And have you responded to the protest?

A We're considering the matter from here on in. As I say, we want more information on this incident.

Q One more question. You say "no U.S. Government personnel."

A Uh-huh.

Q Could you define that? Would that include, for example, people who are employed by contractors?

A Well, as you can imagine, the Government has made some rather exhaustive inquiries within the various agencies that conceivably could be involved, and we are assured that no U.S. Government personnel are involved. There's always a possibility that there's something there of which we're unaware. But I think the answer to your question is, no, there is not -- so far as we can tell -- there is not a possibility that they are under contract to the government in any way.

Q John, Senator Moynihan sought this, and the New York Times report said the CIA has identified the two, as being part of a group of seven Americans that traveled from New Orleans to Honduras.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do we have any identification --

A I'd be cautious about the identification. A group of seven, we know, went to Honduras. American Embassy officials since this incident have talked to a number of individuals who claim to have been associated with this incident. But, again, there's a far cry, I think, from establishing beyond any question of doubt which individuals were involved.

Q Which embassy was that, John?

A Our embassy.

Q Where?

A In Tegucicalpa.

Q A representative of the FDN here in Washington today says that, yes, there were Americans, or whatever.

A Yes. I'm not suggesting that that will not turn out to be the fact. We're not -- we're certainly not denying that, but I think what we're saying is we're going to proceed step-by-step until we have the evidence of American involvement and who they are, and we haven't to our satisfaction got that yet.

Q John, how does the State Department interpret this insofar as the Neutrality Act is concerned, if you have people in Tegucigalpa who have claimed to have been involved and to have come from the United States? Will you initiate an investigation with respect to Neutrality Act violations?

A Well, I think it's the Justice Department that would be involved in any violations of the Neutrality Act or any other legislation, and you should probably talk to them.

I suspect that at this stage, like ourselves, they're waiting for concrete evidence of involvement by any U.S. citizens.

Q I did talk to Mr. Russell over there, and he indicated that the State Department would have to make a -- some kind of inquiry to the Justice Department which would be involved in any decision regarding an investigation.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you have -- does the State Department have any inclinations one way or another on this?

A Well, as I say, I think -- I can't predict what will happen when we have firm evidence of who is involved. But I think the first step is to acquire that evidence, which we're attempting to do.

Q. John, unless there was a blip there, the seven who went down to Honduras, have you been in touch with any of them and the status of that?

A Yes.

Q You have?

A American officials have; yes.

Q Have been?

A Yes.

Q And what did you say they found out?

A Well, first of all, there are problems of the Privacy Act which has not been waived in the case of these individuals. Secondly, we have talked to a number of officials who have indicated possible participation by some individuals we haven't talked to, but we need to be clear, I think, as to the identity of those individuals.

Q These are officials you're talking to?

A American officials; American Embassy officials.

Q "You/we" means you? Not the State Department?

A No, no, State Department.

Q State Department?

A American Embassy officials in Honduras have interviewed some members of the group.

Q They talked to some members of the seven?

A Some of those seven, yes.

Q And, the bottom line on that is?

A The bottom line is that they've had some discussion. They have an account of what may have transpired, but I think we would like to hear firm evidence from Nicaragua as to what transpired, and who was involved.

Q Can you say whether, in addition to there being no U.S. Government personnel involved in the incident, whether there was any awareness on the part of the U.S. Government of any plans for this?

A I think I tell you, without fear of contradition, there was no awareness.

Q There was no awareness of the plans for this raid?

A No, not that I'm aware of.

Q John, on the -- when you talk -- when the U.S. Embassy in Honduras talked to some of the seven, you're saying you're waiting to hear from Nicaragua before you reveal what that conversation produced, is that right?

A Well, I guess, in a way, we're saying that. I guess what we're doing is checking various stories that we've heard.

Q Do we know, John, what links -- if any thing links -- the seven? Do they belong to a group, to an organization? Are they supported by somebody?

A No, I don't have anything for you on that.

Q John, on the same line of questioning, what you can tell us generally about the circumstances of their going? Is there anything you can reveal there, the whys and who paid for it, and that sort of thing?

A I really can't. It may well be that the Contras are involved with mercenaries or the Contras, as you know, were -- you know the history of our own budget considerations as far as Nicaragua is concerned. And it may well be that the Contras are seeking to raise money or seeking to recruit mercenaries. I don't know. I'm just offering that as general speculation.

Q John, do we know where the helicopter took off from based on our investigation?

A I don't. It is possible that the Embassy in Honduras may now know. I'm sure it's pursuing its investigations.

Q Why would the Embassy in Honduras know?

A All the reports I've seen suggest that it took off from Honduras, but --

Q That -- sorry?

A All the press reports I've seen suggest that it took off from Honduras, but I don't know that of my own knowledge.

Q Do you consider those credible?

A The press reports?

Q Yes.

A I think that's why the Embassy is looking into them, to find out whether they are credible.

Q John, those men that you say have no relation to the U.S. Government, do you know if any of them may have had, or may have been connected to the U.S. Government at some point?

A We have no reason to believe that they have been or ever were.

Q John, if it turns out Americans were involved, is this the sort of thing we would express our regret to the Nicaraguan Government over, or even apologize?

A Well, as I say, I think we're a little ahead of the game. We'll wait until we really make a firm conclusion as to who was involved and who was killed.

Q What is the U.S. policy on recruitment of mercenaries by foreign individuals?

A I'd have to go back and give you a policy statement on that.

Q Are we going to -- are we also in touch with Honduran officials with respect to this incident?

A I cannot answer that of my own knowledge, but it would seem logical, Jim. I wouldn't see why we wouldn't be.

Q John, in this regard, do you have any comment on.Qadhafi's speech of last Saturday, and his admission that Libya has been offering assistance to the Nicaraguan Government?

A Yes, I do have something on that. Libya's military involvement in Nicaragua is not new, as was so clearly outlined by last year's surreptitious shipment of military equipment to Nicaragua which was stopped in Brazil.

The presence of Libyan personnel, together with Soviet bloc/PLO/Basque and other foreign military personnel in Nicaragua, is of serious concern to the United States and other countries of Central America.

The central objective of the Contradora process is the removal from Central America of such foreign military personnel.

Colonel Qadhafi's boast of Libya's military presence in Nicaragua, combined with Nicaragua's extraordinary military buildup, underlines again our concerns about the true nature of the Sandinista regime and the threat it poses to its neighbors.

Q John, as long as you're on Qadhafi, how about his remarks about Mecca? Do you know anything about this?

A No, I think that's a question for Saudi Arabia and Libya to respond to.

Q Is it possible to have a copy of the --

A Sure.

Q John, three on South Africa. Do we have any statements about the violence and riots and the deaths?

A Yes, we do. As you know, we've been closely following the situation in southern Africa, and we've said in recent days that we're deeply disturbed and concerned about the continuing violence in South Africa. Those views are well known to the South African Government, and we have similarly strong feelings about this latest round of violence over the weekend.

Q Has Secretary Crocker made any protests, or can you give us any readout about his visit?

A I can't give you a readout on his visit to South Africa. But, as I say, I think there isn't any question that the South African Government is aware of how concerned we are about these demonstrations and about the violence and the deaths.

Q About Iraq, the Iraqi official newspaper --

A Excuse me, one minute -- South Africa.

Q A third one. The Observer now is back on the stands. Did we have a statement on that?

A Yes. We're pleased about that. As you know, we expressed our concern at the time of that publication's banning, and we welcome this action in lifting the ban by the publication's Appeal Board, which contributes to freedom of expression and the freedom of the press in Namibia.

Q John, do you have anything on southern Africa -- I mean on South Africa?

A South Africa? Yes.

-- MORE --

Q Did Secretary Crocker specifically raise the internal situation in South Africa in his meeting's?

A I don't know.

Q Do you have any further information on the reassurances sought by the United States from Morocco regarding the agreement with Libya?

A Well, I don't quite know what you mean by "reassurances."

Q Reassurances for the good relations between Morocco and the United States, the impact of the treaty on the mutual relations between the United States and Morocco.

A Well, as you know, we were surprised by the announcement and certainly been looking at it and pondering its implications, but underlying all that, nevertheless, is our long-term strong relationship with Morocco.

As you know, a Moroccan official, I think, is going to be in Washington tomorrow. Undoubtedly, this question will come up. He's here at the instigation of the Morrocans, and it's obviously very likely that this will be a subject of discussion.

Q John, is there any indication, just to follow that up, that there was any quid that the Moroccans got, such as ending of Libyan supplies to the Polisario, or something?

A I think you'd have to ask the Moroccans and the Libyans, John.

Q John, would you characterize the reassurances that you got so far from the Embassy, from the Moroccan Embassy here, and from your Ambassador in Morocco, as non-sufficient -- or, I mean, not enough?

A Well, it would be unusual for me to tell you what our Ambassador is reporting to the State Department, and I guess it would be unusual for me to tell you details of conversations between Morocco and ourselves.

But, as I think I already told you last week, there is nothing that we have heard which would suggest that the relationship between Morocco and the United States is going to be impaired in any way.

Bill?

Q John, new subject?

A Sure.

Q Have you anything today on a possible Shultz-Gromyko meeting in New York?

A Really don't, Bill. It's about as it has been for the past several days.

Q How about, to follow that up, John, in a different way: Remember, Speakes some time ago, said -- I don't know whether he was joking or not -- that we would anyway send a delegation to Vienna just in case?

A Well, no, I don't think Larry Speakes was joking. As a matter of fact, I think Larry Speakes was quite clear in what he said, and what he was doing was indicating readiness to become involved in the Vienna talks.

And I think that was misconstrued, and I think later corrected by one news organization. It was misconstrued as a statement that a delegation would go, whatever, and at no time did Larry say that.

Q Back to the Gromyko thing, John. Do we read anything into the fact that three weeks before Shultz's going we still have nothing?

A No. I don't think we read anything into that. I think in terms of an announcement from the Soviets as to Mr. Gromyko's plans, we're on track. This is fairly routine.

Q Do you have anything -- any reaction to the announcement that Erich Honecker will not be coming to West Germany?

A Well, I understand the West German Government is going to make an announcement in Bonn a little later. Insofar as the U.S. view on that decision is concerned, it's impossible to provide a judgment without knowing the details of Mr. Honecker's announcement, but it's quite clear that the Soviet Union was skeptical about such a visit taking place at this time.

As far as the United States is concerned, we continue to support improvements in relations between the two German states as contributing to the stability and peace in Europe, and we would welcome a meeting between the two leaders.

Q Do you see this as a further sign of cooling down East-West relations?

A Well, I think you would have to look at the motivation of Mr. Honecker and look at whatever pressures there may have been on him.

Q Do you feel Moscow is definitely behind the cancellation?

A Well, I think what we're stating is the obvious, namely, that Moscow clearly has not had a vested interest in this meeting going ahead.

Q John, is there anything at all in the Chernenko interview which seems to bear on the possiblity of any future meetings to discuss disarmament?

A I really don't have anything, Barrie, beyond the statement that the Department put out over the weekend, which is available.

Q Has there been or will there be any follow-up discussions at any level to pursue as to whether or not this means that Vienna might take place, or can't?

A Obviously, there are channels, and, obviously, there are exchanges going on quite frequently through those channels. I don't know of anything that would suggest any change in the assessment of how likely the Vienna talks are likely to come off this month, and, as I think the Secretary said in his interview with the AP, he wouldn't lay heavy odds on that meeting.

Q John, the Sikh hijackers of an Indian aircraft who had demanded to come to the U.S. were flown back from Dubai --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- and are to stand trial for air piracy. Do you have anything on that?

A I don't. I think the Press Office may well have some copies of the statement that was issued by, I think, the Government of India*, and we can make that available. But --

Q I checked with them, and they said that it should be announced by you.

A Well, I don't think it's going to be announced, but I'm sure afterwards -- is that right, Brian, you could make copies of that statement available? Sure.

Q John, you said last week that there were talks between officials of the UAE, India and the U.S.

A Yes.

Q Will you consider those talks successful, and did you take a tough stand and say we are not going to permit those hijackers to enter the U.S.?

A Well, the United States takes a very tough stand on hijacking and hijackers, and in this case as in all cases, we make it plain that hijackers who end up in the United States are going to be subject either to extradition or to punishment to the full extent of the law.

Q John, an Iraqi official --

A I'll catch you right after this. Excuse me.

Q An Iraqi official newspaper criticized U.S. stand on the war, and they call it hypocritical and immoral, by equating the aggressor and the victim, and that you are addressing it in general terms. What do you have --

A Is that a newspaper report of some days ago?

Q Yes. Ath-Thawrah.

A Yes. I'd be cautious about that. I'd be cautious about that. That is a newspaper. Is that the Baath newspaper?

Q The official Ath-Thawrah. It's an official newspaper.

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* later corrected to read: "by the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi..."

A I'd -- of course, what the newspaper says isn't true, as far as we see the situation, but I also would be careful about suggesting that represents an official viewpoint.

Q John, do you have any response to a request by President Nimeiri of Sudan who's been calling for a conference to maintain peace and security in the Red Seas, and there are a number of states in the region that may get involved in that effort.

A Uh-huh.

Q Has the U.S. been called upon to participate in any capacity?

A I'm not aware of that. Let me take a look at that.

Q John, there are a couple of reports in the Christian Science Monitor this morning that Senator Charles Percy of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is going to be asking for more funds and assistance to Israel. And the second report also, which I ask two questions at one time, about an attempt -- a renewed attempt by sponsors and supporters of the bill to move the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem is going to be intensified and possibly would work out a compromise with you?

A Well, on the first question, I guess you better ask Senator Percy whether that report is true. On the second question, maybe talks have compromised, but I know of nothing which has moved the President or the Secretary off their firm stand on the Embassy in -- the proposed Embassy move to Jerusalem.

Q Let me go back to you first answer about asking Senator Percy -- what's the status of the request for financial aid or assistance that the United States Government is working for Israel?

A Do you mean the standard budgetary --

Q Yes.

A I don't have that in my head. I'm sure that's being worked, and may even be in the public domain. I'm not sure.

Q There were reports that Mr. Shultz is having advisers, Herbert Stein, from the outside to work out special big deal for assisting Israeli economy. Do you have any comment on that?

A Let me talk a look at that and see what -- I'm not sure but what we might have done something on that question. Let me take a look.

Q Do you have anything on a general amnesty in Romania last month?

A No, I don't. No.

Q The release of a political dissident?

A I don't.

Q Catholic priest?

A It's just possible that while I was away there may be something. In fact, I'm getting a signal. We did have something?

MR. CARLSON: One person.

MR. HUGHES: It's one person.

MR. CARLSON: Yes.

MR. HUGHES: One person? Amnesty for one person, and we do have something on it? We did have something on it.

Q My understanding is that the leading political dissident was released, but as part of a general amnesty.

A I'm getting a nod. Yes. I guess if you'll see Brian, he'll be able to produce that.

Q John, do you have anything on the Chinese defector who mysteriously reappeared in China? Was it voluntary?

A Our understanding is that he did return to China voluntarily. Yes. That's correct.

Q How do you know it was voluntary?

A I don't have the details on how we are aware of that, George.

Q Did you interview with him? Did any American Government officials talk to him before his departure?

A I'm just -- I really just am not up on what might have transpired, but I do know that we're satisfied that he returned to China of his own free will.

Q Was he denied political asylum?

A Well, there are two problems about that. Firstly, factually, I'm not aware of an application, but secondly, we don't discuss asylum requests anyway. So I'm afraid you struck out on both points.

Q Do you have anything on Crocker --

Q Will you look into the question of whether the U.S. has had contact with him or whether this statement that it was voluntary came from the Chinese Government?

A Let me see what we might be able to come up with.

Q John, on the Middle East, is there any update on the trade talks with Israel? Has that free zone talk -- have they stalled?

A I don't think it's stalled. As you know, we are in favor of that free trade association as moving forward, as far as I know.

Q Do you have anything on Crocker's talks in Uganda, and what his itinerary is now?

A Well, he was in Uganda. He saw President Obote. He was in Uganda September 3. He met with President Obote and other senior Ugandan officials in an effort to improve communications in diplomatic channels.

Reading from Secretary Crocker is that the meetings were constructive. We have a longstanding relationship with Uganda, and this visit should be seen as part of an ongoing dialogue between two friendly governments who are working together on the tough problems facing Uganda today.

And, yes, he did discuss the human rights situation in Uganda.

Q And what's the status of the military -- the IMET agreement? Do you --

A I can't answer that one.

Q Okay. And do you know where he's going now?

A Let me see if I have -- he's leaving Kampala today. Plans to return to Washington September 6. He'll be stopping in Nairobi and London on the way back.

Q Okay. Thank you.

A Okay.

(The briefing concluded at 12:39 p.m.)

Becker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #160

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 1984, 12:05 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, everybody. Couple of housekeeping announcements:

First, I'd like to introduce Gil Calloway. Why don't you stand up, Gil? A number of you know Gil from Managua, where he was Public Affairs Officer. Before that he was Press Attache in Rome. He's also been Press Attache in Moscow. He is replacing Jeff Biggs. Stand up, Jeff. (Laughter) He's replacing Jeff Biggs as Chief Public Affairs Adviser in ARA. Jeff is going off to the Hill for a Congressional Fellowship period, so this is the gentleman to raise Cain with in ARA henceforth.

I'm going to offer you a statement on the Genocide Convention, but before I do that, I'd just like to point out that we'll have a backgrounder on the Genocide Convention. It will be held in this room at 2:30 this afternoon. That's at 2:30 here this afternoon.

Now, the statement itself is: On August 22 the Administration completed an extensive review of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. As a result of that review, and at the strong urging of the American Bar Association and other interested groups, the President concluded that it would be in the nation's best interest for the United States to ratify the Genocide Convention.

The commitment of our country to prevent and punish acts of genocide is indisputable, yet our failure to ratify this treaty, which has now been pending before the Senate for 35 years and has been supported by Presidents Truman, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Carter, has opened the United States to unnecessary criticism in various international fora.

We can refute such baseless criticism by ratifying the Convention, and, more importantly, we can utilize the Convention in our own efforts to expand freedom and fight human rights abuses around the globe.

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In 1976 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported favorably on the Convention and recommended that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification, subject to three understandings and one declaration. This approach exceeded the clarifications considered necessary by the Nixon Administration, but the President supports these understandings and declaration, and we believe they will help to secure Senate advice and consent to ratification of the Convention.

We look forward to working with the Senate to resolve any issues that may arise in connection with its consideration of this treaty. Ratification of the Genocide Convention would reaffirm, in this international legal context, the fundamental and timeless American commitment to human rights.

And, again, that backgrounder will be at 2:30 this afternoon.

Q Is there a pro-genocide lobby on the Hill, John?

A I'm not aware of any pro-genocide lobby. I guess there are technical obstacles.

Q Copy?

A Sure.

Q Would the Administration like, or is the President asking, for this to be done in this current session that is taking place in these next three or four weeks?

A Well, I think it will move forward, although I basically would refer you to the briefers this afternoon. I guess it will move forward as expeditiously as possible. But I guess also there are realities about the schedule of Congress that you have to take into account.

Q John, why did it take three and a half years to arrive at this conclusion?

A I think that's one I'll let the briefers at 2:30 handle, Bill.

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Q John, one thing that I could cynically observe -- that in order to have some treaty to show during the first four years of his term, Reagan has reached rather far back to come up with something. Would you have a comment on such a cynical observation?

A Well, I think implied in your question is the suggestion that I would be shocked at such cynicism, and I, of course, am. And, again, I'll leave the briefers this afternoon to respond to the timetable in which we've moved this forward.

Q On another subject, John, in light of the news conference that was held yesterday in Huntsville and -- has your investigation turned up anything of interest about those Americans?

A Well, I don't know that we're much further than we were yesterday, Jim. You've gotten some names that were given to the press. Those names, that information, coincides with the information we have received, basically from the same sources.

Depending on confirmation that these individuals are Americans, which confirmation we're still waiting on from the Government of Nicaragua, we will follow the normal consular procedures in attempting to determine the wishes of the next of kin regarding the disposition of the remains.

As I say, we have not received the confirmation of the identities from the Nicaraguan authorities. I believe a Nicaraguan spokesman was out there today, suggesting that there had not been contact. We're bemused by that, because we are in contact with the consular officials in the Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry.

I don't have a great deal more to offer you. That question you raised yesterday -- violations, possible, under the Neutrality Act -- I think that's a matter for either the Department of Justice or the FBI, and I understand that they would be prepared to entertain questions on that particular point.

Reports circulating this morning that Cubans and Libyans were killed in the incident -- at least the FDN claimed that -- we're certainly aware of the presence of

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numerous Cuban and military -- Cuban and Libyan military and security advisers in Nicaragua. It's possible that some may be engaged in military activities, but we don't have anything on their involvement in this particular incident.

-- MORE --

Q Do you have any reason to think that these seven Americans were unique, or are there more down there like them?

A I don't know. I don't think we're aware of any others down there, but I guess it's possible that there could be others.

Q John, is it the Administration's view that when Congress cut off funds to the contras, they created a situation whereby people such as this will be out there beating the bushes for Commies?

A I think that is a logical deduction that -- you're well aware of the budgetary history of our involvement in this, and you're certainly well aware of the strong feeling by Nicaraguans that the Sandinistas have stolen their revolution, and you're certainly aware of their activities in connection with the various Sandinista acts of oppression against individuals, against the press, against the Church, and of course, that activity goes on; and I suppose it is entirely possible that those people who feel that their revolution has been stolen, as the Secretary has said on a number of occasions, may resort to other sources.

Q Is the underlying assumption, John, that if the Congress were funding the operations, then the American government would have control over who gets involved in these incidents?

A Well, I think I'll let you draw your own conclusions. It's not a question of having total control, but, obviously, the less involvement one has the less influence.

Q Has the Administration in any way encouraged the contras to seek alternate sources of supply?

A No.

Q Did they -- by not -- maybe you didn't encourage them, but was it pointed out to them that it would be O.K. if they did it?

A No. The position of the Administration, I think, is quite clear on that, in that it has not encouraged other governments or solicited in any way, but I guess there are realities about how the contras might proceed.

Q In the Post account today, some attention is paid to the allegation that, in fact, support from independent mercenaries was solicited by senior members of the Honduran Government as early as last November, and that by last May, already one group had sent three paramilitary training teams to Honduras to train contras.

Was the United States Government in any way aware of either these trips or the role played by the Honduran armed forces in soliciting assistance from independent groups?

A Not that I'm aware of, Jim.

Q Can you look into that question?

A We'll take a look at that and see whether we might have some response.

Q All right. Can you also tell us anything you might be able to on a Hector Jove Torres, who is reported to have been killed in combat near the Costa Rican border this spring, by the Post today?

A No, don't have anything on him.

Q You can't confirm that such an individual existed or was killed at that time?

A No, I don't have anything on him.

Q Would you look into that question --

A Let me see what it --

Q -- since it said that it's the U.S. Embassy in Managua that confirmed --

A What's the name again?

Q Hector Jove Torres.

A O.K.

Q John, on your question about this situation, I have two things I wanted to ask. First, I don't quite understand the business of waiting for the Nicaraguans to identify. I thought they had said that the one body was charred beyond any recognition and the other had no kind of identification on him, so how could they do it?

A   Well, I'm not sure, Don, it's a question of specific identification of an individual, but I think it's a question of our talking with them or seeking to talk with them and establish reasonably that these are Americans, in which case we will take the appropriate action.

Q   It seems -- I mean, it seems from your earlier statement that you expect them to do something to establish that these guys are Americans.

A   Well, our people are talking, or attempting to talk, with their people, and I think when the outcome of those discussions is satisfactory, as far as we're concerned, then we can move to the next step.

Q   And, secondly, regarding the Neutrality Act, --

A   Uh-huh.

Q   -- the Justice Department, as I understand it, is saying to reporters, or was saying yesterday to reporters --

A   Uh-huh.

Q   -- that for us to pursue this, normally it starts with the State Department, and if State wants us to pursue it, we'll do it, but we've heard nothing from the State Department to suggest that.

A   Try --

Q   What is the State Department position?

A   Try them again today.

(Laughter)

Q   Has the State Department communicated in any way with respect to the substance of whether there should be an investigation initiated into this? Have they in any way communicated with Justice on this question?

A   I don't know whether there has been any official communication between the State Department and Justice. I think, at my level, it might well be that we have encouraged the Justice Department to be a little more forthcoming today.

Q John, independent of the question of whether a required request is necessary from the State Department to the Justice Department, would the State Department want to see, would it be happy with, an investigation of the Neutrality Act ramifications of this incident?

A Well, the Justice Department enforces the laws of the United States, and if there has been a contravention of the law, I'm sure that the State Department would be happy to --

Q Do you want them to look into whether there has been? Would you be happy with such an inquiry?

A I'm sure the appropriate people are already seized with that --

Q Do you know if any such inquiries have been made about whether there are any violations of the Neutrality Act in connection with support of the leftists in El Salvador?

A I'm not aware of any.

Q Was the State Department, or any U.S. Government agency, to your knowledge, aware of the departure -- I'm sorry -- of the meeting August 1 in Memphis by the Veterans of Foreign Wars at which Mario Calero spoke, and the departure on August 23 of Calero with the six individual Americans?

A I don't think so. Was your question, "Was the State Department aware"?

Q Yes.

A No, I don't think so.

Q O.K. Also, there is an indication here in the Post that an FBI agent did interview this Mr. Posey at one time last spring.

A Read that with great interest this morning.

Q And why were you interested?

(Laughter)

A Well, it's an interesting turn to the story, and I suggest you ask the FBI about it.

Q You didn't know anything about it?

A No, was not aware of it.

Q John, it's been suggested from there that were the United States still involved in financing this particular effort, this particular incident wouldn't have happened. Would it be also fair to say if the U.S. had never become involved down there, that this incident wouldn't have happened?

A I think both are very hypothetical and speculative theses, Greg, if you'll forgive my saying so, and you know speculation is anathema to the State Department.

(Laughter)

Q Do you have anything on the meeting the Secretary had with the Special Counselor to the King of Morocco?

A Not a great deal.

Q Would you give us his name and spelling?

A That I do not have with me, but it is on the public schedule. They met; obviously they discussed the recent association between Morocco and Libya. There was a good exchange of views, and really beyond that, I'm not prepared to offer a characterization, as we say.

Q Without going into substance, was there an explanation provided for the reason for this union?

A I think the Moroccans offered their view of the events surrounding this decision, yes.

Q Was there -- can you go into substance?

A (Laughter) I thought I --

Q I mean, was there any -- John, there has been a suggestion that the Moroccans got some kind of a commitment or a pledge from the Libyans not to continue supplying the Polisario. Is there any substance to that at all, in terms of what the adviser said to the --

A You'd have to ask the Moroccans.

Q Can't you confirm that he reiterated the position that other Moroccan officials have offered to the U.S., in the sense that they don't envision any change in Moroccan friendship toward the U.S. as a result of this federation?

A Well, I don't think -- You know, the Secretary's rule on these sessions always is that you should never speak for another government. I think they should speak for themselves; but I wouldn't deter you from pursuing that line with the Moroccans.

Q What is the U.S. view of the agreement?

A Well, as you know, we were surprised at the announcement. We have been taking a look at the implications and are continuing to take a look at the implications of it.

Q John, after announcing now the results of the referendum, which is, conclude 99 percent of the people agree on this federation, and you said for the last two weeks you are studying the agreement, so do you have anything to say now, after this?

A No, other than that we continue to analyze and study the implications of what has been done. You know very well our viewpoint of Mr. Qadhafi and the kind of person that he is, the kind of regime that he operates, and the kind of activities in which his regime is engaged in various parts of the world. Our position on that is very clear so there is no question about that.

Q But you don't think that the association of Morocco with Qadhafi will affect Morocco's traditional relations with the USA?

A Well, as we have said, that relationship traditionally in the past has been a good and a steadfast one. Now, we're taking a look at the implications of this agreement.

Q John, are you having consultations with the French regarding the Moroccans' step towards Libya?

1-2239

A I guess I'm really not prepared to get into kinds of discussions we might be having --

Q What other countries you may have consultations with regarding this?

A I really am not prepared to get into that.

Q Algeria? Can you say Algeria?

A I'm really not prepared to get into that.

Q John, did the Secretary seek any assurances from Hassan's adviser about the transshipment of --

A I think it's logical to assume that the Secretary would have offered some thoughts about the union and probably asked some questions, too.

Q What about seeking assurances about the transshipment of weapons and that sort of thing?

A I guess I'm really not going to go any further into the substance.

Q John, is there any kind of a hold at the moment on the pipeline, weapons in the pipeline?

A I'm not aware of any change in our assistance program to Morocco. If, in general terms, you're saying, within the overall framework of U.S. law, you have to look at what is going to various countries and what conceivably could be moved onto other countries, I think that's a reasonable kind of thing to be taking a look at.

Q Pursue that, John, if you would. Has it been suggested that either the Administration's attitude toward aid to Morocco or, alternatively, the attitude of Congress toward aid to Morocco, might be affected by this affair?

A Well, I don't think it's been -- As I say, I'm not aware of any change, or any suggestion that it be changed, but if your question is, "Do you, in accordance with reporting requirements and in accordance with U.S. laws, have to look at the question of onward transfer of technology or certain kinds of equipment," I think that's -- yes, I think that's a --

Q John, there were reports suggesting that Morocco initiated the talks towards this treaty with Libya.

A Uh-huh.

Q According to your own information, do you have anything to confirm this --

A No, I'm not going to get into that. Ask the Moroccans and the Libyans.

-- MORE --

Q Do you believe that the Moroccans were under any sort of pressure to get into a treaty like that?

A Don't have anything for you on that.

Q John, Libya is on the "abetting terrorism" list. If Morocco is federating in some way with Libya, does this mean Morocco is -- has to be put on the terrorism list?

A Well, I can't answer your specific question, John, but I think that falls within the kind of guidelines I've suggested.

Q So that's all what you're looking at?

A I think that's --

Q You said that you're still studying the agreement between Libya and Morocco. Is that an inference, the fact that the U.S. is not satisfied with the explanations that were presented by the Moroccan envoy?

A I don't -- it's not a question of not being satisfied. It's a question of taking a look at the situation and considering the implications.

Q But, in light of his explanations, you're not satisfied yet?

A Well, I think that we're continuing to look at the implications of it.

Q John, there's a report in the New York Times today that Spain, who is a member of NATO, has voiced some worries and concerns about this accord between Libya and Morocco. Has Spain told you, since they are members of NATO, about such things, and what do you comment on such --

A You're always persistent in suggesting we might talk about exchanges with other governments, and I'm always non-forthcoming.

Q But, John, --

A And it grieves me that we have to engage in that exchange.

Q John, did Tunisia or Algeria have some representation, an anxiety, about this unity? They expressed some anxiety to you -- the American Administration?

A Well, I'm not talking about what is expressed to us through diplomatic channels. You've seen the same reports that I have that are in the public domain, where various governments have raised questions about this particular development.

Q John, did he mention anything to be conveyed from the Libyan side to the American government, any new overtures to improve relations between Libya and --

A I just really don't have anything on that.

Q Any, just guidance there on what now is the U.S. position toward the Western Sahara?

A Nothing beyond what we have said in the past, Jim.

Yes?

Q In your posted answer to the question with regard to the return to China of Zhang Zheng Gao --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- you mentioned that the American judgment on the voluntary nature of his return is not based on Chinese Government information or statement.

A That's correct.

Q Are you -- how do you leap to this kind of conclusion?

A It is a conclusion that we arrived at on the basis of our own information.

Q Has the Chinese Embassy notified the American government before Zhang's departure?

A That I do not know. I know that the Immigration and Naturalization Service had interviewed him earlier on, and we were satisfied that he was leaving of his own free will.

Q Do you have some --

1-2243

A But whether there was any contact with the Embassy, I don't know.

Q There are some allegations that Zhang was kidnapped by the Chinese Consulate in New York.

A I've seen --

Q Do you have any response to that?

A I've seen that. No, I don't.

Q John, can you update us on your position on Western Sahara because for the last year you haven't mentioned it at all, and I tried through the Office of Public Affairs; there's nothing. So can you update us, and take a question?

A Let me see what is available, if there is, in fact, anything new. If there is not anything new, then, you'll just have to continue --

Q But do you support the Polisario self-determination or not?

A Let me take a look at what we have on file.

Q Thank you.

Q Do you plan to remove the minesweepers within the next, I guess, that will be nine days?

A Oh, that operation is going on, John, and obviously we're in touch with our Egyptian and Saudi Arabian hosts, if that is the right word to name those countries that asked us to come there. But I don't have anything on when we might leave.

Q Anything new on Shultz-Gromyko, John?

A No, nothing on that for you today.

Q Any words, John, on the Canadian election result?

A Well, we certainly expect to maintain the close and effective relationship with Canada, that we traditionally have had, with the new government.

I think the President talked with the new Prime Minister this morning, and I think the Secretary sent a message of congratulations.

Q Do you have anything --

A Sorry?

Q You think the relations between the two countries will be improved, better than before?

A They've been good, they've been close, they've been effective, and we certainly expect them to continue in that mode.

Q (Inaudible) a meeting between the Secretary and the new foreign secretary, whoever he is --

A There is, in principle, a meeting -- I think, obviously, there'll be a new foreign minister and it may take a few days to determine just when that meeting will be. But, we -- yeah, I think we would expect that meeting to take place more or less within the same timeframe as had been planned.

Q Would that be here or Canada?

A Well, the previous meeting was to have been in Canada. And assuming there's no change in the foreign ministry's position, I would expect that it would be. But it's --

Q We had a foreign minister down -- external affairs minister -- here most recently --

A I can't quite remember the sequence, John.

Q It was back in the spring.

A I think that's right.

Q John, do you have anything on the U.S. position towards the Lebanese complaint to the United Nations against the Israeli attacks in the Bekaa Valley and in South Lebanon?

A Well, as you know, that Security Council procedure has been going forward. Our position is unchanged. We support the independence, the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Lebanon, and we seek realistic means of achieving this goal.

We, have, of course, been in touch with the Lebanese, the Israelis and others in New York. We are not negotiating on the text of a resolution.

Repeated experience convinces us that a contentious Security Council debate on South Lebanon is not likely to help Lebanon regain its full sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.

Q A copy of this?

A Sure.

Q So, in other words, you would veto anything you regarded as contentious?

A Don't like to prejudge a situation, but that certainly seems to be the implication of -- we're not wheeling and dealing on any text, if that's --

Q Are you trying to convince Lebanon to withdraw the complaint?

A I don't know what, you know, what discussions may be going on specifically on that point, but I think they're well aware of our position.

Q Do you have anything on the unrest in either South Africa or Chile, or both?

A Yes, I do. In the case of South Africa, we oppose the resort to violence for whatever reason, from whatever source, and have followed the rioting in black townships around South Africa with deep concern.

The events of the past weeks represent the confluence of several factors and forces that have been building in the non-white communities. Those include school boycotts, the campaign against the new constitution, rent increases and the economic impact of inflation and unemployment, as well as underlying opposition to the apartheid system.

These tragic events underline the urgency of developing a political system based on the consent of the governed, in which grievances can be aired openly and dealt with peacefully. In the short term, we hope to see early dialogue between the government and community leaders, and within the communities themselves.

As of this morning, the official death toll stood at 29, and there have been some 36 arrests. Both the government and ordinary citizens of South Africa are aware of our concern, and we continue to follow the situation very closely.

Q Do you have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Do you have anything additional with respect to the kind of early dialogue that you envisage?

A No. We have made it always clear, Jim, that within the framework of our opposition to apartheid and its abhorrence of apartheid, we're not trying to offer a blueprint or a plan for how South Africans of all races themselves have to work out their problems.

Q Do you have anything on Chile?

A Anything on Chile? Yes I do have something on Chile.

Our Embassy in Santiago reports that, compared with previous demonstrations over the past year, there apparently was a higher incidence of violence associated with yesterday's events in Chile. At the same time, it appears overall that the protest, in terms of numbers, was smaller than the demonstrations which occurred about this time one year ago.

The United States regrets the loss of life and the violence. As we've said before, we believe that dialogue and communication are needed so that steady and concrete progress can be made towards a transition to democracy -- which is what most Chileans want.

Q Can we have a copy of that as well?

A Sure.

Q The fact that you noted that the protest was smaller, does this mean that you agree with some newspaper accounts that, in fact, Pinochet is stronger than, say, last year --

A No, I'm just trying to give you a factual account: less people, more violence.

Q And why did't you, then, call for a resumption of the formal dialogue that was cut off last September, as opposed to simply calling for a dialogue and communication?

A Well, we've given you on a number of occasions our attitude towards the restoration of democracy and --

Q Are we retreating from those --

A No, absolutely not.

Q What is your position on the call by Nicaragua for a special, or urgent, meeting of the U.N. Security Council to discuss escalation, or whatever the phrases were?

A Let me see if we can't offer you something on that, Don, a little later in the day.

Q Can I follow that up for just a second? Something you said earlier comes to mind. I'm not quite sure I understand what you meant.

On the one hand, you said that -- you scoffed at the idea that Nicaragua said that it had not been in touch with the U.S. On the other hand, you said you were attempting to talk with Nicaragua about this. Could you explain what the problem is? You have contacted them and said you want information but they're not talking with you?

A Well, no. Our officials are in touch and have been in touch with their consular officials in their Foreign Ministry. So we're a little puzzled by the statement, I think, on television this morning that there hasn't been such contact.

What was said does not jell with the facts as we understand them.

Q But then a few moments after that, you said that your people were attempting to talk with Nicaragua.

A No, well, we are talking with them, but I guess the point is, we haven't received satisfactory information.

Now, insofar as the Security Council is concerned, Don, we have instant response to your questions. (Laughter)

The Nicaraguans have raised the issue, and we understand that it will be taken up on September 6. In general, Nicaragua's approaches to the Security Council have tended to distract from the underlying problems of the region and to undermine the Contadora process for addressing those problems.

Q You don't sound too enthusiastic.

A That does seem to come through. (Laughter)

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q John, forgive me, but I haven't been here recently. What's the latest on Rabbi Kahane? Have there been any steps to investigate his activities, --

A Yes, there --

Q -- in concern to his citizenship?

A -- there is such a proceeding going forward. I think he has been informed of that situation. As I understand it, he -- he certainly was in the United States and I think still is. He had not and has not asked for any meeting with any State Department officials, so to my knowledge there hasn't been one. But the investigation, or proceeding, goes on, and I guess will be fairly lengthy.

Q There isn't any necessity that he meet with State Department officials, is there?

A No, none that I'm aware of, at this stage.

Q On Morocco, what is the present U.S. position on the Western Sahara issue?

A I think we can do a little research on that for you.

Q John, please, can I have one more? Do you have any comment on the TASS report today of Chernenko's public appearance on the astronauts?

A No, I do not.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:40 p.m.)

1-2249

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #161

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 1984, 12:21 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon everybody. I have a couple of announcements. The first relates to the death of Indonesia's Adam Malik, who a number of us in this room knew well.

The Department of State notes with sorrow the passing on September 5 of former Indonesian Vice President Adam Malik. During a long and distinguished career of public service, including the diplomatic offices of Foreign Minister of Indonesia and President of the U.N. General Assembly, Adam Malik demonstrated an unflagging determination to achieve international understanding. Not the least of his many accomplishments was a leading role in the formation and strengthening of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations; that is, of course, one of the most successful regional groupings today.

Mr. Malik's brilliant wit and penetrating intellect will be missed by those in the State Department who were privileged to know him. And, as I say, I know that a number of of us in this room underscore those feelings and that respect for him.

An announcement on the Secretary of State's trip to New York for the United Nations: The Secretary of State will be in New York City over the period September 23 to October 5 in connection with the United Nations General Assembly.

While there, he will be meeting with a number of foreign officials, including Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. That meeting will take place on Wednesday, September 26.

Just a small housekeeping note: Correspondents who expect to be at the U.N. probably ought to let the Press Office know, and I think there will be a list available after the briefing for sign-up so we can kind of keep in touch with everybody.

Q Do you expect only one meeting with Gromyko?

A Well, we are focusing on this meeting at the moment, Jim, and I don't have any information on any subsequent meetings or the possibility of subsequent meetings.

Q John, when you say the 23rd to the 5th, do you mean he'll be there continuously or is he going to go back and forth?

A Not necessarily. He may go back and forth between New York and Washington.

Q John, on the Gromyko meeting, can you tell us anything about the agenda, what we hope to emerge from this?

A No, I think I really can't. I think that the subjects that you have traditionally come to expect to be raised at meetings between the Secretary and Mr. Gromyko, I think, would be the same kinds of subjects you would expect to have come up.

Q Do you know where the meeting on the 26th will be held?

A Do I know where it will be held? I don't have anything for you on that yet, Hank.

Q When is Gromyko arriving?

A I don't know.

Q Will he be coming to Washington at all during the U.N. General Assembly?

A You have to ask the Russians; you have to ask the Soviets.

Q Has he been invited to Washington?

A Don't have anything for you on that.

Q Is there an effort being made to work out a meeting with the President?

A Well, a Presidential meeting would be a White House (matter) -- I don't have anything for you on that.

1-2252

Q As far as you know, that has not been discussed with the Soviets --

A Just don't have anything on that --

Q Do you have anything on resumption, or continuation of negotiations for a cultural agreement?

A Not -- I don't have any update today. I think there was a little guidance a few days ago which, in essence, talks about ongoing discussions.

Q Is there a meeting scheduled for Washington next week?

A I don't know whether it is scheduled, John. That -- for Washington? No. Okay.

Q John, do you put any particular significance on the fact that this will be the first meeting in some time between senior U.S. and Soviet officials? Significance on the Soviet "yes" to such a meeting?

A If you mean, are we surprised that this meeting is going to take place, no. As the Secretary has been saying for some time, he expected to see Mr. Gromyko at the U.N., and those expectations have been fulfilled.

Q John, on the subject of the Soviet Union, do you have any comments you'd like to offer on Mr. Mondale's speech yesterday, particularly his announcement that if elected he would have a summit -- he would propose a summit within six months on a freeze?

A No, I don't think that we would have a reaction to that.

Q John, another question on the Gromyko meeting, if I may.

Would --is the Vienna -- the possibility of the Vienna talks still open? Would that be on the agenda?

A I don't think we have -- I think the situation is as it was when the Secretary was interviewed by a distinguished wire service, Greg. And I think he gave his appraisal of the prospects at that time. I think that's a good -- that remains a good appraisal.

Q You would not bet money on it?

A Not to bet money on it.

Q What is the -- just to -- if you could restate the American position on those talks? It is -- is it --

A That we were ready to go to Vienna.

Q Provided ...?

A Without preconditions.

Q Provided they were willing to talk about other issues -- other arms control issues or not?

A That was careful wordage, John, and I'd ask you to go back to that. But, basically, we accepted the invitation without preconditions.

Q So the position is just as you stated now, that the United States is ready to go to Vienna without preconditions?

A Of course, yes.

Q John, which airport is --

A Without preconditions, but I would refer you to the language that was used at the time of the acceptance.

Q That has not changed?

A That has not changed.

Q At which airport is the Soviet Foreign Minister going to land?

A I don't know. I guess you would have to ask the Soviet Embassy.

Q Do you anticipate any problems about --

A No, we do not anticipate any problems.

Q Are you taking steps to make sure there aren't any?

A The only thing you may have wrong is the tense in which you cast your question.

Q (Laughter) It's my fault.

A You cast it in the future tense.

Q In view of the continuing Soviet position on the 007, and in view of your remarks the other day on the first anniversary, why are you lifting the heretofore ban on the Aeroflot plane landing at a commercial airport, and not insisting on a military landing?

A Nothing has changed on our position insofar as 007, and how abhorrent that act was.

On the specifics of Mr. Gromyko's aircraft arrival on a previous occasion, you have to recall that that was action taken not by the United States Government but by local authorities controlling those airports. The United States Government, in fact, made it clear that in light of the prohibition or ban or obstruction, or however you want to phrase it, that was placed in the way of a Soviet aircraft arriving at a civil airport, Mr. Gromyko's plane would have been welcome at a military base. The Soviets chose not to exercise that option.

Q Do you have any guarantee that this will not be repeated again by the labor unions, or whatever, who are --

A Well, I think we're confident that that problem of the arrival of his plane at a commercial airport of their choice is not a problem.

Q Can I come back for just a second to the cultural talks? A meeting is not scheduled, and a meeting is not scheduled in Washington. What is it about such a meeting --

A I'd have to go back to that guidance, Ralph, which I don't have in my head. But it tells the state of play as it has been developing and as it is likely to unfold, and I'd just like you to get that specifically from that guidance.

Q Would you anticipate that that subject would be among the ones that you -- in the basket of things that you say would usually come up in a Gromyko meeting, or is that something that's separate?

A It's conceivable, but I also think that is moving forward at another level, and therefore there may not -- it may not be necessary, or there may not be a reason for it to be raised.

Q Did the State Department get sufficient assurances from the Moroccan Royal Counselor to lead you to believe that you can continue the military assistance program?

A Well, I don't have a great deal more on that than I gave you yesterday. As you know, the Moroccan Royal Counselor met with the Secretary, and today, as yesterday, we're reluctant to get into the content of private diplomatic exchanges.

As far as the effect on treaties is concerned, speculation is not particularly helpful. Our programs with Morocco have been developed to serve mutually perceived needs and interests, and we anticipate a continuing close and productive relationship.

If you're going on to some of the stories that are circulating concerning release of Libyan dissidents, we've seen those stories. We would, of course, deplore the forced repatriation of political dissidents to Libya. Our view of the reprehensible nature of the Libyan regime is well known. However, your question really should be addressed to the governments of Morocco and Libya.

Q And does this productive relationship that you foresee include the continued military relationship?

A Well, as I said yesterday, Jim, we have had a good and long-standing relationship, one of cordiality with Morocco; expect that to continue but, again, within that overall framework, would necessarily be looking at the implications of this treaty and any impact it might have on --

Q To rephrase my first question, you have not received yet the assurances that you have been looking for?

A Well, the Moroccan emissary, if one wants to phrase it that way, is still here, still meeting with other U.S. Government officials today. So I think that the talks are continuing, and obviously our evaluation of this association is continuing.

Q There have been some reports, contained in some of the reports you cited, about military cooperation between Libya and Morocco particularly the sharing of troops -- Morocco's turning over as many as 30,000 troops to Libya.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you have anything that would indicate those were accurate --

A No, we don't. We are simply unaware of, I think -- that story is phrased in the context of a secret annex to the agreement, and we are simply unaware of any secret annexes. And I guess if you want to pursue that, you'd have to ask the governments of Morocco and Libya.

Q Well, has that been raised by the Secretary?

A I don't know whether that was raised. But, as I say, we are unaware of such.

Q John, at this juncture, do you know who initiated the talks -- began the talks? Was it -- it was Morocco or Libya?

A You mean the talks that we're having with the Moroccan visitor here?

A No, no, no. I'm talking about the whole union?

A The union? No, I don't.

Q John, any consultations with France presently on this agreement, and, specifically with respect to Chad and Algeria?

A Well, I know you keep fishing, Jim, for that. But I guess we're really aren't going to talk about --

Q (Inaudible).

A Oh, well, someone keeps fishing. Some bright --

Q But you have nothing to say about--

A Nothing to say on any discussions we might or might not have had with other governments.

Q Any travel plans by senior officials to the region?

A I don't know how to answer that. I'm not aware of any travel plans, but that doesn't mean there may not be some. People are traveling all the time, and there could well be something in the planning.

Q Would you confirm the reports saying that the Moroccans explain things in the direction that they are trying to make Qadhafi more moderate?

A Well, I don't think from here I really can get into the substance of Moroccan Government exchanges with the United States.

Q John, in your answer to the taken question yesterday about Western Sahara, you said that you advocate the solution of Western Sahara by political means. But the Moroccan regime always advocates the reverse. They want to finish this by military means.

A Uh-huh.

Q And they said that you never support them in that way. So can we conclude that there's a major difference between you and Morocco on this case?

A Well, you can conclude that the approach of the United States to international disputes is for resolution by peaceful means.

--MORE--

Q Do you still endorse the OAU settlement procedure on this?

A Not aware of any change in our position.

Q John, could I ask you about another part of this agreement, please? The publicly-released text contains some fairly strong anti-Israeli language. There are suggestions today that King Hassan has agreed to contribute troops should there be another war against Israel. Considering the fact that Morocco played a key role in setting up the Israeli-Egyptian contacts, the original contacts, and has played a very constructive role in this area, does that particular aspect of this agreement cause any concern here?

A Well, I think you're going back to this report that there's a secret annex which talks about supply of Moroccan troops, and as I say, we have no knowledge of such an (inaudible).

Q Even in the publicly-released text there is strong anti-Zionist language which seems rather out of character for Morocco, and I'm sort of curious whether that's caused any concern here.

A We have no -- I have no reaction on that.

Q There is a story this morning about the two men who were, the men who went to Honduras to help the Nicaraguan rebels, that there was an indication that the U.S. Embassies in the region helped them. Are there any specific guidelines on how the U.S. Government or U.S. Embassies in the region should deal with people who offer to help the Contras?

A Well, I guess there are two parts to that question. I'm sure there are guidelines relating to U.S. Embassy contacts with visiting Americans on a variety of issues -- visiting American journalists, visiting American businessmen, visiting Americans of all kinds and categories. Insofar as this particular issue is concerned, basically what I would say is what we have said already, that there is no suggestion of United States Government involvement in this operation. That was what we told you as soon as the story broke and we became aware of it. Nothing has changed in intervening days to change our assessment of the U.S. Government role. However, reports do arise of contacts, and we're looking into the suggestion --

Q But on the general --

A -- that there may have been individual American officials --

Q But on the general --

A -- who may have had some contact with these people.

Q On the general subject of Americans who contact an Embassy, say in Honduras, and say, "Well, we would like you to help us locate the Contra leaders," what would be the response from the Embassy there --

A Well, I think --

Q -- could be the response?

A I think I'd have to do a little research. I'm sure there are guidelines. I don't happen to have them with me, but --

Q Can you take that?

A I'd be glad to take a look at it.

Q John, would it be reasonable for us to assume that if there were guidelines on this subject and someone came and asked to be put in touch with, to be assisted in being put in touch with the Contras, that a U.S. Embassy, a U.S. Government official would be required to reply something to the effect of, "You better be careful. There are laws in the Neutrality Act, and this may, this kind of activity may violate that?"

A Well, it certainly is reasonable to assume that if any American citizen approached any Embasssy official or DOD official attached to an Embassy, or whomever, and suggested some activity that was illegal, that officer would be obliged to counsel them of the illegality.

I'm not going very far down this road because, as I say, these reports are surfacing; we want to pursue them very rigorously, which we are doing in this agency of the government, and I know that other agencies of the government are pursuing this. Justice is involved in the question of the Neutrality Act; our own Legal Department is. We, for example, have asked the Customs department to take a look at -- the Customs Service to investigate into whether there has been any willful violation of Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act, which obviously, relates to the export of arms. But I think the government is in a posture where it is running down these various reports and trying to get to the truth of them.

Q When you said "operation" in your initial response to Alfonso's question, were you defining it narrowly as the operation that, say, began some time last week and ended on Saturday, or were you talking about anything having to do with the Civilian Military group based apparently in Alabama?

A Well, what I'm saying is I'm not -- I guess what I'm really saying is, I'm not going very far down this road because we don't have the facts. Hypothetically, I suppose Americans may arrive in American Embassies abroad and declare themselves to be involved in a variety of enterprises. I think we have to look at if there was such contact, what these individuals said they were doing, and why they were there. I don't think we have that information.

Q I understand that, but you used a word which was, or a sentence, "There is no suggestion of U.S. involvement in this operation."

A Well, the operation, in the operation --

Q Is the operation defined narrowly in terms of time and a specific mission, or is it defined over the entire period beginning last November that's come over in the press reports about this CMA group?

A Well, what I was referring to specifically was the flight, or the alleged flight, of a helicopter into Nicaragua with two American citizens aboard.

Q So, then, you are leaving open the possibility of some U.S. involvement with respect to CMA over the period from November of '83 to this particular incident?

A Well, if you're referring, for example, of the reports that the FBI interviewed some members of that organization, that may well have taken place; certainly not suggesting that that didn't take place.

Q Back again to the Libyan-Moroccan affair, you are studying the text of the treaty between the two countries.

A Uh-huh.

Q Are you studying the texts in themselves only or in the light of the --

A Sorry, in the which only?

Q In themselves, I mean, or also in the light of the treaties being held between the United States and Morocco since the 70s?

A I think what we're doing is taking a look at the meaning of this association in a number of respects, what kind of implications it has.

Q Maybe I didn't make myself clear enough. I mean, you are looking in the text for violations or for contradictory stipulations in regards to what you have of agreements and the treaties with Morocco?

A What we're doing is -- as I told you, we were surprised initially by this association. What we are doing is taking a look at the meaning of it in terms of United States foreign policy and in terms of our association with Morocco. We don't have much of an association with Libya, so that's perhaps an academic thing to be looking at.

Q John, can I come back to Nicaragua for just a second again? Has the United States received a second protest from the Nicaraguan Government over this incident, and what does the U.S. think about Mr. d'Escoto's claim that the Nicaraguan Government directly contacted the relatives of the two who died?

A I think the Nicaraguan Government has been in contact with the relatives, as have we. I am not terribly sure whether that contact was from Managua or whether it was through the Nicaraguan Embassy in Washington. There certainly has been contact between the Nicaraguan Embassy here in Washington and the families of those who were believed to have been killed. We have been in contact with the families, too, and we're discussing with them appropriate methods of identification -- the dental charts, fingerprints, and that kind of thing.

We have ourselves handed a diplomatic note to the Nicaraguan Government. We have had verbal conversations with them about the individuals and the identification of these bodies.

Q Have the uncertainties that you referred to yesterday in the conversations with Nicaragua been resolved now?

A No, they have not.

Q Is your note in reply to the protest?

A No. That is a note concerning identification, access and identification to -- identification of the bodies.

Q This is a note of protest (inaudible)

A Our note to the Nicaraguans?

Q Yes.

A I don't think I would cast it in those terms.

Q You haven't, though, formally replied to the initial note by them?

A I don't have anything to -- There are two notes: there's the note from the Nicaraguan Government, which we've spoken of a couple of days ago, and I don't have anything for you on any U.S. response to that. We have, ourselves, sent a diplomatic note to the Government of Nicaragua concerning the bodies and the identities of these individuals, and they have not responded to that.

Q Is there a meeting in Manzanillo today --

A Yes.

Q -- with Shlaudeman?

A Yes.

Q It began today?

A Yes. Ambassador Shlaudeman was there yesterday and is there today, and the meetings, the agenda is obviously one of substance, but I don't have anything beyond that to tell you at this stage.

Q Just one other on this same issue: Do you have any -- Is there now a U.S. policy on mercenaries that you could --

A I think we posted something on that, Jim.

Q Is it posted?

A Yes. We got that question --

Q I'm sorry.

A -- a few days ago, and I think we posted something on that.

Q John, in Foreign Policy magazine there is an article by Colin Gray, who is on one of the intelligence oversight committees --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- and he is rather critical of the Administration for not making public more of what it knows of alleged Soviet --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- arms control violations. Do you have anything to say on that?

A I don't think beyond what we said -- That's the GAC Report. That's the classified report, I think. No. I guess we had some earlier response to that and certainly aren't taking it any further at this stage, certainly as long as that document remains classified.

Q John, yesterday you announced about the Genocide agreement ratification by the United States, or acceptance or whatever.

A Uh-huh.

Q Does waging a war with the intent of destroying the infrastructure of an organization which freely, and willingly, and by the choice of the people it represents functions around the world, wouldn't waging such a war be considered as committing a genocide against such organization and people? I'm looking at the thing, the hand-out that you have saying that "... with intent to destroy in whole or in part national, ethnical, racial, or religious groups."

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(Laughter)

A Somewhere in there there was a question, but I'm not quite sure what it was?

Q Yes, the question is, I'm asking if waging such a war against -- let's, you know, say the Israeli war in Lebanon against the Palestinians to destroy the infrastructure with the intent ....

A This is a Lester Kinsolving-type set-up. You roll one in first. I'm sorry. I want to be serious, but I'm still not getting the point of your question.

Q The Israeli war in Lebanon has not been defined yet as it was a defensive or offensive war, which was raised in June of 1982.

A Uh-huh. Right.

Q The Israelis, they said that they intend to destroy the infrastructure of the Palestinians, the PLO, in Lebanon.

A Uh-huh.

Q Destroying such infrastructure of all organization which represents the Palestinian people, and it was duly elected by the Palestinians everywhere --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- would be considered an act of genocide or not?

A Act of genocide?

Q Yes.

A O.K. Well, you're asking a very specific legal question, and I really can't give you a very, a legal answer.

(Laughter)

I would make a few general observations, namely, the PLO certainly -- and we have made some comments about the character of that insofar, in the past, aspects of the PLO have been involved in terrorism, so those statements are out there and I refer you to those. We did not favor, as we have made clear on many occasions, Israel's invasion of Lebanon. That, too, is out there.

Point three, we favor the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. Their presence there is not helpful to the stability, the integrity of Lebanon. We --

Q You still didn't answer my question. I want to know about attempts of Israel to (inaudible) --

A Well, I was very straight with you up front in telling you I wasn't going to answer your question in terms of that narrow definition of, "Is it genocide?" and I --

Q Can the Legal Adviser look into that if he can find --

A The Legal Adviser is very busy right now, (Laughter) but I certainly will tell him of your interest in this --

Q Also, on the Genocide Treaty, John, do you have any comment on The Washington Post report this morning that the decision to announce the Administration's support was hastily put together when it was learned that Vice-President Mondale was going to come out in favor of --

A I don't have any -- I have heard some initial negative reaction to that suggestion and skepticism in the State Department. I don't have anything beyond that. White House might want to respond to it.

Q Do you have anything more today on Chile or South Africa?

A I do not have anything on South Africa, and I do not have anything on Chile.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:52 P.M.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #162

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 1984, 12:15 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, everybody. I have a few announcements:

Secretary of State Shultz has been designated by the President to lead the United States delegation to the inauguration of Panamanian President-elect Nicolas Ardito Barletta. That will take place in Panama City on October 11.

Secondly, Secretary Shultz will deliver a foreign policy address on narcotics issues before the Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce next Friday, September 14, at a lunch at the Omni Hotel in Miami. There will be Q & A following his speech. If anyone is interested in covering this event, they should be in touch with Seth Gordon, of the Miami Chamber, at 305-350-7700. That's Seth Gordon, 305-350-7700. And, barring any technical difficulties in this technological age, the Secretary's speech and the Q & A will be piped live into the Press Room starting at about one o'clock on that day.

Thirdly, an announcement on Secretary Armacost's travel plans:

On his first trip to Europe as Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Michael Armacost will visit five Allied capitals during the period September 8-15. He'll meet with a number of senior officials and other public figures during his stops in London, September 10; Paris, September 11; Rome, September 12; Bonn, September 13; and Brussels, September 14. He'll also meet with the North Atlantic Council of NATO and the EC Commission during his stop in Brussels.

That's all I have for you.

Q Is that why the Ambassadors from four of the Allies were in to see Mr. Armacost?

A In part. In part, Bernie, yes, certainly, some of the issues discussed.

Q Is there some Berlin issue involved? It seemed to be the Berlin four.

A I'm not aware of any specific Berlin issue. I think, as I say, mainly -- they may well have discussed other issues, but I think, mainly, it was in connection with his trip.

Q John, just to clean up an issue we were dealing with earlier this week, after the visit of the Moroccan Royal Counselor, is the U.S. Government now satisfied with the assurance given by Morocco?

A Well, I think we are where we have been, Jim, and it hasn't advanced beyond the fact that we're continuing to look at the implications of what Morocco and Libya have done and are doing, and looking at those implications in the light of various discussions that various U.S. officials have had with Moroccan officials, both in Morocco and here.

Q But we are seeking new assurances, are we not, from the Moroccans?

A Well, I'm not sure that I would phrase it that way. I think I would prefer to use the language I have; namely, we're looking at the implications.

Q Can I pick up a question Jim has been asking you throughout the week?

A Uh-huh.

Q Will there be no interruption at all in the flow of U.S. economic and military assistance to Morocco, in the wake of the union announcement?

A Well, I'm not aware of any such interruption as of now.

Q What did the Counselor say about Libyan access to Moroccan military equipment provided by the United States?

A I guess we're just really not going to get into the --

Q John, besides --

Q John, can you be more specific about the implications? For two or three days now, you've said that the State Department was looking at the implications of this. To what end?

A Well, I think, as I suggested, one of the implications is to look at this association within the overall framework of U.S. law and U.S. regulations concerning exports, concerning exports of military equipment. Naturally, we would want to make sure that U.S. laws are observed. We have very strict controls on export of military-type equipment to Libya -- I think they are stricter than in the case of the Soviet Union -- and naturally, in terms of our reporting procedures to Congress and in terms of regulations and laws, we would want to make sure that there is not going to be any contravention of those regulations.

Q In answer to my first basic question, have you received, or are you now satisfied with, the assurances? What you seem to be saying, in short, is no.

A Well, I guess what I'm saying is, I'm really not going to respond to that question; that we are still looking at the implications of this association, and I'm not prepared to give you a sign-off on where we are today.

Q John, why did the Counselor of the King cut his visit short to Washington? He was supposed to stay today, but he left today morning (sic).

A I didn't know he had cut it short. As far as I know, he saw everybody he asked to see.

Q Have you requested from the Moroccans any written assurances or new assurances that the flow of arms and economic assistance will go on?

A Well, you're asking the same question I really refused to answer already; I'm not going to respond to that question. What we're doing is looking at the implications and making our judgment about the implications of it. How we're going to do that and what the course of the discussions is I'm just really not going to get into.

Q Can you refresh our memory? What are your apprehensions about the whole thing?

A I thought I just outlined them.

Q When you said you're not aware of any interruption in the flow of U.S. economic/military aid as of now --

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A Uh-huh.

Q -- you're leaving that open, that if when you search out your implications and examine the U.S. laws, etc., there could be a cutoff.

A Well, I don't want to lead you down that -- We're talking about a hypothetical situation, but obviously one would have to take account of any alleged or proven or suggested contravention of American law.

Q Is there any kind of a holdup of pipeline shipments?

A Not that I'm aware of, John. I'm not aware of any change in the situation. I mean, I think you have to see what I'm saying about examination of this issue within the context of other statements we've made about the good relationship we've had with Morocco and which we expect to continue. But having said that, there are some questions that we're going to get answered.

Q Have you received what you consider a satisfactory explanation from the Moroccans about the reasons for the union?

A I guess I will continue to be non-forthcoming, as distinct from my usual method of operating from this podium.

Q Still the question, there is no answer for it. You just said it.

A I said there are questions that we're going to answer for ourselves.

- MORE -

Q There's no answer yet (inaudible)?

A Well, I'm not going to tell you where we are. What I'm saying is that this Administration is looking at the implications of that association and seeing what it means for this Administration and for our relationship with Morocco, which has been a good one.

Q Any travel plans for this weekend or next week for senior officials to go to the region?

A To Morocco?

Q To the region.

A I'll answer that two ways. I'm not aware of any specific travel plans; and I think, within the context you're asking it, of this particular situation, I'm not aware of any. But don't rule out that officials could well be, in the course of things, going there. I just don't know.

Q Do you know of any plans for the King to come to the U.S.? He was at the U.N. last year, I remember.

A I really don't know, Bernie. I guess you'd have to ask the Moroccans. We're not aware of any plans.

Q John, the Libyans, at least according to FBIS, have been issuing statements of concern about the activities of the U.S. Fleet off in the Gulf of Sidra again.

Is there a maneuver going on?

A I guess you'd have to ask the Pentagon on that. I don't know.

Q John, several Congressmen have expressed their unhappiness with reports that the United States is planning to sell the, I believe it's called, AC-47 -- the famous "Puff, the Magic Dragon" plane that shoots a lot of bullets and stuff like that -- to the Government of El Salvador.

A Uh-huh.

Q Does the State Department have any comment on whether we're going to, or whether it feels that this is an unwise or improper type of sale to be made?

A   I guess I'm going to refer you back to some guidance I think Mr. Romberg had when I was away, and I think I'm correct in saying that that basically says that is a matter under consideration.

(Looks at Mr. Romberg.)

I am correct in saying that.

Q   These people are sending, or have sent, maybe, a letter -- members of Congress -- saying they feel it would be very bad to do, and it would cause a lot of civilian casualties, and would not be the kind of thing to -- that the United States should be engaged in at this particular stage. Do you have any response to that?

A   No, except that as in all these matters, the opinions of various members of Congress -- and they are various -- I'm sure would be taken into account. I'm sure there are many opinions on this.

Q   Also, in that same part of the world, do you have any comment on the reports that a U.S. Embassy official in El Salvador facilitated the group in Alabama's giving or supplying military equipment to the El Salvadoran Government, and that some U.S. officials may have helped them to be in touch with the Honduran Government and/or the contras?

A   I'm not very much beyond where we were yesterday -- namely, we're pursuing the facts; want to extract all the information that is available on this. Apparently there were some contacts between Mr. Posey and his group and some American officials, and the Embassies in El Salvador and Tegucigalpa; we're looking into, want to get all the information that might be available.

Some of those individuals are no longer at their particular posts. We're taking a look at the records and, as I say, in general trying to produce as full an accounting of any such contacts as possible. But, having said that, I just would reiterate once again that, insofar as the alleged helicopter foray into Nicaragua is concerned, we remain -- we continue to believe that there is no U.S. Government involvement in that particular operation.

Q   Are you saying you do intend to issue a complete report once you have assembled all the facts?

A   I don't know quite how we would issue the report, George. But, certainly, we are pursuing, and

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other agencies of the government, and I think there is quite a focus on the Pentagon and Department of Defense in this particular regard because some of those Embassy officials are said to have been DoD people --

So how this will all come out -- but I mean, a number of agencies are pursuing it and trying to find out what exactly happened.

Q John, you said that you would pursue it -- "investigate vigorously" was one of the words used earlier this week.

A Uh-huh; sure.

Q Will the Administration prosecute vigorously if it determines that any of these Embassy officials facilitated the illegal flow of weapons to a foreign government?

A If illegality is concerned, certainly the Justice Department will be looking into that.

As you know, yesterday we asked the Customs Service to take a look and see whether there had been any illegal arms export. That's one --

Q Could I check -- stick to the word "prosecute vigorously" as opposed to "look into" or "investigate vigorously?"

A Well, I guess what you do, before you find people guilty and launch prosecutions, is get the facts, Ralph. And so that we will do.

Embassy officials deal with visitors in a number of respects. They deal with journalists and are very helpful to those of us in this room who are in or were in the journalistic profession. They deal with Congressmen; they deal with businessmen. We've got to look at what the contacts were and what was asked, and what, if anything, was offered.

Q But there is -- you're not going to make the distinction between "investigation" and "prosecution?" "Prosecution" doesn't involve finding anyone guilty; it involves determining whether there was some weight of evidence of illegality.

A I don't want to pledge prosecution before an investigation is finished, but I also don't want to lead you in the direction that anybody is not going to prosecute in the event that there is any illegal activity uncovered.

Q John, is it true that the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Control follows a policy, as it says in the paper today, of not informing the State Department when they receive information that somebody plans to export weapons?

A I must confess I missed that one.

Q It's in there.

A Is it?

Q In the Washington Post.

A In the Washington Post? (Laughter)

Q It quotes an official as saying --

A It probably is true, I expect. I don't know. (Laughter)

Q Well, if that's the case, how are you suppose to -- since you control the munitions list -- supposed to deal with the licensing and the export of weaponry? Isn't this a kind of gap or glitch in government procedures here?

A I don't know whether there is gap in broad terms in that process, John. But I don't think, if there is any suggestion of impropriety or illegality in this particular case, I somehow don't think the State Department is going to be frozen out from that knowledge.

Q Well, no. For example, the specific allegation in the Post story today is, is that -- it's not an allegation -- I mean, it has the AFT (sic) confirming that this Mr. Posey, I guess, applied for a license as an arms dealer and stated specifically on it that it is his intention to export arms to various organizations in Central America.

A Uh-huh.

Q And then when asked, "Well, did you tell the State Department about this?" the response was, "No, we have no policy.

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A Well, you may be -- I don't know whether you're right, strictly on that narrow question of licensing as an arms dealer. But, of course, there are other regulations concerning the export of arms. That might be a license to deal. But specific case-by-case exports --

Q But licenses to deal with arms is only for within the United States.

A Okay.

Q But in justification -- apparently in this particular application, they said specifically, right up front, what the purpose --

A I can't answer that one.

Q John, for the record, is this your first acknowledgment that there have been contacts between some of the Alabama group and some members of the U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa?

A I don't know whether it is the first acknowledgment--

Q Your first --

A I don't know whether it's even mine. I certainly think that earlier this week I had been responding to those questions and wouldn't have suggested that there might not have been such contact, but I don't know whether this is my first --

Q Before you said you would be looking into it. Now you're saying, in fact it has happened.

A Oh, I don't think there's any question that we now are convinced that officials in the Embassies did have some contact. I think that's --

Q John, you mentioned that some individuals no longer are at their particular posts. Do you mean that some people may have been transferred --

A Yes.

Q -- as a result of this?

A Oh, no, no, no; but I think as a result of the passage of time.

Q John, you're still making the distinction, if I understand you correctly, between contact with this group and this specific incident. You're still maintaining that there was --

A Absolutely.

Q -- no connection whatsoever --

A Absolutely.

Q -- between the contact that these officials had with the group and the incident itself, is that correct?

A That's correct. We remain firm in our position that the United States Government was not involved in this particular, as I phrased it to Jim yesterday, "operation," or "incident."

Various people, as a result of our own inquiries, as a result of press inquiries, as a result of some of Mr. Posey's statements, suggest that there may have been earlier contact with Embassies and earlier visits to Honduras and Salvador. We see that as a separate issue from this particular thing, but certainly we want to get to the bottom of that and find out what is involved.

Q At this point, you have not established any link in terms of the possibility that those earlier contacts may have been to secure arms for this operation?

A No, not at all. And, indeed, these -- all the -- I don't want to prejudge the outcome of all our investigations, but, in fact, all the emphasis is on non-lethal equipment being offered to those governments.

Q May I follow up?

Q Before, you mentioned that there were contacts -- when we were talking about contacts between the group and U.S. officials, I think you meant that there had been a contact after the incident and now you are acknowledging that there were contacts before the incident; is that correct?

A Yes. Correct. I mean, in 1983, something like that apparently.

Q But in these contacts, if I may follow that up --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- In these contacts, beyond this particular operation that you were talking about eight days ago, were any other -- was any other help to the contras discussed at those meetings before between U.S. officials and the CMA group?

A Okay. Don't want -- obviously, I'm not going to go very far down this road because we, like yourselves, are looking at the facts, trying to establish what happened. But, insofar as we are aware of what happened, some members of this organization, or association, or however you want to phrase it, may well have been in Salvador and in Honduras, as we understand it, and have been in touch with individuals at our Embassies in either of those countries, professing interest in helping the governments of those countries with non-lethal equipment.

That's about where we are. That's what we're looking into.

Q Posey had said publicly that he sent 4,000 rounds of ammunition, as well as arms, into Honduras earmarked for the Nicaraguan rebels.

A Uh-huh.

Q That doesn't sound very non-lethal to me.

Q Well, you may have taken this further than we're able to take it. What we have been looking at is, I think, the ammunition clip; (that) is about as far as we have been able to take it so far.

Q John, I don't know if you said this before, but have you -- has this government, whether the Salvadoran Government or the Honduran Government, or the army in any one of those countries have acknowledged receiving help from that group? (Sic) I mean, is there any chance --

A I don't know. I think you would have to ask the two governments concerned -- the government of El Salvador and the government of --

Q But you are investigating this. Aren't you going to question this cause? I mean, you going to ask him?

A Well, American citizens may do all kinds of things with foreign governments. Now, you're asking specifically about any contact that this organization might have made with an Embassy official. That's what we are trying to run down. But what happened after that contact, I guess you'd have to ask the alleged receiving government.

Q When the CMA people were talking to officials in the Embassy in Tegucigalpa, were they talking about providing help to the Honduran Government or to the contras in Nicaragua?

A That's as I understand it. But, as I say, we're not going far down this road until we really get a handle on the facts.

Q Which one?

A To the Honduran Government.

Q To the Honduran Government. And not to the contras or --

A Not, as I understand it, to the contras.

Q Do you know the identity of the Embassy official?

A I think we will continue to work on that, John.

Q Can I pursue something you mentioned a minute ago? You said the ammo clip is as far as you've gotten. Are you drawing a distinction between an unloaded weapon as being non-lethal and an ammo clip --

A No, no, no. What I'm saying is that, insofar -- and I keep on saying, I'm not going farther on this road; then, I'm going further than I really want to go -- But insofar as our inquiries are concerned at this stage, we're talking about uniforms, we're talking about leggings; and somebody here said, well, about weapons? And there are reports of weapons. Well, there may be reports of weapons, and we'll pursue that. But so far as we are aware at this stage, the only thing approaching a weapon is an empty ammunition clip, or empty ammunition clips.

Q How many of those items are on the OMC's list that require a license?

A It appears to us that on the question of licensing, ammunition clips are something that would require licenses for export from the United States. Rifle-cleaning kits are something that would require licensing, and possibly protective vests. Now, apparently, that depends on the kind of protective vest it is, and you've gone about to the end of my expertise.

Q The uniforms and other matters that have been mentioned are not on the list?

A Insofar as we understand it at this stage, they are not on the list.

Q One more question. What can you tell us about Major McAnarney, specifically? And when we ask the Pentagon about him, they refer us to "part of the Country Team, it's a State Department question."

Can you confirm that he sent a letter to Mr. Posey? What did he tell him, and was he authorized to do that?

A Yeah. I don't think the Pentagon will refer you to us on him. I think they have been working at this diligently and pursuing their inquiries, and I think they are in a position --

Q They referred me to the Embassy in San Salvador.

A Well, I talked with the Pentagon probably a little later than you did, if you were in this room for five minutes before I got out here. They have been working that story, and I'll refer you to them on him.

Q John, Posey also said -- it was quoted in the Times yesterday but not asked here -- that he he had -- or that his organization had put in -- more than a dozen Vietnam veterans in Nicaragua with the contras in recent months.

A Uh-huh.

Q Are you investigating that?

A Of course. We're investigating the whole thing. I'm not aware of that -- we're investigating allegations concerning that organization. What the specifics are, I don't know, but obviously we're looking at the claims that organization is making.

Q On the specific operation, the helicopter operation --

A Yes.

Q -- have you determined a couple facts about that? Mr. McFarlane yesterday, on McNeil-Lehrer indicated that he believed a Cuban Soldier had been one of the victims, or military advisor. Do you have anything to substantiate that?

A Well, there have been reports of Cuban deaths involved in that operation. Yes, I think that's out there in the public domain.

Q Are there more than reports? Are you able to confirm anything? He suggested it; he didn't come right out and say it.

A We're not going to get into that. But if your question is, do we have anything which casts doubt on the possibility that -- you said "Cuban", singular. But if your question "Cubans", plural, I wouldn't steer you away from that conclusion.

--MORE--

Q Which operations are you talking about specifically?

A Apparently the operation in which the two Americans were involved.

Q I just want to come back to this again --

Q John, on that --

Q Could I just follow up the other on the operation? Have you determined where the helicopter took off from?

A We haven't. No.

Q You have not --

A Maybe --

Q You have not determined that?

A I don't know. It's possible the Pentagon might have something on that. I don't know.

Q But as part of your investigation you haven't inquired into where the helicopter took off from?

A We're inquiring into a lot of things, but I don't have anything for you on that particular question.

Q Earlier, on the helicopter operation and the people involved, you said that you were investigating the possible violation --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- or the Government is investigating possible violation of the Neutrality Act.

A Uh-huh.

Q In your answer, it said the Neutrality Act forbids mercenaries from taking action against a foreign government.

A Uh-huh.

Q That presumes -- "mercenary" presumably has something to do with compensation, money. That presumably, then ,would exclude volunteers. Is that right?

A I don't know. I think that is probably just the kind of question that the Justice Department and probably the State Department legal advisers are looking at, among others. But I can't give you an answer to that question.

Q Could I ask you a couple of technical questions? One is what are the --

A Oh, dear. All right.

Q What are the rules governing officials at an Embassy in dealing with people of this nature as it applies to providing military equipment of one form or another to a government?

A Well, I think -- you know, there are no posted rules. I think we were asked that, were there rules posted for -- for example, people who come in and want to make contact with the contras. As I understand it, there are no rules.

It is very difficult to, I think, provide blanket regulations. What is the question, for example? What if members of a Congressional delegation arrive at an Embassy and seek assistance in meeting various individuals? What if journalists arrive at an Embassy and ask for assistance, being put into contact with people? What if businessmen arrive?

So I really can't give you a kind of blanket response to that question.

Q (inaudible) people identified themselves, allegedly. They identified themselves. They knew they weren't Congressmen. They weren't journalists.

A Then the Embassy official would, obviously, handle that on a case-by-case basis.

Q Just one more question along -- what about the rules or the propriety of using United States military aircraft to transport goods which had been collected privately for another government?

A I don't know. I guess you're asking that in a general sense, because I'm not aware that anybody is suggesting that U.S. military aircraft are involved in this, but I assume the Pentagon has specific guidelines that would cover that eventuality.

But I'm not aware that anybody is suggesting that has happened in this particular case.

Q Could I just come back and ask you for the record again the extent today that you've looked into this over the last few days? Was there any U.S. Government foreknowledge whatsoever that this operation was being planned?

A Not as far as we -- certainly not as we -- as far as we have been able to determine 'til now. There's no change in our firm position that there was no foreknowledge.

Q John, could you just clean up a couple of diplomatic questions?

A Uh-huh.

Q Shlaudeman and Tinoco -- any readout or any response to the two protests that the Nicaraguans have sent now?

A I don't have anything for you in regard to the two protests. The second one I understand the Nicaraguan Government has made public. We do not make public diplomatic notes, and therefore we don't have any response on that.

Insofar as Ambassador Shlaudeman's talks are concerned -- yes, he met with the Nicaraguan Vice Foreign Minister, Mr. Tinoco, in Manzanillo September 5 and 6. That was their fifth session.

As was the case with the past several meetings, they were serious conversations of a substantive nature. We consider the private nature of those discussions to be an important element, and so we're not going to have any additional comment except to say that we do anticipate future meetings.

Q And on that protest question, you have said -- without revealing the contents of any response or diplomatic message, you have confirmed whether or not you've replied. Have you replied?

A No. I haven't confirmed whether we've

replied.

Q No, no. I'm speaking more generally.

A No. I haven't confirmed whether we've replied.

Q John, another subject, please?

Q Same subject.

Q Have we replied?

A I haven't up to this point confirmed, and I'm not about to confirm.

Q Can you say whether the Tinoco talks -- Shlaudeman-Tinoco talks -- in any way have dealt with this issue of -- the current issue of the protests or anything, or have they dealt exclusively with issues that were on the table prior to the helicopter incident?

A Not in a position to talk about the Shlaudeman-Tinoco talks.

Q Have you heard of an arrest of an American citizen in Cuba recently?

A Yes. We are aware of that situation. That is the case of an American citizen who had some critical remarks to make. The Cuban Government did sentence an American citizen early this year to six years in prison for allegedly praising U.S. actions on Grenada and for criticizing the Cuban role on that island in late October 1983.

According to his own statement, all he did was express a personal opinion in a non-violent manner to a group of Cubans. We have raised this with the Cuban Government. The United States Interests Section in Havana delivered a diplomatic note to the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Relations on April 18 of this year, in essence stating the view of the United States Government that the imprisonment of this U.S. citizen for the peaceful expression of his own opinion constituted a violation of his basic human rights and was clearly in conflict with Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The note also urged the Cuban Government to reconsider the harsh decision regarding the imprisonment

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and requested to be apprised of all charges against this U.S. citizen.

Q Where did he make --

Q Do you have a name on him?

A I don't have a name. No. I'm sorry. Let me see if --

Q A resident of Cuba or --

A Is there a Privacy problem? Let me see if there's a Privacy Act problem.

Q Resident of Cuba? I mean --

A I don't have any more on that.

Q Do you know whether he's a businessman or a politician or tourist or --

A Let me see what else we can produce for you.

Q Dual national?

Q Copy of that, John?

A Sure.

Q Also, where did he make those comments, in what context?

A In view of the interest in this, let us see what else we can produce for you.

Q I thought you don't make public your diplomatic notes?

A I was very careful not to make public the contents, but to give you a general indication of the -- of what was said in them.

Q Going back to Nicaragua, do you have any word for us now on what has happened regarding the bodies of the two men?

A No. I think we are still waiting for a response from the Nicaraguan Government on that question of identification.

Q John, in that context, the father of one of the young men who was killed there says the State Department contacted him and urged him not to accept a Nicaraguan invitation to go down there and identify the body.

A Can't speak to that. I know the State Department has been in contact with the families, but I'm not aware of that position. Be glad to take a look at it.

Q John, can you say why the United States vetoed the resolution in the Security Council on Lebanon's complaint against Israel in southern Lebanon?

A Yes. Sure can. The draft resolution focused entirely on the situation in southern Lebanon. It ignored the many serious problems in the rest of the country. This gave it, in our view, an inherent imbalance.

The United States firmly supports the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial integrity of Lebanon, and believes that all foreign forces must withdraw.

The United States seeks realistic ways to achieve that goal, and the draft resolution in the Security Council did nothing to advance the withdrawal of foreign forces in any practical sense.

We are more than ready to work with other members of the Council toward constructive action in Lebanon, but we cannot acquiesce in an unfair highlighting of just part of the problem as this debate and vote sought to do.

Q John --

Q Copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Prime Minister Karami said today on domestic service in Arabic, in Lebanon, that this act is a shameful position. He criticized the veto and called it a shameful position.

A Uh-huh.

Q What you can say about that?

1-2033

A Obviously, we disagree with Mr. Karami.

Q John, on another area, are you aware of any U.S. Naval exercises or maneuvers in the Mediterranean, across from Libyan shores?

A I guess that question's already been asked, but I'd go to the Pentagon and ask them about that.

Q John, do you have anything on the Ogarkov development --

A I don't --

Q -- in the Soviet Union?

A -- Bernie. No.

Q John, back on the veto for a moment, please. Was this done in line with the, I guess, 1975 agreement that the United States would veto any resolutions which would condemn Israel as part of the -- I guess it was part of Sinai II.

A I can't respond specifically to that point. I think the fact is we had made plain all along that we thought this was an unbalanced way of approaching this particular situation in Lebanon.

I don't think, from what we've said here and what has certainly been in the public domain, there could have been any doubt about the way we were approaching this question; and, as we have said, we were not prepared to attempt to negotiate text on this. It's an issue on which we had a clear position, and we voted accordingly.

Q On another subject, does the beating up of a Swedish member of the Iranian Claims Tribunal by two Iranians have any impact on whether that institution will continue?

A Well, I don't -- we certainly hope that that institution will continue, and we found that behavior deplorable. The attack was unprovoked and appeared to be a deliberate attempt to prevent Judge Mangard -- I think he's the Swedish arbitrator -- from participating in the Tribunal's proceedings.

Following the attack, the President of the Tribunal condemned it as utterly alien to the spirit of arbitration, and the very antithesis of the peaceful settlement of disputes, and he ordered that all Tribunal proceedings be suspended, I think, until September 14.

As far as the United States is concerned, we consider it to be an inexcusable violation of the norms of conduct by arbitrators, and an interference by the attackers with the good faith implementation of the Algiers Accords required by international law.

We view it as extremely serious and are determined that it should never be repeated. We certainly hope that the hearings and pre-hearing conferences will be rescheduled in the near future so that claimants will not be seriously delayed in pursuing their claims.

Q Copy, please?

A Sure.

Q John, I want to go back to the Security Council. You say that the resolution was unbalanced. Was there any consultation between the delegates of the Security Council and the United Nations representatives prior to the -- putting the resolution for voting, about the wording of the resolution and such things?

A Well, as I said, we felt strongly on the overall issue, and I think it never really appeared to us that a satisfactory -- a resolution that we would find satisfactory was being offered. So I think it was fairly clear that, given that situation, our vote would be as it was.

Q John, do you think that the Lebanon Government is going in the wrong way, I mean, in putting that in the United Nations Council or --

A I think we've made that plain in the past week, as we have offered you almost daily comments on the attempt to bring that resolution before the U.N. and to bring it to a vote.

Q Let me continue on this --

Q Do you have any comment on a fresh report this morning that there are Soviet military personnel in Lebanon in the Bekaa Valley?

-2290

A I don't. I mean, those reports have been persistent over many months, Ralph, but I don't have any -- I can't take it any further.

Q I thought that it had been confirmed a long time ago.

A I don't know whether we confirmed it, Hank. There certainly have been reports that Soviet advisers have been in and out of the Bekaa.

Q John, do you have any response to the opinions expressed by former Ambassador Robert White in today's New York Times?

A No, I don't.

Q How about Tom Wicker's column on the KAL?

A Pretty far out. Pretty far out.

Q Really?

Q Do you have anything, John, on that --

A This is the -- you mean, this is the conspiracy theory again, and Wicker picking up on some of the wilder aspects of the allegations that have been made about -- I mean, I really -- I'm hard put to remember an occasion on which governments have made more information available than has been made available in this case, where there's been such exhaustive inquiry, not only by the United States but by other governments and by international organizations. But somehow there are a few people on the fringes who continue to perceive and foster this great conspiracy theory.

Q Is Tom Wicker one of those people on the fringes?

A I thought I sort of made myself clear today.

Q Do you have anything, John, on the Foreign Affairs Committee action on South Africa, the non-binding resolution on honorary consulates?

A On the consulates? Yes, I do have. We're going to take a look at the resolution when we actually see the wording. It has yet to be acted on by the full

1-2291

House, and therefore it probably is premature for us to comment at this time.

I just would note the resolution, among other things, calls for the closing of South Africa's honorary consulate in Pittsburgh, and for the record the South Africans closed that office on April 30 of this year.

Q Would this resolution that the Security Council was -- that the United Nations (sic) vetoed -- I'm going back to this -- can you -- after you justified your position, can you still express your concern and possibly issue a restraining, whatever, order or request to Israel to cease and desist from the things which the Lebanese Government says that they are in contravention and their objection to the daily life of the Lebanese and to the rights of the Lebanese in the Palestinians there?

A Our position on Lebanon -- and I think we've invested American blood in that effort and American energy, and I don't think we can be faulted for our contribution to the peaceful future of Lebanon -- but the fact is, a variety of forces are active, and we think that this particular resolution was one-sided, didn't address itself to the overall problem. It's as simple as that.

Q Okay. Thank you.

Q Hold it. How about Marshal Ogarkov?

A Nothing on that, Bill.

(The briefing concluded at 12:55 p.m.)

Stenz | Becker
Peterson

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DPC #163

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1984, 12:15 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Just like to remind you, the Secretary will be appearing tomorrow morning, 9:00, in a closed session before the House Judiciary Committee leadership. That's Room 2237 in the Rayburn Building; and then at 10:15, in open session, before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee policy. The second meeting is in Room 124 of the Dirksen Building. That's all I have for you.

Q Does that mean there's no briefing tomorrow?

A No, there will be a briefing tomorrow. It might start a little late, but there will be a briefing.

Q What room number is that, John; sorry?

A The open session is 124 of the Dirkson Building, and the closed session is Room 2237 of the Rayburn.

Q And there will be a briefing tomorrow?

A There will be a briefing. It might begin a little late.

Q What prompted the (inaudible), first hearing, the closed hearing?

A Their call. They asked for it to be closed.

Q When was that? Was that just the other day?

A Well, I may have misled you on Friday by -- because I believe they were both open, but apparently even on Friday they were not. Mr. Rodino had asked for that to be a closed session, so it's his call.

Q John, the Soviet -- the new Soviet Chief of Staff this morning, in an NBC interview, indicated that the tradition of meetings by the --

Q Korneienko.

Q Korneienko. I'm sorry, Korneienko, a Foreign Ministry official, said that the tradition of meetings between the U.S. President and the Soviet Foreign Minister had been broken by the United States. He seemed to indicate that there was no strong Soviet objection to such a meeting taking place, possibly this year.

What's the American view of that tradition?

A Well, as the Secretary said -- I don't know what the view of the tradition is -- but insofar as this year's plans are concerned, I think I'll rest on the Secretary's words yesterday in which he said we're talking about the meeting with Mr. Gromyko, between Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Shultz, and he didn't have anything to say about any subsequent or successive meetings.

Q Is the United States open? Is the President open to such a meeting?

A I guess you'd have to ask the White House.

Q Is part of the Secretary's brief or writ in meeting with the Foreign Minister to explore the possibility of such a meeting?

A I don't have anything more on the agenda, John, than we've already offered.

Q Have the Soviets indicated before this morning's interview that they would be willing to have this interview -- this meeting between Gromyko and the President?

A I really am not going to get into the kind of discussions we've been having with the Soviets in preparation for the U.N. meeting.

Q Was this any surprise to you here?

A I don't think anybody is surprised at what was said this morning.

Q Could you tell us about how that is done technically? Who is inviting whom, or who is raising the question technically?

A Well, as I said, I think I will rest on what the Secretary of State said yesterday about focusing on his meeting with Mr. Gromyko.

Q When you say, "Don't think you're surprised," you're saying then that the U.S. believes that there was a readiness on the Soviet part to meet the President?

A Well, I think what you're asking me is for an off-the-cuff reaction as to whether I was surprised at the Soviet statement.

A You said you don't think anyone was surprised. That can only mean that the U.S. is not surprised about Soviet readiness to meet the President; is that what you mean?

A No, I think you're going beyond what I said. I think that I was asked whether his remarks this morning surprised me, and I said, no, I didn't think it was surprising.

Q Those were the remarks.

A Well, as far as a second meeting where the Secretary of State is concerned, as far as a Presidential meeting is concerned, I just don't have anything.

Q Well, does one depend on the other in any sense?

A You can pursue this, but you're not going to get anywhere.

Q Well, what about -- can you address the general question of whether such meetings are considered useful?

A I think the President has spoken on a number of occasions about those meetings and the need for preparation, and the Secretary has talked about his philosophy of those meetings, too, on those meetings.

Q Is it the kind of preparation that you envision necessary possible in the period of time that remains between now and the beginning of -- and the end of the U.N. General Assembly session?

A Well, I'm sure anything is possible, Ralph, but I just don't have any announcement on subsequent meetings.

Q John, you have no announcement just for protocol reasons? I mean, you have nothing to say just for protocol reasons? The White House --

A I just don't have any announcement.

Q John, can I just follow up on this, please? Why, after this Administration has made it clear that it would welcome such a meeting, you have the blip from the Soviet Union today, why is there such a non-commital response on the part of --

A Presidential meetings are usually announced by the White House, Bernie.

Q John, there is a report that Secretary Shultz sent an invitation to six foreign secretaries of six Gulf Cooperation Council states to meet with them in New York October the 1st. Do you have anything on that? And what do you expect the agenda to be?

A I don't because I don't have anything on the Secretary's schedule insofar as it's nailed down. I mean, I wouldn't steer you away from the suggestion of a meeting, but I really don't have anything to give you on it because I really don't know where the -- what the state of preparations is. It's possible.

Q Is it true that he sent the invitation to them?

A I don't know. That I don't know.

Q Can you brief us and let us know about it?

A No, I don't think we can. No. When we've got something to give you on his schedule, we'll give it to you.

Q John, do you have anything about the training of the Marine on the Kfir airline?

A I think the Pentagon will respond to that. That's not a new story, though. I understand that there was some kind of announcement over at the Pentagon about ten days ago.

Q John, do you have any comment on the very critical statement made by the Lebanese Government against the veto used in the Security Council later?

1-2897

A That's Mr. Karami's --

Q Yes.

A No, nothing beyond what we said the other day; Friday, I think.

Q John, has Egypt renewed interest in having the U.S. Naval forces in the Suez Gulf and the Red Sea stay on any longer? It seems that they want to do some more mine-sweeping in the area. Do you have anything to that effect?

A I don't know that there's any great change in that situation. No, I guess there isn't.

Q Okay. Another question. Israel -- a report out of Israel indicates that there's a deadlock over the trade zone talks with the U.S. Do you have anything on that?

A No, I don't.

Q John, do you have any statement on the reports that private companies or groups and foreign governments, including Israel, may be supplying money to the contras?

A Well, just a sort of general comment. Some months ago when the Congress failed to provide all the funding that we had asked for for Central America, obviously there was consideration of options and alternatives in the government, but the decision was taken not to play an active role in soliciting either private funding or third country support. And the fact is that the United States Government has not done that.

Clearly, the anti-Sandinistas have been able, on their own, to obtain some support, although it's impossible to indicate how much and from where.

Provided United States funds are not used, we do not discourage other countries from providing support nor have we discouraged legal private U.S. contributions. It's obviously within the framework of the law.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Can I follow that up a little?

Q (Inaudible) aid to the rebels to buy arms or ammunition or supplies, logistical supplies of some kind, is that legal?

A Well, I'm not going to pose as a legal expert. What I'm doing is giving you the broad outline of what we have decided.

As to specific questions, as you know, we have asked the Justice Department -- or the Justice Department, I guess, already has its own investigation. We've asked the Customs Service to look at certain aspects of activities that may or may not have gone on. Just as a matter of record, solicitation of funds conceivably could come under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. You ought to talk to the Department of Justice about that. So there are various legal ramifications.

But what I'm doing is saying that, obviously, we haven't been able to keep track of everybody who may or may not be involved in this, and haven't taken a position on it; certainly haven't gone out and worked for it, but certainly haven't discouraged it.

Q John, to go back to the previous question I asked, if I could just follow that up a little bit.

By that statement that you read, you're stating categorically, then, that the U.S. Government in no way told the -- helped the contras obtain outside aid; is that correct?

A Well, let me -- now, you're talking about the contacts, and let me go over that as the situation stands today and in the light of the inquiries that we have been pursuing vigorously.

We're still looking into that matter. But as of now, according to our records, the Alabama group first came to the attention of an official of our Embassy in El Salvador in October 1983. This and subsequent contacts and communications with our Embassy were related to an offer of the group to provide small amounts of free clothing and other supplies of that character to the Salvadoran military. And our Embassy, or the individual in the Embassy, extended the group the kind of normal courtesies that an official of the Embassy would.

A   Now, as far as Honduras is concerned, in January of this year the group made similar offers to the Government of Honduras, and there was also contact with our Embassy in Tegucigalpa.

Insofar as the anti-Sandinistas are concerned, apparently, at some time this past year, the group established contact with the anti-Sandinistas, again apparently offering to be helpful.

We have no indication that the United States Government was involved in those contacts. As far as we know, they took place without any contact with USG officials. And certainly as far as the operation into Nicaragua is concerned, that took place without prior knowledge of the United States Government. And, as you know, that unfortunately revolved -- resulted in the tragic death of two Americans.

Q   Can we get a copy of that, or is that more difficult?

A   Sure.

Q   What do you mean when you "We have no indication the United States Government has been involved in these contacts?" meaning what by "these?"

A   I'm talking specifically about this group and its contacts with the contras.

Q   Contacts with the contras?

A   Yes.

Q   That does not extend to -- I mean, you're also categorically denying, from the previous statement, that the U.S. Government did not help the contras secure outside aid in other governments?

A   Yes.

Q   All right.

Q   What do you mean when you say you've not "discouraged?" I don't quite understand what it means not to discourage?

A   Well, I think -- there's a question of knowledge, I suppose, Don, in the first instance. But I suppose if a private individual wants to make available money, for example, for purposes that are legal, that is not something that the United States would be directly involved in.

Q But how do you not discourage this? What do you -- is this a backhanded way of saying you're encouraging it?

A No, it's not a backhanded way of encouraging it. We're saying that that is a private negotiation between a private individual and another group, or another country over which we have no control.

Q And do you have -- was the United States Government aware of this, aware of these potential contributions or actual contributions?

A Certainly in the case of this particular group, as of now, our information is that it was not.

Q Doesn't that mean, John, that if, when you use the term "not discourage," that if any of these private groups -- this one excepted -- were to check if the United States had any objection, the indication from the United States Government would be that it did not?

A Well, I don't know. It depends where that contact might have been made, but I -- I mean, if there were a totally legal overture, it's my impression that the United States would not discourage it.

Q To what extent do you seek to determine the legality as opposed to the illegality of these private ventures which you say you do not discourage? Is there an investigation?

A That would be at the judgment of the individual who was contacted. If you're talking about an Embassy official, for example, he would make a judgment as to whether what he was being asked to do bordered in any way on the illegal, and we're still looking at those contacts.

I have to say that as of now we have no indication that any facilitation that was conducted in either Salvador or Honduras was, in fact, illegal.

Q But assuming the case -- and apparently there have been them -- that a private individual seeks to provide money or certain kinds of supplies to a non-governmental group like the anti-Sandinistas, you say that you do not discourage private companies or individuals from providing such aid -- such legal aid.

Now I'm asking, to what extent do you seek to determine, if you're not formally notified by that individual or company, that --

A We might have no knowledge of it.

Q -- they're providing it, to what extent will you seek to determine whether that funding is legal or illegal?

A Well, you might have no knowledge of it whatsoever.

Q Then --

Q Are there guidelines prepared on what is legal and what is not legal, because these contacts did come up over a period of time?

A I don't know that there are guidelines, Roy. I don't know that they exist in a kind of neat, compact package; but certainly Embassy officials are aware of the various controls, of the various export regulations, and certainly aware of the laws that prevail --

Q How is an individual officer in an Embassy, say, or in this government here, to determine such an unusual case coming along, whether it's legal or illegal when it seems that -- your basic attitude is that you'd like to just look the other way?

A I think he would determine his action in the same way as he would determine any action that he's obliged to take on behalf of any American citizen.

He would obviously look at it, and if of his own knowledge he were able to determine whether that was legal, I presume he would make his own judgment. If he felt that the request was questionable or went beyond his expertise, I presume he would refer it to higher authorities either in the Embassy or here in Washington.

Q Do you know if that happened on any occasions?

A I do not know.

Q John, does this mean that -- any organization anywhere in the world makes a pitch for money here in the United States, it's wide open, or is there a --

A That's a question that I would have to take a look at legally, Bernie. You're talking about within the United States, and I would have to --

Q Well, we've talked about the contras raising money within the United States. You say you're not discouraging that.

Suppose there are organizations that are fighting governments in different parts of the world. Does that mean, from your point of view, that's wide open?

A I would have to take a look at the legal circumstances, Bernie.

Q But is it legal -- is it ultimately a legal definition that's going to be applied, or is it a political definition that if the U.S. Government approves of group "X, Y," or "Z" opposed to such-and-such a government, and if that fits under the rubric of U.S. policy, that's fine. But if --

A Congress inhibited the flow of funds to Central America to support certain causes. The United States at the time of the cutoff of those funds looked at the various options, decided not to take initiatives in connection with furthering funds from other countries or other groups to Central America.

But that doesn't mean that the United States has put itself on the side of discouraging such funds; may have no control over them.

Q What other areas -- what other options might it have? Congress said no. What do you do?

A Well -- oh, I suppose one option may have been to encourage our people to send funds.

Q John, on this same topic --

A And I'm commenting on the legality of that. But that is an option.

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Q Aren't you, in a sense, holding or saying that the United States has a much lesser standard of watching and guarding against subversion or arms flows or arms smuggling, or different kinds of activities related to support of insurgent groups than the standard that's being proposed -- that it proposes for all of Central America in the Contadora process?

A No, no.

Q Well, if, for example, under the example -- what we've been talking about -- the Salvadoran refugees in Nicaragua wanted to supply boots or medicines to insurgents in El Salvador, and the Sandinistas took the position that, "Well, we're not encouraging you and we're not going to facilitate it, but we're going to look the other way," wouldn't that, if we were in the United States and it pertained to the FDN, be illegal?

A We'll look at that one when it arises.

Q Could I ask a question of clarification about your intitial statement?

Did you say that at the time that Congress cut off the funds, and so forth, the decision was made not to play an active role in private funding?

A In solicitating either private funding or third country support, and we have not done so.

Q And at that time, when that decision was made, was that decision then disseminated in some fashion to U.S. officials around the world, or at least in that part of the world so that they would know that?

A I don't know whether it was disseminated. It certainly was a decision in which the policy-makers of the government concurred and of which they were aware.

Q And --

A And therefore would be implemented.

Q But would you not have a problem if the people in the field didn't know that that was the policy of the government?

A I don't think that's been a problem, Don.

Q John, getting back to the question -- excuse me, Ralph. Getting back to the question of legality, to the best of your knowledge, have there been any precedents of when a determination, such as this, had to be made as to the legality?

A Determination of what?

Q Well, you said "legal." You used the word "legal." "If such aid is provided and if it's legal."

A Uh-huh.

Q Have you had such precedence, to the best of your knowledge?

A I don't know, because, frankly -- I mean, we're looking at this particular instance. What -- there may well be other groups; there may well be other individuals. There are lots of people who think that the cause of the contras in Nicaragua is an honorable one, and there may very well be groups involved in trying to aid them.

Q But don't you try to keep tabs?

A As I say, it's impossible to keep tabs on -- there are a large number of people who think that's an honorable cause.

Q John, you don't know the answer to the question as to whether, if a third country checked with the United States Government, the government response is that the U.S. had no policy on that, or was not opposed, or what?

A I think we would reiterate the policy that I have outlined here, that the United States is not going out and seeking to move those funds but is not discouraging them.

Q How about the question of diversion of U.S. aid funds by third countries? Was there any policy decision made as to whether a country could take U.S. aid funds, or in some fungible way use equivalent money, given in U.S. aid, to aid these private groups in Central America?

A Well, I think, Don, as we've said on a number of occasions -- I mean, if the suggestion is, has the United States tried to circumvent the will of Congress by allocating funds which were then earmarked for something which Congress had voted against, the answer to that is a flat no.

If you mean, does the United States Government have a veto over every item in the budgets of every foreign government, I think the answer to that is no.

Q In between, what about the diversion of funds supplied by the United States to this purpose, or materiel supplied by the United States?

A I'm not aware that there is any conscious diversion of such funds, and certainly that is not -- has not been the policy of the United States to circumvent Congress' will by that technique, and we have said so.

--MORE--

Q John, in view of the fact that a number of the countries involved appear to be major recipients of U.S. assistance, would you agree that, in the words of Mrs. Ferraro, "it doesn't look so hot"?

A Well, I think that we have to do what we think is right in terms of our aid program to various countries. I mean, if you're suggesting are those figures artificially manipulated in order to move funds onto another venture which Congress has indicated it does not support, I think that clearly would be thwarting the intent, and it has not taken place. But if you are suggesting that we can control every government out there, some of whom think that what is happening in Central America is important to them as well as to the United States and to the region, no, I don't think you can control governments who think that they want to aid certain factions or certain governments in Central America.

Q Does that apply to Nicaragua as well, for example?

A Well, a lot of aid goes to Nicaragua from a lot of governments we know about.

Q That's right. So you would not discourage, presumably take the same view that you can't discourage that?

A I think we've made it clear that insofar as the weaponry that has gone to Nicaragua and insofar as the 9,000 Cubans who have gone to Nicaragua, 3,000 of whom are military advisers, I think we have made it clear that we don't consider that as a constructive effort.

Q As a consistent policy?

A I think we've been fairly consistent in our view of that military buildup in Nicaragua?

Q John, is there in all this a clear line -- I may have missed it -- about the legality of private Americans providing money to anti-Nicaraguan forces in Nicaragua? Have you answered that? If so, it has escaped me.

A What I'm saying is that, clearly, we're not sanctioning any illegal action, but at the same time we're not thwarting private gifts -- money, for example -- to Central America where those are not illegal.

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Q Then, I come back to my question. Then, do you have a judgment on whether I can provide money to the contra forces?

A Well, if you came in, Hank, and said, "I want to give $1 million to the contras," I think I'd get you a good legal opinion. (Laughter)

Q Have you decided it's deductible? (Laughter)

Q Did you -- as Hank says, "Maybe I missed it." No country, no third country that has aided the contras has checked in advance with the U.S. to find if --

A No. I said I didn't know whether that was the case or not. I don't know --

Q Have any private donors checked in advance before --

A I don't know.

Q Well, can you check, can you take that question?

A I think that would be an extraordinary amount of research. I mean, this is why we're where we are now. We're talking about middle-level officials in Embassies who may or may not have had contact with various groups. There are a lot of such groups around.

We cannot --

Q The basic question is whether the government in any way has coordinated or supported or given a wink or somehow helped this aid go in there?

A No. Well, we've made that clear that insofar as this particular group and this particular operation is concerned in Nicaragua, the answer to that is no.

Q But if people come to --

A Insofar as their activity in Salvador and Honduras is concerned, they have done what they have done. There has been the contact that there has, and it has taken a fair amount of research to pull that together, so I doubt that we're going to be speedily able to produce a chronicle --

Q My question is whether at any point a request has been made to the State Department for a legal opinion on whether it's permissible.

A I really do not know the answer to that.

Q John, what is your answer if somebody, or groups in the U.S., were to provide money to Nicaragua? Is that not to be discouraged as well?

A I think that would be a question on which one would take legal advice.

Q John, does it fall in the same category?

A As I say, I think it is a question on which one would take legal advice.

Q So there is a difference between giving aid to the contras and giving aid to Nicaragua?

A The words, the yardstick, is legal activity; and we would look at such approaches within that framework as to what is legal.

Q But are you prepared to say it is not illegal now?

A No, I can't say. What I would say is that on such an issue as that, if an American official were approached, he would have to make a judgment as to whether it was legal or not.

Q John, isn't this a Hatch Act question of whether something defeats the intentions and policies of the United States?

A No, I don't think it is that at all because we have made very clear that we have not sought to do that.

Q No. What I'm saying is, I mean, to take Barrie's point, if we were supporting the other side, that would be a Hatch Act offense, wouldn't it?

A Well, --

Q Does the United States Government, this one, consider that it has an affirmative obligation to prevent the flow of money or supplies or weapons or people to insurgent groups in Central America?

A I would rather describe our policy in the words I used than have you recast those words and ask me to accept or deny your words.

Q I'm asking, though, whether the United States, in terms of arranging a peaceful settlement under the Contadora process supported by the United States, does the United States Government believe that it has an affirmative obligation to prevent the flow of weapons, money, other forms of support to insurgent groups in Central America or any other parts of the world?

A Well, as you know, the United States has very strongly endorsed the 21-point Contadora program which certainly embraces the withdrawal of weaponry and advisers from the region. I just have to point out to you, however, that it takes more than one side to bring that about.

Q What is the affirmative responsibility of the United States Government with respect, for example, to enforcing the Neutrality Act, noting in particular that in 1982 the United States publicly offered to Nicaragua that it would make a public statement that it was enforcing the Neutrality Act.

A Well, where instances of contravention of the Neutrality Act are brought to our attention or we initiate such disclosures ourselves, obviously, we would encourage action against any who have contravened the Act.

Q John, in view of the interest in this subject, would it be worth trying to get a briefing put together by someone who is a specialist in the area?

A It's possible. I doubt that we're going to go much further than we have gone, but I certainly will communicate your request.

Q John, can I ask you, if aid were to go to the El Salvador insurgents, would you also not discourage it?

A I think that's a rather hypothetical question.

Q Why? Why?

Q John, since you are talking about the question of the Salvadoran rebels, you said was hypothetical, but there are groups in the U.S. which have raised money for the Salvadoran rebels here.

A Uh-huh. Well, I'm not prepared to answer that question.

Q You don't turn your back on that one.

A I'm not prepared to answer that question.

Q John, on this subject in principle, you said you are against any action, any military action to destabilize any country in Central America by force. I remember for the last year you repeated that many times.

A Yes. But your question is what?

Q Are you still -- I mean, you are against destabilizing any Central American country by force?

A Of course.

Q So, are you still with that?

A Of course.

Q Since you are talking about money, John, do you see anything illegal or wrong with Arab municipalities in Israel and the occupied territories to receive funds from building infrastructure from Arab and Palestinian sources in the United States and Europe?

A That is one, as distinct from all the other questions today which I have obviously answered skillfully and forthrightly, you have caught me unawares (laughter) on that one, and we will have to do a little research on that one.

Q O.K. Thank you. And I want to follow up, do you have any thoughts about Khomeini's refusal to accept any kind of compromise with Iraq and the reported upcoming visit of Iran's President Ali Khamenei to Syria?

A No, don't have any comment on that.

Q John, on the Middle East, also -- Just a second, while we're still on the Middle East, can I ask --

A How about if you speak one at a time, and I'll get to you.

Q On Central America, please. You explained that the decision was made some months ago.

A Uh-huh.

Q You didn't say exactly why it was made. What is the justification?

A I would have thought that rather obvious. A cause in which this Administration believes very strongly suffered an acute setback by the decision of Congressmen to reduce the funds that we considered were acutely necessary. You had some decisions to make at that time, and in the course of looking at that very unfortunate decision, from the Administration's point of view, the Administration looked at its options and decided the way it did.

Q At the time the decision was made, was there some consideration that it might get out of hand, that you might have various groups with various causes making their contributions, and that sooner or later would become public, and you'd be stuck having to explain (inaudible) --

A I don't know. I don't know whether there was a decision, whether there was a discussion of that particular aspect, but I think you ought to address that question more to those who voted to cut off the funds than to the Administration. I think they would bear the responsibility for the lack of influence and the lack of coordination that might develop over the succeeding months.

Q Aren't you, then, carrying out a policy which you say Congress wants to thwart, and you're doing this against the will of Congress?

A Not a question of -- You have totally misread what I've said here. It's not a question of doing something, it's a question of not taking a position on a private organization or another country that legally makes its decision to help the anti-Sandinistas.

Q Is there concern, though, that this might get out of hand, this might get out of control, because obviously, you don't have control any more and you're looking the other way as these things, as this money, is flowing in?

A Well, I think this particular incident is a very unfortunate incident, but I think you're really seeing -- there are two aspects of the story, two levels of this story. There is the one aspect where Americans, presumably, flew in a helicopter into Nicaraguan territory, and sadly were killed. There is the other aspect of a group from Alabama wanting to help in Honduras and Salvador, making contact with the governments of those countries and offering equipment, which certainly was their privilege so to do.

Q John, would you quarrel at all with the $10 million figure that was published yesterday --

A I'm not sure what that relates to.

Q -- total amount of aid supplied by private groups to --

A I just have no idea of knowing.

Q (Inaudible) more specifically of what funds you were referring to when you said funds were "cut?"

A Well, I think, obviously, you have us at something of a disadvantage, Jim, because we have not wanted to talk in great detail about funds involved in covert activities, but I think the amounts and, to some extent, the purposes for which the Administration was seeking them are really quite well known.

Q You used the word "cut," which means, as if they were decreased or something like that. Is that how we're to interpret it? My understanding --

A I think it is --

Q -- is there was never any decrease.

A I think it is quite clear that the provision of funds for a variety of purposes in Central America sought by the Administration, the funds voted were not of the amount that the Administration had requested.

Q Will you give us some idea of what the time element was of the decision made not to play an active role? You say when Congress cut off, but this has been a long -- As you know, this thing has gone over many, many months.

A Sure. I would assume -- I can't give you a specific answer, Don, but I assume it would be during those critical days, when it became clear that Congress was not going to support the Administration.

Q But they have had a number of votes going back a year and a half.

A Yes, and I can't tell you (inaudible).

Q Can you find out when it was this decision that you describe was made?

A I'll look at it, but I don't guarantee to give you a kind of blow-by-blow account.

Q John, are you making a distinction here between arms and financial aid?

A Yes, I am.

Q John, can I ask you just one last question to be clear?

A Sure.

Q It is legal, you are saying -- I mean that has been looked at -- to raise money in this country for the --

A No, I didn't say that. I think when Bernie asked me that question I said I think we would need to look at such contacts and such requests, where they are known to us, on a case-by-case basis.

Q Well, there are representatives of the contras who are active in this country.

A Uh-huh.

Q Has any determination been made as to whether their fund-raising activities are legal or not?

A I don't know that any determination has been made that they're illegal.

Q Could you take that question with regard to --

A You'll have to ask the Justice Department.

Q Well, but it opens up a larger question of whether, unless I'm mistaken, it is not legal for Americans to contribute to the PLO, to the Polisario, or to other groups that are --

A I think we will let the Justice Department, which is clearly much better versed in all this than the State Department, handle that particular query.

Q John, tell us, with Central America, do you consider Israel as one of those countries you described as concerned or interested in Central American developments?

A Well, if you mean have Israeli officials visited Central America and shown interest in Central American affairs, yes.

Q I mean, as one of those countries being mentioned as a third party --

A Then, you'd have to ask --

Q -- to channel money to groups?

A You'd have to ask the Israelis.

Q Before we leave Central America, do you have anything on the stories over the week or yesterday on the alleged massacre in El Salvador or the killing of the two candidates in Nicaragua?

A I don't think we have anything today on that, Jim, but I know that we have had earlier guidance -- perhaps it was on a day when you weren't here -- but there has been earlier guidance on Duarte's launching the investigation.

Q Of the 28th. But you also said at that time that the United States had not been able to confirm anything and it remained unclear, a number of things about the Salvadoran army. Haven't you straightened up any of those questions?

A I think there is later guidance -- obviously, it's a Salvadoran investigation -- but I think there is later guidance than the 28th.

Q And did you have anything on the two legislative candidates reported killed or abducted in Nicaragua?

A Well, obviously, we don't condone kidnappings.

Q Did you say that there are out-of-bounds areas, for example the purchase of arms, for the money that is contributed to the two countries -- proscribed lists?

A Well, there are questions -- the question of what kind of license you have to have to be involved in the export, and then there is the question of what kind of permit you have to have case-by-case for export, and of course, many people do have such licenses and do export. So it would depend, I guess, on the individual and it would depend on the country and would depend on the character of the arms being exported, but certainly it is not illegal.

If you've gone through the process and you've observed the laws and the regulations, it's not a question of nobody being able to export arms. People do it all the time.

Q You could take that money and buy stockpiles of arms if the export was legal.

A Again, I really don't want to be a legal, your legal adviser up here.

Q But wait, what about that on arms? Suppose you got this $10 million that's reported, can you buy $10 million worth of arms?

A I'm really not going to get into hypothetical, legal questions that are beyond my depth. As I say, I think what you ought to do is ask the experts on this.

Q John, can I ask two unrelated, miscellaneous questions? One, do you have any comment on a report from the Middle East that King Hussein plans to visit the

Soviet Union next month to purchase anti-aircraft weapons from the Soviet Union?

A No.

Q And two, do you have any comment on the published report about Jamaica's drug activities and the U.S. efforts in Jamaica to curtail that --

A There is a rather lengthy piece of guidance on that, Ralph, and I think you can get that from the Press Office.

Q Could you make that available to us as if he asked the question and you read the answer?

A Sure.

Q Thank you.

Q John, do you have anything on the activities of the naval force, the U.S. Naval Force in the Suez Canal and the Suez Gulf?

A No, not really.

Q The Egyptians are saying that they intend to ask the U.S. and other European countries to extend their activities to areas beyond the --

A Well, we're obviously in touch with the respective governments in the area and have been working very closely with them. The fact is that each country involved is sweeping a specific assigned area. When we and the Egyptians are satisfied that we have swept our area, we will leave. I don't have a date for you on that. It's conceivable we might leave before some of the other countries involved, because as I say, each country has an assigned area to sweep, but I don't have a departure date.

Q John do you have any comment on the Japan-South Korea talks on unification of --

A No, I really don't.

Q Do you have anything on Crocker's talks? You indicated last week he was just going to go to Nairobi and London, but then I guess he wound up somewhere near Lusaka.

A   He did meet with the Angolans. He met the Angolan Interior Minister. That meeting took place on September 6-7 in Lusaka. I think he is back in Washington at this stage.

Q   Was that previously unscheduled? And can you tell us anything about those talks?

A   Obviously, they discussed matters of mutual interest.

Q   But you didn't -- I mean, you weren't obviously trying to mislead us by saying he was going to fly right home?

A   No, I wasn't try to mislead you. His schedule did change.

Q   It came as much of a surprise to you as it did to us?

A   I think -- Well , no not surprised that he met with the Angolans. But I think he, in fact, came back at the weekend. I think I'm right in saying that, or was scheduled to, and his itinerary coming back from South Africa obviously was subject to change.

Q   John, is there a trip -- Don's story yesterday in the paper, the Post -- that the Secretary is considering a trip to Eastern Europe in December?

A   Well, the Secretary has no plans for any -- I think three countries were mentioned -- he has no plans, certainly at this stage, for any visit to those countries.

Q   Can't confirm it?

A   I'm not confirming it.

Q   But invitations have been tendered?

Q   John, do you have anything on the resolution passed by New Zealand's Labor Party to get that country to pull out of ANZUS --

A   Yes, I do.

Q   -- and to close the air base used by the U.S. in that country?

A Yes, I do.

The United States believes that implementation of such a proposal as suggested at the conference, New Zealand's withdrawal from ANZUS, contrary to the intent of the authors, would have a most serious destabilizing effect on the peace and security of the region. However, we understand the Labor Party's Conference resolutions are not necessarily binding on the Labor government. Such resolutions have been adopted in the past without becoming the policy of the Labor Party.

Moreover, Prime Minister Lange and his government have frequently asserted that they attach importance to New Zealand's continuing participation in ANZUS.

Insofar as the resolution related to U.S. bases is concerned, they are no United States military bases in New Zealand. United States Air Force aircraft do operate through Christ Church in connection with Operation Deep Freeze in the Antarctic.

Q Copy of that?

A Sure.

Q John, have any dates been set for meetings between Secretary Shultz and Rauf Denktash and Spyros Kyprianou of Cyprus, when they come for the U.N. meeting?

A I don't want to mislead you, but I just don't have a schedule for the Secretary. That schedule is hectic -- I think there are about 30 bilaterals -- it takes a little time to organize those meetings with the various countries involved, and it just isn't available yet.

Q John, do you have any comment on the Israeli newspaper report Hadashot which unveiled a few days ago that a massacre was perpetrated by a unit called "Battalion 89" headed by Moshe Dayan, in an Arab village next to Jerusalem, October 27, 1948. The name of the town is Dweimea, which came --

A 1948?

Q Dweimea, in 1948, yes, and it just came out a couple of weeks ago.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:57 P.M.)

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DPC #164

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 1984, 12:25 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. Before taking questions, just want to let you know that available in the Press Office is the prepared statement by the Secretary this morning before the House Judiciary Committee, the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees and International Law; his testimony was on refugee consultations. And, similarly, before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy.

Q Are these two identical?

A I believe they are.

Q Alan, how are you going to work, technically, now in New York? The Secretary will see Mr. Gromyko on the 26th; then Gromyko comes here and sees the President?

A Right.

Q Normally, there have been two meetings.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do we now expect tradition to be upheld and there will be two meetings with the Secretary?

A I think, as the Secretary indicated the other day, in terms of whether it's appropriate, necessary, desired to arrange a second meeting, can be looked at. But the focus of what he will be looking at for his New York appointment will be that first meeting, and then we'll see, I guess, what happens after that; but I don't have anything further on that.

Q It's safe to assume he will return to Washington on Thursday evening in time to be present at the President's meeting?

A Well, the latter is certainly safe to assume. I don't know precisely when he will return to Washington, but surely he will be in that meeting; yes.

Okay?

Q Well, let's pursue the meeting a little bit.

A Well, okay. I don't have a lot of answers for you.

Q I'm sure you don't, but, as you can see, we didn't have a lot of questions for you, either.

What about the -- what can you tell us about the timing of the preparation of the Presidential meeting; how long ago did the U.S. -- did the President make the proposal he today said he made? And how long ago did the Soviets tell the United States that it would be okay to have such a meeting?

A I guess, Ralph, given the fact that we're talking about a Presidential meeting, I have to ask you to check with the White House and see what they're prepared to say on that.

Q Alan, there are reports from the Middle East saying that Syria may be readying herself to play a positive role towards the Gulf -- towards the war in the Gulf. Do you have any comment on that, or do you have any information --

A I don't have any information; I don't have any comment.

Don?

Q Could I ask about Central America? Yesterday, John Hughes gave us a statement regarding the U.S. governmental policy of not facilitating -- I believe the word was "soliciting" -- aid to the Contras.

The question was asked, "When was this decision made?" Can you shed any light on that?

A Yes, I can. I think, by the way, to be accurate, the word was -- "the decision was taken not to play an active role in soliciting...." Okay, just so -- just to be accurate.

The answer on that is that the time-frame for the interagency decision was when it appeared that the

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Congress would go into recess in July, without having provided all the funding that had been requested, and was acutely needed, for Central America.

The decision to not play an active role in soliciting private funding was not taken because it was considered illegal, but to avoid any possible controversy about the appropriateness of such an action when the request for full funding remained before the Congress.

The decision was based on a desire to avoid any suggestion of an attempt to frustrate the will of Congress. At the same time, no decision was taken to discourage private support because it is our understanding that such contributions can be perfectly legal.

Q When you say it was -- the time-frame was when Congress prepared to go in July, this implies, are you saying that it was made around July, or in July?

A I just -- I don't have a more specific answer.

Q You're saying it was made before Congress went out.

A It was in the context: when it appeared that the Congress would go into recess in July.

Q So it's somewhere -- it would be --

A I would accept the wording. I don't have personal knowledge of this, Don, but I'd have to take the wording to mean as that time approached.

Q Alright. And regarding one other thing about this, you said a minute ago -- John said yesterday -- that your understanding is that these contributions -- that is, by private citizens -- are perfectly legal. You said a minute ago, "I think can be perfectly legal."

A Yeah, I think that's what the sense of what he said, too. I refer you to the law, and refer you to John's refusal, which I think I will second, to become a legal reference for you. But --

Q Let me just ask you --

A Sure.

Q -- at the risk of being a little burdensome on this, I have the law in front of me.

A Which one?

Q The -- what is known as the Neutrality Act. It's Section 960 of Title 18, U.S. Code.

A Right.

Q It's entitled "Expedition Against Friendly Nation."

A Right.

Q It says, "Whoever, within the United States, knowingly begins or sets on foot or provides or prepares a means for or furnishes the money for, or takes part in, any military or naval expedition or enterprise to be carried on from thence against the territory or dominion of any foreign prince or state or of any colony, district, or people with whom the United States is at peace, shall be fined not more than $3,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both."

A Yeah.

Q In view of that, which says it's -- as I read it -- it's prohibited to furnish the money for such an expedition, how could a contribution be legal?

A Let me -- you know, you're me asking me to talk from this podium as an official government spokesman on the law, and I really don't feel qualified to do that.

I have an explanation for you that I would offer you because I think that is a pertinent provision, but it applies to expeditions from the United States against another country, etc. It doesn't talk about any contribution of funds. But let me just halt --

Q (inaudible) contribution of funds.

A Well, let me -- in terms of any comment from the podium, let me cut it off here, Don. I don't mean to be uncooperative but I just think it's not fair to have me try to pretend to be a legal expert on this.

Q Well, could you answer the question in some other way, in writing, or whatever?

1-2325

A No. I think -- no, I think that, in terms of the law, I would ask you check on the applications of the Neutrality Act, for an official answer, with the Justice Department, and --

Q What is the basis, then, for your saying, and John saying yesterday, and your repeating today, that you believe it's perfectly legal?

A Our understanding from talking with our lawyers about it. But I don't want to stand up here and speak for the United States Government, articulating legal interpretations.

Q (inaudible) the State Department.

A Well, the Justice Department is the one that would operate against anybody who violated the Neutrality Act, so I think --

Q The Justice Department didn't say they thought it was perfectly legal for these people to give contributions.

A Well, I'm not aware they've said that it wasn't.

Q Well, Alan, the point is well made here. It does seem only fair that if you're making some sort of a judgment this might be legal, that when there's a -- that you give some explanation to back that up.

A Well, I'm asking you -- I'm not aware of anybody who will contradict this within the government. So, there may be exceptions to this, but I don't think so.

Anyway, I'm not going to try to stand up here and give you a legal opinion. I think that if you want a legal opinion about how the law is to applied about contributions from an expedition to be launched within the United States outward against some other area, you ought to go to the Justice Department, which would be applying that law.

Q Alan, on the question of frustrating the intent of Congress, it's -- there's an implication in what you said that you didn't want to give the appearance, even the appearance, of frustrating the intent of Congress. But in those deliberations, prior to that decision, was there a sense that, if the decision had been made to help these groups that -- though the appearance would not have been good -- substantively on the merits you would not have been frustrating the will of Congress?

A Well, I don't think I'm going to go beyond what I've said in this statement. I'll repeat to you what I said, but I really will not go beyond it.

"The decision to not play an active role in soliciting private funding was not taken because it was considered illegal, but to avoid any possible controversy about the appropriateness of such an action," etc. But I just am not going to -- I'm not going to go beyond that in terms of --

Q Copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q Let me follow that up. Does the Department feel that, given the votes in the House of Representatives recently, that the intent of Congress is clear at this point, or do you feel that there is a division in Congress and therefore the intent of Congress is not clear?

A Well, I'm not going to try to interpret beyond what I've said, in terms of this specific action.

Q Alan, regarding the Secretary on the Hill today, why did the Administration announce today the decision to allow Amerasian children into the United States?

A I don't have anything to go beyond what the Secretary said. I think the statement is pretty comprehensive. The issues involved are all obviously related to the issue of refugees and immigration, and I don't quite understand the puzzlement, but I don't have any guidance to take you beyond what he said.

Q Can you tell us the total number of Indochinese refugees to be admitted under the program in this fiscal year, the one that compares to the 40,000 and 10,000 for the next year?

A No. Is that not explained in his testimony?

Q I don't think so. It said it was over 50,000 this year, but he didn't say how much over.

1-2367

A   Alright, let me take a look at that and see if we can get something on that.

Q   Can we get a copy of your statement on Central America?

A   In terms of the response to the question --

Q   The original question from Don; the response that you read.

A   Yeah, sure. yes.

Ralph?

Q   Could I come back just a second to the Gromyko-Reagan meeting? The President said that -- in explanation for why the meeting was being set up, he said, well, it was, you know, Gromyko is coming to New York for the U.N. and it just seemed like a logical opportunity to invite him to Washington and come down and have this meeting.

Those circumstances applied in 1981 and 1982, as well as --

A   Also in 1980 and 1979 when Mr. Gromyko also did not come to Washington.

Q   That's correct. So what I'm asking is, what has changed about this year, in the Administration's view, to suggest this change from the last Administration's decision to cut off those meetings?

A   Oh, I don't know that there was a decision last year to cut off that meeting. I think that --

Q   The last Administration's.

A   The last Administration. Well, I think, clearly, the President articulated why he thought it would be useful to meet with Mr. Gromyko.

Q   Because it was --

A   And I will leave you with his words. I don't think I need to interpret those.

Bill?

Q Alan, where do we stand on the U.S.-Cuban talks on the Marielitos and on the political prisoners?

A We are essentially where we have been. That is, there have been the two formal sessions that we have talked about; there's been further interchange in diplomatic channels, and so that process goes forward, but --

Q As that process goes forward, would it include the Secretary meeting any Cuban official in New York during this General Assembly session?

A I'm not aware of any plans for that, Bill.

Q How about meeting any Vietnamese official re the political prisoners in Vietnam?

A Again, I don't know, frankly, Bill, but I'm not aware of that. But I just don't have the whole schedule in my head, but I am more up on the Marielito question.

Q While you're dealing with the Indochina refugee question, I am puzzled by the figures a little bit. While you're asking questions, would you find out if what we have here is essentially a reordering of priorities for refugees within figures that are no larger than the refugee inflow from the past? That's my understanding from reading -- from listening to the Secretary and reading the testimony, but I'm not sure that's correct.

A Okay, let me take a look at that.

Q Alan, there is a total unanimity in the Arab world of condemnation of your -- the United States' position in the United Nations Security Council, including Egypt, which condemned it yesterday, and even the leader of the Phalange party, or the former leader of the Phalange party, Camille Chamoun. Do you have anything to comment, or to tell the Arab world, about their anger and your position, besides the statement that you issued a few days ago?

A I refer you to the statement that was made at the time the vote was cast.

Q Alan, there is a statement attributed to General Moshe Levi. He's the Chief of the Staff of the

Israeli army. He said the strategic cooperation talks between Israel and the United States "are in no way directed against the Soviets."

A Uh-huh.

Q Whom do you think they are directed against?

A Well, the statements were made at the time that that arrangement was established, and I refer you to -- again, to those statements. I think it's fairly clear what we had to say at that time.

Q This statement had, I think, sort of additional significance by the mere fact that it is made in the United States. It is not made there in the --

A Well, I don't necessarily agree with that, in terms of "additional significance." Anyway, in terms of our position, I refer you back to what we said. Our position was made clear at that time.

Q There is a report that the United States is setting an economic office in East Beirut and one office in West Beirut, and about to spend $175 million on economic reconstruction in Lebanon.

Another report says that the United States, through an act in Congress, will be cutting $40 million from the money earmarked to Lebanon, and this money will go to Grenada. What do you have to comment on these reports?

A I'm not sure where we stand on the aid levels for Lebanon. Let me check on it.

Ralph?

Q To follow up Bill's question a moment ago on the Cuba talks, are there any plans for Shultz to engage himself in those negotiations, outside of the question about whether that would be done at the U.N.?

A No. This is going on at -- I think you're aware of the level it was conducted at previously and the scope of it, and I think that's what we anticipate continuing when and if another round is scheduled.

Q Alan, if agreement is reached on exchanging the Marielitos for the political prisoners, will that mean a new program will have to go to Congress for a much larger number of people from the Caribbean?

A I don't know what the technical dimensions of that would be.

Q There's almost no mention. There's no mention at all.

A I just don't know the answer to that.

Q Alan, do you have anything to say about the decision on the gunships to Salvador, the decision not to send them the AC-47s, like when that decision was made, or any other comment?

A No. I have just -- the fact is that the possibility is under consideration of sending -- of upgrading two Salvadoran C-47s to arm each with three .50-caliber machine guns and a flare illumination system. That would -- this is low technology, relatively unsophisticated system.

I might note that it's clear from recent combat actions the Salvadoran Armed Forces need a way to deliver increased fire support for ground combat forces. But I would also note, in terms of the weapons system, it is not the same high rate of fire system that was used in the AC-47s of the Vietnam era. .50-caliber machine guns are already being used by the guerrillas against Salvadoran Armed Forces.

With two upgraded C-47s, the El Salvador Armed Forces would have the capability to respond to massed guerrilla attacks quickly and effectively.

We are, of course, concerned about the potential for human rights abuse inherent in this or any other weapons system, and we would intend to adopt a phased approach to actual delivery of the weapons system, with a trial period for use of the first such aircraft deliverying -- first such aircraft. And then our Ambassador would personally monitor the aircraft use.

Q Don't they already have these?

A They have the aircraft. But in terms of the upgrading of it, is what I'm really saying.

Q It's a question of mounting the .50-caliber machine guns?

1-2331

A I guess that's correct.

Q Copy, please, of that, Alan?

A Yeah.

Q Why then was it decided not to do what earlier had been discussed down there, or, if not recommended?

A I don't have details on what decisions were considered and what changes may have been made on that, Don.

Q Well, it was widely reported, in the press.

A That may be, and I don't whether that's right or wrong. I'm not arguing with you, but I not -- I just don't have information. This is what is under consideration at this point.

Q Nothing further is under -- I mean, nothing more sophisticated than this is under consideration, on this question?

Q This is what is under consideration.

Q Is that the similar mounting scheme as the AC-47?

A You'd have to check with somebody who knows the technical dimensions. But, obviously, three .50-caliber machine guns are not the same as the "Puff the Magic Dragon" that everybody seems rather familiar with.

Q Alan, do you have any comment -- does the Administration have comment on the Congressional request for the report on the arms treaty violations?

A I'm sorry, I missed the first part.

Q Does the Administration have any comment on the Congressional request for the report on treaty violations?

A No. I think that the President talked about that in his remarks at noon, that that report -- you're talking about the GAC Report?

Q Yes.

A Yeah. That report, I think, is going to be going forward to the Congress shortly. I don't have an exact timing on that, but I don't have any comment to offer you on that at this point.

Q Well, will it be --

A As we indicated before, I think that is a -- that is not the Government's position, it's the GAC's position, and so just be clear on that.

Q Alan, Ian Gilbert, the writer for the Washington Times, in his commentary today about Meir Kahane's citizenship, and the State Department looking into the matter, said that -- to the effect that the United States State Department will say that they are looking into the matter. Beyond that, they will not be doing anything specific, and possibly they will keep saying that they will look into the matter until the press will forget it and the whole matter will be forgotten.

A No, no. That's accusing us of lying, and I reject that charge. But I also have nothing for you publicly to say about that at this stage beyond what we have said, which is, indeed, that we are looking into the matter. It's under review.

Q John, do you have any comment on the agreement of the national unity government in Israel?

A No.

Q Will you consider it as a welcome step by the United States?

A Well, I think we have indicated before we have very close relations with Israel. We intend to continue those.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:45 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #165

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1984, 12:15 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: A couple of announcements up front: The Secretary of State will visit the Louisiana World Exposition in New Orleans Friday evening and Saturday, September 14 and 15. That's after the Miami trip. He will go on to New Orleans Friday afternoon.

He'll tour the Exposition pavilions and join Exposition officials and Commissioners General of the international pavilions for a private luncheon, which will be on Saturday. In other words, Miami, the speech, Friday; then go on to New Orleans Saturday afternoon and half of Saturday, come back to Washington Saturday afternoon.

On the Secretary's trip to Panama, which will take place October 11: A sign-up sheet for press wishing to apply for a seat on the Secretary's plane has been posted in the Press Office. There is a possibility of additional stops on this trip. We'll keep you informed of the itinerary and on a closing date for applications for press seats.

The next item: Available in the Press Office is the prepared statement by Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Elliott Abrams. That was before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee today. The subject of his testimony is the Genocide Convention.

And, finally: Available in the Press Office are limited copies of Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, East Asia and the Pacific: Multilateral. Please note on the press release the embargo date of September 14 at 6:00 p.m. One copy per organization. A summary prepared by the Office of the Historian is available with that volume. That documents 1952 to 1954, and we're putting an embargo on it until September 14.

That's all I have for you.

Q I defer to my colleague here.

1-2335

Q Anything on the Iraqi -- supposed Iraqi -- attack, John, on a convoy?

A Seen the reports; don't have any confirmation. Sorry.

Q John, do you have anything fresh on the GAC report on arms violations by the Soviet Union that the Secretary referred to this morning?

A Oh, no. I think the President has referred to it. The Secretary has referred to it. There's interest in Congress in receiving this report, and I think the Administration is presently considering what kind of mechanism to meet that request.

Q And this does not represent an Administration position?

A No, it is a private report.

Q John, the Nicaraguan Defense Minister, Mr. Ortega, was saying last night that maybe another American may have been killed down there, and that they were searching for his body after a clash. Do you have any confirmation of that?

A Well, no confirmation. We've noted their claim. According to our Embassy in Managua, the Nicaraguan Defense Ministry issued a communique September 11, which said that a Contra partisan who may have been an American citizen was reportedly killed recently while participating in a Contra attack against La Cruz de Rio Grande in central Zelaya province.

We have no confirmation of this report, which obviously is attributed by the Nicaraguan government to a Contra who was captured, but we're looking into the matter.

Q If it turns out to be true, you -- there's still no official American personnel down there of any sort with the Contras? I mean, fighting with them or advising them inside Nicaragua?

A I guess my answer has to be that you're talking about alleged intelligence matters and operations, and therefore we wouldn't talk about that. But I wouldn't like you to assume from that that I'm leading you in the direction of suggesting there are.

Q You said the other day that the Department has asked the Customs Service to determine whether there have been any violations of arms export regulations.

A Uh-huh.

Q Are you referring all questions to Customs on that, or what?

A Well, at the moment there certainly hasn't been any report from the Customs Service that I'm aware of to the State Department, so I guess we're not in a position to respond to any questions. And, certainly, in the interim, I think I'd go to them.

Q Do you have anything on this report that was put out yesterday on the Hill from this congressional caucus, Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus, with respect to a troubling pattern of disrespect and disregard for the law, etc.?

A Yes. I've seen those reports; haven't seen the full document yet. But, obviously, the Administration is not in the business of breaking the laws in Central America and is not aware that it has broken any laws in Central America.

Q One of the points that it makes in there, and referring to George's question at the same time, is that any training in the use of weapons or other kinds of supplies that are on the control list is also prohibited in the absence of a license. Do you know if that's correct?

A I don't.

Q John, any progress on the identification or removal of the two American bodies, or any responses to the Nicaraguan notes or to the U.S. note that had not been responded to?

A Nothing on the notes, but a little, despite some procedural obstacles, a little progress, Ralph. Our Embassy in Managua has provided certain dental and other records to Nicaraguan authorities for use in identifying the bodies.

Other records will be handed over as they arrive at the Embassy, and that's in process. As I said,

I-2337

there are some procedural obstacles that we've run into in dealing with the Nicaraguan Government in this matter. But Nicaraguan authorities have now indicated that they are willing to turn the remains over to the Embassy once positive identification has been established.

We're talking to the families of the two men to find out what their wishes are before we're able to make firm arrangements.

Q John, anything on those reports in the Times and the Post today on Rifat Assad's status as exile or not?

A No.

Q Anything, then, on who might be Hafiz Assad's heir-apparent?

A No. No.

Just in the process of being helpful, I'll state what is obvious, that there has been a lot of speculation about Rifat in various directions.

Q To get back to Nicaragua briefly, do you have any more information on the Cubans who were allegedly killed in that raid?

A No. No.

Q Sticking to Central America, do you have anything on the Contadora Act, which is supposed to be signed on the 15th of October?

A No, I don't.

Q John, do you have any reaction to a statement reported to be made by Yasser Arafat that the Secretary of State is working to get the West Bank Palestinians into Latin America?

A I heard a report of such a statement, which certainly seemed bemusing, but I -- where did this run?

Q We had it on our wires.

A You had it! (Laughter). Oh, I beg your pardon. I beg your pardon. No, I think not -- even not having seen the report, the reaction continues to be one of bemusement.

Q Do you have any reaction to the latest statements by Pinochet in Chile? --

A Yes, I do have --

Q -- upstaging Jim Lobe here.

A That's a Jim Lobe question, is it?

Q What was the question? I missed it.

A Reuters has stolen your question, Jim. (Laughter)

Q That's okay, I welcome Reuters. (Laughter)

A These are the reports by Mr. Pinochet suggesting he might stay in office?

Q Right.

A We've seen those reports. Have really only a general comment to offer. We believe that dialogue and communication are needed in Chile so that steady and concrete progress can be made towards a transition to democracy, which is what most Chileans want.

While we have not involved ourselves in the sensitive task of defining the transition to democracy in Chile, we have been both straightforward and unequivocal in supporting a return to a democratically-elected civilian government in that country.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Also just to follow briefly, the European Community ambassadors boycotted the ceremony -- yesterday's ceremonies -- as did the Archbishop.

Did the United States send its ambassador to attend?

A I don't know.

Q Can you look into that?

A I'll look into it, although I think you might more properly address that question to our embassy.

1-2339

Q Anything there, John, on the French ship with the uranium containers in the North Sea?

A No, nothing on the French ship.

Q John, there are so many reports around -- the so-called emergency aid to Israel -- in contrast to the language you offered us during the last two weeks.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you have anything new on that?

A No, nothing in contrast to the language we offered in the past couple of weeks. (Laughter)

Q John --

A Wait a minute. A Palestinian question.

Q I thought you were about to read something to me.

A No, no, I wasn't. I was turning back to my index in case -- (laughter) -- getting ready for any Palestinian question. (Laughter)

Q Are you in complete understanding with your European allies about the search for mines in the Red Sea, or is it true that the United States is pulling its crew because of conflict with European countries about it?

A I'm certainly not aware of any such conflict, and, as I suggested earlier, when the withdrawals of the various countries -- various minesweeping nations -- take place, it will be because they've finished their assignment in the given sweep areas, and they've worked out their withdrawal arrangement with the countries that invited them in, either Egypt or Saudi Arabia. But I'm not aware of any problems between the countries.

-- MORE --

Q Since we are on the Gulf, are you -- can you offer anything about Secretary Shultz's meeting with six GCC foreign secretaries in New York on October 1?

A I can't give you anything on that because I still don't have his itinerary. I mean, I'm not leading you away from it; it's entirely possible. He's obviously, going to meet with a large number of foreign leaders, but I can't confirm that specific one.

Q John, anything about the kidnapping of this American priest in Sudan?

A Yes, I do have something on that. Our Embassy in Khartoum has received unconfirmed, but apparently reliable, reports that an American priest -- he's a Roman Catholic -- Peter Curtin Major -- he's a resident of Bentiu -- was kidnapped on or about September 4 by insurgent elements in the Sudan. The Sudanese Government is aware of the situation, and of the United States Government's concern that all appropriate action be taken to obtain the early safe release of the American citizen concerned. We are continuing to follow that situation very closely.

Q There's no thought, John --

Q May we have a copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q John, there's no thought, if I can follow that up, that the priest in question could have been in fact kidnapped by government forces rather than insurgents, since he was -- the insurgents happen to be, to a large extent, Roman Catholic?

A Not aware of any unusual ramifications.

Q John, do you have anything on the statement by Korean dissident Kim Dae Jung that he's going back to Korea? And is the State Department concerned about his safety once he gets back and possibly another Aquino-type situation arising?

A Well, Mr. Kim has made a decision to return to Korea. He's informed the State Department of that decision. As you recall, he was released from prison in Korea by the Korean Government in December 1982, after serving two-and-a-half years of a twenty-year sentence. He was allowed to come to the United States for continuing medical treatment, and then he took up a longstanding invitation from Harvard University's Center for International Affairs. He has told us that he has completed his fellowship tenure at Harvard and his medical treatment, and he is therefore planning to return to Korea.

As to what will happen to him when he gets back, the United States fully recognizes that this is a matter for the Korean Government to handle. While we have expressed our hope to all concerned that his return will be trouble free, insofar as his personal situation is concerned, we don't know what his legal status is under Korean law.

Q Do we know when he is going back?

A Don't have anything on that.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q John, the Foreign Minister of Vietnam has hinted, according to reports, that Vietnam would -- may accept a separate mediation body on the Kampuchean issue.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do we know about this? And would we look into it at the United Nations meeting?

A Well, I think, Spence, we've seen those same reports a little while ago that you saw, and I really don't have any reaction to it other than to note, I think, that the ASEAN countries have tended to take the lead on the Kampuchean issue, and I think, obviously, we would be much interested in their reaction; but I don't really have a formal response.

Q Thank you.

Q John, do you have any comment on the reports about Sakharov being out of the hospital?

A No. No, don't.

Q Anything on the Chernenko hospitalization report?

A No, I don't.

Q Anything on the MX vote delay on the Hill?

A No.

(Laughter)

Q Anything on the Argentine protest on the U.S. operations off the coast?

A No, don't have anything on the Argentine protest.

Q Do you have anything on the Syrian aid to Iran to try to swing the war against Iraq?

A Syrian aid to Iran? No, I don't. (Laughter)

Q Anything about the cancellation of Secretary Weinberger to visit to Israel?

A Cancellation of Secretary -- well, I'm not sure that such a visit is set, but I guess you'd have to ask the Pentagon.

Q Anything on Colonel King's report that you (sic) released yesterday on the attitudes of the Salvadoran and Honduran armies?

A No.

Q Thank you. (Laughter)

Q Thank you for saying thank you. (Laughter)

Press briefing concluded at 12:32 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #166

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 1984, 12:14 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: This need not take long. (Laughter) Available in the Press Office is the prepared statement by Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs Gregory Newell before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights and International Organizations. The subject of his testimony given today is UNESCO withdrawal. And that's all I have.

That's it. That's it.

Q Thank you.

A Good afternoon. (Laughter)

Q Do you have any questions for us, John?

A I'll tell you: why don't you give me the answers and then I'll give you the questions.

(Laughter)

Q John, do you have any comment on the report out of Paris that the French Government is taking some role in the treatment of Salvadoran guerrillas on humanitarian (inaudible)?

A No, I don't, no.

Q Do you have any view of it?

A Haven't seen that report, Don.

Q It's on the wires.

A O.K.

Q John, do you have anything on the reports that a senior Soviet diplomat has told the Administration that Ogarkov was dismissed for "un-partylike practices" or something?

1-2345

A No, I don't have any reaction to that.

Q Well, wait a minute. Did you get from the Soviets an assessment along those lines?

A I wouldn't comment on any diplomatic conversations that might or might not have taken place.

Q They quote a senior State Department official as saying this.

A Uh-huh.

Q The National Security Adviser this morning, on the "Today" program, made some reference to the possibility of arms negotiations resuming with the Soviets. Do you have any indication at all from the Soviets that they are even willing to discuss resumption of the negotiations?

A Well, I think Mr. McFarland's words really speak for themselves, and I'm not attempting here to interpret them, but I think what he was doing was underlining our readiness and the efforts that we have made in the past to engage the Soviets in those negotiations, and I think he was underscoring and reiterating our continuing readiness. I don't think we can speak for the Soviet Union.

Q But you do not -- I mean let me go back to my question again: You have not had any indication from the Soviets themselves that they are prepared to discuss that subject at the Shultz-Gromyko meeting?

A Well, as I say, I mean obviously, we cannot talk about our discussions with the Soviets or what the agenda might be for those talks other than in the broadest terms. But I'm sure arms control would be a subject that would be discussed then.

Q Have both sides agreed to talk about arms control?

A Well, we are out there with a great degree of readiness to engage in serious arms control negotiations. I'm sure we will reiterate that position at those meetings.

Q There are reports that there is an imminent offensive by the Salvadoran guerrillas, even starting maybe this week or next week. Do you have anything on that, please?

A Not really. There have been reports and indications for some time that the guerrillas were preparing to mount an offensive sometime this fall. I think there is evidence that they have been taking the kind of preparations that you would expect to launch that offensive, but there have also been reports that the Salvadoran Army -- not reports -- evidence that the Salvadoran Army has been much more active in the kind of sweeps and military activities that would forestall and hinder such an offensive, so how that will develop remains to be seen.

Q Do you have any comment on the new procedures for Salvadoran pilots, in light of what you just said, and would you welcome those new procedures?

A Yes, we welcome those steps taken by President Duarte.

On September 12, President Duarte announced new guidelines for approval of bombing by the Salvadoran Air Force. Each mission will have to be approved by the El Salvador Armed Forces Chief of Staff or his designate. In areas where non-combatants might be present, approval is required by the Minister of Defense.

We applaud these steps taken by President Duarte to help avoid civilian casualties. They represent another step by President Duarte to ensure that the rights of non-combatants are respected and to improve the human rights atmosphere in El Salvador.

Q May I have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q John, has there been any response through diplomatic channels, or officially, from Hanoi to the statements of the Secretary the other day on our willingness to take --

A No official response, Bernie.

Q There have been some press reports from Kyoto and from Bangkok. Do you have any comment on those?

A No. As I say, there has been no official response, and I think in the light of that, we wouldn't have any comment.

Q John, could we view the meeting between Assistant Secretary Wolfowitz and Prime Minister Son Sann in any context of Kampuchean peace talks?

A Well, no, I would not read any special significance into that. Mr. Wolfowitz will be calling on Son Sann, President of the Khmer Peoples National Liberation Front and Prime Minister of the Khmer Resistance Coalition this afternoon. Senior American officials normally meet with Mr. Son Sann when he's in the United States. Obviously, they will exchange views on the current situation in Cambodia and probably discuss the upcoming General Assembly.

Q May I have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q You will remember the last time out on this subject, when the Secretary was in southeastern Asia this summer, it was said that if the countries of the area -- namely the ASEAN countries -- requested the United States to do more for the non-communist forces --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- in Cambodia, the U.S. would be disposed to do so.

A Uh-huh.

Q At that stage, there was no actual request, as I recall it --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- for the United States to do more, though this was something that was being talked about.

A Uh-huh.

1-2348

Q Where does that matter stand now? Has there been some increase in what the United States is doing or is willing to do to assist the group that is headed by Son Sann?

A Sure. Let me check into that. It's a fair point, Don. There's no change in the guidelines we have set for aid, but let me take a look at the question of quantity or any additional aid.

Q Do you have any comment on the Israeli Government situation today?

A No -- internal affair of the Israeli government, country, nation.

Q John, let me just come back again to Vietnam. Is there still any -- is there any decision yet on whether any senior official should meet with Foreign Minister Thach at the U.N.?

A No plans that I'm aware of.

Q No plans?

A No.

-- MORE --

Any guidance on what he was quoted as saying yesterday, today?

A Who?

Q Thach; Thach.

A No.

Q Nothing?

Q Is there anything new on the Moroccan-Libyan treaty?

A No.

Q I remember that the last thing you said, that it's under study --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- by the U.S. Government.

A Still under study. Sure.

Q The study is still going on?

A Still going on.

Q John, could I just come back to this? The Secretary in his presentation put forth what the U.S wanted to do. But I don't see how you could get a reading from a high-level of the Vietnamese Government unless you actually made some effort to talk to them.

Is it really your position just to do it at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level of Mr. Funseth?

A I don't know what the process will be. Of course, you do have the next -- one next step will be the meeting in Geneva, and that provides some opportunity for discussion of the situation.

Q John, a group of U.S. academicians and concerned American leaders met yesterday with Mr. Pelletreau about the closing of An Najah University in Nablus, West Bank, and their spokesman expressed the group's disappointment because the United States Government will not take a strong stand on this matter with the Israeli Government. Do you have any comment on their impression?

A No, I don't. No.

Yes?

Q Yesterday, State Department officials contacted the family of James Powell and said that they were going to need some fingerprint records on him, a process which could take several days, since they have to get them from the personnel center.

The Nicaraguans are saying that they already have the dental records and all information they need. What is the -- can you clarify the situation?

A I don't what yesterday's -- I'm not aware of a phone call yesterday. Certainly, there have been earlier discussions with the families about dental records and fingerprints, and certainly some records have been sent and are in the possession of the Nicaraguans. I'm not sure whether there's a problem, whether an additional set was needed, or something like that. So I'm not -- I'm just simply not aware of this latest phone call.

Q Well, can you give us any timetable, or (inaudible)

A No, I can't. The situation is unchanged as of yesterday.

Q Have you got any confirmation now of the Nicaraguan claim of another American death?

A No. No.

Q Nothing further from yesterday?

A Don't know anything about it.

Q John, there's a newspaper report about the Soviets building a new naval and air base at Sao Tome. Do you have anything on that?

A Yes. Don't know anything at all about that. We have no reports to confirm that. There are -- just simply nothing we can offer on it.

Q Can I try another one, then? There's been some charges by Angola that the South Africans are not pulling out as they promised. Any guidance on that?

A No, I don't.

Q John, a new leader has been elected to the Phalangist party in Lebanon. Do you expect the same type of relations with the Phalangists in Lebanon to continue with the United States Government?

A I just have no comment for you on that.

Q John, is the report on Soviet compliance with previous SALT agreements and the ABM Treaty going to be held up until after the Gromyko --

A You're talking about the GAC Report?

Q Yeah.

A Well, no change in the guidance I gave yesterday, John, on the mechanics; looking at the mechanics of how that is made available, declassified.

Q Well, is it going to be released prior to the Gromyko meeting?

A Why don't you check the guidance from yesterday.

Q John, do you have any information or comments about the -- regarding the reports about the status of the Syrian Vice President Riafat Assad?

A No. Seen all the same reports you have.

Q John, a few days ago -- maybe last month -- an Israeli official, or semi-official by the name of Yisrael Harel, came to the United States to launch a campaign of public relations about the importance of the West Bank to Israel. Had he met with any U.S. officials here?

A Don't know. Don't know anything about his visit.

Q Can you look into this, please?

A I'll see whether we're prepared to provide anything on that question.

Yes, go ahead.

Q Is Secretary Shultz prepared to discuss any Middle East issues with Mr. Gromyko in New York?

A Well, I don't want to get into the agenda, but it seems logical that in their discussion of world affairs, the Middle East would certainly come up.

Q Another question, please? There was a report that UNESCO is prepared to consider such amendment to its charter. Is the U.S. aware of that?

Q I think the U.S. is watching carefully the UNESCO situation. And, as I say, Mr. Newell -- Assistant Secretary Newell -- is testifying today on that, but I'm not aware of any basic changes. In fact, I'm not aware of any changes in the U.S. position on withdrawal.

Q Do you have anything today on Ambassador Kirkpatrick's statement that allegations that private individuals supporting the anti-Sandinista groups may have violated the law "shouldn't be taken seriously?" Was she speaking for the Administration when she said that?

A No, I haven't seen the text of her speech.

Q On the -- this New Zealand situation, bilateral talks have recently concluded here at the State Department. Has the United States made any progress in convincing New Zealand to change its mind on the nuclear ships?

A I really don't have anything to offer on talks that might or might not be going on between the United States and New Zealand.

Q It is possible to get a readout on the talks that just ended here?

A I don't think so. I think that's the kind of issue that we would pursue quietly.

Q John, have you gotten anything at all in the last couple of days on the sort of dust-up in Argentina, about the U.S. Navy (inaudible)? There was an explosion -- U.S. navy pilots were hurt in an explosion --

A It seems to me there was a little guidance a few days ago.

1-2353

MR. ROMBERG: Not on that.

MR. HUGHES: Not on that. Okay.

Q Another part of the world. On Poland: Do you have anything on either the State Department encouraging IMF credits to Poland --

A No.

Q -- or on the President preparing to provide extended voluntary departure status to 2,000 Poles?

A No. No.

Q John, can I come back to the Ogarkov thing for just one more second? Can you tell us whether Secretary Shultz made any special note of that article today, and made any comment to you about it, regardless of whether you'll tell us what he said or not?

A Well, the answer is no.

Q He did not, did not remark upon it?

A (Nodding negatively.)

Q The CMA group is saying that they are still going to be collecting some medical supplies and clothing to ship to the contras. Is the State Department going to stick by its previous decision that it will not discourage such efforts?

A If such activities are not illegal.

Q Do you have anything on this colloquium again in California? Has Ungo or Zamora applied for a visa, and are you -- have you granted it or --

A He had not as of a few days ago. I do not know whether there's been any change in that situation.

Q Thank you.

(The press briefing concluded at 12:30 p.m.)

1-2354

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #167

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1984, 12:20 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. SLADE: Alan, before you start, we need to say a few words here, I think. We do have a short-timer among us today. He has been wined and dined and, as John Goshko says, has given more farewell performances than Sarah Bernhardt. But Barrie Dunsmore is on his way to London. We're going to miss him. We've had a great association. He's been here longer than most of us; and when we're in London, we all know where we can stop for a drink.

CORRESPONDENTS: Hear, hear! Hear, hear!

MR. ROMBERG: Indeed, let me second that from the perspective of not only PA and the people who work directly with the press, but I think everybody in the building who has worked with Barrie over a very long period of time. With sorrow and great respect and good wishes, I wish you well.

MR. DUNSMORE: Thank you very much.

MR. ROMBERG: Also, I want to wish well Peter Vajda of Nepszabadsag, who is going back to Budapest on reassignment. I was looking around; I don't see him here today, but I think this is his -- the end of his tour as well.

Okay. On to housekeeping-type announcements:

The Department has forwarded to the Congress today the required report on the situation in El Salvador for the period July 2 to August 31, and copies are available in the Press Office.

Also available is the Secretary's address to the Miami Chamber of Commerce. The speech will cover "The Campaign Against Drugs: the International Dimension." I think that's been available to you from this morning. We will be piping that speech here into the briefing room at about 1:00. It will be followed by a question-and-answer session.

1-2356

On Monday, September 17, at 8:30 p.m., the Secretary will deliver keynote welcoming remarks at the opening ceremony of the International Conference on "Faith in Humankind: The Righteous People." Now that ceremony is being held at the Eisenhower Theater at the Kennedy Center; and if you plan to cover it, please notify Marcia Feldman at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council, 724-0779; Marcia Feldman, 724-0779.

Q Do you have a text?

A Don't know whether there will be a text to distribute.

Q They're welcoming remarks?

A Welcoming -- keynote welcoming remarks; right.

Q For whom?

Q Well, is it a speech or is it a -- welcoming remarks?

A I don't recall how extensive they are. There may well be a text to provide to you.

Q What is this welcoming?

A Well, all right. I will give you -- I have some background on the Holocaust Memorial Council. If you want, I can make it available afterward instead of reading it.

Q All right. Fine.

A So, Brian, why don't we do that.

Okay, that's it for announcements. Happy to take questions.

Q John (sic), the speech in Miami, is that a campaign speech or a non-political speech?

A No, this -- The Secretary's remarks today are not a campaign speech. He's been interested in giving a speech on narcotics issues, and so this seemed an appropriate thing to do.

Q How much time is set aside for Q&A? Would you know, Alan, on that?

A I don't have that in my head, Bernie. I'm sorry.

Q What have you got on the postponement of the arms control report on Soviet cheating?

A Well, you're characterizing it as a "postponement." In fact, no decision has been taken, as that report is still -- the final review of the downgrading, and so on, is being processed.

I can give you something more formal, but the fact is that it was addressed at the White House this morning, and I don't think there's need to repeat what was said over there.

Q Do you have anything to say on the final settlement of the Israeli Government negotiations and the likelihood of somebody coming here soon?

A On the former, we congratulate Prime Minister Peres and Deputy Prime Minister Shamir for the courageous and difficult decisions that have resulted in the formation of the new Israeli Government.

We are confident that our relationship will continue to develop, and we look forward to working with the new government of Israel on the full range of issues of common concern.

As to any visits, there is no visit scheduled at this point, so --

Q Can we have a copy?

A Of the first part, sure.

Q Would you expect a visit by Peres prior to the elections here?

A I don't know, Bernie. I simply don't know whether there would be a visit prior to the election.

Q Forgetting what you know, is there anything under consideration?

A There is no visit scheduled. There's no discussion of a visit. Obviously they're welcome, but there's no discussion of a visit at this point.

Q Is there any meeting scheduled with Mr. Shamir in New York, or something like that?

A I don't know what the schedule in New York calls for. I mean, that would be pretty traditional. But in terms of a Washington visit, that's what I took the question to mean.

Q Alan, do you think that the new government will have another look at the Reagan initiative; especially Peres, when it was announced he didn't reject it completely? Do you think -- and, especially now, he said in the beginning of his speech that he's urging Jordan to join negotiation, and so on. Do you think there will be another chance for re-evaluating the Reagan initiative again?

A Well, I don't want to try to speak for the Israeli Government. And in terms of his -- the Prime Minister's -- statements about Jordan, those statements speak for themselves.

We of course would hope to see progress toward peace, and we remain prepared to proceed whenever the parties themselves are ready to do so.

Q Based on the Reagan initiative?

A Sure, on the whole peace process, yes -- the Reagan initiative.

Q Alan, there's been criticism from the Polish Government of the United States for not -- refusing to lift the sanctions regarding admission of Poland to the International Monetary Fund as had earlier been projected. Do you have any response to that?

A Yes. The August 3 White House statement on the subject said that, and I quote, "complete and reasonable implementation of the amnesty decision will create a positive atmosphere that would allow reactivation of Poland's application for membership in the International Monetary Fund." That's the end of the quote.

The implementation of that amnesty is currently under intensive study.

Q Why has it taken so long? They point out that it's been finished a while ago.

1-2359

A Well, we want to check with all the available sources before we make a determination.

Q Would you anticipate that this thing is going to be finished in the next day or two, or is this one of these diplomatic reviews that is reviewed and reviewed and reviewed? What is your guess here?

A I don't know that I would necessarily anticipate something in the next day or two on that, Don, but I also would steer you away from the suggestion that this is going to be reviewed and reviewed and reviewed.

Clearly, of course, as implementation moves forward, even as you reach stages, that implementation will continue to be looked at. But in terms of the current intensive study that I mentioned, I can't give you a specific timeframe; but it is a serious look at what is happening.

Q There's been a lot of reports that the Administration would be ready to provide Israel with another 500 to a billion dollars in economic assistance in this -- in the fiscal year that begins in October if Israel gets its economic house in order. Is that accurate?

A Well, I think that we have indicated, obviously, that we want to be helpful with the Israeli economy but the main ideas are going to have to come from them.

But in terms of the kinds of massive new assistance that you're talking about, I'm not aware that there's been a proposal to do that, or that that is under consideration.

Q Alan, the Israeli Chief of Staff was reportedly in town this week. Has he met with anyone in the building concerning an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon?

A I guess you catch me unawares. I was not aware he was in town this week. I don't think I would get into the question of the Israeli policy on southern Lebanon. I think the various Israeli government figures have talked about it, including Mr. Peres before taking office, so I'd leave it to them to talk about their plans.

Obviously, our hopes and objectives for Lebanon include, among the other things that we have continually pursued and hoped for, the withdrawal of all foreign forces.

Q Well, could you check into whether he met with anyone in the building?

A I can check whether he met anyone in this building. I guess I'd ask you check the Pentagon for their meetings, and so on.

Bernie?

Q Alan, do you have anything on Flora Lewis's column that quotes segments of the Syrian general's remarks about the United States?

A No, I don't.

Q Alan, there's an item on the FBIS today that Moscow Radio saying that Israel has pledged to accept American Pershing missiles, nuclear missiles, in an area near Haifa to protect the Negev. (Laughter) Do you have any comment on that Radio Moscow report?

A Somebody has a very wild imagination. There's absolutely nothing to that.

Jim?

Q Do you have something on the Reuters report of a massacre in El Salvador at the end of last month, involving perhaps several hundred people?

A No. I've seen the wire. We have no information on that, but, as I say, we're aware of that report and we're checking into it.

Q Alan, do you have anything on tensions between India and Pakistan?

A Yes. There was some attention to this, I guess, in the press yesterday; one report on television.

While we have been concerned in recent weeks by suggestions of a temporary cooling in Indo-Pak relations -- for example, cancellation of scheduled non-aggression talks, cease-fire line clashes in Kashmir, public recriminations over the handling of hijackers and allegations of meddling in each other's affairs -- we do not believe --

Q That's all?

A -- we do not believe that conflict between the two countries, as reported by the press, was or is imminent.

--MORE--

Q Well, have you any reports that some general has advised, or some group of military people has advised, Mrs. Gandhi to bomb the nuclear facility in Pakistan?

A Without trying to lead you one way or another on that, Don, that would either involve diplomatic or intelligence reporting, and I wouldn't get into that. But I refer you to the judgment that we do not believe that an attack was or is imminent.

Q Alan, the United States got an offer today from Tasmania to move facilities from New Zealand, the Christchurch facility, to Tasmania if New Zealand didn't want them.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you have any response to that?

A Yes. Our Embassy in Canberra has received a letter from Tasmania Premier Gray, addressed to Ambassador Nesen, as indicated by that press report. The Ambassador is presently in the United States and has not had opportunity to respond to the letter.

While we appreciate the spirit of the letter, it would be inappropriate to comment directly on its substance. On the general topic, however, we're pleased with our present facilities at Christchurch. We have not received any official New Zealand request that we relocate those facilities, and the U.S. is not considering such a move.

Q Can we have a copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q Thank you.

Q Do you have anything about Vietnamese readiness to discuss a peaceful settlement of the Kapuchean issue?

A Yes. I think we had something that we may have made available earlier on that. Let me read you what I have. This refers, I think, to Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach's statement in Hanoi:

Vietnamese willingness to negotiate a genuine political settlement in Cambodia based on the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces and internationally supervised free elections would be a welcome development. ASEAN has regularly stated that it is prepared to negotiate a settlement based on these points, which are supported by the great majority of the world's nations. We will be consulting closely with the ASEAN governments and others interested in the Cambodian problem in the coming weeks.

The United States of course welcomes Mr. Thach's statement that Vietnam will continue its efforts to work with the United States to resolve the cases of Americans missing from the war in Indochina. This reaffirms promises made by the Vietnamese Government last February during Assistant Secretary of Defense Armitage's visit to Hanoi.

Q On that point, you start out by saying that their willingness to withdraw based on negotiations would be welcome, but are you interpreting the statements made by the Foreign Minister as meaning they are willing to withdraw based on this negotiated settlement?

A Well, I'm not prepared to give you an interpretation beyond what I've just --

Q Why do you start off by saying this?

A Because there was a statement that was reported in the press by the Foreign Minister which suggested that they would negotiate unconditionally for a settlement in Cambodia. So this is our reaction to that.

Q Would you confirm the report of the Kyodo reporter that the Vietnamese Foreign Minister's remarks are true or -- ?

A No, I can't confirm beyond the report.

Q Can I just follow that question because --

A I'll come back to you in one second. Go ahead, Bernie.

Q Can we have a copy of that, Alan?

A Yes.

Bernie, go ahead, and then I'll come --

Q -- because that Kyodo report said, as it appeared in FBIS at least, that he said he was willing unconditionally to discuss a settlement on the basis equally of the ASEAN proposals and the three Indochina states' proposals, which don't -- you know, which kind of cancelled out each other in the past. I don't --

A Well, I can't predict for you --

Q I mean this shows --

A -- where this would lead, but I can only give you our reaction to his statement at this point.

Q But you chose to emphasize the possibility of his talking on the ASEAN proposals, as distinct from the three Indochina states' proposals.

A I chose to give you our reaction to his statement and our expressed -- and our views on that.

Q Do you have any comment on the South Korean Government's decision to accept (the) North Korean offer of aid for the flood victims in South Korea?

A Yes. We consider this a positive response which demonstrates the South's continuing commitment to reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

Q What about, to follow that up, any reaction to the Japanese suggestion that both Koreas be made full members of the U.N.?

A I think that was a position that South Korea proposed as well. I think that's been a standing position, and I don't think we have had any quarrel with that, have supported it.

If I'm wrong on that, I'll come back and tell you -- quickly! (Laughter)

Q Going back on Vietnam for a sec, do you have any response to the words of this Vietnamese Embassy spokeperson in Bangkok about the reeducation camp political prisoner issue?

A Well, we've seen reports of the remarks on the subject by a Vietnamese official in Bangkok, but I really don't want to comment until we've had a more authoritative or official Vietnamese statement.

1-2365

But as the Secretary said on Tuesday, the success of the initiatives will require the good will and cooperation of the Vietnamese Government, and we very much hope that such cooperation will be forthcoming.

Q Alan, do you have anything further to report on the status of the two Americans in Nicaragua, the bodies? Any change in that?

A No. The process continues. Some information used for identification purposes has been received by our Embassy and passed to the Nicaraguan officials. Other information, I gather, is still on its way -- in the mails, literally -- and so there really is no progress to report; but that effort, obviously, goes forward.

Q Anything yet on the confirmation or denial of the claim of a third American?

A No, I don't have anything specific on that. I believe -- and would ask you to check because I believe it's on the public record -- that the Nicaraguans themselves have said that they don't have any further information beyond what this one prisoner has said to them. But they haven't found any body or anything of that sort, so obviously that presents considerable difficulties.

Q Alan, on the Gulf, in the last four days it appeared that Iraq is escalating its attack and its seige of Kharg Island. I mean, do you have any comment now after, you know, four days of reports about that?

A Well, there have been reports of, I guess, greater activity than there had been in the preceding couple of weeks. Our basic position on that remains unchanged, that we would like to see -- and a lot of other people would like to see -- a negotiated settlement which respects the territorial integrity and independence, sovereignty of those two countries.

Q Alan, could you --

Q Does the State Department produce or distribute some sort of newsletter called "The Wireless News" to Embassy personnel abroad?

A I think you're referring to a USIA product.

Jim?

Q Do you --

Q Can I follow up along those lines?

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you have any response to charges made by representatives of the Schiller Institute in Bonn, West Germany, two days ago that the U.S. Embassy in Bonn, the State Department, and other officials of the United States Government, including Fred Ikle and Richard Perle, have been involved in a campaign of harassment against attempts to build a conference in Weisbaden scheduled for next week involving U.S. and European participation to support the Western alliance?

A No, but I think that since you've mentioned a couple of Defense Department officials, your question really should be addressed there or to the Embassy, if you think that --

Q I'll ask them about their officials, but I'm asking you about State Department officials in the U.S. Embassy.

A I'm not aware. You can ask the Embassy; I'm just not aware of it.

Jim?

Q Do you have anything on South Africa, either the shutting down of protest meetings or the temporary asylum in the British Embassy?

A Don't have anything on the latter. On the former, I think we've had a fair amount to say over the last week or so, basically, and refer you back to what we said. I don't have anything new to say today on --

Q O.K. Also, do you happen to have anything on Indonesia and on the unrest there?

A No, I don't. There was what was essentially sort of a sitrep yesterday that was available, but it really didn't offer you any policy views.

Alfonso?

Q Just going back to Nicaragua and two other update questions: One is, is there anything new on the Cubans reported killed there? Do you have any new information?

A No, and I -- you keep on asking the question. I don't anticipate that we will have anything further on that, so I think you could cease and desist from that line of inquiry. (Laughter)

Q The other one is, also on Nicaragua, whether the U.S. has replied to the Nicaraguan notes on the Americans, and whether you can tell us what they said.

A I don't think I;m going to get into the question of response on the notes. The facts have, to the extent that we know them at this point, have clearly been made public -- specifically, a very flat denial that there was any U.S. Government involvement in that operation, and we have made known some information regarding previous contacts by CMA with U.S. Embassies in El Salvador and Honduras. We're still looking into the details to make sure we haven't missed anything. But I think we've made it very clear that the U.S. Government was not involved in that operation, so -- But I don't intend to get into the question of providing information on diplomatic responses.

Q Alan, Richard Burt is quoted in the Washington Times as saying that in his view, one of the major issues facing NATO nations over the next year is that Europe should follow suit and have an economic recovery modeled on that of the United States.

I would like you to explain -- and you might want to check with Mr. Burt and look into it -- is that, given that the U.S. recovery has been supported by capital inflows from Europe and Latin America and that there would be no recovery without that capital flight from Europe, how does he propose that this can happen?

A Well, I don't think we're going to get into a great deal of exegesis on a published interview, but I will pass your interest along.

Anything else?

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The press briefing concluded at 1:38 P.M.)

Glennon/ Watson
Patterson / Hoag

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #168

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 1984, 12:22 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. No announcements.

Q That's it?

A That's it.

Q O.K. Tell us about the seamen who are being detain by the Soviets, please?

A The seamen. Well, our Embassy talked with the captain of that ship today. The Embassy in Moscow was in phone contact with the captain of the detained crew. The skipper said that the five Americans are safe and well. According to the Soviet Government, the five are being held at a hotel in Ureliki on the Bay of Providence because of what the Soviets see as a violation of Soviet territorial waters, which occurred on September 12 -- that's the Soviet version.

Q You don't agree it was a violation, or what?

A Well, until, I think -- until we can have a longer discussion with the captain, it's not definite -- we're just not in a position to make a judgment.

Q And is there any doubt in your mind that they will be released soon?

A Well, we certainly see no reason for them not to be released. We are hoping that that release will take place soon. And as I say, we see no reason why they should not be released.

Q What is the delay due to?

A In fairness, I have to say that it is fairly far-flung territory out there -- that is one problem; but on the other hand, we see no reason for this to take much longer.

Q Has the dispute over the territorial waters been dealt with at the diplomatic level at all?

A On this particular -- ?

Q On this particular incident?

A I'm not aware of it at the moment, Ralph. I think what we need to do is get some more facts from the crew.

Q So, basically, the situation is, the Soviets have claimed a violation, the U.S. has not said there isn't one --

A Well, I think --

Q -- but said, we want to see the guys released and then we'll talk to you about it?

A I think it's very difficult for the United States to be in a position to say whether a barge was or was not inside territorial waters. I think we have to wait and talk to the crew about that.

Q What was the crew doing?

A I think they were delivering water and supplies, I think, to remote Alaskan ports.

Q Is there any way you could characterize the Soviet handling of this matter?

A Well, I think, basically, where we stand is that we're looking into the way the Soviets have handled it. It has been a little tardy, in our view, and so we're looking at the way they have notified us and the manner in which they have given us access, which is by phone -- to see how that lines up with the appropriate USSR consular treaty that we have in effect.

Q But you're not, John, at this point accusing the Soviets of a provocation?

A No, we're not accusing the Soviets of a provocation.

Q Where does the captain say he was, John?

A I don't know that that is clear in the rather brief phone call that we had with him today. I think, basically, the intent was to establish that the crew was safe and that they were in good condition. That was the prime purpose of the phone call. Now, we will continue to work with the Soviets for their release.

Q John, how many days had they been held before this phone call was cleared?

A Well, the violation, according to the Soviets, took place on September 12, which would have been Wednesday. We were first notified by the Soviets on September 14, which was Friday, so presumably sometime between 12 September and 14 September, but I suspect closer to September 12. I suspect that relatively soon after the violation occurred they were picked up.

Q And this is your first contact with them?

A September 14, Friday, was our first contact with the Soviets; today is our first contact with the Americans.

Q That's what I mean.

A Yes.

Q Was there a problem getting through earlier, in other words?

A Yes.

Q There was a problem getting --

A Yes.

Q The Russians had said no on phone calls, was that it?

A What the Russians said, what the Soviets said, basically, was that they were working on that question of access by phone, and it came through today.

Q Is there any question, John, of what might happen to their vessel after this is all over?

A Not aware of any question about that.

Q Do you know whether the boat strayed -- do you know whether the boat strayed off-course or whether it capsized, as a Soviet broadcast suggested?

A Haven't heard the capsized report.

Q The Soviets said in one of their broadcasts that they "rescued" the crew.

A Yes. Can't help you any further on that.

Q Can you say whether there were any U.S. Government employees on the boat?

A U.S. Government employees?

Q Yes.

A No, not that we're aware of.

Q John, do you have any indication at all of when they will be released?

A Well, working on it; hope it will be soon.

Q Any kind of intelligence mission on the part of the U.S.?

A (Laughter) Well, (a) we'd have to go through the normal business of saying that if you're going to ask questions about intelligence matters, we can't discuss that; but what I've just said is not in any way intended to suggest that the barge was. Quite the contrary.

Q John, has this any impact at all on the current negotiations on the consular, new consular agreement?

A I'm not aware of any impact. I'm sure -- as I say, we're looking into the manner in which they notified us -- there was a two day delay there and a further two days before we had access; but as I say, we also have to recognize that it is pretty far-flung territory up there, so I would say at this stage, we're simply looking into the way this is being handled without making a judgment.

Q John, anything further you'd like to say about the fact that Mr. Mondale will meet with Mr. Gromyko? And secondly, is there any plan for any liaison so that the positions that Mr. Shultz takes in the meeting are not contradicted by Mr. Mondale the next day and by the President the following day?

A Well, I don't know that Mr. Mondale's office has had any contact yet with the State Department. I think rather not. But as the President has said, there's no problem insofar as the government is concerned about this meeting between Mr. Mondale and Mr. Gromyko.

Q Do you expect contact? Are you offering briefings to Mr. Mondale?

A I don't know that we have offered anything. I'm just not aware of any contact at this stage.

Q Well, do you think it would be a good idea if there were some coordination prior to the meeting?

A I don't have a thought on that today, John.

Q You have no reaction, John, to this perhaps being, I think being the first time Mr. Gromyko, in his many years of coming to the United States, has met with a Presidential candidate as opposed to --

A Well, no reaction beyond the President's that he has no problem with it.

Q Do you have any reaction, John, to the French and Libyan withdrawal from Chad?

A Well, all I would say is that the United States Government favors a peaceful solution to the Chadian conflict which preserves that country's territorial integrity and sovereignty and ends Libyan aggression against it. We've seen the press reports that France and Libya have agreed to a mutual troop withdrawal and we're in contact with the French and Chadian Governments on this issue.

Q Would you relate that announcement of a withdrawal to the recent treaty of union between Morocco and Libya?

A I think not at this stage. I think it's a little premature to be making that kind of link.

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Q John, some of us want to get to this luncheon, so I'd like a filing break, please?

A O.K. Filing break, fine. As a matter of fact, you can wrap it up, if you like.

Q John, coming back for just a second to the Mondale-Gromyko meeting, when another Presidential candidate at one point suggested a trip to the Soviet Union to deal with certain negotiations, there was a fair amount of comment on that from the Administration.

Do you have any comment on the principle of a Presidential candidate engaging in this type of high-level meeting with the Soviet Union?

A Well, I'm not quite sure what you mean by your question. I think Mr. Mondale has made it clear in what he has said that he recognizes Presidential authority in the area of foreign policy, and is not seeking in any way to dilute that relationship.

I think what you may be referring to is hesitation that we have had in the past about a variety of people attempting to get into negotiations with a foreign power, which, clearly, is the preserve of the President.

Q New subject?

A Sure.

-- MORE --

Q What can you tell us about the Indian Foreign Minister's visit here today?

A Not very much. I think he's seeing Mr. Armacost. I don't know much beyond that.

Q The subject, or, (inaudible) expect it to be -- ?

A I don't know whether it's a visit that's been arranged for sometime or not. Just don't -- can't enlighten you on that.

Q John, can you tell us why Mr. Dobrynin was in the building this morning?

A He's back from his summer vacation. I think this is the first time he's seen the Secretary since he's back; a part of the on-going series of meetings between Mr. Dobrynin and the Secretary.

A Not related to the fishermen's incident specifically, or do you think that might have --

A I really don't have any readout on the agenda.

A John, according to some reports the Israeli Cabinet will be asking for $1 billion of extra economic aid to assist Israel in its economic situation, and they reduced their budget, according to reports, $1 billion. Do you have any comment on that?

A No, other than the obvious one, that we obviously have supported the Government of Israel in its bid to come to grips with its economic problems.

Q Is -- to follow this, when will Prime Minister Shimon Peres be coming to Washington to meet with the -- ?

A I think dates are being worked out.

Q They've been announced.

A Have been announced? Is already announced?

Q 8th of October.

A Okay, then you're ahead of me; ahead of me. Okay.

Q John? Shall I begin?

A Uh-huh.

Q Can you tell us anything about when the consultations with the French took place with respect to this?

A After the press announcement.

Q Were there consultations prior to that as well?

A No.

Q None at all?

A I mean, are you -- if your question is, "Did the French inform us of this in advance," the answer is no.

Q They did not?

A They did not.

Q So did it come as a surprise to you?

A I think we were unaware that it was coming.

Q Was it on -- in terms of -- you were unaware? Is that correct? I didn't hear you exactly.

A Uh-huh.

Q Was it as much of -- would you qualify it in the same kind of "surprise" category as the Libyan-Moroccan agreement?

A We tend to avoid qualifying the degree of our surprise about international events. (Laughter)

Q All right.

Q John, if the press reports are true, is this a welcome development?

A Well, if it leads to the kind of withdrawal that we have suggested, which obviously would insure the territorial integrity of Chad, yes, that would be a welcome development.

Q Are you still studying the document?

A Still considering the implications of that --

Q This is very hard to understand the document. (Laughter)

A It's not hard to understand it. We've had a good relationship with Morocco, but nevertheless we continue to look at the implications of what it is doing.

Q John, have the French indicated whether the Libyans are going to withdraw from Chad, from the Aouzou Strip which is disputed up in the north, or are they going to stay?

A We, at the, moment, I think -- I think Mr. Cheysson has sent a message to the Secretary, but I think at the moment we're working from the same kind of information basically as you are.

I'm sorry, Bill, I didn't get back to you.

Q He asked it.

A You got it taken care of? Okay.

Q John, on the minesweeping operation in the Red Sea, do you have any comment either on the reports of the mines that were found by the British and the French or on U.S. departure plans or scheduling of U.S. -- ?

A Nothing on the -- I guess there are two mines, one of which was exploded, and the other -- the second one of which is now apparently being looked at.

As far as the United States is concerned, the United States came to the Gulf of Suez at the request of the Government of Egypt, which assigned the United States a specific area in which to hunt for mines. The various countries contributing to the mine-clearing effort have reached understandings with the Egyptian Government that they will remain only as long as it takes for each to search its designated area.

The U.S. forces have now thoroughly searched the area assigned to the United States. No mines have been discovered, and all reasonable steps have been taken to insure that no danger remains to international shipping

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from from explosives in that area.

U.S. forces are now approaching the conclusion of their work, and we're consulting with the Egyptian Government on the timing of our redeployment. The precise dates of redeployment depend on the outcome of those consultations.

Q Copy, please?

A Sure.

Q Do you expect that to be -- those negotiations to be prolonged, protracted or just -- ?

A No, don't expect those negotiations to be prolonged.

Q John, do you have anything on these lawyers who want to go to Cuba?

A Not a great deal, George. I think, basically, we are going to refer you to Treasury on that. But in today's issue of the New York Times there is a letter from Assistant Treasury Secretary Walker which responds to the points that have been raised, and which reiterates that the U.S. is not attempting to prevent travel to visit close relatives, and by journalists, government officials, and persons engaged in professional research or similar activities.

As the letter notes, we're concerned that the authorized categories not be distorted by travel agencies, such as Marazul.

The 1982 decision to bar tourists and business travel was to deny hard currency to Castro's Cuba, and that policy is not changed. But for any specifics, I guess talk to Treasury.

Q John, just to be sure I didn't miss anything there on the minesweeping thing, you did not have any comment on the mine that was found, exploded, and then apparently announced that it was a Soviet-made mine?

A No, I don't --

Q No comment on either one of those?

A That was discovered by another nation, as you know.

Q Do you have any response to Sergio Ramirez' op-ed piece in the Post today?

A No.

Q Do you have anything on the allegations that appeared in the Post over the weekend about the supply of these planes?

A No. Nothing that -- not obviously going to get into allegations involving intelligence matters. But having said that, nothing that has been said or has emerged changes the United States' confidence that the United States Government was not involved in that particular operation that we're speaking of, into Nicaragua.

Q And do you have anything at all on the article that appeared by Ed Cody today in the Post on Duarte's control over the military?

A No.

Q Anything on the comments by the Nicaraguan Defense Minister about the future plans for Punta Huete?

A Yes. The Secretary has had something to say about that in the past. And basically what I'll do is reiterate what he said, and as a number of other high-level Administration (official)s have also said, that the addition of advanced combat aircraft to the Sandinistas' military arsenal would be a serious development which would alter the balance of power in the region. It would increase the threat that Nicaragua poses to its neighbors.

As we have indicated before, the Sandinistas are well aware of our position.

Q John, last night on "60 Minutes," there was a report on the F-20 fighter -- the Tiger Shark -- and among other reports in the documentary, or the report, they said something that the United Arab Emirates and Qatar and some other Gulf States requested to buy top-of-the-line planes from the United States, like for instance Oman which requested and received F-16s, and the United States refused.

A Uh-huh.

Q As a result of this, they went and they bought Russian -- they bought French and other jets -- the 2,000, I think, the top-of-the-line French jet. What do you comment on such reports, especially that the State Department, Mr. Schneider, was involved in making some statements about the marketing of the F-20, the Tiger Shark, that this is not made available to other countries who wanted this plane? Can you look into this report?

A Well, no, I really don't have any comment about that except in a general sense; that obviously the experts in the Administration, and particularly in the Pentagon, look at such requests in the light of requirements and needs of a particular country, and obviously make judgments on that basis. But I'm not commenting on this particular request. I'm just giving you a kind of general view of how that process goes forward.

Q My understanding from the report, and some defense newsletter, commentator or editor said that by the United States refusing to sell these countries the top-of-the-line, they are really undermining these countries and possibly putting them in a rather negative perspective about handling technology, or advanced technology.

A Well, the F-16 is a very powerful aircraft which has offensive and defensive capability. And, as I say, I think, in general, the particular and specific needs of a country are something that is taken into effect when that judgment is made on supplying weaponry.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:40 p.m.)

Story/Becker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #169

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1984, 12:06 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, all. I have one brief announcement and that is that available in the Press Office is the prepared statement by Assistant Secretary Wolfowitz before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs. The testimony was on the Philippines.

That's all I have.

Q O.K. John, why don't you bring us up to date on these seamen and their release?

A Well, the Soviets have informed us that they are going to release the five American seamen. We, in a telephone call from Moscow to the seamen today, told them that so they themselves, the seamen, are now aware of that.

What we have agreed to is a transfer in international waters somewhere off Ureliki, which is the location where the seamen are being held. That will take place on our side by means of a U.S. Coast Guard cutter. We will use a cutter that is presently at sea in the Bering Straits. We understand she is about 24 hours' steaming from the location, or the planned location, for the transfer, so that exchange will take place in the next one-to-two days.

She is within 24 hours' steaming distance, but we don't quite know what the light conditions will be when she arrives and what exchanges will have to take place between the Soviets and ourselves. But at any rate, the five Americans will be transferred by the Soviets at sea to the cutter, and we understand that their vessel will be returned at the same time.

We do not know whether they have signed any statements of any kind. We probably will not know that, I think, until they're back on American territory.

Q In a telephone conversation, apparently the captain said that they had been asked to sign a statement saying that they had in fact violated Soviet territorial waters, but they refused to sign it. Do you know if that's true?

A I think -- that is correct, that is what he said, and I'm not leading you in any direction. That may well still be the case. It's just that we're not able to tell you whether they signed anything or not. I think at one stage, the captain offered to -- and maybe did -- write his own account of what transpired and offered that to the Soviets which was refused. And during the course of their detention, the Soviets asked them to sign a statement apparently indicating that they consciously sailed into Soviet territorial waters, which, so far as we know up to now, they have refused to sign. But as I say, one won't be able to put that to them until they are back. (inaudible)

Q And have you been able to determine if the Soviets lived up to the terms of the consular treaty?

A Well, we protested formally to the Soviets yesterday in Moscow about their handling of the situation, about the limited access to the American citizens and the fact that, as we understand it, the seamen were asked to sign this statement that they consciously sailed into Soviet territorial waters.

We have protested to the Soviets. The Secretary raised this in his meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin yesterday also.

Q John, can I ask you in that connection, the cutter is already in the area. Will any non-Coast Guard personnel be aboard? Will there be a U.S. diplomat aboard the cutter to deal with the exchanges?

A I don't think so. No, I don't think so, Ralph. At one stage, it was thought that an American official of some kind, maybe a civil official might need to be there, but that apparently is not the case. The Russians are satisfied that the Coast Guard commander is the appropriate official to whom the men should be handed over.

Q Have the Russians responded to the U.S. protest at all?

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A Sorry?

Q Have the Soviets responded to the U.S. protest?

A Not that I am aware of, Ralph.

Q John, who is the commander and what is the name of the cutter?

A I did ask for that just a few minutes ago, and we were unable to get that, but I'm sure that we will, or the Coast Guard will, during the course of the day.

Q Why does it have --

Q Is the destination known?

A Well, the destination -- it's in international waters.

Q No, I mean once the liaison is made between the Soviets and the Americans and they steam back, where do they steam back to?

A Well, I also asked that question, anticipating your question, and that also is not clear. I guess it depends on the inclination of the Americans, of the five Americans. It is said to be entirely possible that if they are in good shape, the Coast Guard might provide their own boat with the provisions it needs, if it needs provisions and fuel, or whatever, to continue on their assignment. But I think that won't be clear, and that's clearly their call.

Q Why the cutter -- in fact, why don't they just go out on their own boat?

A I think it is the intention of the Soviets to hand the five Americans over to some kind of official American presence.

-- MORE --

Q Have you had an explanation from them, John, about how they did happen to sail into Soviet waters?

A The five Americans? I do not think that we have had a very detailed explanation. I think that what they have indicated is that they were unsure of their position; that they saw a vessel in the vicinity; that they sailed towards it to try to get a fix on their position; and the vessel to which they sailed turned out to be a Soviet warship. (Laughter)

Q Do you know if weather conditions were bad?

A I don't know.

Q What was the point of sailing toward the vessel?

A I think they were a little -- it's very difficult terrain, if that's the right way to describe water, and apparently they were a little unsure of their position, saw a ship, sought directions, and instead of getting directions were arrested.

Q John, just to be clear, I take it from everything you're saying that there's no dispute between the U.S. and the Soviet Union on the question of whether or not they were in international waters. The dispute is over the handling of the Americans and the handling of getting the information, and so on?

A Well, I think the honest answer is we don't -- I don't think we can give you a view yet as to whether they did in fact sail into Soviet territory. It is entirely possible they did; but if they did, and we're not -- as I say, we're not in a position to say yea or nay on that. But even if they did, clearly their voyage was an innocent one, and that should have been apparent to the Soviets fairly soon.

Q New topic? Are we finished?

A I don't know whether I have exhausted your curiosity on this.

Q John, why do you think the Soviets are trying to get them to sign a statement saying that they purposefully strayed across the line?

A I don't know.

Q John, are there legal ramifications to an American citizen signing such a statement and later disavowing it? Is there still a legal penalty?

A I can't answer that. That's a good question, but it's one I'm afraid I can't answer.

Q John, you're saying the seamen's ship will be returned promptly, or do you have any idea as to how long?

A As we understand it, the ship will be returned at the time of the handover. Now, how it will get out there, I don't know. Whether it will be towed or whether it will be sailed, I can't answer that.

Q You're talking about a release on Wednesday or Thursday, is that right?

A Well, we're talking about a release sometime after that Coast Guard cutter arrives. And as we understand it, she's about 24 hours away steaming time. Now, I assume that if there's instant communication, if the visibility is good, if the seas are calm, handover could take place right away. But given the weather and the sea, and so forth and so on, and communications between the Soviets and ourselves, I guess we would need to be cautious and say sometime after 24 hours, perhaps within the next two days.

Q Can you be more specific on location exactly of the handover?

A I can't at this stage because I don't have that, but I think it is -- it will be in territorial waters fairly close to the point at which they're being held.

Q Territorial?

A In other words, they apparently are not going to -- in international waters. Sorry. In other words, they're not going to sail out very far from where they're presently being held.

Q Where is the cutter based?

A There are, I think, two conflicting reports about that. One is that she was based in -- registered in

Juneau, and the other one, that she was registered in Homer, Alaska, and I can't --

Q Has her crew been augmented by any additional personnel involving this handover, any specialists, anyone involved in such matters?

A The crew of the Coast Guard cutter?

Q Yeah.

A I don't think so. The Coast Guard, I'm sure, can answer that, but I don't think so because this particular ship apparently is at sea. I mean, she was at sea before there was any knowledge of this assignment.

Q Will the Americans be debriefed either on the Coast Guard cutter or on shore by the U.S. Government?

A I can't answer that because it's a little premature. We don't know what their own plans are. As I say, it is just possible that they may take on whatever they need and go about their business, and it'll be sometime before they get back to land.

Q Aren't you interested in debriefing them?

A Well, I think we're interested but I also think that the main emphasis has been on getting them back and insuring their safety, and we'll come to the question of talking to them about their experiences later.

Q Did this incident take place in those -- in that part of the Bering Straits which is now under discussion between the Soviet Union and the United States?

A That I cannot answer, Jim. I'm not sure. In fact, I'm not sure we even know where it took place of our knowledge.

Q How does it stand now, John, do you know? The Bering Strait talks?

A I don't. Do you know where those negotiations on the boundary that Mr. Kozak has been involved in? (Question directed to the staff.)

No, I don't.

Q John, the question on the debriefing was really intended to determine whether the U.S. Government is interested in pursuing the question of whetner this was in international waters or not, or whether basically your intention is to just get them back, let them go back to their work, and let the whole thing go away?

A Oh, I'm sure the government will be interested in their story and their experiences, and what kind of treatment they were given. There are a number of questions, I think, already. The captain did several times request permission to telephone the United States Embassy.

As far as we understand, that permission was denied, and certainly there were no incoming calls, so that's one question that certainly we will be interested in.

Q Can you tell us anything more about the telephone call that occurred today in which you -- was that from Washington or from Moscow, or -- ?

A No, that was from Moscow to the place of detention.

Q Can you tell us anything more about what the captain said?

A I really can't. We just have a fragmentary report at this stage.

Q Is there anything unusual, John, about the position or the activities of the Soviet ship, Soviet warship, that might have contributed to the curiosity of this -- ?

A I'm not aware that anybody suggested that. I'm not aware that anybody has suggested anything along those lines.

Q Were they sailing in the direction of the Soviet ship, to do what?

A Well, I think they were uncertain of their position in this area, and they saw a ship which they thought might be able to be helpful in directing them to wherever they were going and locating their position exactly. And, as I say, it turned out to be a Soviet naval ship.

Q Did they communicate by radio (inaudible)?

A That, I don't know. We haven't had much talk with them. One of the phone calls that we had was interrupted, and I do not think that either of the other phone calls were very lengthy.

Q Interrupted by whom?

A One doesn't know, Bernie.

Q So a total of three phone calls --

A Three phone calls.

Q -- one interrupted and two were completed?

A Well, I assume the other two were completed but the other two were, as I understand it, not lengthy.

Q Okay. And one of those was yesterday when Moscow --

A Two of them were yesterday and one was today.

Q Were all the subjects of the agenda for the Shultz-Gromyko meeting discussed yesterday with Dobrynin?

A I don't have any readout on the Secretary's session. I'm sorry.

Q Can you tell from this whether this sort of thing happens very often, and this one time it became an incident?

A I don't know that -- I'm not aware of -- I mean, I just don't have facts and data on whether this happens frequently in that area.

Q New subject, John?

A Sure.

Q Today is the 18th of September when the Vienna talks were supposed to take place. Have you got anything on their not taking place?

A Yes. The United States regrets that despite our acceptance without any preconditions of the Soviet proposal for talks, the meeting in Vienna is not taking

1-2390a

place. As we told the Soviets, we are prepared to have serious discussions on outer space arms control, to listen to their proposals and to discuss our own ideas.

At the same time, we are not willing to agree to preconditions in order to have a meeting. While we've said that we would be prepared to consider what specific mutual restraints would be appropriate, we could not agree to that as a condition for having a meeting. Nor would we agree to prejudge the outcome of any talks before they have even begun.

We now look to the future. We seek to meet with the Soviet Government to discuss questions of mutual, vital concern such as reducing nuclear arsenals in a balanced and verifiable manner, and we are prepared to talk about space arms control as well. We welcome any moves that would further that goal.

Q Copy, please?

A Sure.

Q John, I have one on another topic?

A Sure.

Q You might have to take this, if you would please. They're both on New Zealand. Is the United States delaying agrement on the new New Zealand Ambassador to the United States, Mr. Rowling, because of this nuclear ship controversy?

A First of all, one generally doesn't talk about agrement, I've learned in the diplomatic world. But, secondly, I am not aware of any particular problems, and, thirdly, let me take a look at it.

Q I appreciate it. And, also, has the United States softened its stand on this ANZUS controversy?

A Well, the United States has made its position clear on the importance of ANZUS; has made its position clear on the question of ports of call by nuclear-powered vessels, and there isn't any change in that position. And I think the New Zealand Government is well aware of our views.

Q When the meetings take place in New York, will the United States try to set a date for the visit of warships to New Zealand?

A I don't think I'll get into that kind of detail about the -- any meeting that might take place between the Secretary and New Zealand officials.

Q Can you tell us anything about the Arab ambassadors in the building? Can you tell us anything about the Arab ambassadors in the building now? You haven't announced that they are meeting.

A Sorry, which Arab --

Q Some Arab ambassadors -- more than three?

A It is conceivable that such a meeting is taking place but I don't know anything about it.

Q Why you don't announce that meeting? Usually, you announced that.

A I guess we don't announce every visit of every ambassador to the State Department.

Q (inaudible) meeting with Secretary Shultz?

A There are no Arab ambassadors meeting with Secretary Shultz that I'm aware of today.

Q Could you find out about that meeting?

A Let me check and see what's at the root of this.

Q John, there is an Egyptian weekly newspaper which has a story that orders to evacuate the nationals from an Arab Gulf state -- reportedly Kuwait -- have been on a standby. Do you have any comment on such report?

A No, don't know anything about it.

Q Can you look into this?

A I don't think it's something for the United States to look into.

--MORE--

Q The report says it's in light of Kuwait receiving the new arms from the Soviet Union that --

A I don't know anything about it, so I can't give you any comment on its accuracy, but it doesn't seem to me something the United States should look into.

Q John, Kuwait is proposing a hard-line, anti-Israel resolution for the inter parliamentary -- International Parliamentary Union next week. Will the U.S. be opposing this resolution and, if so, how will we go about it?

A I don't know any specifics about this particular case, but we always take a keen interest in resolutions affecting Israel.

Q John, back on the Shultz-Dobrynin-Gromyko agenda question, and so on, can you tell us anything about yesterday's meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin?

A No.

Q Can you comment on a report that Ambassador Dobrynin received a gift from the Secretary of State yesterday?

A That I can do. He did in fact get a chair from Secretary Shultz. Some time in June apparently, during one of their meetings, Ambassador Dobrynin admired one of the chairs in the Secretary's office. The Secretary has five what I would call "Harvard chairs." They're black wooden chairs. We don't have any around here.

The Secretary has one for each of his associations in government. He has one for Treasury, one for OMB, one for the State Department, one for the Marine Corps, and -- I'm missing one --

MR. ROBMERG: Labor.

MR. HUGHES: Labor. So he has five such chairs. The Ambassador admired them, thought they were comfortable, spoke of the problem of finding comfortable chairs -- (laughter) --

The Secretary remarked upon this at the time, without apparently indicating to the Ambassador that he planned to, in light of the Ambassador's enthusiasm for these chairs, to buy him one. So he did. It did not --

Q How much?

A I don't know how much it cost, but he used his personal funds. This is not a government purchase. He had it produced with the Department of State seal on the back of it, and when Ambassador Dobrynin came in yesterday -- which I think was his first visit back since being on vacation -- Secretary Shultz gave it to him.

I think the Ambassador did not take it with him. I think somebody from the Soviet Embassy came back later in the day -- (laughter) -- to take it away, and yes, it went out of the front door, so far as I know.

Q But beyond that, you won't have anything to say about the meeting?

A Other than that, I've been having a -- you know, you've now drained me of all the stuff that I didn't intend to tell you. (Laughter)

Q Is it wired?

A I'm sorry?

Q I'm just curious whether the chair had any accessories. (Laughter)

A I'm not aware the chair had any accessories. (Laughter)

Q John, can you tell us anything about the level of greeting Gromyko will receive today in New York? Will the Administration send someone up to meet him or -- ?

A There will be a U.S. Government official there, but the kind of official that is appropriate for meeting the Soviet Foreign Minister at Kennedy Airport.

Q Well, what --

A I don't know what level it is, but it will be the usual.

Q Is it State Department?

A There will be State Department officials there. Yes.

Q Has the State Department discouraged him from speaking at the airport when he arrives?

A No.

Q Apparently --

A Not at all.

Q John --

A You might look to others for the kind of decisions that have been made about what he might do when he arrives.

Q Could you take the question of who will meet him?

Q But that would be a Soviet decision.

A It's a Soviet call.

Q Can you take the question of who will meet him? If it's a State Department official, I think we ought to be able to find out who it is.

A Let me take a look at it. It will probably be the same kind of level as has previously met him in the past.

Q I understand he's considering giving a speech, possibly one in New York, possibly one here. Does the State Department have any objection to that?

A Not that I'm aware of. I didn't know that he was giving a speech, but I'm not aware that we have any objection to it.

Q Do you have anything today on continued South African violence or their new constitution?

A No. Nothing on South Africa.

Q Do you have anything more to offer on the announcement by France and Libya to evacuate their troops from Chad?

A Not, not really.

Q More than you offered yesterday?

A We're still in -- we're in touch with both the Government of Chad and the Government of France, and still looking at the implications of that decision.

Q You don't believe it's taking place, or what?

A We think it's -- I have no reason to doubt that it's taking place, but, nevertheless, like to know a little more about it.

Q I find your silence or your reticence curious since up until about a year and a half ago you made such a big deal out of this.

A Well, if it all is going forward, if there's going to be a speedy and simultaneous withdrawal, that would be a return to the situation we have argued for, and, obviously, we would welcome that. But I think one wants to see a little more, make sure it all takes place.

Q What about the question of U.S. military aid to the Government of Chad? Is it continuing?

A I'm sure there's no change in whatever level is going forward. I'm not sure what level of aid is presently underway to Chad.

Q Is it your position that you are not making a clear statement about the announcement, which was in the front pages of all the papers, related to your study or the impact of the agreement between Libya and Morocco that you are still having it under study and -- ?

A No. Studying the implications of two separate things. The Moroccan-Libyan association, and now this announcement that French and Libyan troops will be --

A I heard yesterday, saying that you would like to see that, you know, the Libyan forces getting out of Chad, if I'm not wrong.

A Sure.

Q For a long time.

A Of course, we would.

Q So you welcome such an announcement by France and Libya?

A Yes. Of course, we would. If it's going to take place.

Q Because you're making quite a fine in your answer by saying "if it's going to take place." You are not sure that they are? You don't believe in them?

A One has learned to be cautious in the case of Libya.

Q John, what do you think of the idea of a quarantine of Nicaragua?

A I gather that's -- you're referring to Mr. Mondale's interview in The New York Times --

Q Yes.

A -- and I don't have any comment on that.

Q Well, has Mondale asked for a briefing on -- before the Gromyko meetings?

A No.

Q He has not.

Q You mean he hasn't been briefed on talks -- the progress of the talks between Nicaragua and the United States?

A He has been briefed on, -- I think Mrs. Ferraro has -- I was going to say on a number of occasions, I think I'm right that there has been more than one briefing in each case -- but that was a general foreign policy review, and certainly that would be part of the review and the briefing, but I'm not sure at what detail.

Q Because in one of his remarks he said that it was his understanding that the Administration had offered to stop the Contras in exchange for a cessation agreement by the Nicaraguans not to export their revolution further.

1-2396

A Uh-huh.

Q In the course of these talks.

A And the question is?

Q Is that correct?

A Oh, we wouldn't have any comment on that.

Q Did you say that they had each received at least one, if not more than one, foreign policy --

A I'd like to go back and check that, but I'm sure that briefings have been offered to the Vice -- to Vice President Mondale and to Mrs. Ferraro, and I'm sure that that invitation was accepted and a briefing took place. But let me check that for you. I want to be sure about the number of briefings.

Q There is a statement being attributed to the Secretary about Israel's --

A Excuse me. I'm talking about briefings within the general context of the campaign -- not a specific briefing on --

Q Right. General foreign policy briefings.

A Sure.

Q A statement attributed to the Secretary about Israel's economy or -- I don't know if the word "condition" is correct, to United States increasing its aid, if Israel doesn't do certain things.

Where was this statement made, and how can we get a copy of it, if you have anything on it?

A I'm sorry. A statement by whom?

Q By Secretary Shultz.

A I am not aware of such a statement. Can you narrow it down a little as to where --

Q Yes. He -- well, about the $700 million or $1 billion or --

A Yes, yes. But, I mean, where is he supposed to have made it?

Q Yes. That's what I'm asking, because it was today in the -- (laughter) -- I mean, it's been more than once written about by the major papers here and broadcast.

A Well, I think I hear most of the public statements he makes, and I can't recall that particular one.

Q And you -- as far as you know, there are no "conditions" placed on Israel in order for Israel to receive the extra $700 million or $1 billion.

A Well, our aid program to Israel, and our aid levels, are well known. Matter of public record. Insofar as Israel's own economy is concerned, as we have said, we welcome the vigor with which Israel is tackling its economic problems.

Q Can you look at this, if there was ever such a statement, or can you --

A Well, you're asking me -- you know, you're asking me to be a research organization, and I think if you -- if everybody -- if I ran down every statement that somebody presumed the Secretary has made, I would never get out here to the Daily Briefing, which you all may welcome, but, nevertheless --

Q (Laughter)

A I mean, if you can do a little more research and find out where he's supposed to have made this, I'll be glad to look at it, but it's kind of hard for me to look for something I don't think he said.

Q John, any comment on the Bitov news conference in the Soviet Union today?a

A I'm sorry, Ralph?

Q Any comment on the Bitov news conference in the Soviet Union today? That Bitov matter?

A No.

Q Any more today on the Peres visit?

A I think the White House may having something on that.

Q John, about Chad, you just said that you don't have any reason to doubt that the withdrawal of the French and Libyans will happen, and then after a while you said you should be cautious about Libyan withdrawal.

A No. I said that we traditionally approach Libyan promises with some caution.

Q John, with relation to this economic aid that has been talked about, has there been any statement made publicly by the State Department on the need for additional aid by Israel to meet its economic situation?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q There is a briefing this afternoon on the Middle East, and I'm wondering whether or not -- do you know who's going to be the witness for the State Department?

A No. It's a State Department briefing?

Q No. At the Senate Subcommittee on the Middle East.

Q It's closed.

A I'm told that's a closed hearing.

Q Murphy.

A Murphy?

Q Who is going to be there?

A Murphy, I'm told, and it's closed, I'm told.

Q Yeah. Well, I'm just wondering whether or not you can give us any idea as to when discussions will be taking place between Israel and the United States on a formal basis.

A No, I can't.

Q You can't do that. Can you tell us anything about the -- whether or not there has been any

1-2399

consideration given to the position of the United States towards settlements and economic aid, whether there will be any tie-in?

A No, I can't.

Q There's a report that the United States Government is planning with Israel to station Pershing missiles on Israel soil. Can you comment on that? (Laughter)

A A more mind-boggling and idiotic story is difficult to countenance. (Laughter)

Q That's a "no," is it? (Laughter)

A (Laughter)

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:35 p.m.)

1-2400

Alexson

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #170

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1984, 12:12 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Okay, let's get the show on the road here. Have a number of announcements:

Available from the Press Office is the text of an announcement on the U.S.-Japan Economic Sub-Cabinet Consultations. They'll be held here at the Department of State on September 20 and 21. The heads of the respective delegations: Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, W. Allen Wallis; and Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Moriyuki Motono. Plan to hold a joint press conference at 3:00 p.m. Friday, September 21, here in the Press Briefing Room.

Available in the Press Office at 2:00 this afternoon will be the prepared statement by AID Administrator, Peter McPherson. That's before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Agricultural Subcommittee of Foreign Agriculture Policy. The testimony will be on "Food Aid to Africa."

Just a reminder that Faith Whittlesey's Central American Outreach Group will be meeting in Room 2008 in the New Executive Office Building, Wednesday, September 19, 2:30 p.m. There'll be remarks by our Ambassador to Paris, Evan Galbraith, who will be speaking on "The French view of Central America," and also Ambassador Frank Ortiz, our Ambassador to Argentina, who will be speaking on "The Argentine view of Central America."

Q (Inaudible) on that, John: I went to one of those, and it's a big deal getting into it. You have to phone ahead.

A Okay. I have a contact number. If you have any problems, you might want to call Sue Mathis, who's at 456-2910. And in the light of what Jim says, there apparently having been problems about getting in in the past, it might be a good idea to call her in advance and let her know you're coming.

Q What is the date again? Say that again?

Q Today.

A Today.

Q What time?

A 2:30.

The Secretary of State will participate in a "Salute to USIA," sponsored by Leonard Marks and Frank Shakespeare, tomorrow, September 20. That's a noon lunch at the Madison Hotel. That's a private -- I mean, it's a non-governmental sponsored luncheon so if you have any inquiries about covering it, or whatever, I guess you need to be in touch with Leonard Marks's office at 293-3860; 293-3860.

Q The Secretary will be speaking?

A He will be -- he will have some remarks, yes.

Q Will there be a briefing tomorrow?

Q Will there be a formal speech -- subject?

A I don't know quite how to respond to that, Bernie. A formal speech in the sense of a 30-minute speech, no. If you mean, will he have remarks, perhaps for about 5-10 minutes, yes.

Q After or before the President's taped remarks?

A I don't have any idea what the rest of the program is. As I say, it's sponsored by these two gentlemen. The Secretary is simply going and speaking there.

Q Will his remarks be confined to USIA?

A Yes, they will, and there'll be no Q&A.

Q The USIA is the subject; is that what you mean?

A It's a "Salute to USIA," sponsored by Leonard Marks and Frank Shakespeare.

Q And the subject is USIA?

A USIA.

Q (Inaudible)

1-2403

The Secretary will address the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on Monday, October 1. That will be one of their afternoon meetings. It'll be 5:30 in the afternoon. As is traditional with the Council on Foreign Relations, that will not be open for media coverage. However, we will make the text of the Secretary's remarks there available, hopefully, in as far in advance as we can.

Q Will a copy be made available both in New York and here?

A Sure.

Lastly, the Secretary will be involved tomorrow at the presentation of Presidential Awards to Members of the Senior Foreign Service. That will be at 10:00 tomorrow morning in the Dean Acheson Auditorium. Certificates will be presented to award winners for the years 1983 and 1984. Those to be honored are employees of the State Department, AID, USIA, Commerce and Agriculture. And if you want more information about the awards and the recipients, I believe there's a list available in the Press Office, so you might want to talk to Brian Carlson.

Q Is he making any remarks?

A He will be -- he certainly will be present, and he will certainly make remarks. I'm not sure whether he's going to make all the presentations.

That's it.

Q Can I ask a housekeeping question?

A Sure.

Q Is there going to be any briefing, as such, before next week about Gromyko, etc.-- schedule or --

A Don't anticipate anyone. Don't anticipate anyone, Bernie.

Q What about Sunday in New York? Is the White House going to brief?

A I think I'll leave that to the White House to fill you in on, but I would look to some activity in the late afternoon on Sunday.

Q But that's about the President's schedule that day and about the speech the next day?

A Uh-huh.

Q Okay. Can you bring us up to date on the seamen?

A We had another telephone conversation today with the skipper of the Frieda K in his place of detention, or however you want to currently describe it. That was between the Embassy in Moscow and the town of Ureliki. They're now preparing to leave and preparing for the handover. The Sherman is steaming towards the handover point.

We expect the transfer to take place around 6:00 tonight our time. The crew will be transferred. The Frieda K will also be transferred to the Coast Guard cutter, the Sherman. Captain J. F. Billingham, who is the Commander, is authorized to sign for receipt of the Frieda K and the five Americans, and to conduct what necessary negotiations there are with the Soviets.

After that has taken place, the Frieda K will be refueled. Any supplies that are needed will be put on board, and the Captain of the Frieda K and the Coast Guard Captain will then make the decision about how to proceed. We think that the Frieda K will either be escorted or towed to Gambell, G-a-m-b-e-l-l, which is the nearest American port to the point of transfer and that is on St. Lawrence Island. In other words, they'll come out from Ureliki; the transfer will take place on the high seas; and the Frieda K will then either be towed or escorted, we think, to Gambell, where the owners of the Frieda K will inspect their vessel. And after that, we don't quite know what the decision of the Frieda K and the crew will be.

We will be monitoring the handover by open line to the Coast Guard from the State Department. Captain Billingham is aware of the information that we seek from the crew and will transmit that information to us.

Q What do you mean by "open" -- there going to be a constant radio transmission to the cutter?

A Yes. Uh-huh.

Q And do you --

A Well, I hesitate when you say "a cutter." It's to the Coast Guard in the area. I'm not quite sure whether the link goes right through immediately, but it is an open line to Coast Guard officials, who certainly will be in touch with Captain Billingham.

Q Is there --

A I'm not sure -- in other words, I'm not sure whether a State Department official can talk to Captain Billingham directly.

Q Will we be able to listen to that?

A I doubt it.

--MORE--

Q Could you ask?

Q Will you take that question?

A I'll ask, sure. I'll ask

Q Will you put something out --

A But you should -- I mean you should be aware that there will be a pool on the cutter.

Q Oh, there is?

A Uh-huh.

Q Okay.

Q What kind of information are you trying to obtain from the crew?

A I think we want information about the circumstances of their detention. So far as we know -- We have advised them that they certainly are not obliged to sign any untruthful or inaccurate statements as to the circumstances surrounding their seizure or detention.

So far as we know, they have not signed any papers whatsoever, but that's one of the things we will be interested in: what kind of treatment they had, when they requested access to American Embassy officials, what they were told, those kind of questions.

Q How long was the phone conversation today?

A I don't know, Mike, how long that conversation was.

Q Was it allowed to reach its termination?

A I'm not aware of any unusual interruptions.

Q What does the -- What are you implying by the captain of the cutter signing a receipt for the turnover?

A I think the Soviets have, from the point at which they said they were going to release the crew, have indicated that they wanted to hand over to a U.S. Government official. I'm not suggesting it's a very elaborate signing ceremony, but I think, whether it's a receipt for the vessel and the crew, or just what form that takes, I don't know. But I guess there will be some kind of signature indicating that, in fact, these American citizens have been returned to an American official.

Q Will they board the supply vessel to determine it's condition, if all --

A That I don't know.

Q -- equipment that was there before the seizure is now --

A That -- I think we'll have to defer to the Coast Guard on that and to your colleagues who apparently will soon be on the cutter.

Q John, is there any --

Q John, as this thing is winding down, how would you characterize the whole affair? Is it just a minor, random blip, or do you see some deeper significance in the Soviet behavior, especially their delay?

A I don't think I would really try to analyze the Soviets' behavior at this stage. As you know, we have been concerned, and have officially protested, about the delays that the American citizens had in gaining access to their representatives, and we certainly have protested at the suggestion that they were pressured to sign false statements indicating that they had consciously violated Soviet territorial waters. But I don't think, really, we can go beyond that until we -- we're, obviously, grateful that they are being released. Also, I think they should have been released sooner.

Clearly this, so far as we know, was an innocent mistake, if indeed it was a mistake. We won't know that until we get them back and are able to talk to them.

Q Has there been any response to the protest from the Soviet Union at all?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q Did you say that you understand they have not signed any statement or only (inaudible)

A That is our understanding as of the phone call we had with them today.

Q And they were pressured to do that?

A We know that earlier they were. We know that earlier the captain of the craft offered to give his own written version of what had happened and that was rejected by the Soviets. And as he tells us -- and we have no reason to doubt his word -- he was invited to sign a Soviet statement which certainly stated that he had consciously violated Soviet territory.

Q John, would you care to compare the handling of this incident with other recent incidents in the past month or so in which Americans got into trouble or came into contact with Soviets in that same area? Has there been any problem?

A I'm not aware of any such incidents in the past month.

Q There was a Chicago woman, apparently, who was piloting a single-engine plane and was aided by the Soviets recently --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- and returned.

A Just not aware of that, Ralph. I'm sorry.

Q Are you issuing a travel advisory for the Bering Sea?

A (Laughter)

Q Are there any U.S. ships, beyond the Coast Guard cutter, that are involved in this operation at all, other than ones that are normally there, doing things they normally do?

A I'm not aware of any craft in the area, in addition to the cutter, there for this particular transfer. I'm not sure what else might be around.

Q John, is information on the movement of the cutter classified? We're trying to track this somehow and having difficulty getting information.

A I'm not aware that it's classified. I talked --

Q The Coast Guard is not willing to describe it.

A Oh, really? Okay.

Q Do you have a sense of why?

A We defer -- As always, we defer to the Coast Guard and the Pentagon on what they want to say about their ships and aircraft and so forth and so on.

Q John, can you tell us from whom the pool is drawn? Where would we look for words?

A I don't know how that -- I guess you'd have to talk to the Coast Guard. I think they flew from Nome. But why don't you talk to the Coast Guard.

Q Did you find out if this region is involved in the U.S./Soviet negotiations?

A I didn't, unless --

(To staff): Did we get any further information on that?

A I don't know whether that is within that area of negotiation, Jim.

Q Where is the point, in the Bering Straits, right half-way in between?

A Which point?

Q Where the transfer will be made.

A No, it's -- I would say it is about half-way, looking at the map, between Ureliki and the -- Saint Lawrence Island.

Q So they are not being transferred -- Yesterday you indicated they were going to be transferred at the point where the incident, where they were first taken into custody by the Soviets. But that's, again --

A I don't think I said that yesterday. I think I said the point of transfer would be in international waters.

Q Yes, near where they were picked up, I thought you said. But anyway, it doesn't matter. It's on the record, whatever it is.

A I think the point is to -- the Soviets are taking them out of Ureliki into international waters, and we're going to take them from there to the nearest American port, or village, or whatever it is.

Q Can we move on to a new subject now?

A Sorry?

Q Can we move on to a new subject?

A You've exhausted my knowledge on this one, yes.

Q Long ago. (Laughter)

A I probably don't have any others.

Q Anything on this mine business, John, a new mine apparently being -- or newly-manufactured, whatever it is?

A Well, we're obviously interested in the reports and we'll be very interested to see what the British have got.

--MORE --

Q Can you comment on a report that if the Arab countries will try to raise the issue of expulsion of Israel from United Nations membership, then the United States will withdraw from the United Nations and suspend its financial contribution to the world body?

A Well, I won't respond specifically on tactics, but, certainly, the U.S. position on attempts to bar Israel from international organizations is very clear, and the Secretary and others in the Administration have responded very strongly on that issue, and I would expect the response to be similarly strong if there is such an attempt.

Q I want to follow: There was a report from Kuwait that the United States directed such a warning to some Arab Ambassadors in Washington, telling them to tell their delegates not to ask their country to raise this issue at this time, or to raise this issue in the United Nations. Can you confirm, or what?

A No, I can't confirm that. Don't know anything about such a conversation, and probably wouldn't discuss it anyway, but I wouldn't think the United States would shrink from making its view plain on this particular question.

Q John, there is a list of statements attributed to the Egyptian Ambassador, the newly-appointed Egyptian Ambassador in Moscow, relating very much to the United States-Egyptian relations, and he talks about pressure by the Reagan Administration against his country and -- Its a long story. I don't know if you have seen it or not.

A Haven't seen it. No.

Q Will you take the question, please?

A Well, it's a pretty wide question. (a) I haven't seen what he said, (b) I probably would be unlikely to discuss it, but (c) you well know our position about our hopes for a better relationship between Egypt and Israel, if that is the thrust of his remarks.

Q The whole story is available -- the FBIS, anyway.

A Okay. You have the advantage of me. You've done your homework, and I haven't.

Q John, any comment on the second -- in two weeks -- report out of the Philippines on the Aquino report --

A No.

Q -- conclusions?

A No.

Q Do you anticipate the U.S. would have a comment when the report is officially issued?

A I think we'll wait and see when the report comes.

Q John, in a follow-up to an earlier question, is Shultz prepared to discuss the issue of whether there might be a move to expel Israel from the U.N.? Is he prepared to discuss that with the Foreign Ministers of Arab countries when he meets with them in New York?

A I'm not aware of any plans so to do, but, as I say, I wouldn't think that the Secretary or other American officials would shrink from discussion of that issue if it comes up.

Q Is there any sense here in this building that Israel will receive the extra hundred million that it's seeking?

A Don't have anything beyond what we've said on that overall question of Israel's economic problems.

Q Is there any comment on the new economic budget proposals being made in Israel?

A No.

Q Do you have anything on a conference that was held here yesterday by the American Civil Liberties Union? They had a lot of critical things to say about a pattern of keeping out foreign policy critics -- Mrs. Allende and Tomas Borge

A I don't.

Q -- and a NATO general.

A No, I don't.

Q No response?

A No.

Q Do you have anything, with respect to the Philippines again, on the discussion yesterday on the Hill with respect to possibly using leverage?

A Nope.

Q How about anything on South Africa, mining strikes and --

A You pressed the right button.

Q Thank you. (Laughter)

A The tragic and senseless deaths and injuries to gold miners in South Africa are especially regrettable since they apparently occurred after the legal strike by black mine workers at eight mines was successfully resolved.

We are deeply concerned about the current violence and have made our views known to the South African Government.

Q Follow-up: Any statements on some of the comments made by the new president that seem to exclude urban blacks -- or exclude blacks from a constitutional role in the government?

A No. I think our views on South Africa's internal problems are well known.

Q Are there any other buttons we should push on this?

A Not on South Africa.

Q Does the meeting of Ambassador -- Syrian Ambassador yesterday with Mr. Pelletreau have anything to do with Mustafa Talas' announcement about -- statement about nuclear arms -- Soviet nuclear arms?

A I thought we had posted some guidance --

Q You said only that they met -- Pelletreau, I mean -- the Syrian Ambassador met Pelletreau -- but anything on it, I mean? Why?

A No. I think that's probably as forthcoming as we're going to be.

Q On another Ambassador -- the Omani Ambassador --

Q John --

A I'm sorry, I've got one over here. I'm sorry?

Q The Omani Ambassador is meeting with Mr. Armacost today. Do you have anything to --

A He may be. I wasn't aware of it, and I don't have anything on the reason for it.

Q It was on the schedule.

A As I keep on telling you, ambassadors -- in the way of things, ambassadors like to come in and talk with officials, and do it a lot. I wouldn't read great significance into it always.

Q One more, John. It looks like Britain and China are close to some sort of an agreement on Hong Kong.

A Uh-huh.

Q Have you been keeping up with that? Do you have anything to say about that?

A We don't have anything to say about that today. We have had statements in the past. As you know, that is a matter for China and Britain to resolve, and we have talked about our hopes for a successful outcome of those negotiations, but I don't have any comment today.

Q Is the Administration following the Republican platform, which seems to call for the independence of Hong Kong?

A I think the Secretary of State had some comments on that in Dallas in an interview, in which he made plain the Administration's point of view, and made plain that the Administration's policy isn't necessarily that of the -- doesn't necessarily follow the Republican Party platform in all respects, including Hong Kong.

Q Any information on the mines in the Red Sea?

A No, other than that we obviously are interested in what the British have.

Q The Secretary had a meeting today with a high official from Portugal. What was it about?

A I'm afraid I don't have any further details.

Q John, anything on the French Defense Minister's statement --

A (Laughter as Mr. Kalb departed the briefing room) Must be a filing break.

Q -- two days ago --

A Sorry.

Q -- the French Defense Minister's statement two days ago in Jordan that France is ready to supply Jordan with whatever military assistance it needs?

A No.

Q Do we have any general policy on allies and arms supplies to the Middle East, arms sales to the Middle East?

A Well, I think we have some obvious preferences for the source of arms.

Q John, does this government see any sign of change in the behavior or in the politics of the Libyan Government?

A I'm sorry. In the which government?

Q Libyan Government.

A Well, you've seen developments that have taken place, but I think we have learned, over a long period of watching Mr. Qadhafi, to approach such developments with caution and over the long term.

Q Thank you, John.

(The briefing concluded at 12:36 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #171

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 1984, 12:20 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I'm sorry we're a little late in starting, but I wanted to get the very latest on the Beirut situation for you. Let me just say --

Q John, before you start, may I make a suggestion that you deal with the Embassy thing, then let's have a filing break, and then deal with other news.

A That's fine. That's fine. Sure, we'll deal with the Embassy first.

Q Can you speak up a little?

A Yes. In general terms, let me just say that the Secretary of State has expressed all our feelings about the senseless, brutal attack on Americans and Lebanese working in Beirut. This cowardly attack will be understood by the world as another reminder that rule of law and civilized norms of behavior are threatened by those who use terrorism as a political weapon.

Now, let me give you a rundown on where we stand as best --

Q Can we have a copy of that, John?

A Sure.

-- as best as we can understand it at this time. At 11:30 this morning Beirut time, which was 4:30 this morning our time, a van approached the north entrance access road at the Embassy Annex compound, northeast of Beirut. The Annex is located on a residential street blocked at both ends by barricades. The occupants -- we think there were two -- of the vehicle opened fire on the contract Lebanese guards at the barricade -- this was at the north end of the street running outside the Annex -- and disabled them.

The vehicle came under fire from other Embassy guards, but it maneuvered through the barricade behind the

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checkpoint and proceeded for about 500 feet toward the Embassy building. It was stopped by the firing -- the vehicle was apparently pretty badly shot up at that stage -- and the two occupants may indeed have been dead at that stage. But nevertheless, the vehicle stopped some 20 feet short of the northern end of the Embassy, still on the street, and at that point it exploded.

We understand that in addition to the Lebanese guards, there was fire onto the vehicle from Americans who came out of the Embassy, and we also understand that a guard who was with the British Ambassador, who was visiting the Embassy at the time, also opened fire on the vehicle.

The building was severely damaged, although the floors did not collapse. We have varying reports on casualties including a number of deaths. Among the killed we believe were two Americans. Among the wounded were 20 Americans. Four of them were treated and released and the rest have been confined to hospital. We do not have accurate figures on the number of Lebanese killed and injured at this time.

Beginning at 7 o'clock this morning, State Department officials began notifying the families of Americans stationed at the Embassy to provide them with information as it became available.

Ambassador Reginald Bartholomew was in the building at the time. He was in his office on the fourth floor. He was briefly buried under rubble, but he cleared that; he walked out of the Annex. He has cuts and bruises. He was taken to hospital for treatment of them. He is still in the hospital. We expect him to be there for another day or two. He is in charge from the hospital. He is telephoning various officials and is in touch with us directly by phone from his hospital room. He spoke to Secretary Shultz earlier in the morning; he spoke to the President earlier today.

As I say, the British Ambassador was in the Annex at the time, and he was slightly injured, I gather, along the lines of Ambassador Bartholomew.

The Department learned of the attack at 5:24 this morning. We established an open line with the Embassy office in West Beirut at 5:26. That line has remained open since. The Secretary of State and senior officials were informed immediately. The Secretary was at home at the time, accelerated his departure, came to the office somewhat earlier, was in the Operations Center early this morning, and then went over to be with the President before the President left town.

Responsible officers were quickly assembled and a Working Group went into force at 8 o'clock under Arnie Raphel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. As I say, we've been in constant communication with the Embassy office in West Beirut. Communications have now been established between the Department and the U.S. Ambassador's residence in Yarze, and a number of people from the Annex in East Beirut have moved into the Ambassador's residence in Yarze. The West Beirut Embassy office is closed for business, but is under guard.

The Secretary of State has asked Assistant Secretary Richard Murphy to lead a team to investigate the situation and lend assistance to Ambassador Bartholomew and his staff, and Secretary Murphy will be leaving swiftly. He will be joined by Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, who is Director of the Office for Counter-Terrorism and Emergency Planning. Ambassador Oakley was in London when this tragedy took place, and he will make his way, also speedily, to Beirut.

All our diplomatic posts have been informed, and in fact there was already in effect an alert following suggestions of threats against the Embassy a little earlier this month, so there already was an alert in effect. But since today's developments, embassies have been informed of what has happened and given a further warning to be alert.

The Israeli Defense Minister, Mr. Rabin, on behalf of the Israeli Government, has been in touch with Ambassador Lewis, our Ambassador to Israel, and offered all possible assistance from Israel including hospital facilities. We have had similar offers from two other governments, the British Government and the Government of Cyprus. We have State Department medical officers assigned to Cairo, and they will be traveling to Beirut even as we speak to assess the situation there.

That, basically, is what I have to bring you up to date on the situation, but I'd be glad to --

Q Do you have any idea of who was behind it? And from whom did these threats come, these earlier threats come that you're talking about?

A Well, a news agency received a telephone message in Beirut on September 8. The caller claimed to be a representative of the Islamic Jihad organization, threatened that the organization would strike very shortly at a key American interest in the Middle East. That threat was taken seriously, and as I say, U.S. Missions in the area were alerted.

We understand that again, today, the Islamic Jihad has claimed responsibility for the attack, but at this stage we have no evidence to either confirm or deny that.

Q Did the threat make any link to the U.S. veto of the Lebanon resolution?

A I think it did. I think the threat was linked to the U.S. vote in the Security Council on the Lebanese debate, yes.

Q Which news organization received that?

A You may be able to answer that better than myself. I think AFP -- I'm not quite sure whether -- AFP certainly was notified on one occasion. I'm not sure whether it was AFP in both cases.

Q John, the President, I think it was, has said in the past that the United States would carry out swift and effective retribution against those who would seek to harm Americans.

A Uh-huh.

Q What is going to happen in this particular case?

A Well, I think the President and the Secretary have addressed themselves in the past to possible actions, but I don't have anything to take that any further or to suggest that there is such action contemplated or imminent. I think the first concern is to assure the well being of those who were injured, to ascertain the whereabouts of those who are missing, and to make sure that they're secure -- I think making sure that they're secure is paramount.

Q May I just follow up? Are you putting out the word here that the United States -- as you put it, that you would not like to suggest that any retaliatory action is being contemplated or imminent --

A No.

Q -- that those who carried out the test (sic) are free from any retribution?

A No, I wasn't suggesting that at all. What I was saying was that I wasn't going to go beyond what the President and the Secretary of State have said on that question in the past.

Q John, when you say "other embassies have now been put on alert," do you mean embassies in the region, or is it a wider area? How big an alert is this?

A I think it's a fairly widespread alert-- an information cable and a warning to be on the alert. Obviously, embassies in this particular region of the world are on a special alert. They traditionally operate on a high degree of vigilance, but we have asked them to enhance that.

Q Is this alert, John, then, based on a suspicion or intelligence that other embassies or other American installations may be targeted by allied groups?

A Well, I think that's always a possibility one has to take into account.

Q John, has the security been enhanced here or are you aware of any other facilities in Washington, because of this attack there?

A I'm not aware of -- Well, I guess, in general, we don't discuss security preparations; but I'm not aware of any specific actions that have been taken.

Q John, there has been some mention of the fact that this van had some kind of diplomatic license plates --

A Yes.

Q -- Dutch diplomatic license plates.

A Yes.

Q And there was some suggestion this aided it in getting to the road. Is this the fact? Your statement seemed to suggest they blasted their way through.

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A We have reports that the van or the van-type vehicle -- there are a number of descriptions on what kind of vehicle it was -- there certainly are reports that it was bearing diplomatic plates, and there are reports that they were Dutch diplomatic plates. We're not able to confirm that. That's, obviously, the kind of report that the security and intelligence people now investigating this will be looking into.

Apparently what happened is that they stopped at the -- there are barricades at the end of the street, each end of the street. They came through the barricade at the northern end of the street; they stopped; they apparently tried to, I gather, bluff their way through by conversation, by indicating that they had business at the Embassy Annex. The guards, the Lebanese guards, at that particular point did not buy that story, attempted to stop them. I'm not sure who opened fire first, but the occupants of the vehicle fired on the Lebanese guards, and the Lebanese guards fired on the vehicle. As I say, I'm not sure who opened fire.

The van, the vehicle then traveled down the street, as I have already indicated, to an Embassy checkpoint in the vicinity of the Embassy, and apparently it was at that point that it was brought to a halt.

Q Can you tell us any more about the team that's going under Secretary --

A Sorry?

Q Can you tell us a little more about the team that's going with Oakley and Murphy? What are -- are they assigned to help investigate and clean up the mess, the situation, or are they assigned to do something further about security or tracking down those responsible?

A Well, as I said, I think they will be assigned -- Ambassador Murphy is a high official, an Assistant Secretary, and he is being sent to assist Ambassador Bartholomew with all aspects of the kind of thing that needs to be done. That includes medical attention; it may include evacuation; and certainly, it would include investigation of what happened, why it happened, and who was responsible.

Q John, was the reason Oakley was in London, does that have to do with the general alert?

I do not think that Ambassador Oakley's presence in London should be read in connection with that.

Q John --

A Yes, Greg. Let me take A.P. first.

Q The van was stopped finally by another checkpoint? Did you suggest that just a minute ago?

A It apparently was stopped at another checkpoint, but apparently by that stage, at the time it had reached almost the wall that runs outside that building, at that stage, they had pretty much been brought to a standstill by fire from various directions.

Q Apparently, it was headed toward an entrance in a wall?

A That's correct.

Q John, you said it was stopped on the street.

A That's correct.

Q The President said that this morning. Is this checkpoint on the street, or did the van actually get into the property, onto the Embassy grounds?

A No. Our understanding is that it did not penetrate that second checkpoint, which is outside the Embassy. It got through the first checkpoint, which is at the northern end of the street, street on which other people live. It got through barricades, wove its way through barricades, and got as far as the wall of the Embassy compound where there is another checkpoint. As we understand it, it did not -- at that point, it was brought to a standstill.

Q In view of that, John, what is the initial assessment of the State Department regarding the adequacy or inadequacy of the security measures at that Embassy building?

A Well, I think that that is one of the questions, obviously, we will be looking at. We've taken a number of steps. The very fact that the Embassy Annex is in East Beirut was a measure taken to enhance security following the developments in West Beirut. East Beirut is thought to be a more secure area, and though we certainly maintain the chancellery in West Beirut, I think probably most of the Americans on duty in the Embassy were in East Beirut.

That's a building that -- barricades have been put up around that building, at the end of the street. Lebanese Forces had been specially trained by American advisers. All this was taking place, of course, at a time when work is proceeding on the new Embassy, the new American Embassy in West Beirut, which will incorporate the latest security devices that are being developed.

I think one thing you have to remember is that this is an embassy; this is not a military compound or a military barracks or a fort. We think, around this time of day, there would ordinarily be in that Annex probably 30 to 35 Americans. Around that time of day, just before lunch, ordinarily, there would be in that building probably 200 Lebanese. Some of those Lebanese would be local employees of the government, of the United States Government, some of whom are believed to have been killed. Some would be security forces, but many of those people would be members of the public, for example, lined up with visa applications. And the fact is that Embassy has to operate as a public building; it has to be open to the public, has to do business. That's the window of the United States on the world in Lebanon.

Q Is the initial assessment that the response to this truck at the outer gate and other places could have been better than it was or do people feel satisfied with what was done?

A I think that's the kind of thing that will be -- that's the kind of question that is a fair one to pose and that Ambassador Murphy and Ambassador Bartholomew will be looking at. Certainly, it didn't drive through that barricade without any obstruction, and I don't know what the fate is of the Lebanese guards who opened fire, but there was a fire fight at that barricade.

Q John, one of the things you mentioned was that Murphy would be going there to look at medical things and evacuation? What did you mean by that?

A Well, the general picture -- I'm sure by the time Ambassador Murphy gets there many of those decisions will be far along -- the question of immediate evacuation, if any is needed if anybody is seriously hurt.

Q Evacuation only of those seriously hurt?

A Yes, medical evacuation, sure.

Q Will there be any further drawdown of the staff, the U.S. staff there?

Q How many staff are there?

A There are about, variously -- we have two figures -- 99 or 100 Americans at the Embassy in Beirut. Now, not all of those would have been on duty at this particular time, but if you're asking for a total number of official Americans in Beirut, 100 is a good figure.

Q The East Beirut Annex, is that the working chancery? Is that the --

A I would say that more Americans are ordinarily in the East Beirut Annex than in the West Beirut chancellery.

Q You said the Embassy was already on increased alert.

A Yes.

Q Just what does that mean?

A It means extra vigilance.

Q Can you be more specific?

A No. No.

Q Was there anything that happened after you got that first threat on the 8th of September? In other words, was security enhanced from the 8th, or was it the same on the 9th as it was on the 7th?

A I cannot tell you specifically what the Embassy did after that warning.

Q John, apart from the Embassy -

Q In the updating you just read now, the updating you just read at the very beginning of the briefing, there is no mention whatsoever of the Lebanese Government.

A President Gemayel has been in touch with Ambassador Bartholomew; other Lebanese officials have been in touch with Ambassador Bartholomew to express their regrets and their shock at this outrage, and to obviously offer any assistance. Lebanese Armed Forces have cordoned off the Embassy and are helping to guard it with the U.S. Marine detachment and other U.S. military personnel, and they obviously are doing that at the chancellery in West Beirut as well, so the Lebanese Government has been very helpful.

Q John, do we have enough Marines? We've withdrawn so many from Lebanon, do we have enough there to provide security?

A Well, the Marine detachment is primarily for internal security, within the building. Lebanese Forces have been trained, as I say. These are contract Lebanese guards, and I have to assume that the decision of the security officials operating in that area is that they were sufficient.

Q John, can I ask you a couple of questions, please?

A Sure.

Q Is it the intention of the U.S. to introduce any more Marines to beef up security?

A I'm not aware of any such move. I guess you should talk to the Pentagon about military movements. That is their prerogative. I'm sure that people are contemplating what might be done with ships in the area and so forth and so on, primarily in the sense of any medical or emergency assistance that is needed. I'm not aware of any other unusual movements.

Q Let me follow up, if I could, on another question, please. When you got -- when that alert came -- when the warning came in to the news agency on September 8 --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- and you introduced more security measures --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- did the United States or the Lebanese at that particular point launch an operation to find out who was behind the telephone threat to see if you could grab the group, etc.?

A I'm not aware, Bernie, of what specifically happened. I have to say that operating in a city like Beirut is -- the risks of such operations, I think, are foreseen, and appropriate actions are taken on an hourly basis to forestall threats, so there is already a high degree of vigilance. And I'm not really able to get into intelligence collection and activities, but I think you can assume that those are intense in such areas, as well.

Q Those are what?

A Intense. I'm sure that we have a great deal of interest in who threatens us and what actions they might take against us.

Q John, since this organization is the same one which claimed a year-and-a-half (ago) the Embassy, bombing your Embassy, and until now you haven't established yet if Iran is, you know, behind this organization or not, after a year-and-a-half and you've been attacked by the same organization three times -- and other embassies have been attacked.

I mean, why after a year-and-a-half --

A So what is the question?

Q Has this Jihad, Islamic Jihad, been established that it is behind it, Iran? And have you established that since a year-and-a-half since the first explosion?

A I think, you know, maybe you have a better way of corroborating these claims, these rather murderous claims that they say, with some smugness and satisfaction, that they have taken actions which have killed innocent people. I think you have to weigh those for what they are worth.

Q Until now, you haven't established any responsibility. Who is behind --

A I'm not talking about what we have discovered in previous instances. I'm talking about this particular case. You have a claim, a rather unusual claim, that people want to take credit for this kind of extraordinary outrage which they've done, but I don't know whether they did it or they don't. I don't have the evidence to give you today as to whether they did or they didn't.

Q But, John, you don't think -- you don't have any retribution against these people, encouraging them to do more of the same act, terrorist act?

A Well, I was asked the question about retribution earlier in this briefing, and I said I wasn't going to respond to that.

-- MORE --

John, was that -- was that telephone call on September 8 unique, or was it -- did it just happen to get into the paper because it was to the Agence France Press? And, secondly, is there an FBI team going over there?

A Well, I think various investigative agencies will be involved in the inquiry that will go on there.

As to this specific threat, I think it was specific in terms of a response to the U.S. action at the Security Council. But as anybody involved with the Middle East knows, threats, claims, counterclaims, sometimes by several organizations that they have done the same -- performed the same act -- are not unusual.

Q Can the Embassy Annex be reopened? If so, how long would it take, or are you going to move the people to still another location?

A I think that's a little premature to make that judgment. There isn't any question that the Annex is badly damaged. Whether it is un-usable or not, the experts will have to determine.

Q When did we occupy it? Was it May?

Q Do you have any reason to link that tragic event with the threats coming from Lebanese Minister Berri two weeks ago, saying that he has fifty people ready to make acts of suicide against the U.S and Israeli --

A Well, I think what we're doing is taking a look at the evidence that we will develop to make our own judgment. I'm not going to make any assumptions at this stage.

Greg?

Q John, the Saudi Arabians have withdrawn their diplomatic mission from Lebanon -- from Beirut -- because they couldn't protect it. Any thought being given to a similar action by us?

A Well, I'm not aware of any thought. I think that what the President of the United States said this morning and the Secretary of State said this morning implies commitment to the peace process.

I will make the same point that I've made before. When the President has talked of his peace plans

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for the Middle East, he has made the point that it's a long, hard road, and that the United States has a long-term commitment. Peace doesn't come easily in the Middle East, and it doesn't come without cost, as we've seen again today. But I don't know of any plans to forsake the struggle for it.

Q John, on the security question --

Q The warning that have come September 8, and the one subsequently, obviously it made the State Department take seriously on an international level. As I understand it, the warning implied that terrorism would be transferred domestically, come to this nation -- into this country as well. Is that being taken as seriously as it is in the embassies around the world?

A I think the possibility of terrorism against American facilities within the United States has been taken seriously for some time.

Q John, the Embassy was a temporary facility. Did the security reflect that in any way? You talked about the fact that the new Embassy in West Beirut was going to have the latest in security devices.

Did this Embassy, this temporary facility, not have the latest in security devices?

A Well, I think it had the latest and what was considered adequate that can be provided at this time. If you mean, did we build this building, no. We lost our building in West Beirut, and we had to find another building, so this was a building that was already built. Presumably, if we had built it, we might have built it differently. But we had to take what was available and do the best in terms of security that the experts felt was appropriate.

Q When did we occupy it -- April or May?

A I'll do a little research on that. Anybody got a date on the occupation of that Annex in East Beirut? I think it was --

MR. ROMBERG: July 31, it was occupied --

MR. HUGHES: July 31, occupied.

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Q John, what is the explanation given for the fact that the United States, notwithstanding its warnings, take no action of the retaliatory nature either to the April attack on the Embassy and the October attack on the Marine barracks?

A Well, as I say, Bernie, the President has spoken about retaliation; the Secretary has discussed the issue of retaliation and the thinking that has been evolving in this Administration and in the country at large, I think, about how to deal with terrorism. But I'm not going beyond what he has said.

Q John, what is the size of the Marine detachment at the Embassy Annex?

A I think it's about -- it should be, and probably was, about fourteen, I think, inside the Embassy. Not -- that's the detachment. They obviously would not all be on duty at the same time.

Q Were the two Americans killed Marines, or --

A I can't give you anything on that. There is a report that the two Americans were military personnel. I just don't have names for you.

Q John, is there anything other than serendipitous that the British Ambassador was there at the time? Do you think this was just an added target of opportunity or mistake?

A I'm not aware that -- I'm not aware that those who attacked the Embassy knew the British Ambassador would be there, and I'm not aware of any link. I mean, one just doesn't know.

Q Do you know why he was there at the time; what they were talking about?

A I don't. Obviously, Ambassador Bartholomew would talk with other Western Ambassadors, particularly the British. The British have been very hospitable to us; have offered their facilities in the past when we've had problems. When the British Ambassador was wounded today, we offered him American medical help if he should need it, so there's a strong tie between us and the British.

Q John, do you feel that this attack --

Q You said that the men who were involved in the truck, in the van, came through and talked -- tried to bluff their way through?

A Apparently.

Q Was anything said that was able to be reported? In other words, did anyone survive the gunfire to be able to report any evidence --

A That I can't answer. We may develop that during the day as the investigation proceeds, Ralph. But I -- at the moment, I don't have anything for you.

Q Anything picked up that suggests any kind of organization, or any evidence at all that has already been collected?

A No. Not that I'm aware of.

Q John, in light of this, do you feel that our intelligence was adequate, and do you feel any new steps are needed to try to improve our intelligence?

A I think that's -- I mean, I think those are fair questions, and I think those are the questions that the experts will now be looking at.

Q John, do you know how many Lebanese guards were posted outside?

A I don't. We may be able to give you that during the day. I don't at the moment.

Q Do you know if there were guards along, if there were just -- if there was just that cluster at the beginning of that course that the van ran, or were they posted along the way? Did the gunfire come from either end or was it continual?

A Well, I haven't -- you know, I haven't personally seen this street outside this particular Annex. But insofar as I'm able to understand it, that street runs past the building. It is barricaded at both ends.

This vehicle came through the north end, through

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a barricade, where they exchanged fire. There are barrels, or tanktrap-type obstructions, beyond that. It worked its way through that, came down the road but was stopped at the Embassy proper barricade, which is outside the Embassy.

Q Do you know how they reached there? I mean, aren't there army patrols or barrack, or whatever -- barricades -- from West Beirut to East Beirut? How could they cross over?

A You mean, how they came before they hit the barricade at the end of the street?

Q Yes.

A No, I don't know.

Q John, are you transferring offices in East Beirut, or --

A I don't know of any plans to change the present disposition of our offices.

Q John, do you expect this to -- this event to complicate the Israeli -- the new Israeli Government promise to withdraw from the south of Lebanon?

A Well, I don't see what impact it would have on that.

Q Filing break?

A Filing break? Filing break.

Q John, what can you tell us about the Lebanese guards? Was this the practice of the United -- were the Lebanese guards hired only in the wake of the Marine withdrawal in February to beef up U.S. security?

A I can't tell you when they were hired, Bernie. They're Lebanese Forces, and I know that they have undergone training by some of the American trainers that have been in Beirut. But I don't have any information on how many there were or how long they have been in the employ of the Embassy.

Q John, when you say --

Q Yeah, can you clear up a semantic difference there? Lebanese Forces are the Maronite Catholics and --

A Phalange.

Q The Phalange, and --

A Yes.

Q That isn't what you mean, is it?

A Yes, it is what I mean.

Q Oh! Okay. I thought you meant the Lebanese Army.

A No, the LAF. You're speaking of the Lebanese Armed Forces.

Q A question, please?

Q These people working, were being paid by the United States, were they, or --

A Yes.

Q They were being paid by the United States but they were members of the Lebanese Forces militia?

A Part of the Embassy security force, yes.

Q John, do you expect the U.S. Government to exercise sort of pressure against -- with Israel not to withdraw?

A Well, that's just something that I'm not -- I mean, I think that our overall policy in Lebanon is very clear and hasn't changed, and I can go over it; but I think I have done (that) on many occasions and there's no change in our desire to see all the foreign forces withdraw from Lebanon.

Q John, why do we --

Q (Inaudible) meeting going on -- excuse me -- in the Embassy, were Dutch officials there for any reason, or was the British Ambassador their only visitor?

A There may have been -- oh, I see what you mean, connected with --

Q Yes.

A No, I'm not aware of any Dutch officials in the Embassy.

On that question of the diplomatic plate, and specifically the Dutch plate, (a) let me say that it's only a report -- something that we're looking into; and (b) let me say that I understand it is not impossible to come by diplomatic plates in Beirut.

Q John, a point of clarification. You said the British Ambassador was in the building but you did not put him in the same room with the U.S. Ambassador. Was that the case?

A I'm not quite sure whether he was in the room with Ambassador Bartholomew at the very instant the explosion went off or simply in the building, but he certainly had met with Ambassador Bartholomew.

Q John, another --

A And his guard was outside and apparently fired on this vehicle.

Q Can you tell us -- we seemed to missed -- have missed what you said about the Lebanese Forces. Were the Lebanese Forces guarding the American Annex in East Beirut? Is that what you said?

A Yes.

Q John, since the publication of the Long Commission Report on the Marines compound in East Beirut and Beirut, were the faults or the flaws in security, to your knowledgement, were they corrected, that you can say that they were corrected in the security of the Embassy --

A Well, let me make the point. You're talking about a different kind of installation. You're talking about a Marine barracks at an airport.

In this instance, we're talking about an Embassy which has to do business with the public, and therefore you had to have public access to it.

Q To my knowledge, I think there were also some recommendations about the general security apparatus for the Embassy, whether it leads in East or West along the line of the addendum for the Commission, the Long Commission Report.

A Uh-huh.

Q Were these flaws corrected, to your knowledge?

A I can't answer those specific questions, but an awful lot of thinking has been going on about security, a lot of action has been taken on security, a lot of money is being spent on security, and a lot more money, we hope, will be spent on security.

Q John, could you clarify this business about using personnel from the Lebanese Forces as guards? I mean, is this just something we, you know, advertise for, recruited people? Was an agreement made with Fadi Frem, and other leaders of the Lebanese Forces, or how did it work?

A I think it's an agreement made, obviously, with the approval of the Ambassador by the Security Officers in charge of the Embassy who recruit local personnel for a variety of reasons, not only in Lebanon but in a number of countries. And in East Beirut, I think, in this case they looked to the Lebanese Forces.

Q John, why didn't they use -- why didn't they use, or why didn't the Gemayel Government provide Lebanese Armed Forces? The question hangs around the United States utilizing one of the factions within a very devisive political set up.

Why didn't the United States use, or have made available to it, Lebanese Armed Forces that fly the flag of Lebanon --

A I don't think the United States Government generally employs the armies of other countries.

A No, no. I'm talking about what is being made available. You are employing an armed faction in a country that has many armed factions.

Q Well, I'm not suggesting that there may not have been regular Lebanese security organizations also in position. But you're asking whether the United States Embassy is taking adequate precautions for its personnel, and now you're casting doubts about its hiring of additional private personnel to safeguard offices.

Q I'm raising questions about the utilization of an armed faction within Lebanon.

A I think the wisdom of the officials charged with security at the Embassy was that this was an appropriate force to help protect American lives.

Q Sir, may I ask a question, or turn this around for a second?

How many peoples' -- how many lives were saved because of the security that was in place? Do you have any estimate of that, any thought to that?

A How many lives were saved?

Q Yeah. Before all this -- the double guards, the cement barriers, all that stuff was in place, what would this -- would this bomb have destroyed that building?

A Well, I mean, if your answer -- if your question is, "were there no barricades there and were there no security," I suppose --

Q Were they not there, would this bomb have destroyed that building?

A Well, I suppose if the vehicle could have gotten into the compound and into the building, I suppose many more people would have been killed.

Q John, have you had prior consultation with the President Gemayel Government before having this agreement with the Lebanese Armed Forces guarding the Embassy?

A Well, if your question is, has President Gemayel been concerned about the safety of Americans in Beirut, the answer to that is yes. And I think that he has had an acute interest in that.

Q A housekeeping, John?

Q How seriously does the United States take the fact that this threat was made after the Security Council veto? In other words, do you accept the possibility that the American action in New York had some linkage to this raid?

A It's certainly possible. Certainly, we took that threat as we take all threats seriously.

Q John, since the Phalangists forces control East Beirut, you don't think that casts doubt how an organization, which has claimed to be from West Beirut, can penetrate these forces or all East Beirut to reach the northern part of Beirut?

A Well, you're making a lot of assumptions there. You're making an assumption that you knew what force conducted the terrorist attack. You're making assumptions about where they came from, and I think you're really in the realm of speculation.

Q On this Working Group you have --

A You know, the sad fact around the world is that it is not impossible to attack the embassies and installations of a number of countries.

Q Could you tell me how many U.S. personnel are in Lebanon still training soldiers there?

A I can't. I think the Pentagon would probably have to give you that. As I said, the figure that I have is (that) the official Embassy community in Beirut is about 100, and that's about the best figure I have.

Q Did you mention something before about someone firing from the truck?

A Yes. The people in the truck fired.

Q Do you know if it's one or two people in the truck?

A We think -- you know, those are developing stories. I can only give you what I have at the moment, but I think the best information we have at the moment is that there were probably two people in this vehicle.

Q Do we know how heavy the weapons were being used by the people in the truck or by the defenders?

A That I don't know. No, that I don't know.

Q Do we have any idea yet, though --

A I don't here.

Q Do we have any idea yet the amount of the -- the volume of the explosives that would have been required to create a blast of that kind?

A There -- I've seen reports suggesting 200 kilos of TNT. That is sort of "shoot-from-the-hip" first surmise. I wouldn't place a great of reliance on it, but I think that is what is being discussed.

Q Is there any plan to evacuate the seriously wounded to other hospitals in the area?

A I think that the medical people there and the medical people who will be flying in will make that judgment.

Q An earlier question, John. When you were asked about if there was consultation with President Gemayel before you hired the Phalange, and you said that President Gemayel was concerned about security of the people there?

A Sure.

Q Besides being concerned, did he give his approval to the hiring of private militia to be protective of the Embassy which could be used by both sides? (Sic)

A I do not -- that I cannot answer. I don't know to what extent he was involved in that.

Q John, do you have the same arrangement for West Beirut, the Embassy in West Beirut? Did you have local personnel?

A I did my homework on the Annex in East Beirut for you, and I'm afraid I can't answer on the West Beirut.

Q Can you check on that?

A I don't know that we would really get into very great detail about --

Q There was a report that you have an arrangement with the Shi'ite group there also.

A Well, I think I will rest where we are.

Q That's a relevant question, though.

Q (Inaudible) the new building, what construction has been done?

A Work is moving along on it. I don't know what the completion date is.

Q Are you a year away?

A I don't know.

Q Can I ask one more little question on this, the Lebanese Forces. Did the U.S. Government -- did the Embassy pay the individual guards or did the Embassy pay the Lebanese Forces?

A You have really gone beyond my expertise, but it is my impression that it is an individual payment, but I --

Q Could you take that?

A Okay, let me take a look at that for you.

Q John, can you take the earlier question? I think it's a relevant question: what kinds of private guards are hired in the East Beirut thing. I mean, if there's a question about --

Q West Beirut.

Q -- in the West Beirut Embassy, because if there is a question about the political nature of the guards outside the Embassy in East Beirut, then I think it would be fair to inquire about it.

A I will look at it, Ralph, but I guess you will forgive me if I do not promise on a day like this to give you every detail of our security precautions at every installation.

Q John, you said earlier that Israel, among two or three other countries -- three countries in all -- had made an offer of hospital use.

A Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

Q The last time, last October, there was a bit of a flap about some Americans who were taken to Germany, about whether there was a command decision not to use hospitals in Israel.

A Uh-huh.

Q Is there -- what is the thinking about it this time?

A I know that Secretary Weinberger has been in touch with the Israelis, and it may be with Mr. Rabin directly. I'm not sure with whom he has talked, but I know that Secretary Weinberger has expressed his appreciation for the offer and taken the position that we appreciate its being there and we'll take a look at the situation when we get reports from our people on the scene as to what is needed and where it's available.

Q But it's not a situation where Israeli hospitals will not be used for political reasons?

A I think that all the offers that we've received are gratefully accepted. And in the event that any of them proved to be the best way of treating Americans or saving American lives, or others that we evacuate from Beirut, they obviously would be used.

Q John, would you say that the strategic cooperation between the United States and Israel has gone now to an extent which permits or gives more chance for the U.S. casualties -- I mean, those injured -- to be transported to Israel?

A Well, I don't think strategic cooperation, as you put it -- and I wouldn't use that phrase -- I don't think that has anything to do with it. This is an offer, a humanitarian offer from a strong ally of the United States.

Q There are reports from Beirut indicating, contrary to rumors, that the van belonged to the American Embassy with diplomatic license --

A I've seen those reports; I've seen rather a lot of reports this morning. I've seen reports that proved to be totally fallacious about dead Marines lying in the road. I've seen reports that our Ambassador there was gravely injured and was in surgery. A lot of those reports turned out to be pretty irresponsible.

Q Can you look into the question of whether it belonged to the Embassy or some other embassy?

A I can assure that the people looking at the events of the day are vigorously pursuing the origins of that report.

Q John, on the -- a couple of things on the Working Group: Is that going to be 24 hours? Two, has the Secretary's schedule changed, or is going to change because of this event?

A No change in the Secretary's schedule.

Q Are the Press Office hours going to be extended? What -- can you give us some housekeeping information there?

A No change on the Secretary's schedule. He will pursue his normal activities. As I say, he came to the office somewhat earlier than usual this morning, although he's always here pretty early; spent some time in the Ops Center with various officials; talked on a secure phone there with Ambassador Bartholomew.

But that Task Force will operate around the clock at present. On the Press Office, let me get back to you and let you know where we will stand.

Q John, can you help us on a housekeeping about who will be available to take questions from us on the latest information?

Now that you have a Task Force, can there be some people designated that we can reach without a bureaucracy problem?

A Let's take a look at that. Sure. Let's take a look at that for you.

Q Thank you.

Q When is the Task Force expected to arrive in Beirut? You say it's --

A Now wait a minute. You're confusing two things. What we're talking about is a Task Force here working on the problem, making sure that every agency and every branch of the government is involved. And then you're talking about Ambassador Murphy and his group, and perhaps other groups, going to Beirut.

I don't have a departure time for Dick Murphy, but I would think he would be on his way this afternoon.

Q In whose hands are now the remains of the two men who were in the van. if there were two?

A That I cannot tell you. Looking at the reports of the size of the hole and the damage, I don't know what degree of mutilation there may be to those bodies.

Q Do you have any idea about their nationality?

A No, I do not.

Q In addition to what was called into AFP, or whoever it was today, claiming responsibility, has the Embassy or the U.S. Government received any other claims of responsibility or are there any direct indications of who is responsible for this?

A Not on this particular incident --

Q That's what I mean, on this incident.

A -- but I just want to make plain that threats against ambassadors, not only American but other nationalities, threats against installations, are sadly all too frequent in that part of the world.

Q In this instance, all you know is what was told to the AFP?

A In this instance -- that's correct. In this instance, that's correct.

Q New subject?

Q How deep and how wide is the hole? Have you got the same dimensions as the AP?

A I don't. I don't, but it's a pretty big hole, I gather.

Q John, you talked about threats. Since the attack this morning, has there been any threat or anything to cause you to have more than particular concern about the other American installations in West Beirut?

A Well, I think, as I said, that installation is virtually closed except for some holding personnel and communications, and there are not Americans in that installation at the moment.

Q Have you received any threat that there might be an attack on the installation?

A No, no.

Q Sir, is there any --

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 1:20 p.m.)

alenson

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #172

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1984, 12:32 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. Just one housekeeping announcement -- a reminder that there will be a joint press conference this afternoon at three o'clock in the briefing room here by Under Secretary Wallis and Japanese Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Motono. That's in connection with the U.S.-Japan Economic Sub-Cabinet Consultations being held September 20 and 21.

That's all I've got in any way of announcements. Would you like a little --

Q Yes.

A -- situation report on the Beirut situation? Casualties: Two Americans killed; twenty wounded. Four of them were released yesterday from hospitals after treatment. Of the 16 who remained in hospitals overnight, most of them were released this morning. That included our Ambassador to Lebanon, Ambassador Bartholomew. He's now at the Ambassador's Residence in Yarze. He's working out of that Residence, as are a number of Embassy officials.

Of the Lebanese Embassy employees -- Lebanese employees of our Embassy in Beirut, six were killed and 15 were wounded.

We have very sketchy information on casualties among Lebanese who are not Embassy employees, but, obviously, there are deaths among Lebanese who were not employed by the Embassy but who may have been in the vicinity or doing business in the Embassy. We do know, according to eyewitness accounts, that at least four of these non-Embassy Lebanese were killed, and there are an unknown number of wounded.

The two American fatalities, Michael Wagner and Kenneth Welch were assigned to the Defense Attache's Office, and the Pentagon, I think, can give you additional information about them.

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As I said, some Embassy operations are now underway in Yarze. U.S. medical officers from Cairo have arrived in Beirut, and they're checking the condition of the injured. Decisions on the necessary follow-up action will be made after they have completed their examination of the injured.

Ambassador Murphy is en route to Beirut, and we expect him to arrive there -- in fact, he may already have arrived in Beirut at this time.

The Embassy Annex compound has been cleared of rubble. All the dead and injured have been removed. We're still awaiting an authoritative report on what happened. It's the Embassy's preliminary assessment, however, that the firing of the guard force did prevent the driver of the suicide vehicle from maneuvering into a garage under the Annex. Had the driver of that car loaded with dynamite done so, it is the assessment of the Ambassador and the Embassy there that the disaster would have been much greater.

Q That's all?

A Yes.

Q There's some confusion about who was in the car. Do you have any idea?

A There is some confusion about who was in the car -- that's absolutely true -- and I think we will have to wait for the Ambassador's report and perhaps for additional reporting data.

One of the guards who was firing at the car, and another of the guards who fired at the vehicle a little further up the street, are both in hospitals, one of them seriously injured. So there is the question of talking to those who were closest to the vehicle as it came through and finding out what it was they saw -- whether there was one person in it, whether there were two persons, or more.

Q Our bureau in Beirut says that the Dutch diplomat, who by some accounts was kidnapped or in the car as a hostage, was in fact inside the Embassy. Do you know if that was right?

A Well, I don't know anything about -- I think it's safe to say we don't know anything about Dutch diplomats held hostage in the car. I don't know about any Dutch diplomats who might have been in the building, in the Annex, but I'm not -- I've seen the reports, and there is still that report yesterday of diplomatic license plates. That is what we understand from the local security forces. We understand the vehicle had a number plate on the front of the vehicle but not one on the rear, so there was one plate.

There is a problem about finding that plate. There is a problem about finding pieces of the vehicle and trying to reconstruct what kind of a vehicle it was.

Q Was that a Dutch plate, this plate you're talking about?

A The report is that it was a Dutch diplomatic plate. That's a report we're not able to confirm.

Q John, when you talked about the firing having prevented a greater disaster, was that the firing by the Lebanese forces that you had in mind there, or by the Marines deeper down the trail?

A I think basically what happened is the local forces, our contract guards, at that first barricade opened fire first.

Q Lebanese, then?

A Whether there was any firing -- I understand that there was -- there were in fact Lebanese Armed Forces there in addition, and there may have been Lebanese police, for all I know. Whether they fired, I do not know.

Q You mean the Lebanese stopped that?

A The Lebanese opened fire and did considerable damage to that vehicle, and other Lebanese contract guards fired as the vehicle progressed down that street. And, as I told you yesterday, we're of the view that it's entirely possible that some Americans came out of the Embassy and fired, and also the British guard accompanying the British Ambassador.

1-2449

Q   I understand that the firing began when the people in the car fired at the sentries.

A   There was an exchange of fire, apparently. I'm giving you the best we have, you know, trying to piece together a report for you before we've got our own official report. But nothing that I've heard casts doubt on the story that there was an exchange of fire.

Q   Do you know if there were some security measures there that were incomplete? For instance, there have been -- variously reported that there is a steel gate yet to go up?

A   That's correct.

Q   I saw something about some tank traps and another thing about an earthen berm or some barrier. Can you describe what the additional security was, and --

A   Well, I think what you're talking about -- the tank trap -- I think that's the kind of thing we're all familiar with -- the concrete block-type thing that you maneuver your way through, and those were in position.

Q   They had four of those, right?

A   Yes.

Q   They were already there.

A   Yes. They were there. As we understand it, this steel gate-type thing -- I guess it's a steel beam, really -- the posts for that were in position. They had been set in concrete, and the concrete was curing. The bar which would go up and down for each vehicle was not in position.

Q   That would be out before the barricades?

A   That's before the, as you call it, the tank trap-type concrete blocks. Yes.

Q   So there's that that was incomplete, and then --?

A   That was incomplete.

Q And then there's supposed to be an earthen structure of some sort?

A Well, there is a berm and a ditch around the Embassy building, and, as far as I'm aware, that was complete.

Q So maybe the gate is the only additional thing that wasn't complete.

A Well, part of the complement of the Embassy is made up of people on temporary duty who were installing security devices, and I think they were about 75 percent through the installation of security devices. They obviously had some way to go and, indeed, a crew was at work on some of those security --

-- MORE --

Q Do you know of any other big things missing outside other than that gate?

A I don't know of any big things missing outside. There are security measures both inside the building and outside.

Q Were those devices you just mentioned devices inside the building or devices that might have prevented the car from (inaudible)?

A I think I'm really not going to get into very great detail about what --

Q I'm not asking what they were; I'm just asking where they were. Would they have played a role in this incident if they had been in place or would they -- ?

A Well, I assume the steel bar would have played a role.

Q Right. But I mean the ones you were referring to, the 75 percent complete ones?

A I can't give you a breakdown, but I'm not aware of any additional major activity needed outside.

Q Another question on that is why was it incomplete?

A Well, because -- leave us not forget the conditions that existed in West Beirut: very difficult and very dangerous. That was one of the reasons for acquiring an annex in East Beirut where it was thought that Americans would be safer. We had acquired the appropriate building and steps were being taken to make it as secure as we possibly could. At the time of the move, I think the rationale was -- and still is -- that the best judgment at that time was that although we hadn't built that building, and therefore it didn't have state-of-the-art security installations, and although we would still have to provide some additional security measures there, it was still safer in a relatively remote area of East Beirut and on a relatively distant street than the hazardous conditions under which Americans were living and working in West Beirut.

Q John, the number of casualties among the Lebanese employees, does it include the Lebanese Armed Forces, those who were guarding the building?

A I'm afraid I cannot break down the Lebanese casualties for you. Lebanese Armed Forces, of course, would not be forces employed by the Embassy. You're talking about regular Lebanese Army --

Q Yes.

A -- and I just can't -- I just do not know whether any regular Lebanese Armed Forces were --

Q I'm talking about the Lebanese armed forces meaning the Phalangist militia.

A Lebanese Forces, you're talking about, yes.

Q Yes, that's what I mean, the Lebanese Forces.

A O.K. Well, I know that at least two were shot in the course of -- in the course of --

Q So they are included in the number of casualties here?

A I assume they are because we're talking about employees of the Embassy, and I assume they are in the tally we've got there included as employees.

Q John, if you've been asked these questions, I apologize. I came in late. Is this building now going to have to be abandoned? Is the Embassy building in West Beirut open again today? Where do we go from here now?

A O.K. I don't think we will know on the building until we get additional data from Ambassador Bartholomew and the people who have gone out there. That does include among the group -- in addition to Ambassador Murphy's group -- that does include structural engineers from the Foreign Buildings Office; obviously, they will be taking a look at the situation. It includes a senior security officer from the Department of State who has on his team experts in forensic science, explosive ordnance disposal, and, as I say, there will be structural engineers, and I think they will be looking into the cause of the explosion, looking at the structure, and seeing what should happen to it next.

On the question of the chancellery in West Beirut, I do not think -- I know that is not open today, but I think there are plans to resume operations there soon.

Q John, have any of the wounded been evacuated to Frankfurt? There's a report circulating.

A I cannot answer that.

(To staff) Does anybody know whether wounded have actually been -- ?

I can't answer that one. Sorry.

Q John, the steel gate -- at what distance was it supposed to be erected from the Embassy?

A I'm sorry.

Q At what distance was it supposed to be erected?

A Well, let me walk -- I cannot answer that question of my own factual knowledge, but let's walk it through. We're talking about a gate that was at the end, the northern end of the street; the vehicle, as we understand it yesterday -- and nothing that I've heard today changes those figures -- ran 500 feet down the street, stopped 20-30 feet from the Embassy, so I presume that gate is some 500 feet from the Embassy.

Q When had construction of the steel gate started?

A I don't know when we assumed possession. I'll have to do a little research on that, when we assumed possession of the building and when the work actually started.

Q Are you suggesting there was no undue delay because the concrete was still curing, that they couldn't have put it up any faster?

A I can't give you a horseback judgment from here. There are security people there; the Ambassador is in charge of many elements of the security operation. I'm sure that program was proceeding with dispatch. I don't know at what stage you decide that it is wise to put a pole on posts and risk those posts being uprooted because the concrete hasn't set properly and what -- you know, that's a decision that I can't question.

Q John, do you assess the forces in charge in West Beirut to be helpful during the investigation on the point of how the car could cross the so-called Green Line from the west to the east?

A I just don't know what degree of sharing of information is taking place on the investigation. Nothing that I have heard indicates there is any impediment. Certainly, a large number of Lebanese officials at a very senior level have either telephoned our Ambassador there or visited him in hospital. That includes security people; that includes Army leaders; that includes President Gemayel, the Prime Minister, and various others, so there is certainly, apparently, no lack of concern on the part of the Lebanese Government.

Q Did you include the Prime Minister on that list?

A Yes, I did include the Prime Minister, yes.

Q On the license plates, John --

A Yes.

Q -- with all this business about diplomatic plates and whether it was a Dutch vehicle, things like that. I would assume, obviously, you've been in touch with the Dutch Government about this. Have they been able to provide any information to you?

A I'm sure that the investigation is covering all bases.

Q You were probably asked this yesterday, and I'll apologize if you were, but what is the rationale for leaving that security job to the Lebanese contract guards as opposed to not having pulled the Marines out, around the Embassy at least.

A Well, I don't want to get into great detail about that, but let's not forget we're talking about a street outside diplomatic territory. We're talking about a regular street in the city of Beirut, and there are obvious questions about what nationality personnel operate on a public thoroughfare.

Q John, do you have any complaints about the role that the Lebanese guards played, or were you satisfied with the job they did?

1-2455

A To the contrary. Our feeling is that the Lebanese guards performed with great valor -- the fact that they apparently shot out the tires of that vehicle, apparently did considerable damage to it, and may have killed the occupant or occupants. We don't know whether that vehicle was detonated by the driver or someone in the car or by remote control, so we don't know whether those who were in the vehicle were, in fact, alive at the time of the detonation. There was, obviously, a very vigorous and prompt fire. So, they performed well.

Q John, any consideration being given to pulling out our diplomatic mission yet, or --

A No. No.

Q -- conversely, sending in more guards?

A Not aware of any plans to change the composition of the Embassy there and also not aware of any plans to send -- Well, you mean send in additional people? What do you have in mind there, Greg? You mean --

Q More Marines?

A Not aware of any of that kind of thing. Obviously, investigative people, security people, and medical people are going in, but not aware of any plans to send Marines in.

Yes, Bill.

Q Is there any change from yesterday -- do you know any more about who did it, why they did it, where the explosives came from? Anything more about retaliation?

A No.

Q If the United States plans retribution?

A No.

Q And it's still -- I gather from what you just said it's still up in the air whether there was one guy or two guys in the explosive truck?

1-2456

A Yes, yes.

Q John, can I follow that for a second there? You said, in response to questions yesterday on the AFP threat that was received on September 8 -- ?

A Uh-huh.

Q You made a point of saying that as of that date, you had, the State Department had sent out an alert cable --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- and that increased security measures were -- security measures were stepped up at the embassies and so on, as a result of that.

Did you have any other information available to you beyond the telephone threat to the AFP on that day that would suggest -- that prompted those actions?

A If you mean, did we have any additional information on that day or since concerning this particular attempt, the answer to that is a clear-cut no; if you mean, is there a considerable amount of information about potential terrorist threats, potential assassinations of U.S. and other diplomats, yes. Sadly, there is a great deal of such information. There are many such relatively public threats, and one takes them seriously.

Q And can I ask if -- I'll be more specific: Can you respond to the report that says that the United States knew of a shipment of explosives through Syria, perhaps not knowing that it was destined, was or was not destined for this particular incident?

A No, I can't because we, obviously, never get into intelligence-type information. But let me reiterate that any suggestion that we had any specific information about this attack is false.

Q Well, can you say why the U.S. -- without saying whether you had such information -- can you say why the U.S. apparently took no action in response to any information it might have had regarding any -- not this specific instance?

A Well, you are making a statement that the United States took no action. That happens not to be in accord with the facts.

Q Can you explain why it's not in accord with the facts?

A I told you. We sent an alert to all our embassies.

Q Beyond an alert, any other action?

A Well, what an individual embassy does is the responsibility of that embassy. It's very difficult for us from Washington to say, "Put two more men on the 8-to-12 shift."

Q Can you say anything about what this specific embassy did?

A I can't, no.

Q Why can't you say a bit more on Ralph's question about the report of explosives moving from Syria?

A I don't want to talk about -- (a) I won't talk about intelligence matters; (b) I won't talk about specific reports. Let me say that the frequency of reports about movement of equipment and alleged terrorists I would cast within the same framework as I just cast threats against U.S. ambassadors, and so forth and so on. Unfortunately, there are all too many of those instances.

In some instances, where one has relatively specific information, various embassies have acted, and events that were supposed to have taken place or were threatened to have taken place, have not taken place. Does that mean that action the United States and others may have taken forestalled such an event? Or does it mean that there never was such a threat, and the information was misleading or intended to be misleading?

-- MORE --

Q John, can you discuss the decision-making that went into the withdrawal of the 80 Marines that had been guarding the Embassy before it moved to East Beirut? Was that done at the State Department's request, at the Marines' request, or what?

A I really -- you know, as always, one doesn't get into very great detail about how an Administration decision is arrived at. Obviously, there was some thinking that the threat had diminished with the movement from West Beirut to East Beirut. As I say, that Annex in East Beirut looked a lot safer in many respects than the kind of conditions of extreme hazard under which American diplomats were operating in West Beirut. A collective decision was taken at that time that the final contingent of 80 Marines could be removed.

Q I thought it was 90.

A I thought it was 80, but I wouldn't quarrel with you if it wasn't 80.

Q John, do you know if the Embassy started employing the Lebanese forces as guards to the building just after transferring to East Beirut or later on after getting terrorist threats?

A I cannot tell you when those local contract guards were in operation, but it is my understanding that the Marines, other than the 14-man detachment which is currently assigned to that building -- that the Marines that were removed never in fact served at that particular building. So I would assume that the locally-hired and -trained guards were in position when we moved into that building.

Q Of the 14 Marines --

Q Has there been any easing of the State Department and the U.S. position of having dependents -- Embassy dependents -- live in Beirut with their husbands and wives?

A Well, there's certainly no change that I can tell you of today, and I'm not --

Q And going back prior to this, though?

A Yes. I think that as conditions had seemed to improve there are about, I think, 10 or 12 dependents -- Embassy dependents -- in Beirut.

Q And a second one: In a number of Embassies around the world, the U.S. has security cameras, much like in a bank lobby --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- where they routinely videotape outside movement and things.

A Uh-huh.

Q Is there by any chance -- you guys capture this thing?

A Let me -- that's a fair question. Let me inquire as to whether there were cameras or not.

Q Could we all have it for tonight? (Laughter.)

Q John, could you provide a profile -- to the degree that the U.S. has it -- of the Islamic Jihad group?

A No, I can't, Bernie. I think I will rest on the Secretary of State's words last night about that organization.

Q Back to the steel gate, was this one of the increased security measures taken in answer to the threat of September 8th?

A No. There were a large number of security measures already in place. A number of things had been done. This was a planned part of those activities.

Q John, do you suspect any country in the region that could have assisted them in their mission or their attack on the Embassy?

A Well, I don't think we will speculate. An investigation is underway, and I think we would be unwise to speculate on the perpetrators.

Q John, the scope of this investigation doesn't seem to be as large as the one after the Marine blast. Of course, it wasn't such a big blast, but they sent an FBI team over there. They literally sifted through all of the debris --

1-2460

A   Uh-huh.

Q   -- and this team -- you said an expert in forensic science and ordnance disposal?

A   That's as part of the State Department's security team. There will be other agencies involved.

Q   Like the FBI? What are the other agencies?

A   I don't have a list of the other agencies, but sending an Assistant Secretary is a fairly serious indication of our intent, I think.

Q   Oh, no; I didn't -- I meant the scope of the investigation.

A   I think you'll find that either with Ambassador Murphy or arriving separately will be all the folks that are needed to conduct a full investigation.

Q   Of the 14 Marines --

Q   Has the United States taken advantage, or does it plan to take advantage, of a standing Israeli offer of medical assistance?

A   I don't think we will know that until the medical people who have arrived from Cairo have looked at the wounded and they'd --

Q   You haven't (inaudible)?

A   I'm not aware of any decision that has been made at this stage.

I mean it may even be being made as we speak.

Q   Of the 14 Marines assigned there to the Embassy, do you know how many were on duty at that time?

A   I do not. (To staff) Can anybody answer that?

MR. ROMBERG: No.

A   No.

Q   And do we know if any of them were pre-stationed outside or if they would have had to come out from inside?

A The function of those Marines is internal. The function is not to ward off a serious external assault on the Embassy. Their duties are basically inside, and the points that they guard are basically inside.

However, there are reports that some Americans came out of the building and fired on the vehicle. Just who they were and whether any of those could have been Marines, I don't know --

Q John, is there --

A -- at this stage. We will, I'm sure, in time.

Q John, will the blast in any way alter or reshape the general direction of U.S. Middle East policy?

A There isn't any question of that. The President has made it clear that he is constant in what he has said about the United States' determination to pursue peace in the Middle East. I keep on reminding you that when he launched his initiative, he made clear that it was for the long haul and the United States would stick with it And I think the President and the Secretary have made it clear that those who try to run the United States out of the Middle East by this kind of murderous activity are not going to succeed.

Q You said no change in policy.

A No change in policy.

Q I was just wondering. On the basis of the investigation so far --

A I can hear you, Jim, but I can't see -- ah, you're over here! Sorry.

Q On the basis of the investigation so far, without naming any names, do you have any evidence at all that would have this operation fall under the category of state-sponsored terrorism? Do you have any evidence that any government may have been involved?

A I think you set yourself up by pointing out at the beginning of your question that we're in the midst of an investigation, and I think we will wait for the results of that investigation before we come to conclusions.

Q John, can we have a filing break?

A Filing break.

Q John, have you received a protest from the Government of China regarding textile regulations imposed by this Government?

A We certainly have been talking with Chinese. China has given us its views on the proposed new rules of origin on textiles, including its concern that the rules would adversely affect its textile imports. We're in the midst of the 60-day comment period during which we're accepting the views of all concerned parties. China's views, along with the views of other concerned governments, will be passed to the U.S. Customs Service and other concerned agencies for their consideration; and, if necessary, modifications in the rules will be made. We're prepared to consult with Chinese officials on this question.

Q How do you characterize the -- do you call it a view, or is it a protest, or is it a nasty message, or --

A We characterize it as Chinese views.

Q John, on another matter, when the Secretary testified on refugees a couple of weeks ago, he said that to carry out the policy that he enunciated of admitting 10,000 people from the re-education camps, that the United States would discuss this at Geneva at this conference due to begin in early October.

A Uh-huh.

Q On the FBIS, there's a statement by the Foreign Minister of Vietnam saying that Hanoi in fact rejects the idea that these people are political prisoners or that they should come to the United States under the Orderly Departure Program and rejects the idea of discussing it in Geneva. Do you have any comment on that?

A Well, we have seen the Vietnamese news agency report and we note that Vietnam is ready to hold talks with the United States on issues of mutual concern. Our delegation looks forward to talking with the Vietnamese delegation at the UNHCR Conference in Geneva October 3 and 4.

Q In other words, you won't talk with them separately from Geneva.

A Our plan is to talk with them in Geneva.

Q Why will no American official meet with the Foreign Minister of Vietnam in New York, for instance?

A Well, I just don't have anything on his schedule.

Q John, if the Vietnamese keep to their position that the delegation the United States is sending to Geneva is not the one that should discuss the prisoners, we'll just stonewall?

A Well, it's not a question of stonewalling. They have said they are willing to discuss matters of mutual interest.

Q They said specifically not in Geneva.

A Well, let's see how it develops.

Q John, can you shed any light on the developments in the Gulf War, on the latest attacks against Kharg Island -- who did what to whom and what it means, if anything?

A Yes. I do have something on that.

We're aware of an Iraqi statement that it has conducted a "warning bombing" of Iran's oil export terminal at Kharg Island. However, we have no confirmation of the attack. This development, along with the recent resurgence of attacks against shipping in the Gulf, illustrates the continuing dangers of the Iran-Iraq conflict, now entering its fifth year. The United States' view has not changed: any widening of the war threatens the peace and stability of the region. Attacks on neutral shipping are of particularly serious concern to us in light of our traditional commitment to the principle of free navigation in international waters.

We look forward to and fully support continuous efforts on the part of the international community to work toward a resolution of the conflict, such as UN Security Resolution 540 and 552. We note that the forthcoming session of the UN General Assembly may again provide opportunities for international consultation and movement towards resolution of that conflict.

Q A copy?

A Sure.

Q John, can you explain -- are you suggesting that the bombing, the warning bombing on Kharg Island, is a widening of the war -- or was that separate from the response to the question of the widening?

A Well, (a), we were unable to confirm that, but I think that -- assuming it took place, I think in the light of these words you may draw that deduction.

Q John, did you get any reaction from the Syrian Government about the attack on the Embassy in Beirut? Any concern, any --

A Let me take a look at that for you.

Q In the same general area, anything on the incident in southern Lebanon yesterday?

A No.

Q Also, do you have anything on the report -- the GAO report about UNESCO?

A No.

Q And, finally, if I may, anything on the mediation by President Betancur in Nicaragua?

A No.

Q This was a complete loss? (Laughter.)

A A complete loss? I thought it went very well. (Laughter.)

Q John, what's the problem -- I suspect I know the answer to this -- what's the problem of identifying the man or men who were in the truck? It's just there's not enough left of them or --

A Well, you said it.

Q Yes. (Laughter.)

Q Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 1:06 p.m., the briefing concluded.)

Becker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #173

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 1984, 12:16 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. One announcement on a BACKGROUND briefing on a trade delegation from Mauritius:

On Tuesday, September 25, at 2:30 P.M., a senior Department official will give a BACKGROUND briefing for the press here in Room 2118 The subject will be the Mauritian Investment Mission. To stress the importance, Deputy Prime Minister Duval will head the Mission September 24-October 5. They will be meeting with a number of government officials as well as with the media. Mauritius is one of the few democracies in Africa that nas a functioning multi-party parliamentary system of government.

That is it for announcements. I'll be happy to take questions.

Q Anything on Nicaragua today, Alan?

A Ah --

Q With respect to their position on Contadora?

A No. I think that you have various pieces of guidance, or a piece of guidance, issued over the weekend, but you also have what the Secretary said yesterday at his briefing in New York, so I refer you to that.

Q But he didn't address the Contadora announcement itself. He just sort of vaguely criticized the draft treaty.

A Well, he was asked the question about it and he gave the response that he did, so I refer you to that.

Q His comments seemed somewhat more positive than some of the comments made over the weekend here. Is that not true, that --

A I'll leave that kind of interpretation to you; but the fact is, as I say, that there are various things out there and I refer you to them. But the most recent authoritative statement is what the Secretary said yesterday.

Q What about the visa for Mr. Ortega? There is a story in the New York Times today, according to which a visa to go to Los Angeles might be denied.

A Well, in terms of a visa, I understand he does have a visa which will enable him to travel to the United Nations General Assembly. As far as travel in the U.S. and any discussion of that, obviously we always carefully consider that in light of the purposes of the travel and any other relevant circumstances.

Q Can we go to the Middle East?

Q I'd like to stay on this, if it's okay.

A On that subject or a different Central American subject?

Q No, same -- same subject.

A Well, go ahead.

Q Does the Reagan Administration have a copy of the Contadora draft agreement?

A I don't think it's up to us to comment on the specifics of the Contadora draft, Jim; it's up to the countries. Whether we have it or don't have it, I think the various statements that were made reflect our position at this point. I don't think it's -- it's not up to us to talk about the draft; it's up to the countries who are considering it.

Q If you say that a country which says that it is ready to sign the draft is "hypocritical," that seems to be a comment on the draft.

A Well, I'd refer you again to what the Secretary said yesterday about having some progress represented in that draft and good parts, and also some problems as we understand it.

Q Which are the problems that the U.S. has --

A Well, as I said, I'm not going to get into details. I don't think that's (inaudible).

Go ahead, Ghassan.

Q What can you tell us, Alan, about the visit of Secretary Murphy to Syria, like as to when was it planned, is it a reaction to the Embassy bombing, and things of that kind?

A Well, I think that the -- we indicated before that he went out there to the region at the request of the President and the Secretary to look into the question of the bombing in Lebanon and he is taking advantage of his presence in the region for consultations with other key governments.

As you know, he has gone to Damascus and he's had meetings there, and he will be moving on. I believe he is either in or shortly arriving in Israel, and so he is in the region. There isn't really much more to say about that at this point.

As the Secretary indicated yesterday, we have indicated consistently we'd like to be helpful if we can, but that that requires that that is desired by all the parties concerned. And so that is the position on that. I would caution you against thinking that he's engaged in some sort of negotiation or intensive effort at this point. He is talking with the various governments. I'm sure that various questions relating to Lebanon are on his agenda and of interest to the governments he'll be talking with.

Q So he is exploring the possibility, then?

A I didn't say he was exploring the possibility. I just said that I'm sure that that, the subject of Lebanon, is on the agenda.

Q Can I follow up on the first question, Alan?

A Uh-huh.

Q There are reports in the American media that his visit now is to -- like you said; but it's also been reported that there was a plan to send him, or to send an American official, to the Middle East to explore the likelihood of United States mediating between Israel and Syria, so is that -- are you saying this is not the case, or what?

A I guess I'm saying two things about it. First of all, I said we have been consistently willing to be helpful. I don't know that I would take that to the point of saying we're mediating or will mediate; I'm not saying that it won't come to that, but I simply caution you that that's not where we are at this point.

Secondly, in terms of a plan to send somebody out there, obviously with developments in the Middle East or the desire to see progress, it's always under consideration what we could do. But I'm not aware of a specific plan for him to go out there at this time, other than the fact that he did go and is taking advantage of the presence to do this other consulting.

Q Who did --

Q But if you were asked --

A Excuse me.

Q Who did Murphy see in Damascus?

A I believe he saw President Assad. I don't know whom else he saw.

Q If the U.S. were asked to mediate, as the reports have it that it has been asked by Foreign Minister Shamir, will the United States take the mediating role on?

A I think that's getting ahead of the game. Obviously, Mr. Shamir is going to see Secretary Shultz during the course of their presence up at the U.N. and there are other discussions going on -- Ambassador Murphy's discussions in Israel and elsewhere -- but I don't want to take that -- as I say, I'm cautioning you not to go too far with that at this time.

Q Weren't there reports, Alan, that -- there are reports that the Foreign Minister has actually asked. It's been reported in the media. So you're saying that no such request has been --

A No. I think I'll leave you with the words given you. I'm really not going to get into the exact dialogue that we've had with various parties, so --

Q Has the U.S. asked the Syrians for help in combatting terrorism or cracking down on the radical Islamic revolutionists in Lebanon or Bekaa Valley?

A I don't think I would, again, want to get into the question of specifics of dialogue with any particular government. The extreme seriousness of the situation, specifically in Lebanon but elsewhere, regarding terrorism is very much on our minds, and obviously we would want to pursue that subject with a variety of people; but I don't intend to get into the specifics of what was discussed or how it was discussed with any individual party.

Q Alan, on that, can we clarify a couple of things on the bombing? First of all, do you know what Mr. Murphy's plans are in terms of reporting back here on the findings of his mission?

A The first report that will be made actually will be made today because Ambassador Oakley and others in his party who are specifically concerned in terms of their institutional responsibilities with counter-terrorism and with security will be coming in today -- may have landed in New York already. They will be conferring with and reporting to the Secretary this afternoon, so that is going to happen today.

I can't tell you specifically when Ambassador Murphy will actually come back to the U.S. at this point. Obviously he has been reporting his conversations out there. He will continue to do that.

Q One of the things that I think John said last week and President Reagan repeated yesterday was that security was 75 percent completed at the Embassy at the time of the bombing. Can you give us any idea of what the additional 25 percent of the work was to involve?

A No, I can't, really. I think it would be imprudent to try to get into the specifics of what is involved in security. I do think that he indicated -- and I would reiterate that to my knowledge anyway -- the only sort of major physical outside feature that was not in place was the drop-bar at the end of the chicane, because the cement footing was curing.

Q One final point on this --

A I would note, by the way, that to my understanding also, such a drop-bar -- and I may be wrong on this, but I think it's correct -- is in place in the West Beirut facility, but it was still in the process of being installed in the East Beirut Annex.

Q The other issue is whether or not foreign guards can be provided outside the grounds of the Embassy. I think Mr. Reagan said yesterday that there was a prohibition against that. Yet, weren't the Marines, when they were still deployed in West Beirut -- the 80-man contingent -- they were out on the area overlooking the Mediterranean there on the Corniche, which was technically not within the grounds of the Embassy?

A Well, I think you have to keep in mind several things: first of all, that there was the decision to withdraw that last contingent of Marines, who were not Marine Guards *per se*, was something that was -- that was a decision that was taken by the government as a whole in light of the circumstances, including movement to what was believed to be, though not ideal, at least a safer facility in East Beirut. Second of all, those Marines were also initially in Beirut as part of a larger deployment, and they were left there following the movement of most of the forces that they had gone in with, following the movement of those forces out.

It really is an unusual situation to have -- and perhaps unique -- to have Marines who are not Marine guards playing some sort of external security role. So it was a question of -- I don't know whether it's a prohibition; I can't tell you whether that's factually right or not of my own knowledge -- but obviously, there is a certain degree of appropriateness of having somebody else's combat forces in your country.

Q You don't know whether security --

A And it is standard to have the forces of the host country, be they armed forces or police forces or other kinds of security forces, as well as hired local guards, provide the external security. That is true around the world.

Q But you don't know if there was a specific prohibition against having the Marines continue that kind of duty outside the Annex, if they had, if the decision --

1-2473

A I don't know if it was a specific prohibition or not. Obviously there is, as I say, though, a question of appropriateness and also necessity, and those are judgments which are made case by case.

Bernie?

Q Do you have any examples where there are hired guards at American embassies elsewhere in the world? You just made that point.

A It's true; there are. I'm just trying to think. Let me see if I can get you that. In fact, maybe before this briefing is over if I can at least just get you one example of that.

(To Staff:) If you can give me some help from the side over there.

Q There are quite a few unanswered questions about the incident that at least John was unable to answer on Friday and apparently they are still unanswered, and I just wondered whether it would be possible for Mr. Oakley, Ambassador Oakley, to come down and brief when he returns here.

A Let me take that under advisement and pass it on. I'm not sure at this stage whether they will feel they've gotten deeply enough into the specifics of that situation to feel comfortable doing that, or whether they want to discuss security in that kind of detail in any way because of the possible vulnerabilities it creates for the future. But in any case, in terms of what happened, and how it happened, and all of that, as a general matter, obviously it's a legitimate question. Let me just see what they are willing to do with that.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the FBIS report this morning that there was another message, another threat, from the Islamic Jihad about actions against the United States?

A Yes. We're aware, obviously, of that threat. And as of today, we are sending an advisory, alerting posts worldwide to this most recent threat by the Islamic Jihad; and we have advised posts to make a critical evaluation of their security measures and to take appropriate actions to decrease the risks to their facilities and personnel. So it's clear that whatever the threats are and however much we don't know about this so-called Islamic Jihad, nonetheless we take every threat seriously .

Q Alan, did you have that DIA report -- did the State Department have that DIA report warning of inadequacies in the security -- did they have that in advance of the bombing?

A No. No. My understanding is that that report, which was prepared in July, was not to be printed until October. I don't quite know what the processing is between July and October. But in any case, that is the fact on that. There obviously were a lot of security measures which had to be taken as people moved into that facility, and everybody was aware that there needed to be, and those were being addressed, as we say. They only moved in at the beginning -- I believe it was the beginning of August, end of July.

-- MORE --

Q Is this standard procedure in the government when one agency perceives some threats to another they wait several months until a report is printed, and then after the fact, as a matter of fact?

A Well, I don't know what the processing of this thing was. And, as I say, my understanding was that it really wasn't due to be published as a formal document until October. So what further evaluation goes into that, I just can't tell you; (I) don't know.

Q Isn't there any --

A You might want to address that to DoD. I don't have anything for you.

Q And would -- yes. I just wonder though, from State Department's standpoint, isn't there any common-sense procedure where if a guy said, "My Lord, this Embassy is in peril," he doesn't get on the telephone and call somebody up?

A I think that there was recognition pretty much all around that there were a lot of things that had to be done to make the security around that facility better, and a lot of those things that are referred to in that report -- and I'm somewhat hamstrung because it's a classified report -- but, nonetheless, a lot of things that were in that report were very much the things that were being worked on and that had been 75 percent completed.

As I say, you're starting at a point before a lot of things were put into place.

Let me go back on the question of external guards. You asked where else do we hire local guards. Among many others would be Rome, Manila, Paris, Kinshasa. So it is not an unusual procedure.

Q Isn't it different, Alan, that these guards are attached to one of the factions?

A No. I think that that -- although I can't say what the background of these people may be, they were hired as individuals. They were not hired as members of one faction or another The fact is that, as a practical matter, that in West Beirut the guards, I think, were all Muslem, and in East Beirut they were mostly Christian.

1-2476

Q Well, yes, but they were identified for us -- we didn't discern this -- they were identified here as members of the Lebanese Forces.

A Well, yes. I think that that -- I don't know whether they all were or were not, but in any case they were not hired as members of the Lebanese Forces. They were hired as individuals. And whatever faction they might have belonged to was not relevant to the hiring.

Were they on full-time payrolls though, Alan, or were they working part-time -- moonlighting, so to speak?

A I don't know. Obviously they would be hired in terms, from our perspective, as trained, full-time guards. Whether they moonlighted, as people do in many other jobs, I don't know. But from our point of view, they were full-time employees.

Q Working full schedules, in other words --

A Yes.

Q -- full eight-hour shifts.

A That -- to my knowledge. If I'm wrong on that, I will come back to you. But my understanding is certainly that.

Q Do they -- I'm sorry.

Q A couple of questions, please, Alan. The people who were hired on an individual basis -- were they wearing the uniform of the Phalange?

A I don't know what clothing they were wearing.

Q You don't.

On this new threat, was this a threat that the U.S. received perhaps through the Embassy or is the response that you're making to the published threat?

A I think that the response is to a published threat, that there was a statement made to a newspaper in Beirut.

Q That's what I meant.

A And that came to our attention.

Q Nothing directly to the U.S., then?

A To my knowledge, that's correct. Yes?

Q It was the question of the uniform.

Q Alan, I want to take you back to Secretary Murphy's discussions. Lebanese Prime Minister Rashid Karami said that he's more optimistic about an impending Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- following his discussions with Secretary Murphy. And you said earlier that Secretary Murphy is not involved in any "negotiations." That's the word that you used.

A Uh-huh.

Q Why would the Lebanese Prime Minister say that?

A I can't speak for the Lebanese Prime Minister. I would, as I said, point out to you that we have indicated on many occasions in the past -- and while I don't have a report of the conversations to give you, I'm sure it would not be out of the ordinary for him to indicate again -- that we are willing to be helpful in any way we can that is agreed to by the parties. And so that's all I really can report to you about that.

Yes?

Q Is Murphy going somewhere else in the Middle East or is he coming back from Israel to the United States?

A I don't have an onward schedule to give you. I'm not sure that he's coming back directly. I think he may be going elsewhere, but I don't have that schedule to give you. And I think, for obvious reasons, ahead of time we would not give that.

Q In the Middle East, Alan, or in Europe?

A No. I think he may be staying in the region for a little bit.

Q Alan, on the security alert, your statement spoke of alerting posts to take appropriate measures. Does each post have a fixed plan that this sets into action or is the determination of appropriate measures left up to the situation and the officer in charge?

A I can't really answer that for you. I'm sure that they all have measures in force already which are basically designed to take care of the existing situation.

I haven't seen the message myself; but, subject to correction, I would guess that they would simply be alerted to the fact of a threat and be left to their own judgment as to what would be required.

Q Has that already gone out, Alan?

A I don't know whether it actually has gone out -- you know, has left the building -- but it went out as of today, or is going out as of today.

Q O.K.

Q Alan, would this be the same kind of advisory alert that went out in response to the September 8th warning?

A I think it -- again, I haven't seen the exact wording; but I think, in essence, that is correct, and I think that -- yes; let me just leave it at that.

Q Alan, when was that alert -- it was first known yesterday, wasn't it?

A Which?

Q The latest one.

A I don't know when that threat -- you're talking about the threat? You said "alert."

Q The new one, the new one. I'm just wondering what the delay is, if you're not even sure it's gone out yet -- whether there's a delay in sending out the advisory alert.

A Well, I don't know what the processing of it is, Bernie. I don't think it's an excessive delay to have it go out as of the time I've walked out here. Somebody has said it has gone out.

The reason I hesitate is because between the time things are typed and actually put on the wire and so on, there may be some time. But obviously we act as quickly as possible. And I think the fact is we've also indicated before that since the bombing in Beirut there has been another alert.

So I think you could rest assured that people are on a very high level of alert in any case and this is simply a further notice and cautioning to people.

Yes.

Q Alan, do you have anything on a pact between Syria and Saudi Arabia on the Iran-Iraq war?

A No; don't know about that.

Q Alan, do you have any casualty figures today for the bombing and --

A Well, I have updated casualty figures. Let me give you what I've got.

-- Of those killed: two U.S. employees, both in the Defense Attache Office; six Lebanese employees; an unknown number of non-Embassy Lebanese visitors -- there are conflicting reports of anywhere from five to 15.

-- Of injured people: 20 U.S. employees; 19 Lebanese employees; and again, an unknown number of non-Embassy Lebanese visitors -- reports, again conflicting, range between 20 and 30.

On evacuation, let me give it to you by day so that you have it. Medical evacuation:

-- On the 22nd, which was Saturday, there eight U.S. and one Lebanese employees evacuated to Lanstuhl Army Hospital in Germany. Of those nine, six were litter cases and three were ambulatory.

> -- On Sunday, the 23rd, four U.S. employees, all ambulatory, were medevaced to Shiba Hospital in Tel Hashomer, Israel. Also, one U.S. Marine who was ambulatory was medevaced to the USS Shreveport. That Marine had an injury which was unrelated to the bombing.
>
> But on Sunday, yesterday, a Marine who was in a litter was medevaced to the Shreveport as well; and that Marine was injured in the bombing

So of all of those I have given you, there was one injury that was unrelated to the bombing. The rest all were related to it.

Q Alan, was that evacuation to the Israeli facility the first such of U.S. personnel from Lebanon to Israel?

A I can't tell you altogether. I think it was the first such in in this incident, and I guess you'd have to check with the Pentagon.

Q Why the four -- eight to Germany and four to Israel? Why not -- how do you explain that division?

A These decisions were made on the ground by the medical authorities.

Q Medical authorities.

Q Did the four who went to Israel -- some reports suggested that they all or some or most of them had punctured eardrums.

A Yes.

Q Did that play any part in why they went there?

A I don't know, Chris. I just don't know.

I also think it would be appropriate to note that we are very thankful to the Lebanese medical and civil defense personnel who responded so promptly and efficiently in the time of need and to the Government of Lebanon for its assistance, and also that we are grateful to the Government of Israel for its immediate offer of

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medical facilities and support -- an offer which, as I said, we have accepted.

Q Alan?

A Yes, Bill.

Q I don't know whether this is covered by your answer to George, but do you know any more about the license plate of the vehicle or this Dutch diplomat or who -- how many people were in the cab of this vehicle, or --

A No. I think that's the kind of thing, in terms of giving you an authoritative kind of response, we really ought to wait for the investigation. I learned, frankly, from reading from the newspaper, that there was apparently a Dutch diplomat in the Embassy -- not talking to Ambassador Bartholomew but talking to somebody else.

But I don't know that that's at all related to the reports. It may be. But I don't know that that's related to the reports which were there about Dutch diplomatic plates or faked U.S. plates. There were all sorts of conflicting reports, and I don't think we'd be wise to try and comment. We just don't know at this point.

Q You don't even know how many people were in that truck?

A There are, again, conflicting reports.

Q Yeah.

A There were some reports at first that there were two. There are other reports that there was only one.

Bernie?

Q Alan, on this first report by Oakley to the Secretary --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- that will be private or public?

A Oh, I'm sure it will be a private briefing.

Jim, did you have a question?

Q Well, I wanted, with your forbearance, to go back to Nicaragua for a second. I went and I got Shultz's remarks so I'd be more informed.

A Yes.

Q Is that all right with you?

A Sure. (Laughter.)

Q Does the United States believe that Nicaragua is involved in these negotiations in good faith?

A I don't think it is up to us to proclaim on the good faith or not of -- you're talking about negotiations with whom? With the Contadora group?

Q Under the Contadora group.

A Yes. I think that it's not up to us to make that judgment. I think what we end up with in the end, in terms of any sort of agreement, that will obviously be something that has to be subscribed to by all of the parties who are negotiating, will have to meet the requirements of all of those parties.

Q Well, as to that particular point, my understanding is that every Central American government has issued a communique accepting the draft over the last week and a half. But in the Secretary's comments he indicates that some are yet to be heard from. Who are they?

A I'm not about to talk for the other governments or for those governments which are directly concerned, but I think the fact is that our discussions indicate that what the Secretary said -- which is that, just to quote him: "We see a draft treaty that does that in part" -- which is to say translates the 21 points, the principles, into something more operational -- "but misses in some substantial part. Other countries have yet to be heard from."

So that is a reflection of the state of our understanding --

Q But you won't in any --

A -- which does not only come from public statements.

Q You won't in any way specify or hint at what the substantial part is?

A No. I don't think that that's for us to do.

Q O.K. And, finally -- just one more: In terms of the statement that came out of this Department on Saturday --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- with respect to the elections and there not being sufficient time --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- what would the State Department respond if the criticism were leveled that there was a double standard with respect to Nicaragua and El Salvador and elections in terms of time and participation?

A I don't think that you're at the same point on that. What you got in Nicaragua, first of all, are people who are willing in the opposition to participate in the elections, which is not the case in Salvador. And you have those people having made very clear what I think are generally recognized, not only in this country but abroad -- elsewhere -- as reasonable terms in terms of the ground rules, which includes the amount of time, the access to the media, freedom to speak out, and so on.

And so I think you have a different situation which you can't quite compare that way.

One of the points that also, I think, was made in the guidance on Saturday is that while there are presumably protestations of allowing free elections and so on, the press reports that Mr. Cruz has been attacked by Sandinista-organized mobs on certainly more than one occasion; and the police have done little, if anything, to stop that, and so on.

So I think that there are some real problems

Q O.K. Just one -- I'd just like a comment on this. This is from the Times this morning --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- quoting a State Department official: "The whole point was to get the Nicaraguans to accept the Contadora proposals. Now they have, but we say we aren't satisfied. I'm not sure I would blame the Nicaraguans if they were confused." Do you have a comment on that?

A Well, I don't know who that individual may have been. I think that the position of the Government is clear on this, and I can't really speak to an unnamed source.

There was also somebody, I believe, who said something in there about there's no point in talking further with the Nicaraguans. That certainly is not the Administration's view. There will be further talks.

And so I would caution you in terms of accepting such views as representing authoritative Administration positions.

Chris?

Q A late report this morning that Senator Proxmire has given the Department the Golden Fleece Award --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- for its travel allowance policy -- specifically, something to do with allowing people traveling to post to take ocean liners instead of cheaper air --

A Yes. I think primarily it had to do with use of local currency. I tried to get something on that before I came out, was unable to. But I'll see if we can get some reaction to that.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Whereupon, at 12:47 p.m., the briefing was concluded.)

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DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC # 174

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1984, 12:18 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have just a couple of brief reminders for you: first that a senior Department official will give a BACKGROUND briefing here in the briefing room today at 2:30 on the Mauritian Investment Mission.

And also a reminder that at the White House today there will be a readout on Mr. Mulroney's visit -- I believe that's about 1:15.

That's it. Be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, the Soviet news agency has responded to the President's speech at the United Nations. Have you seen that account? Do you have a comment on it?

A No, I really don't have a comment on it. I think that Assistant Secretary Burt was on television this morning. I refer you to what he said. Beyond that, the fact is there will be meetings this week, obviously both in New York and in Washington, and I think we'll conduct our diplomacy through those meetings --

Q Not on T.V.?

A -- rather than responding specifically. I think he did not respond in detail to it. But I think we won't respond either at this point.

Q Alan, do you have any details of the $372 million emergency request for security?

A I have something on that. I think, actually, the numbers have changed a little bit since there was a briefing on that in New York yesterday, so let me give you what I have on that.

Q O.K.

A As I understand it, the figure is approximately $366 million at this point. If you want the exact figure, it's $366,278,000. That's for increased security at our missions worldwide. Approximately half of that would be for buildings and facilities, and approximately half for people and security equipment. Heavy emphasis will be placed on security protection at Middle Eastern posts, but a relatively small amount is targeted for Beirut facilities because there has been a special amount set aside earlier that has been appropriated and so on -- it was around $22-$23 million earlier this year, or last year -- I'm not sure exactly when that was finally enacted -- but in any case to take care of the Beirut situation. And at that point, that money is still being expended.

I might note that that package has been sent to OMB. It has not been formally presented to the Congress, hasn't been formally made final through the Administration, but the hope is that it would be brought to the Congress before the end of the current session, so that if that is done, if the Congress approves the request, we're prepared to begin work immediately on increased security arrangements at our posts worldwide.

Q That's the 366 you're talking about?

A That's correct.

Q And when do you think it will go to Congress?

A Bernie, I don't think I can get ahead of the internal processes. This is obviously a matter which has come up, as John explained it yesterday in New York, in the wake of the most recent security threats and events and it is an urgent and top priority matter.

Q You've only got till the 4th of October.

A I'm sorry.

Q You've only got till the 4th of October.

A Well, I understand that, so we'll see how that proceeds.

Q How much of that money is allocated for the Beirut vicinity?

A I said in this particular one, there is very little of it that is -- of this particular amount -- because there already was money that has been put forth on a special program for Beirut previously, and so that money is already there. Now, obviously, this not the totality of what we'll be doing over a period of time. We will be continuing to be looking at and putting requests forward for security but this is the amount which, on an urgent basis, is being proposed from here to be sent forward to the Congress and appropriated.

Q Alan, how much of the $23 million earlier allocated to Lebanon was spent, do you know, and how much --

A I don't have the details on how -- but I think that, basically, all has been programmed. Whether it's actually all been paid out, I don't think it has all been paid out at this point, but it has all been designated for uses. I think over time, obviously, as programs change, there may have been changes within that program, but nonetheless, that's the situation on that.

Q This is essentially the story that John put out yesterday except for the revised figure, is that right?

A Yes, I think it is basically that. I don't recall whether he had the breakdown in terms of half for this and half for that.

Q Alan, can you be more specific regarding the half of the money allocated to people? You said half --

A I cannot -- no, I don't have any further breakdown on it.

Q Can you break down the percentage of where it's going? You said the bulk in the Mideast, but --

A No. No. I can't do that.

Q Alan, do you have any characterization of Ambassador Murphy's visit, now that he's going to Israel from Damascus, of his talks in Damascus regarding either Syrian willingness for some kind of disengagement or tacit agreement with the Israelis or Syria's desire for improved relations with the U.S. directly?

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A No, I don't have anything on it.

Q Alan, in accordance --

A Excuse me. Is this on the same subject?

Q Yes, pretty much the same. It has to do with deterring aggression --

A Well, I'd like to be sure we finish --

Q -- on the embassies.

A Before we come back, I'd like to be sure we finish off on this and not go around on....

Q In the light of the new conciliatory language of President Reagan yesterday in the General Assembly, do you expect any change in the U.S. attitude towards the Soviet proposal for an international conference on the Middle East?

A I think that our position on the Middle East and the international conference has been stated before. I don't think anybody has indicated there is any change on that. Obviously, we have indicated -- and I think the Secretary indicated -- that we do talk with the Soviets about the Middle East. It's an important area, it's a broad area, it includes everything, I mean, not only the peace process, but the Gulf, Iran-Iraq, and so on. But I don't think that that reflects a change in the attitude toward the utility of an international conference in actually moving the peace process forward.

Q So in what sense do you expect a sort of regional -- I mean bilateral cooperation with the Soviets regarding regional problems?

A The Secretary briefed yesterday following the President's speech, and I'm going to refer you to that briefing. I think he did address this.

Q Alan, going back to where we were, three years ago, when President Reagan welcomed the hostages home from Tehran, he promised, as I'm sure you remember, that any further terrorism against Americans would be met with what he termed swift and effective retribution. Mr. Mondale, as you may know, yesterday charged that the Beirut terrorists "have humiliated us and pushed us around and killed our people."

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Question: Did the State Department advise President Reagan to make this promise of swift and effective retribution inoperative? Or can you cite any swift and effective retribution for any of the three recent U.S. Embassy bombings?

A I think the President was asked about this recently. He addressed himself to it. I'm not going to add to his words.

Q But what about the State Department? Can you cite any --

A I don't get into agency positions.

Q In other words, your evasion means that you can't?

A No, it means that I don't get into agency positions, Lester.

Q Oh, I see.

A Never have; don't intend to.

Q There is swift and effective retribution?

A I think I just answered your question.

Q Alan, two things: if you needed $366 million for security, why didn't you ask for it earlier? Why wait until there was a bombing if you needed the money?

A This represents, essentially, an acceleration of plans which were already underway. I think that, as John indicated yesterday, to read his words, "It's a direct and immediate response to the worldwide security situation which has been reviewed in the aftermath of last week's vehicle bomb attack against the Embassy in Beirut."

It isn't a question of finding new things, primarily. I can't say that in the end there won't be some new things that hadn't been considered before. But essentially, it represents an identification in the wake of what is perceived to be a more heightened security problem, in light of the bombing and so on, to identify those highest priority things and try and get the money for those things now before the Congress goes out so that we can move ahead immediately, as we're prepared to do.

So it isn't a matter of identifying things all of a sudden. It's a matter of facing the situation as we see it and trying to do the best we can to move those things ahead. But there has been, obviously, a lot of work done on security, and I think there has been a lot of testimony given on that and I don't have all the details to rehash for you.

Q Beyond what John said yesterday on what Ambassador Oakley reported about the size of the explosives, do you have anything in addition to that in terms of what he has reported to the Secretary on the findings of the Murphy --

A No. I think that John gave you pretty much --

Q That's it at the moment?

A I think for the moment, yes. There are still people on the ground who are providing, or trying to get more exact detail, and there will be continuing examination, obviously, of that situation. But as we know it at this point, I think that you've got it from the briefing yesterday.

-- MORE --

Q Do you have any specific comments on the GAO report released last Friday suggesting that the Security Enhancement Program has not been going all that well?

A I did have something on that but it is partially addressed by what I've already said, but let me give you what I've got.

We are pleased that the GAO report notes that its "follow up work indicates the Department has implemented or is in the process of implementing our recommendations." That is a quote. The report notes that there are some continuing construction delays, however the Department is satisfied that these delays are being addressed to assure the completion of the multi-million dollar construction projects now underway.

Under the Security Enhancement Program, we have made substantial security improvements at twenty-four posts. These include construction of improved perimeter controls, installation of public access controls, monitors, alarms and other devices.

The Security Enhancement Program does not include new office buildings Now, as I indicated before, the Department addressed Beirut's security needs as an urgent project outside of the Security Enhancement Program.

I've got a little history on the Security Enhancement Program, if you are interested in that, but it is up to you.

Q Yes, if we can have it.

A Well, let me give it to you to make sure everybody gets it, because there is one aspect of this thing, I guess, in terms of the numbers that was somewhat confusing. Let me just read you what I've got.

The Security Enhancement Program was initiated in 1980 to upgrade the security of designated overseas posts in the wake of the events that took place at our embassies in Tehran, Islamabad and Tripoli. The Security Enhancement Program coordinates the efforts of the Office of Foreign Buildings, the Office of Communications, the Office of Security and the Office of Operations within the Bureau of Administration in the Department.

Initially the Department planned to upgrade 125 posts within five years, but this was an optimistic projection given the complex construction requirements. Last year we reviewed the program and determined that the security upgrades of 62 posts we considered most vulnerable would continue in the program. Other posts apart from these 62 have received funds for enhanced security, and of course there are other ongoing programs to improve the security of other posts throughout the world.

Q Alan, the money you have for Beirut asserted, does it include replacement for the bombed Annex in East Beirut, or -- ?

A I think, at this point, we don't quite know what that is. Do you mean the 366? No. I think that that money includes, as I say, very little money at this point for Beirut. I don't know precisely how, when people get through looking at that Annex, for example, they will decide they want to go: whether that building would be repaired or whether we get another facility, or what. I think all that remains to be examined.

Q Could we have all that on paper?

A All of which on paper?

Q About the security posts.

A Well, I can give you, other than what I have said, I can give you what I've got on paper. Put it that way.

Q Alan, this is a question that is directly to your field of expertise.

The Associated Press reports that when they asked for State Department comment on Senator Proxmire's "golden fleece award," on that $400,000 spent by State Department people on ocean liners and Mississippi River cruises, --quote -- "Several aides" -- that is, at the State Department -- "said that public information officers were busy with the aftermath of Thursday's bombing," and my question is this:

When -- I understand there is a crisis management team working on this bombing -- what specifically is it that the 27, I estimate, State Department press and public affairs officers are doing about the aftermath that makes them all too busy to answer such questions by Associated Press?

A Lester, there are some people who work on some problems and others who work on other problems, and those who work on both the Middle East -- because I believe that Pakistan was mentioned as one of the areas specifically in Senator Proxmire's statement -- and also who work on the question of administration and security in buildings, had been tied up on such things as the Beirut bombing.

Q All of them. I see.

Well, we don't have that many who work on those specific subjects. You talking about a number which I believe you perhaps anonymously this morning called and asked for --

Q Anonymously? No one asked who I was. I've never concealed my identity. Alan, one follow-up on this.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee said this morning that it is conducting an investigation of what it called these outrageous State Department cruise expenditures, and a staffer for Senator Proxmire says that this ranking minority member of Appropriations will also be investigating.

Question: Does the State Department give a damn about this, or will you respond with the customary, lofty evasion? Are you concerned?

A Your customary, lofty arrogance in your question notwithstanding, we will have an answer which I believe will provide a response on this question of why these funds were used in this way. I hope we will have it this afternoon.

Q This afternoon? Good.

A Yes.

Q Alan, last week I think a question was asked here about an alleged report in the Arab press that U.S. cruise missiles might be stationed in Israel, and John said that that was completely out of bounds, any such allegation. Are you aware of any reports in the Soviet press that cruise missiles are being, or will be

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stationed, in northern Israel which could then threaten the southern Soviet Union directly?

A I am not aware of the reports, but it remains as ridiculous a proposition as the other one.

Chris?

Q Yes. This morning, Department officials have been on the Hill briefing on security in Beirut, and other things --

A Right.

Q -- and when Members emerged they summarized it by saying that they had been assured that from now on vehicular traffic would be sealed off from in front of embassies.

Q Does this represent a change in security policy?

A From in front of embassies?

Q In front of embassies.

A Worldwide?

Q They were specifically just talking about the Middle East.

A I don't know, specifically, frankly, whether that is where we are on that question. Certainly people are looking at the kinds of measures which need to be taken to protect embassies, not only the embassy in Beirut, but also in the Middle East and other high risk areas, so it may be that that was in that briefing. I frankly don't know. I know that vehicular traffic obviously is one thing that needs to be examined.

Q In earlier briefings on this subject, the point has been made by John and other people that, well, this is a street, you know. We had to let traffic be on it, which struck many of us as being absurd, since there have been five of these horrendous car bombings in Lebanon in the last two years. Isn't it about time -- isn't this way overdue that this step be taken?

A I am not going to try to respond to that sort of conclusion, Chris.

Q Alan, there is a report this morning from Israel that the new government there is giving a new hearing, so to speak, to the President's September 1st plan.

A Uh-huh.

Q Are you aware of this? Do you have anything to say about it?

A No. I have seen the wire reports. Our position on it, obviously, is that we stand behind that proposal. As we have said many times, it represents what we see as the best and maybe the only workable proposal -- at least in our view at this point, and it remains out there for the various parties to come to the table and discuss with their own views. So, I am not going to try to speak for the Government of Israel or try to analyze what their views are on it. They apparently have made some statements about it, and I see those.

Q All that you know, Alan, is what I've heard and --

A That is all I know. I don't know if there has been further discussion on that.

Q A follow up on that, Alan.

A Uh-huh.

Q Unlike in 1982 when the plan was first proposed, will U.S. diplomacy this time vigorously advance the plan, promot it among the parties?

A I am not going to get into the details of how we might proceed from this point. Obviously we have indicated that it is there, that the parties in the region have to want to get together to talk before they will talk. That is self-evident. I would, I guess, take exception to your suggestion that the proposal wasn't vigorously pursued before. Jim?

Q Can we go to Contadora? Would the United States stay with Contadora and still support it if no changes were made?

A Well, you are asking me a hypothetical question and I am not going to give you an answer to it.

Q Can you say what changes the United States wants made?

A No. I told you that yesterday.

Q To follow on that, do you have any response to the Nicaraguan official who was quoted in today's Times?

A No.

Q Any response at all to what Nicaragua has been saying?

A No.

Q Anything on Los Angeles trips, or cancellation thereof?

A No. George?

Q You have no new language on Contadora.

A Huh?

Q You have no new language on Contadora today?

A No.

Q One last question. Alan, Mr. Mondale has charged that the lack of sufficient security at our embassy in Beirut is, in his words, "an atrocious abdication of leadership."

My question is: Will Secretary Shultz respond to this, or does he feel it is directed entirely at President Reagan?

A Well, I guess we will wait and see, won't we, Lester?

Q Well, yes. We can wait and see if the sun comes up, Alan, but my question had to do with Shultz. Does he feel this is directly at President Reagan, or is he going to shoulder part of what might be, in your view, misjudged blame?

A I think there have been a number of statements made by senior officials starting with the President, the Secretary, and others, about what's gone on in Beirut. I am sure there will be more, and I refer you to them.

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Q I am sure, too. Specifically, what is the answer to the question I have asked, though, Alan? Does the Secretary believe that it is entirely at Reagan, or -- ?

A That wasn't your question, Lester.

Q It was.

A You might want to review the transcript and see what your question was.

Q I really don't know if this question has been asked before here, but still I consider it as an important one.

A Uh-huh.

Q Was the diplomatic move by the United States, headed now by Under Secretary Murphy, as a result of the bombing of the embassy or was it prepared before?

A No. I think I answered that the other day, to indicate that this trip by Assistant Secretary Murphy was undertaken specifically because of the events in Lebanon. I indicated that it would hardly be surprising that as Assistant Secretary for the region, he had in mind the possibility of travelling out there at some point, but that there was no specific plan for him to do so. And so he is in the region, he is taking advantage of the fact that he is in the region to stop at other posts and to talk to other governments.

Q On that mutual withdrawal in Chad that reportedly got underway today, do you have anything to say about it?

A I don't, sorry.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:48 p.m.)

Nancy / Mahon / Patterson

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #175

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1984, 12:29 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: O.K. Good afternoon. A couple of brief announcements and a statement.

On the announcements: Under Secretary of State for Management Ronald Spiers testified today on terrorism legislation before the House Judiciary Subcommittee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and we hope to have the text of his prepared statements later this afternoon.

Available in the Press Office is an embargoed-- underline embargoed -- text of Ambassador Rowny's address to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations on arms control. I think the embargo is for 8:30 tonight our time.

The statement is regarding the U.K.-PRC agreement on the future of Hong Kong, and it is a statement on behalf of Secretary of State Shultz, who is in New York:

The United States Government welcomes the successful conclusion of two years of negotiations between the United Kingdom and the People's Republic of China over the future of Hong Kong.

The United States has a strong interest in the continued stability and prosperity of Hong Kong and believes the agreement will provide a solid foundation for Hong Kong's enduring future progress. In this regard, we have noted statements by both sides indicating that Hong Kong's way of life will be guaranteed for fifty years from 1997, and that systems existing in Hong Kong will continue in the Special Administrative Region.

We expect the American business communities, both in the United States and Hong Kong, will see in this agreement good reason for sustained confidence in the future of Hong Kong as an attractive and thriving commercial center.

The United States will provide any assistance it can, in close cooperation with the United Kingdom and the

People's Republic of China, to maintain Hong Kong's appropriate participation in international bodies.

That is it.

Q May we have a copy?

A Sure.

Q International what, please?

A Bodies. That's organizations, Mike, *et cetera*. (Laughter)

Q Jordan has decided to resume its full diplomatic relations with Egypt without requesting an abrogation for Camp David Accords as a precondition. Do you have a comment on that?

A Yes, I do have a comment on that: Indeed, Jordan has resumed full diplomatic relations with Egypt effective yesterday, September 25. We welcome this step as helpful to the cause of peace and stability in the region. Secretary Shultz congratulated Egyptian Foreign Minister Abdel Meguid in their meeting in New York yesterday. Assistant Secretary Murphy is in Amman today, and he will personally convey congratulations from President Reagan for this important move by King Hussein. We hope other governments will see it in their interest to move in this direction.

I might also note that I believe the White House will be commenting on some messages that were also sent.

Q May we get a copy of that, please?

A Yes.

Q Why do you think Jordan took this action?

A I'm not going to try to explain the reasons for it, Bernie. I think I would leave that to the governments concerned.

Q Were you aware of it? (Inaudible) before?

A I'm sorry?

Q Were you aware of it?

A I'm not going to get into the question of what diplomatic exchange there might have been. The fact is, we welcome it.

Q How do you interpret it in light of the September One Initiative?

A Again, Jim, I'm really going to stick with what I've given you on this. I'm not going to try to interpret it beyond what we've said, which is that we think it is helpful to the cause of peace and stability in the region. I'm not going to try to take it beyond that in terms of the peace process of September 1 or --

Q You don't think there's any relationship?

A I didn't say that.

Q Oh. (Laughter)

A I said I'm not going to try to interpret it.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the comment of the Israeli Government on the speech by President Reagan in front of the General Assembly, especially regarding the Reagan Initiative?

A No. I think I was asked this yesterday, and I said we've noted the various comments, but don't have anything to say about it.

Q It carries a sort of reemphasis of the refusal by the Israeli Governments of the Initiative.

A Well, as I say, we're aware of the various comments. I think yesterday I was asked about comments in a different direction. Our position on that Initiative and on the peace process remains as it has been, and I don't have any comment on their comments.

Q On to another country: The New Zealand Parliament now has a bill before it to make New Zealand -- to deny any port access to any nuclear ships. Do we have a response?

A I don't have a specific response to that. Our position on that issue is known. I think John Hughes addressed it in giving a readout in New York on -- I don't know whether it was John or was somebody else. I don't know. Anyway, there was a readout on this subject, and I would refer you back to what we've said about the substance, and obviously we'll be continuing to discuss this question with the Government of New Zealand.

Q Has the United States rescheduled any nuclear port calls to New Zealand?

A I'm not aware that there are any at this period, and again I'd refer you -- I think the subject was discussed in New York and I really would prefer that you take your readout from what was given there.

Q Alan, you commented the other day, but I wonder if you could elaborate, having had time, a little more time, to study the Nicaraguan government's embrace of the latest Contadora package for Central America. This Administration has all along said that it supports the Contadora process.

Can you elaborate a bit on the logic of the initial dismissal of Managua's acceptance of this package?

A No. I think that you're obviously quite right in saying we have indeed strongly supported the Contadora process and we do. The various words we had to say about the Nicaraguan action are there; they speak for themselves. The fact is that the text which people are looking at is not an agreed text at this point, and I think that we will want to -- we understand, as I think the Secretary indicated in his briefing, that not only do we see some problems in that, but some of the countries concerned who are dealing with it as part of the Contadora process themselves, some of the Central American countries, see some problems with it. I don't want to speak for them, but they will be addressing this, obviously, and I don't want to get into specifics as to what those problems might be.

Q If I could follow: In that context, is not the Department's initial reaction somewhat premature in that event?

A No. I think that what our reaction reflected was both the facts, in terms of the Nicaraguan actions on elections, which I think were mentioned in our initial response, which are there -- it's not a matter whether they are premature; it's there -- but also reflected, as the Secretary indicated, our understanding not only of our own reading, but of other countries' readings as well. So it's not a question of premature, but it isn't.

I've declined and I'm going to, as I said before, going to have to continue to decline to be specific about which parts of the draft are problems, because that draft has not been made public, and obviously, the countries are addressing it quite intensely at this point.

Q So your position remains that it was an act of hypocrisy for Managua to have accepted --

A Well, I refer back to what we've said; but there was a statement issued Saturday, there was a statement issued on Sunday, and refer you back to what we said at that time.

Q A follow-up on Nicaragua: The Secretary of the Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry, Mr. Bendanas, indicates in the New York Times that Nicaragua might be willing to stop seeking jet fighters if the Central American draft peace treaty takes effect. Do you have any response to that?

A The 21 Points, obviously, address, among other things, the question of weapons in the region, and to that extent, that is addressed in that context. However, as regards advanced aircraft, we have indicated our position on that, in terms of creating instabilities and the problems we would have with that, and that position remains as it has been. That is a matter which stands on its own.

Q Alan, two things on Beirut: One, Dante Fascell said yesterday that the Department's bureaucracy involved in Security Enhancement Program and other efforts to provide security to embassies was a -- I guess he used the phrase -- "bureaucratic mess."

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you have a response to that?

A I don't really. I gather that we got the report this morning. It's classified, and it will be studied. I have a preliminary indication from somebody who has gotten a quick look at it that it referred to a situation which may have existed previously, and so I don't know that I would accept that. I'd be careful in reporting that. But you have to talk to them if you want to get a comment, because we're not going to go beyond this. But I'd be careful to interpret that as a comment upon the current situation.

Q Yesterday some Department officials, including Mr. Spiers, indicated that they didn't feel that any one individual or office had been responsible for any security failure in Beirut. Is it the Department's intention at this point not to fix accountability on any office or individual?

A Ambassador Oakley has come back and made a report to the Secretary. I think he has reported, as I understand it, also to the NSC. There is a team still in Beirut looking at the problem. Obviously, there will be continuing evaluation. I don't think it would be appropriate -- without suggesting that there will or will not be a fixing of responsibility for this, that or the other thing -- I don't think it's appropriate to comment on the measures which might have been taken or which will be taken in the future as a result of this evaluation at this time.

So I think we'll have to leave that in abeyance. But I think his -- he has made his remarks and those are clear.

-- MORE --

Q Alan, can you share any of the Ambassador's findings with us?

A No, I really can't. I think, as I say, that he's just making his reports now. There are further assessments being done; and Ambassador Murphy, who headed that team, along with Ambassador Oakley, when he went out there, is not back yet. He will want to make his reports. And I think people will want to look at this very carefully and not rush ahead.

It isn't a question of trying to hide things, although obviously there are sensitivities on the security front. But I think it's a matter of proceeding in an orderly fashion, and we'll do that.

Q Alan, is it of any concern that, several days after this tragic event, newsmen on the scene were able to demonstrate -- at least yesterday -- that other avenues of approach to that building were totally unprotected --

A Well, --

Q -- and without security at all?

A -- yeah, that may not actually be the case.

First of all, I'd note that we're moving rapidly to eliminate any security deficiencies in the West Beirut Embassy, which was the subject of that report.

But I also would like to correct a number of inaccuracies in press accounts regarding the security at that facility.

First of all, the press account of the alley: the question does not take account of, or take note of, the fact that there's a 14-inch-diameter tree which is in the middle of that alley.

There are also two Embassy cars blocking the entrance to the alley.

There is also a 50-caliber machine gun covering this area.

And, additionally, there is under construction 20,000-pound concrete blocks in that alley.

Now, as far as the rocket-propelled grenade screens are concerned, they are, I am told, 95 percent completed on Building A; and on Building B, pillars are going up and the screen wire will be hung within one week.

Currently, I'm told, there are no employees working in the West Beirut buildings, so that there is nobody there to --

Q Alan, have you exchanged any information on the incident with the Lebanese Intelligence Service?

A I don't think that would be an appropriate subject to get into. Obviously, the question of this bombing is one that, as a general matter, is under discussion between our two governments. It's an obvious subject. But I'm not going to get into the question of intelligence exchange.

Q Some reports suggested that the Lebanese Intelligence Service had a knowledge, or have a knowledge at the present time, who were behind the bombing.

A Yeah. I would -- I'm not -- let me just say I'm not aware of any problem in that regard. But I don't want to go into intelligence exchange.

Q With reference to the Evans and Novak column today -- is that what you're referring to?

A I'm referring specifically to the question of whether there is a problem in exchanging information with the Government of Lebanon.

Q I think it alleges that the Lebanese may know the identity and they're not sharing it with you.

A Well, I'm not going to comment specifically on Evans and Novak. That would break our longstanding rule. (Laughter) But I've answered the substance of that point.

Q Have you ever received a sort of objection, or protest, from the Lebanese Government for using Lebanese Forces as guards on the embassy in East Beirut?

A Well, I refer you back to what I said the other day about who these guards are, and I'm not going to go back and rehash that. These people were hired as individuals, whatever faction they may have belonged to.

I'm not aware, again, of a problem with respect to the guards either at the East Beirut facility or the West Beirut facility in the terms that you're raising. And I don't think anybody's objected to that.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on Congressman Alexander's statement yesterday that the Department, for budgetary reasons, did not spend all the money for the security enhancement program available to it?

A For Beirut?

Q I'm not sure how specific Alexander was.

A Well, I thought that the comment referred to Beirut, and I would say that my understanding is there was a lot going on -- that a lot had been done, there was a lot going on -- and that there was nothing that was in the plan to go on that wasn't being done, for shortage of funds, in Beirut.

There has obviously been a plan to go ahead and do a number of other things; and we've talked about that. And I really have to refer you back, George, to the things I said yesterday, primarily, on that subject: the numbers and the projects -- number of projects, number completed, and so on.

But the fact is that there was work going -- in Beirut, there was work going forward. A lot had been done, most of it at the West Beirut facility. I think we said 75 percent of the total security-enhancement work had been done.

Now, as far as I know, outside, all but the one drop-bar question, in terms of major facilities, were installed --

Q (Inaudible)

A I'm sorry, East Beirut. Thank you. East Beirut -- And so on.

So I don't have anything new to add to that. But there is no suggestion that the security enhancements in Beirut were being held up by a lack of funds.

Q Is it your assessment, as reported in the paper today, that the British bodyguard, of the British Ambassador Miers, was the central player in stopping the attack?

A   I can't say that; I can't say that. We obviously know that there are the reports that he fired and so on, but I don't think we're in a position to make that judgment.

Q   Senator Specter suggested that the U.S. should consider kidnapping terrorists, anti-U.S. terrorists in the world.

A   Should do what? I'm sorry?

Q   Kidnap.

A   We should kidnap terrorists?

Q   Yes. And bring them to trial in the U.S.

A   I see.

Q   Do you have anything on that?

A   No. I think we've avoided the question of retaliation, what we might or might not do.

Q   Do you have any change on casualties in Beirut, or just what you said yesterday?

A   No, I don't have an update on casualties other than to note -- I think I said -- that I understood -- I don't know whether it was before or after -- that the one local -- national employee was going to be brought to the United States today. I think that there's been a delay in that for technical, logistical reasons.

Q   To Philadelphia?

A   To Philadelphia. And I think that's going to be delayed until, at this point, tomorrow.

Q   Alan, do your earlier answers mean that the Lebanese have certain information on who was responsible for the bombing?

A   It meant I was not going to go into the question of exchange of intelligence information at any point.

Q   Does the United States have any information on who is responsible?

A I'm not going to get into the question of intelligence information.

Q Alan, how do you characterize the state of relations between this Administration and the government of Mr. Rashid Karami, Prime Minister of Lebanon?

A Well, our relations with Lebanon are good, important; and we work towards similar goals -- that is, the restoring of Lebanese authority throughout the Government of Lebanon, and protection of the security situation in northern Israel, and the withdrawal of all the foreign forces.

Now, obviously, there are a lot of sub-goals within that; but there's no difference, I think, in terms of those broad objectives.

Q Again I notice that you are not saying they are "very good."

A No, I don't -- don't try and parse it. I haven't got my scale with me to give you one of these. (Laughter)

Q Alan, has there been any additional alert for embassies, posts, since we last noted one had been put out?

A I'm not aware of --

Q Any change in security?

A (To Mr. Matthews:) Frank, is there any new, broad, worldwide alert since three days ago?

MR. MATTHEWS: No.

A No. O.K.

Obviously, I would caveat that by saying that all the time -- you like that word, Bernie? (Laughter) -- all the time we receive reports from all over the world about threats to this or that embassy or this or that person; and those continue, unfortunately, to flow. And so information is passed and action is taken to try to deal with that situation.

But, in terms of a worldwide alert, the answer is no.

Q Can I go back to Central America? I understand that Ambassador -- Are you still? -- O.K., sure.

Q Just one more on Beirut.

Can you elaborate at all on your reaction to the Fascell report, if necessary later in the day?

A No, I don't think so. It's a classified report, and I don't think we would --

Q The Congressman has released, as you know, a summary. He made a rather extensive statement.

A Well, all right. I'll look at it, but I'm not aware of what --

Q And his staff members -- their account of what the report is about conflicts with what you've told us.

A Uh-huh; O.K. Well, let us take a look at it and see.

Q Thank you.

Q I understand that Ambassador Shlaudeman is meeting with the number two of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nicaragua --

A That's right.

Q -- for the sixth time --

A That's right.

Q -- in Mexico. I know that you usually don't talk about this; but is it safe to assume that the reaction, the U.S. reaction, to Nicaragua's acceptance of the act of Contadora will be dealt with in those talks?

A I think it's safe to assume we're not going to talk about the substance of the talks. But I will confirm to you that they are meeting in Manzanillo They met yesterday, are meeting again today. Those talks are supposed to wind up today. This is their sixth session. And Ambassador Shlaudeman will then come back to the United States.

Q They continue after that? Will there be a seventh round?

A I don't have any specific word on it, but I have no reason to assume that those talks are stopping.

Q How do you characterize this round, this --

A Again, the round is still going on. But the talks had been substantive, and I'm sure that is the case of this round as well. I have no doubt of that.

Q If I can follow up on Mexico itself: There was a story in the paper today about the Mexican officials being angered by actions taken -- or allegedly taken -- by the U.S. Ambassador there. Do you have any comment on that?

A Yes. Simply to note that Ambassador Gavin has not exceeded the bounds of his diplomatic responsibilities and we reject the charges as totally unfounded.

Q As what?

A Totally unfounded.

Q I understand that Under Secretary Dam met this morning with the Prime Minister of Peru. Do you have anything on that, please?

A Yes, he did meet with him. The meeting was at 9:30 this morning for about a half an hour. The Prime Minister -- Mr. Mariategui, -- who was in New York for the UN General Assembly, came to Washington to join President Belaunde's party prior to the Peruvian President's meeting with President Reagan tomorrow, his call on him. And while in Washington the Prime Minister took the opportunity to call on the Acting Secretary.

Q Can you talk about the meeting that is going to to take place tomorrow at the White House? I mean, was it to prepare the meeting?

A Well, I don't think it's our custom to get into the question of what they may have talked about; but he did call on him.

Q Do you have anything -- while we're still on Central America -- on the Common Market Central American meeting this week?

A No.

Q One other: Do you have anything on Chad today, after the withdrawal?

A Yes, I have a little bit on that. We've noted media reports that the French have begun implementation of the withdrawal agreement. We're not in a position at this time to comment on whether or not the Libyans have begun to implement the agreement.

We're closely monitoring the situation and are in contact with the French and Chadian Governments on the issue.

I would note the French Government statements that French troops would withdraw only if Libyan forces withdraw.

As we've said, we favor a peaceful solution which preserves Chad's sovereignty and territorial integrity and ends Libya's aggression.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Whereupon, at 12:52 p.m., the briefing was concluded.)

~~[illegible]~~ S / Becker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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Thursday, September 27, 1984

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F-2515

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #176

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1984, 12:32 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. At the beginning, I just wanted to call to your attention an action that was announced yesterday by the Department of Commerce, which is that effective upon publication in the Federal Register on September 28, the United States has imposed additional controls on exports to Iran.

The new controls tighten and extend the anti-terrorism export controls which have been applied to Iran since early this year. Henceforth, a license would be required, and normally not granted, for any exports of aircraft or spare parts for aircraft, regardless of value or weight, and for export of outboard motors of 45 HP and above. Formerly, the controls did not cover aircraft consigned to a commercial carrier or which were valued at less than $3 million, helicopters of less than 10,000 pounds, spare parts or outboard motors. In addition, exports of goods and technology subject to control for national security purposes, regardless of value, if destined for a military end-use or end-user will be subject to denial policy. Formerly, such items were not subject to anti-terrorism controls unless valued at $7 million or more.

All items previously controlled under the anti-terrorism controls, including crime control and detection equipment and certain military vehicles and equipment on the regional stability list, continue to be controlled. The policy of denial for the export of munitions list items, chemical weapons components, and nuclear-related items to Iran also remains in force.

That's it.

Q Copy of that, Alan?

A Yes, if we can get it corrected before I issue it to you.

Q Alan, what prompted this directive?

1-2516

A Well, this has been a matter that has been under consideration for some time. A continuing pattern of Iranian support for terrorism is sufficient to justify those controls. I think we've talked about the fact that policy on exports to Iran has been under study -- that should not a surprise. From time to time, you've asked about it. We said it was being reviewed, and so that what it is.

Q Has it been determined that there was a great abuse of such exports that was contributing significantly to the Iranian war effort?

A I guess I'd say two things about it. First of all, we've had continuing evidence of the Iranian Government's support for international terrorism, and we wanted to minimize the possibility of any legal American contribution to Iran's capability for engaging in such support, so these new measures tighten such export controls.

We think that those regulations were working quite well, but they did leave some latitude which we wanted to remove to make the ground rules clearer to U.S. exporters, or potential exporters, to make the system stronger and to demonstrate the seriousness of our determination to prevent the export of controlled items from the U.S. as long as the Iranian regime continues in its present hostile policies.

Q Does this have any connection whatsoever with the bombings of the American facilities in Beirut? Indirectly, how (inaudible)

A Well, (a) I guess I have to say you're asking me about an intelligence-related matter, and so I can't comment directly, but I repeat what I said to you before, that this has been under review for some time, and there has been a continuing pattern of Iranian support for terrorism. So that is sufficient to justify the controls.

Obviously, the recent incident in Beirut serves to heighten our general concerns about terrorism.

Q What examples of Iranian-sponsored terrorist acts can you cite?

A Don't have anything to give you today beyond what we've talked about in the past.

Q Does this extend -- just to be perfectly clear -- to all aircraft sales of any type and any weight?

A I guess all I can do on this is repeat what I said on this, Jim, and I will do that. But also, if you have further follow-up questions, I think the Commerce Department is the place to address your questions.

"A license would be required, and normally not granted, for any exports of aircraft or spare parts for aircraft, regardless of value or weight." And it also -- well, I think that's pretty straightforward.

Q Does that mean that there is a presumption of denial --

A That's what it sounds like to me.

Q -- and that it could be overcome, with some kind of showing?

A That it would require -- Well, I can't tell you how it would be administered; but as I say, it would normally not be granted.

So, could there be an exception? There are always exceptions possible, but that doesn't mean that there will be any, in fact, granted.

Q What influence would this have on allied countries who also sell to Iran? Does it have any weight with them?

A Well, consideration, as I understand it -- and again, Commerce is the place to get the answers -- but consideration might be given under the new regulations to exceptions to the cases involving either pre-existing contracts or foreign-produced items with a U.S.-origin content of less than 20 percent. But those controls, as I say, have been issued and announced by the Commerce Department, will be administered by them in consultation with the Department of State, and I really think that if you have any follow-up, you ought to go to them.

Q Nothing in there about licensing?

A Sorry?

Q Nothing in there about licensing?

A About licensing? All of this is about licensing.

Q Well, I know -- about parts that are manufactured in foreign countries under license from the United States.

A Again, let me ask you to check with Commerce as to how that would specifically fit in.

Q Are you aware of any large pending requests from the Iranian Government that somehow would now be blocked by this decision?

A I'm not; but again, let me ask you to direct your questions to Commerce. I'm not sure they're able to answer that specific one, but --

-- MORE --

Q Alan, would you be able to say which departments and agencies participated in this review?

A No, I don't have that to give you, Max, I'm sorry. Okay, shall we move on? Anything to move on to?

Q Do you have any information on the long-expected Israeli request for additional aid --

A No.

Q -- to the economic crisis in Israel?

A I keep on getting questions about it and I read about it in the Israeli press, but, no, I don't.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the Murphy mission to Damascus?

A No, not really. Ambassador Murphy is in Damascus.

Q Who is he seeing, please?

A I don't know precisely whom he will be seeing, Mike. I understood that it was likely he would see Mr. Khaddam, but I can't confirm to you that that has actually taken place.

Q He will not see the President?

A I can't tell you that.

Q How long will you expect him to be in Damascus?

A I don't have details, and we have not given you an itinerary, and I am not going to, I am afraid.

Q Alan, is there any feeling that the renewal of relations between Jordan and Egypt will help the 1982 initiatives, Mr. Reagan's Initiative?

A I think I was asked about this yesterday, and as I said then, we welcome it as a contribution to peace and stability in the region, but I am not going to try to speculate on how the peace process or the President's September 1 speech and proposals would be affected.

Q Would you comment on Syria's denouncement of it?

A Not really directly. I don't have any comment on the press articles which report that. I would note the United States supports the territorial integrity, independence, sovereignty and unique and enduring character of Jordan, and, as I said earlier, we welcome the resumption of relations between Egypt and Jordan.

Q Alan, the Senate probably will take up the Kennedy amendment this evening on the aid to the contras. What's the posture of the Administration? Are your legislative people on the Hill up there trying to get votes against the Kennedy amendment?

A Max, as you know, (a) I don't talk about all these stories about aid to contras, and (b) I don't talk about legislative strategy, but (c) I would point out to you that whatever the specifics might be, the President and the Administration stand behind the President's entire Central American program. So I am going to have to leave it at that.

Q Do you have anything further on the Contadora process?

A No.

Q You don't have any new statement at all?

A No.

Q You were saying that the Central American countries will be having something to say, but what they are saying is, despite suggestions in the past about changing it first, that they're ready to sign it, but that more modification will -- not modification -- but more effort will be needed to carry it out after the signing.

A I guess I have seen different statements from the ones you have seen, perhaps. In any case, we have talked about it before. I haven't anything new to add to it. I think we can let those governments speak for themselves and take whatever action it is that they are going to take, so we will see what it is that they say. But I don't agree with you that that's the entire character of what they have been saying.

Q Anything on the Shlaudeman meetings?

A No. I understand they concluded. He is not back, Ambassador Shlaudeman, so I don't have -- I can't say he is back here -- but we do anticipate further meetings. As before, that session, or those sessions were substantive, but I don't have a read-out; don't expect one.

Q Did he go down to Central America?

A Did he go down to Central America? Following that?

Q Uh-huh.

A No. I expect he is coming back here. He has been -- as I think I mentioned before -- he has been in El Salvador. He has travelled back and forth to the region quite a bit, and I think it has been noted in the local press each time he has shown up some place, at least most of the time he has shown up. So his travel to the region is quite frequent, but I believe his itinerary is to come back to Washington from Manzanillo.

Q Alan, any comment on the continuous reaction by the official media of the Soviet Union against the new language used by President Reagan towards the sort of reconciliation with the Soviet Union?

A I'm sorry, reaction -- I missed the first part of it. I apologize.

Q If you have any comment on the passive reaction by the official media of the Soviet Union to President Reagan's speech in the General Assembly.

A No, I don't have anything.

Q Nothing.

A Jim?

Q Can I go back to Central America for a second? There are reports that the Secretary sent notes to his counterparts in Europe and the European Community regarding the upcoming meeting in San Jose in which he said that he supports their efforts but that he would appreciate it if no money of any kind be committed to Nicaragua at that meeting. Can you confirm that?

A No. You say the President or the Secretary?

Q My understanding was the Secretary.

A The Secretary. Well, obviously as a matter of policy we don't generally comment on diplomatic correspondence, but certainly the United States has communicated its views on the situation in Central America to our friends in Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere, and those views include our support for the Contadora process as a framework for the resolution of regional differences, and, more specifically, our support of the 21-point Document of Objectives agreed upon by all the nine Contadora participants. We have encouraged the Europeans to undertake a greater role in promoting economic stability and supporting the strengthening of democratic institutions in the region, and we hope that the upcoming meeting in San Jose will contribute to that end.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q More specifically, did the Secretary or the President send a letter to people in Europe regarding specifically this upcoming meeting?

A More specifically, I don't intend to get into our diplomatic correspondence.

Q Well, more specifically, or yet more specifically, back on Contadora for a second, Duarte said that he would sign the document on the basis of four conditions -- he said that, I guess, yesterday -- one of which, he said, the provisions of the treaty must take effect simultaneously and not in stages. Is that the position that the United States Government thinks is best?

A Jim, I think I have said many times in the last several days, and just a few minutes ago in response to Jim's question, that I am not going to comment further at this point. We have said, I think, what we have to say at this point.

Okay?

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:45 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #177

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1984, 12:16 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. Two announcements, or one statement:

First, on the death of Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, is a statement by the Secretary:

"I'm deeply grieved to learn of the death of Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker.

"This most distinguished diplomat served the nation under seven Presidents. For more than a quarter of a century, following his retirement from business, he undertook difficult assignments for his country. His keen intelligence, patience, superb negotiating skill, judgment, dedication and modesty were known to diplomats and rulers around the world. As Ambassador to Argentina, Italy, India, Nepal, and South Vietnam; as Ambassador-at-Large; as U.S. Representative to the Organization of American States; and as chief negotiator of the Panama Canal Treaties, he scored remarkable achievements that have few parallels in American history.

In recognition of his exceptional service, Ambassador Bunker was appointed a member of the career Foreign Service, achieving the rank of Career Minister. He was proud of this affiliation, and the Foreign Service was too.

"In addition to his public career, Ambassador Bunker found time to serve humanity in such diverse activities as president of the American National Red Cross and founder and chairman of the board of Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. His unique accomplishments pointing toward a better world will be his monuments -- today and in the years to come.

"The Department of State and the Foreign Service join me in extending deepest sympathy to his wife, retired Ambassador Carol Laise, to Ambassador Bunker's children and grandchildren, and to all members of their families."

1-2525

Q . Alan, you have him as Ambassador to Nepal. That was Carol Laise who was Ambassador to Nepal.

A That is correct. Let's get a corrected version issued of this.* (I) apologize for that.

On the arrival of injured from Beirut -- and I will put out the list of names so I won't go through all the spellings for you. O.K.?

Seven of the American employees who were among the most seriously injured in the recent explosion at the Embassy in Beirut will arrive at Andrews Air Force Base from Germany. The estimated arrival time is 4:00 p.m. I emphasize "estimated."

They are -- well, let me put out the names for you instead of reading them all to you at this point.

Arrangements have been made for them to receive further treatment. They will be met at the airport by Robert Lamb, Assistant Secretary of State for Administration; Ambassador Henry Cohen, who is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Personnel and the Foreign Service; Robert H. Pelletreau, who is Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

Photo opportunities will be at Andrews Air Force Base only. The media center there will open at 2:30. State Department press credentials will be required.

I understand that most of these individuals have their own plans for onward treatment, including hospitalization. The only one that I know of that is going to be taken care of here immediately by us will be Mr. Bigler, who is the Regional Security Officer. He will be going to Fairfax Hospital where, as I understand it, there is to be a medical briefing only -- not an interview or anything of that sort -- but a medical briefing tomorrow, Saturday; and the contact there would be Judy Abbott, who is in their Public Affairs Office there at 698-3481.

Q Sorry, Alan, did you say they are U.S. employees or Lebanese employees, or both?

A No; American employees. The American employees.

---

* See clarification on Page 4.

1-2526

Q Seven?

A Seven. Yes. I think that the -- we talked about one local national employee going to the eye hospital. I think that she already has gone there.

Q What's this medical briefing?

A Just for anybody who's interested in terms of his medical condition.

Q You mean just on Bigler?

A Just on Bigler. He's the only one going there, to my knowledge.

Q What's the number again, please?

A Sorry. 698-3481. O.K.?

Q Alan, speaking of embassies, do you have anything about the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Lima today?

A I have a little bit on that, yes. According to our Embassy in Lima, shortly after midnight, four or five individuals fired shots at the Embassy from a park across the street. The Peruvian police guards, the civil guard, stationed at the Embassy returned the fire, and the assailants escaped the scene in a getaway car.

As of this morning, no suspects have been arrested in connection with the case, nor has anyone claimed responsibility for the attack. The Embassy, which is normally on a high state of alert in any case, is taking even further precautions. There were no injuries at the Embassy, which was unoccupied except for the Marine security guard; and damage was limited to a few broken windows, splintered window frames, and some damage to curtains.

Q This state of high alert was the result of the attack on the Beirut Embassy?

A I think that, certainly, that was the most recent general notice that went out to them on this, yes.

I think I would also note that my understanding is that Under Secretary Spiers sent out a message worldwide a couple of days ago as well -- a personal message; it wasn't an alert of a sort of coordinated,

1-2527

interagency alert-type -- but it was a personal message to security officers which said to them: "Take a look at what you're doing."

By the way, I'm told, George, that this notice was correct, that Ambassador Bunker was Ambassador to Nepal from 1956-1959, whereas Ambassador Laise served there as Ambassador from 1966-1973.

Q Alan, did you mention India as well?

A Yes.

Q Alan, to follow up on the Peru thing, isn't there also a possibility that the attack may have been connected to some national political conditions there rather than just to Beirut?

A Oh, I'm not trying to connect it, and I didn't think the question was trying to connect it to Beirut specifically. And if there is any implication that I was --

Q Well, but I mean the high state of alert in the Embassy would have been a result of the Embassy's and the --

A All the embassies -- well, I say the most recent broad alert that was sent out worldwide was with respect to Beirut. I think that all of the Latin posts are on their own additional alert. I'm sure that other posts around the world are, too. It's hard to chronicle the various alerts and the various threats that exist, but everybody is more than well aware of the threats.

Q Was this machine-gun fire at the Embassy, as reported?

A The only thing I've got for you, Jack, is what I've just given you.

Q Alan, do you know if the Sendero Luminoso had threatened the Americans there or had even threatened an attack against the Embassy?

A I guess I wouldn't talk about specific threats, Jim. I'm sorry.

Okay. Anything else?

Lester?

Q New subject?

A Sure.

Q Could you tell us, Alan, what difference there is between Secretary Shultz describing Mr. Gromyko's U.N. speech as -- and I'm presuming this is an accurate quote in the Washington Post -- "Yet another misrepresentation of history and distortion."

What is the difference between this and a statement that Gromyko has told more lies and is, therefore, a liar?

A I think that we prefer to choose our own words, Lester, when we makes statements -- that includes from this podium or from any other podium in government, including by the Secretary -- and I'm not going to try to --

Q I understand.

A -- interpret --

Q If there is any --

A -- I'm not going to try to interpret remarks for you.

Q Just to follow up -- I understand. Now if there is any difference, why won't you, for the Secretary's sake, point it out unless you can't find any, because I can't find any? When he says --

A I try --

Q -- it's another misrepresentation and a distortion, that suggests to me that he is saying, in effect, that Mr. Gromyko is a liar.

A Well --

Q Can you tell me why we shouldn't draw this conclusion?

A I'm not trying to tell you why you should or shouldn't draw conclusions on --

Q I see.

A I think that --

Q -- There is no difference. O.K.

A I think that the Secretary's words were rather strong, they spoke for themselves --

Q Yes. Marvelous.

A So I'll leave it at that.

Q But you won't, you can't site any reason why we can't conclude that what he was really saying is, "Gromyko is a liar?"

A I tend not to interpret the Secretary's words for you.

Q O.K.

-- MORE --

1-2530

Q -- Alan, did --

Q Another question on Latin America. At this time do you have any response or reaction to the Hondurans not allowing Salvadoran soldiers to be trained at the Regional Training Center?

A Yes, I do have something on that.

We've been holding discussions with the Government of Honduras on the establishment of a permanent Regional Military Training Center for use by friendly countries in the Hemisphere. These discussions are continuing. Meanwhile, the Government of Honduras has decided that no additional foreign military personnel be trained at the RMTC pending a final agreement. We, of course, respect the Honduran decision.

Q Does that mean that -- I mean, the U.S. respects the Honduran decision, but will it take no action and will agree to that and continue training Honduran soldiers or --

A Well, for the immediate future, yes; we expect to continue the training of Honduran military personnel at the RMTC. I would note that the Salvadoran units that are currently there will complete their training schedule. But, as I said, the discussion continues, so I would emphasize that to you.

Q One follow-up on that is: If you can't train Salvadoran soldiers there, where are you going to train them? Will you increase the number of military advisors in El Salvador?

A Well, specifically to answer that question, there are no current plans to increase the number of U.S. trainers in El Salvador. Beyond that, and more generally, we are discussing with the Salvadorans this question, and we're confident that we can find alternatives if that proves necessary.

Again, as I say, the discussions with Honduras are continuing, and I just don't have any details beyond that at this point.

Q Do you have any information on new training exercises being planned for Honduras?

A I don't, and in any case, George, I guess I'd have to refer you to the Pentagon. But I don't have any information on it.

Q What about training in the United States?

A I'm sorry; I can't hear you.

Q I'm sorry. What about training in the United States?

A As I said, we're discussing this. I just don't -- not that specific thing, but we're discussing the question of if it's necesssary what will we do. And I don't have any details, Jim.

Q And can you characterize in any way how the United States feels about this decision?

A I'm going to have to leave you with the words I've already given you.

Q One final: Will the United States seek to involve itself more directly in the Honduran-Salvadorean border negotiations --

A Well, again --

Q -- as a result?

A -- I just don't have any words to offer you beyond what I've just said.

Q Can you take those questions?

A No, I don't think so.

Q Another area?

A Yes.

Q Would you just have anything to tell us about how the Middle East rated during the talks between Secretary Shultz and Mr. Gromyko?

A No, I wouldn't get into that. There was, as I'm sure you're aware, a BACKGROUND briefing on the subject of those talks following the talks, and I refer you to that. But I don't have anything to say.

1-2532

Q -- Anything about Mr. Murphy's tour in the Middle East?

A He's in Beirut, but I don't have anything to give you about his onward travel.

Q At what point does -- I asked the same question of John earlier in the week -- at what point does Mr. Murphy's mission become shuttle diplomacy? How many times does he have to visit different countries before you begin to recharacterize the fact that he's not just testing the waters?

A I would not recharacterize it. As he himself explained it, he's on an exploratory mission. He's talking about various ideas. He's visited the places we have indicated. But it would be incorrect to talk about him engaged in some sort of formal negotiating or mediating role. At this point, I can't -- should it evolve to that --

Q Even though he keeps going back and forth?

A Well, I don't think I'd quite say he keeps going back and forth. I think he has been to a couple of places twice.

Q And three times is the charm? (Laughter)

I'm serious.

A No -- I'm serious too. And I would not expect that on this trip you would find there would be a recasting of his mission.

Q Do you have any comment on the Syrian statements about Jordan's decision to resume diplomatic relations with Egypt?

A I had something on this yesterday, Jim. Basically, we did not comment on those statements or the reports of those statements directly but called attention to our views of Jordan and of the agreement between Jordan and Egypt. And I refer you to the Press Office on the specific language on that.

Q Because the ones coming today sound pretty threatening.

A -- Well, I think again I would refer you to what we said yesterday. It's in the Press Office, and I'll give it to you. I don't have it with me; I'm sorry.

Q Don't you see any contradiction between the reaction of this Administration to the agreement between Libya and Syria -- sorry -- between Libya and Morocco, as two Arab countries, and the reaction to the resuming of diplomatic relations between Jordan and Egypt?

A Don't I see -- ?

Q Any contraction --

A -- a contradiction?

Q -- in your reaction?

A I think that our concerns about Libya are quite of an order of their own and well- or oft-repeated. So I don't think that there's anything in the Egyptian-Jordanian situation which is a parallel with that, nor is the action the same action.

Lester?

Q One of the editors of the New Republic has noted that last June Secretary Shultz indicated that the U.S. might make preemptive strikes against terrorist groups. And I recall the President's 1981 promise that any terrorism against Americans would be met with "swift and effective retribution."

A As you have reminded us several times now already.

Q Well, I think it was a promise made.

A Go ahead, Lester.

Q And that, they say, is a debt unpaid.

Since Mr. Kondrake (sic) says that this seems Shultz --

A Since who said this?

Q Kondracke.

A Kondracke. I'm sorry.

Q Kondracke.

A Yes.

Q -- says that this seems like talk only and the Administration is acting as though no one knows anything about this Islamic Jihad, would the Administration be willing to consult the Mussad or do you find favor in Mr. Kondrake's (sic) suggestion to either beef up our intelligence or rebuild our embassies underground?

That's his suggestion --

A Well --

Q -- and not mine.

A Fine. I don't think we're going to respond to all the specific suggestions. But I would say that the Secretary was asked several times recently about the question of retaliation. He has answered those questions the way he wanted to, and I refer you to the record on that.

Q Well --

A It is essentially that we're not going to talk about retaliation -- about doing it, not doing it, or otherwise --

Q Sure.

A -- we're not going to talk about retaliation.

Q It hasn't been ruled out, though.

A I say we're not going to talk about it. And in terms of --

Q But that means it has not been ruled out.

A -- and in terms of security, obviously, that is a subject of intense interest and intense activity.

Q But you're not considering building under ground, are you?

A I hadn't heard that, Lester, no.

Q Well, you haven't heard it? O.K.

A Yes.

Q Alan, did you come to any conclusions out of the study of the text of the agreement between Libya and Morocco?

A I haven't got anything anything new to say on that today.

Jim?

Q Do you have anything today on Nicaragua, either Cruz's statement or Ortega's, or Ortega's travel plans?

A Well, on the Arturo Cruz Op-Ed piece in the paper today, I would simply commend it to your careful reading, but I --

Q Can we get a copy of the column? (Laughter)

A I'm afraid you have to spend money on it. (Laughter.)

Q Is that it?

A I have no substantive, detailed comment on it.

As far as Mr. Ortega's comments are concerned, I think we have indicated before our position that we think there are some problems with the draft as it now stands. We understand that a number of the Central American countries share the view that there are problems, and they will be discussing that. I don't have a specific response, however.

Other than that, clearly we have -- I think there was some suggestion that we have a plan to invade or something like that, and that is obviously absurd.

Q Is Ortega free to go to L.A.?

A Yes. He applied for a visa to go to New York and to Los Angeles, and that's been approved.

Could you be more specific this time about your problems with the Contadora draft?

1-2536

A No. I don't think I really can be more specific. No, I'm going to have to leave it at that.

Barry?

Q I got the answer.

A O.K.

Q Why didn't you use yesterday's painstaking guidance on that?

A Yesterday?

Q During the briefing.

A Yesterday -- what, the question about the EC 10 meeting? Well --

Q No. The Contadora.

Q One last question on another subject: Since the Reagan Administration is very strongly opposed to the expansion of Marxism in Central America, why is it that we're still giving -- I think it's $30 million -- to the expansion of Marxism in Zimbabwe, now that Comrade Mugabe has announced a Politburo --

A Well --

Q -- and a definite one-party system? Could you explain that?

A -- Lester, I don't think that anybody is giving aid to the expansion of Marxism. But --

Q You think that's not a Marxist government?

A -- in any case, there has been a lot of testimony in terms of aid programs; and I refer you to that.

Q But, I mean, are you saying as the Spokesman of the State Department that Mugabe's Government is not at all Marxist?

A I'm saying that --

Q Is that what you're saying?

A I'm saying that we are not giving aid for the purpose of expanding Marxism, and --

Q Why are you giving aid to Mugabe?

A As I say, there's a lot of testimony on aid, and I refer you to --

Q And you love to evade.

A No, --

Q O.K. That's fine.

A I just think that there's been extensive testimony --

Q I understand. It's a painful --

A No --

Q -- thing, Alan.

A Do you want to keep on talking or do you want to listen?

Q I'd be delighted!

A Good.

There is extensive testimony on aid programs, and I think that you ought to take those carefully considered words.

Yes.

Q Can you tell me whether the Administration has lodged a protest to the Chinese Government about the Amnesty International report on human rights abuses there?

A For those who couldn't hear it, the question is: has the U.S. Government lodged a protest to the Chinese Government over the allegations of human rights abuses in the Amnesty International report?

I think that there is some guidance on this report that came out the other day, and I refer you to it;

but essentially our view on the situation on human rights is explained, laid out, in the annual Human Rights Reports, and I would refer you to that.

Q But you can't say whether there was a protest?

A I wouldn't have anything on that.

Q Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 12:37 p.m., the briefing was concluded.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #178

MONDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1984, 12:18 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A couple of housekeeping announcements before I go to questions. First, available in the Press Office is the text of the remarks given by Deputy Secretary Dam this morning at the White House to the National United Jewish Appeal leaders. Also, the text of the statement given by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Jim Dobbins, before the House Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East will be available in the Press Office at 2:00 p.m.

Q What's that on, Canada?

A That's a question. Brian, what is the subject of Dobbins' -- ?

A All right. Let's get that. See if we can tell you. Sorry.

Also, to tell you that while I will be willing to take some questions on the Contadora process and so forth, there will be a BACKGROUND briefing this afternoon at 2:30 here in the briefing room. It will cover the Contadora process and the meeting of the European and Latin American Foreign Ministers in San Jose, Costa Rica.

That is it for announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, can you tell me what role, if any, the United States has regarding the six fugitives that are in the British Consulate in Durban? Has the Ambassador there received some type of a warning, message, what-have-you, from the Foreign Minister not to become involved?

A As to facts, our Embassy in Pretoria received a telex on Saturday from counsel for the six, which asks that we provide sanctuary for them. I would

1-2541-[illegible]

note that the same request was made to the French, to The Netherlands, and West German Governments as well. The Embassy passed the telex containing that request to us; we're studying it. Our policy, basically, in answer to questions of this sort, is that while a decision on refuge status must be made by an officer on the scene, it now appears that at this time there is no imminent or immediate threat to life or safety of the six at the British Consulate in Durban.

Q Well, what about the Ambassador and his communication with the Foreign Minister?

A I don't think I'm going to go into the diplomatic dialogue between us, but that's the -- what I've given you is the status of where that communication to us by counsel and our consideration of it rests.

Q Alan, does that policy line have any relationship to a case -- apparently a few weeks ago in East Germany, some fellow with his family went to the Embassy and asked for asylum and were evicted, and now he's been put in the "pokey" for a while. Do you know anything about that case -- the name of Schnappauf?

A Yes. We've seen the reports and so on, but we really don't have any comment on that. Again, as I say, we don't comment specifically on individual cases, so I guess I'm going to have to leave you with that.

Q Is there a policy --

A Well -

Q -- that applies generally to people who come to embassies seeking refuge?

A I guess there are two things to say in terms of refuge policy. To go back -- well, in general, we consider offering temporary refuge for humanitarian reasons in extreme or exceptional circumstances where the life or safety of a person is in imminent danger, such as when being pursued by a mob. Protection is normally terminated when the period of active danger is ended. So, on refuge, that is the case.

In terms of asylum, U.S. law does not provide for embassies abroad to grant asylum. That can only be

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offered within the United States. We do not encourage people to believe that they can force their own authorities to grant them exit permits by staging their protests in a U.S. embassy. On the other hand, we deplore the restrictions on free travel which give rise to the type of case that you have just alluded to.

Marvin?

Q On another subject?

Q Can we stay on this?

A All right, Jim. Go ahead.

Q Did the United States receive a message from the South African Government regarding this?

A As I say, we're not going to get into the diplomatic exchange.

Q -- just to say whether or not any message passed?

A No.

If I may go back on Jim Dobbins' statement, it is on issues relating to the NATO Alliance.

Okay, Marvin?

Q On the Middle East, is the U.S. now involved in supporting, perhaps even pushing a new effort, to get Israeli troops out of southern Lebanon based on some understanding with the Syrians that Syrian troops would not reoccupy or go into that area, or Palestinian extremists would not go into that area?

A We have talked about this for some days, Marvin, as you know. There was a report this morning that the U.S. had presented a plan, was acting as a mediator. The fact is, the U.S. has presented no plan and is not acting as a mediator.

As we've indicated before, Assistant Secretary Murphy took advantage of his presence in the region to visit key capitals and to hold discussions with a number of leaders on a variety of regional and bilateral problems. Among them was the question of the situation in Lebanon, and his talks with Lebanese leaders and with others were exploratory. He has returned to the U.S., as the Secretary indicated yesterday; he has reported to the Secretary, and it remains to be seen whether the United States can play a role.

Q When you say, Alan, that the United States is not acting as a mediator, is that because there is not yet agreement by the two parties to a U.S. role?

A Well, first of all, I think that there are three principal parties involved in that situation. But I think that beyond that, is simply a statement of fact that we are not. We have indicated that we would not enter into such a role without agreement of all the parties. We have said we would do what we could to be helpful, but at the present time the extent of what we have done is, during Assistant Secretary Murphy's travel, to explore various ideas during this trip and to have him come back and report to the Secretary.

Q Well, the Secretary is meeting today with the Israeli Foreign Minister, and I guess will be meeting tomorrow and the next day with the Syrians and the Saudis. Are those meetings intended to try to -- I won't say secure agreement, but to -- find out if those parties want the United States to become the mediator?

A I think that you have to look at those meetings in a broader context, that is to say, they were arranged in terms of the usual consultations that take place at the U.N. General Assembly. At the same time, I think it's quite possible, even likely, that the subject of Lebanon would come up in some, if not all, of those meetings. I can't predict that for sure, but it seems to me a logical subject for discussion.

Q I just want to be clear, you're not shirking off here a willingness to play a role in this, are you?

A No. We have said we would be willing to be helpful; but the nature of that role and whether we indeed can be helpful depends on circumstances which have not taken place yet.

(MORE)

1-2545

Q Do you think that the Israeli prerequisites that there be no new terrorism, that the Syrians control the terrorists behind their own lines, be no introduction of Syrian or PLO forces in the south, are reasonable preconditions?

A I am not going to get into specifics. I am not going to -- by the way, by saying that -- accept that those are necessarily Israeli positions, but I just don't think that at this point I can take you into the specifics of what various parties do believe.

Q Alan, when you say that circumstances have not yet taken place and that the U.S. has indicated it will not enter into such a role without the agreement of the three parties, does that mean that, conversely, we have run into a rebuff from one of the parties, that they do not want to see the United States play such a role?

A You are asking me to get into the details of the discussions, in a sense, or at least --

Q Of course.

A -- surprise, surprise! I guess I would decline to get into the specifics, Bernie, but I would also say to you that I would not rule out a role. But I would -- again based on what we know so far -- but I would again caution you the U.S. is not playing a mediating role at this point. That was not what Mr. Murphy's trip was about.

Q Yes, but, Alan, you are not answering the question.

A Yes, I know, but I think I have answered it as best I can at this point. As I say, based on what we know thus far, I am not ruling out the possibility that the U.S. could play such a role.

Q Well, based on what you know so far, it is possible that we haven't got the three acquiescences we need to trigger a U.S. role?

A Well, I think I would have to leave you where I just did.

Q Alan, the BBC said this morning that Israel had agreed to withdraw the troops pursuant to an arrangement by the United States with Syria. That's incorrect, then?

1-2546

A I am not speaking for the Government of Israel. That is reporting an Israeli position that you are telling me they have taken. I'm not going to address the specific positions at this point. I can only tell you where we are, and that's where we are.

Q Then as far as you know, there is not such a withdrawal agreement?

A I think the best I can do, again, I am not sure that I read anything which said there was any agreement. I think the best I can do is describe for you where we are in this process, and I have done that.

Q They said there was a plan that had been brought --

A Bill, I just said I am not going to -- we have not presented a plan, we are not engaged in mediation. I don't think I can say it any more plainly, but I am also not going to be able to get into more detail.

Q Alan, you are saying that the United States is exploring ideas. The question is, are you exploring new ideas or old ideas, your ideas or the other's ideas?

A Ideas. I really am not going to get into the details of the discussions.

Q That is two words -- new or old? Yours or theirs?

A Why don't we just try "ideas?"

Q Alan, this morning, since Mr. Shamir, the Israeli Foreign Minister, made the statement at the United Nations that he asked the United States to be actively involved, do you consider yourself that you will be actively involved because you have some caveats about your involvement until there are some conditions to be met?

A I think I have described as best I can, anyway -- and I am sorry if it is not adequate -- but I have described as best I can where we are in this process, what Assistant Secretary Murphy was doing during his travel, where we are now, the fact that there are going to be other discussions up in New York and here that will presumably touch on this subject. That is about as far as I can go.

Q Let me ask in a different way. Had Lebanon asked you to, at the present time, after Mr. Shamir said what he said in the United Nations, to be involved in trying to bring about a settlement?

A That's getting me back to the question, I think, that I indicated to Bernie is as far as I can take you on it.

Q New subject?

A No, let's finish this one.

Q Alan, will Mr. Murphy publish the results of the investigation he did in Beirut lately?

A On the bombing?

Q Yes.

A There are still people, as I understand it, who either are in Beirut or just recently left. Obviously people are going to continue to piece together the facts. I can't tell you what may happen to the results of those investigations. Obviously there is a great deal of interest within the Administration in getting the exact facts in terms not only of what happened but also what can be done to prevent recurrence. There is obvious interest on the Hill. We know there is public interest, and we will just have to see what can be done within the confines of security considerations to make that information public.

Q Alan, could we request a background briefing from Mr. Murphy sometime within the next few days?

A No, I don't think so. I think it is pretty clear that that is not possible, but we will keep in mind the obvious interest in the subject, and as it can be presented publicly, we will do that.

Q To follow up on the same question, please, Mr. Murphy raised the bombing question with the Syrians and the Israelis during his talks?

A I am not going to get into the question of what he discussed with individual parties other than the fact that, obviously, we are cooperating with the Lebanese Government authorities on this, but I don't think in terms of going around and saying what he discussed with whom is going to be very much -- very productive. Jim?

1-2548

Q Do you have any comment on the southern Lebanon ban on Beirut-based correspondents going there?

A Not in any specific way. Obviously our views on freedom of the press are clear and well known, but I don't have any specific comment on that.

Q Do you have any comment, Alan, on the European decision to extend economic aid to Central America, including Nicaragua, in light of the reported letter from Secretary Shultz advising them against reaching such a conclusion?

A Well, it is not clear to me what specifically the -- cn the economic side of things -- what was done. I think that we have had parts of the communique that was issued, read to us over the phone, but to my knowledge at this point we don't have the full text; and in any case I would say that if there is some aid decision that has been taken by that group with respect to Central American, then that is their decision.

I might note, though, in light of some of the reporting this morning, which I think was misleading in the way it described the communique, that we agree with the San Jose communique that the Contadora process has made real progress and that the second draft represents an important step in that process. That was the gist of the Secretary's remarks on September 23rd.

At the same time, it is clear that the drafting process is not over. The Central Americans have been requested to offer their suggestions by October 15th, and I understand that there may be another draft that is in the works already.

A key point is the need for all of the provisions, including those on troop levels, armaments, and foreign advisers, to go into effect at the same time. In the current draft, those issues are left open for future negotiations that may or may not ever take place.

A second point is verification. Most countries agree that any treaty should provide inspection teams with the authority and the technical means to do their job. It would also seem that Nicaragua's rush to preempt the process involving the Contadora Act was designed to take the spotlight off one of the key issues -- the fairness of its elections. One must question how sincere the

1-2549

Nicaraguans are on the treaty's democracy principles if they shut out Arturo Cruz and the major opposition parties of the Coordinadora from their elections. This further points to the need for adequate verification.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Yes.

Q Alan, do you have any comment in that respect with the article that appeared in the Post that the United States was encouraging its allies in Central America to submit new proposals that may now be in the working?

A I don't have a specific comment on that, Jim. I think I did indicate last week that we talk with our friends and allies in various places, including in Central America, and the region in general, and also elsewhere about our views on things, and that is hardly a great surprise.

Q Where is the new draft in the working? Is the United States contributing anything to this new draft?

A Well, the draft is not a draft of the United States to -- of a document which the United States would sign. It is a document which the Contadora countries -- that is, the nine -- would sign.

As I said, the process is now at a stage where comments are due by October 15th from the Central American countries, so.

Q Well, is the United States contributing ideas to this new draft?

A I think I have addressed myself to the question of our views and the fact that, sure, we talk with people, but --

Q Alan, are you saying here that we are reserving judgment on whether we will support the outcome of the Contadora process or not?

A No, I think what I am saying is that we strongly support the Contadora process, as we have consistently. In terms of the specifics of this draft, we have said this is a good next step, that we have said there are problems, and I have identified to you today some of the areas where we think some of those problems lie; also where we understand a number of the Central American countries think problems lie. So I don't think there is any either purpose or really any way to take it beyond that at this point. They will make their comments, and I think that is the next step in this process.

Q When did the United States begin saying they had problems with the current draft?

A Well, I don't have a date to give you. I think that our concerns, however, have been consistent since we have been aware of the provisions of that draft.

Q Prior to Nicaragua's acceptance?

A Oh, yes.

Q Has Ambassador Shlaudeman been talking to the Central American governments in the past ten days, two weeks, on this subject?

A I don't know, George, whether he has or hasn't specifically. He has been in the region, I think, in that period of time, because we talked about it in connection, for example, travel to El Salvador in connection with his trip to -- his talks in Manzanillo. So the fact that he has had conversations is quite clear, but I really don't have anything to say beyond what I have said about talking with them.

Q Alan, what I was trying to drive at is, are there new, strong reservations about the Contadora process itself?

A No. As I say, we are very strongly supportive of the process.

Q Are you saying that until the issues that you outlined are completely resolved, the United States will not support the Contadora treaty?

A I am saying that we have reservations and problems about certain provisions of this draft. As I said, I understand there may even be another draft that is underway. Certainly the countries in the region who have been asked to comment by October 15th haven't done that, so let's let that process go forward. It isn't a question of really our taking a position beyond that at this time.

Q But you seem to be laying down preconditions for the U.S, U.S. agreement to -- is that true?

A I am not trying to lay down preconditions, I am explaining what our position is, and I think you can perhaps pursue this subject further at the backgrounder this afternoon.

Q In Central America, since you are talking about that, do you have any comment on a report over the weekend that El Salvador has cluster bombs made in Israel?

A I believe you are misquoting, frankly, the reports. I think the reports had to do with napalm, not cluster bombs, and I think --

Q Either way is killing.

A I think that Ambassador Pickering indicated that to the best of our knowledge Salvadoran armed forces are not using napalm. We are aware that they have some stocks, but we have no reason to believe -- on the basis of the evidence that we have seen -- that they have used them.

Q Where do these napalm bombs -- if they are not made in Israel, where do they come from?

A You will have to ask the Salvadorans. The fact is we did not supply napalm to Salvador, but it is not up to us to comment on where Salvador gets all of its military equipment.

Q Alan, before you leave Central America, is there any possibility that the Secretary of State will meet Mr. Ortega in New York during the week?

A I guess you would have to check with John on that. I am not aware of any plan for such a meeting, though.

Q New subject?

A Sure.

Q No, on Central America, I would like to ask one question. Do you have anything new on where the Salvadoran soldiers who were supposed to be trained in Honduras are going to be trained next?

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A No. I think I indicated last week that we are looking at the question of how that would be handled. I would also emphasize, as I said before, that is last week, that the discussion with Honduras about the use of the Regional Military Training Center is, discussions are still underway.

Q Do you anticipate any decision on that soon, this week, or -- ?

A I cannot project that for you. Bernie.

Q Do you, Alan -- Monday, therefore, do you have any assessment as to what the talks that the President and Shultz had with Gromyko will lead to at this particular point? For example --

A Not other than what has already been given.

Q You have nothing -- ?

A Nothing new. I mean, you have had a briefing, you have had the Secretary on television, you had Mr. McFarlane on television. I think we will leave it with their remarks.

Q Can you just take one question on that area? Whether there is any specific agreement to continue -- I'm sorry, I phrased that the wrong way -- whether any specific talks are scheduled?

A I think that it was made clear in briefings you have gotten and in the way that it was addressed by the Secretary and Mr. McFarlane that what we anticipate is that each side will review the record of these talks, and we would expect that we would be in touch through our embassies with the Foreign Ministry and the State Department as the next step in that.

Q There is nothing now scheduled, even on the cultural agreements, or anything like that?

A I think that there are a lot of things that are ongoing. There is discussion ongoing, for example, on the cultural exchange agreement that has been going on for some time now, and that will continue. So that there are a number of specific things. I'm sorry, I thought you meant with respect to the discussions held this weekend, but there are various arms control kinds of talks that are ongoing, the exchanges talks are ongoing.

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Q On the discussions that were held over the weekend, there is nothing scheduled?

A Nothing beyond what I have given you. Jim?

Q Just briefly on Central America again, today is the beginning of FY '85, so the cap with respect to certain kinds of programs in Central America has expired. Can you tell us what the position of the Reagan Administration is with regard to the absence of a cap or absence of legislation now in force?

A I try not to address certain kinds of programs.

Q You have addressed this issue in the context of whether or not the United States would encourage other governments to fill the gap, and I think this kind of falls into that same area, and is worthy of an answer.

A I think it is fair enough to say that the Administration is well aware of the fact that the Congress is still considering legislation which may be acted upon shortly, and I will leave it at that.

Q Alan, about this napalm, Israeli napalm, in the hands of the Salvadoran Government, do you mean that --

A I didn't say that there was Israeli napalm in the hands of the Salvadoran Government. I said we are aware that the Salvadorans have stocks of napalm. I can't talk about the source of it. I don't know.

Q It's okay. About the napalm and the stock in Salvador: you say that they didn't use it. Do you mean that you don't start to be concerned unless they are used? I mean the mere fact that they are having napalm is not a cause of concern to you?

A Well, I guess the question is what you would expect us to do about it. I think that our confidence about their not having used it -- without getting too deeply into intelligence sources and methods -- regarding that I would say that we fly over virtually every inch of El Salvador almost every day and we have taken more detailed looks at controversial bombings, and we have never seen any indication of the use of napalm or other incendiary bombs.

Q But if it extended to other kinds of weapons, such as nuclear, such as chemical, biological weapons, it would be a new principle?

A There are a lot of countries in the world, I suspect including the United States, that have napalm in inventory. I think the question here really is one of use, and we have no reason to believe it has been used.

Q Ambassador Bartholomew is back in Washington. Is he here on a private visit or for consultations?

A You know more than I do. I am not aware that he is back in Washington. Did you see him?

Q No. Some people told me that he is here.

A I'll check on that.

Q Alan, can I go back to the supposedly purported agreement of withdrawal? If such a unit will be -- I understand that it will be a major role for the United Nations forces, American forces. What role do you see there in that?

A Again, I am not going to try to get into the specifics of what might be involved in some hypothetical situation in the future. I think we will let the diplomacy go forward on that and not try to pronounce on it publicly. Mike?

Q Alan, a newspaper in Tokyo reporting that Soviet Far Eastern Forces were placed on alert for thirty minutes after the President's comment regarding outlawing the Soviet Union. Are you aware of that report? Are you aware that those forces did go on alert? Do you have any comment?

You are asking me to get, I guess, into the question of intelligence activities and so on. I guess that I'll have to pass you by on that one, Mike. I'm not aware of that kind -- I'm not aware of a crisis atmosphere.

Bill.

Q The U.S. also went on alert following --

A U.S. forces?

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Q Yes -- following the Soviets going on alert. Can you comment on that?

A Well, why don't you let Mike Burch comment on that.

Q Alan, you said earlier that the U.S. law doesn't provide for embassies granting asylum.

A Overseas, that's right.

Q What's the distinction between that and what Cardinal Mindszenty had and that Baptist family had in Moscow?

A I think it is a question of refuge, not asylum.

Q Alan, do you have anything on events in the Koreas over the weekend, and the latest South Korean offer?

A Well, we are happy in terms of the transfer of goods that went on. We are happy that the transfer went smoothly and we welcome developments which lower tensions on the Korean peninsula.

Q Is the South Korean offer today consistent with that?

A I guess you are ahead of me on what that offer is, so I can't answer you.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the 35th anniversary of Communist rule in China, and also, for the first time, China is telling that they have nuclear missiles, especially at a time that this Administration has supported a nuclear program in China.

A You are saying for the first time they have nuclear missiles? I don't think that is the first time, if they have said it today, but in any case I don't have any comment on their anniversary.

Did somebody in the back have a question?

Q Thank you.

A Okay, you are welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:48 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #179

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1984, 12:05 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Okay, I don't have any announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Mr. Ortega said the United States is planning an invasion for October 15, but he left a lot of questions unanswered. Could you fill in the blanks?

A One is tempted to give frivolous answers in response to that, but basically, the fact is that that is obviously absurd.

Q Do you have any other guidance with respect to his other allegations in this morning's speech?

A Haven't had a chance, George, to look at it. I'm not sure that we would respond.

I might note, though, that Mr. Ortega had a few other things to say yesterday, apparently, in talking with some correspondents in New York, and through his own words, he has only underscored the concerns which we have raised over the last several days with regard to the sincerity to the Nicaraguans' commitment both to the Contadora process and related to that, but also, specifically, to democratic elections.

For example, although last night on television a Foreign Ministry spokesman here in the United States claimed that the Nicaraguan position on the Contadora process and this draft act is not absolutist, Mr. Ortega, who is the Head of State, flatly says that, "There is no time for modifications, no time for further discussions, and that any modifications would only destroy the document."

Given the fact that it is well known that Central American countries have concerns, want to make other suggestions, it seems clear that this preemptive Nicaraguan position is a negotiating tactic and not part of a genuine search for real agreement.

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Beyond that, with respect to the election issue, when Mr. Ortega says that the Sandinistas refuse to consider postponing the elections because the democratic opposition wouldn't agree to sign a letter to President Reagan condemning the United States, the sincerity of the Sandinista commitment to fair elections is also called into serious question.

Q Apparently, though, there are some kind of talks going on between Cruz and Bayardo Arce in Brazil at this point, and the Sandinistas, as I'm told, are being fairly flexible on the topic of extending the election deadline.

A Well, let's see. Obviously, that is a matter on which we see the same reports you do, that there are such talks going on. That is between them. We have -- Let's just see what happens with it.

Q But do you see that also as another propaganda ploy on the part of the Sandinistas -- it's simply extending the deadline in the same way that they are playing this game with the Contadora proposal? Do you feel that this is also a propaganda ploy?

A Without knowing specifically what is going on there, it's obviously hard to address it in any specific terms. My understanding of what he said yesterday was that even on the issue of asking the democratic opposition to sign a letter denouncing the U.S. Administration, that he was only talking about extending it three weeks in any case, which I think Mr. Cruz and the Coordinadora have made clear is not adequate.

I can't tell you what is happening in terms of the conversations you have raised and whether there is a more meaningful postponement involved or not. Our position on that is clear, and if they postpone it, and have the other things which would make it a more meaningful election, then that would be all to the good; but let's wait and see what happens.

Q Can you describe in a little more detail how important it is to the United States that that election date be postponed, and why?

A I can't really, Dennis. We've talked about it a lot. I think you had some briefing on this yesterday. The basic thrust of it -- and I refer you back

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because we've talked about it a fair amount -- but the basic fact is that you need time to be able to have a genuine election campaign. And this is, obviously, not just our position; this is the position which the Coordinadora and Mr. Cruz have made clear is essential to them.

It's not easy to campaign in Nicaragua, and they feel they need the time to make it a genuine campaign, so that's basically what it's all about.

Q Are there any plans for Ambassador Shlaudeman to be traveling to Central America in the coming days and weeks?

A I don't know what his specific plans are, frankly. He does travel a lot to the region, so it may well be that he would travel in the coming days and weeks.

Q I mean specifically for conferences with the parties involved.

A I don't know. He does talk with them -- and I'm not trying to hide the fact that we have had conversations all along, either through Ambassador Shlaudeman or in other ways -- through our embassies or here. So there is a dialogue that goes on.

Q Alan, Ortega's comments seem to suggest that Ambassador Shlaudeman's conversations reached a dead end. Do you share that assessment? Do you expect him to still be having further meetings with the Nicaraguans?

A I guess all I could do is really address the last part of it, and the answer is, yes, we do anticipate that there will be further meetings.

Q Alan, a new area?

A Sure.

Q Do you have any comment on the statements made by King Hussein of Jordan regarding the Israeli offer?

A No, I don't.

Q Alan, this morning, on the Hill, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, finally passed the sense of Congress resolution on moving the embassy to Jerusalem, and one of the points of order that was brought up by one of the members of the Committee was that "whereas the United States maintains its embassy in all countries at the designated capitals of those countries except in the case of Israel," somebody mentioned the exceptions of Bolivia and Benin, apparently after consulting with the State Department.

To the best of your knowledge, what is the situation in both of those countries?

A Bolivia and Benin?

Q Yes. Apparently, you know, they are not the designated area.

A I'll check on it for you. The fact is, obviously, that our position on moving the embassy, or on changing the status of our Consulate General in Jerusalem, has not changed, and we oppose doing that and oppose resolutions which call for doing that.

Q Alan, not a comment on King Hussein's speech yesterday, but a State Department interpretation on a topic he raised: in his speech, the King said that there wouldn't be peace -- Israel was not serious about peace until every stone of the West Bank or every iota of territory was regained by Jordan; and he called on Israel to accept U.N. Resolution 242, interpreting it to mean a withdrawal from all territory.

The Israelis, at least the labor government, have always maintained that 242 talks about a territorial compromise concerning the West Bank. What is the State Department interpretation of 242?

A There is a long history of this, and I refer you back to the record. I'm not going to try to be an interpreter of what was, obviously, a very detailed and carefully worked out negotiation at the time of the resolution. I refer you back to the text of it. We stand fully on that text, and obviously, what we think needs to be done is for the parties, all of them, to agree to return and talk. But I'm not going to try to give you a further parsing of 242.

Q I'm not asking for the parsing of it, simply a chapter heading. What's the position?

A I refer you to a very rich record of public statements on that subject.

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Q Alan, in the report issued lately by the GAO, there is the list issued by the State Department on the overseas centers that are applied to the enhancement of the security program. The list of 62 countries does not include Lebanon. Do you have an explanation for that?

A Well, I don't know specifically what the GAO report says, but I would point out to you -- perhaps somewhat dangerously, because I'm ignorant of what that report says -- that there was special funding for the Beirut program and that was outside of the program. And I think if you go back a few days and look at what I said in response to that GAO report at that time, it addressed the fact that, yes, there were a number of countries where there was an upgrade planned -- that Beirut had a special appropriation for it.

And that was, I believe, separate from that list that you're talking about. So, obviously, the Beirut program was going forward. And, as I indicated before, the issue in terms of Beirut was not funding.

Q Does this mean that Beirut has a program for itself, or by itself, aside from the other 62 centers?

A Well, I think that that is fair. I'm just not -- I really think that that has been addressed in the guidance, and let me ask you to take a look at what we've got in the Press Office on it. But I believe that is correct because there was a special measure for Beirut last year.

Q Alan, when you say the Administration stand toward moving the Embassy, having been changed (sic), do you mean that you will veto the resolution?

A Well, I can't tell you what the President is going to do. I guess you'd have to ask the White House whether they're prepared to say whether they're prepared to say what the President would do specifically. But the fact is that firm opposition to those proposals is unchanged, and also unquestionable.

Q Alan, there's a story in an Israeli newspaper this morning saying that the Reagan Administration is trying to put a new clause in the foreign aid to Israel bill, saying that the U.S. can hold talks and contacts with the PLO if the President explicitly authorizes it. Do you know of any such --

A I never heard of any such thing. I think I would simply refer you back to our very frequently repeated position on the PLO. That sounds fanciful, to say the least.

Q Alan, Nabih Berri, the Shiite Lebanese leader, is supposed to be in town. Are there any plans for him to meet with anyone in the building, to the best of your knowledge?

A Frankly, I wasn't aware that he was going to be in town. Let me check and see if I can get something on it.

Q Alan, The Washington Post editorial of today was very critical of the posture of the United States Government. Do you have any comment on it, about the security for the Embassy in Beirut?

A No. I think we've addressed ourselves to that issue several times, and I'm sure there will be further occasions on which to do so, but I don't intend to respond to editorials.

Q There is also a hunger strike among Palestinian political prisoners in Israeli jails for the ninth day in a row --

A Yes.

Q -- and there were demonstrations in the East Jerusalem marching towards asking the Israeli Government to close the new prison in Nablus, which is built according to the U.S. system of prisons. Do you have any comment or could you --

A No, I don't.

Q -- look into these things?

A I don't have anything on it.

Q Do you have any comment on the arrests of an East German woman and American naval analyst yesterday on charges for the East German woman of spying for the Soviet Union, obtaining documents for the Soviet Union from the American man --

A No.

Q -- of passing them on to a --

A No.

A To go back to Central America, would you have any comment on remarks by officials of the Contadora countries that, as far as they knew, the United States had treated the draft document, the revised treaty as a final document all along up until this last week?

A I'm not aware of those comments, but I think that would be inaccurate in any case. The concerns which have been expressed over some period of time now, including perhaps more explicitly in the last few days, have been concerns which have existed all along. And, as I think a briefer mentioned to you yesterday, what was called for by October 15th was comments on this draft, not agreement to this draft. So I think that will take place.

Q Alan, also on Central America: whether any decision has been made on where the Salvadoran soldiers are going to be trained next.

A I have nothing new on that, no.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the violent clashes in Egypt between laborers and the Egyptian police?

A No.

Q Alan, anything on the situation in the embassy in South Africa and the six?

A There really is nothing new to say about that, Jim. The fact is that the people concerned are not in imminent danger, so the question of sanctuary really doesn't arise.

And that is consistent with our longstanding policy. It's not something new; the policy has existed for some time and is applied in individual situations.

Q Can you say today whether or not the South Africans sent you a note about it or in any way made a formal demarche of any -- I don't --

A No, I don't think so. I think, as I understand it, that the South Africans have issued a statement, and I think Ambassador Nickel has made a statement. I'm not sure it was directly responsive to what the South Africans said, but in any case I refer you to what's been said over there. I don't have anything from here to add to that.

Q And why was it that the Embassy denied or said that it was misleading that this was being discussed or considered, and seriously -- or why was that, when you said that it was being considered here?

A I said it was being studied. I think that what they were looking at was the words which were attributed to the Ambassador, which I think they were denying that he had uttered.

Q So you are not studying it seriously or carefully. You are simply studying it, is that correct?

A Well, we're studying it, but I would point out to you what I just said in response to your question -- which I'm sure you absorbed fully -- and that is that since the people are not in imminent danger, the question of sanctuary really doesn't arise at this point.

Q So you're no longer studying it now, right?

A I'll just leave you with my words.

Q Alan, there was a story on the AP wire this morning that the Syrian secret service in Lebanon had identified the kidnappers of several Americans who've been missing in Lebanon for some months.

A Uh-huh.

Q How are we treating that information? Is it valid, and how do we feel the Syrians came by this?

A All I can really say about that is that we are actively engaged in efforts to secure the release of the three Americans who were kidnapped this past spring in Lebanon. We have raised the matter with a number of

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governments, but I'm not going to get into detail.

Q Alan, do you have any further information on the case of Meir Kahane's --

A No.

Q -- U.S. citizenship?

A No. I said, as you will recall, that will be probably a fairly long process. So I'm --

Q You didn't say how long it would last. (Laughter.)

A No, I didn't. You're right.

Connie?

Q Do you have any guidance today on various statements made over the week by New Zealand officials about the defense relations with the U.S.?

A No. I think we have had some guidance over time, if you want to check with the Press Office though.

Q Do you want to speak about anything that --

A I think you might want to check back with the Press Office.

Q Alan, you have now enough time to study the Libyan-Moroccan treaty. Do you have any final comment to make or position --

A No.

Q -- to express on it?

A No, I don't.

Q Thank you.

A Okay.

(The briefing concluded at 12:23 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #180

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1984, 12:11 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have two announcements on trips:

First of all, with respect to the Secretary's forthcoming trip to Panama as the President's representative to the inauguration of the new President of Panama, in addition the Secretary will depart Washington October 10 for El Salvador where he will meet with President Duarte before proceeding on to Panama that same day. On the 11th, he will attend President Barletta's inaugural and depart for Mexico for discussions with President De La Madrid. The Secretary will overnight in Mexico, and on October 12 he flies to Puerto Rico to welcome Pope John Paul II to American soil. He returns to Washington that evening.

In addition, Secretary Shultz will visit Toronto, Canada, October 15 and 16 to meet with the new Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark. The visit is both a follow-up to the September 25 meeting between President Reagan and Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and a part of the Secretary's program of quarterly meetings with his Canadian counterpart. Secretary Shultz met briefly with Mr. Clark in New York during the United Nations General Assembly, but this will be his first opportunity to discuss a broad range of multilateral and bilateral issues with the new Canadian Foreign Minister.

The President and Prime Minister Mulroney agreed to encourage exchanges of visits by Cabinet members of the two governments, and there have already been a number of such exchanges, with more in prospect.

As far as that trip is concerned, a sign-up sheet has now been posted in the Press Office for those who wish to apply for a seat on the Secretary's plane. That sheet will be taken down and applications closed at noon on Tuesday, October 9, and no applications will be accepted after that.

Q Alan, it's just an overnight in Toronto, just the night of the 15th?

A That's correct.

Q Ottawa or Toronto? I'm sorry.

A Toronto.

Q No meetings with the Prime Minister?

A In Canada?

Q Yes.

A None indicated here.

Q Alan, with all of that running around that you've mentioned earlier --

A Sorry?

Q -- he literally leaves on the 10th and returns on the night of the 12th?

A That's correct.

Q Okay.

Q Alan, on the stop in Mexico, when will he see De la Madrid, on the 11th or the 12th? Is he going to be in there so late on the 11th he would not see him, or --

A I don't know that we're -- we can chat about that maybe a little bit later, but I don't think we're announcing at this point specific aspects of the visit.

Q You can't get into who he might see in Panama during the inauguration?

A Well, I don't know whom he might see. There are going to be a lot of people there, so I'm sure he'll see a lot of people. Whether he will have substantive conversations with people is another matter.

Q When does he go to Nicaragua?

A Ah-ha! Have no plans for a trip to Nicaragua.

Q Nothing on the 15th in Managua? (Laughter)

A Can we go to serious questions?

Q Alan, just for the record, do you have any comment regarding the arrest of the FBI agent regarding passing intelligence to Soviet emigres?

A No, I don't.

Q Do you have any information you can divulge regarding those two former Soviet citizens?

A No.

Q Any role of the State Department?

A No.

Q Alan, are you aware of any plans by people the U.S. may be supporting for action in Nicaragua in the middle of this month?

A Well, you're asking, I assume, about what would come under the heading of covert intelligence activities, if they were --

Q Not really. They're not all that covert any more.

A -- and, as you know, I don't comment on that subject. I would repeat, though, that the charge that the United States is planning to invade Nicaragua is absurd.

Q Are you aware of any plans by American-backed rebels to engage in military activities in the middle of this month in Nicaragua?

A Well, I'm not aware of any plans by anybody, but it's also not up to me to comment on rebel activities, and so I'm not going to comment specifically on that.

I would also point out to you that various people have asked questions here about funding for programs that I don't talk about, but I think you're aware of the status of such funding, so I think that there are certain things to be kept in mind with respect to the status --

Q You mean the funding that would come directly from the U.S. Government?

A Yes.

Q There is funding that comes from U.S. citizens.

A Well, we've talked about that before.

Q Right. But you are not aware of activities that are now being planned?

A Again, you're asking about things that would either get into the area of covert activities or would have something -- or would really not have anything to do with us, presumably, and in either case I just don't have anything for you.

Q You say "presumably." I would like to know whether you --

A Well, I've answered it as much as I can, Marvin.

Q Different topic?

Q One more -- well, not exactly on that topic, but on the elections. Do you take their statement yesterday as being the final statement that the elections will not be postponed, and do you have a position on it?

A Well, I think all I really can say on that is that, as we have noted on several occasions, we hope the Sandinistas will guarantee the conditions necessary for free and fair elections so that the democratic opposition can participate in the Nicaraguan elections.

Q Do you have a reaction to the report that the talks in Rio between Cruz and Arce broke down without such an agreement and that Arce repeated the November 4 date was the date?

A That would be my reaction to it, Chris.

Q Has the Herb Stein group made, or will it make, any report on Israel's economy to the Secretary before Prime Minister Peres's visit?

A I don't know whether in fact there is to be a report or not to be a report, and I think that the nature of that activity is one that has been advisory to the Secretary, and I guess I therefore wouldn't get into how they are conducting themselves on this.

Q When is the Israeli Prime Minister officially arriving here?

A In terms of the protocol and so on of when he is actually getting here, I guess maybe we could help you in the Press Office, or the White House would have it. I don't happen to have that.

Q And something else: There are reports this morning, Alan, that some Palestinians tried to reach the American Consulate in East Jerusalem and were stopped or something like that. Do you know anything about it? Can you tell us anything about it?

A Well, I don't know a great deal about it. I think this was a couple of days ago that this happened. The only thing I really can comment on is that the reports apparently indicated that the Consulate General refused to accept a petition, and that isn't true. They apparently did get a petition. I don't know what the nature of it was. But beyond that, I really don't have any comment on it.

Q There was a report from Jerusalem which mentioned that your proposal concerning the Taba issue is now being discussed between the Americans and Egypt. Do you have any information about that?

A No, nor would I have any comment on that except to say that, as you are well aware, we think that the Egyptian-Israeli relationship is an important one; we would like to see it even better than it is and hope that the various problems between them can be worked out.

Q Alan, have you been asked by the Lebanese Government to seek any new arrangement with the Israelis to withdraw from southern Lebanon.

A I don't have anything to say beyond what we have (said) before on the subject of southern Lebanon. I think that there was a readout given ON BACKGROUND yesterday in New York following the Secretary's meeting with Prime Minister Karami, and I would refer you to that.

Q Alan, back on the issue. Do you know if the Consulate General actually called the police to disperse those Palestinians?

A I don't have any details on that aspect of it, Gasson.

Q Alan, could this visit by the Palestinians to the Consulate in East Jerusalem is related to the question I asked yesterday about the demonstrations on the West Bank about the Israeli jail in Nablus and the hunger strike which is going on now for, since September 20th (sic)?

A I don't have any comment on the substance of that.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the stories today about the mining in the Red Sea, that the mines come from Libya that were made by the Soviet Union? Do you have any information on that general theme?

A I have some information on that. Marvin. First of all, as far as who laid the mines, there is still no conclusive proof on that, but there is persuasive circumstantial evidence indicating that Libya was involved in mining the entrances to the Red Sea.

As far as whether it's a Soviet mine or not, I've seen those reports. I don't have any reason to doubt them, but I guess it really is a question of what the British have found in examining the mine that they did find. So I think they should address themselves to it, and I guess I would leave it to them.

Q You said before the Libyans were involved? There was persuasive evidence? How did you phrase it?

A "Persuasive circumstantial evidence indicating that Libya was involved in mining the entrances to the Red Sea."

Q What do you mean involved? Did they do it?

A Well, I think I'm going to have to leave it at that. I don't think there's a whole lot of difference between your formulation and mine.

Q There is no difference?

A I say I don't think there is a whole lot of difference.

Q Alan, do you agree with the Egyptian version of the accusation of Libya?

A In terms of the Aswan Dam?

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Q And also of the Red Sea?

A Well, I just addressed the Red Sea. In terms of the Aswan Dam story this morning, I don't have a specific comment on that. But plotting of this sort is consistent with other examples of Qaddafi's aggression in the area.

-- MORE --

Q Alan, what is the nature of the persuasive circumstantial evidence, please? Could you tell us?

A Don't have anything to offer you in specific terms on that, Bill. Connie?

Q Alan, I have got a series of southern African ones. See if I press the right buttons.

A Okay.

Q Anything on that Mozambique accord reached earlier today with the rebels?

A Well, we don't have details of the agreement yet. Nevertheless, we would certainly welcome a cessation of hostilities in Mozambique. This would contribute not only to the welfare of the people of Mozambique but also to the achievement of peace and prosperity in the region as a whole.

Q There has been some more violence and death in South Africa. Also there have been some decisions on the squatters. Anything on that?

A I don't have anything specifically on the violence. Obviously we have addressed ourselves to those problems before.

As far as the residency requirements and the removals and all that is concerned, we welcome indications that the government plans to amend laws which currently prohibit black South Africans from residing permanently in the Western Cape, in accordance with our view that all South Africans should have the right to live and work where they choose.

However, we view with serious concern continued reports that the South African Government intends to proceed to remove thousands of residents of Crossroads and other communities near Cape Town against their will to specially townships far from where these individuals work.

We deplore any action by the South African Government to remove citizens from their homes against their will or to destroy their property. We do not believe that such actions will contribute constructively to the resolution of the problems South Africa faces, which can only be resolved by means of dialogue between the government and all South Africans.

Q Copy?

A Sure.

Q One last one, if I may? Anything on the decision by Harvard not to disinvest from companies' dealings?

A No. Mike?

Q Alan, do you have anything regarding the Secretary's meeting with the Austrian this morning?

A With the Austrian? No, I don't. Sorry.

Q Can you take that, please, and give us something on that?

A Well, I will look into it. I don't know if I will come back with something.

Q Do you have anything on the Vietnamese Foreign Minister calling for an international conference inviting the United States, China, Cambodia, Vietnam, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, India, and the ASEAN countries to discuss the future of Cambodia?

A I have, I guess, two points on that: First of all, genuine Vietnamese willingness to negotiate a comprehensive political settlement to the problems of Kampuchea, based on the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese forces and free elections under international auspices, would be a welcome development.

ASEAN has repeatedly stated its willingness to negotiate a settlement based on these points which have been endorsed by the great majority of the world's nations.

We note that Foreign Minister Thach will be meeting with the Indonesian and Malaysian Foreign Ministers in New York, and we look forward to consulting closely with ASEAN on the results of those discussions.

As to the question of an international conference, ASEAN has always made clear that it wished to involve interested regional countries and the five principal parties to the 1954 Geneva Accords in a Kampuchean settlement. The United States, for its part, is prepared to participate fully in a conference if requested to do so by ASEAN.

Q Alan, a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Same subject?

A Go ahead, George.

Q I understand the Vietnamese Foreign Minister is arriving in New York today.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you know if the Secretary has plans to meet with him?

A No plans.

Q Alan, I just want to know, if you know why did the Consulate General refuse to receive the petition? Is that --

A No, I say, it did not.

Q He did not? Why?

A He did not refuse to receive it. Apparently they did --

Q Oh, he did not refuse it.

A The only thing I am aware of, with respect specifically to that, is that there were reports that they did not receive the petition. Those reports are wrong. They did actually receive the petition.

Q What was the subject?

A I don't have details on it.

Q Alan, on that conference again on Cambodia, if the U.S. is prepared to participate fully if requested to do so by ASEAN, right, and the Vietnamese have laid out the participants that they would like to have in there, doesn't that conform to what you are saying? Isn't this an acceptance, in fact?

A Well, I think that --

Q All of the five that you mentioned are there, the five neighbors.

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A But I think you have to pay attention to the point that I made, that the U.S. is prepared to do that if requested to do so by ASEAN.

Q Right.

A So ASEAN has to determine whether that is indeed warranted and welcome and so on.

Q And your first statement was that if the Vietnamese pulled out and allowed free elections -- allowed free elections and pulled out totally -- that would be a welcome development and what the ASEAN people have always favored, right?

A Well, their willingness to negotiate a comprehensive political settlement based on a complete withdrawal of Vietnamese forces and free elections under international auspices would be a welcome development.

Q So, would that all have to precede a conference, some kind of willingness to accept those principles, or could those principles be determined by the conference?

A That I am not going to try to lay out. I think that that is something that -- as I say, Prime Minister Thach is meeting with other Foreign Ministers from ASEAN countries, and we would be interested to hear what they have to say, but I don't have anything specific to offer on that question.

Q Alan, about the story of the Aswan High Dam, President Mubarak of Egypt said that he got sort of confirmed information on the Libyan threats. Do you have any information to confirm what he said?

A Well, I said, I don't have any specific comment on that story other than that this kind of activity is --

Q Do you know anything about his source of information?

A I don't think it would be up to us to comment on the sources of President Mubarak's information.

Q Anything to say on ANZUS controversies?

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A No.

Q A senior Mondale adviser last night at John Hopkins, Mr. Dave Aaron, charged that the United States Administration under the Reagan Administration has been dealing with Middle East issues behind the back of Israel and that you strayed away from Camp David and all of the promises to King Hussein were done behind the back of Israel, also the September 1 initiative of President Reagan was done behind the back of Israel. What do you answer to these charges?

A Well, I don't intend to get into comment on statements by political figures and people involved in the campaign. At the same time, I would refer you to what the President said in his September 1 speech and the references there to Camp David, 242, and so on; and I think that there is a rather full record of our views, and I would leave you with that.

Q Alan, you don't happen to have anything on the talks in Geneva today -- the United States and Vietnam -- on the question of resettlement of Vietnamese political prisoners?

A I don't.

Q Anything on the reaction to the vote on the Export Administration Act in Congress?

A No, not specifically. I think that the Administration's position on a number of those issues is clear, but I don't have a reaction to what I gather is a rather active situation up the Hill. With regard to that, I think that is an ongoing matter.

Yes, Chris?

Q There is a report on FBIS that in Athens the American Embassy and other American institutions like banks have been on some kind of special alert for the last couple of days for a terrorist attack. Is that something different from the general world-wide -- ?

A I don't think it is appropriate to get into the question of what specific threats may or may not exist at individual posts. I don't think that serves the well-being of the people there and so on, and so I am afraid I am going to have to stay away from that. Yes?

Q Do you agree to the idea published today in different newspapers that the resolution to transfer the Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem is a dead move?

A Well, I can't talk about the Congressional state of play. Our policy on that issue I stated yesterday, and that obviously remains valid, but it is not for me to comment on the legislative calendar and so on.

Q Do you have any comment on what Congressman Crockett said, that Israel is trying to establish its capitol on a foreign territory?

A I think we have expressed ourselves on this several times, and I'll leave it there.

Q Do you have anything regarding the new deployment of SS-22 in East Germany and Czechoslovakia?

A I think we had some guidance on this the other day; and if you will check in the press office, I think we can probably help you with that.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:31 p.m.)

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~~Storg~~/Becker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #181

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 4, 1984, 12:00 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: I have one announcement on the release of some documents today.

Today the Departments of State and Defense are releasing, in one volume, some 113 of the thousands of documents found on the island of Grenada after last October's rescue mission. Copies of this volume, entitled "Grenada Documents, an Overview and Selection," will be available after this briefing in the Press Office.

The present selection was made by Michael Ledeen of the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Herbert Romerstein of the United States Information Agency. Ledeen and Romerstein have concentrated attention on documents dealing with life under the Peoples' Revolutionary Government and that government's involvement in international affairs which are likely to be of interest to students of international relations. Later this month, we expect the Grenada documents collection to be available to the public generally.

Now, I offer you the possibility of a briefing by the authors this afternoon. I would note they've had a briefing up on the Hill, including before the press, this morning. If there is great interest, we'll be happy to produce them, but I don't want to have a wasted effort here. So is there a ground swell of interest?

Q I'd like to check with the office. I don't know.

A O.K. If there are individuals, maybe what we could do is put you in touch individually with them, O.K.? But we will then not have a briefing.

Q Alan, on that, the documents have not been released in any form until now?

A To be honest, I cannot tell you whether the documents that are in this volume, to what extent they overlap the documents that we've already put out in a less formal way; and I guess I'm just going to have to leave it to you to do that chore.

Q (Inaudible)

A Sure.

Q (Inaudible)

A The book is about like that (indicating), so I'm sure you'll enjoy reading it tonight. (Laughter)

O.K. That's it for announcements. Be happy to take questions.

Q Is there a summary at the beginning or --

A I just haven't had a chance to take a look at it. I think that you will find that it's got analysis in it, as well.

Q Alan, has there been any change regarding the events in South Africa on a group seeking refuge, who sent the telex seeking American approval for that? Have we responded to them in some form?

A Yes. The American Embassy in Pretoria did reply to the counsel to the so-called Durban Six. Our reply reiterates our opposition to detention without trial and notes our actions vis-a-vis the South African Government in this regard. The reply goes on to state our policy on the granting of temporary refuge, and notes that in our judgment, the Durban Six do not appear to qualify under current circumstances.

You may have a copy of that reply, if you wish, after the briefing.

I would point out that the question of refuge for this group is somewhat moot at this point since they are in a state of refuge now, having been at the British Consulate in Durban for the past three weeks. I would also reiterate our policy on the question of refuge, namely that we consider such requests only in exceptional cases of imminent bodily harm for the individual making the request and based on humanitarian considerations.

Q Can we have a copy of your statement?

A Copy of the statement, sure.

Q Alan, what have you got on the congressional report on the bombing in Beirut?

A Okay. The State Department's investigating team is still examining the situation and has not submitted its final report. Our findings, of course, will be shared with the Congress. The Department will take full account of the issues raised by the Committee.

The decision to move most of our operations from West Beirut to the Embassy Annex northeast of the city was made on the basis of the best information available, and all concerned agencies agreed that this was the wisest course of action. Even though all security measures had not been completed, it was judged safer to move the bulk of our personnel to the suburb northeast of Beirut rather than keeping them in the center of the city. Work on security measures continued after the building was occupied in early August, and at the time of the bombing, 75 percent of that work had been completed.

As we have indicated, final assessment of this outrage and proposals to prevent its recurrence will be drawn up once we have the investigating team's full report. As the Secretary has said, if there was negligence involved, we will find it. But our principal concern in dealing with the reality of terrorism, which is an affront to human dignity, is to protect our people adequately while performing embassy functions, and not to allow these murderers to deter us from doing what is right and necessary to help bring peace to the Middle East.

I might note in that connection that there was an article --

Copy? Yes.

-- in this morning's New York Times, I believe, that had an interview, or reported an interview, with the Iranian Foreign Minister in which he, basically, said that U.S. intervention in Lebanon is the main cause of the bombing attack against the Embassy Annex.

This charge is outrageous and irresponsible. Statements such as this which lend encouragement to international terrorism threaten the norms of international conduct. They undermine the ability of nations to work together for the common goals of peace and prosperity. The apparent official blessing for acts of terrorism against diplomatic establishments from a government official charged with directing his own country's diplomatic relations is nothing short of incomprehensible.

The United States will not be deterred from pursuing with Lebanon, and with other countries in the region, the goal of peace. We will continue to assist the Lebanese Government in its efforts to extend its sovereignty and achieve stability and peace. We will also continue to seek the removal of all foreign forces from Lebanon and to promote the security of Israel's northern border.

Q Copy of that?

A Sure.

Q While we're on that subject, can you tell us whether the U.S. has presented an 8-point plan for Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, according to Nabih Berri?

Q Could we just stay -

A Let me just answer this and get it out of the way.

The fact is, as I have said before -- I will repeat it -- we have no plan, we're not engaged in mediation or negotiation; we have been exploring ideas. That was what Ambassador Murphy was doing in part of his conversations during his recent trip to the region.

Q Could you give us some sense of when the State Department intends to complete its report?

A I think that that report -- the internal formal, report will be completed within -- it's due to be completed within the next week to ten days.

-- MORE --

Q Will that be made public?

A I don't know that the report itself will be made public -- as I said, the findings. I don't necessarily mean the complete report, or -- I'm not sure what form it's going to take, Marvin; but our findings certainly will be shared with the Congress.

I've indicated before we're obviously aware of public interest in this. We also have security concerns. So we have to balance those out. But I don't think that there is any question here of anybody trying to hide something. So to the extent that we can be helpful, we will do that.

Q Right. Now, what is the difference -- if you can help us understand -- what is the difference between what the Congress has already produced in the time that it took it to produce its report and the one that you're still compiling?

A Well, my understanding of this report is that it was based on a limited number of hours of hearings on primarily the intelligence aspects of was intelligence adequate?

And while there were some comments in there about security, I think that the Committee itself made it clear that addressing the security issues and measures taken and so on was not the principal focus of their hearings.

So I don't even know that you could say that "the Congress" had made a report on this at this point. But, obviously, that Committee's findings are something, as I say, we will take seriously into account as we are looking at our own findings. But --

Q Alan, on the basis of what you know so far, do you share the burden of its conclusion?

A I think that I will stick with what I've said about -- in response to this earlier, Marvin. I don't have --

Q Do you disagree with anything?

A I don't have any words to take you beyond what I've said in response at this point.

Q Alan, but --

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Q Alan, on this --

Q Excuse me.

A Hold it a second, Mike. All right --

Q But if the intelligence report, even though it was limited to strictly intelligence and not security aspects, warned well in advance of the obvious gap there or the need for beefed-up security, why was it not taken more seriously? I mean the --

A Well, I think I've answered it in the statement. I would ask you to examine the statement in terms of the views -- we've talked about this before. It is not a new question. The fact that it was decided and was agreed by everybody -- I'm not aware of any disagreement -- that it was safer, even though the security measures had not been completed in East Beirut, to move to East Beirut rather than staying with the bulk of our people in West Beirut.

As I say, we're going to have to stick on these words at this point. And when our investigation is completed and we have something more to say, then we will be able to say it.

Q But, Alan -- excuse me -- but that notwithstanding, there's still the issue of accountability. I mean the --

A Well, you're taking --

Q -- Congressional Report is pointing an accusing finger primarily at the State Department.

A Well, I think that the fact is, as I said, we have an investigation under way. We would like to do that, complete that, and draw our own conclusions before trying to jump to responding to press queries about it. So I think we'll do that.

Q Alan, your allusion to the Iranians -- do you have anything there, any sense that Iran is in any way responsible for this latest bombing -- encouraging this group, or actually assisting in some measure in the bombing?

A Well, I think that we have not to this point said anything about what kind of evidence we may have. I've seen the various press reports about this, but I don't have anything to state on that subject today.

Q Alan, you don't think that the Iranian statement implicates them in the bombing or not?

A I think I would stick with what I've said. In terms of the Iranian Foreign Minister's statement, I will stick with what I've said about this today.

Q Alan, could you confirm the meeting yesterday in New York between Mr. Ortega and Mr. Shlaudeman and Mr. Motley?

A And Mr. Motley? Yes, there was a meeting in New York.

Q Do you have anything else about that?

A No, I don't have anything else to say about it.

Q That was my part. Then you can't elaborate a little bit on what transpired there or was discussed?

A No, I can't.

Q Is there a way you can at least say whether it was just a continuation of the previous talks in Mexico or whether a new subject might have come up?

A No, I'm not going to get into the subject matter of the conversation.

Q Will there be other talks?

A I don't know whether there will be other -- you mean between those people?

Q Motley and the Nicaraguans, or high-level Americans with high-level Nicaraguans.

A Well, there are the Shlaudeman-Tinoco talks which, as I indicated at the end of the last one, we expect will take place again. But I don't have any other talks to suggest to you at this point.

Q Alan --

A Marvin?

Q -- in terms of the FBI indictment yesterday, there were Soviets named who were working in the consultate, the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco, as having been involved in this whole affair. Is the Department considering the expulsion of a number of these people, named or unnamed?

A Marvin, I don't have any comment of any sort to offer on that entire matter, so I'm just going to have to beg off of that --

Q Okay --

A -- whole investigation and what it involved. I just don't have anything for you on it.

Mike?

Q Alan, the Prime Minister of Greece has made a statement that the KAL flight was definitely on a spy mission for the United States when it was shot down.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you have any reaction to this?

A Yes. We have at this point only seen press accounts of Prime Minister Papandreou's statement and we are seeking official clarification. Any such statement, however, would be outrageous and demonstrate a willful disregard for the facts. It stands in stark contrast to the findings of the international community and appears to be a blatant replay of the Soviet cover story to deflect responsibility for its action.

There is not the slightest evidence for a claim of a spy mission, and any such claim can only be termed irresponsible.

The KAL tragedy was thoroughly investigated by the International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO, which gave no support to the Soviet disinformation effort. In fact, ICAO postulated after a thorough investigation that KAL-007 was off course in Soviet air space due to a navigational error of some kind by the pilot.

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The principal issue is that the Soviets shot down an unarmed civilian airliner without positively identifying it, without adequate warning, and without justification, killing 269 innocent civilians.

Q What does it say to you that the Prime Minister of an allied government says this?

A I'm not going to try to assess what Mr. Papandreou was intending to do. And, as I say, we're seeking an official clarification; we've only seen the press accounts of this.

Q May I have a copy of that statement --

A Yes.

Q -- please?

A Surely.

Q And you're not going to ascribe any motivation. This is the same -- do you see it as the same argument put forth by the Soviet Government?

A I think that the statement I just gave you, Mike, speaks for itself.

Q Alan, do you have any progress reports or anything new on mines in the Red Sea?

A No, I don't.

Okay?

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:14 p.m.)

1-2500

~~Story~~ S Becker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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FRIDAY, OCTOBER 5, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #182

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 5, 1984, 12:04 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Okay. Let me just give you a few announcements and then go to the very little guidance I have today. First, a reminder that Monday is a holiday and the office will be on a Sunday schedule -- no briefing.

Second, two briefings on Tuesday: At 1:30 p.m. on Tuesday, the ninth of October, here in the briefing room, we'll have a press conference on the formation of an Inter-Agency Task Force on the African Food Emergency. The briefers will be Peter McPherson, the Administrator of AID, and Julius W. Becton, Director of AID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. It will be ON THE RECORD for camera and sound. Any questions, please call Sarah Tinsley in the AID Public Affairs Office, at 632-4200 -- 632-4200.

Also on Tuesday, there will be a BACKGROUND briefing here at three o'clock on the Secretary's trip to El Salvador, Panama, and Mexico.

That is it for announcements. I'd be happy to take questions.

Q Alan, also on briefings and things --

A Sure.

Q -- I missed the announcement of the White House Peres briefings. Do you know of any readouts of the Peres visit Monday, Tuesday? Anything scheduled at this stage?

A I don't know what the readout schedule will be. Normally, we don't have a readout here, but there are usually readouts at the White House following meetings there. I guess I'd ask you to check, and we'll try and keep up with it, too. I'm afraid I wasn't aware of the briefing scheduled this morning either, so --

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Q Do you know when you'll have a schedule of the visit for the --

A There will be shortly, I think, put out a press release with the schedule.

Q That would be put out here or the White House?

A We'll put that out, as we usually do.

Q What time is the (trip) briefing?

A 3:00 o'clock.

Q Alan, there are conflicting reports about the extent of the assistance the United States is going to give Israel.

A Well, let's start in our regular order, and see if Mike has some questions.

Q Yes. Have you had a chance to consult with the Government of Greece regarding the Prime Minister's remarks, which you criticized yesterday, on the KAL matter?

A Mike, I don't have anything further for you on that. (I) stand on the remarks made yesterday, though.

Q Is there a plan to lodge a protest?

A I don't think, at this point anyway, we'd get into the diplomatic back and forth.

Q Alan, there are conflicting reports this morning in the papers, in the Post and the Times, about the extent of the U.S. assistance to Israel. Could you tell us something? I didn't go to the briefing because I didn't know about it this morning, in the White House and the other place -- the Foreign Press Center.

A I'm afraid I don't have any details to give you. You might be able to get a readout on that briefing from some of your colleagues or perhaps over at the White House, but the -- I guess I will just leave it at that. The statements regarding the visit and what may be done during the visit are going to be handled in the various briefings which will be held. I do think that I've read accounts of various public statements by Israeli officials, and I guess I would refer you to those statements, which have contradicted some of the press accounts that were published previously.

Q Alan, do we know anything about the "Party of God" described in a newspaper report today?

A I don't have anything more to give you on the Islamic Jihad than we have in the past.

Q Can you tell me anything -- the President at one point said that those found responsible for terrorist attacks would be visited with vengeance. Where is that policy now?

A The Secretary has addressed this, and I refer you to his remarks. Primarily, what we have said recently is, we're not going to talk about the question. That doesn't mean that there is a change in policy; it means we're not going to talk about the question.

Q Do you have any comment on the proposal made by Mr. Peres to have a summit meeting with President Mubarak?

A No, I don't have any comment on that.

Q Alan, has the U.S. ever made a decision on whether to withdraw its objection to Poland's becoming a member of the IMF?

A I think that the question of -- that question is still under review.

Q Do you have any idea how long it is going to take? It's been a couple of months now already.

A No, I really -- Well, I don't have any idea at this point.

Q Alan --

A Excuse me, go ahead.

Q Alan, in terms of the Department of State's study of the Beirut bombing September 20, is it limited to what happened on that day, or will it address questions such as, "Should there be U.S. guards on the grounds of an embassy in a vulnerable situation like Beirut?"

A I can't tell you whether it will address that specific question. That would be a unique situation if it were to suggest that, since U.S. Marine guards are responsible worldwide for internal security in embassies,

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not for external security. But in any case, I really can't tell you what the specifics of that study will include, because I haven't seen it.

Jim?

Q Alan, I'm told that you have something on the meeting in Geneva yesterday on the Vietnam re-education prisoners.

A You mean you've been going around sniffing out what it is we'll have here? (Laughter)

Q They said, "If you want to know anything, ask Romberg."

A During the October 3 and 4 Geneva consultations on the UN's Orderly Departure Program, American officials formally presented to Vietnam the President's proposals for accepting into the United States all of the Asian-American children in Vietnam and for the release and admission to the United States of all "re-education camp" prisoners detained because of their association with the United States or the former Saigon government. Under these proposals, qualified family members of both categories would also be accepted by the United States. The American side proposed that these persons be included in the already-established and functioning Orderly Departure Program.

Following the general meeting on ODP (the Orderly Departure Program), chaired by a representative of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, on October 4, U.S. and Vietnamese representatives met alone for almost two hours to discuss the "re-education camp" detainees. The American side explained its proposal in detail, noting that we are ready to take all people in an orderly way, beginning with 10,000 in the next two years.

The Vietnamese side did not respond to the U.S. proposals, but agreed to receive them. They repeated their publicly-stated position that the United States should accept all the Amerasian children and the "re-education camp" prisoners, but did not give an indication of numbers or lists.

The United States told the Vietnamese that we are prepared to meet again soon to work out a practical program to make progress on these humanitarian subjects. We want to help the Asian-Americans and the "re-education camp" detainees to come to the United States, and we will be flexible about the best way to do it.

Q Can we have a copy of that, Alan?

A Surely.

--MORE --

Q Secondly, Alan, on a follow-up: Do we have any estimate as to what the overall number would come to, Asian-American children, the re-education people, and their families?

A I don't have any numbers beyond what was discussed at the time of the Secretary's testimony, Bernie.

Q Why was the 10,000 figure put in?

A 10,000 is in terms of the numbers that would be -- that we would be prepared to take over the next two years. I think there is a fair amount that was discussed at the time, as I say, of the Secretary's testimony on this subject on the Hill, and I really would refer you to it because it was carefully crafted and it's a very complicated subject, obviously, and I'm just not prepared to try to go through all of that again.

Q But the 10,000 would not leave anybody out who would like to come to the U.S? They'd be in that package, be included in it?

A Well, this is talking about over the next two years. I think that if you are talking -- you know, I can't give you a final number, but presumably we are talking about a large number of people, not only in the camps but also family members, and so on, so I am not sure that the number would at all be limited to that.

Q One last question, please: Under the Orderly Departure Program, as of now, what have been the numbers of Vietnamese who have in fact come to the U.S.?

A Let me try and get you a figure on that.

Q As I understand it -- same subject?

A Go ahead, Jim.

Q As I understand it, the problem is the United States wants some procedures so it can make sure that they are re-education camp prisoners.

A Uh-huh.

Q And was there any progress on that at the meeting yesterday?

A Again, as I say, the Vietnamese did not respond to our proposals at that time. I really don't know whether the question of a definition of re-education camp prisoners was discussed. Obviously that is an important consideration, as you are suggesting in your question, and I agree with that, but I just don't have anything further at this point.

Q When is -- on the same -- when is the next meeting contemplated?

A I think, at this point, it really is a question of the Vietnamese having taken our proposal and taking a look at it and getting back to us.

Q Okay. And just to clarify, if you can, questions raised by Bernie's (question): If it exceeds 10,000, is the implication, then, that the United States will accept other people after that two-year period? Is that correct?

A Again, our proposal -- the President's proposal is to accept into the United States (a) all of the Asian-American children, and (b) all of the re-education camp prisoners, subject to the point that Jim raised before about making sure that we agree on the definition of what that means. So if the number exceeds 10,000, presumably one would have to find a way to do that, yes.

Q And the Amerasian children are included? It was --

A Again, go back to the briefings at the time. I just don't have all that mathematics in my head.

Q They were confusing, as well as complicated.

Q Alan, in principle, the Vietnamese are -- have agreed to all the Asian-American children and the re-educated persons?

A That -- I can -- they repeated their publicly-stated position, as I said, that we should accept all the Amerasian children and re-education camp prisoners.

Q Has the United States decided to treat this as a bilateral issue with the Vietnamese instead of a UN refugee issue?

A Well, as I say, the proposal was made and formally presented during the ODP consultations under the UNHCR chairmanship. At the Vietnamese request, we did agree to discuss it following the departure of the UNHCR representatives from the room. So this is not, as I understand it, a unique circumstance where you are talking about humanitarian concerns. Obviously we have had discussions with them about POW-MIA questions and other humanitarian-type questions, so the issue here really is to make sure we can deal effectively with what is very much a humanitarian concern.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the statements made by the two officials, two Lebanese officials, in this country, expressing willingness to get into discussions about the security measurements asked by Israel?

A No, I think we will stand on the statements we have made before, both on the record and the background briefing which was provided in New York following Mr. Karami's discussions with the Secretary.

Q Alan, a couple of days ago you said something about there is "persuasive circumstantial evidence" that Libya was involved in laying the mines in the Red Sea or the Suez. Do you have any more information to this effect?

A I don't have anything.

Q (Inaudible) have changed or not?

A No, I don't have anything further to say. I don't anticipate we necessarily will have anything further to say about that.

Q The other side of the question was about the Aswan High Dam story, which came also a couple days ago. Do you have any more specific --

A No, and I, again, don't anticipate anything further on that.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the Beagle Channel mediation?

A Yes, I do have something on that.

Q What is the Beagle Channel?

Q It is a channel in the South Atlantic and South Pacific.

Q (Inaudible)

A Let's get this done. There was a reported announcement that Argentina and Chile have reached full accord on a solution of the Beagle Channel dispute. We haven't seen the text of the accord, but throughout this dispute we have supported a peaceful and negotiated settlement of this longstanding territorial problem involving two countries who are our friends. We therefore welcome the reported announcement. A peaceful resolution of this dispute will open the way for increasing mutually-beneficial cooperation between Chile and Argentina and will set an important example, not only for this hemisphere, but the entire world.

Q Copy, please?

A Sure. Bernie?

Q This story on the front page of the Times today in connection with U.S. suspicions as to who was behind the last attack in Beirut: do you have anything on that, please?

A No, I don't.

Q Nothing on that?

A No.

Q Anything on the article on Pastora today, in which he implies that the United States has ceased all support for his efforts?

A In which he implies that the United States has ceased all -- ?

Q Ceased all support for his efforts, political --

A No, I think that we have stayed away from that, but the legislative situation is as you know it to be.

Q Anything on Mozambique and South Africa now?

A No.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:18 p.m.)

Becker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #183

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 9, 1984, 12:16 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A couple of reminders on briefings: First, at 1:30, here in the Briefing Room, there will be an ON-THE-RECORD briefing on the formation of an Inter-Agency Task Force on the African Food Emergency. The briefers will be AID Administrator Peter McPherson and Director of AID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Julius W. Becton.

There will also be a BACKGROUND briefing today at 3:00 here in the Briefing Room on the Secretary's trip to El Salvador, Panama and Mexico.

Further, on housekeeping: Given the fact that John Hughes is ill, and that I may therefore be accompanying the Secretary on the trip, we may not have a briefing here tomorrow. At this point, my suggestion would be to stay in touch with the Press Office, and if that turns out to be the case, we will do our usual and make sure that you have available to you guidances in the Press Office to respond to your questions shortly after noon.

That is it for announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, do you have any reaction to President Duarte's proposal, and the apparent acceptance of it by the insurgents?

A George, I have the statement which we issued yesterday. If you want, I can read it, or I can make it available later. You want me to read it? Okay. Some of your colleagues want me to read it.

As far -- let me just say -- well, let me go ahead and read the statement and then I'll go on with that. Let me ask you a question, those of you who want me to read it. This is all -- it is cast in terms of being yesterday.

Q Put it in the present tense.

A Put it in the present. (Laughter)

Q Are we managing the news?

Q A little fraud never hurt anyone.

Q It doesn't answer George's question?

A Okay. I'll get to George's question. It does answer part of it.

In his address before the United Nations yesterday, October 8, President Duarte offered to meet the internal guerrilla military leaders at La Palma in Chalatenango, El Salvador, on October 15.

He proposed to discuss with the guerrillas, without arms and in the presence of the international press and the Church, their participation in a political process to return peace and social harmony to all Salvadorans. President Duarte also announced that he will propose to the Salvadoran Legislative Assembly a general amnesty for political crimes.

President Duarte also expressed his government's strong support for full implementation of all 21 points set forth in the Contadora Document of Objectives, and insisted on the need for ensuring that the commitments are actually carried out in a verifiable manner.

President Duarte had previously expressed his desire to discuss with the guerrillas national reconciliation based on full participation in the constitutional democratic process. Yesterday's offer to meet with the guerrilla leaders at a particular time and place is a major step toward that end.

This specific offer by President Duarte is a clear advance in the search for peace in Central America. The United States welcomes this initiative.

So far as the response, George, I've just seen that on the wires. If it means that the meeting that the President of El Salvador has suggested is, in fact, going to take place, then obviously we welcome that.

Q When did the United States become aware of this initiative?

A I don't think I'm going to get into great detail on diplomatic discussions, Jim. The fact is that this is President Duarte's proposal. It was prepared -- or proposed, rather -- in a very strong speech at the United Nations, and any suggestion that it's anything other than his proposal would be misplaced.

Q The guerrillas today claim that this was a response to a proposal they made in May, and that was transmitted in part, or reiterated, by Jesse Jackson. Did the Reverend Jackson make it known to you that he had transmitted such a proposal?

A I don't have information on that.

Q Can you look into that?

A No, I don't think I'm going to get into a question of dialogue.

Q Alan, to what extent do you think -- does the Department think that this development is linked to the recent successes and advances of the Salvadoran Armed Forces as outlined recently by senior Administration officials?

A I'm not going to try to analyze that. I think that Mr. Duarte answered that question in a television interview, and I would refer you to his words. It's his initiative.

Ralph?

Q Alan, the Secretary has said, and I think other Administration officials have said on numerous occasions, that they don't think the Salvadoran guerrillas ought to expect to be able to shoot their way into power, and the Administration has expressed skepticism on many occasions about the kind of dialogue that takes place; a certain kind is okay, other kinds are not okay because you don't want to let them shoot their way into power.

Is this the kind of dialogue that the Administration has wanted to see take place for a long time, or have things changed so that this dialogue is now acceptable but might not have been a year ago?

A Again, I refer you to President Duarte's statements in his TV interview yesterday in which he made clear that he was -- in fact, he said it was against the constitution to be involved in a power-sharing arrangement. What he was talking about was participation in the electoral process, but I refer you to his words. It's his proposal; they're his words, but I think his meaning is very clear on that, Ralph.

Q But how about the U.S. Administration's --

A Well, we have expressed, obviously, very strong support for this proposal, our understanding of it, and what it involves is that which he also gave in that interview yesterday. So there's nothing changed as far as I understand about that aspect.

--MORE--

Q Alan, on a related subject on El Salvador, The New York Times today has a story, I guess, in effect claiming that the Salvadorans have used napalm.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you still stand by your earlier statement that there are no confirmed reports of that?

A Yes. Let me give you a longer answer, though. While it is difficult to comment definitively on a reported conversation between a Salvadoran air force commander and a group of congressmen, we have seen press reports that indicate that any napalm that might have been used was used before 1981.

As you know, it wasn't until 1981 that we began providing the Salvadoran Government with military assistance. In fact, press reports indicate that the Salvadoran air force commander credited U.S. assistance with obviating Salvadoran military use of napalm.

Having said that, we stand by our previous statement that the United States Government has seen no evidence to indicate that napalm has been used in El Salvador.

The present government has a policy not to use the modest stockpile it inherited from previous governments. Our increased ability to monitor the situation in El Salvador over the last four years enables us to speak with greater authority about this recent period than over the period before 1981.

Q May we have a copy of that statement, and could we also have a copy of your statement on the acceptance --

A Yes.

Q -- on Salvador?

Q Do you have a text of Duarte's speech and his subsequent interview or press conference?

A I think you should get those from the appropriate people. The speech was given at the United Nations, and I'm sure the Salvadoran Government can make that available, if not the United Nations, and the interview that I'm speaking of was on MacNeil-Lehrer, so I think you could --

Q I didn't ask for a copy, but I'd like to.

A I'm not in the business of providing interviews from networks.

Q You won't say when we were made aware of his offer. Is it fair to say that it was discussed with either Ambassador Pickering or with people in the Department -- the Duarte proposal?

A I really don't want to get into the question of specific discussions. I think that that -- the fact is that it is very clear that this is Mr. Duarte and his Government's proposal, and I think that's an obvious fact which stands by itself.

Q Alan, a couple of months ago you were saying that the Salvador Army was on its last legs and counting its last bullets. What has now changed that gives the Salvador Army and Government this kind of confidence to advance on the diplomatic side?

A Well, I think, again, I would have to refer you to President Duarte. He is the man who has made this proposal. He has explained it in interviews. I think it is a fact that the Salvadoran armed forces have been more assertive in recent weeks and possibly months --

Q That dramatically?

A I'm not trying to draw a connection -- I was asked before, is the better performance by the Salvadoran military the reason that President Duarte has now advanced this proposal, or did it set a framework for doing that? I'm not going to try to speak for President Duarte. I think you have to ask him or his government --

Q Turn it around to the diplomatic side: Is this so much rhetoric?

A No. We think this is a meaningful proposal.

Mike? I'm sorry, George, you were --

Q Alan, will the Secretary be meeting with President Duarte tomorrow?

A Will the President be meeting with --

Q Will the Secretary be meeting with President Duarte tomorrow in San Salvador?

A In San Salvador, yes. Surely.

Q One other follow-up: I recall it was one of Ambassador Stone's responsibilities to try to arrange peace talks between the government and the insurgents when he was on board a year ago.

Has Ambassador Shlaudeman had the same mandate?

A I don't have any new words to offer to you about the mandate. I think that you would be misled, however, to think that the proposal or the arrangements for meeting were U.S. in origin -- they are Salvadoran -- and I don't know what the details are of how that's going to be worked out, and I -- again, I think that's something for Mr. Duarte to talk to.

Q On a related question to Marvin's. As you well know, the armed forces in El Salvador as well as the businessmen there are very much against, or have been in the past, talks with the guerrillas.

I'm just wondering if the State Department now sees Duarte's political position in the country so strong that he puts himself in no political jeopardy by talking with the guerrillas. Is that your analysis?

A Well, again, you're trying to get me to talk about an internal Salvadoran matter, and I think I'm not going to do that. President Duarte has talked to the question of what kind of support he has. I've talked earlier about our understanding of the nature of this proposal, and that might have some implications as well, but I'm just not going to talk about internal political developments or views within El Salvador. That is not --

Q But there are no concerns at this point from the Department in looking at this situation. We're looking at it as a very positive development, and that's that.

A We are looking at it as a very positive development, indeed.

Jim?

Q Alan, on this same question, also in the past the State Department has said repeatedly that it discounts proposals for negotiations that are somehow conducted in public, indicating that such public give-and-take is usually done for propaganda purposes, not for anything serious.

Why is it that we support this proposal that will be in the glare of the world press, and so on and so forth? What's changed about this?

A I think that there are cases where one may be true, and cases where the other may be true. In this case I think that it is very clear President Duarte has made a far-reaching and courageous proposal to go unarmed to an area that is -- in an area where there has been certainly a proximity of guerrilla and government forces -- I can't speak to the specifics of who controls what up there -- but to talk with them. And I think the seriousness of his proposal is self-evident, and I don't have any question about that.

Q Do you believe that the Sandinista Government of Nicaragua had any influence on the acceptance by the guerrillas to accept the Duarte proposal?

A I have no idea.

Q Also on Central America, there was an interview in The New York Times with the Foreign Minister of Honduras today, in which he sort of expresses that he -- that his country wishes to become more independent of the U.S., or a less stringent alliance with the U.S.

Do you have any comment on that?

A The U.S. and Honduras are in continual contact through various channels, and we consider our overall relationship with Honduras to be good, dynamic and mutually-agreed upon.

The bulk of our aid to Honduras has been and will continue to be in non-military areas, and we agree with the Foreign Minister that economic development is an essential foundation for the overall development of all the countries of Central America.

Q Alan, that sort of skirts the question. He didn't say that the bulk of the aid wasn't -- at least as reported. The interview suggested that whatever the bulk of the aid was, he was interested in a smaller amount of military component.

A Well, I'm not sure that I would -- well, I guess I'm not going to get into parsing it, but the emphasis was that it should be on economic -- the emphasis should be on economic assistance. We agree it is, it has been, it will be.

Q So your answer suggests --

A And we think that the relationship is quite good.

Q Your answer suggests that there's no need for a change in that; that it always has been, and will be, and is, and so on.

A Well, we have indicated before -- this goes back now several weeks, this subject of discussions with the Hondurans. We've indicated before that we have had discussions with them at various levels. The Foreign Minister met with the Secretary. Assistant Secretary Motley meets with various senior officials. There is dialogue at all levels. So it isn't as if we are saying we won't talk about the relationship. It's quite the opposite. We talk about the relationship all the time.

Q Is an agreement being worked out on the Regional Military Training Center, and what -- where the Salvadorans are going to be trained next?

A Again, that topic, or those two topics, remain --

Q It's still going on.

A -- under discussion.

Q You're aware of the deadline for comments by people on this current draft of the Contadora agreement is next Monday. Does the United States intend to provide its comments on the draft, either in a formal document or somehow informally to those people who are working on this treaty?

A Don, we have said before, both here on the record and in background briefings in more extensive comment, that we have had a very active dialogue with the countries involved, both the Contadora countries, so-called, and the Core Four, and we have talked about the draft Acta and have expressed our views on it and gotten their views on it. So there has been a very active back and forth.

Q Are you expecting to -- is the U.S. going to give them some official position? Are you going to give them a paper, saying this is what we -- our concern is, or is this just going to be a kind of informal chit-chat?

A I will check and see what we can say on it. My impression is that this is -- it is a matter between the countries who are formally involved in this situation -- that is, those nine countries themselves -- and it isn't for the United States to give to the nine as a group a U.S. position.

But, on the other hand, obviously, we are deeply involved in the region, have a lot of interests in the region --

Q Could we have a backgrounder here to explain what U.S. objectives are?

A We've had that.

Q I say, when you have that, it doesn't seem to me that you can say "we're not involved."

A I say, we have had -- we have deep interests, we are, obviously, involved in the various countries in different ways. We have had extensive relationships with those countries, and we have not shied away from the fact that we've had a lot of discussion of the draft Acta, nor of our continuing very strong support for the Contadora process and the 21-points.

Q Well, can you find out if there's going to be some paper passed to them, or whatever?

A I will take a look at that. Yes.

Q Alan, can we get a copy of the Honduras guidance?

A Yes. I can give you part of it. Yes. Sure.

Q Can we change the subject? Do you have any comment --

-- MORE --

Q I have one more on El Salvador. Is Secretary Shultz going to meet with Ortega?

A We're where we were on that. I think the Secretary said the other day, meeting with a few correspondents, that he had no plans at this point. I can't tell you that for sure that isn't going to happen, and I can't tell you particularly that at the reception for the Panamanian inauguration there won't be some sort of place where they come together. But as of this moment, I have no reason to change what has been said on that before.

Q I understand there was a story about an hour-long meeting, not just a meeting, an exchange at a reception.

A Well, there may be a story about it, but I have no reason to change what we have said from here before, that there is no such meeting scheduled at this point.

Q Do you have any comment on President Mubarak visiting Jordan and meeting King Hussein beginning today?

A Not really. As you know, we welcomed the re-establishment of relations, and this is a natural follow-on to that event, so --

Q Can we look for Egypt to help Jordan resist Syrian pressure in the threats that we heard last week against Hussein?

A I don't think that is something for us to comment on.

Q Do you have anything on a Chinese visit, current Chinese mission here?

A Yes, I have a little bit on that. This is the technical working group that's here?

Q Yes.

A Yes, there is a technical work group from the PRC that's in the United States examining marine engines for possible commercial purchase for the Chinese Navy. But I really don't have any details beyond that.

As we've indicated before, we always examine possible sales of selected items of defensive military equipment for China on a case-by-case basis.

Q Are these the G.E. engines that the Post referred to this morning?

A I really can't address -- the fact is, I personally don't know, but I also cannot address the question because it would get into the proprietary information area, so I cannot get you any information on it.

Q Well, have the Chinese applied for an export license on these?

A I'm not aware that that's the case, but I also think that I probably am not going to be in a position to talk about export licenses. If we have -- to the extent that there are things that can be made public, we'll make them public; but I think you've got a problem here. Again, this is a technical working group and --

Q Who are they meeting with?

A I don't have the details of whom they are seeing. I'm sure they're seeing people that -- Well, I just don't know whom they're seeing.

Yes, Marvin.

Q What is the subject matter for today's follow-up meeting between Shultz and Peres?

A I'm going to leave, Marvin, the question of the visit by Prime Minister Peres to the White House briefing, which is going to take place, I guess, in about an hour, following meetings over there. The general outline of the visit, topics, I think, has been given already in briefings. There will be this further briefing which will get into that. There will be a further meeting this afternoon, as you indicate, and if there is something to say afterwards, presumably one side or the other, or both, will have something on that.

Q Well, could you tell us whether the Secretary, acting on behalf of some U.S. economic group, is suggesting ways in which the Israeli economy can turn around?

1-2613

A I think that the fact that there has been discussion of the Israeli economy is no secret. It's a subject of great importance. We're interested in hearing their ideas and to see how the U.S., within the context of their ideas, can be helpful. But I really don't have anything beyond that to suggest--

Q Are there specific American ideas for the Israeli economy that have been discussed and perhaps even serve as a basis for discussion?

A I think that's the kind of question that I guess you would have to put to your briefer at the White House at 1:30.

Q Do you have anything on the moves by Israel to have a summit conference with Egypt?

A No, I don't have anything on that.

Q Alan, with respect to the Gulf, how do we view the latest Iraqi attack on a tanker and the death of six crewmen?

A As with the other attacks, this latest report of loss of life underscores the need to bring the earliest possible end to this tragic conflict. We have repeatedly called for full implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 540 which calls for an immediate end to all hostilities in the Gulf region and security for all sea lanes, waterways, and port facilities.

Q Copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Are we still -- In our response on the (inaudible) do we still, are we neutral or would we like to see the Iraqis in particular call off this kind of thing at this point?

A Our position of neutrality in this war has been quite clear; our position against attacks on this type of shipping has been quite clear, and don't have any new words to offer to you beyond what I just --

Q We're not particularly exercised at this particular attack by the Iraqis?

A Well, we are exercised about the entire war and the fact that there are attacks on innocent shipping, so --

Abdulsalam, you had --

Q Alan, do you have -- last weekend -- I believe it was Friday or Saturday -- Israeli Foreign Minister Shamir on CNN with Sandy Freeman, he was asked about the Golan Heights and he suggested that Israel is ready to talk to Syria about the Golan Heights' future and the possibility of striking a deal with Syria about the Heights. Do you have any comment on that?

A No, I don't have any comment on it.

Q Was the hit against the tanker inside the neutral water or in the beseiged water?

A I don't have specifics on that.

Q Do you have any comment on the statements by the North Korean Foreign Minister that they are ready to talk about confidence-building measures in part of the three-way dialogue which they have recommended?

A Yes. In terms of confidence-building measures per se, we welcome the North Korean Foreign Minister's reported interest. Over the years, the United Nations Command has made a number of proposals for tension reduction measures, including those mentioned in the article, that is mutual notification of military exercises and the exchange of observers at military exercises.

These proposals have been made by the U.N. Command directly to the North Korean representatives to the Military Armistice Commission, the MAC, and the proposals remain on the table and could easily be discussed in the MAC forum where both the Republic of Korea and China have representatives.

Q What about the question of the three-way talks?

A Well, we've expressed our views on this before, Don, that is that the important thing is that North and South Korea talk, and if it can't be worked out, that they, the two of them, should sit down directly -- our preference would be for quadrilateral talks. In any case, that's where we are on that issue.

Q The U.S. has not actually -- Have you actually rejected three-way talks, or are you just saying something else as you preferred?

A I'm saying that the need is for them to sit down bilaterally. Our preference beyond that would be for quadrilateral talks. It really would be premature to talk about other modalities, but these are the two things that we've been focusing on.

Q Can you shed any light on the statement by the North Korean Foreign Minister that in September of last year, the United States suggested three-way talks?

A No, I really can't. In terms of contacts with the DPRK, I might note that we did make a notification to the PRC last year of adoption of somewhat more relaxed rules concerning the diplomatic contacts with North Korean diplomats, and the implementation of that was, and in fact remains, suspended in the wake of last year's Rangoon bombing.

I would also note that when we informed the PRC of the more relaxed contact guidance, we also noted our side's proposals for confidence-building measures remained on the table.

Q Was this in September?

A I don't -- This was-- as I say, this was last year. I don't have a specific date beyond that.

Q Alan, sliding back to the Middle East for a second, the U.N. Relief Agency is complaining today that Israeli authorities in southern Lebanon have for some weeks been blocking the delivery of food shipments to refugee camps in the Sidon and Tyre areas. Have you been able to confirm that, and if so, does the Department have a position?

A I don't have a specific comment on that. We have noted many times our hope that all the parties would pay particular attention to the humanitarian aspects of the situation, but I don't have a comment beyond that on that specific thing.

Q Do you have anything further on the report that is supposed to go up to Capitol Hill today that reportedly shows 11 Soviet violations of arms control (inaudible)?

A This is the GAC report?

Q Yes.

A Don't have anything beyond what we've said before.

Jim?

Q Anything on South Africa today with respect to the people in the Embassy or the seizure of documents by police authorities in churches, in church buildings?

A No, don't have anything --

Q Alan, did you get the clarifications you said you were going to ask of the Greek Government concerning Papandreou's remarks last week on 007?

A Well, I don't have anything to say on that, and I'm not sure we're going to have anything further to say. We have made our position clear, and I don't -- I don't think --

Q But you said you were going to ask for clarifications from them.

A Yes.

Q Did you get any reply?

A Well, I think I'm not going to get into the question of diplomatic dialogue. But I'll leave you with what I said last week.

Spence?

Q Can we have a copy of the remarks about North Korea, please?

A Well, part of it, yes.

Q Alan, to come back to Abdulsalam's question, would the United States welcome a resolution of the Golan dispute within the context of 242?

A Well, I'm not going to try from here to get into the question of how this all should be approached. Obviously, we're in favor of reduction in tensions and of promotion of the Middle East peace process, but I don't have a specific comment on those reports. I can't verify them; I can't -- and I don't have a comment on them.

Q Would you welcome a resolution of the dispute within 242?

A Our position on the Middle East peace process and basing our policy on 242 and on Camp David, which is based on 242, is quite clear. There is no question that that also effects the Golan -- it encompasses it.

Q Alan, what is the Department's attitude toward Cardinal Sin?

A I don't have anything in particular to say. We've talked with him on many occasions.

Q What about the other meaning of that question?

A I'd leave that to you, I guess.

Q Comment -- any new status report on the Sino-American nuclear agreement?

A No. Don't have anything on it.

Q Thank you.

A O.K. You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:45 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #184

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1984, 12:23 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. A housekeeping announcement and then a statement:

Deputy Secretary Kenneth Dam will address the Commonwealth Club of California on Monday, October 15, 5:15 to 6:15 at the Gold Ballroom of the Sheraton Palace Hotel. If you want to cover this event, please be in touch with the Commonwealth Club. That's Area Code 415-362-4903. The title of that address will be "Challenge and Continuity: American Foreign Policy in the 1980s," and there will be a Q&A session, and there will be a prepared text available. That's Monday in San Francisco.

Secondly, a statement on the bombing of the Brighton Hotel housing delegates to the British Conservative Party Conference:

The United States cannot emphasize too strongly its abhorrence of this cowardly attack and its condemnation of those responsible for this criminal act of violence. President Reagan is sending a message of sympathy and support to Prime Minister Thatcher. The Secretary of State is sending a separate message to Foreign Secretary Howe.

Our Ambassador, the United States Ambassador to Great Britain, was in Brighton at the time of the explosion. He talked with Prime Minister Thatcher shortly after the explosion. He reports that she is uninjured, but obviously saddened by the deaths and by the injuries to her friends.

The United States offers its deepest sympathy to the families and friends of those killed and to those injured in this brutal attack. We also offer to the people of Great Britain every assistance we can appropriately provide to bring those responsible for this criminal act to justice.

Q Copy please?

A Sure. And so far as we know, there were no U.S. citizens injured in the bombing.

1-3620

That's it.

Q That's it?

A Yes.

Q Do you have anything on Pakistan asking to buy reconnaissance early-warning planes?

A I do have something on that, Jim. Our current six-year program of economic and security assistance for Pakistan has been underway since 1981. That program has included the sale of a limited number of advanced aircraft and other defensive systems. The program does not include an airborne early-warning system, and no decision to sell such a system has been taken. We are sympathetic to Pakistan's need to improve its air defense system; but as I just said, no decision has been taken on what might be done in this regard.

Q Have they requested the sale?

A (I'm) not going to get into detail of any back and forth.

Q Is it being considered?

A No decision has been taken.

Q Can we get a copy of that, please?

A Yes.

Q That sounds like an affirmative response.

A Well, I'll leave you with the -- leave you with the words.

Q Do you have anything on the tensions on the borders of India and Pakistan, especially --

A No, not really beyond anything we have said. If you're referring to those earlier reports of rumors of an Indian attack on Pakistan, no. We have said before, and continue to feel, that such an attack is not --

Q Also, some officials in Islamabad said --

Q Is not what?

A Imminent or in the making. There's no -- we see no such threat.

Q Some officials said unofficially that President Zia is waiting for American elections before maybe he attacks India because he hopes for support from President Reagan.

A That's a question? What is the question? Do I think President Zia is waiting for the American elections?

Q Yes. He hopes for full support from the Reagan Administration.

A It sounds like a fantasy to me, but you'll have to ask President Zia about his plans.

Q This may also be fantasy. I have no idea, but -- (Laughter)

A Try me.

Q -- a Lahore, Pakistan, newspaper had a report which is, I guess, creating some sensation in India that President Reagan has sent a letter to President Zia suggesting that the United States would be open to essentially an alliance relationship similar to that of NATO if Pakistan abandons its nuclear program. Does that ring at all anything?

A Well, there are stories about Presidential letters, and we obviously don't get into that. I think there is a very, very far-out Indian newspaper report suggesting that the United States has made some commitment to place Pakistan under its nuclear umbrella. That clearly is not correct. No such offer has been made by the United States, and none has been requested by Pakistan. But there is -- I think there is an Indian newspaper story circulating along those lines. It's not accurate at all.

Q But this is a little different and it comes from a Pakistani newspaper, which says that -- it doesn't say specifically a nuclear umbrella or anything like that, but it says that the United States would commit itself on the same basis -- I'm quoting from the quote that's attributed to the paper -- "on the same basis as to NATO, if it abandons its nuclear program."

A Uh-huh.

Q And then suggests that some special arrangements could be made beginning in -- beyond 1987.

A No, I don't have anything on that, Jim. No response to it.

Hankt

Q John, do you have anything on where any aspects of foreign aid were left with Congress' departure? I assume it's departed.

A On the contras?

Q Aid to Central America, the contras --

A Well, as you know, the President is committed to his overall plan for economic and overall aid plan for Central America and I presume will want to return to that.

--MORE --

Q What does that do for the contras in the meantime?

A Well, I don't have anything for you on that, Bernie.

Q Does the United States -- by signing that bill today, is it your understanding that the Reagan Administration will now -- is legally obligated not to provide any support, indirect or direct, to the contras until at least February 28?

A I can't give you a legal interpretation, Jim. The President has done what he's done, taken the action that he's done, but I can't interpret for you what the implications are.

Q Well, for example --

A I mean, I'm not quarreling with your interpretation, but I think I'd be unwise to give you a legal interpretation.

Q The -- with respect to the flap here awhile ago after that helicopter crash with the two Americans aboard, you said that a decision had been reached not to either encourage or discourage --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- not to discourage such attempts. Does the fact that this is now -- a ban on aid to the contras has been enacted by the Congress and signed by the President mean that we could foresee a change in that policy?

A I'm not aware of any plans to change that policy. You are talking about two different things. You're talking about U.S. Governmental aid, and you're talking about private aid from other sources. I'm not aware of any decision to change that.

Q John, as far as the Administration is concerned, is the Jackson/Kissinger plan now in effect as a result of Congressional action? I don't think Congress has specifically referred to it --

A How do you mean "in effect," Hank?

Q Well, in the sense that enough money has been provided so that the Administration can shape the program as it was envisioned under those recommendations?

A That's a good question. I'm not quite sure what the definitive answer is to that. I'll pass on that one.

Q New subject?

A Sure.

Q Could we finish this subject first? I'm sorry. Do you have any comment to the story in the Post today that the Coordinadora has accepted the offer of the Sandinistas as laid out in Rio last week?

A Well, it's -- I think it continues to be a somewhat confusing situation. Our policy is to support the growth of democracy throughout Central America, including Nicaragua. We hope that the Sandinistas will yet agree to guarantee the conditions necessary for free and fair elections, which would permit the democratic opposition to participate.

But in the story you cite, there seem to be some discrepancies and some confusion and contradiction as to what has been agreed on by both sides.

Q Do you have any comments there on a statement by Deng Xiaoping that has been interpreted as being menacing toward Taiwan and warning the United States to be careful on how it handles the issue?

A Yes, I do. I think you're referring to his remarks to a Japanese group made in a private session.

We note that China's official news agency Xinhua merely stated that Mr. Deng had answered questions from his Japanese guests, "including questions about Sino-U.S. relations."

China's official position on Taiwan was summarized by Mr. Deng himself just 12 days ago in his National Day address at Tian An Men Square, when he said "we stand for the peaceful reunification with Taiwan, which is part of our sacred territory. Our policy in this regard is also known to all and will not change. Being an irresistible trend, the peaceful reunification of our motherland will sooner or later come true." End the quote; that's the quote from Deng Xiaoping.

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Now, going back to our language, this same position -- that China will pursue a policy of peaceful reunification with Taiwan -- has been stated by Chinese leaders on many occasions in public and private over the last few years. It's also reflected in the August 19 -- August 17, 1982, U.S.-China Joint Communique in which the Chinese state it as their fundamental policy.

Q John, as I understand it, there was a suggestion in Deng's remarks that there could be a situation arise where they might blockade Taiwan.

Is that your understanding? Would that be interpreted as a peaceful approach?

A As far as our position is concerned, we understand Chinese policy to be as I have just reiterated it.

Q Copy of that?

A Sure.

Q John, on another subject, did the State Department receive warnings that the U.S. Embassy in Cyprus was potentially to come under attack?

A I don't think, you know, Jim, we'll get into specific warnings. As I've said, they sadly are all too many these days. There are many such threats to specific embassies and specific diplomatic installations, and I don't think we'll get very specific about them.

Q And on the subject of Cyprus, have you heard from them about the Vice President's rather slighting remark about President Kyprianou last night? (Laughter)

A I'm not aware of any response.

Q Wait. (Laughter)

Q John, do you have comment on the World Court decision on the Georges Bank?

A Yes. There is some -- we could even provide a map, if that would be helpful, and there is some background data. The fact of the matter is that this is a 400-page judgment, and it will take us a little time to digest it. But we certainly can provide some factual information on its implications.

Q What was the question?

A The World Court on the Gulf of Maine decision.

Q John, do you have any comment on the signing of a treaty between North Yemen and Soviet Union lately?

A No, I don't.

Q No?

A There might have been something on that yesterday. I'm not sure about that. I think there is some guidance.

Q Are there any golden goodies in that book we haven't already had?

A Golden goodies that you haven't already had? (Laughter) No. I think you've -- as you always do, you've just drained it all out of me, I think.

Q Okay. We give up.

A You give up? (Laughter)

(The briefing concluded at 12:35 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #185

MONDAY, OCTOBER 15, 1984, 12:09 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Couple of housekeeping announcements, and then a statement.

Firstly, available in the Press Office is the prepared address by Deputy Secretary Kenneth Dam before the Commonwealth Club of California in San Francisco. That's today. The subject of the speech is "Change and Continuity: American Foreign Policy in the 1980's." There is an embargo on the time of delivery: 5:15 their time, 8:15 p.m. our time.

The Secretary will accept the National Conference on Soviet Jewry's Humanitarian Award and make acceptance remarks at that organization's National Assembly on Monday, October 22, 8:30 in the morning. The event will take place in the Federal Room of the Capital Hilton Hotel.

If you are interested in covering, please notify Nancy Albrecht, National Conference on Soviet Jewry, who's presently at Area Code 212-679-6122. Beginning Friday, October 19, Miss Albrecht and Myrna Shinbaum may be reached at the Capital Hilton Hotel, and that is 393-1000. They are presently at 212-679-6122, and after Friday, 393-1000.

Q Is that a Press Room or is that a direct number or do you know where they're located?

A I do not know what that is. I suspect, looking at that number, 393-1000, it's probably the hotel. So I guess you would need to ask for the suite being occupied by the National Conference on Soviet Jewry. I guess they've got an office there, or something like that.

Q No Q&A, right? Acceptance remarks.

A That's acceptance remarks. That's right. No Q&A.

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Q Are his -- the Secretary's speeches at the end of the week going to be piped in, do you know, here? Los Angeles?

MR. ROMBERG: The L.A. speech, technical operations permitting.

MR. HUGHES: The L.A. speech will be? God willing, the L.A. speech will be. How about the Rand speech?

MR. ROMBERG: No.

MR. HUGHES: No. Okay.

Q That's Thursday?

A The Rand is Thursday and World Affairs is Friday. That's right. World Affairs Council is Friday.

Q How about the texts on those speeches?

A Just as soon as they're available, as always, we will rush those right down.

Q The Rand speech is open to coverage, isn't it?

A I think that both of them are open to coverage, John. Yes.

Statement on Valeriy Marchenko: The Department of State has learned of the death of leading Ukrainian human rights activist Valeriy Marchenko in a Leningrad prisoner's hospital on October 7. Mr. Marchenko, who had long suffered from a serious kidney disease, apparently died of kidney failure. A journalist by profession, he had been sentenced in March of this year to 10 years of imprisonment and five years of internal exile for writing articles criticizing the harsh conditions in Soviet labor camps and deploring the violation of human and national rights in the Ukraine. He previously served and barely survived eight years imprisonment and exile on a similar charge.

At the time of his March conviction, Mr. Marchenko's friends and relatives had predicted that because of his precarious health his sentencing to a "special regime" labor camp -- the harshest in the Soviet system -- amounted to a death sentence. We understand he

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was transferred from this camp to the Leningrad prisoner's hospital on September 13. We've also received a report that Soviet authorities refused his family's request that he be transferred to a hospital with kidney dialysis facilities.

The death of Mr. Marchenko at the age of 36* removes from the scene a young and powerful spokesman for the human rights struggle in the Ukraine, but his life will remain an inspiration to all who care deeply about human rights and the Ukraine.

The U.S. Government mourns his death and deeply deplores the insensitive and inhuman treatment by Soviet authorities which precipitated it. The death of Mr. Marchenko is, sadly, yet another example of the Soviet Union's callous disregard for human rights and human life.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A Sure. That's it.

Q So you -- that this amounts to a death sentence, you support that and agree with that?

A Well, I think we'll let the facts speak for themselves. The family predicted what would be the outcome of failure to provide him treatment, and that has been the outcome.

Q John, is support for human rights in the Ukraine the same thing as supporting Ukrainian nationalism?

A I would not respond to that query from here, Marvin, but I'd be glad to make sure I give you some carefully crafted words later. That's it.

Q Has the U.S. taken this case up or discussed it with the Soviets?

A Oh, I think the Soviet Union is very well aware of our feelings in the area of human rights. I think they are raised on every occasion on which we talk with them.

Q John, do you have any comment on the fact that the talks have now begun in La Palma between the rebels, including the political leaders and the military leaders, and the Government of El Salvador?

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*Later corrected to read 37.

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A Well, I think the Secretary really addressed himself to that on NBC this morning, so I don't know that we have anything more to really say.

As you know, the United States fully endorsed, and endorses, President Duarte's bold and courageous effort to renew a process of dialogue aimed at bringing the opposition into the ongoing democratic process in San Salvador.

Just a little background, factual information: As far as U.S. presence is concerned there, President Duarte has made clear his intention to limit any official participation or attendance to Salvadorans -- this is a Salvadoran affair -- and so there will be no official United States Government representatives nor American officials at the meeting today. I think that's really about all I have to take it any further.

Q John, on that same point, bringing the opposition into the democratic process, what does that say about the former Administration opposition to any kind of power sharing? Has that opposition to power sharing changed in any way?

A No, I don't think our position has changed on that, and I don't think President Duarte's position has changed on that, and he has made it clear that what he is about to talk with the left about is a process within the framework of the Salvadoran constitution.

Q So that unless the opposition were prepared to drop its desire for power sharing at this point, this negotiation may not get anywhere?

A Well, I don't think we should, at this stage, be predicting the course of the talks, assuming they take place. But the fact is, President Duarte has made very clear the basis on which he goes into these discussions with them, and President Reagan has very vigorously endorsed that position. So there's no change on either our part or theirs.

Q John, what is your assessment of the implications of these talks at La Palma to U.S. policy in El Salvador? Is there a benefit, or are they wise, or --

A Well, of course, it depends how they go, but even the fact that they're taking place would seem to

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underline the significance of what we have been trying to do in El Salvador.

We have consistently talked about the need for democratization there, and we have consistently talked about the need for economic development. As you know, our aid to that country, in that area, is heavily tilted in the area of economic development; and, having said that, we have always and consistently said that this cannot take place without a military shield.

So that's been our policy, that remains our policy, and it remains to be seen whether the left are moving into these discussions on the basis of the success of that policy.

Q Do you have anything on the circumstances surrounding the presence in La Palma of Senator Tsongas today?

A No. I do not know. I heard the report that Senator Tsongas is there, and also heard the report that -- there's a Congressman. His name escapes me.

Q Shannon, I gather.

Q Who is it?

A Shannon. Heard both those reports, but of our own knowledge we're not sure of that. You might check with their offices.

Q Do you have any reaction, John, to the apparent breakdown of efforts to involve Mr. Cruz in the Nicaraguan elections?

A Well, our policy, in support of the Contadora process, has been to encourage the growth of democracy throughout Central America, including Nicaragua, and so our hope today is, as it has been for the past several weeks, that the Sandinistas will yet agree to guarantee the conditions necessary for free and fair elections which would permit the democratic opposition to participate.

And that's one of our problems in looking at the Contadora Acta. If those conditions are not guaranteed, the sincerity of the Sandinista commitment to the Contadora process and their willingness to abide by any agreement reached would be called into question.

F-2633

Q Copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Just going back on El Salvador for a second, some countries apparently are sending observers in a kind of unofficial capacity -- that is to say, in their personal capacity -- and I guess the Vatican has also sent someone in its official capacity.

If we don't have any official observation there, do we have -- is anyone going to be there in his personal capacity who is U.S. Government personnel?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q Nobody at all, from the Embassy or anyplace?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q John, how does that -- just to clean up the Tsongas and Shannon question a little bit -- if they -- granted that you don't know whether they're there or not, if they are there, if it turns out that they are there, are you saying that they would not be representatives of the United States Government?

A They would not be representing the United States Government. They would be there in their personal capacities as Senator or Congressman, and, obviously, we don't dictate to Senators and Congressmen where they travel.

Q You'd expect a report from them, wouldn't you? Wouldn't the U.S. Government --

A Well, as we're not -- you know, as they, to the best of our knowledge, have not been in touch with us, and all we're working with are reports that they're there, it's a little premature to talk about getting any report from them.

Q On the election negotiations, were you only expressing hope against hope, or do you have -- have you made some analysis and believe that their categorical statements are not so categorical?

A I'm sorry. You mean on the --

Q They said that the --

A In the case of Nicaragua?

Q Apparently --

A No, no, no. I wasn't leading you. I was indicating what our position is and what we think they should do.

Q On the 19th, when the Contadora Ministers meet again, the four --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- what is it, now that the Secretary has been down there, that the United States hopes will take place?

A Well, I don't think we'll get into very great detail on that, as we have not done hitherto. We've made our views known to the various participants, and, as I think we have said before, our particular areas of concern, as indeed those of other governments, lie in this area of simultaneity and verification.

You want to be sure that things agreed to are taking place within an overall pattern; that one side doesn't get an undue advantage in being able to do something before the other side, or vice versa.

And then there is this question of verification. That's our concern about the election process in Nicaragua. If you can't follow through on promises that the Sandinistas have made in this area on many occasions to us and others, how can you be sure that promises in other areas will be carried out, so that's an important aspect.

Q Can you confirm reports from Jerusalem that the U.S. told Prime Minister Peres when he was here that some of their debt repayments could be put off for three months?

A No, I can't confirm that. Obviously, we've talked with the Israelis on a contingency basis about problems that may develop with their economy, but I'm not aware that any such agreement has been reached.

Q Was there an offer? I think the story says an "offer."

A Well, as I say, I think I would cast it in terms of more of contingency discussion of what might be done. No decision has been taken about what moves would be the most desirable, or, indeed, about whether they would be needed.

But, obviously, there has been general discussion in that area, but I think I'd caution you on stories that there's been an agreement on such a matter.

Q John, in another area, about Iraq, President Saddam Husayn lately said that they would reconsider resuming diplomatic relations with U.S.A. after the election. What -- do you have any comment on that?

A No. Our -- I think there is in fact some guidance from last week, but in essence our position has been very clear. There's been some talk of this over the months, and should that transpire, that would be very agreeable to the United States, but I'm not aware of any immediate plan to go forward with that.

-- MORE --

1-2636

Q John, may we have something on the record on why the Secretary will be out -- will not be, in a sense, advising the President in preparation for the foreign policy debate?

A Well, I think he has been and will be. The Secretary obviously sees the President, talks to the President frequently, in terms of the formulation of U.S. foreign policy and in terms of its articulation, and all that has been going forward on the same basis as is usual. However, I think he is involved this week. I think he is going to be involved Wednesday. He will be out of town Thursday and Friday, of course, and out of town today, later today and Tuesday, but I think on Wednesday he will be involved directly.

Q What will he be doing?

A I don't know what specifically he will be doing, but I know that's the one day he's here this week, and he's going to be involved in some kind of preparation for the President.

Q Will he be playing Mondale?

(Laughter)

A I don't -- I have no -- I haven't heard that the Secretary will be playing Mondale.

Q Are there any other State Department officials more directly involved on a daily basis this week, or --

A Well, I don't quite know how to answer that question, Bernie. If you mean role-playing or coaching, not that I'm aware of. If you mean, in the traditional back-and-forth between the White House and the State Department on foreign policy, I'm sure that continues to go on.

Q Can you confirm reports that the Israelis are about to withdraw from Lebanon? Is that your information?

A No. There is really no change in that position, as we see it. There needs to be compromise on the part of various parties. We do not presently see that compromise. We see the positions as being quite far apart.

As you know, we have been, and still are, in an exploratory mode. We are not negotiating or mediating at this stage, but we certainly intend to remain engaged and to be helpful.

Q Did you say all or both parties? There needs to be compromise on the parts of all or both parties?

A Well, there are three parties.

Q Oh, excuse please.

A I think the positions of those parties are far apart.

Q John, any ideas --

A Let me take the one behind you first.

Q Yes. The reports from Israel, a press conference that Prime Minister Peres has given, he apparently confirmed that there would be a withdrawal from south Lebanon, but not from the Israeli troops facing the Syrian Army. Can you -- would you add anything to what you said?

A Well, (a) I'm not going to -- I don't think it's for us to interpret Israeli statements, but I'd be careful about suggested announcements of timetables and that kind of thing. But that's an Israeli affair, not ours.

Q Can you expand on the word "compromise" from the parties, what kind of compromise you are seeking?

A There are obvious difficulties, mainly, I would suppose, pertaining to the question of preserving Israel's security on its northern border from southern Lebanon. I certainly think that would be one area in which the parties would be deeply concerned.

Q John --

A I'm sorry. I cut you off before.

Q No, you were -- I'd like to go back to El Salvador and ask -- Mr. Zamora is saying that this initiative by Mr. Duarte was "impulsive" and "thoughtless."

A Imposed by --?

Q "Impulsive" and "thoughtless," that he didn't think much about inviting the -- What's the U.S. assessment of that?

A The President has made it clear that we think it's a very fine and courageous initiative, and, as the Secretary said this morning, President Duarte is risking his life to go through with this. That seems to us to demand our admiration.

Q Is there another meeting scheduled between Mr. Shlaudeman and Mr. Tinoco or Mr. Shlaudeman and any Nicaraguan official?

A I don't know that one is scheduled, Ralph. I'm not aware of any scheduling, and so therefore, I don't have anything to --

Q Do you expect another meeting to take place?

A I think we would expect such a meeting, sure.

Q John, about the withdrawal from Lebanon --

A Yes.

Q -- what's the difference between you saying that you are "engaged" and "helpful" and between "mediation"? What's the difference between these two?

A I think the point that we're making is that the differences, the positions, are far enough apart at the moment that it does not, in our view, warrant U.S. mediation, so we're continuing to explore the positions of the parties and to see whether there will come a point when we might be more actively involved as a mediator, when the parties come somewhat closer together, and there is a real hope of a mediator being able to achieve something.

Yes?

Q John, do you have any guidance on King Hussein's apparent interest in purchasing more Soviet weapons and --

A No, I don't.

Q -- how much the U.S. can do to help him not purchase them, perhaps, or to purchase them from European allies--

A Well --

Q -- or even produce an American equivalent?

A No, I really can't. I think the problems attendant upon Jordanian purchase of American arms are obvious -- and we certainly understand that -- but I don't have anything on where else he might acquire such arms.

Yes?

Q Is there any U.S. official involved at the moment to narrow the differences between Israel, Lebanon, and Syria to bring about the withdrawal or the security issue of Israel?

A I'm sorry. I missed the first part of your sentence.

Q Is there any U.S. official involved at the present time?

A Well, Ambassador Murphy continues to be involved in the same kind of way in which he has been.

Q There is no shuttle diplomacy in the area by anyone in particular?

A No. I'm sure that Ambassador Murphy has the lead on this, and, certainly, he continues to be helpful and active, but he has not upgraded, if you will, that activity to the point where you all would describe him as a "mediator."

Q John, a couple of follow-ups, please. The first one about the Egyptians were asking that the United States treat Egypt on equal treatment with Israel in the field of economic and military assistance. They are asking if you are increasing the assistance to Israel, you ought also to increase the assistance to Egypt. What do you comment on that?

A No, I don't have anything on a change in aid levels.

Q The second follow-up, also President Mubarak of Egypt said that, called on the United States to warm up for King Hussein because he feels isolated. Do you have any comment on that?

1-3640

A I'm sorry. Called for a what?

Q Warm-up, you know, to warm up for the Jordanians, since King Hussein feels like United States --

A Called for the United States to warm up towards Jordan?

Q Yes.

A Well, we think that we already have very cordial relations with Jordan.

Q Besides these cordial relations, you know, about the field of weapons and other things that --

A Well, as I say, there are certain practical difficulties attendant upon the supply of U.S. arms to Jordan.

Q You hope that in the next Cabinet of Mr. Reagan that you will be able to overcome these things?

A Well, I don't think the problem lies in the Cabinet.

Q I mean, you know, in the next tenure of the President.

A It wasn't the Cabinet that I had in mind when I was talking about the practical difficulties.

Q What did you have in mind?

A (Laughter) I think there is a little problem of Congressional approval for such sales.

Q Well, what happens after the elections? Is it the Administration's intention, when the elections are over, to provide the arms Jordan wants?

A Well, certainly the United States wants to be helpful in supplying arms to Jordan, but that has to be within the constraints of the law and with the approval of Congress.

Q Do you have anything on the apparent Soviet decision to deploy cruise missiles and /or Mr. Romanov's remarks --

A Well, I do, although we don't, frankly, consider that a very new piece of information, John. The Soviet Union has long had an intensive program for cruise missile development and has previously deployed cruise missiles. The 1984 edition of the Department of Defense publication, Soviet Military Power, reported on five types of cruise missile systems which were being developed by the Soviets, including those the Soviets have now indicated they are deploying.

The United STates has proposed a global ban on all ground-launched cruise missiles of the kind currently being deployed as part of the 1979 NATO decision, or, failing that, to limit them to the lowest possible numbers. In addition, in START, the U.S. has proposed limitations on air-launched cruise missiles, and offered to discuss sea-launched cruise missiles. The United States has also indicated a willingness to discuss tradeoffs between areas of U.S. and Soviet strategic advantages in the START talks. If the Soviets are seriously interested in limiting cruise missiles, they should be willing to resume the negotiations to reduce offensive nuclear weapons. As the President has said, we will be prepared to negotiate flexibly when they return.

Insofar as the Romanian* statement is concerned, we haven't seen the full text, but we certainly would welcome any expression of interest by Soviet officials on resuming arms control negotiations. We would like to see such words translated into concrete actions.

For our part, we are ready to meet any time, any place on questions of space arms control, and, as I said, are ready to resume negotiations on strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces.

Q May we have a copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q John, can I ask on another topic, please?

A Sure.

Q President Dos Santos of Angola had some interesting statements over the weekend, both conciliatory towards South Africa, but also said the U.S. should pressure South Africa on Namibia. Do you have any response to his statements?

*Later corrected to read "Mr. Romanov's"

A Well, we're engaged in what we consider to be serious talks with Angola. We're encouraged by President Dos Santos's reiteration that the principle of Cuban troop withdrawal in the context of an overall settlement is accepted.

As I say, the discussions that we've had with the Angolan Government on this matter are serious. The door remains open to further progress. Deputy Assistant Secretary Wisner is now in Luanda, again, for a continuation of those talks, which concern the conditions under which a Cuban troop withdrawal could take place.

Q What about counter-charges by UNITA that they are a force that has to be reckoned with and that they are the legitimate government in Angola?

A Well, I think our position on that remains plain, that the factions within Angola have to resolve these kinds of differences for themselves. That's an internal Angolan affair.

Q On this same area, the article today about the joint -- the Lusaka Agreement and the Joint Commission and the apparent stalling at the 25 miles north of the border, do you have anything on that?

A Well, the ceasefire has held and we believe that both sides are committed to making it work. Although we follow the situation, the specifics of ceasefire observance are a matter discussed directly between South Africa and Angola; and we don't really wish to elaborate on it.

Q There is an implication in the article that's written that the U.S. has been encouraging South Africa to take the final step and withdraw. Is that -- Would you disagree with that?

A I wouldn't disagree with the general direction you're heading in.

Q And also, do you have anything today on the South African-Mozambique --

A No, I don't.

Q John, one last question.

A One last question, O.K.

Q Back to Soviet weapons in the Middle East: Is the U.S. concerned that by denying arms to countries like Kuwait, for example, and Jordan, that there will be more that may follow suit and turn to the Soviets for weapons, or is it satisfied that the strategic cooperation agreement with Israel is enough to counterbalance any further Soviet penetration in the region?

A Well, that's a pretty broad question, and, you know, one has observed Soviet activities in Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East with interest, and as we've said before, in the case of Syria we certainly haven't found them to be helpful or stabilizing for the area.

As far as arms purchases, I think in the case of both the countries you have mentioned, I think they have previously acquired arms from the Soviet Union, and I don't think we have a concern about their overall commitment to the stability of the area or their particular friends.

Q But you don't see a possible escalation or the fact that more Soviet weapons may end up in the region as a result of --

A Well, I suppose more Soviet weapons may end up in the region; but, as I said, there are certain realities that the United States is confronted by.

Q John, has there been any definition of the objectives of the strategic agreement between Israel and the United States? There were talks about that it was aimed at stopping the expansion of Soviet presence in the Middle East, and on the other side, the Israelis say that it is aimed against the Arab aggression against Israel.

A Yeah. No, I don't have anything beyond we've said on the --

Q Thank you.

Q Thank you, John.

(The briefing concluded at 12:38 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #186

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 16, 1984, 12:10 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A few announcements. First, a reminder that the Secretary will speak before the U.S. Chamber of Commerce International Forum tomorrow morning, October 17, at an 8:00 a.m. breakfast. The Secretary will address the Forum at approximately 8:30 in the Chamber's Hall of Flags at 1615 H Street, Northwest. If you wish to cover the event, please contact Tom Love of the Chamber at 463-5675. Barring technical difficulties, the speech and Q&A following it will be piped into the briefing room.

Also, the Secretary will have remarks tomorrow when he and Dr. Robert Warner, who is the archivist of the United States, co-host and preside at a ceremony opening the Grenada documents collection to the public at the National Archives at 2:30 -- again tomorrow, Wednesday, October 17. The microfiche documents being made available tomorrow are from the collection of documents which came into the hands of the joint U.S.-Caribbean forces last year soon after the rescue operation began on October 25. Any questions about that event, please contact Ms. Merrill, 523-3099.

Tomorrow morning at 10:30, here in the briefing room, there will be a BACKGROUND briefing on the present situation in Grenada.

I have two texts, or one text and one statement to give you: the text of a message sent from Secretary Shultz in Toronto to President Duarte last evening. The text reads as follows:

"Last week in El Salvador, I was deeply impressed by your courageous initiative to meet directly and unarmed with guerrilla leaders in La Palma. My prayers went with you today. Having learned of the success of this most important step towards peace, I share your well-earned feelings of triumph. My heartfelt congratulations to you and to the people of El Salvador whose will has been heard."

And finally, --

Q Alan, that release last night, was that in Toronto?

A I don't believe it has been released in Toronto.

Finally, on the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Bishop Tutu: We offer our congratulations to Bishop Desmond Tutu on being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. This is a great honor for the Bishop, a champion of non-violence, who has devoted his life to the pursuit of a more just society in South Africa. The United States shares that goal and supports peaceful change away from apartheid.

Q May we have a copy of that and the Shultz message?

A Sure. O.K. That's it for now. Be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, do you have anything else you can say regarding the statements being made in Jerusalem that there is an understanding the United States has offered to defer payments on some $500 million in interest as part of the aid package?

A Well, I guess there are two things to be said about it. First of all, as we said yesterday, during Prime Minister Peres' visit here, a number of issues were discussed between the United States and Israeli officials, but no decisions were made. The second thing I will do is refer you to what the Secretary said en route to Toronto yesterday, in which he was asked about the question. Let me just read you what he did say. He said:

"In their flow of funds which we have offered to look at with them, of course, they are immediately benefitted by the fact that the $1.2 billion Economic Support Fund is to be made up front, so their basic cash position is vastly improved by that very fact, and so we will look at the flow of funds and go in for that analysis. I think if the strong steps are taken as Mr. Peres has outlined, there shouldn't be any problem. We have discussed various ways in which any potential problem might be met. And, of course, loan repayments is one way to get at cash flow, and there are some other ways; but my own opinion is that it won't be necessary to take additional steps."

So I think that that really is the totality of the issue. It was not -- As I say, various things were discussed, ways perhaps of dealing with the cash flow problem, but the Secretary pointed in his statement, as I say, to the front-loading, if you will, of the $1.2 billion disbursement of the ESF and felt that the measures they were talking about would perhaps obviate other measures.

Q Alan, for just a second, please --

Q That doesn't close the gap between the statements being made there, where they say specifically -- I mean you have an official Cabinet -- you know, people coming out of the Cabinet saying specifically that Peres reported that this offer was made by us. Is any effort being made to clarify this?

A I think you might want to take a look at the provisions of law. I'm not sure it's a question of making an offer. I think the fact is that there can be late payment, if that's viewed as necessary. That's just a fact.

Q But the Israelis describe it in terms of an offer.

A Well, I don't really want to pick a quarrel over words. I think the fact is, the U.S. has said it -- within the context of looking at what Israel's own plans are for its own economy -- we were certainly willing to be helpful, and I refer you to the Secretary's words. I really just don't have anything further to offer you on it.

Q Do you think they misunderstood? Alan, do you think they misunderstood?

A I don't think it's a question of misunderstanding. I think maybe the quibble is over words here, like "agreement," and things like that. I don't think that we're talking about an issue which even would require agreement.

Q Are you prepared to rule out the possibility that these loans are going to be postponed, or that the Treasury Department would be willing to extend its special line of credit to Israel or a cancellation --

A I'm not going to try and speculate on the latter kinds of questions at all. In terms of whether they would find it in their interest because of their cash flow situation to defer payment or delay payment, I can't tell you.

Q Alan, are you saying that they can defer those payments without any U.S. approval? Is that what you're saying, they can just go ahead and do it?

A I think that if you look at the law that that effectively is the case. There are, I think, some interest payments which would be due, and so on.

Q So they could delay those 90 days, and it's not something that we necessarily have to offer, it's something that they can just routinely do?

A I think that that's essentially correct. I think --

Q There would be a penalty on that, wouldn't there, though, an automatic penalty?

A I say there would be interest payment.

Q There would be an interest penalty?

A I don't know if it's penalty.

Q But there would be some cost to the Israelis after (inaudible) --

A I would refer you at this point, I guess, to the legislation which governs this, because I don't --

Q You seem to be -- just in your own words, you seem to be saying there would be some cost to the Israelis of taking advantage of this --

A Well, as I say -- as I understand it and I refer you to the law -- there would be, under any circumstances for anybody -- and this is not a special deal -- there would be interest payments due on any late payments. You used the word "penalty;" I'm not using that word. O.K.?

Q Can we get a copy of the Secretary's statement that you read to us?

A Oh, yes.

Q Alan, this means that the time period which was mentioned that after the elections and the new Congress, the three months, is -- you cannot confirm it or deny that the $500 million will be repaid, or be paid to the United States?

A Again, I'm not going to get into the details of, first of all, the discussion that took place. Second of all, I think I've described to you as I can at this point the situation regarding sort of what the possibilities are and pointed out to you in the Secretary's statement that the front-loading of the ESF payment and the measures that Mr. Peres and his government anticipate taking, as we understand them, may well take care of any problems that they have. So I don't think we ought to get ahead of the situation.

Q Alan, let me follow up on that and on something that you quoted the Secretary as saying. He said, "If strong steps are taken, there shouldn't be any problem." There shouldn't be any problem in the Israeli economy, or there shouldn't be any problem in delaying the payments if they go ahead and take the strong step?

A I think the question was in terms of cash flow.

Q In other words, there won't be a cash flow problem if they take the steps? It's not that if they take the steps, the U.S. sees no problem in them delaying the payment?

A Well, I don't know that there would be a problem in terms of the U.S. I don't think that that question arises. It seems to me that there are provisions for -- if there's a late payment, I guess you pay some interest or you owe some interest on it. I think that's just a matter of fact again.

Q Are you expecting a delayed payment?

A I think that's something that you'd have to ask the Israeli Government.

Q And during the talks that Peres had with the President, did the President recommend that the portion of the budget that goes toward military expenditures be reduced or not?

A Oh, I don't intend to get into the question of what was discussed between the Prime Minister and the President. I think that -

Q What is the U.S. recommendation?

A I'm not going to get into the question of positions. There was a readout after the meeting at the White House, and I don't recall frankly to what extent that might have been addressed, but I refer you to that.

Q Alan, let me try one more thing here: You're saying -- you've said again today, there's no agreement; you've added today the idea that maybe no agreement is necessary. Does the U.S. have any objection to Israel exercising whatever rights it may have under the law as it is written to do what it feels it wants to do regarding the payment of these loans?

A I don't think the question of a U.S. objection would arise, no. I think that the issue is what is helpful to the Israeli economy, and I think again the Secretary's addressed that in terms of the measures that are already envisaged.

Q The bottom line really is that if Israel wants to delay the payments, it can go ahead and do so? No U.S. approval is required? No objection must be overcome? They can simply go ahead and do that if they feel that their situation requires it?

A Yes.

Q Well, once again, there seems to be a gap between what you're saying and the statements being made in Israel.

A Well, I've seen various statements. I've seen various statements that have been made in Israel .

Q What they're saying -- I've gone over the area -- what they are saying there is that they would have to ask the United States for permission, that they have not yet decided whether or not they are going to ask the United States --

A Well, I --

Q -- if you want to (inaudible) --

A Again, Israel is going to have to speak for itself, John. You know, whether they have decided whether they would like to do this that we've been talking about in terms of delaying payment is -- Well, I would guess they haven't decided. But I can't really speak for the Government of Israel in terms of their decision.

Q Well, then the statement from Jerusalem speaking for the Israelis, according to everybody's --

A I'm not going to try to address their statements *per se*. All I can do is address the situation as it exists.

Q Another point, Alan, --

Q Is this something Weinberger would be talking with Rabin about, or is this not the kind of thing that they would get into?

A I have no knowledge of whether that would be discussed between them. I don't know any reason particularly why it would be discussed.

Q Do you regard your position today as consistent with what you were saying yesterday, Alan?

A Yes. Absolutely.

Q Another point, Alan, there were talks also about that President Reagan is thinking about forgiving Israel the past debt to the United States, which is about $9 billion. Do you have anything to offer on that?

A I don't have any information on that.

Q Where can we obtain the regulations concerning the option to delay the payment on the loans?

A Well, I guess -- I don't know specifically. I suppose there are various regulations which can govern -- the Arms Export Control Act and other legislation -- which governs export of military equipment and so on, services.

Q Request for a filing break on Israeli aid.

A Any objection?

O.K. Go ahead.

-- MORE --

Q Alan, can I come back for a second to the statement Secretary Shultz -- the message of Secretary Shultz to President Duarte?

A Sure.

Q I may not have written or gotten the exact quote here, but please correct me -- I think he said "having learned of the success of the talks" or "the success of the initiative," or something, you made.

A Uh-huh.

Q Could you help us with what he means by "success"? The talks were held. Does that count as a success, or is there some outcome that he views -- or that the State Department views as a success?

A Well, first of all, let me give you a general reaction to the meetings yesterday. We're pleased that both sides have judged the meeting to be positive, and we commend their mutual call for peace, pluralistic democracy, and social justice. We support this initiative and hope it is the first step toward achieving a lasting peace through the democratic process.

President Duarte's offer to the guerrillas to participate in his country's political process, together with an amnesty, is an historic and generous gesture. The people of El Salvador and their elected leader, President Duarte, whose desire for peace and democracy has been clearly demonstrated, have our firm admiration and support.

Q So you --

A With respect to your specific question, I think that really does answer that this -- in terms of what they have agreed to follow on -- they agreed in their description of it as positive, they had agreed on the language that was issued in the communique.

Q As long as both sides see it as positive --

Q Can we have a copy of that statement?

A Sure.

Q -- and leading toward the democratic process. Can we have a copy of that statement, please?

A Sure.

Q Can I just follow up on two earlier topics? On the payment --

A No. Let's stay on El Salvador. Let's not jump back and forth. Go ahead, Jim.

Q I just wanted to ask a couple questions relating to fairly specific events that took place and whether the U.S. has any reaction.

The first is the absence of Villalobos, how the State Department explains that, and does it know whether there had been an undertaking by the Salvadoran Government to provide them with transportation? And a second --

A Well, I think that -- let me take them one at a time.

Q All right.

A I think that that is a question to address to the Salvadoran Government. I don't think it's for us to speak for them.

As far as Mr. Villalobos' position is concerned, I guess it's not for us to speak for him either, but I have seen accounts of Radio Venceremos where he has indicated that he supported the process. So I'd refer you to those, but I can't speak for him.

Q Also, Vides Casanova was quoted in The Washington Post today at some length, in which he indicated that the -- when and if the army was asked to take part in any negotiations or dialogue, the army would have to decide.

How do you interpret that statement, in view of Duarte's assertion that he is commander-in-chief?

A Well, I don't know what the exchange back and forth was, whether they were talking about the uniformed military service, or what they were talking about specifically.

But I think President Duarte's position on that, that he is the commander-in-chief, was quite clear in his press conference the other day, and I'm not aware that anybody, including Mr. -- the Defense Minister, Mr. Vides Casanova, disagreed with that.

Q Alan, now that everybody has had a chance to see the statements made by both sides after the meeting, the rebels listed their demands. They said there were demands that were made. I'm curious to know whether the U.S. would endorse any of those rebel demands, including the identification and punishment of the murderers of the nuns and the Romero killers, and so on, the identification of political prisoners and the release of political prisoners, clarification of status of people who are missing, withdrawal of U.S. advisers and military aid, and access -- free access to the media.

Do you have any comment on the specific proposals that --

A I don't want to get into their specific proposals. Obviously, our position on a number of those questions has been articulated many times -- on the murders of the nuns, for example. You could put a book together on statements that we've issued on that, and we take that, indeed, very seriously.

This -- the whole process of national reconciliation through the democratic -- through democratic institutions is something which we have made very clear we support, which we view as very much of a piece with the Contadora process and the 21-Point Document of Objectives.

So I think that we have looked at it from that perspective. I don't think it's going to be particularly fruitful in terms of the process, as it's going to move forward in El Salvador, for us to look at the proposals of the guerrillas and try to endorse, or propose, specific ones. I think that is something that, indeed, this dialogue that they are now about to undertake, or at least will continue, will be about in large part.

Q Do you envision any role for the U.S. in this dialogue, of any kind?

A I -- at this point I guess I'd have to say I don't, but I don't know what would be asked of us at some point. Obviously, we have had, and will continue to have,

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very close liaison with President Duarte and his government.

But this is very much his initiative, and he deserves full credit for that. And he made it very clear that the dialogue yesterday -- and I see no reason to expect that it would change -- was a dialogue between Salvadorans.

Q One more: You told us about a message Shultz sent to Duarte. Did Duarte send any -- have any communication with -- directly with the United States yesterday after the talks?

A I don't know, frankly, whether he saw Ambassador Pickering or not. He may have. I simply do not know that.

Q Can I get my follow-ups, please?

A Yes, please.

Q Thank you. On the Tutu statement, does this action change American policy in any way towards South Africa?

A No.

Q On the Israeli repayments, would there be the interest repayments even if it was not delayed?

A Well, I don't think you pay interest on something that you haven't accrued an interest obligation on.

Q "No" is the answer?

A Well, I don't know what their interest obligations are at this point -- that doesn't change -- but in terms of interest which would become due on anybody who delayed payments, obviously, it's when you delay the payments that they would become due.

Joanne?

Q Back to Salvador for a minute. Ambassador Shlaudeman -- can you tell us a little bit about his role, if any, in laying the groundwork for this announcement of these talks between Duarte and the guerrillas?

A Well, I guess I'm not going to get into the diplomatic dialogue, particularly, but I don't know --

we've talked about the announcement in President Duarte's speech at the U.N., and so on, before, and I'm not sure that I have anything new to say about that.

Ambassador Shlaudeman has been particularly active, as you know, in terms of the Contadora process, his own talks with Vice Foreign Minister Tinoco of Nicaragua. I don't know how to sort of characterize it beyond that.

This was the -- the initiative was President Duarte's. The liaison contact that was established was established at his instance, and I guess it's through the Red Cross and the church and others, and so on, and I guess that's just a fact.

Q I'm trying to understand the U.S. role, if any.

A Well, I'm not sure that -- well, this is his -- I think the U.S. role has simply been in -- over a long period of time -- supporting the Government of El Salvador in its efforts to move towards national reconciliation, democratic institutions, and peace. And to the extent that that has provided a situation which has helped move this process forward, that is the U.S. role.

Obviously, as I said before in answer to a question, we've certainly had a very active dialogue, and will continue to have with the Government of El Salvador on the situation there. But that is the nature of the U.S. role.

Q Getting back to Mr. Shultz's statement in Toronto about U.S. aid for Israel, is it his position that the austerity measures in Israel, coupled with the front-loading payment mechanism for the economic aid, will be sufficient only through January, or through the remainder of Fiscal 85?

A I don't have anything to give you on his interpretation beyond what he actually said.

Yes, Jim?

Q I have two questions more, again on El Salvador, if I may. In view of the joint statement that was released afterwards regarding the humanization of the conflict --

A Uh-huh.

Q Does the -- will the United States take any action with respect to urging, for example, a ceasefire or to slowing or calibrating the flow of the military aid that's been voted this year? Is there any position that it has on a ceasefire as a --

A I'm not going to try again to get into the specifics of what might eventuate in a dialogue between the parties. They have a -- they have set up a mechanism for continuing that dialogue, and I don't think it's going to be helpful for us to talk about specific positions from here particularly.

Q Okay. One other on --

Q Wait, wait. That's a fair question about U.S. aid levels.

A I'm not aware of any change in the aid level that's anticipated.

Q Thank you. My hat's off to AP.

MR. MYERS: Thank you.

Q The other question I had was with respect to amnesty --

A The UPI has demanded equal time --

Q I'm sorry.

A And Reuters. (Laughter)

Q Would you like --

A Go on.

Q On amnesty, you praised a general amnesty which would apply to all political offenses, presumably those of the right as well as any others that may have taken place, and yet at the same time the United States has pushed for the prosecution of those responsible for certain murders.

A Uh-huh.

Q Does -- in a sense, which is it? I mean, is this a matter for the parties to decide, as opposed to the U.S. urging the prosecution of certain assassinations?

A Well, I don't think our position has changed in terms of the Americans and our concern in that respect. In terms of what the scope of the amnesty will be and how it will be applied, I just don't know, and I can't really speak to that.

Q Another subject: Can I ask about whether you have any comment on North Korea's acceptance of economic talks at Panmunjom with South Korea?

A Yes. Further direct contacts between the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on various issues continues the momentum of last month's successful delivery of North Korean relief materials to the South.

We support the Republic of Korea's policy of encouraging direct contacts with North Korea as a means of reducing tension on the Korean peninsula.

Q So you think there is momentum going now?

A That this continues the momentum of those other things, yes.

Q Is it normal in U.S. relations with other countries to extend the grace period of a foreign debt without consulting Congressional committees or some proper authorities?

A I'm not aware that there's anything particularly unusual that we're -- you're talking about the earlier conversation I had about it?

Q Yes.

A Yes. I think it's a question of what the -- I mean, there is legislation that covers this. There's legislation that covers arrears of over a year. I mean, there is -- the Congress has considered these issues, so I don't think we're talking about something here that's unusual.

Q And have you received any request from Egypt to extend the grace period of some loans due to the United States?

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A Oh, I don't know the answer to that.

Q Alan, is there any new development on the nuclear cooperation agreement with China?

A No.

Q Specifically, have you resolved the differences with China on the non-proliferation clause?

A Well, instead of talking about differences, I refer you back to the language that we've used before. But, in any case, I don't have anything new to offer today on that subject.

Q Do you have any comment on Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach's offer to talk with Reagan over Kampuchea?

A Well, we have talked before about the willingness of the Vietnamese to talk about the re-education camp prisoners, and with respect to that subject, we welcome Vietnam's willingness to discuss with us our offer to accept for resettlement in the United States all persons now confined by Vietnam for their past association with the United States or the former South Vietnamese Government. And we hope to begin this process by resettling 10,000 such persons and their qualifying family members in the next two years.

We hope for an early substantive response to our proposals so that we and the Vietnamese can begin to work out the details.

I don't have anything specific at this point respecting the question of Kampuchea, and I think our position on that is quite clear.

Q So that means you're only interested in speaking about that specific topic?

A Well, I think we've indicated before what our concerns are with Vietnam's policy in Kampuchea, and that where we were with respect to the ASEAN countries taking the lead on that particular question.

Ralph?

Q Do you have any comment on an announcement out of the Middle East today that talks will begin at UNIFIL headquarters next week between the Israeli military and the Lebanese Armed Forces on withdrawal?

A Don't have anything on that. Don't know.

Q Alan, do you have any reply from Cuba to your communication of some technical information recently?

A No, we're still awaiting that.

To go back to your Vietnam question a minute, I'd refer you back to some guidance which we have had in the past about our position on Kampuchea, and so on, so you might get a fuller statement, if you don't already have that.

Q Alan, back to El Salvador, what's been the extent of discussions between Senator Tsongas and the State Department after the meetings yesterday?

A After the meetings yesterday?

Q Uh-huh.

A I'm not aware of what contact there may have been with the Embassy. I don't -- in fact, I understood that Senator Tsongas was going to be back in Massachusetts for a press conference tonight. I mean, I've heard that. I don't know that.

Q Is Senator Tsongas wanted there by the U.S. Government?

A I think, as John indicated yesterday, that that really isn't an issue. We don't tell members of Congress where to go and where not to go. That was his decision. (Laughter)

Q Figuratively?

Q Thank you.

A Okay. You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:45 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #187

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1984, 12:24 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A couple of announcements.

First, I am pleased to introduce to you our newest press officer, Vivienne Ascher. Vivienne has served in the Foreign Service for five years. Her previous assignments include Belgrade where she was Banking and Finance Officer, Marseilles where she was a consular officer. She graduated from Georgetown School of Foreign Service and from Johns Hopkins SAIS, School of Advanced International Studies, in Bologna, Italy, and in Washington. Her specialty is economics. She speaks Italian, French, and Serbo-Croatian, so maybe she can translate some of the questions that we haven't been able to get through on.

Q ...some of the answers? (Laughter)

A The answers? Those will be given in Serbo-Croatian and maybe they'll be clearer! Anyway, we're very pleased that she has joined the office and I know you will make her feel welcome.

Q What did she do wrong? (Laughter)

A You mean, to have to answer your questions, John?

A reminder of an Outreach, Central American Outreach Group, Briefing today in Room 450 of the Old Executive Office Building at 2:30. Remarks by His Excellency Roman Arrieta, the Archbishop of San Jose, Costa Rica and President of the Secretariat of Catholic Bishops of Central America, who will be talking about the pressing realities of Central America and also Dr. Jose Antonio Teherino, former professor of international law at the University of Central America, who will talk about the framework of the judiciary in the Sandinista government.

That also brings me to give you a change at the same time on the Grenada documents archives opening. Deputy Secretary Dam will give remarks at the opening on behalf of the Secretary today. The Secretary has been called to another meeting. The remarks are available in the Press Office and are embargoed until the time of delivery which, as I indicated, is 2:30.

Q The Secretary was called --

Q The Secretary's remarks to be read by Dam?

A Yes. He will give remarks on behalf of the Secretary.

Q Does that mean that the Secretary has been called to the White House --

A Yes.

Q -- to help President prepare for the debate on Sunday?

A I don't know specifically what the purpose is, and I guess you'd have to ask the White House what's going on. But in any case, he has had to ask Mr. Dam to take over for him on that.

Q John said that the Secretary was going to be involved --

A Yes, he did.

Q -- in the preparations. Could you take a question as to what involvement -- to what that extends?

A No, I don't think I'm going to get into the details of what it is. John has answered that the Secretary indicated in his meeting with the press in Toronto that he was around this week on various -- throughout the week, actually, beginning on Monday, the end of Tuesday, all day today, lots of tomorrow -- and the fact is that he will be involved. So I'll leave you with his answer on that.

Anyway, that's it. I'll be happy to take questions.

Q On the Chernenko interview in the Washington Post, have you had a chance to look at it and respond to it, please?

A On that, I'm going to, I think, have to refer you to two other places on that, Mike. One is to --

Q (Inaudible)

A That's life, Bernie.

-- one is to what the Secretary said this morning ON THE RECORD (Laughter) and the other is to what -- I think Larry Speakes will be addressing this in his briefing.

Q When is Larry Speakes --

A I think he's going to brief around 12:30.

Q The White House said earlier that the State Department was analyzing and that it would have a comment.

A Well, I think that they indicated that we're analyzing it, and that is correct. But in terms of -- I think it's been analyzed different places, everybody getting together, and Larry will be addressing it, so.

Q Can Larry speak for the cameras -- no pun intended.

A I guess you'll have to ask them. Don't know.

Q So that's it on Chernenko?

A That's it on Chernenko.

Q How about this article, Alan, in The Nation alleging that the President ignored --

A Well again -

Q -- the Pentagon and other warnings?

A Bud McFarlane, I think, addressed this this morning in an interview, and would refer you to what he said on it. We don't tend to get into questions of alleged NSC discussions or things of that sort.

Q What about Dillon's role in that?

A Sorry?

1-2066

Q What about Ambassador Dillon's role in that connection, unrelated to McFarlane's role. The article reports that Ambassador Dillon had said that the Marines should not be used. Was that the State Department's view or was that Ambassador Dillon's view at the time, or --

A I haven't seen the whole article. You're talking about "used" in what sense?

Q Used -- that the U.S. ship New Jersey should not be becoming involved in what the Ambassador apparently referred to as internal disputes between the Druze and the Moslems.

A I guess, as a general matter on that, Ralph, we're not going to get into the question at all of internal discussions or deliberations, and I'm not trying to lead you one way or another. I'm just not going to do that, so -- I mean, I have to --

In terms of talking, you're talking about talking with different people, or the New Jersey -- you mentioned the New Jersey?

Q Dillon is quoted as saying that he advised the Administration not to have the New Jersey fire on the hills because that would inject the United States into internal political disputes between the Moslems and the Druze, and that his advice was ignored.

A Uh-huh.

Q And one of the quotes to him is something about it being "amateur night in Washington."

A Fine. I'm going to repeat what I said. We're not going to get in -- I haven't seen it, but in any case, we're not going to get into any internal deliberations.

Mike.

Q The Office of Prime Minister Peres issued a statement today in which he said that Israel will welcome the good offices of the United States in mediating between the sides -- Syria, Lebanon, Israel.

A Well --

1-2667

Q Have you seen this? -- and issued a framework for withdrawal, et cetera. Have you had comment on that?

A No. I think we're where we were before. That is to say, I refer you back to what we said earlier, that the situation is such that a negotiated withdrawal -- this is repeating what we said before -- a negotiated withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon is possible if all the parties are willing to make the compromises which will be necessary. The gaps between the parties are still very wide. The United States is willing to play a helpful role if all the parties wish us to do so. We are not, however, at the present time playing a mediating or negotiating role. That remains the situation.

Q When you say "all the parties make compromises," can you be specific what compromises need to be done --

A No. I think, again, that's asking us to try to get into what might be a negotiating posture from here, and I'm not going to do that. So I think, I think the fact is, however, that there are differences as to how this could be done, and at this point, we're not in a position where we feel that it would be appropriate to undertake some sort of mediating (inaudible).

Q That is a sticky question, sticky problem, which is about the security in Southern Lebanon between the UNIFIL forces and Lahad forces. What is the feeling of the United States Administration about either one?

A I think that the question, obviously, of security for Israel's northern border is very central to this whole thing -- that's what we're talking about -- and it is precisely how one goes about assuring that security and what arrangements are made, how those arrangements are made, and all the rest of that that's at issue. And as I say, we're not just -- we're not going to talk about it, but there are differences of view among the parties, and those remain at this point.

Q Alan, about the Lahad Party, I mean you don't think that this is an internal Lebanese problem? Israel, America, or anything should not interfere with this?

A I'm just not going to address the questions of how this is all going to be worked out. I think we'll let the negotiators for the various parties, or the officials for the various parties explain what their own positions are, and we're not going to proclaim on that.

Q Alan, the statement issued in Jerusalem today had the cast of an official statement by the Peres government saying that the Peres government would welcome U.S. mediation. I know there have been unofficial statements of that sort made public in the past, but has the Administration now received -- does it feel it has received an official invitation, request from the Israelis to become involved as a mediator? And are you, in effect, today saying to the Israelis, in response to this official statement in Jerusalem, that the United States is not at this time interested in playing a mediating role?

A I'm not going to address it in terms of "have we received an official request," or haven't we. I think it is clear that all of the parties find a role for the United States useful. The discussions that we've had with them, the exploratory talks, have, I think, made that clear.

The point we're making is that there are wide gaps in their positions, and that we're not going to get into that sort of role unless it appears that there is agreement that there is indeed -- there is closing of those gaps and the prospect that there would be some productive outcome from that.

So it isn't a question -- the question really does not arise at this point because we think that we know what the answer is: people welcoming a U.S. role. The question is what should such a role be and can it be helpful? And we're where we have been on that question.

Yes?

Q I have two questions on El Salvador. First of all --

Q Can we stay with this for just a minute?

Q Okay.

Q Let me ask you, when you say "wide gaps," did the United States --

A You can keep on asking questions about gaps, but I'm not going to talk about the substance of the issues. Okay?

Q Well --

A I'm just not going to get into the differences that exist or what we think about them.

Q Has the feeling of the United States Government been delegated to this, and the private conversations and contacts with these people (inaudible)?

A Have we expressed our feelings on these issues?

Q Yes, on all your outline or plan for this -- to bridge the gap?

A We don't have a plan. I think I made that clear. We're going back now over material we covered when Ambassador Murphy was in the area. The U.S. doesn't have a plan. We've had exploratory talks, we've discussed various ideas, and certainly we've explored the issues.

Q Is Under Secretary Armacost planning to go to the area?

A I don't have a schedule for you. And yes, though he is planning to travel in the area. I will see what I can get for you in terms of -- obviously, for security reasons, we will be somewhat cautious about this, but be happy to see what I can provide.

Q What will the purpose of the trip be?

A He hasn't been out there since he has assumed responsibilities as Under Secretary to that region, and I think he wants to do that. I think, also, when he goes to Israel -- which he will do -- he will continue the series of talks which Larry Eagleburger started with David Kimche on sort of global issues. You will recall that there was a back-and-forth where those meetings have taken place, both here and in Israel, and he will continue that tradition, if you will.

Q What's the time frame on his departure?

A I don't have his itinerary.

Q Would this be timed with the timing of the Political Military Joint Commission with Israel or outside of it?

1-2670

A   Well, I'm not aware that there is a meeting scheduled of that Commission, so I'm not -- I don't know why that would be --

Q   Will he visit the Gulf area?

A   I don't have his itinerary, and if I can provide you information on that, I'll be happy to do that.

Q   Will he also be discussing the other relevant issues -- the Reagan peace initiative and the Lebanon withdrawal question -- on an exploratory basis?

A   Well, without getting into the specifics, I'm sure he will touch on all the issues that are of interest to the countries he will be visiting and to us.

I don't think -- Well, I think I'll leave it at that. I don't want to get more specific than that.

Q   New subject?

Q   Will that deal with the economy, too, or are you basically saying that he is going to deal with other, with non -- not with the --

A   Well, I don't know whether he'll touch on the economy or not, Ralph. It may be that he would touch on it. But I don't think -- he's not going out there to negotiate or to --

Q   -- bring a check or anything like that?

(Laughter)

Q   Is it different from the Eagleburger visits to Jerusalem before? It is a continuation?

A   Well, I don't know what that means. There's a different --

Q   New subject?

A   Go ahead. New subject.

Q   Since you have made some exceptions in the past about talking about the contra subject --

A   I haven't.

Q Huh?

A I haven't. But go ahead.

Q Well, I mean, are you entertaining any questions at all about the "How to be a Guerrilla" manual?

A No.

Q Let me hit it from a different direction: (Laughter)

On the 24th of June, Secretary of State Shultz, in a speech to an anti-terrorism conference of the Jonathon Institute said among other things, "It is not hard to tell as we look around the world, who are the terrorists and who are the freedom-fighters. The resistance fighters in Afghanistan do not destroy villages or kill the helpless. The contras of Nicaragua do not --

A Instead of reading into the record, what's your question, John?

Q Well, wait a minute. -- "or hold mass executions of civilians." Is that still an operative policy --

A Certainly.

Q -- on the part of the Department?

A Certainly.

Q Alan, will you be more elaborate (sic) in saying that Under Secretary Armacost is going to continue the negotiations of Mr. Eagleburger?

A Well, you're calling them "negotiations." I'm not. I'm saying he's going out there for discussions and consultations. And he certainly has you know -- he's Under Secretary. He will follow in that same general path. But I don't -- different things are prominent at different times, so I don't quite know how to address it in terms of the previous talks.

Mike.

-- MORE --

Q Alan, will we be conducting talks with Soviet representatives here next month?

A Will who be?

Q United States and the Soviet Union had talked about a nuclear technology proliferation -- ?

A Well, Secretary Shultz and Prime Minister Gromyko discussed the desirability of continued bilateral consultations on nuclear non-proliferation at their meetings last month. There had been previous bilateral consultations on non-proliferation, both on the margins of the meetings of the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency, in Vienna and also over the past two years in capitals.

We are currently working through normal diplomatic channels on the next meeting and the exact timing and venue of that, and I don't have that timing and venue to give you therefore today -- but that is being worked on and it is, as I say, a continuation of a process which has been underway for some time.

Q When was the last such meeting held?

A I will have to try and get that for you. I don't have it.

Q Who will lead these talks?

A Well, traditionally, Ambassador Kennedy has, I think -- obviously that is his responsibility -- has led them and I would anticipate that would be the case.

Q Back on John's question. You just said that the speech by the Secretary --

A Secretary Shultz.

Q -- on the 24th of June is still operative, but would you not acknowledge that there is a difference between what the Secretary said on that day and the recommendations outlined in that CIA manual?

A Well, you are (a) identifying it as a CIA manual and I am not. I am not commenting on it in any way and I am not going to try to compare something that has appeared in the newspaper with what the Secretary of State has said, so the Secretary's statement stands as issued.

1-2673

Q But were the issues raised in the manual to be true, would they be contradicting what Shultz said?

A That sounds like an "if" question to me. I don't answer those.

Q Alan, do you have any comments on the Soviet official's statements about Sakharov in Copenhagen?

A I do, but there also seems to have been some amendment of those statements, as I read the wires.

First of all, to the best of our knowledge, there is no truth to the original reports that he's got permission to go abroad and he is not going. And indeed, as I say, Mr. Polyakov apparently now has denied making such a statement. What he reportedly claims that he said was that Dr. Sakharov wouldn't want to go abroad, even if he were permitted to do so.

The fact is that in the past, Dr. Sakharov has often indicated his willingness to leave the Soviet Union and travel abroad, to accept invitations from universities, private organizations and family members, but has been denied permission by Soviet authorities. And this would tend to cast doubt on the Soviet assertion that he doesn't want to leave the country.

We continue to deplore the isolation of Dr. Sakharov and his wife by Soviet authorities, and the Soviet refusal to allow contact with any independent Western observers.

That is the only way we will be able to verify the current health of the Sakharovs and the truth concerning Soviet assertions that Dr. Sakharov is free to travel abroad.

Q Copy?

A Sure. It may take a little bit. Well, I can give you some language. I think I am probably going to ask you to get that from the transcript.

1-2674

Q Alan, India has expressed concern about U.S. assurances of defenses for Pakistan. There is a report that the U.S. Ambassador in Islamabad had promised Pakistan U.S. support in the event of any attack by India. Can you straighten that out?

A Well, I don't have a text of what Ambassador Hinton said. I think, as I understand it, his remarks were primarily directed to the question of problems coming across the border from Afghanistan. But I just don't happen to have that, Spence.

In terms of the question of the overall question of a defense relationship, or something of that sort, with Pakistan, I think we have had some guidance in the past on that, and I would refer you back to the Press Office for that. I don't have it.

Q On El Salvador, the rebels have said in interviews with journalists after the meeting that they still consider powersharing to be their fundamental goal. Meanwhile, Duarte and the army and, to my understanding, the United States, still insist that the dialogue must be kept within the Constitution, meaning only focused on how they could participate in elections.

Now, it sounds to me like both sides are just as far apart as ever, and yet the United States is calling it a success.

Where do we go from here?

A Well, I think that in terms of why we view this as a success, I addressed this yesterday and I refer you back to that.

President Duarte has made it very clear -- he made it clear before he went to that meeting, in terms of issuing the invitation to the meeting and in terms of talking about it afterwards -- what the context was that he was meeting in, and it was within the Constitution.

He has had extensive press conference remarks about that and I refer you to that. So there is a process underway. There will be further discussions, per the communique that was issued and the announcements made for a meeting of this commission that was created, and that will take place in late November. Let's see what happens with that meeting.

Q Do you have any comment at all on the interviews granted by the insurgents after the meeting in La Palma?

A No.

Q Anything on the Wisner trip today? Any progress on those Namibia talks?

A Don't have anything new for you on that.

Ralph?

Q Alan, there is a report that Iraq will be buying some 45 helicopters, Bell 214 helicopters, from Textron.

A Uh-hum.

Q Do you have any comment on the sale, on the transfer of those helicopters, whether they are civilian or military, and whether licenses are needed for them? If so, would they be granted?

A Okay. A few things on this. First of all, basically in the information regarding a sale is considered proprietary and therefore you'd have to go to the company that you have named for basic information.

Our general policy is to control the export of arms through licensing by the State Department's Office of Munitions Control, and we do not, as a matter of specific policy, grant licenses for arms exports to Iraq or, as you know, to Iran.

The Department of Commerce has the authority to license the export of civilian aircraft. The helicopter that you have cited is reportedly configured as a civilian transport. Certain civilian helicopter models are not subject to validated licensing by the Commerce Department, and I guess I have to refer you to the Commerce Department for a detailed explanation of their procedures and regulations.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Well, you can have a copy of some language. It isn't exactly that.

Q Certain ones are not subject to licensing. That's one category that are not subject to licensing, and then there is another category of civilian helicopters that are subject to licensing by the Commerce Department.

A Military equipment is subject to licensing through the Munitions Control process.

Q DOD.

A No, it's State Department, Office of Munitions Control. You cited a certain helicopter. Our understanding is that helicopter is a civilian helicopter, civilian aircraft. Civilian aircraft are covered by the Commerce Department, but certain helicopter models are not subject to validated licensing. They don't have to go get a specific license.

Having said that, go talk to the Commerce Department.

Q So some civilian helicopters -- all civilian helicopters are licensed by -- are subject to Commerce. Some of them --

A One way or another.

Q -- need licenses and some of them don't.

A I think that is a fair enough statement but go -- I think Commerce agrees with that.

Q Is it correct that these particular helicopters under the recently modified regulations for Iran would -- we would not be able to export these to Iran, correct?

A I think in the case of Iran, under present circumstances, no, we wouldn't. We control export to Iran of all aircraft because of the Government of Iran's repeated support for acts of international terrorism.

I guess in that context, I would note that the Government of Iran under the current Iranian leadership intransigently refuses to consider an immediate cease-fire and a negotiated settlement to the war, and Iraq has stated its willingness to accept a cease-fire and mediation efforts.

Q You wouldn't call that a tilt, would you?

A No.

Q No. I mean, the fact that all aircraft are controlled to Iran and some are not.

A I wouldn't call that a tilt, and I think we addressed this in a case when we announced on the 27th of September the new controls on Iran, what that was all about. I refer you back to that. Mike?

Q Alan, is it correct that - did you say --

A Excuse me, going back to Mike's asking was there more information on contract. The answer is no. I'm not talking about it. As I say, it is proprietary information, and you would have to talk to Bell.

Q Is it correct that 45 helicopters are being sent?

A Again, you would have to go talk to the manufacturer.

Q Well, I was just wondering, doesn't that quantity indicate that it is not strictly for civilian purposes? What kind of civilian purpose would they have in mind?

A Well, I would refer you again to what I have said before on this subject.

Q Well, if it is configured as a civilian aircraft, it can also be used by military -- transport the military, can't it?

A Well, there obviously is a possible area of dual use, and we understand that this helicopter, as I say, would be configured for civilian use. I would also note that there are helicopters that are specifically configured for military use that are available to Iraq from other suppliers, and therefore it is unlikely that Iraq would buy civilian aircraft for military purposes over those other choices.

Q Well, I take it the State Department went into this before deciding not to have an opinion on it.

A You are asking me to comment on something I've just said I won't comment on.

Q Well, the point is that you don't have to pass on every decision if you just choose not to, but I assume that you go into it to figure out that this is not civilian aircraft being used for military purpose, because if it were military, you'd clearly have to say --

A If it's military and it's on the Munitions Control list, there is a responsibility in the Department of State for licensing it. The general policy of the U.S. Government is obviously to promote exports, and exports are restricted only as necessary to meet U.S. national security or foreign policy or other statutory objectives, and thus export controls are limited to specified items and/or certain countries, and items subject to controls are carefully selected.

Q May I have a copy of that, please?

Q If the Iraqis use these helicopters to ferry their troops back and forth, what's -- is there a restriction on the sale that it is not to be used for military purposes?

A As I say, you have to check on the Commerce Department.

Q Can we have a copy of --

A Yes.

Q Alan, how does this, I don't quite follow, how does this square with the recent tightened restrictions that were placed on exports of strictly non-military equipment to Iran which could bar the sale of helicopters of this type?

A Let me refer you back, John, to what I said on the 27th, in making known what had been done at the Commerce Department, and it explains what was done and why it was done. And I think that was fairly clear.

Q If these helicopters were military, you think you'll give them a license or not?

A We said we are not exporting military equipment --

Q I am saying "if they were military?"

A If they're military equipment, they're not going to be approved, and we said that.

Q You may have covered this, but at any point did the Iraqis have to tell us what their intentions are with respect to the use of the aircraft?

A   Again, let me ask you to check with Commerce in terms of what their regulations are and how they cover that. You know, if it is not designated as a piece of military equipment, it comes under Commerce procedures, and you really have to check with them in terms of what licensing requirements are.

Q   You said a moment ago that there are helicopters configured specifically for military use that are available to Iraq from other sources.

Does that mean that the United States no longer has any problems with Western nations selling arms to Iraq or Iran.

A   I would refer you back to what we have said before on that subject. It is just a matter of observaton, a question of why they would go after a helicopter which is not armored, and so on and so forth, if they were planning to use this in a combat situation, or something like that.

Q   Alan, I feel strongly tempted to ask you the same question as our colleague. What's the part played by the State Department, if any, in preparation for the foreign policy debate that's coming next Sunday?

A   I said, we have indicated that the Secretary will be, has been, as a regular matter of dealing with his responsibilities in the formulation and articulation of policy with the President. He's participating in a general way and also is here and has been, I think, doing some other things, or will be. I am not sure what schedules are, so he said that, and John has indicated that before.

Beyond that, I don't know specifically. There are obviously preparations going forth, and I think we would be careful to do whatever we do do within the appropriate constraints.

Q   Thank you.

A   You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:52 p.m.)

Becker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #188

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 18, 1984, 12:19 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A few announcements on speeches, texts, things like that.

Available in the Press Office is the prepared text of the Secretary before the Rand-UCLA Soviet Studies Conference. I would call your attention to the fact that it is embargoed until time of delivery which is 8:30 p.m. Pacific Time, 11:30 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time.

There will be a Q and A session following the Secretary's speech. The address will be given at the Beverly Wilshire Hotel in Los Angeles. If you wish to cover it, please contact Paul Weeks of Rand at Area Code 213 393-0411.

Q Copies of the speech will be here when?

A Copies of the speech are available after the briefing.

Q Just for the record, you are not planning to pipe in the Q and A are you?

A At 11:30 p.m. tonight?

Q Yes. Just for the record, just for the record.

A I don't --

Q Why not?

A I don't think so.

Q Could you call us up and put it on the phone line?

A We will give you a call-out on that.

Q Will you be here?

A I'll be here if you'll be here. Secondly, Secretary Shultz will address a luncheon meeting of the

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Los Angeles World Affairs Council tomorrow, October 19th, at the Los Angeles Hilton Hotel. The speech is scheduled for 12:45 p.m Pacific Time, which is, again, 3:45 Eastern Time, embargoed. Text will be available following the briefing today.

Q Both?

A How about that? I think we can stop the briefing at this point while we're ahead.

Q Subject?

A There will be -- it is a speech looking ahead at foreign policy. I don't have the exact title. Do you remember the title?

MR. CARLSON: "A Look Forward --"

MR. ROMBERG: "A Look Forward at Foreign Policy" or something of that sort.

Q (Inaudible)

A Well, read it carefully.

Q Embargoed for tomorrow?

A Embargoed for tomorrow. There will be a Q and A following that, and in that case, barring technical difficulties, indeed the program will be piped live here into the Press Room. For live coverage out there, for anybody interested, please contact Leslie McGhee at the Council, which is 213 628-2333.

In addition, the Secretary will speak at the Park Avenue Synagogue in New York City at 8:00 p.m. on Thursday, October 25th. His address will be on "Terrorism and the Modern World", and it is a part of the Synagogue's Sherr Institute of Adult Jewish Studies 1984-85 program.

We have been informed that the writing press is welcome to cover, but the evening is closed to electronic media because of insufficient room. If you have questions, please contact the Synagogue Executive Director, Barrie Modlin, Area Code 212 369-2600. I understand there will be Q and A and we hope to have an advance text.

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Q What time will it start?

A 8:00 p.m., Thursday, October 25.

Q That text will not be available today?

A Not today. Don't push your luck. Okay. Happy to take questions.

Q Alan, speaking of terrorism, any comment today on this CIA document which is interpreted by many people as advocating terrorism?

A Not specifically. Obviously we don't comment on alleged intelligence information. I believe that if you will check with the CIA -- and you really should get your information from them -- you will find that they certainly will be responding to the Congressional Committee's request for information, and so they will be doing that, and obviously what I said yesterday stands in terms of our view of terrorism and the view of assassination, which is involved in the Executive Orders which obtain.

Q Alan, two questions about that. First, Ed Boland, the Chairman of the Intelligence Committee, says that it is a foreign policy disaster, which would seem to be the realm of the State Department, and I wondered if you would have a response to the fact of its publication if not its use?

A Again, I am not going to comment on the reports of the existence of such a pamphlet. That gets us back into the area that I just am not prepared to address for reasons of usual practice and principle.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the story in The Washington Post today regarding -- that this Administration had a specific reliable warning that explosives had been trucked into Lebanon, into Beirut, and that the Embassy was the specific target, one of the specific targets.

A Actually, I think you are misquoting the report, frankly, because I think it talked about assessments, but in any case, obviously we have said before there were a number of intelligence reports of possible terrorist activity against U.S. Government personnel and facilities in the Beirut area. However, we had no specific knowledge of the time, place or method of the actual attack which did take place against the Embassy Annex.

I might also note that that report suggested there was a side road which was unimpeded. To the best of our knowledge, that is not true. There apparently is some sort of a side road that goes off of a road behind that Annex, but, in fact, it is impeded by berm and areas that are difficult to get over. So, anyway, I'll leave that.

Q By what?

A There is a berm.

Q What is a berm?

A A mound --

Q A hillock.

A Thank you, George.

Q Were you aware of a large amount of explosives that was brought into Beirut?

A I am not going to get into the specifics of what intelligence information is or is not available, Mike. The fact is, as I say, there are threats all the time, and there are reports all the time of this, that or the other kind of activity in general terms that may take place. As I say, though, there is no specific information regarding the time, method, place of the actual attack which took place.

Q The means, the explosives, there is nothing specific on that?

A Well, there are all sorts of reports of different kinds of terrorist plans which may or may not take place. Obviously we take seriously whatever we get, and I think that goes without saying and it applies in this case.

Q Alan, just to clarify it, you are saying no specific information about place, time and method. The report says that the U.S. had -- that an intelligence assessment had narrowed the targets to two. Now, if you did know that it was one of those two targets, then you could still say, "Well, we didn't have specific knowledge of the target," but -- had you narrowed it?

1-2625

A I don't have that kind of assessment to give you, but I would point out to you that the majority of the Embassy operation had indeed moved to the Annex. There was also --I think that the report this morning talked about the residence at Yarze, where there was also a fairly large American presence. So, if you want to say those are where Americans were mostly concentrated, one could say that; that would be fact. But the fact is that -- go back to what we have said before about moving from West Beirut to the Annex based on the judgment that despite the fact that all the security measures were not complete at the Annex, it was nonetheless safer to be there than to be at the -- have the majority of the operations at the West Beirut facility.

Q Alan, has the State Department completed that report that you said started about a month ago?

A No. There was a team which has been out in the area and has come back. It has put some material together, but that effort continues, and I can't predict for you precisely when that report will be completed.

Q Alan, do you have anything to say about the individual who was quoted in The Washington Post as saying it was an intelligence disaster?

A No.

Q Alan, what is the current state of alert in the Beirut Embassy, and all overseas embassies? Is it still the same as it was a week ago when the worldwide alert was put out?

A I don't remember frankly when -- now, with all that has gone on -- when the last alert was. I think we have told you basically that people are on a very high state of alert. I can't compare it sort of day-to-day, and I don't think it is going to be profitable to talk about specific threats received at specific posts. There have been reports in the press about a number of such threats, and it just isn't, I think, in the interests of the safety of the people involved to be talking about that. But obviously, as I say, there is, unfortunately, a flow of this kind of reporting -- fortunate in the sense that maybe it provides a warning, but unfortunate in the sense that maybe people wish us ill, and others. But in any case, all such reports are taken seriously, and action is taken as deemed appropriate.

Q Is it true that, as suggested in that Woodward report, that anyone coming up to the Embassy has to disembark from his vehicle and --

A I guess I would have to ask you to check with your colleagues in Beirut, frankly.

Q It is easier to talk to you.

A I know, but I think you probably have folks on the ground.

Q How about the statement in the piece that the U.S. now has another report saying there will be another attack within the timeframe of now to November 6th?

A As I say, I am not going to get into the question of specific reports about specific locations, be it Beirut or any place else. I just don't think that it is in the interests of prudence or safety to do that.

Q You have talked in the past about having a flood, or being inundated by reports of possible threats against American officials in the Middle East and elsewhere. Does that characterization still hold?

A Unfortunately, it is still true.

Q The moving of the Embassy from West Beirut to East Beirut in the Annex, was this intended to phase out completely the Embassy in West Beirut, or --

A No. That was maintained. The complex there was maintained, as you know, and there were certain functions that were being carried out there.

MORE

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Q Actually, it was an idea to have two Embassies, one in East and one in West?

A No. There was an Embassy Annex that was set up in East Beirut at that time, and we went through this. A large part of that had to do with concerns for security, and we didn't have an ideal Embassy site at that point to go to, so that was something to be looked to, to the future. But this was a measure which was taken, deemed appropriate, in the interests of various things, including safety.

Mike.

Q Alan, new subject, on the Iran/Iraq war: Have you got any information for us regarding an offensive by Iran?

A Not really. Obviously, we've seen a lot of media reporting on that, but we don't have additional information on it. So there is quite a bit of media reporting and I guess it comes out of Iran and Iraq, but I don't have anything to add to it.

Q Alan, is there any reconsideration of the establishment of the new premises of the Embassy in Beirut -- after the bombing, I mean?

A I don't know where we stand, frankly, on the question of, "What do we do now?" and where we set up, and so on. I guess at this point, we're not quite ready to reach those conclusions.

Q Could I ask you about the Contadora Group's announcement that they would undertake to revise the agreement? Do you have any comment on that?

A Well, the Contadora representatives did announce in Madrid that they were responding in particular to concerns raised by the Central American countries that submitted their comments about the draft, as requested by the Contadora Four. The United States fully supports this process in the belief that the best means of resolving the regional issues in Central America is an agreement that seriously addresses the concerns of all the states in the region.

Q Copy of that?

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A Yes.

Q You're saying that these are the requests made by Central American countries. Those wouldn't be the same ones that the Secretary of State carried to Central America last week, would they?

A Well, I've indicated before we've had extensive discussion with the countries involved; the Secretary did on his trip -- with the Central American states, with the members of the Contadora Four group, and so on.

We've also indicated that those concerns were generally shared, that different countries emphasized different concerns of their own, but that in general, concerns on verification, simultaneity, and so on were concerns that the Central American countries had. But the concerns expressed to the Contadora Four and the comments submitted were submitted by the Central American states, not by the United States.

Q Alan, anything on Papandreou's allegations about U.S. policy?

A Yes, I do. First, I guess I'd have to note that we've only seen press reports of the Prime Minister's statement, and we don't have a text of his remarks, so I can only address it in a general way.

Assistant Secretary Perle met with Prime Minister Papandreou and other Greek officials recently to discuss a wide range of issues. These meetings, which had been scheduled for several weeks, took place in a friendly atmosphere.

The U.S. values its friendship with Greece, and has made clear its desire for good U.S.-Greek relations. What is needed, frankly, is a similar approach by the Papandreou government.

Q Copy?

A Yes.

Q Alan, anything on allegations by some academic experts or authorities on international terrorism that the Papandreou government has made a tacit agreement with Middle Eastern terrorists to allow Athens to be used as a base as long as Greek interests aren't harmed?

A No. I don't have anything on that.

Q Do you have any comment on the speech of Egyptian Defense Minister Abu Ghazala to a joint Egyptian-Sudanese group about Israeli intentions in the area and the condemnation of Israel in that speech that was --

A This was some time or some days ago?

Q No, yesterday.

A Well, no, I don't.

Q Alan, is there anything specific you would like to see the Greek Government do? You said "general approach" here, but --

A Well, I think we've talked before about certain areas. I don't have anything beyond what I said today.

Q There are some reports that some of the members of the Coordinadora have been discussing the possibility of holding a national dialogue in Nicaragua with the Sandinistas after the elections. Would that improve the United States' image of Nicaragua as meeting some of the objectives in the Contadora process?

A Well, I don't -- I'm not aware of those reports, frankly, and I don't know what that consists of, so I'm not really in a position to address it. I think that our concerns for free and fair elections and the allowing of the Coordinadora to participate under the terms of the agreement, which they apparently reached, but was then backed out on in Rio -- backed out on by the Sandinistas -- that is where we would put our emphasis.

Q Are you saying an agreement was reached?

A Well, there were reports -- I saw the same reports you did -- that there had been agreement, that Mr. Arce put out some terms, and that that was agreed to, and I saw reports coming out of Nicaragua that the Coordinadora endorsed that last week. It included, as I recall, delaying the elections so that there would be ample time for campaigning and also various terms having to do with free campaigning and access to the media and to

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the public. So it is the emphasis on that election and whether it is going to be free and fair that I would call your attention to.

Q May I just follow, because I'm not sure I understand.

A Well, go ahead.

Q Are you saying that last week, when the Coordinadora said that it was willing to take part in the elections under those terms --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- that an agreement was possible?

A I think that's something you would have to ask the Sandinistas, whether they were willing to go back to an agreement, or to terms they apparently had put out. But we certainly hope that that would be able to take place.

Q How about, then, an ABC report saying that U.S. officials are expecting new attacks from the air by Iranian terrorists flying at low altitude in small planes?

A Again, I'm not going to get into the question of specific information with respect to specific possible attacks.

Q Alan, regarding the shooting death of the Chinese-American journalist by the name of Henry Liu in Los Angeles a few days ago --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- the Washington Post has a story today quoting a State Department official as saying that the assassinations by Taiwan agents are "certainly a possibility."

Does this statement reflect the State Department's position?

A Well, we're aware of the tragic death of Mr. Liu, and we understand the police are investigating the crime. We don't believe that it is proper to comment on possible motives or perpetrators while the matter is under investigation, and any further inquiries should be directed to the appropriate California police authorities.

Q Alan --

A I might note that we don't have any information suggesting that Taiwan authorities were involved in the case, but again, you've really got to go to the police authorities.

Q Do you have anything new regarding the results of the talks held by Secretary Weinberger in Israel with the Israeli Government regarding Israel's position on Lebanon?

A No, I don't.

Ralph.

Q Alan, to come back for just a second to something on the contra book. You said that you would not comment on reports of the existence of such a book. Are you trying to suggest in any way that the book doesn't exist --

A No, I'm just trying --

Q -- or that it wasn't published or --

A No, I'm trying -- trying -- not to address the issue because we don't address intelligence questions. I'm not trying to steer you one way or another on that; I'm just not -- I don't want to get into the question of those reports, basically.

Q If it existed physically in your presence, would it still be considered an intelligence question that you wouldn't be able to address? The Committee has practically circulated it around town --

A Well --

Q -- quite widely.

A That still would not be a question for us to address from here. If you wanted to address questions to CIA, since it's alleged that it is a CIA publication or document, then I would suggest you do that.

Q But the policy implied in it is a policy in which the State Department, presumably, would have had, at least, some input if not --

A Well, you could say that about anything, Ralph, that has any foreign implication. I'm afraid I'm going to have to (inaudible)

Q Just for the record on that, is it still the U.S. policy that it is not seeking the overthrow of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua by force?

A Yes.

Q Alan, we know what Israel's demands or conditions are for withdrawing from southern Lebanon. Do we know what Syria's are in any similar way, something solid, some definite set of conditions?

A Well, as I said before, I'm not going to get into the question of what the various parties -- Syria, Lebanon, or Israel -- think specifically about how that may all be arranged, and I refer you back to what I've said now for two days.

Q Alan, I would like to go back to my question about Defense Minister, Egyptian Defense Minister Abu Ghazala, because his speech is in FBIS today, and two days ago there was in the Washington Times an article by Dr. Joyce Starr from the CSIS, saying that the Israelis are apprehensive that Egypt is preparing for war, and the Egyptians are also at the same time saying that Israel is preparing for war.

Can you look into these things and possibly (inaudible)

A No. I think that's a question -- Obviously, we view that relationship as very important and don't know of any inclination by either party to pull away from the treaty relationship that they have.

In terms of the state of their relations and problems they have in that relationship, those are questions which we, obviously, would like to see eased; but they are for the Governments of Egypt and Israel to address -- not for us.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the report circulating in the Arab world about --

A I'm sorry, reports about --

Q -- circulating in the Arab world about the Syrian President seeking a strategic alliance, agreement, with the Soviet Union?

A No, I don't have anything on it.

Q Alan, on Contadora, do you have anything on the meeting in Honduras Friday, or tomorrow, and particularly on whether United States officials are involved in trying to help them work out, or consulting with them on how they should work out their approach?

A Well, I don't have a lot on it. First of all, I don't know at this point what the status of it is. I've seen reports that Nicaragua says that it will not attend, and we think that's unfortunate, that Nicaragua is not going to take advantage of this opportunity to meet directly with its neighbors and negotiating partners in the Contadora process.

As far as a U.S. role is concerned, this is not a meeting in which the U.S. is to be involved; it's a meeting of the Central American countries.

Q Thank you.

A O.K. You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 1:40 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #189

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1984, 12:01 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: I hope you have early lunch plans. (Laughter)

O.K. Let's go ahead. This should be short and sweet.

Just wanted to tell you, in terms of the speech today that the Secretary is giving at the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, for the sake of time he's not going to be reading all the words that are written in the text that we have released to you on an embargoed basis; nonetheless, the text as prepared for delivery is the text that counts, O.K.? So don't worry that he isn't uttering all of the words that are in there. That is a full text, and he stands by that text.

Q All the political words?

A Also a reminder, because we will not convene again before next Monday morning, that the Secretary will have acceptance remarks upon receipt of the humanitarian award from the National Conference on Soviet Jewry at their National Assembly on Monday, October 22, at 8:30 a.m. That event will be in the Federal Room* of the Capitol Hilton Hotel. I think we've given you the information, but let me remind you that if you plan to cover, you should be in touch with either Nancy Albrecht or Myrna Shinbaum, at the Capitol Hilton, 393-1000.

Q When does he get back? Sunday?

A No, he will be back early -- we can talk about his schedule later.

That's it for announcements.

Q Is he on "Meet the Press?"

A Well, why don't we talk about his schedule later?

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* NOTE: Late moved to the Congressional Room.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on a statement issued, made today in Moscow by the Foreign Ministry briefer?

A Excuse me, John. I wonder if I could have your attention. Go ahead.

Q -- a statement made this morning in Moscow by the Foreign Ministry briefer, Mr. Lomeiko, saying that the Soviet Union would accept a mutual freeze including allowing the Pershing and cruise missiles that were installed last year by the U.S. to remain in place in Europe and a somewhat less definitive statement saying that those missiles need not be removed in order for arms talks to resume?

A Haven't seen that, Ralph.

Q Would you at least take the idea of looking into -- looking to see whether there is anything to be said about that?

A Sure.

Q Anything, Alan, on the report of an evacuation in Beirut of U.S. dependents?

A Yes. We have in fact, on a temporary basis, removed all of the dependents from Beirut. There is a reorganization, obviously, of embassy operations going on, and there are security-enhancement measures being taken, undertaken, in the wake of the terrorist incident, and so they have been moved out during this situation.

I think, Greg -- and the figures are a little squishy -- but I think six is the right number, total. But there may have been one -- I saw the Embassy spokesman said five, but there may have been one who left at an earlier time, and so on; but it's a small number of people we're talking about.

Q Where did they go to?

A I think that they are in various locations between Lebanon and Washington. Their orders, I think, would authorize them to travel to Washington, but they are free to stop along the way and set up housekeeping.

Q Any time element in how long they're going to be out?

A No. I think that, again, will depend on the security situation, and we will continue to review that on a continuous basis.

Q Does it reflect new threats?

A I think it reflects the overall situation in the wake of the bombing and the situation in Beirut overall, rather than any one specific thing.

Q Alan, why have you waited until now?

Q (Inaudible)

A O.K. Sorry.

Q Why have you waited until now?

A It's a question of looking at the situation and seeing what steps seemed appropriate, and a decision was taken to do that.

Q How many Embassy --

Q If our policy --

A Excuse me. Go ahead, Jack.

Q How many Embassy employees are there now operating in Beirut right now?

A I don't have a number on that, and I think that that question is under review, too, to see what should be done about that.

Q Alan, do you have any information on other Americans in Beirut who have left, taking a cue from this?

A No, I don't.

Q Is it possible they may draw down to a considerably smaller number?

A You mean of the officials?

Q Yes.

A I think that the question of what the appropriate level will be is, as I said before, Bernie, under review, and I just can't predict for you what the number will be. I don't -- I'm not trying to hide something from you, but I just -- that decision hasn't been taken. So, clearly, I think one will want to look at the possibility of reducing excess personnel. On the other hand, we obviously also are going to maintain that Embassy and perform the Embassy functions.

Q Can you take for us the question of how many people are there now? Is that a difficult number to acquire?

A I will see what I can get on numbers of people.

Q Can you expand on your phrase "security enhancements" in connection with this decision?

A No.

Bill.

Q I was just going to ask you, if you were taking that question, Alan, if it were at all possible, if somebody's doing the research, how many employees did we have at the Embassy during normal times -- that is to say, you know, two years ago -- relatively normal times. What was considered to be the full complement of how many people were needed in Beirut?

A Uh-huh. O.K., well, let --

Q Say two years ago, so you know -- the top of our -- when Dillon was Ambassador, for example.

A O.K. I'll check on that.

Q What is the distribution of personnel now? The Annex is still closed down, right?

A I'm not sure if there is anybody actually operating because I don't think that that entire building was made unusable, so there may be a few people who are operating out of part of that. I don't know at this point.

Q So the Ambassador -- the people at the Ambassador's residence --

A Mostly they're operating out of the residence.

Q Also, but still at the Embassy in West Beirut, too, right, or is it closed?

A I'm not aware that they've resumed operations in West Beirut.

Q There was a report in the last day or two that there is a new threat, some new threat. Was this addressed at all?

A Yesterday.

Q And are you expecting an escalation in this situation there? I mean, can we understand that, an escalation in the Beirut area?

A I'm sorry. I can't hear you.

Q Are you expecting an escalation of the security problem or any problem in Beirut?

A I don't have anything -- I don't have anything new to say about that. As I said earlier, the movement of the dependents out is not related to any one specific thing. It's related to the general situation, the general reorganization, thoughts going into the Embassy operation, and the security situation in general. So I think I would peg it to that rather than to a specific thing.

Q Was this a recommendation made by the daily meeting group here, or was this a recommendation made by the Embassy -- by the Ambassador?

A It certainly is something that has been discussed both by the Embassy in communications with Washington and in the morning meeting, so I can't tell you where what originated and so on, but it's been thoroughly vetted.

Q I guess the reason I'm asking is to determine whether this is something that, on the ground in Lebanon, they felt you needed -- it would be better to have fewer people, or whether as a policy matter, dealing with terrorism in general and dealing with the Middle East and with the Lebanon negotiations and so on, whether at a broader level it was decided that since personnel might be reduced, you ought to get the dependents out first?

A I would peg it to what I just said, which is the reduction of the -- the departure of the dependents is related to the factors that I've just given you, rather than trying to broaden it out beyond that. But I don't think I'm going to get into, specifically, who made what recommendations when on that thing.

Q When did they leave?

A I don't know precisely when they left. It's been over the last several days, I guess.

Q This week?

A It may go -- no; well, the process goes back over a week. But when people actually left Beirut, I don't know.

Q They take scheduled airlines, right? They don't take military planes or --

A Well, I'm not sure how they go. I'm not sure of that, Jack.

Q Alan, just to make it clear what -- my request a bit more precise, let us say if we could get a figure of before the first terrorist attack on the U.S. Embassy in April of '83. What would have been the complement before terrorist attacks began?

A Uh-huh.

Q That's what I'm looking for.

Q After the explosion, the last explosion, you said you had 99 Americans in the Embassy, I mean in the Annex, and you moved them to the Ambassador's residence. Is that right?

A Well, I don't know how many are still there at this point. As we pointed out at that time, there were quite a number of temporary duty personnel there, a number of them, in fact, in connection with the Embassy security, or the Annex security enhancements as well as at the downtown facility. So I just don't know what the number is at this point.

Yes? Did you have a question?

Q On El Salvador, the *New York Times* today reported that -- quoted Colonel Monterrosa as saying the offensive going on in Morazan, one of the ideas was to capture guerrilla commanders returning from La Palma.

I have two questions about that. One, can we assume that that was under Duarte's instructions; two, what does that say about good faith in humanizing the war and all that, if the guerrilla commanders are going to be captured when they leave the talks? You know, can you really expect to have future talks, and what is the U.S. position on this?

A Well, you have to talk to the Salvadorans about their commands and who made what decisions. I guess one could ask the same questions about the guerrillas' announcements that people should stay off the highways. I don't think I'm going to get into the question of who's doing what at this point. The fact is that they've met; they've agreed to meet again. Humanizing the war is one of the issues they're going to talk about.

Ralph?

Q Can we assume that these five or six dependents that have left Beirut are now here in the United States; and, if so, where?

A No, I don't think that. No. As I say, they could be anywhere, and I think they are between Lebanon and Washington, and I'm not going to provide information where they are. I think they can be left to their privacy, but they have authorization to travel as far as Washington; they can stop off along the route.

Q Alan, would you link this to Secretary Murphy's trip out there in any way?

A Not specifically. The fact is that he is the Assistant Secretary for the region, so -- I mean, it's hard to detach it from Assistant Secretary Murphy, *per se*, but I don't know what you're trying to get at.

Q I mean, did he recommend this?

A Oh, I'm not going to get into the question of who recommended what, Max. I'm not trying to lead you way or another, but I'm just going to stay away from --

Q Is that security report done yet -- the State Department's?

A I was asked about that yesterday, and I indicated that there had been some work on it, that the team had been out, had come back, and that there was other work which is yet to be done. I don't have a time yet.

Q Do you happen to know, in the wake of the Gromyko visit here, whether there have been any follow-up talks with the Russians either in Moscow or here?

A I think that Rick Burt indicated, in a television interview the other day, that we anticipated that the Secretary would be following up, as was indicated, indeed, during the time of Mr. Gromyko's visit here. I don't think that's taken place yet. But obviously there are always talks at various levels, so I don't want to leave the impression that there's no contact; but in terms of, say, _that_ level of talks, that hasn't -- that's anticipated.

Q What about Moscow?

A I don't know whether Art Hartman's talked with people.

Q Alan, have you caught up with these reports of new Soviet suggestions or proposals of something made today, one of which is --

A I think this may be what Ralph asked before -- the Lomeiko press briefing.

Q I came in late. It may well have, yeh.

A Okay. I said I would take a look and see if there's anything to respond to. I wasn't aware, frankly, of that press briefing.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on this report coming from Israel saying that the U.S. Administration leaders made it clear to Prime Minister Peres that they understand that the Reagan initiative had already been dead, and that they consider this one of the main achievements of the Israeli delegation here?

A No, I'm not aware of the report, but obviously we don't consider the President's initiative dead. It's out there, it's a serious proposal, and we've talked about it many times. I don't have anything new to say about it today, but it certainly is considered the basis of the U.S. policy for those issues.

Q Alan, as a general -- back to El Salvador -- if, indeed, the General was quoted correctly in El Salvador that one of the goals was to deal with guerrilla leaders as they were leaving the La Palma area, is that an acceptable approach for the United States? I mean, I know it's their war.

A Yeah. You're asking me about a newspaper report about a quote that may or may not have been accurate from a Salvadoran who may or may not have said it.

The fact is, of course, that meeting took place several days ago, and there has been a lot of military activity on both sides since then.

As I said, in response to the earlier question, I think if you want to raise questions about what is happening in the wake of that meeting, you might want to ask the same questions about what the guerrillas have said about people staying off the highways and the operations that they've launched. So I don't think that, really, it's going to be fruitful for us to address it in those terms.

Obviously, they did not reach any agreement nor am I aware they particularly discussed a cease-fire at this point. So that's something for them to address for themselves.

Q On another topic, Alan, have you got anything on --

Q Same subject?

A Go ahead, Greg.

Q Just on that, as long as we're on the subject, do we consider that there is an offensive underway on the part of the Salvadoran military?

A I don't know. I can't give you a definition on it.

Q Alan, do you have anything on a U.S. military rescue mission in the Persian Gulf today, a U.S. Naval rescue mission?

A   I don't know. I guess I'd have you ask you to check with the Pentagon.

Q   Do you have information --

Q   Do you have anything on Murphy's travel plans in the near future?

A   We had something on that. I don't have details. I think, in fact, all I could really give you at this point is that he has gone out to the region. He left, I think, yesterday and he is going to Colombo, I think. I don't know whether he has a stop before he gets there, but he's going there for some consultations with both Sri Lanka and, I think, American officials. I don't have an onward schedule. We will, I think, do our usual and not try to project specific stops for obvious reasons.

Q   Will he be going to the Middle East or to South Asia? Can you be that specific?

A   I think he's probably likely to go to both South Asia and some stops in the Middle East, but I don't have a specific itinerary at this point.

Q   Would he be expected to link up with Armacost?

A   I don't think so, Mike.

Q   Is the Secretary going to see the President before the debate Sunday night?

A   Well, the Secretary is, of course, in California. He comes back -- he will come back during the course of the weekend, but I don't know what the President's plan is. He saw the President, I think, a couple of times in the last couple of days. He saw him yesterday and the day before. I'm not aware of another planned meeting, but I may be -- I may not be totally up to date.

Q   Alan, do you have anymore information about the clashes between Iraq and the Iranians at the beginning of the big attack?

A   I don't have anything on that.

Q   Anything on the pamphlet?

A No.

Q Alan, do you have any updating on the status of the Ras Banas bases or facilities in Egypt?

A No, I don't.

Q No talks going on between the United States and Egypt regarding the base?

A Well, it's an Egyptian facility, in any case. I'm not -- I don't have any update on it at this point.

Q Administration officials have said that the pamphlet was produced by a contract employee of the CIA. The cartoon book that came out a few months ago, was that also by a cartoon -- by a --

A Excuse me, I think I've said I didn't have anything to say about all of that.

Yes, Bill?

Q Anything on a status report on the talks with the Vietnamese Foreign Minister on both the Amerasian children and the political detainees?

A Well, there was, as I think you're aware, a meeting between Mr. Childress of the National Security Council Staff and Foreign Minister Thach.

Just to review where we were on that particular meeting, our agenda for that meeting was limited to humanitarian issues of concern to the United States in a bilateral context with Vietnam. Those included the POW/MIA issue, Amerasian children and persons who are still held under detention by the authorities in Vietnam because of their association with either the former Government of South Vietnam or with the United States prior to 1975.

Those subjects had been previously discussed, both in Hanoi in February and earlier this month in Geneva.

All I really can say at this point is that Mr. Childress' meeting with Mr. Thach continued the progress on these issues, but I don't have a specific state of play to give you overall on where we stand on those issues except that we are -- we have had discussions, there is progress, and that's sort of where we are.

Q I guess they obviously didn't agree to a new meeting?

A Well, I don't have anything on where we are in terms of follow-up on these issues at this particular moment.

Q A point of procedure. I think that people ought to be allowed to finish their questions even if you don't like the questions, with respect to the one that is being asked here.

A Yeah. I hear you. I'll also make a judgment on how I will respond, Greg.

Q Alan (inaudible) question. Is there any new consideration of lifting the ban on Aeroflot flights to this country?

A Don't have anything new on that for you.

Bernie?

Q Did you have any report on Mr. Wisner's visit to Angola?

A Don't have anything on that.

Q Did you say that the return of the detainees was discussed in February, or did you say that the return of the detainees, the Amerasian kids, and -- all three had been discussed --

A No, these subjects -- that's right.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the next meeting of the military/political committee between Israel and the United States?

A The -- which committee? The joint political/military committee?

Q The joint political/military committee.

A I don't have anything on that. As you know, they agreed initially to meet about twice a year, and I guess the last one was in June. But I don't know when the next formal meeting is scheduled.

Q Alan, I came in late so this may have been asked. But, again, back on Lebanon, what other measures are being taken to safeguard the lives of the personnel in the Embassy? And are there other types of plans now to have some come back to the United States, not only family members but also employees?

A Well, I did indicate earlier that the question of the staffing of that Embassy is being looked at, and I don't have anything to give you on that at this point.

In terms of specific security measures, that I would not go into. I won't do that.

Q Thank you.

A Okay.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:21 p.m.)

Becker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #190

MONDAY, OCTOBER 22, 1984, 12:12 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR HUGHES: I have a housekeeping announcement and a couple of statements. Available in the Press Office are the remarks of Secretary of State George Shultz before the National Assembly of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry this morning. The subject of his remarks was Soviet Jewry and U.S./Soviet Relations.

I have a statement about a kidnapping in Poland of Father Jerzy Popieluszko. With respect to reports that Father Jerzy Popieluszko, a noted human rights activist in Poland, has been kidnapped by unknown individuals, the United States Government wishes to state its concern in this matter and express the strong hope that the Polish Government will ensure Popieluszko's speedy release.

Finally, a statement on the death of yet another Ukrainian human rights activist. On Monday of last week, we reported the death of noted Ukrainian human rights activist Valeriy Marchenko in a Soviet prison hospital. It is therefore with special sadness that we must announce the death in prison of yet another prominent Ukrainian human rights activist. He was Yuriy Litvin, a former member of the Ukrainian Helsinki monitoring group who was serving a fifteen year sentence for his human rights activities. Reliable sources have informed our Embassy in Moscow that he died sometime in August in a Soviet labor camp. He reportedly took his own life.

Yuriy Litvin was a poet and journalist who spent most of his adult life in Soviet prisons due to his persistent and courageous struggle for human rights in the Ukraine. He served sentences from 1951 to 1953, from 1955 to 1965 and from 1974 to 1977. Soon after his release from prison in 1977, he joined the group set up by Ukrainian human rights activists to monitor Soviet compliance with the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. His activities with the group led to his arrest in 1979, and he was tried and sentenced to three years in prison. Then, cruelly, five months before his scheduled release, he was retried on a more serious charge and sentenced to a further ten years in prison followed by five years in internal exile.

At the time of his death, Mr. Litvin had spent 20 of his 50 years in the harsh bleakness of Soviet labor camps. We do not know what special despair led him to his final desperate act. But we do know that he had been badly mistreated in prison in the past and had suffered a perforated ulcer due to willful neglect while imprisoned in 1977. We can only surmise that continuing and willful mistreatment by Soviet authorities finally broke him in the end.

Mr. Litvin is one of three prominent Ukrainian human rights activists to die in a Soviet prison in the past six months. His fellow Helsinki monitor Oleksiy Tykhy died last May and Valeriy Marchenko died on October 7. All three deaths can be attributed to the brutal conditions in Soviet labor camps which fail to meet minimal standards of human decency. The United States Government deplores the systematic persecution of courageous Ukrainian human rights activists like Yuriy Litvin, Aleksiy Tykhy and Valeriy Marchenko. And we condemn the cruel and inhuman treatment they are subjected to in prison which so often leads to serious illness and death. Once again we call on the Soviet Union to end its callous disregard for human rights and human life.

Q John, on this, how do we find out this information, and do we take this up directly with the Soviet Government? Have they responded to these particular cases?

A I guess we can't get into the manner in which this information comes to us, but, as I said, I think our Embassy in Moscow is totally convinced of the reliability of that information.

On the question, I won't get into specific back-and-forth with the Soviet Union, but I don't think there is any question that the Soviet Union is very well aware of our concerns and feelings on this and similar issues.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q John, (inaudible) on both of these, do you see any role by the Government in Warsaw and the kidnapping of this gentleman?

A We don't know who is responsible for the kidnapping, and we are not making assertions or allegations.

Q A government spokesman said that the government had a tip that he had been seen. Do you have any credibility in that statement?

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A No, don't have -- well, it is not a question -- it is just simply not being able to comment on such a statement.

Q John, can I raise something that the Secretary mentioned in his "Meet The Press" appearance yesterday? He was asked about a published report that Mr. Weinberger at an NSC meeting had specifically called for the withdrawal of the Marines from Lebanon -- the report said five days before the actual bombing there last year. The Secretary seemed unusually fuzzy on this subject, saying he couldn't remember one meeting from the other, but it was quite possible since Weinberger had been against the Marines in Lebanon.

Has he had a chance to think about this or look in the record?

A I don't know that he has taken it any further. I think basically what happened was, he was asked very specific questions about timing and dates, and I suspect, like most of us, we would find it difficult to recall what we were doing on a specific date last October, or what specific decisions, but I don't think there is any question that the Secretary wasn't responding, and indeed is not accepting that there was a specific request.

What he was doing was offering a general assessment of Secretary Weinberger's views.

Q John, what do you mean, "He is not accepting?"

Q Yes, I got caught in that double negative.

A Sorry, what did I do?

Q You said, "He is specifically not accepting that there was a specific request."

A Well, what he was not -- first of all, you are absolutely correct in saying he couldn't specifically remember a meeting on that day, and therefore he wasn't addressing that particular issue. He, at the time, couldn't remember it.

Point number two, he is not in any way suggesting that there was such a request, because there apparently was not.

Point number three, he was offering a general characterization of Secretary Weinberger's views of the Marine presence in Lebanon. But in terms of a specific request, he was in no way confirming that, because there was not such a request.

Q Well, he said at the time that there may well have been or there may well be, or something like that, didn't he, in answer to this question?

A Well, I think I would go back and look at the specific language that he used, but he certainly was not confirming such a request. What he was doing was characterizing Secretary Weinberger's view.

Q Since he has now characterized Secretary Weinberger's view, what is his view on -- what was his view at that time on the Marines in Lebanon?

A Well, I think I would refer you to the words he used in a number of settings around that time.

Q John, what is today's headcount at the Embassy in Beirut? How many American employees are there?

A I don't know that we have a specific number for you. I don't know that I can really take that much further than Alan did last week. I think he gave you a review of what we are doing there and what the situation is.

Q You moved some people out during the weekend.

A Yes.

Q What is the range of employees who are there now, and why are these --

A I can't give you a number, and I don't know that anybody really wants to be very forthcoming on movements of individuals or the presence of specific individuals or numbers in Beirut. I think clearly it is prudent to keep those numbers as low as possible at the moment, and that is what we are doing.

Q John, can I ask you about the Secretary, one of the Secretary's comments, also that was reported this morning, about Israel's request to reschedule or stretch their repayments to the United States? He is quoted as having said, "Over my dead body." Did such a thing --

A Ah, the Evans and Novak column.

Q Well, I knew you wouldn't answer it if I said Evans and Novak.

A That is why I said it was in the Evans and Novak column. Well, (a), you know our feelings about

Evans and Novak columns, but, (b), I think the Secretary has responded. I am not aware of such a phrase, and it certainly doesn't seem to be in character with the Secretary's comments that he has made about that, which are there for all of you to read.

Q Okay, can I then just follow up? What is the Secretary's view if Israel, or not if, actually, it's reported it has requested to reschedule its payments to the United States? What are the Secretary's views of that?

A Well, the Secretary's view is that clearly the United States wants to be helpful to Israel in its time of economic need. Discussions certainly have taken place during the visit here of the Israeli Prime Minister and the Israeli Foreign Minister. There were general discussions about contingencies, a variety of steps that conceivably might be taken, but I think the Secretary has made clear that we did not expect those contingencies to arise.

Q John, one other point, is it true that the West Bank was not discussed in the conversations or the talks between Mr. Peres and Mr. Reagan and Mr. Shultz?

A I cannot answer that because I wasn't here at the time, so I honestly don't know.

Q It is very common --

A Let me take a look and see what we might have for you on that.

Lester.

Q Yes. John, last night, as you know, President Reagan said, with regard to the Marines in Lebanon, "I will never send troops anywhere on a mission of that kind without telling them that if somebody shoots at them, they can darn well shoot back, and this is what we did."

Captain J. Ferrar of the Marine Corps Public Information, who was there in Beirut, recalls that the -- what he called the rules of engagement carried by every Marine there, required among other things that Marines not shoot back unless they could determine who fired, and even in this case, they couldn't fire back with a weapon of larger caliber than used by the snipers, and since Mike Burch of the Department of Defense has admitted during the briefing that these rules of engagement for the Marines were a matter for the Regional Security Officer who was a State Department employee and the Ambassador and the Senior Military Officer. In other words, you had input into these rules of engagement.

Was Secretary Shultz' gracious offer to let his own head roll due to the obvious difference between what the President wanted if the Marines were fired upon and what the State Department ordered in their rules of engagement?

A Somehow in all that, Lester, I lost the kind of theme of your question.

A Well, simply, it is obvious that -- I will rephrase it. The State Department helped formulate those rules of engagement, which were not what President Reagan said he wanted last night. He said, "I would never tell the Marines not to fire back if you were fired on." The State Department told them exactly the opposite, and I want to know, is this the reason that Secretary Shultz has offered graciously to let his head roll?

A Well, I think you are confusing a couple of things.

Q I might I am here to get rid of confusion.

A Well, I am not sure I can help you. I don't think the President's general commitment to the authorization to Marines to defend themselves in general is a contradiction of specific rules of engagement issued by commanders in an operational setting at the scene.

I don't -- I am a little puzzled as to why you find such a contradiction.

Q You see no difference between where he said, "... without telling them that if somebody shoots at them, they can darn well shoot back." If they are shot at in the night, how can they determine exactly who did the shooting if it is dark?

A Well, I think that is why the commander on the scene would make operational judgments as to the rules of engagement.

Q That is different from what the President said, but that is all right. I appreciate your efforts.

A All right

Q John, if I could go back to Friday evening for a moment, I'd like to try to clear up some different versions of events in El Salvador. First, by asking you to offer the Administration's view of what happened with the CIA plane in El Salvador on Friday night -- which mountain did it crash on?

A I can't because I thought that that had been satisfactorily covered over the weekend, so I don't have anything --

Q You call that -- That's all been resolved about why there were two different reports about where it had crashed, what it was doing?

A Well, a difference as to whether the spot was some 10 miles from where it --

Q -- or three miles.

A -- thought it was, in heavy storm weather.

Q Yes.

A No, I don't have any. I'm sure the Embassy in --

Q Can you offer an explanation for why it --

A I can't.

Q -- what it was doing in --

A I'm sure the Embassy in San Salvador may have some clarification.

Q Can you explain what the plane was doing so close to El Salvador, to San Salvador --

A I can only reiterate that it was doing what we told you it was doing on Friday, and there certainly has been no change in that.

Q In either location, no matter which location it was actually in, it would have been doing the same thing?

A It was on the mission as we described it.

Q Was it chasing another plane, as has been reported over the weekend?

A If that's how we described the mission? We didn't say it was chasing another plane.

Q That's right. But over the weekend, there were subsequent reports from El Salvador that it was chasing another plane. Do you have any comment on those?

A No.

F-2716

Q Do we have any kind of economic analysis of what an OPEC production decrease, if it takes place in the next week or two to keep prices up, would have on the economic recovery here or in Western Europe?

A I don't, but I'm sure that somewhere in this warren there are people working on such things.

Q John, Mr. Wisner has returned from his latest mission to Angola. Do you have anything on it?

A Well, I can give you what we have. He came back on Thursday evening, had a series of discussions with senior Angolan Government officials. The discussions focused on Angolan proposals for a reasonable settlement based on Security Council Resolution 435. We consider that the talks were constructive in moving the peace process forward. We are reviewing the Angolan proposals in the expectation of further talks in the near future.

Q Who are these senior Angolan officials?

A I don't have a readout, Don, on who he spoke with.

Q Can you find out?

A Let me see whether we can -- let me see if we can amplify this further.

Q Is there some further -- You say you're thinking about it and all, but is there some other trip or meeting or something planned now?

A I think that, given the language we've offered you, that's a reasonable deduction.

Q John, can I ask you just one more thing? We take for granted the fact that you were not going to answer questions relating to Evans and Novak. Is this -- I mean is this something that you will not answer, questions about columns in the newspapers, or is it only Evans and Novak?

A Well, one never says "never" about anything, so I presume what may come one incautious day when we might be persuaded to respond. I think the fact of the matter is, one really isn't interested in pursuing a number of highly speculative stories that tend to appear in that column.

Q John, last Wednesday or Thursday -- I guess Wednesday -- when the Secretary was at the Chamber of Commerce, referring to the Chernenko interview, he said that he planned to follow up on it.

A Uh-huh.

Q Anything on that? And anything more on the Lomeyko briefing on Friday?

A Nothing more on the briefing and nothing really I can give you on the follow-up. I think it obviously is a fair inference that at some appropriate time the Secretary would meet with Ambassador Dobrynin to --

Q Burt said that they'd meet this week.

A I think he probably did. I don't have any date for you.

Q John, do you have comments on two events in Nicaragua? One is the return of Brooklyn Rivera, head of Misurasata, to Nicaragua for discussions with the Sandinistas. And the other is Virgilio Godoy's announcement that he will not take part in the election.

A Yes, I do, and so far as Brooklyn Rivera is concerned, noting that the OAS Inter-American Human Rights Commission in June reported that the Sandinistas have repeatedly violated the basic rights of the Miskitos, we would hope that Mr. Rivera can persuade the Sandinistas to respect human rights, political and individual rights, not only of the Miskitos, but of all Nicaraguans.

And then insofar as the election is concerned, we've consistently urged that the Sandinistas establish conditions for fair and free elections. Mr. Cruz and his supporters have evidently not been satisfied with their efforts to persuade the Sandinistas to guarantee the necessary conditions. Now the independent liberals, whose candidate for President is a former Sandinista Cabinet Minister, have also reportedly decided that the Sandinistas have still not provided the conditions for genuine elections and have authorized their leaders to withdraw from the elections unless those conditions are established.

Q Just to follow up, any comment on the report in The New York Times yesterday that the CIA was encouraging Cruz not to take part in the elections, the Coordinadora?

A No. I'll reply to that in two ways: Firstly, we don't -- we're not spokesmen for the CIA, so we don't talk about CIA matters; but secondly, the fact is that the United States is not attempting to block anybody's participation in the election. Quite to the contrary, we are for elections, although obviously elections conducted within a format that permits freedom of assembly, freedom of choice, freedom of the press -- in other words, the kind of normal democratic conditions that you would expect if there is to be a truly free election.

Q Do you have anything on a meeting that --

Q Can we have a copy of the two?

A Sure.

Q Do you have anything on a meeting that the U.S. is supposed to have with Vietnam some time this week on the MIA issue?

A There was some guidance last week on that, I think, and I don't believe we have anything beyond that to --

STAFF: On a technical meeting?

MR. HUGHES: Was this a technical meeting between the --

Q Yes. Anything beyond last week's?

A You can pick up the guidance in the Press Office.

Lester.

Q Last night, President Reagan was asked if, as the oldest President in history, he has any doubt about his being able to function in time of crisis. I'm sure you saw that didn't you, John?

A Uh-huh.

(Laughter) What's the next question.

Q That was the preface.

A I know. Those are always the set-up ones. (Laughter)

Q Since this question was asked not by a White House correspondent, but by a State Department reporter with apparent sources in this building, could you assure us, or could you tell us, John, do you know of anybody in this building who is contending, or would contend, what Mr. Trewhitt suggested as a possiblility? And I have one follow-up.

A No, I don't know of anybody who is suggesting that.

Q Do you, as a former editor, think that there was any possibility that the President would have waited until this debate to confess his inability to function?

A I'm not here as a former editor --

Q Oh, yeah, I know, but I'm --

A -- I'm here as a spokesman and --

Q I'm drawing on your expertise.

A Well, I would simply refer you to the President's remarks, --

Q Oh, yes.

A -- but he does not plan to make either age or youth a political factor.

Q In other words, there was nothing from the State Department that would ever suggest to Mr. Trewhitt there was any possibility that the President is unable to function?

A Mr. Trewhitt is a very able correspondent, and I've not usually been aware that he takes his questions from the State Department.

Q Well, the question was, nothing from the State Department, to your knowledge, would ever lead Mr. Trewhitt to such a suspicion?

A Not to my knowledge, but --

Q So that it's really --

A -- I testify to the sturdy independence of Mr. Trewhitt.

Q It could be described as "Baltimore balderdash," couldn't it?

A You might describe it --

Q I, well, I might.

Q Anything in the security situation in Lebanon?

A No, nothing beyond Alan's readout on Friday on numbers.

Q John, do you have any comment on Egypt's guarantee to the freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, according to a story this morning?

1-2720

A No. I don't.

Q Do you have any situation report on the Iran/Iraq front?

A No. I don't.

Q John, one other debate-related question. With regard to the Philippines, I'm not sure whether it was the way the question was asked or the way people, including high officials, talk "off-the-cuff," the upshot of what was said in the debate, especially by the President, suggested that the alternatives were, in the Philippines, for Mr. Marcos or the Communists.

Does U.S. policy see that as the alternatives in this case?

A Well, I don't think the President was narrowing on the situation that far. I mean, I think there is certainly recognition on everybody's part that there are other forces working for democratic change in the Philippines. I think what the President was saying was that the Philippines have been a sturdy ally of the United States, and his policy is to try to work with President Marcos' government for the kind of change and reform that we would like to see.

Insofar as the Communist possibility was concerned, he is, was, referring, I think, to the facts, that there is a very vigorous Communist insurgency in the Philippines, and if one were to look for a non-democratic change of government, it would come likely from that particular source and, clearly, that would not be something that the United States would find satisfactory.

Q I guess, to put it more sharply, does the United States Government see any alternatives to Marcos other than the Communists in this situation?

A Well, as I say, I think there certainly is recognition that there are other forces in the Philippines.

Q John, as a follow to that, you said in your response to Don's first question that, "It is a policy to try to work for the kind of change we would like to see." Is it understood we would like to see a change?

A Oh, I don't think there is any question that there are certain aspects of Philippine policy that have caused us concern from time to time.

Q Another on the debate -- I don't know how you'd get into this, but with regard to the question of

1-2721

whether Soviet strategic forces are heavily land-based, the President suggested that not only he, but -- I think he said, "I wasn't the only one," or some phrase like that -- were surprised that the Soviet Union during the negotiations on -- it seemed he was talking about START -- had indicated its priority given to land-based --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- missiles.

A Uh-huh.

Q It's been commonly held that everybody knows that the Soviet Union's forces are heavily land-based, and every chart that you might pick up in any magazine would show you that.

A Uh-huh.

Q Can you amplify at all what he may have been referring to about the degree of surprise that people had that the Soviet Union was more -- giving a greater emphasis and priority to land-based missiles?

A I really can't because, clearly, he was talking about a Soviet conclusion with which we were presented, and I don't think he or anybody else was quarrelling with the analysis of the numbers. I think, as I listened to what he was saying last night, he seemed to be saying that the Soviets themselves had placed this particular emphasis -- as distinct from numbers -- that they had placed an emphasis on land-based versus sea and air. That had been surprising to a number of people in the government and outside of it.

Q I guess it's the surprise factor I wonder if you could amplify, because it was generally accepted, by laymen anyway, that they did have this attachment because their forces are so heavily land-based, and it's hard for people to see why they were surprised.

A Well, numbers, yes. But I think what the President was saying was that, irrespective of the numbers, the Soviet reliance and the significance to which they attach to land-based certainly came as a surprise to some people.

Q Did it come as a surprise to anybody in the State Department?

A I don't know. Haven't talked to anybody about it.

Q John, will you look into the question of whether there is a study on OPEC's options in price and

1-27220

production being prepared, and if it will be released?

A Let me see whether we might have something on that.

Q John, you said that there were some other aspects in the Philippine policy that have caused us concern. Could you just elaborate on what those aspects are?

A No, I can't. I think we have made a number of statements over the past, I suppose, year in which we have drawn attention to processes that are underway there. We've been enthusiastic about some of the steps that President Marcos has taken in the democracy area and in the electoral area, and we have had statements to make on other occasions when we have been less enthusiastic.

Q Well, John, there was one report that we were so concerned that we had some fallback positions from Clark and Subic, and so forth, and that there was some difference in perceptions between the Defense and the State Departments on this subject?

A Well, I don't have anything on that. I don't want to lead you down the wrong road here, but I would assume that the Pentagon -- I would assume that, as I assume that there are people in this building working on oil prices, I would assume that there are contingency planners at the Pentagon -- in fact, they would be rather derelict if there were not such a process going on underway -- which would be looking at U.S. bases and their availability around the world and contemplating alternatives. That's not to say that a change is imminent, or even expected, but I certainly would assume that there are some planners looking at that kind of thing.

Q How much urgency do we attach to this research on contingency plans, as far as the Philippines is concerned?

A Well, that's why I said I don't want to steer you down the wrong road, because I'm not suggesting there is, but I'm just assuming that there are bright people at the Pentagon looking at bases all around the world and contemplating what alternatives the United States might take were those bases not to be available. But I'm not in any way suggesting that I'm aware of such a process, or that there is an urgency about it.

Q John, in view of President Reagan's public exposition last night about a gentleman under CIA contract directing military operations in Nicaragua, do you feel the yoke of secrecy is now lifted from your shoulders (inaudible) --

A   Not so far as I'm concerned. There's a little matter of going to jail for revealing classified information.

Q   Are you suggesting that the President ought to go to jail?

(Laughter)

A   No, I'm not suggesting (inaudible)

(Laughter)

(The briefing concluded at 12:42 P.M.)

1-2723

Becker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #191

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1984, 12:03 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good morning. I have a couple of statements: One on the Agrava Board findings in the Philippines, and the other on the anniversary of the bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon.

Firstly, the Philippines and the Agrava Board report: We note that President Marcos has taken swift action on the report issued by the Chairman of the Agrava Board, Mrs. Agrava, today.

We expect that the Philippine Government will take equally swift action following the submission of the majority report which we understand will be issued tomorrow.

We trust that, as President Marcos has promised, those responsible for Senator Aquino's murder, no matter who they may be, will be held accountable for this terrible crime.

Secondly, Beirut: We continue to mourn the tragic loss of life which resulted from this vicious and unwarranted attack on our Marines and the French contingent of the Multinational Force. This anniversary, and the recent attack on our Embassy, are grim reminders of the obstacles we face in our pursuit of peace in the Middle East.

The Marines went to Lebanon as instruments of peace, and we must honor their sacrifice in that cause. We have pursued this objective because it is what America stands for and because it is in America's interest.

This anniversary reminds us that our road will not be easy. Nevertheless, we will not be diverted from pursuing a just, honorable and lasting peace in the Middle East. We will persevere.

Q Copy?

A Sure.

1-27241

Q Copy of one of those, please?

A Sure.

Q On the Philippine report, do you have any comment or reaction to the substance of it, which would -- of the Chairwoman's first report, which seems to be that the involvement of the Philippine military was very high in rank?

A I don't think any comment. Firstly, this is the minority report. I think we would want to wait for the majority report tomorrow; but I think, basically, our position is that the judicial process should now go forward effectively and fully in the Philippines based on the findings of these Commissions.

Q John, on that point, you say that you take note of the action by President Marcos who confined these people, who were named in the report, to their quarters and ordered court proceedings begun in the civil court apparatus there.

And you say we expect the government will take equally swift action following the majority report. This implies that you expect them to take the same action with regard to the army Chief-of-Staff, General Ver, who is very well known -- is the person who's named in the majority report that isn't named in the minority report. Is that what you were indicating?

A Well, you're going a little farther than I think we're able to go today because the majority report hasn't been issued.

Q But everyone knows what's in it.

A Well, perhaps unofficially everybody knows what is in it, or everybody says they know what is in it. What I'm suggesting is that when that majority report is available, we expect that just as effective and comprehensive action will be taken in the courts against anybody named in the majority report should those names be different to those named in the minority report.

Q Well, if the -- as is widely anticipated by the courts in the Philippines, the majority report involves the head of the -- chief person of the uniformed military in the Philippines. Will this have any effect on the relationship between the United States and the Philippines, especially in the military area, since there are so many military ties between the two countries?

A Well, the fact is that what we support in the Philippines is the rule of law and justice. And we would expect that President Marcos would pursue the rule of law and justice in this case.

Q Copies of the two?

A Yes, sure.

Q I guess what I'm getting at is that a good many of the relationships on the military side between the United States and the Government of the Philippines have been through the man who is about to be named, if all reports from the Philippines are correct, as the person behind the assassination; and who may if your advice, at least by implication is followed, be suspended and sent to court. Will this have an effect on the relationship, or does this throw some kind of cloud over the relationship that has been had between the United States and the Philippines in the military area?

A Well, one cannot project, but the fact is that what we support in the Philippines is the rule of law and order; and we certainly hope that that will be pursued vigorously.

Q Can I put Don's question, perhaps, in another way? Other than exhorting the Philippine Government to pursue a policy of law and justice, is the United States prepared to do anything if it is not pursued?

A Well, I think in terms of the kinds of statements we have consistently made during the investigation of Senator Aquino's murder, we have made clear what our views are, and we certainly hope that these would be taken into account.

Q In other words, would the Philippine Government, and specifically the military branch of that government, be less worthy of American support if this policy of law and justice were not pursued?

A I think we're entering the hypothetical here. What we have today is a minority report; what we will have tomorrow is a majority report. We're making clear what our feeling is about how the process should go forward after those reports are received. But I think we would be unwise to speculate on the future beyond the action that will be taken by the Filipino Government tomorrow.

--MORE--

Q John, setting aside for a moment the question of General Ver, which obviously will be dealt with tomorrow in your view, what does the report that's out today say to the United States about all of the statements made by the Marcos Government immediately -- in the immediate days and weeks after the incident, attributing it to the -- to this individual who was shot on the -- Communist individual who was shot on the runway, and so on? What does it say about the security forces in the Philippines who have now, by today's report, been implicated, aside from General Ver?

A Well, as I say, we support the process of justice in the Philippines, but I think it would also be unfortunate to find people guilty before that guilt is proven by the judicial process. We have a Commission report at the moment, and the judicial process will now go forward, and I think when that -- when the courts have finished that process and made findings, that's the time to ascribe formal guilt.

Q Does that statement also -- can we read that statement to also mean that the U.S. believes that the attribution of the crime to someone else early on was also improper in that it found guilt before --

A It's not a question of the U.S. pronouncing on comments made outside the Commission, outside the court process. The fact is the U.S. is taking note of this Commission report, both the minority and the majority aspects of that Commission activity, and will support the court process in the Philippines. That should go forward.

Q Can I try once more on a -- perhaps on a broader scale? Will the actions of the Philippine Government in pursuing this affect the overall climate of U.S.-Filipino relations?

A As I say, I think you're venturing into the hypothetical. We have not had the majority report of the Commission presented yet. We have not had a reaction from the Government of the Philippines, and until they react, take the action that has been promised, I think it would be unwise to speculate on the future.

1-2778

Q John, has the Presidential visit been rescheduled since it was postponed?

A I'm sorry?

Q Has the Presidential visit been rescheduled since --

A I'm not aware of any Presidential plans that are scheduled after the election, any travel plans. I don't --

Q Have you had any discussion with the Philippines of a schedule for the --

A I do not think the President has scheduled any travel after the election.

Q New subject, John?

Q On Lebanon, on television this morning, Mr. McFarlane said -- I believe this is accurate -- that he expected further terrorist acts, or he said there was a high degree of probability -- I think he said 70 percent -- that there would be additional terrorist acts against the United States in the Middle East region.

Can you give us some idea what's being done to forestall this at the moment? Any further drawdowns in other countries?

A No. I don't think we're going to be very specific. Embassies in that area and in other areas around the world are on a high state of alert, as would be expected in view of various rumors and various threats that have been circulating.

As I've said before, sadly, threats and intelligence relating to possible attacks on U.S. missions and U.S. embassy offices are all too frequent, as they are against the diplomats and missions of other countries as well. But I don't think, given the climate, we're going to go into great detail about various actions being taken.

Q Can you relate the timing of these threats to the American election?

1-2729

A No. I don't relate them to the American election. These threats, sadly, have been snowballing, I would say, over the past year, perhaps a little longer.

Q John, is there the possibility of closing our embassy in Lebanon now an active option?

A Not that I'm aware of. I don't know of any plans to close the Embassy. As I said yesterday, we are keeping the permanent staff there, plus the temporary staff that goes in and out, to the minimum level that is prudent and necessary to conduct business for the foreseeable future. But I know of no plans to close the Embassy.

Q Would it be fair to characterize the force that remains there, the diplomatic force, as a skeleton crew at this point?

A Well, it's the minimum necessary to conduct necessary business there. I don't know whether you'd call that a skeleton crew -- I'll let you make that judgment -- but it is smaller than it has been.

Q And we are conducting business there?

A Yes. Sure. From the Ambassador's residence.

Q How big is the current staff?

A I don't think we're going to give numbers, Jim.

Q In addition to the embassy staff, there's still a group of military advisers?

A I'm not sure about the military advisers. Does anybody -- we think there are, but I guess you better check with the Pentagon on that.

Q Well, one person committed suicide this -- or shot himself, killed himself by accident this weekend, John, so --

A Really? Hadn't heard that.

Q A colonel, a corporal. Sorry, a corporal.

A I hadn't heard that one.

Q So there are, obviously --

A There may be.

Q -- Marines --

A There may be, but I think the Pentagon can better respond to that one.

Q On another subject, do you have any comment on what seems to have been some kind of outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan along the border overnight?

A I don't. Seen the reports on that, but don't have anything to offer on it.

Q What is the latest status of the concern of the United States regarding the tension between those two countries?

A Same as we indicated about ten days ago. No change.

Q Is there any response to the Indian Government's protest to -- delivered to Secretary Murphy about U.S. aid to Pakistan?

A Well, Ambassador Murphy is -- has been in India and is today in Islamabad, and I'm sure the overall relationship between the United States and India, United States and Pakistan, and between India and Pakistan, would be something that would have been discussed.

-- MORE --

1-2731

Q One of the stories were they presented him with a protest about the --

A I don't have any details, but I think it would be unusual if the relationships had not been discussed.

Q How about Armacost's whereabouts?

A Armacost is in Israel today.

Q New subject?

Q No. One more on this. Can you tell us today what the state of play is on our effort, if you agree there is an effort, to get Israeli troops out of Lebanon? Anything new happening there?

A It's as it has been. We are engaged in that issue. We want to be helpful, but there is no major new U.S. initiative underway, and our position is as it has been that we would like to see the various interested parties move closer, and I think that would need to happen in the case of Lebanon before we would contemplate mediation or something of that nature.

Q Is this subject in Armacost's portfolio?

A I'm sure that it would be something that he would be discussing.

Q Mr. McFarlane this morning, in an interview with Russ Howe, our diplomatic friend, he implied that the United States anticipates a new peace move or initiative in the Middle East next year. Can you elaborate on such reports and anticipations in The Washington Times?

A No, I can't. I think Mr. McFarlane's words speak for themselves.

Q Can you look into that interview? It's very important.

A No, I don't think so. You have an interview. You saw what he said.

Q John, is it a practice of the U.S. Government to pay for favorable overseas reporting?

1-2732

A   Not that I'm aware of. I think you're referring to a story relating to an earlier administration and citing CIA projects, and therefore, I would exclude myself from discussion on both of those grounds.

Q   Would you disown that sort of activity?

A   Well, I'm not aware of -- I'm not aware of -- There is certainly not any such activity coming out of this building that I'm aware of.

Q   Do you have anything regarding some westerners who may have been kidnapped by some rebels, I believe, in Ethiopia -- Tigrean rebels?

A   Yes, I do. Our Embassy in Addis Ababa has received reports confirming the recent capture by rebel forces of a number of non-Ethiopians including two American citizens. Although we have no independent confirmation of this information, it appears that the rebels of the Tigre People's Liberation Front captured the Ethiopian town of Lalibela last week and in doing so seized a number of captives including ten foreigners, two of whom are reported to be American citizens. At this time, we are attempting to confirm the identity of the American citizens involved and have been in contact with Ethiopian authorities as part of an effort to assure the safety of the Americans.

Due to the Privacy Act, we are unable to disclose any further information about the U.S. citizens thought to be involved.

Q   Copy.

A   Sure.

Q   Anything on contact with the rebels as to --

A   I don't, no. Sorry No..

Q   -- what their --

A   No.

Q   That's all you have?

A   That's all I've got.

Q John, the British Defense Minister is in Jordan today. Will we be supportive of a sale of Stinger-like missiles by Britain to Jordan, if that's being discussed -- if it takes place?

A Well, I think we've discussed the realities of our own involvement in possible U.S. arms sales to Jordan, and I don't think we really want to go beyond that.

Q Do you have anything on a visit in late November being discussed with the Iraqi Foreign Minister?

A No, I don't.

Q John, has the U.S. changed its policy in dealing with Polish refugees and Polish immigrants and things -- people who were stranded here in the U.S. after the martial law was in effect?

A Don't know that there is a change in policy, but there was some rather lengthy guidance yesterday, and that will be in the Press Office, so you can get it. I don't happen to have it with me, but we had it yesterday.

Q They've given this extended voluntary departure -- The guidance deals with 2,000 Poles.

A Yes, that's what the guidance deals with.

Yes, Connie.

Q Anything against the police and military action against the black township in South Africa?

A Yes, I do. Just setting the scene, we understand that the South African army surrounded the township of Sebokeng early this morning while police personnel conducted a search for arms and ammunition, banned literature, stolen property and illicit drugs. And, it's our understanding that some 347 residents were arrested.

The United States deeply regrets this latest action by the South African Government. These repressive measures are bound to obscure and put into question South

Africa's professed intentions of dealing with the problems of the country by reform and consensus. It's the earnest hope of the United States that the South African Government will attach proper weight to the internal and international costs of this action. We continue to urge the South African Government to open a meaningful dialogue with the leaders of the non-white communities, especially the black community, to establish mechanisms for airing grievances without resort to violent or repressive measures and at the same time to open the way for political participation by South Africans of all races.

Q Has the United States delivered a personal protest to the South Africans?

A Well, I don't think we'll get into the specifics of exchanges, but I think the South African Government is well aware of our thinking and feeling on this.

Q Can we have a copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q O.K. Thank you.

A O.K.?

(The briefing concluded at 12:21 P.M.)

Story / Becker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #192

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 24, 1984, 12:15 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good morning. I've got a housekeeping announcement and then a statement on developments in the Philippines.

Firstly, Secretary Shultz will represent the United States at the Fourteenth General Assembly of the Organization of American States that will be held in Brasilia, Brazil this year. The Secretary will meet with other participants on November 11 and will attend the formal opening and address the General Assembly on November 12. As soon as we get more detail on his program, we'll give you that just as soon as we can. We're going to post a list for correspondents who are interested in traveling with him, and we will take that down at close of business on Monday.

Q Is he still coming straight back on the night of the 12th?

A Don't have -- I think what you can sort of count on is a Saturday departure and a return early Tuesday, but I don't have those times finalized yet.

Q There are no intermediate stops?

A Just picking up some fuel on the way down and on the way back.

Insofar as developments in the Philippines are concerned, the Agrava Board, whose deliberations we have followed closely, has carried out an impressively thorough investigation and addressed many of the questions surrounding the brutal murder of Senator Aquino. This is testimony to the vigor of democratic traditions in the Philippines and to Philippine respect for the rule of law.

We note that President Marcos has taken the same swift action on the majority report of the Agrava Board, which was submitted on October 24 in Manila, as he did with Mrs. Agrava's minority report yesterday.

We view President Marcos' transmittal of both the minority and the majority reports to the special prosecuting body as a positive development.

1-2787

We find it noteworthy that an independent civilian board was empowered to investigate allegations of criminal activity on the part of the military.

We also note that President Marcos has called for the immediate trial by a civilian tribunal of all parties who may be held responsible in the two reports. He has also authorized the Agrava Board members and the Commission's legal staff to assist in the prosecution of the case.

The United States trusts that, as President Marcos has promised, those responsible for Senator Aquino's murder, no matter who they may be, will be held accountable for their crime.

That's all I have for you in way of --

Q Copy?

A Sure.

Q Are you prepared to go any further than you were yesterday on whether the actions of the Philippine Government will affect the climate in which the relations between the two countries are carried on?

A I don't think I'm prepared to go any further, Jim. As has been said by the President, as has been said by Secretary Shultz, we've long had a good relationship with the Philippines, the people of the Philippines. No reason why that shouldn't continue.

I really don't think I want to go beyond the remarks I made yesterday. We have now seen the work of the Commission completed. We see the judicial process underway, and I think we should wait for that to go forward.

Q You mentioned the positive sides of this as the judicial inquiry took place. What comment would you have on the fact that Marcos announced that it was a lone gunman who was a Communist who shot Aquino, when his Board says it wasn't true, that it was one of the Philippine military, that the Philippine military announced this, and the whole Board says that was a lie also, and that the government is stuck with having said a lot of things which its investigating Board says is completely untrue?

a Well, but I think the fact is that this Commission has been permitted and has indeed carried forward its investigation apparently unfettered, has come to objective conclusions, that a report has been presented, and no matter what various people have said earlier about responsibility and so forth and so on, you now have a Commission report with specific charges and documentation, and that is going to be processed through the court system in the Philippines, so we think that is a positive development.

Q Was President Marcos acquainted by the Embassy, or some other means, with the U.S. posture yesterday about what the United States hoped he would do with the second part of the report, on the majority report as you called it?

A I don't know what communication there was, if any, through diplomatic channels. I don't know whether our Ambassador was in touch with President Marcos yesterday or not; but I don't think there is any question that the Philippine Government has been aware of our view throughout the course of the investigation, and certainly was aware yesterday of the views we expressed here.

Q John, do you have any comment on the two members of the Agrava Commission who were being detained when they tried to leave the country?

A Yes. We understand that is a situation that developed temporarily, that Luciano Salazar and Dante Santos, both Board members, were apparently stopped at Manila International Airport October 24, on the basis of a letter from the legal counsel to the Aviation Security Command which stated that he intended to file certain legal charges against some Board members. We understand that the hold order has been lifted and that the two Board members are free to depart.

Q Copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q John, are you not going out of your way by not saying that this is an internal matter of the Philippines? You are going into details in a matter that I don't see the United States (inaudible) --

A No, I don't think so. I don't think there is a contradiction between our traditional posture that we don't meddle in the internal political affairs of another country, on the one hand, but also the acute concern of the United States Government, of various administrations, with human rights throughout the world. I think the latter and the comments that we have made concerning the course of this investigation

1-2739

purport to the latter. I think the fact that we are now saying that a judicial process has started and is going forward and should be allowed to run its course indicates that we are not meddling in the internal affairs of another country.

Q Your comments have increased after the last Sunday debate between Mondale and President Reagan because he made it an issue, almost an election issue -- Mr. Mondale, (inaudible).

A Well, I don't know that our comments have increased. I think somebody here asked me a question about the Philippines after the debate, which I tried to answer, and the fact is that the Agrava Commission has reported. I'm sure you're not suggesting that we orchestrated their timetable or the day on which they would deliver their report.

Q John, do you have anything on the --

A Hold on. I've got one up here.

Q Sorry.

Q Aquino himself was convicted of what many people think were charges -- a political crime, and imprisoned --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- by courts that many Filipinos thought were under the control of the government. What confidence do you have that this civilian tribunal will be free of undue political influence from the government?

A Well, I think we will maintain a healthy interest in the progress of this case.

Q Do you have anything there on the status of the economic program for the Philippines which has been under negotiation with the IMF and with the United States Government, with U.S. banks, and all this?

A I don't have any update, Don, on where we are.

Q Do you anticipate, John, that the healthy interest that you're going to keep on the progress of this case will affect in any way the Administration's budget proposals, foreign aid budget proposals, in the coming 6-8 months or so?

A Well, we tend not to operate on that kind of basis. I think that the question of observing the judicial process in the Philippines will be quite separate from our aid program.

1-2740

Q If I may make the comparison, in the case of El Salvador, human rights concerns with regard to El Salvador played a very significant role in the Administration's own attempt to secure continuing funding for various purposes in El Salvador. Wouldn't that be the case also in the Philippines?

A Well, I guess I'd refer you to the history of that. You say the "Administration's efforts;" I think there were other forces involved in that ongoing situation, too.

Q Well, the Administration now voluntarily reports to Congress under an agreement which it reached with Congress and signed with Congress on that score.

A I hear you, but I think to compare the --

Q O.K.

A -- to compare El Salvador with the Philippines is not a very realistic kind of comparison.

Q On human rights and aid, it's not the same sort of issue?

A I don't think it's a realistic comparison.

Q The Aquino family is saying there is a cover-up about Mr. Marcos' involvement in this and is asking for his resignation.

A I'm sorry. Who is saying?

Q The Aquino family.

A Yes. I've seen some of those reports.

Q How do you respond?

A I think we have to wait and see what the courts do with the Commission's report. But certainly, there doesn't seem to be such an allegation in the report of the Agrava Commission.

Q John, on another subject, do you have any information from the Embassy in Beirut that journalists are now being targeted as -- by the terrorists?

A Well, I think that Beirut is a dangerous place, has proved to be a dangerous place for diplomats, newspapermen and women, and indeed other Americans. We do have an advisory out which is still in force, warning Americans about the dangers that exist in Beirut and Lebanon. A number of news organizations represented in this room have had correspondents seized, or in some cases seized and then released, or as recently as today, taken, I gather, by forces unknown -- and I don't know whether there has been any resolution of the case of the AP correspondents this morning. But I think all of this points up that it is a pretty hazardous place in which to operate.

Q Is there new information now indicating that there is a special current threat?

A I don't know of information which would indicate specific newsmen or specific organizations targeted, but I think there is new information concerning the threat across-the-board to Americans, including newspaper correspondents and newsmen.

Q Would you expand on that?

A No. I don't think that would be prudent.

Q New information since yesterday, since the bombing, since --

A Oh no, I'm not making it that recent, Ralph. I'm talking over the past couple of weeks.

Q John, you say there was an advisory out. When did that advisory go out?

A I may just have that with me, Bill. Let me take a look. I don't think I do, but certainly we can produce that for you later.

STAFF: In May.

A May? May of this year?

STAFF: Yes.

A O.K.

Q But if you've had something within the last couple of weeks, John, is there any -- I mean, I don't know what the bureaucratic process is -- is there any way of updating or raising the level of an advisory?

A   In legislative or bureaucratic terms, I think not. I think that is the level to which we go. In terms of word-of-mouth and friendly information, obviously, we are doing that.

Q   John, The Times today has published a figure of 100 threats a week against military -- U.S. diplomatic installations around the world. Is that a good figure?

A   Well, I sort of hesitate to use that figure. I think I would -- and I'm not suggesting that it's inaccurate by that response. I guess I simply would go back to what I've been saying for the past couple of weeks, namely that the volume of threats against posts, individuals and specific Ambassadors is very great. Whether it's 100 in every week or whether it's less than that in some weeks, or more than that in some weeks, is kind of hard to categorize. But certainly, the amount of information that flows through U.S. and other channels about potential terrorist activity against individuals and posts is very substantial.

Q   Why is it hard to categorize? I mean that seems to me to be pretty "cut and dried."

A   Well, it isn't "cut and dried." It is information of varying quality; it is information sometimes that disappears into the wind and nothing ever develops. In other cases, it is information where we take action ourselves of a preventive character; in other cases, it is information in which local governments and local security organizations take action, and nothing develops. In other cases, there are specific instances of activity, so it is a very mixed bag.

There is a great deal of information -- some of it unsubstantiated, some of which proves never to result in an activity -- about the movement of people, money, and resources around a region.

Q   Has the volume of those threats increased since the bombing of the Embassy, as indicated by some sources?

A   I don't know whether it's increased since the bombing of the Embassy. I would say that the volume of those threats has been high for the past year.

-- MORE --

1-2743

Q John, are you coordinating your steps with the Lebanese Government one way or the other, or will you just take it as an American --

A No.

Q -- affair?

A We work very closely with the governments of these countries in these high-threat areas, and, indeed, there's a very practical reason for that, in that our security precautions and defense of our Embassies basically extends to the building.

In most cases the perimeter or the streets outside the Embassy are protected by the host government.

Q John, are you still cooperating also with militia, local militia, in these areas --

A Surely.

Q -- in the West and East?

A Surely.

Q What do they mean when you say "high-threat areas"? Do you include other regions like Central America and Latin America as well, as reported today in the Times?

A I don't think we will really get into much more detail than I've given you. If -- I don't know, I think I'll let you use your own judgment, but if you get too specific in indicating which areas we think pose specific risks, that's not -- there's no reason for us to be helpful to those who wish us harm.

Q Did the Lebanese Government express its concern for your -- about your steps drawing out some of your -- withdrawing some of your diplomats?

A I really don't know what kind of diplomatic exchanges there have been about that. Certainly, the Lebanese Government expressed its great sympathy and compassion and understanding at the actions that were taken against our Embassy Annex.

Q What do you mean "suddenly?"

A Sorry?

Q What do you mean by "suddenly?"

A Sorry? Suddenly?

Q You said "suddenly." They expressed their --

A Sympathy --

Q Sorry. Sympathy.

A -- and compassion.

Q John, does the level of -- when you talk about the level of threats being high for the past year, is it fair for us to draw the conclusion, then, that the same sort of difficulty that the U.S. has in dealing with sorting out which ones amount to anything and which ones don't -- the same sort of difficulty that U.S. officials have talked about prior to this most recent bombing still exists at this moment, or has there been a qualitative change of some sort --

A No. I don't --

Q -- in the ability of the Administration -- of the Government to deal with this level that has existed for the past year?

A No. I think each threat has to be weighed by the experts, and, as you all know, the threats vary. Sometimes it's a question of a phone call received by a wire service or newspaper. It may be American, maybe not. So you've got to make an assessment as to whether that is -- all of these threats are taken seriously, but you've got to make an assessment as to whether that is a hoax or whether some specific activity is planned. That's one level of threat.

Another level of threat is someone calling an Embassy and saying, "Clear the embassy, there's a bomb in the basement." That is taken very seriously. And, as we all know, that happens in a number of buildings. It happens in news organizations. It's a great inconvenience. You have to make judgments about that kind of thing. A lot of that goes on.

Q John, what I was getting at --

A A lot of it is more serious.

Q What I was getting at was, has there been any change in the way the U.S. Government is handling that volume of information --

A Taking each one seriously and trying to analyze what it means. There is clearly a worldwide increase of terrorism, not only against the United States but, sadly, against the British Government, against other governments, Saudi diplomats, Kuwaiti diplomats -- a number of people have either been hurt or given their lives in such incidents.

Q John, I think there is a report that Gemayel is visiting or is about to visit Libya. Do we have any comment on that?

A No. I think he's -- I actually think he's back in Beirut, or very shortly will be back in Beirut, but we don't have anything on his visit to Libya.

Q In view of Libya's involvement in the region in a negative way for our interests, do we consider this an adverse development?

A Well, I -- you know, that's hard for me to comment on the visit without knowing what transpired, and I'm sure our Embassy in Beirut and our Ambassador there will be pursuing this with the Lebanese --

Q Gemayel visited the United States three times during the major involvement of the U.S. in Lebanon. Has he been invited back here? Would he be welcome to come again?

A I'm sure he'd be welcome, but I don't know of any specific invitation.

Q Is Richard Murphy going back to the Middle East from Islamabad?

A He may well do that. I don't have an onward itinerary for him, but he may well do, Jim. I wouldn't be surprised, while he's there.

Q For any particular purpose?

A Well, he's the Assistant Secretary for that area, and it would be -- I wouldn't be surprised. I don't have specific information that he will, but I wouldn't be surprised if he does a tour of the region.

Q John, has the Secretary arranged to see Ambassador Dobrynin this week?

A Nothing set that I can tell you about as of this morning.

Q Will something be set this afternoon, do you think?

A I do not think there will be a meeting today.

Q John, is there an explanation for our vote last night in the U.N., the South African vote?

A Well, as I think Ambassador Kirkpatrick made clear, our -- the fact that the apartheid policy of South Africa is repugnant to us and we abhor it, that's well known. That's established, and there certainly isn't any dilution of our feeling about that.

But in practical terms, the resolution on which we were asked to vote contained language that we thought was extreme, and so while making it clear that there certainly wasn't any question of our feelings about apartheid, we could not vote for that resolution.

Q Just for the record, have we ever voted in the U.N. Security Council for a resolution calling for an end to apartheid?

A I hesitate to answer that question from the podium without doing a little research. Let us see what we can find. But the fact is, our policy and our declarations about apartheid are very clear.

Q On the same subject, any additional -- any follow-up to yesterday's statement? Has the South African Government responded to it, or have we called the Ambassador in, or anything like that?

A I'm not aware of any diplomatic activity. There's some developments on the ground which all of you have been reporting on. I gather there's been a sort of pullback today.

Q John, you indicated there was new information about across-the-board threats in Beirut, and you said that this has come to light in the last couple of weeks.

1-2747

A Uh-huh.

Q This is not on the basis of any more threats, but you believe that qualitatively these threats are more frightening, more believable, than previous ones? I'm trying to understand what you're --

A Well, it's a high-risk area. We have suffered tragedy in that area. We're particularly alert and trying to be prudent insofar as government personnel are concerned. As you know, we are trying to keep the number there to a minimum, and trying not to be helpful to those who wish us harm. And it's our belief that certainly there have been actions against newsmen, and it's our belief that newsmen, too, should exercise prudence.

Q John, on another matter related to newsmen, yesterday the International Press Institute issued a statement regarding this French journalist -- who I believe is named Abouchar -- who was seized by the Soviet troops, or maybe it was the Afghan troops in Afghanistan, calling on various parties and governments and countries to do something about his case.

Do you have anything to say on him?

A Yes. We believe that the freedom of journalists to report significant stories, such as the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, is a basic and important human right, and we urge the immediate release of Mr. Abouchar by the Afghan authorities.

Q Is there any U.S. official reaction to the statement of Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of keeping the country in NATO?

A Yes, there is. The United States has long believed that full Spanish participation in NATO is in the best interests of Spain and the Alliance, and so we welcome this endorsement of Spain's membership in the Alliance.

Q The Prime Minister also said, however, in the course of his speech that he thought that U.S.-Spanish relations ought to work toward a reduction in U.S. military presence in Spain. Do you have any comment on that portion of the speech?

A Sure do. We believe that U.S. military presence in Spain makes an important contribution to Spanish, to European, and to Alliance security. We will continue to work closely with Spain in the context of the 1982 U.S.-Spanish

1-2748

Agreement on Friendship, Defense and Cooperation to secure the security of both Spain and the Alliance.

Q Can I follow up on that? The speech --

Q Could we have copies of that?

A Sure.

Q Both of those, please?

A Sure.

Q The speech also, I thought -- I read it quickly, but I thought he said that Spain should not become a part of the integrated military structure of NATO. While his comments on NATO in general were more positive, that part was not, as far as the U.S. was concerned.

A Well, as far as the U.S. is concerned, we believe that full Spanish participation in the Alliance is in the interest of both Spain and the Alliance. That's, of course, a matter for discussion between Spain and all its allies, but that's where we stand.

Q Can we have copies of all of those?

A Sure.

Q John, Ma'Ariv newspaper in Tel Aviv on August 17th of this month ran a story which leads, "U.S. Administration leaders made it clear to Prime Minister Shimon Peres and Vice Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir in their recent talks in Washington that they realize the Reagan plan is as dead as its predecessor, the Roger Plan. Therefore, it will not be raised after the U.S. Presidential elections and Israel will not be pressured to accept it." What do you comment on that?

A Well, I think the Israeli Foreign Minister has already suggested that that story is nonsense -- I think already issued a denial.

Q Can we go back to South Africa for one second?

A Sure.

Q You mentioned language in the U.N. resolution that was found unacceptable.

A Uh-huh.

1-2749

Q Could you specify what that language was?

A No, I can't. I think I'd refer you to the U.S. Mission at the U.N. on that.

Q Do you have a comment on the crash of the helicopter in El Salvador, and what is the U.S. interpretation? Was it shot down by the rebels, or an accident?

A Well, I don't think we know, and I think basically you have to go to the Salvadoran authorities for that. The cause of the crash is still not certain. The Salvadoran armed forces have stated that it's their government's belief that the helicopter crashed as a result of mechanical failure. And, so far as we know, there's nothing yet that would indicate otherwise.

But, as I say, I think that basically is a Salvadoran inquiry, and you'd really have to stay with them on that.

Q Could I follow up on that?

A Sure.

Q The Washington Post a few days ago quoted Pickering as saying in this -- all this discussion about the travel of U.S. advisers to areas that might be combat --

A Uh-huh.

Q He said that the advisers were safe with Colonel Monterrosa. Given the light of what has recently happened, do you foresee any tightening on the restrictions on the movement of advisers?

A I don't think so. I think the military situation, in fact, has been improving in Salvador. Obviously, it's very hard to draw with certainty lines around combat areas. You have to use your best judgment and common sense as to what is a combat area and what is not a combat area.

I'd just remind you that Ambassador Pickering -- his own helicopter has been fired on in areas considered to be non-combat areas, and I think members of the Congressional delegation flying in an area considered to be a non-combat area in Salvador -- I think their helicopter was fired on.

So it's hard to guarantee that there will be no fire from an area considered largely safe, but I think you just have to use judgment on a case-by-case basis.

Q   John, do you have any comment on Nicaragua's protest over the manual -- the assassination manual?

A   Well, there's a wire service story out there that there's been such a protest. In fact, no such protest has been received by us. Our Ambassador was summoned yesterday to the Foreign Ministry. He arrived there. I think, somewhat to his surprise he found a room full of reporters and photographers whose mission apparently was to photograph him arriving. He waited what he thought was a reasonable amount of time while this melee continued -- surged around him -- and he thought that the appropriate thing to do was to leave at that time.

So he left, and we all note with fascination this morning a report published in Nicaraguan newspapers of this protest. But so far we have not received it, although it has been published in the Nicaraguan press, and so we wouldn't dream of commenting on a note we haven't yet received.

Q   How long did he wait?

A   I don't know how long he waited. I'm sure it was a reasonable amount of time.

Q   Where was that? The Foreign Ministry?

A   At the Foreign Ministry.

Q   John, I want to go back --

Q   Did they receive him at the Foreign Ministry --

Q   John --

A   I'm sorry?

Q   Was there no escort at the Foreign Ministry to take him into the room where he was going --

A   Not that he could perceive. He thought it smacked of somewhat unusual behavior on the part of a Foreign Ministry.

Q   With whom was he supposed to have an interview?

A   I don't know with whom the interview was set.

Q   John, I want to go back to that story of Ma'Ariv. What do you see the trend? A couple of stories coming out from Israel, the first one which was on the front page in The Washington Post, about the United States deferring the payment of the debt, the $500 million, to Israel, which was not agreement, and then coming to another story about the Reagan plan which had proved to be not accurate.

What do you see? Are you concerned about such --

A Well, I don't think there's any link between the two. I think on the first story there was a misunderstanding. Certainly, we want to be helpful to the Israelis in terms of their economy, and while their Prime Minister and their Foreign Minister were here, certainly contingencies were discussed.

I think the view of the Administration was that those contingencies probably would not be necessary if the Israelis were to undertake the kind of action that they were contemplating with their economies, and even if those contingencies were to be necessary, no decision had been made on which one might be appropriate.

There seemed to be a little confusion as to whether in fact that discussion represented an offer, a formal offer, which we did not think it did. There were some statements out of the Israeli Government, but I think the last one is that, offer or not, or however you want to describe those talks, the Israelis were not taking us up on them. So I think that story is put to rest.

Why a newspaper would publish a report which was later denied by the Israeli Government, and certainly would be denied by us as to the course of the conversation, I don't know. I guess you'd have to ask them.

Q According to them, this is the central achievement of Mr. Shamir and Peres' visit --

A You're talking about the peace plan statement.

Q Ma'Ariv, yes. Yes, yes.

A And the fact that the Israelis said during a meeting with the President that it was dead? Well, the Israelis deny that they said that, and we certainly deny that it's dead.

Q What are your thoughts about the Reagan plan yourself now?

1-6252

A I don't know of anything that anybody else has suggested that is more meaningful or that is being acted upon.

Q Okay. Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:46 p.m.)

1-2753

Story/Becker/
Peterson

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #193

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 25, 1984, 12:09 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, everybody. (I've) got a couple of sort of housekeeping and logistical announcements up front, and then a brief statement.

Firstly, the Secretary will address the Park Avenue Synagogue in New York at 8:00 this evening. His speech will be on "Terrorism and the Modern World." We hope to have a prepared text available in the Press Office later this afternoon. It will be embargoed until time of delivery. There will be a Q&A session after the Secretary's address. The writing press is welcome to cover, but the evening is closed to electronic media due to insufficient room. That is the call of the sponsoring organization, not ourselves. If you have any questions, please be in touch with Synagogue Executive Director Barry Modlin, and he is at 212-369-2600. Mr. Modlin, at 212-369-2600.

This afternoon at 2:00 o'clock here in the briefing room Peter McPherson, Administrator of AID, will hold a press conference. The subject will be the famine in Africa and the U.S. response. That's ON THE RECORD for camera and sound. (For) any additional information, call Kate Semerad at 632-4200.

Finally, a statement concerning Nicaragua:

The United States has learned that the Government of Nicaragua is encouraging foreign media to cover a demonstration being organized against the United States Embassy in Managua scheduled for this afternoon. The United States wishes to make clear that it holds the Nicaraguan Government totally responsible for the safety of U.S. Embassy personnel and property.

That's all I have for you.

Q On that demonstration, do you have any indications that there's any violence planned?

1-2755

A No indications that there is violence planned, Jim, but I think this is a little unusual to have a government encouraging press coverage of a demonstration outside a U.S. Mission, and so therefore we just want to make our position crystal clear.

Q Is this protest also being given to the Nicaraguan Government?

A I think the Nicaraguans are very well aware of our views, and the local security forces are very well aware of our position.

Q Is that a "yes," there was a protest?

A That's a "yes." (Laughter)

Q What precautionary measures is the Embassy taking?

A I won't get into our own measures, but we obviously are alert.

Q Does the U.S. believe that the Nicaraguan Government, in addition to encouraging coverage of the demonstration, is sponsoring the demonstration itself?

A Well, I suppose that implication is certainly out there. I won't go so far as to make that assertion, but certainly there is advance knowledge of such a demonstration and there is encouragement of foreign correspondents to cover -- and local correspondents -- to cover such a demonstration, and I let you draw your own conclusions.

Q John, will you be more elaborate about --

Q (Inaudible) as far as we know?

A It is -- as distinct from the weekly small demonstration outside the Embassy in Managua by a small group of U.S. citizens in Nicaragua, we understand this is a Nicaraguan demonstration.

Q Spontaneous? (Laughter)

A Well, spontaneous with considerable advance warning.

Q Can you be more elaborate about encouraging -- how are they encouraging the demonstration?

A They're calling up your colleagues up in Managua and saying, "Hey, why don't you run around to the American Embassy; it looks like a pretty good demonstration there today."

Q Have they said anything about putting on extra security for the Embassy?

A Well, I'm not going to get into that, Mike.

Q John, on the subject of Nicaragua, is there anything that you can give us on this Bulgarian freighter that may or not not be at El Bluff on the Caribbean side of Nicaragua unloading crates of we don't know what.

A Yes, there is. Our information obviously indicates a continuing flow of Soviet-bloc arms into Nicaragua, including a current shipment. We deplore the continuing military build-up in Nicaragua, especially when that country has already created an overwhelming military imbalance in the region.

We have no indication Nicaragua has received advanced aircraft, but, as we've indicated before, the addition of advanced combat aircraft to the Sandinista military arsenal would be a serious development which we would view with utmost concern.

Q Can you be more specific about how big the freighter is, where it's coming from, it's name, what is in the crates?

A No, I can't. I wouldn't direct you away from reports concerning the vessel itself. I guess what I'm urging a little caution on is the assertion that it contains advanced aircraft.

Q A copy of your statement on that?

A Sure.

Q Back to the demonstration for a moment, John.

A Sure.

Q Has there been a history in terms of violence there? Have there been any, during the last really five years, any violent attacks of any kind on the Embassy?

A I can't answer that of my own knowledge. Let me see if we can produce something for you on that.

Q On another subject, John, have you got anything on the Wall Street Journal's article today saying that President Reagan on the 12th of September sent a letter to Pakistan's President Zia al-Huq, cautioning him on proceeding with the Pakistani nuclear program?

A Well, you know, we're always a little unforthcoming on Presidential communications. The President corresponds regularly with a number of foreign leaders, including President Zia, but we tend not to get into the content and the frequency, so I'll stay away from that.

On the general question of nuclear programs in Pakistan, let me say that the U.S. has expressed its concerns to Pakistan over the Pakistan nuclear program on several occasions. As we've repeatedly stated, we do have assurances from the Pakistan Government that its nuclear program is entirely peaceful in intent and that it does not seek to acquire nuclear explosives of any kind.

The United States believes that a program of U.S. military support enhances Pakistan's sense of security and may help remove the principal underlying incentive for the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability.

Over time, we hope to persuade Pakistan that the pursuit of such a capability is neither necessary nor in its broader interests.

Q A copy of that?

A Sure.

Q I take it, John, you don't mean that the policy of military support would be the Indian allegation of the nuclear umbrella?

A No. No.

1-2758

Q On another nuclear matter, have you got anything on a French Socialist politician's statement that the Chinese leadership told him of their concern that the Soviets are storing or using Camranh Bay as a nuclear weapon base?

A No. I simply saw the report, but we don't have any response or comment on that.

Q Would you take that question?

A Let me see what we might be prepared to come up with.

Q Getting back to --

Q There is a report of American officials in Hanoi today to discuss the MIA problem. Is that accurate?

A I just don't have in my head the latest state of play on --

STAFF: Why don't you check with the Pentagon. (It's a) technical mission.

MR. HUGHES: Yes. I think that may be the technical talks that we've been suggesting might take place. I think the Pentagon may have something on that.

Q Getting back to Pakistan, if Pakistan were disposed to give up its nuclear program, or at least those aspects of it which cause continuing concern in the United States, would the United States be disposed to take some further kind of action to ensure their security or do something of a reciprocal nature?

A To ensure their security in what regard?

Q Well, they have a neighbor which has exploded a nuclear device --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- some years ago, if you will recall. And you were just talking about the buildup, military buildup, being a way to improve Pakistani security.

There have been reports that the United States might consider some kind of a quid pro quo. They give up

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their nuclear drive and in return the U.S. would do something further, either substantial or in terms of some kind of commitment if they were threatened by some other country that has a nuclear weapon.

A Well, I think our position is that our existing military assistance program provides the kind of assurance that you're suggesting, so I'm not aware of any additional program that is contemplated.

Q What has happened regarding the AWACS?

A Nothing further that I know of, Don. That is still something that is being considered.

Q Don, you're not talking about AWACS; you're talking about the Hawkeye.

Q Well, it's AWACS-type --

A AWACS-type aircraft. Yes.

Q John, have you received any new requests for increase in the aid to Egypt in accordance with the increase in aid to Israel?

A I don't know whether we've received any requests. I think there was some kind of statement in the public domain by President Mubarak within the past day or so. I think the fact of the matter is that aid levels for next year are some distance away, and there certainly isn't any development on that, on our side.

Q But is there -- is this rule to prevail in the relations between the United States and Egypt, Israel and Egypt? Each time Israel will have increase in aid, Egypt will be valid to ask for such an increase (sic)?

A Well, Egypt would not be alone in asking for increases in aid levels of the United States. I guess anybody's able to ask for increases, but that is something that we have to decide as a matter of policy and as a matter of consultation with Congress.

Q John, what's your understanding of the status of the Belgian-Libyan nuclear agreement?

A I don't have anything on the reports that have been circulating on that. But, as a matter of policy, the United States is opposed to nuclear supply to Libya.

Q Could you take the question and --

A Let me see whether there is anything beyond the "no comment" on the report.

Q While we're in that neighborhood, John, is there any motion at all in the nuclear agreement with China?

A Nothing moving, Jim.

Q Why is that?

A I guess the same kind of factors that prevailed earlier are still in play.

Q Do you have anything, any comment, on the Polish Government's investigation into the disappearance of priests?

A No. I don't have anything further on that.

-- MORE --

Q John, do you have any comment on the Greek Prime Minister's statement that Jaruzelski is a patriot and that Greece would serve as a mediator between Poland and the West to ease sanctions against Poland?

A Well, you know, we've been noting Mr. Papandreou's statements in connection with Poland, and we think that his views indicate a total misunderstanding of U.S. policy as well as current realities in Poland and Eastern Europe. He has put himself in opposition to the views of the Polish people, to the Roman Catholic Church, and to trade unions, actually, throughout the world.

The United States, along with the overwhelming majority of its allies and the international community as a whole, reacted strongly against the imposition of martial law and the subsequent outlawing of Solidarity. The U.S. policy towards Poland was then, and continues to be, designed to encourage genuine national reconciliation between the government and people. So it is not a question of mediation. No mediation is required. Ample avenues of communication already exist between Poland and the West.

Q Copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Could I ask whether -- it seems as though in the last 2-3 months, the U.S. and Mr. Papandreou have had a number of misunderstandings, or at least the U.S. has suggested that the Prime Minister has been under total misunderstanding on a few points. What's the status of Greek-American relations diplomatically these days? What's the status of our ability to get along with the Greek Government and accomplish U.S. goals?

A Well, as I think we have said, we're working to achieve a more constructive relationship. We have had a good relationship in the past. We're working to ensure that that is constructive, cordial; and obviously that calls for a similar effort on the part of Mr. Papandreou.

Q That implies that you have not had a similar effort from Mr. Papandreou.

A Well, I think we've had some problems with various statements that he made during his trip to Libya, for example, and now during his trip to Poland.

Q Do you have any comment on Duarte's reprimand of the U.S. Embassy over this death-squad killing of a son of a Duarte supporter?

A I don't think so. I think that's something the Embassy is looking into down there. Obviously one would be glad if the murder of a child had not taken place. Obviously, one would be horrified and sickened if it had taken place. But I think the Embassy there will be clarifying the situation.

Q You can't clarify what happened? The father seems to have disappeared.

A I can't clarify what happened, but in general I think the first suggestion was that a teenager, a young man, had been killed, and now there is the suggestion, happily, that that didn't take place. But I can't give you the hour-by-hour account of how the Embassy came into the possession of that first report or what the situation is now.

-- MORE --

Q John, on a related question on Nicaragua, has Nicaragua officially communicated its complaints concerning the guerrilla warfare manual to any U.S. diplomatic personnel?

A Yes. They delivered the protest note, I think, about 3:30 p.m. yesterday afternoon. That was the day after our Ambassador had been summoned, as you recall, to the Foreign Minister to find about fifty cameramen awaiting his arrival. As I think I told you yesterday, he waited for about ten minutes or so. No Foreign Ministry official arrived, so he thought that it would be appropriate and tasteful and prudent to leave, which he did. Some twenty-four hours later, a protest note was delivered to our Embassy in Managua.

Q What do you think of that protest note?

A Well, as a rule, we don't handle protest notes through the press, although the Nicaraguans seem to have elected to do that in this case, so I guess we will handle it diplomatically, Ralph.

Q What do you think of the published reports of Nicaragua's attitude toward the manual?

A I am sure people are checking them to make sure the published ones are the same as the ones they have communicated to us diplomatically.

Q You won't comment on the published reports? It is not that you are not commenting on the diplomatic communication?

A Not going to comment on them, that's right.

Q Can you say whether you have responded to the manual -- to the note?

A No, I can't.

Q You can't?

A I can't because I don't know whether we have.

Q But you would if you knew.

A Not necessarily.

Q Oh. (Laughter)

Q John, do you have anything on the Iraq attack again today?

A No, I don't. Sorry.

Q John, the Contadora Four have called for acceptance of the latest draft Central American peace treaty, as is, up at the UN. Mexico apparently has introduced a resolution to that effect. Do you have any comment on that?

A I don't, George. No, I don't.

Q John, a quick question on the Pegard case. At last report, the check was in the mail.

A I'm sorry. Which case is this?

Q Pegard of Brussels, the Belgian sale to the Soviet Union.

A Oh, yes. Yes, yes. Right.

Q At last report, the check was in the mail on that, but there had been some question over five additional machines that the Belgians have licensed to the Soviet Union. Does the U.S. have any further information on those, or --

A Let me take a look and see.

Q Okay.

Q Do you have any observations about the demonstrations today in the Philippines?

A No, I really don't think we have anything more to say than we did yesterday, Jim. I think we will let the judicial process take its course now.

Q John, anything further on the Dobrynin visit, Dobrynin meeting?

A No.

Q Not today?

A No. It won't be today.

Q Any comment on the British security incident reported this morning? I don't know whether you would go so far as to suggest --

A You mean the French explosives and the British sniffing dogs and the French sniffing dogs? No, don't have any --

Q No comment on that.

(The briefing concluded at 12:27 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #194

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1984, 12:27 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: I guess it is with some sadness that we say "Au revoir" to Jim Anderson today.

Q (Inaudible) "Au revoir?"

A Well, "Au revoir," yes, because it's not necessarily "Good bye," as I understand it. Our sadness is tempered only by the knowledge that he's going off to Jamaica for at least three months (laughter) --

Q A rough assignment!

A -- to help --

MR. ANDERSON: I'll read the weather reports every day, and I'll think of you.

MR. HUGHES: Anyway, Jim, we all wish you well while you're there --

MR. ANDERSON: Thank you.

MR. HUGHES: -- and we hope that we will see you back here.

MR. ANDERSON: Thank you very much.

MR. HUGHES: I just have a little announcement on the Secretary speaking at the U.N. Association next week. The Secretary will address the United Nations Association in New York, Thursday, November 1, at 1:00 P.M.. The subject of his speech is "Nuclear Non-Proliferation." That will be a luncheon, will take place in the Trianon Room of the New York Hilton Hotel. If you want to cover that, please be in touch with William Powell of the U.N. Association. He is at 212-697-3232. William Powell --

Q Would you give us that last name again? Powell?

A Powell. P-o-w-e-l-l, at the U.N. Association. (212) 697-3232.

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Barring technical difficulties, the Voice of America will pipe the Secretary's speech live back to the Department, and there will be a Q&A session following his speech.

That's all I have for you.

Q On the speech that the Secretary gave last night, the Vice President, Vice President Bush, gave an interview this morning in which he appears to disagree with some of the philosophy behind the speech by the Secretary last night.

Has this been discussed? Was the Secretary stating an Administration position last night?

A Yes. I'm not aware of the Vice President's interview this morning, so I really can't comment on that, but certainly the speech was cleared by the White House and was circulated at the Pentagon, and certainly the Secretary was voicing the Administration position.

Q Does he have any specific place, any specific organization in mind when he talks of "retaliation" or "preempting"?

A Well, as you know, Jim, we've been reluctant to -- I guess I'd like to answer that in two ways: in a general sense and then in a sort of advisory sense. We've been reluctant to discuss this question of retaliation, and certainly have been, and would be, reluctant to talk about specific organizations, or targets, or locations, or operations. But if you're -- I would not direct you to the view that the Secretary had a specific operation in mind when he was speaking last night.

Q John, on Sunday in the debate, President Reagan, in explaining why we hadn't retaliated for the terrorist attacks in Lebanon, cited among the reasons the danger of hurting, killing innocent persons.

A Uh-huh.

Q Shultz now, in stressing the need in some instances to retaliate, is saying we may have to take innocent lives. Isn't there a contradiction there?

A No, I don't think there's a contradiction at all, because both the President and the Secretary were talking, among other things, of the need for more precise and better

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intelligence information which would permit you to make the proper judgments about those who had undertaken acts against the United States, or who were about to undertake acts against the United States.

The Secretary wasn't flagging that it would be necessary to kill innocent people. He was raising the question that, in an operation, there conceivably could be a loss of innocent life.

Q But wasn't that all Reagan was saying in his debate is, we didn't want to create a situation where we would be endangering innocent persons? I don't see that much of a difference there.

A I think the Secretary and the President were absolutely in line. Nobody wants to create a situation in which innocent people would be at risk, and that is not the intent. But I think you -- given the evolution of our thinking about the way to handle terrorism, the recognition that terrorism is in fact a kind of warfare, and therefore, may have to be responded to with war-like action, or military action, there is the possibility that civilians who may be innocent might be involved.

I think that's what the Secretary was saying. But he wasn't suggesting that it was inevitable that civilians would be killed.

Q Let me ask a question: Were the Secretary's views as expressed in the speech last night part of a generally accepted policy in the Administration, would we have already retaliated for any of the three bombings in Lebanon? I ask it in this context, when we know from people in this building and elsewhere we have a pretty good idea who carried out those bombings, who was behind them.

Shultz was saying last night we don't necessarily need to have a case against the terrorists that we could prove in a court of law, meaning there may be -- there obviously would be still some doubt, some degree of doubt, when we retaliate, whether we were retaliating against the right people. So were this now the generally accepted framework for response, would we have responded?

A Well, as I say, we're really not going to address specific cases and specific operations. I think what the Secretary was doing was saying, yes, it may be very difficult if you acquire good information about a threat that either has taken place, or an operation that has taken place against the United States, or a threat that is imminent, you may not have the kind of evidence that you could produce in an American court of law.

But he wasn't ignoring the question of the quality of the intelligence, the verification of the intelligence, and of course, the morality of moving in a particular instance without the kind of evidence that you would be able to produce in a court of law. And that is all part of the mix, all part of the discussion that we're engaged in, and obviously would be the kind of factor that would determine what action the President would authorize in any specific instance.

Q One final question (inaudible): In making the speech, what is he looking for in the way of a national consensus or public approval? Are we looking for some sort of a resolution by the Congress that would sort of provide a carte blanche power for the Administration to respond?

A No. I think what has been happening -- the Secretary, as you know, has been as concerned as has the President about this burgeoning question of terrorism, which has certainly become graver in the past year and more obvious, and in volume much greater. It's an alien kind of activity to the United States, and I think that the thinking of the Administration has been evolving on this -- certainly, the thinking of the Secretary has been evolving on this. On a number of occasions, he has sought to stimulate and encourage a public debate and exchange of views on this whole question, and I think has been raising what is very obvious -- that the United States has to devise and tailor new kinds of responses to a new kind of threat, which is, in fact, part of a war against the United States and others.

Q John, can I come back to the question of circulation for just a second -- and it really follows on this last answer as well. You said that the speech had been circulated at the White House, that it had been cleared by the White House, and that it had been circulated at the Pentagon. And now you're saying that the President's thinking and the Secretary's thinking have been evolving --

A Yes.

Q -- over a period of time, which we can assume began early in this year.

Has the thinking of this Administration evolved, and is it now -- was it as of yesterday afternoon, when this speech was made public -- had it evolved to the point where the

Administration, including the Pentagon and perhaps including consultation with Congress, had reached the point of agreement on this policy? Or was this speech an expression of Secretary of State Shultz's evolution on the subject of terrorism?

A Well, I think in terms of discussion with the public, I think that has been an evolving process. In terms of the President's authority, and willingness, and determination to act against terrorism, not to permit terrorists to attack Americans, and American installations, without the possibility of retaliation, that has been in place for some time.

Q But the mechanics of responding to it have not.

A That's right.

Q So my question is, are these mechanics as expressed in Secretary Shultz's speech now, was that agreed upon as of the time of the Secretary's speech, or does it reflect his evoltuion on it?

A As I say, I'm not going to give you specifics on specific terrorist operations and whether we would respond and when we would respond and where we would respond. I think both the President and the Secretary have made clear that they are simply not going to discuss that kind of detail. But if you're asking, does the Administration feel that it has the authority and the capability to respond, I think that is clear that it does.

Q And that it would use, or should use, military force?

A Well, as I say, we're not going to discuss what the Administration might do in a given situation.

Q (Inaudible) That's not specific. That's what Shultz said in his speech.

A Well, I think -- it is clear that there are a variety of ways of responding to a terrorist attack, and one of them is certainly with military force.

Q John, can I ask you several questions here? Some are specific and some are more general. One, can you say that the Secretary has the support of Secretary Weinberger, of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Vessey, and of the CIA Director, Mr. Casey?

A Well, I do not know, and even if I did, probably wouldn't tell you which Cabinet ministers the Secretary had discussed a particular speech with. The fact is that the Secretary's speech last night represented Administration policy.

Q You say it represents Administration policy, that the Administration has decided on the steps outlined by Mr. Shultz, or is it agreed on a general approach outlined by Mr. Shultz, which is, as he states at some length, the necessity of getting a public consensus beforehand on various actions he spells out?

A Well, you have to be careful about that. The Secretary made a number of points there, and on the question of public consensus, he was talking about the evolving views of the Administration and the evolving views of the public, and the desirability of national debate, but I think also elsewhere in his speech he was suggesting that there may not always be the opportunity or the desirability for public debate about a U.S. response in a given situation before that takes place.

Q That's correct. But he said in the speech that the way has to be found to get the public to understand beforehand that this might happen, and --

A I think what has been happening over a period of six to nine months is what --

Q Does he mean that he now has this public understanding?

A Well, I would say, judging by the reception that the speech got last night and judging by public response to the kind of murderous and barbaric actions that we're seeing around the world, there certainly is a heightened public consciousness on this particular subject.

Q John, on that point, what he says in the speech, and I quote it: "What will be required," -- in the future tense -- "however, is public understanding, before the fact, of the risks involved of combatting terrorism with overt power."

Now, he's putting that in the future tense: "What will be required" --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- "is public understanding, before the fact."

A Uh-huh.

Q Are you now suggesting that he has the public understanding before the fact that is necessary to take the actions that are outlined in the speech.

A I think public understanding has been developing. I think he was talking about a continuation, a broad debate on this matter, but I don't think any terrorist should assume that any action taken against the United States would entail, necessarily, a protracted public debate before there might be retaliation.

Q Do you think, in response -- if I could clarify your -- or ask for clarification of a response you made to an earlier question: Does the Administration believe that any authority is needed from Congress before taking military, or paramilitary, actions in foreign countries, of this nature?

A I can't answer that, Don. In a broad sense, obviously, in the event of action such as we're discussing here, that would be the President's decision, and he would make that decision and take the kinds of questions that you are raising into account at that time, given the particular scope of the action.

Q By saying it's the President's decision, are you suggesting there is no Congressional input into this?

A No. No, I'm not suggesting that at all. I'm suggesting that nobody is going to take any action against a terrorist organization without the sanction of the President of the United States.

Q But what about the Congressional side of it?

A That's what I said, the President will certainly take that into account at the time he considers such action.

Q And a moment ago, you referred to the President having the authority to take these actions.

A It depends on what action we're talking about.

Q Well, you're talking -- I'm talking about attacks outside the United States against foreign nationals, possibly foreign civilians, for the purpose of preemptive action against terrorism.

A And that's the kind of action I'm saying that the President would decide on, and he would take into account at that time (inaudible) --

Q But you said a while ago, I thought, that the President had the authority to take these kinds of actions.

A Well, I'm sure he has authority to take certain kind of actions, such as have been undertaken overseas.

Q Could you answer -- or if you can't answer now, which you probably can't, since neither one of us is a lawyer, could you obtain an answer -- under what authority of United States law could the United States Government mount attacks overseas against foreign civilians in a country where the United States is not at war, before those people take some action against U.S. forces or U.S. civilians?

A I don't think so, because you're talking about a hypothetical situation and pinpointing certain specific actions, and I think I would prefer to leave to the President of the United States the range of activity from which he would choose.

Q Let me ask a second question: As I understand it, there is a law in the United States on the books -- not a Presidential directive or something that can be changed in a simple way -- which forbids a conspiracy in the territory of the United States which is aimed at killing people overseas, or anywhere.

A Uh-huh.

Q How could the government deal with this law in planning an operation of a preemptive nature against people overseas which involves, as the Secretary says, possibly foreign civilians as well as, maybe, innocent people?

A Well --

Q Has this been taken into account?

A Your first point was right, that neither of us can answer it because neither of us are lawyers. However, speaking as a non-lawyer, it does not seem reasonable to me to assume -- talking in the hypothetical sense -- that a specific action taken to prevent a truck bomb blowing up a U.S. facility and possibly killing a large number of Americans, of action taken to forestall that, could by any reasonable person be called a conspiracy.

Q I guess what I'm trying to get at is, the Secretary has called for a public debate on this whole matter and public airing of it. And we have here in his speech, and in several earlier speeches which he made on the same subject, a statement of the problem, basically, and some suggestions that we may not be able to live totally within the earlier parameters of what this country has done in the past. But what, it seems to me, having raised this subject, the Secretary or somebody has some responsibility to provide, is more details about where the law stands, what are the kinds of facts which have to be taken into account, or which the government may have taken into account, in determining how far the United States can go in these kinds of things.

So I'm asking, really, will you, or the Secretary, or somebody, explain more clearly how these kinds of actions which he is saying "may be necessary" fit into the scheme of American law, of Presidential authority, of Congressional authority, of what kind of public means of acquiring this -- what kind of means of acquiring this consensus the government feels is necessary?

A Well, I think that's a fair point and I think the Secretary and others may well do that, and I think probably what you're doing is contributing to what he's asking for, namely, public discussion of these issues and the raising of public consciousness on the subject. These are fair points.

Q John, in the realm of retaliation, there are big bangs and there could be small bangs. Has the Secretary's thinking about retaliation evolved to the point where he is reconsidering the prohibition against assassination?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q John, there are less than two weeks before the election.

A Uh-huh.

Q The Secretary's speech would have to be, you know, viewed as at least somewhat unsettling. Why would he not wait until after the election to give this speech?

A Why would the Secretary's speech be viewed as unsettling?

-- MORE --

Q Well, it seems to suggest a possible change in our policy --

A Then you haven't been listening to what the Administration --

Q I think --

A -- and the President have been saying.

Q Well, I think it's a front-page story in both newspapers because someone thinks that it's a new expression of policy. Now, why would he --

A Well, I won't get into --

Q Why would he make this comment right before the election? Does he feel it can't wait -- that something may be happening?

A Well, I won't get into a discussion with you on the merits of why some newspapers run some speeches on page one and others put them on page 14. That is the healthy expression of journalistic independence.

Q Well, may I follow up, though: Is this something that the Secretary felt must be said now for some particular critical reason of timing, it cannot wait?

A Well, the topic of this particular speech to this particular audience on this particular occasion had been selected some time in advance -- maybe a couple of months in advance -- and, even if it had not, I wouldn't see any particularly unusual aspect about him continuing to develop the discussion of anti-terrorism measures.

Q John, could I follow that up in a different way? Would it be fair to look at the Secretary's speech as a kind of warning to international terrorism and the people who practice it, that they cannot expect to always operate, in the future, with impunity?

A I think there are certain warning implications in that. That's not to say that we're projecting impetuous or necessarily universal action, but, nevertheless, I think there are warning implications in what the Secretary said, yes.

Q John, I would like to rephrase the same question, please. It's not clear from the speech of the Secretary if he is trying to mobilize the support of the U.S. public opinion

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for retaliation action for what had happened already, or for what could be a swift retaliation action against what could happen later.

A Well, I guess your surmise is correct that I'm not going to respond to questions about specific actions, either past or future. That's correct. I think the Secretary was doing two things: He was seeking to continue to encourage the public debate about the changing manner in which the United States must respond to terrorism, and he was articulating U.S. policy on this question.

Q John, doesn't this speech, which gives the idea, or the thought, of retaliation or military action against some people, some countries, some organizations, give a pretense to other countries in the Middle East to follow a hot pursuit method against so-called terrorist organizations inside independent countries, which will be another act of terrorism itself committed by such country or countries?

A I don't know about hot pursuit, but I think, obviously, we strongly encourage the ideas of governments taking action against terrorists on their own country and we'd like to see more concentration on that particular activity.

Q Another area, please?

Q No. Follow on this topic yet, John?

A Excuse me. George?

Q Don Oberdorfer, I thought, raised some good questions --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- and you praised him for making some --

A Good, thoughtful points. Sure.

Q -- some provocative insights. I notice you didn't promise him any answers? (Laughter)

A I think Don has performed a worthy service in raising questions which certainly the American people will be raising, but I don't happen to have a pocketful of answers for those thoughtful questions today.

Q No. But normally you "take" questions when you don't have the answers.

A I don't think those are the kind of questions -- I think those are the kind of questions that feed into this ongoing debate, and I will certainly draw attention to those with the capacity to answer them.

Q John, this increase in terrorism that we're noting, do we consider it primarily of the state-sponsored variety, or of organizational, largely due to non-state organizations? And if it's state-sponsored, is the Secretary standing behind his definition at the Jonathan Institute of the unholy alliance of Syria, Libya and Iran as the sponsors?

A Well, I think those countries are certainly countries that have been named by the Secretary before, and I don't know of any change in his thinking. But I think that he was referring in general both to individual terrorists, to terrorists encouraged by organizations of different kinds, and also the problem of state knowledge or sponsorship of certain individual and group terrorists.

Q John, you said the speech was cleared by the White House and circulated at the Pentagon. Did the Pentagon express any opinions one way or the other about the views in the speech?

A Well, perhaps that was a careless description of the process. The fact was that the speech was submitted to both the White House and the Pentagon and went forward with the full clearance and authority of the Administration.

Q Can you be more explicit what that means?

A No.

Q The reason I ask is, as we aficionados of George Shultz speeches have noticed, that when he enunciates Administration policy, he usually has the President's name endorsing it. This speech, as his other terrorist speeches, have always -- have all had an exhortatory quality to them, in which he's urging action be done. And the President, as far as I can remember, is not mentioned as having enunciated this policy, nor has the President in fact enunciated this policy. And in fact on Sunday night the President was going in the other direction and asking Mr. Mondale, "What would you do?"

A I don't agree with that, Bernie. I don't see any contradiction between what the President was saying on Sunday night, which was, you need a well-focused intelligence operation to pinpoint the kinds of people who are acting against you, and what the Secretary was doing; he is certainly urging that as part of the campaign.

I guess my feeling is that the speech was both exhortatory and explanatory, but that doesn't mean that because the President wasn't named in it -- I don't know whether the President and the Secretary discussed the details of this speech before it was given, and I guess if I did, we generally don't tell you what --

Q The Vice President seems not to agree with it. He's quoted as telling an interviewer in a Cincinnati radio station that he doesn't agree with Shultz.

A Okay. Well, you have --

Q And that would raise the question in my mind as to whether or not either the Vice President doesn't know what Administration policy is, or there's some problem in here.

A Well, you have the advantage of me, because I haven't seen the Vice President's interview. I certainly will take a look at it after this session. (Laughter)

But on the question of consultation and coordination between the Secretary of State and the President on the question of terrorism, Bernie, I don't think you should think there is any daylight or lack of such coordination and discussion.

Q John, one more on the subject of terrorism: Do you -- does the State Department have any comment on the Foreign Relations Committee report put out this morning, saying that, in effect, the steel barrier should have been in place?

A Yes, we do have some comment on that, Jim.

We've been cooperating with the Committee in its inquiry into the bombing. This is a serious endeavor, and we'll study the report with great care. Based on a quick review, we note that the staff members found that the partial success of the attack was not due to a premature move into the Annex building, to the withdrawal of the Marine unit, or to basic lack of equipment. And so we have no reason to challenge the staff report conclusion.

Our own investigation of the attack is continuing, and until that is completed and we can compare our findings with those of the Committee staff, we don't plan to comment further on the report. But in the meantime we'll continue to cooperate

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with the Committee's review of the Department's oversight of the security function.

Q John, can we have a filing break?

A Filing break? Sure.

Q Could we ask again whether that report -- the Department of State review -- will be completed before November sixth?

A I don't know when it will be completed. A considerable amount of material -- physical material, among other things -- has been shipped from Beirut to Washington and other points. Investigation of -- sometimes of a scientific nature is going on, and just when that will be completed, I don't know.

Q Will that report be made public when it's finished?

A I don't know what -- I can't guarantee what kind of format it will be and what degree of classification, but I certainly think we would be prepared to discuss it. I know the Secretary's whole thrust on this is to be as forthcoming as we possibly can.

Q John, could you say whether --

A There may be parts of it that may give us some problems in terms of the manner in which information was collected. And, as I say, I'm not going out on a limb on the classification of it.

Excuse me. Yes?

Q Could you say whether the State Department has learned anything about these reports that journalists are in danger in Beirut? And, if you did intercept any form of communication on that, would the State Department somehow warn, particularly American journalists, that they have been targeted?

A Well, I'm not going to talk about the manner in which we acquired and are acquiring information, but I think we did try to be helpful in a warning to news organizations in Beirut, and I think we have tried to be here, and I think those warnings are still well heeded -- should be well heeded.

Q John, do you have any comment on the report by the investigators in Italy on the assassination attempt against the Pope?

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A Yes, I do. The investigating magistrate's report is an important step in the process, in which the United States has full confidence. We have and will continue to avoid taking any public position on the merits of the case as it proceeds through the Italian judicial process.

There should be no mistake as to the gravity with which we view the attempt on the life of the Pope. During the investigation the United States has been, and remains, prepared to offer the fullest possible assistance to the Italian authorities.

Italy and the United States share deep concern over international terrorism. We applaud the determined and conscientious manner in which the Italian Government has pursued its responsibilities in this and other matters related to international terrorism.

Q I think you -- can we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q I think you answered the question, but I want to ask whether the U.S. -- Secretary Shultz has been asked on numerous occasions about his conclusions as to the Soviet role, if any.

Are you prepared, as a result of this report, to draw any conclusions?

A No. I don't think so. I think what we have seen is a very effective Italian judicial process under way, and I think we will want to -- we will certainly be watching that process closely, but we will want to make sure that that process comes to a conclusion and the judgments emerge from that court before we make judgments outside the judicial system.

Q John, in an interview yesterday, President Reagan was asked about United States citizens aiding Nicaraguan contras in Honduras and inside Nicaragua. He cited Americans who worked -- who fought in the Spanish Civil War, volunteered for the Flying Tigers, and he said there is a "long and honorable tradition." He said he'd never been asked about the "actual legality of such activity."

What is the actual legality of such a --

A I don't know. It's a complicated legal question, and I suppose the Justice Department would be the appropriate

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agency to rule on that, as they traditionally have done in a number of other parts of the world where Americans have either sought to fight or have thought about fighting. So I think Justice would be the right place to go for a legal opinion.

Q John, another question about the timing of the speech of the Secretary: It looks somehow strange for me -- the Secretary is trying to mobilize the support of the public opinion, and he chooses a time when the Congress is not in session?

A Well, I -- you know, the Secretary doesn't determine the timetable of Congress. The Secretary was offered to -- was invited to give the Sherr Lecture. He contracted some time ago to do that, and that's what he did.

I don't know, when he accepted that invitation, whether he gave any thought to whether Congress would be in session or not.

Q John --

A Yes. Sure.

Q Let me go back to the speech for my ritual trade question. Could you take a question whether in light of this speech the Administration is reviewing or planning to modify its anti-terrorism trade controls?

A Let me take a look at that.

Q Thank you.

Q John, can we assume that any retaliation will be on these three countries -- Syria, Libya and Iran -- in the future, I mean?

A Nice try, but we're not going to respond on any detail.

Q John, there were -- there was a report that 22 Ambassadors, U.S. Ambassadors, entered the political fray, endorsing Senator Helms.

A Uh-huh.

Q Is there a State Department reaction, and has this happened before, where there's been outright political --

A I don't know whether it's happened before. The Secretary early this year, after reviewing the situation with the White House legal authorities, gave his view to Ambassadors and to other State Department employees about their role in the election process, and I think followed that up later in the year specifically with a cable to Ambassadors. So they're well aware of the Department's position on this.

The U.S. Ambassadors who have endorsed Senator Helms are among those who are not subject to the Hatch Act -- they're all Presidential appointees -- and they've made their decision strictly on their own responsibility as individuals.

The Department of State is not involved in any political campaign, nor does it endorse any Senatorial candidate. Secretary Shultz has stressed to our Ambassadors that they are full-time Federal employees whose primary task is the timely and successful completion of their official duties. That's in conformance with the policy, as I said, established by the White House and in accordance with longstanding tradition which has discouraged Ambassadors from participation in partisan political campaigns.

While it's not unlawful for non-career Ambassadors to engage in some form of partisan political activities, the Secretary reminded them in his communication that their first responsibility is to the nation and the execution of our foreign policy.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Do you interpret from that that he disapproved of this?

A I think I'll let you make your own interpretation of his words.

Q Is there going to be any disciplinary action?

A No disciplinary action is needed. These Ambassadors certainly have not taken any action which is unlawful. They've taken an action which is their right to take as individuals.

Q Apart from any disciplinary action, did the Secretary, upon learning of this, correspond in any way about this subject with these 22 Ambassadors --

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q -- either to remind them of the earlier policy or--

A I'm not aware of such correspondence.

Q John, I understand the American Foreign Service Association has distributed to some of us in the press room their statement on this whole thing --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- this morning, in which they say, in essence, that it's wrong for Ambassadors to do this because an Ambassador is the, in effect, the Ambassador of all the people and not of some who favor one political candidate or another political candidate.

A Uh-huh.

Q And that it is against the wise public policy of the United States for Ambassadors to be so engaged in partisan politics.

A Uh-huh.

Q What is your response to that?

A I don't have a response on that. I think we stand by what the Secretary has said. If you pressed us, we might be persuaded to make available the communication.

Q Could I press you on that?

A Sure. Let's see what we can give on that.

Q John, I'm told by a colleague that Ambassador Dobrynin saw the Secretary this morning.

A Yes, he was in this morning.

Q Do you have anything to say on that?

A No.

Q John --

Q No read-out on that?

Q What did they discuss?

A I'm sure they discussed matters of mutual interest, Bernie.

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Q How long did they meet?

A I don't know how long they met. I think the Ambassador was in about ten o'clock. I don't know what time he left.

Q Did he meet with anyone other than Shultz as well or --

A I'm sure there was not another -- well, I shouldn't say I'm sure. I guess it's always possible. But I do not think there was any other meeting, and I'm not aware of who was in the meeting.

Q Last week you suggested, in answer to questions about this, that this meeting might be a follow-up to Mr. Chernenko's statements --

A Sure.

Q -- by the Administration. Is that still a fair conclusion for us to draw?

A Yes. That's a fair conclusion.

Q John, do you have any comment on the reported killing of POW in Iran -- of Iraqi POW?

A Yes, I do. The United States supports the efforts of the International Committee of the Red Cross to relieve the suffering of Iraqi and Iranian prisoners of war and their families.

We condemn the current Iranian regime's execution and mistreatment of prisoners of war as tragic violations of the Geneva Convention.

Q Confirmed them? You confirmed them?

A Uh-huh.

Q John, is the United States ready to resume relations with Iraq?

A Well, we have made clear over a period of time that we certainly are prepared so to do, and there have been some public statements by leaders in Iraq that they're contemplating that. But I don't have anything for you on when that might take place.

Q I have another question --

Q John, do you have any words there on the --

Q Specifically on that, John, how about the meeting at the U.N.?

A Excuse me.

Q -- on correspondents to, American correspondents -- American troops to El Salvador for exercises and their proximity --

A I think that is a non-story, and I think that the Pentagon is knocking it down today.

Sorry. Ralph?

Q John, can I just follow on -- I'm sorry -- on the Iraq question? Would you take the -- would you -- I'd like to ask the question about the meeting Secretary of State Shultz had with the Foreign Minister in New York.

A Uh-huh.

Q In the context of the United Nations.

A Uh-huh.

Q Was that a topic of discussion -- relations between -- restoring diplomatic relations?

A We're not really prepared to get into, you know, the subjects that they covered, but I think you can assume that this has been discussed over a period of time.

Q Well, you've just said that there were public statements from Iraq --

A That's correct. Those differ from private discussions.

Q Right. I understand that. So my question is, have there been private statements, even if you don't want to discuss what they are?

A Well, if we discussed private discussions, they wouldn't be private any more.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 1:07 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #194 [195]

MONDAY, OCTOBER 29, 1984, 12:15 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A couple of announcements. First, that the Secretary will address the Miami Conference on the Caribbean, which is sponsored by the Caribbean/Central American Action, in Miami on Thursday, December 6. December, that is. Okay?

The luncheon event will take place at the Hyatt Regency Hotel Ballroom. If you plan to cover or wish further information, please contact Susan Kohler in Washington at 466-7464. She's with the Caribbean/Central American Action; that's Susan Kohler, 466-7464.

I understand that although we're obviously some weeks away from that, we expect, barring technical difficulties, to pipe that speech in. I don't know whether there will be Q's and A's, and we would hope to have an advance text.

Q What's the time on it?

A That's luncheon.

Q But there's no time?

A Don't have a specific time at this point.

Q How do you spell Kohler?

A K-O-H-L-E-R.

Second, the Secretary will meet this afternoon at 3:00 with Dr. Arturo Cruz and other members of the Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinator Group. Although there's no formal agenda for the meeting, the Secretary will be interested in hearing of the continuing efforts of the Coordinator Group to persuade the Sandinistas to establish the conditions necessary for free and fair elections.

That is it for announcements. I'll be happy to take questions.

Q Wait a minute -- he's meeting this afternoon?

A This afternoon.

Q A time certain?

A I said 3:00.

Q I'm sorry. Alan, do you have any comment regarding the investigation into the apparent murder of a priest in Poland?

A Don't have anything on that, Mike, no.

Q Are you following that, or is there any concern about unrest it may cause?

A Well, obviously, we're following it, and we had a statement on this the other day. But at the moment we don't have anything further to say about it.

Hank?

Q Alan, what is the relationship of this meeting with Cruz to the November 4 elections? Does this in anyway signify that the Coordinadora still thinks there's a possibility of postponing the elections, or does it have no relationship --

A I guess you'd have to ask them what their view on that is. As I say, though, (a) there is no agenda for the meeting; (b) the Secretary will be interested to hear how their efforts at seeking conditions which will provide for free and fair elections in Nicaragua are coming.

Q Have you any comment on the meeting in Italy of Western European Foreign Ministers reviving the Western European Union?

A Yes. The United States supports efforts to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and will examine the results of the Western European Union Ministerial Meeting in that light.

FRG Foreign Minister Genscher, who represented the Presidency of the WEU, stated at his October 27 press conference, "It is not that America is too strong in the Alliance, but Europe must step up its own contribution." We welcome such statements and efforts to devote greater attention to defense issues within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance.

Q Copy, please?

A Sure.

Q On Africa, the Ethiopian famine. At one point the government there accused -- said there had been international foot-dragging -- to paraphrase -- to getting aid to those starving.

That point, any thoughts on that? And, secondly, on whether the form of U.S. aid will change in a way that they seem to want?

A There was a briefing on this, I think, the end of last week, Dennis, and I'd refer you to that briefing. Certainly, the U.S. has been quite active in providing humanitarian assistance and in working with others in that endeavor. But I think that, again, Peter McPherson gave a briefing on the subject, and I'd refer you to what he said.

Q Are there any thoughts since then about changing the form of the aid or --

A Since Friday?

Q -- with transportation.

A Since Friday, I'm not aware --

Q Is there any consideration of that; let me rephrase it?

A I'm not aware of any changes in where we are. But I'm not sure why one would look to reconsideration. The fact is we've got a rather forthcoming position on that.

Q Alan, do you have any reactions to reports of redeployment of SAM-6s -- Syrian SAM-6s in the mountains of Lebanon -- Dahr Al-Baidar -- and what do you read into that?

A I'm not aware of such reports.

Q Do you have anything on the Israeli Cabinet appointment of Yitzak Rabin to be the negotiator with the

Lebanese, and an apparent appeal to the United States to play a more active mediating role in trying to secure an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon?

A As far as appointment of Minister Rabin, no, I don't; and I've got to confess I guess I missed that part of it. But, in general, as to the mediation, as we've said before, we are willing to play a helpful role if all the parties wish us to do so, but in order for such an effort to successful the parties must be prepared to show flexibility in narrowing the substantial differences that currently exist in their positions.

So that position is unchanged. And I think -- while I don't have a schedule to give you, it is possible that in his onward travels, Ambassador Murphy may be traveling further in the region, and I'm sure this would be a logical -- in general, a logical topic for discussion.

Q Copy of that.

Q What are the -- are there other conditions attached beyond this to -- an American mediation effort? I guess it was Weinberger who was quoted today as saying that -- having said in Israel that the United States would not get involved in anything before the election but might consider doing so after November 6. Is that --

A Well, I'm not aware of what Secretary Weinberger said specifically, but I think our position on this is unchanged. It's just as I articulated it to you today and it has been consistent, and we are, of course, not at the present time in a mediating or negotiating role.

Q Also on this, there are reports from Israel that a group of American Arabs and Jewish personalities, with the approval of the Secretary and the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, are trying to act upon what the Secretary called "improving the quality of life of Palestinians and the territories."

Are you -- I mean, they said it was with the Secretary's approval in the State Department. Are you aware of this, and do you have any comment about it, and can tell us a little more about it?

A I don't have a formal response at this point, and maybe we'll have something later.

The fact is that that group is a private group; it is not sponsored by the U.S. Government, and so I just would point that out to you. I don't -- if we have something further on that later, I'll be happy to provide it. You started out saying, "with the sponsorship of the Secretary and the Under Secretary," and so forth, that would not be really an accurate statement. But they certainly have kept us apprised at different stages of some of the things they had in mind, but they were acting on their own initiative. As I say, it's a private group and that's simply a fact.

Ralph?

Q Can you give us Murphy and Armacost's whereabouts?

A They're -- as I have it here, they are both in Saudi Arabia at this point. I don't have an onward schedule for them.

Lester?

Q Could you give us -- you're aware William Vanden Heuvel, and along with 36 other Ambassadors -- or 35 other Ambassadors -- and the American Foreign Service Association protested the endorsement by the ambassadors to Senator Helms. And Vanden Heuvel said, "I can't think of an occasion when a single Ambassador, much less 22, has joined in a partisan campaign."

Can you think of one, Alan?

A Lester, I don't know. But in any case, our response to that whole matter was given to you last week by John.

Q But there's another development. What is the State Department's reaction in view of the Curtis case in 1980, or the Young case in 1978?

A I don't know what the Curtis case --

Q The Washington Post on February 6, 1980, page A-8, said, "The extent to which the Carter forces are prepared to go to insure a victory was indicated by the decision to call Kenneth M. Curtis, Maine's popular former Governor, back from his duties as Ambassador to Canada last Thursday for a week of campaigning on behalf of the President." That's Carter of the Carter-Mondale team, and that was just before the Maine Presidential primary?

A Don't know what the facts are, Lester.

Q Do you have any comment on that?

A May I respond?

Q Please.

A Thank you.

Q If you're going to respond.

A I always respond, Lester.

Don't know what the facts are. Our attitude towards participation in the political process were given to you -- was given to you last week.

Q One other one. The Washington Post reported in May of '78, that their Ambassador --

A If it's the same issue, it's the same answer.

Q No, no, wait a minute. This is a different -- this is a different one -- that Ambassador Andrew Young twice appeared in North Philadelphia with the Reverend William Grey, who was campaigning against incumbent Congressman Robert Nix.

A Again, I'm not speaking for the Carter Administration.

Q Well, this would be political involvement, isn't it, Alan?

A Connie.

Q Do you have anything on these Cape Verde talks with Secretary Crocker? How decisive are they expected to be?

A Well, as you indicated, Assistant Secretary Crocker will be meeting. He's leaving today to meet with South African Foreign Minister Botha in the latest round of South African negotiations.

This meeting follows two trips by Deputy Assistant Secretary Frank Wisner to Luanda. And, as you know, the Angolans presented us with some proposals during the last Wisner visit. And on the basis of that situation, and the new situation, Assistant Secretary Crocker will discuss next steps in the negotiations. I don't have a characterization of the sort that you're seeking, though, to give you.

Q Will Angolan officials be brought in or will it just be South African-American officials?

A No, I think they're bilateral talks. I'm not aware of any plan to meet with Angolans, at least, at this time.

Q One last point, do you have any comments on Chief Buthelezi's article in the Washington Post, some of the points he raised?

A No, I don't.

--MORE--

Q Alan, on the Middle East again, on the wide gaps separating the parties between Israel, Syria and Lebanon, how are you expecting those gaps to be narrowed without any mediation from a third party?

A Well, I think, again, that we have indicated before that the question really is that there should be a negotiated withdrawal of Israeli forces. For this happen there has to be from all parties a willingness to show flexibility and adopt a practical problem-solving approach to the issues. So that process, obviously, needs to be worked.

Q Can I follow up on that? What -- I mean, who are the parties who are not flexible? I mean, is it Israel and Lebanon or Syria, or --

A I'm not going to try to describe the positions of the various parties and to weigh them on certain scales. We've indicated before, though, that the parties' -- that we're talking about here -- involvement include Israel, Lebanon and Syria.

Q All of them. You mean they are not helpful -- all of them? They are not helpful.

A As I say, I'm not about to give you a description of their positions or weigh them on any scale. I'm simply indicating a general position and who the parties are, but I'm not going to try to describe or analyze or critique the position of each party.

Q It seems to me, Alan -- I asked you this question before -- that the issue of the Antone Lahad Lebanese forces in southern Lebanon -- Syrian or the Lebanese army -- Southern Lebanon Army, SLA --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- is one of the major points that is going to be a stumbling block. What's the thought of the United States Administration about employing this force instead of employing the UNIFIL forces in southern Lebanon?

A Well, again, that, obviously, is an issue that is out there for discussion and for resolution, and it's not going to help for us to be laying out positions from here. But, obviously, it's something that has to be worked on.

Q Alan, another question --

Q Excuse me. If I can follow on this: Is the United States Government now in complete accord with Secretary Shultz speech on terrorism that he delivered last week?

A Is the Department in accord with Secretary Shultz? I think so.

Q No, no, no. The United States Government. Not the Department. Not the Department. I'm not talking about the Department. The United States Government?

A I believe so, and I think that has been said on several occasions from the White House.

Q Alan, a leading Egyptian newspaper has an editorial urging Egypt to follow a military buildup in response to Israel's military buildup. Do you read anything into that? How we --

A Don't have anything specific on it. As we have said many times before, we hope that the relations between Egypt and Israel will improve. That's a very fundamental relationship. They, obviously, are both dedicated to the peace agreements, treaties, but that is a relationship which has some problems. We hope it will improve.

Q However, that transcends a diplomatic relationship -- that's strictly military.

A Well, I'm not aware of any particular military tension between those two countries.

Q Alan --

A I'll come back to you in a second, Lester. Ralph?

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the -- or readout on the MIA talks that ended on Friday last week in Hanoi?

A I don't. Again, I think, as John indicated, those were technical talks. You might want to check with the Pentagon and see, since they were military people who were meeting.

Q And any comment on the OPEC discussions?

A OPEC?

Q On the OPEC.

A Don't.

Go ahead.

Q In regard to this gentleman's question, I gather that Vice President Bush's revised statement on the Secretary's terrorism (speech) has pretty well clarified the issues when he said, "Under the able leadership of Secretary Shultz, the State Department is focusing as never before on terrorism and what can be done about it."

There's no question of Mr. Bush's accuracy in this statement, is there, Alan?

A I'm not aware of any, but I --

Q Okay. One to follow up --

A -- think you also should check with the Vice President's office on what he said.

Q If you're certain that this is accurate, you can tell us, Alan, what the phrase "as never before" means. Does it means "as never before" the Reagan Administration came into office, does it mean "as never before" this latest Embassy bombing in Beirut, or does it mean "as never before" the three Beirut and one Kuwait bombings? What does "as never before" -- if you said it clarifies it, what does he mean by "as never before"?

A If you -- well, two things, Lester. One, if you listen to the rest of my statement instead of being interested in reading into your tape recorder, I think you would have found I said on the statement you might want to check with Vice President Bush's office.

Secondly, it is no secret that terrorism is a growing and perceived to be a growing threat all over the world, and particularly the United States, and growing attention is being paid to it.

Q Well, Alan, the only reason I asked this question is because in 1981, as you know, I've noted a number of times in this room and the White House, Mr. Reagan said any terrorism will be met with swift and effective retribution. That was 1981.

A Uh-huh.

Q This is 1984. When is the "as never before?" Does that mean last week, or what?

A Well, again, I think that over a long period of time this problem has grown. There's no inconsistency, obviously, between what the Secretary said and what the President said back then.

Q Of course, but it's an evasion, Alan.

Q I have another question on Shultz' speech. In it he praised --

A On whose speech?

Q On Shultz' speech last week on anti-terrorism. In it he praised Israel's handling of terrorism, and -- but just yesterday there was a murder by a Jewish terrorist of an innocent civilian Arab. Do you have any comment on that?

A Well, yes, and I think that the Israeli Government has indicated that they are going to move forcefully and swiftly to do whatever they can to bring those responsible to justice. Obviously, we deplore that attack. So does the Israeli Government.

Q There seems to be an air of sympathy for acts of terrorism against Arabs in Israel by the people in sympathy for the 20 Jewish terrorists on trial. In view of our support of Israel as the major democratic country in the area, there seems to be a contradiction.

A Well, you're making that judgment about an air of sympathy. I think that the Israeli Government has spoken quite forcefully on this issue.

Connie?

Q Anything today to announce on pending U.S. dairy sales to Iraq, and is this part of our closer relations with Iraq?

A Don't have anything today. I don't know if you got what we had last week. There is something on that subject which I guess you could get from the Press Office.

Go ahead.

Q Do you have any comment on Marcos' speech and particularly the things he had to say about the State Department's comments?

A No.

Q How about -- (general laughter)

Q One other thing. Anything on the report in the Post about Nicaragua seeking L-39 aircraft from Czechoslovakia?

A No. I really don't have anything on that.

Q Would that be considered the same level of seriousness as MIG's?

A I don't think I'm going to try to get into a definition of different kinds of aircraft from here.

Bill?

Q On the Arturo Cruz visit, is it the Department's position that he was excluded by the Nicaraguan's from that election or that he abstained to partake in that election?

A Well, I suppose you can use your own words. The clear fact is that apparently there was -- he agreed to terms that were put forward by Mr. Arce in Rio, and those terms were then withdrawn. So I leave it to you to give your judgment on that.

Q One follow-up question.

A Okay.

Q You're saying he was excluded. If he is not part of that election, which looks like it will go forward Sunday, does the Department have a position ahead of that election on how free and fair it will be without Arturo Cruz?

A I think that we have indicated before our concerns about the current ground rules, and the fact that that makes it very difficult, to say the least, to hold elections which anybody objectively looking at them would consider free and fair elections.

Obviously, we would still hope until the event that the Sandinistas would reconsider and would hold elections which, indeed could be considered free and fair by the international community as well as by the people of Nicaragua.

Q Are we still pushing a postponement?

A It's not a question of our pushing a postponement. It's a question of what the various competing Nicaraguan political parties have called for.

Q What is the attitude --

Q Alan --

Q Can I follow that, Alan? What is the attitude towards the various international bodies of various kinds that the Nicaraguans have invited to monitor the election? Do we have any --

A Well, I don't know what -- who all has been invited. Obviously, one would hope that anybody who does go to monitor that would, indeed, look on those elections and take into account the entirety of the circumstances surrounding them.

Q Alan, can I --

A Excuse me. Go ahead.

Q In light of a series of terroristic activities on the part of Jewish settlers in the West Bank which mostly are European or American dual-citizens -- and the last thing was this attack on the bus yesterday, which was in a launcher. It looks like it wasn't a small weapon. It wasn't a gun. It was sort of -- I don't know if it was a missile or it was from a canon, or something like that.

Are you concerned, or the United States Government is concerned that many weapons are roving around in the hands of these settlers in the West Bank cities and towns and never issued a demand or appeal or request of the Israel Government to stifle these type of elements and let them go unchecked, unrestrained, by any means?

Do you have any comment on this?

A Well, there obviously are a lot of weapons around lots of places in the world. And, as I said before, we deplore and condemn this attack, and the Israeli Government has done likewise.

Ghassan?

Q Alan, can you say if the Secretary did talk to Prime Minister Peres about my question that I asked you about the improving the quality of life and this private group, because it is reported that the Secretary and Prime Minister Peres did talk about this?

A The fact that they've talked about the quality of life is not news. They did talk about that. I don't know whether the -- this group was mentioned or not, and I don't know that I would get into what the discussions were, but I would re-emphasize to you what I said before, which is that that group is a private group, it is not a government-sponsored group, and that is a fact which I gather from your question is important in defining precisely what the circumstances are in terms of the press reports you're reflecting.

Q You said that you would look to see if you can provide us with something?

A Yes. I'm not sure -- well, beyond what I've said, I'm not sure whether we'll have anything here. If not, you might want to check later this afternoon and see if there's anything further.

Q Has the Secretary got any scheduled speeches between now and election day? And, if he does, will you be sure that copies of the speech get to Vice President Bush on the campaign trail? (Laughter)

A Without rising to the bait of your second half, of course, we have announced a speech this week --

Q Advance copies will go to Bush?

A -- and I'm sure you have paid attention to that, Lester.

Q Is there any comment on the hunger strike of the President of Bolivia?

A No. I don't have any comment on that.

Q Thank you.

A Okay.

(The briefing concluded at 12:36 p.m.)

Storey/Becker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #196

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1984, 12:00 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good morning. You may deduce from the fact that this briefing is starting promptly at 12:00 and I have no announcements that it is a very lean day. (Laughter)

Q: Why don't you just tell us what you've got, then, and lay it out here? (Laughter)

A What would you like?

Q Anybody have any questions? (Laughter)

Q Anything on the Hedrick Smith column in today's Times, suggesting that the CIA manual proves that the real intention of the United States is the overthrow of the Nicaraguan Government, contrary to the stated public policy?

A Well, as you know, the President has ordered an investigation into the manual, so I don't have anything to say on that. But the suggestion that the policy of the United States is to overthrow the Sandinista regime is not correct.

There has been no change in our basic policy objectives, and I'll just go through them again for you.

Number one, the reduction of Nicaragua's expanded military apparatus to restore military equilibrium among the Central American nations.

Number two, the removal of Soviet and Cuban military personnel and termination of their military and security involvement with Nicaragua.

Number three, the termination of Nicaraguan support for subversion in neighboring countries.

And number four, the implementation of the Sandinistas' democratic commitments to the OAS.

So our policy is unchanged. The goals remain constant.

Q A copy of that, John?

A Sure.

Q Are the talks underway again today between Shlaudeman and Tinoco?

A Yes. Ambassador Shlaudeman met at Manzanillo yesterday with Mr Tinoco, and that went into a second day's session today. We expect they would end today. We would expect Ambassador Shlaudeman back in Washington tomorrow.

Q That sounds like a more fulsome elaboration of our goals down there. Is that so?

A If it is, it is not by design. It is intended to be a very accurate restatement of unchanged goals.

Q John, on the talks, the Nicaraguans published or broadcasted an item that's on the FBIS, suggesting that the talks had moved into a new phase, that they were no longer discussing, I guess, shape-of-the-table issues and shape-of-the-agenda issues, but have begun to discuss the Contadora agreement itself and the specific -- the substance of that agreement.

Do you have any comment on the nature of the talks?

A No. The agreement between ourselves and the Nicaraguan Government was that those talks would be confidential, and so far as we're concerned they remain confidential.

Q Would you have any comment on the Nicaraguan report of those talks?

A No.

Q John, the manual goes into various formulations on ways the Sandinista Government can be destabilized or even overthrown. What would -- would we be pleased if the Sandinista Government were overthrown?

A Well, I think the Secretary from time to time has expressed his views about the kind of system that the Sandinistas have initiated and are implementing in Nicaragua. But our goal, nevertheless, remains free and full elections involving all parties that want to participate, given the kind of environment that one would expect for such a free contest, which would include access to the press, would include freedom of assembly -- which certainly isn't being provided the opposition at the moment -- and those goals are out there. What the choice of the Nicaraguan people would be in the end, of course, is their decision.

Q Do we think it's possible to achieve those goals under this particular government?

A Well, if you had the kind of environment that we're suggesting, which would permit free elections -- not predicting what the outcome would be -- but, nevertheless, you would afford the people of Nicaragua the opportunity to vote on the kind of system that they would really like to see in control in their country. You haven't had such a test yet.

Q Do you have any comment on any of these reports suggesting that the United States has been paying opposition party leaders money as an inducement to get them to not participate in Sunday's elections?

A I don't, and it certainly would run totally counter to what the Secretary has been saying and what -- to various leaders. As you know, he met some of the opposition leaders yesterday, and what he has been underlining is the commitment of the United States to a free electoral process in Nicaragua.

We want to see free elections, and we want to see everybody take part in those elections under the kind of conditions they would deem satisfactory.

-- MORE --

Q John, is there any readout on that meeting yesterday in terms of what the Secretary may have learned or what he now thinks about the elections?

A Yes. I think we posted some brief words yesterday after that meeting; and of course Mr. Cruz, I think, had some words to say when he came down.

Q Do you have any comment on some statement made by Mr. Brzezinski over the weekend to the effect that State Department officials have been witting or unwitting dupes -- that's not his word, but essentially -- in the case of covering up for the Bulgarians and the Soviets in the Italian case?

A I don't, and that would certainly run counter to the kind of position that we have taken and the way we have responded to such allegations in the past. There's no reason for the State Department to cover up in that case. What we've been doing is carefully monitoring the judicial process and awaiting the outcome of it

Q Have you any comment on the people slain in Guatemala over the weekend? There was a deputy to the Constituent Assembly, two economics professors, and a Peace Corps person. I --

A We may have had something on the Peace Corps --

Q Yes. There was just a --

A -- volunteer yesterday.

Q -- recognition of it happening.

A I don't have any more.

Q Do you think that the United States might do som kind of investigation into the Peace Corps --

A Oh, I think our Embassy there is following that very closely.

Q Staying on that region, do you have any comment on the apparent crackdown in Chile yesterday and today?

A Yes. The steady increase in terrorist bombings, efforts by non-democratic sectors to foment violence, and yesterday's announcement by Chilean authorities that promulgation of a law legalizing political parties is being postponed indefinitely are of deep concern to the United States

We regret both the increasing violence of the non-democratic left and the failure of the authorities to respond clearly to the desires of the vast majority of Chileans for a peaceful return to democracy. The United States sympathizes fully with these desires. We are reviewing carefully how recent developments may affect U.S. interests. We continue to believe that dialogue between the government and the democratic opposition is an essential step to reverse the trend toward polarization and to develop the internal consensus essential to the transition to democracy in Chile.

Q May we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Can you spell a little bit that "reviewing carefully?"

A I think not at this stage, Marvin. It's something that, a review that is going on within the State Department, and I don't really have anything to take that any further.

Q When did that begin?

A It's within the past several days. I don't know exactly when.

Q And triggered by what -- these reports?

A By reports of what is happening in that country

Q Aimed at what?

A Sorry.

Q Aimed at what?

A Seeing how that impacts on American interests.

Q But when you say "American interests," do you mean diplomatic interests, business interests?

A I think both, and perhaps other as well.

Q Any comment there on the sending of Chilean dissidents or others to internal exile?

A No. I think our overall response is an all-embracing kind of response.

Q John, do you have anything on an apparently home-made grenade launcher found near the Embassy in Lisbon?

A Yes, I do. The police in Lisbon discovered and dismantled a device about a 100 meters from the Embassy compound consisting of two bazooka grenades inside long metal tubes which were linked by wire to a motorcycle battery. The device had failed to work apparently as the result of a technical malfunction. Portuguese authorities are now pursuing an investigation of the incident.

We don't have any information at this time that would identify those involved. A number of news organizations in Lisbon are reporting they've received calls from individuals claiming to be members of FP-25, a local, far-left terrorist organization; and apparently in these calls to various news organizations this terrorist organization is claiming credit. The device was discovered on October 27.

Q Copy of that, John?

A Sure.

Q Along those lines --

Q Did the Embassy receive a call on this?

-- MORE --

Q Along those lines, as we get closer to election day, are you finding any pickup in the number of terrorist threats around the world, and specifically in Beirut?

A Are we seeing any?

Q Yeah, uh-huh.

A I don't know that I can give you a kind of day-to-day tally, but certainly I think the reports have been on an upward curve for sometime, and I think we are obviously exercising considerable vigilence in obvious high-risk areas around the world.

Q John, has the Embassy in Lisbon received a call on this launcher, or had it --

A Not aware of any such calls.

Q -- had it been receiving a number of calls of potential attacks?

A In advance?

Q Yes.

A Not aware of any.

Q Weeks, whatever?

A Not aware of any, Mike.

Q John?

A Yeah?

Q Yesterday, in the Wall Street Journal, Gerald Seib had a story about the Congressional Research Service study about Israel being the leading threat to both begin testing and to produce nuclear weapons followed by South Africa, India, Argentina and Pakistan. Do you have any comment on this report?

A No, I don't.

Q Can you look into this if there is a possibility of sending a letter like you sent to Pakistan?

A No. I think you ought to ask -- I think you ought to pursue it with the Wall Street Journal, not with us.

1-6810

Q So, the report -- I mean, you couldn't comment on the report itself?

A Not aware of it.

Q Mexico is not an OPEC member, but it's been apparently participating in the talks about production cut-backs. How would we feel, or how would we deal with a possible Mexican production cut-back? Would we try to dissuade them?

A No, I don't think so. I don't think we're involved in such activity.

Q John, could I just come back to the non-proliferation question a moment?

A Uh-huh.

Q The report issued this morning by the Carnegie Institute, although I haven't read it from cover to cover, seems to suggest that Libya has achieved something in the past year with regard to a creation of nuclear weapons.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you have any comment on Libya, specifically, with regard to nuclear --

A I don't. We're obviously taking a look at the Carnegie report, and I'm not (a) aware of that. In general, our position on Libya and any nuclear activity by Libya and any cooperation on the nuclear front with Libya is, of course, well known. We're opposed to it.

Q Okay. But you're not aware of any new development along those lines?

A No.

Q Okay.

Q Do you have anything on the -- any reaction to the OPEC cutback?

A I don't. No.

Q Regarding terrorism, the Secretary in his speech last week seemed to be calling for a kind of public debate or public discussion of this whole question of what should be done about international terrorism. And, as we have noted here, there's a lot of debate, some of it within the U.S. Government about what the hell should be done.

Q Some of it in the U.S. press, too.

A Some of it in the U.S. press. Now, several days have gone by. Does he have any assessment, or do you, about the response to the speech that he made or what this tells us about the consensus or lack of consensus in the country?

A No, not that I'm aware of.

Q Would he be likely to update his view of this in some forthcoming address?

A Well, I don't know. One sees columns and editorials raising various points, some supportive, some critical. That goes on. I'm sure there's mail, although I haven't seen a tally on it yet; but I'm not aware of any plans by the Secretary to make any additional remarks in the light of any reaction there's been at this stage.

Q Will the Secretary be making any speeches before election day, or is he pretty much --

A Yes. I think he's giving one in New York on Thursday.

Q Can you characterize whether it'll be non-partisan or not, like his previous speeches?

A It's on the question of nuclear non-proliferation

Q So it will be non-proliferation. Will he, or are you ready to say where and when you will have the next round with the Soviets on that subject, since we seem to be concerned about proliferation.

A Well, as you know, the Secretary met with Ambassador Dobrynin last week.

Q Yes.

A But beyond that I don't have anything for you.

Q You don't have -- you don't know if it will be in Moscow or Washington, nor when in early December yet?

A On that specific topic, I don't have anything for

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you, but I think Ambassador Hartman is due to meet with Foreign Minister Gromyko. Perhaps he even has met with him this week. I don't know.

Q John, while you're back here, I don't think anyone asked for you language on Chile. Would you let us have that, please?

A Sorry?

Q I don't think anyone asked for your language on Chile. Would you let us have that, please?

A They did, yeah. Sure, you're welcome to it.

Q John, do you have anything at all today on that missing Polish priest?

A No.

Q Anything at all on the situation there?

A No. We're obviously watching that situation very carefully.

Q John, any comment on King Hussein's remarks about anyone in the Arab world can't trust that the U.S. is able to act as a fair arbitrator in the Middle East?

A No, haven't seen that.

Q Or for his -- you haven't seen his remarks at all.

A Uh-uh.

Q Would you take that question; take a look at his speech -- his interview?

A I don't think so. I think King Hussein has made a number of speeches along --

Q He has renewed his call for a Soviet-American conference on the Middle East.

A Uh-huh.

Q Would you take that aspect of the question?

A Don't need to take it. Don't think it's a very good idea.

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Q Do you have any comment on the warning to Western news correspondents in West Beirut?

A Beirut is obviously a high-threat area. It continues to be thus, and I would urge correspondents there to proceed with caution.

Q Have we squeezed you dry?

A Squeezed me dry.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:15 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #197

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1984, 12:42 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: A couple of announcements. Firstly, Deputy Secretary Kenneth Dam will leave Washington tomorrow for a visit to Peru, Bolivia, and Argentina. In each of those countries, the Deputy Secretary will meet with senior host government officials to discuss economic, political, and social matters of mutual concern. He will also attend a meeting of the Atlantic Conference in Argentina, and he will return to Washington on November 11.

Q Who is this, John?

A Ken Dam. Deputy Secretary Kenneth Dam.

On Friday, at 2:00 in the afternoon in the briefing room, there will be a BACKGROUND briefing on the current status of the Namibia independence negotiations and our ongoing talks with the Angolan Government on regional issues. This BACKGROUND session is being held in response to requests from many of you for an update on the southern African negotiations.

I don't plan to read them, but I would just refer anybody who hasn't seen it to the Secretary's statement this morning on the assassination of Prime Minister Gandhi. I think the White House also a few minutes ago announced that the Secretary will, at the direction of the President, lead the U.S. delegation to the funeral ceremonies in New Delhi.

I would also like to refer you to the statement we put out last night on the death of Father Popieluszko.

That's really all I have for you in the way of --

Q When will the Secretary leave for the funeral?

A That is still being worked on, Bernie. Can't really give you a departure time.

Q Is it possible there may be a change in his schedule tomorrow?

A That is also something that is being worked on. As of now, the Secretary hopes to continue with that commitment to speak at the U.N. tomorrow, but keep in touch with us as the day and arrangements unfold.

Q Will he add any stops, do you know, on that?

A Certainly no thinking at the moment that he would.

Q Will there be any press on the plane?

A That is another question that is apparently presently under review. We expect that the Presidential delegation will be fairly large, and there will also be considerable security involved, so we just don't yet have a feeling on whether there will be press on that trip or not.

Q John, what impact will the assassination have on relations between the United States and India?

A Well, I don't -- I can't speculate on that. The fact of the matter is that we expect India to undergo a democratic orderly transfer of power as it has in the past, and the relationship, so far as we can see, between the United States and India will remain good.

Q Will remain what, please?

A Good. Good.

Q Do you see a leadership struggle developing there, or do you --

A Well, I don't think that is something that we can speculate on. We have seen the reports that Rajiv Gandhi has been sworn in as Prime Minister. I think insofar as the facts of the situation on the ground are concerned, you are aware of them. The official Press Trust of India carried extensive reporting on the assassination of Mrs. Gandhi. They reported that Sikhs certainly were involved in the assassination attempt.

The Secretary has sent a message of condolences to the chairman of the Ministry of External Affairs Foreign Policy Planning Board -- that's Mr. Parthasarathy. The situation in Delhi appears to be calm although there are some fragmentary reports that some violence has erupted there, and so based on

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this information, we've issued a travel advisory until the situation becomes clearer. That advisory, in essence, says that based on, as I say, this rather limited and fragmentary evidence, there appears to be some violence in New Delhi and other urban areas of India following the assassination of Prime Minister Gandhi, and so we have suggested that Americans traveling within India should exercise caution; they should avoid crowds; they should contact the American Embassy or the closest consulate if the situation appears to warrant it.

People about to travel to India might wish to consider deferring their travel until the situation becomes clearer, but this is simply an advisory which we consider to be prudent at this time, and in no way suggests that we are privy to or expect wide-scale violence.

Q Is Ambassador Barnes in New Delhi?

A Ambassador Barnes is in New Delhi. The telephone communication to India is pretty difficult at the moment. There is a lot of traffic, but nevertheless, we are in contact with the Embassy by cable.

Q John, some weeks ago you --

Q (inaudible) fragmentary in limited reports that you have?

A I think there have been some -- You probably, I think, are better aware of them than we are. I think there have been some instances of hostility towards Sikhs and some stone-throwing, that kind of thing in Delhi.

Q Some weeks ago, you -- or maybe it was Alan; I forget which -- on behalf of the Department expressed some concern about the state of tension between India and Pakistan which the U.S. Government was concerned about. How would you describe the relationship between them now? And do you have any sense of how this latest action might affect them?

A No, I don't. I think our appreciation of the relationship between Pakistan and India is the same today as it was several weeks ago. There's no suggestion that that has changed, nor do we have any indication that that is changing.

Q Well, several weeks ago, it wasn't so good. I mean, you were worried about it.

A Well, I think several weeks ago we raised some obvious points of disagreement but also were quite emphatic in rejecting some of the more sensational suggestions about that relationship.

Q John, when you say that you expect the Indians will undergo an orderly transfer of power, as they have in the past, are you referring to the hand-over that occurred today, or are you suggesting that there ought to be elections or something else?

A In general, there is a procedure -- and really that is not for us to chronicle -- that is for the Indian Government to explain and to follow through on; but it is a fairly clear-cut procedure, and all the indications are that that process is going forward.

Q John, have you seen the numerous reports from the Soviet Union regarding the assassination attempt? And do you have any comment on the Soviet allegations about U.S. involvement?

A I think they are outrageous and irresponsible. It is really quite a disgusting line of argument to suggest that the United States somehow is involved in this very tragic development. So, as I say, we consider them to be outrageous and extremely irresponsible.

Q John, hasn't this Department suggested to President Zia, to transfer the power to the civilian, as a democracy, as you said, that we expect India to transfer power as a democracy.

A Have we suggested to President Zia this?

Q Right.

A I'm not aware of any communications following the tragic events in India with President Zia, but President Zia is well aware of our confidence in the democratic system in India.

Q According to today's Washington Times, Pakistan is close to completing the nuclear, I mean the atomic bomb. Do you have any comment on that?

A None, other than the statements that we have made over the past months of our concerns about development in Pakistan towards nuclear armament and the reassurances that we have had from Pakistan, which of course we accept.

Q John, a Sikh leader in Los Angeles called Amrich Singh (phonetic) has gone on record saying that this is just the beginning, and that if Rajiv comes into power, that he will meet the same fate. Is the United States contemplating any action of threats made here in the United States by individuals here?

A Well, I'm not aware of that statement, and therefore, I can't comment on action; but clearly, the United States would deplore any hint of further violence in India.

-- MORE --

1-0730

Q John, was there ever any confirmation of the -- by this government that a lot of the weapons uncovered by the Indian Government in the attack on the Golden Temple bore Pakistani and Chinese markings?

A I'm not aware of that, John. I'm just really not briefed on any findings that might have been made.

Q John, was the U.S. aware last week, or in the last couple of weeks, of any threats, specific threats, by Sikhs to go to New Delhi and attempt an assassination attempt?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q John, when was the Secretary notified of the assassination? When did he come in the building; what was his routine?

A I can't give you exact -- I'm sorry, Mike, I didn't mean to cut you off. Go ahead.

Q What happened once he was notified?

A I don't quite know what time. Sometime during the course of the night he was notified, and at his direction offices of the State Department dealing with that area, of course, were in the building and were closely monitoring the situation. He has met with a number of officials this morning involved in that particular region.

As you know, he went over to the Indian Embassy. He was with the President there, and he certainly has talked with Bud McFarlane this morning.

Q Is there a special working group?

A Not a working group, Bernie, in the traditional sense in the Op Center, but nevertheless, obviously, key officials (were) working on this through the night and continuing to work on it.

Q When did he first speak to the President on this?

A I do not know whether he spoke to the President before they went over to the Indian Embassy. I'm not sure about that.

Q When did he come in the building?

A He was in the building sometime around 7:20, something like that, this morning.

Q John, have you had any chance to talk to -- or has the Secretary talked to Ambassador Lewis in Israel for a --

A The Secretary has not talked to Ambassador Lewis.

Q And is he satisfied with what he said, or -- I saw the guidance that came out last night.

A You saw the guidance that came out last night?

Q That's it for today, too?

A I would stand by that guidance.

Q Do you have a copy? Did the Embassy send you a transcript of --

A Have not received a transcript yet. We have asked for a transcript and have not yet received it.

Q Who did talk with Ambassador Lewis last night?

A I think officials in NEA talked with Ambassador Lewis.

Q John, what is the -- I mean, I understand that there was a statement, John. Maybe we could have a copy of it later. But do you -- although the Ambassador was expressing his own views, or private views, what in particular does the Department disagree with what he said?

I mean, do you care to actually comment on the aspects that he mentioned as "abysmal," "worse," and "nil?"

A Well, the fact of the matter is that President Reagan is deeply committed to the peace process with the various ramifications that we have traditionally outlined and within the parameters we have traditionally outlined. And even an Ambassador voicing personal opinion, suggesting that that is not the case, is clearly not voicing an opinion with which the State Department agrees.

Q Is he -- has Ambassador Lewis informed the State Department that he's retiring at the end of the year?

A I don't quite know what his plans are, John.

Q Has he met with -- discussed this with Secretary

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Murphy?

A Secretary Murphy is in Israel. I do not know of my own knowledge that they met, but they were to have met at the airport last night, and I assume that this has been a matter of discussion between them.

Q John, generally speaking -- I'm not aware of what the answer is -- the ambassadors clear certain speeches with the Department, or they actually do not?

A Well, this one wasn't.

Q Was not? (Laughter) But generally they do?

A I'm not sure that I would agree with that "generally." I'm not sure that I would agree with that.

Q John, are you consciously leaving the impression that Ambassador Lewis is now in disfavor with the Administration as a result of this speech, or are you trying to leave the impression that this speech, or these comments are not in agreement with the Administration view but that, in general, there's no portend of dismissal or retirement or some other action to come as a result of this speech?

A Well, as I say, the Department has asked for the transcript. I think that will be looked at carefully, and one wants to make sure that reports of what Ambassador Lewis said are correct.

Ambassador Lewis has been a key and respected Ambassador in the Middle East. But I think, clearly, there are aspects of his remarks that are troubling to people in Washington.

Q John, there are reports that this speech is a prelude to amend the Reagan initiative after the election, to put another initiative, or to frame it?

A I think you would be very wrong to suggest that there is any amendment or dilution of the President's Middle East initiative.

Q John, your statement just now is somewhat different from the guidance that was issued last night which was -- had no problems at all with his remarks.

A I wouldn't say "had no problems with the remarks." I think after discussion with Ambassador Lewis, I think what the statement we issued last night was trying to do was to amplify what he had said, make the point that his remarks were made in a broader context, that he was talking about lost opportunities in the Middle East for a number of parties. But I think the fact is that people here will want to take a look at that transcript and review what the Ambassador said in its overall context.

Q John, you say that the President is deeply committed to the peace process. And, without questioning his intentions, what evidence do you have in mind of late that indicates this?

A Well, I think there's been a continuing diplomatic activity even in the face of intransigence and obstacles. And, once again, I'll remind you that the President, at the time he launched his intitiative, made the point that he was in this for the long haul; that Americans sometimes are criticized for a limited focus on a problem, but that he recognized that peace had been a very elusive prospect in the Middle East and he was determined to pursue it down what probably would be a long road in the face of many obstacles.

So he hasn't been fainthearted because peace has not yet emerged in the Middle East. He's keeping --

Q Who is the U.S. -- is there a U.S. mediator or negotiator or an envoy now who's --

A There have been in the past. There is not at the moment. But I'd point out that Ambassador Murphy is currently in the area. I'd point out that (Under) Secretary Armacost has just returned; Secretary Weinberger was in the area earlier, so it is not as though there's no dialogue.

Q John, there was a bit of a stir the other day when 22 political appointee ambassadors got involved in the political process.

Is there any concern on having a career ambassador get involved with remarks that could be interpreted, at least, as critical of the President?

A You're back on Ambassador Lewis' remarks?

Q Yes, yes.

A Well, I think it is fair to say that there is some concern in Washington about his remarks as reported.

1-2824

Q John, does the guidance last night --

Q Could I follow up? Is that concern in this building or is it concern in another building, or both buildings? In the White House or the State Department?

A I would say that there is considerable interest in this building and other buildings in clarifying what it was Ambassador Lewis, in fact, said.

Q John, the guidance last night left the impression that the State Department felt Ambassador Lewis had not criticized the substance of the President's September 1, '82 initiative, but the guidance notably ignored the question of the timing and presentation of that initiative.

Is it fair for us to conclude that those are the issues around which the people in Washington are interested in checking the transcript?

A Well, you know, as I say, we haven't seen the transcript, but I couldn't engage you in a violent argument to deter you from that conclusion. (Laughter)

Q I would never engage in a violent argument anyway.

A Or even an non-violent argument.

Q John, who is reviewing the statements now?

A I don't think I will go into that. I think we will wait until we see the transcript and see who reads it.

Q Is there any consideration of recalling the Ambassador for consultation?

A I'm not aware of any plans for Ambassador Lewis to return to Washington.

Q John, do you know if these were prepared remarks, or was it a Q & A situation?

A I think that some parts of that meeting were certainly spontaneous. I'm not sure whether the Ambassador was speaking from notes or a text.

Q Was Secretary Murphy at the same place, or the same --

A No. He had not arrived in Israel at that time.

Q John, could I ask if Ambassador Shlaudeman is back in Washington, and whether he was in the NSC meeting yesterday afternoon at the White House?

A He was due to be back in Washington. I personally haven't seen him, so I of my own knowledge cannot answer that, but he was due to be back. Whether he was at that meeting yesterday, I don't know.

Q And do you have any statement on the dialogue that's supposedly taking place in Nicaragua today, or anything new on the crates that were unloaded in the eastern part of Nicaragua last week?

A Nothing new on the crates. Insofar as the dialogue is concerned, we understand the Coordinadora has decided to meet today with the Sandinistas in a further effort to obtain adequate electoral conditions which so far have been rejected by the Sandinistas.

The United States has consistently supported the opposition's efforts to participate in free and fair elections.

Q Copy, please?

A Sure.

Q One other thing. Do you have a statement on a visa that was given to Italian playwright Dario Fo, and why that visa was given now?

A Yes, that visa was granted. I'll give you the background on it. Mr. Fo and his wife, Franca Rame -- I may have that pronunciation incorrect -- have applied for non-immigrant visas to visit the United States in connection with their work in the theater.

Although they were found excludable from the U.S. under Section 212 (a) (28) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the State Department has recommended that the grounds of ineligibility for a visa be waived because the applicants' entry into the United States is deemed to be in the public interest.

Since the Justice Department has concurred in this recommendation, it's expected that single-entry visitor's visas for temporary workers in the arts will be issued shortly, if they have not already been issued.

You probably will ask, "What are the grounds for ineligibility?" They were found ineligible for visas under Section 212 (a) (28) which section excludes from admission to the United States aliens who advocate anarchism, communism or terrorism, or who are members of or affiliated with anarchist, communist or terrorist organizations.

The finding of ineligibility was based on the applicants' past activities on behalf of such organizations.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Was the fact his play was opening on Broadway have anything to do with the fact that he got a visa?

A I think the Department and the Justice Department reviewed the situation and decided there was just cause for a waiver in this particular instance.

--MORE--

Q John, on the topic of Nicaragua, the Nicaraguans have been complaining in the last two days or charging that U.S. planes have flown over the port of El Bluff, apparently on a surveillance mission, looking at a Bulgarian freighter which has been offloading for the past week. There may be two Bulgarian freighters. I don't know.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you have any comment on that?

A No.

Q Neither admitting it, or no comment whatsoever, or --

A Let me see what --

Q Can you elaborate a little?

A -- what words we might come up with on that later in the day.

Q John, there has been a long article in the _Times_ this morning out of Managua, suggesting, once again, that the Embassy has sought to discourage the opposition from taking part in the elections, and I'm curious, especially in conjunction with the issuing of this "Resource Book (on) Sandinista Elections in Nicaragua" --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- because it does draw the conclusion that the process is fatally flawed and says for many Nicaraguans the elections will offer no real choice at all --

I'm just wondering if you could indicate just what is the Embassy's role in this? It seems like the Administration has decided, in putting it in writing, that those elections hold no prospect and so, therefore, it would see it to its advantage to convince the others not to take part.

A No. I don't think that's correct. I think the Embassy has denied reports that it pressured in any way opposition officials to boycott the election. Don't misunderstand me -- the United States is not in favor of a phony or a fake election, which is what we seem to be heading for in Nicaragua. But the United States is very much in favor of a free election with the kind of conditions there that would permit the opposition to put its case. And you all know what that means. It means freedom of assembly, freedom of access to the press, which the opposition certainly doesn't have at the moment.

Insofar as Secretary Shultz's own meeting with Mr. Cruz and other leaders, the fact is that during that meeting the Secretary underlined the importance of the free electoral process in Nicaragua, and that's what we want to see. And we hope that even at this late date -- although one recognizes that the lights are going out or the sand is running out -- even at this late date, we would hope that the Sandinistas would agree to establish the necessary conditions which would permit a free contest of wills in Nicaragua.

Q This pamphlet, which has no named author and has no footnotes, or --

A I think it says "Department of State" on the cover.

Q Yes. But no individual, and has no footnotes about what the sources are. It just raises the -- has the implication that there is a kind of a campaign here that - which has previously been a question of the President's rhetoric, but here it seems like a full-fledged campaign by the Administration to discredit those elections. Is that the case?

A I don't think the Administration needs to mount a campaign to discredit the elections. I think one only needs to read the kind of dispatches that have been appearing in major newspapers in the United States in the past several weeks - the reporting by your own colleagues of facts. The fact seems to be that we're heading into a phony election in Nicaragua.

Q Why issue this, then?

A We traditionally have in cases of elections in El Salvador on previous occasions, but if you think it is not helpful, we will pass the word back that you do not wish such documentation.

Q John, on a related issue, do you have any reason to believe that Soviet-bloc arms supplies to Nicaragua or transshipments to El Salvador have not reached the levels that you expected for this --

A No.

Q -- for this time of the year?

A No. Have no such evidence.

Q No such evidence. What about -- do you have any evidence, as reported, that Mr. Castro has said to some other Bloc officials, "Let's cool it in Central America for awhile..."?

A I am not privy to such communications, but certainly in terms of the evidence on the ground, there doesn't seem to be much indication of change of heart.

Hank?

A John, just to be clear about a point, you say that you still hope that the Sandinistas will establish conditions for free and fair elections there. Are you still suggesting that this might technically be possible before November the 4th?

A I think it would be very hard for them to turn that society around by the present projected election date.

Q So that, implied in that, then, is the notion that the elections should be postponed, is really what I'm getting at.

A Well, you know, if you -- obviously, I think that is a fair implication. If you cannot provide the conditions under which there could be a fair test of opinion by that date, that seems a pretty pointless exercise.

Q John, just come back to the Indian thing again for a moment, just to follow up Don's question: Is there no concern -- if I understand correctly -- in this building that what happened might lead to increased tension between India and Pakistan?

A Well, I think that is a very speculative type question, and I think we would be unwise to respond in a speculative way. We've had a great tragedy in India. The Indians are proceeding with the kind of orderly transition process that one has come to expect and respect in India, and we expect that democratic process of transition to go forward. I think that's about where we are and what we look for.

Q There are no special messages being sent to the Pakistanis or communication or --

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q Or travel, or anything of that sort?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q What would the extent of the U.S. commitment to Pakistan be in the event of a conflict over there?

A I think that we have issued specific words on our commitment to Pakistan and to India, our involvement with both countries, the relationship between Pakistan and ourselves, and India and ourselves. I'm sure the Press Office would be glad to pull out those policy statements for you.

Q John, how long will the Secretary stay in India, and will the issue of terrorism be discussed with Indian officials, and is there any possibility that he might stop in the Middle East?

A I don't -- I think -- the answer to the first two questions: I don't know how long he will stop in India. The ceremony is, I understand, on Saturday afternoon around 4:30, their time. I think they're ten and a half hours ahead of us. So how many hours or nights he will be in India, I don't know. We don't even know the time of departure yet. It will be a very brief visit.

I do not know what Indian official -- with which Indian officials he may or may not talk, or, indeed, officials of other governments. I don't know who will be there and who he will see at this stage. And, I'm sorry, the third part of the question was?

Q Is there any possibility that he might stop in the Middle East?

A Oh, Middle East? Certainly no plans. Certainly no plans.

Q Do you have anything more today on Chile, first of all?

A No, I don't.

Q And do you have anything to say about a reported mediation between the Sudanese Government and southern rebels?

A Yes. I do have something on that. The United States is encouraged by this evidence of serious reconciliation efforts by the Sudanese Government to end the conflict in southern Sudan.

The Government's announcement indicates that a group of southern insurgents led by Abdullah Shol Deng and an armed forces committee have been conducting peace talks, and that a tentative agreement has been reached.

We hope that this development will encourage a similar dialogue with other rebel groups.

Q Copy?

A Sure.

Q John --

A Are we done?

Q John --

A I think we're done.

(The briefing concluded at 1:14 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DPC #198

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 1984, 12:22 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A couple of announcements:

First, available in the Press Office is the prepared text of the address by Secretary Shultz before the United Nations Association in New York City at 1:00 p.m. today. The topic of the speech is Nuclear Non-Proliferation. There will be a Q&A session following the speech.

Barring technical difficulties, the address will be piped here live into the Briefing Room.

Second, Peter McPherson, the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, will be available here in the Briefing Room at 2:00. That's going to conflict, presumably, with the feeding in. I guess we will do that in any case, but beware of that.

He will provide further background and respond to questions on this morning's White House press release on the U.S. response to the African drought situation. Mr. McPherson has had preliminary meetings with Ethiopian Commissioner Dawit this morning. Those negotiations are on-going and not expected to conclude until tomorrow. We will make available to you in the Press Office the text of that White House release in case you don't already have it.

Q Alan, can we get the text after this briefing?

A Yes.

Q And will he be ON BACKGROUND, did you say, or ON THE RECORD?

A No, he'll be ON THE RECORD.

Q Why is he giving his briefing today instead of waiting until the end of the talks?

A Whether he will have something to say further at that time, I don't know. But the fact is there has been an announcement made at the White House, and so to pick up any questions that might arise out of that instead of trying to deal with them at a briefing by people who don't really have it in their heads, that seemed the best way to do that.

Okay. That's it for announcements. I'll be happy to take questions.

Q Alan, do you have an assessment of the political conditions unfolding in India, the unrest?

A I don't really have an assessment of it, Mike. You're as aware as we are of the press reports, and we have some other sketchy information. There are, as you know, unconfirmed Indian press reports that curfews have been imposed in some cities, but I don't really think we can take you beyond what your colleagues have already reported.

Q Do you have anything to say on the succession to Mrs. Gandhi?

A No.

Q Alan, has the United States protested to the Soviet Union the allegations of U.S. involvement?

A Yes. As we said yesterday, we strongly resent the Soviet allegations that the United States, and specifically the CIA, were involved in or inspired this act of political terrorism. We reject in the strongest possible terms the outrageous Soviet allegations. They are absurd and irresponsible.

The United States has protested strongly, both in Moscow and here in Washington, against the Soviet media and official suggestions of U.S. complicity in this tragic event.

Q How did we protest -- a copy of that, please, Alan?

A Sure.

Q How did we protest here and in Moscow? Who did what to whom?

A I guess we don't usually get into the question of who does what to whom, and I think I will follow that pattern.

But there's no mistake in the context and content of those protests about how seriously we regard those accusations.

Q Alan, was anyone from the Soviet Embassy in the building for a meeting today?

A I don't know the answer to that.

Q Could you take that question?

A No, I don't think so. We have a lot of back-and-forth with the Soviet Embassy.

Q Some of which you do tell us about.

A Well, if the Secretary has a meeting, we have acknowledged those things, but I think that otherwise we generally do not.

Q So there was no meeting with the Secretary this morning?

A There was no meeting with the Secretary.

Q Were the protests delivered today or yesterday?

A The protest was, I think -- the protests were made both days.

Q Alan, what about this report of a possible meeting between the Secretary and Mr. Tikhonov?

A I don't have anything specific to give you on that. There have been some soundings made about possible meetings with some of the delegations that will be in New Delhi in addition, of course, to possible meetings with the Government of India. But since no meetings have been set, I don't think I'm in a position to comment on which countries, and so on. I think we'll just have to let that unfold.

Q And is there a particular sounding as to a meeting with the Soviets?

A As I say, I think until any meetings are set I would not comment on which countries would be involved in that.

Q The same question.

A Okay.

Q There's absolutely nothing to these press accounts that indicate that that meeting between Shultz and the Russian has already been squared away?

A To my understanding -- and I've checked on this -- there are no meetings that are actually set at this point, though, as I say, we have sounded out some of the countries as to possible meetings.

Q Among those countries, the Soviet Union is one of them, I assume?

A To repeat myself for a third time, I'm not going to get into which countries we've sounded out.

Q How long do you expect the Secretary to be in India? When do you expect him to return?

A He will be there, I guess, a little bit over 24 hours. He gets there late on Friday and will leave late on Saturday.

Q Alan, can you tell us if Richard Burt will be accompanying the Secretary on this trip?

A I think he is on the aircraft, yeah.

Q Can you make a list available of the delegation and the Secretary's staff?

A No, I don't think the staff. The delegation, I'll be happy to make available. I don't think we would normally make available all the staff who are accompanying him. But Rick Burt will be --

Q How about Assistant Secretaries of State? Will he meet with Richard Murphy, for example, on the trip?

A I don't -- my understanding is that Ambassador Murphy, who has just been in that region, as you know, will probably not go back to New Delhi at this point.

Q Alan, have you been in consultation with the Pakistani Government regarding the situation in India?

A I honestly don't know the answer to that, but I guess even if I did we would not get into the question of what diplomatic discussions we may have held.

Q Alan, forgive me for following up on that other thing -- that Murphy will not go back to Delhi. Will he meet with Shultz in any other area?

A I'm not aware of any plans for him to meet.

Q (Inaudible).

A No, I'm not trying to be tricky about any possible stops, although I've got to say to you that there obviously will be a fuel stop some place and --.

Q Cairo?

A I don't know where it will (be). And whether Ambassador Murphy would seek to see him at that point, I honestly don't know, and I don't know that we will have that.

Q Is there any change in yesterday's forecast that this trip is basically a trip to and from New Delhi?

A No.

Q No change?

A No change.

Q Alan, another area?

Q Still with India, still. Alan, by the criteria of the State Department or the U.S. Government, do you consider the situation in India as an emergency situation which necessitates sort of an emergency committee or commission or some such thing?

A I don't think it's up to us to characterize it one way or another.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the Israeli Foreign Minister's statement that he is surprised about why United States Jews would contribute money to improve the quality of life in the West Bank? And I have another part of this question.

A No, I don't have any comment on it.

Q And can you elaborate on what Mr. Howard Squadron and Steve Cohen from Queens College, together with Mr. Najib Halabi, former Director of Pan Am, and others, who in coordination with Mr. Peter Rodman in the State Department are planning to do in the West Bank?

A Well, I think I answered this the other day -- maybe you weren't here -- that the group you're talking about is not an official group; it's a private group. They have kept us apprised of some of their activities. But their activities are just as I described them: private. So the question the other day, I think, suggested that perhaps there was U.S. Government sponsorship. That is not the case. It is a private organization, and you should ask them about their activities.

Q But I understand that they are in coordination, or they coordinate their activities or their movements with the State Department?

A No. I say they have kept us apprised of some of their activities. But I think it would be wrong to suggest, as your question does, that there's some sort of linkage, official sponsorship, with them; that's not right.

Bill?

Q Any reaction to the direct -- prospect of direct talks between Israel and Lebanon on an Israeli withdrawal?

Q What?

A The question is, "Any comment on the prospect of direct talks?" I assume you're talking about the U.N. announcement about direct talks between Israel and Lebanon.

Q Uh-huh.

A We welcome this development as an important step toward working out security arrangements leading to an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon.

--MORE--

Q Alan, do we have any reading on why the Syrians would now give the Lebanese the go-ahead to talk to Israel?

A Well, you're making a lot of assumptions in your question, and I'm not going to comment on those assumptions; but anyway, let the Syrian Government speak for itself and let the Lebanese Government speak for itself.

Q Did the U.S. have any role in arranging or facilitating this meeting between Israel and Lebanon?

A We have supported the U.N. effort, but I'm not going to get into the question of what diplomatic dialogue there may have been. But it's clear the announcement is a U.N. announcement.

Jack.

Q Two questions on Lebanon: First of all, has the United States requested the Government of Lebanon to restrict air traffic over U.S. Embassy facilities?

A I don't think we would get into the question of security-related measures, either that we would take or ask others to take.

Q Our correspondent in Beirut says that the Press Officer in Beirut is no longer answering any questions from the press. Is that a policy on the part of the government to divert all questions back to Washington and not answer them on the scene?

A No, I don't think that that's the case. I don't even know if he's there or on leave, I mean, so I can't answer that question.

Q He's there.

A He's there? O.K. No, there's no directive that he not answer questions. I think in terms of questions about security issues, if that's what they're asking --

Q No, no questions about that.

A Well, anyway, the answer is as I've given it to you.

Samir.

Q Is Ambassador Murphy going to visit Damascus?

A I don't have his onward schedule to give you; and as you know, we have not done that. He is in Israel today, but we have not tended to give --

Q Is he involved with these talks that will take place on Monday?

A Is he involved with them:

Q Yes. I mean, is he discussing --

A Well, I think, again, we have -- to go back to what I said before, in a broad sense, we have supported the U.N. effort, and obviously the issue of southern Lebanon and the total withdrawal of all forces from Lebanon and so on has been something that has been of great interest to the United States and part of various discussions. I'm not going to go into the specifics of what he might discuss here or there. There will not be U.S. participation in those talks.

Q The timing of his visit there (inaudible)

A No, the timing of his visit to the region is really related to a couple of meetings that he attended first in Colombo, with attendant stops in the region in Islamabad and New Delhi and then also in Saudi Arabia. Those were Chiefs of Mission meetings which he attended, and he is doing some other consulting and meeting while he's out there.

Q Alan, do you have anything new on the new meeting of the U.S.-Israel political/military commission?

A No, don't have anything on that.

Q Neither the economic one, the new one?

A No. I don't think that they've had a meeting yet, but don't have anything on the schedule for them.

Mike.

Q Alan, have you had some communication from Ambassador Lewis? Have you got a transcript of his remarks at Tel Aviv University?

A Well, the answer to the first, or the second question rather, is that, yes, we do have the transcript. We're not going to make it available because they were not official remarks.

As we said yesterday -- John indicated -- Ambassador Lewis' comments were personal views about obstacles and missed opportunities in the peace process since Camp David. I would note that he emphasized at the outset of his remarks, which were informal and made at a university seminar, that he was not speaking on behalf of the United States Government and was offering strictly personal impressions.

Q What is your judgment of his overall remarks, now that you have looked at the transcript? Are you concerned, as you expressed yesterday or --

A I think that we're not going try to get into -- since they were personal remarks, we're not going to get into them. I think John expressed yesterday, again, nothing new in what he said what our policy is; but I don't think we're going to try to analyze personal remarks.

Q Has he been chastised in any way not to speak in such a --

A Oh, I don't think we --

Q -- clear manner, or is that --

A I don't think -- without leading you to that conclusion, I would not get into the question of communications between any ambassador and the Department.

Q Alan, John made some pretty tough statements yesterday. Are you now going back on those? Is Ambassador Lewis in disfavor? Do you expect him to come back after the election or what?

A I don't have any information suggesting that he's going to come back after the election, no. I think that the Secretary regards Ambassador Lewis as one of our ablest diplomats and as an important contributor to the U.S.-Israeli relationship and to our thinking about the peace process.

Q Is he disappointed by the remarks? Did he make any --

A Again, I'm not going to get into the question of the remarks and specific reaction to them.

Q Your comment is a lot different from what was said yesterday. Are you sending signals?

A I'm not a parser of tones. (Laughter) I'll

Q Regarding the talks between Israel and Lebanon, does that mean that we have found or seen some of that flexibility between the parties that we've been talking about, or you've been talking about, the last few weeks? Is there some new flexibility somewhere?

A Well, I think that is up to the parties to eventually demonstrate. The fact is that we welcome this, as I said before, and let's see what comes out of it.

Ralph.

Q Alan, yesterday the State Department said that both the Department and people in other buildings in Washington were concerned by Ambassador Lewis' reported remarks. Have those concerns now been resolved as a result of the receipt of the transcript, and do you consider the matter closed as far as Ambassador Lewis' reported remarks are concerned?

A Well, it's closed as far as I'm concerned. I'm not going to have any further comments to make on them, so --

Q You just spoke about the Secretary's feeling for Ambassador Lewis. Is it closed as far as the Secretary is concerned?

A I think, again, as far as anything we have to say about that, we've said it.

Walt.

Q Yes. Some questions on Secretary Shultz's speech on non-proliferation. (At the) top of page 13, he says, "We're convinced that nuclear cooperation with China, grounded on an agreement that satisfies all the requirements of our law and policy, will advance our world-wide proliferation objectives."

A Uh-huh.

Q Is this a new agreement yet to be negotiated or --

A No. This is the agreement which has been negotiated and which, as we've indicated many times before, we think is a good agreement, meets the requirements of law, but we're in the same situation we have been with respect to moving ahead with that agreement.

Q It still has to be ironed out? There's still work to be done on it?

A In the terms that we have mentioned before --

Q Any time --

A -- not in terms of any textual changes or anything of that sort, but I refer you back to what we've said before about that agreement.

Q Any timetable on when this will be finished?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q O.K. Another point: On the previous page, he says that the Chinese say that they "would refrain from assisting other nations to acquire." That's the same issue that's --

A Uh-huh

Q -- being ironed out, is that correct?

A Well, we haven't -- beyond the words that we've offered you before about implementation and making sure that we don't have any misunderstandings and so on, we've not attempted to get into the specifics of what we're talking about, and I'm going to leave it, I'm afraid, to that degree of generality.

Q Alan, the New York Times has an interview published this morning with a Mr. Chamorro, who claims to have had U.S. Government support for his family in Miami for a year and also claims that the U.S. Government instructed him in how to assist in the overthrow of the Nicaraguan Government. Do you have any comment on Mr. Chamorro's reported remarks?

A I don't, except to say two things: One, obviously,the context of the article was presumably intelligence activities, and for that reason I wouldn't have any comment at all on those remarks.

As far as our policy on Nicaragua, I stand by what we have said before. It is not the policy of the United States to seek the overthrow of the Government of Nicaragua.

Q Uh-huh. So if he says that it was, then he is wrong?

A I think I'll stand on what I just said. It's fairly unambiguous.

Q Has that policy been made clear to the CIA? (Laughter)

A I'm sure that everybody in the United States Government is aware of that policy.

Q Alan, when will Tarig Aziz, the Foreign Minister of Iraq, come to visit Washington and meet with President Reagan where expected restoration of diplomatic relations between Iraq and the United States will take place?

A I don't have anything on a specific visit by the Minister to the United States. I think we've talked before about the state of the relationship, the fact that they've said -- he and Saddam Hussein have said -- that they would seek to upgrade the relationship. We've said for a long time we would welcome that. But I don't have anything specific about a visit.

Q On Chile, John Hughes said the other day that we are reviewing the situation in Chile; and in the light of that fact would you have any comment on the article today saying that the human rights situation is worsening in Chile?

A No. I think that the statement the other day indicated our concerns, and I don't have anything to add to that.

Q What do you think about the government spokesman saying that these actions are necessary to act tough against a communist threat?

A Well, again, I think that in that statement, if you'll look at it, it expressed concern with both actions by terrorist organizations, on the one hand, and also some actions taken by the authorities on the other; so I think that that statement adequately covered that situation.

Q The official also said that he really -- he dismissed the U.S. statement and said that he didn't think the U.S. was actually going to do anything.

A Well --

Q What action is the United States prepared to take?

A Don't have anything for you beyond what we said the other day.

Yes.

Q That was the same question I wanted to ask.

A O.K.?

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:42 P.M.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #199

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 1984, 12:22 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A couple of announcements before I take your questions:

First, to remind you that at 2:00 this afternoon here in the Briefing Room there will be backgrounder on the current status of the Namibia independence negotiations and our on-going talks with Angola.

Second, as you know, AID Administrator Peter McPherson and the Ethiopian Commissioner, Dawit Wolde Giorgis, are meeting today to continue discussions on famine aid to Ethiopia. We had hoped to be able to provide a briefing for you this afternoon on the outcome of those talks, but because the meeting has been delayed until somewhat later this afternoon, the timing of that briefing is uncertain, and I would therefore ask you to be in touch with the Press Office regarding when, or indeed if, Mr. McPherson will be able to brief you.

So with that, I'll be happy to take questions.

Q Alan, are you concerned about -- do you have fresh threats against the Ambassador in El Salvador, or any top officials in the Embassy there? Have you taken increased security measures because of that?

A Well, we have consistently not talked about specific threats, Mike, and I think we will continue to do that. So I don't have anything to --

Q Have you issued any fresh restrictions or cautionary notes on travel to El Salvador by American officials?

A There is -- as a matter of long-standing policy, we have a general understanding that travel of U.S. Government employees to high-risk areas should be limited to essential business, and we conduct periodic assessments and cut back temporary-duty travel of U.S. Government personnel to El Salvador, cut them back to those which are, indeed, essential. So that is being done.

There's no ban on travel; it's a matter of just making sure that those who need to go, go, and those who don't really need to go, don't. And we are constantly monitoring that situation, and when we determine that the situation no longer requires it, then we would lift that restriction as well.

Q Is this the restriction that's been placed for two years, or is that the other travel advisory for U.S. citizens?

A No, the citizens -- in terms of the advisory for citizens, as we, I think, have indicated before, citizens should -- and this is not new -- citizens should make themselves aware of the possible security risks wherever they travel. And given the existing security situation in El Salvador, travel in that country does carry certain obvious risks, and should not be undertaken casually. This is, as I say, doesn't represent any change from our previous position on that.

Q Have you tightened the screening process for essential business? Is that what you're indicating in --

A We always are careful in a situation where there is a risk, and where we do want to look at necessary travel, sure, we would want to take a look at it and make some judgment as to whether, indeed, such TDY travel was necessary. So, obviously, in a case of a restriction like this, we would look at it; whereas, in a case where there was no restriction it would be, perhaps, looked at in terms of availability of people down there, or hotel rooms or something, so this is a little different.

Q Alan, isn't this an old warning dating back to June? There is nothing fresh in this, is there?

A No, I think this -- there is -- this is done periodically. I think I would mislead you if I said there hadn't been some recent review of this and a decision to try and restrict TDY travel to essential travel at this time, as well.

Q Do you have any idea of the volume of temporary travel there at all --

A I don't.

Q -- or also, how many American citizens are travelling to El Salvador these days?

A I don't have a figure on either of those. Ralph?

Q To follow that question, I don't quite know how to get at it, but if there were not any plans to send lots of TDY people to El Salvador anyway, then the restriction, although it was reviewed and perhaps implemented in a fresh way, would not have any effect?

A No, I think --

Q Can you give us some idea, or could you at least take the question of -- to give us some idea of what the flow has been and what it would be under this --

A No, I don't think I will do that. First of all, I'm not sure how available it is and, secondly, I don't think we're going to be trying to give out numbers of American officials who might be around in areas where we think there is some risk.

The introduction of your question, though, suggested something to me. What was -- ?

Q It was just that I'm trying to get a feel for -- if there was nobody -- if there were no plans to send a lot of TDY people down there anyway, then reviewing this policy would --

A It's not --

Q It might be a good thing to review, but --

Q There are all sorts of agencies in the U.S. Government who send people all around the world. And so sometimes that is essential travel, and sometimes it's a good thing to do but it isn't really essential. So, it isn't always known what people may be going to visit any given country, so this would tighten up that procedure, as Jack was asking about before.

Q Making it harder?

A Sure, and we would be making some decisions about that.

Q Alan--

A Excuse me. Go ahead.

Q On a subject related to that area, I have a couple of questions on the plot in Honduras. One is, is the United States seeking the extradition of this general from Chile for some prosecution, or --

A General Bueso?

Q General Bueso-Rosa. Or is he going to Honduras to be tried there? What is the indication there?

A Well, his situation is under discussion between the Government of Honduras and the Government of Chile, or rather with the Government of Honduras and with the Government of Chile. We're involved in discussions as well, and it's really too soon to get into that question.

Q You said you are involved in the discussions?

A Well, sure we have been, yeah. We have -- I ought to note that he was the -- as I'm sure you're aware -- the military attache, Honduran military attache, in Chile, and we have been in contact through diplomatic channels with the Government of Honduras and with the Government of Chile.

The government of Honduras has terminated his diplomatic status and immunity and has formally requested that he be provisionally detained, and we have also made such a request. So that's where we are at this point. As I say, we're in discussions with them.

--MORE--

Q Also, you're in touch directly with the Chilean Government on his case, or just dealing through the Hondurans?

A No. We're discussing the matter with the Government of Honduras and the Government of Chile.

Q Alan, a related question to that is, some of these people have been identified as associates of General Alvarez, the former Armed Forces Chief in Honduras. Is there any information that may be available to the Government of the U.S. as to whether Alvarez is actually implicated in this plot?

A I don't have any information, and I guess I would have to refer you to the Justice Department on that.

Q Okay. Do you know of any arrests in Honduras related to this case?

A I don't.

Q Do you have any update on the content of those crates that --

A On the update on the --

Q On the crates that were disembarked in El Bluff, in Nicaragua?

A Not specifically.

Q You haven't had any recent information about exact --

A You asked me if I have anything for you on that. I say I don't have anything for you specifically. Obviously, we indicated that there is a continuing flow of military equipment, and that is the case.

Q Alan, has Svetlana Alliluyeva renounced her American citizenship?

A Well, I just would say that we're aware of the TASS announcement that Svetlana Alliluyeva has returned to the Soviet Union, and that the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet has considered, and complied with, her request to restore to her the citizenship of the USSR, as well as her request for granting Soviet citizenship to her daughter, Olga.

We don't have any independent information concerning the circumstances surrounding this development. As you know, she was living in England for some time, and, as a private citizen, she's at liberty to travel to the Soviet Union.

As far as U.S. citizenship, I really just don't have anything at this point.

Q Would it be possible for her to have both citizenship of the Soviet Union and the United States --

A Well, there are questions about what governments recognize what citizenship and so on and so forth, but in terms of whether she would lose U.S. citizenship or something like that, I think we've talked about those kinds of things before, and there are various circumstances that would have to obtain before that were the case, so I just don't have anything on that today.

Q Isn't it easier to lose, though, when she has a naturalized citizenship rather than a native --

A I think you've got me over my depth in terms of the law, and I would refer you to the law on that.

Q Another area?

A Yeah, sure.

Q Would you confirm this report attributed to the Israeli Embassy in Washington, saying that Israel had already initiated contacts with the United States Administration to receive more financial aid?

A I don't know what discussions, informal discussions, may have taken place. I think that, in terms of where the formal aid process -- that's quite clear as to where we are, and I'm not aware of any change beyond what already has been programmed and talked about publicly before.

--MORE --

1-2852

Q It is only because this came just after the report saying that the U.S. transferred already $1.2 billion to --

A Well, that's the disbursement of the already-approved funding.

Q Yes, I do understand this --

A I'm not aware of any -- I may be uninformed on this, but I'm not aware of a request for further funding at this time.

Bill?

Q Back on Nicaragua, do you have any statement on the breakdown in the talks between Mr. Tinoco and Ambassador Shlaudeman in Mexico?

A Yes. The fact is that those talks have been going on. We consider the meetings between Ambassador Shlaudeman and Vice Foreign Minister Tinoco to be serious, substantive, confidential conversations, supportive of the Contadora process, and we don't discuss their substance.

I would note that at their last meeting in Manzanillo, Messrs. Shlaudeman and Tinoco agreed to meet again in two or three weeks, so we don't accept the characterization in the story in this morning's Times that those are stalled.

Q What about the characterization in the story that in fact the United States isn't looking for an agreement? I believe there was several quotes --

A I think, as I say, these are serious, substantive conversations, and they are designed to support the Contadora effort, and there's no change in that.

Q Alan, can you take us beyond yesterday on the question of a meeting between Secretary Shultz and Soviet officials in India?

A Only to the extent of saying that such a meeting is under discussion with the Soviets, but I would note that the schedule in New Delhi is very tight, and at this point I really cannot confirm that a meeting is going to take place.

Q Is Tikhonov the individual Shultz would like to meet with?

A Well, I think he certainly -- if Mr. Tikhonov is leading the delegation, which I understand he is, he would be the appropriate person to meet with.

Q Alan, could I follow on that? I've seen conflicting reports about whether Gromyko is in the delegation.

A Don't -- I don't --

Q Can you shed any light on that?

A I don't know.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on what Radio Moscow announced, that USSR is constructing a nuclear power plant in Libya?

A No. Don't have anything on it.

Q I have a follow-up to my question about the aid to Israel. Would it be correct to say that this is a first time in history -- in the history of the U.S. aid to foreign countries -- to just give this lot of money to a country or --

A I don't know. It was, as I recall it, mandated in the legislation, so there's nothing new or unexpected about the disbursement.

Q Alan, do you have anything else there on Svetlana beside what you gave us? Was there any general comment on her returning to the Soviet Union?

A There's not a general comment, no. I think that if one were to ask, did we have any indication that she returned against her will, we don't have any information at this time that would indicate that she returned involuntarily.

Q Are you seeking information about the circumstances of her departure?

A I don't know that we are, particularly. I mean, as I say, we have no indication that there was anything untoward about it.

Okay?

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:36 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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MONDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #200

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 1984, 11:59 A.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good morning. I guess that's one of the few occasions on which I can say that. We are very timely today.

A little housekeeping announcement up front in connection with the Secretary's visit to Europe in December. On December 13 and 14, Secretary of State Shultz will participate in meetings in Brussels with NATO and with the EC Commission. He'll attend the semi-annual fall meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers.

The U.S. and the Commission of the European Communities will hold ministerial-level consultations in Brussels on Friday, December 14. A Commission delegation chaired by President Gaston Thorn will meet with the U.S. delegation. The U.S. delegation will be made up of Secretary of State Shultz; the Secretary of Agriculture, Mr. Block; Secretary of Commerce, Mr. Baldridge; and the U.S. Trade Representative, Ambassador Brock. The Treasury Department will be represented at a senior level. The agenda for the meeting will be determined in the coming weeks.

We're going to have a sign-up sheet -- I guess it has already been posted in the Press Office -- for those of you wishing to apply for a seat on the Secretary's plane. That sheet will come down and applications will be closed at 12 noon, on Wednesday, November 28. And it says here, pre-emptorily, "no applications will be accepted after that time." Hard ball! (Laughter)

Q Tell us about the beginning and the end of that trip.

A The beginning and the end of it?

Q Yes. The Department has nothing to do with what you've just told us?

A As distinct from the middle part?

Q Yes.

A You mean whether there'll be anything else? Let me chat about that a bit later, after this session.

Q That's it?

A That's it.

Q Just remind me, the Secretary has this address on the 6th of that month?

A It's the preceding Sunday, I think it is, yes. Yeshiva.

Q John, have you had a chance to look over the election returns in Nicaragua? Do you have a judgment on the validity of the election?

A What election? (Laughter)

Q Next subject? That's all you have? O.K.

A Well, I do have some words on that. Regrettably, the Nicaraguan people were not allowed to participate in an election in any real sense of the word. The Sandinista electoral farce, without any meaningful political opposition, leaves the situation essentially unchanged. The democratic opposition continued, up to the last moment, efforts to convince the Sandinistas to establish conditions for a free and fair election.

The United States consistently supported the opposition efforts to participate in a meaningful electoral process. Unfortunately, those efforts went unheeded. Without the participation of any significant opposition, the Sandinistas continued to manipulate every aspect of the electoral process, including the police, the army, the media and mass organizations in an attempt to project the illusion of popular support. So, as far as the United States is concerned, November 4, 1984 was a lost opportunity for Nicaragua.

Q Copy of that, John?

A Sure.

Q Well, is the U.S. position better that they had it or didn't have it?

A Well, the U.S. position is that what is required in Nicaragua is a free, fair election in which the forces of the opposition would be permitted to offer their opinion about the kind of government under which they are prepared to serve.

Q John, is an election like this better than no election at all, or worse than no election at all?

A I don't think, you know, we want to parse all that. The fact is, this wasn't a very good election. In fact, it wasn't an election; in fact, it was a kind of piece of theatre for the Sandinistas to manipulate.

Q John, how was this -- I mean, given your reaction, how is it going to affect talks with the Nicaraguan Government and the United States?

A Well, they go forward. We have pledged ourselves to continue serious talks with the Sandinistas, and those continue to go forward.

Q The overall state of relations between the United States and Nicaragua?

A Well, I think it underlines our concern with verification. I mean, I suppose you may say, "Well, if you see them behaving like this, why pursue the talks?" But I think you pursue the talks because we have a very real desire to see an improvement in that relationship and to see the kind of objectives that we have discussed on a number of occasions be implemented and to see that country take the kind of actions that we have consistently urged, and indeed which they have pledged in the past, so we continue to make the effort.

I think in light of the broken promises and the kind of performance we've seen in this election, however, that underlines our concerns about verification and being able to confirm and prove out the kind of commitments that they might make.

Q John, do you have anything on the grenade attack against Alfonso Robello in San Jose last night?

A I don't, Mike, no.

Q Can you take that?

A Sure.

Q John, do you view this as the end of the process there, or do you envision the possibility of a dialogue going on there after the election, possibly leading to a more democratic election sometime in the future?

A I think that's up to them. I think Mr. Ortega said something about the Assembly having to take some decisions on future elections. Obviously, that's their decision. But if you mean as far as the Contadora process -- Is that what you had in mind, the Contadora process going on?

Q Mine is just a question of whether or not you view this as the end of the opportunities for elections in the near term, or whether you foresee a possibility of (inaudible).

A One always hopes for that possibility, and one continues to urge it.

Q Could you flesh out what you mean by verification?

A Oh, I think that's clear. I think we've made that very plain in terms of reduction of advisers, in terms of limiting the flow of weaponry into Nicaragua and out of Nicaragua into El Salvador; I think general verification of the kind of steps that the Contadora process is seeking to bring about.

Q John, something on India?

Q Could we stay --

A All right. We'll come back to India.

Q Will you recognize -- will the United States recognize Mr. Ortega as now as the President of the country?

A Well, I think Secretary Motley applied himself to that question on one of the morning shows and made the point that as far as recognition is concerned, the position is unchanged.

Q The question is, will you consider him the President of the country rather than the head of the junta, as we was before today?

A Let me take a look at that one for you, Don

Q John, while the U.S. has strongly denied Soviet allegations that it is supporting Sikh extremists, sympathizers of an outlawed Dashmesh Regiment which was started by the slain terrorist leader Bindranwale have been openly demonstrating in places like New York, and in fact with insignia too, and threatening that they would be assassinating Rajiv Gandhi next.

How does the U.S. react to these demonstrations, and does the U.S. take these threats seriously made by people over here in the --

A Well, I want to be careful how I reply because I've been out of the country for a few days, and I'm not sure what specific instance you're talking about. The fact is that in this society people clearly are free to demonstrate within the confines of the law and free to make their views known.

If you are talking about threats of further assassination or enthusiasm for the very tragic assassination that has just taken place in India, the United States Government, obviously, views those with abhorrence and repugnance and has said so.

Q I've got a follow-up. The London-based Sikh separatist leader Chauhan is in touch with Senator Jesse Helms, and last year Senator Helms circumvented a refusal by the State Department to issue him a visa by getting Chauhan to come and testify before a Senate agriculture committee.

A Uh-huh.

Q How does the U.S. view this Senator Helms-Chauhan relationship?

A We have -- I'm not -- again, I'm not responding specifically to this case, but we have not granted visas to extreme Sikh leaders in the past, and there certainly will be no change in that position.

And insofar as this case, although I'd like to take a further look at it, I doubt that there would be any change in this case either.

Q Have you seen President Chernenko's remarks today regarding pluralistic --

A Yes. I saw a wire service report on them, Mike, but I don't have any reaction.

Q Do you want to take that and see if there is anything new in them or --

A Should, in the course of the day, anybody want to respond, we'll make something available, but I don't think we likely would.

Q Does the Secretary have any comment about talk of a possible "czar" in nuclear arms negotiations?

A He hasn't commented on it in my hearing.

Q What's your comment?

A I don't have any either. I guess this is the time of year when all kinds of speculation about personnel changes and restructuring, and so forth and so on, go on, but I think I won't have any comment.

Q John, do you have any comment on the meeting of the Secretary with Moshe Arens today?

A Not really. Mr Arens is in the United States on a private meeting -- for private reasons, I should say. (He) Asked to see the Secretary, and, of course, the Secretary was happy to see him, but I don't have anything beyond that.

Q It has nothing to do with Richard Murphy staying in Israel five days, or anything like that?

A No. Not that I'm aware of. Mr. Murphy is in fact in Jordan today. He was --

Q Can you confirm that President Assad refused to meet Murphy when he was --

A I don't know whether he refused to see him. I think, in fact, Mr. Murphy saw Vice President Khaddam in Damascus. He did not meet with President Assad.

Q He did not ask for a meeting with President Assad?

A I don't know what the arrangements were or why he did not meet with President Assad.

Q Anything on the delay in the Lebanese-Syria talks?

A No, we think that -- what they have in mind is a good process, and we'd like to see that meeting go forward as soon as possible, but I understand it's apparently a temporary hitch.

Q John, you've said that the U.S. is not involving itself in any mediation effort at the moment.

A Uh-huh.

Q But Mr. Murphy has spent a good bit of time there in the last five or six weeks, I guess. What is the general underlying and important purpose of all of these?

A Fact-finding.

Q Was he really that uninformed before? (Laughter)

A Quite good, Marvin; quite good! (Laughter)

Q What are you after; what are you up to?

A We're looking to see what the mood is, what the positions are, of the various parties. As you know, there's been a little movement on the question of the Lebanese and the Israelis talking at a certain level. But, basically, the process of fact-finding continues.

Q Will you still qualify it "exploratory mission?"

A I think it's exploratory and fact-finding. It is not mediating.

Q But, John, can you say it is in the term -- I mean, it's for Middle East peace in general, or Lebanor and Israeli withdrawal?

A I'm sure that both subjects are matters for discussion.

Q John, on this subject, is Murphy, in addition to fact-finding, is he carrying positions from one capital to the other, talking to different countries, looking for flexibility, etc?

A I'm sure that in the -- under the mantle of his exploratory mission, I'm sure he would be exchanging ideas. I don't know that I'd say he's carrying messages or carrying positions. I think it's more a sounding out and testing kind of -- testing of opinion mission.

Q On that general area, has the Department now got the transcript of the famous speech made by Ambassador Lewis?

A Yes, it has.

Q And what is your reaction to it now that you've got it?

A Well, we're not going to distribute it because as we and Ambassador Lewis made clear, those were personal remarks and were not a statement of government policy, so we're not going to distribute the transcript.

Q Well, are you going to -- has the Secretary or somebody else in the government had any further exchange with Ambassador Lewis now that you've looked at the text about what they think about it all?

A I'm sure the Secretary has not spoken with Ambassador Lewis. Others in the government may, but I think on Friday Mr. Romberg gave you an indication of the esteem in which the Secretary of State holds Ambassador Lewis, and I think made clear that we would have no comment beyond that, and so I don't.

Q Thank you.

A Okay.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:15 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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Tuesday, November 6, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #201

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 1984, 12:11 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I have no announcements.

Q Who are you voting for?

A I have no news, but maybe we can string this charade out for five minutes. (Laughter)

Q John, in what way will American foreign policy be enhanced by the prospective victory of the President?

A Well, I think there's been a -- I think there's been a constancy to President Reagan's foreign policy, Marvin, which I'm sure will be demonstrated after the election, should he be re-elected.

Q And what would happen to American foreign policy if Walter Mondale were elected?

A I don't have any comment on that. (Laughter)

Q John, there is a story in today's Post on a paper regarding Nicaragua and how we were handling the elections and the Contadora treaty. Is this true, and would we do such things?

A Well, as you know, Greg, we never discuss alleged secret documents, and so we won't discuss this particular alleged one. But, in general, insofar as the U.S. position on Nicaragua is concerned, that position is very clear. We have supported the Contadora process, and our attitude towards the Nicaraguan election is a matter of record.

On Contadora, we supported the process as the best way to achieve a verifiable and peaceful resolution to Central American problems. Specific steps taken to assure that the process moved forward, addressing the concerns of the countries involved, should be agreed upon by the participants.

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U.S. concerns in the areas of verification and timing have been openly stated; and, as I said earlier, so far as the election is concerned, we do not consider that the process the Sandinistas went through on November 4 was a free and fair election.

Q What is the status now of the proposed Contadora treaty and the process that might evolve -- the follow-up document?

A Well, I think the various countries concerned are continuing to work on the proposed Acta; and, as you know, Ambassador Shlaudeman and Minister Tinoco have been meeting in support of the Contadora process on the Acta, and that is continuing to go forward.

Q But various qualified recommendations for changes have been filed --

A Yes.

Q -- by Contadora countries.

A Yes. That's right.

Q Where does that stand? Is that --

A I don't know where the process is at the moment. I don't know where the next meeting is to take place and what the drafting process is specifically.

Q John, I think one of the main points in that story was that the United States was not following the lead of the countries in Central America as it has professed to be following, but rather setting the tone and setting the agenda and, in effect, pressuring the governments in Central America to pursue that particular American line. Is that correct?

A Well, with the proviso that I'm not talking about a specific alleged document, the fact is that we have made -- I don't think we have been reticent in indicating our concerns. Various countries have had concerns. We have talked with countries involved about our concerns. They have talked to us about their concerns, and nobody is suggesting, I hope, that only the United States has concerns. That is not factually correct. Different countries have different gradations of opinion and reserve about the draft Acta.

-- MORE --

Q But have we been suggesting to others that they should register their concerns in --

A We have certainly talked to other countries within the diplomatic confines, explaining our position, and I'm sure we do it skillfully.

Q The gist of the article, however, was that we "blocked" the September 7 treaty, and we "trumped" the Nicaraguan-Mexican effort to go ahead and sign that early draft.

A Well, as I say, I'm not going to talk about a specific alleged document, but the fact is, as we have -- there's no problem about our concerns. We have aired them publicly. I think that certainly the other Central American countries have discussed publicly some of their concerns, and I'm not going to get into the question of individual drafts. The drafting process goes forward; but the point is that we would support an ultimate treaty that would meet the various points that we have outlined as being our goals and which would fulfill the 21 points that the Contadora process has indicated should be met.

Q Another part of that document talks about what really is an orchestration of denegrating the Nicaraguan election -- talking to intellectuals in Europe, getting academic people to write articles and give speeches against the election.

A Uh-huh.

Q Has there been, in fact, a major orchestration on the Nicaraguan election?

A I don't know of any such orchestration. As I've said before, one hardly needs to have orchestrated the kind of international view that has been expressed of those elections.

Q John, since the U.S. is not going to be a party to this treaty, as I understand it, why should we be taking such a lead role in helping to shape it?

A Don't know that it's a lead role, but I think it is totally credible that we would be interested in the kind of resolution of the situation in Central America. It is in our backyard. We need to be assured that it is a stable area insofar as United States interests are concerned; and while we may not be a signatory to a treaty, I think we would be derelict if we did not try to ensure the kind of stability and economic growth that we have been urging in that area.

Q Another point: Ortega is quoting as saying the U.S. should make up its mind soon whether it's going to invade or not. Do you have any comment to that?

(Laughter)

A The President has made very clear, the Secretary of State has made very clear, Assistant Secretary Motley has made very clear that there is no such invasion planned. It is absurd. We have listened to Mr. Ortega make predictions. I think October 15 has come and gone, and I guess there have been revised predictions, but there is no such plan.

Q No such what?

A Plan.

Q I wasn't here at yesterday's briefing, but we have a written response to a Monday request, "Will the United States recognize Mr. Ortega now that he is President of the country? Will you consider him the President of the country rather than the head of the junta, as he was before today?"

The response says: "The United States, in maintaining diplomatic relations with other countries, normally refers to officials of foreign governments by the titles bestowed on them by their governments. This does not constitute a judgment as to the legitimacy of a title or an endorsement of any political system or procedure."

All right, I put this out this morning. Now, we have an awful lot of Latin American clients, UPI does, and everything else, and they say there is an ambiguity in there. Now, we recognize the head of the Soviet Government; we recognize the head of the Polish Government; and we recognize -- Is there an ambiguity in this thing of recognizing what is apparently an electoral victory? How it was borne out, we don't know.

A Don't think so. I got asked that question yesterday, and I made the point that it wasn't a question of recognition. Our attitude towards the Nicaraguan regime would remain the same after the election as before.

The specific question yesterday was, "Well, how will you address Mr. Ortega?"

Q That's right

A And I took that question in order that the Department could do a little research on it, and in essence the answer is we will call Mr. Ortega what he calls himself after this election. And so if he chooses to refer to himself as President, presumably we will use that form of address, as we do other dignitaries in regimes around the world whose ideology is not particularly attractive to us.

Q I've got a follow-up on that one, too, which I put in early this morning. There have been some reports from the Middle East -- from some of our Middle Eastern bureaus anyway -- about new plots. You don't know how hard they are or how soft they are or anything else, particularly in Kuwait?

A Take them all seriously --

Q Yes, well --

A -- in the light of events.

Q And the question was put to us by several American newspaper clients: "What are we going to do about this thing?" Well, it's a very difficult area and it's a very security (sic) area.

A Uh-huh.

Q We realize that, you know. And also, I noticed up on the bulletin board that we take these threats very, very seriously and we're doing the best we can.

A Take the threats seriously and --

Q But the imperative part of this thing mostly came from the Middle East, and it said that three key embassies in our Middle East area, Kuwait, Beirut, Cairo, and Amman --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- were really drastically being drawn down, as far as Americans are concerned, you know.

A Uh-huh.

Q They wanted to know, is this true or not?

A Well, given the current situation, we're really not going to comment on security measures --

Q No, I understand -- this is a security matter.

A -- taken at specific embassies or indeed in general. There are threats; they are serious, in our estimate; and we are taking the kind of measures that we consider to be prudent at a number of embassies. But I'm not going to discuss them.

-- MORE --

Q Do you have any comment on the resignation of the Cabinet in Chile?

A We've seen that report. I understand that a new Cabinet is going to be sworn in at 4:00 p.m. EST today. Don't have anything further on it.

Q Well, in general in Chile, would you say say that -- would you tend to agree with former Interior Minister Jarpa's assessment that terrorists and the Catholic Church are the main blocks to democratization?

A I don't have any comment on that statement.

Q John, do you have anything on yesterday's meeting between the Secretary and the former Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens?

A I really don't have a readout. As I said yesterday, Mr Arens was in the United States on a private visit, asked to see the Secretary, and did. But I don't have a readout on that meeting for you.

Q John, can we attach any particular significance to the Secretary's meeting this afternoon with the Italian anti-terrorist team?

A Well, that's a group that is here for the kind of activity and consultation and exchange that a number of groups and governments, and ourselves, are involved in.

The Secretary, as you know, has a very keen interest in security and so is meeting with them, relatively briefly, this afternoon in pursuit of those interests.

Q (Inaudible).

A Let me give you a somewhat more precise reading on the composition of that group.

It's an Italian anti-terrorism delegation composed of members of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other Italian Government officials. The delegation is here for consultations with the U.S. on the subjects of common interest in this field, such as overall policy, the protection of embassies and the prevention of hijacking. It's another indication of the excellent cooperation between the U.S. and Italian governments in combating terrorism.

Q Does that have to do primarily with the assassination plot against the Pope?

A I think this is --

Q Or is that part of that --

A I think this is a delegation which is discussing terrorism in a rather broader framework.

Q Are there other meetings with other groups from other countries on this?

A Oh, I'm sure there are; yeah. It goes on all the time.

Q But you haven't announced them, have you?

A No, I don't have anything on any others.

Q There are reports from the Middle East that the Secretary of State is in consultation with former Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, in the way of planning for any new peace initiative in the Middle East after the elections and after -- Do you have any --

A I'm certainly not aware of such contact. The Secretary has met Mr. Kreisky in the past, but I'm certainly not aware of any recent contact, and I keep on giving you our view of the reports about a new Middle East initiative.

Q Anything on the violence in South Africa?

A Yes, I do have something on that. We're, of course, saddened by the violence and deaths in South Africa. We do not believe that violence holds the solution to the complex problems of South Africa. Rather, as President Reagan stated in his letter to Bishop Tutu on winning the Nobel Peace Prize last month, "We continue to urge the South African Government to engage in a meaningful dialogue with all its citizens aimed at accomplishing a peaceful transition away from apartheid."

U.S. policy of constructive engagement is intended to accomplish just that, to help foster peaceful non-violent change in the system of apartheid in South Africa which the President has called repugnant.

Q Can we have a copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q Back to Nicaragua. How could be affected the credibility of the U.S. support to the Contadora initiative if the National Security document is not denied?

A Well, that's a very odd-ball question. We never confirm or deny the correctness, accuracy, or otherwise of secret government documents. So you're setting up a stalking horse; it's just a non-question.

Q If I could ask that another way, perhaps. How can -- how does it square American support for the Contadora process with news that, in fact, we blocked, and tried to block, the first treaty to come out of that process?

A I wouldn't think that enthusiastic U.S. approval of a treaty which is considered to run counter to our national interests would be very intelligent or, indeed, would be within the spirit of the Contadora process. There's no point in any country agreeing to a treaty which is not enforceable, which is not going to be adhered to.

Q One other question on that. The Mexicans could not have been very pleased to read this morning's story in the Post. Have we heard from them or other Contadora nations about this?

A I keep on returning to the point that I'm not going to talk about a specific alleged document, but I'm not aware of any approach from the Mexicans this morning.

Q John, anything new on India?

A No, nothing more on India. We're looking into -- I understand that some news magazine photographers had some problems in India, and we're looking into that. Obviously, our attitude towards freedom of the press is well known.

Q Murphy's whereabouts?

A Murphy is in Israel today.

Q Any plans for him to return here soon?

A I don't know what his onward travel is, Greg. As you know, he pretty much indicates what that is on a day-to-day basis.

Q Thank you, John.

A Okay.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:27 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #202

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 1984, 12:10 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Don't have any announcements.

Q What do you have on what's on board the Soviet vessel which apparently docked last night in Nicaragua?

A I would be careful about that report that that ship had docked.

Q Okay. Can you tell us what happened?

A Well, you know, obviously we're not going to get into the intelligence ramifications of this particular case. The fact of the matter is that there is, as we have indicated frequently, a continuing flow of Soviet-bloc arms into Nicaragua, including current shipments.

We've made it clear that we deplore the continuing military buildup in Nicaragua, especially when that country already has created an overwhelming military imbalance in the region. And as we have indicated before, and made very clear to the various parties concerned, the addition of advanced combat aircraft to the Sandinista military arsenal would be a serious development which the United States would view with the utmost concern, and we are monitoring the situation carefully.

Q John, when you say "careful that the ship has docked," is it -- are you being very careful there with your words? Is it possible that that ship came in and left again, or has not, you know, in a strict narrow sense, docked?

A I'm not going down that direction. What I'm urging you to do is be scrupulously careful as you proceed with this story. There's a lot of speculation out there that the ship has already docked, I think some people have reported. I would be very careful about that suggestion that it has been in and out or that it has docked. And, of course, I would be careful about flat statements as to what is on that -- what is aboard that ship.

Q What is the -- the Administration, I guess -- and you used the term this morning again -- has cautioned the Sandinistas against deploying advanced aircraft. Is that the phrase?

A That is correct.

Q What does that mean?

A It means advanced combat aircraft.

Q Does that mean all MiG's?

A It means advanced combat aircraft.

Q What about helicopters, John? Are they included in "advanced combat aircraft?"

A Well, we're concerned about the overall supply of weaponry to Nicaragua. But I don't think you should necessarily include helicopters in the description "advanced combat aircraft." I think we're talking about high-speed jet aircraft.

Q John, there's a distinction between advanced aircraft and helicopters, granted. Nevertheless, there has been in the last couple of weeks an apparent escalation in the kind of equipment that the Nicaraguans are receiving -- the attack helicopters, some fairly sophisticated anti-aircraft systems.

Do we anticipate reacting to that sort of escalation short of some receipt of advanced fighter planes? How is --

A I'm not going to get into the question of a U.S. response. I think there isn't any question that the Soviet Union and Nicaragua are aware of the gravity of the statements we have made hitherto, and have again made recently. And those statements are there to be listened to carefully, but I'm not going to go beyond that and talk about response.

Q Have those been reiterated within the last 24-48 hours?

A Yes.

Q John, will you consider the using of the helicopters, the attack helicopters, against the contras within the borders of Nicaragua as a step further in the Sandinistas' aggressive policy?

A Well, as I have said, we're concerned about the flow overall, which we do not believe to be necessary, and believe certainly to be destablizing in the area. But I want to be careful that I don't mislead you into including certain items in this description of advanced combat aircraft which are not included.

Q John, can you --

A That doesn't mean that we consider the flow of other equipment to be something of which we take no notice.

Q John, just to be clear on this. When you say "which are not included," are you saying that in this reported shipment, not included are advanced combat aircraft?

A No, I'm not saying that about this particular shipment. If you're asking me whether we have any indication that advanced combat aircraft have yet been landed in Nicaragua, the answer to that would be no; we have no confirmation.

Q All right. To follow that up, do you have any indication that such combat aircraft may now be on freighters heading for Nicaragua?

A That's the kind of thing that we are monitoring. That is the kind of thing that we are not prepared to discuss, but I continue to urge you to be cautious and clinical as you pick up speculation as to what might or might not be on that ship.

Q You yourself -- I mean, the government itself does not know at this point what is on it? When you say we're monitoring it very carefully --

A We're monitoring it very carefully.

Q That still doesn't indicate whether you know what's on board the ships?

A No, and I guess I'm really not responding to that question.

Q John, can you go to the question of L-39's? I mean, what category do they fall into?

A No, I don't think I'm prepared to break down what kind of fixed-wing jet aircraft we're talking about.

Q John, could you say exactly what our concern about drawing that distinction is, the distinction between "advanced combat aircraft?"

What exactly would the capabilities of an advanced combat aircraft be that we're so concerned about?

A Well, I presume that they would have a pretty demoralizing and destabilizing effect on some of Nicaragua's neighbors.

Q Are we concerned about their capabilities against our own naval forces in the area, for example?

A I'm not going to speculate beyond where I've gone.

Q You said the U.S. position has been reiterated in the past 24 to 48 hours. To both the Nicaraguan and the Soviet governments?

A It certainly has to the Soviet Government, and I don't think there's any question that the Nicaraguans are aware of our long-standing position on this.

Q What prompted this reiteration of the position -- of the U.S. position?

A Well, there are reports of a Soviet vessel in the vicinity of Nicaragua.

Q What reaction did you get? Can you say --

A I'm not going --

Q Can you say what level the protest was?

A No, I don't think I really will. It was both here and in Moscow.

Q In written form?

A I'm not going to get into it, John.

Q John, why are we drawing a line at combat aircraft and not at ground combat vehicles like tanks?

A I think that our position has been consistently to take particular exception to the advanced combat aircraft.

which we consider to be particularly destabilizing, and obviously having an offensive reach beyond the boundaries of Nicaragua.

Q John, since this ship apparently left in September from a Soviet port --

A I'm sorry, John, I didn't catch the beginning.

Q Since the vessel apparently left in September from a Soviet port, have we previously, before this last 24-48-hour notice to the Soviets, said anything to them about this --

A Let me go a little bit further and say, not only are we monitoring the situation carefully, we have been monitoring the situation carefully.

Q John, the Nicaraguan Embassy sort of denies that they are even looking for advanced aircraft.

A Yes, I've seen that, and I think there is also a junta statement of denial, too. That's why -- it's probably a good idea for everybody to take this story step-by-step and very carefully until we see -- until it is established --

Q My question then is, what evidence do we have that they are even desiring to get advanced aircraft, to make this an issue? Why --

A You're asking me what evidence we have. I mean, I have to point out that it is not us, not the United States Government, that initiated this story.

Q John, are you in a way saying that we're hoping to use -- that yes, indeed, there may be MiG-21's in those crates marked "MiG-21" and they may be near a Nicaraguan port, but that we're hoping to use diplomacy to make sure they're not off-loaded?

A Well, we're certainly hoping to use diplomacy in the general sense, and have all along, in the hope that diplomacy would prevent any shipment.

As to the specifics of whether there is anything on that ship or not, I'm not going to go into that.

Q But even, let's say, dealing with the fear of what's on that ship, are we using diplomacy to make sure that nothing we don't want off-loaded is off-loaded?

A Concerns have been raised, obviously, about the contents of that ship. And certainly we are reiterating our position and underlining how imprudent it would be for aircraft, should they be on that ship or any other ship, to arrive in Nicaragua.

Q Have those concerns been raised directly with the Nicaraguans, or are you just talking about what you're saying publicly?

A They certainly have been raised with Nicaragua in the past.

Q John, just to try to get a little closer: Do you know what is on the ship?

A I think that I'm just going to pass on that question, Marvin.

Q You've done so well on some of the others.

A Sorry?

Q You've done so well on some of the others.

A I've been so forthcoming on all the rest that I've passed the limit.

We are looking at that. We're continuing to look at that situation very closely.

Q I know, but you're leaving us with the impression that you must know what is on it because you've gone to the Russians; you've explained to them that --

A Well, one -- I don't think --

Q I mean, if it was loaded up with stacks of hay, you wouldn't have done it.

A Well, let me help you a bit with that. I don't think you would need necessarily to have proof of what was on a certain vessel to underline one's concern to the Soviets about what might be on the vessel.

Q You're not positive but you suspect?

A I think I gave you good words in what I just said.

Q John, how do you characterize the Soviet response, if any, to your presentation?

A I'm not going to characterize it.

Q Do you have any comment on Mr. Gromyko's speech yesterday --

Q Before we leave that, can you just clarify on the last question? Are you saying, in effect -- I mean, there have been some reports that the crates are crates that would have carried MiG-21's and are so marked, but that the U.S. Government does not know, in fact, what is inside the crates for sure. Is that, in effect, what you're --

A Well, I mean stories since last night, now in the public domain, that there are crates on that vessel. There's speculation as to what might be in the crates. I guess there's some speculation as to whether there, in fact, are crates on that ship.

Q But where are you taking us here? That towards -

A I'm not taking you beyond the speculation.

Q You're not suggesting that the U.S. Government at this point knows what is in the crates, are you?

A I'm not suggesting that.

Q You could end the speculation rather quickly by just telling us what you know. (Laughter)

--MORE--

Q John, just two small points: Do we know what port the ship departed from and what the name of it is?

A (Pause) We do know that. (Laughter) We do know that.

Q You said a while ago that this --

(Laughter)

A Thank you, Don. Very helpful.

(Laughter).

Q Would you like to tell us the name? Let's just start with that.

A Let me take a look at that for you.

Q You said a while ago these stories were not originated by the U.S. Government. Where do you think they're coming from?

A I think the initiator was a network report last night.

Q Don't you think they've got it from somebody, some government somewhere? (Laughter)

A I know not. I'm continuously bemused by sources for stories, Don.

Q Do you have any idea what the motivation might have been?

A No, I don't have any idea what the motivation was. I mean, I really think we all have to take this story step-by-step and be careful about it.

Q John, do you have any comment on Mr. Gromyko's speech and/or the statement by the Soviet Government to the President today?

A I do have some comment on Mr. Gromyko's speech. The United States certainly agrees with Mr. Gromyko that there are real possibilities for improving relations between our two countries. The Administration has been urging the Soviet Union for some time now to join us in capitalizing on those possibilities.

The United States has put forward numerous practical proposals for forward movement in all areas of our relationship, including arms control. We are not the ones who have intransigently refused to negotiate practical solutions to our problems.

At the same time, we disagree fundamentally with Mr. Gromyko's very distorted version of recent history. We are disappointed by the repetition of the Soviet view that it is incumbent on the United States to pay a price so that the Soviet Union will come back to the nuclear negotiating table.

We recognize that negotiations will require give-and-take. We are ready whenever the Soviet Union is, but we cannot accept Soviet insistence that all the give must come from our side.

It will take concrete deeds to improve our relations. When the Soviet Union is ready to negotiate, they will not find the United States wanting.

Q Copy, please?

A Sure.

Q How about the other part of Bernie's question?

A That's all I've got on it right now.

Q To go back to the Nicaraguans, the Nicaraguan Embassy has said that the story originated from a campaign official in California, who cited an intelligence source in the U.S. Government.

A Uh-huh.

Q Is that incorrect, as far as you know?

A Don't know. Don't know where it came from.

Q John, usually, or at times, you characterize a Soviet reply. Can you tell us in this case whether they just out-of-hand refused, contradicted what we said to them, or whether they just listened carefully and said nothing, or --

A No. The answer to your question, John, is no, I can't.

Q You won't characterize that?

A "Can't" I prefer better than "won't."

Q New subject, John?

Now that the election is over, is there any change in the status of alert for U.S. embassies abroad, especially in the Middle East?

A I'm not aware of any change in the alert status as of today.

Q Wouldn't you expect to see, perhaps, a change in the next -- or is this --

A I guess we'd have to wait and see.

Q How about the level of threats yesterday, John? As we monitored them coming in on election day, was there any change in the level, or pitch, or number?

A No, not that I'm aware of.

Q Still pretty high?

A Still pretty high.

Q Have you any comment on the story in the Washington Post yesterday saying that the Egyptian authorities are permitted, or gave permission to a U.S. nuclear-powered cruise to cross the Suez Canal?

A No. I think probably the Pentagon would be the place to answer that question.

Q What is the personnel situation here? Do people have to, who are Presidential -- political appointees, are you all supposed to submit resignations?

A I don't know what the situation is concerning Presidential appointees across the board. I believe there is such a provision concerning ambassadors, and I'll be glad to look into that to see what has happened, if anything, about asking for their resignations.

Q John, can you comment on the report from the Middle East that you evacuated, the United States Government evacuated, most of its diplomats from Beirut, Amman, and Kuwait Embassies?

A No, I don't think we're really going to get into a very detailed discussion of what is going on in embassies in that area where the risks are high, but obviously, the ambassadors in those embassies, and others, are being prudent about the current threat, and I presume are not anxious to provide a lot of targets for would-be terrorists, so they are taking the kind of prudent activities that you might expect.

Q Do you see anything significant in Syria forbidding the flight of Iranian airlines over it to prevent the coming to Syria of terrorists or something like that?

A No.

Q Now that the election ended, do you expect the situation about terrorism to be more relaxed?

A Well there is no evidence that the terrorist threat has relaxed today -- let's put it that way.

Q Do you have any --

Q Is Murphy still out there finding facts, John?

A Murphy is in Iraq today.

Q Iraq?

A Yes.

Q Is there a threat that you're aware of in the last three or four days against the President in California that led the Secret Service to ask for the registrations of every single vehicle owner in the State of California?

A I'm not aware -- I mean, I don't know. I'm not aware of such a specific threat. I guess there were some statements issued in the Middle East including the President in the suggested targets, but I'm not responding to a specific threat in the way you posed the question, John.

Q John, is there any plan to introduce a new approach to resolve the Middle East issue, or will it be pursuant to the old initiative?

A I think the President's 1982 initiative is very appropriate, and I don't know that anybody has taken it any further or offered any particularly good alternative.

Q Do you have a comment on the imposition of the state of siege in Chile?

A Yes, I do. Over the past year, the United States has repeatedly emphasized its support for a dialogue between the government and democratic forces to develop a consensus on the orderly return to democracy in Chile. The growing cycle of violence by the extreme left and repressive measures by the government reinforce the need for such a dialogue.

We are not in a position to offer a comprehensive analysis of the ultimate implications of the latest developments in Chile. It is clear from events of recent days that there is a growing terrorist problem, but the question is whether this problem is of such dimensions as to justify the extreme measures associated with a state of siege.

We appeal to both the government and the democratic forces outside government to overcome their differences and to move ahead toward a consensus on the transition to democracy.

Q What do you mean by the "democratic forces" in Chile?

A I think the words speak for themselves.

Q Copy?

Q It's a little bit ambiguous, the bit about "the question is whether or not these terrorist acts" --

A The question is open.

Q Huh?

A I think the point is, the question is open.

Q But is that to be read as a criticism or a condemnation of --

A It's not to be read as a criticism; it's simply raised as a question, as to whether the extent of the violence justifies the extent of the response.

Q So we're not condemning the imposition of the state of siege?

A I think I'd prefer to leave you with my words.

Q Could we have a copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q John, last week, on the subject of Chile, you had another statement -- I think it was last week --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- which said among other things that because of the actions being taken down there, the United States was reconsidering its interests in Chile.

A Uh-huh.

Q How is this reconsideration coming along? Is it finished? Or, does the fact that this statement does not mention that suggest one thing or another about it?

A I think it's a matter that is still under review.

Q Do you mean that it's left to the Chile Government to decide whom to get into contact with, or whom to negotiate with?

A I think the forces in action in Chile know who they are and know who they need to engage in a dialogue with.

Q If the Communist Party of Chile is considered out of these democratic forces, so do you think that this would be a negotiation with the opposition?

A We're not seeking to mastermind or tailor a solution; we're making some observations about the general need for dialogue there.

Q John, you said Ambassador Murphy was in Iraq. There were reports, including some by the Iraqi President, that after the November election, Iraq would take up the question of formal diplomatic relations with the U.S.

A Uh-huh.

Q Is Ambassador Murphy empowered to reach any kind of agreement while he's there on this question?

A That statement is out there by the Iraqis, but I can't take it any further, and don't really have any comment on it, Bernie. He will be discussing matters of bilateral and regional interest with the Iraqis.

Q Has he ever extended an invitation to Tariq Aziz to visit the U.S.?

A He's discussing matters of bilateral and regional interest.

(Laughter)

Q Do you have the dates of the visit? (Laughter)

A Don't have any dates for a visit.

Q Is he also studying the situation, or fact-finding?

A He's studying the situation and fact-finding, yes.

Q Is that date of November 28 the date for the talks on non-proliferation with the Russians?

A Yes, that's a good date, yes.

Q What about the trade talks mentioned in today's --

A Yes, sure. I mean, do you want something on trade talks?

Q Yes, please.

A Sure. We are planning to have a meeting of a working group of American and Soviet economic and trade experts in Moscow in early January. Commerce Under Secretary for International Trade Lionel Olmer will head the U.S. delegation to these talks.

We expect our experts to review various aspects of the U.S.-Soviet trade relationship and hope that this will result in better contacts and an increased flow of commercial information between us. We do not expect a sharp rise in trade as a result of the meeting but believe that it will have a positive impact on our trade relations.

Q Copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q Thank you.

A O.K.

(The briefing concluded at 12:35 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #203

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 8, 1984, 12:00 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: I have some housekeeping announcements and a very lean book.

A couple of BACKGROUND briefings: First, one on the Secretary's trip to Brazil. On Friday afternoon at 2:30, we'll have a BACKGROUND briefing here on the Secretary's trip to Brazil to attend the 14th General Assembly of the Organization of American States. That meeting will take place in Brasilia between November 12 and 17. The Secretary, obviously, will not be there for that entire period -- that's the meeting period.

An ON-THE-RECORD briefing on the drought situation in Ethiopia: AID Administrator Peter McPherson, just back from Ethiopia, will hold a press conference on the drought situation in Africa. That will be on Friday at 1:30 here in the briefing room. That will be ON-THE-RECORD for both sound and camera. And somewhat in connection with the Ethiopian situation, journalists who are planning to go to Addis Ababa to cover the famine should be aware of the extremely difficult conditions under which they will have to operate. Hotel reservations are controlled by the Ethiopian Government and are almost impossible to obtain, particularly during the upcoming OAU Summit Meeting between November 8-15.

Journalists should also arrange for visas beforehand and expect delays, not only with visas but with transportation arrangements inside the country and permits to travel within the country once they arrive. Our Embassy, our mission there, will be as helpful as we can. But this is by way of warning that there are some problems attendant upon covering the situation in Ethiopia.

Q Other than that, they are welcome. (Laughter)

Q John, a procedural question: Will the briefing tomorrow be limited to the Brazil trip?

A It will be limited to the Brazil trip, that's correct.

Q What will he (the briefer) do if we ask a Central America question?

Q Run.

A I imagine he will handle that with his usual aplomb.

(Laughter)

Q In that regard, do you have any of that for us today? A plum?

A A plum? (Laughter) No, no plum.

Q -- regarding the delivery of high-performance aircraft to Nicaragua? Can you --

A Nothing. Can't take you beyond where we were yesterday. We continue to monitor that situation very closely. We would, obviously, continue to be concerned about the possibility of delivery of high-speed combat aircraft, but I don't have anything to go beyond yesterday.

Q What about Nicaraguan claims that we've been monitoring the situation with overflights and even with a ship?

A Well, I think the Pentagon has responded very directly to suggestions that their vessels have encroached upon Nicaraguan territorial waters, and I think I'll refer you to the Pentagon on questions concerning ships and flights in that area.

Q Has the Soviet Union responded to your words of concern of the other day?

A Don't have anything further on that, Bernie.

Q Can I get, can I ask something further on your initial statement -- and forgive me if I cover ground that you covered yesterday?

A I forgive you.

Q You said you're monitoring the situation carefully. Are you telling us that you're monitoring this delivery carefully to see whether it has MIGs in it, or are you telling us that you're monitoring the general situation of delivery of MIGs in general? In other words, are you still holding out the possibility that there are MIGs or high-performance aircraft aboard this particular ship?

A Well, obviously, we are paying close attention overall to the possibility that MIGs or other high-performance aircraft might be delivered; but I think that the ship that is in port is the particular focus of our interest.

Q So you still believe there is a possibility that those high-performance aircraft may be aboard that ship?

A Still taking a -- still monitoring that particular ship and its unloading pattern and plans carefully, yes.

Q Has it unloaded yet, to your knowledge?

A Don't have anything more for you.

Q John, this morning Senator Moynihan said on a television appearance that the issue of introducing MIGs into Nicaragua is not really one between the U.S. and Nicaragua, but one between the U.S. and the Soviet Union because the Soviet Union would thereby be introducing strategic weapons into the region.

Is that a view shared by this Administration?

A Well, certainly, if those aircraft came from the Soviet Union, obviously we would be making clear, as we have done, our views to the Soviets. That's not to say that we haven't made our position very clear to the Nicaraguans in addition.

Q Have you received a protest note from the Nicaraguans?

A Yes, we have received --

Q -- on the overflights?

A -- a protest.

Q Have you replied?

A No.

Q Nicaragua has warned that this is all a prelude to an American invasion of Nicaragua. Do you have any comment?

A   As the President and the Secretary have consistently said, there are no plans for an American invasion of Nicaragua.

Q   Today.

A   Well, let me -- let me -- I think you have to see those -- you have to recall the sequence of the statements. There are no plans for an American invasion of Nicaragua. At the same time, we have used serious language in expressing our concern about the consequences of landing in Nicaragua high-speed, combat aircraft.

Q   John, could you take another crack at answering Greg's question? I have the impression that you gave an answer, but it might not have been directly in response to his question.

A   Well, if you -- I'm not quite sure where the question was going. If the question is, do we deal only with the Soviet Union on this question, the answer to that --

Q   No, no.

Q   Is it chiefly a U.S.-Soviet issue rather than a U.S.-Nicaragua issue?

A   I think that obviously a principal thrust of any exchanges we might have on this issue would be with the country supplying the aircraft; but that's not to say that we wouldn't make our concerns and the implications of such an action known to the Nicaraguans in addition.

Q   But the problem is essentially a U.S.-Soviet problem, since Nicaragua in this case -- all we're talking about is -- they are the recipient.

A   Well --

Q   It says a great deal about the Soviet Union who provided the (inaudible)

A   Well, I think you're splitting hairs. I mean if the aircraft were to be delivered to the Nicaraguans, it seems a little fanciful to say that they would be the innocent, unwilling recipients of these aircraft, thrust upon them by another power.

Q John, what did you mean by saying "introduction of such aircraft would be introduction of strategic weapons into the area?" I mean, they're certainly --

A When did I say that?

Q Moynihan said that this morning.

Q Oh, I'm sorry. Excuse me. All right.

Q John, can we pursue that and just ask you about the nature of the problem that you would foresee developing? Is it a strategic problem? Is it a threat to Nicaragua's neighbors? What kind of problem does it create?

A I think Nicaragua's neighbors would see it as a threat to themselves. If you look at the range and the speed and the distance in which even an aircraft would need to turn, an aircraft of that caliber, I'm sure that Nicaragua's neighbors would consider it to be a destabilizing introduction of sophisticated weaponry.

Q But since you don't speak for Nicaragua's neighbors, what does the U.S. view the situation as?

A Well, I don't think there is any question about the United States' concern in such an area very close to our own borders.

Q So you --

A We have compelling national interests in that area, and the suggestion that we would be unconcerned by that event is ludicrous, it seems to me.

Q John, you may be concerned, but what would the justification be to say that they do not, they cannot take delivery of those planes. It seems to be the U.S. telling another country what sort of weapons it can buy somewhere?

A It certainly would be the United States' warning of the implications of introducing that kind of aircraft so close to our own borders and in an area in which we have an acute interest.

Q How would we justify -- can we justify in terms of international law, saying that we would not tolerate their taking such aircraft?

A I don't know what our legal people would offer you in the way of words on that, but the fact is that we consider that that would have a destabilizing influence in the area.

Q John, how would you answer the Nicaraguan argument that they have the right to buy any weapons they want to defend against U.S.-backed guerrillas who are killing their people?

A Well, I guess you have to look at the role of the weapons that they introduce, and make your judgments about the defensive and offensive capacities of those weapons.

Q John, were you saying in answer to Phil's question that you would consider the introduction of these weapons to be an act taken by the Soviet Union, or the supplier of those weapons, against the United States or against Nicaragua's neighbors?

A No, I really wasn't responding to that. I was simply saying that the Soviet Union in this case, were it proved to be the case, would be the supplier, and obviously, we have made known to the Soviet Union our concerns. There is no question that those concerns are also known to the Nicaraguans.

Q Have you been in touch with the Nicaraguans over the past day or two, as you have been with the Soviets?

A I'm not sure that we have been in touch with the Nicaraguans in the past day or so, but there's no question about their awareness of our view.

Q Are we interested in any kind of mutual defense pact with Honduras?

A That relationship between the United States and Honduras is a good one and a dynamic one -- has been, continues to be -- and if they have any particular concerns or interests, we certainly would be very willing to sit down and discuss those with them.

Q Do you think that -- Is there a likelihood that Shultz and McFarlane will meet with them, as the Washington Post reported they're seeking such a meeting?

A I'm not aware of any such meetings scheduled, but I can't speak for what the calendar might be in days ahead

Q John, one of the concerns you expressed was the proximity of these aircraft, if they were to be delivered, to our own borders.

A Uh-huh.

Q I wonder if you could elaborate a little bit on that and say whether or not that fact might justify some sort of unilateral action on the part of the United States?

A Well, as the President has said, he is not going to get into the question of how we might respond to such a delivery, and certainly, I'm not.

Q Could I take you back --

A Sure.

Q -- though, to the first part of the question --

A Right.

Q --and ask you to elaborate on the significance of the proximity of these aircraft to U.S. borders?

A I think we have an acute interest in what goes on in our own back yard.

Q Would these planes, if they existed, pose any manner of threat to --

A They might.

Q Sir. Sir.

A Yes.

-- MORE --

Q Could one say -- could one not say that this -- if MIGs should be landed, would this not be another blow at the Monroe Doctrine? I know there have been so many blows. Would this not be another strike at the Monroe Doctrine?

A Well, I think what I will do is refer you back to the words the President has used. And I think it has been made clear by the Administration that this would be considered a destabilizing action.

Q John, when you talk about a threat by the MIGs, are you referring to the U.S. mainland, or are you referring to Nicaragua's neighbors, or are you referring to the Panama Canal?

A I wasn't getting specific. I was simply making the point that it is considered to be in the national -- that area features in the national interest of the United States.

Q But when you talked about "national interests" down there, can we say that one of those interests would be the Canal? Is that one of your --

A I think our interest extends throughout the area.

Q Has anything happened today that --

Q Can I ask you about something that I'm not clear about.

A Sure.

Q When you're talking about -- is it the view of the Administration that the Soviet Union by introducing MIGs, should it occur, into Nicaragua, is introducing offensive strategic weapons against the United States, or do you see the introduction of MIGs as an attempt by Nicaragua to have an offensive capability against U.S. allies in the region?

A Well, I don't think we can be in a position of analyzing their motivation and intent. I think what we have to do is look at the possible consequences and formulate our own response, and I think that's what we're doing. We're saying we do not think the presence of high-speed aircraft delivered to a regime of that character, given its activities and its proven record of subversion outside its own borders in the area, we do not consider that to be in the national interest of the United States, or in the interest of other countries in the area.

Q John, has there been a serious intelligence breakdown here in that it seems that the Administration was aware of these things being loaded in the Soviet Union and yet, in the most heavily surveyed sector of this hemisphere as far as American intelligence is concerned, you seem incapable of telling us whether these things have been delivered or not?

A I didn't say we were incapable of telling you. I said I wasn't going to tell you.

Q Do you know?

A I said I wasn't going to discuss intelligence activities.

Q John, is there anything more today that has occurred between what you knew yesterday and what you knew today that would lead you to repeat the caution and the warnings that were delivered yesterday?

A There's nothing new that would lead me to repeat the caution, but I would repeat the caution. I think we all should proceed step-by-step as the story develops.

Q I ask the question because I understand that the Soviets have reassured the Administration personally in two cases -- fairly senior officials -- that these MIGs were not being delivered on this ship. Do you have reason -- indeed, one Soviet official apparently is quoted as telling an American, "You have nothing to worry about." Do you have reason to doubt that today?

A Well, I'm not going to respond to purported conversations between ourselves and the Soviet Union.

Q Have you received an answer to the warnings from the Soviet Union?

A As I said earlier, I'm just not going to get into our exchanges with the Soviet Union.

Q Are you worried -- are you as worried about the helicopters that Nicaragua has as you are about high-performance aircraft in terms of their offensive capability against neighbors if not against the United States?

A I think we went over that ground yesterday.

Q Okay, sorry.

Q John, the Nicaraguans say that the ship has been unloaded. I think they say military supplies have arrived.

They say there are no MIGs among the supplies.

Is your information such that you, too, believe that the ship has been unloaded?

A Not going to get into that, Marvin.

Q You don't know at this point?

A Not going to get into that, Marvin.

Q You know where the ship is? Is it still in port?

A I think we know where the ship is.

Q Is it in port?

A I think we know where the ship is. (Laughter)

Q John, was there anything unloaded, as far as you know, that would indicate that the Nicaraguans are preparing to receive MIGs at some point in the future?

A I think where we are, John, is exactly where we were yesterday when you pressed me whether we had any information that would confirm that these aircraft have been landed. And my answer to that yesterday was no, and my answer to that today is no. We do not have information which would confirm that such aircraft have been landed in Nicaragua.

Q Do you have information today that would indicate that those aircraft were actually loaded onto that ship?

A Watching the situation closely.

Q Do you have any evidence that the Nicaraguans are preparing in any way to receive aircraft? Besides this business of the ship, have you seen activity at airfields or anything else that would indicate --

A Not specific activity at airfields. Obviously, over a period of time, we have drawn attention to the length of the runways and the capacity of airfields in Nicaragua to handle high-speed aircraft.

Q John --

Q And that capacity -- excuse me -- and that capacity has been increasing, concerns you?

A Over the months, yes.

Q John, there was a shipment that received this sort of attention last June. I believe it was in early June, and I'm not sure which port it was at, but is there something different about this shipment from that one up until the point where we now know what was unloaded in that one but we may or may not yet.

Is there anything different about this shipment at this point that leads you to be any more suspicious?

A I don't quite follow the thrust of your question.

Q Well, at the time that other shipment was being moved, everybody was watching it carefully, and the same warnings were issued about MIGs, and so on, and then it was unloaded and there wasn't anything on it. There weren't any MIGs on it.

At this point, assuming that the ship has not yet been unloaded, is there any more reason to believe that the -- to be suspicious of this shipment than there was to be of the shipment in June?

A I'm really not going to get into why you are more suspicious of one ship than another.

Q But are you, as opposed to why are you?

A My guess is that the amount of time we've all devoted to this yesterday and today underlines that we at least have had some suspicions about the contents of this vessel.

Q Have you -- have other governments in the area supposed a threat -- supposedly threatened by this development, if it occurs, sought your advance and requested that you do -- you talk to the Russians and to the Nicaraguans about it?

A I'm sure there have been such discussions in the past. I'm not aware of what may have taken place recently.

Q John, would it be correct to characterize the current situation now around Nicaragua as a sort of partial naval blockade?

A No, I don't think that would be correct.

Q How will you --

A I think it would be very incorrect.

Q Well, how do you characterize the situation where the Nicaraguan naval movement is now under surveillance by the United States?

A Well, I haven't said it's under surveillance.

Q John, do you expect that the Secretary will meet with Foreign Minister D'Escoto this weekend in Brasilia to talk about this?

A Don't know whether that may happen or not.

Q Do you plan to raise the issue at the meeting of the OAS in Brasilia?

A I'm not aware of any plans so to do.

Q John, in general, would you --

A You have to bear in mind this story's not played out yet. I mean, you seem to be reaching conclusions about what is being delivered, and I continue to urge you to be careful about that.

Q One way or the other -- careful about it?

A Well, I think we should all be clinically objective and careful about this story.

Q John, the Foreign Minister of Nicaragua has been very categoric in denying this MIG story.

A Yes, that's right.

Q Is there any evidence to disprove him at this time?

A I think that those statements have certainly been listened to and taken into account, but that doesn't mean that our monitoring of the situation isn't continuing. But I think that is certainly a factor, the Nicaraguan denials.

Q Well, John, regardless of the fact of whether there are or are not advanced aircraft underway to Nicaragua, what do we know insofar as Nicaragua's procuring advanced aircraft?

A Don't have anything that I could offer you on that.

Q New subject?

A Sure.

Q Do you have any comment on an Israeli television report that says that Ambassador Lewis will leave his position to be replaced by Ambassador McFarlane with Ambassador Kirkpatrick moving into McFarlane's position?

A Yeah, I think that report has been very strongly refuted at the White House.

Q John, there have been some reports in the Middle East speaking of the Murphy plan and Reagan plan. Is there such a plan carried by Murphy to resolve the Middle East issue and Lebanon?

A Well, I heard somewhere that Mr. Murphy was poised in Israel to engage in a shuttle, but, in fact, he's in Iraq.

Q Anything on the Israeli-Lebanese talks that began today?

A No. We've been for those talks, and so I think that's a positive development.

Q Any change in U.S. participation, observation, whatever you want to call it?

A No.

Q John, do you have any further views on the situation in Chile? Apparently more --

Q Wait. Can we stay on the Middle East?

A A plea to stay on the Middle East.

Q Thank you. With whom is Secretary Shultz meeting today among the Jewish leaders, and why?

A He is having lunch with some Jewish leaders, but I don't have a list of the guests with me. Let me see what we might have on that.

Q John, on that, is he going to be talking at all about the Israeli free trade area?

A I honestly do not know. I know he's meeting with some Jewish leaders, but I don't know what the subject is.

Q Can you find out?

A Let me see what we might have for you.

Q John, you said Murphy is Iraq now?

A Murphy is in Iraq.

Q Is he discussing the restoring of relations between Iraq and the USA?

A As I told you yesterday, he's discussing matters of bilateral and regional interests.

Q Can we consider that the USA would have more positive position in the Iraq-Iran war than ever now?

A Our position on the war is unchanged.

Q Thank you.

A Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:25 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #204

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 1984, 12:06 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: A couple of housekeeping announcements and then a statement on the persecution of the Baha'is in Iran.

Firstly, briefings: at 1:30 this afternoon, here, an ON-THE-RECORD briefing by AID Administrator Peter McPherson. He's just back from Ethiopia. That will be on the drought situation in Africa. That's ON THE RECORD.

Here this afternoon at 2:30, a BACKGROUND briefing on the Secretary's trip to Brazil. That's for his attendance at the OAS meeting.

Thirdly, also this afternoon -- busy afternoon -- BACKGROUND briefing at 3:15 here on the visit to the United States of Grand Duke Jean of Luxembourg. That also is ON BACKGROUND.

And, finally, a reminder that since Monday is a Federal holiday, the Press Office will be closed and operating on a Sunday schedule.

Now, on the Baha'is, we have recently received additional disturbing reports of the Khomeini regime's severe persecution of Iran's Baha'i community. According to these reports, five more Baha'is have died in Iranian prisons. Three of them were apparently executed, two died in prison under circumstances which suggest death as a result of torture. Three of the five deaths were of individuals who had been included among 32 Iranian Baha'is condemned to death in mid-summer.

Since coming to power, Iran's revolutionary Islamic government is believed to have executed approximately 175 Baha'is in an apparent attempt to eliminate Baha'ism regarded by the mullahs as a heresay rather than a separate religion.

These further deaths cause grave concern for the fate of the over 750 Baha'is who remain in Iranian prisons. The United States wishes to take this occasion to reiterate what

1-2905

President Reagan said in May 1983, "America and the world are increasingly alarmed and dismayed at the persecution and severe repression of the Baha'is in Iran."

Furthermore, we call upon the Iranian authorities to abide by the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief. In November 1981, Iran, under the present regime, joined in a consensus of the U.N. General Assembly in the adoption of this Declaration affirming the principle of respect for the right of religious freedom.

Q May we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q John, can you bring us up to date on what you have concerning the Soviet vessel or vessels off the Nicaraguan coast?

A Can't really take it much beyond yesterday. We're continuing to watch the unloading process in which that ship is engaged very closely. It has unloaded a number of crates. There are other crates on the dockside alongside that vessel, and we're continuing to observe the situation very carefully.

Q John, is the State Department backing off from its original or the Administration's original statements that were awfully strong in the beginning?

I'm sensing around, talking to people, that the State Department is less sure about the intelligence information that there are MIGs there.

A Well, I don't agree with your question. I don't -- the premise. I don't agree that the Administration was "strong." In fact, quite to the contrary. We have consistently urged from the very beginning that everybody take a cool, clear, clinical, objective look at this story.

The fact is that the Administration was observing a vessel proceeding from the Soviet Union in the direction of Central America. That vessel went around Latin America, and we were particularly concerned when it appeared to be heading for Nicaragua. That process of monitoring was going on when the story was broken, and I do not think the Administration can fairly be accused of starting a scare or seeking to publicize the situation.

The fact is, from the beginning we have consistently said we are looking at that particular ship, and indeed other ships, but particularly that ship because it is conceivable that it might have been carrying high-speed performance aircraft -- high-performance aircraft.

Q Do you think that there's a possibility that the Soviets were bluffing the U.S., testing our resolve by placing crates where our intelligence people could see them that might have contained MIGs but, in fact, did not?

A Well, that's always a possibility. I don't think we can explain Soviet motivation, but I guess that's always a possibility.

Q John, has the United been assured by the Soviets that there were not MIGs on the ship?

A Well, as you know, we don't care very much to get into detail of our exchanges with the Soviet Union, but I wouldn't steer you away from the theme on that particular subject of a story in the New York Times this morning.

Q John, just out of curiosity, do you have any -- does the Government of the United States have any idea what might be causing sonic booms in Managua these days?

A I guess I would refer you to the Pentagon on allegations of U.S. military movements in that area.

If your question has any relationship to reconnaissance aircraft or --

Q They might be passenger planes; I don't know.

A -- obviously, we wouldn't respond to that kind of question.

Q Do you have any comment on the exercises that are now going on?

A No, but I think the Pentagon has. I gather there's a fair amount of hysteria abroad about exercises and troop movements which the Pentagon is explaining very forcefully.

Q What do you think about the hysteria that's been generated that you mentioned?

A Apparently it's misplaced.

Q Why?

A Well, if there's a suggestion the United States has embarked on an invasion of Nicaragua, that is manifestly not the case.

Q John, how does this situation get resolved? The ship leaves port at some point. Will we ever know whether there were MIGs on board that boat if they don't unload the crates that we saw before?

A Well, I think some crates have been unloaded --

Q Do they --

A -- but we will continue to monitor that situation.

Q The crates that have been unloaded so far are not the kind that would contain MIGs?

A Well, you're making that as a statement.

Q I'm asking you.

A I wouldn't respond to that question. There are crates -- some crates are alongside that ship of varying sizes.

--MORE--

Q In other words, we're still in the process of analyzing what those crates look like and therefore what they might contain?

A Still monitoring the situation.

Q John, do you have any comment on --

Q What is the U.S. position regarding the U.N. Security Council meeting asked for by Nicaragua?

A I'm not -- there may have been a formal request. I haven't seen it yet, Don, and I'm sure our people at the U.N. will be taking that up. But I'm not aware of a formal Nicaraguan request yet.

Q Does the United States believe there is any reason for a meeting of the Security Council to investigate threats to Nicaragua?

A I don't know what our response will be on a meeting of the Security Council, but there is no U.S. threat to Nicaragua.

Q John, on a related question, there are new reports that Salvadoran Commander Monterrosa and a couple other high-level officials, when they went down in that chopper, that apparently field inspectors down there now say it was sabotage and they were blown up. Can you comment on that?

A I don't think I can, really. That was a Salvadoran Government inquiry, and it is their finding, and I think you ought to ask the Salvadoran authorities about that.

Q John, do you have any comment on the TASS statements today about the preparation for an armed attack which TASS warns could have far-reaching consequences for the United States? Is that what you were referring to when you used the word "hysteria?"

A An armed attack on --

Q Nicaragua.

A Well, they are obviously not correct.

Q Is that what you were referring to when you used the word "hysteria" earlier?

A   Well, no. I guess I was really responding to Robin's question, or suggestion which -- and I may be unfair -- implicit in the question that the Administration had fomented a lot of speculation about high-speed aircraft going to Nicaragua and now is backing off, which I think is a very unfair characterization of what has happened. I think we've tried to be objective about these reports.

Q   Given what you know about the exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels in recent days, how should we read the public exchanges of strong warnings on the part of the United States and strong warnings now on the part of TASS? Is this merely a war of words at the moment, or are the two sides escalating their rhetoric over Nicaragua?

A   I don't know that there has been any escalation The United States has simply reiterated its concerns about the introduction of high-speed aircraft into Nicaragua. That is not a new position; we have done it before. We have done it for over a period of almost two years, I think it is. They were always intended to be words of gravity, treated seriously, and we have repeated them.

Q   John, can you comment on -- there is a report from the White House, a senior official, at least in the Washington Post version, saying the Soviets are showing some interest in the "umbrella" talks proposal and talks last week, I presume, between either Ambassador Dobrynin and the Secretary or Hartman and Gromyko.

Can you bring us up to date where that proposal stands? Is there some optimism about its being accepted?

A   As you know, the Secretary basically has wanted that diplomacy to go forward on a quiet basis, reasoning that would be the most effective way to move things forward. But I think, basically, those remarks really relate to the discussions that certainly took place on the "umbrella" talk concept when Foreign Minister Gromyko was here and talked with both the Secretary and with the President, and related to the kind of follow-up meetings which you know have taken place between Ambassador Dobrynin and the Secretary here and Ambassador Hartman and Mr. Gromyko in Moscow. And I think the suggestion of probing or clarification refers basically to those follow-up meetings.

Q   John, could you be a little more clear than you were the last time this question came up, about the United States regards the introduction of L-39s to Nicaragua?

A No, (I) cannot. Don't intend to specify what aircraft give us particular concerns.

Q John, can we go to a new subject? We don't have much time today. We have a luncheon.

A You have a lunch?

Q No, not I. I mean everybody in here.

A I don't have a lunch.

Q You suggested on Tuesday that the United States would not view with equanimity the introduction of advanced Soviet helicopters into Nicaragua. Can you be at all more specific on what the reaction might be?

A No. I think I was fairly careful in the language I used then about the difference, and I think I'll just refer you back to that language. I tried to be careful in the use of that language.

Q I'd like to go back to the question of the hysteria abroad. If you're defending the Administration's handling of the situation, who would you think is responsible, then, for the creation of this hysteria or stirring up the hysteria?

A Well, it's hard to pinpoint, but I guess what I basically was doing was refuting the suggestion that the Administration has whipped up feeling. The Administration has consistently made clear its position about the introduction of this type of weaponry into Nicaragua. There's no change in that. The new development is the movement of a ship towards Nicaragua which conceivably could have -- and conceivably still could be carrying -- this particular aircraft that gives us so much concern. That was the new development.

You have all written about that and broadcasted it, and there has been reaction to that, I suppose fomented by the Nicaraguan administration which keeps on saying the United States is about to invade Nicaragua. And the fact is, that's not the case.

Q John, is there a second Soviet ship approaching Nicaragua, about which you are now concerned?

A I really won't get into other ships, but I think you may take it that, obviously, we will be taking an interest in the general movement of Soviet and East-bloc shipping to

Nicaragua, given the fact that they clearly -- whether they are about to receive advanced aircraft or not -- given the fact that they clearly are receiving considerably larger amounts of military equipment.

Q   John, do you have any reaction to reports from Nicaragua that they are arming up to some 20,000 of their youths now?

A   No. I've seen their announcement that they're doing that.

Q   Do we have any confirmation or --

A   No, I don't.

Q   What about the report that a CBS camera crew was fired at today?

A   (I) saw that. That particular organization has not been in touch with us or sought our help in any way, but it may well be the case.

Q   Is there a travel advisory in effect for Managua -- for Nicaragua these days?

A   For Nicaragua?

Anybody know that, off the top of their head? Let me check that one for you.

Q   John, is there a feeling over here that there has been a serious intelligence failure in all this, that clearly this is -- if the MIGs were being delivered, it would be a very serious development, and yet there seems to be an awful lot of gaps in terms of what is known about either where the crates are or what's in the crates.

Is there annoyance, unhappiness, displeasure over here over the gaps and the lack of more thorough intelligence on this?

A   I, personally, haven't heard annoyance expressed. One follows these things as one is able to do

-- MORE --

Q John, the front-page story of the Washington Times this morning claims that the Administration is preparing a military operation in Nicaragua --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- while the Washington Post has a different story saying that there is not enough evidence for them to accumulate the facts on the ground.

A Uh-huh.

Q What do you comment on the Washington Times story, especially, which is more affiliated or close to the Administration than the Washington Post story?

A I don't know. I guess you'd have to ask the Washington Post and the Washington Times how they come to the -- I haven't seen the Times story -- but how they come to those contrary viewpoints.

Q John, have you been --

A I mean, the fact is that there is not an invasion planned of Nicaragua; that stands there. That is not to say that we have not expressed concern specifically about the question of high-speed jet aircraft arriving in Nicaragua. But there's --

Q To say there's not an invasion planned is different from saying there won't be an invasion.

A Well, I'm not aware of any invasion that is taking place or is about to take place.

Q Does that include the possibility of air strikes? I mean, when you talk of invasion, is that an all-encompassing term, or is it -

A I was trying to divorce -- I was trying to allay fears, concerns, allegations that the United States is preparing an invasion of Nicaragua, and that stands there as a statement.

When you look at the question of aircraft, the President has specifically declined to indicate what action the United States might take in the event that the aircraft we're concerned about are landed in Nicaragua.

Q But you are making a distiction then -

A We're making a distinction?

Q -- between a possible air strike and the term invasion?

A No, I'm not --

Q And the term "invasion?"

A No. I'm talking about an invasion in general, broad terms; and I'm talking about specific action that there might be in response to the landing of a specific type of weapon.

Q John, do you include a "surgical" air strike in the definition of "invasion" or is that something you haven't thought about?

A I think I'm going to rest where I am.

Q How do you respond, John, to charges by Minister D'Escoto in Nicaragua that the United States -- well, not maybe the United States -- but there is already an invasion of Nicaragua? And he points to the contras and the manual, etc.

A I suspect that the news organizations represented in this room have more manpower on the ground in Nicaragua than the United States Government. And we haven't seen it, but maybe you have perceived such an invasion.

Q John, let's talk for a second more about what they have been doing in terms of sending in helicopters -

A Uh-huh.

Q -- and air defense systems. Why do we think at this point the Soviets and their allies have chosen now to sharply increase the quantity and quality of what they're sending?

A I can't speculate on the motivation of the Soviet Union.

Q Do you see anything unusual in the timing -- I don't mean "unusual" but out of character with what they've been doing for the past three years in the timing of the deliveries?

A I don't see anything out of character with what they've been doing in the past three years, which has been to cause trouble in the area, export subversion and revolution

Q And to continually deliver military supplies.

A And to continue a flow of arms into Nicaragua and onward to El Salvador.

Q I guess what I'm getting at is the premise of Phil's question, which was that there's some kind of step-up in that flow. Is there?

A Well, you'd have to ask -- well, I think there is no question that there is a step-up in the flow. But as to the reasons for that, I guess you'd have to ask those who are shipping it and receiving it.

Q Would the Reagan Administration rule out the use of military force to deal with MIGs if they were delivered?

A I think the President has spoken to that question. I leave you with his words.

Q John, do you have any knowledge of a proposal being prepared for a large-scale increase in foreign economic and/or military aid on the part of the Administration, as being suggested by some officials with the President in California?

A I personally don't, Don, but I'd be glad to take a look at that.

Q Would you?

A Sure.

Q John, do you have any comment on the East Germans seeking refuge in West German embassies in various countries in Europe?

A No, I don't.

Q Do you have any comment on the new Contadora draft treaty proposal?

A Yes, (I) do have something on that.

We view the tabling of a new draft by the Central Americans as a positive and constructive step in a negotiating process that we strongly support. It's long been the position of the United States Government that regional problems in Central America will only be resolved through frank, open and honest dialogue among the countries involved.

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The Contadora process provides the best means of arriving at a peaceful settlement in the region, and the United States is gratified by the steps taken by the Central American countries and the Contadora states to develop a mutually acceptable agreement.

Q Can we have a copy of that, please?

Q Do the terms of that draft satisfy you now?

A Sorry?

Q Do the terms of this draft satisfy you?

A I'm not sure that we're aware of what is in that draft.

Q Can we have a copy of that statement, please, John?

Q John, do you have anything to report now on the Secretary's call a couple of weeks ago on a consensus to combat terrorism?

A No, I really don't have anything --

Q Are you likely to have something, say, in the next couple of days?

A I don't know. I assume the Secretary might respond in a speech at some time, but I don't think he is planning such a response at the moment, though.

Q Well, yesterday you said that you would look into the meeting of Jewish leaders with the Secretary.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you have something to tell us about that?

A I don't know whether we were able to develop anything on that during the -- I don't, but I don't know whether we posted anything.

Apparently we didn't have much to offer.

Q Can we have something later today on it?

A If we weren't able to produce it yesterday, I doubt that we will be able to produce it today; but we will do our best on your behalf.

Q Richard Murphy -- where is he?

A Sorry?

Q Richard Murphy -- where is he now?

A Cairo.

Q Richard Murphy is in Cairo?

A Uh-huh.

Q Anything on the reports of full diplomatic relations between ourselves and Baghdad?

A Nothing to offer you on that.

Q All right.

Q John, do you have any comment on the creation in China of a nuclear watchdog group? And has anything changed on the status of the nuclear --

A No.

Q -- agreement with China?

A Nothing changed. Still where we were.

Q Q John, given the fact that both the *Times* and the *Post* Have characterized what's happening in Chile as the largest crackdown since '73 and the United States is reviewing its interests there, do you have more, further comment on it or analysis of the situation?

A Nothing at the moment. It's conceivable we might have something during the course of the day.

Q O.K., thank you.

A O.K..

(Press briefing concluded at 12:29 p.m.)

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #205

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 1984, 12:09 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have no announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, what can you tell us regarding the visit of the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister next week, and what do you expect to come out of that -- those talks?

A Mike, I don't have anything on that subject, so I'm afraid I can't answer the second part of your question.

Q Okay. Is he coming at all --

A As I say, I --

Q Is he not coming? (Laughter)

A I just don't have anything on that subject.

Q Do you expect to have something later?

A Don't know that I'll have something later, no.

Q The White House have something later?

A I don't know that the White House will have something later.

Q Alan, concerning the information that came from sources in the Administration on the possible presence of MIGs in those crates or off-loaded from the ship in Nicaragua, did Shultz consider the leak of that information "criminal"? Has that word been attributed to him?

A Well, I think that he did talk about it in those terms. I can give you the exact quote in a second. But I don't know whether he was considering it in terms of the exact provisions of law or what he had in mind. But, obviously -- I mean, I don't have any problem with that characterization, and he and others have clearly expressed their concern about these leaks. They're unauthorized, they are detrimental to our foreign policy and to the national interest, and he, indeed, has a serious concern about a matter which has adversely affected, or does adversely affect, the effective operation both of the Executive and Legislative Branches of the Government.

So there's no question about the seriousness with which leaks, in general, and a variety of leaks that have occurred over the last week or so, in particular, are being viewed.

Q Will there be any -- two questions: Does he know where that leak has come from, and what sort of follow-up will there be?

A I don't think anybody at this point knows specifically where the leak has come from. In terms of follow-up, I can't be specific for you but I think you can taken it as a given that his concern and the concern of other senior Administration officials is not momentary.

Q Do you have that exact quote?

Q Yeah, we would like the exact quote, yeah?

A I'll see if I can find that. The question that was asked of him was whether he was unhappy about the leaks, and whether he was unhappy about the intelligence analysts and their summation of the information they had available. And he indicated that, "There is nothing wrong with the way the intelligence community handled the situation. They described a variety of things accurately and with the proper caveats. The process by which things became known, I don't know. You people in the news business have a better idea than I do about that. But I would say that those activities were criminal, and I use that word advisedly. Whoever leaked that material engaged in a criminal act in my opinion, and there is absolutely no excuse for it."

Q When was this that he said this?

A This was on the flight between Washington and Puerto Rico on the 10th, Don.

Q If he considers it that serious, Alan, surely he'll want a follow-up, an investigation of some sort, won't he?

A Well, I've given you some indication --

Q I wasn't sure --

A -- that this is not a momentary concern. I'm not going to get into the question of specific investigations which may or may not be conducted, but the issue is not a passing one.

Q If an investigation is not conducted, then I would consider the rest of the Administration didn't take it quite so seriously as the Secretary?

A Well, I don't think I would -- first of all, I'm not going to talk about investigations, but I also don't know that you can draw conclusions about the seriousness.

I think that everybody views it seriously. I refer you to Secretary Weinberger's remarks on Sunday, and I think those views are shared universally through the senior levels of the Administration.

Q Alan, speaking of Secretary Weinberger, he used the Monroe Doctrine, or cited the Monroe Doctrine, as a justification for the United States possibly taking some action if MIGs were involved in Nicaragua.

Is this building citing the Monroe Doctrine as a rationalization for doing -- thinking about future action?

A I think John got asked about that last week, and I refer you to what he said. The fact is that we're not going to speculate about the legal basis for actions which are quite hypothetical, so I'm not going to respond to the legal basis for any action.

Q You won't provide any legal thinking as to how we can impose -- when we say it is not acceptable for us that MIGs be delivered to Nicaragua --

A You're then asking about what action we might take, and that, I'm saying, is in the realm, at this point, of the hypothetical, and so I'm not going to respond to that.

Q We've stated specifically that it is not tolerable for the U.S. Government, in the U.S. Government's mind, that MIGs be delivered to Nicaragua. Now, what is the legal justification for us saying it's not tolerable?

A I don't think there's a legal justification necessary for making a policy statement. If you're then going to follow on and there were some action, then one might need to look at the legal basis for it.

I don't think the question arises in terms of the statements we've made.

John?

Q Alan, what is the status today of the presence or not presence of those MIGs? Have we concluded now that they were not on that boat or that they still may be but have not been unpacked?

A Well, we do not know the full nature or size of recent arms shipments to Nicaragua. We have evidence that recent shipments from the Soviet Union and other Bloc countries have included more advanced weapons systems than the Sandinistas previously had. We do not have evidence that advanced combat aircraft are presently in Nicaragua. Any indication that the Sandinistas were adding advanced combat aircraft to their military arsenal would be a serious development which we would view with utmost concern.

As the Secretary and other Administration officials have indicated, we are concerned about the continuing flow of weapons into Nicaragua, which began in the fall of 1979 and which is contributing to the already overwhelming military imbalance in the region. We continue to monitor this situation carefully.

Q Can we have that statement?

A Sure.

Q Alan, that doesn't address the question of whether these MIGs, or parts of them, might still be on the ship. Is that a possibility?

A I'm not going to get into what we might know about what's on ships. As I say, we have no evidence that advanced combat aircraft are presently in Nicaragua.

Q Alan, what is the Administration's evaluation of the apparent delivery of MI-24 helicopters that D'Escoto has declared?

A What is our --

Q Opinion about them? Do they change the military balance or --

A I think I'd refer you to what I just said on this, Walt. As I say, the evidence is that they have gotten more advanced weapons than they had before, and we're concerned about it. But I'm not prepared to take it beyond that at this point.

Q I feel obliged to ask you the following question. You say there's an "overwhelming military imbalance in favor of Nicaragua." If the Sandinista government has not been able to defeat the Contra effort within its own borders, isn't it logical to presume they would continue to buy weapons until they reach the point where they are able to defeat the guerrilla movement?

A Well, I think that the question of what is necessary to defeat the efforts of people whom they have alienated is not one I guess I'm going to go into. I think if one looks purely at the numbers of people, one looks at the numbers of tanks and other heavy equipment which have been brought in -- which clearly, if you look at the statements coming out of neighboring countries, have an effect on the neighbors, are viewed as threatening -- that there is no question that it does indeed contribute to such an imbalance.

You're raising a question as to whether certain kinds of equipment are -- part of your question implicitly raises the issue of whether certain kinds of equipment are effective in fighting in certain kinds of warfare, fighting against the Contras, for example, as opposed to their utility in other modes. I'm not about to get into that. But that certainly is an issue to be asked when looking at this kind of heavy equipment.

Q A follow-up on that: If you were -- just hypothetically -- I know you don't like these sort of questions -- but if you were a Sandinista leader, wouldn't you feel threatened at this point in time both from outside and inside?

A Well, I'm not going to get into their internal situation.

As far as the situation with respect to potential or alleged U.S. invasion of Nicaragua, John has made clear, the Secretary has made clear, the President has made clear that there is no plan to invade Nicaragua. So I can't comment about what drives them and what their motives are. I can only tell you what our policy is.

Q Alan, would it make a difference to this country if an upgraded flow of weapons into Nicaragua was primarily defensive or offensive in nature, or is it all to be viewed the same way?

A You're asking me to try to define weapons systems as defensive or offensive, and I don't think I'm in a position to do that.

Q Well, can you, in general, take a view toward --

A I that it has been -- in general, the point is that it is clearly our assessment that the level of weaponry, particularly heavy weaponry which has come into Nicaragua and which is continuing to come in at a rapid pace, exceeds anything which is justifiable in purely defensive terms.

Q To follow that up, has -- you've noted a couple of times that this is clearly having an effect on Nicaragua's neighbors.

A Uh-huh.

Q Have any of those neighbors at the OAS meeting reflected that concern to the Secretary?

A I wasn't there. I don't know, John.

Q Alan, could you -- on the question of whether or not Nicaragua should feel threatened, could you explain what exactly did Shultz mean when he said that, "We will work in every way that we can to cast this aggression and subversive influence out our hemisphere"?

A I think it -- I haven't talked with the Secretary about that, but it's very clear from the context, and going back over our policy over a long period of time, that the United States has been working in supporting the Contadora efforts, for example; and in stating what our four principal policy objectives are with respect to Nicaragua, which includes removal of the Soviet and Cuban military advisors and reductions and controls on the types of weaponry, amounts of weaponry brought into the region; that what we are seeking, obviously, is to eliminate the kinds of activities in respect of Nicaragua's neighbors that has been commented upon very frequently from here.

Q Alan, the Secretary is quoted as saying that, "The U.S. will work in every way to cast Nicaragua's aggressive and subversive influence out of our --

A Yeah, that was just the question I answered.

Q Can I follow up on that? Do you have any -- what do you think about the comments of the President of the Democratic Coordinator Rivas Leiva, saying that, "The U.S. campaign in recent days hasn't done us any good"? He's referring to --

A Well, I don't -- first of all -- that the U.S. campaign? I'm not sure what campaign we're talking to. I'd go back to what John said last week -- and I think that there's been a fair amount of mischaracterization of the Administration's position even after he made it clear that the Administration has not mounted a campaign -- that we have sought to make sure that in addressing the MIG issue, for example, that we were looking at it very carefully and very coolly, and we were not hyping this story, that we did not assert that MIGs were on the ship. And yet a number of correspondents went ahead and talked about the U.S. "claim" that there were MIGs on that ship, which there never was an Administration claim of, and so on.

So I don't know what "campaign" that refers to. There certainly has not been one.

Chris?

--MORE--

Q Summing up, could you say we're back now, as regarding Nicaragua, to where the situation was prior to last Tuesday?

A Well, I think as far as the concerns over the one ship are concerned, I refer you to the statement that I made, including the statement about advanced combat aircraft. But it is also clear that that ship brought military equipment to Nicaragua, that there are other ships heading for Nicaragua that are bringing more military equipment.

So terms of returning to the situation, the problem I have with that characterization is that the situation continues to advance in terms of a continuing flow of this kind of military equipment.

Q What is the necessary --

A Chris -- I'm sorry. Chris?

Q I was not aware that any news report ever said there were MIGs on those planes. I don't think there ever were. From election night, CBS's report, which was the first one, which said "Administration officials believed there may be," I think was the --

A Well, I think --

Q So, if I may just ask the question -- that is, if from that podium you had reacted to these stories by saying "I have nothing for you on that," wouldn't this story have had a shorter run?

A Well, I think that the fact is there were concerns. That's not a wrong reporting story. And [illegible] characterization that "there may be" -- there was concern that "there may be" or "may have been" or whatever -- MIGs on that ship is not an inaccurate characterization. That is not what everybody said in reporting that story.

So -- and I think if you check it out, you'll find that I'm right about that.

George?

Q With respect to these other ships bringing military equipment to Nicaragua, could you tell us how many and what the nationality of these ships is?

No. I think that, as the Secretary indicated on his trip, we're not going to get into what we do or don't know about ships which are heading for Nicaragua, except that it's obvious that this flow indeed is continuing.

Yes, go ahead, Bill.

Q Could you tell us anything, Alan, about Murphy's talks in Damascus? Did he meet with Hafiz al-Assad this time?

A Well, I think I saw a wire report which indicated that he had, so I refer you to that. I haven't seen a report. But, in any case, he is in Syria. During the weekend he was in Egypt, Israel, and Lebanon. But I'm not going to get into the details of the discussions. But, as I say, indications were from wires that indeed he did meet with President Assad.

Q Do you know where he goes from here?

Q Would you acknowledge he's mediating now?

A No. No.

Q Because the Israelis seem to be under that impression, that he's been talking to the Lebanese on their behalf.

A Well, I think you're talking -- well, the fact is, as a general characterization, the answer to your question is "no." The general purpose of his mission, of course, depends on where he is and what issues are relevant. But in terms of the broad construct of our concerns about southern Lebanon and so on, he is still in an exploratory mode. He is not mediating. And that continues.

Q Alan --

Q You're saying that --

A Excuse me.

Q You're saying he's not operationally trying to resolve the problems which have suspended the talks between Israel and Lebanon?

A Now you're getting into a specific issue which has come up in terms of those talks, and I'm not going to get into the specifics of his conversations. But, as I say, in the broad construct of our concerns and our policy towards southern

Lebanon, his mission is not a mediating mission; it is an exploratory one. And it continues.

Q Alan, an Assistant Secretary of State does not go on a two-week guided tour of the Middle East like that, does he? I mean, he's --

A Well, that's true.

Q -- and he is presumably --

A I'm not suggesting that this is not a serious effort that he's undertaking, so --

Q Can you give us a better idea of how to describe this effort, and how long will it go on?

A I thought what I said was perfect. (Laughter.)

Q Well, it's somewhat less than perfect. I hate to say.

A I'm sorry.

No. It is an accurate characterization. I refer you back to what we have said before -- that the gaps are obviously wide between the various parties; and that while we remain ready to play a helpful role, that until all of the parties indicate that they want us to play a role and that there is a prospect that those gaps indeed will be narrowed and that there can be progress, we will have to continue in this mode.

Q So this is open-ended as far as Murphy is concerned?

A Well, I don't know that I want to try to indicate what the end date might be of this particular trip, for example, or of what future steps might be. I don't think I can do that at this point.

Q Alan, your answer just now carries the implication that there are some parties or a party still not being helpful, in addition to being wide gaps between their positions. Are there parties or a party that is being an obstacle, or is it just that they are far apart in their --

A Well --

Q -- initial positions?

A I didn't make the statement that you asserted that I implied at the beginning. I will stick with the words that I've used and not use yours, if I may.

Q If he's not mediating, is he trying to narrow the gaps between the parties? (Laughter.)

A As I say, he's on an exploratory mission, and he continues to talk with the various parties. And obviously one hopes that, not only in the course of those talks but in others, that one will see some way of moving ahead; but the fact is he is not in a mediating role.

Q Alan --

Q Does the United States have any views about the substantive matter that seems to be the hangup right now -- as to whether Israel should release these people who were --

A Don, I don't think --

Q -- arrested in southern Lebanon?

A Yes. I don't think it's going to be helpful for us to make any comment about that. We obviously have viewed the arrangement of those talks as a positive step, and we hope that they will be able to go forward without being sidetracked.

Q There have been reports of intimidation of the media covering the aftermath of the Indira Gandhi assassination -- the refusal of satellite feed, the confiscation of film, etc. At the same time there have also been reports that the Indian authorities have protested to the U.S. Embassy in Delhi about the media's activities. Is this correct? Has there been any protest by the Indian authorities?

A I think we had some guidance on that at the end of last week, and I'd ask you to check in the Press Office on that.

Q Do you have any comment on the Prime Minister's speech on foreign --

A No, don't have one.

Spence?

Q Alan, it's been reported that a compromise agreement has been reached with Japan on the International Whaling Agreement adherence.

A Well, I don't think --

Q Does this have to be approved by the Senate?

A I don't know, if there were an agreement reached, what the requirements would be in that respect, Spence. As of the time I walked out here, my understanding was there was no agreement reached.

I would stress that the purpose of the U.S. Government in its recent consultations with the Government of Japan has been to encourage adherence by the Government of Japan to all of the provisions of the Convention -- that is, the International Whaling Convention's schedule. So that is simply our objective.

But, as I say, my understanding, as of the time I came out here, is that the report of an agreement was not accurate.

Please.

Q Has there been any concern about the Soviet bombers flying over Japanese airspace, and when will there be talks with the Premier of Japan?

A Well, I think in terms of the Soviet intrusions into Japanese airspace, I will leave that for the Japanese Government to comment upon.

As far as any talks or meetings with Prime Minister Nakasone, I don't have anything to give you on that.

Yes?

Q Could you comment on the OAU's decision to give Polisario a seat as a republic?

A I don't really have any specific comment on that move. Obviously, the United States continues to support a peaceful resolution of the dispute over the Western Sahara along the lines that were endorsed by the OAU, and that calls for a negotiated cease-fire, followed by a referendum.

Q What about the implicit recognition of the Polisario as a republic?

A Well, as I say, our policy is along these lines, and I don't have any comment beyond that on that.

Q Does it have any implications for U.S. military aid to Morocco, if the OAU is in effect calling Polisario a republic?

A I don't have anything for you on that.

Q Alan, just to come back for a minute to Nicaragua, you said that the Secretary has made clear and the President has made clear there's no plan to invade Nicaragua. Do you then regard this state of emergency that is taking place in Nicaragua as unnecessary and perhaps motivated by another reason, not that of concern about an American invasion?

A I can't speak to other motivations, John. As far as whether it's unnecessary, if the supposed cause -- as we're all reading -- is because of a fear of U.S. invasion, yes, it's unnecessary.

Q I'm sorry?

A Yes, it's unnecessary, if that's what -- if they're saying it's a fear of a U.S. invasion.

Q Alan, do you have anything on Shultz-Gromyko, January, Moscow, which Soviet sources are apparently talking about?

A Well, again, the Secretary addressed this on his trip; and when it was suggested to him that there was a Yugoslav report saying that Soviet sources were saying that he was expected in Moscow in January, I think his response was: "They must know know something I don't know" or something like that. Maybe I can find the exact words for you.

But I think that gives you a sense of where that issue is.

Q Alan, you're not --

A "They must know something I don't know," was his exact quote.

Q You're not denying, though, that the subject of a return visit has been discussed?

A I'm not getting into the question specifically of whether there has been a discussion of a return visit. And don't take that as confirmation, John, that there has been. But there certainly is no plan at this point for a visit.

Q A couple of weeks ago a senior official here said that the U.S. expected an early response from South Africa on some Angolan proposals. Is anything in the works to get that reaction or has it been received yet?

A I don't have any update to give you on that, Bernie.

O.K.?

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:34 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #206

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1984, 12:06 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Just one little announcement and then we can move right along.

Ambassador Zhang Wenjin of the People's Republic of China will present his government's letter of accession to the Biological Weapons Convention to the United States as depositary for the treaty. He'll do that tomorrow, November 15, at a brief ceremony from 10:00 to 10:15 a.m. in the Jefferson Room -- that's on the eighth floor. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Michael Armacost will preside at this ceremony. The press is invited to attend, and Mr. Carlson will, during the course of the day, have any more details on press arrangements, cameras.

Q Is that tomorrow?

A That's tomorrow.

Q Tomorrow morning?

A Yes.

Q What is on the Secretary's schedule, that he will not attend?

A I'm not aware the Secretary is going to attend that. I think, as I say, Under Secretary Armacost will be presiding.

Q John, where is Ambassador Murphy today, Secretary Murphy? What role does he plan in (inaudible) --

A Ambassador Murphy today is in Paris. He earlier during the day was in Rome.

Q What is he doing in Paris?

A He is consulting with various of our allies in Europe --

Q This time he's fact-finding.

A -- still fact-finding and being helpful.

Q When do you expect him here?

A Don't have anything to --

Q Would you lead us away, John, from speculation that he's in Paris to get the French and Egyptians to lay off on the revised 242?

A To do what? Sorry.

Q To lay off on their plans for a revised 242?

A I really don't have a readout on what he's doing in Paris.

Q Speaking of France, John, there's a story in the later editions of the Times today saying that Libya has not pulled all its troops out of Chad, as had been reported earlier. Do you have any update on that?

A Well, yeah, I do. Substantial Libyan forces do remain in Chad, south of the Aouzou Strip I can't give you any more precise details. We are, of course, consulting with both the French and the Chadian Governments about this -- what it means.

Q John, yesterday a senior official at the White House compared the buildup in Nicaragua to that preceding the Cuban missile crisis. Does that square with the State Department view?

A Oh, I think so. I think you need to read what Mr. Speakes said in the total context of his briefing, and he was drawing attention to what we have drawn attention to, namely, the fact that there is an unwarranted military buildup in Nicaragua which we consider to be far in excess of Nicaragua's defensive needs.

Q And the buildup is as great, the number of ships coming in, the amount --

A No, I don't think he was making that comparison. I think what he was saying is, they appear to be developing a military establishment far greater than is needed, clearly far in excess of anything else that exists in Central America.

The shipments are coming in in Soviet ships. That hasn't always been the case. Sometimes they've been East-bloc ships. But there does seem to be a procession of Soviet-registered ships to Nicaragua, and I think what he was doing was making the case that that seems to be inordinate.

But I don't think he was comparing levels with those that were moved into Cuba at the time of which you're speaking.

Q What is the significance, do you think, of the fact that these are Soviet ships now?

A It seems to me the Soviets are more directly involved in the shipping.

Q John, what level of comparison or measure do you use to determine what you think is in Nicaragua's interest, military interest? You say that what they are doing now far exceeds what the United States believes they need. How do you figure out what they need?

A I think if you look at the threat in the area, look at the capacity of other nations in Central America, you will see that there is an extraordinary imbalance between the size of Nicaragua's army and people they have under arms in addition to the number of Cubans, Soviets, and other advisers they have there. Also, the weaponry -- armor and helicopters far outmanning and outgunning what others in the region have.

Q John, is the Administration considering recommending any change in the character or amount of military aid to other Central American countries to resist this buildup?

A I don't know that there is any change contemplated. The Administration plans to proceed with all its requests, both economic and military, that it has outlined for Central America. I think the Administration will continue to move forward on that front.

-- MORE --

Q John, what the senior official in the White House said yesterday was that there were similarities in Soviet behavior to the months preceding the 1962 Cuban crisis. Do you see the same similarities, and which would they be?

A Well, in the sense that they are clearly not being helpful in the kind of actions on which they are embarked, are destabilizing to the area, yes, that's the similarity. But I don't think the White House Spokesman was suggesting similarity between weaponry necessarily that was introduced into, or was intended to be introduced into Cuba.

Q What about similarity of U.S. reaction?

A I think we have been very clear in our statements about our concern.

Q Is quarantine is still a possibility?

A Don't have anything on that. We have made clear what our position is, but I'm not going to amplify those statements beyond those that were made over the past week.

Q John, several Salvadoran rebel officials have been granted U.S. visas and will be traveling, in some cases, to Washington, this week.

A Uh-huh.

Q Does that indicate any kind of change in our political treatment of the Salvadoran rebels?

A No. I think those visas are looked upon on a case-by-case basis, and I think we had something earlier in the week indicating that four out of five, I think, have been granted visas.

Q Are any meetings planned with them?

A I'm not aware of any meetings. You mean with Administration officials?

Q Yeah.

A I'm not aware of any.

Q Do you know for how long the visas were granted?

Q Could you take that, please?

A Sure.

Q John, can you say anything about the Secretary's meeting with the President today, what this plan is that he's presenting to him?

A Well, the Secretary meets regularly with the President. I think this is an expanded meeting, and I think Larry Speakes had some words this morning on what is on the agenda.

Q Can you tell us anything more about the imminent resumption of diplomatic relations between this country and Iraq?

A I don't have anything -- no, I don't have anything for you on that continuing story.

Q Have you got anything, John, on the U.S. Embassy in Moscow looking into the status of Olga Peters?

A We are discussing that case with the Soviets through diplomatic channels, but I don't have anything --

Q Why are we doing that, John?

A Because of interest in the case. The daughter is an American citizen, holds American citizenship, and I think her father has requested that the State Department look into this case, and so we're doing that.

Q What sort of concerns were raised?

A I'm really not going to go beyond where I am.

Q John, to get back to Nicaragua, are there any plans in the Administration for talking directly with the Sandinistas under the aegis of the dialogue which had begun before the election to discuss the current situation, the arms flow into Nicaragua?

A Well, if you mean are more talks planned between Ambassador Shlaudeman and Mr. Tinoco -- Foreign Minister Tinoco -- yes.

Q Can you give us any kind of a framework of time?

A   I can't. I guess our routine on that has been not to give you the date before the meeting is actually held but to you let you know when it is taking place, and we'll do that.

Q   John?

A   Yes?

Q   On Murphy again?

A   Yes?

Q   Does his consultation with allies have anything to do with the European initiative on resolving the Middle East issue?

A   I think you should see it within the framework on the meetings that traditionally he and others have had in Europe in the course of, or at the end of, various travels to the Middle East. It is a fairly usual thing to confer with other interested parties.

Q   Because there have been reports from London, actually in Arabic magazines, of an imminent European peace initiative similar to the Reagan plan.

A   I'm not aware of it.

Q   Are you aware of any?

A   No, I'm not. Haven't seen those.

Q   John?

A   Yes?

Q   Does the new whaling agreement with Japan require Senate approval?

A   Basically, I'm going to refer you to Commerce on whales, Spencer. As a matter of fact, I guess I am going to refer you directly to Commerce because I don't seem to have anything on whales in my book. (Laughter)

Q   You're not spouting on any of that?

A   Not spouting. Enough of this blubber.

Q Do you have anything on Prime Minister Trudeau and his remarks regarding the --

A Yes, I do have something on that. Obviously, our appreciation of NATO's political consultations differs from Mr. Trudeau's. NATO has preserved peace for over three decades. During this period it has dealt regularly and intensively with the questions of war and peace in a variety of fora -- at meetings of Heads of Government, at meetings of Foreign and Defense Ministers, and through bilateral contacts among NATO members.

These consultations within the Alliance have been intense and productive. Major defense and arms control initiatives, for instance the December 1979 decision on intermediate range nuclear forces, have emerged from these meetings. In 1983, NATO Defense Ministers, meeting in Canada, agreed upon a unilateral reduction in NATO's nuclear stockpile by 1,400 weapons. Last May, allied Foreign Ministers reviewed the course of East-West relations of the past decade and put forward a comprehensive program for their improvement. And, of course, we support efforts to further strengthen them.

Q Copy, please?

A Sure.

Q So you disagree?

A Sorry?

Q Is that the answer --

A That's the answer.

Q Has Mr. Trudeau requested a meeting with Secretary Shultz?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q Thank you.

A Okay.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:16 p.m.)

1-0941

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #206 /et seq. +37

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1984, 12:17 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Nothing for you today. Be glad to take one or two softball questions. (Laughter)

Q The usual.

Q Okay. Let's start with Chile. Do you have any comment or any concern about the mass round-up, detention of young males in Santiago?

A I don't really have anything beyond the words of sadness that the Secretary expressed when he was asked about the situation in Brasilia, and I'd refer you to his words. I think he said that what was happening in Chile today was disappointing and sad. And I'm sure that events of the past day or so simply have underlined his feeling about what is happening there.

Q Have you expressed your concerns to the Government in Chile regarding this?

A I'm sure they're well aware of our feelings.

Q Do you have anything, John, on the reported comments by an unnamed Soviet Embassy official and Dobrynin reported in the Post today?

A Yes, I do. We're not going to get into the specifics of our diplomatic exchanges with the Soviets. In the high-level discussions that took place between President Reagan and Mr. Gromyko, and Secretary Shultz and Mr. Gromyko, we've described our thinking on the idea of umbrella arms control talks, and, indeed, that was outlined by the President in his speech at the U.N. General Assembly, and we responded to questions from the Soviet side.

Our overall objective remains the same: the resumption of a serious arms control dialogue with the Soviet

Union. Obviously, there's going to have to be give-and-take if we are to move forward, since the results will need to reflect the interests of both sides. It's not simply a matter of accepting or rejecting ideas put forward by the United States. To date, the Soviets have not indicated whether they are ready to join us in such discussions.

Q Copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q John, the Soviets still seem to have some questions about this. Have they put these to you, or have they only given them to the American press?

A Well, I wouldn't -- I think the words I have just used would not deter you from -- I said we're not going to get into the details of the diplomatic exchanges. But since the Gromyko visit here, Secretary Shultz has meet with Ambassador Dobrynin; Ambassador Hartman has met in Moscow with Foreign Minister Gromyko, and I think you can take it as a given that this kind of further exploration and probing has been taking place in those sessions.

Q Well, have they compared them in a jocular way -- "umbrella" to a "mackintosh?" They understand a "mackintosh;" they don't understand an "umbrella?"

A I wasn't privy to the Secretary's discussions with Ambassador Dobrynin, so I don't know whether the Soviets used the word "mackintosh" in those negotiations.

Q John, I don't mean to be -- I certainly don't mean to be facetious about this, but the Soviets have had questions. Have we had answers? This Administration does seem to be still to-ing and fro-ing about its approach.

A I don't think it's a question of to-ing and fro-ing. I think it's a question of continuing through these quiet diplomatic channels, of which the Secretary has spoken so often, the kind of questions that undoubtedly were raised during Mr. Gromyko's visits here.

Q Are you distressed that the Soviets are not respecting the quiet diplomatic channels?

A I'm not aware that anybody has -- first of all, we're talking about statements by unnamed officials, but I'm not aware that anybody has expressed their concern about that story.

Q Does the Secretary intend to meet any time next week, whatever, with Ambassador Dobrynin; and a tentative schedule for him?

A I'm not aware of a meeting set, Mike. I'm not -- as always, a meeting can be arranged at very short notice, but I'm not aware of one scheduled at this stage.

Q John, one of the questions was what the umbrella talks could deal with first. Any idea what they would deal with first?

A No, I don't have anything on that.

Q You've mentioned in your statement, "resumption of the arms talks." Obviously, you wouldn't go right to those first.

A Well, the umbrella talks are arms talks. I mean, that's in the range of arms control talks. That's what umbrella talks are.

Q Implying--

A It's not the whole range of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Q But you're implying nuclear reduction talks in your statement?

A Well, the President has said very clearly that one of his goals is reduction of nuclear weapons; elimination as opposed to --

Q But you would start with less than that?

A I'm not going to outline how they would progress.

Q John, has the Secretary been asked to stay on as Secretary of State? I mean, you haven't had any formal statement to that effect.

A Well, the Secretary continues to feel that it's an honor to serve as Secretary of State, a privilege and an honor, and he is honored to continue in this office as the President has requested him.

Q What does that mean?

A The President has asked him --

Q Does he mean to continue beyond January 20?

A I don't know that any dates were suggested, and I think you'd be misled if you suggested -- if you wrote or inferred that any date was discussed. The President has asked him to stay, and he is honored to stay on.

Q And when did he ask him?

A I do not -- there have been a number of conversations between the Secretary and the President. I do not know specifically in which one of those he was asked.

Q Was it before yesterday, do you think?

A I don't know. He's talked to him by phone, he's seen on a couple of occasions since the election. I don't know when.

Q Are you going to stay at his side, or are you going to leave?

A Sorry?

Q Are you leaving or staying?

A Oh, well, I'm a Presidential appointee, and I'll let the President know what I'm doing.

Q John, you say the expression of the President's wish came after the election, but you can't pin it down as to which day that the President asked him --

A No, I don't think so.

Q Did the Secretary have any discussion with the President, about how the foreign policy set-up of the government is going to work when he stays on, that you could enlighten us about?

A Well, as you know, the Secretary and the President and the National Security Advisor met yesterday for about an hour and twenty minutes and clearly discussed the course of foreign policy. And I understand the White House described that as a "rich discussion of a broad range of foreign policy matters."

Q Could you be anymore specific about this "rich" agenda, or whatever it is?

A (Laughter) No, but I gladly endorse the White House's words.

Q What is it -- in what sense do you mean "rich?"

Q Like fat?

A I guess I'll ask you to ask the White House if they want to elaborate further. I think they meant it was a very satisfactory and full discussion.

Q Has the Secretary asked his senior advisors in the Department to stay on, or how has he described what he would like them to do in this next term?

A I do not know what individual discussions he might have had with individuals in the Department.

Q Has he said anything to you generally, collectively?

A Not that I'm aware of.

--MORE--

Q New topic?

A Yes.

Q On South Africa, has the U.S. received any replies from South Africa on Angola? And do you have anything to say about the recent violence or about the naming of Bishop Tutu to head the conference?

A I think we might have had something earlier on Bishop Tutu. As far as the violence is concerned, the United States deeply regrets the recent police and army raids and crackdowns on those involved in work stayaways in South Africa. These actions by South African authorities are attempts to suppress manifestations of legitimate, deep-seated grievances which blacks in that country have toward the apartheid system. We do not condone the violence and intimidation that were associated with black protests. However, we do believe that nonviolent expressions of black opinion are legitimate. They point up once again the critical need for the establishment of a dialogue between the South African Government and the black community; such a dialogue is the only means to address the causes of this unrest.

We believe that recent statements by top South African leaders, including the President, indicated that the government is seeking to open up lines of communication and pursue a dialogue; but the actions of the government in detaining individuals, raiding homes and offices of organizations, including unions, which oppose apartheid run counter to those goals.

Q A copy of that, please, John?

A Sure.

Q One more: What exactly is going on in these talks in Europe this week? Who is representing the United States? And do we expect a response from South Africa at that time at the --

A Well, as you know, Assistant Secretary Crocker will be in South Africa later this week -- tomorrow, I think. But I don't have anything beyond that.

Q In the country of South Africa?

A In the country of South Africa.

Q Did he participate in talks in Europe first or is it indirectly --

A He was in Europe on his way over there, but I'm not quite sure what his participation was.

Q Any other countries on his trip -- South Africa alone?

A I guess we don't have anything on his onward trip, but I wouldn't be surprised.

Q Can you check that for us?

A Let's take a look, although these days, we're pretty reluctant to pinpoint where people are going.

Q John, on southern Africa, have you seen a report about North Korean troops in Angola?

A I have not, no.

Q Also, North Korean troops, according to Reuters, in Uganda?

A It seems to me I saw something on one of the wire services this morning about that.

Q But you have nothing on it?

A I have not, no.

Q John, what is the purpose of Crocker's trip to South Africa?

A Pursuing the overall goals that we have had for that region.

Q John, a couple of questions about Nicaragua: Ambassador Cruz is suggesting, it seems, that there be a period of grace given to Mr. Ortega by the United States in order to let him consolidate his power and deal with the hard-liners.

1-2949

A Uh-huh.

Q What is your reaction to that advice?

A Well, Mr. Cruz has said a number of things over the past several days, and certainly that was one of them, and we have a lot of respect for him, obviously. The fact of the matter is that the United States has been pursuing the path of peace very vigorously in Central America and particularly with regard to Nicaragua. That is why we have been working so hard to help the Contadora process, and that is why we are enthusiastic about a treaty emerging from that process which, obviously, would have to meet U.S. requirements for verification and that kind of thing which we have expressed on a number of occasions.

Ambassador Shlaudeman has been vigorously involved in this process, as you know, has had a number of meetings with Mr. Tinoco. There are further such meetings set, and we'll tell you about them on the day they take place, as is our custom. So there isn't any question that the United States has been very vigorously trying to bring peace to that are

Now, having said that, and at the very time the United States is doing this, we have seen this in-flow of Soviet weaponry into Nicaragua, and that certainly doesn't help the cause of peace and stability in the region along. So I think what we have been doing is simply addressing the realities of the situation as they have been produced by the Soviet Union and the Nicaraguan junta.

Q You mentioned the Contadora process. The communique issued, I guess yesterday, by the four countries said that the demands of several Central American countries were a valuable contribution, but they could alter the balance achieved, and only some would be adopted.

Now, since the United States has put itself behind those demands and endorsed them, do you consider this to be a step forward or backward or what?

A I consider that people are still working at that process. Different people have different views. Clearly, Nicaragua has some different views to the other countries in Central America. There may be different views and differences of nuance among the Contadora nations.

Q These are the four countries agreeing.

A Yes, but it isn't easy to get the kind of treaty or agreement that would be honored by everybody involved. It isn't easy, and that's what we're working on.

Q Another question is that the Nicaraguan results seem to be in now, and the Sandinistas won 63 percent, which is not all that much more than President Reagan won in his election.

A Under somewhat different conditions.

(Laughter)

Q Well, I was just wondering, in light of the fact that it's only 63 percent and that there is a fairly large other group there, whether it's still regarded as a pure sham or whether there is any legitimacy to it.

A Still regarded as a sham. It took place without freedom of assembly, took place without freedom of press, took place with precinct captains who were responsible for issuing food ration books -- one or two little things like that. I think those are some of the differences between our electoral process and the Nicaraguan.

Q Essentially, then you're regarding -- you're rejecting Ambassador Cruz's advice?

A I'm not rejecting his advice. I've given you some words which I thought responded to your question.

Q John, can you confirm that Lebanese employees of the Embassy in Beirut did fire at a civilian airliner?

A There was an incident yesterday. An aircraft did fly in the direction of the Residence. We're really not going to talk very much about the response. I think that you should ask the Lebanese Government, basically, for an accounting of what happened. Insofar as our own personnel at the residence, including contract guards, they carried out the orders under which they are operating, and we're not going to get into what those orders are.

Q Anything on a meeting between Mitterrand and Qadhafi on the question of Chad and U.S. reaction to that meeting?

A Seen the reports; had no previous knowledge of it and don't have any comment on it.

Q The U.S. is not irked by the fact that Mr. Mitterrand is meeting Qadhafi?

A Well, people can meet other people, and there's no reason for the United States to be "irked."

Q How does this square with your comment yesterday that, "We have indications that there are still substantial numbers of Libyan troops in Chad?"

A I don't know. Maybe that would be something that would come up in --

Q Is this what they're discussing?

A I have no idea, but I suppose it is conceivable that it is something that might come up in the discussion.

Q What is your reading today on Libyan troops in Chad?

A As it was yesterday.

Q "Substantial numbers?"

A Uh-huh.

Q King Hassan of Morocco said in an interview yesterday with Le Monde that Qadhafi respects his word, and he will withdraw his troops from Chad. Do you believe King Hassan?

A Do we believe that Libyan troops are all out of Chad? No.

Q What King Hassan said?

A I haven't seen King Hassan's interview, but if you're asking me whether we believe that there are still Libyan troops in Chad, the answer is yes.

Q On Nicaragua again, do you have anything on the Soviet charge that the United States is guilty of state terrorism down there? It's the second day in a row they have accused the United States of state terrorism.

1-2752

A Well, what did they have in mind?

Q Well, they just said state terrorism and --

A Yes, but what are they suggesting constitutes state -- I don't know what they're referring to.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:35 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #207

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 1984, 12:09 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: A couple of announcements concerning speeches and visitors:

Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam will address the Washington World Affairs Council on Monday, November 19, from 6 to 7 o'clock at the National Theatre, 1321 Pennsylvania Avenue. If you want to cover this event, please contact Julie Chitwood of the World Affairs Council, 293-1051. No advance text available. I understand the Deputy Secretary will be speaking from notes. The topic will be "Latin America: the Struggle to Restore Economic Growth."

The Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dato Musa Hitam, will be coming to Washington on a working visit November 20-21. He will meet with Vice President Bush, with whom he met during his visit to Washington last year. The Deputy Prime Minister is scheduled to attend a working lunch hosted by Secretary Shultz for senior U.S. officials on Tuesday, November 20. He'll also meet with the Attorney General, the Commissioner of Customs, and the Acting Director of the Drug Enforcement Agency.

His visit is a welcome opportunity to review the range of issues we have with Malaysia and the Association of South East Asian nations, ASEAN. Discussions at the Justice Department will focus on anti-narcotics enforcement, treatment, and rehabilitation, in line with the Deputy Prime Minister's special responsibilities as head of the Malaysian Government's anti-narcotics task force.

Prior to his Washington program, Dato Musa will give the keynote address at a conference on Malaysia to be held at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, in Medford, Mass., November 18-20.

Also, French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson will be in Washington from November 18-20. He will meet with the Vice President, with the Secretary of State Shultz, with Secretary of Defense Weinberger, and Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Kenneth Adelman, as well as other senior government officials. The Foreign Minister's visit is part of the ongoing high-level dialogue with major allied partners.

[illegible]

That's all I have for you.

Q Any more details on the Cheysson visit, the actual date of the meetings, the activities?

A I don't have anything else on his schedule, Mike, I'm afraid. No, that's it.

Q O.K.

Q In Little Rock, Congressman Alexander of Arkansas said the Administration has an agreement with Cuba on the exchange of political prisoners and Cubans held in U.S. jails and mental institutions.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you have anything on that?

A That's not correct. We certainly have had continuing exchanges with the Cubans, and certainly further exchanges and meetings are planned. But that story is not correct.

Q Well, is it incorrect only that you do not have a formal agreement --

A Yes.

Q -- or how close are you to getting it sealed?

A Don't have any prediction on how close we are, but I wouldn't make any assumptions about the closeness of an agreement.

Q Can you tell us about the next meeting?

A I can't, Greg, because I don't know -- I just can't quite remember whether dates are set or not.

Q Have they been meeting in New York ? Is that --

A I'm a little --

MR. ROMBERG: They've only had the two rounds. We've talked about (inaudible) --

MR. HUGHES: Two rounds. O.K. And where were those, do you remember? They were both in New York? Yeah.

Q Those two rounds that were held last summer? And there have been no talks since then?

A I think there have not been talks since August -- I think I'm correct in --

MR. ROMBERG: Rounds. No actual face to face.

A Rounds? Yes. No face-to-face, but continuing exchanges.

Q Did Congressman Alexander brief this Department, anyone, regarding his trip to Cuba?

A I can't answer that, Mike. I don't know.

Q Would you see if you -- could you take that --

A Sure.

Q -- to see if there has been any exchange between the Department and the Congressman?

A Let me take a look.

Q Alexander is actually quoted, John, as saying that the agreement is "on the verge" of being signed.

A Uh-huh.

Q Is there anything that you know that would give credence to that?

A No.

Q Do you have anything on the Cuban troop withdrawal agreement that Granma, the Cuban press, has intimated?

A No. There have been a number of stories about the form of any such withdrawal; but, no, I don't have anything beyond it. Some of those stories have been wrong. We've seen speculation before, and I'm sure we'll see speculation again, but don't have anything on any specifics.

Q What is happening in terms of the negotiations?

A Chet Crocker is in South Africa.

Q Would you say they're close to an agreement or --

A I wouldn't say "close to an agreement"; I would say the process continues.

Q Who has he seen so far?

A I think he arrived in South Africa today, so I'm not sure that he's seen anybody yet.

Q On South Africa for a second --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- there have been more roundups reported and Alan Boesak has been apparently ordered arrested.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you have any comment?

A No, not beyond our statement of yesterday.

Q Do you think there is any relationship between Crocker's arrival and this crackdown on Boesak?

A I can't see any such connection.

Q John, do you have anything on -- have the U.S. and the Soviet Union spoken or are there plans to talk about joint space rescue missions?

A Might have something for you later in the day on that. Might have some words on that later in the day.

-- MORE --

Q Would you like to try to take a shot at clarifying who's in charge of arms control? (Laughter)

A I think Larry Speakes addressed that question this morning, Bernie.

Q Is it your understanding that the Secretary of State is the "point man?"

A I think Larry Speakes addressed that question this morning.

Q Can you -- let me try again. Is there still any consideration of appointing a messenger of some sort?

A I think Larry Speakes addressed that this morning. (Laughter)

Q John, any word on when Mr. Murphy will be back to Washington?

A He'll be back this weekend. He's in London today.

Q (Inaudible).

A I don't know whether he will --

Q Will he see the President upon his return?

A I don't know; I don't know.

Q Can you say anything about the visit of Pakistani Foreign Minister in terms of the particular issue of that letter that the President wrote?

A I assume there will be a readout at the White House. I don't quite know who will do that, but I assume there will be a readout at the White House after that visit.

Q John, do you know anything about these three Soviet ships maybe headed for Nicaragua? Did they -- was there -- did it (sic) declare their cargo when they went through the Canal, and was it just trucks and tractors and things like that?

A I think I'll leave that one to my colleagues at the Pentagon who, I think, have spoken to that question.

Robin?

Q John, on Nicaragua, apparently the Nicaraguans have made -- a Nicaraguan official has made some statement indicating that if Secretary of State Shultz would be interested, they, the Nicaraguans, would also be interested in having Foreign Ministry-level meetings.

Has there been any thought or talk about that on this end?

A Haven't seen that statement.

Q It's in FBIS.

A Okay. We'll take a look at it.

Q John, do you have any decision yet on the visa applications by the four Salvadoran women?

A No. I think those are still under consideration.

Q John, the only thing your colleague at the Pentagon had to say on those ships yesterday was that, yeah, at least one of those three had gone through the Canal.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you have anything else on the manifesto of the ship?

A No.

Q Back on the Salvadoran women, they are due here in about 48 hours. Could tell me what the reason is for the delay in making up your mind?

A I don't know that it's a delay. I know that it is still under consideration.

Q Do you know why -- you're not acknowledging there's a delay? Is there a problem with these visas?

A I don't know that there's a problem. The applications are certainly under consideration.

Q The Palestine National Council is supposed to meet in Amman next week. Do we have any feeling on whether that's a good thing for Jordan or for the peace process in general?

A I'm not sure that is -- that there's an official announcement -- I've seen some reports on that, but I don't know that there's any announcement by the Jordanian Government on that.

Q Speaking of Jordan, King Hussein is quoted today as saying he will not seek any American arms because of conditions attached by Washington.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you have any --

A No, no comment.

Q There are reports today on Libyan radio that a suicide Libyan team has assassinated the former Prime Minister of Libya in Cairo. Do you know anything about that?

A Don't know anything about it. We've heard those reports.

Q Do have anything more on Soviet-American talks over "umbrellas" or "mackintoshes," or anything of that sort?

A No.

Q Any comment on the Mitterrand-Qadhafi talks?

A No.

Q John, are you satisfied that President Mitterrand said that Libyan forces do remain in Chad?

A He said that Libyan forces --

Q Do remain in Chad?

A I know nothing that would contradict President Mitterrand's assessment of the situation.

Q John, what is the status of the Secretary's meetings with Ambassador Dobrynin? Has he met at all in the last --

A To my knowledge, he has not met except socially with Ambassador Dobrynin since we last informed you of that. I forget just when that was -- about a week, ten days ago.

Q Has there been any discussion of a visit to Moscow by the Secretary?

A Well, as you know, there was a *Tanjug* report suggesting there was such a meeting, and the Secretary responded to that by saying the Soviets must know something that he doesn't know.

Q Since then?

A Nothing has changed since then.

Q Chile?

A Chile? No, nothing on Chile for you.

Q Mr. Yaqub Khan, Foreign Minister of Pakistan, is here in town and meeting with officials this afternoon. This is his second visit within a month.

Can you tell us why he -- what is he doing in town? Is it related to the F-16s supposed to be delivered next month to Pakistan?

A Well, I think, as I say, you'll get a readout on his meeting with the President after that meeting, and I'm sure that will explain all about his visit here.

Q F-16s are going to Pakistan next month?

A I don't know what -- certainly, there have been F-16s in the past. I don't know what future delivery dates are.

Q Thank you, John.

A Okay.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:20 p.m.)

1-2962

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #207 /et seq. +47

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1984, 12:10 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good morning. I have a couple of -- three statements, to be precise.

The first is on the Vietnamese attack on Nong Chan. Three weeks ago at the United Nations, the international community overwhelmingly called on Vietnam to end its illegal occupation of Cambodia and to restore to the Cambodian people their inalienable right to self-determination. At that time, Hanoi sought to convey an impression of moderation and reasonableness. Actions, however, speak louder than words and on November 18, Vietnam responded, as it has to so many other calls for peace, by shelling and attacking a Cambodian encampment near the Thai border, containing some 20,000 civilians who have sought refuge there from Vietnam's oppression of their country.

The United States condemns Vietnam's attack on Nong Chan near the Thai-Cambodian border. We again urge Vietnam to reconsider its failed policy of military conquest and allow the Cambodian people to rebuild their country free from outside interference. The United States also pledges its continued support to the efforts of the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross to assist the Khmer people uprooted by invasion and war.

I have a statement on the --

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Sure can. A statement on an inaccurate statement in CBS "60-Minutes" report last night. Last night, on 60-Minutes, Monsignor Robert Call appealed for approval of pending Catholic Relief Services' request for additional food aid for Ethiopia. We wish to state for the record that the commodities for CRS were among those for which approval was announced last Friday by AID Administrator, Peter McPherson. Therefore, all current CRS requests have been acceeded to.

And, finally, a statement on the assassination of a Turkish diplomat. The United States strongly condemns those responsible for the murder today in Vienna of another Turkish diplomat. This tragic incident is the most recent in a long, sustained terrorist campaign against Turkish citizens, and the second fatal attack on a Turkish diplomat in Vienna since June alone. In all instances Armenian terrorist organizations have claimed responsibility for the act.

These attacks must be condemned as vicious, senseless and contemptible. The United States calls on all nations to take strong action to stop acts of this kind.

That's it.

Q Copy of that, please, as well?

A Sure.

Q On the Cambodian thing. Two questions: Do you have a casualty figure (a); and (b) was this strictly a refugee camp or was there any capability at this camp for launching military attacks into Cambodia?

A I cannot answer either of those questions, but let me take a look at that for you, George.

Q Where does the discussion with the Vietnamese -- between the United States and Vietnam now regarding the immigration here of people in re-education camps or these other humanitarian matters stand? I think a delegation went over there not too long ago; what is the perceived result of it?

A Let me see if we can get an update on that for you; sure.

Q John, Mr. Cheysson, before leaving Paris, compared, in a sense, the United States actions to Nicaragua to how it is -- to discussing with France how it should act in Chad. Are you aware of those comments --

A I'm not aware of those comments.

Q -- or see any correlation between those?

A No.

Q What is the current state of matters in Chad regarding withdrawal of Libyan and French forces or incursions?

A   Unchanged beyond where we were, in our view, beyond last week.

Q   John, have you had any discussions with the Egyptian Government over this rather bizarre episode of last week on the --

Q   Can we stay with Chad for a second?

Q   Well, it's Libya and Chad. I don't know what the --

Q   Okay.

Q   Do you have anything to say about the reported Libyan attempt to assassinate its exile leader, and this hijacking of a U.S. plane?

A   Well, on the events that took place in Egypt itself, and what has gone back, what was reported back, and so forth and so on, to the Libyans: no, I don't have anything on that.

Insofar as the overall question of Libya's involvement in assassination plots, Mr. Qadhafi's regime repeatedly has sought to assassinate both Libyans and others in the past. These plots have been well-documented, and we certainly do not rule out the possibility of additional assassination plots, and we're always on the alert for indications of such activity.

The United States is appalled that the Libyan Government is prepared to brag that it is responsible for killing its opponents, and, furthermore, brag that such killings will continue.

Q   Do you think that the western governments should have dealings with Qadhafi's government?

A   Well, I think our views about dealings with Libya, insofar as our government is concerned, have been made plain over the months, and I think we'll leave to others how they deal with them.

Q   Can we go back, John, to the French-American row, if there is one? What has the Secretary got to do tonight that's so important that he couldn't go to the -- couldn't accept the invitation offered by Cheysson to dinner?

A   Well, the Secretary frequently does not attend dinners at that level in foreign embassies in Washington. The fact is, the Secretary is seeing Mr. Cheysson this morning, is hosting a lunch for him, and I think may see him again this afternoon.

Q So you wouldn't think it unusual that when the foreign minister of a ally invites the Secretary to dinner, the Secretary can't make it?

A I'm told that it is not unusual.

Q Uh-huh.

Q Will there be a stake-out this afternoon, involving one or both?

A Will there be a stake-out?

Q Alright, well --

A That's up to you. (Laughter)

Q Do you know if any arrangements are being made for --

A A readout?

Q -- for the foreign secretaries to --

A I'm not aware that the Secretary will come down with Mr. Cheysson. If we have anything to report on the meetings later in the afternoon, we'd make that available.

Q John, could you answer the question about what the Secretary has to do this evening that's more important?

A I don't know what his schedule is for this evening.

Q How would you characterize the current state of Franco-American relations?

A I think our relations with France are sound and good.

Q How about with Cheysson? (Laughter)

A I think our relations between Mr. Cheysson and the Secretary are sound and good. It doesn't mean that there aren't differences of opinion from time to time. Have been in the past; probably will be in the future.

Q Do we have any attitude toward the reports of French reconnaissance missions now overflying Chad?

A Do we have any reaction to that?

Q Uh-huh.

A No.

Q Are the French sharing this data with us?

A Never talk about intelligence matters.

Q You did last week, John, didn't you?

A Did I? I must of slipped.

Q John?

A Yes.

Q On terrorism, on the question of terrorism, the New York Times, as you may know, has published a report that the State Department Legal Advisor, Davis Robinson, has been secretly promoting Jimmy Carter's 1977 Protocol's addition to the Geneva Convention, which the Senate has not ratified and which would give to such terrorists as the PLO and SWAPO the status of "parties to an armed conflict."

My question is, since Secretary Shultz has been very outspoken on the need to take action against terrorists, did he know what Mr. Robinson was up to or not, or has the New York Times published false information?

A There was press guidance on that last week; refer you to that, Lester.

Q You've already dealt with that?

A Uh-huh.

Q Okay.

Q John, I'm surprised you say you don't know about Cheysson's comments. They were widely reported in the morning newspapers. They were on the radio this morning.

A   Yeah. I haven't seen them, Don. Must be lapse on my part.

Q   What about his remark that the United States Government is carrying on a press campaign to embarrass France about Chad? You seem to be the subject --

A   Do I seem to be the villian?

Q   -- of the remark.

Q   Target?

A   Well, I'm not carrying on a press campaign against anybody.

Q   Does it seem to you out of order to --

A   I'm seeking to answer your questions, as you toss them at me.

--MORE--

Q John, has the Soviet Union followed up its Washington Post suggestion that it needs to know more about umbrella talks by officially advancing questions through diplomatic channels?

A Well, as I think we have said, I think you may assume that that kind of exploration has been going on in the talks between Secretary Shultz and Mr. Dobrynin here and between Ambassador Hartman and Mr. Gromyko in Moscow.

Q Well, have there been any new questions advanced since that Post article?

A I'm not aware of any protracted exchanges since the Post article.

Q John, do you have a readout --

Q Can you tell us anything about Hartman's call on Gromyko today --

A I can't. Sorry.

Q Was it about arms?

A Is it the what?

Q About the arms question.

A I don't know what they'll be discussing. Sorry.

Q John, do you have any readout about the meeting this morning with Ministry of Finance Director Sharon?

A No, I don't. We have some guidance on the various, or the two I guess, Israeli meetings that are taking place today, but I don't have any readout on them.

Q Could you tell me anything on the U.S. Naval blockade of the Columbian Atlantic coast?

A I'll give you what little I have on that drug program. We're not going to talk about an ongoing operation, but we understand the beefed-up Coast Guard operation to interdict drug trafficking is occurring in the Caribbean at this time. Inquiries should be directed to Meredith Armstrong in the Vice President's office, who is working with the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System. I think that's the one you --

Q How long will it --

A Why don't you talk to Miss Armstrong.

Q John, I didn't to get to finish my -- Is this guidance today that you can read to us? And do you know whether the talks on the free trade zone have completed?

A On the latter question, I do not. I can give you what I have on the meetings, which is very pro forma. I'll be glad to give you that: Two separate sets of meetings will be held this week between Israeli and U.S. officials. On November 19 and 20, U.S. and Israeli officials will meet to discuss various bilateral security assistance issues. The Israeli side in the Joint Security Assistance planning meetings will be led by Ministry of Defense Director, General Menachem Meron. The U.S. side will be led by Under Secretary of State William Schneider.

Meetings are also scheduled for November 19 and 20 for the Joint Economic Development Group. The Israeli side will be led by Emanuel Sharon, the Director of the Israeli Ministry of Finance. Under Secretary Allen Wallis will lead the U.S. side.

Q What is the Joint Economic Development Group?

A That is, I think, the precursor to later meetings that are going to be held, I think

Q Could you explain a little more what you mean by that?

A Let me see what I can produce for you on that.

Q John, on AID --

Q Who is on it; while you're at it?

A Let me see what (inaudible)

Q I think this is the first time we've had a meeting of this group, or maybe even announcement that it exists.

A Yeah. I'm not sure about giving you names, but let me see what we can do on that.

Q John, on aid, can you address this question that was in the Washington Post on Saturday that says that Shultz and McFarlane are talking about a 7-8 billion dollar increase in --

A I can't. Don't have anything further on that for you, Bernie. Be glad to take a look at it for you.

Q Will you?

A Sure.

Lester?

Q What is -- Has the State Department commented on the Los Angeles Times report that in South Africa a considerable number of blacks have been murdered or fire-bombed, or assaulted by other blacks who have judged them as insufficiently militant?

A Had a number of statements on the situation --

Q You have made?

A -- in South Africa during the past week. I don't know --

When was this incident?

A Well, I just -- It was in the Philadelphia Inquirer. It was a Los Angeles Times report that I got over the weekend.

A Uh-huh. Why don't you take a look at what we've said about the South African --

Q You have spoken to this?

A We have spoken -- I don't know about this specific incident, but certainly to the violence in South Africa for the past several weeks, we have, yes.

Q O.K. One other follow-up, if I can: Since the Washington Post reports that the White House has just lifted the pass of a stenographer who was adjudged a security risk because he's a practicing homosexual, will the State Department adopt a similar standard, or have you developed some way to protect your personnel against AIDS?

A You have gone to the extent of my expertise on this particular area. I just can't answer your question.

Q Well, I mean, you're aware of the story?

A I'm aware of the story.

Q Does that procedure by the White House signal to you, in the State Department, that you should have the same standard or do you have a different standard?

A It hasn't signalled to me anything yet, but I'll be glad to take a look at it.

Q You'll look into this?

A I'll be glad to look.

Q John, anything to report on Murphy's trip to the Middle East?

A No, I really don't.

Q Thank you.

Q Wait a second. A couple more here. Can you go beyond your earlier statement, beyond the need for vigilance in dealing with Libyan assassination threats? Can you go beyond that in any way? What can we do about Qadhafi?

A No, I don't think I'll go beyond that.

Q John, there's some tension building up in Limni. There's a game plan of Papandreou.

A Sorry. There's tension building up where?

Q In Limni, L-i-m-n-i-, down south in the Aegean -- about NATO Headquarters --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- being turned between Greeks and the NATOs into NATO hands. Today General Rogers had an announcement. Do you know about that?

A I do not, no.

Q All right. Well, I would like to know what the American point of view is.

A Well, what's the question?

Q The question is that Papandreou wants to turn his forces to NATO and operate under the NATO command there, and General Rogers says --

A Papandreou?

Q Yes. And General Rogers --

A Wants to transfer his forces to NATO command?

Q Yes. Yes.

A I hope whoever is taking this question down gets it down right (laughter) because I'm lost already.

Q This morning General Rogers did announce in Brussels that this was exactly an issue of the two countries that should, you know, solve between themselves, and NATO will not be involved in it. And Lord Carrington has a different view. What is the American view?

A Let us take a look at that? (To staff:) Have you got that?

Q John, do you have anything on the reports of Marcos' illness?

A No. He certainly is not in the United States, to our knowledge, but we are aware of all the speculation there is about his health.

Q Has there been discussion between the U.S. and the Philippine Government about his coming to the United States for some medical treatment?

A I do not think so. There was a report circulating we were asked about suggesting there had been such contact between the White House and President Marcos. Those who are in a position to know and who have checked the records do not believe that that is accurate. There is nothing to indicate that that took place.

Q Do you have anything on the assassination of Cesar Climaco in the Philippines? He's the third notable opposition leader, I think, who has been killed?

A No, I do not, Spence. I'm sorry.

Q No comment?

A No.

Q How about on the Contadora peace process talks in Mexico -- any decision?

A Ambassador Shlaudeman is meeting with Mr. Tinoco today and tomorrow in Manzanillo. We would expect Ambassador Shlaudeman to be back here late tomorrow.

Q John, do you have a comment on the report in the Washington Post today quoting the Salvadoran Bishop who has been an intermediary between the government and the rebels saying that the time may not be right, that it may not be possible to have the next talks in November.

Does the United States have a position as to the postponement or non-postponement of the Salvadoran peace talks?

A No, that's for the Salvadoran Government to work out.

Q Also, I don't know if this was asked in the last few days, but a rebel spokesman on Friday said that the rebels were interested in meeting with Shlaudeman and had put some feelers through, and why had the United States not responded to this?

A Hadn't seen such a report -- not aware of it.

Q Would Shlaudeman be open to such a meeting if it were proposed (inaudible)

A I don't know. I guess we've had to wait to see whether such an approach was made.

Q John, going back to the Shlaudeman-Tinoco meeting in Mexico, is there a possibility that you might give us a readout on that this week -- say, Wednesday?

A Don't think so. Don't think so. Both we and the Nicaraguans have an agreement not to discuss those talks, and as long as that agreement is in effect, I think we probably wouldn't.

Q That means that you anticipate more meetings, then, after this one?

A Well, no reason to think that there wouldn't be further meetings.

Q John, on Mexico, do you have any readout on that natural gas explosion? Are there any Americans harmed?

A I do not. I'm sorry.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:30 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #208

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1984, 12:12 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: A couple of comments, really, up front. In line with our joint pursuit of truth here in this room, I'd like to draw your attention to the results of the lawsuit by Korean Air Lines against the British magazine Defense Attache. The results corroborate what the United States Government has been saying all along. There is absolutely no evidence that the Korean Airliner 007 was anything but a civilian airliner off course. The statement attributed to the editor of Defense Attache says as much. Any allegations to the contrary are simply wrong, and we are glad to have this underlining of what the United States has consistently argued to be the case.

Secondly, a short piece on The New York Times editorial page this morning talked about "Bad Raps." I think probably the United States Government got a bad rap on that piece. It has to do with the Salvadoran Mothers' Committee visas. The New York Times piece on recent visa cases involving Salvadorans is inaccurate in substance and incorrect in the conclusions it draws.

With regard to the Salvadoran Mothers' Committee, five representatives of that organization applied for visas, not four as reported by the Times. One representative was issued a visa and four of them -- not three -- were denied visas, but not on the grounds reported by the Times. The visa denials were based upon the applicants' personal advocacy of acts of violence and actual participation in terrorist activities. That's under Immigration and Nationality Act Section 212 (a) (28) (F), not on the grounds that applicants' presence in the U.S. would be prejudicial to the public interest of security -- that's 212(a) (27), or because of links with anarchist or communist parties -- that's 212(a) (28) (A) and (C), as reported by the Times. The one Mothers' Committee member whose personal history did not make her ineligible for a visa, has been able to come to the U.S. and speak freely on political subjects.

In the recent visa case of Salvadoran leftist leader Ruben Zamora, also mentioned in the Times, the visa denial was based on his personal advocacy of violence -- that's 212(a) (28) (F). Four other leftists politically associated with Mr. Zamora who had not personally advocated violent acts were found eligible for visas and entered the U.S. to air their views fully in a televised debate.

In all these cases, the political views of the applicants and their political affiliations played no role in the visa decisions. These decisions were not capricious or un-American, as claimed by The New York Times, nor were they based upon political tests, as claimed by the Times. The decisions stemmed from the particular actions of the applicants which made them ineligible for visas under the law.

These decisions have not prevented the presentation in the United States of the full range of political positions espoused by the organizations of which the various applicants are members.

Q Copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q Did you want a copy of that, Bernie?

(Laughter)

Q Isn't that longer than the story? (Laughter)

A Just an observation.

Q How was the rest of the paper, John? (Laughter)

A Well, I made a careful distinction between the editorial page and the news columns, which -- (Laughter)

Q Can we expect you will always be as forthcoming on the reasons for denial of visas as you are today in this case?

A Well, I don't -- I think what we were doing is clarifying the section. We continue to be reluctant to discuss specific, particular acts which, obviously, is a matter we're not particularly anxious to discuss. But as far as clarifying the section, when a newspaper mistakenly reports a section under which they were excluded, we feel that is worthy of a correction.

Q Have you considered if you were more forthcoming with some information as to why visas are denied or considered to be denied -- (inaudible)

A I think we always tell you under what section they are denied, but I don't think we necessarily go into detail. For example, where someone has espoused terrorism or violence, there may be good reasons for not going into that.

Q Might you in this case, John, release the details, is that it?

A No. That's as far as I'm prepared to go -- not aware of any predelection to go further.

Q Is it safe to assume, for those of us who have been out for a couple of days, that everything you've just said has already been stated ON-THE-RECORD by the State Department in the recent past, and that the Times somehow just misstated those facts, or is it possible that the information in these cases was distributed on a BACKGROUND basis by sources who decline to be quoted on the record, and then perhaps the information (inaudible) --

A I don't want to get into internal machinations of the New York Times on why --

Q -- or of the State Department.

A -- the editorial writers sometimes get things wrong, but I think that everything I have said is, basically, a matter of public record.

Q It is a matter of public record?

A I think if you collect what we have said on this over the past week or so, I think you'd find it's all in there.

Q As long as you're on El Salvador, do you have any comment in general on the action of the Salvadoran court in regard to Lt. -- what is it? -- Lopez Sibrian?

A Yes.

Q And also specifically, do you have anything on how this affects the Congressional legislation which ties a certain portion of the aid to a successful prosecution of that case?

A Don't have anything on the linkage, if any, with the program before Congress, but certainly do -- or did yesterday -- and I don't happen to have them with me, but the Press Office, I'm sure will be very happy to produce them, which basically underlines our concern about the manner in which this case is progressing or not progressing, and also details the manner in which we plan to proceed.

Q Would you ask about the question of how this bears? As I understand $5 million was -- Congress instructed it not be used for aid to El Salvador unless an acceptable conclusion of the case regarding the AID workers whom this man is accused of having killed --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- or ordered there to?

A I haven't researched that particular point, but be glad to.

Q John, could you comment on today Rose Styron, a judge at the Kennedy Memorial, said that the State Department by alleging that these women, Salvadoran women, had taken part in terrorist activities, but without naming them, was endangering them in their own country; and that if they had actually been guilty of these acts, they wouldn't be alive today?

A I do think we do have some guidance, again which I had with me yesterday, which the Press Office will be glad to produce in response to --

Q But specifically about the charge that -- this charge was made today that the State Department was endangering the lives of the four women, whose visas were denied, by saying that they had engaged in terrorist activities? (inaudible)

A The United States must rule on visa cases on a case-by-case basis. And we're simply -- as I said, we're not going to go into detail about the reasons for rejection, but we certainly will tell you under what section they were rejected, and that was -- the case was thoroughly researched, and that was the reason they were not granted the waiver.

Q John, would you consider releasing specific information in any single one of the cases, since there is really no proof offered now other than the opinion here that --

A Well, I doubt -- I think the process has gone on at some length; the investigation has gone forward; the government has come to the conclusion it has; I doubt that it will offer any additional information, but I'll certainly pass that on.

Q Right, since the accusations obviously are rather harsh, and proof would be helpful.

A It's a case of their meeting the requirements of U.S. law. That's what's at stake here.

Q John, has there been some message from the Soviet Union in the last few days suggesting timing on a meeting with Mr. Shultz and Mr. Gromyko? There was a report in The Wall Street Journal that I saw.

A Not going to have anything for you on a Moscow meeting, and obviously, not going to get into private exchanges with the Soviet Union. We will say that we remain deeply interested in improving our relations with the Soviets and resuming an arms control dialogue.

As Secretary Shultz told NBC on Friday, we are ready to sit down and engage in real negotiations with the Soviet Union on arms control, and seek concrete results to work out our problems

Q Copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q Is it envisaged, John, that the Secretary might get those negotiations underway in some more formal sense?

A John, simply don't have anything for you on that.

Q You specifically said you wouldn't have anything for us on a Moscow meeting. How about a meeting in some other place, other than Moscow, like Eastern Europe, for example?

A Let me broaden my non-response. I don't have anything for you on any meetings in any capital.

Q John, anything on preparations for the Secretary to visit Eastern Europe?

A No.

Q Was such a trip being planned or considered?

A There have been -- I've been asked about such a trip by various gentlemen in this room, but there's no planning for such a trip this year, certainly.

Q Not this year?

A I haven't seen any plans for the Secretary's travel for next year. I'm not misleading you. I'm not suggesting there's something to it, but I just haven't seen what he may be thinking of for next year.

Q John, anything on the relations with the Government of France?

A Excuse me, let me go over here.

Q To follow that up, if the suggestion were to be made that such a trip is being discussed for some time in January, would you be able to deny that?

A I'm not aware of any planning for the Secretary to go to Eastern Europe in January.

Q Anything on the relations with France?

A They are as sound today as they were yesterday.

(Laughter)

The Secretary met with Mr. Cheysson, had lunch with him, and met again after lunch. I think the Secretary stopped over for the reception at the French Embassy last evening.

During the course of the day, during these various settings, there was discussion of the East-West relationship; some discussion of the situation in Chad; some discussion of Central America.

Q Does the United States Government feel that the situation in Chad now is evolving in a way that is constructive, that's going to improve the circumstances in that country, or what?

A Well, we don't think it's constructive that Libyan forces remain in Chad. That is clearly not a constructive development.

Q What about the question of the French position?

A Well, I think we would -- we should leave to France any comment on French intentions.

Q Do you believe the Libyan forces left Chad and then have come back, or were they just remaining there all along?

A Well, I suppose -- I'm not going to get into the detail -- but I suppose there could be a combination of things. Some could have left and returned, and some could have stayed there.

Q Is there any indication the United States Government has that the Libyan forces basically all withdrew and then some came back?

A I'm not aware of any American feeling that all of the Libyan forces withdrew and then returned.

Q Do you have anything to confirm reports, or unconfirmed reports that Libya could get acceptance from France that the Libyans has the right to be -- to intervene in case of a third party -- will try to intervene in Chad?

A I don't know quite how you're relating that to France, but obviously -- our views on Libyan intervention and Libyan behavior around the world are very clear. We do not -- we are obviously not supportive of Libyan intervention.

Q John, some French sources are saying that the real problem here is that Libya receives a tremendous amount of money, oil revenue, and it comes from United States, basically. Why doesn't the U.S. cut off, they say, purchases by American companies of the oil and therefore dry up Qadhafi if the U.S. is so upset about it? Do you have a response to that?

A Well, I think the United States has tried to take measures insofar as Libya is concerned that are effective. You're aware of the measures we've taken insofar as travel by U.S. citizens to Libya, the validity of U.S. passports insofar as travel to Libya is concerned. You're aware of our own, insofar as they can be effective, trade measures affecting Libya, and certainly precluding the importation of Libyan oil into the United States. You're aware of measures that we have taken which are actually harsher in the case of Libya concerning transfer of technology than the rules governing transfer of technology to the Soviet Union.

But I think you also have to be realistic about where the markets are for Libyan oil, and where that oil goes. I think 60 percent of it, or so, goes to Western Europe and I think some 40 percent of it goes to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Q Why do you permit American companies to do that business?

A Well, as I say, I think obviously one continues to review the situation, but I think the measures that have been taken to date are considered by the Administration to be the kinds of measures that are most effective.

Q Is the U.S. Administration ready to respond to Mr. Backouch and his appeal for assistance and his appeal for a boycott, a world boycott against Libyan oil, and all that?

A I can't respond specifically on that, but I think this Administration continues to consider the most appropriate ways to restrain Mr. Qadhafi.

Robin?

Q Anything on the Manzanillo talks in Nicaragua, and anything on the, I would guess, the still increasing military buildup in that country?

A Nothing on Manzanillo. It's the second day of the talks. They presumably will end today, and we will hear from Ambassador Shlaudeman, get an account from him of how they progressed. Nothing further on the buildup, but it continues, I guess.

Q There's no hint of any kind of higher level meeting between Nicaraguan and U.S. officials?

A No, not that I'm aware of.

Q John, do you have any comment on the report about Honduras asking for F-5s, and , if so, would the Administration apply the same standards to the transport of high technology fighter aircraft to Honduras as it does to Nicaragua?

A Sure. We usually don't discuss details of security requests from other countries. A point of fact: I don't think there is such a request before us but at any rate, we can say that, at present, we have no plans for providing F-5s to Honduras. We're concerned about the threat and the arms buildup in Nicaragua poses to the entire region, and we are pursuing various paths to reduce that threat such as supporting the Contadora process and providing military assistance to Honduras and other democratic states in Central America. But no plans to equip Honduras with F-5s.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q And also, how about other -- another military aid request? Have you received a request for a substantial increase in military aid to Honduras, like a doubling of their aid level?

A I'm not sure about that. Let me take a look at that for you and see whether there's anything we might say.

Q John, do you have any readout on the talks, the Middle East talks, today with the Israeli officials?

A I do not, no.

Q Is it possible to get us some by the end of the day?

A Was there a readout yesterday that we -- no? I guess nothing forthcoming.

Q Can I just have another question on Malaysia? Can you give us any detail of the Malaysian talks today?

A I do not know whether any readout is planned after the Malaysian --

Q John, have you received any expressions of concern from Israel regarding the requests by Saudi Arabia and Jordan for U.S. arms?

A Well, I'm -- (a) I'm not going to get into the requests, and (b) I'm not going to get into diplomatic exchanges with Israel.

Q John, has Mrs. Kirkpatrick informed the Secretary that she intends to return to private life?

A I'm not aware of any such conversation. I mean, I just don't know. They talk, but I'm not privy to what they discuss.

Q John, in view of a number of reports, can you say whether the United States is discussing with the Soviets at any level the possibility of a summit meeting?

A No, I'm not going to get -- well, "summit meeting?"

Q Not a Shultz --

A (A) I'm not going to get into exchanges with the Soviet Union. But on the question of a summit, if you're coming off the NBC report, just to clarify, I think the NBC report of a summit was picking up on a suggestion made by Mr. Allen.

Q No, that was --

A If that's feeding into confusion about this story.

Q No, I thought it was picking up on a new attitude within the Administration that a get-acquainted meeting between the two leaders might make more sense now than it perhaps in the past has --

A No, no change in the President's position on a summit. I think he outlined it at his June 14 press conference, and that's where he is.

Q And what is that?

A I don't have his words here. But the June 14 transcript will give it to you. I think it's June 14.

Q In general, has there been any new discussion of the possibility of arranging such a meeting?

A I'm not going to get into our discussions with the Soviets. But on the question of a summit, if you're looking for a little help, I'd point out that what was said yesterday on the NBC report should not be confused with the President's earlier position as outlined in his press conference.

Q Or with the note that was received on Saturday?

A I'm not talking about notes that may or may not have been received.

Q John, back on the Israeli talks, could we get some sort of readout at the end of the day, please?

A We'll try. I wouldn't be too optimistic.

Q Does the Secretary plan to see the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq? Is that still set on Monday --

A   A week -- next week, yes. And the question is --

Q   Is he still seeing him on Monday? Do you have anything on plans --

A   I think that's still set for Monday, but maybe Brian Carlson can confirm that for you. I think that's still set.

Q   Any announcement of resumption of diplomatic relations, then?

A   I don't have anything to say on that subject.

Q   Has the United States heard anything from Marcos about his health?

A   President Marcos talked with Ambassador Bosworth by phone yesterday.

Q   And can you fill us in on what he said?

A   No, I can't.

Q   Does he plan to come to this country for some medical treatment?

A   No suggestion that he's coming to this country.

Q   Is he still alive?

A   I assume the telephone conversation is the answer to that question.

(Laughter)

Q   John, anything on the report, on the FBIS, about Soviet construction of air fields in Afghanistan near the Iranian border? Is there anything --

A   I don't have anything on it. I saw it. It certainly does not auger well.

Q   You don't know whether they are major air fields or whether this is just --

A   It's part of their continuing process --

Q John, would you have a comment on Congressman Michael Barns' suggestion that the United States should oppose the loans at the IDB to Chile?

A I don't. I think until the vote comes up on that, which I think may be later today, we won't have any comment on that.

Q Any comment on the Heritage Foundation report that the U.S. should use broader paramilitary means to alter other governments?

A No.

Q How about southern Africa? The announcement that South Africa and Angola are going to meet for the withdrawal of the South Africa forces from Angola, or what Mr. Crocker, what he's doing?

A Sure. We welcome that development. We believe that the -- as soon as I can read a small insert here. I have a feeling Mr. Romberg may have been at work on this. Why don't we give you this from the Press Office. There's a little scribble over this.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:35 p.m.)

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DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #209

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1984, 12:25 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: If I can get through this without falling into a coughing fit, we'll all be in good shape. So let me try and be brief, and maybe you can, too.

First, the Press Office will be on a Sunday schedule tomorrow, Thanksgiving Day. On Friday, the office will be open as usual, but there will be no briefing.

In connection with the visit of Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, there will be a BACKGROUND briefing for all accredited State Department and White House correspondents on Monday, November 26, at 12:00 noon in the White House Briefing Room.

Finally, there will be a handout available in the Press Office following the briefing on disinformation questions. As you know, we've made clear previously our concern over groundless Soviet accusations of U.S. complicity in the assassination of Prime Minister Gandhi, and despite our denials, the allegations have continued and provide a case study, in fact, of how the Soviets attempt to manipulate public opinion through an active campaign of disinformation. So we're making available, as I say, a compilation of media reports demonstrating how such falsehoods are spread through the international media.

I would note that legitimate papers and journals can unwittingly become caught up in such campaigns even though they cite the Soviet source of the allegations and question their veracity. I think you'll find that's a self-explanatory document.

That really is all I've got. Be happy to take questions.

Q Alan, can you enlighten us on the announcement in

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Australia regarding the United States sending a team to brief Australians on nuclear arms issues?

A Yes. During a press conference in Melbourne, Foreign Minister Hayden noted that, in an exchange of correspondence with Prime Minister Hawke, President Reagan had offered to send a high level arms control team to Australia to review U.S. arms control policies and progress. The offer was accepted, but no timing has been set as yet, other than that the visit will be in the first half of 1985.

The composition of the team and the agenda have not yet been determined, and we welcome Australia's interest in the President's arms control initiatives.

Q How does this involve the Soviet Union, particularly in regard to negotiations that are stalled with the Soviet Union on arms control issues?

A Well, I think there's -- the fact is that Foreign Minister Hayden also mentioned that he expects a Soviet arms control team. According to our information, his statement made clear that two separate sets of meetings at different times -- between Australian officials and the American team, and Australian officials and visiting Soviets -- were envisaged.

Q So there's no mediation role, third party --

A No.

Q How high level do you expect the American delegation to be?

A As I say, I don't have the composition yet, Connie, so I can't answer that question.

Q Alan, I may have missed the exact language. You said that what, basically, the U.S. will be doing is reviewing the Administration's arms control policy and progress with the Australian Government. So if this is a review of past things, it's not an effort by the Australian Government and the U.S. to break new ground on arms control?

A I don't think it's an effort to break new ground. I'm sure, however, that the Australians will have comments, observations, questions. There will be a back and forth. So, in that nature of things, obviously there would be discussion.

Q How does this differ from similar reviews of U.S. arms control policy that are conducted from time to time with

Western European nations, for example, such as West Germany and France, Britain?

A I'm not sure I would try to make a distinction between them. I don't know who's going to go and who goes to Europe, and so on, but I would not just abstractly draw a distinction between those.

Q Would the Americans go if the Soviets do not go?

A Our offer, the President's offer to send out people was totally unrelated to any Soviet team going, so --

Q Alan, on the subject of U.S.-Soviet --

A As I said -- just to repeat, as I said before, we welcome Australia's interest in the President's arms control initiatives

Q Could we have a copy of your comments there?

A The first one?

Q Yes.

A Yes.

Q A propos of today's stories in the The New York Times and the Washington Post, Alan, do you have anything more on U.S.-Soviet contacts edging towards talks?

A I don't. Just refer you to what John said on that yesterday.

Q Can you tell us if Mr. Chernenko has sent a letter to President Reagan about a meeting of Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko?

A As I say, Don, I don't have anything to take you beyond what John said on this yesterday.

Q Do you have any comment on the Heritage Study on ANZUS?

A No.

Q Do you have any comment on the Jane's report today on the MIGs having been off-loaded in Libya before getting to Nicaragua?

A No, I don't.

A-2993

Q No comment on that at all?

A No, I don't think -- to comment --

Q Am I asking the wrong question?

A No, you're not asking the wrong question. To comment on that would take us into the question of what we know about Soviet ships and what they're carrying in detail, and I think we'd prefer not to --

Q It does sort of suggest, though, that the information the U.S. had at the time the ship arrived in Nicaragua may have been outdated?

A If _Jane's_ -- if that report about _Jane's_ is correct, that might be an inference one would draw. But I would not necessarily draw the inference.

Q Can we have a request for a filing break on Australia, arms?

A No objection? Sure. Filing break.

Q Do you have anything on the Manzanillo talks?

A Very little, as usual. That is to say that Ambassador Shlaudeman and Vice Foreign Minister Tinoco met in Manzanillo on November 19 and 20 for their eighth round. The talks were serious and substantive, and we anticipate that there will be further meetings. As has been agreed with the Nicaraguans, we will not discuss the details of those talks.

Q You do anticipate further meetings? And some suggestions there might not be any more are not well-founded?

A Well, I think the words speak for themselves.

MORE

-2774

Q Are the talks between the United States and Israel over the economic matters now concluded, at least this round of them? And can you tell us what it is -- where they are?

A Very briefly, I can Don. As you know, there have been two parallel sets of talks, and both are part of an ongoing series of discussions. The first was a preparatory meeting of the U.S.-Israeli Joint Economic Group. The discussions were a useful exchange of ideas and have set the stage for a plenary session of this group -- which is known as the JEDG, Joint Economic Development Group -- which would be held in December, I believe, in Washington.

The Joint Security Assistance Planning Group has reviewed Israel's defense procurement requirements and financial arrangements in the context of Israel's overall security needs. They have been productive discussions, and they also will be continued in December. And I understand, but can't guarantee you, that they also will be held here.

Q Well, this suggests that they've now finished for this round.

A This round is over, that's correct.

Q Can you tell us what it is, this U.S.-Israel Joint Economic Group? I don't think it was ever really announced.

A I thought we --

Q Who is on it, and what is it?

A Well, I thought we provided something the other day --

Q Well, I asked for it, but I don't think --

A -- in response to your question.

Q Well, I asked for it, but I don't think --

A (To staff) It was posted?

Let me ask you to check the board on that, Don.

It was a group announced, I think, at the time when Prime Minister Peres was here, and it was explained at the time. As I recall that posting, it does explain what the issues they are to address are.

1-2975

Q Alan, do you have anything on the Libyan media threats to the life of Hosni Mubarak?

A This, I think, goes back to yesterday. Obviously, if those threats are accurate, it is outrageous that they should do that. But I guess I wouldn't have anything beyond that.

Go ahead, Stan.

Q Alan, on the question that you raised in your announcements on the Gandhi assassination, has the United States taken any position on the request of the Government of India that Chohan Singh be extradited from Britain to India?

A I'm not aware that we've taken a position on that.

Q Has the United States taken any action to disassociate the Administration from people like Lane Kirkland in the United States who have publicly promoted Chohan Singh and the assassins of Indira Gandhi?

A Well, you're drawing all sorts of connections which I'm not prepared to draw.

Q I'm not drawing connections. Lane Kirkland drew the connections --

A Let me -- We have made --

Q -- and you drew the connections to him.

A Would you like an answer, or would you like to make a speech?

Q I just wanted to clarify the question. Now, you can answer it.

A O.K. Let's go on.

Q (inaudible) Do you (inaudible) to answer that?

A Oh, no. I already did, and I refer you back to the record. It's been addressed. Our attitude towards --

Q Do you deny -- (inaudible) to answer that?

A   Our attitude towards the comments which were made about the events in India is on the record, it's very clear, and I invite you to read it if you can find it --

Q   If I can follow up, the question I'm trying to get at --

A   No, no.

Q   The question I'm trying to get at is that you talk about Soviet disinformation --

A   Uh-huh.

Q   -- but the Soviets also operate by actually tainting policy circles in the United States, and the fact of the matter is --

A   Now, let's --

Q   -- and the fact of the matter is that policy circles connected with this Administration were involved in the assassination, and unless you disassociate yourself from those policy --

A   I hope that your lawyers are ready to deal with whoever is going to sue you.

Q   How about the other sets of talks that have been taking place here in D. C., in Washington, D. C., between the United States and Israel on the Joint Economic Zone?

A   On the free trade area?

Q   Yes, the free -- excuse me.

A   Let me see if I can get you an update on where that stands. I'm not sure where that is.

Q   Anything to give us a status report on the upgrading of the C-47s in El Salvador? Has that been accomplished now?

A   Don't know the answer to that. You might want to check with the Pentagon on that.

Q   Concerning Libya, the Foreign Minister of France, Mr. Cheysson, in his press conference yesterday, said the United States has notably different ideas from his, or

France's, regarding how to handle Mr. Qadhafi. He suggests that the U.S. is not interested in having France carry on discussions with Qadhafi.

A Uh-huh.

Q What is the U.S. attitude on this?

A Well, I think the fact is that our attitude towards Libya is well known, and I understand that in his press conference yesterday, Mr. Cheysson also indicated that U.S.-French relations are on a good footing, which is what we've been saying to you now for the past several days. Nothing has changed with that, and I think that's all I really have to say about that.

Q Well, your attitude toward Libya is well known, but your attitude toward French discussions with Libya is a little bit less well known except by Mr. Cheysson's press conference.

A Well, I guess that's something we will leave to discussions with the French rather than here.

Q Alan, in his campaign appearances, the President made it clear that he didn't believe in the over-population thesis of Parson Malthus. However, this Department is on the record supporting the view that population expansion is a contributor to economic difficulties. Your Emergency Disaster Relief group on Africa has been telling the public that the cause of the current economic problems in Africa is over-population.

Is there any plan to move this Department's policy position in line with that publicly-stated policy of the President?

A I think the policy statements have been quite consistent.

Robin.

Q Can you explain the consistency?

A No. I think I'll go on to another questioner, Stan.

Q On Chile, apparently the United States through the Inter-American Development Bank will be making some kind of statement on our policy and the reason why we are either voting for moneys for Chile or not, through the IDB. Can you give us any information on that?

A No, I can't. I'm not aware that necessarily there would be, or what kind of a statement might be made once the votes have been held. My understanding is that they -- actually there are two loans for Chile that are scheduled for consideration by the IDB, but neither has yet been approved. And since the vote hasn't been taken and is still under consideration, I'm not going to address it. And I think, in terms of any details about those loans, I guess I would have to refer you to Treasury.

Mike.

Q Alan, is this government considering, or has it sent any special aid to Mexico, assistance regarding the gas explosion, and medical treatment?

A Well, we certainly lament the tragedy that has befallen the Mexicans in this gas explosion, but I think that Ambassador Gavin already indicated that we have offered assistance should the Mexicans wish to have it. I don't have an update on where that stands. Our Embassy in Mexico may, but I don't have anything today to bring you up to the minute on that.

Q Do you have any comment on a report in the FBIS wire from the rebel radio station in El Salvador saying that a third member of the U.S. Embassy security staff has been killed?

A I don't have anything to give you on that at this point. I'm aware of the reports. If we get anything later, we'll be happy to provide it to you.

Q Do you have anything on the AP report that Israeli troops opened up on West Bank Palestinian students demonstrating their support for PLO Leader Yassir Arafat, killing one and wounding five?

A Well, I think the reports on that are not entirely clear. I gather that there was a lot of confusion and violence and so on going on. In any case, obviously, we deplore violence from any quarter, but I think given the confused circumstances, I wouldn't have any comment beyond that.

Q Thank you.

A Sure.

(The briefing concluded at 12:40 P.M.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #210

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1984, 12:07 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have one statement on the Uruguayan election, and then I will be happy to take questions.

We welcome Uruguay's return to democratic rule and congratulate the Uruguayan people for the way in which the elections were conducted yesterday. In returning to its democratic traditions, Uruguay is joining other countries in our hemisphere in which the people vote to select their governments' leaders.

That's it. Be happy to take questions.

Q Alan, first, can we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q And do you have any comment on the World Court ruling today?

A Yes, I do, George. We are disappointed with the Court's decision. We believe that we presented to the Court compelling arguments, including a demonstration that Nicaragua had deliberately failed to accept the Court's compulsory jurisdiction and was thus seeking to sue when it could not be sued. We continue to believe that the Court is not the proper forum, either as a matter of law, or for helping to achieve a peaceful resolution of the conflict in the region.

Q Alan, does that mean that the United States will abide by the ruling of the Court and will adhere to any decisions made in this case, including the one that was made several months ago -- I've forgotten when -- regarding U.S. activities in and around Nicaragua?

A Well, I think we've addressed the question of the temporary measures before, and I refer you back to what we said about that. In terms of the future and your question with regard to that, we can make no specific comment in that regard. We only just received the opinion, and as I said, we

1-3801

continue to believe the Court is not the proper forum, either as a matter of law or for helping to achieve a peaceful resolution of the conflict in the region.

I'm going to have to leave you at the moment with that.

Q Alan, when you say "as a matter of law," you mean the old point that you were making, that it does not have the proper jurisdiction for issues like this?

A That's right.

Q You're not questioning its ability to reach legal decisions?

A No. I am -- At this point, I'm addressing what we have said before. I'm not talking to the future.

Q Will there be any further U.S. action at the Court to appeal this -- to attempt to appeal this decision at the Court itself?

A I'm not sure what the next steps are, Ralph. I'm not sure whether an appeal of any sort, in fact, is possible. My impression is that in that respect, the Court has reached a judgment with respect to its jurisdiction, and I think that is as far as they will go on that side of it.

Q Can we have a copy of the statement?

A Sure.

Q As long as you're on Latin America, unless there has been a move for postponement, the Inter-American Development Bank is scheduled to vote today on -- I believe it's a $125 million loan to Chile. Do we have a position yet on how we will vote, or anything you can tell us about it?

A I don't have anything I can tell you, John. Frankly, I'm not familiar with the schedule of the vote, but in any case, we have tended not to speak ahead of time about our votes.

Q Well, it was due last Monday and was postponed for seven days --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- which means it's today.

1-2002

A Yes. Fine. But I think once we have voted, normally then we would comment, but not beforehand

Q If there is a vote later today, could you issue a statement explaining your rationale?

A I'll pass on the interest in getting that, sure.

Q Alan, on Iraq -- I'm sorry.

A Marvin, go ahead.

Q On Iraq, has it been the U.S. position all along that it favored a reestablishment of relations with Iraq, and that it was Iraq's decision to come forward at this time?

A Well, in terms of "this time," I think that I'm not going to announce or talk about the events surrounding Tariq Aziz's visit to the United States. But, yes, our position all along has been that we were prepared to resume relations and that that was, therefore, a matter for the Government of Iraq to decide.

Q And why do you think they came forward at this time?

A Marvin, I think that there is probably right now going on a briefing at the White House following the Minister's meeting with the President. I think I would leave those questions to the briefer.

Q Can we talk for a moment -- A lot of water has gone under the bridge since there has been a State Department briefing, and maybe we could just talk for a minute about the announcement that was made on Thursday of Secretary Shultz' meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko in January. I don't know to what extent you're prepared to discuss that here, but since there hasn't been an opportunity, I'd like to ask a couple of questions about it.

First of all, can you tell us whether the talks in Geneva will involve substantive discussions on nuclear arms reductions, or will they involve discussions on forums for such negotiations and agendas for such negotiations?

A Ralph, I am going to beg off answering questions, basically on the grounds that Bud McFarlane had an extensive ON-THE-RECORD briefing on Thursday, and I think he addressed all of those kinds of questions, and I will leave you with his words on that. There also have been appearances since then, but that was a rather extensive briefing.

Q   Alan, on the situation in Ethiopia. Somalia is charging that Ethiopia will be responsible if anything happens to those 108 hostages that are still held on board the plane. Do we have any comment on that? Do we either support their view, or do we disassociate ourselves from it?

A   I don't have a particular comment on that aspect. Our focus has been on working on the situation itself. We have been in constant touch with the Ethiopian authorities in monitoring the situation. Our influence with the Ethiopians, however, is limited, and we've not been allowed to talk to the passengers who were released.

I've got a little sit-rep if you want, but I suspect that your wires have brought you up to date.

Q   The specific question I have to deal with has to do with the possible release of the 21 political prisoners. Have we had discussions with the Somalis on that in the past about --

A   Again, I don't think I'm going to get into the question of what diplomatic exchanges we may have had. I'm going to not address that.

Go ahead.

Q   One other question: This is on Namibia. The Portuguese newspaper Expresso had an article last week, and it said that the U.S. had mediated an agreement between Angola and South Africa which would call for the disengagement, the final disengagement to begin on December 25. Do we have -- do you have any statement to confirm or deny that?

A   No, I don't have any statement on that. We have been working very hard on various aspects of the southern Africa situation and have been involved in mediating efforts to facilitate a settlement, and we will continue to work on this.

Q   Alan, D.C. Delegate Walter Fauntroy and others say it is going to be a continuing tactic of civil disobedience at South African Embassies and Consulates around the country. Does the Department have a view on that? Do you intend to do something about that? For instance, there is a demonstration scheduled for this afternoon at the South African Embassy here.

A   Well, I don't have something specific. There was some guidance available last week, at the time of the incident at the Embassy itself. Obviously, there are certain regulations which apply to demonstrations, and I would expect that those would apply in this case as well. But I don't have anything specific in response to your question.

George.

Q Is there a visiting Honduran delegation here? And if so, do you have any idea what they're up to?

A I think there is going to be; I'm not sure whether a delegation has actually arrived. An official Honduran delegation will visit the United States this week to discuss economic and security topics. Meetings with U.S. officials are scheduled for November 28 and 29, so that's Wednesday and Thursday.

These meetings are part of an ongoing series of discussions between the United States and Honduras, which reflect the good relationship between our two governments.

Q At what level will they be represented?

A The head of their delegation will be the Minister of the Presidency Arriaga.

Q Alan, do you happen to know if General Lopez is part of that delegation?

A I don't have details on who's in the delegation.

Q On Nicaragua, do you have anything on L-39s?

A No, not beyond what we've said before on the subject.

Q What have you said about that?

A Marvin, I don't have all in my head what we have said. We've been asked questions about L-39s --

Q There is something new and specific. Wasn't there a --

A Well, there was a report in the --

Q -- shipment -- something about Libya?

A There was a report in the weekend press about L-39s, but I don't have any response to those reports.

P-3605

Q Alan, what about the situation in Colombia? Have American diplomats or dependents been withdrawn from Bogota?

A Yes. I think probably it has been indicated in various conversations, since the press has carried a lot of this. Obviously, I can't go into a lot of detail for security reasons, but the terrorist activities in Colombia have been a concern for some time, and security arrangements at our Embassy have reflected that.

It's our view that recent developments and our continuing cooperation and cooperative efforts with the Colombian Government to address problems of drug trafficking warrant particular vigilence at this time. And in this context, our mission has been on a heightened security alert, and we are in the process of lowering our official profile in Colombia on a temporary basis, doing this by authorizing departure of a small number of Embassy employees and their dependents.

It's not, I would stress, an evacuation. It's a slight trimming of the staff until we can get a better handle on the situation, and the Embassy program activities will continue.

Q May we have a copy, please?

A I think you're probably going to have to get that from the transcript.

Q Was this announced by the Embassy in Bogota earlier?

A I'm not sure whether there was an announcement on it, George. There has been a lot of press coverage of it, and I don't quite know how that came about.

Q Alan, on the World Court again, is the decision, as you see it, simply on the narrow issue of whether the Court feels it has jurisdiction? Or is it that the Court finds in your view that the U.S. is in violation of international law?

A No. I think that it was quite clear that the question was on jurisdiction and acceptability of the Court of the case in the Court.

Q But there is still --

A It was not addressing itself to the merits.

1-3006

Q So that there is still the Nicaraguan issue to be resolved by the Court because they they went to the Court to accuse the United States --

A Right.

Q -- of being in violation of the law.

A Right. And as I say, with respect to future activities, I don't have any specific comment at this point.

Q So you can't say whether you'll participate in those hearings should the Court schedule them?

A I don't have anything further for you at this point.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:20 P.M.)

1-3007

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #211

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1984, 12:01 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon.

I have one announcement on the death of the American Ambassador to Trinidad and Tobago. It's with great sadness that the Department of State announces the death this morning in St. Croix, Virgin Islands, of the Honorable Dr. Melvin Herbert Evans, who had served as United States Ambassador to Trinidad and Tobago since 1981. The cause of the death was a heart attack. The Ambassador was 67 years old.

Dr. Evans was named Ambassador to Trinidad and Tobago after a distinguished career in medicine and public service. He was delegate to the United States Congress from the Virgin Islands from 1979 to 1980, and was Governor of the Virgin Islands from 1969 to 1975.

Further biographical data on Ambassador Evans is available in the Press Office.

That's all I have in the way of announcements.

Q Any reaction to Chernenko's statement of yesterday?

A No. I think Larry Speakes, at his briefing at the White House, will be responding to that particular question.

Q Do you have any comments on Moscow's defense budget increase, more than 12 percent?

A No.

Q Any reaction to the explosion at the Embassy in Bogota?

A Yes, I do have something on that. That was a car explosion. It took place on the street behind our Embassy in Bogota at 3:55 p.m. local time yesterday. The debris recovered at the site indicates that dynamite was used.

1-3007

According to preliminary reports from the Colombian police, one passer-by was killed and six were injured. There was damage, the extent of that as yet undetermined, to an office building which faces the Embassy. Insofar as the Embassy itself is concerned, there were very minor injuries to two Embassy gardeners and minor damage to the Embassy building and to cars parked in the Embassy compound.

That's really about the extent of what I have. The Embassy was open as usual at the time. The Ambassador was out of the building at the time. The Colombian authorities are investigating this incident.

Q Do we see this as linked to our efforts to curtail the cocaine trade there?

A That obviously is a possibility, Greg, but I think the fact of the matter is that we don't know who did this, and I find it really tough to speculate at the moment. But, obviously, that is a possibility.

Q John, just for the record, do you consider this a case of state terrorism?

A I suppose one would have to be sure of who did this before one could describe it as "state terrorism."

Q That's not always the case, though. You don't always wait for that, do you, or --

A I think it's a good idea to find out which state was involved before you accuse anybody of state terrorism.

Q Do you have any reaction today, or any decision to tell us about the United States -- what the United States is going to do now in the World Court?

A No, I don't.

Q Do you have any indication how long it is going to be --

A No, I don't.

Q -- before the government decides what to do?

A No, that's a fairly extensive judgment, and we'll be needing to take a look at that, but I don't have a time frame.

Q Can you give us some indication of the options?

A No.

Q John, do you have anything on the possibility that the Secretary, when he's in Europe in December, may choose to set up a meeting with Gorbachev who will be in Great Britain?

A I'm not aware of any such plans, Marvin. I do not believe that there's any such planning under way at the moment.

Q Any consideration being given to that?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q There is consideration, though, of a stop in London. Is that where the confusion may arise from?

A Have we announced the trip yet? As we haven't announced the trip, I --

Q I said "consideration."

A -- I find myself in a somewhat difficult position discussing stops, John.

--MORE--

1-30 11

Q Theoretically or hypothetically, if he stopped in London, would he enjoy having the opportunity to meet with Mr. Gorbachev?

A Well, I know nothing about a Gorbachev meeting, but why don't we chat a little bit about the schedule afterwards -- the schedule of the trip we haven't announced.

(Laughter)

Q Is the Administration about to sign an M.O.U. with India on technology?

A On that question, let me just say that the United States has sound commercial relations with India. In support of that trade, discussions between the two governments have been ongoing in a number of areas including high technology. Since the discussions are continuing, we are not in a position to comment further at this time.

Q Can you give us any indication of -- I mean, it says in the Post this M.O.U. is going to be signed within the next day or two?

A I saw the story.

Q Can you give us any hint that --

A No, I can't.

Q -- something might happen in the next couple of days.

A No, can't.

Q Can we have a copy of that statement?

A Sure.

Q Copy of the statement on the Ambassador, please?

A Sure.

Q Do you have anything on the Israeli air attack into Lebanon?

A No comment on the Israeli air attack.

1-3012

Q John, on the proposed Iraqi pipeline through Jordan, was there any discussion between the United States and the Iraqis on a joint ownership of the line, of the pipeline, through Jordan -- between the United States, Jordan and Iraq?

A I don't know. I think there was a briefing on the Iraqi visit yesterday, and I'll simply refer you to that record.

Q John, in the restoration of relations with Iraq, did we discuss this beforehand with the Saudis? Did we get their input in any way?

A As I said, I think there was a BACKGROUNDER on this yesterday and I'll refer you to that record.

Q Well, we were there, and there was nothing mentioned on that.

A Ah! You didn't ask the right questions.

(Laughter)

Q Any comment, John, on the Post story that we were prepared to retaliate around Thanksgiving --

A No.

Q -- in Lebanon?

A No.

Q Any comment, John, on a FBIS report this morning about a rather large capture of Soviets by Afghan rebels inside Afghanistan?

A No. As a matter of fact, I haven't seen that, Ralph. Sorry.

Q Could you perhaps take that question and see if there is anything to be said on it?

A Let me take a look.

Q John, yesterday at the briefing the restoration of ties with Iraq was described as the culmination of the long process that had begun with relatively low-level dialogue and over the years built up. Do we have any kind of process underway now to improve relations with Iran, or perhaps restore relations with Iran?

A Well, there's no change in the position vis-a-vis the United States and Iran, and there is no change in our posture of neutrality in that war.

Q But I didn't really ask about the war. Are we talking either with them or through third parties, or is there a process?

A No, I don't have anything on that.

Q John, do you have any comment on Senator Kennedy's call for U.S. support of the peace effort for Nicaragua's Indians?

A No. No, I don't.

Q Thank you.

A You were trying to get in here?

Q I wanted to ask you --

Q We're not privileged to have him here every day.

Q I wanted to ask you a question about trade with Nicaragua. In May of last year, the Administration cut off or reduced the sugar quota trade into this country from Nicaragua.

A Uh-huh.

Q A White House statement said it was because of, you know, their export of subversion and violence, etc. When I look at the trade figures from '81 to '84, trade going from here to Nicaragua and from Nicaragua coming here, there has been no effort besides sugar to restrict it.

A Uh-huh.

Q In '83-84, tractor parts are being sold to Nicaragua, millions of dollars worth; millions of dollars worth of lubricant oils. They are importing into this country millions of dollars in bananas, beef.

Why was there a restriction on the sugar that comes here, but there has been no effort by this country to restrict any of the other trade that either goes to Nicaragua or comes here from Nicaragua?

A I can't answer that question off-the-cuff, but let me do a little research on that for you, and see if we can -- I suspect there was some guidance on that at the time we made the announcement on the sugar quota. But let me take a look at it.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:10 P.M.)

1-3015

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #212

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1984, 12:00 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: A couple of announcements. Firstly, there will be a BACKGROUND briefing on the November 30 State Visit of Federal Republic of Germany Chancellor Helmut Kohl. He's coming to the United States tomorrow, November -- or, I guess the briefing is tomorrow, the 29th at 10:00 a.m. in the White House Briefing Room.

Q This is 10:00 a.m. tomorrow?

A 10:00 a.m. tomorrow for Kohl.

Q In advance, in other words?

A In advance.

Q And, secondly, I have a statement from the Secretary of State, which I have special pleasure in reading, because it concerns my successor.

Secretary of State George P. Shultz today announced the appointment of Bernard Kalb as Spokesman for the Department of State. The White House has authorized the State Department to announce the President's intention to nominate Mr. Kalb as Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, in which position he will serve concurrently.

Mr. Kalb will succeed John Hughes, who has resigned from government effective January 1, 1985.

Mr. Kalb, a longtime and distinguished print and television journalist, has most recently covered the State Department for NBC. Born in New York City February 4, 1922, Mr. Kalb attended New York public schools. Graduated from City College of New York in 1942. He spent two years in the United States Army, mainly in the Aleutians. Joined The New York Times in 1946.

He worked for The New York Times radio station, then as a city reporter in New York, then at the United Nations, and on assignment to Antarctica before becoming a foreign correspondent in Southeast Asia. (Laughter) Kind of cools you off before you go to Asia.

He went as a foreign correspondent to Southeast Asia from 1956-61 for the Times. Then he was an Edward R. Murrow Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York from '61 to '62. Joined CBS in '62, serving as a correspondent in Southeast Asia, and as Paris bureau chief through 1970. In that year he became Washington anchorman of CBS Morning News, then moved to the State Department in 1975, covering, in the ensuing years, Secretaries Kissinger, Vance, Muskie, Haig and Shultz

Mr. Kalb is the author of two books, one on Henry Kissinger, and another, a novel, The Last Ambassador. He's written prolifically for various magazines. He's married and has four daughters

A note about Mr. Hughes, who is a former editor of the Christian Science Monitor, Pulitzer Prize winner and former President of the American Society of Newspaper Editors. He has been the State Department Spokesman and Assistant Secretary of State since July of 1982. Before that, he was Director of the Voice of America and Associate Director of the U.S. Information Agency, and he is leaving government to return to journalism

Q John, couldn't the Secretary have chosen someone with some experience to do this job? (Laughter) I mean -

A Let me just say personally that I think this is a very good appointment for the State Department, and I think it's a very good appointment for this press corps, which will be served well by Bernie, so I think it's a very, very happy appointment. As you all know, he's a man of great professionalism and integrity, and who knows, he even may add some sartorial excellence to the podium.

--MORE--

Q Personally, I'm delighted.

Q Congratulations.

Q What are you going to do in the field of journalism, John?

A Oh, I'll chat about that a little later on.

Q Have you thought about joining the State Department Correspondents' Association?

A No. I did --

Q -- and working here?

A I did think that on Bernie's first day at the podium it might be nice if I were accredited to somebody and sat in the Bernie Kalb Memorial Seat and enjoined him to cut the ambiguities and the nuances and get more directly to the (Laughter)

Q This is effective, you said, January first?

A Well, I'm leaving -- I have sent my resignation to the President effective January 1. I, in fact, will leave the State Department December 21, which happens -- coincidentally happens to be just before Christmas, and Bernie will be here on the 16th which will be the -- that week before I leave.

Q Of December?

A Of December.

Q He'll be at the podium, or he'll be sitting in the room?

A I cannot speak for the new Spokesman, so I do not know when he will assume the podium. He may want to spend a week finding out how it all works.

Q Okay.

Q It will be interesting.

Q (Inaudible)

A Sorry?

Q Will you be going to Brussels for the NATO --

A Yes, I'll go to Brussels. Yes. Yes.

Q Will Mr. Kalb?

A I don't know whether Mr. Kalb will be in Brussels. I don't know.

So that's all I have for you today, and a lean book.

Q Copy?

A Copy of the announcement? Sure. (Laughter)

Q Do you have a reading on what is happening in the Kremlin regarding Minister Ustinov?

A Well, only that our Embassy reports that suggestions that flags are flying at half-mast proves not to be true, if that helps. (Laughter)

Q What about the Minister? Does he --

Q They're all the way up?

A I don't know that anybody from the Embassy has seen --

Q Pardon?

A I don't know that anybody from the Embassy -- I do know that nobody from the Embassy has seen Mr. Ustinov, but I don't know what his status is.

Q Do you have anything on the agreement between Spain and Britain on Gibraltar?

A Yes. That is something that we applaud. We welcome the sincere and statesmanlike efforts that each side has shown in dealing with this question, and that have made this agreement possible. The United Kingdom and Spain are close friends and allies, and we are very pleased at the agreement between them.

Q John, do you have anything more on the Italian arrests of those Lebanese --

A Not really, Bernie.

Q Any definite links to the terrorist organization?

A Not really much beyond where we were yesterday. I think we're particularly appreciative of the efforts that the Italian authorities have taken in this case. They seem to be really out front in this area of terrorism and charting a very fine path, so we applaud that. But I don't have any more details.

Q Do we have any indication, John, that this group may be the same one involved in the attacks in Lebanon?

A No, I don't have anything on that.

Q Do we hope to question these people?

A I don't know whether we will. I think our position will be that the Italian authorities have the situation in hand

Q Do you have any indications the Italians are seeking other members of this group, or is this the core, the only members involved?

A We have worked very closely with the Italians in the area of terrorism, and they -- we have worked with them in general very closely, but particularly closely in the past several days, and that cooperation -- closeness of cooperation will continue I'm sure they are actively looking for others who would seek to perform acts of terrorism in Italy.

Q John, as the investigation unfolded, were we kept apprised of it, one? And, two, did we take any special precautions at the Embassy, such as evacuating any personnel?

A I think we'll pass on the question of special precautions. As you know, we're a little diffident about discussing security these days, but we certainly have had very close contact with the Italians in the past several days.

Q Well, you have been able to say that we've withdrawn some diplomatic personnel from Bogota in the face of the threats there.

A Uh-huh.

Q Why couldn't you say the same thing about Rome?

A I'm just not going to respond on Rome.

Q These people apparently had a map of some sort --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- of the Embassy and the persons there.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do we have any idea how they might have come to obtain that?

A No, although I suppose the presumption is by observation and reconnaissance.

Q John, the use of the phrase "past several days" leads me to conclude that the period of intense cooperation with the Italians on this particular case has been since the arrests were made on Saturday, but not before the arrests were made.

A No, I wouldn't read that interpretation into what I said.

Q John, do you have any comment on the -- so many statements made by Libya's Qadhafi yesterday on the "Nightline," especially those relating to --

A A suggestion that France reneged on the deal and kept their troops in Chad, so reluctant Libya had to go back in there? That? I think it's ridiculous.

Q Are Libyan troops still in Chad?

Q -- his position to being anti-terrorism himself?

A Well, I've -- we certainly would applause his stand against terrorism. That's just fine. (Laughter)

Q John, are Libyan troops still in Chad?

A I think Libyan troops are still in Chad. Yes, Bernie.

Q Are they still at the number of about 3,000?

A I'm not going to get into numbers, but I wouldn't -- well, I guess I just won't get into numbers.

Q You won't argue with that?

A I wouldn't engage in a great argument with you on that number.

Q John, do you have any comment on the statement by President Reagan on six more Soviet ships headed for Nicaragua?

A No.

Q Is there any additional information on that?

A No.

Q Are those the same six ships that were being referred to after the -- about a week or two ago after the alleged MIG ship out there?

A I don't quite know what the -- I don't have in my head, Ralph, whether any of the six ships that were referred to earlier have docked and whether there are more -- I just don't know what --

Q I'm just trying to get an idea as to whether there are 12 -- there have been a total of 12 ships over the past two weeks, or --

A I can't answer that one. But, as you know, the flow of weaponry continues to be high to Nicaragua.

Q Is there any more suspicion about the ones President Reagan was referring to than there was about the ones that succeeded the one ship that we were all paying a lot of attention to a couple of weeks ago?

A We remain interested and would be concerned and have so indicated, as you know, should there be high-performance aircraft shipped to Nicaragua, and we have made that plain. And I think you may take it as a given that we are following the situation as closely as we are able.

-- MORE --

Q John, is the U.S. going to issue a visa to the Nicaraguan Vice President-elect Ramirez?

A Yes. Yes. Has done so.

Q John, would this new Libyan anti-terrorist position open the door for new relations with the United States?

A Well, I didn't say it was a new anti-terrorist position. I was asked to --

Q They described it like that.

A If Mr. Qadhafi is now taking a position against terrorism, that would be a welcome development, and would seem to run counter to his previous positions.

Q But if that was the case, would that open the door for them?

A I think, as always with Mr. Qadhafi, one wants to take his statements very cautiously and make sure that these statements are followed by specific action, constructive action.

Q John, anything on the Honduras delegation meeting with Secretary Shultz this morning?

A Nothing beyond what we have already given you, no.

Q John, the Angolans and the South Africans have made public their relative positions on the withdrawal of Cubans in Namibia. Do you have any comment on how you describe, how you would interpret these various positions?

A I don't think so, Bernie. I think our position is that we would like to pursue what I think we feel is a progressing situation, but we'd like to pursue it quietly and through diplomacy.

Q John, a similar topic: Do you have any statements on the comments by Ambassador Fourie yesterday comparing his Embassy's situation with that in Iran?

A Well, the situation is totally different. In the case of Tehran, you had seizure of the American Embassy, clearly with the support of the authorities there. The situation is quite different here, and obviously, this is a country in which people who feel very deeply about such issues as apartheid in South Africa, as does this Administration, have the right to demonstrate. They also have the obligation to heed the laws, and the laws are being enforced around the South African Embassy.

We have had no suggestion of criticism from the South African Ambassador here of the manner in which the various law-enforcement authorities have been handling that situation.

Q Is the State Department upset by his remarks? Have you said anything to him?

A It's not a question of being upset; it's a question, I think, of that particular comparison being inappropriate. It's just not accurate.

Q John, on the arrest of the Czechoslovak spy yesterday in New York, the U.S. Government called him, in the press release, "an illegal officer of the Czech intelligence service."

A Uh-huh.

Q I may have missed something, but are there any legal officers of the Czech or any other Soviet-bloc intelligence service allowed in the U.S.?

A I think that you would have to ask the head of the Czech intelligence agency that and see whether he can define that. I can't.

Q What is meant by that? What --

A I can't answer that. Who put -- who called him an "illegal officer?"

Q The FBI, the Justice Department.

A Why don't you go back to them and ask them what they mean by it?

Q John, back here. Do you have anything on the situation today in Chile? Are we still concerned by --

A Yes, we are concerned by the situation in Chile. We view the situation with growing concern. A cycle of terrorism, repression, and protest is developing in Chile. This cycle threatens the transition process. It impedes the development of a political consensus between those forces in government that favor a transition to democracy and those outside of government that favor discussions and dialogue on this issue. Previous discussions and dialogue have resulted in an impasse, both on a timetable and procedures for initiating the transition to democracy. Clearly, some initiative is necessary to break this impasse. And so we again appeal to those forces which favor a return to democracy to renew efforts to open discussions on a timetable and procedures for returning to democracy in Chile.

Q Copy of that?

Q What do you see in Pinochet's attitude?

A Pardon?

Q What do you see in Pinochet's attitude? Is he among those who are for shifting to democracy?

A I'm not going beyond the words we offered here, which I think express our position quite clearly.

Q Copy of the Chile?

A Sure.

Q Also, John, tentatively at least, there are two loans at the Inter-American Development Bank to Chile that are tentatively scheduled to come to a vote today.

A Is it today or tomorrow?

Q Well, my information is that today it is -- if they are among the things slated to come up before the Board today. Do we have a position yet on what our representative will do?

A Well, I don't think we will indicate our position before the vote.

Q Is it your information that it will be tomorrow?

A I thought it was Thursday, but I may be wrong.

TO STAFF: You thought it was today?

Mr. Romberg thinks it is today; I think it is tomorrow

Q Well, it's today, but if they don't get to it in the order of business, then it goes over till tomorrow.

A So both Mr. Romberg and I are right. (Laughter)

Q A follow-up on the Chile question is: When you speak of an "initiative," is there a possibility that the U.S. may be involved in --

A No, I wouldn't read that into this. I think what we're -- we're not suggesting that. We're suggesting that those forces who are for progress and democracy undertake that kind of initiative.

Q John, has Ambassador Theberge been instructed to talk to the government along this line, and to encourage such a --

A I'm sure the government is very well aware of our thinking on this.

Q Anything on the election of Yasir Arafat?

A His election? You mean his resignation and his speedy re-election? No. (Laughter)

Q John, can I get back to the Czech spy for just a second? Is there a damage assessment that has been concluded since --

A Sorry, on -- ?

Q -- a damage assessment on the Czech spy?

A I think you'd have to talk to the FBI on that, Ralph.

Q A U.S. intelligence damage assessment would be an FBI matter?

A I think you'd have to talk to the FBI on the question of the Czech --

Q One more on the Middle East?

A Sure.

Q Anything on Iraq's statements regarding a rapprochement between Jordan and Israel -- or just general comments on Israel?

A No. No. Nothing specific.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:17 p.m..)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #213

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 1984, 12:25 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have a few announcements. First, to tell you that Deputy Secretary Kenneth W. Dam will address ON THE RECORD a joint luncheon meeting of the Dallas World Affairs Council and the Rotary Club on Wednesday, December 5, from 12:00 to 1:15 p.m. at the Union Station, which is 400 South Houston Street, in Dallas, Texas. (Laughter) I've never been to Union Station. I don't know quite what that's about.

Anyway, if you want to cover the event, please contact the Dallas World Affairs Council at (214) 827-7960. The subject will be "Latin America: the Struggle to Restore Economic Growth," and there will be an advance text, so I'm told.

Q The title?

A "The Struggle to Restore Economic Growth."

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

Available in the Press Office is the testimony this morning by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs John H. Kelly before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Governmental Affairs. The subject is "Child Pornography And International Efforts To Impede The Flow of Such Materials Into This Country."

And finally, a statement about international narcotics efforts and relationship to recent violence in South America. The Department is making clear that the recent violence in South America has not, and will not, diminish the high priority which the United States assigns to its international narcotics control objectives.

In testimony before the President's Commission on Organized Crime on November 28, Assistant Secretary Jon R. Thomas said, "Anti-narcotics efforts will not be slowed. We and our South American colleagues will not be deterred by the cruelty, torture, bombings, or threats from any source. The issue goes beyond narcotics control. These traffickers and terrorists are striking at the very foundations of democratic government."

The Department welcomes the strong statement issued by Colombian Minister of Justice Enrique Parejo-Gonzalez in Bogota on November 27, in which the Colombian Government condemned the criminal bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Bogota in which an innocent bystander, a mother of five children, was killed and six other people injured.

The Minister said: "The terrorists have to realize that they are sacrificing human lives that have no connection whatsoever with the problem that they allegedly tried to vindicate through this type of reprehensible actions, which are criminal and rejectable in every sense. These terrorist actions will in no way discourage the Colombian Government, nor will they make us deviate one inch from the line of conduct that we have adopted in our struggle against all forms of crime, and especially against all forms of organized crime such as drug trafficking. We will continue to severely repress and prosecute drug traffickers with legal mechanisms we have at present and with extraordinary legal measures if we see fit to adopt them."

The Colombian Embassy in Washington has also expressed its deep regrets at this criminal action and stated its certainty that Colombian security forces will continue to act against narcotics traffickers."

That's the end of the statement. I have to check, I think, Brian, where the quote from yesterday's statement begins and ends. It's unclear in this.

That is it for announcements. I'll be happy to take questions.

Q Alan, can you confirm the resumption of U.S.-Cuban immigration talks?

A Yes. The talks on immigration issues resumed yesterday, on November 28. This is on the return to Cuba of Mariel excludables and related migration issues. Those talks are continuing today.

Q Will they end today?

A I don't know whether they will end today. I can't tell you that.

Q Could you give us the --

A In New York City.

Q -- the participants?

A The heads of the delegation are Michael Kozak, the Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department of State, and Ricardo Alarcon, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cuba. These are the same two gentlemen who headed the delegations previously.

Q Is this the third round?

A This is.

Q Alan, could I just ask that on your point there, on the quote, you may not know the answer. It's obvious you're not sure of it.

A Right.

Q When you started saying, "These terrorist incidents will not deter us," do you know whether you were saying "will not deter the U.S." or "will not deter Colombia?"

A Oh, I see. No. This is part of a U.S. --

Q The last section of the statement --

A Uh-huh. We're going to have to check on the quotes.

Q That's what you don't know?

A Yes, check on these quotes.

Q I didn't know what --

A Maybe we can do that while we are still here.

(TO STAFF:) Can we get somebody to do that?

Q Alan, can you confirm a story in the Boston Globe today saying that any officials who are involved in planning for the arms control talks must sign some pledge of secrecy?

A I'm not going to get into the specifics, I guess, are very sensitive issues involved in these negotiations, and there is nothing unusual in limiting access on sensitive subjects such as this, either in written ways or other ways, and so I guess I would leave you with that thought.

Q Alan, do you have any comment --

A Excuse me.

Q (Inaudible)

A Well, I think it really depends on the circumstance and who is administering it. I can't speak for each agency and how they might be, in specific circumstances, requiring people who have access to sensitive information, and there are various kinds of categories of this.

Usually, or often, there is a written requirement if the feeling is that the specific information concerned is sufficiently sensitive to merit that.

Q Requirement that what happen?

A Well, it depends on the circumstances, but basically, that people who have access to the information will treat it with due sensitivity. It is a reminder to people of their responsibilities to treat the information properly and not to disclose it.

Obviously, that doesn't subtract from the idea that any classified information should not be disclosed improperly, and that remains; but there is a long history in the government of having, on special kinds of issues, special reminding kinds of procedures.

Q Is Secretary Shultz --

Q By "requirements" do you mean signed --

A Excuse me.

Q Is Secretary Shultz ready to sign a pledge that he won't blab this all over the place?

(Laughter)

A Well, I don't know that that issue has arisen, Don

Q When you say "written requirements," you mean signed statements?

A In some cases it is signed statements; in other cases, it may not necessarily be. I don't have information on the specifics to follow up on the piece this morning; but I'm not taking you away from the fact that this particular negotiation obviously does involve very sensitive information, and that that fact affects the way the information is being treated.

-- MORE --

Q So you are saying that something is being required beyond what routinely is required?

A I think that that is a reasonable assumption, but I'm not going to get into the methods of how that's being done.

Q Alan, do you have any views about --

Q What is the difference between "usual" and "unusual?" You said "it was not unusual for this to be done."

A Well, not unusual --

Q Either it is or it isn't unusual.

A It is not unique. It is -- there are a number of circumstances in which people are required to do something of this sort.

Q So you don't call it a secrecy pledge; you call it something else?

A I don't know what I would call it.

Q That's basically what it is?

A I'm not calling it anything particularly, but it is -- I mean, that's simply the fact.

Q Can you give any other examples in recent years? You say it isn't "unique."

A Well, I'd rather not because it gets us, among other things, into the question -- certainly, there are various kinds of information. I don't know if the Pentagon would be willing to go into their procedures, but they certainly have some. The intelligence community certainly has some. There are various kinds of things, and I'd rather not go into the specifics. (Inaudible)

A Procedures are one thing, but what I thought this addressed was cases where there is some particular unusual degree of sensitivity that goes beyond the normal procedure. I assume everybody who gets employed and who gets a security clearance has to routinely sign something or other that he won't divulge.

Q As I say -- I was talking to Marvin before, in answering his question, there is obviously not a detraction from the concern about disclosure, improper disclosure of classified information in any case. But there are, in certain kinds of circumstances, where the information is very sensitive and is held on a very close need-to-know basis, a procedure that is adopted that goes beyond the usual confidential or classified non-disclosure requirements.

Q In this instance, is it the same procedure for the various agencies of the government?

A I can't tell you for sure that each agency is going to do this exactly the same way. I think the thrust of any concern obviously would be the same throughout the Administration, but I don't know specifically whether each agency has to follow a specific format.

Q Alan, just to give some context to this, when the U.S. Government was deeply involved, for example, in negotiating the Camp David agreement, would people have had to have signed this kind of pledge?

A I don't know, Marvin. I don't know the answer the answer to that.

Q Do you have anything -- a follow-up on Don's question -- anything that suggests a parallel for this?

A Well, I think, I gave you, in general, a couple of areas where this is -- I think this type of procedure has been followed before. I'm just not able to cite them to some extent as a violation of the kinds of restrictions that there are. But I cited, for example, certain kinds of intelligence information, which require that kind of special attention.

Q What do you mean when you said, in answer to my earlier question, about Shultz, that it hasn't arisen? I thought he was being asked to sign it.

A No, I'm not aware that he's been asked to sign it.

Q Would he?

A I have no idea, but I don't think -- as I say, I don't think the question really arises. We're talking about the Secretary's efforts coming up at the President's direction in Geneva and that whole topic, and I'm just not aware that that issue arises.

Q Can you say whether it was Secretary Shultz who directed that this not unique but somewhat unusual procedure be adopted in advance of his meetings with Gromyko, or was this a directive --

A I don't know that he got into the specifics of techniques. I think -- everybody has been concerned, as we have talked about before, about the problem of leaks. So that concern is shared by the Secretary; it's shared by most officials I know.

Q So he might have expressed his concern about leaks in this specific case but not saying "I want you to sign a --

A I'm not going to -- I guess I'm really not going to go down the road of what happened in this specific case. But the general concern about leaks is real, and so that's a factor.

Q Do you know which agency initiated this?

A I don't know what the specific mechanisms are; no

Q No, I say which agency --

A I know, but that's part of the mechanism, and I don't know what --

Q Does the document outline penalities? Does it give blanket ability to submit to lie detector tests? What kinds of things are they --

A Well, you're talking about the document. I'm not taking about a document. I'm not aware, of my own knowledge, of any -- well, I just don't know what the various agencies might be doing in terms of --

Q So you're not acknowledging this specific instance; is that what you're saying?

A I'm not addressing it really, Jack. I'm going to stay away from the specifics.

Q Staying away for a second from -- you keep bringing up what other agencies are doing. If we don't ask about other agencies -- we're asking about this agency.

A Well, I'm not going to get into the specifics of what mechanisms might be used. The fact is that in cases like this -- I'm not saying that this is not a case where there is attention to the sensitive information. I'm not steering you away from that idea.

Q Other agencies --

A And so the fact also is that, as has been indicated, the interagency procedures on this are being run, as I think Bud McFarlane indicated in his briefing, the interagency committees and so on, are being run out of -- under his direction. So I don't think it's up to me to address that.

Q Other agencies of the government have provided the consent forms. For example, when you get a secret or top secret clearance, the Defense Department and the DIA will provide you with the blank form that you would have to sign. Me, as a reporter. If I ask for it, they will provide it.

You will not provide the document, or whatever it is in question, for us to just look at -- the blank, with the words, unsigned?

A Well, I will take back your interest in knowing precisely what procedures are being followed in terms of anything that -- any written documents, or whatever. I don't know whether I can produce that. I'm somewhat skeptical, but I will pass it back.

Q Alan, do you have any information on whether Mr. Adelman is continuing in his post as Arms Director?

A I do not know. I guess you'd have to ask his press office. I don't know.

Q Alan, to go back to your statement on the drugs and terrorism, you say that this is basically a statement that says that the U.S. will not be intimidated by any kind of violence. But when there was an attack on the Peruvian Center recently that the U.S. was funding, the U.S. immediately stopped the funding or pulled back. Is that correct, or --

A I don't know that that's correct. I saw some press reports which indicated that there was some temporary review of how to deal with the problem. I wasn't aware of any reporting that there had been a cessation of any particular program or the intention to proceed with programs, but I don't have specific information before that, Alfonso.

Q Can you explain why it is the United States voted for a loan for Chile while they're beating up people down there and you're objecting to what they're doing.

A The United States yesterday voted in favor of the loan in question on the basis of economic considerations. The

$125 million loan is primarily for health, education and sanitation projects in small cities in the most impoverished parts of Chile.

We are satisfied that the government and people of Chile understand clearly our support for the return to democracy. We do not believe that efforts to promote economic development in Chile are inconsistent with the policy of uncompromising support for democracy.

Q Do you think maybe this sends the wrong signal to the Pinochet government?

A As I say, "We don't believe that efforts to promote economic development in Chile are inconsistent with the policy of uncompromising support for democracy." So the answer to that is clearly no.

Q Would there be anything the government could do no matter how repugnant that would get the United States Government not to vote money for that government?

A Well, I would point out, Don, that our position on this loan was arrived at only after a very careful review of the economic merits and the requirements of U.S. law. And in the context of those requirements, we will be continuing to look closely at the situation, and the serious human rights situation in that country, and weigh the economic and humanitarian benefits of the development loans to the people of Chile.

--MORE--

Q Less than two weeks ago, if I recall, you said, or maybe John said, that as a result of what was going on in Chile, which it wasn't as bad as it is now --

A Uh-huh.

Q The U.S. was reconsidering its whole "interest," I believe the word was used, in that country. Does the fact that you voted for a loan despite the actions of the government down there indicate that this reconsideration is all over and it's all right for them to go ahead?

A No. I wouldn't put it in those terms. I think the -- as I say, we will continue to look closely at this serious human rights situation and the economic benefits of various loans and the humanitarian effects. And I would not draw the conclusion that you did.

Q Well, is the -- are you doing anything about it?

A I think we're still continuing to look at that issue.

Q Is Mr. Michael going down there?

A Yes. He is.

Q When?

A I think he may already have gone. He's traveling there, I guess, going to a number of countries in the Southern Cone. I don't have a complete itinerary, but he will meet with a number of different people in various countries.

Q Asking Don's question another way, is there any price the Pinochet Government will have to pay in its relations with us for doing something that we very much disapprove of down there?

A Greg, I think we have addressed this subject previously in terms of our concerns and our looking at that, and I don't have anything new to say today about that, and I don't think I can address it in the terms you're trying to today.

Q Alan, last week, speaking on the Soviet disinformation campaign vis-a-vis complicity in the assassination of Mrs. Gandhi --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- you said that the legitimate media were also running such allegations. In the compilation of media reports you attribute an interview with Dr. Ralph Buljens to the Hindustan Times that's about CIA penetration, etc.

How do you react to the fact that this was based on an interview on a wire service report of an interview that Dr. Buljens gave with the New York-based Channel 47? Has there been some sort of Soviet penetration of the U.S. media?

A I -- well, I -- I'm not suggesting that. I would go back and refer you to the exact words we used on that occasion. I don't have anything new to add to that.

Q Alan, a senior Israeli official said that Washington has promised Israel that no arms will be sent or sold to Iraq as a result of the resumption of --

A Well, I think we have --

Q -- diplomatic relations. Do you have comment on that?

A I don't think there's anything secret about the fact that we have made clear that in the course of re-establishing diplomatic relations with Iraq we were maintaining our policy on arms sales. So that was made clear at the time this was made public, so it's not a matter of telling somebody else; it's a matter of having said it publicly.

Q This may implicitly be understood as a sort of promise to Israel that Iraq will not get American arms?

A No. I think it's a question of what our position has been, and I don't have anything to take you beyond that. But we have a very standard, longstanding position in terms of the Iran-Iraq war and arms sales.

Q Alan, do you have anything more on that India agreement?

A I don't.

Q Do you have anything on the Honduran meeting yesterday?

A I don't have anything on that.f

Q Do you have anything on the Iran POW situation, a further assessment by our government?

1-3040

A This is on the ICRC charges?

Q Yes.

A We wholeheartedly endorse the efforts of the International Committee of the Red Cross to relieve the suffering of Iraqi and Iranian prisoners of war and their families. We also condemn the current Iranian regime's execution and mistreatment of prisoners of war as tragic violations of the Geneva Conventions and call upon it to observe international norms.

Such incidents demonstrate the need to bring the fighting between Iran and Iraq to an early negotiated end.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the Gulf Cooperation Council statement -- summit meeting?

A I don't.

Q Do you have any situation report on the Naqura talks between Lebanon and Israel?

A No, I don't.

Q Any comment on the French-Syrian talks?

A No. Don't have anything comment.

Q Alan, these continuing demonstrations at the South African Embassy are intended in part to try to secure the release of 13 labor leaders.

A Uh-huh.

Q I know you said before that the Administration has abhorred apartheid and doesn't -- expressed concern about the way the South African Government is handling the present situation.

A Uh-huh.

Q But have you spoken specifically to them about the 13 labor leaders?

A I don't think I would get into the question of what our diplomatic dialogue would be, but I don't think that there's any mistaking the fact that the South African Government is aware of the concerns that we have in this respect.

Q Alan, did Secretary Shultz read Secretary Weinberger's speech yesterday, or hear it, or see it?

A He, as I understand it -- he saw Secretary Weinberger yesterday morning, and I think they may have had breakfast together. And Secretary Weinberger gave him a copy of that speech for his information. The Secretary was glad to get it.

Q Did he read it, and did he have any reaction to it? (Laughter)

A Well, I -- he doesn't -- didn't have any particular reaction to it.

Q Alan, on the --

Q Then you can't say whether or not he agrees wholeheartedly with this policy of the government as stated by Mr. Weinberger?

A Well, as I say, he didn't have any particular reaction to the speech.

Q Will you take that question?

A No. I don't think so.

Q Are the United States Navy ships on a maximum alert on the international waters facing Lebanon, facing Beirut?

A Uh --

Q There was report about --

A Well, I guess, without -- I'll refer you to Mike Burch and let him deal with questions of states of alert.

Q Any change in the situation --

Q Can we get a list of which Ambassadors --

A Excuse me. George had a question.

Q Any change in the situation on the ground in Chad, vis-a-vis the presence of foreign forces?

A I don't have any changes to report to you.

Q All right. As John described it yesterday, I believe, your position is that Libyan troops remain, no French troops there, the statements by Qadhafi to the contrary notwithstanding? Right?

A That's -- yes. That's my understanding.

Q Sorry, George. Is it possible to get a list of which U.S. Ambassadors have offered their resignations or don't plan to continue in their posts?

A No. I don't think that would be appropriate. I think those are individual decisions for Ambassadors to take, and as they -- as people resign, obviously, and are replaced, those announcements would be made.

Q Isn't a blanket resignation routine in these circumstances?

A Not necessarily, Hank.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the reported arms sale between Israel and the Republic of China -- the --

A No.

Q -- well, with Red China, as reported in the British press?

A No. I don't.

Q What if such a sale will be -- what will be the position of the United States --

A I don't have any views to offer you on it.

Q Do you have anything on the upcoming visit of the Soviet Minister of Agriculture, especially whether he will meet any other high-ranking government officials than his partner?

A I would -- I thought we had something very brief on that some time ago, but I guess I would ask you to check with the Department of Agriculture and get anything they might have on that.

Q Could we have a copy --

Q Thank you.

A Excuse me --

Q Anything on U.S.-Polish relations in light of the press conference of --

A Yes. I do. We have not seen the text of the press conference, and consequently are not in a position to comment on its content. I would note, however, that while we disagree with some of the comments reportedly made by the General -- for example, his suggestion that the U.S. believes "Poland can be deleted from the world scene" -- we welcome his interest in improved U.S.-Polish relations.

Furthermore, in accordance with the President's step-by-step policy, the United States is ready to respond to positive steps by the Polish side.

Q Copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Alan, can I go back to the question about the demonstration at the South African Embassy?

A You can go back to it. I don't have anything new to say about it. (Laughter)

Q Well, the story -- the editorial in The Washington Post today answered the charges of the Ambassador of South Africa. In view of the thrust of the article that you have done your best -- or the editorial -- to protect the Embassy --

A Were you here yesterday?

Q Today's paper.

A No. Were you here yesterday?

Q No.

A John addressed this. Let me ask you to look at the record on that. Was there a hand?

Q A copy of the Chilean and Colombia drugs --

A Yes.

Q Thank you.

A Okay. You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:50 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #214

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 1984, 12:03 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Two statements, one on Bolivian democracy:

Q Bolivia?

A Bolivian democracy. The United States Government views with concern the current economic and political crises afflicting the Republic of Bolivia and the constitutional democratic government headed by President Hernan Siles.

Particularly distressing is the hardship caused to the Bolivian people. We hope that leaders of the various groups, sectors, and political parties involved can move from confrontations and threats of force toward agreements on actions that will begin to correct the economic crisis, slow inflation, restore productivity and enable the country to carry out successfully Presidential elections in June 1985, as recently proposed by President Siles. We wish to reiterate once more the strong support of the United States Government for constitutional democracy in Bolivia and in this hemisphere.

Second, a statement on passport controls for Libya:

The Secretary of State has determined that the continued unsettled relations between the United States and Libya and continued threats of hostile acts against Americans in Libya require extension of the restrictions on the use of United States passports for travel to, in or through Libya.

Accordingly, the Secretary on November 29, 1984, signed a public notice for publication in the Federal Register extending the existing restrictions on the use of United States passports for an additional year.

That is it for announcements. I'll be happy to take questions.

1-3047

Q Can we have copies on both?

A Sure.

Q And on Bolivia, it sounds as though you're expecting a coup of sorts in Bolivia. Is that what prompted this statement?

A Well, I think that the statement is reasonably self-explanatory. I offer you the following additional on this, George:

Faced with a grave economic crisis and mounting political pressures, President Siles responded to a Church-sponsored mediation effort November 19 by offering to advance Presidential elections from May 1986 to June 1985.

Despite the President's announcement, the atmosphere in the country remains tense and confrontational as elements of organized labor are stepping up protests against a set of economic measures announced by the government on November 23. An indefinite general strike has been in effect for the past three days, causing serious disruptions in the availability of food, gasoline and other essentials. Protesting workers and students have erected road blocks, and clashes between police and demonstrators have occurred.

Q Copy of that?

A Sure. That's all I really have on that.

Q On the Libya statement, Alan --

A Sure.

Q -- nothing has changed; just extending the things as they are for another year?

A That's correct.

Q Alan, do you have any update on the talks between the United States and Cuba?

A I don't. Those talks -- the talks we -- the so-called Mariel talks are continuing today, but I don't have any readout to give you or any prognosis on when they will end.

Q Do you have a reaction, Alan, to the Gulf

Cooperation Council decision yesterday on the rapid deployment force, or whatever you call it?

A On the rapid deployment force? I don't, really. Frankly, we've seen the reports, but we don't have particular information on this reported decision. Nonetheless, measures that contribute to the security and stability of the Gulf are obviously welcome.

Q Alan, there's an announcement in Moscow today about nuclear non-proliferation talks between the Soviets and the U.S. Do we have any reaction to that? And was that supposed to be a joint announcement?

A I don't have details. I saw the wires on that, and I have not seen reporting coming back. As you know, there were talks going on in the last three days headed by Ambassador Kennedy. I just have not seen beyond the wire service reports, Greg, what has come out of that.

I assume, based on those reports, that there is briefing going on by both Soviet and American briefers. So I think we're going to have to depend for the moment on that, and we'll also look into the possibility of getting some sort of a briefing here at the beginning of next week, if that's do-able.

Q But whatever announcement is being made is being made in Moscow at this point?

A At this point, that's correct. That's where the meetings are.

Q But, Alan, as a practical matter, haven't the talks been held approximately every six months anyway?

A Yes.

Q So if -- I know you're not confirming or anything that this is so -- but if the reports are true, then, again, it's a matter of no change in the existing thing except perhaps to say, as a policy, they shall meet every --

A I understand that, and as I read those that is a possible explanation for it, Ralph, but I hesitate to give you a readout because I just don't know.

Q Bolivia just for a second. Do you have anything on some reports I've seen of a famine situation in the altiplano section of the country where two years of drought have created a real serious situation. Do you have anything on that?

A I don't.

Q Nothing on that?

Q Anything on Chile?

A Ron -- excuse me. Ron, did you having something?

Q Yeah. Asking about Honduras, they say there will be another meeting of the commissions. I believe they gave the 17th of December as the day, with Ambassador Motley as heading the American side. Do you have anything to confirm that?

A Well, I think there will be some meetings coming up at that time. During the meetings that were held November 28 and 29 with the Honduran delegation, it was agreed to form a commission, formally chaired on the U.S. side by Assistant Secretary Motley; and that commission will deal with economic and security matters of mutual interest to the two governments. And, as I say, I understand there may be working-level meetings in the middle of December, but I don't have details.

-- MORE --

Q Do you have any comment on the suggestion by the Armed Forces Chief of Staff of Honduras to the effect that the establishment of a permanent U.S. military base in Honduras is a possibility?

A Well, I'd refer you back, George, to what we said the other day on that, which is that the United States has no plans for establishing permanent bases in Honduras.

Q Anything on --

Q Alan, anything on Chile? Any update at all? Are you -- are we --

A On the general situation in Chile? No, I don't have anything.

Q Do you have anything specifically on the expulsion of a UPI reporter from Chile or other measures of cracking down on the press?

A Yes, I do have. U.S. Government support of freedom of the press includes freedom of foreign correspondents to cover developments in any country and to send their despatches out of that country without censorship.

We strongly object to any infringement of the legitimate rights of foreign correspondents by the Government of Chile. We are communicating our views to this effect to the proper Chilean authorities.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Can you also tell me, is this something that Mr. Morley (sic) will be bringing up today with Chilean authorities?

A I don't have specifics about how we are handling this with the Chileans.

Q Alan --

A Bernie, did you have a question?

Q No.

A Okay.

Q Alan, there's a report on the FBIS this morning, quoting President Habre of Chad as saying that he's agreeing to going into a -- to having French troops come back into Chad, and that his government believes there are five to six thousand Libyan troops still in Chad. Do you have any comment on either of those developments?

A No. I don't have anything beyond what we've said on that previously.

Q Apparently Belgium has delayed making a decision on deployment of cruise missiles. Any comment on their delay?

A No. I don't have a comment on the delay. I think that the issue was addressed in a background briefing at the White House the other day on --

Q The overall --

A -- Chancellor Kohl's -- the overall question. But I don't have anything on that specific --

Q Do you have anything on The Washington Post report that the United States is against the talks of Brooklyn Rivera with Nicaraguans?

A Well, we've, I think, had guidance on this before. I don't recall, to be honest, whether we used it in the briefing, but I will simply repeat what we've had for some time.

Noting that the OAS Inter-American Human Rights Commission in June reported that the Sandinistas have repeatedly violated the basic rights of the Miskitos, we would hope that Mr. Rivera can persuade the Sandinistas to respect the human rights, political and individual rights not only of the Miskitos but of all Nicaraguans.

Q Why does The Washington Post report that the U.S. is against those peace talks?

A Well, I'm telling you what our position on it is. I'm not trying to tell you why The Washington Post reports what it reports.

Ann, did you have something?

Q Yes. Do you have anything on the report that Duarte has asked for the dismissal of Lopez Sibrian?

A I don't really. I've seen the reports. I am not aware of any announcement at this point by the Government of El

Salvador, and I think that therefore we wouldn't have any comment at this point.

Q Alan, back on Libya, there's no change in your earlier position that Libyan troops remain in Chad. Is that correct?

A Correct.

Q Alan, anything on the -- to explain the meeting between Secretary Shultz and the Ambassador of Lebanon? Actually, I may not -- I may be wrong about who he's meeting with. There's an appointment on the schedule today with the Ambassador of Lebanon and the Arab League Ambassador. I guess it's with Murphy. Do you have any --

A I don't have anything on it. Sorry.

Q Alan, yesterday the Secretary met with Lane Kirkland on the issue of South Africa. Did the Secretary indicate any position on the arrest of the labor leaders and American interests?

A Frankly, I don't have any --

Q Nothing on that?

A -- information on that meeting at all. Our position on the labor leaders was made public, I think, some time ago, but I don't have anything on that meeting.

Q Do you have anything on the dismissal of the charges against Ferreira Aldonate in Uruguay?

A Against Wilson Ferreira?

Q Yes.

A Yes. Our Embassy in Montevideo has confirmed that the Uruguayan Supreme Court has nullified the two principal charges -- that is, assistance to subversion and exposing the country to reprisal by a foreign power -- against Mr. Ferreira.

We welcome these developments and hope that Mr. Ferreira will soon be released.

Q Do you have anything on the Saudi newspaper account that the Secretary is planning to go to the Middle East shortly and that revisions are contemplated in the 1982 peace proposal?

A (Laughter) No. I don't know of any plans for the Secretary to go to the Middle East, and I don't know of any proposals that the 1982 Presidential Initiative be amended.

Q On the Colombian situation --

A On the what? Colombian situation?

Q On the Colombia situation, there were reports in Bogota that two high U.S. officials were kidnapped. Do you have anything on that?

A No.

Q By the drug traffickers.

Q One month to go and still U.S. withdrawing from the UNESCO? (sic)

A Uh-huh. Well, our --

Q Or where does the membership stand today?

A Our position is what it has been. I don't have anything new to announce to you today.

Q Alan, anything new, Alan, on the U.S.-China nuclear agreement?

A No.

Q Anything new on the South African Embassy demonstrations? More and more black leaders are going to get arrested, including Jesse Jackson and Marion Barry and --

A I've addressed this before. I don't have anything new to say about it.

Q There's a report on the FBIS that there was a new attack on the U.S. Embassy in El Salvador. Do you have anything on that?

A I have a little bit on it, I think probably not much more than you have from reports in the press.

Our Embassy in San Salvador was hit by some M-16 rounds yesterday at approximately 3:30 p.m. local time. The shots appear to have been fired from about a block and a half away. There were no injuries, no damage to the Embassy building. No groups or individuals have claimed responsibility.

Q Thank you, Alan.

A Okay. You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:16 p.m.)

Clausen/
Patterson

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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1-3056

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #215

MONDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1984, 12:23 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I have a couple of announcements. There will be a BACKGROUND briefing on the State visit of President Lusinchi of Venezuela. It'll be at 3:00 this afternoon at the White House.

Secondly, a statement on the appointment of CDE working groups. The 35-nation Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Stockholm has today adopted a working structure which we hope will encourage detailed examination of the possible areas of agreement. We are pleased to join in this decision. We look forward to the flexible give-and-take negotiating process called for by President Reagan.

We hope serious negotiations on the concrete and practical confidence and security building measures introduced by the West will no longer be delayed. Our efforts to move forward in CDE are part of the overall arms control objectives of the Administration, which we are pursuing both in multilateral forums and bilaterally with the Soviets.

The United States believes that tangible progress in the Stockholm Conference can contribute significantly to an improved East-West relationship and enhanced security for Europe.

That's all I have for you.

Q Can we have a copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q John, regarding talks, what can you tell us about the talks with the Cubans?

A They began on November 28. They recessed Sunday but are meeting again today.

1-3057

Q Could you characterize them --

Q How are they going?

A I don't think I will be any more forthcoming than we traditionally are, and so therefore I will characterize them as businesslike.

Q Is this the longest session?

A I don't know that this is the longest session. They traditionally have been two-day meetings. Maybe we can check. I think this is the longest session, but let me check that for you.

Q Shall we read anything into that, John, or out of it?

A Not other than the fact that the sessions are businesslike, and an effort, clearly, is being made on both sides to reach an agreement, as it has been in the earlier sessions.

Q Is that going to run all day tomorrow?

A I don't know. That I don't know -- whether they'll get through today

Q When the talks come to some result, do you plan to then immediately announce it, or wait a few days, or what?

A I suppose that would depend on what the parties agree to concerning an announcement, if any.

Q (Inaudible) obviously would?

A Obviously, if the outcome were positive at some stage, an announcement would seem to me to be fitting, but I have become versed in the diplomatic tradition in the past two and a half years, and I suppose we have to negotiate that with the other side.

Q No sooner have you become conversant, you're leaving.

(Laughter).

Q John -- same subject?

Q New subject. There were reports last week, John, that put the Libyan troop level in Chad at 5,000 to 6,000, and had the Libyans building an airport in the north of the country. Do you have anything on that?

A I was out for a couple of days last week. That goes further than my own knowledge, and I guess it goes further than Mr. Romberg's knowledge, too, because he's nodding. That sounds -- that figure, although we haven't discussed figures, that figure sounds a little high to me.

Q As far as you know, it means that the troops are still in Chad?

A As far as I know, yes.

Q No Libyan withdrawal has begun?

A I don't know whether any Libyan withdrawal has begun. Again, let me see if there's any late -- no, there is no new chapter on that since when I left you all on whenever it was -- Wednesday or Thursday.

Q But we have nothing new to --

A Nothing new.

Q John, is Roberto D'Aubuisson coming to the United States?

A I think he is already in the country, Mike. He was given a visa, and I can give you the details on that. He was issued a visa December 2. That visa is a single-entry visitor's visa for tourism and private business. It's a B-1/B-2 visa. It was valid for entry into the United States for five days after the date of issuance, which was, as I say, December 2, and it bears the annotation "for a stay of seven days," which we consider to be a sufficient period for the activities Mr. D'Aubuisson indicated he had planned.

Q What can you say about those activities?

A I guess what we need to do is ask you to talk to him about the purposes of his visit.

Q Is anyone in this building involved?

A No, there are no plans for anybody in this Department to meet with Mr. D'Aubuisson.

Q What is the reason for the reversal of the position whereby the last time around, if we recall right, he was denied a visa?

A These cases are treated on a case-by-case basis, Don, and in this particular instance the reasons, I guess, that he indicated for his visit here were absorbed and weighed and analyzed, and the judgment was that he should be issued a visa.

Q The Department rejected the visa applications for four Salvadoran members of a Mothers' Committee on grounds that they advocated violence.

A I'm not sure your number is right, but there certainly -- was it four rejected? Okay, you're number is right; beg your pardon, George.

Q How about the rest of my premise that --

A What's the rest of your premise? I can hardly wait to --

Q If the four mothers were denied entry on grounds that they advocated violence, how can you grant a visa to Roberto D'Aubuisson?

A Well, because, as I say, these are looked at on a case-by-case basis and that was the judgment in the case of the mothers.

Yes, Ralph?

Q Do you have any comment on King Hussein's remarks yesterday in the Egyptian Parliament about the Camp David Accord?

A No comment on King Hussein's remarks.

Q Or President Mubarak's follow-up statements in which he -- King Hussein criticized Camp David; Mubarak avoided the topic?

A I assume that means that the Egyptian Government remains firmly supportive of the Camp David process.

Q If they say nothing in the face of a pretty harsh criticism, live on national Egyptian T.V.?

A I think our assumption is that the Egyptian Government remains fully supportive of the Camp David process.

Q What's the status of the negotiations with India on the M.O.U. on technology transfer?

A I don't have any update on that. No, nothing new on that. Sorry.

Q John, do you have anything on a U.S. official being expelled from Laos?

A Yes, I do. The Government of Laos requested the recall of Robert C. Porter, First Secretary at the United States Embassy in Vientiane. Mr. Porter departed Laos on November 24. A Second Secretary of the Lao Embassy in Washington, who held a position equivalent to Mr. Porter, departed the United States on November 29.

We have had extensive discussions with the Lao Government through diplomatic channels, and we now regard the matter as closed. Both governments have agreed to continue to work for improved relations between the two countries.

Q Why was the original expulsion?

A Well, I'm not going to get into -- As I say, we regard the incident as closed, but I would just say that we are absolutely sure that Mr. Porter's activities during his assignment in Laos were completely compatible with his status as a diplomat.

Q Is that also true of the Lao official who left Washington, in your view?

A I'm not going to get into the question of his departure, but I simply underline that his position is comparable in rank to that of Mr. Porter.

Q Your statement said that he left Washington.

A Yes.

Q Can we assume that he was asked to leave?

A Well, I'm just going to -- as I say, we regard this matter as closed, and I'll let you draw your own conclusions.

Q John, I have another question on the D'Aubuisson visa. To some people it might look like there is a bit of a contradiction here in granting a visa to D'Aubuisson, given his history, and denying visas to the four women who were coming essentially to receive a human rights award. I was just wondering if you want to go into a little detail as to why he is entitled to one and they are not.

A No, I don't think I will go into detail, but I mean, there are some differences. For example, from the Mothers' Committee there are some preposterous charges that two young men were lured into our Embassy in San Salvador and disappeared and all kinds of odd and -- I shouldn't say odd; I should say simply outrageous allegations.

Q But having said that, there have been some allegations against D'Aubuisson for rather preposterous behavior, too, including his possible association in the murder of the Catholic bishop.

A As I say, we look at those visa applications at a given point in time, taking into consideration the reasons for the visit and the other circumstances surrounding the applicant at a particular point of time, and in this instance, the decision was to admit him.

Q John, now that the PNC has ended in Amman, do we have a view as to whether or not the results, the outcome, were helpful for long-term peace prospects --

A No, I don't.

Q -- and whether or not this was a good idea for Jordan to have hosted?

A No, I don't have anything on that. I'm sorry.

Q Any comment on the attack by an Iraqi fighter against a Cypriot tanker today?

A Seen the reports; can't confirm that for you, Ralph. But seen the reports.

Q John, on the question that relates to The New York Times series on terrorism, could you confirm for us whether Ambassador Bartholomew was, in fact, whisked out of the country just before the election, I believe, because of terrorist threats?

A Well, let me answer that in two ways. We're very reluctant these days, understandably, to talk about the movements of ambassadors or personnel. But having said that, you should not take that as a denial of the story that the Ambassador may have been out of the country.

Q Is it your belief that as a result of the efforts that were described in the Times story that an attack upon the Ambassador's residence was forestalled?

A Obviously, those who planned such an attack would be able to answer that question better than ourselves. The facts are that an attack did not take place. The facts are that the United States had introduced a number of heightened security measures at its installations in Beirut, and particularly at the Ambassador's residence. Now, what conclusion you draw, juxtaposing those two facts -- I mean, I guess we could all draw conclusions. But the fact is, we took precautions, and the fact is an attack did not take place.

Q That also would depend on the information that you had prior to the talked-about attack, wouldn't it? I mean, it just doesn't go on that. It depends on what information you had earlier.

A Well, I don't think anybody is denying rumors that those who seek to do us harm, were planning an attack on American installations.

Q Was it the same group responsible for other attacks?

A I'm not going to get into any further detail on this.

-- MORE --

1-3063

Q And one other detail: It was said in one of the stories when the Secretary returned from India, he expressed unhappiness about the state of security around the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi. Is that correct?

A Well, again, I don't think we're going to pinpoint these days embassies where we think the risk is high, embassies where we think security precautions could be improved.

Having said that, the fact is that in every capital that we have visited in the past couple of months the Secretary has had a security briefing from the Ambassador and the security officials at that site. Certainly had discussed existing arrangements and what improved arrangements might be made, and he certainly has participated in discussions and recommendations concerning our embassies in a number of capitals.

Q Do you expect Secretary Shultz to respond to Secretary Weinberger on this subject of terrorism?

A I thought that Mr. Romberg had handled that whole situation masterfully at the end of last week, so I didn't really have any plans to take it any further, and the Secretary hasn't indicated that he plans to respond.

Q Which kind of leaves the public with the two members of the Cabinet taking two opposite views in some of the most important aspects of a subject raised by Secretary Shultz in the first place.

Don't you think that maybe somebody ought to clarify what the Government's position is?

A Well, I think the White House responded to that, and I think Mr. Romberg responded to that, and with that combination, who could ask for any more? (Laughter)

Q Do you have any situation report about the economic talks between Israel and the United States, and does the United States Government see the measures undertaken by Mr. Peres' Government as adequate, or would you like to see more drastic reshuffling of Israeli economic structure?

A No. I don't have any readout on those discussions. Obviously, the Secretary has indicated his concern over the economic situation in Israel in the past, and has welcomed various steps that the Israelis are taking. But I don't have an update for you on where we stand today.

I-2064

Q John, on the Armand Hammer visit with Mr. Chernenko tomorrow, will he have a message from the United States Government?

A I don't think he's bearing any message. I think in the way of things, as people who are going to see the Soviet leadership sometimes come in and talk to us before they go, I think h was in, and I think saw Mr. -- I think he saw Under Secretary Armacost, but he's not bearing a message.

Q Will he see Secretary Shultz after he comes back?

A I don't know. I really don't know.

Q John --

Q After the -- when the Supreme Court of El Salvador said that all charges against Lieutenant Lopez Sibrian would be dropped, the United States said that we didn't consider that matter to be finished.

Now that Duarte has dismissed him, does that satisfy our concerns, or are we still going to press for a further --

A I think we're waiting. I don't -- I think the fact of the matter is that we have not had an official announcement of Lopez Sibrian's dismissal, so I think we won't -- until we get that, we will not have any comment.

Q But will you take that question?

A Well, as I say, I think come the time when we're satisfied that there is such an official action, then I'm sure we might have something to say.

Q Do you have -- do you know why -- I mean, this was reported in the press three or four or five days ago --

A That's a question I've asked myself. I don't have a good answer for you on that, but sometimes the government-to-government channels take a little longer.

Q John, there were reports in Israeli newspapers that a -- the possibility of appointing a new Middle East negotiator. Who are the candidates? Can you elaborate on that? (Laughter)

A I think you have your hands on a fanciful report.

1-3065

Q Fanciful report? This was reported --

A Yes. I'm not aware of any plans to appoint a special Middle East negotiator.

Q Any plans for Ambassador Murphy to return back to the Middle East, and do you have any assessment or comments about the talks between Israel and Lebanon?

A No. I don't on the latter point, and I'm not aware of any specific plans for Ambassador Murphy to go back to the Middle East, but it's always possible. I wouldn't -- I certainly wouldn't rule it out.

Q John, last week the Ambassador from South Korea sent a letter to Senator Kennedy in which he made some statements about the probable future of Mr. Kim Dae Jung if he goes home.

A Uh-huh.

Q He would have to serve the rest of his prison term for 20 years, and so forth.

A Uh-huh.

Q Does the Department have any reaction to this?

A No.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:40 p.m.)

1-3066

Clawson/Patterson

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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1-3067

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #216

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1984, 12:24 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have a number of announcements and statements.

First, to remind you, I guess, because I think you probably know, there will be a BACKGROUND briefing on the visit of the Venezuelan President, President Lusinchi, at 3:00 p.m. today at the White House. By that time President Lusinchi will have met with President Reagan and Secretary Shultz.

Available in the Press Office are copies of Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952 to 1954, Volume II, National Security Affairs. Please note on the press release the embargo date of December 6, 1984, 6:00 p.m. One copy per organization. A summary prepared by the Office of the Historian is available with the volume.

Also available in the Press Office is the prepared address by Deputy Secretary Kenneth Dam today* at 1:30 p.m. before the Dallas Council on World Affairs and Rotary Club. Please note the speech has been embargoed until the time of delivery.

I also want to remind you that the Secretary will address the Miami Conference on the Caribbean sponsored by the Caribbean-Central American Action in Miami on Thursday, December 6. The luncheon event will take place at the Hyatt Regency Hotel ballroom. If you plan to cover or wish further information, please contact Julia Golding -- G-o-l-d-i-n-g -- of the organization in their press room, which is the Gardenia-A at the Hyatt, Area Code 305-358-1234, extension 4729. That's 305-358-1234, extension 4729.

Q What time is that speech?

A I don't know exactly. It is a luncheon speech, Bernie, but I don't have a more --

*Tomorrow

1-3068

Q It will be piped in here?

Q Do you know the subject, Alan?

A Let me just go -- finish what I've got. Following the lunch the Secretary will meet with Dominica Prime Minister Eugenia Charles and El Salvador President Jose Napoleon Duarte. Darlene Kirk of our Press Office will be at the Hyatt, working out of Gardenia Room A beginning Thursday morning, December 6, to organize photo opportunities in connection with these two meetings.

Barring technical difficulties, the Secretary's speech will be piped back live to the Department. There will be no Q&A following the speech. So we'll try and get you tomorrow, if we can, a more exact time on that. Now, was there another question on that?

Q Anything on the subject?

A I think I'd simply say the subject is -- the conference is on the Caribbean, and you can assume that the speech is relevant to the conference topic.

Q And you will have an advance text?

A I don't know yet when that text will be available. We're working on it, Mike.

The Secretary will deliver a foreign policy speech at a special convocation of Yeshiva University on the occasion of receiving an honorary Doctor of Humane Letters degree. The convocation will be held in the Grand Ballroom at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York City on Sunday, December 9, beginning at 4:00 p.m.

Among others receiving honorary degrees is Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir. If you wish to cover this event, please telephone Sy Schwartz at Area Code 212-489-6900 -- 489-6900 -- or Roy Campbell at 212-960-5285 -- 960-5285.

Secretary Shultz will hold bilateral talks with Foreign Minister Shamir at the Waldorf-Astoria immediately following the Yeshiva Convocation. And, again, Darlene Kirk of the Press Office will coordinate a photo opportunity of this event. She will be available in the West Foyer of the Waldorf after 2:00 p.m. on Sunday, December 9.

A statement regarding the CSCE semiannual report. On behalf of President Reagan, Secretary Shultz on December 4

1-3069

transmitted the 17th semiannual Report on Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act to Chairman Dante Fascell of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

These reports are submitted to assist the Commission in its function of monitoring implementation of the Helsinki Accords. The present report covers the period April 1, 1984, to October 1, 1984. It provides a factual survey of developments in the area covered by the Final Act: human rights and humanitarian concerns; security; economic, scientific and technological cooperation; and educational and cultural exchanges.

The report concentrates on Soviet and Eastern European compliance with the Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document. Although the record of compliance varied among the Eastern States, performance was in general flawed in the human rights and humanitarian area. The report documents the persecution which many Soviet citizens, including Nobel Prize-winning scientist, Dr. Andrei Sakharov, have suffered for focusing attention on and attempting to alleviate the violation of human rights in the Soviet Union.

This report is an important element in the United States Government's effort to assess the progress and shortcomings in achieving the Final Act's goals of strengthening security, expanding cooperation, building mutual confidence, and protecting human rights.

Q Copy of that?

A Copies of that, and copies are available of the report.

Regarding violence in Sri Lanka. The United States Government wishes to express its deep concern over the recent escalation of armed attacks on both government targets and on innocent civilians in Sri Lanka. Our sympathy goes out to the families of those who have been killed or wounded. We deplore these attacks as a serious and unwarranted challenge to the government of a practicing democracy at a time when efforts are underway to address the legitimate aspirations of the Tamil community in Sri Lanka.

The United States firmly supports the Government of Sri Lanka in this endeavor and supports Sri Lanka's independence, territorial integrity and democratic institutions.

Q Copy, please?

1-3070

A Copy.

And, finally, on the Grenada elections. The United States views with satisfaction yesterday's elections in Grenada. Support for democracy and the democratic process, as demonstrated by elections, is one of the cardinal points of U.S. foreign policy.

Initial reports indicate that a high percentage of Grenada's registered voters went to the polls in that country's first elections since 1976. The balloting was conducted peacefully in 135 polling places scattered throughout Grenada's 15 parliamentary constituencies.

By their enthusiastic participation, Grenada's voters have brought to a successful conclusion a year-long process aimed at putting Grenada firmly back on a democratic path. Governor-General Sir Paul Scoon and the interim government, under the leadership of Chairman Nicholas Brathwaite, are to be commended for their skill and determination in preparing the country for a return to democratically-elected government. The interim government conducted a remarkably successful voter registration campaign, signing up over 90 percent of those eligible.

It also established conditions for a truly free and democratic electoral contest, including freedom of speech, press, assembly and political affiliation. Candidates representing all viewpoints could and did participate, offering Grenada's voters a full range of political choices.

The United States congratulates the New National Party, which was the choice of an overwhelming majority of Grenada's voters. We look forward to cooperating with the new government as it tackles the Island's many remaining problems, particularly of an economic nature.

Q Copy?

A Copy of that, too. And that is it for announcements. Happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, regarding the hijacking in Tehran, do you have any information that any Americans are aboard the plane, specifically any U.S. Government employees?

A We understand, Mike, that several U.S. citizens may be on the plane, but Privacy Act constraints prohibit us

I-3071

from identifying the U.S. citizens, and I have nothing for you on the question of employees.

Q Alan --

Q No indications of who the fatality is?

A I've got to tell you that our indications are mixed as to whether indeed there even is a fatality. It may well be that there is, but the reports that we have are both yes and no on that score, so we can't confirm that.

Q Alan, a follow-up on the question of the U.S. citizens in Sri Lanka --

A Uh-huh.

Q Author Arthur Clarke is -- lives there. Do you know if he's there or if he's --

A Excuse me. U.S. citizens in Sri Lanka?

Q Well, he's not a U.S. citizen. That's right. But, I mean, the author, Arthur C. Clarke lives in Sri Lanka. Do you know what his status is? Is he --

A No. I have no idea.

Q Do you have anything on the criticism by two Senators yesterday in this letter to the President on the U.S. going ahead with compliance with the SALT agreements, even though the Soviets are reportedly violating it?

A Yes. I do have. This is the Symms-East letter?

Q Yes.

A We have not received the letter that you mention. However, the President's policy on interim restraint has not changed. As he has stated many times, the United States is continuing to carry out its own obligations and commitments under relevant agreements. This policy does not diminish in any way our commitment to press the Soviet Union for clarifications and corrective actions in areas where questions of Soviet arms control compliance have arisen.

Sea trials for the seventh Trident submarine are not scheduled to begin until late 1985. The issues this event raises regarding the SALT I and SALT II agreements will be addressed at the appropriate time. It would be misleading to

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infer that the absence of a decision before one is required implies anything about what course of action will eventually be taken. In the meantime, we are preserving the programmatic flexibility required by our policy. When the time comes for a decision, it will be taken in the context of the international situation and U.S. national security requirements. Among other things, our assessment of the Soviet commitment to a corresponding policy will be relevant to our considerations.

Q Copy of that?

A Sure.

Q In other words, you're -- the two Senators said that they had been informed that the Government was going to begin dismantling six Poseidon submarines to take into account the Trident sea testing. Are you saying that decision has not been made?

A Well, I can't really take you beyond this in terms of what decisions have been taken on dismantling, Bernie, but I think -- this issue is not a new one, and we addressed it, I think, several months ago, very much in the terms I have today, and I just -- as I say, the issues regarding SALT I and SALT II will be addressed at the time it's necessary to address them, and you shouldn't -- just to repeat myself, shouldn't infer anything from the fact that a decision won't be taken until that time. So I think you can infer some things from that answer.

Q Along those same lines, you probably have the same answer, but let me ask the question anyway.

A Sure.

Q As you know, the whole SALT II treaty expires at the end of next year. What is the government going to do if there's no extension of it? Is it going to still keep on observing it?

A Well, again, you're asking for decisions which would be addressed in the future, Don, and I don't have anything --

Q Alan, can you --

A Go ahead.

Q Do you have anything on chemical warfare weapons in the hands of the Nicaraguan Government? Can you shed any light on those reports?

A I don't have any guidance at the moment on that. I think that we may have something later, the Pentagon may have something later on that. I think that report's been in the press the last few days, and is based, as I understand it, in large part on a parade which took place in early September where some things were on display. So why don't you check back with us later or check with the Pentagon and see what we may have on that.

Q Can you confirm reports on the expected travel by Mr. Murphy to the Middle East?

A I can only give you a little bit. That is, that Assistant Secretary Murphy will be leaving for the region in the next few days, but in keeping with our usual practice, I don't have any details to give you and an itinerary . We will try to keep you informed as best we can on his whereabouts.

Q Alan --

Q Follow up, please.

Q What is the purpose?

A He's going out there to do, I think, a number of things. I think I would note with specific regard to one set of issues, which obviously has been important -- that is, the question of southern Lebanon -- we are not engaged in a U.S. mediation. We do, however, believe it would be useful to stay in touch with the parties and to be helpful where we can in supporting the resolution of their differences.

I would emphasize that any discussions we might have would be supportive of the talks taking place at Naqura under United Nations auspices.

- MORE -

Q Alan --

Q Can we have a copy of that, please?

Q Alan, the Chief of the FBI has called in the (inaudible) for an international campaign to go fully ahead with the implementation of the SDI in echoing the recent statement of Defense Secretary Weinberger.

How does the State Department express its commitment in light of the upcoming Geneva talks?

A Well, I think that the position on SDI is clear. It is a research program which is going to go ahead at this point, and no decisions beyond that have been taken nor could they be until the results of that research program have come in.

Q Alan, back on Murphy. Can you tell us the countries he will be visiting, please?

A No, I can't. As I say, we'll try to do it as he is some place, or by the time we get out here, has been some place, we'll try to do that. That's our usual practice.

Q You indicated a number of issues. Can you expand a little bit on that?

A No. I think that, obviously, there are a number of issues which you've talked about from time to time here that are of importance in that region that we follow, and I would assume that he would be talking about various issues at different stops.

Q Would the development of the Reagan peace plan be one of them?

A I'm not going to go into the details. I think that it's quite clear that the September 1 initiative remains our policy, but I'm not going to try to talk about what the agenda might be.

Q Will he be visiting Jordan and Egypt?

A Again, I'm not going to try to give you stops before he has been to places.

Q If I might follow. It seems from the story of Goshko in the *Times* this morning -- the *Washington Post* this morning, that he is sort of a semi-negotiator for the Middle East. Can you just put this description that he's going to be the shuttle diplomat or

A I think I've indicated to you that the effort -- we're not engaged in a mediation effort so far as southern Lebanon is concerned. He's the Assistant Secretary for the region. So it's perfectly natural that he carry out conversations, but I think he's not a special Middle East negotiator, or something of that sort, but he's going out and he's going to be traveling in the region.

Q At the present time, right?

A Sorry?

Q At the present time?

A I leave you with what I said.

Q Any surprise on President Mubarak's endorsement of this international --

A Of the International Conference?

Q Yeah.

A Well, I don't know if it's a question of surprise or not surprise. But as we have said before, we don't believe that such an international conference would lead to productive results.

We are in favor of what is realistic and feasible, and we continue to think that the most practical course is direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab parties directly concerned as envisioned in the Camp David Framework.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Jonathan?

Q Have we heard from the Government of El Salvador yet regarding the status of Mr. Lopez Sibrian?

A Don't have anything new for you on Lopez Sibrian today.

Q And do you have anything to say about Bishop Tutu's statements this morning before Congress?

A Not a great deal. I think that there was a briefing yesterday at the White House which went into, I think, great length about our approach to southern Africa, and I refer you to that.

As you know, Bishop Tutu has had contact with American officials frequently, so I think that there's been an exchange there.

Bill?

Q Alan, have you got anything on the status of that young Soviet defector in Korea? Is he on his way to the States, do you know?

A I don't have anything on him. Let me just check and see if I can get something for you.

Q Do you have any comment on the allegation by the Sri Lanka Government that the terrorists are launching the attack from Tamil Nadu? And, also, why did the Sri Lankan Ambassador meet with Mr. Armacost last Monday?

A Well, I really don't have anything for you on either of those. I have no comment on the first one; and on the second one, we have frequent contact with the Ambassadors in town, but I'm not going to get into the specifics.

Bill?

Q Do you have any update on the number of Soviet SS-20s? The last figure was 378, and the Defense Secretary said there were more, without being specific?

A Yes. Since we last briefed the press on this subject, after the November 20 SCG meeting, another SS-20 base has become operational. Thus, we are raising the number. The number of deployed SS-20s is at least 387.

I should note that while the number of SS-20s currently associated with bases is 387, the SS-20 is an inherently mobile system and mobile launchers can be moved to and employed from the field and other locations. In addition, other SS-20s not currently associated with a base could be available in time of crisis.

And, finally, as we have indicated, the number of operational SS-20 bases could fluctuate if the Soviets convert any further SS-20 bases to other purposes. However, the Soviets have more than ten additional SS-20 bases under construction. Given the scale of this construction program, we expect that the 387 number will go up, not down.

In any case, the SS-20 is, as I said, an inherently mobile system and any SS-20 launchers from converted bases will remain capable of operation in time of crisis, and we anticipate that they will be relocated to newly-constructed bases.

Q Can we have a copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q Do you have any comment on the comment by Armand Hammer following his meeting with Mr. Chernenko; talks about Mr. Hammer's view, and apparently shared by the Soviet President, of the desirability of a no-first use declaration?

A I don't really, Don. I think that Larry Speakes addressed it this morning, and he indicated that there is no change in our policy on the issue of no-first use nor is there any change in our view toward a summit.

Q Cuba talks -- update?

A Cuba talks? Will continue again today, but I don't have anything beyond that.

Q No progress report?

A Don't have a progress report to offer. Sorry.

Ralph?

Q There is a report on the FBIS this morning from Jerusalem radio saying that the Egyptian Charge has confirmed that a summit meeting between Mubarak and Peres is being prepared. Is the U.S. aware of that preparation, and will Assistant Secretary Murphy take part in the advance work on that at all?

A I don't have any comment on that report at all. I think you'd have to address your questions to the governments of Egypt and Israel.

Q Eagleburger says that in the Mideast

A Excuse me, you had a question?

Q The Cubans said that the agreement with the United States is imminent. Do you have any comment on that?

A My comment is that the talks are continuing today, and I don't have any prognosis to give you on what the next step will be.

Q Eagleburger said that the time is not ripe for a major U.S.-Mideast initiative; that Israel should first solve its domestic problems. Could you comment on that, and is that in congruence with what Weinberger is going to discuss about?

A I don't go into the question of what Secretary Weinberger will or won't discuss. In any case, our view on the question of the Middle East peace process is clear. We have said that the September 1 initiative is out there and we're willing to be helpful at such time as the parties want to move on that.

Connie?

Q Yesterday, Trade Ambassador Brock made a clear linkage between a nation's policies and its effect on their trade in this country. Do we have any comments on that?

A I'm not aware of what he said, so I just can't comment on it.

Q Could you look into it and take it?

A Well, I think I'd probably -- I'll pass on the interest in it, but I don't know that we have the exact text of what he may have said.

Q Any comment on reports that a prominent Hungarian dissident has been placed under house arrest?

A Don't know anything about it; sorry.

Ralph?

Q Alan, do you have any -- do you draw any conclusion from the SS-20 report that you just issued as far as the Soviets' intentions in advance of the Shultz-Gromyko meeting?

A I'm not going to try to draw those kinds of conclusions, Ralph. This program of construction obviously has been on-going for some time, and we've talked about it as an on-going program, so I think that's simply a fact.

Q Anything on the Jordanian diplomat in Bucharest?

A Yes. Very simply, we have seen the reports. Don't have any additional information to provide you beyond what has been in the press.

We strongly condemn such a despicable act.

Q Can I just get back to the earlier question on this "continuing to abide by the SALT rules." Why does the U.S. abide by the SALT rules if, in fact, various reports have been submitted to Congress saying that the Soviets have violated aspects of these accords?

A Bernie, I'm not going to --

Q Doesn't it really amount to, as the Senator said, a unilateral act of disarmament by the U.S.?

A No, I don't think it does. Instead of trying to wing words, we have talked about this before.

Q But not for a long time.

A Well, the view hasn't changed.

Q No, but the reports have increased in frequency and with more accuracy on the alleged violations.

A The last detailed report I recall from the Government was in January. As you know, a letter went up recently saying that the issue is still being worked, and that there are some reports required in February and so there will be reports going up at that time. I'm not aware of any government reports that have been issued other than that.

Q Alan, going back to your original statement on Sri Lanka, does the State Department have evidence of any foreign involvement in these attacks?

A Again, Bill, I don't have anything to take you beyond the statement. I'm just going to have to leave you with that.

Q What time do you expect the Venezuelan President downstairs after the lunch?

A Check in the Press Office afterwards and see if we can help you with that.

Bill?

Q Alan, do you have any idea when the final decision on the U.S. pullout of UNESCO might come? There was a press conference this morning; they suggested it might be in a couple days.

A Well, I saw a press item which suggested that, but I think -- I don't have anything to signal you in terms of when a decision will be announced on that.

Q Can you -- there's a meeting of the U.S. Commission on UNESCO next week. Is it possible that a decision would come before that?

A Bill, I just don't know; don't have anything for you on that.

Jim?

Q Alan, are the SS-20 bases in both the East and the West, or more in one or the other?

A Certainly, the construction is taking place in both places. I don't have details to give you on where the additional base that we've (inaudible).

Q Is the new one in the West?

A As I say, I don't have details to give you on that specifically.

Q Or is there one new one and ten being built?

A I will repeat: The construction is going on both East and West. I do not have details to give you on where the additional number has come from in this case.

Q Can you take that question?

A No, I'm not going to get into that kind of detail.

Q Was the strong statement on Sri Lanka that you made a consequence of the meeting of the Ambassador with Mr. Armacost?

A I will repeat what I said before on that. I'm not going to get into the question of the conversation between Mr. Armacost and the Ambassador. Obviously, it's a reflection of U.S. policy.

Q Alan, do you have any guidelines on the meeting this morning at 11:00 between Mr. Armacost and the Minister of the Court of Jordan, Dr. Adnan Abu Odeh?

A Yeah. I don't have a readout. Mr. Abu Odeh is taking advantage of his presence in the United States on a private, unofficial visit to meet with the Under Secretary. Obviously, we don't get into the question of the specifics of the discussion. I believe that they met when Under Secretary Armacost was in the region some weeks ago.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:55 p.m.)

Clausen / Patterson

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #217

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1984, 12:06 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good morning, all. Got a few announcements:

Available in the Press Office is the corrected text of the address by Deputy Secretary Kenneth Dam today before the Dallas Council on World Affairs and Rotary Club. The first two lines on page 2 were dropped in the copy that was handed out yesterday.

Also, there will be no press briefing tomorrow. The Secretary will be in Miami, but, as usual, the Press Office will be available to answer all your questions with dispatch and comprehensiveness.

Q John, we've had briefings before when the Secretary is out of town. What's the occasion?

A Well, the problem is that I will be with the Secretary, and Mr. Romberg will not be available tomorrow.

Q Nobody trustworthy in the Department?

A Oh, I wouldn't put it in quite those terms.

Q B. Kalb available?

A The fact of the -- B. Kalb is not actually in the employ of the United States Government yet.

Q He could wing it. (Laughter)

Q No Q&A tomorrow, right? Is that correct?

A Sorry?

Q Still no Q&A scheduled for tomorrow?

A No, there is a Q&A after that speech, as I recall.

Q There is?

A Is there not? Did I not see something yesterday?

Q Yesterday you said no Q&A.

A I said no Q&A? Is that what I said? Then I must be right. There's no Q&A. (Laughter) Actually, there was, but we've just killed it, Ralph, to conform with what I said yesterday. No, there's no Q&A.

Q Will there be any readout after the Duarte meeting?

A I don't think so, because we will leave right after the meeting.

Q Do you have a time on that meeting?

A On Duarte?

Q Yeah.

A (To staff) Time on Duarte?

Do not. Haven't seen the schedule.

Q Even an approximate time would help.

A (To staff) Is it morning or afternoon? Afternoon. After lunch.

Q The speech delivery is at what time?

A Now you know all I know.

Q Could you fill us in on what time the speech is?

A The speech is 1:15.

Q So it's a 30-minute speech.

A Yes.

Q Will we get that speech in advance?

A The speech is going to be piped in, and we certainly hope you'll get an advance in addition.

Q Any chance of getting Sunday's speech on Saturday?

A Oh, we're working night and day to produce that, Bernie.

Q On Friday?

A As soon as we can. Seriously. Yes. As soon as we can.

Q Is that the announcements, John?

A Yes. Like to announce that the Secretary of State has accepted an invitation from British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Sir Geoffrey Howe, to stop in the United Kingdom for informal talks on his way to the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting in Brussels.

Secretary and Mrs. Shultz will be guests of Sir Geoffrey and Lady Howe on December 11.

Finally, there will be a BACKGROUND briefing on the upcoming North Atlantic Council Meeting, which will be held in Brussels December 12-14, and on the travel of Secretary Shultz to the U.K. December 11, and to the Federal Republic of Germany December 15. That briefing will be held here tomorrow at 11:00 a.m.

I guess that concludes everything that I have to announce.

Q John, what can you tell us about the hijacking in Tehran, particularly regarding the number of U.S. diplomats and total number of Americans on the plane?

A Okay. Give you what we have. Communications are not particularly good, and we have no presence there, the weather is bad, so there are a number of complicating factors. But as of 9:00, Eastern Standard Time, this morning, the hijacked Kuwaiti airliner was still on the ground in Tehran. That is in contrast to some reports that it had left. As I say, as of three hours ago, she was still there.

The hijackers have apparently released 66 people, most of whom are women and children, and two of those released are American citizens. In addition, the hijackers reportedly permitted an injured airline security guard to be taken to the hospital.

We've seen reports that a medical team has been given access to those passengers remaining on the plane, but we can't confirm that.

A number of U.S. citizens were reportedly on this flight. Among them, so far as we know, three USAID officials, and those are not, so far as we know, among the two that -- the women who have been released. We're talking about two American citizens released among the women and children and a possible three AID officials still on the plane.

We are obviously working to get confirmation of numbers and identities. We believe that one person was killed during the hijacking. We're working to find out the identity of that individual, but we are unable to confirm name or nationality at this time.

Insofar as other efforts are concerned, the Kuwaiti Government has been in continuous contact with Iranian authorities in an effort to impress on them the need to release the plane and the passengers expeditiously. We are also working through the Swiss, who protect U.S. interests in Iran, to seek assurances on the status of any U.S. nationals.

Obviously, the United States is strongly opposed to the sort of terrorism that is occurring in Tehran. Citizens are involved from at least five different nations -- Kuwait, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, the United States and West Germany.

This demonstrates that terrorism is, indeed, an international problem which must be faced with joint and steadfast resolve among the community of nations. We fully support the Government of Kuwait in its efforts to secure the safe release of those remaining on the aircraft.

Q What about --

Q What concern do you have that the American diplomats have been singled out for especially harsh treatment, or they have been punished? What knowledge do you have --

A Well, obviously, we're concerned about the safety of everybody on that plane, but, obviously, we're particularly concerned about American citizens.

Q What warnings have you given -- passed on, and so forth?

A It's not a question of warnings. We're working through the Kuwaitis and through the Swiss and other friendly diplomats in Tehran, and, obviously, the Iranian regime understands our concern and our expectations that they will take the kind of -- discharge the kind of responsibilities under the Geneva Convention, to which they are a signatory.

Q How much credibility are you giving to the rumors that an American diplomat was the person killed?

A Well, as I say, I can't confirm that. We are working with others to try to confirm the identity. That body was dumped out of the plane without any identification, so we are working with others to try to identify that individual.

Q If that was the case, would that be another AID diplomat, or are we talking about someone else?

A If it were to be an American, it is possible that it could be one of the three AID officials. Yes, that's correct.

Q Well, just to clarify now -- there are three AID officials, plus --

A We think.

Q You think. Plus two additional America women who have been released, so that -- a total of five Americans involved. Is that --

A Well, as I say, it's difficult to communicate. We're not there. But that is the best information we can give you at the moment. We're not sure how many Americans were on that plane or are on that plane.

In addition, I understand that even those who were released were not bearing identity papers. They had been removed. But, so far as we know, among the women and children that were released, there were two American citizens, and we think that there are three AID officials on the plane. It is conceivable, I suppose, that there could be others.

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Q John, through the Swiss or through anybody, have you been able to talk to the two released women passengers?

A I'm not -- I just don't know that. I just don't know.

Q They would be a possible, or the best source of information, wouldn't they -- first-hand information -- at this point?

A Well, information is coming back as to what transpired on the plane; but, of course, that was an earlier stage, because I think these were released yesterday.

Q Does the physical description of the corpse match in any way the physical description of the known AID officials?

A I think that's obviously the kind of thing we would be working on now.

Q John, when you say you don't know how many Americans are on, I can understand you're not knowing how many Americans of any sort would be on; but I can't understand why you wouldn't know how many American diplomats would be on.

A We're fairly confident that there were three AID officials.

Q And no more?

A So far as we know.

Q O.K.

Can I just check one technicality there? You mentioned the Geneva Convention. Is that The Hague Convention on Hijacking, or is there a separate -- is there something else there that --

A I gave you a phrase that I have here, and I'll -- it is on hijacking; yes, that's correct -- or at least that's the phrase that I have here.

Q O.K.

Q John --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- do you have anything on the gas leak in India?

A I'm sorry?

Q The gas leak in India.

A No real update. The United States has offered its services both to the Union Carbide Company in any way it could be helpful in their investigation and also to the Government of India. There have been --those requests have not been taken up so far, but the offer stands.

Q Also on Nightline the other day -- that some of the equipments and material are not allowed to be use in this country but sold overseas. Is that the case in India? Might -- has this --

A I don't know. I can't answer that of my knowledge.

Anything, John, on Chernenko's latest message to the International Physicists, in which he places top priority on getting rid of space weapons?

A No, I haven't seen that one, Bill. I'm sorry.

Q Anything on the Cuban-U.S. talks?

A They continue.

Q Continue today?

A Continue today.

Q Anything on the South African --

Q Do you think they might be continuing tomorrow?

A I guess we'll know that at the end of today. (Laughter.)

Q John, anything on reports of harassment of a prominent Hungarian dissident?

A Yes, I do have something on that.

We've learned with great disappointment of recent acts of Hungarian Government harassment of dissident intellectual Gyorgy Krasso. We understand that on November 22, Mr. Krasso's home was searched by police, his personal papers confiscated, and he was placed under indefinite police surveillance. He is forbidden to leave his home at night and may not appear in public places. These actions against Mr. Krasso reportedly derive from his involvement with various samizdat publications in Hungary. The United States deplores all such actions aimed at suppressing the freedom of expression of any individual. At a time when Hungary is preparing to host the Budapest Cultural Forum, a follow-up to the Madrid Review Conference of the Helsinki Final Act aimed at promoting better communication and understanding among peoples, this is particularly disturbing.

Q A copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q John, any comment, anything new on the demonstrations at the South African Embassy and consulates?

A No, nothing beyond what we have said over the past several days and what Assistant Secretary Crocker said after his visit to the White House.

Q Are we doing anything new regarding the jailed labor leaders in South Africa, to gain their release?

A Oh, I think you may take it as a given that the South African Government is very much aware of our concern.

Q Concern to what end?

A Concern -- well, I think we offered you some specific words last week, but obviously we're concerned about their detention.

Q John, can I ask you to take the question on Chernenko's statement on militarization of space?

A Take a look at it.

Q Take a look --

A Sure.

Q -- and see whether there is --

A Sure.

Q -- see whether there is anything there.

A Sure.

Q O.K.

Can I also ask you another question related? There's been a lot of discussion, obviously, as the White House prepares its budget and so on, with the Hill over what steps are going to be taken to cut the deficit and cut the budget and so on. A number of statements from the Hill in the last few days have been very strong along the line of, if you're going to have cuts in domestic spending you're going to have to have cuts in military spending.

Does the State Department have a view on how such statements and the debate over the defense budget at this moment might or might not affect Secretary Shultz's dealings with Gromyko in January?

A I haven't heard such a view expressed, but obviously the Secretary is involved in the overall discussion of the budget situation, and I'm sure he's made his views known about various aspects on it to the President.

Q Will the State Department budget be affected in any way by those discussions?

A I don't know; I don't know, George.

Q Anything on Murphy's travels?

A He's still here at the moment.

Q And tomorrow?

A Well, when he goes we'll get back to you and let you know.

Q John, yesterday I asked for further comment on this question of why the United States continues to abide by the --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- SALT agreements even though there are reports of Soviet violations --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- and I -- no one was able to come up with any new words yesterday. Do you have anything?

A I don't; I don't.

Q Any comment on the NATO 7.8 billion dollar pledge on --

A No, I don't.

Q -- conventional forces?

A I think Secretary Weinberger had some comment this morning, but I don't. I can't take it any further.

Q Anything new on a decision on UNESCO -- where that decision stands?

A No. As you know, we took that decision -- or gave indications last year -- that we would leave. I think the expiration date is December 31. We've been looking at the measures that have been taken so far this year, and the question of the United States's departure is something that's being looked at, and I suspect we'll have something soon on that.

Q Any consideration being given to put that date off? I understand some of the European countries have asked us to postpone our decision.

A I'm not aware of any consideration to postpone the decision.

Q John, do you have anything on why the UNESCO chief cancelled his planned trip to the United States?

A The UNESCO chief?

Q Yes.

A Mr. M'Bow?

Q Right.

A Cancelled his trip to the United States?

Q Yes. He's supposed to be here.

A I didn't know that. Didn't know he had.

Q Will it be announced this week, do you think, or is it -- Where does that decision stand?

A This week -- no, I would think not this week. I would think next week.

Q Do you have anything on President General Haq in Pakistan? He called for a referendum on December 19. Now, he's the only one candidate. He doesn't allow anybody else to be in the referendum.

A Uh-huh. I think we had some guidance on that earlier this week. Won't take you very far, but you can take a look at what there was.

Q He didn't (inaudible) showing the world that he's really a dictator.

A Why don't you take a look at the guidance we already produced on that?

Q Do you have any more on the Howe meeting? Is the purpose of that to consult on the Gromyko meeting?

A No. This is something that Sir Geoffrey and the Secretary had talked about over the months, making available time for such a discussion, and it was raised again when the Secretary met with Mrs. Thatcher in Delhi for Mrs. Gandhi's funeral. But I don't have anything on the agenda.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:23 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #218

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1984, 12:25 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: I've got a couple of housekeeping or planning announcements for you up front:

Firstly, at 2:00 o'clock this afternoon there will be a BACKGROUNDER in this briefing room on the upcoming visit of President Seyni Kountche of Niger.

Announcement on an in-house conference on International Human Rights Day: Monday, December 10, is International Human Rights Day. That day, in recognition of the 36th anniversary of the signing of the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Department's Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs will host a conference to discuss the impact of the "Zionism Equals Racism" Resolution passed by the U.N. General Assembly nine years ago. The conference, which is being sponsored by the World Zionist Organization in cooperation with the World Jewish Congress and the International B'nai B'rith, will be held in the Loy Henderson Auditorium from 10:00 o'clock in the morning until 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon.

Among the guest speakers will be Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams, Senator Patrick Moynihan, and Israeli Ambassador Meir Rosenne. Members of the press will be welcome. That's Monday, December 10, International Human Rights Day, conference from 10:00 o'clock til 5:00 o'clock.

That's all I have for you.

Q Do you have a detailed schedule of that or will you have it released later -- speaking times and such?

A I don't know whether we have a detailed schedule at this stage, but we'll certainly work on it for you.

Q Okay. John, can you give us what update you have on the hijacking?

1- 3096

A   Well, I'll give you what we have. The terrorists' demand that they be allowed to broadcast has apparently been met, and that broadcast has been made.

They promised that after that broadcast they would release more prisoners. As of a few minutes ago when I came out here, there was no evidence that any further prisoners had been released. Indeed, there were some disturbing press reports that there has been further shooting in or around the aircraft.

The terrorists claim that they have killed five people. They claim that among those five are two Americans: Charles Hegna and William Stanford. There is some confirming evidence that these two AID officers might be those who are killed, but we are still not at the stage where we can offer positive identification.

Data which would identify them has been acquired by the Swiss who represent our interests in Tehran. That material is in process of being sent to us for our examination.

In addition, the Swiss have asked that the bodies be turned over to them for shipment to the United States, and we continue to work on all of that.

That's really about all I have for you at this stage. Basing our analysis on the various reports that are available, we think that between 53 and 60 hostages are still aboard the aircraft; and, of course, the President and other officials in the government have been working closely with other governments and individuals in an effort to resolve this tragedy.

Q   John, in that statement that you mention, the terrorists listed four names -- one American and three Kuwaiti officials -- and they said they would kill them. You didn't make reference to that.

A   No. What I was speaking to was a report that we had indicating the terrorists had broadcast --

Q   But you've also seen the -- you've also seen a copy of that broadcast report on FBIS, and it lists the name of a Stanley Stevers, a U.S. AID employee and a worker at the White House, according to the terrorists, even though garbled --

A   Well, we think --

Q   -- and three Kuwaiti names.

1-3097

A We think from what they have said -- and there's a garble in one of the names -- but we think, from what they have said and some evidence that we think corroborates that claim, that two AID officials -- and we think those two are Charles Hegna and William Stanford -- we think the probability is quite high that those have been murdered.

As I say, we are looking at obvious further data that is on its way to us that would help us make a final judgment.f

Q John, I hate to press you on this, but so you're not acknowledging that they have in fact in their broadcast statement said that the remaining Americans and others would never leave the plane alive, that they would be killed or buried under the wreckage of the aircraft. I think that was the --

A I'm not going to discuss the status of any other Americans who may be on that plane.

Q Is it true --

Q Well, how many Americans are on board, as far as we know, still on board?

A I'm not going to get into how many Americans we think are on the plane, for rather obvious reasons.

Q John, Ambassador Oakley suggested last night on ABC's "Nightline" that he believed the Iranian Government was in collusion with the terrorists.

Is that a State Department view?

A I think the President addressed that this morning, and I think you should go back and look at the President's exact words. But I think the President made the point that there was no evidence, that he was in a position to offer, of direct complicity; but I think the President also said that he felt there were certainly areas in which the Iranian authorities had not moved with dispatch or had not been as effective as we would like to see happen.

Q John, what areas might those be?

A Well, I think that in the past the Iranian authorities have proved themselves capable of acting forcefully and effectively in the case of hijackers, and I think there are also -- there is this question of the way events have been handled. It is not usual in hijacking cases to permit hijackers the kind of access to the media that has taken place in this particular case. It is not generally thought to be the most efficient way of dealing with hijackers to permit photographers to board the plane and photograph corpses. So those are some of the areas in which we think the procedure has not been as efficient as we would like.

Q Can I follow on that? Both you and Ambassador Oakley appear to be saying that the view of the United States is that the Iranians should have taken military action by now.

A Well, I don't think we're saying that. We're saying that there are a variety of ways of handling hijacking statements, and I don't think it's for us to say at what stage you assault an aircraft. However, this has been going on for some time. There have been threats to murder individuals. Those threats have been carried out, and murders have taken place. And I'm not pinpointing the time at which other methods should be overtaken by military action, but I certainly -- that is something that the experts would take into account.

Q John, have they met the requirements of the Hague Convention in all aspects in this?

A Well, I think I'll leave you with these words I've offered today in the areas where we think they could have been more effective.

Q John, who have you identified --

Q What is the nature of our contact with the Iranian Government? Is it only through --

A Well, we have no direct presence there, but we're -- primarily the Swiss, but of course there are other presences there, and, of course, there are a number of other leaders to whom the President has spoken and who are making their views known.

Q John, in reference, in fact, John, to a message to the leader of Kuwait, is there anything you can tell us about the nature of that message and whether or not the United States has sought the release of anyone?

A Well, the United States' position in hijacking cases is not one of compromise, and I do not think the position of Kuwait has been one of compromise, and we certainly have supported Kuwait's position.

Q How would you describe the negotiations now going on --

Q (Inaudible) --

A Not really. There has obviously been a lot of back and forth between ourselves and a variety of goverments who are in touch with Iran, who might be in touch with Iran, or who could be helpful in this case. There are, of course, other governments whose nationals are on that aircraft, and they're making similar contacts. So there's a lot of activity.

Q John, how would you characterize the negotiations now going on between Kuwait and the hijackers?

A Well, I don't think I would. I think I'd like the Kuwaitis characterize those negotiations.

Q Are you more pessimistic than previous -- on previous occasions, or more optimistic?

A I don't think we'd use that characterization. It is a very, very difficult and dangerous situation.

Q John, what other information do you have on --

Q John, can you tell us who else the President -- you said the President --

A Excuse me, Ralph.

-- MORE --

Q What information do you have on who these hijackers are, and what connection they may have with any groups in Iran that bombed our --

A Nothing for you on that.

Q Can you take that?

A No. I don't think we'll have anything on that for you.

Q You said the President had spoken to a number of leaders.

A I did. He may have spoken to some by -- you know, person-to-person. I don't know. I really was referring to cabled messages.

Q Okay.

Q John, whom do you have -- somewhat different from Mike's question -- whom do you hold responsible for the hijacking?

A I assume the individuals who have murdered a number of citizens and who are presently holding that aircraft illegally on the ground.

Q But do you know -- what's their name? Whom do they belong to?

A No, I don't have anything for you on that.

Q The hijackers say they are not responsible, John.

A Oh, really? It seems rather an astonishing statement.

Q John, what role does Algeria is playing in this matter? (sic)

A I'm not going to get into what countries we're involved with or not involved with.

Q John, I understand the State Department has direct contact with the control tower in Tehran. What kind of message are you getting?

A I'm not aware of such direct contact.

Q Would you characterize Iran as being

cooperative or uncooperative with U.S. efforts to gain information about the Americans or about the hijacking?

A Well, as you know, we have no direct American presence there and there's no direct contact with the Iranians, so our discussions are going on through the Swiss.

It is not the easiest capital in the world in which to operate. It is the Islamic Sabbath today. There are a number of complications. Telephone lines are sometimes cut. There are all kinds of complications to what is going forward there.

Q You say that any cooperation the Iranians may have been providing is now suspended because of the Sabbath?

A No, I'm not saying that. I'm saying that insofar as reaching government officials and that kind of thing, I'm just pointing out to you that it is their Sabbath.

Q John --

A John?

Q To go back to the original bombing in Kuwait, what position did we finally arrive at about Iranian complicity in that?

A I'd have to go back to whatever words -- I'm not going to wing that one, John. We'd go back to whatever words we used at the time.

Q Can you be helpful at all in terms of what response we've had, if any, from the Iranian Government to our pleas through the Swiss and other governments for them to take more positive action? Have they given us any kind of --

A No, I don't really think I can.

Q But we have had a response from them?

A Well, we haven't -- obviously, various parties are in touch with the Iranians and urging them to bring to an end this --

Q Can you say whether the responses we've had from the Iranian Government through these other parties tends to confirm the belief that there is some complicity on the part of the Iranian Government?

A No, I can't. I'm just going to leave you with the President's words of this morning.

Q John, there was a report that the Iranian negotiator, Mr. Mir-Salim, had initially taken the tactic of attempting to persuade the Kuwaitis to accept the hijackers' demands rather than to persuade the hijackers to give up. Do you have anything to confirm that on the record?

A No, I don't. I'm not aware of that.

But I think the fact is that the Kuwaiti Government's position has been made very clear by the Kuwaitis.

Q If we find out at some future point who's responsible as an organization, or even a country, would we consider responding against the organization or country, not the individuals directly involved now?

A I think that's the kind of decision the President would make.

Q John, in the first part of your statement, you used the word "prisoners," referring to hostages.

A Uh-huh.

Q Was that the language of the hijackers, or the language used by you, referring to them?

A I guess I was using the term interchangeably -- hostage and prisoners.

Q Why is that?

A I guess because I feel that are both prisoners and hostages. I'm not sure I see the subtle distinction.

Q If it has any political significance, I mean? When you use the word "prisoners" maybe you mean prisoners of war?

A No, I would not read that -- I certainly would not read any suggestion that there is any legality attached to the action that these terrorists have taken.

Q John, has the U.S. asked any of the governments it's been in contact with on this episode to express to the Government of Iran just how deeply the United States feels about this incident?

A Oh, I think that's a given. I think that various governments whose nationals are held on that plane have indicated how deeply they feel.

Q John, do you have any indication --

Q Do we have evidence from some of the people who have been released that the hijackers indeed are members of this extremist Hizballah, Party of God, Shi'ite group?

A No. We have -- I think those who are released have indicated that all of the discussion, or all of the language used by the hijackers, has been Arabic, that they do not speak much English. And, of course, you've seen the same reports that we have of roughing up and abuse on the aircraft and the separation of Americans and Kuwaitis from others in the plane.

Q But is there anything more to indicate -- you know, this party has threatened American interests for a long time, and indeed a lot of the threats you've picked up were traced to this one. Anything more to indicate that this group is responsible?

A No, I don't have anything that we can offer you on that, and I'm not aware that any of those who have come off the plane have identified the hijackers as belonging to a specific group.

Q John, on the basis of your -- of the same reports that you just referred to, do you have any indication of how the remaining Americans on the plane are being treated or have been treated so far? Have they been subject to abuse and torture, and so on, or do you have any indication about that?

A I think the indications are that prior to the apparent killing of two Americans, and probably continuing after that, the treatment has not been good.

Q Of the Americans?

A Yes.

Q John, on the basis of contacts with the Iranian officials, have they asked for anything in return to cooperate?

A Certainly not to us, but I'm not aware of such requests. I mean, it is the hijackers who have laid down demands. I'm not aware of any Iranian request.

Q John, you have now a special working group dealing with this issue?

A Yes.

Q And without mentioning any countries -- you don't want to mention countries which are interceding into this -- are you in consultation with just about all countries surrounding this area?

A A lot of interchange going on.

Q And where did the broadcast that you just mentioned earlier, where did it originate? Did it originate from Tehran or Kuwait?

A That is -- what we have, I think, is an Iranian news agency account of that broadcast.

Q But it was originated from Tehran or --

A I think so; yes.

Q Not from Kuwait?

A I think from Tehran; yes.

Q Where is Ambassador Murphy? Is he playing any role in this --

A Ambassador Murphy is in Saudi Arabia today.

Q Is he playing any role in this incident?

A I'm not aware of any role, but of course he's in the area and I'm sure he's abreast of what is happening.

Q John, what can you say to families of members of the Foreign Service or Diplomatic Corps about the U.S. response to terrorism directed at them which seems to be escalating in the last couple of years?

A I would say that it is escalating in the past couple years.

Q Well, perhaps -- is there nothing -- no new American response that may come out of this increased terrorism?

A Well, a great deal has been done, as you know. Secretary Shultz is very deeply involved in this himself insofar as the physical protection of our Embassies and the physical protection of Foreign Service Officers, Foreign Service Nationals. The aim, however, is not to turn those embassies into redoubts, into fortresses. The Foreign Service has a job to do; it has to interchange with people in that area. People have got to come to those embassies, so you have to protect them in such a way that you maintain that access and keep them open for business, which is --

--MORE--

Q Is there any way to protect them when they're traveling in two's or three's, or individually, throughout commercial airline routes?

A Well, a lot of thinking is being done, and obviously a lot of emphasis is being devoted to intelligence, but obviously incidents like this will occur.

Q John --

Q Has there been an abandonment, John, in your policy in what the President enunciated as "swift and effective retribution?"

A I don't think I'm really going to address the question of what the United States might or might not do in any given situation.

Q No. I just wondered -- that policy is not inoperative, is it?

A Everybody's statements are out there, and you have read them and they're still operative.

Q The only reason I ask, John, once again, here's another terrorism against Americans. And in 1981, the President promised there would be swift and effective retribution, and there hasn't been to my knowledge. Now, you correct me if I'm wrong.

A No. But I did say in the beginning of my answer to you, in the light of each case you have to make that decision; you have to look at what the area is that you're talking about, what the conditions are there, and what the options are for response.

Q Well, in other words, the policy is still there, it's just never been put into action, has it?

A Well, the policy is there.

Q Right.

Q John, in this broadcast, I see that the hijackers have demanded that their statement, which was broadcast over Iranian radio, also be broadcast over Kuwaiti radio --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- that if that is done, they will release another group of passengers. Does the United States think that would be helpful or not?

A I'm not aware of that, Terry, and I don't know what the Kuwaiti response has been.

Q How do you characterize the Kuwaiti position? Are they cooperative with the U.S. Government in this regard or less cooperative?

A Well, if you mean, has there been a lot of interchange and is there a lot of common concern and a lot of common action intended to bring this to an end, the answer is yes.

Q How about the other Arab governments in the area?

A There is such interchange and there is such cooperation, but I'm not going to give you a country-by-country list of who we are talking to and who is helping.

Q Do you mean that they have different positions towards the episode?

A I didn't say that. There are people who obviously have better access to the Iranian Government than others, not only in the Arab world but elsewhere in the world. And I think it is logical that one would tend to work with those who have access and influence.

Q May I go back to my question about Algeria, because the wire says that the Algerian Foreign Minister, I believe, has summoned the Iranian Ambassador to the palace or to his office to talk about the issue.

A Uh-huh.

Q Can you, because Iran played a role --

A No, I just said I'm not going to identify specific countries.

Q John, is the U.S. planning to go to the United Nations at all with this?

A I'm not aware of any thinking about that this morning, but obviously one never rules anything out.

Q Is there anything you can tell us about U.S.

movements of military hardware, either for rescue or removal purposes or for any other reason in the region?

A No., no.

Q Has there been any movement in response to this incident?

A Not going to answer that question.

Q New subject?

A Yes.

Q John, what can you tell us beyond what has been said about the talks with the Cubans? Where do we go from here?

A It seems to me that there was some guidance on that yesterday.

Q Yes, but would you like to go beyond your guidance?

A I was in Miami all of yesterday -- well, not all of yesterday

Q It's close to Cuba. (Laughter)

A It doesn't help my knowledge.

Q What can you tell us about Secretary Shultz's meeting with President Duarte?

A They met for about 50 minutes. They discussed the economic situation in El Salvador. They discussed the initiatives that President Duarte had taken in terms of dialogue with the guerrillas, of which, as you know, the United States has been very supportive. And certainly the fact that the guerrillas were as intransigent and hard-lined as they were at the last meeting was very disappointing to us and obviously disappointing to President Duarte.

Q (Inaudible)

A Did not discuss Lopez Sibrian --

Q There were no --

A -- as I recall.

Q John, any further information on new requests from Israel for increased aid?

A I don't, no.

Q Mr. Hughes, the arrest and later release of the gentleman from Union Carbide in India, what do you know about what happened in communications between the two countries?

A I'll give you what I have on that. We understand that officials in the state where Bhopal is located issued an order calling for the house arrest of Mr. Anderson, Warren Anderson -- he's the Chairman of Union Carbide. That order has been rescinded, and he has proceeded to New Delhi where he is -- this says "scheduled to hold a press conference," but in fact I think he has held a press conference. And I guess we should refer you to Union Carbide for anything further they might want to offer.

From an official U.S. perspective, the Centers for Disease Control is dispatching a team to India to assist with public health assessments, and of course we remain in regular contact with Indian officials and are prepared to assist as appropriate.

Q Mr. Speakes spoke of some kind of communication between the two countries. What was that communication? Was there a role played by the United States?

A Oh, I'm sure our Embassy in Delhi was in touch with Indian officials on a matter like this, but I don't have anything further on it.

Lester.

Q Yes. John, today, 13 of President Reagan's fellow Republican conservatives who are directors of organizations that strongly supported his reelection took out a full page in the Washington Times charging that Chester Crocker is, in their view, pursuing a policy that is likely to consolidate a Marxist dictatorship in Mozambique, undercut Savimbi in his efforts to defeat a Marxist-Leninist tyranny in Angola and install the pro-Soviet terrorists, SWAPO, in Namibia.

A Uh-huh.

Q And my question is, what is the State Department's response to these serious charges by the President's fellow conservatives?

A Don't have any responses to those charges, but I know what Secretary Crocker has been doing, and that is to try to help bring peace to southern Africa.

Q O.K. Could I follow up? I have a -- the reports of Bernie Kalb's succeeding you said that you are going back to the newspapers that you own on Cape Cod.

A Hm-mm.

Q For human interests' sake, could I ask how many are there and where? And this gives you an opportunity to advertise. (Laughter)

A Well, I don't want to be promotional, but they are a small group of community newspapers.

Q How many?

A There are five.

Q Five?

A Yes.

Q What are they called? The Hughes papers?

A I'll give you this in a somewhat less --

Q Do your reporters ever have problems with Massachusetts state or municipal government press secretaries who show favoritism toward the big media such as the Boston Globe and the New Bedford Standard?

Just human interest, John

A Our reporters are incisive and unbending in the pursuit of news. (Laughter)

Q Anything on -- do we expect a UNESCO announcement soon?

A I would look to next week for that.

Q Sometime next week?

A Early next week.

Q Anything on a U.S. pullout from the Food and Agriculture Organization?

A Well, I think I would pursue that with the White House. That obviously is in the area of the budget cuts the President is seeking to make, and I think we will refer you to the White House on that.

Q Has the State Department been consulted about that, John?

A I think I will refer you to the White House on that.

Q How about the text of the Secretary's remarks Sunday?

A Working like beavers on that, and the beavers have not produced anything on that. (Laughter)

Q They look asleep.

A The beavers are doing that. (Laughter)

Q John, as to your announcement about the conference December 10 on the International Human Rights Day, who will be footing the bill for this conference? Is it the State Department of the World Zionist Organization and B'nai B'rith?

A I don't have that at the back of my head.

Q Well, could you check on that, please?

A Be glad to take a look at it for you.

Q Mr. Hughes, back on India for just a moment, does the United States consider the arrest of an American who is the head of a multinational corporation something within the legalities of world law?

A Well, I think our Embassy in Delhi -- that's the kind of question that they would be looking at, if they are looking at it, in the light of Indian law, given the fact that this seems to be a closed chapter.

Thank you

(The briefing concluded at 12:52 P.M.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #219

MONDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1984, 12:03 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: I guess we ought to get this show on the road. I have a couple of announcements.

Available in the Press Office is the prepared statement by Assistant Secretary for International Organizations Gregory Newell. That was before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources. Testimony is on UNESCO

Secondly, regarding the sign-up list for the Secretary's trip to Geneva on January 7 and 8 for his meetings with Foreign Minister Gromyko, we've posted a sign-up sheet in the main Press Office for those of you who are interested in applying for a seat on board the Secretary's plane, but don't everybody get too excited. Although we've posted the sign-up sheet, we really don't have a decision yet on whether press will be going, or if press will be going, how many seats will be available for the press so it's a kind of provisional thing, to let you do a little advance thinking and let us get an idea of how many would like to go. And that list will be taken down, applications closed at noon on Wednesday, December 26.

Q What's the -- do you have any sense now of whether that will be -- will there be any other stops on that trip?

A I don't have -- I don't think there is any firm plan, but I wouldn't rule out the possibility that there might be.

Q But there will be no major -- you don't think there will be -- it would tie the Eastern European (inaudible) to that, or any of that sort of thing?

A No, no. That's all I have.

Q Are we satisfied with the Iranian performance in the hijacking incident?

A Well, as you know, Greg, we have two Americans still in Tehran. And I think what we would like to do is wait until they are returned to American soil and we have had an opportunity to talk to them before we offer any further comment about the details of their treatment.

Q Let me follow up. Mr. Oakley had suggested on "Nightline" on ABC the other day that the Iranians were in collusion with the hijackers. I'm just wondering if, in fact, the Iranians helped to free the hostages that we still feel there might have been collusion?

A Well, I think the President addressed himself to that last week and I think we'll remain with his language.

As I say, obviously, we are interested in further details of what took place and how people were treated, and so forth and so on. So I think we would like to see those two Americans out of Iran and in a position where we could talk to them before we offer any further comment on that.

Q Do you see any difference in -- yet -- in the way the Americans are being treated in comparison with how the Iranians are treating the other hostages?

A You mean post release?

Q Post release.

A I guess I won't get into that insofar as the Kuwaitis are concerned. As far as the Americans are concerned, a representative of the Swiss Embassy, which represents U.S. interests in Tehran, has visited the two who are free: Mr. Charles Kapar. He's a Foreign Service Officer with AID. He's stationed in Karachi. He's a regional auditor. And Mr. John Costa, who is a private business man. We have biographic information on the three AID employees, the one now being treated medically in Tehran and the two others who we believe to have been killed. As you know, those are Mr. Hegna and Mr. Stanford. We're still not able to offer final confirmation on those two until we -- until the remains are returned to the United States. But we believe that they are Mr. Hegna and Mr. Stanford, and obviously our sympathies go out to the families of both of them.

As I say, we have biographic information on all three of the AID employees in the Press Office. Mr. Costa is not a U.S. Government employee, and we have no biographic information or, indeed, any further details on him.

The arrangements for the return of the remains and the two Americans who are alive are presently going on. Don't have any conclusion on that for you. Our initial report, which appears to be verified by television footage, is that both Mr. Kapar and Mr. Costa have no debilitating physical injuries, although, of course, there have been these reports of ill treatment and cigarette burning. But, as I say, we would like to wait for more detailed information until they can be returned to U.S. custody ard we have an opportunity to debrief them.

Q Is it likely they will go through Pakistan?

A A number of ideas and options are being worked, but as of the time I came out here, nothing had been firmed up.

Q John, has there been anything in the way of a message from the Secretary, or from anyone else, to the Iranian authorities?

A Not that I'm aware of

Q Do you now know anything more about the identity of the hijackers?

A No, they are in the custody of the Iranian authorities.

Q What do you have to say about what you expect to happen to them?

A We expect that Iran would carry out its clear obligations and either try them or see that they are extradited to a country where they would be tried.

Q What are your concerns that they took so long to storm the plane?

A Well, as I say, I think we have two Americans in Tehran, in Iranian facilities, and I think we will wait until they are back in U.S. custody and we can talk to them before we have any further comment on the handling of the situation.

Q John, when you say "Either try them or extradite to a country that would try them," would you expect that country to be Kuwait, because of the route of the plane or would you --

A Well, I'm not a lawyer.

Q -- think the United States would be a possibility?

A To the where?

Q Would the United States be a possibility?

A I'm not aware that the United States --

Q Because of those murders?

A -- is a possibility. That seems to me unthinkable. I'm not a lawyer, but I would think Kuwait is the appropriate country.

Q John, last night on the networks were a story that -- implying that the whole hijacking was coordinated or possibly concocted with the Iranian Government, and when the Iranian Government saw that there was a lot of pressure from Algeria and Syria, and other countries, that they changed the course of the whole thing and they did what they did in the last 24 hours; can you comment on that?

A Well, only to confirm the obvious. That there were a lot -- there was a lot of international diplomatic activity going on; that we were in touch with a fair number of governments as were other countries who had nationals on that aircraft. And, undoubtedly, a number of governments were making their views known and making our views, and the views of other governments, known to the Iranians.

Q So you'll not give any substance or you'll not comment on this -- in the story that the Iranian Government or the whole hijacking was in coordination with the Iranian Government from the beginning?

A No, I'm not commenting on that.

Q John, there was talk around the fringes of this whole thing for several days about the possibility of retaliation; is that now unlikely in the view of the way --

A Well, you know, I think we have taken the position, John, that we simply don't talk about the possibility of retaliation, and I think we will continue to hold that line.

Q Do we know anything more about, you know, what kind of a target that would exist, who these hijackers are? I mean, is there any --

A Well, I don't have anything more to offer --

Q John, do you consider this a "rescue" last night of the Americans -- of the two Americans -- and others?

A I don't know quite how to describe it, Ralph. I think, as I say, for more specific details, we'll wait until our nationals are back in our custody.

Q John, do we know why the Americans did not go out with the first group of hostages who were released and left Tehran this morning?

A Let me be sure I understand your question. Are you suggesting that all the others who were released yesterday have now left? Because, if you are, you're ahead of me. I don't know that.

Q I don't know that they've all left, but I understand that a planeload of hostages has left Iran. Do you know if that's true? Is that --

A I do not know if that's true. It is possible, but I think the negotiation is involving --

Q Larry Speaks at the White House this morning indicated that a plane had gone from Tehran to Pakistan.

A Well, maybe he's ahead of us. I don't -- I'm not aware of that now. We don't seem to know that here.

Q So you don't know why then the Americans have not left, presumably?

A No. I wouldn't try to draw a conclusion though, if that is the case.

Q John, two follow-up questions of what you said earlier. If I understood you right, at the beginning you said "you did not want to say anymore until they were on American soil;" later, you said, "until they were in American custody," or another phrase, "had left Iran."

A American custody, I think, was probably the best --

Q What does that mean -- "American custody?" Some place out of Iran, like an air base in --

A Well, I think it's unlikely we'll be able to interview them in Iran, so I think we'll wait until we are in a position where we can talk to them.

Q And, secondly, with regard to contacts with other governments, did the United States, at any time, send a message specifically to the authorities in Iran, addressed to them?

A I'm not going to get into the various channels that we used, which were numerous. But if your question basically is, could there have been doubt in the Iranian authorities mind about the seriousness of the situation, the seriousness with which we considered the whole matter, the answer to that is no.

Q I wasn't asking you about the channel; I was asking you about whether the United States Government addressed itself to Iran and said, "we make this _de_ _marche_ to the Iranian Government..." through whatever channel was used?

A I think the Swiss -- while not responding to that question, we are represented in Tehran by the Swiss, and they did represent us and our views.

Q But did they present something from the U.S. Government to the Iranian authorities?

A I just really am not going to get into detail.

--MORE--

Q John, is there any problem at this point over the - the negotiations that deal with the release of the two living Americans, is there any distinction between the negotiations going on over that and the release of the bodies?

At one point last week, I thought at least, that one of the bodies had in fact been released to the custody of the Swiss and the other had not.

A No. That's not true.

Q So at this point the Americans -- the living Americans and the remains are all in the custody of Iran at this moment.

A That's correct.

Q And are the negotiations all one set of negotiations, or is there some distinction being made by the Government of Iran over return of --

A No. I wouldn't say there's a distinction being made by Iran. I think the Iranian authorities feel that the two Americans who are alive would be best served by remaining in -- under medical observation for 24 hours.

Q John, what issues do you hope to learn more about by talking to the surviving hostages?

A I think we would, if they are prepared -- certainly in the case of the non-Government official, if he is prepared to talk with us -- but presumably in the case of the AID official, they might be able to offer some more details about the hijackers, about what happened, about what happened when, about their treatment, and negotiations that might have taken place between the hijackers and the --

Q So it's your view that they could shed more light on the Iranian conduct of --

A Well, one doesn't know. It depends where they were in the plane, depends what they saw, depends what access they had to events and to the back and forth.

Q John, I draw from an earlier answer that we had asked for the quick release of the Americans -- the two live Americans, and that the Iranians said, "No, we're going to keep them for 24 hours for medical observation." Is that a correct --

A It's a little more complicated than that, Hank. I'm sure you're aware of the kind of environment in which discussions go on in Tehran between Western Governments and the Iranian authorities. Beyond that, there are some complications about transportation, about what aircraft, about whose aircraft people would move out on.

I mean these are simply -- I'm not suggesting anything sinister here. I'm suggesting there are just some practical arrangements, given the number of flights, given the countries whose aircraft fly into Tehran, given the kind of clearances for various people's aircraft that fly into Tehran. So there's a fair amount of negotiating to be done.

Q Why has it taken so long to get return of the bodies? Are they to be considered part of a single package return, or why has that been held up so long, John?

A Well, it -- as I say, it is part of the environment of doing business in Tehran. There have been some complications, one of which, as you know, was the holy day, but the Swiss are doing the best they can on our behalf, and we hope that that will be brought to a conclusion soon.

Q Do you think the two living Americans are lucky to get out of there alive, and just how thankful are you for their release?

A I guess you'd have to ask them when you're able to get your cameras on them.

Q Well, what's your answer?

A Well, I assume they're lucky. Two suffered a very tragic fate, and two are alive. I'm sure they're very grateful.

Q John, do you have any readout on the Secretary's meeting with Mr. Shamir yesterday?

A Well, it went on for about an hour. I would say that a lot of the discussion centered on Israel's economic situation and continuing consultations that we are having with the Israelis about that.

There was also, as one might expect, a general discussion of events in the region and developments in the region.

Q John, did the Israelis make a specific aid request at this meeting?

A I guess I would like to answer that in two ways. Basically, I'd like to steer you away from that story, without responding in very great detail to what was discussed.

Q John, did the Israelis offer to assist in any way in connection with the hijacking incident?

A I'm not going to get into that.

Q Did they discuss the negotiations in Lebanon now?

A There was a general discussion of the Lebanon situation.

Q Did Israel ask the United States to make some statement or assurance regarding its attitude toward Mr. Mubarak's recent statements about the next steps in the peace process?

A No. Not that I can recall. No. Not a request for a statement. No.

Q What is their attitude regarding what the U.S. might find to be helpful in this situation?

A Well, I think -- you know, as always I guess I should observe the Secretary's rule, which is that the Israelis have to talk for themselves, and we will talk --

Q All right. What is your attitude toward Mr. Mubarak's recent statements?

A There was a general discussion of the relationship, obviously, between Egypt and Israel. No secret that we would like to see that relationship stronger than it is.

Q John, do you have an idea how long will Mr. Murphy be in the Middle East touring the area?

A I don't know how long he will be there. He is in Lebanon this morning. He was in Israel over the weekend.

Q John, yesterday's Boston Globe says that the Secretary of State may offer a three-year moratorium on anti-missile testing to the Soviets, but in the last two weeks both Vice President Bush and Secretary Weinberger have indicated that the defensive weapons won't be a bargaining chip, there will be a new context.

Can you comment on that Globe report?

A No. Don't have anything on that.

Q And a follow-up: Are you aware of the reports that the Soviets are in the middle of implementing what is known as the Ogarkov Doctrine, a reorganization of Soviet strategic war fighting to carry out a one-week takeover of Western Europe?

A I don't have anything on that either.

Q John, getting back to the Mideast for just a second, is President Mubarak coming to visit Washington in February?

A I don't have anything on that for you.

Q There's a story in the Times -- Washington Times this morning to the effect that a retired Air Force officer claims to have access to the remains of nine MIA's. Do you have anything on that?

A I don't. No. We, obviously, continue to monitor such reports carefully, but I'm in no way suggesting that we have such evidence.

Q John, you mentioned UNESCO at the outset of the briefing. Has a final decision been made, do you know, on that?

A I don't know that we have a final decision on whether -- you might look to us for something later in the week, I think.

Q It will be announced, do you think --

A I think it will be announced.

Q Here?

A Don't know where it will be announced.

Q Back on the MIA's -- do you have any comment on the propriety of freelance efforts to locate MIA's?

A Well, I think the Secretary, over the months and years, has addressed that particular question.

Q You don't care to paraphrase his remarks?

A I don't care to paraphrase what he said. No.

Q John, anything on the Manzanillo talks? When do they -- is there another session under way?

A They're being held today, and I would expect them to end tomorrow. That will be the usual pattern: two days of talks.

Q Any substantive comment on them?

A No.

Q John, in the Secretary's remarks in New York -- I came in a little bit late. This may have come up before I arrived. If it didn't I'd like to ask the question.

In the Secretary's remarks in New York yesterday, is he taking a different posture toward the use of American power than Secretary Weinberger?

A No. (Laughter)

What aspect did you have in mind?

Q Well, you seem to be saying that he didn't think it would be necessary to develop consensus of public opinion to support the use of American power around the world, where Secretary Weinberger in a speech a couple of weeks ago at the National Press Club seemed to be saying something quite differently.

A Well, Secretary Shultz doesn't see a contradiction between what he said and what Secretary Weinberger is saying. Both the Secretaries agree that there has to be public support for the use of American force under the conditions that Secretary Shultz set out, and the use of force is a last resort.

I think Secretary Shultz's view is that there is not always the opportunity to conduct a national referendum before the use of force in those limited situations which he set out in his speech yesterday.

But I think the point he's also making is that the Administration has to comport itself, has to operate in such a manner, that it does have -- earns the support of the public

I guess what I'm focusing on is the specific question of whether you have a referendum before that force is used, or whether the use of it is clearly in line with American interests and carried out in such a way that you can count on public support. So I don't think the Secretary sees a contradiction between himself and Secretary Weinberger on that.

Q John, has the United States offered India any emergency help for this tragedy in Bhopol?

A The answer to that is yes. I'm not -- I can't quite recall what the specifics are, but certainly the offer of assistance has been made, both to the Indian Government and to Union Carbide, and I guess we have dispatched a team to India.

Q There is a team on its way?

A Yes. And the exact description of that I think we gave you on Friday of last week. The Press Office will have it.

Q John, any comment --

A (To Staff) Did we not do that? Mr. Romberg assures me we did, and, therefore, it must be so.

Q Any comment on the Chairman's release -- in fact, being flown out of India? Union Carbide Chairman --

A No. I think we said everything we had to say about that last week.

Q On Lebanon again --

A Yes.

Q Any comment on the Israeli threats to break off relations concerning its withdrawal from southern Lebanon?

A No.

Q John, considering what you just said about there has to be public support for the United States' policy.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you consider the results of the elections, the landslide that Mr. Reagan received, as confidence in the President and his direction of foreign policy, that the public to go -- the Reagan Administration doesn't have to go to the public again asking for more support, or the same support?

A Well, I mean, I think the answer to your question is in two parts. Yes, clearly, the election would appear to indicate rather significant support for the President's policies, and, obviously, that would include foreign policy.

If you mean, is that to be taken as an indication of specific public support for any particular military operation, I think that is not necessarily the case.

Q Thank you, John.

A Okay.

(The briefing concluded at 12:27 p.m.)

Decker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #220

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1984, 12:17 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I don't have any announcements. I'll be happy to take questions.

Q Do you have anything on the reported agreement between the United States and Cuba?

A Not a great deal, George. As you know, we've had three rounds of talks with the Cubans on the subject of the so-called Mariel issue -- immigration issues. All of them were businesslike. The third session was the longest and considerable progress was made.

We do not yet, however, have an agreement, and until we do there's no point in speculating on how close we might be.

Q There is no, then, plan for a formal announcement of the agreement out there?

A As I say, we don't have an agreement, and presumably one doesn't announce things one doesn't have. I'm not saying that -- I'm just not going to speculate at this point on where we are.

Q Well, I don't think it's a matter of speculation. I think that there is an arrangement already reached within the government, and certainly including the Justice Department, which is planning for an announcement on Thursday.

A Well, I can't tell you what people may or may not be planning for, Marvin. I'm telling you what the state of play is.

Q Well, is there -- the story in the paper today speaks about an agreement in principle. You're speaking about an agreement, and there is a distinction between the two. Is there an agreement in principle?

A   I'm not going to get into the question of agreements in principle, yea or nay. The fact is we don't have an agreement yet, and I'm not going to speculate --

Q   What's holding it up?

A   I'm not saying necessarily anything's holding anything up, but the fact is there were discussions, considerable progress was made, and that's where we are.

Q   Alan, when the last session of talks ended, the State Department said further discussions would be -- were expected or anticipated, or something of that sort.

Are further discussions with the Cubans still anticipated?

A   I would expect that there probably would be a further session.

Q   Do you know -- do you have a date yet when this session might be?

A   No.

Q   Will it be --

A   No. And we would not, in accordance with our previous pattern on this, give you advance notice of that.

Q   Are there talks under way today?

A   I don't know whether there are any communications under way today, but there are no meetings.

Q   But the session that you spoke of, is that under way?

A   There's -- no.

Q   Would that session involve the same principals?

A   Don't know that for sure, George. I wouldn't see any reason why it wouldn't, but I don't --

Q   Could you characterize --

A   You know, before a session is held, one -- it's a little hard to speculate necessarily who would be there, but I'd think that that's a logical assumption.

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Q Would you characterize this session as a signing session or as a negotiating session?

A I don't think I would characterize it.

Q Well, put another way, is -- you've had three negotiating sessions so far. The last made considerable progress. Do you need another session of this sort to complete the deal?

A Well, I understand what you're trying to get at, Marvin -- it would be a little hard not to -- but I can't really take you beyond where I have at this point.

Q Alan, last Thursday when the Department put out a statement on the third round of talks, it said, "Another round of discussions is foreseen." Does that continue to be the case?

A Well, I just, I think, addressed it to the extent that I can at this point, Don.

Q Are you backing away from what was said last Thursday?

A I'm not -- I don't have in front of me what was said.

Q Well, I have it right here.

A Well, good. I've given you what I've got on it for today.

Q Do you -- is another round of discussions foreseen?

A I say, I think that there will probably be another session, but I don't have any details on it.

Q Would you take the question of whether or not you stand by the statement that was issued --

A No.

Q -- on -- last week?

A No.

Q After you've had a chance to look at it?

A No. I've given you what I have for you today, and that's where we are.

Q Okay. All right. Well, let me ask you this: Is there any significance to be drawn from your intentional change of the word from "discussions" to "session"?

A I'm not going to try and parse the words that fine.

Q Well, then, will you -- if you --

A I'm going to leave -- I've given you what we have to say about it today, and that's as far as I'm going to take you, and I'm not going to take questions on it, I'm not going to try and speculate about when another meeting might be held or what would take place at that meeting. Where we are is where I've described it.

Q Another area?

A Yes. Sure.

Q Do you have anything new on Mr. Murphy's activities today?

A He is in Damascus today. I don't have anything beyond that, though.

Q What he is doing in Damascus?

A Sorry?

Q What he is doing in Damascus?

A Holding talks. (Laughter)

Q Alan, do you have anything on the.--

Q About what?

A Subjects of mutual concern. (Laughter)

Q Do you have anything on the Times piece about Shultz and Weinberger?

A No. I really don't have any comment on that.

Q Anything on a shaken-up of Ambassador in Latin America?.(sic)

A No. I don't have anything on that. Obviously, any -- without giving credence or addressing the piece that was written on this, any announcements on Ambassadorial appointments, obviously, would come from the White House, in any case. I'm not suggesting they're about to make some, but I'm --

Q Alan, again with the Middle East, would you confirm the report by Egyptian press that President Mubarak is invited to visit Washington by the third week of February?

A No. I think if there were such an announcement to be made, obviously, it would be made from the White House also.

Q There is another report in the Egyptian press coming from Al-Ahali. It is an opposition weekly in Egypt.

A Uh-huh.

Q Saying that Egypt is protesting the United States' taking pictures by satellites and conveying them to Israel.

A Well, I don't know anything about it.

Q Pictures of military installations.

A But, in any case, I don't think I would address it for a number of reasons, having to do (a) with satellites, (b) with diplomatic conversations, and so on. But I just don't know anything about it either. I can't help you.

Q Alan, reports from Pakistan of interviews of some of those who survived the hijacking of the Kuwaiti airliner say that, quote -- some of those on the plane as saying that the Iranian authorities gave arms and other aid to the hijackers while they were on the ground in Tehran.

Can you comment on that, or do you -- what can you tell us now, since the two Americans have left Iran, about the U.S. attitude toward the whole affair?

A Okay. Let me do one thing first which may be something of a repeat in terms of a sitrep of what you had before, and then let me address your question.

We have received confirmation that the remains of the two murdered Americans have arrived in Frankfurt. The remains will be identified by U.S. military forensic specialists.

After identification, tentative plans call for the bodies to be transported to Andrews Air Force Base, but that will all be forthcoming and details will be provided as we have them.

Messrs. Kapar and Costa are being flown, I think at this point have been flown, by a Kuwaiti aircraft to Kuwait, where they will be transferred to a U.S. Air Force medical evacuation aircraft and will be transported to Frankfurt, West Germany, shortly. A determination of their onward itinerary beyond that has not yet been made.

So far as the issue of the Iranian handling of the hijacking is concerned, while we have not yet had a chance to debrief the American survivors, the Government of Iran's handling of this situation clearly raises disturbing questions, to which we are seeking answers.

The fact of the matter is that two passengers were murdered by the hijackers, more were tortured, and many were brutalized for an extended period of time without any effective measures being taken by the Government of Iran.

Granting selective media access, broadcasting statements and screams of tortured passengers, permitting photographers aboard the aircraft all clearly encouraged extreme behavior by the hijackers. The passengers, the families of the murdered passengers, and the world deserve answers from the Government of Iran.

Now that the hijackers are in its custody, the Government of Iran has very clear obligations. Under the Hague Convention for Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, to which Iran is a party, the Government of Iran has an obligation to submit the hijackers' case to prosecutorial authorities, or to extradite them to another country for trial. Iran's failure to date to try or extradite several previous groups of hijackers reinforces the impression that it is sympathetic to, and provides a safe haven for, hijackers.

The American attitude and actions toward the Government of Iran in the aftermath of this tragedy will be conditioned by whether Iran meets its obligations and by our assessment of its role during this tragic incident. We have been and will continue to watch Iranian actions closely.

-- MORE --

Q A copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Alan, just to be clear, that is the statement that Speakes read as well, is it not?

A This morning or at noon?

Q A couple of minutes ago.

A He may have used the same statement at noon.

Q Alan, will we press for those answers from Iran through any established bodies? How will we go about it, and do we really expect answers?

A I don't have details as to what discussions may be held with other governments at this point, Jim. But, obviously, some Iranian authorities have been quoted to saying there will be an open trial. If that takes place, presumably we will all know that, and we'll know what takes place.

Q Will you send an observer to an open trial?

A Well, I'm not aware that Iran would welcome a U.S. observer at its trial.

Q Will you ask it?

A Switzerland is protecting U.S. interests in Iran, and I don't think that that question really arises.

Q Let me follow up. From all of these statements, and there are press reports, you are not pinpointing a direct complicity of the Iranian Government with the hijackers?

A I'm going to stick on what I've just said on this at this point.

Q I realize this may duplicate the last question, but you never did answer Don's original question --

A I don't have anything I can specifically say in respect to that. I saw the report on it; I'm going to have to again stick with what I've got on this at this point.

Q Alan, what about the speculation that there was a lot of play acting Sunday?

A Well, I saw that and I don't really have anything to say. I guess, again, as with everything else, one will want to talk with the passengers and get some views about that and make assessments based on that and other information we may be able to come by.

Q Alan, now that the tragic event came to an end, will you be more forthcoming telling us about the countries that were in diplomatic contacts with the United States on this problem?

A No, I don't think we would want to be too detailed about that. It's a private matter -- official contact.

Q It was understood --

A I think it's up to other governments to talk about what they did or didn't do, and it's not up to us and there would be a suggestion that if we talked to somebody and they aren't saying something, that maybe they didn't follow through, and I don't think we need to leave suggestions of that sort around.

Q It seems you have the sort of conception that maybe Iran -- any other government than Iran would have behaved in a different way in such a difficult situation. Why do you have this?

A I think I will leave you with what I said about Iran's -- the questions we have at this point and Iran's behavior towards hijackers that they have had on their territory before, and let you do some comparing with the public record on others' actions.

Q Do you know by now whom the hijackers belong to -- like to which organization?

A I think that this is something which the Government of Iran might be able to provide some information on if they interview them, or as they interview them.

Q Secretary Shultz was quoted as having said in London -- I can't tell whether it's when he arrived or on the plane on the way over -- that the Kuwaiti security was extremely lax.

A Don, I saw --

Q Would you amplify that?

Well, I can't. I saw the wires. I don't have the transcript of what he said, and I leave you with his words. I don't have anything to add to what he said, and I can't provide you the exact words because I don't have them.

Q The reports possibly in the Jerusalem Post today, quoting Washington sources, that the Administration will increase aid to Israel next year by $500 million to a total of $3.18 billion, do you have anything on that?

A No.

Q That's all I have. There's no further details.

A This story, I think, has been bouncing around in various stories for a long time, and I don't think we've had anything to confirm that.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the --

Q As a follow-up --

A Excuse me, I'll come right back in just a second.

Q Do you have any comment on the explosions in Belgium today at the NATO facilities?

A Very briefly, that we understand the Belgian authorities are investigating the bombings and the terrorist group which has claimed responsibility for these and similar acts in Belgian during the past months. That is, they're investigation that group.

Because the installations that were attacked belonged to NATO, we would refer further questions to NATO authorities. Sorry. Sir?

Q Do you view this as a case of state terrorism, given the nature of the group that claimed responsibility?

A I don't have any characterization to offer you on that.

Did you have a question, sir?

Q Yes, I do, I have a question. There are units of the U.S. Navy which are at the Israeli ports now. Is this part of the rapid -- the Memorandum of Understanding for strategic cooperation between Israel and the United States that these units of the navy are out there stationed for the next few days?

A I think in terms of -- I don't have any information on U.S. Naval ship movements, and I guess you better ask the Pentagon about that.

Q I was just asking if you have anything on Mr. Shamir's visit?

A No, I don't. I think that, as I recall, John gave a brief response yesterday to that -- about that conversation, but I don't have anything further to give you.

Q Alan, why you have three ambassadors today visiting the State Department, three Arab Ambassadors -- the Algerian and the Moroccan and the Egyptian? Is there anything special?

A Ambassadors visit the State Department all the time. No, I don't have a specific set of subjects to share with you about their conversations. As I recall, the Egyptian Ambassador has not called on Under Secretary Armacost before.

Q Are those related -- are those meetings by any chance related to the hijacking incident?

A I really don't want to get into the subject matter.

Q Is it a sort of coincidence that three of them - the Arab Ambassadors -- are having meetings on the same day on the same occasion?

A Well, I think various ambassadors come in at various times. I wouldn't draw any conclusions.

Q What about the Algerian? Always they have helped you in dealing with Iran.

A Again, I say, I'm not going to get into the subject matter of those meetings.

George?

Q Any comment on the allegations by the Greek Communist Party concerning American activities in terrorism?

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A Yeah. I think I do have something brief on that. I think that the U.S. Embassy has issued a statement on that.

The U.S. Government fully shares Ambassador Stearns' indignation at the false charge made by the General Secretary of the Greek Communist Party. We find the accusation particularly outrageous coming as it does at a time when Americans are being singled out as targets for international terrorism in many countries including, in the recent past, Greece itself.

Just so you know what it is we're supporting, the following statement was issued by the Embassy in Athens on December 10.

The American Ambassador expressed to the Greek Government his indignation at the attempt by the General Secretary of the Greek Communist Party in a press interview to implicate the United States in a recent bomb, excuse me, in recent bomb incidents in Athens.

The Government of the United States is categorically opposed to terrorism in all its forms. The statement of the General Secretary and the sensational treatment of it by the newspaper are a particularly disgraceful example of disinformation designed to serve political ends.

Q Copy of that please, Alan?

A Sure.

Q Alan, in the last issue of Middle East Policy Survey indicates that the United States supplies the French and Hassein Habre in Chad with pictures of the movement of Libyan forces inside Chad, including the moving of some of their ammunition and equipment. Do you have any comment on that?

A Well, I wouldn't comment. That would obviously involve questions of intelligence information, and I wouldn't comment on it.

Q Alan, can we have a copy of your statement on the Cuba talks, please?

A Sure.

Q Alan, about the so-called Final Report of Mrs. Kirkpatrick to the President about the United Nations -- U.S.

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relations to the United Nations, is it expressing the Administration's point of view regarding the United Nations?

A Frankly, I don't know about that report. I know she's going to see him, but I don't know -- and I guess you better check with the White House on that.

Q Do you have anything to say on a successor to Mrs. Kirkpatrick?

A No.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:35 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #221

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 12, 1984, 12:10 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A couple of brief announcements:

First, today at 2:30 here in this room Peter McPherson, Administrator of AID, will be holding a press briefing on the Ethiopian famine ON THE RECORD. If you have any questions, call David Loveday at 632-4274.

I'm also told that we have a witness going up to the Solarz Subcommittee to talk about the Bhopal tragedy and that we will try to have a prepared statement for you some time this afternoon on that. That is, this afternoon in any case. So we'll be working on that.

And I guess that really is all I have at the moment for announcements. Happy to take your questions.

Q Do you have any updates you can give us on any aspect of the hijacking situation, including perhaps the travel plans of the survivors who are now in West Germany?

A In terms of Messrs Kapar and Costa, they have indicated a desire, which I think is quite natural, for privacy. So it is not clear at this point, George, that we will be able to provide you any information on their arrival here since that would tend to conflict with that. We'll be continuing to take a look at that, but I think that your understanding would be requested in that respect.

In terms of anything else really, no, I don't have anything new to say. Obviously, as we've indicated before, we will want to talk with them and also talk with other governments who have talked with people who were on the plane. And before we've done that, I think we would withhold any further statements beyond what we said yesterday.

Q Alan, one would assume that that talking has been underway, at least since you said it would take place yesterday. Both the gentlemen who are in Frankfurt are presumably conversant and not physically impeded.

A I'm not sure how much -- I'm sure there's been some discussion; but also, of course, the principal purpose of their going to Frankfurt was for a physical exam on their way home. And so whether there has been conversation with them or not -- I presume to some extent there has been, too, but I don't know that for a fact, frankly -- I'm sure there will be further conversations with them. We would want to evaluate that. I don't have a report on that. And, as I say, we would want to talk to other governments about what they have learned.

Obviously, we've seen on television and in the newspapers, and so forth, some different views of what happened, and I think we would want to be careful about that.

Q Could I follow that up? Have you obtained any information, either from governments which are talking to the Iranian Government or from other sources, as to the identity of the individuals who perpetrated the hijacking and the murders, and specifically whether or not they may have been involved in other hijackings or incidents of this type?

A I don't know the answer to that. I saw a wire just before coming out here in which some -- I guess it was a Tehran -- news agency indicated they did not have information on the identity at this point. So that's really the only thing I've got to go on as of this moment.

Q But, Alan, as a matter of policy, would you expect the Iranian Government, as one of the questions that you hope it will answer, would you expect the Iranian Government, which now has custody of those hijackers, to make public the identities of the hijackers and their affiliation, if any, and their past records, either in preparation to or during the course of a trial?

A I can't tell you specifically what would or would not be appropriate. Obviously, I would think that that sort of information, at least in terms of identity and affiliation and purposes, and so on and so forth, would be the kind of thing that one would look for.

An Iranian official -- at least one apparently -- has said they would hold an open trial. We've talked about that before, and I don't have anything new to add to that. So I think we really ought to wait to see what happens. But, as we have indicated before, there are obligations that Iran has in this respect, and we will be watching very closely what happens

Q Can you say anything about the departure plans as opposed to the arrival plans that you declined to talk about?

A No. I think that tends to give you information about the arrival which, as I say, at this point, consistent with their request for privacy, we're withholding.

Q In its effort to pursue the survivors' privacy, will the U.S. Government whisk them out of the U.S. Government facilities in West Germany in a surreptitious manner to prevent coverage of their departure and their arrival?

A I have no idea what the arrangements are.

Q Will you confirm their arrival after the fact, sort of like the Manzanillo talks?

A I think we could probably arrange that, yes. The purpose is not to keep the basic information from you, George; it's to respect their request for privacy, so --

Q Alan, do you have any information about the contradition in the statements of the two survivors about the role of the Iranian Government contrary to what other people are saying?

A No. As I said to Bill before, the question of - we've all seen these different versions of what happened, and we will want to talk with the Americans, and we will want to talk with governments who have interviewed other people who were on board that plane and try to come to the best judgments we can. Before doing that, we're really not going to have anything further to say.

Q And to follow up, the statement in the front page of the papers -- all papers today -- that the President is more angered and concerned about, you know, the Iranian Government, he almost coming out and saying that they didn't do their job or possibly there was some complicity.

Will there be any further statement coming out after you have the information from these survivors?

A Once we have made our evaluations based on the various factors I've cited now, I can't tell you whether we will have something further to say. It's possible. But we certainly will be also following, as I said before, the question of what the Iranians do with these hijackers.

Q Alan, you've called for prosecution of these hijackers. I wonder in the two previous cases -- the Air France and the Saudi plane, both in the last six months -- they obviously -- those hijackers haven't been prosecuted. What is the status of those people? Are they running around free? Are they in Iran? Are they out of Iran?

A I don't know the answer to that question. But I think we pointed in the statement yesterday to that fact, so it's obviously something that concerns us as we look at this event.

Q Alan, you said that the U.S. is going to watch the situation in Iran, what they're going to do with the hostages now -- the hijackers. Now, how long are you going to wait until you take any decision to --

A I'm not going to try to set calendars.

Q Alan, as a matter of the international law and our view of the situation, would we rather see these hijackers taken to Kuwait for trial or tried in Iran, or -- do we have any feeling on that at all?

A The obligation that Iran has under the Hague Convention is either to try them or to extradite them some place where they will be tried, and I think that that is what everybody who signed has agreed to do, and I don't think we are arguing for one course or the other. But we are arguing that at least one of those two courses be pursued.

Q We don't have a particular preference, though, to have them in Kuwait, for example?

A I don't have a preference to offer on that, no

Q Even if they are Iranian, they should be extradited to Kuwait?

A Well, I'm not sure anybody's ever said they were Iranian. The point is that Iran has committed itself to do certain things with regard to hijackings, and those are the two options. So the answer to your question is, whoever they are, they've got to do one of those things if they're going to live up to their obligations.

Q Alan, yesterday, the United States Government criticized the Iranian Government for certain acts. For example, selected media access.

Does the United States have an agreed set of principles of what to do, what not to do, what's helpful, what's complicit in a case like this?

A I don't have a list that I can offer you what the -- I think that there are certain procedures which those who are involved with trying to deal with terrorists and hijackings, specifically, normally do. There are things -- there are procedures. They follow things that -- there are do's and don'ts. I don't have a list. and I'm not going to try to get such a list.

But, obviously, providing them access to the world's press and giving them that kind of publicity is not consistent with what the experts have felt is conducive to a satisfactory and quick resolution of such a situation.

Q Before we leave this subject, I'd like to just raise a point on the information about travel plans and just ask you to at least take it into consideration as you pursue this matter within the government.

I'd like to ask whether you think -- don't you agree, or wouldn't you agree that there is a public interest in knowing the same sorts of details about what was going on on the plane as the government has in knowing those details for the simple reason that the U.S. Government was intimately and to a large extent involved, in its hopes and its diplomatic efforts to secure the release and the safety of two American citizens? And for that reason, don't you think that -- would you take into account that public interest as you decide, as you make decisions and balance that with the legitimate privacy rights of the individuals involved?

A Well, I think that we would take into account -- obviously, there is a public, and a legitimate public, interest in what went on in that plane; no question about that, Ralph. The kinds of information that we would obtain from our conversations might or might not always be the kind of thing that should be released, in terms of helping others who would seek to do the same thing again. So that obviously has to be taken into account.

At the same time, these are private individuals in the sense that they can talk to -- I don't know -- talk to anybody they want to, presumably, and I don't know any restriction that's going to be placed on them.

So, in terms of our own judgments at the end of the line, I'm sure that in one way or another those judgments will be made known and the reasons for those judgments, but I can't tell you how or when or anything else. But I take your point; I think it's a valid point.

Q Alan, given that different hostages on that plane seemed to have seen different things at different times, does the government plan to interview firsthand hostages other than these two Americans?

A I don't have any indication about that, frankly. But, as I say, we are planning to be in close touch with other governments. I think it's rather obvious that other govenments will be talking to their own citizens. I'm not aware of any plans for us to talk to citizens of other countries. So that's the best I can represent it to you at this point.

Q Have any decisions been made concerning the future of these two -- actually there is just one with AID, right?

A Correct.

Q About his future with the Agency?

A I don't know of any plans. I mean -- I'll just leave it at that.

Q Anything to report today on the UNESCO decision, where that stands?

A No.

Q Do you have any update on the U.S. and Cuban negotiations? Have they resumed or are they going to resume soon?

A No, I don't have any update to give you. I would, I guess, go back to the discussion of yesterday and clarify, as I think some reports did this morning, that, yes, there is further discussion to be carried out, and there will be a further session -- further meetings. But I don't know -- I don't have anything to give you at this moment.

Q If I could follow up. I think one of the news agencies yesterday -- Agence France Presse -- reported from Havana that a government delegation from Cuba was on its way to New York today, and that --

A Well, our practice on this has been, as you know, not to announce an advance of those sessions, and so I'm going to follow that practice.

Q Can you shed any light on the stories late yesterday of a large-scale shakeup among American Ambassadors, especially in Latin America?

A No, I really can't, Don. Actually, I think that story was working throughout the day. But, as I --

Q I just heard about it late in the day.

A I think the point is that Ambassadorial appointments are a matter of Presidential action, and so I would refer you to the White House on that.

I think that the White House indicated somewhat yesterday that should there be any such changes that it would not be suggestive of any policy shifts or anything of that sort, so I would refer you to that. I think that some have interpreted remarks that were made at the White House to suggest that if there were any shifts, it would also be because of threats to individuals, and I don't think that's quite what they were saying. I think that they were pointing out that, indeed, there are some difficult posts, not only in that region but other places in the world, so that's simply a fact.

Q Well, can you say whether or not concern about Mr. Pickering's safety may be the reason for him to go someplace else?

A I'm not saying that Mr. Pickering is going any place else, so I don't see how I can really address that except to suggest to you that I don't think that anybody was saying that that is -- if there such a change, that that would be -- the reason for the change. Okay? That isn't to say that, as we all know, there haven't been threats. That's very clear.

Q You don't think they were saying it then, and - well, how does that apply to you now?

A Well, I'm not disagreeing with what they said, as I interpreted it.

Q You were stressing the difficulty of some of these posts around the world. Would you expect that some political appointees would be replaced by career people?

A I'm not going to try to predict anybody being replaced by anybody. I think that, again, is something that the White House would announce.

Q Would that be a logical thing to think about, if you're talking about the stress and the difficulty of posts?

A I wasn't stressing the difficulty in terms of any replacements. I simply was saying that they were pointing that out as a fact of life. And I think, in answer to Don's question, I was suggesting that I don't know anybody who would be suggesting that in the one particular case as the reason, if there were to be a change. But I'm not going to try to address your question about career and non-career appointments.

Q Alan, what was the purpose of General Walters' visit to Sri Lanka? There have been reports in the government media that the main topic of discussion was the military situation and U.S. assistance to Sri Lanka.

A Well, I think it would be more accurately described to say that General Walters was in Sri Lanka, has been in Sri Lanka and India, to discuss the situation in Sri Lanka. I'm not going to go into any details, but I would think that would be a more accurate rendering of the situation than what you just gave me.

Q Do you have a response to the Vietnamese Foreign Minister's remarks on the release of political prisoners? He says they won't be allowed to go unless Vietnam receives guarantees that they won't be used for subversion?

A Yes, there is some guidance which exists on that. I don't happen to have it with me; but if you check with the Press Office, I think they could make that available to you

Q Alan, when you -- when the rebels in El Salvador refused to accept the full cease-fire after the most recent meetings with the government, you issued guidance critical of that.

Do you have any comment now on their unilateral decision to call a cease-fire, a truce, during the vacations?

A Well, I think that the proposal for a general Christmas cease-fire was first made by the Salvadoran church authorities and officials during the Ayagualo talks as a step towards what was termed "humanization" of the conflict. And during the talks, that was accepted by the Government of El Salvador and rejected by the guerrillas.

President Duarte obviously has publicly stated his support for that proposal. I understand he's studying this specific response at this point on the assumption that this is a meaningful proposal, and I don't know the details of it so we can't really comment.

Obviously, we would be pleased if the guerrillas had finally indicated their willingness to go along. But I think, again, the details are not entirely clear so I can't go beyond that.

--MORE--

Q Alan, as a follow-up to the Walters' visit, does the visit constitute a change beyond the statement made by the United States last week? Does it constitute a change in U.S. policy beyond the statement made last week?

A A change?

Q Yes.

A No. I would not think it constitutes a change.

Q And was it on the request of the Sri Lankan Government, or was he in the region when he made that visit?

A Well, I don't think I'd go into the details of the arrangements for his trip, and so on.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on reports that the U.S. Ambassador in Beirut, Reginald Bartholomew, and Ronald Spiers, the Under Secretary for Management, and Assistant Secretary for Administration will be either removed from their positions or transferred to other positions as a result of the failure in the protection of the embassies in Beirut?

A I don't have any specific things to say about Presidential appointments, and all of those people fall into that category. However, I would think you would be ill advised to follow that particular story line.

Q Alan, what are your thoughts on the change of government in Mauritania, and will that have any impact on our aid to that area?

A I have a little bit about it. I don't -- in terms of any implications for the U.S. or judgments on it, we really don't have any comment at this point. All I can do is give you essentially a situation report.

Mauritania Radio has announced that Chief of State Haidalla, who was in Bujumbura for the Franco-African Summit, has been removed in a bloodless coup. Colonel Maouya Ould Sid Ahmed Taya, former military chief of staff, has reportedly replaced Haidalla. Colonel Taya was also at one time Prime Minister of Mauritania. Other members of the ruling military committee are said to have retained their posts.

I wonder if I could have your attention.

There is a curfew in effect in Nouakchott. The city is said to be calm. Schools and airports are reportedly

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closed. Our Embassy reports all Americans are safe. We don't have any further details at this point.

Q Do you have anything on a report that China may allow international inspection of its nuclear installations?

A Yes. I do have something on that.

The text of an agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation signed by Brazil and the PRC has recently been published. The text includes a provision calling for the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards in China to nuclear materials and equipment it imports from Brazil and to nuclear material produced through the use of such imports.

Japan and the PRC are in the process of negotiating an agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation. There have been press reports from Tokyo that the Japan-PRC agreement will contain provisions referring to IAEA safeguards. As far as we know, however, the negotiations between Japan and the PRC have not been completed. Neither government has released the text of any provisions of the proposed agreement.

The proposed U.S.-China agreement for cooperation does not contain a provision for the application of IAEA safeguards since there is no requirement that U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements with nuclear weapons states such as China provide for IAEA safeguards.

The proposed U.S.-China agreement does contain provisions that would allow the United States Government to confirm that nuclear material and equipment subject to the agreement is being used exclusively for peaceful, non-explosive purposes as called for in the agreement.

The provision in China's agreement with Brazil is the first indication of its acceptance of the principle of IAEA safeguards in China. It had previously announced a policy of requiring IAEA safeguards on its nuclear exports to non-nuclear weapons states. We regard both of those actions as important and welcome steps.

The United States has made a voluntary offer and has concluded a formal agreement to permit the IAEA to apply its safeguards to all U.S. nuclear activities, excluding those with direct national security significance. The United Kingdom has concluded a similar agreement with the IAEA.

France, and most recently the U.S.S.R., have also made voluntary offers for the application of IAEA safeguards to some of their respective peaceful nuclear facilities. Thus, all of the other nuclear weapons states have recognized the importance of voluntary acceptance of IAEA safeguards in their facilities.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Is the United States' position now that the U.S. would like to see as part of its nuclear agreement with China IAEA safeguards?

A I don't think any --

Q You said it hadn't been -- it wasn't in there now.

A Yes. I don't think anybody, as we said before, Don, has called for -- in the Administration has called for the change -- a change in the text of that agreement, and our position on such safeguards, I think, is in this statement. So I don't have anything to take it beyond that. But --

Q Well, by inference you're saying it would be a good thing if China does this. You're not actually calling for it, but you're pointing out everybody else is doing it, too.

A Well, that they are accepting such safeguards on their non-weapons or non-military facilities.

Q And that they're putting such acceptance in writing.

A Well, I think I'll leave you with the statement. I think it expresses our view on that. So we --

Q We don't have the words of your statement in front of us --

A Well, take a look at it --

Q -- but it sounds to me like what you've said is that you would like to see China put that voluntary acceptance in writing, in some form, if not necessarily in the text of the U.S. agreement.

A Well, I've said two things, and then I'm going to -- I'll repeat what I've said and go back to let you look at the text and examine it.

As I said, "all of the other nuclear weapons states have recognized the importance of voluntary acceptance of IAEA safeguards in their facilities." That's the last thing I said.

Before that, I indicated that "the agreement with Brazil was the first indication of the PRC's acceptance of the principle of IAEA safeguards in China, and in addition they had previously announced a policy of requiring such safeguards on its nuclear exports to non-nuclear weapons states," and that we regard both of those actions as important and welcome steps.

That's as far as I'm going to take you with it.

Q As you know the agreement with China on nuclear matters has been held up by a somewhat different issue -- the United States' request for some further assurances from China regarding a non-proliferation policy.

Has there been any progress on that front?

A Don, I think we have described it in somewhat different terms with respect to implementation of the agreement, Don, and I'd refer you back to what we've said in the past.

In any case, I've nothing new to report to you in terms of moving ahead with that agreement.

Q What is your answer to the United States Senators who sent a letter, saying the Administration should ask China for a safeguards agreement since all these other countries have got it?

A Well, I guess when we respond to the Senators, we'll have an answer to specifically provide to that letter, but I don't have --

Q Can you tell us whether this subject was discussed at a meeting yesterday with Ambassador Zhang and Assistant Secretary Wolfowitz?

A Don't have anything on the subject of that meeting.

Q Could you take that question, please?

A No. I don't think so. We have not gotten into the subjects of such meetings.

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Q That's not true, Alan. Sometimes you give us a list of the subjects that were discussed at meetings without telling us what was said about those subjects.

A Not generally here. I think that's sometimes been done on trips, but I don't think we've done that in terms of meetings in the building.

Q Alan, it has been one of the cardinal principles of constructive engagement that by not criticizing South Africa, we will be able to get on with the diplomatic business, notably solving the problem of Namibia.

To what extent do you think that the more outspoken approach the Administration is now taking is going to be a stumbling block in actually reaching a settlement in Namibia?

A Well, I think that this has been addressed, to some extent, in briefings you've had; and I don't really have a view to offer you. I think that one thing I would note -- and I can provide you something in writing. I could read it to you, but it depends on what you want.

But there is in fact not a change in the policy of constructive engagement, and there is a whole list of statements that have been made at the top levels of this government about apartheid, condemning it and so forth, which have been consistent all the way through.

If you want me to, any of those who need it for voice, I'd be happy to read it. But that's up to you.

Q Read the list of statements?

A No. It's a -- it's in sentence form. An explanation of what we have said in the past.

Q Read it.

Q You might as well suffer. (Laughter)

A The President's decision to speak out forcefully against human rights abuses in South Africa does not represent a change in U.S. policy. The President has spoken out before concerning his feelings on apartheid, having termed it repugnant.

The Vice President, in his address in Nairobi on November 19, 1982, said, "Apartheid is wrong, it is legally entrenched racism inimical to the fundamental ideals to the United States."

Secretary Shultz, in his Boston speech of February 15, 1984, spoke of our feelings towards apartheid and the moral interest we have in seeing the peaceful emergence of a more equitable system.

Various senior officials of this Department have also spoken out forcefully on apartheid and associated human rights abuses in South Africa. I'd refer you to a speech made on June 23, 1983, by former Under Secretary Eagleburger in San Francisco, testimony given by Assistant Secretary Abrams before the Congress on June 21 of this year, Assistant Secretary Crocker's Congressional testimony of September 26, 1984, and the numerous statements made from this podium over the months.

So I think that the President's remarks, interpreted by some as a turning up of the volume, are fully consistent with what we have been saying and will continue to say both publicly and privately to the South African Government on its apartheid policies. We're not changing the policy at all. We're simply trying to assure that it is better understood.

So I think the answer, going back to your question, is that we intend to pursue the policies with respect to Namibia and don't see a reason why, since we are not changing policy on another dimension of southern Africa, or South Africa, that should have an effect.

Q We'd like a copy of that sentence, please.

A Of what I read to you?

Q Yes.

A Yes. Sure.

Q Also --

A Go ahead.

Q Also, same subject --

A Excuse me.

Q Same subject. Alan, you say it's not a change in policy, but you're aware a senior official at the White House briefed reporters and said it was the end of quiet diplomacy. I mean, is this just a semantic difference? It's a change in tactics or strategy, but the policy is the same?

A Well, again, the President wants our position to be clearly understood at a time when it's obvious that some have misconstrued or misunderstood our policy here at home. Moreover, recent repressive acts or actions in South Africa call for an unequivocal statement of our opposition to their actions.

As the President said on December 10 on the occasion of Human Rights Day, "We feel a moral responsibility to speak out on this matter, to emphasize our concerns and our grief over the human and spiritual cost of apartheid in South Africa."

Q Copy of that, too, please?

A Sure.

Q You wouldn't dispute it's a different approach, though, would you?

A Yes. I think that the policy has not changed. If, as has been described by the press, the volume is turned up a little bit, I would refer you to what I just said as to why, and so in that respect perhaps, going in your direction about something more is being said. But I think if you look back at the various statements that I've indicated in what I originally said, and obviously particularly would point to not only the very senior level statements but what has been said very frequently from here, there is just no ambiguity about the policy.

Q Alan, does that statement say -- what you just said -- say that some have misunderstood here at home?

A I said that some have misconstrued or misunderstood our policy here at home.

Q Here at home. So the turning up of the volume, or however you want to phrase it, is aimed at American domestic consumption --

A Well --

Q -- not at emphasizing it to the South Africans?

A No. You didn't listen to the whole thing, Ralph. I said, "Moreover, recent repressive actions in South Africa call for an unequivocal statement of our opposition to their actions." In other words, things have happened.

Q Well, that's right. So my question is, is there any feeling among --

A So it is --

Q -- Is there any feeling in the Administration that among those who have misunderstood or misconstrued is the South African Government?

A Well, I don't think that -- I can't tell you whether the South African Government has misconstrued it. I don't think there's been any, as I say, any ambiguity, and I think that they have paid very close attention to what we have said.

There have been some recent events which have taken place. We wanted to make sure there was no misunderstanding if there was any potential for any.

Q If they're going to be outspoken about events in South Africa, how is your policy different from the policy that we left behind in the past Administration that this was supposed to be a big change from?

A Well, I think you've had extensive briefings on this subject, and I'm not going to try to re-cover the ground which has been covered, even in recent days on that, Don.

Q Could you say in general how it's different?

A No. I think that you've got -- you've had a lot of briefings, and I'm not going to try to rehash that.

Q And could I ask --

A Please.

Q -- on one other thing. I don't know that you were asked about this -- maybe you were -- but do you have any comment on the recent release -- I believe it was last week -- by (sic) two fairly important dissidents in Poland -- people who had been Solidarity people, who had been jailed, and so on?

A I don't have any -- obviously, we welcome their release. I don't have anything more specific to say at this time.

Q Alan, why --

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A Excuse me. Bill, you had a question.

Q Yes. Back on South Africa. Regarding the release of, I believe there were three opposition leaders who had been under British diplomatic protection --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- and who were subsequently arrested. There were indications that some assurances as to their legal status had been offered in talks with the United States, and there's some discussion now that their arrest may have been a breach of faith at worst or a misunderstanding at best. Does the Department have a position on their arrest?

A I'm not prepared to endorse what you've just said. Let me just give you what I have.

We have just learned that the three did depart the British Consulate in Durban, and that two -- Archie Gumede, who's President of the United Democratic Front, and Paul David of the Natal Indian Congress -- were arrested by the South African police. The third member, Billie Nair, was not apprehended and is apparently free.

At this point we don't know what charges have been placed against them. They were apprehended inside the building which houses the Consulate, and there has not yet been a public announcement.

Q Alan --

A And that's all I really can say about that.

Q Have there been talks with the South African Government about the status of those individuals?

A I don't think I could get into the question of diplomatic exchanges on that.

Q Alan, on the general -- the very general question of the majority rule in South Africa, what's the position of this government, this Administration?

A Well, again, there is a lot on the record and also in some background briefings in recent days, and I really don't see the point of rehashing it. I'm sure you can get access to that record. And there was discussion of this, and I think the statements are very clear, but I don't want to try to wing it from here when those statements are there.

Q Why you turning up the volume now, not before the elections and not early this year, while you know that the practices of South African Government towards the majority black people have been consistent for the last few years?

A Well, I'll say -- I'll go over this one more time, and then I'm going to cut off the discussion of this because it's not -- I don't think we're cutting into any new territory here.

There has been a lot of public criticism and condemning of apartheid. That is not new; and if you haven't heard it, you haven't been listening. If -- the reason for some further discussion at this point and for further speaking out, I explained in terms of what I said about the President's statement and about possible misconstruing or misunderstanding of the policy, and also the fact that there have been recent developments which merited further comment. And I will refer you to what I just said, and I think that that is very clear.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:44 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #222

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 13, 1984, 12:13 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Available in the Press Office is the prepared text of the address by Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Gregory Newell before the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO. The speech was an overview of UNESCO in 1984. That's the speech he made this morning here in the Department.

I believe you may have seen the press advisory from AID, but I just wanted to call it to your attention, so nobody misses anything, that Charles Kapar, the AID auditor who survived the recent hijacking that ended in Tehran, has agreed to meet with the press on Monday, December 17, at 9:00 a.m. here in the State Department Press Briefing Room. It'll be ON THE RECORD. He has indicated that he will not answer any questions or make any appearances until that time so he may be reunited with his family, and we appreciate your cooperation on that.

I have two statements for you. First, on Americans in Libya:

In December 1981, President Reagan expressed his concern for the safety of Americans in Libya and called for their voluntary departure. Consequently, use of American passports was proscribed for travel to, in, or through Libya unless specially validated by the Department of State. Such validation is granted only in extraordinary circumstances. These travel restrictions remain in effect under renewal announced on November 30, 1984.

In response to the President's December 1981 request, thousands of Americans voluntarily departed from Libya. The individuals and companies affected by the President's request were very cooperative, and the number of Americans there dropped significantly. Only a few hundred remained, a large number of whom were spouses of Libyans.

Unfortunately, the number of Americans in Libya has again risen, apparently in part as a result of business opportunities and the willingness of the Libyan authorities to cooperate in allowing U.S. citizens to subvert the intent of U.S. policy by entering Libya without using their passports.

Colonel Qadhafi's readiness to use terrorism in support of his policies, and to sponsor the use of terrorism by others, has been tragically demonstrated in repeated incidents in recent months. Furthermore, Libyan hostility toward the United States has not diminished. There is a potential danger to Americans who reside in, visit, or transit Libya.

There is no direct American diplomatic representation in Libya. Belgium is the protecting power of the United States interests in Libya and can only provide minimum consular services or assistance to Americans. Therefore, the United States Government cannot assist Americans who may be endangered by hostile actions of the Libyan Government.

Against this background, all Americans should honor existing travel restrictions, which were initiated to help ensure their safety. In addition, we again call upon American firms to honor the President's request and to withdraw any American citizen employees who might remain in Libya.

Copies of the Secretary's November 30 decision regarding invalidation of the U.S. passports for travel to Libya are available in the Press Office, together with the State Department's travel advisory for Libya.

Q A copy of that statement?

A Certainly.

Q How many are there now?

A I think there are between -- it's hard to know, but the estimates at this point range from a thousand to 1,500.

Q What companies --

A I don't have information on specific companies.

Q Alan, do you have anything you can compare to the figure that was in place in 1981 when the President made the original determination?

A The only order of magnitude I have is that there were thousands in Libya at that time. It then went down to several hundred, and it's now back up to the estimated 1,000-1,500.

Q Can you give us an idea of when the -- a noticeable increase in the rate of Americans that are present in Libya began to occur? Has it occurred over the past four years or just in the last couple of months?

A I'm not aware that it's a sudden spurt, Ralph, but I don't have a trendline to give you on it.

Q Do you have a low point, Alan, the lowest point --

A Several hundred.

Q -- of occupation?

A Several --

Q Do you have a period?

A I don't have a period. But, as I say, in response to the initial request, it did go down. So, obviously, it would have been after people were moving out, but in that earlier period.

Bill?

Q I was curious. If you don't know the names of the companies, do you know the types of companies? Whether they're oil companies or construction companies, or --

A I don't have information on what companies are there.

Q Can you take that question?

A Well, I think that -- I can look into it, but you might want to also check, I suppose, with Commerce, who would look at U.S. investment abroad, and so on.

Q Is the State Department making any effort to contact individual companies or people who may be there, directly?

A I don't think we're contacting people who are there. I think we certainly would want to make sure that the companies that we would know about would be aware of our concerns.

Q You will be contacting companies directly?

A Well, I think I'll leave you with what I said.

Q Alan, to your knowledge, has any American been the target of politically-motivated hostility in Libya since the initial announcement in December of '81?

A Well, all I can really say is we're not aware of specific threats on that, George, directed against Americans in Libya. But there does remain a potential for Libyan hostilities and, therefore, we are urging Americans to move out of harm's way; and we think that the potential threat is continuing at sufficient levels to warrant this reminder of our travel policy.

Q Alan, do you mean by "hostile actions," actions taken by Libyans against Americans inside Libya, or do you mean "hostile actions" that may happen, say, between Egypt and Libya?

A We're talking about hostility against Americans potentially.

Q Why now, Alan, that you have this -- why do you have this advisory now? Is it in light of Mr. Mitterrand's statement yesterday?

A Well, I think, basically, because the number of American citizens has been increasing from a low, as I say, of several hundred to perhaps as high as 1,500, we want to remind the public that we continue to regard the situation in Libya as potentially dangerous.

And, as I noted before in the statement, the 1981 decision to invalidate American passports for travel to Libya was made in response to a pattern of continued Libyan hostility to the United States, for example, the burning of our Embassy. The hostility continues today and is the basis for the continuation of our present policy and the reiteration today of our appeal, or request, for Americans to withdraw. As I noted, there is no U.S. diplomatic or consular presence in Libya to provide assistance for American citizens.

Q Do you have any further information on any troubles inside Libya since the time of the attack of the anti-Qadhafi elements against this camp?

A I don't have a report to give you on that subject

Q Alan, do you have any contingency planning, for example, preparing for evacuating these Americans if they wanted, or --

F-8/6/4

A I don't have anything to offer you on evacuation plans.

Q Alan, is this related at all to the discussion that we had maybe three/four/five months ago about the pipeline, when Qadhafi celebrated the anniversary and there was a fair amount of discussion about who was building the pipeline, what kind of firms were supplying expertise and so on for that pipeline?

A I can't draw that line, Ralph. Obviously, if the point is that more American business is going on, whether it's with the pipeline or anything else, which, as I say, we think is a factor in more Americans going back there, then, indeed, the fact that they are there, that the numbers have gone up, is what leads us to reiterate the points today.

Q Okay, but that ceremony and that public display of, or touting of, the American participation, and so on, which was done with news conferences and celebrations and so on at the time, did not trigger a review of this policy (Inaudible) which has resulted in this?

A I can't tell you whether that was a factor. That was some time ago.

Q It's not that long ago.

A I just don't know about that.

Jim?

Q It's safe to assume that all the Americans there are contracting services to the Libyan Government, or are they allowed to operate enterprises there in Libya?

A I don't have information on that.

Q Alan, (inaudible) about your statement. You just said that because the increasing -- the number of increase in U.S. citizens in Libya and the situation is potentially dangerous, do you have any clear and present danger, or information of clear and present danger, to U.S. citizens there?

A I think I answered that before when I said we're not aware of specific threats directed against Americans, but the potential, we believe, remains.

Q Alan, the timing --

A I just went through all that. I answered that specific question.

--MORE--

Q Do you have another announcement?

A I have another announcement. Why don't I go ahead and do it?

On the Cyprus Summit: The United States welcomes the announcement late yesterday by United Nations Secretary General Perez de Cuellar that the two Cypriot communities have agreed to participate in a summit meeting in January. We view this as a most positive development, one creating a new opportunity to end the division of Cyprus and establish a reunited Cypriot government.

This agreement to hold direct, high level talks, the first in over five years, came about only because of concerted efforts by all of the parties concerned. Cypriot President Spyros Kyprianou and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash have shown statesmanship and courage. The Governments of Turkey and Greece, which have important traditional roles to play, took an active interest in the three rounds of proximity talks and deserve credit for helping to bring about this favorable outcome. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar deserves our congratulations and appreciation for this accomplishment and shall continue to have our full support as he works towards a fair and final settlement of the Cyprus problem.

In deciding to proceed to a summit, the leaders of the two Cypriot communities have undertaken an historic but difficult task. Finding solutions to concrete problems which have divided the two communities will require skill, patience and vision. As the President announced in May, we are prepared to assist the Cypriots in rebuilding a united country when a settlement, or major progress in that direction, is achieved.

That's it for the statements.

Q Copy?

A Sure. Happy to provide a copy.

Q Alan, again about the Libyan affair --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- do you have any indications that maybe Libya participated or played a part in the incident of the Kuwaiti aircraft?

A I don't have any further information to give you about that hijacking at all.

Q Alan, on (Inaudible) again, do you know where those Americans originated their flights from, from Morocco or somewhere else?

A Which Americans?

Q That are in Libya.

A No, I don't have any information on that.

Q Is there any special advisory or special attention at all to news people in Libya or who go in and out of Libya doing the same sort of thing that you were referring to on business people?

A Well, the situation remains as it was. As you know, there was a series of exceptions, if you will, that were made, and news correspondents were among those. Having said that, the concern for the safety of Americans remains a broad concern. The exception, nonetheless, exists.

Q So that the exception stays and the concern stays?

A That's right.

Q O.K.

Q Alan, I know you just appeared to have put a lid on this, but do you have any response to reports that two of the hijackers involved in the Tehran incident might have been those involved in the Air France hijacking of August as well?

A No, I don't have anything on that.

Q Do you have any response to the suggestion that those people would be extradited only in exchange for a person the Iranian Government wants, and that they say that they will try these people if they find it necessary?

A Well, I find the first part of it rather strange and bizarre. The second part, in terms of whether they are extradited for trial or whether they are prosecuted and tried in Iran, I've addressed in the last -- previously, and that is to say that under the Hague Convention, formally known as the Hague Convention for Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, the Government of Iran has an obligation either to bring those people to trial or to extradite them where they can be brought to trial.

Q Alan, have you seen or heard anything to suggest, since they seem to have ruled out extradition for the time being, that they plan a trial?

A I have nothing beyond what you have on that.

Q Again on Libya, do you have any figure on the commerce between the U.S. and Libya?

A I don't, but I would be sure that some place in this government those statistics are kept. I would think, again, that Commerce might have them.

Q Alan, you used the words "strange and bizarre."

A Uh-huh.

Q I'm not quite sure I heard the question. What is strange and bizarre?

A The suggestion that somehow the Iranians who are abroad should be exchanged for extradition of the hijackers who murdered two Americans in this hijacking.

Q Do you know of any case where Iran has tried hijackers?

A I'm not aware of any.

Q Do you have any reason to believe they will try these?

A I think we spoke to this yesterday, Marvin, that obviously, the fact -- the record, shall we say, concerns us on this, but they have an obligation. Some Iranian officials have indicated that they would be brought to trial. There have been these other more recent statements. We'll have to see what they do.

Q Do you have, within the capacity of the U.S. Government, anything that you can do that would affect the Iranian decision.

A I guess the answer to that is, we will certainly make efforts with others who have direct contact and, potentially, influence on Iran, to make sure that they are aware of the obligations they have taken on themselves by adhering to the Hague Convention.

Q Since the revolution, they have taken on these obligations?

A I don't know when the --

Q Has this government ever said that it lives up to the Hague Convention?

A I don't know the answer to that, but I'm not aware this government has ever repudiated --

Q Alan, have you gotten any further on your analysis of Iran's role in the hijackings?

A I don't have anything further, as I say, to say on the whole question of responsibility, or that aspect of it

Q You said you would be talking with the other governments and talking with the American survivors, and so on. Regardless of whether you've drawn any conclusions or not, have you finished your investigation, or your interviews, shall we say?

A No. I think that probably will go on for a while, Ralph. It's -- But the answer is no

Q Are you going to give Iran a deadline to (inaudible) one of these?

A I said yesterday, I don't have any calendars to set on this thing, but, obviously, we will be watching carefully what happens

Q Alan, do you have any investigative team there in the Gulf?

A Any what?

Q Any investigative team, somebody investigating the case, in the Gulf area -- in Kuwait or --

A Well, we certainly are in touch with other governments, but that's as far as I'll take that.

Q Do you consider these terms that the Iranian Foreign Minister, I believe, put out for the exchange, or the extradition, of the hostages, as part of maybe an indication that the Iran Government actually was involved, or will this add fuel to the rumors that they were involved directly in that?

A I don't have a judgment to offer you on that.

Bill?

Q Alan, does this warning to Americans in Libya indicate a heightened possibility of conflict between the United States and Libya?

A I don't think there is anything specific that this arises out of, Bill, so I would not steer you in that direction at all. But the concerns, nonetheless, are real, and they remain.

-- MORE --

Q Is there another meeting of the Cuba delegations today?

A The talks are expected -- the delegations are expected to meet in New York today.

Q For what purpose?

A To continue the discussions on the issues we have discussed heretofore.

Q Would you anticipate another session after this one?

A I guess we'd wait until this session is concluded.

Q Will there be an announcement after this session is over?

A I guess we'll wait until this session is concluded.

Q Will you have something for us on that later today?

A I guess we'll wait until this session is concluded. (Laughter)

Yeah, we'll have something for you. Seriously, obviously, we will. When we've got something to announce, we will make sure that you get it. I don't think we're going to be hiding something under a bushel. Is that the right word? Bush? (Laughter)

Q Will you have a note about the -- when the session ends, Alan, or --

A No. I don't think we would do that. I think that when we are ready to announce something, we will do something for you on that

Q Do you expect a signing today?

A As I say, I don't have anything -- (Laughter) -- to say to you at this point.

Yes?

Q On the Cyprus issue, do you think that President Reagan's letter to General Evren, urging Turkish flexibility, was instrumental in getting the Turkish Cypriots to finally agree to Secretary General's proposals?

A I can't tell you what factors went into this. Obviously, I'm not going to get into the question of diplomatic exchanges. I think I've expressed our views about the contribution the various governments have made in this, and so I think I'll leave you with that.

Q Alan, what's your interpretation to this increase of Americans working in Libya?

A I think I gave you that, which is --

Q No. This is the procedural part of it, but there must be a reason why the Americans are --

A Well, I think --

Q -- forthcoming to the Libyans' invitation for them to work in Libya.

A I think I indicated to you that we think that perhaps this is in response to increasing business opportunities, and so on, that --

Q Alan, may I ask about the status of the United States' decision to pull out of UNESCO. Where is that?

A Don't have anything to announce to you today on that, so stay tuned.

Q Secretary Newell suggested it was imminent this morning --

A Well, as I say, I don't have anything to announc to you today on that.

Go ahead.

Q Do you have anything on the disappearance of four Americans in Mexico and a call by four parties, including the (Inaudible), to declare Ambassador Gavin as persona non grata?

A Well, I certainly don't have anything on the latter. Obviously, Ambassador Gavin, we've talked about before, is doing what he should be doing. And, as far as the abduction of the American citizens, a status report, as it were: Our Consulate General in Guadalajara has confirmed that two American couples are reported to have been abducted in Guadalajara on December 2.

As reported in the press, the Americans involved have been identified as Rose and Dennis Carlson, and Patricia and Benjamin Mascarenas - let me spell that -- M-a-s-c-a-r-e-n-a-s

The four Americans have not been heard from since that time. We have no information concerning the motives for the apparent kidnapping and nothing on the identities of the perpetrators.

I might note that our Consulate General has been in close contact with the state and federal police authorities, and our Ambassador has been in touch with the highest levels of the Mexican Government in this matter. We are closely monitoring the investigation and have aided in the dissemination of photographs of the missing Americans, and we have also been in communication with their families.

Q Alan, is there any consideration --

Q I -- we had a --

A Excuse me. Yes?

Q Copy?

A Sure.

Q Are you planning to issue a traveling advisory (sic) as Ambassador Gavin threatened some months ago?

A Well, there is no current travel advisory concerning travel in Mexico. However, we have been advising inquirers to exercise caution in traveling by road, especially in certain parts of Mexico, and not to sleep by the roadside at night.

I might note that the present incident apparently did not occur on a highway, but in an urban environment. We are continually monitoring conditions in Mexico, as elsewhere, in order to determine whether issuance of a travel advisory is appropriate. There are no plans to issue a travel advisory for Mexico at this time; however, we continue to be in close contact with Mexican authorities concerning their follow-up in cases of crimes committed against American citizens traveling on Mexican highways.

Q What is the status of the travel advisory in El Salvador at this point?

A The status of the travel advisory?

Q Yes. It was toughened a while back, right around the --

A I don't have anything new to give you.

Q -- right around the American elections.

A I don't have anything new. I can check and see if there's anything new that's been issued that we may have missed in the meantime.

Q Could we have a copy of whatever's available on Mexico?

A I'll give you what I just read to you.

Q Alan, another area?

A Go ahead.

Q Anything on the Israeli forces' attack on Lebanese villages and the seizure of more than 14 Lebanese civilians?

A We are looking into those reports. They do point to the importance of the talks at Naqura in order to set the stage for an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.

Q Alan, is there any consideration in the State Department in the direction of taking Syria off the list of countries or states supporting terrorism, in the light of the part played by the Syrians in the Kuwaiti aircraft hijacking?

A I don't have anything new to say about that list

Q Where is Ambassador Murphy today?

A He is in Israel today.

Q Can you tell us whether Syria is still considered by the U.S. Government to be "helpful" in the Lebanon situation?

A I think we talked about that at the time, and I don't have anything --

Q No change?

A Well, I don't have anything to say. I have no characterizations to offer you He's been having talks, obviously, regarding that situation, and I'm not going to try to characterize those talks or characterize, you know, his specific discussions

Q Alan, the Iranian Prime Minister was quoted yesterday as saying it's the aggressive policies of the U.S that caused the death of the Americans. How do you respond to that?

A I think that's sick.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the confidential report which was put out by the public committee, or U.S. public committee, to study the relations between UNESCO and the United States, or the United States and UNESCO?

A I don't have a comment on that.

Q Alan, another area: Has anything ever happened on the question about withdrawing U.S. objections to Polish membership in the IMF?

A I don't have anything to give you today on that subject.

Q Any comment at all on the state of relations? It's been three years since they imposed martial law. It's been about a year and a half since it was --

A I don't have a new statement. I think we've issued, from time to time -- and I presume you're well aware of that -- various statements on that relationship, but, no, I don't have anything new today to offer on that.

Q Alan, the most recent guidance on Sri Lanka, largely blamed the terrorists for the violence going on there In light of Rajiv Gandhi's statement the other day, do we have any new assessment of the cause of the violence there, or anything new at all to say on this situation in Sri Lanka?

A I don't have anything new to say about the situation.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:36 p.m.)

Alexson

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #223

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 14, 1984, 12:03 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have just one announcement:

Secretary of State George Shultz will present the 1984 Redskin of the Year Award at a luncheon sponsored by the Quarterback Club of Washington at 12:00 noon on Tuesday, December 18. The event will take place at the Touchdown Club, which is 2000 L Street in Washington.

I gather that the arrangements for arranging for press coverage are complicated -- that is, different people are covering for different kinds of media -- so if you are interested in covering it, let me ask you to contact Gil Sherman in our Office of Public Programs at 632-2733 and he will direct you to the right person at the Quarterback Club.

That is it for announcements. I'd be happy to take your questions.

Q Will there be Q&A? (Laughter.)

A Keep going, George!

Q Are you going to keep us in suspense as to who the Redskin of the Year is?

A Oh, that's not for us to announce, George. (Laughter.) If I have something to give you on that, I'll give it to you. (Laughter.)

Q When do you expect a decision on that? (Laughter.)

Q Offensive or defensive? (Laughter.)

Q What do you have --

A Not bad, Bill; not bad. (Laughter.)

Q Will they still do it if the Redskins lose Sunday?

A Absolutely! They aren't going to lose. What are you talking about? (Laughter.)

Q What do you have on the Cuban talks?

A What do I have on the Cuban talks? I don't have anything on the Cuban talks.

Q Are they going on today, Alan?

A I am sure they have been in touch today, yes. I don't know what the arrangement is up in New York, but they certainly are in touch with each other and they are still there.

Yes.

Q Alan, what can you tell us about Mr. Murphy's travel and his success in mediating or, actually, narrowing the gaps between Israel, Lebanon and Syria?

A Well, I'm glad you eliminated the "mediation" from your question.

I don't have any progress report to give you. He was in Saudi Arabia earlier today; he is now in Egypt. And that's as much as I can give you on his efforts.

Q Do you have any report on --

Q It's been reported that he brought back from Israel to Lebanon and Syria a big zero.

A I saw the press report this morning. As I say, I don't have any comment on the substance of his conversations.

Q That was my question.

-- MORE --

Q Alan, now that you know the extent of the Israeli surgical operation yesterday in south Lebanon, and the attack, and there are some conflicting reports, what's your assessment of such an operation at the time that there are talks going on between the Israelis and the Lebanese?

A Well, again, we have seen reports about various activities and who might have been killed or not killed and so on, and we just can't confirm any of that.

In general, we regret the continuing violence and loss of life taking place in various parts of Lebanon and express our strong support for the resolution of the differences through dialogue and negotiation.

Q Alan, there is an Arabic newspaper -- I forget which country -- which claims that the United States was preparing a commando operation to rescue the hostages in Tehran, and that when word of this got out this induced the Iranians to bring the incident to a conclusion.

A I think, just as a matter of general principle, George, it is not going to behoove us -- without suggesting that that story is right or suggesting that it's wrong -- it's just not going to behoove us to talk about actions that might or might not be taken in terrorist incidents like that. There unfortunately are likely to be more, and I think we need to preserve as much security as we can on that.

Q Mr. Kapar said last night that one of the Iranians involved in freeing him from the plane was shot in the process. Do you have anything on that?

A I have no idea. Don't know anything about it.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on a report from North Korea today that the two sides have agreed to resume the full-scale Red Cross talks?

A I saw the report. I don't have confirmation of that. But obviously we have been very strongly supportive of those and other talks which had been on-going and some of which had been postponed; so if that's true, obviously we would welcome that.

Q Would you consider it any sort of a breakthrough on this particular set of talks, because they've been suspended for so long, or is this just a small step in your view?

A I don't think I'm prepared to characterize it either way, Ralph. Obviously, it's a welcome development, and that's as much as I can do for you on that.

Q Do you have anything on UNESCO, Alan?

A No, I don't have anything on UNESCO today.

Q Any comments on today's Post story that Americans living in Libya have been given new warnings?

A Have been given new warnings? I think that's reflecting what I said here yesterday, so I'd refer you back to yesterday's briefing.

Q Is that related to the hostages crisis in Iran? That might happen in Libya, or --

A I don't quite follow the thrust of your question but I'd refer you to what I said yesterday about Libya.

Q Do you have any comment on Prime Minister's Botha's apparent disagreement with President Reagan over what brought about the release in South Africa?

A No.

Q Do you have any comment on the report from the U.S. vets who have been in Vietnam that the Vietnamese are interested in opening up a U.S. Interests Section in Vietnam?

A No. I saw that, and some people were looking at that. There may be something later in the day. Why don't you keep in touch with the Press Office.

Q Alan, anything on the story on Abu Nidal in the current issue of Moment magazine which says that it may be that even while Nidal was living in Syria that he was always on the Iraqi payroll -- in other words, a double agent for Iraq his entire career?

A No, I don't have anything on it.

Okay, is that it?

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:10 p.m.)

CB

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #224

MONDAY, DECEMBER 17, 1984, 12:17 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: I have no announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, what can you tell us regarding a Soviet defector, a soldier, who has been in this area for some time? Is he in the building today with some Soviet Embassy officials regarding his desire to stay in this country or to return to the Soviet Union?

A Let me give you what I have on that, Mike, and then beyond that let me tell you what I know and don't know.

We were recently informed by the Soviet Embassy here that Nikolay Ryzhkov, a soldier from Soviet forces in Afghanistan who made his way to the United States and requested refuge here approximately one year ago, had gone to the Soviet Embassy and requested assistance in returning to the USSR.

We have held a meeting in the State Department with Ryzhkov in which he declared that he wished to return to the Soviet Union, and that he made that decision voluntarily. I don't have anything on his onward plans, and I don't have anything on specifics of what was said at the meeting other than to reiterate that he stated his intention to return to the Soviet Union and stated firmly that he had made this decision freely and voluntarily.

Q In what condition did you judge him to be in physically, and was a doctor present at this point

A I don't have details on who was present, Mike, but I don't think, in the view of those people who spoke with him, there was any question regarding his ability to make an independent judgment.

Q Spell his last name, would you?

1-3183

A R-Y-Z-H-K-O-V.

Q Is the veto against the Polish membership in IMF formally withdrawn?

Q Can we stay on this one for now?

A Let's finish off and then we'll come back to your question.

Q There was another defector in this area associated with him. What information do you have on his status?

A I don't have any information on his status.

Q Have you inquired or do you have any knowledge that he is seeking also to return to the Soviet Union --

A I just don't have any information on him at all.

Q Alan, I know you said that you thought in the view of those who were at the meeting that he made an independent -- he was capable of making independent decision. Can you say whether or not the U.S. believes there was any coercion involved prior to this morning's meeting? Not necessarily in the minutes before but in the days or weeks before this?

A I can't really, Ralph, address what views are on what has transpired before, but I think that as in previous cases -- sort of similar cases, if you will -- an important point with us and an essential point with us is to assure that any individual in a circumstance like this, who is alleged to desire to return, in fact is making that decision of his or her own free will, and that we are convinced of that. And so I think that's the basic criterion that we would apply here.

Q Alan, do you think there's any pressure on him because of his family back home in the USSR?

A Well, I think I've just answered it as much as I can on his views.

Q Now I ask, is the veto against membership -- Polish membership -- in IMF formally withdrawn?

A We have informed the Polish Government that an atmosphere has been created that the United States hopes will permit the reactivation of Poland's application for membership in the International Monetary Fund.

I should note in this connection that any final application by the Polish Government will, of course, be considered on its merits, including Poland's ability and willingness to fulfill the obligations of IMF membership.

Just to recall the history of this a little bit, as you remember, on August 3 the White House stated that implementation of the amnesty decision would determine whether a positive atmosphere had been created that would allow the reactivation of Poland's application for membership in the IMF. And, as I say, we have now completed our review of the amnesty, and it has been determined that a basis has been created for proceeding.

Q Can you describe the positive atmosphere that has been created? What elements go into making that positive atmosphere?

A Well, I think that the issue, again, was the review of the amnesty, and I'd refer you back to the language of the August 3 statement from the White House on that subject.

Q Can we have a copy of that announcement?

Q And can we have a copy of your comments on the Soviet soldier?

A I think we can probably put that together, yes.

Q The disturbances of yesterday have not affected that decision?

A Well, obviously, we deplore the use of force to prevent a peaceful wreath-laying ceremony. This once again underscores the need for genuine national reconciliation in Poland, but the IMF decision pertains to the implementation of the amnesty decision as outlined in the White House statement on August 3.

Q What is the outlook on returning Most Favored Nation status to Poland?

A Bernie, our position on that, again, is as it has been for some time. That is, consistent with the President's step-by-step policy towards relaxation with the Polish Government which matches steps to relax or remove sanctions to moves toward national reconciliation with Poland, we are ready

1-3-85

to respond positively to further progress in the process of national reconciliation in Poland.

The Polish Government knows of our specific concerns.

Q Alan, on that, what are some other things the Poles could do that would make possible MFN?

A I don't think I'm going to try today to lay out, if you will, a menu of items. We've discussed before our concerns, Greg, and I don't have a new statement to issue you on that subject. This relates to a decision taken in August. I think at that time, we discussed the fact that there were sanctions which remained in place, and whatever we said at that point -- and I don't want to try to wing it and I don't have it here -- would be where we are on that issue.

Q In other words, we're still not satisfied that the situation in Poland has returned to normal? There still are specific things we would like them to do, and we have in mind those things?

A Again, the process of national reconciliation, in our view, obviously has not been completed. And as I said before in answer to the question about the events over the weekend, the wreath-laying ceremony and the problems associated with that underscore the need for genuine national reconciliation.

Q That's what I wanted to ask you. You said -- sort of implied, in answer to Bernie's question that what happened yesterday wasn't related to the IMF decision, that it was something apart. What I wanted to ask you, isn't that part of the overall mix of what is going on in Poland? And shouldn't that sort of thing be considered in decisions on whether to lift particular sanctions?

A Well, I'm not going to try to get any more specific with you on, "If they do this, we'll do that." I would leave you rather with the broad thought that in line with the President's step-by-step policy, we would respond to steps toward national reconciliation.

Q But to answer my question, is that the kind of thing we would consider in the decision to lift sanctions?

A What? Not beating up on people?

Q Huh?

1-3186

A We would look at the situation and see. I'm not going to try to outline (it) for you. Obviously, it underscores, as I say, the need for national reconciliation. It is a symbol or a sign that there are problems. But I don't know how to turn that into a positive for you out of what I've just said.

Q Can you define that in general terms, what you mean by "national reconciliation?"

A I'm not going to go beyond what we've said before, Marvin, on that. As I say, the issue, I'm sure, was addressed at the time of the August decision, and I would refer you back to the record at that point. I have nothing to add to whatever was said at that time.

Q But at one point, I think the U.S. Government used to say that there ought to be talks between Solidarity and the government. That's been dropped?

A I refer you back to the record. There has been a lot said on the record, and I think that record is quite available.

Q Alan, this is a new development. We're having an announcement here today of this, and I think it's only fair to spell out what additional things need to be done before (inaudible) sanctions in place.

A No, I don't think -- Well, you and I have a different view of this. The fact of the matter is that this is a step forward consistent with a decision taken and announced in August. It is in the process of implementation; it is not a new announcement on further steps beyond that.

So we have said a lot on the record about what we would be looking to in terms of national reconciliation, and I refer you back to that record.

Q New subject?

A Sure.

Q Any announcement on UNESCO?

A No, to my knowledge.

Q Do you have any comment on the criticism voiced by President Mitterrand in his year-end interview yesterday on Star Wars --

1-3187

A No. I don't.

Q -- research?

A No. I don't.

Q What about Mrs. Thatcher's comments on --

A No. I'm not sure I've seen a real text of what she's said because I think there have been different versions. But in any case, I don't have any comment.

Q Alan, is there any indication of Libyan backing for the coup in Mauritania last week? Do we have anything on that?

A I don't have anything on that.

Can I get back to you, Bernie, to your question for one second? Obviously, in terms of our own position on SDI, that has been laid out at considerable length, so our position on that is there. The Secretary addressed it, I think, in Europe in briefings with the press and so on, so I refer you to that.

Q Alan, that's what I was getting at too -- are you in any way following up -- do you feel it necessary to follow up last week's obvious consultations with the British, both at NATO and in London, and then those consultations were obviously followed by the statement by Mrs. Thatcher. That would suggest that the British either disagree with or don't understand the U.S. position on SDI.

A Again the Secretary addressed it, and I think I'm going to have to leave you with his words. I'm sure that if anybody wants to discuss it at a higher level, they have an opportunity coming up in the next several days.

Q To follow up on that question, are we looking into the possibility that there was Libyan support for that coup?

A I don't know the answer to that question.

Bill?

Q Alan, can you spell out what General Rowny was talking about in Germany when he said that the United States would be willing to make some compromises that the Soviet Union might be interested in?

1-3188

A Well, I've seen various accounts of that interview -- or maybe there was more than one, I don't know. Anyway, I don't have any comment. Ambassador Rowny was expressing his personal opinion. The President and his senior advisers are currently studying such issues in preparation for Secretary Shultz' meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Geneva on January 7 and 8.

Bernie, to get back to your question, I think there are some meetings next weekend, if you will recall.

Q Oh, with Mrs. Thatcher. I'm sorry.

A That's right.

Q What did you say about certain answers to questions in the next few days?

A I said, if there is need for further consultation beyond their normal diplomatic give-and-take, there is a meeting coming up at the end of the week, you will recall.

Q I thought you were talking about a news conference.

A No, no, no, no. (Laughter)

Q Nothing -- nothing as radical as that?

A No. I did not mean to mislead you on that.

Q Do you have anything on the escalation of the so-called "tanker war" by Iraq against Iran?

A I would reiterate what we have said before on this subject, which is that -- First of all, in terms of specifics, I don't have anything for you. But our policy toward the war in the Gulf remains, as reflected in U.N. Security Council Resolutions 540 and 552, which called, among other things, for a ceasefire against shipping and inland ports. We note that Iraq has accepted these resolutions, while Iran has intransigently rejected them.

Such incidents further demonstrate the need for an urgent resolution of this tragic conflict.

Q Do you have anything on the timing of this escalation just after the resuming of diplomatic relations with the United States?

A No. I would not draw conclusions about any timing on that.

Q Do you have anything on Mr. Murphy's activities?

A Excuse me. I'll come back to you.

Q Do you have any comment on a story that Armand Hammer, the President of Occidental, is talking to Israelis about a conflict in Taba between Israel and Egypt?

A No.

Q And the second one: Will the United States send an observer to the Taba talks which will be resuming in Beersheba and Ismalia in the next few days or weeks?

A I'm not aware that there's been an announcement of any talks, but I will pass on your interest, and, if there is some talk to be held and announced, and so on, about U.S. participation, I will pass it on.

Q Alan, any reaction to an Evans & Novak column today about a sort of purge of the Ambassadorial ranks by the Secretary of State?

A No. I think we have, both in terms of that column in particular, but also on personnel matters in general, just not going to react. There are many, many stories out there that are appearing, and I'm not going to start down the path of commenting on those stories.

Q Can you say when there might be some of these rumored changes in embassies take place?

A No. I can't. I'm sorry.

Q I was talking about Mr. Murphy's activities, and if there is anything to say about the results of his talks?

A Yes. First of all, in terms of activities, he is in Israel today. Over the weekend he was in Cairo and Amman. In terms of what he's doing and what he's finding out, as we've said all along, Assistant Secretary Murphy is not engaged in U.S. mediation.

Thus far in this round of consultations with Middle East Governments, he has found that the differences between the parties remain substantial. And while there appears to be a

1-3190

general agreement that an Israeli withdrawal would be desirable, it is clear that additional flexibility will be required for negotiations to be successful.

Q Copy, please?

A Sure.

Q Alan, can you comment on a report on Israeli Radio from Jerusalem, saying that there was no breakthrough on his talks with Israeli defense ministers?

A I have no comments beyond what I just gave you.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on any of the descriptions given this morning by Mr. Kapar concerning the hijacking, his conclusions about the Iranians and their perfect timing on the release effort, or his conclusions about the -- his conclusion, which was that there was no link -- no apparent link between the hostages and the Iranian Government?

A Well, I guess I -- I haven't caught up with what he actually said, so I can't really comment, and I don't know that it's particularly appropriate to do so. And he had a certain perspective from where he was sitting in the plane and what was going on. We have certain questions that we have raised, and there's no change in those questions.

I do understand that he indicated that if Iran wants to suggest to the world that it's serious about dealing with hijackers, that it ought to bring these murderers to trial. We certainly endorse that. But I don't have any comment. He was offering his own views, as I say, based on his experience.

Q You haven't reached a conclusion yet on the basis of your analysis of the situation?

A Nothing further for you on that. No.

Bernie, did you have something?

Q No.

A No? Okay.

Q Alan, anything new on South Africa and the demonstrations here at the Embassy?

A No.

Q Do we expect the talks in Naqura to continue after the holiday break that's scheduled?

A I don't have a readout. I guess you'd have to ask the Israelis and the Lebanese.

Q Whatever happened to the working group -- the joint working group of American Jews and American Arabs who supposed to form an organization to help the West Bank in building some infrastructure. I'm referring to the story of Edward Walsh in The Washington Post on Saturday.

A Well, we've addressed that group before: indicated that it is a private group. And I guess in terms of what's happened to it, you ought to ask them. I don't know.

Q Specifically, I'm talking about the project which we have built in the story about Al Farah water irrigation in Nablus area.

A Again, that is a private group, and I think you'd have to ask them about whatever progress they may be making.

Q Alan, you said before that more flexibility would be needed. You meant from all parties?

A I don't think I specified, Marvin.

Q No, you didn't, but I was asking.

A I think that it is simply a fact that more flexibility is needed, and I'm not going to try to identify who needs to be more flexible or how much more flexible.

Q Generally, from all parties?

A Well, I think I would simply leave it where I did.

Q Is Mr. Murphy going back this week?

A I don't have his return schedule at this point. We have, as you know, tended not to give it ahead.

Q But wouldn't --

A I just -- I don't have it.

1-3192

Q Is it safe for us to assume that since you've issued a statement on the basis of his talks so far that he wouldn't make such a statement if he thought there was some imminent change in anyone's position, and, in effect, that this round of talks is over?

A I'm not sure you could draw the conclusion -- and I'm not saying, because I don't know, Ralph -- but I'm not sure you could draw the conclusion that the round of talks is over. Certainly the U.S. interest in trying to be helpful is not at an end. We're just trying to be helpful and give you a sense of where we are. The question has come up quite frequently, what is he finding out? So this is a modest effort at being responsive to that.

Q We look forward to having more such modest efforts.

A That's right.

Q Alan, does that mean that his mission now is over for the time being?

A As I said, I can't -- I don't know what his onward schedule is, buy I wouldn't necessarily draw such conclusions.

Q Is he expected to be here for the talks with the two groups of Israelis later this week?

A I don't have anything on his schedule. I think I've said that three times now.

Q Alan, anything new on Afghanistan after five years -- the Russian presence? Any announcements coming?

A I don't have anything today, but I'm sure we will have a number of things to say over the succeeding days.

Q You have something on the Manzanillo talks last week?

A I think I addressed that last week. To the extent that I have anything on it, I refer you back to the record on that.

Abdul Salam, did you have a question?

Q Yes. Do you have any comment on Egypt's demand to hold direct talks with Jordan and the PLO as a prelude for peace in the Middle East?

A No.

Q Thank you.

A All right.

(The briefing concluded at 12:35 p.m.)

Becker 1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC # 225

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 18, 1984, 12:00 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: O.K. Shall we go?

One announcement, one statement. The announcement is simply to note that the 4 o'clock meeting this afternoon with Secretary Shultz and the Italian Christian Democratic Party Secretary, Mr. DeMita, which I think you've seen on the public schedule has been cancelled due to scheduling problems. Mr. DeMita, however, will be meeting with other Department officials today, and I think that also is reflected on the schedule.

Q What do you mean by "scheduling problem?"

A I don't know specifically what is involved with that, Jack. It's not a big deal, obviously, and we certainly welcome him here.

The statement regarding Australia: In view of press reports in Australia presenting a misleading view of our relationship and of the nature of our working relations with Foreign Minister Hayden, I would like to offer the following to set the record straight:

The United States and Australia have a very close and comprehensive working relationship. The United States Government maintains a very close relationship with the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and with the Minister personally. We consult frequently with the Foreign Minister, and share common ground on a host of bilateral and international issues. The purported remarks by U.S. Government officials do not reflect the views of the U.S. Government.

Q Copy, please?

A Sure.

Q To whom specifically do you refer in these matters, these remarks?

1-3196

A There were some reports coming out in the Australian press that were very -- purportedly from U.S. Government officials -- that were very critical of certain members of the Australian Government, and they, as I said, don't reflect U.S. Government views. So I wanted to get that straight.

O.K. That's it for announcements, statements. I'd be happy to take questions.

Q Alan, do you have a view to the remarks of Mr. Gorbachev in London regarding nuclear arms, not seeing an arms race advance to the heavens, if you will?

A I don't have a specific response to that, Mike. I think that --

Q Do you see anything new in them?

A No. Well, I'm not going to try to analyze all of that. The announcement that was made at the time of the setting of the Geneva meeting made it clear that space arms would be covered as well as offensive and nuclear arms; and so I refer you back to that. And I think the Secretary has talked to this in his press remarks during the course of the NATO meetings, and I don't have anything new to add today.

I think that Secretary Weinberger is giving a speech today in which he will address certain aspects of arms control issues, which I think will be of some interest. I don't have anything new though.

Q Does the Secretary of State support what the Secretary of Defense is saying in that speech?

A I don't know if he has seen the text of the speech, but I'm not aware that there's -- I just don't know whether he's seen it. I guess I should leave it at that, Bernie.

Q Can you comment on Fidel Castro's statements of last Friday whereby he claimed -- he denied having emptied the mental asylums in Cuba during the Mariel boat lift and that the --

A No, I really don't have a response to that. We've talked about what the -- I mean, that goes back years, and I would refer you back to the things that were said at the time of the Mariel -- Marielitos' coming here.

1-3197

In terms of the history of the talks about that issue, we've put out, I think, various versions of the history of the negotiations over time. It's been made available to you, and I would leave that to you to look at.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the Iranian prosecutor's remarks today asserting that there will be a trial for the hijackers involved in the most recent hijacking, as well as for those involved in the August -- I believe it was August 3rd -- hijacking of the Air France jet?

A I haven't seen an exact text of what he said. I've seen the reports.

As we've indicated before, Iran has an obligation either to put the hijackers on trial or extradite them to a country where they will be put on trial. So we take it for granted that they should be prosecuted. We expect that trial to be open, and the sooner it is held, the better.

If the reports today mean that there is a new attitude by Iran towards hijacking and treatment of hijackers, then that would be welcome.

Q It would be what, sir?

A That would be welcome.

MORE

Q Can I ask why you expect the trial to be open? Is that -- I mean, in what way does the United States have a responsibility for supervising the judicial systems of other countries?

A It's not a question of supervising. It's a question of the kind of treatment which is going to be accorded to them. An open trial, obviously, is the greatest assurance that the world community will have that Iran is dealing seriously with these murderers.

Q Alan, do you think that other countries in the area are also asking for open trial --

A I think that's up to them to address. I think it's up to the other countries to express their attitude.

Q No, I mean, have you been in consultation with them about this request?

A We certainly have been in touch with them about the issue of hijacking in general and this specific hijacking. But I don't have anything to give you in terms of the substance of their views or what we've expressed to them on this point.

Bill, do you have --

Q Just the standard UNESCO question.

A UNESCO -- I don't have anything for you today.

Q Could it be of some sort of harm to the security of such countries like Kuwait to make such a trial open and let all details of how the hijackers got out of the country, or got control of the aircraft?

A Again, I think that our view of this is that this should be an open trial and should be available for everybody to be able to see how justice is being handled.

Q Do you have any reaction to a trial in Vietnam where five people were sentenced to death for trying to overthrow the government?

A I don't have a specific reaction to the trial, no. We had some guidance on the general subject the other day which I think you probably have.

Q Alan, do we have a preconceived notion to what sort of penalty should be meted out to the hijackers?

1- 3199

A Don't have anything to offer on that, Greg. Obviously, it's quite clear that there were murders, and I think that we would be looking to prosecution which takes that into account, but I don't have a specific thought to offer you on the kind of punishment that should be meted out, no.

Q To follow that up, do you know what the mandate of the interagency committee is that is looking into this; how long it'll stay in existence, if it's attempting to find out if there was Iranian government complicity?

A I'm not aware, John, of what specific interagency organization there may be to look at this one event. There is obviously a great deal of interagency coordination and cooperation that goes on on (a) the general issue of terrorism, including hijacking, and (b) which obviously then gets into the specifics when something happens. So I don't know if there was some special --

Q Well, there was a special committee that was set up.

A Well, I'm not aware of that. I'm not saying there isn't, but I'm not aware of that. But there certainly is an awful lot of coordination that goes on, and that is going to be a permanent feature, obviously, of this government, and I'm sure it will be enhanced as time goes on, and -- well, I'll just leave it at that.

Ralph?

Q Related to, as long as we're on Iran, there is a report which I admit to not having seen personally in Readers Digest saying that the Iranian ambassador in Switzerland arranged for the purchase of the explosives used in one of the Beirut bombings against American facilities. Do you have any comment on that report?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q Have you seen the report?

A I have seen wires which said -- I wasn't aware that somebody was saying the ambassador was involved. In any case, I've seen wires which report it, but I don't have anything to offer you on that here.

Bill, did you --

1-3800

Q Do you have anything new on the activities of Mr. Murphy?

A Yes. He is in Syria today.

Q Seeing who, please?

A I don't know whom he has appointments with.

Q Anything on a return?

A I would think, as a general matter, that one could assume he would be home by Christmas. I don't have anything more specific than that to offer you, Greg.

Q Any comment on the Israeli Cabinet crisis?

A No, I don't

Q Alan, do you have any update figures on Soviet casualties in Afghanistan? I've seen some in the press, and I wondered whether you had any?.

A I don't. And as I said yesterday, in answer to your question, I think we'll have a number of things probably to be saying about the Afghanistan invasion and the anniversary as it's coming up. And perhaps in that context people will have something on that. I just don't happen to have it, though.

Q Briefings this week?

A I would think that there would be. Yes.

Q Thank you.

A Okay, you're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:15 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #226

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 19, 1984, 12:02 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: I have a number of announcements for you. Firstly, UNESCO: Gregory J. Newell, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, will hold an ON THE RECORD briefing on UNESCO today, 2:30, here in the State Department's Briefing Room. So that'll be ON THE RECORD, for cameras.

Under Secretary for Political Affairs Michael Armacost will conduct an ON THE RECORD briefing on Afghanistan after five years of Soviet occupation. That will be here in the Department's Press Briefing Room Thursday, December 20, 3:00 p.m.

Q 3:00 p.m.?

A 3:00 p.m., Thursday, tomorrow.

Q ON THE RECORD?

A Also ON THE RECORD; cameras.

Q Lights?

A You got it; you got it. At that time, recently issued Department publications on Afghanistan will be available in the Press Office for your information. I guess you could even have them right away.

An announcement on the selection of Ambassador Abramowitz: The Secretary of State has selected Ambassador Morton I. Abramowitz, a Career Minister of the Senior Foreign Service, as Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, succeeding Hugh Montgomery. The appointment will be effective February 1, 1985.

Ambassador Abramowitz's most recent assignment was

1-3203

United States Representative to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations in Vienna.

Earlier, he was Ambassador to Thailand between 1978 and 1981, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-American, East Asian, and Pacific Affairs. That was from 1974 to 1978.

Mr. Abramowitz began his government career with the International Cooperation Administration in 1958. He joined the Foreign Service in 1960 and was posted to Taipei as consular-economic officer, serving there until 1962. In the year following, he took Chinese language and area training, then became political officer in Hong Kong.

Back in the State Department in 1966, he served as international economist for two years; as special assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State until 1971; and as foreign affairs analyst until '73. He then did a one-year tour as political advisor to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific.

Mr. Abramowitz was born January 20, 1933, in Lakewood, New Jersey. He received a B.A. from Stanford University in 1953 and an M.A. from Harvard in 1955. For the next two years he was in the Army. He is the author of several works on Asia, including, written with Richard Moorsteen, "Remaking China Policy." That was published in 1972. And "Moving the Glacier: The Two Koreas and the Powers," also in 1972.

He is married to Sheppie Glass Abramowitz. They have two children.

Finally, an announcement on further persecution of the Baha'is in Iran: According to recent reports, nine more Baha'is imprisoned by the Khomeini regime have died in Iranian prisons. Six were executed in Tehran on December 9. Three died in Tabriz in November (although word of their deaths has just now been received); one executed by hanging, two dead of unknown causes, but likely victims of torture. We understand that 19 Baha'is remain under death sentence in Iran.

The United States considers it's particularly poignant that Iran's latest executions of Baha'is occurred on the very eve of Human Rights Day, which commemorates the adoption by the United Nations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. At this year's Human Rights Day commemoration, President Reagan declared that we who are free have a special responsibility to speak up for those who are not. Among the victims of persecution whom President Reagan cited on that solemn occasion were the Baha'is of Iran.

The United States appeals to the Iranian authorities to abide by the spirit and the letter of the Universal Declaration, Article 18 of which affirms, "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance."

Just as a little footnote, we understand that the number of Baha'is killed by the Khomeini regime is now 194, and there are about 750 in prison.

Q Copy?

A Sure.

Q A copy also of the Abramowitz bio?

A Sure.

Q John, do you have any information on the arrest of suspects regarding a possible attack on the Embassy in Tel Aviv?

A Basically, that story is correct, Mike. We're confirming the incident, in general. I think I would refer you to the Israeli Government for additional information. The incident points up the commitment of the Government of Israel to the protection of diplomatic facilities, one of its responsibilities as the host country.

Q Was the United States informed in advance or did it work in cooperation with the Israelis in deterring this attack?

A Well, I don't want to get into the kind of contacts we have had with the Israeli Government. But, certainly, there is no question of any slippage in communication or any reluctance of the Israelis to provide information or any suggestion that there was any lag in making known this threat to the appropriate American authorities.

Q So the information -- so you were aware in advance of a possible attack?

A Didn't say that. Didn't say "in advance."

Q Were you informed after the arrest?

A   Well, as I say, we really don't want to get into too much detail, but the -- we received the information in timely fashion.

Q   John, do you have anything to say to reports that a purge of conservatives is under way at the direction of Mr. Shultz in this Department, of which the appointment of Armacost or to replace Montgomery may be illustrative?

Q   Abramowitz.

Q   Abramowitz; sorry.

A   No. Abramowitz is a career officer replacing a career officer. We do not get into great detail about personnel decisions in the Department. But, obviously, at a time like this, after you've just gone through an election and the Administration is heading into a second term, it's logical that a number of Departmental and, indeed, Ambassadorial appointments would be the subject of review.

As far as the Department is concerned, in some instances this is because of the desire of incumbent officers to change jobs. In part, it's the operation of normal rotation. The State Department likes to keep people about three years in a certain place. They themselves like to move, broaden their experience, and, of course, move up the career ladder.

The fact of the matter is that the primary criterion the Secretary has utilized is getting the best possible people to carry out the implementation of the President's foreign policy, regardless of where they come from, and he will do that.

The fact of the matter is, however, that in the recommendations made, there is no change at the Assistant Secretary level in the present career versus non-career ratio.

As for Presidential appointees, obviously, the Secretary makes recommendations to the President. Those recommendations are fully discussed in the White House, and the President makes the ultimate decision on Presidential appointments.

-- MORE --

1-3206

Q Did Mr. Montgomery desire to be rotated out at this point?

A I don't know the details of that particular change. He is going to continue in government service.

Yes?

Q John, the Israeli state has denied a visa to a representative of the Green Party of West Germany. The Bonn Embassy of Israel has identified the Green Party as a Nazi Party.

In light of the fact that Petra Kelly is scheduled to come to the United States sometime next month, would the United States consider denying a visa to her under those considerations and in light of the fact that that party has advocated physical violence directed against U.S. servicemen and personnel?

A I don't know. The United States looks at visa applications case-by-base, and I don't have anything on that particular one.

Q Would you take that as a question?

A I don't think so.

Q John, can I come back for a second to the appointments question?

A Yes.

Q You said the fact of the matter is that "the Secretary of State wants the best possible people to carry out the President's policy, no matter where they come from." Isn't that really the -- precisely the allegation that there's some disagreement -- I hesitate to use the word "dispute" -- between the State Department and the White House, that Shultz is making the decision on the basis of who he thinks will carry out the policy best, whereas there are other considerations that need to be taken into account by the White House, including some political considerations?

A No, I don't think so, because the Secretary is carrying out the President's wishes that the best people who can be found to implement his foreign policy should be found, and that's the situation. So it's not a question of a quota or an allocation as between career and non-career officials. The Secretary, in accordance with the President's desires, will get the best people for the best jobs, although in fact, as I say, the present distinction between career and non-career appointees at the Assistant Secretary-and-above level is not due to change in any recommendations that have been made.

Q Would you take that whole body of thought that you just expressed and apply it also to the question of Presidential appointments and Secretarial recommendations for those appointments?

A That the best people who can be found should be found? Sure.

Q And that it's not a question of career versus non-career?

A It's a question of finding the best people, and as you know, there is a mix, even in Presidential appointments, as between those who may be career officers and those who come in from outside.

Q O.K. But you said it's not a question of that in the case of appointments made by the Secretary. Is there a question of that type in the other category?

A No. If you mean, is there an inflexible quota system, not that I'm aware.

Q O.K.

Q John, do you have any comment on Mr. Gorbachev's speech yesterday?

A No, I really don't, Bernie.

Q John, do you have anything on -- unless you want to follow it up -- anything on these reports of Ethiopia bombing refugees?

A No, I don't. No.

Q On personnel again, are you suggesting he's going to retain the Assistant Secretaries presently on duty?

A No, I didn't say that. What I said was that in recommendations for how the Assistant Secretary level should be staffed in the immediate future, the recommendations that are going forward in fact represent no change in the allocation as between career and non-career.

Q In answer, you expect there will be changes then?

A Oh, I think there will be change.

Q The ratio will be the same, but --

A I would think there would be changes, sure.

Q Do you have any reaction to the Soviet response to our carrier maneuvers off Vladivostok?

A I really don't. I guess I would ask you to go to the Pentagon on that. There has been no Soviet protest or anything in the diplomatic area; but insofar as the military aspect of it is concerned, I guess the Pentagon would be better able to answer that.

-- MORE --

Q John, do you have any comment on the new Israeli aid request which was announced in Jerusalem today?

A Well, I don't know that I have a great deal, but I'll give you what I have. The United States, as in past years, expects to provide significant totals of economic and military assistance to Israel next year.

In support of our traditional commitment to Israel's security and economic well-being, both economic and security assistance levels for Israel next year, including the question of additional assistance, are being discussed with Israeli officials during the current sessions of the U.S.-Israel Joint Economic Development Group, and the U.S.-Israel Joint Security Assistance Planning Group.

So I really don't have anything specific for you on those exchanges that are currently taking place.

Q Copy?

Q The exchange that took -

A Sure.

Q There was an exchange that took place, apparently, in Israel today, at which the Israeli Government presented the U.S. Government, in a public ceremony of sorts, with a specific request, and the U.S. Ambassador, Sam Lewis, made some comments there.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you -- did Ambassador Lewis speak for the Administration in his comments?

A I haven't seen his comments. I wasn't aware of his comments.

Q He suggested in his comments -- and I don't have the quote in front of me -- that the Israelis were going to have to take tough economic measures and that -- before they were going to get any more aid, and that he reminded the Israeli Government, in this apparently public ceremony, that the U.S. Government was at this very moment trying to deal with a $200 billion deficit.

A I think both those statements -- there's no surprise in either of those statements, that the United States recognizes that Israel has serious economic problems and is wrestling with them and has to wrestle with them; also, no question about the kind of budget cuts that are presently being considered in the United States. But that's not responding to the specific question of what the Israeli economic and military assistance figures will turn out to be.

Q John, on the same subject: Has there been any discussion with the Israelis about the request for arms from Saudi Arabia?

A I do not of my own knowledge know the answer to that question.

Q John, does -

Q Do you have further information regarding this request?

A Sorry?

Q Any further information about -- regarding this request for arms?

A No, I don't.

Q Anything on Jordan, John?

A No, I don't.

Q Do you have anything on a similar delegation here from the Egyptians on aid and --

A Yes, I do. A subministerial delegation, composed of representatives of the Egyptian Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Planning, Defense and Economy, is here this week discussing economic and assistance issues with Administration and Congressional officials. The group met with Under Secretary Schneider December 17.

The discussions are part of our ongoing dialogue on economic and assistance issues, and don't have any further details on that for you.

Q Does the State Department have any comment on Secretary Weinberger's criticism of the press for revealing details of shuttle payloads?

A No. I think Larry Eagleburger -- Larry Eagleburger -- I think -- I think -- (Laughter) --

Q Speakes.

A -- Larry Speakes responded to that this morning. Thank you.

Q Is he getting a job -- Eagleburger?

A (Laughter)

Q Does Bernie Kalb qualify as a political appointee? Would that be --

A In his role as Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, that is a Presidential appointment, that's correct. His other role as Spokesman is a Department appointment. So he qualifies as both. (Laughter)

Q He doesn't change the ratio, in other words?

A He doesn't change the ratio. (Laughter) No. No. Exactly the same. We're maintaining the balance. (Laughter)

Q Do you have anything on the instructions to the negotiators going down to Honduras to talk about aid?

A The instructions to them?

Q Anything about what package they're taking? Anything --

A No. No.

Q Anything at all about the talks in Honduras?

A No.

Q Anything on Mr. Murphy's activities in the Middle East?

A Murphy was in Damascus earlier today, was to have seen Vice President Khaddam, and expect him home for Christmas.

Q Thank you.

A Okay.

(The briefing concluded at 12:20 p.m.)

Story/Seike

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #227

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 20, 1984, 12:03 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have three announcements.

First, I want to call to your attention the release of a volume prepared in the Office of the Historian in the Bureau of Public Affairs here at the State Department called the American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1981. Copies may be purchased at the U.S. Government Printing Office for $28 per copy. A press release summarizing the volume is available in the Press Office.

Second, a reminder that Under Secretary for Political Affairs Mike Armacost will conduct an ON THE RECORD briefing today at three o'clock here in the Press Briefing Room. The topic will be the continuing Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

Finally, an announcement on the U.S.-ASEAN Center for Technology Exchange. The President has authorized the awarding of a $1 million dollar grant to the US-ASEAN Center for Technology Exchange by the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Presiding at the signing ceremony today at 5:00 p.m. in the Thomas Jefferson Room will be Under Secretaries of State Michael H. Armacost and W. Allen Wallis. Also participating will be Ambassador Tommy T.B. Koh of Singapore on behalf of the six ASEAN Ambassadors; Charles W. Greenleaf, Jr., Assistant Administrator of AID for Asia; Ralph A. Pfeiffer, Jr., President and Chief Executive Officer of IBM World Trade; and William E. Tucker, Chairman of the U.S. Section of the ASEAN-US Business Council.

Preceding the signing, there will be a press conference at 4:15 p.m. by the Co-Chairmen of the US-ASEAN Center for Technology Exchange -- Messrs. Tucker and Pfeiffer -- and the Center's Executive Director, Robert Driscoll.

The US-ASEAN Center for Technology Exchange is intended to foster increased trade and investment between the United States and ASEAN through the sharing of management and technical expertise.

A White House fact sheet concerning the grant and the activities of the Center will be available from the Press Office after this briefing but embargoed -- embargoed -- until 5:00 p.m. today.

I might note that in terms of the 4:15 p.m. press conference we're working on a location at this point and hope to have something for you by the end of the briefing. If not, as early as possible this afternoon.

That is all I have in the way of announcements. I'll be happy to take questions.

Q A copy of that announcement, please?

A Sure.

Q Are we waiting?

A No questions?

Q Oberdorfer is not here.

A Sorry?

Q Don Oberdorfer isn't here yet. You'd get two columns.

Q There's a report that comes from AP that says that sources from the Intelligence Committees in both Houses have admitted -- or have stated that the CIA admitted that U.S. personnel under contract to the Agency took part in helicopter attacks inside Nicaragua on January 6th and March 9th of this year over two ports -- the ports of Potosi and and San Juan del Sur. Any reaction from the State Department?

A No. That obviously gets us into the area of alleged intelligence activities and I would not address those kinds of questions -- period.

Q The Nicaraguan Embassy sent notes of protest to the Department. I believe they were on January the 9th and March 9th. Was there a response given?

A Well, I don't know. I don't have anything today on protest notes, and I don't anticipate anything. In any case, I would not get into the issue of alleged intelligence operations.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the report --

A Excuse me. Hold on a second.

Q Do you have something on the talks with the Honduran Government?

A Not a lot. There was a headline this morning which suggested that there was some new aid agreement signed. That is not a fact. We have, obviously, ongoing programs with Honduras both in economic and military assistance programs, and we also have ongoing discussions with the Government of Honduras to review security and economic issues of mutual interest. But I don't have -- other than saying to you that at least that headline was wrong, I don't have any details to give you about the results of the conversations over the last couple of days.

Q Do you have any comment on the report of The Washington Times on General Walters?

A No. I don't have anything on that. If -- well, I'll leave it at that. I don't have anything on that.

Q Alan, going back to Honduras again, there is also a report that the Honduran Government is interested in an agreement with the U.S. Government that we would take the contras in case their activities in and around Nicaragua came to a failure.

A I don't have any guidance today on that. I think that subject has come up before though some weeks ago, and whatever we had to say, however much or little that may be, I think is in some guidance which exists going back. I'd ask you to check in the Press Office on that.

Q To be sure I understand what it is you said that is wrong about the headline --

A Well, the headline said that --

Q The headline is there's --

A -- there was an aid agreement signed.

Q So there's no agreement signed.

A No.

Q Can you tell us whether the United States and Honduras have agreed to increase the level of aid?

A I think what I gave you is essentially where we are. That is, there are ongoing discussions. And I would leave you with that at this point.

Q Yesterday Assistant (sic) Secretary Dam, when we asked him if the United States has any stand on the unilateral withdrawal of Israel -- he said we should ask the briefer. So can you tell us: Do you have any stand on that?

A (Laughter.) No!

Obviously, we have been working hard to try to help where we can to facilitate resolution of the problems in southern Lebanon; but I don't have any specific response to that, no.

Q Since the Israelis say that the Lebanese have hardened their position and possibly they are threatening that they will not rejoin the talks after January 7, can you say that the main stumbling block now is the stationing of the Lahhad forces, the southern Lebanon army, that they are not coming to an agreement on that?

A As you may suspect, I'm not going to get into the question of the substantive problems that exist. I think I indicated the other day that we do see coming out of Assistant Secretary Murphy's talks the need for further flexibility, and so that remains the case, and I don't really have anything in terms of the specifics of the discussions to give you on that today.

Q In the past, I asked you about the southern Lebanese Army and the Lahhad forces, which is replacement for Haddad, and you never expressed a specific opinion --

A That's right.

Q -- of the United States Government about that.

A Very observant of you.

(Laughter)

Bill?

Q Alan, anything on Qadhafi's visit to Spain and his warnings or threats about NATO?

A No. I don't think we'll respond to that.

Q Where is Murphy today?

A He was in Beirut. He's en route back to Washington at this point.

Q Are there any plans for him to see the Secretary before either one of them takes off for the holidays?

A I don't know specifically, Mike, whether there is. It wouldn't surprise me if they were. I think that they may well overlap here, so that I think that that's possible that they would be meeting. But I'm not aware of a specific meeting that's set up.

Q Would you take a request for Mr. Murphy, a request for someone -- a senior official -- to brief the --

A Well, I'll take it, but I wouldn't ask you to hold your breath and delay your weekend plans as a result of that request.

Q I think you've already answered this question: Does the statement you made yesterday, or the day before, on the Murphy mission stand as of after his departure from Damascus and Beirut?

A Yes. This obviously is a good moment when the Naqura talks are adjourning, for him to come back here, review the situation, see what he learned, and see what we should be doing next.

-- MORE --

Q Can you tell us anything about Secretary Shultz' purpose in briefing the Hill today? Is that Middle East-related, general, arms control, Geneva talks?

A I think the basic subjects were to talk about his recent trip to Europe, specifically the NATO aspect of it, and also the forthcoming talks in Geneva with Foreign Minister Gromyko.

Q Do you have any report -- any comment on the reports that the South African police, I believe it was, broke into the offices of ABC and some other press group and stole some video cassettes?

A Well, we don't have all the facts on that, and we're looking into it, so I can't be too specific. But, obviously, we are concerned by any infringement of freedom of the press which we consider essential to all societies, but lacking specifics I can't take you beyond that.

Q Alan, do we anticipate any announcement after the U.S.-Israeli meetings here? Do you have any guidance on that?

A I don't have any guidance on it. My recollection is that after the -- for instance on the economic talks, and even the security assistance talks, we really didn't have anything to say last time.

I would anticipate following that pattern, but if there is anything different we will obviously be sure to let you know on that.

Q When will these talks finish?

A I don't know specifically. My sense is they may well finish today, but I don't know precisely.

Q Did you say that Ambassador Murphy left to washington?

A He has left Beirut. He is en route back to Washington.

Q Thanks.

Q Can you be anymore forthcoming today than you were yesterday on the status of an AID request from Israel?

A No.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:13 p.m.)

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DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #228

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 21, 1984, 12:00 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: I have a brief announcement concerning the U.S.-U.K. airfares:

The United States and the United Kingdom agreed yesterday, in a Memorandum of Understanding, that the two governments will approve low winter fares for travel between the United States and the United Kingdom.

We expect consumers to benefit from very low fares coming into the market. For example, the typical mid-week round-trip APEX fare from New York to London will drop from the current $579.00 to around $378.00. Other airlines will reduce their fares accordingly. For example, one airline will offer a promotional fare from Baltimore to London for $338.00.

Q What are the restrictions on that?

(Laughter).

Q When is this going into effect?

A I understand that no such applications have yet been filed. But, of course, that's up to the appropriate airlines.

Q Is there any special rate for purged political appointees?

(Laughter).

Q What airline are you representing?

A I do think that, as this is my last day, I would just offer a few words of thanks to the various people who worked with me for the past two and a half years.

I would like to thank, particularly, my two deputies on the Public Affairs side, John McCarthy and Bob Smalley. Most of the people in this room may not be familiar with the fairly extensive public affairs operation that goes on. That involves sending hundreds of speakers out around the country. It involves staging conferences for many different organizations in the Department and around the country. It involves handling all the foreign policy mail that comes to the Department, as well as operating a phone bank for phone inquiries on foreign policy.

The Public Affairs Bureau produces a rather sophisticated array of brochures, fact papers and publications, and also is responsible for the historical volumes which are much respected by scholars. And, as I say, I just want to thank John McCarthy and Bob Smalley for the way they have led a very able team of Foreign Service Officers and Civil Service employees in carrying all this out.

You are perhaps more familiar with the Press Office and Brian Carlson's fine directorship of that, and the good work that he does with Anita Stockman, his Deputy. And you're all familiar with the always outgoing, always cheerful staff in the Press Office, particularly those you like to call at 3:00 o'clock in the morning, especially on a Saturday or Sunday when a big story breaks.

I obviously cannot leave without paying tribute to Alan Romberg, who has been my strong right arm for the past two and a half years. I think Alan epitomizes the excellence of the Foreign Service. He has a marvelous sense of discipline, great conscientiousness. And it goes without saying that intelligence runs rampant throughout the Foreign Service, and he certainly expresses that. He has been a restraining influence on me when needed during the past years. He's been a good friend; he's been a wise counselor. He has been patient with me when I have made him the target of my occasionally irreverent humor, and I'm going to miss the notes both real and imaginary that he thinks he passes to me on the podium

So with that I will take a few puffball questions on test experiments on Haley's Comet, and whatever else you might care to --

Q After that opening --

Q Top that, Mike!

Q Do you have any comment on the death of Defense Minister Ustinov in Moscow?

A No real comment. I guess the Soviet authorities have announced that. The question of U.S. representation at the funeral, I suppose, will arise. It is not ordinarily for -- in this kind of situation, this kind of level -- it is not usual for someone to travel from Washington. I don't quite know what the resolution of that will be, but I think it would be more likely that someone from the Embassy in Moscow will represent the United States at the funeral.

Q Would you expect to have a statement later on it?

A I'm not aware of any upcoming statement, but why don't you keep in touch with us on that.

Q Is there consideration -- is there any consideration of anyone going from Washington?

A Let me take a look, and we'll keep you posted during the day.

Q Do you have anything, John, on -- the French counter-intelligence apparently have arrested a high-ranking Popular Front terrorist who allegedly was responsible, or was involved in the murders of Charles Ray and the attempted assassination of Chapman, and so on?

A No, I don't have anything on that.

--MORE--

Q Does Ustinov's death affect arms control negotiations in any way?

A No. We don't see any reason for it to have any impact on the upcoming Geneva talks.

Q John, just to come back to a question of representation from Washington, has there been any suggestion at all by the Russians that we send someone from here or that the funeral will be more than a usual --

A I'm not aware of any such suggestion, John. On the other hand, this is -- we're talking very closely after the announcement of the fact. I think Mr. Gorbachev cancelled his -- or cut short -- his trip to Scotland early today and flew back And so I think this has just happened. But I'm not aware of any Soviet suggestion to us that this will be an unusual funeral.

Q Is there any suggestion on the part of the Soviet Union to the United States suggesting any delay in any of the preparation or the process for the Geneva talks in any way?

A No, none at all. No.

Q John, do you have any comment on the report that the U.S.-Israeli talks on economic assistance didn't bring any conclusive results and there was no agreement?

A Well, I've got a little comment on that.

We've just completed a series of useful consultations with Israeli officials in two groups which discussed respectively, as you know, military and economic assistance as well as other issues.

The United States will be providing proposed levels of aid to Israel to the Congress, together with a proposed overall foreign assistance budget in the coming weeks. The Administration expects to recommend to the Congress continued substantial levels of economic and military aid for the next fiscal year, and that would be consistent with our close relations with Israel and U.S. budget objectives.

On the military assistance front, the Administration expects to submit a request to the Congress for a level of military assistance that will insure Israel's continued security and maintain its "qualitative edge," as has been our position.

As far as economic assistance is concerned, we'll ask the Congress to maintain a significant level of regular annual assistance as in the past.

Now, insofar as extraordinary, additional economic assistance above the current levels which Israel has requested, the United States is going to defer a decision on this pending the adoption of an effective Israeli economic stabilization program and a determination of the utility of such additional U.S. assistance in supporting such a program.

So we'll wait a little and see how that plays out.

Q Copy?

Q Can we have a copy?

A Sure.

Q You have no figures there, John?

A Sorry?

Q You have no figures there to answer?

A I don' have any figures here.

Q So when you say "substantial," what do you mean by it? You're approving $700 million, $800 million, or --

A I just don't have a figure for you, but it will be substantial, as it has in the past.

Q John --

A Yes, Robin?

Q -- can you, or do you have the information of how many Central American ambassadors and Latin American ambassadors are going to be replaced? And if you do have that information, can you make any of the changes public?

A Well, as you know, ambassadorial appointments are Presidential appointments and if and when there are changes they would be announced by the White House.

Q Do you see these changes as ideological in character or nature?

A No change in what I said earlier. The Secretary, in accordance with the President's wishes, is using the criterion of getting the best people possible -- be they career or non-career -- for the positions, the ambassadorial positions and others in the State Department -- the people who will carry out the implementation of the President's foreign policy.

Q Like Bernie Kalb, right?

A Like Bernie Kalb. A superb choice.

Q John, you have no comment on the front-page story of the Washington Times (sic) of the shooting of two -- or the destruction of two -- vodka bottles from -- which were --

A Sorry. The shooting of who? (Laughter.)

Q The destruction of two vodka bottles. The front-page story in the Washington Post

A I'm sorry. I'm still not getting it.

Q The vodka bottles.

A The what?

Q The vodka bottles.

A Vodka bottles!

Q Yes. I made it! (Laughter.) It's a big story.

A No. I am delighted to leave comment on that particular story to others, although I think it certainly underscores the vigilance with which those who took that action are approaching the question of any packages that arrive on their doorstep.

Q What does it say about Soviet-American relations, John? Do you view --

A It says that we're ever vigilant, Ralph. That's what it says. (Laughter.)

Q O.K.

A I got one here.

Q What are some of the fundamental economic reforms the U.S. is requesting Israel to make?

A   Oh, I think that I will stand on what the Secretary has said on previous occasions about that and not go into great detail.

Are we done?

Q   Thank you.

A   Thank you all.

Q   Wait, wait a minute.

If no one else is going to do it, I would like to at least express on my own behalf and on behalf I think of all of us --

A   We'll extend the briefing for this. (Laughter.)

Q   -- almost everyone else in the room our appreciation for a Spokesman who as always attempted to answer our questions and has always explained why he can't answer our questions when he can't answer them.

We appreciate John's forthcoming nature, his good humor, and we wish him good luck in his next career.

A   Well, thank you.

(Applause.)

Q   I second that.

Q   Filing break! (Laughter.)

A   I appreciate that.

(The press briefing concluded at 12:12 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #229

MONDAY, DECEMBER 24, 1984, 12:00 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon to this group of "hardies." I have one announcement regarding a report to Congress on the situation in El Salvador.

At the conclusion of the press briefing, copies of the report to Congress on the situation in El Salvador will be available. This report covers the period September 1 to November 30, 1984, and is made pursuant to PL-98-332. Authority to make the report was delegated from the President to the Secretary. It was transmitted to the Congress this morning.

The general conclusion of the report is that progress in El Salvador continues apace. The major event during this period was President Duarte's historic offer of a dialogue with the guerrillas, two rounds of which have been held, with another to be held after the new year.

That is it for announcements. Happy to take questions.

Q Why are you not having a briefing? There's always a briefing on this.

A Do you promise to attend?

Q Sure.

A No. We don't always have a briefing, John. In fact, these have been periodic reports over the last several months --

Q Usually --

A -- and I think you'll find it is quite complete and self-explanatory.

Q Usually there's a senior official who --

1- 3230

A Not over -- not the last several.

Q -- makes sure you get all the good parts.

A Oh, I think we can trust your journalistic talents to find all those good parts.

Mike?

Q Alan, former President Carter made some comment at a Miami news conference yesterday regarding some -- what he said were American businessmen being held as hostages in West Beirut, and that the government was not actively pursuing their release.

Have you seen those remarks, and do you have a response?

A Well, I saw a press report. I think that President Carter, unfortunately, perhaps is not informed of the efforts that are under way. There are four people missing. You'll recall there are the three whom we have talked about before as being kidnapped, and there is a person missing, also, from the American University, and we're not sure whether he has been kidnapped or has other reason for being --

Q The librarian --

A That's correct: the librarian. These are not all businessmen. We've got the Cable News person and the Reverend and the Embassy person, so -- Buckley, Weir, Levin -- not necessarily in the order I just gave you -- their titles or positions -- plus the librarian.

But, in any case, efforts have continued and will continue with those whom we think perhaps can be effective in helping, and so it is not correct to say -- to state that there has been no effort made. That's quite the contrary.

Q Is the former President briefed at all on matters like this where he is --

A I'm sure that he -- if he specifically asked on this, Mike, he would be. I don't know what arrangements are made to keep him informed, but I'm sure there would be response to a request on his part. I just don't know what has gone on between himself and the Department or the White House.

Bill?

1-3231

Q Do you have any comment on the apparent problem that's arisen in getting Vietnamese into this country after the Vietnamese are saying that they want the United States to curb their activities?

A Yes. I saw that story. The report is very disappointing, in light of earlier pledges by Hanoi to release all of these prisoners. Three years ago the Vietnamese said they could all come to the United States if we agreed to take them all. We agreed in principle.

Hanoi then insisted that we meet bilaterally with them to discuss the matter. We agreed and did so for the first time in Geneva October 4.

We have offered to meet with their representatives again soon and were encouraged when Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach appeared in an interview December 10 to confirm that Hanoi was willing to negotiate. But now they seem to be adding new preconditions.

The Government of Vietnam is well aware that allegations the United States is supporting anti-government activities in Vietnam are totally baseless. We do not have formal diplomatic relations with Vietnam, and we have many differences with the government in Hanoi, but we accept it as a reality. We deal with it on a practical basis.

Many of the persons whom Hanoi has kept in prison since 1975, frequently under the most harsh conditions, are now old and feeble.

If Vietnam is serious, we are prepared to meet again to negotiate about the release of these prisoners. We are very serious in our desire to end their persecution by Hanoi because of their association with previous governments in South Vietnam or with the United States.

If Hanoi merely wishes to make propaganda, however, it will continue to find reasons to delay talks on this humanitarian issue.

I might note a couple of other points: One is that there was a charge, I think, made that former South Vietnamese officials or officers had been sent to Central America. That also is totally baseless.

The question arose about guaranteeing that re-education victims would not be allowed to subvert Vietnam or

1-3232

other countries if they were released. With respect to that, I would say that both sides are free to raise any concern or question they wish when our delegations meet again. The essential matter is to resolve this issue on a humanitarian basis separate from political differences between our countries. We will do our best to work out a practical arrangement with Hanoi for finally ending the long suffering of these people and enabling them to leave Vietnam and rejoin their families.

Q Copy?

A Sure.

Q Do you have an estimate of how many of these people are being held in the re-education camps?

A Don, I don't. If you'd go back, I think there was some information provided at the time there was testimony before the Congress, and I don't have any numbers that could update you on that. If you don't happen to have that, I think we could probably help you get hold of that.

Q Okay. And another point on this: As I read the story, the Vietnamese seem to be saying that they want some kind of a guarantee or assurance from the United States that Vietnamese who are living in this country will not in any way take some anti-Vietnamese action, or support anti-Vietnamese action in Vietnam.

Quite apart from your reaction to the complications introduced here --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- is the United States Government in a position to or is it disposed to make any guarantees about what Vietnamese living in this country may do?

A I guess there are two elements to a response to that beyond what I said here about they can raise any concern when we get together. One is that this is a country which is devoted to free speech and nothing is going to change that. The other is that we also have laws, some of which potentially, I suppose, could apply to certain kinds of activities. This country -- obviously, this government will enforce its laws, but beyond that I really can't --

Q What about the charge that their Mission in New York has been attacked?

A We're not aware of any such attack.

Q Alan, while we're at it, why don't you bring us up to speed on the Amerasian children -- what's the status of that?

A I don't have an update to give you on that, Hank. I think that -- I just -- I'll see if I can get you something that takes us further from our last report on that.

But I think that those discussions have continued, and so forth. I don't think they've introduced the same problems there that they have introduced here, so that -- I believe that process moves forward.

Q Does the State Department have somebody with these congressional delegations? Do you have a man traveling along with the Congressman?

A I don't know in each case whether we do or don't. I know that with Congressman Montgomery we did. That person, however, did not go to Cambodia -- would not go to Cambodia. I don't know what the situation is with Congressman Solarz, or others.

-- MORE --

Q The Israeli press is reporting yesterday and this morning that the U.S. asked for more reform, a thorough-going reform in the Israeli economy before considering or talking about increased aid levels. Do you have anything on that?

A Well, I'd refer you back to what John said last week. I don't have anything new to say about that.

Robin?

Q I don't know if anything has been said on this or not, but on El Salvador, is there anything in the report in reaction to and in response to Ungo's statement a few days ago that he would like to see the United States take an involvement -- get involved --in the peace negotiations?

A I can't tell you whether there's anything in the report or not on that. We had something on this, though, at the end of last week, and if you haven't gotten that, we can get it for you in the Press Office.

Q Alan, can you say that the United States looks favorably as a last resort to the idea of convening an international conference under the auspices of the United Nations to discuss the Middle East question?

A I think we have made clear our position on the conference. That we do not think it would be a fruitful approach to resolving problems of the Middle East.

Q So there is no consideration under any circumstances if the United States will take the role over the Soviet Union in convening a conference?

A Well, I'll leave you with what I just said. I think it was fairly straightforward.

Q Do you have anything about this American who was arrested in Paris for helping the -- somehow involved in gun smuggling for the Libyans?

A I have not seen but I've heard about a report to that effect. I also understand that there is no Privacy Act waiver which has been signed, so I can't --

Q The French authorities have made it public.

A Well, if we can get something on it for you later, Bernie, I'll be happy to do that but at the moment I'm told that the Privacy Act presents us with certain problems; but let me see what we can do.

1-3235

John.

Q Alan, during a briefing last week, a senior U.S. official, speaking on BACKGROUND, made some statements that were interpreted as an indication that we were willing to use the so-called Star Wars problem -- I mean program -- or SDI as a bargaining factor in Geneva.

Then you have these statements yesterday by Mr. McFarlane and Mr. Weinberger saying, no, absolutely not, never, as I heard them. Can you give us something that would deal with this apparent discrepancy?

A No. I think that I would refer you basically to what Messrs. McFarlane and Weinberger said yesterday. I think if you look at the transcript -- the total transcript -- of what the senior official said on BACKGROUND last week, you will find that what he said was not quite what most correspondents wrote. There were some who did write the story the way it was briefed, which was also consistent with what was said yesterday. But I think that there was perhaps some misunderstanding of the point, but I refer you basically to what was said yesterday.

Q Following on that, about this business about whether the object is to protect the entire United States or to protect just our ground-launched missiles, a senior U.S. official, who spoke with reporters following Mrs. Thatcher's press conference the other day, while he didn't spell it out completely, sort of bored down rather hard on one of the problems that the United States has with the ABM Treaty is whether or not the Soviets are doing things that might pose a serious threat to our ground-launch missiles which has been one of the reasons why we are attaching such importance to this research program.

Would you say therefore that this is at least a first-stage priority, or something, of the SDI research?

A I'm not quite sure how to answer it in the context of your question. Obviously, the President has indicated the importance he attaches to the research program, and that at this stage is all that it is. Decisions beyond research would be for a future President together with a future Congress, presumably, to look at.

So priority on the research program, I think, is quite clear and on the record.

Q What is it we're aiming for? Are we directing a screen over the total United States or are we screening our ground-launch missiles?

A I don't have any words to add to those that were made on the record yesterday by the two senior officials you have referred to.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the continuing shooting of -- shooting up of oil tankers in the Persian Gulf on the part of Iraq?

A Don, we had something on this last week, and I think the basic point is that, obviously, we have been opposed to attacks on civilian, innocent shipping, and the Iraqis have agreed to a negotiated end to the war. The Iranians have not, and so our position on this is basically that the fastest way to get this over with is, indeed, for the Iranians to agree to come to the table and negotiate a solution to the war.

Q This seems like a kind of non sequitur in saying we oppose attacks on innocent shipping and then we introduce these legalisms.

A No. I think also that, if I read the press reports right -- and I have no reason to, in broad terms, dispute them -- attacks are taking place on shipping by both parties.

Q On this point, Iran rejected totally the mediation of five Islamic countries, or some Islamic countries. Do you have any comment on that?

A Well, I'd refer you back to what I just said. We hope that Iran would, in fact, agree to a negotiated settlement. I can't tell you which one or how or what, but it was an idea and they've turned it down.

Q And can you comment on if there are any plans for the United States Government to request Congressional approval for the sale of sophisticated weapons to Saudi Arabia and Jordan sometime next year?

A Wouldn't get into the question of future notifications to Congress. When we have anything to notify, obviously we would do that, and I don't think there would be any problem making people aware of that. Obviously, it would be something that would be open on the Hill.

Q   Has the U.S. asked Israel to put up a VOA transmitter?

A   Don't have anything on that, Bernie.

Q   Any specific comment on the terrorist attack in Italy?

A   Not really a specific comment beyond the fact that the United States strongly condemns those responsible for this contemptible act against innocent civilians and persons.

This tragic incident is another example of the terrorist's inhuman and callous disregard for life. The Italian authorities have had considerable success in combating terrorist groups both the right and left. And I might note that anonymous callers claiming to represent both left and right-wing terrorist groups have claimed responsibility for the attack.

The United States supports Italy completely in this effort and calls upon all nations to unite in action against terrorism everywhere.

I don't know what the latest press figures are. Our latest report is that 17 people were killed, over a 100 injured; our Consulate in Florence reports that the Italian authorities have informed them of the slight injury of three American citizens on the train, one already having been treated and released from the hospital, the other two receiving medical care and expected to be released today or tomorrow.

There are Privacy Act considerations in terms of names. I might also note that of the 17 deaths, or at least 17 deaths which occurred, five people have been identified; none is an American citizen, but we have no further information on the identities of those who had not been identified so we don't know whether there are other Americans involved there.

Q   Alan, do you have anything on this Russian flotilla now in the Caribbean?

A   I don't have anything on it.

Q   Can we have a copy of that statement?

A   Well, it's kind of hard to pick apart, George.

Q   Alan, going back to that statement you read about --

A I can give you some of it, George; Okay, I'll give you what I can.

Q Going back to that statement you read about the terrorist attack in Italy, there was some news account or report which I'm asking if you have any evidence of this or like to comment on it, that this terrorist group claims that they belong to an Islamic group, or something like that, do you have any comment on it?

A Who were responsible for the train bombing?

Q Yes.

A No. As I say, there are four or five groups from right and left who have claimed responsibility, and I don't have any reason to identify one or another as actually being responsible.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:29 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #230

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 26, 1984, 12:10 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. Let me read you, first, one statement on the Vietnamese attacks in Cambodia, and then I'll be happy to take questions.

Six years ago on Christmas Day, Vietnam invaded Cambodia and quickly occupied most of the country. Yesterday, Vietnam marked the anniversary of its invasion by launching attacks, backed by armor and artillery, against encampments near the Thai-Cambodian border which are home to more than 85,000 Cambodian civilians who have fled there from Vietnam's oppression of their homeland. More than 60,000 Cambodian civilians were already in temporary evacuation sites in Thailand as a result of Vietnamese attacks on their camps this year.

When it invaded Cambodia in 1978, Vietnam claimed that it had acted to save the Khmer people from the Khmer Rouge under Pol Pot. Hanoi still claims that its occupation is necessary to prevent the return of the Khmer Rouge. Yet, during this dry season, Vietnam's offensive along the border has been directed solely at camps loyal to the non-communist Khmer People's National Liberation Front -- the KPNLF -- led by former Prime Minister Son Sann.

Vietnam's continuing aggression in Cambodia, directed chiefly against civilian camps and non-communist military forces, is contemptible. The Cambodian people, after so many years of war, should be allowed to chose their own government and to live in peace. Unfortunately, there is no sign that Hanoi is prepared to accede to the world community's call for a Vietnamese withdrawal and the re-establishment of Cambodian sovereignty through free elections under international auspices. Hanoi still rejects this formula in defiance of the United Nations General Assembly which this year endorsed it by 110 votes to 22. The United States again urges Hanoi to recognize that a negotiated political settlement in Cambodia is in Vietnam's own national interest.

The United States wishes to express its appreciation to the Royal Thai Government, the U.N. Border Relief Operation, and the International Committee of the Red Cross for their efforts to assist the Cambodian civilians again made homeless by Vietnamese attacks. We hope the international community will join us in continuing our support for Cambodian relief efforts.

Q I assume you have a statement -- a copy?

A Copies? Sure.

Q Do you have the number of deaths, Alan?

A I don't have numbers of deaths. I can give you sort of a -- well, let me give you what I have in ways of numbers of what's going on.

On the military side, early on Christmas morning, elements of two Vietnamese regiments attacked the Khmer People's National Liberation Front camp at Nong Samet -- also known, I guess, as Ritthisen -- which was home to more than 60,000 Cambodian civilians. Most of the camp has been seized by the Vietnamese forces.

The KPNLF camp at Obok was attacked the same day, reportedly by Heng Samrin forces. Artillery shells fell on Ban Sangae, otherwise known as Ampil, but we have no confirmation of a ground attack.

As far as casualties, Embassy Bangkok has reported 47 wounded evacuated to the International Committee of the Red Cross -- the ICRC -- hospital at Khao-I-Dang. The New York Times this morning, I guess, quotes a Red Cross official saying 59, which may be a more recent figure. We have reports of several civilian deaths caused by Vietnamese artillery fire, but I don't have a more specific number to give you on that.

We also have numbers, if you would like, on the civilian population in these various camps. Note, that the civilian population from Nong Samet has been evacuated to a prepared site inside Thailand where the U.N. Border Relief Operation is providing food, shelter and medical care. Obok's population is also reportedly moving to an evacuation site. The population at Ban Sangae, or Ampil, is reported to be prepared for evacuation if necessary.

Thus far this year, what has happened is that Green Hill, or Ta Tum, had 29,414 people -- I'll give you these figures in writing afterwards if you would like -- and that was evacuated since April of '84. Nong Chan had 21,614; that was attacked on November 18. Nam Yun has 2,590 attacked December 8. Sokh San had 8,448 attacked December 11. Nong Samet had 60,403 attacked December 25. Obok had 2,212 attacked December 25, and Ban Sangae, or Ampil, had 23,342, and that was shelled, as I indicated, on December 25.

Q   Alan, what is the Chinese reaction on this?

A   I think you'd have to ask the Chinese what their reaction to that is.

Q   Copy, please?

A   Sure. Mike?

Q   Alan, anything regarding the U.S. role and aid to refugees or military equipment for Thailand, or any movement in that?

A   Anything new to say about any of that?

Q   Yes.

A   We have talked before about a rather substantial program we have underway. I don't have anything new to --

Q   Nothing has been activated by this?

A   Let me check and see. I was not given any indication that there was but if there is we will provide that.

Q   Alan, if we wanted to make a protest like this, can we do it directly to the Vietnamese without diplomatic relations, or how do you go about --

A   Well, I'm not sure in this case how this would be done. Obviously, on the humanitarian issues and the issues of releasing prisoners, the Amerasians, and so on, we obviously do have channels of communication that are direct, and in some cases bilateral and in some cases coming under U.N. auspices, and so on.

I do not know in this case, Bill, quite how we would do it and how we would make our views known other than in the way that I have now publicly done it here today. And I guess I would stay away from trying to be too specific about channels of communication other than to say I'm sure that they are aware of our views. As I say, we hope that others will continue to join in in efforts to help these people, and presumably, also, to persuade the Vietnamese that this is not a humanitarian way to go.

Q Alan, are these camps also used for military purposes? Are they --

A I can't tell you who is in the camps, Bernie. The basic point is obviously that, if the Vietnamese were to withdraw from Cambodia and also allow Cambodians to choose their own government freely, instead of having regime which they have sponsored there and put in place, the issue wouldn't arise.

--MORE--

Q Well, but it is germane; it's one thing if they're attacking a purely humanitarian camp of refugees, which is the thrust of your statement, and another if these camps are in fact are the base camps for the anti-Vietnamese military groups.

A Well, I don't know whether they are -- you talk about base camps. I saw some figures in the papers, I think, which suggested that there may be some forces defending these camps. I don't know how many. And I can't tell you what the numbers are on that side of things. But, clearly, we're talking about tens of thousands of civilians, and so this is simply looked at from that perspective a matter which is humanitarian in nature. And, as I say, if people are concerned about who's in those camps, one thing they could do is withdraw and have a political solution to this problem, as the overwhelming number of nations in the United Nations have called for.

Q But you did suggest that there's a political component to it when you suggested that the camp attacked yesterday contained people whose loyalty is with Son Sann --

A Uh-huh.

Q Is that right? But you -- on the specific question of whether these camps are used for military purposes, you can't go beyond what you said.

A I don't have anything beyond that.

Q Do you have any comment on the final communique of Islamic Foreign Ministers which issued in Sanaa?

A No, I don't.

Q What was the question?

A Any comment on the final communique of the Islamic Foreign Ministers.

Q Do you have anything on Robelo's -- Alfonso Robelo's announcement that he's going to drop his military front and --

A No.

Q -- go to political activities?

A No. I don't.

Q Alan, if -- as long as you're in Central America, if my memory serves me correctly, a few days ago the President said something about five ships loaded with ammunition bound for Nicaragua. They seem to have dropped from radar screens. Can you tell us anything further?

A I have not tried to keep up with the progress of Soviet -- these are Soviet ships, I believe, your source -- ships coming from the Soviet Union.

No. I don't have any reason to change what the President and others have said about the fact that there are ships heading to Nicaragua with military supplies on them. That remains a fact.

Q Anything on Soviet military maneuvers around Cuba?

A No.

Q Alan, is there anything about this report that there is a letter from Secretary Shultz to the Israeli Government establishing sort of demands of reform as a prerequisite for further aid?

A Well, I'm not going to get into the question of diplomatic exchanges, and so on. I think if you look back at what John said on Friday, he talked about the economic program. Just to quote him, in addition to talking about maintaining a high level of economic and military assistance, a significant level -- which he did -- he also then talked about -- what I think these stories are addressing themselves to -- would be "extraordinary, additional economic assistance above current levels." What John said was "the United States is going to defer a decision on this pending the adoption of an effective Israeli economic stabilization program and a determination of the utility of such additional U.S. assistance in supporting such a program."

So Israel is working towards adoption of an effective economic program -- they're keeping us informed -- and we support a program which would solve Israel's economic problems and gets its economy on the right track.

As I say, I'm not going to get into the diplomatic back and forth, but I think you can take it as a given. First of all, there was a delegation here last week discussing these subjects but you can take it as a given that what we have said publicly we certainly are conveying privately.

1-3246

Q Alan, does the United States have any reaction to Israel apparently using this Shultz letter as a lever for internal politics?

A Well, that's your description of it. I really don't have any comment on the fact that it is -- that a report has come out concerning our diplomacy on this. I think I will have to stand on the substance of our position and not get into it.

Q Prime Minister Peres quoted from this letter in a public speech yesterday. Did he quote from it accurately?

A Again, I'm not --

Q It's your letter.

A Well, I'm not going to get into it beyond what I've already said.

Q The Israeli Embassy said today that there wasn't a letter; that these were only talking points in a personal meeting between Sam Lewis and Shimon Peres.

A Well, so you're citing to me two different Israeli sources, apparently, at least as reported in the press. I'm not going to get into it. I'm going to tell you what our position is on it, which I've done, which John did last week, and I'm going to let it go at that and not try to get into the diplomatic exchanges. But, as I say, there's no question that our views have been fully discussed with the Israelis.

Q Alan, the Iranian Government said terrorist agents of the United States are responsible for the bombings yesterday and today. Have you seen that, and do you have a comment on that?

A Yes; that's absurd. I would also point out, as we have in the past, when there have been bombings and civilians hurt in Iran, that we condemn those bombings -- terrorist bombings as much as we do terrorist bombings anywhere else.

Q Alan, on the subject of Iran, have you been able to confirm whether it was Iranian aircraft that attacked that tanker yesterday?

1.-3247

A I'm, I think, going to stay with our traditional position of not trying to confirm who attacked whom. Obviously, the traditional circles have made --

Q Alan, the traditional position --

A Yes.

Q -- is to confirm when the Iranians do it, and not to confirm --

A Not to when the Iraqis do it? I see. Well, I'm not going to get into the question of it. I don't have any reason to question the press reports on this, but I'm not going to try to confirm from here what the press is reporting on this.

Q Talking about attacks on shipping, do you have the latest information on what happened to the Spanish tanker which was attacked today?

A What I have is, I think, is what you have from the press, which is that a Spanish registry tanker, the Aragon, was attacked today about 1200 Greenwich time, which is 0700 Eastern Standard Time, in the southern Gulf. The ship, which sustained minor damage, is proceeding to Bahrain. The tanker's captain claims that Iranian aircraft were responsible for the attack. And that's about as far as I could take that.

Q Can you confirm that they were Iranian?

A I just think I answered that, saying I'm not going to get into the business of --

Q Alan, I'm just trying my luck.

A No.

Q Do you have any comment on the report that the Philippine opposition is unified around a program that includes exclusion of U.S. military bases?

A Well, I think that our understanding is several opposition leaders have agreed to a statement of principles calling for efforts to create a zone of freedom and peace in Southeast Asia -- that is, free of all foreign military presence.

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In this context, the statement calls for the removal of U.S. military bases in the Philippines. This statement does not specify the timetable for achieving its objective, and this is, of course, a compromise statement intended to cover a variety of views and which may be subject to a variety of interpretations.

We understand that a number of the opposition leaders have declined to sign, although their reasons are not clear.

Q Copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Do you have anything on the referendum in Pakistan, and also why the United States is not putting pressure on the military government to hold free elections in Pakistan as they do elsewhere?

A Well, I think -- I don't have any reaction to the referendum specifically, and I think we've talked about movement toward democracy before, and I refer you back to our previous statements.

Hank, did you have a question?

Q No.

A Okay, George. I'm sorry.

Q Is a congressional delegation going to Geneva with the Secretary, and, if so, has its makeup been decided?

A I don't have any information on the delegation to Geneva at this point, George.

Q Will there be one?

A A delegation, or a congressional component?

Q Congressional component.

A I don't know the answer to that.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:26 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #231

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 27, 1984, 12:09 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. One announcement regarding a briefing here this afternoon. At 2:00 o'clock today there will be a briefing ON THE RECORD, for cameras, in the briefing room on the emergency situation in the Eastern Sudan created by the large influx of Ethiopians from Eritrea and Tigray Provinces, and on the U.S. Government response to date.

The briefers will be AID Administrator Pete McPherson, the Director of the Bureau of Refugee Programs, Jim Purcell; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Princeton Lyman; and the Director of the Refugee Program's Office of Emergency Operations, Tex Harris.

So, again, that's a briefing here, ON THE RECORD, 2:00 o'clock today, on the emergency situation in Eastern Sudan in connection with the Ethiopian influx from Eritrea and Tigray into the Sudan, and our response.

Okay. That's it for announcements. I'll be happy to take questions.

Q Yes. Concerning the U.S. Ambassador Tambs, can you confirm that he is, indeed, enroute back to the U.S., and is his apparent reassignment in any way connected or the result of death threats against him?

A Well, I'm not going to get into questions of reassignments of Ambassador Tambs or anybody else. I think personnel decisions are matters for the -- of that nature for the White House to announce.

I can confirm that he has returned to the U.S. for a brief visit, but I don't have further details.

Q Can you discuss the apparent death threats against him?

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A   No. Obviously, as we have said previously, drug traffickers in Colombia have issued threats against Colombian officials and American officials in Colombia, and that's a fact, and that's not secret. But I don't intend to get into the specifics of those threats. So I'm going to have to leave you with that.

Q   Is he going back? Someone told me he has to go back to his university by January.

A   I don't have plans for him onward other than that this trip is a brief visit back here.

Q   He will return?

A   Yes.

Q   He will return to Colombia?

A   Yes.

Q   Alan, today the fifth anniversary of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Do you have anything new to add to this?

A   No. I think the President has had some words on that, and, of course, we did last week have a briefing, and I'm sure there will be other appearances, but I don't have anything today to add to all that.

Q   Alan, Senator Gordon Humphrey at the news conference yesterday, he charged the State Department in more than one instance of -- that we should reassess the policies toward Afghan freedom fighters. He also told that you gloat over the fact that on paper the freedom fighters have a military stalemate with the Soviets and appear to run free over 80% of the countryside, and a lot of harsh statements that -- and accusations against the aid that was being supplied to the Afghanis, and also he singled out the State Department and the CIA.

Do you have any answers to his charges and --

A   Just very briefly. First of all, we're talking about an alleged intelligence-related activity, so that, obviously, confines what one can say about it.

I haven't seen the wires on it, but I gather that the President talked about this a bit this morning. I refer you to what he said. In the briefing you had here last week, Under Secretary Armacost talked about it. I believe the gist of what he said was that after five years of fighting, the Afghan resistance is more effective than ever before and has succeeded in preventing the heavily armed and equipped Soviet army from achieving its objectives in Afghanistan.

So I would cite that as a factor in looking at the overall situation, and I think that Phyllis Oakley was on MacNeil-Lehrer last night and would suggest you might refer to her words as well.

Beyond that, I really don't have anything specific to respond at this point.

Bill?

Q Alan, given his current political activities, can you give us a status report on Meir Kahane's citizenship?

A That continues to be processed, that review.

Q Do we -- do you have a position on his political activities?

A No.

Q Any further word on the Thailand --

A I mean, not other than we have said before. We've talked before about it, but I don't have anything specific today about it.

Q Could you take a question on the status of his citizenship?

A No. I'm giving you what the status is. I have looked into it in anticipation of that question, and that is the status. It is under review, and that process is continuing. It isn't just sitting there.

Q Any further word on the refugee camps in Cambodia and the Thai border region?

A I can give you as much of a sitrep as is available here.

As of December 27, the Vietnamese forces reportedly control the eastern half of Nong Samet camp. Khmer People's National Liberation Front, the KPNLF forces, still hold the western edge of the camp. The Vietnamese forces are supported by several Soviet-built T-54 tanks. About half the civilian camp has been burned by the Vietnamese.

We have nothing further on the fighting at the KPNLF camp at Obok which was reportedly attacked by Heng Samrin forces. The situation at Ban Sangae is quiet after Vietnamese shelling on the 25th.

We have received reports of fighting to the south of Aranyaprathet in areas controlled by the Khmer Rouge. The civilian population of one Khmer Rouge camp, Ban Taluan, reported population 8,800, has been evacuated but no further information is available to us.

On casualties, we're unable to confirm any specific casualty figures, although the International Committee of the Red Cross, the ICRC, hospital at Khao-I-Dang has received a large number of both civilian and military casualties, most of them caused by artillery fire. We have nothing on Vietnamese casualties

As to the civilian population situation, the civilian population from Nong Samet, approximately 61,000, is being assisted by the United Nations Border Relief Operation at an evacuation site inside Thailand. Obok's population is also reportedly at an evacuation site, as is the population of Ban Taluan mentioned above. The population at Ban Sangae, 23,000, has reportedly moved to the Cambodian side of the Thai strategic canal, but has not evacuated to a prepared site inside of Thailand.

-- MORE --

Q So how many people are we talking about who may be on the move or fleeing?

A Well, I don't have totals to bring you. I think what I'd ask you to do is to take this and make this available to you, and update what we gave you yesterday and put that together. I haven't done that up to this point.

Q Do you have a better estimate of how many Vietnamese forces may be involved in this?

A I don't.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the Vietnamese Government's rejection of a U.S. request to talk about the release of political prisoners?

A Well, I think that's a mischaracterization to a certain extent, Bill. I saw that report last night. We talked about this the other day and we have some guidance on the terms which the Vietnamese laid out, and we had a reaction to it.

I don't think there's anything new beyond what we reacted to and talked about the other day. So I refer you back to our words on that. There's fairly extensive guidance on that.

Q Do you have anything on the nature of the meeting of the Ambassador of Mauritania, Ould Daddah, with Murphy?

A No, don't.

Q Have you recognized the new regime there or not?

A I don't think that question really arises. I think if you'll check back over time when there have been changes of government, we have generally not made an issue out of that particular aspect.

Ann?

Q The New York Times this morning reported that there's reports of atrocities by the Contra forces have recently come to the attention of Congressmen and government people. Are these reports of atrocities news to the State Department, or have you previously investigated them or what do you know about them?

A Well, I don't have any sit rep to give you on that. I don't think that's quite our role on that.

As to our reaction to those reports, the United States condemns unequivocally all acts of terror and violence directed against innocent civilians. And I would note that press reports quote anti-Sandinista leaders publicly disavowing responsibility for any such abuses and stating that they have disciplined individuals who have been found to be responsible for unjustified acts of violence.

Robin?

Q Alan, NBC, last night, is reporting more or less just the opposite of what the State Department is saying about Afghanistan. NBC is implying with its reporter in Afghanistan that things are not going well for the guerrillas, and that the Soviet Union basically is about to control Afghanistan completely.

Do you have any comment on that, and can you talk at all about Senator Humphrey's charges without referring directly to American aid? Is it possible that a lot of the aid is being siphoned off by the Pakistanis?

A Well, I'm not going to get any further into the question than we already have on that, Robin. I refer you, again, back to the discussion -- I think Senator Humphrey participated in that discussion on MacNeil-Lehrer where Phyllis Oakley was also a participant -- and I think that there was an exchange there and that would, in terms of responding directly to him, be as good a way of looking at our position on that as I can give you.

And as far as our position on what's going on, whatever NBC may have reported, our position has been laid out, so I don't have anything new to offer you on that.

Q Alan, has Israel replied yet to the U.S. request for transmitting facilities?

A I don't think we've talked about a U.S. request, Bernie, so -- I had some guidance on the fact that VOA is talking with a number of countries about transmitting facilities, but I don't have anything specific on any given country.

Q Can we have a copy of the Cambodia statement?

A The sitrep? Sure.

Q And the Contra one also?

A The contra one also, yes.

Q (Inaudible).

A Sorry?

Q Statement on Afghanistan?

A I don't think I gave you anything that was --

Q Can I go back to --

A No, I'll come back to you.

Q Jerusalem radio reported today that --

A I can't hear you. I wonder if you could --

Q Jerusalem radio reported today that the delegations from Egypt and the United States and Israel will convene next January for discussing matters relating to deployment of a multinational force in Taba area. Can you confirm that report?

A No, I can't. I'm not going to speculate on the possibility of talks between Egypt and Israel on Taba. But, in general, I'll repeat what we said before, that the U.S. favors discussions between the governments of Israel and Egypt on such bilateral issues, but I think you would have to seek confirmation from them on the holding of any meetings.

Q How about the U.S. participation?

A Well, I think that if we were asked by the governments of Israel and Egypt to participate, we would participate in such talks. Yes?

Q Alan, are you involved now in preparing for this meeting or not?

A I'm not going to get into the questions of preparations or non-preparations. I think, in terms of the meeting being held, talk to the Egyptian and Israeli Governments. Obviously, if there is a meeting held and we participate, that will not be a secret.

Q Do you know what prompted Tambs' brief visit back to the United States?

A Don't have anything for you on that.

Q Do you know where he returned to?

A No, I don't.

Q Going back to Pakistan -- Afghanistan, do we have the number of deaths during the past five years of the occupation of the Soviet Union? How many Afghans have been killed?

A I think that if you look back at Under Secretary Armacost's briefing, he gave you some statistics in that report.

Q Second: Whether the Secretary of State is going to discuss this matter with Mr. Gromyko when they meet in Geneva?

A I don't have an agenda for you on that meeting. Obviously, the subject of Afghanistan has frequently come up in our conversations with Soviet officials at all levels.

Q Alan, in light of Mr. Gordon Humphrey's statements yesterday and his accusations that it appears most of our aid is being lost in a leaky pipeline. Will the United States Government consider maybe forming a special study group to see where this financial aid is going or out? How is it dispensed?

A You can ask the question any number of ways. I don't have anything to add to what I've already said.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:23 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #232

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 28, 1984, 12:00 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: I don't have any announcements. Do you have any questions? Going once?

Q Do you have any word --

A Spoil sport!

Q Do you have any word about the U.S. Government role in preventing the sale of sonar equipment to the Soviet Union?

A This is the story that's coming out of Tokyo?

Q Tokyo, yes.

A Yes, I do have a little bit on that, Bill. U.S. agencies are investigating a possible illegal export of an anti-submarine device to Japan for re-export to a proscribed destination. We are cooperating with the Japanese in this investigation, and we are confident that the Japanese export controls will prevent the export of this controlled technology to a proscribed destination.

Q Copy, please?

A Sure.

Q The equipment is in Tokyo now, I take it, is that right?

A I've seen the reports which suggest that. I don't have details on it, Bill. I don't have any reason to question that report that says it's there.

Q Any progress report on the Thai-Cambodian border situation?

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A Yes, I can give you a little bit on that. As far as the military situation is concerned, Vietnamese forces still control the eastern half of Nong Samet Camp, as far as we know. Now, we've seen a wire report that the KPNLF have recaptured most of that camp, but we can't confirm that as of this point.

Yesterday, I talked a bit about the fighting at the KPNLF Camp at Obok, noting that it had been attacked. I would note that it was attacked by Heng Samrin forces in conjunction with the Vietnamese. That, apparently -- that fighting continues with Vietnamese forces -- a different situation; sorry. Ban Sangae remains quiet but tense with Vietnamese forces in a position to attack on short notice.

While we don't have details, it appears that the Khmer Rouge forces south of Aranyaprathet are under military pressure from the Vietnamese.

Despite reports we had yesterday of evacuation, the Thai military has not confirmed evacuation of the Khmer Rouge camp at Ban Taluan, so let me give you that as perhaps an amendment to what we had.

I don't have anything new on casualties. On the civilian population, with respect to the 61,000 people who were in the Nong Samet Camp being assisted by the U.N. Border Relief Operation at an evacuation site inside Thailand, our Embassy in Bangkok has reported the condition of the civilians is good but that most were unable to retrieve many of their belongings because of the suddenness of the Vietnamese attack.

Obok's population has been at an evacuation site since last spring when it was threatened. That camp is reportedly still the scene of fighting, and the population at Ban Sangae, 23,000, reportedly remains today on the Cambodian side of the Thai tank ditch and has not evacuated to a prepared site. So some of that simply is an update of the points I gave you yesterday.

Q You still have no overall numbers of how many people have been made "campless" as a result of this?

A No. I don't have anything more than I can give you beyond the figures we had. I'll see -- I asked, actually, if we could add that up, and maybe that's not possible, but let me see if later we can do that.

--MORE--

Q Alan, do you have any reaction to the reported expulsion of an American priest by the Chilean Government?

A I have just a sort of a sitrep on that: simply that our Embassy in Santiago confirms that Father Dennis O'Mara, a Catholic priest and U.S. citizen, has been expelled from Chile following his arrest under state security law. Father O'Mara departed Santiago by plane about 8:50 p.m., December 27th.

As reported in the press, that flight was scheduled to arrive in Miami at 7:30 a.m. today. Since Father O'Mara has specifically declined to waive his rights under the Privacy Act, I won't have anything further to say about him.

Q Alan, can you confirm a report that the United States has agreed to increase military aid to Israel by about 33 percent?

A Yes; I saw that report. The fact is, as we indicated before, we have recently completed a series of useful consultations with Israeli officials on our Military Assistance Program, but no final decisions have been taken.

As we noted following the most recent consultations, the Administration expects to submit a request to Congress for a level of military assistance that will insure Israel's continued security and maintain its qualitative edge.

Q May I have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Is that likely to require a substantial increase or just the sort of increase that would go with inflation?

A Well, as I say, there have been no final decisions taken; and I think until we have something specific to report we'll stay away from numbers.

Q Alan, there were press reports -- Mideast press reports -- last week that an aide to Murphy had met with some PLO representatives. Do you have anything on that?

A Our position on the PLO has not changed, and our actions consistent with that position have not changed, so that simply isn't true.

The reports I saw actually suggested that Ambassador Murphy had met with the PLO, and that's equally wrong. So I'll leave you with --

Q A flat denial?

A Right.

Q Anything on reports of new turmoil in South Africa?

A Not a great deal -- not specifically on that.

There was -- in the story this morning that was talking about -- one of the stories talking about that was there was a suggestion that blame was being put on the South African Government, that they were seeking to overturn the Nkomati Accords or something of that sort. The fact is we have no reason to believe that any party plans to abrogate the Nkomati Accords. We've seen a variety of press statements about negotiations between South Africa and Mozambique, and it's our clear understanding that discussions between the parties continue and that the South African Government and the Government of Mozambique are seeking a way to end violence in Mozambique.

We support this effort, as its success will contribute to peace and stability in Mozambique and the region.

Q Alan, is there any progress report on the U.S. trying to get the U.S. hostages free in Beirut?

A No, there is nothing on that. As we have indicated before, that obviously is an important issue. It is one we pay a lot of attention to. We're working with various others who might be of assistance in that. But our position also is that talking about it isn't going to help the situation.

Q Anything new on attacks on the shipping in the Gulf?

A No.

Q Alan, going back to South Africa, do you have any comments on Mr. Tutu's remarks criticizing the United States' role in South Africa, that the U.S. is not doing enough --

A No.

Q -- doing enough?

A No; not on his recent remarks. I think we did have some thoughts when he, a few weeks ago, said something; and we had something on it then.

Q Anything on the continuing talks between President Gemayel and Assad?

A No.

Q Also, do you have anything on -- since these two lawsuits has something to do with the foreign policy --

A Since -- ? I'm sorry?

Q Two lawsuits: one against CBS, and one against *Time* magazine.

A No. I don't have any comment on that.

O.K.?

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:09 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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MONDAY, DECEMBER 31, 1984

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #233

MONDAY, DECEMBER 31, 1984, 12:02 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. Two brief announcements. First of all, tomorrow being a holiday, there will be no briefing, and the Press Office will be on a Sunday schedule.

Also, I believe the White House will be announcing, but just so you are also informed, there will be a briefing on Thursday at noon in Room 450 of the old EOB on the Geneva meetings. So I would refer you to what Larry Speakes will have to say about this.

Q Who's going to do it?

A I'm not clear at this point, Marvin, whether it's going to be ON THE RECORD or ON BACKGROUND, so we'll see how that comes out.

Q Alan, do you happen to know if McFarlane will appear on any of the television talk shows subsequent to that briefing?

A I am not aware of any, but you better check again with the White House.

Q It's at noon Thursday?

A Noon Thursday; 450 old EOB.

Q 450? What are you planning here at noon?

A We'll brief.

Q A regular briefing?

A A regular briefing. Okay, that's it for announcements. I'll be happy to take questions.

Q Any comment on the remarks of Mr. M'Bow concerning Jean Gerard?

A I think that Ambassador Gerard had a statement, George, which I will refer you to. And if you don't have it, we can, I think, help you with the text of that.

Q Is the Department going to back her up in any way?

A Well, I think that, clearly, by providing you that, we are. I think that it's an unfortunate event that that happened, but, again, I think I'd refer you what Ambassador Gerard said about it.

Q What was Senator Tower doing here?

A Sorry?

Q What was Senator Tower doing here this morning?

A I don't know specifically what he was doing here. He was meeting with Mr. Dam, but I don't know what the subject was.

Q Has he been offered an ambassadorship?

A I don't know the answer, and in any case, obviously, it wouldn't be for me to comment on. But I don't happen to know the answer to that question.

Q Do you -- one thing. What was it that the U.S. gave to Israel for economic guidance? Was there some kind of a letter, or --

A Marvin, I addressed this last week, and I really don't have anything to add to what I said about it at that point. We've had, certainly, a full exchange of views. They had a delegation here; we have very active diplomatic channels, and so on, but I'm not going to get into either the substance or the specifics of whether there was a specific kind of message, and so on.

Q Peres said that the Secretary did not officially, or even unofficially, give a U.S. blueprint, for example, for what Israel should do economically. But he did say that there was something passed on by the Secretary.

I'm just wondering, who would have -- from what source would this come from?

A I'm going to, I'm afraid, stick where I am on this. That is, I'm not going to try to comment on how our views have been passed in specific terms, but there's been a very rich exchange; and I don't have any problems with the descriptions that have been made of it by Mr. Peres, but I don't have any specifics to offer you.

Q Have you got anything from the Embassy, or what can you tell us about the rebel attacks in Kabul?

A Don't have anything for you.

Q Can you take a look at that and see -- give us an idea how serious it is, or --

A I'll take a look at it. I think there is a program to try and inform journalists in that region about what's going on. But beyond that --

Q I haven't read about that.

A Well, you read about it, I think, frequently. In any case, I will see if I can get anything specific.

Q Anything for a slow news day.

A Anything for a slow news day.

Q Peres said that the President had asked Israel to establish the VOA transmitter, and they had some problems with it. Can you say why the U.S. wants Israel to put up a VOA transmitter?

A No, I don't have anything specific. Obviously, he indicated, yes, we have made a request, but I don't have details.

Q Anything you want to volunteer today, Alan, that we are overlooking?

A No. I think that you've probably got the sense of the flow of news for today.

- MORE -

Q Do you have a Cambodian sitrep today?

A I can give you a little bit on Cambodia. Sure. I'm always somewhat hesitant to do it in the sense that you've got a good deal of it already from your colleagues in the region, but let me give you what I have.

The latest reports available to us indicate the Vietnamese forces still control the eastern half of Nong Samet camp, otherwise known as Ritthisen. I'm told that the KPNLF, Son Sann forces, control the western edge.

We have no information to confirm press reports that Khmer People's National Liberation Front, the KPNLF forces, have recaptured much of the camp. That is, no information to confirm that.

Fighting between Vietnamese and KPNLF forces is reported to have been heavy on December 28 and over the weekend, including a KPNLF counterattack on December 30. KPNLF forces are reported to have disabled at least one and possibly two T-54 tanks.

The last news we have on the KPNLF camp at O Bok indicated that at least a portion of the military camp is still in KPNLF hands. Ampil, or Ban Sangae, remains tense, but there has been no attack on the camp.

Nothing new on fighting between Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge forces south of Aranyaprathet. Nothing new on casualties beyond press reports.

As far as civilian population, evacuation, and all of that, the O Bok evacuation site was reportedly shelled on December 27, forcing a portion of the population to relocate to another site further inside Thailand. Civilians also remain at the original evacuation site.

Thai authorities have still not confirmed evacuation of the camp at Ban Taluan.

And that's it. I think we provided you Friday afternoon some totals which you were looking for in terms of numbers of people moved across the border.

Q Will you put out this report?

A Yes.

Barry?

Q If you haven't been through this before, could I ask you, is Shultz coming home directly from Geneva, and could you give us some idea of who's going where, because apparently there's going to be extensive briefing of --

A I don't have anything --

Q -- allied governments.

A Yeah. I don't have --

Q In other words, they're not all going to assemble in one place

A I don't have anything to give you yet on the question of where anybody's going following Geneva, so --

Q How about the Secretary?

A As I say, where anybody is going.

Q I mean, I'm excluding duty free shops. I mean, is he going to make any European stop or --

A I'll repeat it. I don't have information on where anybody's going at this point, Barry.

Q Okay

A When we have it, we'll be happy to provide it

Q On another area

A Let's go

Q Is Mr. Murphy returning back to the Middle East to assist Lebanon and Israel before the resumption of the talks on January 7?

A I don't have any information on that. If there's something different to say, I will check on it and let you know I think that, as we indicated following his extensive conversations out there, he came back; we're in the process of evaluating both what happened during the course of his talks and what is happening generally in the region and specifically on the issue of southern Lebanon

But I don't have anything at the moment to suggest a specific plan for him to return before the Naqura talks would resume. As I say, I will check on that to see if there's anything --

Q Is it your understanding they will be resumed?

A I think that's something you have to ask the Egyptians -- excuse me, not the Egyptians -- the Lebanese and the Israelis. I don't have anything specific.

Q Alan, do you have anything on elections in India now? What's the future of U.S. and Indian relations?

A We congratulate the people of India on their demonstrated commitment to democratic institutions and traditions, and we also congratulate Mr. Gandhi on his party's victory, and we look forward to working with his new government.

Q According to Senator Tower in his report, he said that the only way the U.S. and India come closer is that the U.S. must stop sophisticated weapons to Pakistan. Now, you think it's going to happen in the future, or U.S. will stick to previous statements?

A I have no reason to believe that we're changing our policy, and I'd refer you back to what we've said before about the relationship with India as well following the -- particularly during the course of the Secretary's visit there.

So I don't think it's a matter of changing policy at this point.

Q Also, I have an article here that U.S. Embassy New Delhi and Indian Embassy in Washington has a copy of a 214-page report that was guided by State Department officials, a study by the CIA, titled "India Under Pressure." That -- what's going to happen --

A India what?

Q "India Under Pressure."

A Under pressure.

Q And what's going to happen if Indira dies before the elections?

A Oh, I think we had some --

Q And this was done.

A Yes. We had some guidance on that which goes back some way. I think what you're referring to is a study that was done by an academic, was published some months ago in fact --

Q September '84.

A It represents that individual's own assessment. Has no particular standing as far as a government position is concerned, but, you know, if you want to read it, read the entirety. But there's also some guidance which you might want to get a hold of in the Press Office.

Q Can you confirm, please, whether -- since a State Department official involved in this, and also CIA, that why this study was done before Mrs. Gandhi's death, and --

A Well, I think if you take a look at the guidance, it was something that had been under contract for a long period of time, and I think that the inferences you're suggesting in your question are misplaced.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:13 p.m.)

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END

08-19-88

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
LARRY SPEAKES
ON
THE PRESIDENT'S TELEPHONE CALL
TO THE REVEREND JESSE JACKSON,
LIEUTENANT ROBERT GOODMAN, JR.,
AND AMBASSADOR ROBERT PAGANELLI

January 3, 1984

The Briefing Room

11:04 A.M. EST

MR. SPEAKES: The President, in the photo, had a statement on the release of Lieutenant Goodman and Jesse Jackson's success. I think you'll have a readout on that shortly.

This morning at 9:41 a.m. -- for ten minutes -- the President spoke with Ambassador Paganelli, Reverend Jackson, and Lieutenant Goodman.

Some quotes: To Jessie Jackson -- "It is a great day here in Washington -- "

Q Can you slow down?

Q It is a great day --

MR. SPEAKES: -- "here in Washington. All Americans thank you. There have been a lot of prayers in Washington."

Q Slower, please.

Q He's talking to Jackson at this point?

Q Prayers -- here in Washington?

MR. SPEAKES: Yes. "I have been praying for you."

Q Great. (Laughter.)

MR. SPEAKES: "I couldn't be happier."

Q Oh, yeah.

MR. SPEAKES: To Lieutenant Goodman:

Q Hold it, hold it --

MR. SPEAKES: To Lieutenant Goodman: "It's good to hear your voice. I've talked with your wife. She has great faith in you. We've all had great faith in you, and great admiration."

That's the end of the quotes. The President will be meeting with Reverend Jackson tomorrow, times to be established later.

Q And Goodman?

MORE

II-1

Q Pictures?

MR. SPEAKES: I don't know whether -- always --

I don't know whether Goodman will be with Reverend Jackson or not. We're not clear on the specific plans as to whether the Lieutenant will return to his home, or whether he will come on in to Andrews.

Q Why wouldn't he come to Andrews?

MR. SPEAKES: Because he may want to go home.

Q But -- Isn't the flight coming directly to Andrews?

MR. SPEAKES: Not necessarily --

Q Might there be two flights --

Q You could have his family here, couldn't you?

MR. SPEAKES: We could. But, it's his option, it's his desire and the desire of his family as to which he wishes to do. If he wishes to fly home, he may --

Q Where's is his home --

Q Isn't it Baltimore?

MR. SPEAKES: His home of record is in Virginia Beach. His parents live in Boston and New York, or --

MR. SIMS: One is in Boston and I'm not sure where the other one is.

Q Well, Larry --

Q Can we get this straight? Now, the invitation to come to the White House has been extended to both of them?

MR. SPEAKES: Yes. But -- we won't be clear until they arrive in Germany, and until we have an opportunity to talk with them as to the specifics on whether he wishes to go to his home or whether he wishes to come here.

Q But, you were able to ascertain that Jackson accepted the President's invitation -- but you were not able to ascertain that Goodman, who was also on the telephone, accepted --

MR. SPEAKES: That's right.

Q Oh, I see.

Q Larry, what about the possibility that the President may go to Andrews?

MR. SPEAKES: I don't think so. I would imagine he will see him here.

Q When did the President talk with Goodman's wife?

MR. SPEAKES: A couple of days ago -- I'm not sure when. We can check on that and see --

Q Do you know what he said at the time? Do you know whether he said --

MR. SPEAKES: No. Only his description of it.

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Q What's the latest time now for arrival at Andrews?

MR. SPEAKES: It's 6:30 p.m. still -- right?

MR. SIMS: I wouldn't put any faith in that -- we just don't know -- (Laughter.) And, if you'd rather I say "I don't know" -- (Laughter.)

Q I like his style.

MR. SIMS: We think it's 6:30 p.m.

Q Keep it up -- that's great.

MR. SPEAKES: Historically, as you know, returns from Europe -- which all of us have been through many times -- tend to vary and there are many stories -- we'll just stay close to the Pentagon and see. I think we'll know a lot more when they leave Germany.

Q Jesse Jackson said this morning that he was trying to reach the President -- or the President was trying to reach him -- but couldn't get a call through -- was there an effort by the President earlier to call Syria?

MR. SPEAKES: I'm sure the call was placed earlier, but it was not taken until 9:41 a.m.

Q Not taken by the President, or?

Q And -- it was a call -- to the White House?

MR. SPEAKES: Visa-versa -- from the White House to --

Q Was there a reason -- why the President -- well, did the President want to meet with McFarlane let's say before he talked to Jesse Jackson -- was there a reason for delaying the call to Jackson?

MR. SPEAKES: No.

Q Is there any record that Jackson tried to call the President early this morning -- as seems to be indicated?

MR. SPEAKES: I don't know --

Q Can you tell us what Jackson's response was to what the President said?

MR. SPEAKES: No. We only heard one end of the conversation, so --

Q Charlie Wick wasn't present, was he? (Laughter.)

Q You have no word from the President what either Goodman or Jackson said to --

MR. SPEAKES: No.

Q What did he say to Paganelli?

MR. SPEAKES: Paganelli? He appreciated his effort.

Q Will you take that -- that question?

MR. SPEAKES: Yes -- we'll see what -- what the other side of the conversation was.

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Q Are we going to get a readout from Rumsfeld on the -- the Lebanon --

MR. SPEAKES: No.

Q Did he talk to Assad? Thank him? (Laughter.)

Q -- Lebanon radio?

MR. SPEAKES: Okay. See you at 12:15 p.m.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 11:09 A.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release January 6, 1984

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
AMBASSADOR JAMES GOODBY,
CHIEF, U.S. DELEGATION TO THE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE

The Briefing Room

10:10 A.M. EST

MR. SIMS: This briefing is by Ambassador James Goodby, who is the Chief of the U.S. Delegation to the Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

The Ambassador will have an opening statemert, I believe, which we will have a copy for you at the end of the briefing and we expect to have a Presidential statement at that time as well, a written statement.

Ambassador.

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: Thank you.

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I'd like to read this very brief statement and then take your questions, if I may.

The President has reviewed and approved the instructions for the United States Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, which will begin in Stockholm on January 17.

Essentially, the instructions require that the United States delegation search for agreements on concrete, practical measures designed to reduce the risk of war in Europe arising from surprise attack or from miscalculation.

The instructions to me emphasize that the United States Delegation shall conduct its work in accordance with the mandate which was negotiated by Ambassador Kampelman during the review meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which concluded its work in Madrid last fall.

That mandate stipulated that measures to be negotiated in Stockholm should be militarily significant, verifiable, politically binding and applicable to the whole continent of Europe.

This Conference, I want to emphasize, should be viewed as one facet of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which also monitors participating states' cooperation in other important areas, such as human rights.

The active participation of Secretary Shultz and other Foreign Ministers in the opening of this Conference in Stockholm is a clear demonstration of their serious commitment to this Conference and should insure that these negotiations get properly launched in January 17.

The United States Delegation -- again, I want to emphasize this point -- will be working very closely with our allies in Europe to reach agreements on such measures as advance notification of military exercises, observations of military exercises and, also, importantly, I think, means to improve communications among the participants in this Conference.

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The point of departure for the proposals will be the Helsinki Accord of 1975. But our proposals, which we'll be presenting very shortly in Stockholm, will go well beyond those agreements.

At the same time, I think it is necessary for me to emphasize that this Conference has its own agenda issues and that they are different from the other arms control negotiations. Serious efforts to negotiate mutually acceptable confidence-building measures are not in any way a substitute for other arms control negotiations, but rather should compliment those negotiations.

Finally, I'd like to make a point that's important to me: President Reagan, in one of his very first foreign policy decisions after taking office, decided that the United States would take part in such a conference on disarmament in Europe provided that it dealt with measures which would be militarily significant, verifiable, politically binding and applicable to the whole continent of Europe. And, as I've already emphasized, those ideas now do form a part of the mandate which has been given to the negotiators in Stockholm.

On the general subject of confidence-building measures, the President has spoken both in Europe and at the United Nations about the importance of such measures in terms of maintaining peace and security. These are issues about which he obviously cares deeply and I look forward to his strong support in negotiating measures which are in keeping with the objectives that he has defined.

That's the end of my statement. I might add to that that I've just come from a very good, very supportive, I might say, meeting with President Reagan, Secretary Shultz, the Vice President and others

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and the President reaffirmed to me, personally, his strong backing for this conference and said to me that he will be following this very closely and wished us Godspeed. We welcomed that. I think this conference does have some important possibilities in it, and I have a very good delegation representing all of the agencies in the United States interested in the subject, who will be going with us for the opening of the negotiations in Stockholm. So with that --

Q Sir, what can you tell us about anything new that's in your instructions, because we've heard about the confidence-building measures from the President, and we've seen what Secretary Weinberger sent over.

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: Well, I think the important thing that's new about the nature of this conference is that, unlike some of the other confidence-building measures that we've advanced in other negotiations, these would be applicable on a 35-nation basis, covering the whole continent of Europe up to the Ural mountains. And that is new and different and, I submit to you, important, because it does provide a basis for, in effect, doing what the Helsinki process was designed to do, namely try to break down the barriers between East and West, try to provide greater openness.

And the proposals we're making, which -- some of which you've heard before, do deal with roughly four categories: exchange of information; notification of military exercises above a certain threshold; there will be a certain amount of observation -- monitoring, if you will -- of such exercises; and, finally -- and this also is new in this particular context -- we hope to find ways in which we can deal more effectively with crises, and particularly those crises that might arise from some kind of a failure to implement fully these agreements regarding advanced notification of military exercises.

We have some ideas about improving communications, for example, between the countries --

Q Hotlines and things like that, sir?

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: Roughly that idea, yes. I wouldn't call it exactly a hotline because it will be a somewhat different context when you're talking 35 countries.

Q Does this include President's --

Q -- computer link-up?

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: We haven't gotten into that detail yet. I want to emphasize to you that we've been working now for the past several months -- and, in fact, this goes back some years -- with the NATO allies. There will be a final NATO meeting next Tuesday in Brussels which will put the finishing touches on these proposals.

These points that you were just raising is one of those points we're talking about, and I don't want to pre-judge how we'll come out in some of those details. But we'll have some very interesting -- I think, innovative -- ideas to present.

Q Is there a timetable for reaching an agreement or for producing a document?

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: No, there's no timetable of that sort. We did have -- I should emphasize this -- a preparatory meeting that took place this fall in Helsinki, which was a very businesslike and rather constructive meeting, I thought. And we did reach agreement on a timetable for meetings that will take place in Stockholm during the rest of this year. But we did not set any kind of a deadline for reaching agreements. Our hope is we can move rather rapidly towards

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reaching some agreements, but we're under no deadline to do so.

Q What's "rapidly"? Within the year?

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: It all depends. I emphasize in my statement that we're interested in getting it down to the very practical -- and I would even say rather detailed -- propositions that we'd like to negotiate with the 35 countries including, of course, all the Warsaw Pact countries.

And if the Soviets are prepared to do that and to engage with us in that kind of a negotiation, I am optimistic enough to think we could make a lot of progress in the next several months. But at the same time, one has to recognize that there may come some elements of propaganda into such a conference and that would, of course, have a delaying effect on how much we can do. So I can't make any definite predictions, but I'm hopeful that we can get down to some very specific and practical measures and do that rather quickly.

Q Well, what -- these things are always prepared in advance. What indication do you have that the Soviet Union will comply with this, and do you mean that this would not take in the SS-20 positions and so forth?

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: Well, again let me emphasize. This conference is really different from other arms control negotiations, in that we are not talking in this conference about reductions in

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forces, nor redeployment of forces. In that sense, I think these proposals we're making -- while they have a very positive effect -- will not really deal with SS-20s. But they will emphasize conventional ground forces. This is where the whole focus will be. And that's the thing that I think you should keep in mind.

Q Well, what reaction have you gotten from Moscow so far?

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: Well, I think you have to look back at the record. We spent roughly three years in Madrid -- I should say Ambassador Kampleman, in particular -- was, I think, very successful in negotiating a mandate that did the things we want.

I emphasized that in the statement -- about the kinds of proposals that we want to negotiate. And, the Soviets did subscribe to that. We had preparatory meetings last fall in which the Soviets again were relatively cooperative.

Now, if this trend continues, it may be that we'll be in for some serious negotiations. And -- signals that we're getting from the East are relatively positive about this.

Q How about the Gromyko statement, though? Didn't he -- yesterday or the day before -- down play any chances of success on this -- this meeting?

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: No. Not to my knowledge, in fact, to the contrary. Generally speaking, the Soviets have been emphasizing the possible agreements that might come out of this and emphasizing their interest in it, so --

Q It's non-nuclear, though?

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: This is -- designed to be -- non-nuclear. It should focus on preventing conventional war. And if you can do that -- and do that at the level that a war might begin with -- you see, I mean, wars are not likely to begin with a large nuclear exchange. They're likely to begin with some kind of an incident that escalates.

So, if we can get a better handle on that kind of a problem, then we'll have done a lot to prevent war -- even though war, I suggest to you, is very, very unlikely. But, if you can reduce it by 10 percent, 15 percent, you're doing a good thing. And, I think, this is basically what we're trying to do.

Q I wonder if you could explain -- you said that "signals" we're getting from the East are relatively positive. I wonder if you could expand on that. And the reason I ask that is the White House took some pains to have you come out here and do this briefing, there's the Gromyko-Shultz meeting, there's a report that the President may make a speech on East-West relations -- do we detect some change from the recent period where the nuclear arms negotiations broke down and the KAL incident, etcetera -- is there something in the air here about a --

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: I wouldn't want to say that there's been a change that one sees in terms of a watershed of some sort, but you have to bear in mind that this is a conference that the Soviets have had an interest in for a long time and have taken very seriously over the years.

You have to bear in mind that they're talking about a

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Conference which includes all of the European countries as well as the United States and Canada, and that does, for them I think, put a little different cast on their general approach.

I want to emphasize that, as far as we're concerned, this is another important channel. We're very pleased that we have this channel. But, at the same time, this is no substitute for the other negotiations on START and INF, and on MBFR. And I should say, technically speaking, START is in a temporary state of suspension, if you will, pending what the Soviets say will be a reassessment of their position.

Therefore, one cannot foreclose in any way the resumption of START sometime in the spring.

Q I don't think you understood his question. We think that there's some -- suddenly a sudden interest in disarmament and moving in rapprochement with the Soviets. There seems to be -- all of a sudden we hear about this Conference out of the blue --

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: Oh, you mean on the part of the United States?

Q Yes.

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: No. There's no change in that respect, either. We're ready to negotiate on any of these things. It depends on the Soviets. We're ready to negotiate on all of these arms control issues.

This Conference has not attracted very much public attention, I must say, and -- as you say -- comes out of the blue to most people. On the other hand, it has been in works now for at least three years, and indeed, was really part of the agreements that were reached in Helsinki in 1975 which did include some of these confidence building measures of a rather simple type, I might add.

So, it's nothing rather new, but we're anxious that people understand what it is, and what it isn't, and that's why I'm here today.

Q Right now, aren't you the only game in town? I mean, you may call it "suspension" but, for all intents and purposes, there are no other contacts

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between us and the Soviets.

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: Well, there are a lot of contacts through the diplomatic channels, but in terms of --

Q No other formal --

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: Right. This is the only -- at the moment, and I hope it won't continue that way, I might add, but, at the moment, this is the only conference dealing with something that does pertain to arms control.

Let me emphasize this also. It is not a place where we anticipate negotiating on these other arms control negotiations. That is completely out of the ball park. I don't think anybody in this conference, east or west, intends to get into that sort of thing.

Q Of course, that could come up between the two -- the Foreign Minister and the Secretary of State.

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: That's a whole different question. There'll be a whole lot of issues on that agenda.

Q When does the conference actually open? Somebody said today, I thought.

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: It opens on January 17.

Q So that Gromyko and Shultz will be there for the opening?

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: Yes. It opens --

Q What's the significance of today?

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: The significance of today is I had a meeting with the President in which he approved my instructions and I want to share that with you.

Q Why are you out here, I guess is the question.

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: I'm sorry?

Q It begs the question, if this conference doesn't open until January 13th --

Q 17th.

Q -- 17th -- thank you -- why are you out here?

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: For one thing, it's the last occasion in which I'll be in the United States because I'm going to this NATO meeting I mentioned over the weekend. So, in terms of my telling you what my instructions are, what I'm hoping for, I could only do that on this occasion.

I'm sure, in the next week, there will be other people, I hope there'll be other people, that will be talking with you about this thing.

Q I'm sure you're right.

Q . Does the President seem to know a lot about this conference? Did he seem to know anything about it?

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: Yes, indeed, yes. We talked at quite length. We had an exchange, he initiated it. I responded and I felt very, very comfortable with the whole thing, I might add.

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Q So you believe that he knows what's going on?

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: Indeed, yes, yes.

Q What did you mean when you said that it stops at the Ural Mountains? In a sense, is it part of the Soviet Union is excluded from this and part is included?

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: Yes. What happened in the Helsinki agreement of 1975 is that a strip of Soviet territory, 250 kilometers wide, was included as the area of coverage for these confidence-building measures. Now that's been extended to all of the European USSR. So, you have the old idea the French have talked about for years of the Atlantic to the Urals. The whole of Europe, in other words.

MR. SIMS: Last question, please. We have another briefing.

Q I'm just confused about when you said it was only applied to conventional forces. We've always interpreted these confidence-building measures as being -- once the communication is in place, it can be used for averting anything. Is that --

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: Well, when we install, if we install, the kinds of communication or the kinds of ability to communicate I'm talking about, it will be tied into the kind of measures that we hope to negotiate. And those measures, in turn, are basically things that deal with conventional ground forces in that zone.

The other measures that you probably have in mind, we've advanced in START, for example, an advance notification of missile launchers, which is nuclear. So in the nuclear negotiations, we have nuclear CBMs. Here, the basic thrust of it is really on conventional forces.

MR. SIMS: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: Thank you.

END 10:27 A.M. EST

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ON-THE-RECORD PRESS BRIEFING
ON
SECRETARY SHULTZ' STOCKHOLM TRIP
BY
JAMES GOODBY, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE
FRIDAY, JANUARY 6, 1984, 4:35 P.M.

Rm 7422

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AMBASSADOR GOODBY: Would it be useful for me to start with a few words about what the CDE is all about and what our objectives are on that?

JOURNALISTS: Yes.

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: To put it in a little perspective, the CDE, the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, or to use the full title, Conference on Confidence and Security-building Measures and Disarament in Europe, is a part of the Helsinki process. That is to say, it's a part of the Conference that is most well known in this country for its work on human rights. But it was, after all, a Conference that had more than the one part to it; namely, human rights, important though that is to us, remains important. It has as part of it also security.

You may remember that in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, there were several principles that had to do with security, non-use of force, and so forth, and also included in it several so-called confidence-building measures which the two most important were advance notification of military exercises and the invitation of observers to such military exercises.

The threshhold for those notifications was 25,000 troops, 21 days in advance of the exercise, and the zone of application covered only a strip of 250 kilometers in breadth in the Soviet Union as well, of course, as all of the other countries in Europe in their totality.

As a result of work done by Max Kampelman, and others, in the Madrid Review Meeting of the CSCE, which took place over a three-year period, ending last September, a mandate was developed for this Conference among other things that was done in Madrid.

The mandate for this Conference, I think, represented a very significant achievement, and I give Ambassador Kampelman and those who worked on this a lot of credit for it. It stipulated several things that were very important to us and, in fact, that President Reagan had stipulated very early in his Administration that we would pursue in any such Conference.

First of all, the zone of application for any of these confidence-building measures should be the whole continent of Europe, meaning up to the Ural Mountains, and that was acceptable.

Another very important point that was accepted was that these measures should be militarily significant and should be verifiable and should be politically binding. I use those words because those are important criteria by which we will measure any proposals that are introduced in Stockholm after their acceptability to us.

The concept of the CDE is that it is a staged affair, very much like the CSCE itself which moves in stages -- review conferences after review conferences. It is understood, and it was agreed in the mandate in Madrid, that the first stage of this Conference would deal with confidence- and security-building measures, and that there might be a later stage, but it was left totally open as to whether there would be such a later stage and what it would deal with if it ever were agreed.

The next opportunity for the 35 countries that are in the CSCE and, therefore, in the CDE, ~~is~~ to decide whether to move to a second stage or to review the results of the CDE is November of 1986 when the next CSCE Review Conference takes place in Vienna.

It is possible for that Review Conference to decide that the first stage should continue, not enough accomplished, or maybe more needs to be done. It is also possible, if everyone agrees, and the CSCE and the CDE also work by consensus, it is also possible that they all could agree that maybe something more would be done so therefore the mandate would be amended, expanded. That's a possibility. But, as you can see, for the next three years at least we're going to be operating in the stage that deals with confidence-building measures.

I met with the President and the Vice President this morning, the Secretary of State, Mr. Adelman and the National Security Advisor, Mr. Meese, and a number of others were there. We discussed my instructions, the instructions for the U.S. delegation, and I think the essential point I would make about that is that the two key points, perhaps, are that we wish to move ahead, to negotiate certain concrete, practical agreements that deal with certain problems that we think are important to deal within this Conference.

These are as follows. We would like to deal with the problem of surprise attack. We would like to deal with the problem of misperceptions which could lead to miscalculations and therefore unwanted conflict. We would like also to deal, if we can, with the problem of the use of military force for intimidation.

We would also like, if we could, to enhance the stability of the military situation in all of Europe, and we, furthermore, would like to find ways in which it would be possible to deal more effectively with crises should they occur; or better put, perhaps, to head off crises before they get to be that kind of a thing. And to that end, we are giving thought to the various ideas that have to do primarily with enhancing communications between the participants in this Conference.

To sum up, that is, in effect, one of the key points in my instructions. The other key point has to do with the criteria, namely, that anything we agree to should be perfectly consistent with the mandate that was agreed in Madrid which stipulated verifiability. The whole continent of Europe should be the zone of application, politically binding, militarily significant. There are, of course, many other details in the instructions, but I think those two give you some sense of the general direction.

Let me say that in order to achieve some of these objectives I've mentioned, to deal with some of the problems I laid on the table here earlier, we are working with the NATO countries to develop a set of proposals which we hope to introduce very early in these negotiations, probably within the first week or so.

I would say that they fall generally into four categories, and they derive also, I should say, from the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, which I mentioned earlier.

The four categories are exchange of information about military units; the second would be notification in advance of certain types of military activities. (And, here, I would say this would be at a lower threshhold, over a longer period of time in advance than the earlier agreement I cited, which is 25,006 troops in 21 days). Third, we'd like to have a category of proposals and agreements that would deal with monitoring or the observation of certain types of military exercises. And, finally, to deal with this problem of incipient crises, if you will, we would like to have a category of measures that might serve to improve communications among the various countries.

The status of this work in NATO is that NATO has been seized with this problem, really, ever since 1980 when we first began to think about the CDE, when it became a live possibility in the context of the Madrid Review Meeting which was then getting underway, I think. But the work has begun really in earnest and it has been taken very, very seriously, indeed, within the past several months in NATO.

There have been experts meeting day in and day out, a lot of work being done in the NATO machinery in Brussels, a lot of input by us, in particular, but by others as well. It is an operation in which all the NATO countries are very, very actively participating. Every single one of them have expressed a viewpoint, and I would say that includes France, which, I think, it's interesting to know, was one of the fathers, if you will, of this Conference. Former President Giscard d'Estaing was, in fact, the one who proposed a conference on disarmament in Europe when he was still President of France. The French, generally speaking, outlined the staged approach that we're using today ~~and~~ with its emphasis on conventional ground manpower. So the French have an active interest in this and are actively playing a role in developing the NATO position. It would be interesting to have them in this Conference.

Among other things, this will be one of the first serious disarmament efforts that they have been engaged in for quite a long time -- Arms control efforts is a better way to put it.

The NATO package will be completed, we expect, next week. There will be a NATO session in Brussels on Tuesday. The heads of ~~delegation of~~ the NATO ~~are~~ delegations in Stockholm will be in attendance. I will be there. We hope to finish the package and have it ready to be useable by us in Stockholm within a few days after that.

As far as the opening of the Conference is concerned, it will open on the 17th. The evening before, on the 16th, there will be a NATO Foreign Ministers dinner hosted by the French. The main business, the main opening will take place the next morning under the auspices of the host country -- Sweden.

I think the first order of business is for the Prime Minister of Sweden to give a little speech of welcome, and then it moves on into the afternoon. The other ceremonies, during the morning and the evening.

The Foreign Ministers will begin their presentations, their remarks, after lunch on the 17th. Mr. Shultz will be the third speaker. He will, therefore, speak in the afternoon of the 17th January. The Foreign Ministers of all the 35 countries will continue during the next few days and will end that presentation, I think, by Friday of that week. In any case, by the end of the week that phase will be over.

The following week goes into closed session. That part of it is open to the press the public, to some extent. I don't know how many seats there are. But the following week goes into closed session, and at that point the heads of delegation -- my counterparts and myself -- will be starting the introduction of the specific proposals that we in NATO have been working on.

I presume we'll hear proposals from the Warsaw Pact. Perhaps some as well from the neutral, non-aligned countries.

As to expectations of what the Soviets may do, what may the Warsaw Pact do, there are various possibilities and I think the most likely of them is that we will see a kind of mixed picture. I think some proposals will be introduced by the Warsaw Pact. They will be of a very general declaratory nature. They will have to do with the non-use of force. There may be other things as well of a general declaratory nature.

There may also be, and we hope there will be, some proposals that will be derivative, if you will, from the Helsinki Final Act; the proposals that deal with advance notification of military activities, for example. And there are some indications that there may be such proposals in the works. If there are, we, in the United States delegation, will do our best to seize upon whatever common ground there is and try to move towards some kind of active negotiation on those concrete measures. Because you recall I mentioned that my instructions -- and I think this goes really for all the NATO countries -- are to look for concrete, practical, realistic measures that really have some effect in helping us to understand what military activities are about and to have some of the consequences that general declarations cannot have. We are not really much interested in general declarations.

We have subscribed, of course, the non-use of force in the U.N. Charter and, indeed, in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. Resubscribing to some of those principles would not really be breaking new ground. Therefore, we are resistent to dealing with such general declarations and much more interested in, indeed, insisting on some kind of discussion of these concrete measures of the general categories that I've talked about earlier.

There are indications in what we have seen coming out of the public commentaries, if you will, from the Warsaw Pact that they may wish to do some serious business in this Conference. Of course, there are various definitions of what businesslike means, and this is a word the Soviets indeed have used about the Conference; that it should be a businesslike and constructive meeting.

There will be, I think, a judgment made at some point about which road to take in this Conference. If the consensus is that we should move ahead towards negotiation of these measures which go detailed and not terribly glamorous, we think it will have effect, nonetheless, in helping reduce the risk of war in Europe. if we take that road, and I think we can look forward to a fairly tough, but maybe produce negotiation.

If, on the other hand, it appears to some countries that playing to the galleries, or trying to appeal to the anti-nuclear sentiment, which clearly exists, is perhaps the better way to go, then we'll not have a productive meeting. As of now, I cannot predict which of these two roads will be the way we'll go. We're, of course, hoping for the first of these a serious, productive, detailed negotiation that reaches out towards new measure, derivative from Helsinki but going well beyond it.

I think that's probably about all that's useful to say.

Q I just have a technical one. You mentioned when Shultz is speaking. Do you know when Gromyko is speaking?

A He was scheduled to speak the 8th. I don't know whether he's shifted that position with any of his allies or anybody else. I think he would probably speak the next morning. I'm not absolutely sure.

Q Ambassador Goodby, is there any effort being made to dovetail these confidence-building measures with the confidence-building measures that have have broken out of the START negotiations?

A No, they're different.

Q They're nuclear and conventional --

A They're nuclear and convention.

Q There's no effort in terms of the approach to these coming up with an agreement at the same time or anything of that sort?

A No, no. On START, we're in a position where the Soviets have told that they will want to reassess their position in light of the INF deployments, with the implication that at some point START may resume.

The CBM's we have proposed in Geneva, in the START talks, are advance notification of ballistic missile launches of all types, proposals having to do with fleet-wide disbursals of SSBN's and the advance notification of takeoffs of heavy bombers. Those all have a nuclear component. We're not talking "nuclear" as far as we're concerned in the CDE. We prefer to focus, as I think most of our Allies do, on the conventional problem.

Q I only raise the question -- maybe you would care to comment on it -- but there's been some speculation for some months now that maybe some kind of an agreement on CBM's arrive out of Geneva might be sufficient for a summit between President Reagan and Yuri Andropov. I was wondering if that's in the back of your mind at all as you approach the --

A No, it's not; no.

Q Mr. Ambassador, you said, as I understood you, that your instructions which you got today were to move toward concrete agreements on three points: Surprise attack, misperceptions leading to miscalculation, and use of force for intimidation.

A Those are the objectives that these specific concrete measures will achieve, we hope.

Q The "surprise attack" one is the one that is familiar, at least to me -- and I suppose most of us -- I don't know what it means "misperceptions leading to miscalculations" and what you have in mind by "use of military force for intimidation." Would you explain what you're talking about there?

A Yes, I'll be glad to.

Let me put it this way: That second point to me is a very important one because, at least my perception of the way a conflict could occur is that the least likely way that it would occur is through a great nuclear exchange, "a bolt out-of-the-blue kind of thing."

The most likely way it could begin would be at the opposite end of the spectrum, through some kind of incident, perhaps along some frontier somewhere, which then begins to get out of hand, and people begin to use some kind of conventional military force.

At that point, a crisis, I would suggest, is hard upon us; and when you begin to see military actions taking place, you want to know is this something new or is it something planned, was it something responsive to this imminent crisis, or what?

What we hope we'll achieve through agreement on a long-range forecast, for example, of all military exercises down to fairly low levels, over a period of a year, as an illustrative proposal, is we've got a sense of what the normal military routine is. And further, when we talk about trying to get advance notification of individual exercises, and we see one that is not notified in accordance with the agreed procedures, then you understand that this is an anamaly -- that this is something that is different and this is something that was not planned, and is therefore intended to deal with some new situation.

At that point, there is all kind of potential for misperceiving what the problem is. Indeed, without this kind of advance notification there is even a chance that you misperceive what a routine military operation is about. Therefore, our hope and expectation here is that through greater openness about these military activities, through establishing a kind of base line military scenario, or scene, in Europe, you begin to understand what better what an exercise is intended to do and what it is not intended to do.

In other words, greater clarity about military activities should sharpen your perception, reduce your misunderstandings, and that in turn should help with the situation of over-reacting to something that was not meant to be an overt threat, or covert threat for that matter.

Now, on the other point about intimidation, it is possible through the use of military force to demonstrate, if you will, a military intention to march into a country, to perform an exercise on its frontiers, for example, and therefore to intimidate it and to encourage it to take action that the greater power wishes taken. To the extent that you can make exercises -- military activities -- predictable, and make it a little bit more difficult for some unexpected military activity to occur in response to some political event somewhere, to that extent you have succeeded in inhibiting to some small degree the use of military force for intimidation. So that is, basically, what we are trying to do.

Now, let me make a point here: I think this agenda we have before us in Stockholm is an important one, and it can produce some meaningful agreements; but let us not exaggerate what these agreements will do. They will have some useful effect in making perhaps the use of force less likely in making Europe a safer place. And I suggest to you that if you only succeed in doing that by 10 percent, that's worthwhile doing --

Q Can you give us --

A -- but it will not reduce the weapons; it is not a substitute for these other negotiations, and I don't want anybody to think that we're expecting miracles will happen in Stockholm. We'll get perhaps, if we're fortunate and work well and skillfully together in NATO, some useful agreements, but it will not be agreements that will reduce forces or do the things we're trying to do in START or in INF or MBFR.

Q Can you give us some idea of the attitude of the Soviets going into this a little more than you have? There have been preliminary talks between Secretary Shultz and Ambassador Dobrynin. Surely, there has been more contact than that.

Do you see that they have as forthcoming an attitude as they have in the past, less forthcoming, or about the same?

A On the CDE or on other things?

Q CDE.

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A CDE. Well, let me say right away that I do not anticipate that Secretary Shultz is going to spend a lot of his time with Mr. Gromyko talking about CDE. I think they will have an agenda that will go well beyond that, and indeed I, frankly, don't see any particular reason at this stage for spending a lot of time at that level on CDE. We're just getting started; we don't know what the issues are quite yet, and so I don't, personally, see the need for a lot of exchange at that level. However, I'd be frank to say that I am not privy to the Secretary's thinking about how he wants to deal in this meeting. But I don't expect CDE to be a major element in it.

Now, as to Soviet attitudes, I have already touched on that to some extent. There are signals that I hear which indicate to me that the Soviets would like to see something coming out of this meeting. This is not the type of meeting like START or MBFR which they find it in their interest to interrupt, at least for now, for the time being. It is a conference that, as I've said, they've been interested in for a long time. And, very importantly, I think, to use their terminology, it's an all-European conference; and therefore, I think there are incentives for them to want to show that this is a useful thing that they themselves, along with the French and a few others, helped to invent, and that in an all-European context, some things can be done among reasonable people.

So, therefore, I think there are reasons inherent in the nature of this beast -- conference -- for the Soviets to want to do something that would produce agreements. As I suggested, there will be temptations -- to play to the gallery and to look to the anti-nuclear tendencies that exist, and to work that side of the street -- and I expect to see that. But I expect there is another side of the street, too, which is to see if something indeed can be done on some of these practical measures. After all, the Soviets did agree to measures of the past having to do with advance notification of military movements and of observation of military movements. And I think it is reasonable to think -- and some of the open literature suggests -- that they will have ideas in that area.

So I see a kind of two-tiered operation with the Soviets, one dealing with large, political concepts like non-use of force and a few other generalities of that type, and the other, much more below the surface, dealing with some rather specific agreements where we might be able to do some business.

Q Mr. Ambassador, if I can ask you to clarify something, when the Soviets agree to discuss the issues for the whole of Europe, from the Urals to the edge, does that mean that they accept that definition for existing agreements or only for future ones?

A It only deals with the mandate for the CDE.

Q I see. So at the present time, there is only that 250-kilometer strip that they are --

A That's correct, under the Helsinki Final Act of 1975.

Q What is the new threshold that you hope to -- I wouldn't dare to ask which one you hope to end up with, but what is the threshold you probably --

A I don't dare to answer the question right now. We're still working on it in NATO, and there are some specifics that I'd just as soon not lay out here until they're further along.

Q Is it anticipated that Secretary Shultz, or some of the other Foreign Ministers of NATO, will outline in their opening speeches what the proposals are of the NATO countries, or is that not likely to be done?

A I can't say what all the NATO Ministers are planning to do. They are going to get together, as I indicated, a day before; and I'm going over next week, and probably have a little comparing of notes on how we intend to play it.

I would suppose that some of them would probably give some general indication of what we're thinking about, but I do not expect I would see in anybody's speech a detailed laying out of these proposals. I do want to be cautious and say that we'll be comparing notes next week -- Secretary Shultz later on with his colleagues -- and they'll sort it out by the time the 17th rolls around.

Q Mr. Ambassador, the three areas that you mentioned before -- do you expect the Soviets to be interested in progress in any one of those or across-the-board? Do you have higher hopes for the intimidations or the misperceptions category?

A I don't necessarily expect that the Soviets are going to accept our definition of what the objectives of this Conference should be. We have our own ideas about them, and we see the Conference in this light as focusing on the problems of surprise attack and misconception, problems of intimidation. I don't expect that the Soviets are going to say, "Yes, you're right. That's exactly what we're here for." So, therefore, I don't think I could answer in those categories.

I think their general objectives are to create a political climate in Europe that is satisfying to them, and that seems to mean that they want to have some sort of thematic proposals to make that have to do with not using force, perhaps being more specific, in not using nuclear weapons. I think that is proably the general political theme they'll be developing because that to them would be one of the objectives of the negotiations.

I don't think that quite fits in with the objectives I've been talking about. But on the other hand, as I've said, there would be some more specific proposals and more concrete proposals that they will make, and to the extent that we can negotiate them and them into place, it doesn't necessarily matter whether we describe the outcome in one way and the Soviets in another, I think.

Q What is your own sense, having being a veteran of the START negotiations, of when and if the Soviets are going to come back to Geneva?

A I guess I'd better not speculate on that. I do want to say that I think some of the -- the way we've talked about is a little exaggerated. The formal position is that they will reassess their position; they cannot now set a date for the resumption of those talks.

The formal position of MBFR is that they will get back into diplomatic channels with regard to setting a date. It's really probably only in INF where they have been rather definitive and hard-lined about not resuming at all. So, I don't know. Frankly, I'm not sure I can even speculate because I have no idea of what (inaudible).

Q Mr. Ambassador, the White House is beginning to spread the word, as it comes out in inches, that the President will make a major address on the 17th on U.S.-Soviet affairs. I presume that you will cover this in your talks.

Do you think this will have any effect on getting CDE off to a good start?

A I can't comment on that. I don't know what he's planning on that score. I do think having Secretary Shultz there and having all the NATO Foreign Ministers there, he is getting off to an awfully good start. I think that does indicate the proper level of attention to a conference that, after all, is not very well known, certainly in the United States -- and not much better known in Europe, for that matter. I think given that high-level attention is a very good thing in terms of focusing attention on its potential and its responsibilities.

I just happened to think that this whole area we've been talking about has been a much over-looked and underrated area. Some people think of it as something not terribly serious. I think one reason for that is, we haven't given it nearly the attention we've given all these other negotiations. If we were to spend as many man years thinking about how to deal with the problem of preventing war as we have devoted to how do you reduce SS-18s, for example, we would probably have a lot of interesting things to say -- and I hope that that may happen as a result of these -- this beginning, of this meeting.

Did you have a question?

Q Yes. When you explained the threshold, the mandate of the Urals to the coast, that's the groundwork, that's the mandate coming from Madrid?

A Yes.

Q Is that correct?

A Yes. That's the mandate, as we tend to call it.

Q O.K. So it could be anything from 250 kilometers out? Is that already agreed?

A No. The whole Continent of Europe means up to the Ural Mountains.

Q I understood that.

A Now, there was in Madrid some debate about, does it go out to the sea also?

Q That's right. What I'm asking you is, what goes beyond that?

A The solution that was finally found was that you take a functional approach to that question; and "functional" meant -- at least to us; and there may be some debate about it -- but "functional" to us meant that if there was some offshore naval activity, that is organically linked to an onshore ground activity, then that offshore activity is notified along with the ground.

Q But that wasn't addressed in Madrid?

A Yes, it was addressed in Madrid.

Q I mean, it wasn't agreed upon in Madrid.

A We explained it in that way, and made it very clear to everyone what we had in mind. The actual language of the mandate speaks of "adjoining sea areas," which implies something to me, although it may not to everybody.

Now, there was a footnote that was put in largely, I think, at the Soviet's insistence, which talks about sea areas also meaning ocean areas -- will there be a debate about how far it goes and what naval activities are linked to what ground activities.

But as far as we're concerned, it's a closed issue. This deals with the Continent of Europe, essentially the ground forces, and essentially, furthermore, conventional ground forces.

Of course, there will be a lot of ideas introduced about nuclear issues, offshore activities, and so forth. But I've told you what our focus is going to be, and I think all the NATO countries feel that way as well.

Q How difficult do you think it will be to get the Soviets to accept the existing CBMs all the way to the Urals?

A I don't know, but I think that they would be thinking probably in terms like that, but those existing --

Let me present a couple of problems for you: I was asked this earlier at the Foreign Press Center. It's an interesting thing.

There are a couple of other possibilities in this Conference we have to worry about: One is that it evolves into a strickly propaganda circus -- temptations to talk about things that are "pie in the sky" and Utopian become so great that it just becomes the standard, and the general output is nothing much more than that.

In my opinion, that would discredit the Conference -- not necessarily do a lot of harm to the world, but unfortunately, discredit something that I think has some promise to it. I hope that doesn't happen.

But the other problem is a little more insidious, and it is that there may be a tendency to want to try to get some sort of easy agreements. And what you just described to me, I would put in the category of "easy agreements." I can't say whether the Soviets would accept it or wouldn't accept it. But we would like to go well beyond those kinds of agreements.

We would like to lower that threshold, and perhaps even put it in some different concepts and cover maybe other types of activities. In other words, there are a lot of things that can be done that were not done in Helsinki, and we would like to go well beyond the Helsinki kinds of ideas.

There may be a tendency -- and I consider it as a possible danger -- of agreeing on something just for the sake of getting an agreement, to help improve the political atmosphere. That may be one of the problems we will be facing at some point. I personally feel -- and I think most of my colleagues I've talked with in the NATO countries feel -- that it would be a great mistake to, by some lowest common denominator, just to get something going. We must hold out for something serious and meaningful that has some real impact, and not simply just to make this an interesting conference, but because the times call out for that. We're in a period when we need some serious agreements if we're going to try to make this a turning point in our relations with the East. These easy agreements won't do that, and therefore, I see no point in considering them or in encouraging people to think we will agree to things like that.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 5:45 p.m.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF PREMIER ZHAO

January 9, 1984

The Briefing Room

11:08 A.M.

MR. SIMS: This briefing is on background attributable to a senior administration official.

We will have, as you know, a meeting tomorrow and a read-out briefing of the meeting with the President about 2:30 P.M tomorrow afternoon here.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Good morning.

Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang will begin his official visit to this country with an arrival ceremony on the South Lawn at 10:00 A.M. tomorrow.

Premier Zhao's visit responds to the President's invitation and will be reciprocated by the President's visit to China planned for this coming April.

Zhao will have with him what is a fairly large entourage by Chinese standards. In the official party, it includes 13 individuals plus himself and about 28 accompanying staffers. The key people with Zhao, who I might note, is making not only his maiden trip to this nation, but also the first trip by any PRC premier to this country, include Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian; Deputy Secretary General of the State Council Chen Chu; the Ambassador to the United States and former Vice Minister Zhang Wenjin; and at least three vice ministers. The Vice Minister for the State Science and Technology Commission, Mr. Zhao Dongwan; the Vice Minister of the State Planning Commission, Mr. Gan Ziyu; and the Vice Minister of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, Mr. Jia Shi.

I think there'll be available for you a copy of Zhao's schedule, so let me just mention a couple of the highlights. On January 10th, Zhao will have a private one-hour meeting with the President. That will be followed -- with the President and a few key Cabinet members. That will be followed by a larger session chaired by the President with additional Cabinet members present.

On the same day, Zhao will attend a luncheon hosted by Secretary Shultz. He will, later in that afternoon, meet with Secretary Shultz and then with Secretary Regan and then he will be the guest at a state dinner in his honor at the White House starting at 7:30 P.M. tomorrow.

On the following day, Zhao meets in the morning with members of the House and members of the Senate. Also with Presidential Science Advisor Keyworth.

He goes to a luncheon hosted by the Council on U.S.-China Trade. And then, in the afternoon, meets with Secretaries Baldrige and Weinberger.

In the evening, he hosts a reception and then goes to a dinner hosted by the Chinese community in Washington.

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On his final morning in Washington, he will attend a Cabinet breakfast at the White House, and following that, he and his entourage depart for San Francisco where he's going to spend a couple of days. Then back to New York City for a couple of days.

This criss-crossing pattern, of course, is because he leaves the country heading for Ottawa, so he has to come back to the east coast.

Zhao's formal title is Premier of the State Council of the People's Republc of China. In protocol terms, that means he's China's head of government. In practical terms, that means he's in day-to-day charge of running the governmental and administrative machinery of the world's most populace country.

Zhao also happens to be one of the top six leaders of China's Communist party, the so-called standing committee of the Chinese politbureau, and he's the youngest of that elite group. He's a close associate and protege of Deng Xiaoping.

Within China, Zhao has earned a reputation for innovation, for technical expertise, for a can-do approach to problems, and a commitment to far-reaching economic reform. In fact, Zhao's special focus of attention in recent years has been the management of China's ambitious economic modernization program, and I expect that he will devote considerable attention to that subject during his visit to this country.

We view the exchange of visits by Zhao and the President, in a sense, as a single event, although separated by three months in time. The President's visit to China will culminate a series of high-level exchanges with the Chinese during the past year. A period which has seen restored momentum and a more positive tone in our relations.

To recapitulate what has been a rather extraordinary number of high-level visits,

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we began with Secretary Shultz going to Beijing in February. In May, Commerce Secretary Baldrige and Presidential Science Advisor Keyworth went to China. In September, Secretary Weinberger went to China. In October, Foreign Minister Wu came here for meetings with Secretary Shultz and also met with the President and others.

This is an impressive record of consultations by any standard, and the result of it all can be seen both in atmospheric and in concrete terms.

In the atmospherics of the relationship we have seen an increase, I think, in mutual trust and confidence. In the substance we have, among other things, made good on the President's decision to treat China as a friendly, non-allied country in the administration of our export control policy.

The President's decision in June to permit higher levels of technology for export to China has already led to an increase in the number and level of exports which have been growing rapidly, in fact, even in the earlier period.

The value of export licenses issued in 1983 is up to about $800 million, from a level of $350 million in 1982 and a level, I believe, below $200 million in 1981 -- so there's been rapid growth already. There are estimates that it could, under the new guidelines, surpass $1.5 billion of U.S. high tech sales to China in 1984.

We -- after difficult and almost arduous negotiations -- we concluded a new textile agreement with China to replace the one that had expired at the beginning of last year. We made some progress in getting the very difficult issue of China's -- of the so-called Hukwang railway bonds into legal proceedings.

We resumed discussion of military exchanges and military sales during Secretary Weinberger's visit to China, and discussions on that subject are continuing.

We proposed, during Secretary Shultz's visit to Beijing in February, a resumption of discussions on agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation. And starting in July, there have been three rounds of those negotiations in 1983. And through them, must progress has been made toward reaching an agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation. Such an agreement is an essential prerequisite for U.S. sales of major reactors and other items to China.

We've had discussions on investment treaties -- on an investment treaty and a tax treaty -- and those have made progress. These treaties, when signed, would provide a more stable environment for U.S. businessmen and U.S. investors in China.

And the U.S.-China cultural relationship is back on track -- both sides having agreed to resume official exchanges in 1984.

Not all of the activity has been official -- and let me underscore that. A great deal of our relationship is unofficial now, and that is important. It's a growing dimension of it. We've become, for example, the largest source of direct foreign investment in China. It's still a small amount compared to some other countries where we invest heavily. It's $80 million now, but, there is -- there are significant prospects particularly in the energy area, I think, in the future.

U.S. oil companies are heavily engaged in off-shore

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oil exploration, and twelve U.S. companies to date have signed contracts. And others, we think, will follow. Other companies are actively exploring projects in developing China's coal and hydropower resources.

And increasing numbers of Chinese students are in the United States -- currently more than 10,000. I think that is an important -- that's a remarkable number -- and a very important fact.

And there's a continued, active exchange of scientific and business delegations with an average of about 100 a month to the U.S. from China.

Throughout the high level talks that we've held with the Chinese, both sides have recognized a reality that has become even more important over the past decade. The close U.S.-China ties are not only in the mutual interest of our two countries, but are in the interest of regional stability in Asia and in the interest of peace and stability in the world.

I think also, obviously, there are differences between us -- some important, some small. We've made quite a progress, I think, in narrowing our differences, although I would by no means want to suggest that such differences have disappeared, or are likely, in the forseeable future, to disappear

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in their entirety.

While I should leave it to the Chinese to characterize their own views, I do think that both sides look on this visit from a similar perspective: That it will help to consolidate our relations, that it will provide an opportunity for the President and Zhao to get to know each other, that it will let us air our views on recent international events and that it will permit us to discuss in some detail a number of questions on our bilateral political and economic agenda.

I would not look for dramatic developments to result from this specific visit.

Finally, it's no secret, I'm sure, that Zhao will put forward China's views on Taiwan in the course of his meetings here, just as the Chinese consistently do in their private conversations with us. We certainly don't shrink from such a discussion. We will let him know that such differences as we have over Taiwan in our belief should not obscure the mutual benefit that we both derive from our bilateral relationship. Our thinking on Taiwan remains as it has before, that this administration will abide by all of our commitments undertaken by this government in joint communiques with the Chinese, including the August 17th communique on arms sales.

We continue to believe that the resolution of the Taiwan question is one that must be made by the Chinese people on both sides of the strait. Our only interest is that any resolution be a peaceful one.

Be glad to take questions.

Q Number one, is it possible to get a copy of the prepared statement that you have just read?

Q What was the question, please?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He wanted to know if we have a text of what I just read to you. I was editing a bit along the way.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We'll have a transcript later.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We'll get you a transcript shortly.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We'll have a transcript --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay.

Q This Cabinet breakfast, will the President attend that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know at this time.

Q Can you talk about what agreements, if any, might be signed during the visit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me talk -- There are a number of discussions that we have under way. I think there are two that surely are ready for signature and that's all I would predict at this point.

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We have very active discussions going on in these nuclear negotiations that I mentioned and I think -- probably put that at the top of our present agenda. That doesn't mean that we'll get it finished this visit, but we're attaching great importance to it.

At the end of the last round, the third one in December, there were still a few important issues to be resolved. The discussions are intended to insure that both countries share the same basic views with regard to nuclear proliferation.

I can't predict whether a breakthrough can take place until we find out what China has to say during this visit. But there has been progress to date and I think there's been progress also outside the negotiations, which may or may not be attributed to our discussions. Most importantly, China has joined, effective January 1st, the International Atomic Energy Agency and there are indications that China will, in fact, put its nuclear exports under IAEA safeguards.

We --

Q What does the agreement do? I mean, what is the agreement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q What are the negotiations on --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of, I believe it is, 1978, the United States is required, in order to sell major items of nuclear equipment to a foreign country, to have an agreement on nuclear cooperation. That agreement has to cover certain things, such as the use of our materials for peaceful purposes. This is true even in the case of a country like China that already has nuclear weapons. It includes provisions on the unauthorized re-transfer of our technology or products produced from our technology and it includes certain restrictions on sensitive processing, such as reprocessing or enrichment of materials that we provide.

All of that is required under the Act before we can get into things like reactor sales. China has a very large nuclear power program just beginning, aiming to get something in order of 10,000 megawatts of nuclear production in China by the end of the century in order for our firms to participate in that as both we and the Chinese would like to see happen. It's necessary to complete this agreement first.

Q Do you think you could have it -- Are you optimistic that you could have it ready for the April visit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, I -- Well, it's -- Predictions are a dangerous business. I thought you were going to ask me whether it could be done during this visit and I'm not optimistic about that.

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It's a very difficult negotiation. We're working very hard at it. But I think it's still going to take time. I would certainly hope that we'd make it by April.

Q Will the dates for the President's trip to China be announced during this visit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know the answer to that.

Q What about the second agreement? You said that there were two --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, okay. The two agreements that are ready for signature are the renewal of the 1979 agreement on science and technology which was a five-year agreement and will be renewed during this visit. It's been an extremely successful agreement. We've concluded under that agreement technical protocols in 21 fields involving a dozen U.S. government agencies in over 200 specific projects. It's the largest bilateral scientific exchange program that either country has. Both sides are quite pleased with this one, and as it has expired, we are very pleased to renew it.

The second agreement is called the Industrial and Technological Cooperation Accord -- I.T.C.A. or ITCA in parlance. That has been under negotiation since last spring. It was recently completed in Beijing. This accord creates opportunities for improved bilateral economic and trade relations. And it will be signed during this visit as well. It's -- to explain it, if you know what a science and technology agreement is, that is, the first one that creates a general umbrella framework for governments to cooperate and, then, specific protocols get arranged, this is a bit like an S&T applied to the industrial and trade field. It's a good deal more important as an agreement with a country like China than it might be with a market economy.

With a market economy, it doesn't much matter what kinds of umbrella agreements you have at a government level. What really happens is pretty much a question of economic decisions made by the marketplace. But when the market on the Chinese side consists of provincial officials and officials of state corporations it makes a considerable difference, we hope and believe, to have an agreement of this kind. And we think it will facilitate trade.

I've mentioned, but let me just repeat briefly, there are other agreements under negotiation, which we hope might get moved forward some at least during this visit. One very important one is the bilateral tax treaty which has gone through three rounds, I believe, already. And another round is scheduled for early this year. This is an agreement that would permit U.S. businessmen operating in China to be free of the hazard of double taxation.

We're optimistic that an agreement on these lines might -- could be reached this year and maybe by April but probably not during this visit. The other one is the bilateral investment treaty which would provide certain assurances to U.S. investors in China -- also important, probably even more difficult.

We've been through two rounds on that and a third round is scheduled for February. Finally, we have a maritime agreement with China: The old one expired on December 17th. We had some problems with the way the old one had operated. Under the old agreement, each country was supposed to get one-third of bilateral cargoes, and we got only 15 percent. These negotiations were -- made some progress, but not enough to renew in December. And no date has been set for further talks.

We don't plan to propose resumption of talks just now, but if the Chinese make such a suggestion during the visit, we would, of course, be receptive.

Q As you know, there's been an extreme amount of tension on the Korean peninsula, what with the shooting down of the Korean airline plane, the bombing in Rangoon, a number of other things have taken place there. To what extent does the United States plan to get involved in a discussion with China about the Korean situation? And do you think that any progress could be made toward easing the tension through such discussions here?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me just say two sentences in introducing the answer, and that is that I've given you a lot about a fairly rich agenda of economic subjects. There's also quite a rich agenda of international political subjects. We will

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undoubtedly talk about Kampuchea and Afghanistan, which are two important problems where we have, I think, quite common interests although not identical, and pursue essentially parallel policies.

Korea is another subject that we will surely discuss and that's in a somewhat different category since China is, after all, a close ally of North Korea. However, I think both the United States and China -- let me put it this way. I believe that China recognizes, as we certainly do, the dangers of the situation on the Korean peninsula and the importance of efforts to try to reduce tension on the peninsula.

The truly horrifying action by North Korea at Rangoon in attempting to assassinate the President of South Korea and, in fact, murdering a number of the most distinguished leaders of that country, has got to make one pessimistic about the prospects of tension reduction. But, in a certain way, perhaps it also only underscores the importance of efforts to achieve that goal.

While we've had that very grim piece of news and other disturbing actions by North Korea over the last year, the actions and statements by the Chinese side seem to have been a good deal more positive and, at times, quite helpful.

The manner in which the Chinese as well as the South Koreans handled the incident involving a hijacking of a Chinese airliner back in the spring represented a modest step forward in improving contacts between China and South Korea and easing the diplomatic atmosphere there. And it's a rich subject, one on which China has a lot of influence in what it does and what it says, and I'm sure we will be discussing it during the visit here.

Q Can we go back to economic -- to one question. You didn't mention anything about the effect of transfer -- changes except to recount what's happened. Is that subject complete now? I mean, is there any further discussion?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's been a great deal of progress made. And I hope I underscored that when I said I hope I made that clear. There continue to be restrictions as there are with a great many friendly countries including even some restrictions with our allies. But in the case of China, there's a special issue and that is that China comes under COCOM control and we have heard already and will not be surprised to hear again during this visit their concern that a liberalization of exports under our policy not end up being thwarted by a failure to have the same kind of liberalization in COCOM controls.

Under the system, we approve a license and then, in about a third of the licensing cases, there's a requirement that it go to the COCOM coordinating committee in Paris of the NATO countries in Japan where any country can veto a sale.

We underscored to our COCOM partners the very important differences in treatment that we feel are necessary between China and the Soviet Union, and we believe that, in practice, these problems can be worked out. But it is a very tricky thing and none of our partners have indicated any willingness to make a simple exemption of China from COCOM regulations.

Q Are we still negotiating with COCOM countries on this?

SENIOR ADMINISITRATION OFFICIAL: We are continously negotiating with COCO countries because we're continuously submitting cases and the negotiations are really done on a case by case basis.

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Q Well, are the Chinese satisfied with that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think we've had pretty good results in the last couple months in getting a lot of things cleared out of COCOM. I don't know specific problems on the agenda. I think we'll get more of a general concern. It also wouldn't surprise me, over the coming months, to find that some important case that we've approved is tied up for a long time in COCOM, and that will be a problem we'll have to work with if it happens.

Q Well, the reason I asked you is Baldrige told the Hill that the policy wouldn't be out until the negotiations with COCOM and the negotiations with the Chinese were complete. And the policy came out and apparently the COCOM negotiations are not complete and if the Chinese aren't happy, the whole thing could fall apart.

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Let me -- I don't know the exact words he used -- I think the precise words would have been -- at the time we were negotiating a specific arrangement with the Chinese to ensure that our technology would not be transferred to a third country without our authorization. And that was accurately characterized as a negotiation.

With COCOM we were engaged in consultations to inform them of the nature of the changes that we were undertaking and to find out if they had either general or specific objections. And we did not want to rush ahead until we'd had those discussions. Those discussions have been completed, but it remains -- that's a discussion on general principles -- and it remains the fact that in the end you've got to go through case-by-case through the COCOM procedure, and that may turn up specific problems.

Q Can I get you -- or did you say the U.S. wanted China to be exempted from COCOM?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I said none of our allies indicated any willingness to do that. We haven't pushed that as a solution.

Q Would we like it?

Q How does -- how does the administration feel -- or how does the administration think that the Soviet Union will view this exchange of visits, and is there any hope to gain some advantage vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in improving our relation with China?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's a phrase that we've heard often in our discussions with the Chinese that -- we're not playing cards, and this isn't a card game -- and I think that's basically the right attitude with which to approach this visit and this relationship. In particular -- I'll put it this way -- we're interested in building a long-term relationship with the most populous country in the world and a country that we assume will be playing an even more important role in the future than it already plays in the present.

And that you don't build that kind of relationship by telling that country, "Our relations with you are going to be -- simply go up or down, depending on how we feel about some third country" -- so I think we need to treat it in that way.

At the same time, I won't deny -- I think it's clear -- that it is helpful, I think, in our dealings with the Soviet Union for the Soviet Union to see that China and the United States are cooperating on important international issues, particularly related to Soviet expansionism. And it is, by the way, also important for our friends and allies, particularly in the Asia region -- and reassuring -- to see that the United States and China are cooperating in a careful and responsible way in promoting regional stability.

MR. SIMS: We've got another briefing coming up. Can we have one or two questions -- how about -- John, and one here.

Q On the Taiwan issue -- do you regard Premier Zhao's comments a few days ago to reporters in Peking as an indication that they're not going to press for a terminal -- termination date for arms delivery to Taiwan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't want to try to read into his comments. We have the communique -- the communique says what we have committed ourselves to do on that issue, and our effort will be to live up to the obligations of that communique and not to try to refine it or to get into new negotiations on that issue.

MR. SIMS: All right -- one more.

Q On arms controls -- to what extent will that be discussed, and any agreements in sight?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would assume it would at least get some discussion during the course of discussing U.S.-Soviet relations which I imagine will be a topic on the agenda.

We have no arms control negotiations, as such, with the Chinese except indirectly -- this agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation. So, it's not a matter of announcing any agreements with them.

Q But, would the Chinese have an input into the agreement not to have SS-20s moved from the European theatre to the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They might wish to comment on it. Obviously the security of all Asian countries is affected by the SS-20 deployments in the Far East, and in fact, in could probably say that, like most of the Soviet buildup in the Far East, it is aimed at -- as much at China as it is at anyone else.

For the most part, we've found China's concerns conveyed more often to third countries like Japan, than conveyed directly to us.

Q You said they were going to have a private meeting? Does he speak English?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. All meetings will be with an interpreter. And I corrected what was in front of me -- it will be a meeting with the President and a small number of Cabinet Officers -- two or three Cabinet Officers and the Vice President, I believe, is the composition.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 11:37 A.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release January 9, 19

BRIEFING BY
BUSINESS LEADERS
PRIOR TO DEPARTURE FOR GRENADA

The Briefing Room

11:48 A.M. EST

MR. ROUSSEL: We have with us today, Craig Nalen, who is President of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and Sheldon Weinig, who is Chairman of the International Committee of the Advisory Council on Private Sector Initiatives, who have just met with the President. They're getting ready to go to Grenada. And if you're not nice, also, Sam, they also have Jim Brown with them here. I'm going to sic him on you if you don't behave during this briefing.

Q I might be tougher than those 750 Cubans -- (laughter) --

MR. NALEN: I am assuming that a press release has been distributed.

Q No.

MR. NALEN: Well, we are here to answer any questions. What you see is what you've got. This is a group primarily American businessmen going and Sheldon Weinig happens to represent the private sector part of it. I play a small role in representing the government on this thing through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.

If anybody has any questions --

Q Do you have any goals, in terms of dollars of -- in investment there?

MR. NALEN: I tell you, we are always a little cautious in making any projections. Although, I will tell you there were a number of businessmen who wanted to go on this and we had the luxury of being able to be very selective on who we -- who could come. We have just 20. And my guess is that those who are coming have a serious interest in moving forward on investments in Grenada and at the end of the week, we'll see.

I think it's important to know nothing happens overnight. It's been a long time sort of dormant in Grenada and -- But we would think that we would take an important step in beginning to bring together some economic relationships between the two countries.

Q What fields would they --

Q Would you kindly recite for us two or three good reasons for American companies to invest in Grenada?

MR. NALEN: Well, there are -- If you start out by the business reasons, there are good reasons to do it businesswise. There's a labor force in Grenada. And when we talk about Grenada, I think we're also talking about the Caribbean in general and the eastern Caribbean in particular. There are good trainable labor forces -- proximity to the North American markets and we would hope that many companies that have operations in other parts of the world will start looking at the Caribbean more.

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There are -- There has obviously been a lot of attention focused on Grenada and from a tourist point of view, from a resort point of view, that's got to be a positive.

Then, there is simply the social aspects and the other aspects of having close neighbors there and while a businessman is only going to go where he is going to get a decent return on his investment, I would like to think that many of the businessmen going on this mission are going for other reasons as well.

Q Do we owe Grenada something?

Q -- publicity surrounding the -- if you will, "rescue mission" --

MR. NALEN: I think a lot of attention is focused on the Caribbean, which is something very consistent. I mean, the President, right from the very start, has been trying to focus the private sector's attention on the business opportunities in the Caribbean Basin.

Q But do we owe Grenada something? Why not St. Kitts or Barbados?

MR. NALEN: Well, it's the same thing. Absolutely.

Q Do you have common groups going there also?

MR. NALEN: Yes, we do. We've been -- this is our sixth mission to the Caribbean and we've been in the eastern Caribbean --

Q You haven't had briefings on those here, for some reason.

MR. NALEN: Well, we've tried to get you interested in it, and no one ever seemed to care.

Q What are the fields that they will try to plumb?

MR. NALEN: A wide range, going from construction, resort-tourist area, light manufacturing --

MR. WEINIG: -- aquaculture, agriculture. We have some people who are looking into textiles to do finishing of fabrics there.

Q Is one of the results going to be to export American jobs to the Caribbean?

MR. NALEN: Not at all. As a matter of fact, OPIC can never be involved with a project that is -- let me make that perfectly clear -- that has any negative impact on the U.S. economy.

As I mentioned, we are primarily looking at companies that may have operations in other parts of the world: the Far East and so forth.

Q Who will they talk to?

MR. NALEN: They will be talking to their counterparts in the private sector, as well as leaders in the Grenadian government.

Q What counterparts? We were told that the Grenadian economy was in shambles and --

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MR. NALEN: Well, they had an economy once and some of those people didn't leave the island, that that -- there is a small nucleus there, and this is part of the reason that American businessmen are going there, hopefully, to invest capital to get -- to stimulate that economy. Yes?

Q What kind of rate of return do you foresee for businesses investing in --

MR. NALEN: That's a question better asked of the businessmen themselves, but obviously investments in the developing world -- and OPIC is involved with 110 countries -- generally, businessmen can expect, and will, for the higher degree of risk, a higher degree of reward.

Q What was the message to you from the President on the --

Q Twenty-five percent.

MR. NALEN: The message from the President was that he applauded this group of businessmen that were coming forward and wished them well, and underscored the emphasis that he has continually placed on that part of the world, and that the time has come for America to show their friendship for this part of the world and do what we can to contribute to that economic stability in that area.

Q Mr. Brown, can you tell us whether you're going to Grenada or how you're associated with this group, as you step up to the microphone?

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MR. BROWN: Be very happy to.

First of all, gentlemen, excuse me because I have a very bad cold, so my voice is a little low.

I'm a Director of the Hitechnology Engineering Company out in McLean, Virginia. And we have a two-fold mission. First of all, we are looking into security in Grenada. We have the capability of all types of security, high technology on down to personal security. So that's one aspect of our trip is to investigate that.

The other aspect is, as most of you know, I am making a return to the National Football League. But if I don't make that return, I am very interested in the fitness and nutrition of people over 40 and we're investigating the prospects of putting a camp in Grenada.

And the reason for Grenada, first of all, it's supposed to be very beautiful. I don't know. I haven't been there yet; but I will know after this trip. And, secondly, we feel that we will get a lot of cooperation as far as financing from certain agencies around the vicinity.

So those two areas are the areas that I'm concentrating on.

Q By "camp," you mean an individual team's training camp?

MR. BROWN: No, not for a team, but for high-level executives.

Q High rollers.

MR. BROWN: People basically over 40 who have never had anywhere to go, really, where you have a nutrition and fitness program designed especially for them. And I think a lot of you are over 40, so you might -- (laughter.)

Q One more question: Who do you like in the Superbowl and why?

MR. BROWN: Well, I'm in Washington today, right? (Laughter.) You sell out your stadium every week, so, naturally, I'm for the Washington Redskins. But I am for the Washington Redskins for two reasons. First of all, they combine a combination of things that I like. They combine the old with the new. John Riggins and the Hogs represent old, hard-nosed football. And Theismann, with his Smurfs and all the great receivers and the innovations of your Coach Gibbs in the passing offense, represents the new style of football. So you have a combination there that I have great admiration for.

Q The Raiders will win.

Q I thought --

MR. BROWN: I can tell by your eyes.

Q I thought Al Davis and the Raiders were very close friends of yours. Or is that not the --

MR. BROWN: Well, you see, the reason that I can come back with the Raiders is that probably Washington will win in the Superbowl and Al might be a little more interested. (Laughter.)

Thank you very much, gentlemen.

Q Thank you.

Q And ladies.

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Q -- discussion about the Redskins is very interesting, bu
I notice that in five of the nineteen people who are going down are from Florida. How much of that is an accident of geography and how much of that is -- Florida has a Caribbean-oriented economy?

MR. NALEN: I'd say the latter. As a matter of fact, the very first businessman to approach OPIC on a voluntary basis, before we went out and let anyone know we were going to lead an investment mission to Grenada, led by a number of business leaders in, interestingly enough, the Cuban-American community of South Florida. They have been active in other OPIC-related missions there and so this was no surprise.

I think they recognized the need for stability, the interest in that particular area -- and very entrepreneurial Cubans, I will tell you and successful.

Q What tax incentives are being offered to these businessmen who'll invest in Grenada?

MR. NALEN: There are no tax incentive --

Q Will there be tax incentives?

MR. NALEN: From whom -- the Grenadian government or the --

Q The United States government.

MR. NALEN: No, not --

Q That's part of the Caribbean Basin Initiative Plan --

MR. NALEN: Well --

Q -- to offer businessmen tax incentives.

MR. NALEN: Not any others than those that are already articulated in the CBI program.

Q The -- Grenada will not be included in the CBI program?

MR. WEINIG: It will be, but it'll not be any different than that which is given for any of the other Caribbean places. It will not be treated independently of it.

Q Are any of these private investment efforts being coordinated with public sector support? Do you know of, for instance, any plan by this government to help them finish their airstrip, to improve roads, telephone service --

MR. WEINIG: The private sector presently is not involved in the airstrip. And the private sector people going down on this particular mission who are both of the OPIC group and of the President's private sector initiative group are involved in independent businesses and not involved in the airport per se.

Q Is there any concern, though, that if you neglect the public side of, you know, their --

MR. WEINIG: It's not being neglected. It's --

Q -- a good investment --

MR. NALEN: That's another responsibility. This --

MR. WEINIG: There is a study group on the airport right now, and that's moving ahead. And that's independent of this particular mission. We understand that a number of things

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that we're doing, for example, tourism will require that airport be open. And we anticipate that it will be open, but it's not part of the independent people of this mission.

Q -- don't need the Cubans for the labor --

MR. WEINIG: Pardon?

MR. ROUSSEL: Thank you.

Q Thank you very much, Peter.

Q Good to see you.

MR. NALEN: Thank you, ladies and gentlemen.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 11:58 A.M. EST

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF
PREMIER ZHAO ZIYANG
OF CHINA

January 10, 1984

The Briefing Room

2:52 P.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President and Premier had, I think, very useful, very extensive talks covering the full range of both international and bilateral issues that effect our two countries.

They began with a private meeting that extended to an hour and ten minutes with, on our side, the President, the Vice President, Secretary Shultz and Weinberger and NSC Advisor McFarlane and on the Chinese side, five principals.

The talks were very warm, I think reflect very positive state of our relations. They also included frank discussions of issues of difference between us. I think overall the effect of these discussions was very much, to use a phrase the Chinese use often, one of "contributing to building mutual trust and confidence," helping, I think, to also set the stage for the President's visit to China in April.

As I said, there was a full range of bilateral matters discussed, including, particularly, extensive discussions, I am informed, in the private meeting, on the subject of Taiwan, and in the larger meeting with Cabinet Secretaries present, including Regan, Baldrige, Block and Science Advisor Keyworth, an extensive discussion of economic and technological cooperation.

They also talked about international issues, including not only the Soviet Union and common concerns about the Soviet Union, but also specific regional problems, particularly Kampuchea, where we have substantial common interests. And they discussed, again, in the private meeting, our common interests in promoting efforts in the Korean Peninsula to reduce tensions.

These discussions today will be followed, as I said yesterday, by an extensive series of discussions with Cabinet principals starting this afternoon with a one-hour session with Secretary Shultz followed by another hour with Secretary Regan. And tomorrow, similar sessions with Science Advisor Keyworth, with Commerce Secretary Baldrige and with Defense Secretary Weinberger.

I think it's -- so far, certainly, the visit is living up to our expectations of it being a useful and very solid and very helpful event.

Be glad to take questions.

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Q What was the discussion centered on on the Taiwan question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it was the -- I wasn't there. I'm going on briefings of it; but, basically, we have differences. There was, I think, as I understand it, a fairly strong presentation of those differences.

The President affirmed our fundamental belief that the key to managing those differences is to abide by the three communiques that we have between our countries: the Shanghai Communique, the Normalization Communique and the most recent August 17th, 1982 Communique on -- governing arms sales to Taiwan and made clear our intention to live by those communiques.

Q On that last communique, there's been some disagreement on the interpretation, the Chinese saying that it means an immediate end to sales and the U.S. saying it's not necessarily immediate. Did the Chinese Premier say anything about an immediate end to sales?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, there's nothing in the communique about an immediate end to the sales. If you look at it, that's just simply not there. The communique talks, essentially, about a gradual reduction in sales and we have made clear that as they observe our actions over time they will see that we are living by the communique.

Q What's the point of dispute? What is this frank discussion? I mean, were there --

Q And what was the strong presentation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know precisely what they said. And I think, in fact, in terms of what they actually specifically said you should ask the Chinese side. But their feeling, as I think you know, is generally that this whole issue is their internal affair and that we should, I mean, as a matter of principle, they're uncomfortable with almost the entire range of our relationship. They're uncomfortable with things like the Taiwan Relations Act. They're uncomfortable with the fact of any arms sales at all.

We know all of those points of difference. We have tried with the various communiques to bridge those differences, as far as is possible to go. And, basically, our approach now is to live by those communiques.

Q Did Premier Zhao talk about the actual reduction of arms sales, being unhappy with the rate of reductions?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know about that particularly.

Q What about the two agreements that were going to be concluded or signed? Were they?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think those -- No, they were not signed today. They'll be signed on Thursday. I'm not quite sure which time; but I think either before or after the Cabinet breakfast.

Q Does that include the nuclear agreement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it does not.

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The two agreements that will be signed on Thursday are the renewal, for another term of five years, of the Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement that was first signed at the time of normalization in '79 and the Industrial and Technological Cooperation Accord, which was just negotiated between our two countries.

The nuclear discussions continue. Ambassador Kennedy, who is the head of our side, will be meeting again with the Chinese side this afternoon and we continue to make progress. But I'm not -- I don't dare to hazard any predictions about when.

Q Did that come up during the bilateral discussions today?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Did the nuclear -- Yes, those discussions were mentioned and I think it's clear, I think, that both of us are anxious to achieve an agreement and both of us agree that a great deal of progress has been made already.

Q Did you get any commitment from them to go to talk to the North Koreans about easing relations -- easing the tensions on the Peninsula?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't have the details of that discussion, the private meeting. Certainly one of the things that we would have made clear, I'm quite sure, is our concern about North Korean actions, such -- and particularly actions along the lines of the Rangoon bombing and how dangerous and how counter-productive those are.

Given -- Obviously, China is an ally of North Korea's. China -- We're not trying to embarrass China or put China in a difficult position; but it is important in situations like this to urge the importance of restraint on both sides.

Q Which side raised the Korean question first?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know the answer to that. I'm sorry.

Q Has the understanding on Korea been advanced beyond the point that has been achieved in the past with general understanding that both sides benefit where there's stability on --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are diplomatic messages being conveyed; but I can't get into the details of that now.

Q Did Taiwan take up more time than you thought it would originally in these meetings? It seemed we were -- before this started, we were talking about it was all going to be trade and technology and Taiwan was not a major issue. And now it seems to have soared to the top.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I never predicted that. I mean, I would always expect it to take a fair amount of time. I think the right place, in fact, to get into that kind of discussion is precisely where it was done, in the small session where people could be quite frank and candid with one another.

I think we would be kidding ourselves if we think that this issue is ever going to simply disappear or their concerns will not be voiced. But our basic point is that in terms of negotiation, in terms of what can be accomplished in bridging those differences, we've made those efforts with these communiques and the basic thrust of our approach now is to manage those differences as well as we can by adhering to the communique.

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Q Did Premier Zhao take any note of the noise from the Taiwan independence group or from the -- group that were demonstrating around here?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Certainly not as it was passed to me; but I don't know.

Q Did he hear them over the airplanes?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The airplanes were pretty loud.

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Q Do you get the feeling that they are simply expressing their concern or that the Taiwan issue is really hurting relations and the development of relations between two countries? I mean, is this just a diplomatic statement of -- they have to say what they have to say, or is it more serious than that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think they view it, as they say frequently, as a continuing obstacle to the improvement of relations. We've also made very clear that for us our handling of this involves what they would call matters of principle as well, and that the effort we've got to make is to make as much progress as we can on the many other areas where we have common interests and common interest in progressing. It's kind of hypothetical to ask what might happen if this issue weren't there. That issue is there, and it is likely to be there for quite some time.

Q Could any of these differences possibly threaten the President's trip this spring?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think so.

Q How do you interpret Premier Zhao's remark that relations should have gone a lot further than they have in the last ten years? Do you think that's a reference to continuing problems with Taiwan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's certainly, I think, what they are alluding to by that.

Q What was the presentation on the Soviet Union?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As I understand it, it was also discussed in the private meeting. In the larger meeting, among other things, Secretary Shultz emphasized just how relentless the pace of Soviet military buildup has been, even in just the last three years, which is not of course the most intense period of buildup in Asia. We have seen the addition of new Soviet maneuver divisions, we've seen hundreds of Soviet tanks added to their forces, we've seen a large number of SS-20's, several hundred SS-20 warheads added to Soviet forces, we've seen a major increase even in just the numbers of their surface fleet. And this is, I emphasize, just the last three years. That's got to be, I think, of concern to both our countries. It clearly is.

[Kampuchea]

We also are concerned about actions by Soviet proxies, and particularly in Camp Lucia about which there was considerable discussion. Ambassador Kirkpatrick who was there also talked about the very important political dimension of that issue and the effort in the U.N. to develop a strong consensus, and rather successful effort to develop a strong international consensus on the need for a political solution to that issue.

Q Was there any indication this morning, or this afternoon, of a movement toward increasing military cooperation to counter the Soviets, or increase the defensive capacity, either by China sending over some high military official or some other step toward increasing the military cooperation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Secretary Weinberger gave a very brief mention of his view of his very successful talks in Beijing and the followup to those talks that have been conducted at lower levels. And I imagine that this would be a subject of fairly detailed discussion when Secretary Weinberger sees Zhao tomorrow afternoon.

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Q Do you expect any movement forward or backward on the Taiwan issue during this visit, or is it simply a restatement of known positions?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's the latter basically. I think we've gone through some very difficult discussions on that subject. We have very painfully worked out these three communiques, and our feeling is the very best thing we can do is both live by them.

Q Can I just follow that with one question. Do you see any reason for thinking that the atmospherics are better because it was left out of the public statements by both the President and the Premier?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I certainly think it is an issue that is best handled through candid discussion in private, and that it is a sensitive subject politically in both countries. I think we sometimes can make the problem worse by our public rhetoric. So perhaps that was intentional, but I don't know.

Q What was discussed in the economic and technical discussions?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What was discussed?

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: A number of the topics that I

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mentioned yesterday the -- well, to begin with, the nuclear cooperation agreement, the bilateral tax treaty.

By the way, also, I think there's been agreement reached that Secretary Regan will lead our delegation to Beijing on March 19, I believe is the date, for the so-called joint economic committee between our two countries, where the tax treaty will again be discussed.

The bilateral investment treaty, the subject of technology transfer, where I think the Chinese do appreciate the steps the President has taken to liberalize our policy. We heard concerns expressed about the fact that we have so far not succeeded in lifting the existing legislative prohibitions on Ex-Im Bank credits to China. That's a not quite complete list, but those are the main ones.

Q Was there any specific progress made in any of those areas that attach to any -- treaty?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, and I -- as a general rule you're talking about things where the issues -- take the nuclear accord -- the issues outstanding between us are -- get down now into very technical and very detailed things that really need the kind of painstaking line-by-line work that Ambassador Kennedy will be doing this afternoon. Yes?

Q Well, was there considerable discussion about the American side in both meetings about the Soviet Union and the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know how you'd measure considerable. My impression was that the -- certainly more attention was given to the bilateral relationship in both meetings. It's our belief, in fact, that a good bilateral relationship is really the basis on which a lot of the international benefits and cooperation are based.

Q Did the United States want to make a particular point in these talks today to emphasize the threat -- the Soviet Union -- the military threat?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, and I -- we understand very clearly, I think -- I hope this answers the question -- we understand very clearly that China considers itself part of the Third World, that is a non-aligned country, that China is going to have very sharp criticisms of our policies in certain areas, and that China puts very great stock on what it calls its independence in foreign policy and that it carries out an independent foreign policy. And we certainly know that it does. What's important to us, really, is the concrete cooperation that we have with China on a number of key issues where we do have common interests.

Q You didn't emphasize the Soviet Union as a threat to China as well the United States or the rest of the world?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we talked about our concerns and, generally speaking, I think it doesn't help to preach to other people about their own interests. They'll draw their own conclusion about their interests.

Q Does it mean that you're trying to now, in future, somewhat de-emphasize the geopolitical and strategic cooperation that used to be more in the forefront in previous administrations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You're asking me to compare to an unspecified standard of the past. We are not -- let me

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just say this: we don't -- China is not an ally, we're not seeking an alliance, we believe that we continue to have very fruitful cooperation with China on a number of international issues of great importance and, at the same time, we recognize very clearly the strong emphasis China puts on independence and non-alignment in its foreign policy, and that that is always going to mean that on a number of issues we will differ.

Q Mr. Secretary?

Q So what was their reaction -- of the Chinese to these various statements about Soviet expansionism?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You'd really have to ask -- I mean, I don't want to get into the business of characterizing what they said, so you'd really have to ask them.

Q What are the key areas in international politics on which you have concrete cooperation with China --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think certainly -- I think we have common concerns about Soviet military build-up, particularly in the Far East. We've got common concerns and interests about Afghanistan, about Kampuchea, and, in general, about the expansion of Soviet and Soviet-proxy activities.

Q Sir, is it common concern or common cooperation -- concrete cooperation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have common concerns, and on a number of issues it leads to important, concrete cooperation.

Q Was Ambassador Dobrynin invited by the U.S. or did he ask to attend?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Ambassador Dobrynin is the dean of the diplomatic corps, and the dean of the diplomatic corps has the privilege of attending any ceremony of this kind, as I understand it, representing -- he's there representing not the Soviet Union but the diplomatic corps in Washington.

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Q Can you expand a bit more on your answer to Don? Do you expect out of this visit some kind of concrete increased military cooperation following up on Weinberger's visit, or is that something still further down the road?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think -- I don't want to prejudge what is going to come out of Secretary Weinberger's talks tomorrow, and those may -- there may be some significant movement through them, but we're in this area working with the Chinese on a number of very detailed, very specific and very concrete issues, which again lend themselves best to discussion by experts. So I think we may move the process along some, but I don't expect breakthroughs or major developments.

Q Can you say whether, in your discussion about the Soviet buildup, whether you discussed at all arms control?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, we certainly did. And Secretary Shultz made the point that we certainly believe in arms control, the arms control process, we believe in seeking a constructive relationship with the Soviet Union, but we also believe that the best basis for reaching that kind of relationship, particularly in light of the kinds of military activities and military buildup that he described the Soviet Union engaging in, the best basis for trying to reach that constructive relationship is through attending to our own strength and attending to the interests and strength of our allies and friends.

Q Was that in response to any -- did the Premier question our commitment or the extent of the U.S. buildup? Was that the context in which that was raised?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was not in the context of disagreement, no.

Q The President has been pro-Taiwan his whole political career. How did he get along with the Chinese official? Was there any kind of reviewing of the past?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You're asking -- well, the atmosphere seemed to me warm in the private meeting. I think they were candid. My impression [illegible] they, at least the President was candid in fact about th[illegible]at we take seriously the question of commitments to old fri[illegible]nd we don't drop those kinds -- we don't walk away from commitments of that kind. And that is a governing aspect of this whole problem.

I think our point is that we want to build good relations with the People's Republic of China, and at the same time we will continue as provided in the normalization communique to maintain unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

Q Back on Korea for a minute. When you say that diplomatic messages are being passed, can you at least tell us whether or not the traffic is two-way, i.e., whether or not the Chinese are passing messages on Korea to the United States, or whether the messages are simply one-way from us to them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am sorry. We are here talking about something that is not just sensitive as far as the Chinese are concerned, but we have so many other parties involved who are sensitive about it, I really just am not going to get into the details of the diplomatic communications here. I am sorry.

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Q Has -- the nuclear treaty still a transfer or retransfer of nuclear material and inspection monitoring?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question of inspection or visitation or whatever is one of the issues under discussion. The other at the moment appearing to be a principal issue is the question of the use of materials from U.S. reactors in such activities as reprocessing and so forth, where under our law we are required to give our consent if any of that material is to be further enriched or reprocessed, which means to have the plutonium separated from it, or used for any of a number of purposes, including quite peaceful ones. So those are the two principal things under discussion, but one of the reasons I'm not going to start predicting about outcome is you often find that when you solve what looks like the main problem, then something that wasn't so important suddenly looms difficult.

Q The retransfer thing is not an obstacle any more, is that correct?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sale to third countries, you mean?

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that is pretty clear.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Nick, last question.

Q Was the future of Hong Kong discussed at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not that I am aware of.

END 3:16 P.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For release at 3:00 P.M. January 11, 1984

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
ON THE REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL BIPARTISAN COMMISSION
ON CENTRAL AMERICA

The Old Executive Office Building
Room 450

12:43 P.M. EST

MR. SPEAKES: I have a statement here and then Secretary Kissinger will take your questions. He will also have a brief opening statement.

The President met this morning with the members of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America to receive their report. He noted that their report is impressive in its depth of its analysis and in the scope and creativity of its recommendations. He praised the Commission for their bipartisan support. He also commended them for the task that they have performed for all Americans in defining the threat to our national security posed by the crisis in Central America.

The President agrees with the Commission's report, that our response must include increased support for democratic development, improved living conditions, human rights and security assistance. The Commissioners, in their report, note that our level of effort must be increased substantially in order for democracy to prevail in the region. They expressed their concern for the urgent nature of the situation. The President agrees with their observations that more must be done in the near and mid-term in order for their longer range recommendations to be effective.

Within its overall recommendations for U.S. assistance, the Commission has recognized the immediate need for significantly increased levels of aid to El Salvador. The report also urges the administration and the Congress to work together to achieve greater predictability in this funding. The President fully supports these objectives.

Finally, the President emphasized the extraordinary degree of bipartisan consensus the group achieved during their intensive six-month effort. He commended the ability of the group, which represents the entire political spectrum, to arrive at a common understanding of the issues. The President specifically cited Lane Kirkland, Bob Strauss and other members of what he called "the loyal opposition" in this regard. He observed that this very fact gives substance to the hope that "This nation, too, as it learns more about Central America, will find its way toward a united determination."

DR. KISSINGER: Ladies and gentlemen, let me briefly review the work processes of the Commission and some of the main recommendations of our report, and then, of course, I'll be delighted to answer your questions.

We -- beginning in August -- we held thirty full days

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of regular meetings here in Washington, plus another twelve ad hoc meetings. We heard from about, almost 200 people, covering a wide range of expert opinion.

We had nine days of foreign travel, during the course of which we listened to some 300 witnesses, because we broke up in each country we visited into subgroups, to hear the -- as many sectors of the private sectors as we could get.

In addition, we sent 170 questionnaires to outside experts and solicited some 200 other written documents, all of which we will publish in a few weeks, so that you can form your own judgments as to the gamut of opinion that was represented.

As a general proposition, we had a -- we had two lead consultants on each subject: one on the conservative side, one on the more liberal side. It was their responsibility to find witnesses to prepare reading material and to draw together the conclusions of these few days -- of the few days in which they presided.

We used to work full -- through our meals -- and I mention this only because one of the clear violations of human rights that occurred was the lunches served to the Commission by the State Department. I made to the President this morning -- and recommended that in the future there be a progress report on improvements to the extent that that was possible -- on the meal -- (Laughter.) -- at least. We had -- we had the right formula for it.

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Let me now turn -- turn to the report itself. The report was signed by all the members of the Commission. It represents a consensus report of twelve Americans of widely different points of view initially, who came together on some important conclusion.

We had the advice of senior counselors, especially Congressional representations, and Jeane Kirkpatrick spent a lot of time with the group, but was not responsible for the conclusions. But I want to express our appreciation to all of them who spent so much time with us.

Now let me turn to the report itself. The basic argument of the report is this: that there's a crisis in Central America; that the crisis is acute and requires urgent attention. And, in an area so close to our borders and of such consequence for our future, it should be dealt with on a nonpartisan, bipartisan, basis.

It is the argument of the Commission that the roots of the discontent in Central America are, in an important respect, indigenous -- caused by centuries of colonial rule, in some cases, oligarchic rule; inequality in income distribution; and other forms of social injustice. There was, therefore, a need for reform independent of any outside pressures and exploitation that might have taken place. And there will remain a need for progress towards greater equality, economic progress and social justice, quite independent of what outside forces might be doing there.

Some of these indigenous-caused upheavals have been exploited -- given urgency. Discipline, arms and intelligence support by Cuban, Soviet activities, centered at this time in Nicaragua. This is what -- in the judgment of the Commission -- is giving its urgency and its international character to the security problem.

We have recommended, in the sections on economic and social development and in the chapter on human development, a series of proposals. One of the important -- an important aspect of which is, that there should be a meeting at a high level of the leaders of Central America, with us -- to put together a medium and long-range development plan.

We estimate that the costs of these economic development program and human development programs which we have put forward will be on the order of $8 billion dollars over a five year period. And we have attached an appendix to the economic section that explains the basis of our calculations and of how we arrived at that figure.

We have also concluded that whatever caused the climate of insecurity, whatever produced the insurrection, reform alone cannot end the problem. That the security problem can be ended in only one of two ways:

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either militarily or diplomatically. We would obviously prefer a diplomatic solution, and we have a chapter which indicates the criteria which we applied and which we believe are necessary for a diplomatic solution.

But we also make the point that the problem is a seamless web. It is not appropriate to say that it is essentially economic or essentially military or essentially political. And then one should try one of these approaches to the exclusion of the other. We either do them all, or we won't be able to make any of them work.

We also, of course, have to keep in mind that there are limits to the experiments that can be run. But you will be able to read for yourself the various recommendations that have been made, and you are free to ask questions about any of them.

We make the point with respect to security, but it applies to everything else. There is a case for doing nothing; there is a case for doing enough; there is no case for doing too little.

We are also saying, so that there is no misunderstanding, that we do not guarantee success in carrying out this program, but that without a program of this kind success is surely not attainable.

Obviously whatever dissents exist is what makes interesting reading. I think compared to the many recommendations, the 132 pages of the document, there are four or five statements of opposition to particular paragraphs. Two concern the Contras; one concerns the fact that one of the commissioners believes we should have been more generous in our recommendations for promoting Central American exports into the United States; one concerns a statement that the author does not believe there ever existed a Kennedy-Kruschev understanding in 1962 which is not directly germane to any particular paragraph of this document; and one concerns a clarification that two other commissioners and I signed with respect to the conditionality clause. I want to make clear that all three signatories supported the conditionality clause, but believed that since it has to be interpreted and applied in complete circumstances by both the administration and the Congress, that there is a limiting condition. The limiting condition is that it is absurd in the name of human rights to bring into power a Marxist-Leninist group who wherever they have governed have systematically supressed human rights. That is the limiting condition, but we support strongly efforts that are being made and additional efforts that can be made to work together between the Executive and the Congress on a realistic statement of conditionality that achieves both our human rights objectives and our national security objectives.

I would like to conclude by reading one paragraph at the end of the Introduction of the Commission Report because I believe it reflects the spirit in which the Commission operated. I will now read it and then take your questions.

Because the Commission has twelve members, each with strong individual views, there obviously are many things in this report to which individual members would have assigned different weight, or which they would have interpreted somewhat differently or put differently. Such is the nature of commissions. But these

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differences were personal, not partisan. This report, on balance, does represent what all of us found to be a quite remarkable consensus, considering the often polarized and emotional nature of the debate that has surrounded Central America. Among ourselves, we found a much greater degree of consensus at the end of our odyssey than at the beginning. This in itself gives us hope that the nation, too, as it learns more about Central America, its crisis and its needs, will find its way to a united determination to take and support the kind of measures that we believe are needed in the interests of the United States and of the hemisphere, and for the sake of the sorely beleaguered people of Central America.

That reflects the spirit in which this bipartisan commission operated. It was a privilege to be associated with them. I want to stress again that it was an attempt to achieve a unity of approach, not an attempt to score debating points.

Yes, sir?

Q I take it you personally support some degree or form of conditionality?

DR. KISSINGER: That's correct.

Q But not the type that the President vetoed in the recertification process legislation. I want you, if you can, to be specific about what precise form of conditionality we should have.

DR. KISSINGER: I frankly have not studied the precise terms of what the President vetoed. What I think is needed is a procedure worked out between the Executive Branch and the Congress, and enshrined in legislation, in which the Executive Branch can make a realistic progress report, and in which the Legislative Branch sets criteria cooperatively achieved that can be and must be achieved.

What should not happen is that an effort is made to use this as a subterfuge for other disputes that may be going on between the two branches of the government.

I think very big progress can be made on human rights well short of the contingency that I warned against of the collapse of the structure of government in Salvador. And I would hope, and I would expect, that the limiting conditions that my two colleagues and I defined will never arise. But we simply wanted to state that there is -- the one fundamental point that it is senseless in the name of human rights to bring into power the most brutal human rights violators that exist.

Q But it sounds like you want a reporting mechanism that has no teeth in it.

DR. KISSINGER: No. We want a reporting mechanism that has teeth in it.

Q What are they?

DR. KISSINGER: Obviously the administration that administers aid and makes recommendations to the Congress, and the Congress that actually extends aid has many means of making its displeasure known and many means of achieving its influence. I believe that can be done, and that we can also keep in mind our national security objectives at the same time.

Yes, sir?

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Q Dr. Kissinger, have you been given any indication by the administration that they are willing to consider any form of conditionality, since until very recently we were told that the President was not inclined to do so?

DR. KISSINGER: Several of you were present this morning when the President met with the press. I don't think I need to -- you all heard what he said. My understanding of what he said was that he was prepared to work out the conditionality problem in consultation with the Congress.

Q Did you receive assurances yourself that this was the case?

DR. KISSINGER: We are a bipartisan commission that has reported to the best of its ability. We are not a lobbying group, we are not going to pressure either the Executive Branch or the Congress.

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I did not ask for assurances, but it is my strong impression that this reflects the President's views. But on that subject Larry Speakes is a much better expert than I am.

Yes, sir?

Q -- recommend a larger military aid program. Will this require more U.S. forces as advisors or in other capacities in Central America?

DR. KISSINGER: Certainly not -- Again, we did not look into this question. The limit of 55 is a self-imposed one by the administration; it's not legislated by the Congress. We at any rate do not visualize any significant or any -- for all I know, any increase in the level of advisors. This is not -- it was not considered by the group, and I do not believe that we would favor any -- I don't want to be held to three or four or five people but -- any measurable increase, an increase of our advisors.

Q Dr. Kissinger, do you agree that there is a danger in too large or too high a military profile for the United States in places such as Honduras, that it can be counter-productive?

DR. KISSINGER: No, that was not a conclusion of this group. But you will notice in our negotiating proposals, we have recommended the withdrawal of all foreign advisors and bases from all countries of Central America. And we specifically mentioned the fact that this would apply, in our judgment, as a recommendation to both Nicaragua and Honduras. So, we do not object in the present circumstances to the presence of the American -- to the American presence in Honduras, but we would think that as part of an overall settlement in which the level of arms was substantially reduced, Cuban and Soviet advisors leave Nicaragua, that the same should apply to Honduras.

Q But absent that kind of exodus by the Cuban and Soviet advisors, do you feel that the American presence is warranted?

DR. KISSINGER: Substantially, yes.

Q Yes, but do you feel that --

DR. KISSINGER: But I --

Yes? Go ahead.

Q Do you feel that Congress is going to be willing to underwrite an $8 billion aid package?

DR. KISSINGER: I am no expert on the Congress, as I proved in office, and my competence has not greatly increased in the meantime. I would think that it is -- that we would feel and so recommended to the President this morning that the President should put before the Congress his view of what is required on an overall basis and to relate the various aspects to each other.

And whether the Congress will then do it or not is up to the Congress. It was interesting, however, that several members of the Congress present did not seem pessimistic about the possibilities.

Yes?

Q When you recommended this increased military aid, did you consider that one of the consequences is deeper American involvement, and, if the Salvador army is not able itself to improve significantly and they are not in very good shape, that there might have to be a direct American involvement later on?

DR. KISSINGER: No, I would -- Again, we did not deal

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with this problem directly in -- we did not address it in the report, but I'm sure that I express the consensus of the Commission when I say that we would not favor American combat involvement in Salvador.

Q When you say that -- when the Commission states that containment of Nicaragua is not enough, are you suggesting that the United States cannot live with any left-leaning regime in that country?

DR. KISSINGER: No, the argument that we are making is this: that if Nicargua continues to receive between 12,000 and 15,000 tons of Soviet and Cuban military equipment a year, if it continues to have 10,000 plus Cuban advisors of whom about 3,000 at least are military advisors and have hundreds of East-bloc intelligenc personnel, that, then, under those circumstances the containment of Nicaragua would require a militarization of all surrounding societies and even then would not turn out to be an extremely problematical matter.

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The one conclusion on which, I think, the Commission was unanimous in its impression and its trip through Central America, was the fear of all the heads of government in all of the governments we met, including -- especially -- democratic Costa Rica; of the way that even present Nicaragua exercises, the pressure that it exercises on them.

So it isn't a question of left-leaning regimes. We have stated explicitly in this report that regimes that emerge from indigenous causes, or that confine themselves to indigenous resources and do not make themselves part of an international system, are not an American security concern. This is a paraphrase of what is explicly in the report.

But -- we do not believe, in fact -- that a Nicaragua that continues to arm itself at the present rate, and that will emerge with an army larger than all the rest of them combined, can be contained without a military effort that probably cannot work in societies that are as fragile and as ridden by domestic discord as these countries. And therefore, we propose the seven principles of negotiation that we put forward -- which I might say, for each one of them, there is a principle in the 21 Contadora points that corresponds to it. So these are not revolutionary departures.

Yes, sir?

Q Dr. Kissinger, a spokesman for the President said this morning that State Department estimates indicate 40 percent of the violent acts, such as death squad activities whose origin can be determined in El Salvador, was attributable to extremists on the left. That only 30 to 40 percent was attributable to the right -- to the extremely right-wing. Did your Commission hear any such evidence?

DR. KISSINGER: We heard statements of a general nature to that effect. We did not hear evidence that would enable us to assess it independently. There's one point I neglected to make that I would like to stress.

The Commission feels strongly, not only that this program should be put forward in some sort of a general way, but also that it requires an organization -- which we call the Central American Development Organization, but the name is unimportant -- but that it requires some central focal point which permit a middle and long-term planning, and which would enable the countries of Central America to work together in an established institution to promote their economic and social development. And if it gets parceled out among the various agencies of our government, we do not believe it can develop the coherence and the drive that is necessary -- and, I would think that this is one of the recommendations that will be more -- will be somewhat painful to some of the established institutions in the government.

Q If I may follow up on my question, sir -- why is it, in the context of what your Commission heard, that the death squads have not been controlled up to now?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, the death squads -- I suppose, the death squads represent a many-faceted phenomenon, and a combination of various motives. And they occur in a situation in which law and order has broken down. I think we had some testimony -- don't hold me to the exact figure -- that there are only five or six police cars in the city of San Salvador, with no radio communications. Maybe there are 10, I don't know, but at any rate, a ludicrous figure in relationship to the problem -- so that even

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the well-intentioned parts of the government, which I think include the President, do not have always the means to carry out their preferences. I believe, however, also that, as a result -- partly as a result of Vice President Bush's trip to Salvador, it has been brought home to them that we are serious about this problem and I have been told, though we have had no independent study of it as a Commission, I've been told that the death squad raid has sharply declined. But, of course, we believe it has to be ended. We don't want to set a quota for what is appropriate.

Q You said earlier we would not favor American combat involvement in El Salvador. Would that also apply, as far as the Commission is concerned, to Nicaragua, and did you begin your proceedings by ruling out notions of increasing American military advisors or American military involvement in the region?

DR. KISSINGER: I think, to take your last question first, I don't think we began our proceedings with any particular preconception as a group. Or rather, I think there were many different preconceptions and many eloquent statements were made in the first sessions or two that were modified in the course of it.

So we did not start with any preconceived notions. I must say that when one looks at the role of American advisors, one is not necessarily convinced that a substantial increase in their number -- here, I speak for myself, but I think I reflect the consensus of the group.

Now, the first question was, did we rule it out also with respect to Nicaragua. With respect to Nicaragua, we say in the report that the resort -- the recourse -- that force is the ultimate recourse, but it should be used only in the case of a clearcut and demonstrable threat to our national security. And the interpretation of that phrase will have to be left to the Executive Branch. They have to apply it in specific circumstances.

Q So you're clearcut on Salvador but not on Nicaragua?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, but we have not recommended it. We have said it is an ultimate recourse to be applied in circumstances of a clearcut threat to national security. It's in the text.

Q Can you elaborate on what would be the role of the United States in either the creation of such a --

DR. KISSINGER: In using--?

Q In the United States in either the creation of the Central American Development Organization or its activities? Would this be channeling U.S. aid, or otherwise?

DR. KISSINGER: In our proposal -- and that, of course, is something we would not say -- in our proposal, we have recommended that there be -- first of all, there be a high-level meeting in which the United States meets with the Central American countries.

To be precise, for purposes of economic, social and human development, we are defining Central America to include Panama and Belize.

For purposes of security and diplomacy, we are defining Central America in its traditional sense. That is to say the five countries of Central America. This is because Panama belongs to the Contadora group for purposes of negotiation and that definition has never been challenged. In fact, that is the conventional definition.

Now, to go to your precise question, we recommend that there be a meeting in which the general objectives are agreed to. That then there should be set up an organization through which we recommend a quarter of the development funds be channeled which has an American member or executive director. For this, we don't -- what

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its title as. we don't insist upon -- which periodically reviews progress and which can also -- and should also have -- we had an elaborate organization chart first and it nearly survived until the end and then we thought there was something patronizing about our putting out an organization chart for something in which we are calling "a meeting of Central American States to set up the organization." But it would be our recommendation that this could include among it other monitoring functions, a human rights monitoring function, and we, in fact, make specific reference to that in the report.

Now, we will not die on the barricades if a third is channeled or a fifth is channeled through that as long as there is -- there are some funds available to it to create incentives and as long as there's some mechanism by which progress can be measured and programs can be developed on a coherent basis.

Q At the outset of your report, you said that it was important to avoid the mistakes of Vietnam, particularly to avoid a bitter, divisive, painful national debate over policy aims.

DR. KISSINGER: I don't think that's in the report.

Q No, it's not. But you said that in talking to us at the White House before the Commission got together.

DR. KISSINGER: Oh, yes.

Q That it was important to avoid a bitter, divisive national debate over policy aims. Do you think that this report has helped to achieve that in any way, and if so, how?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, if a consensus among twelve Americans of both parties, of widely different views, does not help promote unity, than I don't know what more a bipartisan commission can do. And we believe -- I hope that that is what it has achieved and that the spirit -- that if the subsequent debate is conducted in the same spirit as the deliberations within the Commission, I believe we can avoid a bitter divisiveness because there was no bitter divisiveness in the Commission and the Commission certainly represented a wide variety of views.

Barry.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you said that a case can be made for doing nothing and a case can be made for doing enough but not for doing too little.

DR. KISSINGER: Correct.

Q I take from that that you probably feel that that's the course we're presently following.

DR. KISSINGER: That's correct.

Q What do you see is the consequence of pursuing this?

DR. KISSINGER: I think it would be the judgment of all us that if present levels of expenditure and present efforts are continued, we will fail in both reform -- in both economic and social progress and we will fail in the security field. And there will be sort of a lingering disintegration with very grave consequences throughout at least the rest of Central America with whatever impact this has on surrounding countries. That any person who knows the area can judge for himself.

So we believe that both the scale of the effort and the way it is organized now will not achieve either the positive aspirations or the security aspirations. And, therefore, also not the diplomatic aims that we would favor.

Yes, sir.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, you mentioned -- emphasized in your report that the United States should not impose indigenous change or indigenous --

DR. KISSINGER: Should not --?

Q Oppose indigenous change or even indigenous revolutions in the hemisphere. Since now any attempt at radical change in the hemisphere is opposed, would that concept of indigenous revolution be just an idea? Can you see that happening at all?

DR. KISSINGER: It is -- of course, any report -- in any -- what we attempted to do in this report is to have a theoretical beginning before we made any recommendations so the people at least understood the way we thought. Of course, you cannot write a cookbook in which -- out of which you can pull recipes that apply themselves automatically. You still have to use judgment in applying it to complete circumstances.

Of course, it is always possible to call any revolution outside inspired. And you can't prevent inspiration. You cannot prevent ideas from traveling across borders, but you can determine whether something is organized, led,

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supplied, and disciplined from the outside, not necessarily automatically, but I think this is a distinction that can be substantially made.

MR. SPEAKES: Let's get Chris here and make it the last question.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you talk about the remarkable consensus that has been reached. But in one area, it seems to me, you have not, and that is the aid to the anti-Sandinista guerrillas. Why was the Commission unable to reach what you call a collective judgment on that hot issue? And why have you left that one unresolved?

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, one could say since there were only two opposing statements filed, you could conclude that ten members of the Commission agreed with the statement that was made here.

Q But you said there was no collective judgment in the text of the report.

DR. KISSINGER: Let me make a distinction. Let me be very precise about what the Commission did or did not do. We did not deal with the wisdom, organization and conduct of operations of the Contras in a systematic manner because of the fact that there has -- because in a report to the President, as you know, there has never been a formal acknowledgement of United States governmental involvement. All of the congressional statements, and all of the administration statements have been in negative terms to oppose prohibitions, but not to authorize the actions. So this created a certain delicacy in the manner in which one could deal with that subject as a formal report.

Secondly, the consensus for the overwhelming majority view that developed in the Commission was that those of the Commission who believed that the Contras should never have been started, and those of the Commission who believed that the covert operations -- that an operation of a certain size should not be covert, nevertheless came together on the proposition that for the purposes of negotiation, existing pressures should not be abandoned except in the context of an overall settlement in which the Nicaraguan insurgents would have a possibility to participate in the political process of Nicaragua, and the Salvadoran insurgents in the political process of Salvador. So on that point one can say there was a ten-to-two majority.

On the broader point, on the wisdom of that kind of operation, and on the efficacy of the effort, the Commission did not address that problem for the reasons which I gave you. And the ten-to-two vote reflected the relevance of the existing pressures to the process of negotiation.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 1:23 P.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
ON THE VISIT OF
PREMIER ZHAO ZIYANG OF CHINA

January 12, 1984

The Briefing Room

11:11 A.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is my third time here, and I'll try to avoid repeating things that I've said already about the meetings the President held on Tuesday and about our general objectives for the trip except to say that I think the trip has lived up very well to the objectives that we had set for it.

As you know, Premier Zhao left for San Francisco this morning following a Cabinet breakfast at the White House that was hosted by President Reagan himself. And he did in fact make a visit to Sidwell Friends after all before leaving. The breakfast was relatively short in order to permit time for signing of the two bilateral agreements: the extension of the Science and Technology Agreement and the Industrial and Technological Cooperation Accord. And as Bob indicated, there are two people here who can go into more detail on that, if you're interested after I'm finished.

The President and Premier Zhao took the opportunity to hold a final, short, private discussion with only interpreters present. At the breakfast itself, after --

Q How short?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This was while we were waiting; I think it was about between five and ten minutes.

The President and the Premier made some brief introductory remarks at the breakfast, and then the President suggested that the American and Chinese officials present talk with one another on an informal basis about their thoughts on possible areas of future U.S.-China cooperation. And the breakfast included, in addition to the Cabinet principals with whom Zhao has had meetings as well as Science Advisor Keyworth, I know that Secretary Clark of Interior was there, Secretary Hodel of Energy and Special Trade Negotiator Brock.

Yesterday, Zhao had a very full day and in the morning met separately with leaders of the House and leaders of the Senate and had a call on Science Advisor Keyworth. In the afternoon he attended a lunch in his honor that was hosted by the National Council on U.S.-China trade and met with Secretaries Baldrige and Weinberger and in the evening hosted a reception at the Vista International Hotel which was the largest reception ever given in this country by the Chinese. Following that, he was the honored guest at a dinner given by the local Chinese community.

As I said, we believe the Washington portion of the trip was highly successful, achieving all of our desired objectives. The President's conversations with Zhao were marked by warmth and by candor. Zhao had the opportunity to learn firsthand of the deep reservoir of support among the American public, including on

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the Hill, for the administration's policy of consolidating and advancing our relations with China.

We think Zhao has a greater understanding now of American support for China's modernization effort and of our willingness to contribute to that effort as appropriate. Moreover, the Premier had the opportunity in Washington to discuss in some detail the complimentarity of American financial, technological --

Q Complimentarity? It's a new word just now coined?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Complimentarity --

Q Is this a historic moment?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- of American -- I thought that was a fairly ordinary word. Excuse me.

Q Wrong.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Financial and technological resources with China's developmental needs.

Q The meeting of small minds.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think I am.

As I indicated, we did not expect

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breakthroughs during this visit.

I think there was one fairly important event, though, that because of its timing late in the dinner toasts Tuesday evening probably didn't get the attention that it deserved in the press. The Premier's toast was actually not a very light one. It was full of quite a bit of policy, including a very significant policy statement by the Chinese on the subject of non-proliferation, and I'll just read to you the critical two sentences from that toast.

The Premier said, "We are critical of the discriminatory treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, but we do not advocate or encourage nuclear proliferation. We do not engage in nuclear proliferation ourselves, nor do we help other countries develop nuclear weapons."

We very much welcome this statement of China's policy because it shows that we share certain basic principles in non-proliferation. It is really, I think, the third of a series of rather important steps in the evolution of China's non-proliferation policy in recent months, starting with their announcement that they would join the IAEA, followed by the announcement that beginning with that event which took place formally on January 1 of this year that China would begin requiring IAEA -- that's International Atomic Energy Agency -- safeguards on its nuclear exports.

These three actions by China represent significant steps in international efforts to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons and represent, I think, major progress that provides a firm basis for cooperation between the U.S. and China in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

I will, in a moment, get into the question of the details of our specific agreement, which still has problems in it.

Just briefly on the meetings that the Premier has had since I last met with you: With Secretary Shultz he talked in some more detail about Taiwan issues. He talked about China's interest in the legislative changes we've been seeking on the Hill and in the Foreign Assistance Act to remove prohibitions on assistance to China; and they talked about other international issues with considerable attention devoted to the Middle East.

With Secretary Regan they talked about trade and commercial matters, about our common interest in reaching treaties in the tax and investment areas, if possible, and about plans for Secretary Regan's meetings in March -- it'll be March 19 -- of the Joint Economic Commission with China in Beijing.

With Science Advisor Keyworth yesterday, the Premier discussed a number of areas of technological cooperation and future cooperation between us.

With Secretary Baldrige the principal subjects of discussion were our trade relations with heaviest emphasis on the issues concerning textile trade and a discussion of technology transfer policy, and of the subject of COCOM, and finally with Secretary Weinberger they discussed areas of military cooperation, taking up subjects that were discussed in Beijing by Weinberger last September, and also talked about Soviet military actions -- particularly the build-up of SS-20s -- and about prospects for arms control.

Finally, on the agreement on nuclear cooperation, which we have been working hard on through this visit, it has been discussed in its significant principles between --

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by Zhao with a number of Cabinet officers, in fact, with -- as well as with the President. He's discussed it with Secretary Shultz, with Secretary Weinberger and with Secretary Baldrige.

Although we have not yet come to agreement on all of the obstacles to conclusion of a nuclear cooperation agreement with the Chinese, we did substantially narrow our differences by reaching agreement on several key points and we will continue to work on that.

One other important meeting that I know of was yesterday afternoon. Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Wu had a not previously scheduled meeting at State. They met for over an hour, reviewing a number of specific international questions with particular attention to our shared desire to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula. And the Secretary has scheduled meetings with Foreign Minister Gromyko next week.

A final point, I was asked to -- indicated that some of you were interested in what the Premier's schedule on beyond Washington is, he -- in San Francisco his -- he arrives at 7:30 p.m. this evening, goes -- Excuse me. He arrives this afternoon, goes to dinner at 7:30 p.m. this evening, hosted by the World Affairs Council of San Francisco in association with the Commonwealth Club and the Shanghai Sister City Association.

Tomorrow, his activities will include visits to the University of California, to the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, a meeting with West Coast Business Leaders, a meeting with Mayor Feinstein and a dinner hosted by Governor Dukmejian and the California International Host Committee.

He then flies back the other way, arrives in New York tomorrow at 4:10 p.m., goes to dinner in the evening hosted by IBM.

Q Tomorrow --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Excuse me. Saturday. Saturday. I was -- Sorry.

Q Could you start on New York, when he gets there and when he --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He gets to New York at 4:10 p.m. on Saturday. He goes to dinner hosted by IBM at 7:30 p.m. that evening.

On Sunday, his activities --

Q Where will that be? You know the hotel or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know the location.

On Sunday, his activities include visits to the World Trade Center and to the Metropolitan Museum of Art and a tour of the harbor, starting at Battery Park Pier.

He has a noon luncheon on Sunday -- this man really has got an incredible schedule -- a noon luncheon on Sunday hosted by Mayor Koch and a dinner at 7:00 p.m. that evening co-hosted by -- at the Council on Foreign Relations, co-hosted by Mr. David Rockefeller and former Secretary Kissinger.

His activities on Monday in New York include a meeting with the publishers and editorial board of The New York Times, meetings with former President Nixon, with former Secretaries of

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State Vance and Kissinger and with former NSC Advisor Brzezinski. This is four separate, individual meetings; a luncheon hosted by the National Committee on U.S.-China relations and the Foreign Policy Association and at 2:55 p.m., he leaves for Ottawa for another six days of state visit.

Q What's he doing in his spare time? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He jogs, I'm told.

Okay. I'd be glad to try to take questions.

Q -- the nuclear cooperation, you said that you've not come to an agreement, but there's been substantial progress. Do you anticipate that this agreement could be -- the signing of it could be -- it could be signed in April when the President goes to China? Are you that close?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In one sense we're very close and in the other sense both sides have indicated that we're pretty much run out of flexibility. So it's very hard -- it's a very risky thing to predict. I am on BACKGROUND, at least, not on the record, as having predicted we'd make it by April. So, I may be wrong. I don't have any real basis for changing that. But it's clear that it's going to be very tough.

There has been some significant movement by both sides during the last few days and the number of outstanding issues is smaller. We have solved some real problems. We've worked out

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much clearer positions on the key points, particularly the key point of difference.

Q Is that still inspection?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I tell you -- I mean, the real issue -- no, the real issue is -- and it's never been inspection. It's visits is the thing you're referring to. But that, I think, is probably -- looks soluble. The place where we have the most problem is the requirement under U.S. law, and I will just read you a few excerpts, let you know what we're up against.

That we have to receive in the agreement a guarantee by the cooperating party that no material will be reprocessed, enriched, or otherwise altered in form or content without the prior approval of the United States.

A guarantee by the cooperating party that no plutonium, no Uranium 223, and no uranium enriched to greater than 20 percent in the Isotope 235 will be stored in any facility that has not been approved in advance by the United States.

And a guarantee by the cooperating party that any special nuclear material will be subject to all these requirements specified in this sub-section, which is part of the -- it's Sub-section 122 of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act.

We have very clear requirements we have to meet under U.S. law. Some other countries negotiating with China do not have such strict requirements and the Chinese, quite clearly, find some of our requests difficult to accept. We have told the Chinese, however, that the worst thing that could happen is to sign an agreement which, because it didn't meet these legal requirements, ended up being unacceptable to the Congress, which has, in the end, to consider what we come up with.

Q Is there any interest here in trying to amend that act or provide any kind of legal exclusion? I mean, is that an option?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In connection with this agreement, no. And not in any other way that I know of. It was a rather landmark piece of legislation that was labored over very, very carefully about five years ago.

Q Yesterday afternoon, the Premier said that to his knowledge, no one had asked the Chinese to join in the conversation over Korea. Did the President, today, talk to him about his comments the other night about that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know what the President said to him today.

Q Did that come up again today?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not today, no.

Q Can you tell us how it stands, the whole Korean situation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I guess let me say, I think, as you know, as we now know, there was a very lengthy statement issued by the North Korean government yesterday -- excuse me -- the day before yesterday in Chongsong January 10th. It is lengthy.

We are looking at it seriously. I would say that in doing so, we are accutely conscious of the fact that this statement comes from the same government that planned and carried out the Rangoon bombing. And at the same time, we will be looking at it along with our South Korean allies from the point of view of our very deep interests, both of us, in anything that could seriously lead to a reduction of tensions in the Korean peninsula. And we'll be studying it carefully

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and we'll be talking about it very closely with a number of interested countries, including China, including Japan, and including, most particularly and most importantly, the government of South Korea.

Q What is different about the proposal this time around, that they've included South Korea? They had made gestures before along this line.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The element that would seem to be new, if it's really there, and if it's not somehow caveated out of existence, would be the willingness to hold direct discussions with the government or with the authorities of South Korea.

South Korean government, for its part, has made clear for a very, very long time and on many occasions, its willingness to pursue direct discussions that

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could lead to a reduction of tensions, hopefully ultimately a peace treaty that would stabilize the situation in the peninsula. The North Korean government over a very long time has refused that kind of discussion.

Q What do you think caused the breakthrough? And are the Chinese interested?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't even characterize it as a breakthrough yet. It is a new statement of position, but it has to be seen in the context of many other things, including, as I said, the Rangoon bombing, the attempted infiltration of North Korean terrorists into South Korea at Pusan that took place just in December, barely a month after Rangoon. It is I think unfortunate that they chose to deliver it as a public message. Obviously the concern here is to try to sort out what is propaganda from what is serious interest in a negotiation and it is our very, very strong belief that if we are to make progress in this very important area, it is going to have to be done not through public statements and press announcements, but through very quiet and very careful, and I assume, very lengthy negotiations.

Q You wouldn't even know what the President thought about it if it hadn't been public.

Q Would you tick off specifically the ways in which the United States' interests were advanced by this meeting over what they had done before? A great preponderance of these gains seem to be on China's side.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am not at all sure why you say that. I mean, I will express my puzzlement by starting with the nonproliferation statement of the Premier. I think that was a gain for nonproliferation, it is a gain for the whole world really. It is certainly a gain for U.S. interests, among other countries. I think it is in fact significant he chose to make that policy statement here.

The agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation that we are working on is an agreement on cooperation. It is not at all a matter of the Chinese alone standing to benefit when we sell them reactors. Obviously that is also very good for us. We benefit from that as well.

The Industrial and Technological Cooperation Accord that my fellow senior official can give you more detail on is something that is a cooperative thing. In fact, it may well be, given the difference in the two economies, that we will gain more from this. In fact, the reason -- one of the reasons we chose to sign it at a very high level is because we're -- the President's ability to direct American companies and how they do business is quite limited. The Premier's signature on a document telling -- directing cooperation in industrial and technological matters with American firms is a most significant signature for any economic entity in China.

So we don't see this at all as a one-way street. I think it is very much a matter of mutual benefit.

Q Flowing out of your briefing so far, I would like to ask two questions. First of all, on the nonproliferation matter which you feel is important, does the United States believe that prior to this China did export technology or nuclear materials

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in a way that could help other nations develop nuclear weapons?

And secondly --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am sorry, would you repeat that for me?

Q Does the United States believe that before now, before this statement made the other night, China did export nuclear materials or technology in a way that could assist other nations to develop nuclear explosive devices?

And secondly, with regard to Korea, what is the -- does it seem that the Chinese are willing to be helpful to set something up there? They said they are interested in three sides, the U.S. has said it is interested in four sides. But beneath those formal positions, does there seem some room for cooperation with the Chinese to bring about whatever can be brought about on the peninsula?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On the first thing, I think the answer is yes, China was a significant source --

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is a significant source of nuclear technology for a number of countries that remain of non-proliferation concerns, such as Argentina. It's been a concern to us that that technology was being conveyed without IAEA safeguards applied to it. We very much welcome that application, and we very much welcome the further clarification of the point that while China -- like France, I might add -- is not party and obviously doesn't seem to be about to become a party to the non-proliferation treaty, nevertheless it supports the objective of non-proliferation.

On the question about Korea, I think that underneath the surface of -- or from the discussions that we have underneath the surface of these public pronouncements, certainly our impression that the Chinese are seriously looking for ways to reduce tensions in the Korean peninsula, as are we, and as is the South Korean government. I think all of this activity and all of this attention and all of the study and discussion that it's leading to is itself -- got to have -- be a promising development, but it's impossible to go beyond that. We're talking about probably the most intractable and bitter conflict in the world. We're talking about the aftermath of more than 30 years after the Korean War of essentially no progress toward a peace agreement. There was a provision in the armistice agreement for a peace agreement, and there was a brief conference at Geneva in 1954 that failed to come to one, so we're talking about a problem that's been around a long time.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're going to have to limit the questions here.

Q What about the cultural exchange? Are you expecting an announcement on the resumption of the cultural exchange program?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We are discussing the -- through diplomatic channels the details of what a program would look like, and I don't expect one in the very immediate term, but sometime in the coming months.

Q Could we get a few words on these agreements?

Q How important is it for China to get this nuclear cooperation agreement? If they fail to get it, will it seriously affect their economy?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They have very big plans for nuclear power development -- indicated on the order of 10,000 megawatts of nuclear power by the end of the century. Obviously it will help them a great deal to have access to Western technology. They're engaged in discussions with the British, with the French, and the Japanese, as well as with ourselves. I don't know how critical our cooperation would be if they had the other three, but clearly we have some very good technology, and it'll be good for all of us.

Q Is the nuclear power crucial to their other industrial development? Is that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I know [redacted] has got to leave. We have two other experts on the agreements here. If we can shift to that -- If you gentlemen would like to take over here.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Would it be useful if I gave just a little bit of background about the industrial/technological cooperation agreement accord?

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Let me start by saying here on a general background, on our trade prospects, the United States has become China's third largest trading partner and we believe many U.S. firms are now well positioned to take advantage of the current upturn in our relationship and of Chinese plans to increase imports over the next two years.

There's a myth that China does not have the money to pay for this. China has more than $15 billion of foreign exchange reserves, China can buy anything she wants to buy.

Over 100 U.S. firms now maintain offices in China, and U.S. investment commitments in the People's Republic of China now total more than about $500 million.

U.S. exports to China fell in '82 and '83 due to the shrinking agricultural and raw materials exports to the U.S. The '83 decline was due in large part to Chinese restrictions on the imports, as you all know, of U.S. grain and textile fibers instituted in retaliation against U.S. restrictions on Chinese textile exports.

Our 1983 bilateral trade balance will be in deficit with China. For the first time since relations were normalized in 1979 the deficit would be roughly about $200 million. However,

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we expect, in 1984, a very substantial growth in U.S. exports to China. They will rise, in 1984, due to the resumption of U.S. agricultural and textile fiber exports as well as the growth of U.S. machinery and equipment exports.

Two weeks ago we successfully concluded negotiations with the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade in China on a new agreement. This draft of the agreement was presented to the Chinese during Secretary Baldrige's May visit to Beijing. It was discussed during the first meeting of the U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade which the Secretary co-chaired.

Talks continued over the past eight months through the Foreign Commercial Service of the Department of Commerce. The Industrial and Technological Cooperation Accord -- ITCA -- as it is called, was initialed ten days ago in Beijing, and, as you know, was just signed this morning.

By signing this agreement -- and I would agree with my colleague -- it commits both governments to industrial and technological cooperation by sending a very powerful message to Chinese foreign trading corporations -- foreign trading corporation officials -- that it's all right to buy U.S. products. It's all right to buy American. And also the same message, of course, to the U.S. private sector that it's all right to sell the Chinese and it's all right to buy from the Chinese.

The goal of this accord if to enhance cooperation by doing four things: first, through exchanges of information on specific Chinese projects and priorities; secondly, through the exchange of delegations; third, through the facilitation of financing on the best possible terms; and U.S. government assistance in arranging feasibility studies.

This accord will be used to encourage the Chinese to give U.S. companies early information in their Chinese planning stages about industrial projects. We view this accord as a framework agreement which will be implemented through the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade. We will be cooperating with with Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade -- which is our counterpart organization in implementing this accord.

This accord begins a process. Our cooperation on the accord will focus on those industrial sectors to which China has attached greatest priority -- such as coal, offshore oil, oil supply equipment, railroads, electronics, telecommunications, and the upgrading of existing Chinese plant and equipment.

Our approach is to pursue cooperation in these sectors through separate implementing protocols. So, in other words, we will now move from the general -- which is this accord -- to the specific over time. We would hope, and anticipate, that by the end of 1984 we will have, perhaps, four to five protocols in specific, individual sectors.

This agreement, this accord, does not create any new bureaucracy, nor does it call for any increases in our budget. It was not our intent in suggesting this agreement to the Chinese that we create new jobs for government bureaucrats. It does, however, create a new coordinating committee within the framework of the Joint Commission on Commerce on Trade. The members of this Committee are Ex-Im Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the Trade Development Program, the State Department and the Department of Commerce. Treasury and STR will, of course, play an important role.

Our goal is to create opportunities for American firms to do business in China. The real expertise that the Chinese need for their development program is not held by the U.S. government, but by private U.S. firms. Our international competitors in China have

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a variety of government-supported financial and other means for gaining access to the market. It is our hope that this agreement will help redress the balance by giving our firms a fair shot in open, competitive bidding, which are conditions under which U.S. firms have proven that they can compete competitively.

Thank you.

Yes, sir.

Q What specifically does this do that

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couldn't be done before? A lot of U.S. firms have had business over there -- in oil and coal and -- What does this permit them to do? R&D and everything else?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think one thing that it does is to give the signal to the Chinese bureaucratics in the foreign trading corporations that it's okay to buy American. As Premier Zhao said yesterday and the day before, that political conditions do tend to impact on economic-trade-commercial relations. And I think this is a very powerful signal here to the Chinese trade bureaucracy.

Secondly, it does in a very specific way commit the U.S. government to provide financing for feasibility studies. Of course, that'd be in accordance with U.S. law. Feasibility studies, we've found, on major projects oftentimes lead directly to increased U.S. sales in that area because the feasibility studies specs are written to accommodate U.S. technology and equipment. So, I think that's a very specific area of agreement.

Q I didn't mean to belabor this, but what misconception did these bureaucratics have before anyway? They've been buying American. And, also, their whole tendency is to decentralize this kind of buying to provinces and individual corporations.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The decentralization process is one that's subject to reversal, and in fact it's being reversed right now. As to the first question of buying U.S. products, we're on the eve of a new phase in our economic and trade relationship with China where offshore oil and the production of coal and hydropower is about to take place. These are huge, new, major industrial sectors where U.S. technology is extremely competitive. And we want to be in on the ground floor of that by trying to work with the Chinese to develop early information about their planning.

So, in these areas, of course, there has been some progress made, but the great potential is still ahead of us here, especially in offshore oil. For instance, twelve American firms have signed production contracts. Drilling will start this year and next year. But the major development and production part of that is years on down the road.

We would anticipate that these protocols in the oil area are going to help further U.S. participation.

Yes, sir? In the back.

Q Do you have any concern that if the nuclear power sales issue, the remaining issue, is not resolved pretty soon, that the Chinese will take their business elsewhere and will get equipment and nuclear fuel from the French, the British, the -- or whoever?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the Chinese have expressed to us on innumerable occasions here their desire for U.S. technology. They would like to have it because, as they said several times in connection with, say, from Fromotone, that they'd rather go to the mother than the daughter. And we would take them at their word, that they do want U.S. technology because we are better in certain areas of nuclear technology than Japan and Great Britain and France.

At the same time, because of the laws involving nuclear cooperation being so clear, as my colleague pointed out, we are not going to make any deal just to further our commercial interest at the expense of our strategic and national security interest. So, it's going to be a measured pace. I think both sides very much want to have a nuclear cooperation agreement.

I think it's in sight. I think we've gone about 95 percent of the way there. But the remaining five percent is very difficult.

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Yes, sir?

Q Is there any progress this visit on the telecommunications protocol?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, there is. And I would expect that to be initialed and signed in a very short time.

Q Could you tell me in what meetings the progress was made?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have received a draft from the Chinese that is very close to the draft that we gave them sometime ago. We have yet to meet formally on it, but in looking at the draft, it appears quite good.

Q How many of America's competitors in the Chinese market have similar protocols as the ones you've signed today with --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No one does. This is the only kind of accord that China has in the world.

Q And, secondly, if you're able to come to an agreement on this peaceful nuclear cooperation, how will that affect the positions of Westinghouse and other American suppliers on the Guangdong project? To put it another way, how far has China gone with France?

SENIOR ADMINSTRATION OFFICIAL: I think China's gone pretty far down the road with France. I think it might be difficult to reverse that momentum, so I think we're looking at other projects beside Guangdong.

Q Which ones?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Shanghai. There'll be consultancy on that. And then over the next 20 years, they have plans afoot that would involve nearly $20 billion of nuclear equipment, technology, and materials.

Thank you.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 11:49 A.M. EST

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ' STOCKHOLM TRIP (INCLUDING VISIT WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO OF JANUARY 17, 1984)

WASHINGTON, D. C.
FRIDAY, JANUARY 13, 1984

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. We're ON BACKGROUND rules, which means you may attribute this to a senior State Department official. For your information, not for publication, that is, of course, [redacted]

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Thank you.

I thought I would make a few remarks about the upcoming Stockholm meeting and Secretary of State's meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko and some of the issues surrounding those events, including some of the substance of the CDE, that's the Conference on Disarmament in Europe -- the conference itself and Soviet compliance to arms control.

Let me just begin by giving you a brief itinerary for the Secretary of State's travels. He will be in Stockholm from January 16 through January 19. That is for the Conference on Disarmament. The Conference is actually getting underway on the 17th, and as you know, the Conference was part of the agreement reached in the Madrid meeting last year; and it takes place within the framework of the CSCE, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

On his way to Stockholm, he will stop in Britain January 15-16, and on the way home, he will stop in Oslo. In London, he will consult with Prime Minister Thatcher and Foreign Minister Howe. He will also meet with the new NATO Secretary-General-elect -- he will not become Secretary-General until next June -- Lord Carrington.

In Oslo, he will meet with the Norwegian King, Olaf V, and Foreign Minister Stray. The Prime Minister, by the way, will be out of town.

In Stockholm, there will be four major areas of activity. First, the Secretary will have bilateral meetings with Swedish officials, including Prime Minister Palme, Foreign Minister Bostrom; and he will attend a lunch hosted by the Swedish King. Secondly, the opening of the CDE itself -- there are 35 nations represented in the CDE, 33 European countries of Eastern Europe as well as Western Europe, members of NATO, members of the Warsaw Pact as well as neutral and non-aligned countries -- this first phase of the conference which will continue in session and be attended, as you know, by Foreign Ministers, and we expect the first three days to be filled with opening statements by the Foreign Ministers, including Secretary Shultz.

Thirdly, his meeting with Gromyko, which will take place on January 18, and then finally, talks with other visiting Foreign Ministers in addition to Gromyko. On the eve of the CDE meeting -- on the evening of the

16th, there will be a meeting of the NATO Foreign Ministers hosted by the French. This meeting is designed to be an informal meeting over dinner to allow the Ministers alone to discuss the Conference in broader issues of East-West relations and other questions they may have on their minds.

In addition to that meeting, which will give the Secretary an opportunity to have detailed discussions with NATO Ministers, he will meet with Foreign Ministers of Eastern Europe, and we expect some neutral and non-aligned countries.

Just a very quick word on the CDE. The Conference itself is the result of a NATO initiative at Madrid. The idea for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe embracing all the European countries and focusing geographically not only on Europe but the western portions of the Soviet Union was first raised by Former French President Giscard.

We see the CDE meeting, this Conference on Disarmament, as part of the broader CSCE Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe process, which means that while we are very interested in working on arms control, that our emphasis on human rights is still very strong.

Flowing out of the Madrid meeting last year, there was agreement on several follow-on conferences -- this is only one, the CDE. There are several others, all principally dealing with human rights, and those meetings will take place between now and 1986.

In the Madrid concluding document, which was agreed last year, the mandate for the CDE agreed that the countries would negotiate on measures that were militarily significant, verifiable, politically binding, and,as I mentioned, that would cover the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

We believe that the CDE is an important opportunity to strengthen security in Europe, principally by increasing mutual information on military forces and movements and by building confidence and reducing the danger of surprise attack in Europe. The United States and the Allies will present concrete measures -- what we call CSBMs, confidence and security-building measures -- with this objective in mind. And if any of you are interested, I can go into a little more detail on the shape of that NATO negotiating package.

The Secretary, in his statement at the CDCE, will set out our approach to the Conference in a broader East-West context, and as I mentioned -- no, I guess I didn't -- his speech, as early on as Gromyko's in the conference, both on January 17th.

On the Gromyko bilateral, we took the initiative to propose this meeting. We want it to review the full range of

U.S.-Soviet issues, including arms control and security, human rights, regional problems, and bilateral relations. We will stress the American desire to build a more constructive relationship. Of course, we, as the Secretary of State made clear yesterday, cannot predict Soviet attitudes, but we do believe that they do share similar interests in working toward a more constructive relationship.

I've mentioned the informal NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting on the 16th. Although the question of whom the Secretary will meet, could, of course, change in the next few days. Right now, it looks as though the Secretary will be meeting with Foreign Minister Genscher of the Federal Republic of Germany; the Spanish Foreign Minister Moron; the new Turkish Foreign Minister, the Swiss Foreign Minister, and the Hungarian Foreign Minister.

Lastly, the meeting in Stockholm -- and specifically, the meeting between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko -- will be a significant development in East-West relations. It is not divorced from other developments. As you know, there will be a speech by the President on Monday addressing U.S.-Soviet relations, and he will discuss the Stockholm meeting. But in addition to these developments as you know, there have been discussions, developments concerning a question of Soviet compliance to existing arms control agreements.

Over the last several years, the Soviet Union has taken a number of actions which have prompted concern about Soviet compliance with arms control agreements. After a careful Administration review over many months, the President has determined that the Soviet violations, or probable violations, have occurred with respect to a number of Soviet arms control obligations and commitments. Let me just repeat that: After a careful Administration review over many months, the President has determined that the Soviet violations, or probable violations, have occurred with respect to a number of Soviet arms control obligations and commitments. These involve chemical and toxin weapons; and as you know, we have accused the Soviet Union of violations in this area previously:

-- a powerful new Soviet radar located in a prohibited area; the testing of another new inter-continental ballistic missile; the status of another Soviet ICBM; the encription of data needed to verify arms control agreements; nuclear testing; and finally, the notification of military exercises as provided for by the Helsinki Final Act.

We view these violations or probable violations as cause for concern. In order to make progress in arms control, we must have the confidence that only compliance and adequate verification can provide.

While undertaking this extensive study of Soviet compliance, we have remained in close touch with the Soviet Union on these problems. As you know, there is a formal U.S.-Soviet body, the Standing Consultative Commission, where we and the Soviets are able to raise compliance concerns. We have raised these issues in that body, but in addition, we have raised them in diplomatic channels at senior levels. We will continue to raise these issues with the Soviet Union. Our objective is not to engage in anti-Soviet propaganda or to score public debating points, but to preserve and protect the integrity of the arms control process.

The United States will continue to abide by its legal obligations and political commitments under existing agreements; and the President is committed to continuing his effort to secure arms control agreements that provide for significant reductions and that are verifiable.

I'll be happy to take any of your questions on the various things I touched on.

Q Can I pick you up on the last point first?

A Yes. Go ahead, Barry.

Q I mean, it's the freshest thing in our minds is what you've just been through. I wonder and am trying to determine if Soviet behavior has changed, or if the Administration's sensitivity is a little sharper, because going all the way back, of course, there have been accusations, "Did the Soviets test the limits?" "They may violate the spirit"; "They may step over the boundaries a little bit." In fact, from that podium years ago, some of us remember Henry Kissinger going through all these allegations and saying that, "We're satisfied that, basically, the Soviets are living up the agreements. We get satisfactory explanations at the Consultative.." et cetera.

A Well, I'm not --

Q In other words, what I'm trying to say, are the Soviets more illegal now than they have been in past years, or are you calling them on it more closely than other Administrations might have in the past?

A I understand your question.

Q O.K.

A And I just can't answer it. The reason I can't answer it is that we have undertaken a very extensive examination of Soviet compliance recently, and I'm just not in the position to say that when Henry Kissinger or anyone else stood up here and said that the Soviets had come close to the line, or had exploited ambiguities, or whatever, whether as extensive an examination was taken at that time.

We all know that the Soviet Union takes a very legalistic attitude, and they will exploit loopholes -- and there are plenty of examples in the past where they have. But in this case, after an extensive study, we have found, as I said, violations or probable violations in the areas that I listed.

Q In the last point, when you referred to Geneva, when you took them up, when you took up your questions with the Soviets in Geneva in the private process that exists, were you dissatisfied? Did they give an unsatisfactory explanation?

A Their explanations differ from issue to issue; but I think, generally speaking, you can say, yes, we were dissatisfied.

Q Can you tell us which --

A I might add one thing -- and I'm sorry I forgot it; I'm not sure if it's in my opening -- No, I have not mentioned it, and I think it is very important, that this study, this examination which has been underway was undertaken at the request of the U.S. Congress.

As you know, there are a number of Congressmen who have expressed concern publicly on this issue; they have written letters privately, and the President was undertaking it at the request of Congress -- this study.

Q The Administration said that it was going to abide by the SALT II Agreement as long as the other side did; and if you now say that you have evidence to prove that the other side has not been complying, are you laying the groundwork for some tests or --

A I don't think you heard what I said. I said that the United States will continue to abide by its existing political commitments and legal obligations; and, as you know, what we are doing is we abide by the terms of the ABM Treaty, which is a ratified arms control agreement. We are abiding by the terms of the so-called Interim Agreement, the agreement on offensive forces signed in 1972 that was going to have a duration of five years but was unilaterally extended by both sides. And, as you know, our policy towards SALT II is that we will not take steps to undercut the agreement as long as the Soviet Union does the same.

Q Do you think that the Soviet Union is not doing the same?

A I am saying I have listed some specific probable violations. I am not going to address the question of undercutting.

Q On the question of the phased-array radar, doesn't that constitute some kind of a violation of the AMB Treaty, if not a breakout from the ABM Treaty?

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Q Can you tell us which areas were probable violations and which areas were violations, or do you mean that that phrase covers everything that --

A Without going into too many specifics, the report that the President has approved will go to the Congress in the near future. It will be classified. It is classified because this is a sensitive subject area, and it will be classified because of the problem of sources and methods.

So it is difficult for me to give you too much detail on this; but I will say that, as I've noted earlier, we have already publicly charged the Soviet Union with a violation of the Convention on Biological and Toxin Weapons. This is the yellow rain question.

Q Is it?

A And we have already charged publicly the Soviet Union with violations of the Helsinki Final Act, and this principally concerns the requirements in that Act to provide prior notification of military maneuvers; and it is very clear that there is at least one instance where the Soviet Union failed to do so.

On the other issues I will just simply say some are more clear-cut than others, but in all of the seven we said that we see a probable violation.

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A Yes, it does.

Q Well, what's your --

A We want to resolve these issues with the Soviet Union.

Q Since your observance is conditioned on Soviet observance and if you're pretty --

A No, that is untrue. The ABM Treaty is a formal agreement that is ratified by both sides. We have strong grounds for believing that they have violated, or probably violated, the Treaty. We want to resolve this problem and we are going to continue to work with the Soviet Union to do so.

Q It seems like a carrot and a stick approach. Why have you chosen your timing as you have -- that is, that the Secretary is going there and almost simultaneously you're releasing this report?

A We're not releasing this report. I thought I made it clear that it's a classified report.

Q Yes, but you're giving now the highlights of it. Why that timing?

A I think we would all like to be in the position where we could orchestrate everything. The fact is that this report has been under way, that the Congress would like to see this report, and we did an exhaustive study and we are going to send the report soon to Capitol Hill.

There is no way -- this is a complicated world and there are Stockholm conferences and there are other events, and you just can't predict in advance how to orchestrate these things. It is purely a coincidence. As I made very clear, we are not trying to make any kind of public issue, we are not trying to embarrass anyone. The full report will go to the Congress in classified form.

But given the fact that this has been an issue in the public domain and there have been leaks in other reports, we thought it was necessary to say something.

Q Is this going to be the extent of the number of violations? Some members of Congress have accused that the Soviets are violating up to 40 different instances. Does the classified report go into more detail than the seven areas you're talking about?

A No. It just covers the seven principal areas I've discussed. There was a very, very extensive study which looked at other areas; and it was decided that these seven were the principal areas that needed further examination. It doesn't rule out, of course, the examination of other cases later on.

Q Now, one other question. Is the President at some time going to go public with this?

A He has already addressed the compliance problem, as you know, in several public statements. I think the one that comes to mind is the UN speech where I think he referred, for example, to this radar question and biological weapons and other questions of new missiles.

I don't want to speculate on what he might say in the future.

Q You said you didn't have enough evidence to take it to court. Now I would assume,from what you have said, that they consider they have got enough evidence.

A We have been asked by the Congress to report what we know about these problems, and that's precisely what we are doing; and I gave you the general thrust of the findings of that report.

Q Is it accurate to say that with the exception of at least one instance that you mentioned under the Helsinki Act, as has been charged in the past, and the yellow rain accusations that you still don't have enough evidence to go to court on the other?

A No, no. The problem with international relations is that there is no court. I just simply stand on what I said -- that violations are probable violations.

Q Will these be brought up by the Secretary with Mr. Gromyko?

A The Secretary of State will address a full range of issues with the Soviet Foreign Minister, including arms control;

and, clearly, this is an issue of some significance for arms control.

Q Is there any reason why you had to bring this up right now before the Gromyko meeting?

A No. I think I'll just have to stand on my earlier answer.

Q On the threshold testing, is that a category where you're definite or is there still some disagreement on that?

A Let me just make clear that in defiance of the report there is no disagreement, that we worked through this problem very carefully. All the important agencies were involved -- including the intelligence community, the Defense Department, the Arms Control Agency, the National Security Council, and the State Department.

And on the specifics of your question, the Threshold Test Ban tends to fit into the category of probable rather than certain violation.

Q Can I ask something on the Genscher bilateral, to switch the subject just for a second?

As you're probably aware, Ambassador Arthur Burns in Bonn has been on two major topics organizing within Europe against the President's program, both on the so-called SDI -- the Strategic Defense Initiative -- and also he has been organizing governments to try to pressure the Administration here to cut our defense budget, which is not the President's program.

I'm just wondering if Shultz is going to try to make clear to Genscher that in fact Burns, when he says these things, is not speaking for the President -- if, in effect, you might make that clear also to other foreign ministers.

A That's a silly question. I'm not going to answer it.

Q Well, if I provide you with documentation on this, could I get an answer?

A No.

I apologize, John (Hughes).

Q You said earlier we might be able to get you to detail some more of the NATO package that will be offered next week on CDM.

A Let me just correct quickly.

There are really six principal measures. They involve -- I can't, of course, give you the precise details, and more the general areas they cover.

First, an information exchange on the location and structure of military formations in the region. And I just want to remind you that the region does not just cover Western Europe, and portions of Eastern Europe, but it extends all the way into the Soviet Union into the Urals.

Secondly, regular forecasts of military activities, which will require advance notification.

Thirdly, advance notification of military activities out of garrison on land in Europe -- that means when troops leave their deployment areas and train or engage in movements.

Fourthly, reciprocal observation of pre-notified military activities -- that is -- boy, that is really bureaucratese, isn't it!

Q Yes. (Laughter.)

A What it means is that you invite observers to watch pre-notified military activities. By that, that means military training exercises that you've been notified about.

Fifthly, verification, monitoring and compliance -- that is, agreements on how you monitor and verify these agreements, these measures.

And, sixth, enhance means of communications to help avert miscalculation and to manage crises.

Q Are these refinements of the Helsinki Agreement or --

A They go a good deal further.

Q I mean --

A The Helsinki measures, as you recall, were very few in number and they asked both sides to notify with very large movements.

Q Well --

A This would require both sides to provide very detailed information on their activities.

Q Another requirement?

A Yes, they are.

Q In other words, in my mind these are proposals; these aren't things that NATO feels the Soviets were obliged to --

A No, no. These are proposals that the NATO countries will be pursuing --

Q Right.

A -- at the Conference on Disarmament in Europe.

Q On the communications, is this related to the Hotline enhancement?

A The Hotline enhancement talks which have been under way here in Washington this week and concluded this morning focuses on U.S.-Soviet strategic communications -- that is, communications between the Kremlin and the White House -- as well as some other proposals that we have to improve bilateral communications.

The proposals I was talking about would involve all 35 countries in the CDE negotiation.

Q Could I go back to the verification --

Q Just on that point, have they been successful? Have they agreed to enhance the Hotline -- or whatever terminology you used?

A I think the language is that we thought the meetings were productive and useful.

Q I mean is there any more or is this the end of it?

A I don't know what our line is on this one and whether there is any more, but I just sort of would steer you away from the notion that this is the end of the discussion.

Q Could I go back to the Soviet compliance question? On the eve of an important and significant meeting, you are accusing the Soviets of cheating or coming close to cheating on major agreements. Have you calculated what impact this may have on the Soviet willingness to proceed --

A I'm going to --

Q -- because they're going to deny it flatly, (inaudible) --

A I think the way to respond to this is just to simply say that sweeping these kinds of issues under the rug in the long run is not in the interest of a healthy, productive U.S.-Soviet relationship. These are serious issues and we have to cope with them if we are going to give new impetus to arms control, which is the goal of the President.

MODERATOR: I think we have time for maybe one more.

Q Let me just sort of ask. When you say you "want the Soviets to do," are you suggesting that they have to dismantle the radar or they have to stop testing the SS-25, or how are you going to be satisfied?

A I'm not going to go into the details, but we will be satisfied when the Soviets are in compliance with their obligations and commitments.

Q A lot of people want to know if the United States really wants a thaw or improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations.

A That who does?

Q If the United States really, truly, wants an improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations. And by announcing the possible cheating, as was mentioned now, it raises the question of whether the point here is simply to convince the Europeans that we want improvement and pointing out what the Soviets do wrong and that, truly, we're not telling the Soviets we want improvement.

A That's just flat wrong. I mean the fact is we do want an improvement in the relationship, but we don't want that improvement based on atmospherics. Improved U.S.-Soviet relations requires both sides meeting one another halfway. What it means is that when we have serious differences that we work to resolve them; and compliance, as I said before, is a serious concern.

I'll just make a general point about compliance. I'll remind you that in the SALT II debate the question of verification was one of the biggest issues that loomed and the American people are unlikely to support an arms control process that can not be adequately verified. And the goal of verification is a very important one in our arms control proposal.

We have -- I think part of this process and part of this exhaustive study that we've undertaken has been a learning process for us, and that learning process is that we have to be very thoughtful and careful and prudent in designing arms control proposals so that we can insure adequate verification.

Q Thank you.

A Yes.

(Whereupon, at 2:44 p.m., the BACKGROUND briefing was concluded.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
COMPLIANCE ISSUES
FRIDAY, JANUARY 13, 1984, 3:05 P.M.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIAL: Good afternoon, gentlemen. This is a background briefing mainly designed to flesh out some of the material that I went over in the earlier briefing in a general way. What we wanted to do is bring in a smaller group of people that we thought had a good grasp of the issue area.

The reason we're doing this is not so much to generate stories about the issue here. I'll simply repeat what I said in the press briefing, which was that we're not seeking to make a major propaganda question about compliance, but we recognize that stories on the subject are inevitable.

There have already been a number of stories; some well informed, others written by Rollie Evans. But recognizing that there will be a number of stories written about the subject, we thought we'll get this knowledgeable group together and give you as much as we can on background. Obviously, for public use.

That said, I'm not probably going to be able to give you as much information as you would like. Part has to do with the fact that we would like to preserve some confidentiality in our discussions with the Soviets on the subject; and, secondly, as you know, a good part of the compliance questions have to deal with methods of intelligence collection. We can't say very much beyond a certain point without revealing sources and methods.

Let me just list for you in more detail the findings that the President has made. First of all, I'll just give you, again, the one statement that I gave you downstairs which was, after a careful Administration review over many months the President has determined that Soviet violations, or probable violations, have occurred with respect to a number of Soviet arms control obligations and commitments.

The specific points. With respect to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Geneva protocol and related rules of customary international law, the Soviets have repeatedly violated their obligation, and we have publicly charged the Soviets with these violations.

This concerns, of course, the use of Soviet chemical weapons in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan which is a violation of the Geneva protocol, and the Soviet use of toxin weapons in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia which is a violation of the BWC, Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

With respect to the Helsinki Final Act, the United States has publicly charged the Soviet Union,by its conduct of the ZAPAD-81 military exercise, with violating its political commitment under this Act to observe the confidence-building measure regarding prior notification of military exercises.

Q How troops was that?

A I'm sorry, Bernie, I might be able to get you the number in a moment.

Regarding the ABM Treaty, a large phased array radar constructed near Krasnoyarsk in the Central USSR is almost certainly a violation of a legal obligation the Soviet Union has assumed under the terms of the ABM Treaty.

With regard to SALT II, based on information now available, flight testing of the SSX-25, intercontinental ballistic missile, probably violates the Soviet political commitment to observe the unratified SALT II Treaty. In this case, the SALT II provision limiting each party to one "new type" of light ICBM.

If, however, we were to accept the Soviet argument that the SSX-25 is not a new type of ICBM, then the SALT II provision limiting the ratio of re-entry vehicle weight to throw-weight to no less than fifty percent for existing types of ICBM's has been violated. We conclude that Soviet encryption practices --

Q Can I stop you right there for a second?

A If you're going to ask a question about the substance, I'd like to run through the list.

We conclude that Soviet encryption practices -- that is, encryption of telemetric data from missiles -- are in violation of a legal obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of SALT II prior to 1981 during the period when the treaty was pending ratification.

Q Can you just read that over again; I'm sorry?

A In other words, the Soviet encryption practices were in violation of a legal obligation prior to 1981, during the period when the treaty was pending ratification.

After 1981, Soviet encryption practices were a violation of a political commitment that the Soviets made not to undercut SALT II.

I'll be happy, in response to your questions, to explain the distinction.

In view of the available information, we cannot reach a conclusive judgment of whether SS-16 ICBM's are deployed, but certain activities underway at the Plesetsk testing facility in the Soviet Union lead to the conclusion that SS-16's are probably deployed there. This would represent a probable violation before 1981 of the legal obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of SALT II. And after 1981, it would represent a violation of a political commitment not to undercut SALT II.

And, finally, regarding the Threshhold Test Ban Treaty, based on available information and verification constraints, we have been unable to reach a conclusive judgment on whether the Soviets are violating the unratified Threshhold Test Ban Treaty's yield limit of 150 kilotons for testing.

We believe it likely, however, that Soviet testing violates their obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of the Threshhold Test Ban Agreement.

Q Why the ambiguity on these on the radar, the phased array radar. You said "almost certainly." Is there a big question there.

A The question there -- and, remember, it is almost certainly, so the area of ambiguity is rather small. That said, the radar is deployed well within the interior of the Soviet Union. As you know, the ABM Treaty prohibits the deployment of these types of radar within the interior of the Soviet Union. It says that they should be deployed on the periphery facing outward.

As you know, the character of this radar is that it is not only within the interior of the Soviet Union but the face of the radar essentially points inward. The significance of that is that this radar could be used not only in an early-warning function, which is permitted under SALT II, but it could also be used as part of a battle management system for a large-scale Soviet ABM system, and, thus, that is why the two sides agreed on these restrictions on radar deployment.

You said "ambiguity." The reason we say "amost certainly" is that the treaty does provide for space track radars. And in conversations, we have been told by the Soviets that the purpose of the radar is for space track.

Q Despite the periphery language in the treaty, that would be, in other words, legal?

A I don't follow you?

Q It's not on the periphery; it's about 600 miles back.

A The space track radars are permitted under the treaty and they can be deployed anywhere. But I must say this radar is not, in the judgment of specialists, optimized for space track.

Q Just to clarify one point. When you're discussing the SSX-25, and you talk about it -- even if you accepted the Soviet's definition of this thing, that it still would be in violation because of the throw-away --

A Right.

Q Why don't you then call it a violation instead of, at the outset, you're saying it's a probable violation.

A We call it a "probable violation" for two principal reasons. One, we do not have a good deal of test data on this missile. Why don't we have a lot of test data? Because the Soviets have been so heavily encrypting their information.

The test data we do have is very good.

Secondly, there are certain definitional questions concerning throw-away and how it's defined. That creates a small degree of ambiguity.

I'll just say in passing, we have been immensely careful in preparing this study, and, thus, we have chosen our language very carefully, and in no sense have we attempted to exaggerate our findings.

Q Can I just ask one more thing. Is there anything in the language, the authorization language on the ACDA bill, that called upon the government to produce this? Is there anything in there or any demand upon you to produce this at this particular time?

A At this particular time, no. But this study has been underway for a long time. Remember, there were several members of Congress that are very concerned about this subject and felt that it would be unwise not to complete the work, complete the study, and submit it to Congress as required.

Q -- asking you to send it up there by 93 to nothing in the Senate?

A That is correct.

Q Who felt it would unwise? The Administration felt it would be unwise, not --

A There was never any effort to delay the work of the study.

Q Can you amplify what you found on the SS-16 at Plesetsk? That's been studied for a long, long time. You say there's no conclusive evidence but it probably deployed -- could you amplify that a bit and tell us how many you think they deployed and for what purpose?

A This is a very difficult issue, Bill, because of the problem of sources and methods. We just simply say that activities have been observed that have created real concerns; that despite the Soviet commitment not to deploy the missile, that SS-16's are present and could be used for operational purposes.

Q They've got so many other kinds of missiles. Could you give us some notion of scope because the numbers we've heard in the past have been pretty small. It raises a question as to why they would risk a violation on something with such a small force.

A I'm not going to comment on the size of it.

Q The SS-16 is banned by the SALT II?

A The SS-16 is a mobile missile. It is a three-stage mobile missile. The first two stages of the missile comprise the SS-20. For this reason, recognizing the difficulties of verifying SS-16's and differentiating them from SS-20's, that in the SALT II negotiations the United States pressed the Soviets to ban the SS-16 all together. The reason that we took this step was, in part, the fact that the Soviet Union indicated that they had no interest in deploying the weapon. This is why the activities that we have monitored are disturbing.

Q Could you tell us something about the mechanism or the thought behind choosing these specific seven issues? For example, we've heard that the ACDA Committee had prepared seventeen and that there was an earlier version that it might have been up to twenty-four. Why down to such a narrow --

A All of these subjects require an exhaustive amount of analysis. There were some subjects such as, for example, the Kennedy-Khruschev understandings on Cuba, which are not arms control agreements, per se. They constitute political understandings.

For that reason, some of these alleged violations did not appear to be proper for a technical study on arms control compliance.

Also, other alleged violations. The finding was there was not enough material; further analysis was necessary; that there was not enough evidence. I don't want to suggest that these are only probable or possibile Soviet violations. There could well be others. But these were the seven that the group in an early stage, the interagency group that examined this problem felt that there was a reason or rationale to look into more closely.

Q Am I correct, the only two instances where you're unqualifiably accusing the Soviets of violations are really outside the classic arms control agreements. There's the Chemical Biological and there's the Helsinki; correct?

A No, I don't think that's correct.

Q Or that encryption is a flat asseration; is that the only --

A We conclude that Soviet encryption practices are in violation. It's not wise for me to try to take my language and try to reformulate it for you. I've given the language.

Q No, we sort this stuff out. You're saying violations and probable violations.

A I'm not going to reorganize it for you.

Q I'm not asking you to reorganize it.

A It's your responsibility, if you think you can do that properly. What I've done is on each of the seven given you the language that we are using.

Q I'm not asking you to reorganize it. I'm sort of going on the same line of the previous question. I'm a little puzzled why, if you don't mind the use of colorful language, you dragged into this. Helsinki and Chemical and Biological, you've flogged them to death over this many times when, really, the heart of your interest seems to be the SALT Treaty, the ABM Treaty. Why lump them together? Because those are the areas --

A They are all --

Q -- you have them dead and the others you're not sure? Why lump them?

A I never said that we weren't sure. This is a study of arms control compliance, and we look at arms control agreements across the board. The Biological Weapons Convention is certainly an arms control agreement, just as SALT II is an arms control agreement. Not looking at it would leave out a particularly important area of Soviet activity.

Q Can you just give a short statement on what it is that the Soviets have agreed to as for the agreement which we have said we're not going to ratify; that is, the SALT II agreement?

A They have said --

Q And how have they said it?

A They told Secretary of State Alexander Haig -- it was Foreign Minister Gromyko -- that they would adhere to the SALT II Treaty after being told our position on not undercutting that agreement as long as they did. That constituted a political commitment on their behalf.

Q Does that finish that, Bernie?

A I might say that in one particular area, the Soviets made clear that they did not feel obliged to adhere, and that was on the obligation to reduce down to 2250 which was meant to take place as were observing the protocol. Of course, both of those were no longer relevant given the passage of time.

Q I have one more technical question. On the new missile aspect, tell me again the name of the new missile that they have told us of?

A Let me give you a little bit of background on this. The SALT II Treaty permits both parties one new land-based missile. The Soviets have tested a new land-based missile, termed in the West as the SSX-24. They informed us that this was their one new missile, as permitted under the agreement.

Following the test of the 24, another missile, which we term the SSX-25, was tested. Based on our monitoring capabilities, this missile did not appear to fit into the constraints provided for under SALT II covering new missiles. Those constraints say that any change, plus or minus five percent, of relevant characteristics of that missile, such as the throw-away missile, may exceed the five percent change, then it is by definition a new missile.

Q Can you say how much it exceeded?

A No.

Q It's not like seven percent?

A Let me finish. The Soviet Union informed us that this was not a new missile but was a permissible modification of an existing missile, the SS-13.

The problem with that explanation is that if it is a modification of the SS-13, it would be permissible under the five percent rule, then they have violated the agreement in another sense, and that is the warhead to re-entry vehicle ratio. It's very complex stuff, but I'll explain the purpose of that.

Q You said throw-away the first time. You mean warhead or throw-away. You said throw-away ratio.

A I'm sorry. It is warhead to re-entry vehicle weight. I'm confusing myself. You're right -- re-entry vehicle to throw-away.

The purpose of that ratio is to not allow a new missile, say, with a single warhead on it, with a very small warhead, which could easily be replaced with a larger number of warheads. The ratio could not be under fifty percent, throw-away to the re-entry vehicle weight. In the test that we monitored it was less than fifty percent.

--MORE--

Q The word up here was used, "accusing" the Soviet Union of violations. Do you regard this exercise as the United States Government accusing the Soviet Union of violating arms control agreements?

A That's certainly -- and I thought I had made clear several times what we are doing is carrying out a mandate of the U.S. Congress.

Q The word is correctly used. "Accusing" That's what I want to know.

A Well, I --

Q You're not informing Congress about certain questions; you are accusing the Soviets.

A I'm not -- whether we're accusing or whether we're not accusing, I'll just let the language that I used before stand by itself. We are certainly discussing these problems with the Soviet Union, and we're making our findings clear to them.

Q Well, the question arises --

A Whether you want to call that an accusation or informing them, I --

Q But more precisely, is there anything new just laid out on the table for us that hasn't been laid out before the Soviets long ago, I assume.

A No. Well, some of these developments, you know, some are more recent than others.

Q What did they say on the ZAPAD-81? I mean, that's one up in the open division. Did they forget to notify?

A They said that an article -- was it TASS or *Pravda*?

STAFF: TASS.

A -- a TASS article following the exercise, which was very general about the military maneuver, constituted the notification. Of course, that was not the agreement in the Helsinki Final Act.

Q What is that exercise called again?

A ZAPAD -- Z-P-A-D dash 81.

Q What is the Soviet position about the deployment of the MX missile in the Minuteman silos as it applies to a potential violation?

A Well, I'm not sure what their position is. First of all, we haven't done -- we haven't deployed any MX missile.

Q But that is our intent.

A -- and the issue would be whether or not the deployment of that missile violated -- well, it wouldn't be violation, it would be -- what was it, unilateral commitment? It would have to do with the size of the silo expansion that would be required, and I'm not too sure that there's even -- that there's even any technical information

information currently. I don't know if they've even addressed that problem.

Q If I may just finish the thought, the MX is our new missile under SALT II?

A That's right.

Q If we were to proceed with the development of the Midgetman, then we would also be in violation?

A Wrong. There is nothing wrong --

Q The treaty expires in '85.

A That's right.

Q But, I mean, if we had the Midgetman now --

Q Would be a violation --

Q You mean in '85 --

A If they had flight-tested the missile. There's no plan to flight-test the missile.

Q Excuse me, you referred before to several other problems that this study got into. Is there any instance -- if you can't give us an example, can you at least say are there instances where we had serious concerns and we were dissuaded, as we were persuaded, by a Soviet explanation?

A No. I'm only going to -- you know, I don't think it's worthwhile to go into all of those discussions, and I'm not --

Q No, no. I meant --

A And I'm not --

Q No, no.

Q For the layman again, who we are writing for --

Q That's right.

Q -- and I include myself sort of in that category, would you care to categorize how you think the Soviets on the whole --

Q That's what I mean.

Q -- related to the various arms control agreements? In other words, is this major violations which show that they're not interested in compliance? Are these minor violations? You know, it would be helpful to get some categorization of what they've been doing.

Q It's their overall behavior.

A I don't think -- I think, first of all, you have to have a very high standard for compliance. This isn't a question of whether they adhere to an agreement 50 percent of the time. We expect the understanding of the Executive Branch as well as the Congress is that when we sign an agreement, that both sides are going to comply entirely.

The United States complies with all of its political commitments and obligations under arms control. We expect the Soviet Union to comply to all of their commitments and obligations. So any examples of non-compliance are serious. They're serious both because of their potential military significance, and because of their potential political significance.

Now, I have made clear -- I thought I made clear before that this has not -- we have not concluded and the President has certainly not concluded that we as a result of this should give up our search for serious arms control agreements.

We are going to continue to seek substantial reductions. However, verification reflecting this Soviet picture of non-compliance has got to be a very high priority. Also, we have to recognize that this is not an issue that can easily be swept under the rug; that we have to address it, and we have to solve it in our discussions with the Soviets.

Q Let me ask you this question: Is there a concern or a fear anywhere in this Administration that, particularly with the radar, that there may be an effort to break out, as the experts phrased it, to break out of the whole idea of no ballistic missile defense, and suddenly confront the West with maybe not an entirely workable system, but that this is a clear -- a danger today in U.S. strategic thinking? Or is that just kind of right-wing palaver? You hear it on the Hill all the time. Can you --

A The Soviet Union has a very active anti-ballistic research and development program. And that's -- although we have constraints on ABM development at the current time, we have to be concerned that -- about the potential -- what you call "break out" -- the ability for them very quickly to attempt to acquire a nation-wide ABM capability.

But I'm not going to try to address the question of how immediate that problem is. What is immediate for us is the fact that they are deploying the radar. That appears to be inconsistent with the obligations laid down in the ABM Treaty.

Q Can I ask on the Threshold Test Ban, how they would have -- you used some words, as if they -- it sounded to me like you meant they had deliberately disguised --

A No. No. They haven't -- what I said -- because of verification constraints. I think that was the word I used. The fact is that adequately monitoring underground nuclear testing is very difficult. There is a margin of error of roughly a factor of two. That's what our seismological is able to pick up is a spread of any Soviet test between a higher level and a lower level. In a number of instances -- I think at least 11, 11 tests -- we find that that spread goes way above.

Q Way above 300 KT?

A Several of those have gone above 300 KT, so that the mean or the median would fall above 150. Now, you can't -- I have to tell you that this is an area that is enormously complex, and you get into it. The more you get into it, the more uncertainties, because the way seismic waves travel depends on the geological fomation and the testing area itself. You have to depend on very complex mathematical modeling.

We have gone to the Soviets and asked them to engage in talks on ways of improving verification of these underground tests, and they so far haven't agreed to do so. So this is why we have to phrase, I think, our findings fairly carefully.

Q But wasn't that Comprehensive Test Ban -- I thought the Administration is the one that's not interested in going back and negotiating one in which you have the remote monitoring station.

A No. This is -- well, we --

Q I thought that was to be covered under the Comprehensive Test Ban.

A Well, yes, but the fact is as they're trying to negotiate a Comprehensive Test Ban, when we're not even able to verify adequately the Threshold Test Ban, given the problems, I think what we would like to do is to go step by step on this problem, and we'd like to be satisfied that we can monitor existing agreements before we plunge ahead with more ambitious ones.

Q Have the Soviets charged us with any violations?

A Well, they have -- they have both in diplomatic discussions and publicly talked about violations. I know they, for instance, argued that the fact that we deployed ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe late this year could be construed as a violation because ground-launched cruise missiles were prohibited in the protocol of the SALT II treaty. Of course, that protocol has run out, had the treaty been ratified, so we don't consider this a serious objection.

They have also claimed, for example, that radars we have deployed could provide us with an ABM battle management capability, but the fact is that those radars are totally consistent with the ABM Treaty, and they are deployed on the periphery of the United States, and they look outward.

Q I still have a question on the Kennedy-Kruschev agreements and why those were not included in this.

A They're not arms control agreements. There is no agreement _per se_. They're a series of communications and letters and discussions.

Q Is it less an arms control issue than, say, the Helsinki violations?

A Yes, it is. It is not an arms control agreement. It's a series of diplomatic exchanges. It's a political understanding. It's very difficult in looking at that material to conclude that, you know, either side signed on the dotted line on a specific understanding.

Q I'm sorry, can I just come back to the Threshold -- I mean, it's my ignorance, but I'm reading my own notes here. "We have been unable to reach a conclusive judgment on whether they are -- what? -- violating --

A On whether the Soviets are violating the unratified TTBT yield limit of 150 kilotons for testing. We believe it likely, however, that Soviet testing violates their obligation. That's their legal obligation under the agreement not to defeat the object and purpose of the TTBT. That's a term of art, and the reason it's a term of art is that under international law, when an agreement is signed and is yet to be ratified, both sides have an obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of that agreement.

Q But you're talking about the megatonnage.

Q But I don't understand. On the one hand, you're saying you're not sure if they are going over 150, but on the other hand they are.

A No. I said it's likely. We don't have a conclusive judgment --

Q Oh, conclusive.

A -- but we think it's likely.

Q When you spoke of how you'd like to tighten the verification procedures --

A Right.

Q -- for that is the problem of trying to develop what the Soviet objection is. Is it the on-site argument, or would it have to be on-site to use the new measurements that have been developed since the treaty was negotiated?

A No. I'm not sure that it necessarily would.

Q How can the problem be resolved is what I'm saying.

A Through improvements in verification.

Q And are the Soviets objecting because of on-site, or are they objecting for other reasons?

A No. They have objected -- they argue that we should ratify the Treaty first and then talk about verificaion improvements. We are very uncomfortable in ratifying a treaty that we don't think we can adequately verify.

Q Because you said our commitment on SALT II has been not to undercut it as long as the Soviets don't. With what you've just said, have we concluded that the Soviets have undercut the treaty, and is our commitment not to undercut the treaty changed in any way?

A We are continuing to adhere to our obligations, our legal obligations, such as the ABM Treaty, as well as our political commitments, including these unratified agreements.

Q Well, that raises the question that some of the students on this issue, particularly a guy like Freddy Clay says that the issue here is not verification at all. We have plenty of means of verifying non-compliance. The question is, how do you enforce compliance? Going back to this question, if they say, to all these accusations we're going to make, "Bullshit, we haven't violated," and you get into this kind of a situation, they say no, we say yes, how do you enforce compliance; and, if we don't, what action do we take?

A That's a very academic and a very intriguing question. I don't think I have time to address it in detail, and I'm -- you know, we could go on for some time.

Q Can you discuss it for a minute?

A Yes, I will. But I want you to recognize that I could say a lot more than I will right now.

We believe that, like the United States, the Soviet Union has an interest in the arms control process and in agreements that limit the capabilities of the two sides. These -- Soviet behavior in the areas we've discussed can jeopardize that process, and it's important for them and for others to recognize that if arms control is going to continue and hopefully succeed, that adequate -- that our concerns on verification are adequately resolved. We think the Soviets, like us, have an interest in resolving these problems.

Q Have they evidenced that behavior? In reports we've heard from the SCC recently, that essentially they are arrogantly denying any and all accusations that we make against them about violations?

A We have discussions with them on the SCC. They are confidential discussions. I don't want to say very much about the actual discussions, but I wouldn't share your view of -- or the way you phrased it. We do have a civil exchange with them -- the SCC.

Q Would you put some sort of qualitative value on which are most important of the seven?

A You know, there's a question of the military significance, and there's a question of the political significance. Politically they are all significant, because we are talking about the question of trust and confidence in the relationship. Militarily, obviously, the chemical weapons -- the talks in the weapons area is very important. These weapons have been used against people, innocent people, in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia. Violations of the TTBT would, obviously, permit the Soviet Union some military advantages in testing larger warheads than the United States was developing.

The whole question of the SSX-25 is part of the broad problem we face and the tremendous momentum behind the modernization of Soviet strategic missile force. Rollie Evans pointed out concerns on the ABM radar. That is, we want to prevent either side from achieving an ABM capability beyond the single site permitted sides under existing agreements.

I would just simply say that another area -- in conclusion, another area which is also serious is the problem of telemetry encryption, because without being able to receive necessary data about Soviet missile capabilities, then our ability to determine whether existing agreements are being abided by is severely degraded.

Q I have another small question on ZAPAD-81. Was the complaint that they didn't tell you the size of the maneuver? They didn't announce it three weeks in advance?

A It was the prior notification.

Q But I think --

A Well, I think they had some requirements, too, on the size. (To Staff member) Go ahead, tell them.

STAFF: It was both the problem that they did not -- they notified of an exercise. They did not notify its name or the number of troops ahead of time. They did that in the press the second day after we and the allies complained.

Q When was this in '81? Do you remember?

STAFF: September.

Q '83?

Q '81.

Q When is this physically going to be presented to the Congress?

A I can't tell you precisely. In the near future.

Q I mean, the briefings today -- just oral briefings like we're getting?

A That's right. There are briefings on the Hill. We have also this week briefed the allies in NATO.

Q Will it be this week, or you say --

A I said the near future.

Q Near future. What's that? Within two weeks?

A In the near future.

Q Can some of the experts answer some minor questions? When was the test ban thing signed?

STAFF: July 3, 1974.

A That's the TTBT.

Q Where is Plesetsk?

STAFF: Plesetsk is a missile test range in the northwest Soviet Union.

Q Northwest Soviet Union.

Q European Russia.

Q And when were the biological and toxins --

A '72.

Q What -- was the conventions in '72? No. Was that a treaty --

A It was a biological and toxin weapons convention.

Q Oh, I see. '72. All right. And the chemical weapons?

A 1925.

Q Did we ever sign it?

A I think we did. But the Soviet Union has.

Q Okay.

Q One more question: Given the extent of these violations and other probable violations that you alluded to earlier, what --

A What other probable violations? I've only talked about seven.

Q Okay. You had mentioned that there were other things that we have looked at and decided not to go into for one reason or another, but, nevertheless, what is it that the Administration would expect of Congress, given this situation for verifying or ratifying the future arms control agreements?

A I think that we expect -- we'll expect the Congress to study the agreements, whatever agreements we reach, on its own merits, but recognizing that we cannot base arms control on trust; that each of these agreements has to be adequately verifiable.

Q I lose track of the TTBT thing occasionally, but all of them have been raised publicly at one time or another by the Administration, hae they not?

A I can't -- I would say -- I can't say definitively that that all of them, Mike, but I think certainly almost all.

Q The TTBT thing is the only one that hasn't been.

A Most of these have been raised one way or the other.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 3:56 p.m.)

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ON-THE-RECORD BRIEFING
BY
A.I.D. ADMINISTRATOR M. PETER McPHERSON
ON
ECONOMIC AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
RECOMMENDATION OF THE NATIONAL BIPARTISAN COMMISSION
ON CENTRAL AMERICA
MONDAY, JANAURY 16, 1984, 2:00 P. M.

MS. KATE SEMERAD: We have Administrator Peter McPherson with us today -- Administrator of A.I.D. He will be doing the briefing today on the economic and humanitarian assistance recommendations of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America.

MR. McPHERSON: Thank you. Nice to be here today. The Kissinger Commission recommended a program composed of economic growth -- a program for posing economic growth, social change, political modernization and peace.

They looked upon this as an integrated program, something, if you will, sort of a Rubic's cube. It wasn't really practical only to look at one side; you had to conider all sides to the problem, or else you simply wouldn't get it right.

The President supports the basic elements of this program, including a substantial economic assistance program. No doubt the program which will be sent to Congress will be in the range -- and I say in the range of the $8.4 billion which the proposed -- which the report has recommended. I'm not prepared today to talk about the detailed allocations of such a program, but I would like to spend a few minutes dealing with what I think are the essence of the proposals and of the program which we would expect to go forward with.

One, I would like to talk about why this program, why a major program, if you will, can work;

Two, how in fact the region can absorb -- this has been raised in a couple places -- can absorb a major program such as this; and

Three, of course, to describe basically what the program is about and give some specific goals which we have in connection with this effort.

First of all, the program -- a major program can in fact work. We know from looking around the world where countries have had major economic efforts, where things have worked and where they haven't worked so well. We know that a combination of resources and economic policies, that combination is critical.

If you look at Mexico, or you look at Nigeria, where very sutantial oil revenues were available, but in fact a sustained, broad-based economic growth hasn't really been put in place.

You look on contrast to Taiwan, to Korea, to Colombia and some other places where the U.S. had a major economic assistance program and those countries combined their effort with the right kind of growth oriented policies and, indeed, what happened was a long-term, broadly based economic growth.

We think that the time is right for the Central American countries to achieve that kind of program, and that this economic assistance will help them do that. The time is right, really, as it has never been before, for a couple of reasons.

One, because the economic trauma of the area has been so substantial that these countries in the last couple of years have shown more movement, more economic policy change, than they have for many years previous.

Every indication is that they're prepared to try new things, to make changes as perhaps they've never been, because they've gone through this trauma, they see that something new really needs to be undertaken.

The second reason why the time is right is because we have in place the Caribbean Basic Initiative. This Initiative, opening up U.S. markets, puts these countries in a position to really put in place export growth-oriented policies, really much better positioned than they were a couple years ago.

The next point I'd like to make is that this region can absorbe, effectively use is really the word I'm after -- effectively use a very substantial program. I think we need to put this money -- this eight billion or so -- in a reasonable context. It is in fact only about 5% of the GNP of the region, 5% of the GNP per year. We're talking, remember, about eight billion or so spread over five years. So in fact it's not a very large portion. We have some other programs in the world which are larger. As a percentage of GNP, the Sahel Program, for example, is larger.

In addition, I think we need to keep in context that oil price increases in 1979 and the commodity price drops in recent years have met a shortfall of hard currency of about a billion and a half. That amount of money, a billion and a half, is about the size of the program that we're talking about.

So what you have here are economies who have artificially shrunk, really contracted in recent times, with sizable excess capacity available. In short, I believe the case is very, very sound that this program is not too large for these countries to effectively absorb.

What we are proposing, consistent with the Kissinger Commission, is a program that concentrates on four elements.

One, economic stabilization.

Two, restoration of long-term growth, and the creation of jobs, if you will, because that's what growth is all about.

Three, dealing with poverty; and

Four, promoting democratic government, human rights and such.

One, the economic stabilization: I just made reference to the tremendous drop in hard currency as a result of oil and commodity price changes. The debt of these countries has grown tremendously in recent times, needing hard currency there. For a number of reasons, these economies have contracted.

What this means is that to get these economies back into a position so they can grow again, we need to stabilize them. Hence, a fairly substantial trade credit program and balance of payments program we think is necessary. After all, if a manufacturer in Central America can't get the hard currency to buy a part for a machine that's critical to make his plant work, a lot of people can be put out of work.

If a farmer can't get the hard currency to buy the fertilizer he needs to have productive farming, then it hurts everybody.

What we're talking about, then, is a program, first of all, to stabilize the effort, to stabilize those economies, to deal with poverty, I suppose, in a sense. We think that that balance of payments trade credit effort will take a substantial part of this overall assistance effort, and that such stabilization will provide the breathing room, the breathing space, for these countries to begin to deal with poverty on a longer-term basis.

The next component of our effort is laying the basis for long-term growth, for creating jobs. There has been a population explosion in Central America which now has become really an unemployment explosion. You have 250,000 new people coming on the job market every year in Central America. By the turn of the century it will be 500,000 people.

This tremendous pressure is one that is a political fact, and it just has to be dealt with.

Agricultural production has been stagnating in recent years. Half the population's working relationship is agriculture, but only 25% of the GNP. What you have in human terms is this stagnating economy, this economy that doesn't produce enough jobs, meaning that people frankly just have less money and there's more poverty.

What we want to do is help these countries help their people become more productive. We think that using, as I referred to before, the CBI, following export growth-oriented policies -- dealing with, for example, exchange rates, which, when they're artificial, often end up imposing taxes upon exports. We think that we can do a great deal here, in agriculture, increased research, extension, some continuation of land reform in some places -- all these in combination will provide, we think, the jobs that are at the core of whether or not poverty is decreased.

Our goal -- our specific goal here in this stabilization economic restructuring -- our specific goal is that by the end of the 5-year period that we achieve a real growth rate of 3.5% per capita per year. Now, this in fact will mean about a 6% growth rate is required because there continues to be almost a 3% population growth rate.

We think that that 3.5% goal will in fact generate the 250,000 new jobs per year or more that are necessary.

Next we need to deal with poverty, our third component here. Poverty simply must be tackled. Poverty, of course, has many faces. Literacy -- illiteracy, for one. One-third of the people in Central America are illerate. The educational structure of most of those countries has major problems. We simply must work on improving the people power of these countries. The reason the Marshall Plan worked so well and so effectively, really, in a lot of ways was because the Europeans had the skills to begin to immediately grab hold of it. It's going to be a longer-term process in Central America, but we must work at it.

Our major goal here is that in five years, that primary education, primary school enrollment, be above 95%. In health, there are major problems here, of course, Child mortality, which is one of the better indicia of the general population's health status, continues to be a major problem in Central America. We have the technology now available to handle so much of what is the problem. For example, there's something called "oral rehydration," which can deal with dysentery. Dysentery is the biggest killer of babies in Central America. It isn't dysentery directly; it's the dehydration that results from dysentery.

The simple combination of a pinch of sugar, of salt and a bit of sugar and some water, in fact deals with this dehydration. There is no reason why that technology, this oral rehydration, can't be made much more widely available, and we expect and hope to do so.

Our major goal here in health, then, is to decrease infant mortality by the end of the 5-year period by 15%. Housing is another area. Housing and actually sewer and water and so forth. To give you sort of a barometer of the extent of the problem, there's about 40% of the population live in urban areas, and less than 50% of the population in urban areas have sewage for their homes. The quality of life is, frankly, just very bad for many people.

Our goal here is to support increases in sewer and water coverage by 25% and to support better housing for 100,000 families over this next 5-year period. Now, the private sector will have to be involved substantially, particularly in the housing part of this. It isn't going to be just the U.S. Government providing it, but we think we can help provide some resources and provide an environment in which the private sector can do a broader and better job here.

The last of our four components is democratic institutions and human rights. Human rights, democracy, effective legal processes -- all these are so very important, really. Training, technical assistance, and other help, we think, can do a job here, or can do substantially what needs to be done. An important component, critical, is what these countries do for themselves, and, obviously, our monies need to be dispersed in consideration in part with the kind of progress that people make -- that countries make in these very critical areas.

We think of democracy, of human rights, as being important as a matter of liberty, as a matter of quality of life, and that is so very true. Human rights -- obviously, that is the case.

But I think we often forget that democracy is a significant to countries economically, too. Freer and more open societies by and large over history have had more economic growth. Part of the Rubic's cube business I was talking about before. These things all need to fit together.

Finally, the Kissinger Report talks in terms of organization. It proposes a Central America development organization, so called CADO. The basic purpose here is to set up an organization that has significant Latin involvement so as to establish goals and guidelines or steps along the way toward those goals against which progress in these -- of these countries can be measured. That's progress in human rights, that's progress in economic reform, and so forth.

We think this makes basically good sense. We think that what these countries do for themselves is at least as important as to what we can do for them. Accordingly, an organization that involves Latins, that helps encourage and gently push along such progress, we think is important. Just how it is to be structured is a complicated problem and we no doubt will be consulting widely and with Congress in the weeks ahead as to how this might be done.

I might say, in addition, we think the establishment of a very strong consultative group for economic matters is very important. Consultative groups are led in many parts of the world by the World Bank. What this does is gather together donors to talk about problems, coordinate, and generally work with countries in getting them to move along on economic policy changes.

The World Bank is an excellent consultative group for the Caribbean region. The Inter-American Development Bank has established the beginning of a consultative group structure in Central America. However an augmented process might be brought about is something that is not clear at this time, but we are certain that a strong, internationally led consultative group for Central America makes excellent sense.

To summarize here, then, what I've argued today is, first of all, that this large program can work. That we know from the conditions in the area that this can work. We know, furthermore, that the money -- this large amount of money -- can be effectively absorbed. I hope I've laid out for you -- and I look forward to your questions -- the basic thrust of our program and some specific goals we have for our program.

I'm here primarily to answer economic questions. The State Department, as you well know, has broad authority and responsibility for some of the other issues, and I look forward to your questions and comments.

Q Mr. McPherson, the increase which would be represented by this $8.4 billion program, will that be taken out of the hide of some other program, or will it be a total increase in the overall A.I.D. programs?

A Let me say, clearly, that I don't come to you saying that the Administration is hereby endorsing the $8.4 billion, because we have talked within the Administration in terms of a program "in the range of." We are looking toward supplementals in '84, for example, where clearly they will be in addition to programs already proposed. AS to out years, as you know, it's an ongoing budgetary process, but I don't see a reduction of assistance, certainly not in '84.

Q Mr. McPherson, how much of an increase would $8.4 billion be over current programs? We've all sort of been over all over the lot on that.

A Well, we have an overall economic assistance program now of about $6 billion. This is over a 5-year period, this eight -- whatever it is -- so you're talking, let's say, a billion and a half over whatever those levels are. Those out-year levels haven't been worked out by the Administration, as you know.

Q Excuse me -- $6 billion for where?

A For the world.

Q For the whole world.

A For the bilateral assistance program.

Q What about the region?

A The region has -- for Central America last -- we have proposed to Congress a program I think of 426. That exact number --

VOICE: 465.

A 465. And we have -- and last year, however, it was about 626 last year, I think. What has happened traditionally as the year has gone on, we've allocated money into the region. That happened last year. That happened the year before.

Q The Commission said that $24 billion is needed in the region in this 5-year period. Where will that other 12, or whatever it is, come from, and wouldn't the eight billion be a short round if the other is not forthcoming?

A There's a couple aspects to that. One, the Commission thinks in terms of 24 billion, assuming that all countries in fact are receptive to making the substantial changes that will be necessary to utilize this money properly and well.

For example, if a country isn't prepared really to make the economic changes that are necessary to absorb and effectively use this money, you wouldn't want to put that much money into a country. An immediate country is, for example, Nicaragua. If Nicaragua were not willing to broadly move in the directions that -- economic reform as well as other directions -- then no doubt the monies involved would be less.

Now, in addition, the Commission suggests that at least half the 24 billion would come from non-U.S. official sources. You've got the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank. The Inter-American Development Bank is now a very large contributor, by the way, to Central America, and private sources, so when you add it all up and project the reality of the needs, I think that the figures are ballpark reasonable.

I found in running these in various parts of the world that it's hard to get down to the last cent, but the projections of need and the U.S. role in those projections in my judgment are reasonable.

Q At a meeting of finance ministers -- Central American finance ministers in Brussels late last year, it was determined pretty much that an economic program couldn't work as long as there wasn't peace in the region and as long as regional integration could not be fostered once again.

Could you address how these countries will be able to absorb such a large amount of money without the avenue of regional integration being opened for trade?

A It's our judgment that, as the Kissinger Commission recommends, we need to move -- we need to encourage countries to move back toward regional integration. As you probably know, in the 60s, there was really a very effective Central America common market, and in fact it was with the inauguration of the Central America common market the economies really began to move from agrarian economies to at least a broader industrial kind of base.

In the early 70s, for a variety of reasons, that common market significantly contracted. It's our feeling that, if possible, it ought to be invigorated once more. There are a number of problems, an important part of which involves the countries in the region looking toward reducing some of their tariffs inter-regionally. This is not something the U.S. can do. It is something -- at least certainly not primarily or solely.

My answer to you is that I think economic integration in Central America is an important source of growth, but I would think that perhaps even more important is the potential exports to the United States. So that you've got -- you cannot get the economic growth needed simply by returning to a Central America with high tariff walls around it. You've got to look world-wide.

You know, when -- because Central America has a population less than Colombia. You can't only do it by a Central America common market.

Q I'm interested in some of your proposals based on population growth. I assume the figure of a 3% population growth varies widely from country to country. Isn't that correct?

A Yes, it does.

Q What do you do in a country such as El Salvador which I believe has as a major problem depopulation at the moment? Do you make any adjustments for that?

A For depopulation?

Q As I understand, the cost of the war has been something like 60,000 people, and we have, heaven knows, how many refugees in this country. Are these any adjustments made for -- I don't know if you have a more reliable census than I have or not.

A I don't think anyone's got a good --

Q I don't think anyone has a real reliable one.

A Not everybody has traveled officially.

Q But would you make an adjustment? (Laughter) Would you make an adjustment for a depopulated country?

A I think that depopulation doesn't necessarily mean their problems are less. Often people that leave are more highly skilled people. That isn't always true. I mean, we know a lot of El Salvador maids in this town, but many of the people who have left El Salvador were fairly highly skilled. In fact, person by person had a capability of contributing to economic growth more than those that stayed. You still have among those that remain a very substantial 3% plus among those that remain population growth rate, with kids that need education, that need medical care. I mean, the burden on the society in many ways has been increased, not decreased.

Q The dislocation caused by the depopulation.

A I don't think that helps. Inthat I think it probably hurts. Dislocated people have greater housing problems, they don't have the employment base, they don't have family to work with them. In developing countries the family structure is enormously important as a social net.

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Q The Kissinger Commission called for an immediate program of, in effect, public works -- infrastructure works, road building, irrigation, and so on.

A Yes.

Q You didn't address that, and I wondered if the Administration shares that kind of approach?

A I meant to in part by commenting on housing. We think that some type of infrastructure is in fact necessary. Roads and housing are two components that are mentioned, and we think that's right. Indeed, already as part of our El Salvador program, the displaced people I mentioned a moment ago are part of a public works program that we have there. We think probably an expanded program is appropriate in several countries, but we have got to keep in mind that you don't want to have such a massive infrastructure program immediately that you end up significantly dislocating those economies.

You can cause by massive inflation, a massive infrastructure -- you can cause inflation, you can cause a lot of difficulty. My answer to you is that we accept the Kissinger Commission report that infrastructure and housing are important, and we would intend to do so.

Q Follow-up on that one, Mr. McPherson: Given what you just said, how long do you think it would take in the base-case scenario of reaching your per capita growth of 3.5% per year?

A By the end of the five years we figure --

Q At the end of the five years.

A End of five years. Yes. There's no way now, because in fact we would hope that by -- and pursuant to the Kissinger Commission report, that by 1990 you would have a growth -- you would have per capita income of roughly what you had in 1980.

What you have here is that since 1979, '80, you've had major drops in GNP, particuarly in El Salvador and Costa Rica. It will be by the end of the five years.

Q There seems to be a very practical problem here about trying to create infrastructure, however, because hasn't Salvador suffered a net loss of infrastructure because of destruction from the war over the last couple ofyears?

A That's part of the reason why you need to address infrastructure. El Salvador, it's interesting, had one of the better infrastructure -- roads, power grids and so forth -- systems in place pre the war in that country. It's clear that you need additional infrastructure in El Salvador as well as other countries. Do I understand your question?

Q Yes. Except I was thinking about how far behind you get when power lines go down and the Cuscatlan Bridge, or whatever it's called, goes down -- that sort of thing you're talking about --

A Yes. I think you need to think about infrastructure of two types. One, you've got sort of the replacement program that we've had in El Salvador where a bridge is blown up or a power grid is blown or whatever, and we've done a lot of that work. I think our calculation is that as much as $800 million may have been lost to guerrilla destruction in El Salvador of infrastructure and related kinds of items.

You've got that kind of infrstructure. I think that the report -- perhaps we're thinking of that in part, but they were thinking also of feeder roads, and they were thinking of a whole range of infrastructure that would make a society sort of run more smoothly, not so much responding to guerrilla war.

Q A lot of these plans have been done after a war has taken place, but in El Salvador you still have the war, and isn't it impossible to try to stabilize the economy with U.S. dollars through an aid program while you still have a war going on?

A That obviously is something I've thought enormously a lot about. The economy in El Salvador from '79 to the day has dropped about 25%. You know, one-fourth less GNP. And when you start trying to put your head around that, it's really quite substantial. Now, the drop, however, has been reducing, and so this year it will be only a few percent. Now, it's our hope that next year, that the El Salvador economy will more or less stabilize -- it will stabilize at the new reduced level, but still more or less stabilized. We have been in that country with substantial balance of payments efforts. It will take ongoing balance of payments efforts to keep it stabilized, and then to build up.

It is true, when you have an economy in a middle of a war, it's darn hard. But it's also true that El Salvadorans with our help have pulled off some -- really some amazing reforms or changes, if you will. That land reform program in the middle of a civil war is really quite something. I mean, you've got 550,000 people that apparently have benefited from land reform.

You've got -- and when you think about that kind of change, it's really quite impressive. So we think it's harder in El Salvador than it is in Honduras to bring these changes about, but at the same time a lot has been done in El Salvador. Quite impressive.

Q What's your disposition toward the Kissinger Commission recommendation that public safety programs be reactivated?

A We're studying that closely, but there's been concern for some time that, for example, we had -- we were limited in our ability to do some training, to strengthen the judicial process, and so forth. We're not quite sure of the scope of what an amendment to 660 would mean, but it certainly is one of the things that we're very interested in pursuing further.

Q One of the Kissinger Commission recommendations was to channel about a fourth of U.S. aid money through this CADO or a CADO-type organization. What about that sort of recommendation?

A Just how the CADO impacts upon monies is something that we're sorting through, but we think that however it is finally structured, the criteria that CADO would set up to measure progress on economic issues, human rights issues, and so forth, need to be take into consideration in a very important way. Just how that's done -- as you remember, the report was illustrative in saying one-fourth and then a U.S. veto. It was kind of combined. Money runs through, but the U.S. can veto whatever is done.

I think what the Commission is after here is to, one, involve Latins, looking at the Alliance for Progress model; and, two, to be sure that there's some independent or semi-independent way of looking at progress, and that the U.S. Government needs to take into consideration this quasi-independent Latin involved view of what's going on. And we're really committed to that.

You know, we're committed to it, one, not just because the Commission recommends it, but because we really need that help. I've struggled now for three years with policy dialogue, as we call it, getting countries to change economic policies. And I can tell you that things like -- organizations like the World Bank Consultative Group are just very helpful.

When we can go arm in arm with somebody else to argue a change, it makes it just a heck of a lot easier.

Q A couple of nuts and bolts questions: The Kissinger Commission uses several sets of countries when it talks about Central America.

A Yes.

Q Which set are you talking about? The five or the seven or what?

A Well, we're talking about the seven, assuming that all seven would want to be involved.

Q In other words, including Panama and Belize?

A Yes.

Q And on page 67 they say that the '84 short-term needs for all of these countries, I guess the seven, is 1.5 to 1.7 billion. Is that the range you're talking about for '84?

A I think, though, the Commission recommends a 400 million supplemental for '84 which is on top of the

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456 that we have proposed to Congress, so that would be short of that 1.6. In other words, the Commission isn't recommending that.

Q So for the seven then, it would be just short of one billion.

A That the Commission is recommending. And we really don't have -- I specifically am not coming to you and saying those are the figures we're going to put forward. There are a lot of recommendations in the report, and how they're sorted out, who gets what kind of funding, are things we're going through right now, and I want to avoid coming down in specific figures. But the Commission does recommend 400 more economic supplemental on top of that figure that we've already proposed.

Q Can you give us sort of broad categories, percentages of how the 8.4 billion would be spent?

A Let me just say this: That a substantial component will be balance of payments trade credit kind of support. We've all recognized -- the Kissinger Commission clearly does -- that a very large component -- and I don't want to put a percentage or say dominant -- I'd just like to say a large component of this program needs to be balance of payments trade credit. Trade credit, you understand, would be something like the EX-IM bank component where there's no transfer of dollars per se, it is just a

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guarantee of credit of an importer. See, what I think people need to understand -- and I hope I've laid out here -- is that balance of payments and trade credit which stabilizes economies is really something that's directed at in some ways the poor people in those countries, because without stable economies people don't have jobs, the whole thing sort of contracts, and in some cases collapses. And so balance of payments is a jobs approach, if you will, and the balance of payments stabilization effort is the platform on which we think then you can build the restructuring of economies and the programs to deal with poverty.

Q But until the economies are stabilized, what's your projection for food assistance in the area?

A For what?

Q Food assistance.

A Well, I think we need to kind of play that country by country and year by year. The report recommends additional food assistance, and we would expect to do so.

Q In a country like El Salvador, could we expect it to be longer there?

A Could we expect it to be longer?

Q More food assistance for a longer --

A Yes. I think so. That you remember is what the Commission recommended, and that's compatible with our judgment of the situation as well.

Q How much of that 8.4 billion translates into U.S. exports? I imagine that most of it will.

A Pretty much all the balance of payments, trade credits would all be U.S. exports. Virtually all. What we do with balance of payments program is we go to a central bank in a country, and we say, "Okay, you got $100 million here, and you can then sell that to importers that want to buy U.S. imports of certain critical categories." You couldn't buy perfume, but you could buy a part for a machine that keeps your factory going.

And all that -- so accordingly, almost all the trade credits, all the balance of payments, would be imports from the U.S. In a lot of ways this program -- we focused today -- I think probably I shouldn't take much more of your time -- but we focused today on how this is going to help Central America, and that, of course, is the primary focus. But, in fact, what we know is that this program will benefit U.S. exporters; that this program, to the extent we can strengthen the economies of these countries, they will be in even a better position to import from us. That 3.5 growth by the end of five years is going to put these countries in a position to substantially increase their imports from us.

Q By what you're saying, I assume you would agree with what Congress did in the first supplemental for the CBI bill. That was to ensure that the money that went to the region be used for job creation and couldn't be turned around to pay off interest on a debt or something like that.

A We would be thinking in terms of our money to be used for the imports of goods. I'd like to think further about if there are any possible implications to your question that I haven't thought of right here -- but surely the overwhelming amount would be used for imports -- the overwhelming of the balance of payments.

Q Do you think your expectations are a little high for that amount of money and for the situation and especially in El Salvador doesn't seem to be getting any better as far as the military situation is concerned.

Do you think the expectations of the growth rates you just talked about and the establishing of 100,000 homes, that sort of thing --

A I think if these countries will sort of move out in terms of export growth policies, that a lot can happen quite quickly. First of all, these people in most countries, in most parts of those countries, are pretty diligent people. I mean, they're willing to work hard. The problem has been a lot of ways the right kind of policies and markets, and the exchange rates which are artificially set are so often in effect taxes on exports. And it's an interesting problem politically. Countries say, oh, goodness, how can I change this exchange rate? It's been that way since 1945 or something. But in fact a bad exchange rate is discrimination upon people that can get jobs. We've sorted this through pretty extensively, and our judgment is that those are not unduly optimistic goals, assuming that the countries do these things themselves. I want to emphasize again and again that the U.S. is one of the pair. The other half of this equation is what the countries do for themselves, and if the countries really move out and reform and effort, they can do a lot.

I'm hopeful about that, because, as I mentioned in my comments initially, one, you got such economic turmoil that countries think of options that they would never dream of a decade ago. When things have failed, you begin to think of things you didn't worry about before.

And, secondly, that CBI that the President proposed and Congress enacted is a marvelous tool. I wouldn't be at all surprised if we looked back at this in a decade and think that's really one of the very excellent things that's been done during this era.

Thank you very much.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 2:45 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON EL SALVADOR
MONDAY, JANUARY 16, 1984, 3:15 P.M.

FIRST DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Thank you. You will have received, I hope, a copy of the report which is being submitted to the Congress today. I will not go over it in any detail with you.

Let me say that as a general proposition that the overall situation in El Salvador with respect to human rights, the main component of the report, deteriorated up to the period of November/December during the past six months and has improved in the period after that. This due to a number of factors. I guess the primary factors have been the traditional correlation between the activities of our human rights problems in El Salvador and the correlation with guerrilla violence as it increased into the fall. Also the extraordinary political tension within El Salvador related to the constitutional process led to a degree of polarization, the resurgence of death squad activity up to November/December. The period since that time, or since the beginning of December, has been marked with the coming-to-terms of some of these political problems, the passage of the constitution, the extension of the land reform program and a reduction in the overall levels of violence within the society.

We have tried to reflect that sort of down and then up again characteristic in this report. We've also tried in this report to depart from the previous reports that were tied to the certification process by providing more of an overview of this situation in El Salvador; trying to tie in many of the factors that were called for under the previous certification within their context in El Salvador. That is, within the context of the overall political problem, the overall social and economic problem in the country and some of the background related to that problem.

So you will find that this report is much more comprehensive than were the certification reports. On the other hand, they cover inasmuch detail, I think, as frankly as the previous reports did each of the problems required under the certification.

Do you have anything specifically to say?

SECOND DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Not really. I'd just like to endorse what you had to say with your stress emphasis on the comprehensive nature of this particular report. It does seem to me, in looking at the dynamics of the situation over the past six months, you refer to ups and downs; that this present effort which sort of invites you to measure, let's say, against the certification report or past several, provides a better, more comprehensive overview and gets us away from what I think many of us consider an artificial one-time snapshot which was not able to convey a sense of the dynamics as well as this report.

FIRST DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I'll be glad to take your questions.

Q Does this report in its present form constitute the kind of reporting you would like to, or you would be willing to give to Congress if you could work out some kind of legislative agreement?

A Yes. I think it's fair to say that it does. It is, as I said, a more comprehensive form of reporting than the previous reporting format, and I think it's a kind of thing that we think should be provided by this Administration or any Administration to the Congress whether or not it is required by legislation.

Q Would you prefer that this be given to the Congress on a regular basis?

A The President, when he vetoed the certification requirement, committed himself to periodic reports to the Congress, so that would be a regular basis.

Q "Periodic" could be once every four years. I mean regular -- every six months or a year?

A The intent quite clearly, though, was to adhere to the same schedule and format more or less as had been in existence previously, so that I think you would anticipate something like this approximately every six months without saying that it'll necessarily fall on the six month date.

Q What is the evidence for improvement in the human rights record since the beginning of December, particularly with regard to the decline in death squads? I ask this partly in the context with the press conference this morning of the human rights groups up in the Hill where they've said the record hadn't gotten any better.

A You have to divorce the question of death squads from overall human rights improvements, because they're not always synonymous.

It's noteworthy that even during the period that there was resurgence of death squad activity, there was a constant decline in the overall level of violence attributable to political causes. If you'll look at the chart that was accompanied in the report, I think you'll see the statistical breakdown of the reporting of violent acts as carried in the Salvadoran press.

I think the statistics are 177 deaths in the first half of 1983 to a 104 in the last six months; in each of the months, a 41 percent decline. The '82 average was 219 deaths per months and the '81 average was 444 deaths per months. Notwithstanding the fact that there was a general decline, you nevertheless had a resurgence of death squad acitivity.

Death squad activity is much more targeted. It's much more aimed at leadership elements. It isn't quantifiably a large number compared to the overall number of deaths attributable to political purposes or reasons in El Salvador. So that you have had, if you will, that steady decline in the last six months but also in the last month and a half you've had a decline in death squad activity. I think that can be attributed to some more dramatic actions taken by the Government of El Salvador with respect to death squad activity, particularly the evictions of some of the alleged death squad members from the country and the opening of active investigations into others.

Q If I can follow up very briefly. Aryeh Neier in his press conference said that, one, the Tutela Legal, the church-supported statistics are very different; they show no such decrease in overall killings, and because you continue to rely on press reports, on the part of the press that is government controlled, your figures are not sufficient, and that there has been no such decline, in other words.

A First of all, I think that I would rebut that by simply saying that Tutela Legal, although the statistics are vastly different than the press report statistics mainly because battlefield casualties, including guerrilla deaths, are included in their statistics; that they nonetheless do show a decline from 1981 to '82 to '83 as well. I think the statistics, in fact, whether you use their statistics or the statistics compiled by the Embassy on the basis of reports, do indicate the same trend line.

Q No decline from the first half to the second half, I guess, was my point.

I would have to go back and look at the Tutela Legal statistics. It is a question of the statistics that you choose to believe, I guess. But to some extent if you look at the church's comments in recent homilies, you will see that the church itself accepts the fact that there's been a remarkable drop in in death squad activities in San Salvador, and it's been reflected in a series of homilies.

Q There's been a series of reports in the last few months quoting Administration sources and intelligence officials saying that the arms being shipped from Nicaragua to El Salvador have decreased, and, certainly, people in your own Embassy down there believe have believed that in the past.

Are you saying that they never have decreased the number of arms being sent, or they have once again redeveloped that arms network from Nicaragua into El Salvador?

A I think they've decreased several times in the course of the last year. They've also gone up several times in the course of the last year.

That is to say, that at any given time it'll either just have gone up or it'll have gone down. It's not static. The overall trend of support for the insurgents in El Salvador has stayed more or less the same during the course of the last year.

Q Do you see any correlation between the hardline that Vice President Bush took down there and this decline that you are reporting since the beginning of December?

I think there's no doubt that there's a correlation. It's not a direct cause and effect relationship, but there is a great deal of correlation.

Let me go back into the whole question of Vice President Bush's visit to El Salvador and the impact that it has had.

We considered it important with the veto certification. Important here and also in terms of importance in terms of being able to identify new possibilities in El Salvador, to demonstrate conclusively that it was the Administration, not simply the U.S. Congress, that had an interest in the advancement of human rights in El Salvador.

I think that one of the positive effects of the veto certification was that their came a growing awareness in El Salvador to the fact that this wasn't simply something that was being imposed on the Administration by the Congress but represented a deeply-held view and a conviction within the Administration that substantial progress had to be made in human rights in order to win in El Salvador. That is, there was a direct relationship in our view between the human rights improvements and a successful policy; and, in fact, the long-term success of the government of El Salvador.

I think the Vice President's visit, together with the veto certification and our initial consultations with the government of El Salvador, after that veto, I think did set the stage, if you will, for a much more dynamic policy with respect to dealing with these problems.

Q I think you said this report addressed some of these issues more frankly than the certification reports did. If I didn't misunderstand you, why would you be more frank in this report?

A No, you didn't misunderstand me. I said it addresses them as frankly as they were addressed previously.

Q Last week Larry Speakes suggested that the political left is responsible for forty percent of the killings. We've been guided away, I think,at the podium from that kind of thinking. Today, he repeated it and said "I don't think they took specific exception to the numbers. It was an off-the-cuff reaction of someone in the State Department before they had the opportunity to get their facts straight from the White House." (Laughter)

Why is there this variance?

A I think you're asking me to step out into a field full of land mines.

Q I'm surprised he's pushing it so much and I'm wondering why because we'll be hit with it again if we don't straighten it out now.

A I suspect. I think it's fair to say that there were analysts who have looked at this problem, and reached the conclusions that Mr. Speakes gave you. Those analysts have looked at this problem and were giving it as their best estimates as to what the situation was.

I think we have tried to shy away in the past from giving specific formulas to the press because best estimates may not be based upon a great deal of depth in terms of being to say with any sort of absolute sense of conviction that that's what it was. But, still, if pressed on best estimates, I think as Larry Speakes was, he gave out the figures.

I don't mean to back off of the figures, but on the other hand I do want to indicate to you that they're not the kind of figures that we would want to stake our future on. That is to say, that there's a great deal of margine of error in those figures.

Q Does the State Department believe that there are a substantial percentage of death squad killings by the political left?

A It certainly is our view that there are a substantial number of death squad killings by the political left. In fact, one only need look at the number of ARENA mayors, for example, and ARENA political leaders who have been killed by death squads in San Salvador to conclude that they probably were not the victims of the right but were probably the victims of the left.

Q When you use the figure of a 100-odd deaths a month, are you suggesting that any significant proportion of those are left-wing violence? Do they include, by the way, the murder of the mayors or --

A Those are left-wing violence; and, yes, they do include those elements of violence. There are some elements of left-wing violence in there, and I will not fall into the trap of trying to give you a percentage.

Q Could you help us out on this one a little bit better, perhaps. The figures that you gave us includes left and right?

A Yes.

Q Are there death squads of the left, because the term is generally used for the right?

A It is. And, of course, it's a question of semantics. I suppose the best thing to do would not to use the term at all because it is a misleading term.

There are groups of people on the left who target people on the right for assassination, and that constitutes a death squad in the same sense that there are groups of people on the right who target people on the left for assassinations.

Q And the figure that you've given us includes both?

A Yes.

SECOND DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: One might just add to that, you would certainly have instances of criminal murders on the part of organized squads, if you will, where the motive probably goes beyond ideology and focuses on grievances or something of that nature; a quarrel, whatever it may be.

FIRST DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Let me go one further step. This whole subject can be very misleading. The question is raised and therefore you've answered it, but I don't want to create the impression that we believe that the overwhelming preponderance of these activities are being carried out by the left and that there is not a problem of right-wing death squad activity in El Salvador. To the contrary. We acknowledge that there's a very serious problem of right-wing death squad activity in El Salvador.

We think that important steps have been taken to try and address this problem in the last many weeks. But whether or not those steps are sufficient or will stick or -- in fact, I can tell you right now they're not sufficient. But whether they'll stick over the longer term is simply unknown at this time, and I don't want to de-emphasize the issue and create the impression that we consider this problem is over with or that we've considered it always to be just a small portion of the total number of deaths due to political violence.

It is, in fact, a substantial proportion of it, and is a problem that has to be dealt with in order to have a successful policy in El Salvador.

Q If you have a figure like a 104 a month, that's a very specific figure. You must know then what it's based on and whether "X" percent is the result of left-wing work or right-wing work.

A Let me give you an example. If you end up in the case of a university professor who has professed views that are similar to the FDR/FMLN and who is widely suspected in the rumor mills in El Salvador of having associations and contacts with guerrilla movements and he ends up missing or dead, there is a general assumption that he is a victim of the far right. That assumption may or may not be right. It could have been a criminal act. It could have been any number of other things, but on the basis of that you could go through and try and compile some kind of analysis as to who was responsible for what. But it would have a high degree of uncertainly.

If a teacher disappears who was a land holder and who was involved in a battle with some capesinos, for example, who are trying to take over his land but was nonetheless a teacher and a part of the teachers' union, there would be a great deal of ambiguity as to who might have killed him. It could have been the capesinos; it could have been somebody else. It could have been any number of other different players. And it's precisely for that reason that we don't like to get involved into statistical correlations of this kind.

Q A senior official was quoted as saying that 90 percent of all the killing are the result of the right.

A I think that that would not be an accurate portrayal.

Q That would not be accurate?

A That 90 percent of them are attributable to --

Q -- to the right.

A To the right. Well, once again, I suppose it is best to stay away from statistical corelations, and you can stick with the senior official that you already have.

Q I would like to go back to the question of the figures, because yesterday there was a report published by the Archbishop, and the number that they gave is substantially different from yours. I think it is an important issue to resolve. They say there have been 4,142 people killed in 1983, while according to your monthly percentage, it would give 1,680.

They also say that 67 civilians have been shot by the guerrillas in the same report. I would like to know why do you think the Salvadoran press is more reliable than the Archbishop's office?

A It isn't a question of reliability; it's a question of consistency in terms of trying to demonstrate trend lines. We have never claimed that our figures are reliable; we do think that they represent a sort of common basis for determining a trend line. I mean you could make the same argument with respect to Tutela Legal looking over their statistics traditionally, but they have changed the procedures in which they report their statistics quite a bit from one reporting period to the next. And one of the changes they made was to include all battlefield casualties, including guerrilla deaths, in their statistics at one stage.

So therefore, you have lots of ups and downs that aren't necessarily meaningful in statistical terms; and we do believe that the press reports have been-- More or less about the same standard of judgment has gone into determining what does get reported and what doesn't get reported.

Q In this report they say that the battlefield casualties of the army are 1,430 aside from the 5,142.

A But what about the battlefield casualties of the guerrillas?

Q They don't have numbers for that.

A I think you will find that the battlefield casualties of the guerrillas for most of the groups reporting end up in the category of human rights violations, as do, in fact, the cases of sort of the innocent bystander who gets caught up in a battle, and who is killed -- he also ends up in that category.

Traditionally, if you've taken the press accounts and you've added to it, the Radio Venceremos or the Government of El Salvador's reports on the number of people that they claim that they have lost, you end up with something like the figures that the other groups have, although they, too, vary a great deal from one to the other -- Socorro Juridico, Tutela Legal, the Human Rights Commission of El Salvador, always end up with slightly conflicting reports.

SECOND DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: That's true. I think we shouldn't loose sight of the fact, too, that when we say there has been a decline here from as you noted, 177 in the first of '83 to 104 in the latter half. That's not the difference between bad and good -- both are bad; but the fact that this level of deaths would be sustained is already something which should not be lost sight of, but it is declining.

Q If I can just follow up, again on this discrepancy in numbers, Neier said this morning that the Tutela Legal figures, the church figures include verified or reported cases of political killings and deaths within San Salvador, and the press figures do not include -- that there are are a sbustantial number of killings that the figures you are using don't include, that have no relationship to battlefield deaths.

A I have absolutely no doubt that there are deaths that occur in El Salvador that are not reflected in the press accounts. That is absolutely true. My view is that there is no single source of information on the total number of deaths attributable to political violence in El Salvador that is entirely reliable.

For the purpose of establishing trend lines in sort of gross trend terms, we view that this is as good a system as any. If you wanted to use Tutela Legal, you would see also a steady decline on a year-by-year basis over the last three years. Also, you would not necessarily see that with each and every one of the groups.

Q But the trend lines are not the same. That is what is cumbersome or difficult here. Their trend lines show no decrease in Calendar '83, and yours do. They show a marked decrease in the end of the year against the first.

A I have seen Tutela Legal's figures, and they do show a decrease in Calendar '83. But perhaps we have slightly different correlations on that score.

Q You mention the eviction of people who have been alleged to have participated. Can you tell us how many people? Are these the people who were supposedly assigned to Embassies abroad, from the Treasury police and others? Can you give us a number? You probably don't want to give their names, but how many people have been sent abroad, evicted?

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A In the last few weeks?

Q Well, say since --

A Since the Vice-President's visit.

Q Yes.

A I think there was -- The question was really never put in terms of how many people had to be sent abroad. Some people have been reassigned within El Salvador to positions where, if the allegations were true that they were involved in these activities, they would no longer be in a position to be involved in those activities.

In a few cases, there have been people who have been sent abroad. Also, in some cases, particularly in those in which the military did not have jurisdiction over the people, there have been investigations opened on the people, with the view that they would be investigated, and if exonerated, exonerated, if not, then some kind of action would be taken against them. I don't want to get into the specific question of numbers because I think at this stage, you would be better to just leave it sort of in those general categories.

Q Would you say more than a dozen individuals?

A No. Altogether?

Q Yes.

A Well, it is a question, then, of trying to attribute, trying to determine what changes were made in the various orders that have been put out in the last two months

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for command purposes and what were made to this particular purpose. It's in that general order.

Q On the question of Nicaraguan arms coming into El Salvador, can you give some sort of feel for what this level is now? Is it the highest it's ever been? And number two, how do we know that -- how do we know that it is increasing again?

A Well, we know it the same way as we have always tried to monitor the whole question of Nicaraguan arms shipments. Obviously, we do our best to know these things through the normal intelligence mechanisms; and on the basis of that, it is our view the general level has stayed about the same.

Q Earlier you said that it goes up and down -- _______ not stop it.

A It does go up and down.

Q You're saying now that it is about the same that it has been at other peak periods?

A Within the context that it goes up and down. I couldn't tell you that this week it is substantially higher than it was six weeks ago or two months ago, but generally speaking, the total number of reports that we receive on arms shipments from Nicaragua to El Salvador has indicated that it has stayed more or less steady if taken over, let's say, 3- or 4-month periods without looking to the sort of "micro-trends" from one month to the next.

b-7

Q So you're saying that this report and the intelligence you have really debunks the theory that Nicaragua has been trying to wash its hands of this slowly.

A Yes, it does debunk that theory.

Q Could you tell us more or less how many arms are coming in a week? Can you tell us how many arms the rebels have captured from the army in the last six months, which seems to me a quite important indicator of where their weapons are coming from.

A I couldn't tell you how many arms have come in over any particular period in the last time. Obviously, we have a window into some of the arms shipments, and from that you have to extrapolate as to what the overall situation is. But since you don't see each and every arm that comes in, or necessarily know of each and every arm that comes in, it's very difficult to do any more than sort of a crude estimate as to what the particular flow is at any given limit period.

In terms of weapons captured by the guerrillas. I think it is safe to say that during the course of the last year the guerrillas have become more proficient at capturing weapons from the government, and that they do capture a not-inconsiderable number of weapons. I think in the last count that was made in El Salvador of weapons captured by the government from the

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guerrillas, still approximately two-thirds of those were of outside origin, that is were not weapons that could have been captured from the Government of El Salvador.

Q When was that?

A Oh, I'd have to refresh my memory. It was some few months ago. I haven't seen --

Q "Outside origin" where?

A Well, "outside origin" normally implies origin having been channelled through Nicaragua, usually Viet-Nam-origin weapons.

Q Isn't it true that the Salvadoran Army also carry M-16s that were used in Viet-nam?

A Very few.

Q Could I get your assessment of how the Salvadoran justice system is working? Is it working any better? And specifically, if we could talk about the specific cases of Americans being killed -- the nuns, the labor leaders, and so on?

A Well, as I think you know -- and my colleague can perhaps amplify on my comments -- the Salvador an judicial system has been a non-functioning system for some time with respect to cases of this type. There is a general misconception that it doesn't work on any kind of cases; but in fact, it doesn't work too badly for common criminal cases. It doesn't work well, but it does function; there are convictions in common criminal cases. But in cases that have political components to them, it has not functioned.

With respect to the churchwomen's case, it is in the process, or has been elevated to, the plenarial stage. That is the final stage of the trial process. The defense has appealed that. The final judgments are expected on that in the not-too-distant future, and we expect that before mid-year we will have that going to the jury phase of the trial, which will be very quick, and then moving into a verdict.

We have further to go in the case of the AFL-CIO workers. In the case against David Kline, that seems to be working under a particularly active judge, and we expect progress on that shortly.

Other cases involving the disappearances of Americans essentially find themselves in various forms of difficulty, for example, in the Sullivan case, there was practically no evidence in the case. In the case of Patricia de Cuellar, there is no consensus as to what actually transpired in the case, so basically, it's in various stages, with none of them having resulted yet in a conviction. On the other hand, they are moving forward, and we do expect a conviction.

Q On a follow up, the report -- I just got a few minutes to look at it -- mentions that Captain Eduardo Avila has been arrested. I understand that he is due to be released in the next few days, and that his arrest was not specifically for the killing of the labor leaders, but was for something unrelated like being AWOL from his unit, or something like that.

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b-10 Would it displease the Administration if he were released in the next few days?

A We had been very hopeful that the Government of El Salvador would find a basis for arresting Captain Avila in order to secure his testimony in the AIFLD case, which we view as probably being indispensable in the case. We certainly hope that they could hold them long enough to obtain that critical testimony.

Q Sir, the human rights groups this morning were claiming that all the emphasis and talk about the death squads is diverting attention away from what they claim is the fact that the government security forces are responsible for most of these killings, not free-enterprise murderers who were hired by private Miami exiles. What do you have to say about that?

A I think it is a question of their being a moving target. I'm not entirely opposed to that notion; the fact is, if you begin to show progress in one area, it is negotiations and the focus of attention becomes an area in which there is in progress.

Nobody has raised a question on land reform, for example, because I think the case is actually fairly good on land reform; it is just not as interesting when the case is as good. I think, too, with their focus of attention, what they have wanted to do very much is to focus the attention of the

Administration where they consider the problem is likely to be the worse. And as the "death squad" problem, which was the principal focus three or four months ago, it looks like it is working its way toward some kind of an intermediate solution, and the focus becomes much more on some of the other areas.

I agree that there is a very serious problem in terms of misconduct and by elements of the Security Forces. "Death squad" activities and Security Force activities are overlapping in some respects. I think that has been pointed to quite clearly by Ambassador Pickering in his speeches. This is an area that needs a great deal of attention. These people who have been transferred overseas to get them out of El Salvador and out of a position where they could influence "death squad" activities are, after all, military officers. I think that demonstrates a will to deal with that problem.

MODERATOR: Last question.

Q There are reports that Vice President Bush promised the Salvadorans that there would be no conditionality for aid if they cleaned up the situation with regard to the "death squads," --

A -- which is a contradiction in terms, that is to say, "If you clean up the 'death squads,' there won't be any conditionality," is of course, a form of conditionality.

Q Conditionality in the Kissinger report? It said there would be no conditionality in the military --

A Vice President Bush never addressed himself to what there would be or what there would not be in the Kissinger Report. Obviously, he was hardly in a position to do so.

On that point, I should say that certainly in the Vice President's meetings in El Salvador, he set out very clearly our views as to the kinds of actions that they would have to take in order to succeed, and they set out very clearly the kinds of things that they thought we would have to do in order to succeed. And there was a great discussion about these issues and a consensus achieved. That consensus involved dealing with a range of issues and also involved our taking a second look at the levels of assistance, with a view of seeing exactly what their needs were and exactly how those needs could best be met. I think both sides have moved forward sort of in the fulfillment of what was at that meeting, with the tacit understanding that substantially accelerated efforts needed to be made in El Salvador.

Q Are you saying they anticipated greater levels of aid in exchange for doing what we were requiring of them?

A No. That implies -- has the quality of, "If you do this, we will do that," but it's really much more a question of looking at the problems, seeing what needs to be done, whether it be increased assistance, whether it be dealing with "death

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"squad" activities, or whether it be extending the land reform program, listing out all those items that need to be done, and then having people begin to implement them.

Q To follow on that, please, according to people who were members of the Kissinger Commission, Ambassador Kirkpatrick attempted to approach the Commission, and tried to inform them about what Vice President Bush had told the Salvadoran Government about this question of conditionality in the Report. He said that there might be a breach of faith involved and that the Commission decided it would be improper to be briefed on this by a member of --

Can you confirm that that is the case?

A I cannot confirm the specifics with respect to Jeanne Kirkpatrick's having asked that.

Q Can you confirm the generalities of that?

A I can confirm to you that the Kissinger Commission did not get briefed on the specifics of Bush's visit, and Bush didn't get briefed on what was going to be in the Kissinger Report before he went down there.

Q But you're not denying that (inaudible) --

A Both have come to a not totally dissimilar view on conditionality -- that is to say that obviously, we condition our assistance to any country on the basis of their own performance; and that is something that the Kissinger Commission developed as a central theme in their report, and quite frankly, has been a theme of the Administration's policy consistently.

(The briefing concluded at 3:55 p.m.)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF
PRIME MINISTER MAHATHIR OF MALAYSIA

January 17, 1984

The Briefing Room

11:04 A.M. EST

MR. SIMS: Ladies and gentlemen, this is a background briefing on the visit of Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia. It is on background attributable to a senior administration official.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Good morning.

MR. SIMS: Can you turn the TV --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We are welcoming today here Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia. As you perhaps know, he arrived a couple of days ago and has been spending two days in New York. Yesterday he had a luncheon at the Waldorf hosted by the Asia Society, The ASEAN-U.S. Business Council, The Far East American Trade Council. That points up what I think is one of the important parts of his visit, which is his interest in increasing trade between Malaysia and the United States and, of course, increasing U.S. investment there.

Not to give you more, perhaps, than you may know already, I would like to point out a few things about Malaysia which, of course, is one of the founding members of ASEAN, which has now become a six-member organization with the addition of Bruny recently. It is a stable democracy with a parliamentary system and it's had a rather high rate of economic growth. I think many of us have not realized that in the 1970s they averaged 8 percent a year. Last year, with the worldwide recession, it was down to 5, which many of us would consider pretty good, and this year we hope -- or it's expected to go up to 6, again.

Malaysia has done this in large part, I think, by their commitment to a free-enterprise economy and Mahathir himself is involved in what he calls prioritization, a bit different from Mrs. Thatcher's, I think, but it is a system where, for example, when they add a third TV channel, they are going to put it to the private sector and when they double the rail line, they will probably put that to the private sector. So you see a rather vibrant economy there.

Between the United States and Malaysia there was, until the end of last year, one sort of nagging problem. As you probably know, Malaysia is an important producer of tin, and the sales by the GSA of tin were to them a question mark because, of course, of the effect on the world economy. By the signing of a memorandum of understanding which calls for consultations and which outlines about the speed and the quantity of our GSA sales of tin, this has removed a question or an irritant, if you will, between the two countries.

Here in Washington I give you briefly -- it's a rough outline of the -- can you hear me just talking? -- rough outline of the Prime Minister's schedule. He will arrive this evening, have a private evening. Tomorrow is the core day where he has a meeting in the Oval Office and in the Cabinet Room with the President and senior people, luncheon with the President. Then, during the rest of his visit, he will have a dinner with the Vice President, a meeting with senior economic Cabinet officers, Secretary Regan, Secretary Brock, Lionel

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Olmer and others. On Friday he will meet with -- Mahathir is also Defense Minister -- he will meet with Secretary Weinberger and Secretary Shultz.

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when he returns on Friday, he has made a special point to be able to meet with Mahathir at the very end of the visit and to see him off. So I believe that we have a pretty good -- there's also a meeting with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. I think we have a pretty good schedule for him, and that's sort of the -- backgrounding.

I would say that, perhaps, there are -- while we have differences of opinion on matters, there are no major bilaterial problems -- if that is the right word. There will be no major agreements signed during this visit. I think it's a more -- a matter of discussing exchanging views on a more global basis.

Dr. Mahathir has been Prime Minister for a couple of years. He is a medical doctor in his past, as is his wife today. And he has been known for being a rather forthright, straight-talking political leader.

Thank you.

Q What are some of the areas of -- differences of opinion?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think if you look in the whole area of the North-South dialogue -- if that is the correct term -- I think there may be some nuances as to how we look at -- the Prime Minister, for example, in his speech yesterday, wasn't so much U.S.-Malaysia, but he was saying developed, developing world. And the point he was making -- the developed world has got to find a way to avoid shutting its doors so that the developing world that hasn't quite gotten to the table, or halfway to the table, can have its share. That -- they can't go on commodities forever, because commodities are limited, and your population goes up.

So, I don't think that's a major -- I mean, it's not a confrontational sort of difference -- but, there may be different points of view in that area.

Certainly, as I'm sure you are aware, Malaysia is a moderate, but largely Islamic country. I wouldn't say totally, because the -- probably about half or a little bit more -- but the Malays there who are the -- dominant in the political structure -- are, almost to a person, Moslems. So, you get some differences of opinion in Mideast questions.

Q What will be chief topic of their discussions?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have -- I guess both sides have offered their senior people a list of things which would be interesting. I think that from our side they'll probably want to have a readout on the Zhao visit, and the Secretary -- when the Secretary gets back -- his talks in Europe.

Probably they would want our views on how we see things progressing in the Middle East, and we will want theirs. ASEAN, certainly, and the Kampuchea question. As you know, they are one of the countries that has put together the position on Kampuchea which has pretty much told Vietnam that they can't be a very well excepted member of the world society while they've got troops in Cambodia, and are maintaining, in effect, a puppet government there. So these are areas I think that will be of some interest.

Sir?

Q Do they have any foreign debt problems, as some of the other countries in that part of the world do?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not in a major sense. In the last couple of years -- I suppose it's what you're used to -- if you're used to 8 percent growth, and you plummet down to 5, which by world standards still looks pretty good -- but, they have increased their borrowings for the last couple of years to try and keep the rate of development pretty steady, not at the 8 percent, but at a reasonable high. They, therefore, owe more than they used to, but by international standards, their debt service problem is very modest.

The short answer, I guess, to your question is -- not really, no.

Q Would you say what our responsibilities are under the tin agreement? How far have we gone with other countries in joining, and --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I speak of the memorandum of understanding. You know we are not a member of the Sixth International Tin Agreement, so we have, obviously, no responsibilities there. Let me first and foremost say, this is not a legally binding document, this memorandum of understanding. It is, in effect, we and the ASEAN countries, but Malaysia was sort of the lead country, expressing our views as to how we mean to conduct ourselves. And we have said that for the first two years, assuming no major changes in the world market,

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the GSA would sell probably less than 3,000 tons a year. And that was the years '83 and '84. And as it turned out, in '83 that's about what they sold, a little bit less.

This was an exercise of self-restraint, which was already built into our system. GSA was asked to sell some of the excess tin; but, so as not to disrupt the market that was built into the legislation they were following. But we put this in an expression of how we meant to conduct ourselves and with an agreement that Cal Jones of GSA or others would consult with the ASEAN countries to sort of keep them abreast.

Q So we're not dumping tin --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, sir. We were not before. But I think the fact that this Memorandum of Understanding exists lets the Malaysians, the other tin producers, know that the United States is going to go at a certain speed.

Q It's a state visit, official visit, a working visit --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Official working visit.

Q Would you expect the Prime Minister to ask the U.S. to reduce its sales, though, despite this memorandum?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, sir. We believe quite firmly that the Malaysians, who were the kind of lead for ASEAN, chosen by the ASEANs as the major producer, and that it was discussed sufficiently that both sides were pretty comfortable and it was -- it's only -- it was signed off only a matter of weeks ago. I think that will not be a question.

Q How much tin will we dispose of altogether?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, for the first two -- I mean, the GSA has a -- and I don't know the figure from the Congress, how much they're supposed to dispose of over 10-15 years, because we have more tin in the stockpile than we consider we need now. For the first two years, when the market -- tin market was expected to be a little on the soft side, 3,000. After that, it would go up to 5,000. But all of this is with the caveat that if the market changes drastically, you can do different things. If the world economy suddenly seems to be gobbling up tin, GSA would not be forever stopped from going further; but it would be a matter of consultation.

Q Does he speak English?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, ma'am. I think that --

Q Does he smoke or drink? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That I can't tell you.

Q He says he doesn't.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think he does not. He is a practicing Muslim. He speaks beautiful English, gave a speech yesterday in English. The older, educated Malaysians, often English may well be their first or close to their first language. It is now the second language in the schools after Bahasa Malayu to Malaysian or Malayans.

Q Is a copy of that speech available?

Q -- plays the flute.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have not seen it; but let us try and get it for you. I'm sorry. They didn't pass it out there, that much I know. But whether -- the Embassy may be able to make it available to us.

Q Can you tell me anything about what he's going to be discussing with Secretary Weinberger?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we do not have -- I do not foresee any specific requests of Secretary Weinberger that we know of. We have, as you know, a small foreign military sales program there. As you well know, Malaysia is not an ally. We have no bases. We're not seeking any bases. The relationship is friendly but not heavily extensive in that area. But he -- Mahathir is Defense Minister, also. So it's appropriate, usually -- He is wearing two hats. He's having two levels of meetings.

Q Is there a problem of any size with communist insurgency there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, not today. As you know, the -- as they call it, "the Emergency" -- the 1960's; but they seem to have beaten that back very well. And the -- bringing into the body politic of the Chinese who make up about a third of the country, maybe 35 percent, for example, the new Ambassador here is of ethnic Chinese, Lew Sip Hon, who is a former vice minister. So I think there's been a major effort made to bring the big elements of the population into the body politic.

And the reverse is also true. The Malaysian part -- They're trying to get them more into the economic sphere, so that you don't have rich and poor in, you know, and antagonistic sort of feelings because of differences.

Q What are the relations with China and how does Malaysia -- and how does ASEAN, at this point -- view the developing relations between the United States and China?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You say, ASEAN, I guess I'll do the best I can.

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I think the relations between Malaysia and China are perfectly acceptable. I think all the ASEAN countries remember a time when China supported the communist parties in their country, which is not true now. But in varying degrees, they maintain a certain degree of caution in their thinking.

Perhaps the most caution -- I speak with some knowledge because I spend a lot of time there -- is in Indonesia where they have not -- they have frozen relations since '66 or so. And they -- every year they, again, tell us they're not going to open up the relationship again because they're afraid of the possible Chinese -- using that as a way of subversion.

With Malaysia, I think that doesn't seem to be a major problem. Thailand's relations with China are really quite good. So, I had to give you a little bit of a -- Singapore, as you know, does not have a relationship with China, although I think there are informal relations. Economic relations are quite acceptable.

They say they will wait untilthe Indonesians open up again.

MR. SIMS: That do it? Thank you very much.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 11:24 A.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release January 17, 1984

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
AMBASSADOR PAUL NITZE
ON INF NEGOTIATIONS

The Briefing Room

1:18 P.M. EST

AMBASSADOR NITZE: As you know, I've just met with President Reagan. We briefly reviewed the INF negotiating situation and the continuing Soviet insistence on a wholly one-sided outcome.

The President expressed his personal appreciation for the work of the U.S. INF negotiating team. And we also looked ahead to the next possible steps.

The President, again, underscored his personal commitment to our talking with the Soviets, to meeting them halfway in negotiations and in reducing tensions between our two countries.

Finally, he told me of his deep disappointment over the Soviet breakoff of the INF talks.

He urged me and the members of my Geneva delegation to stand ready to resume the talks once the Soviets are prepared to [illegible] the dialogue in good faith.

I regret that I cannot bring any news of new movement toward resumption of the INF talks at this time. However, I continue to share the President's view that the groundwork has been laid for progress in our talks and that it is in the interests of both sides to return to the negotiating table.

Q Mr. Ambassador, can you tell us if there's any merit to the idea that we might combine the INF and START talks into one set of talks?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I don't think that would be in the interests of the United States.

Q Why not?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: The subject matter of the INF talks and of the START talks is really quite a different subject matter. [illegible] with the [illegible] the balance [illegible] the situation [illegible] but the facts [illegible] START talks are on the balance between the Soviet Union and [illegible] systems with intercontinental capability.

Q Well, what if that was the way to get the Soviets back to the talks, would that then be acceptable?

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AMBASSADOR NITZE: Depends upon the conditions that they would make upon merging the two talks or consolidating the two talks. And I believe that it is probable that the way in which they would approach it would not be in the interest of the United States. I think it would be disadvantageous to the West in general.

Q What about the idea of -- that's apparently being proposed of calling off INF as a formal negotiation and having back-channel, confidential talks on medium-range missiles?

First of all, to the best of your knowledge is the administration considering that as an idea?

And, secondly, what do you think of that idea?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: No. The President's view is that with respect to the INF subject matter, it is better that the negotiations be conducted by the INF delegation, which has experience in this matter, which has -- I think I've got a very good delegation in Geneva that has been working on this. I'd hate to see that team bypassed, and I think the President shares my view.

Q Wasn't the question, really. But you could use your team in a back-channel way.

AMBASSADOR NITZE: That we can do in the normal way. We've been combining formal negotiations and back-channel negotiations for a long period of time. I thought you were suggesting some change from the past.

Q That's exactly what I'm suggesting. So you know of no consideration then of offering that to Gromyko?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I think that has been considered and is not favorable.

Q Mr. Ambassador, what is your assessment of the Soviets coming back, of the possibilities? You've dealt with them a long time. Is this just a ploy or is it real or is it long term? What are your feelings about it?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: You know our feelings about the negotiations as a whole and that is that we think the negotiations should resume. We're prepared. They walked out. We're ready to go back at any time.

Your question really relates to what do I think the Soviets are going to do, because it's really in their hands as to whether or not the negotiations resume. And there it's very hard for me to have an opinion on it. All I can do is to look at what the evidence is. And I've seen nothing that they've said and no indirect indications, other than that they are serious about having broken them off.

Q Well, that means -- That's pretty weak, isn't it?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: Well, it's not that hopeful.

Q Have you any word yet from Secretary Shultz on his talks today with Foreign Minister Gromyko and whether any movement may come out of there on this subject?

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AMBASSADOR NITZE: No, I'm not sure that he's talked to Mr. Gromyko yet, I certainly haven't had any report on it.

Q Do you see a resumption of these talks any time this year? I mean, there was some talk this morning from former Secretary Schlesinger and some others who said that they didn't look for resumption of these talks during this political year.

AMBASSADOR NITZE: As I say, it's hard for me to estimate. I hope that the talks will resume, and resume promptly. I don't see evidence that the Soviets are apt to come back soon.

Q Mr. Ambassador, the President said that once we deploy, this would bring the Soviets to the table to negotiations and to a conclusion. Now, was that based on a wrong reading, or a mistake in assumptions on our part at that time.

AMBASSADOR NITZE: It hasn't quite turned out that way. I've never said that I thought that the Soviets would negotiate seriously only after we'd deployed. I've tried --

Q Well, was the President wrong in making that statement?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: No. I think there were grounds to believe that that was true, but it hasn't turned out that way.

Q Well, if I can follow that -- I mean, isn't that really the larger thesis that the President brought to office, that if we built up our defenses, that only then could we get the Soviets to deal with us and negotiate -- isn't that really what's at stake here, and haven't they refused? Hasn't that theory fallen down?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: No, no, no. I don't believe that's correct. I think the President is quite right when he said that our security is greater than it was before we built up. The question at issue is not whether they sit down at the negotiating table, but whether or not they really negotiate seriously with, in the direction of a deal, that we could, in fact, live with.

Q They haven't done either of those two things, though --

AMBASSADOR NITZE: They haven't yet -- but I think they will.

Q Do you expect anything to change as a result of the President's speech yesterday?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: Frankly, I thought the President's speech was an excellent speech. I thought it set exactly the right tone, and that this was the tone that was needed today. Now to translate that into direct influence upon what the Russians do, I can't draw that nexus. I'm sure that with respect to and understanding in Europe and here in the United States as to what the true views of the administration are, I think the President's speech made an enormous contribution in that direction.

Q Do you know if --

Q I want to follow up on that, please --

Q Go ahead --

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Q Do you know if there's been anything in addition to the speech of a substantive nature that would, in conjunction with the speech, induce the Soviets to come back to the bargaining table?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I know that a great deal of attention has been -- is being given to that problem. As to the question as to whether there is anything we can do which would not be an improper concession to the Soviet Union, but which would make it easier for the Soviets to come back -- yes. A lot of thought has been given to that.

Q Mr. Ambassador, over the last year the Soviets have reemphasized the fact that they never accepted deterrence in MAD, that they've always been on a footing for a world winning posture, and they have been telling their own population essentially to prepare for war, as well as making all kinds of preparations that go even beyond what they've done in the last decade. I'm wondering -- if, in the President's not addressing this and not telling the American population if this, in fact, is the correct posture of the Soviet Union that this doesn't, perhaps, increase the current danger of the Soviets mis-estimating what our response would be?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: Obviously the Soviets -- and various Soviets have said all kinds of different things. I'm sure that you correctly quote what some of the Soviets have said, and others have said other things. I think it's very difficult to encapsule it in a few simple phrases what the Soviet position on any given issue is.

Q If left to your own devices, you and Mr. Kvitsinsky, weren't you very, very close to an agreement? Was it more the fault of each other's principles than holding the two of you back?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I would amend that by saying it was 99 percent the fault of his principles and not mine.

Q Why?

Q What was the -- one percent at this end? (Laughter.)

AMBASSADOR NITZE: You know the U.S. government -- there are always some people who have different views, and they should have. My goodness. Ours is a democratic form of government, with an American form of government, I can't imagine any issue on which there's been unanimity on behalf of -- on anything.

Q May I follow that up? Could you

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amplify that by commenting on some recent news stories in magazines and other places that suggested that some of your colleagues at the State and Defense department felt that you were too willing to make concessions in that form that you referred to or any others?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I've read such statements and I'm not aware -- I'm not certain as to their accuracy either, because generally they were made when I was not here in the United States, but I've read such statements, yes.

Q Sounds pretty hardline to me.

Q Can you say what your reaction is and whether there's any truth to it and are you --

AMBASSADOR NITZE: Those haven't really bothered me. Those really haven't bothered me.

Q Have the Soviets moved new nuclear missiles into East Germany? Do you know?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: They have certainly said that they are going to, and I think they're making preparations therefore. I'm not aware of the fact that they have actually announced that they have already so done. Have they done so?

Q I have a notice saying Tass says Soviet soldiers are now manning new missile bases -- nuclear missile bases in East Germany.

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I don't know that they're operational yet, but they're -- I'm sure they've got soldiers there. There isn't doubt about the fact that they propose to and are going to move some of their SS-1222s from the Soviet Union forward to East Germany.

Q Doesn't it make it more difficult to reach an agreement on the total withdrawal of our Pershings and their SS-20s?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I don't believe so. I frankly think that they would be prepared to move back their SS-1222s from East Germany and from Czechoslovakia when they move them there, just as we would be prepared to remove our Pershing IIs and GLCMs if we make the right kind of a deal in which that would be called for.

Q When you stated the position that it's not to our advantage to -- to merge the talks -- the INF and START -- is that your own view? Are you confident that that is shared by all the major players here?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I expressed it as being my own view. I believe it is the view of the major players, but I wouldn't guarantee that.

Q Do the Soviets want to merge --

Q Are you considering lifting sanctions against Aeroflot into the country or any other kinds of inducements to bring the Soviets back to negotiations?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I don't know the answer to that question.

Q Mr. Ambassador, you must have some feeling for why the Soviets were in Geneva in the first place to negotiate. What's your feeling as to whether they're at all interested in coming back and will that require inducements or incentives by the President?

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AMBASSADOR NITZE: Well, I think they made a decision in the summer of 1982 that they would -- when they compared the situation which would exist if they entered into an agreement which, what they call sanctioned U.S. deployments, or whether they did not enter into such an agreement but instead there were no agreements and the United States went forward with the deployments of Pershing IIs and GLCMs that they preferred the latter situation to an agreement which would call for or permit U.S. deployments of GLCMs and/or Pershings. And at that time -- I think it's going to take a policy decision on their part to change that before we'll be in a position to get the kind of an agreement that we could live with.

Q Two questions: First of all, has the -- have the Soviets said they would prefer to merge the talks?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: No, they have not.

Q Either privately or publicly?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: During the talks they took the clear position that they did not wish the merger. I think it is too early to tell whether they will propose it or not.

Q And secondly, what do we do now? I mean, how do we get the Soviets back given what you say was their very strong decision at the time of the break-off to break off and the fact that you don't see much running room at this point for them to return, how do we get them back? Or is it that important to get them back?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I think the important thing to do is to demonstrate to them that we can live without making concessions to them and that we can -- that the NATO alliance holds together as it has, and that it is not necessary for us to make concessions.

Q Mr. Ambassador, what is the -- how has the apparent illness of Yuri Andropov complicated the situation, and what's the outlook on that?

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I mean, do we have to wait for a succession to get these talks back?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I don't think that really has been a major factor. It has been a -- some factor. And I believe that Mr. Andropov has been well enough to make the important decisions so that they have not been inhibited in negotiating in the way that they wanted to.

Q I want to return to these new Soviet missiles in East Germany. Are you saying that you think it does not complicate the chances of getting an agreement? And is it not more dangerous to have them there?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I don't believe it complicates the problem of getting an agreement because if we can get an agreement, I think they would take them out.

Q Well, is it more dangerous to have them there?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: It is not something you'd want. Certainly you can't say that it's a good thing to have missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. No.

Q But I ask only because they apparently are doing it, they say, in response to our deployment. Is this not the acceleration of danger on both sides?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: Not really, I don't believe. No. Because this is a few. Doesn't really make that much difference.

MR. SIMS: Can we have one or two more?

Q -- here or there.

Q -- question on the difference between what you said about -- there's the thought about whether we can do anything that is not an improper concession, and I think it's going to take a policy decision of theirs to make progress. Are you saying that there are some inducements we should offer, that we can offer that are not improper concessions or it doesn't matter what we do?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I'm saying two things: one of them is that I think it probably, that, as far as I can see, it will take a policy decision on their part before they will wish to negotiate on basis which would be useful to us; and, secondly, that if there are things that we could do to make it easier for them to return to the negotiation, without making improper concessions, this is something that is under consideration.

Q Such as --

Q Do you still think --

Q What kind of things are you talking about, for example?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: -- we'd have to explore that with them to find out what would make it easier for --

Q Do you still keep the British and French out -- their weapons? Which seems to be the stumbling block, isn't it?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: Certainly wasn't in the last days when they offered a method which put that to one side.

Q Why was there some --

Q Well, what is the key issue?

Q Yes. Why was there some consideration given to a back channel in cutting off the INF talks? Why was that being considered and why was it turned down?

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AMBASSADOR NITZE: I didn't know that it was being considered.

Q I thought you just said that. I --

Q You said it was considered and then rejected.

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I've heard it discussed, certainly.

Q Within the administration?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: Yes, obviously the -- Every possibility is discussed and should be.

Q Why was it turned down?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I think, as I said, it was considered that the INF delegation had the background and had the means in which you could discuss both formally and informally every kind of variation that might lead to an agreement.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 1:21 P.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER MAHATHIR

January 18, 1984

The Briefing Room

1:47 P.M. EST

MR. SIMS: This briefing is on background. It is attributable to a senior administration official.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Just a few remarks at the beginning and then I'll be glad to answer questions.

The President's just had a very good meeting and lunch with Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir. As you know, this is the first visit to Washington by the Prime Minister in his official capacity. It's also the first visit to Washington by a ASEAN leader in more than a year and we very much value this opportunity to strengthen our bilateral relationship with Malaysia, as well as to resume our dialogue with the ASEAN countries at the highest level.

As the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahathir leads a nation that is almost unique among developing countries. It is a stable democracy with a rich, vibrant free enterprise oriented economy. And it has never been a recipient of United States foreign assistance.

Malaysia fought and defeated an attempt by communist guerrillas to take over the country. The Prime Minister, himself, is a medical doctor turned politician who is one of Asia's leading international statesmen.

The talk between the President and the Prime Minister covered a wide range of international. political, and strategic matters including the Soviet Union, China, and Japan; including matters in the Middle East where Malaysia as an Islamic country has particular interests and insights; and ASEAN and other regional matters, particularly the tragic problem of Kampuchea where Malaysia has been in the forefront in ASEAN in forging a strategy to deal with that problem.

There also was considerable discussion of the global economic outlook of trade matters and of our mutual desires to facilitate U.S. investment in Malaysia. In the last respect, Malaysia is the most promising location for increased U.S. investment and cooperation in the industrial sphere. The Prime Minister said that he would like to see more U.S. companies become involved there and we strongly agree. In this regard, the President believes that private investment is very important to economic growth in the developing nations in general, and certainly in Malaysia.

Also, we share with Malaysia the objective of promoting freer trade, of reducing trade and investment barriers, and of opposing protectionism both at home and in other countries.

Let me emphasize the importance of our relations with Malaysia and countries like Malaysia. Except in times of crisis, successful countries like this one are often overlooked. The Prime Minister's visit to Washington this week is meant to affirm the importance that we attach to our bilateral ties. I know that the President was very impressed with Malaysia's positive record of economic development and sound management, with its very capable and democratic government, and with the dynamism of the country. We intend to continue working closely with Malaysia, as the President said, and to deepen our cooperation, particularly in the economic field.

I might just make a comment that, in a sense, I know good news is rarely news, but it seems to me that it is news to find a developing country that is able to conduct its political affairs democratically, to conduct its economic affairs with the kind of incredible growth rates that Malaysia has displayed, and to conduct its

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diplomatic affairs with the sort of skill that Malaysia has shown, particularly in the ASEAN area and addressing the problem of Kampuchea. So, while it's good news, I think it is news and it's worth noting.

I'll be glad to take questions.

Q Thank you.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There aren't -- yes?

Q How would you describe Malaysia's role in the ASEAN strategy toward Kampuchea? What is it that they're trying to do?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, let me say -- the question was how would I describe Malaysia's role in the ASEAN strategy for Kampuchea and what is it that they're trying to do? The basic objective is to achieve a political solution of this conflict, a solution that would be based on the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea, that would produce an independent, nonaligned government based on free elections. No one, and certainly the Malaysians definitely are not interested in seeing the return of the Khmer Rouge to power in Pnompenh, but neither do they want to see the continuation of a government in Kampuchea that is based on outside -- that is imposed by outside forces.

They've been working in that strategy to develop support for the noncommunist resistance in Kampuchea, to develop diplomatic and political support for negotiated outcome to the solution and they have, both in dealing with us, dealing with Australia and other friends, in their diplomacy among the ASEAN countries, they have worked very effectively to promote that strategy.

Q Some experts criticize the lack of active role of the U.S. in trying to solve the Kampuchean problem and its, in general, I would say in Southeast Asia. How would you answer to that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There have been people who've suggested that somehow the United States should take the lead in this problem. Our feeling is our best role is supporting the ASEAN countries who've shown very effectively their ability to lead and our feeling that while it's very important for us to support them, and we do strongly support them, that it is, in the first instance, their problem and their security that is at stake, it is they who have, I think, demonstrated skill and expertise to deal with the problem, and that in the end, when it comes to seeking a political solution, that that will best be done by the ASEAN countries and Vietnam dealing with one another while we will play a strong supporting role.

Q The President made reference to this government's disagreement with Malaysia on the Middle East issue. Did the Prime Minister have any advice on how to pursue peace there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I make it a practice not to try to characterize what other governments tell us in these conversations. I can speak for our own position; they need to speak for theirs. It is the case that Malaysia has very openly supported the PLO and, in particular, supported Arafat and supported the general line of resolutions of the Organization of Islamic States, of which Malaysia is a member.

I think, on the other hand, as the President did indicate in his remarks, I believe we have a somewhat common vision of a peaceful settlement in that region, one that meets legitimate interests of all parties and I think, without characterizing their views, I think it was useful for the President to hear the views of one of the very moderate members of the Islamic States about how they saw the problems.

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Q What is Malaysia's position on Israel in reference to its right to exist and so forth? You describe it as a more moderate Islamic state. I mean, everybody's for peace in the region; I don't think anybody's against peace.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it is very clear -- you might want to add something here -- Malaysia does not have diplomatic relations with Israel but I don't believe that Malaysia in any way denies Israel's right to exist, and it is certainly the case that Malaysia is not one of those countries actively seeking to undermine or destroy Israel.

Q First of all, was that subject brought up by the Prime Minister or by the President and, secondly, what did the President say to the Prime Minister's view in support of the PLO and, in general, on the Mideast?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'm not sure who precisely initiated that one, I am sorry. They talked about it at some length and --

Q Well, specifically, would the President have told him or tried to enlist him in some peacemaking role?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Rather more, I think, to explain our views. They have to decide how best to play their role and since they are

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active in Islamic circles, it's -- we feel it's valuable for them to understand what we're trying to do and also to understand what we're not trying to do, since often our role is caricatured and misrepresented.

And I know the President and the Vice President explained very forcefully and quite clearly the concern that we have about dealing with Mr. Arafat as long as the PLO continues to refuse to recognize Israel's right to exist and explain what a fundamental difficulty that is in dealing with Arafat.

Q Did they yell? I mean, what do you mean by "quite forcefully"?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, they made it very clear that it -- how difficult it is to deal with a country or deal with an organization in this case, that denys the right to exist of a country that's a member of the United Nations and a close friend of ours. And that -- that is a fundamental barrier to our dialogue. Obviously we would be seeking to encourage any friends of Mr. Arafat's or any people who do communicate with him to understand that position of the United States so that possibly there could be some progress.

Q Was there any discussion of the latest activities of the Islamic Jihad and what might be done about that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You mean the general problem of terrorism -- I think is what you're really referring to --

Q Well, it's become quite specific, and for a change it's been aimed apparently at an Islamic country as well.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There was discussion of the problem of terrorism -- and I -- the point was made that we're dealing with the phenomenon of people who are even quite willing to kill themselves in order to carry out these acts, and how difficult a problem that is to cope with.

Yes?

Q ASEAN has pledged its effort to help resolve the MIA question in Vietnam and seeking the return of what are said to be hundreds of remains of U.S. servicemen from Vietnam. Was that issue raised between the President and --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Malaysia has, among ASEAN countries, actually played a rather active role in this regard and Foreign Minister Ghazali, after Secretary Shultz raised the subject in Bangkok, did in fact, pursue the issue with the Vietnamese. Again, as with so many of these efforts, it has not borne much fruit yet. That's not the fault of the Malaysians, it's the fault of Vietnam, but it is very helpful to have these concerns raised by countries other than just the United States. So I think that was valuable. I don't believe it actually came up in our discussions yet, although I'm sure it will come up when Secretary Shultz meets the Prime Minister.

I don't think I mentioned that, by the way, but he's still -- he will be in Washington through Friday, and continues to

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have a rather active schedule. He'll be meeting with Secretary Regan, with Special Trade negotiator, Brock, and on Friday afternoon, Secretary Shultz who, of course, is out of the country today, will be meeting with him.

MR. SIMS: We have several Malaysian press visitors here. Can we have the questions from them before we end the briefing?

Q During the meeting, was the question of whether repatriation of Vietnamese refugees from Malaysia still continues to be discussed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, the subject of refugees was discussed. The President expressed our appreciation of the role that Malaysia has played in assisting in providing a country of first assylum for the refugees and pledged our continued strong efforts to make sure that those refugees in turn find places of permanent resettlement elsewhere. And, as you know, that is a continuing problem, but we continue to address it and believe that we really made considerable progress.

Yes?

Q The sales of GSA tin has always been an issue for Malaysia and the United States. Did the President say anything to the Prime Minister during their meeting? A memorandum of understanding has been signed -- but, were there any discussions in detail?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They didn't discuss it in detail, they did talk about the memorandum of understanding itself and the fact that we have reached an understanding with Malaysia and with the other ASEAN countries

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on some general principles guiding the disposal of tin and on an agreement to consult in the face of changing economic conditions, should those arise. The subject of tin was also addressed in a more general context of discussion of international economic recovery and the fact that of all the commodities that Malaysia exports, tin is the one whose price has continued to at least not rise, and I think even decline slightly during this recovery, a problem that is caused by a general decline in the demand for tin. That subject was discussed.

Of course, GSA Commissioner Jones will be at the meeting with Secretary Regan tomorrow, so I imagine they will get into more detail then.

Q Was there any indication that the number of refugees intake will increase on the part of the U.S?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That wasn't discussed specifically. I believe we -- in general, as you know, our total numbers of refugees taken have gone down over the years, although the number of refugees has been declining even more rapidly, so that we still continue, out ofthe Southeast Asian countries as a whole, to be providing a significant net offtake. I believe, in the case of Malaysia last year, the population stayed nearly constant and in our internal efforts to allocate refugee numbers we are trying to make sure that the population of Malaysia also comes down.

Q Relations between Malaysia and the United States has always been described as routine. Was there, during the meeting -- during the meeting was there any indication by those present during the meeting that there is a desire to upgrade the relationship to, say, a more substantive level?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Obviously Malaysia is, being both very far away and very proudly nonaligned, there are certain respects in which our relations with Malaysia are not as close as they would be to countries closer to us or countries that are formally allied with us. But I would say this, that it certainly was my impression from the meetings that the President was most impressed with the kind of leadership Malaysia has and the kind of record that Malaysia has and there was no explicit addressal of whether our relations should be upgraded in some sense but, I think, in fact, they have been upgraded by this visit.

I think the ties between the leaders are much stronger and I know on our side the understanding of Malaysia is much deeper.

Q Going back to the Middle East for one second -- two parts. Roughly how much of the meeting was taken up with that and, number two, was there any substances discussed or was it merely an exchange of policy viewpoints? Were there specific proposals bandied about?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, on the second part of it, as you know, I think the focus of our policy is to get the parties directly involved together in negotiating, so it's not -- though I'm speaking in someone else's area, I don't believe it is our practice to start engaging in negotiations of substance with parties whose involvement is only indirect. But this general exchange of policy, which was fairly extensive -- I didn't time it, but it was much more than a few minutes -- I think does contribute to the kind of general effort that we've undertaken and I think with some modest success, at least over the last few years, to achieve some moderation in positions on the Arab side and some understanding of the seriousness of the President of the United States to find a just outcome to this problem.

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Q Did the President say, "Why don't you tell your friends in the Islamic" --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's much better to let somebody decide themselves what they're going to tell their friends than to preach at them, I think.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 2:02 P.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

Embargoed until Friday morning's newspapers — January 18, 1984

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BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
AND OTHER TOPICS

The Roosevelt Room

2:29 P.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Two meetings this afternoon; but it was apparent when I came in this is clearly not the group of evangelicals. (Laughter.)

Q Will that effect your message?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'll be brief. I'll say one or two words about the speech and then after that take your questions on that subject or the Middle East or what have you.

It seems to me that the reaction has captured I think what the President's central purpose was. That is, that he wanted to make clear to the Soviet Union, to our allies, to the Americans, his commitment to a determined effort to solve problems with the Soviet Union.

If there is a recurring comment it seems to be, "Why now? And what is his motivation?" And on the first part of that comment, in order to gain an appreciation of why now it seems relevant to put this speech in the context of U.S.-Soviet relations in the course of the past ten years. And I will tell you up front, I'm not going to rehearse that history, except to offer the observation that, on our side, we have experienced a period of decline, if you will, an apparently declining willingness of the American people to invest in their security, an apparent inability to solve problems generally, whether economic or foreign, but that that trend of the '70's, the President believed, had been checked and the fact that it was checked requires a certain amount of reflection on the part of the Soviet Union.

After all, they had forecast -- indeed, it's a tentative doctrine -- that the West will decline. And we aren't. And what does that imply doctrinally for them and for their relationship to us? What, if any, changes may it imply for their strategy for the translation of their doctrine in East-West relations?

Now, the President, in his speech, which really hasn't been reported very much, went through about a four point chronology. And he pointed to this history of decline and, secondly, identified that he believed that we had checked that decline and that, because we had checked it and had in place a program which promised to preserve a stable balance, that the world was a safer place and that continued stability seemed possible, indeed, likely.

But, thirdly, while stable, it could be more stable and that stability could be best enhanced by a significant reduction in nuclear weapons, but as well by a more routine and broad dialogue with the Soviet Union toward the resolution of disagreement across the spectrum of our relationship.

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The President expressed that view of history, or translated it in terms of policy for the future, in three areas for this effort. One, the effort to reduce the threat and use of the force in U.S.-Soviet relationships and as they effect our friends. And, secondly, to lower the level of nuclear and, finally, to get a better working relationship, as I've said, in solving problems across the board.

The Soviet Union is in a period, I think, of some introspection. Introspection brought on by this fundamental change in the apparent direction of the United States, that is, and its ability to solve problems and the willingness of the American people to invest a certain amount in their security.

Separately, but related, the major investment of the Soviet Union over four years' time in a strategy vis-a-vis the West, in which they sought to drive wedges between us and our European allies and others, has suffered a reverse. I wouldn't say that it has failed. But that, too, requires a certain amount of reflection on their part.

Now, the third area in which they are probably reviewing the bidding is in arms control. Their diffidence up until now has resulted in the United States still being able to go ahead and put in place a modernization program which promises over time to surely affect their view of the strategic balance and, I would think, pose some incentives for them to get serious about restraining our programs.

So in sum you have some fairly historic conditions that require some considerable thought.

We think that on the latter point the promise that this military modernization program will be in place by the end of the decade surely must induce some interest on their part, even if it isn't altruistic, in getting some restraints on American programs and that they may get serious, for a change, about arms control.

And so that's why now we are ready, we haven't had, perhaps, as good a set of incentives for a serious dialogue with the Soviet Union in 10-15 years. The President believes we have those elements of the foundation in place now and he believes, as a matter of his view of the Presidency, as well as the national interest, that his responsibility, his foremost responsibility is to solve problems with the Soviet Union.

I have a lot of other points I could make; but why don't I take your questions now?

Yes.

Q You said, as I think I heard you, that we have a military modernization program in place that could affect the Soviet perception of the balance of power by the end of the decade. Is that correct? Is that your view?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that it will affect their perceptions of the balance.

Q Isn't that another way of saying that we are on the way toward a measurable degree of nuclear superiority?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I think they may perceive that. It isn't the case. But if they perceive that, it ought to bring them -- or create a bigger interest in reducing the levels of arms.

Q But you don't perceive it as superiority?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. It isn't. Take most any measure that you wish and, if anything, there will be a persistent Soviet edge in many measures.

Q Why don't they perceive it that way then? I mean, how can they be so wrong?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think we could talk a long time about what it takes to establish confidence in the Soviet mind of effective deterrence and their view of American intentions. But, historically, they have believed that it does require a measure of superiority in sheer numbers and power and capability on their side for them to feel secure. We don't operate on that premise; but I think it is true. History bears it out and to the extent that conditions in '79 versus conditions in '89 reflect an

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improvement on our side of the ledger, they, I'm sure, would like to see a less ambitious program.

Q Aren't you counting a few chickens before they're hatched? I mean this situation in Western Europe, within Germany, within England, on the whole issue of the INF talks and the weapons we're presently deploying, is being used clearly by the Soviets over a long period of time as a means of forcing a break. They haven't given that up, they haven't even begun to give it up, and there are signs that they might well be succeeding in some of the things that are happening. So, it isn't quite time yet to be as self-confident, I don't think -- but, how do you react to that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't think I went that far. I said that their policy, thus far, had encouraged some setbacks or reverses. I think that's true. I think the allied cohesion was impressive, too. But I agree with your point. It doesn't mean that they will necessarily change course.

Q Why wouldn't the set of events that you outlined cause the Soviet leadership to decide to redouble their military investments and press even harder on the point that Cord was suggesting in Europe in the months ahead, rather than reversing and having an incentive to negotiate more seriously. It could cut the other way, couldn't it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It could. On the history of their willingness to invest and their ability to put resources there as opposed to elsewhere validates your point. I think that's a very real prospect. I think they will think about it. There are opportunity costs. But I wouldn't pretend that they are so severe as to require that they cut back on defense, I don't think that's true. I think they will consider such things as what has worked in the past for them. That is, in the past they have been able to negotiate with the United States and come to terms on agreements which, by our measure, have been to their advantage. They may feel they can do it again, and that the political downsides of not doing it -- of stonewalling arms control -- are greater than the opportunity costs of what they might gain through arms control.

Q The --

Q Bearing in mind this --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Hank first, then Bill.

Q It is hard for me to believe that the Andropov situation, whatever it is, doesn't make a difference in the ability of the Soviet Union to form coherent policies in response to initiatives from the United States or whatever. Are you confident that you are dealing with a government that, in fact, can make responses to you that mean something for the long term?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, you have to operate on that premise -- being ready to deal with the alternatives of impasse. I think all of us could debate whether or not it's effective or not -- the manifestations of control by Andropov or here and there -- and they seem persuasive to me. Supporters seem to be doing well here and there in regional nominations, which we may consider proforma, but you can kind of evaluate those as a bellwether of how much support he has out in the provinces -- how well the machine's operating.

His level of nominations exceed Breshnev's -- peak. No -- I don't put a lot of importance on that. It is -- doesn't have the appearances right now of a traditional activism and iron grasp by presence and sheer intellectual or physical domination that the predecessors has -- but the effect in day-to-day policy, in the sense of discipline and control, is there.

That's not a very good answer. It's the best one we have. Yes. We operate on the principle that he's in control.

Q I understood --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Excuse me, Bill, you're next --

Q Bearing in mind that we're constrained from reporting from this meeting until Friday, a rather important discussion has gone on today in Stockholm. Could you at least, in general terms, characterize whether the momentum -- the tentative momentum -- that had been started prior to the KAL incident appears now to be moving forward again, or whether there has -- there's no apparent reason to believe that it will move forward again on the basis of this discussion in Stockholm between Shultz and Gromyko?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the short answer is that the reporting cable is not in yet. The only thing that we have written down is the Gromyko speech. Tough speech. And I couldn't say that it provides evidence of instant accommodation, by any means.

For the reasons that I mentioned earlier, and I won't go back over them, I think that it's probably -- looking at the way the Soviet system operates in the face of these past events as well as this speech -- unrealistic to expect that the real reaction is going to come in a day, or two, or a week. I think that the reality of the Soviet response -- that is, the actions and their engagement or disengagement or nonengagement, will be the real answer and that will play out over the course of the next weeks.

In short, it's too soon to tell.

Q Aren't they undercutting their European position, sir, if they react the way you hope -- the way you say you hope they'll react, which is positively. Aren't they undercutting the whole buildup of this anti-U.S. propaganda camp ign in Europe -- Western Europe?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it would substantially undercut it, yes, for them to --

Q That would be an extraordinary -- that would be a large defeat -- for the European policy, would it not?

Q Would undercut it for them to what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think many within would view it that way.

Q For them to accede to our request to come back to negotiations, since they want to intimidate Europe, is that the point?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

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Q It would undercut it for them to return to the talks, is that all you're saying?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Well, insofar as they want to also appear the party of peace, why wouldn't it advance their cause to be -- in other words, they're -- they have a double-track strategy, don't they? I mean, they want to appear the party of peace, and they also want to intimidate -- and they play one and then they play the other. I don't understand why it would necessarily undercut them to show some signs of accommodation.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, what I said was, that I think that it would appear to those within that it was undercutting their strategy. Now, there will be those within -- I guess I couldn't pretend that they are prevailing right now -- who would say that they can have it both ways. That they can return to a -- call it a "detentist policy" if you will -- and make real gains, in terms of restraining U.S. programs without great loss, and indeed preserving what they've had in the -- well, the image of conciliator or peacemaker -- with our allies. We hope that's the case.

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Q Do you think that there's any possibility that they would view the Reagan speech as a sign of desperation on the President's part either because the Alliance appears shaky or because we're entering a campaign season when his opponents are using the peace issue against him and, therefore, this would somehow encourage them to continue with the policy that they've been on?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think so. And the reason I don't is because I believe that the Soviet -- the America watchers in the Soviet Union have begun to put together some realism about Ronald Reagan, and deriving as much from their observation of his -- the way he makes decisions domestically and in foreign terms, that is, his bent toward deliberation, persistence and tenaciousness once he has taken a position and that this decision and proposal is not something that is based upon expediency. It is a matter of conviction with him, and his decisions in general have been decisions of conviction that he hasn't altered.

Q Is there something else necessary in the mixture? It's been said that there should be no American concessions just to get the Russians back to the arms talks. And you've laid out what is the administration's logic as to how the Russians ought to see this thing and what their interests ought to be. There are a lot of people who believe the Russians will read it differently and react differently and that will read it as a challenge rather than something that's in their interest. But, nevertheless, is there not needed something that will sort of break the ice? In other words, not rely solely on Soviet logic becoming parallel to ours?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would acknowledge and concur in your assertion that we don't believe it would be sensible, prudent, wise to come up with new concessions to induce the Soviets back to the talks, that we do feel that way. The fact is that we have gained some knowledge of the Soviet model in START and INF and other talks and the degree of tenacity with which they hold certain of their stated objectives. Their approach in SALT II is well known. It's essentially replicated again in the five rounds of START. And they haven't really changed very much.

But by this time we can see some commonality between our interests -- well, not our interests -- in our approach and theirs through which our common objectives could be achieved. And that requires some discourse and -- In fact, Ed Rowny at the close of the last session made pretty clear that having looked for five rounds at their framework, that we have real problems with it, that we have our own framework, but that the outcomes under ours and theirs aren't mutually exclusive and that there could be trade-offs in the areas between where we hold an advantage and where they hold an advantage. But, he said, "Let's get busy talking about it." Then, the Soviets walked away from the talks. And, yet, they know that.

And, so, the knowledge of that is Moscow's part of the calculus. And in short, in coming back, they're coming back to a forum in which there is flexibility. The President's made that clear from going back years.

Q Can you say why the President thought that the Soviet military were somewhat off the reservation? And, secondly, if that's true, how do you think that will affect their response to his speech? In other words, will there be a greater or lesser chance that they will make overtures then?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President hasn't concluded that.

Q I'm sorry. I'm thinking of the Time magazine interview.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: To ask the question is a [illegible] question to ask in the wake of the KAL situation.

That's different from concluding that they are now operating autonomously. And he doesn't think that they are. But if you concede that they have a greater influence, I think you have to acknowledge that they also have a considerable interest in putting some restraints on U.S. systems. They more than anyone. And so if they have greater influence, it may be in a direction that has some promise.

The difference has got to be that this time around we don't come out with an outcome in which they have an advantage.

Q Is there anything that they could do, though, that would stop us, say, from the space-based defense system?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You imply that that's a matter of deployment in the short term, and it isn't. And they know that. And they also operate from knowledge of their programs which are very far advanced, well beyond ours. And the President hasn't made clear his decisions, but I think there's an emerging misreading of what his decisions, what his intention is. His motive for the program, and I guess that's really not your question, is to see whether we cannot find out what emerging technologies hold some promise. Now, that's going to take a long, long time.

And a responsible R&D program is the sensible thing to do. And I'm confident that's what the President is going to do. But I don't think that the Soviets attach that degree of importance to it in the short term. It is for them, probably, a leading propaganda instrument or target. But it's unfounded.

Q You're talking about deterrent modernization being in place at the end of the decade which is also long term -- six years from now. The space thing is another five or six years beyond that. They have a great respect for our research and development. And we have put them on notice that if our research and development is successful, as they've got ample reason to suspect it will be because we've been so successful in the past, we are going to proceed with something that is a totally new arms race. Is there anything that they could do that would stop us from doing that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You're kind of putting words in our mouth. Again, the President's motive was to see whether greater reliance on defensive systems wouldn't lead to greater stability. Now, it isn't out of the question that the Soviet Union may reach the same conclusion. Before any deployment decision were even possible -- and you're right, that wouldn't even be possible until late in the decade -- the suggestion that the President's beginning on this course reflects a commitment to maintaining offensive deterrence as well as defensive systems is just not right.

I mean, he's very conscious of the several pitfalls of that kind of deployment decision as well as the implications for NATO and defense of our allies and the appearance of first strike and very conscious of the Congressional realities as well. So, the possibilities, the inducements really, the incentives for arms control are, I think, very significant.

I think the Russians, for the reasons you point out, would agree. I mean, they do understand our R&D and our technology, and I think the incentives it holds for better arms control are very solid.

Q Sir --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Owen.

Q -- could I switch to the charge of non-compliance for a moment? Is it your theory that the Soviets have engaged in non-compliance because they think the risk of discovery is much less than the advantage to be gained, the strategic advantage to be gained by getting a jump on the United States or that the risk of discovery, really react? And, third, how will the United States react to these rather precise charges? How can we react aside from hearing the Soviets deny the allegations? Could you address those three things very briefly?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't speak for the Soviet Union. I think the motives for their conduct are

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probably a combination of the first and the second expectation on their part. Whatever risks there may be, they don't equate to the gains that are there or potentially there, and that even if we do discover that the ability to make a defensible case on their side and perhaps persuade enough allies to carry the day, both play a part.

The ways in which you can -- first of all, the purposes of doing what we have done are to make clear the record so that the public the Congress, the Allies, and everyone else, and the Soviet Union know just what we know, understands the problem of getting an agreement in which one can have some confidence that you are better off and is more alert to the risks. It is to as well learn and thereby do better and it is to find out where things in existing treaties appear not to be tight enough, so that you can make them tighter.

There are several things kind of generically that you can do in the wake of it. On the one hand, you can surely try for better verification, more effective verification, in the future where you have had problems in the past. It probably also leads you toward thinking about simpler agreements. We have taken an approach in the past where we've gone to great details, annexes and appendixes and understandings and so forth, to deal with very arcane, esoteric things which, in the end, are subjects of very broad interpretation and, on the other hand, it may well be, and we are concluding this, I think are moving toward this conclusion after this effort, that you might be better off just to go for simpler kinds of agreements or aggregate levels and that kind of thing.

Q Let me just follow that up, if I may. You said verification, but isn't the problem not so much verification as compliance, number one and, number two, what do you do about that radar? Do we say okay, you have built -- and we're going to do the same thing, or do we say get rid of it within a certain specified time limit or prove to us you're not using it for that purpose or we'll consider the ABM a non-treaty? How do we handle that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, further to what I said before, one area where you need to apply the lessons is in better verification -- I'll get to compliance in a minute. Another area is to see what the effect of whatever they gained is on the balance. If these activities give the military an advantage you can cope with it by military programs. Are we in a position now where things that have already happened require new programs? And, finally, you take action in your arms control policy, that is, you apply these lessons and either take a different approach, perhaps to simpler agreements, but in arms control you can also, in the context of compliance with existing agreements, take the matter up in the forum established in Geneva and SEC as well as in your diplomacy, whether by the Secretary or the President, or the other channels that we have.

But each of these areas have been examined and conclusions reached for the kinds of things you ought to do, verification-wise, militarily, and in your arms control policy. And there's also an agenda that the President has directed be studied for the longer term in each of these areas. Looking at technologies coming along in the nineties, what do we need to do now to assure adequate verification and military programs to preserve the balance and what need we do now to assure that we can preserve the arms control process?

Q What are some of those conclusions? Can you say?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Can I ask you how far -- go ahead, finish --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I didn't mean to be flip.

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There are specific things that you can do to improve your ability to verify and they involve technical improvements that have been marginal in the past but now seem justified. I wouldn't lead you toward assuming they're grandiose requirements or programs, because they're not, but they represent some gain.

In terms of major new missile programs or other offensive systems that are justified by the compliance record, there's not a persuasive case to justify major new programs and I wouldn't look for any. But there are, and the record in each of these areas and probably others to follow is very persuasive that we've got a tough agenda in the SEC and we ought to pursue it with some considerable vigor in the weeks and months ahead when they reconvene. Excuse me.

Q I just wanted to ask how far are they with this radar and various other things they've done from reaching some point that we would conclude that they had seriously violated the ABM treaty? What would they have to do short of actually having such a system in place before the United States government would say, okay, that's enough, we get out of it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The violation problem on the ABM treaty, as it involves the radar, is a matter of improved coverage that they have for the detection of incoming ballistic missiles but, as well, a battle-management capability, and it's the latter element which is most worrisome to me, at any rate.

Now, having a radar which could help you in battle management, to the extent that it reflects a turn of mind and better readiness for management, is worrisome but it is not ipso facto the bottom line in threat terms. What is worrisome in a threat sense is the possibility that their anti-ballistic missile systems, their surface-to-air missiles if they were developed to a point where they could rapidly deploy many and defeat any possible U.S. response, that would be terribly worrisome. We are not at that condition today and, by most estimates, while we don't know exactly what the pace is, it's probably three to five years away.

Q Where is it in this country?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Further.

Q How far?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, there is no --

Q If you went full speed ahead, what would it take?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, to give you a precise answer on that really would imply a decision to proceed on that course, which we have not taken.

Q No, I don't mean that -- just a general -- what would the years be? Are you talking six to ten years?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, engineers would probably give you something on that scale. I believe that -- well, I wouldn't count anymore on it.

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Q Are you talking about upgrading as it develops? What are you talking about when you say, "use the radar for battle management"? What kind of system? A surface-to-air missiles that are already in place -- the 12s?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not already, but with systems and development which, if proliferated, would give them -- and with which could be, theoretically, easily proliferated, give them a very effective ABM system well beyond the limits of the ABM treaty.

Q Nationwide?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Or at least to cover enough of their military forces so it would be a very substantial threat.

Q I'm not sure what you mean by -- what is it that's three to five years away?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, when their own R and D efforts mature to a point that they could have confidence in their performance and thus, go to deployment. But they are not at that point. And I don't think, given our estimate of their pace, probably couldn't be for another three to five years.

Q You've twice referred to similar agreements. You're not telling us anything, are you? I mean, Rowny originally described his proposal as a simple proposal. It became more and more complex as time went by. Are you thinking of going back to a simple aggregates proposal -- the Vladivostok model, or something?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it hasn't translated to that point yet, Charlie. This is a conclusion based upon an examination of compliance and verification. And as a kind of an academic exercise, it leads you to an academic conclusion. Now, you're going to translate that conclusion to your policy. We haven't done that but I don't know -- I'm really reflecting kind of personal judgments that this is what it tells me.

Q You mentioned the Middle East in your initial remarks Are you willing to discuss that at all? I'm just wondering where you would go from here.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The history of the past months in the Middle East is both frustrating and promising. I don't mean to be cute. Specifically, there hasn't been a security plan implemented and there hasn't been a Geneva II, and so it's frustrating.

The discourse between the factions in Lebanon has matured. And that's important to talk about it. That's a flaky term when you're talking about Lebanese politics, but there has developed in some, not all, of the exchanges between the government and each of the NSF members a better understanding of what each wants and a more sober absorption by the government, I think, of the imperative of accommodation. Now, that's important.

The security plan right now is in a stage where the two sides are chipping at the margins to try to get more from it -- the Druze, specifically -- than its basic terms contain. A testing of wills there. And it's frustrating, but I don't think that it's out of the question. In fact, I think there's still the real prospect that it will be implemented.

With regard to the possibilities for some movement of the foreign forces, I think that Israel, which has said always that their central concern is for security on the northern border, is gaini

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confidence that the Lebanese, which has expanded, three additional brigades this month, another one by April, to have greater confidence that that army can take care of the problem. Perhaps, their concerns have been influenced by the fact that more PLO have departed, too.

And so, when you look at the whole picture with the PLO leaving -- or having left -- the government having absorbed and in its statements to the opposition that it does want compromise, and beginning to talk privately, but specifically, about what do we mean by reconciliation? What does it mean in terms of Cabinet portfolios? What does it mean in terms of decentralized control over civil functions in the Shuf and other areas? What does it mean in terms of what the Shiite and the Druze get from the economic pie and programs in the future, reconstruction?

Those are incentives. Syria has, as it has had, the incentive of getting Israel out. The opposing Lebanese faction leaders have as incentives getting the country back.

I think that the President looks to Don's report when he gets back -- and I expect he'll be back this weekend -- as an important threshold for us to see what we need to do to put it over the top, to get some significant movement. And with some momentum, achieve a stable outcome.

Q You rule out, sir, any official change in this government's position, of any kind, in the May 17th agreement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Our position on that, really, has been stated, and I'm not going to change it today.

Q You do rule out any official change?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am reaffirming our policy.

Q A couple of months ago in this room, I believe I heard a suggestion that the Marines might move south out of the airport and expand into regions along the coast and perhaps engage in civic action projects. Is that still a possibility?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think an important new element since last we talked is that quite a lot has been done, first, analytically, to look at those alternative dispositions, and secondly, to invest in reducing the vulnerability at the airport.

And I don't know if you've been over there, but it is impressive. They have done quite a lot. And by the accounts of military as well as congressmen and others, it is, orders of magnitude safer from the kinds of threats that occurred in October. Not to say that they are not still vulnerable to small unit actions and individual losses, and that is, unfortunately, still the case.

Q Back on the U.S.-Soviet relationship. I wonder if you could tell us whether you think, looking back, there was any possibility that the KAL shootdown was, in fact, an accident in one term or another? That is, that the highest levels did not know that they were shooting down an airliner. And that question leads to the question of whether we over-reacted rhetorically, and to the further question of whether rhetoric has a negative impact on the U.S.-Soviet relationship?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On the first point, I think that it would be wrong to describe a term of "accidental" in any sense to the KAL shootdown. We say that because we don't believe well, we do believe that those levels of command and decision who did have a role to play and who were involved were levels that at least we expect and believe must reflect a maturity and judgment that would foreclose this kind of thing. And that gobbledygook means that the -- if, indeed, this were a decision by military regional commanders of the Far East military district, that we expect and believe that that level of command, first, ought not have that autonomy and, secondly, should possess a level of maturity and political judgment that would have foreclosed this kind of thing. So, no, we don't think it was accidental.

Q Do you think that they knew they were shooting down a 747? Whoever made the decision to shoot knew he was firing at a 747?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q What about the rhetoric business now? I mean, our rhetoric in that case, and the President's rhetoric in many speeches has been quite harsh and direct and quite in contrast to the rhetoric in this speech, and I just wondered whether -- do you think that rhetoric means anything in the relationship, or has any effect?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, I do. I think it is important. I say that probably in different terms than most people would. Specifically I think that to the Soviet leaders, who ultimately are the ones whose decisions we're seeking to influence, to be passive and to ignore realities of behavior and of common practice that are abhorrent is to send a signal to them. They take the measure of the person and even though the person, the President, will encounter some considerable criticism because it is not in the nature of Western people generally to be bellicose or shrill, that it can have an effect.

Now I would have to admit, and I would agree, yes, with your point, and that is that probably more important, surely more important, in shaping their decisions is the correlation of forces, to use their term. But it isn't, if they ignore and if one kind of concedes to them the field of rhetoric, it is to tell them something about yourself. Now once you establish your position and the lines are drawn and they know whether you can sustain your policy and whether you can get a stable balance preserved in a programmatic sense, and after they have heard your view of their policies, it is probably constructive and useful to deal seriously both ways and to eliminate the level of sharpness and so forth, so that in itself, as you are improving the relationship, doesn't become an aversion.

Q Historically, where would you point in the history of Soviet-American relationships to any kind of correlation of forces similar to those which now exist and which you describe which have led fairly quickly -- by quickly I mean even 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 months -- to the kinds of agreements and a working relationship that you're talking about?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't think there is a good analogy. The President pointedly used the Kennedy quote, expecting that it would be acknowledged in its historical setting; that is, Cuban missile crisis, the Kennedy speech, and then some renewed accommodation, the test-ban treaty. However, we have to acknowledge that at that point the correlation of forces was substantially in our favor --

Q And a test of strength and a test of will and a showdown. That's the reason I asked the question. Its the only potential historical parallel and I'm just wondering whether or not the lesson has got to carry itself one step further in order for the point to be made.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think it does, because the President didn't imply that he was looking for a test of wills at all. Indeed he is not. He was simply saying that from his perspective his commitment to try to solve problems now was as sincere as it was on earlier occasions, but we don't ignore that that is only part of the problem.

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Q Let me go back to the first question. It also is regarded by many specialists as the period that triggered the Soviet decisions to make the enormous military build-up that the Soviets embarked on from 1963 onward, even though there was a partial test-ban treaty. Are we faced with the same kind of dynamic again?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The causal relationship was not the Kennedy speech; it was the crisis. That goes to the earlier point made and that may well happen, that dating from '81 the modernization program may only lead to another expansion of their investment. We'll see.

Q One last question for --

Q Who are these American watchers in the Soviet Union of whom you say that they are starting to get more realistic about Ronald Reagan and to understand his bent towards deliberation and his tenaciousness? Who are these people?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS: Well, I say that rhetorically and it's surely arguable. And that's the way I said it. It seems to me possible that they may reflect on how he has made other decisions and whether he has wavered after the fact. I guess my point really was just to say that Reagan -- that they may have concluded that Reagan makes decisions based upon things he really wants to do and not as a matter of expediency.

Q May I ask this procedural question? When a speech like this is made by the President, is there anybody in the government that you run it past to predict the likely Soviet response?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Who?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Secretary of State. The speech, though, is looked at by the President's Cabinet officers, Bill Casey and Cap. I also shared it with some colleagues. But, of course.

Q I'm thinking of a Marshall Shulman type who would say, based on their past responses to past speeches --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We did not run it by Marshall Shulman. (Laughter.)

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 3:27 P.M. EST

II-235

Unedited

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ON-THE-RECORD BRIEFING
ON
LORTON PAPERS

ROBERT E. LAMB, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR ADMINISTRATION
TUESDAY, JANUARY 24, 1984, 3:00 P.M.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY LAMB: Thank you very much. I think you all have the Executive Summary for the inspection report on this, and so I would be happy to take questions.

Q Could you put it in plain, simple English for us, sir, how these documents got out of the State Department and into a prison? It's not in plain, simple English here.

A Yes, sir, I'll try. In mid July the Office of Intelligence and Research was involved in a microfilming project reducing their files. As a part of that project, they were able to release nine file cabinets. Seven of these went to the State Department warehouse in New England, and subsequently some of these seven were included in a shipment of sixteen file cabinets declared as excess property. It went to Lorton.

In one of these file cabinets, one of the sixteen, there was two cubic feet of classified material.

That's one file drawer. This material was then discovered on October 25 by the Lorton officials. We were informed on that date and picked it up and brought it back to the Department.

We subsequently learned on November 8 that we had not gotten all of the classified material; about 30 pages -- I've forgotten whether it's 31 or 32 -- that was given to us at that time by a reporter from Metromedia News.

Q Mr. Secretary, can you tell the American people at this time with certainty that, Number 1, the national security of the United States has not in anyway been put in jeopardy by this release of classified information to a prison; and that (2) you have a full accounting of all the top secret documents?

A We have conducted a very thorough investigation of the documents. The FBI and the Lorton officials have searched the Lorton facility. We had no indication that we have not gotten all of those documents back.

We are conducting a damage assessment with other elements of the intelligence community on whether there was any damage to our national security or not.

Obviously, the release of classified information to a prison is not something that we're very happy about, but we have no indication now that there was any damage to our national security as a result of this.

Q Mr. Secretary, to follow, are you telling us right now that you really don't know if you have all the documents back in custody?

A I would rather put that in a different way because there's no indication that we have not. We've inventoried all of these documents in INR, and there's no indication whatsoever that we did not get all of those documents back.

Q But one of the prisoners had access to a Xerox machine; right?

A Yes, sir. There's Xerox machines and there were prisoners that have access to it.

Q So you don't know if they were duplicated?

A No, sir, we do not.

Q Let's mix in the memory typewriters, Mr. Secretary, and see what could have been produced from their memory banks, whether partial or whole pieces of data. What did you find?

A Let me just give you a little bit of background on that. We sent a shipment -- again, a part of this excess property disposal program, that we sent a number of memory typewriters to Lorton. We found that in these typewriters there was an auxiliary memory that had not been adequately cleared and under laboratory conditions I understand the FBI was able to identify classified data on a couple, possibly three of these machines.

Q How many machines were there?

A There were five machines all together.

Q Do you know if they had been tapped or whether the material had been extracted? Did it show up in the documents you retrieved?

A It doesn't appear that they were. Let me tell you something that I think is important here. The State Department is responsible for the investigation in this building. The FBI assumes jurisdiction for the investigation at Lorton of those kinds of issues. We've worked very closely with the FBI on this but we do not have the FBI's final report.

Q You have two very serious breaches of internal security here. First, how many individuals are involved; what are the range of disciplinary actions, and what is your general thought and characterization of how this could happen in two different instances; have there been more?

A I have a little bit of trouble in saying how many -- answering your specific question about how many people were involved. But let me say that there is a range of disciplinary action. This runs everywhere from the reprimand to an individual employee to dismissal with combinations of things in between.

Subsequent to this report, the Office of the Inspector General sent information to our Director General, and that's the office that is in charge of Personnel and it's in charge of disciplinary action, with information that is pertinent to the disciplining of some employees.

Q How many, perhaps; how many individuals? I know you can't give names but how many people?

A Three individuals.

Q What was the recommendation?

A I really can't speak. You can understand that this is now with the Director General, for the Director General's consideration, and I really can't speak to the question of recommendations or anything that might prejudice the rights of these particular employees.

Q You can't give us names, then?

A I cannot give you names; no, sir.

Q Can you tell us whether these people are still working at the same job?

A Yes, sir, they are.

Q They're working at the same job?

A These people are working still here in the Department. But let me say that we have taken a number of steps in INR to tighten procedures so that something like this doesn't happen again.

Q Can you explain what those recommendations are to tighten the procedures so that it won't happen again?

A Let me tell you sort of the areas generally. If that's not specific enough, I'll come back at it again for you.

There were several areas where we have addressed it. It goes beyond these three or other employees. These are the things that we've tried to do Department-wide.

We have tightened our system of unit security officers. We have tightened our procedures for the disposal of property and the accountability of property, and we've introduced a better training program for the unit security officers.

Q Can you give us the ranks of the three individuals and whether they're Foreign Service or General Schedule?

A No, sir. I cannot.

Q Why can't you?

A I don't know.--

Q You just don't know what their --

A I don't know that information.

Q But we have been given a summary, a so-called "executive summary" of this report. Are we going to be given the report?

A Let me be quite honest with you on this. That causes us some difficulty. We've tried to do a very thorough report, we've tried to do a complete report, and I certainly don't want it to appear that we're hiding anything in this. But we are -- there are -- in the report we deal with the question of possible cupability of individual employees, we deal with the types of material that were -- that was involved, and these are things that we obviously have an obligation to protect. And there's also this question of the FBI investigation under way, and one of the things that they're looking at is whether this is criminal prosecution, and I think that we have to be very careful that we don't do anything that would undermine their efforts.

Q Excuse me. Are you saying that the executive summary, then, is not complete in some way, that it would have to be classified if you gave us a total summary?

A   I don't know what a "total summary" is. This is a summary of the --

Q   Well, a summary that would cover these sensitive areas you're talking about.

A   This is intended to be, and as far as I know it is, a summary -- this is a summary of the entire report. We have not tried to hide any of the facts in it.

Q   Could you tell us, please -- that you said earlier -- I think you said earlier that there was now under way a damage assessment with the intelligence community? Is that right?

A   Yes, sir.

Q   What does that mean exactly? Which communities, and what do you mean by a "damage assessment"? Do you mean sources and other countries might have been affected negatively?

A   That's one of the things that this particular assessment looks at. Now, there's certainly no indication that that's happened. The damage assessment is done whenever there is a possible compromise of any -- a compromise or any possible compromise of a classified document. This is conducted by the agencies that have an interest in the document, or the information contained in the document, and it's an effort to go through the document and find out what damage might have happened through the incident, where it might have -- this information might have gone, and, if the information got to those places, what damage does this do to our national interest. Is that clear?

Q Well, let me just follow that, then. If the information that you're looking into contained foreign sources, names, information passed on by foreign sources, do you know at this point whether foreign sources of information have dried up as a result of this kind of hemorrhaging?

A This would be the kind of thing that the damage assessment would look at. But let me say as far as I know right now, there's no indication that that happened.

Q It's quite possible there's no harm at all?

Q Could I ask you, quite apart from the Administrative information which you've given here about how the material was transferred to Lorton and so on, could you go into a little bit of an explanation of why the Department did not take any action until October 25th? Why it did not act on additional information or make an additional search on that other information until September 8th when a reporter ended up with this stuff? And why it wasn't until Secretary Shultz was enroute to Asia and had to be sort of stopped, called aside, and given the information in Alaska after a week and a half or perhaps more had gone by when this security breach was known by the Department? How did that happen?

A We learned about this on October 25. On October 25 we thought that we had gotten all of the information back from Lorton. We had at that point instituted a damage assessment and an investigation. It was not, however, until November 8 that we had any information that all of the documents were not back. It was on November 8 that we then knew of the magnitude of the problem, and it was at that time that we informed the Secretary.

Now, it's a little dramatic to say he was stopped and pulled aside. It was true that he was notified at Elmendorf Air Force Base on his way to Asia.

Q But most of the material, the vast bulk of the classified material, highly classified material, was known to the Department on October 25. Wasn't the Secretary of State told that some of his most sensitive papers had been in a prison in Northern Virginia?

Why wasn't he told before it got into the hands of a reporter and was published?

A At that time the people responsible wanted to get the information about the incident, and it really did not seem to be -- at that point it looked like all of the information had come back, and it looked like it was something that we could deal with within the security and intelligence communities in terms of finding out what had happened and making sure that it didn't happen again.

Q Wouldn't it be a more realistic conclusion to simply draw the conclusion that at lower levels of the bureaucracy everybody was embarrassed that this could happen, and they were hoping to keep Shultz from finding out about it?

A Oh, absolutely not. That's not true at all. I think we were all embarrassed about it. I think the entire Department was embarrassed about it. But that was not the reason that the Secretary was not informed.

Q Could I ask about those 31 or 32 documents? What precisely were they?

A Okay. Just to clarify that, that was 31 of 32 pages. That was one copy of the Secretary's morning summary for March 23.

Q And that's all?

A That's all.

Q You mentioned that the report looks into the question of criminal prosecution. Criminal prosecution against whom, and is that still a possibility?

A Yes. It's a possibility. This is what the -- and I must say, I can't really speak for that, because this is something -- a determination has to be made by the Justice Department based on the FBI investigation. That would be -- it would be prosecution under 18 U.S. Code 793.

Q Is that against those three individuals that you mentioned before?

A I really can't speak to that, because this is part of the FBI investigation which I really do not know. I just can't say.

Q Mr. Secretary, presumably some of these classified documents were read by convicted felons in Lorton. Is there any process by which they can be prevented from passing on whatever they picked up?

A There is no indication right now that there was widely -- that these documents were widely read by anyone at Lorton or anywhere else outside of the Department. But we -- again, this question of what damage was done, who could have read it, and to whom they could have passed the information is subject to the damage assessment.

Q Mr. Secretary, how can you be confident at all that you have a handle on how many documents really were there, since we were told at the outset that quite a number of these documents were handwritten pieces of paper which were on their way to being Microfiched when they were taken out of the building? How do you know?

A It's not my understanding that a significant part of these classified documents were handwritten documents. That's something that's entirely new to me. These were documents that were kept in a chronological sequence. It was a fixed block of documents such that it was fairly easy for us to inventory in relative terms, and it's fairly easy for us to determine the completeness of the documents.

Q Mr. Secretary, it says here that no further search for documents was routinely accomplished once the property left the office disposing of it.

Why did the search end at that time? Was it assumed that they were lost in this disposal of excess property? Why did the person know to stop searching at that point?

A Oh, I think that -- I would have to go back and read that, but I think what they're saying there, that within the warehouse itself there was no search of the equipment -- of the files that were being sent out, and I think they're pointing to that as a lapse in our own procedures.

(Continued on next page)

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Q My recollection was that during the full search of Lorton -- after -- another, much older document turned up.

A That's correct.

Q That's not listed here, though. That's not mentioned here in your summary.

A It happened, and certainly, there was no intent on our part to hide that. I don't recall whether it's mentioned there, but this did happen. This is somthing that we're working with the FBI on, to determine how it happened, and again, this is something that would be a subject of the damage assessment. But there was one document that was found at Lorton that appeared to have gone to Lorton prior to this shipment.

Q And my recollection was that it was a Berlin paper of 1961 or something like that.

A I don't, frankly, know that. I'd be afraid to go on the record with the subject of that because I'm just not sure. I have not seen the document; but it is my understanding that it dates from 1959.

Q Did evidence come forward to suggest that this was an isolated incident -- the two incidents, the earlier paper and this set of papers?

A This shipment to Lorton was a unique incident. I think that we've gotten out of this, though, a very -- I think we've gotten some rather positive lessons that we've learned out of it. I think we've found an instance here of a laxity in our procedures and some places where some of our employees were not doing all of the things they could to check this document on the security side. We have not found any indication of widespread laxity, however.

Q Do I understand that there were three cases, a typewriter case, the 1959 document, and the shipment of the drawer full of papers?

A That's correct.

Q Can you be sure there were no more?

A We found internally that there was also a shipment from INR that was transferred from one office of INR to another, again, as part of this microfilming project. There was no compromise of the classified material because it went from one office to another where the people were cleared to handle it.

Q How did you find out about the typewriters? That's not clear in any of this.

A My understanding is that when these arrived at Lorton, were set up at Lorton, and started to operate, that information was called up out of the auxiliary memories. I don't know whether it was classified information that was called up there or not. Again, this is something that will come out, we hope, in the FBI report. But it was when we found out that there was some information there -- this was within days of the discovery of the other material-- we were so sensitive to this that we just pulled all the typewriters back and sent them through a laboratory check.

Q Mr. Secretary, you were talking about three individuals, and you were talking about disciplinary action and procedural changes, and so on. But there is a head of Security, there is a head of Management, there is a head of Administration in this building. If the procedures were not right to begin with, are any of those higher-up officials going to suffer disciplinary action or suffer in any way for this breach of security? Or is it going to be limited to three, perhaps fairly low-level employees who perhaps were involved in carting the cabinets to Lorton --

Q -- whose rank you can't give us today?

A I'll tell you I'm suffering now, if that's any compensation. (Laughter) I think this is very interesting; it's a philosophical question here as to what extent. I think it is clear that we have to tighten up our procedures, and we've taken steps to do that.

Q How about discipline, though? That's what the question was all about. Are any of the management responsible

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for (1) procedures and (2) presumably policing what personnel are doing, are they going to be disciplined in any way?

A Let me say that I'm not sure to what extent anybody is going to be disciplined in this process. Recommendations for discipline have to be considered. All of these employees have their rights and the opportunity to present their own defenses. And at this point, the question of discipline is very much an open questio- -- it has not been resolved.

Q For the higher-level officials as well as the lower-level officials -- unresolved?

A I think the whole question of discipline is an open question that's never --

Yes.

Q Mr. Secretary, could you give us an example of how there could be damage to the U.S. national security as a result of these developments?

A That really gets difficult. I couldn't speculate on the possible ways that that could have happened.

Q Well, could you characterize the degree of sensitivity of these documents for us?

A Yes. I think we would characterize these as sensitive documents.

Q The highest sensitivity?

A I'm not sure what that means. These were sensitive documents.

Q Sir, you were not fully responsive to Mr. Begleiter's question. You only mentioned three -- you used the specific number of three persons who were up for some kind of disciplinary proceedings -- maybe. These, we assume, are not senior persons in any way. Is that correct? At the level of top management?

A Senior persons -- oh, level of top management. I don't know who these people are, but it's my understanding that they are not top management in that context, no.

Q You would know if they were Ron Spire or if they were Robert Lamb or if they were Larry Eagleburger, or any of those who have administrative responsibilities in the Department, wouldn't you?

A I would not. But I have not been informed that it is Robert Lamb.

Q Mr. Secretary, the point is that if this were a business community and there had been a massive fowl-up, and industrial secrets had been disbursed, top management would be chopped.

A O.K. I'm not sure. Let me quite honest with you on this. I'm not sure to what extent you could lay the blame in this particular instance on top management. These were cases where the procedures were there, the mechanisms were there, and these procedures were not followed by individual employees. Now, we would look to management if there were some bigger question of, maybe that these procedures were not there, that the security measures were not there. That is not what happened in this case. That's not what happened at all.

Q How long ago was the last full review of the efficacy of these procedures by top management?

A Oh, I think that's a continuing process.

Q Well, then, management, in fact, then had its oar in, at least philosophically?

A Absolutely. Management in this case -- and let me say that if we came up with the fact that these security procedures were, in fact, inadequate, that this was the kind of thing that would be a recurring event, then I think that we would look different places. But the security procedures were right there.

Q Mr. Secretary, are you saying, in a word, that this all happened because of carelessness by three, perhaps more, State Department employees, that it was just carelessness, sloppiness, not following procedures? Do you have any reason at all to believe anything else about anybody involved?

If you had to put it in a word, what would you say caused it -- carelessness, sloppiness?

A Yes, I think we have to attribute this to sloppiness. There's no question.

Q What did specifically happen? Was someone supposed to check every file drawer, and he didn't do it -- some one person was supposed to do that, and he didn't do it? What specifically happened to cause this?

A There was a system of checks and double checks on files, on the disposition of classified material that did not occur.

Q Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

(The briefing concluded at 3:30 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
LAND REFORM IN EL SALVADOR

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 25, 1984, 3:30 P.M.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: The Department has issued a report today. The Secretary of State signed the certification required by the Second Continuing Resolution for Fiscal Year 1984 stating that the Government of El Salvador has not taken any action which would alter, suspend, or terminate the land reform program as prescribed for Phases I and III in 1980, in a manner that would be detrimental to the rights of the beneficiaries, or potential beneficiaries, and also that the Government of El Salvador continues to make documented progress in implementing the land reform program.

This is a subject that has been of considerable public interest in the past, and we thought that we would offer this backgrounder for you this afternoon coincident with the issuance of the report and the Secretary's certification to the Congress.

At the time that the Continuing Resolution was adopted late last year, the Government of El Salvador had not completed action on its Constitution, and there was considerable concern that something might be done in the process of writing the new

Constitution that would impair the land reform program as it had been in effect, or reverse it, and that, I'm sure, is the motivation that caused Congress to call for this certification, as a measure or expression of its concern about the future of that program and its importance from the standpoint of U.S. policy.

The facts have evolved in a manner that have enabled the Secretary to make the certification that the standards set by Congress have been met, and indeed, some additional things have happened that are noteworthy in the area warranting a more complete report on this subject.

Basically, in the Salvadoran Constitution as finally adopted in December 1983, the existing Phases I and III are preserved with the right of land ownership, including by cooperatives, specifically recognized, and the prior expropriation and compensation schemes set up in those land reform decrees reaffirmed.

Beyond that, though, the new Constitution finally establishes a maximum ceiling on the land that any one individual can own, of 245 hectares, or a little over 600 acres. This brings an end to the uncertainty that had existed about the unimplemented Phase II of the program. The Phase I which had been implemented back in 1980, simply took away those amounts of property held by any individual that exceeded 500 acres, the very largest estates, and made those available to cooperatives. 426 properties were affected, and 317 cooperatives were formed, taking about 15 percent of the agrarian land and benefitting almost 190,000 people, including the families.

That was pretty much implemented in 1980 as far as the land transfer was concerned, and from there on it has been a matter of management, financing, planting, and crop yields by the cooperatives working with the government agency responsible for helping them make these endeavors work.

Phase III, the "Land to the Tiller" program, which is the most sweeping measure, was not self-executing in the same way. It requires an application by an individual tenant or sharecropper to a claim to the land that he is renting or share-cropping as of May 1980, with a maximum claim of 7 hectares, or a little over 17 acres permitted. The "Land to the Tiller" program, Phase III, was due to expire in 1981. It has been extended three times, most recently by the Legislative Assembly after the Constitution was adopted so that applications can continue to be filed under that program by tenants and share-croppers until June 30, 1984. To date, there have been about 60,000 claimants of a potential of somewhat under 120,000. 53 percent of those eligible have, in fact, filed claims; and somewhere in excess of 364,000 beneficiaries of this "Land to

Tiller" program, including the families.

The standards, then, for finding that the government has not suspended or terminated the program are clearly met by the new Constitution, and in addition, Phase II which had been deferred for so long affecting the middle-size farms, is now in a position to move forward with the new limit on individual land ownership set by the Constitution. This ends an uncertainty for those owners of the middle-size farms who hadn't known whether they could invest because their land might be affected by the reform. It wasn't clear what the limit would be, so there tended to be a negative effect on the working of these middle-size farms which had historically been among the more productive in El Salvador.

Under the new Constitution, those individuals who own more than 245 hectares will have three years to dispose of the excess by private sale, not to a family member or corporation in which they own an interest. At the end of that three-year-period, if it hasn't been disposed of, then it can be expropriated by the state, with compensation. This could add tens of thousands of additional acres to the available land now within the Land Reform Program, and the precise amount really hasn't been calculated.

The second part of the Secretary's certification is that the Government of El Salvador continues to make documented progress on implementing the program. Here, I think the report demonstrates that indeed substantial progress has been made in the implementation. The total of the beneficiaries is over half a million people; that may be 25 percent of the "working poor," rural poor, in El Salvador who have had an opportunity to acquire land under this program. It affects a little under 25 percent of the arable land in the country.

While there is some unevenness -- some crops are not doing as well as some others -- and there has been a general decline in agricultural production across-the-board making it difficult to make some judgment here, it appears that the cooperatives and the individually-owned plots under Phase III are holding their own on production, as compared to farmland property, that is not affected by the reform. So while there is an overall decline when you look at what you might call the reformed versus the non-reformed sectors of the farmland, yield is not too different.

There remain substantial problems. The principal one is the guerrilla violence which has caused the abandonment of a number of Phase I cooperative farms -- about 40 of them have been abandoned, particularly in the eastern part of the country where guerrilla activity is most intense.

This also coincides with the lower rate of applications from tenant farmers and share-croppers in the more contested

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areas. I mentioned that somewhere over 50 percent of the eligible beneficiaries had filed applications. A great number of those who have not filed are those whose land they could claim lies in areas where the guerrillas are most active.

There has been, in the experience of the National plan in San Vicente Province, some encouraging progress there. The Government was able to restore a sufficient degree of security that about 2,000 families did resettle in San Vicente Province. Just last week, they initiated a program in Usulutan, which is the next province to the east, and the hope is that that program is effective in restoring security that you will similarly see both the restoration of Phase I cooperatives that have been abandoned and a substantial increase in applications by small farmers who had rented land there.

The compensation for farmer-owners is also a continuing problem. The costs of this program are substantial. There are constraints on our use of foreign assistance to assist the Government of El Salvador in providing compensation to the farmer-owners; and some of the social tensions that this rather sweeping program has produced seem to relate to the relatively smaller landowner, a portion of whose land was taken by this program and there was no capacity to provide prompt compensation.

The cooperatives have been troubled by management. Running a big farm is big business, and you need rather sophisticated management, knowledge of marketing, accounting, how to get the financing. The Government of El Salvador is working with the cooperatives. We do have AID programs seeking to help with the management expertise involved in running these organizations.

Training is, obviously, a high priority there. The landowners, the beneficiaries ultimately are responsible for paying the government to pay the owners, and the debts that have been created and imposed on these cooperatives do pose a substantial burden for their efforts to make profitable ventures out of them.

You have heard, I'm sure, of past evictions, of especially the small farmers on these individual plots. That is a problem that is not entirely solved, but at present it appears that government support, including the armed forces suport for the land reform is strong; that the armed forces are working with FINATA, the government agency charged with administering Phase III, in helping to restore evicted farmers and to enforce the law. So the number of evictions appears to be on the decline, and the program, in summary, in four years has been, on balance, I think, a major success story.

One final thought, and then I'll open this for questions, is that this effort was undertaken in 1980 prior to the elections by the mixed civilian/military government that came in in 1979, without elaborate planning and study. The success that has been experienced has depended to a substantial degree on the ability of Salvadoran institutions to grow and evolve and to deal with the tough political and economic questions and problems that have been presented throughout this four-year period. I think that the success of this Land Reform Program can give one some hope that the process of democratic institution-building, the ability of a legislative branch to come together, debate and decide tough issues, as they did in the Constitutional process, the ability of bureaucracies that can get the job done, to be formed, organized, staffed and funded offer some promise that democratic reform is a doable thing in El Salvador, and offers a real alternative to the Marxist-Leninist revolution preached by the armed opposition. That is comforting to one who is charged with helping to carry out the U.S. Government policy of support for the evolution of democratic institutions in El Salvador.

Let me stop there and take questions.

Q On evictions, if a lot of them are not reported, as you say on Page 20 here, how do you know that they are diminishing?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: Statistics are hard -- let's put it this way: Reliable statistics are hard to come by. A certain amount of the information we get is antidotal and a certain amount is sampling. None of it ncessarily of the highest order of scientific precision.

I guess we are hearing less in the way of on-going active evictions occurring, and we are seeing more in terms of cooperation by the government agency and by the armed forces working with that agency in restoring individuals who have been evicted. Together, that suggests that evictions are a diminishing problem, but I don't want to say that it is a problem that is solved.

Q People like Lionel Gomez say that they're not diminishing, and that furthermore the right-wing death squads are having a devastating affect on this whole thing, which may not be statistically provable, and that they're now targeting the bookkeepers and the technocrats, the people who make this thing operate.

A I don't know what time your information comes from. But certainly the trends within El Salvador

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seem clearly to be toward an increase in the number of people who are able to hold the land that they can claim title to under this program, and a decline -- and this will be dealt with in Ambassador Motley's testimony tomorrow -- but a decline in civilian deaths.

Different organizations, again, have their numbers and everybody has their own set of numbers. But the trends shown seem to be consistent that while there was a disturbing outbreak of political violence this fall -- September, October, November -- it was encouraging to see that the Government of El Salvador reacted to that with horror, that people in positions of authority have spoken out publicly and condemned it in ways that two years ago, even a year ago, would have been very difficult and highly controversial. The revulsion is evident. They are taking measures to deal with right-wing violence, and we're certainly supporting those efforts.

Obviously, the building of democratic institutions, the ability of the people to pursue their lives in peace, to work their land, depends on a measure of security, and that means a necessity for a decline in violence from the left and from the right.

The trend, I believe, is toward a declining violence within the society. There is certainly a need for greater ability on the part of the government to control some of the areas now where the guerrillas are more active so that they can provide an expanded area of security in which people can pursue peaceful lives.

Q How are the guerrillas making people abandon the farms in the east? Open attacks or some kind of pressure?

A There's a history of hit-and-run of destructive raids. They have shot up crop-dusting airplanes. They've attacked the transportation system; they've burned a coffee processing plant just the other day. It's a combination, I think, of overt hit-and-run kinds of military attacks, and an atmosphere of apprehension in which people simply don't want to live.

If you can't get your crop to the market because the bridge is destroyed or you can't apply pesticides because the crop-dusting plane was shot at and the pilot won't fly anymore, there's just an endless array of ways to make it unpleasant for people to want to stay there.

Q Is this certification to continue into the fiscal year '84 budget as well?

A No. This is responsive to a provision in the continuing resolution for fiscal year 1984, and it's a special provision for that one fiscal year.

Q You spoke of compensation, sir. How much has actually been paid to the owners of the confiscated properties, and is there any -- in view of the fact that the large co-ops are burdened by low productivity and so forth, is there any hope that there is going to be any compensation for these lands?

A The government will have to pay the former-landowers, the co-ops will have to pay the government. I think that some restructuring of that debt is very likely to be necessary in order for the co-ops to make it. The debt burden on them caused by this land debt is very heavy.

I think we have numbers in here as to amounts that have been paid out by the Government of El Salvador.

Do you have that handy?

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: On Page 9.

Q Were these payments made in government bonds?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: It's a mix. For the

Phase III, it's half cash and half bonds for smaller properties, and properties -- what is it? If it's under a 100 hectares, which is 200 and some odd acres, then it's 50 percent bonds and 50 percent cash. The cash percentage goes down to 25 percent if your land is over 100 hectares.

The Phase I is long-term bonds with 9 percent interest and cash, I think, for your farm equipment and stock but not for the land. This report says that as of November '83, compensation under Phase I totalled $120.1 million including $9.1 in cash and $111 million in bonds; and an additional $14.9 million has been paid out so far in interest on these bonds.

The Phase III compensation has paid to date, a total of bonds and cash, $9.68 million. That's money paid by the Government of El Salvador to the former owners.

Q I understand the Bipartisan Commission on Central America discovered that the land reform program was "confiscatory." To my knowledge, it's not in the report but I've heard the commission report say that.

A The report endorses land reform as one of the three principal pillars for dealing with the agricultural sector of the economies of Central America.

Land tenure is addressed in the report.

Did you want to add to that?

Q Doesn't that imply prompt compensation in other than government bonds?

A Let me make a distinction here. As a government, we believe that there is an international law standard; that when a government takes the property of an alien, that the alien's government, if you will, has a right under international law to prompt, adequate and effective compensation.

If the Government of El Salvador was in a position to apply that international law standard domestically so that all of the people of El Salvador could get prompt, adequate and effective compensation in cash immediately, I'm sure they would do that, and it would make the program a lot easier.

What we're dealing with, though, is a country that is very poor, and a country in which the historical pattern of land ownership was terribly askewed so that -- what was it? Was it about 40 percent of the land held by one percent of the population and 70 percent of the farmers being sharecroppers or landless peasants or owning very small parcels of land?

The program was one intended to have both an economic and a political effect in giving the rural population of El Salvador a stake in their society and in their country. Under the circumstances there was no practical alternative to payment through bonds. They simply did not have the cash, and they had a social need that had to be addressed. If they waited until they had the cash, I don't think that they would have a land reform.

Q Do you have a figure for comparison against the 40 percent, 1979; 40 percent was owned by less than one percent? Do you know what it is now?

A No. We have all kinds of statistics. I haven't figured that one out. We do say that this has reached somewhere in the neighborhood of 25 percent of the rural poor and somewhere in the neighborhood of 25 percent of the rural land -- 23 percent of the rural land. Now, somwhere there's somebody with an ability at algebra who can take these knowns and the unknown that you've asked and formulate a way to find the answer to that, but I don't know it.

Q The Phase I is 15 percent of the land, the large cooperatives, and those were owned by the largest land owners in the country; and that's 15 percent that was redistributed to the cooperatives immediately?

A Whatever that 1 percent owned before, it dropped from 40 to 25 right there.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: It's 300, really translated into about 30,000 new owners. So that would change that statistic considerably.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: Yes, but we don't have a formula for that.

Q Can you explain one sentence? Again, on Page 20. "Because of the present restrictions in U.S. legislation, AID has to date been unable to assist in overcoming the problem of speeding up the compensation."

A Yes. There's a section in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 -- I believe it's Section 620(g) -- that says that Foreign Assistance funds cannot be used to compensate people for expropriations.

So where you have a program that is a compensated expropriation, it is not the government taking this land away without compensation; it is the government taking the land away with compensation but it is a poor government that is a recipient of U.S. Foreign Assistance. And one of the limitations on our Foreign Assistance is that we cannot provide Foreign Assistance for the purpose of assisting the Government of El Salvador to pay the compensation that it is obliged to pay under its land reform law.

Q Do you have any idea why the eviction rate is so high in Regions III and IV and low in Region I?

A This, again, is one sampling done by one organization. This is the Salvadoran Office of Agrarian Reform Evaluation. This is what they found in their sample. I don't know what significance to attach to that.

Q It doesn't give any clue as to what kind of people are doing the evicting.

A I can't answer that.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: Region IV, of course, is the most conflicted area, so that you have got less ability of the officials to respond to evictions. Evictions can take place out there without a lot of government response either from the Phase III organization implementing it or from the local law enforcement or from the military.

It seems to be correlated with the degree of conflict and degree of control exercised by the government.

Also, I'm sure that the samplers had a more difficult time getting in there and you're data probably is a little more shaky for that area than for the others.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 4:15 p.m.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

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BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE
STATE OF THE UNION

January 25, 1984

The Briefing Room

4:00 P.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Good afternoon. I think you have the fact sheet and in sum, it expresses the fourth point of emphasis in the State of the Union tonight, which is the President's commitment to the achievement of a lasting and meaningful peace.

The President reaffirms the six fundamental objectives of his administration which have been articulated in the past three years and are unchanged. He attaches the priority and his first objective to the establishment of a more stable basis for peaceful relationship with the Soviet Union and goes on to cover the other elements of importance. Renewed relations with allies, building on Williamsburg and his trip to Asia, the visit of the Chinese Premier, seeking to get results in deproductions particularly of nuclear weapons, of maintaining United States' leadership in peacemaking efforts from the Middle East to Southern Africa to Central America, and renewed emphasis and resources being applied to relations with developing countries, particularly those in this hemisphere. And, finally, to the importance of strengthening our effort to build democratic institutions. And this is an expansion and emphasis on the Democracy Project which is oriented toward building the fundamentals of democracy: labor unions, business groups, legislator training, judiciaries, things like that, through educational programs and exchanges.

The President will state that for this to be achieved, we must have bipartisanship. He commends the record of the past year expressed in the Scowcroft Commission and its treatment by the Congress. He welcomes the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America Report and calls upon the Congress for its bipartisan cooperation in its prompt enactment.

He states further that in the past year the multinational force, by its presence, and support of the government of Lebanon's efforts has made possible significant progress in moving toward free, independent, sovereign Lebanon.

He states his confidence that there is the prospect of more progress and he calls for continued Congressional support, which was expressed last year in its resolution regarding the multinational force.

He talks about NATO, the progress made last year, and his expectation that building on Williamsburg and the work program that preceded it, we can make further progress in the year ahead. And he closes with a message to the Soviet people in which he deals again, as he did in the East-West speech, with what motivates basic human beings, American and Soviet.

He acknowledges we have never fought each other. He states again his strong belief that a nuclear war must never be fought and cannot be won.

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And he adds a quote from President Eisenhower who stated that the essential struggle "is not merely man against man or nation against nation. It is man against war." And he closes with a statement that he believes that through our tenacity and investment of the past three years that the United States has reversed the decline of the '70s, has made the world a safer place. That while it is not safe enough, it can be made more so by a reasoned dialogue with the Soviet Union, and he commits himself to that.

I'll be glad to take your questions.

Q How close are we to a dialogue in view of the Andropov statement today? Is there any -- have we made any moves now in their direction privately toward a summit or anything like that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President commented upon the Andropov statement earlier today in coming to a meeting in the Roosevelt Room and I think there may be a transcript of that. In a nutshell, he said that it appeared that Mr. Andropov acknowledged the value and possibility of dialogue in the solution of problems and he welcomed that -- he, the President.

We don't talk about diplomatic exchanges, but I would not lead you toward thinking there's been a new proposal from their side. There has not been.

Q Well, what has there been?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think there's too little --

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The President interprets as he did, that is, that he welcomes the acknowledgement that we must solve problems and the willingness on their part to do so. The President feels, and I'll try to be brief here, that we are at an historic moment. He believes strongly that at the close of the '70s it is likely the Soviet Union had concluded that the United States was in decline. We seemed unable to solve problems, our economy was in distress, the American people seemed unwilling to invest in their own security, and these were expressions consistent with Soviet doctrine that we had intrinsic flaws in our political system and in our free-enterprise approach.

But then in the past three years there have been substantial changes of an historic nature that call into question basic doctrinal elements of Soviet philosophy; that is, we are not declining, we have suddenly seemed able to solve problems at home and with respect to the restoration of the deterrent foundation of our national security policy. The American people seem once more willing to invest a certain amount in their security. Abroad, the disarray in the alliance that appeared in the late '70s has been retrieved, and while we still do have problems and no one is suggesting that the Soviet strategy has failed, they must see these fundamental trends as justifying some introspection and review of the bidding. We expect that is happening.

We have no basis for judging how they may conclude. They may decide that, given this apparently renewed will on the part of the United States and given the out-year implications of these modernization efforts, if they reach fruition, that it is in their interest to get serious about arms reduction. They may, alternatively, decide to continue on with major investment in their own defense industry, with all that implies for other accounts. But, in short, this is a period in which they've looked upon the three-year -- first three years of this administration as having changed some fundamentals in their perception of the United States. They will reach conclusions, we welcome them, we hope that it will involve willingness to have a greater discourse across the board on the agenda of issues that separate us.

Q At the moment, following up from the other speech on U.S.-Soviet relations, and in this one, there is no hint of any new proposals with the Soviet Union, are there? I mean, there's nothing new in here that we're proposing to the Soviets.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The short answer is no. Let me comment on that just in 10 seconds. The suggestion here and there that -- well, Gromyko, and today in the Andropov statement, seeks to place the responsibility, if we are serious, on the United States for making new proposals. Two points: first, as a general proposition, if it becomes accepted by Americans or Europeans, or anybody else, that when the Soviets don't like our policy or our position, they can walk out and it is somehow on our responsibility to make a new proposal -- that is just an invalid negotiating framework.

But, more to the point, and secondly, we have a new proposal tendered at INF less than a week before the Soviet Union walked out. It deserves a serious answer. So we have a new proposal there. We frankly don't think they got the point in START last time, where the United States made clear that we acknowledge we have some advantages, they have some advantages, let's get serious about a trade off between these areas and that has enormous potential for discourse between us. Come on, let's get at it.

Q Approximately when did you and President Reagan and senior members of the administration decide that this period of decline had been reversed? Was it a gradual process or did it suddenly -- did you decide that in the last couple months that it happened because of the work that had gone up to three years? Up to then for three years?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There wasn't a precise day. It has been the President's view that --

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Q It seems to some of us it's a rather dramatic shift of tone by the United States. Public statements, obviously, the President has felt we've been on the right course by his own light but his whole tone of -- that we now are -- after three years in negotiating from a position of strength, it would seem to signify that it's been a quantum jump, rather than gradual --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's a reasonable point.

I think part of why there appears to be a change in tone is because there have been some milestones that have been passed now. The President has always felt this way; but, from the Soviet perspective, it had developed a strategy four years ago which only reached a milestone, a decision point, last November in Europe when the deployments, in fact, took place. And it was a watershed event. Doesn't mean we've won or lost or that the process is over. But it was an important watershed event.

Secondly, the modernization program of the strategic triad was not consolidated until December when the appropriation for the MX was approved. And now that program is authorized and appropriated. Now, there are going to be more appropriations; but that was a watershed event, the first time in 20 years that the United States had undertaken that kind of broad modernization program. These are not trivial matters in Moscow, the sustained effort of the American people, really, to endorse a congressional program as they have and then the ancillaries that I mentioned in the domestic context regarding the economy, all of this has come to a kind of climax.

Now, it isn't at all ominous. It is encouraging. We are pleased, enthusiastic, optimistic that it can lead to an effective discourse.

Lou and then Andrea.

Q The premise of the President's buildup, both when he was a campaigner and as President, was that if you took these steps and modernized the forces and had this defense increase that this would show -- particularly the point with the Soviets that we were serious and that they would negotiate. You're saying here today that maybe they will negotiate and maybe they won't. Maybe they'll go build more weapons. What evidence is there that this has been a success, not in terms of getting it passed, but in succeeding in getting the Soviets to negotiate seriously?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, again -- And I'm glad you mention it because the burden of what I'm saying is that if you were in the Kremlin and had reached, after three years, a point where all these things had happened, I think you would accept that you'd have to stop and think about it.

Q Start holding on.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And that's my point. That's going to take some time. And so your question, "Well, why don't you have any evidence?" suggests that the Soviet decision process, historically, has been given to giving instantaneous decisions when rather strategic conclusions are reached. They're not. They never have been. And so it will take some time. And I think it's premature to just --

Q Could I just follow up? The critics of this buildup said that, no, it wouldn't get them to negotiate. What it would do would be it would [illegible] the arms race and get them to build more. It seems to me from your own previous answer you're saying, "Yes, that's very possibly the case. Maybe it'll get them to negotiate. Maybe it'll get them to negotiate. Maybe it'll get them to just build more weapons."

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: My previous answer was perhaps -- just trying to be too objective. (Laughter.) I do believe that it's going to get resolved.

The fact is, though, that

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only now, after their expectations have been disproven, is there, in their terms, a basis for reviewing the bidding. I mean, I think they surely hoped up until the last moment, and would not have changed course until the last moment, that their expectations would prove out, and they have not.

Q Can you be more specific about the legislative proposal to help combat terrorism that is suggested in the Fact Sheet?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, no -- (laughter) --

Q Give me the long answer. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is an important national issue that has been raised. It is complicated because it was raised for us, tragically, in Lebanon. It is separate but related to Lebanon, and it is state-sponsored terrorism. State-sponsored terrorism has happened in Rangoon, Kuwait, Bonn, Beirut, a lot of places. Because Americans, naturally, have focused on Beirut, their impulse is to look at that event as opposed to the new global threat and to say let's remove ourselves from it and, for us, at least, it will have gone away.

I think in the Lebanon context that that is wrong, but in the broader context of how do you deal with this new issue, it is wrong. If you pull away from Beirut, or Kuwait, or wherever it may occur, you only demonstrate that it is effective and thus coming out of Lebanon doesn't solve the problem of terrorism; indeed, it probably encourages it.

Now, to answer your question, it is a new problem and it is essential that we devote more time, resources, energy, to dealing with all of the dimensions of countering terrorism from intelligence to cooperation with other countries and sharing that intelligence, to learning from others who are better at it than we on how you undertake actions to deter and prevent it, or deal with it if you don't. Now there's a lot you can do intelligence-wise, multilaterally, and in terms of physical security, as well as capabilities for counter-terrorist operations. These several dimensions require integration, and that's what we must do, and then costing out and submission to the Congress, so that each component gets funded in an operation. Yes?

Q Are you suggesting -- I mean, why would there be legislation needed? Are you suggesting some kind of a new structural approach, some kind of new agency to deal with this, or are you just talking about appropriations, or are you talking about, God help us, a study commission?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'm not talking about a study commission and I think until we're finished, and it shouldn't take long, I don't think we're talking about a new agency. We're talking about making sure that what we have in the way of counterintelligence and counter-terrorism infrastructure now in the several Cabinet departments, that they are fully funded and have enough people and that they are getting all they can from friends and allies, and that overseas in physical infrastructure that it's as good as it can be and that we do better at what are known tactics and strategies in the future.

Q But through the CIA?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not exclusively, no. There are responsibilities for --

Q Who else has responsibility?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the State Department does in terms of overseas intelligence at diplomatic posts and --

Q Are we talking about anything on the domestic front? Are we talking about legislation that would deal, also, with the problem of domestic terrorism?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, there's no specific proposal on the boards right now regarding domestic terrorism. We are very conscious that it is a problem and we need to deal with it, but we haven't gotten there yet.

Q But this legislation that you're talking about is strictly terrorism abroad?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That was the motivation of the effort. I wouldn't rule it out, Saul, but we have no tasking on that right now.

Yes?

Q We're hearing reports from members of Congress about sharp exchanges between Congressional Democrats and the President over Lebanon. How would you describe the current state of relations between the President and Congress on the issue of keeping Marines in Lebanon?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would characterize as serious, profound interest in doing the right thing; now, with that, a level of frustration but born, I believe, of misunderstanding of what I would call the other side of the issue. And I've referred briefly to the notion, broadly held, that if you leave Lebanon things are better. What that misses is what happens after you leave. What happens in terms of the global or regional prospects for terrorism and what happens internally in Lebanon, specifically regarding the prospect for war between Israel and Syria?

Now, I think many members haven't looked carefully enough at what is the down-side risk. Now, of course, for as long as the lack of information at large in the country leads people out of not knowing to be impulsive about "let's get away from the flames", so to speak. That's natural, but it isn't enough. We have to deal with the broader interests, and I think we can, cooperatively, with the Congress in the weeks ahead.

Q But what do you have to offer them that you didn't have before and how are you going to change this misunderstanding?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that we must clearly provide the information that gives them this frame of reference. They have to begin to think about what happens if we were to do something precipitous. So, just illuminating the issue is part of it.

I think, too, however, that if you examine the record of the diplomacy in the past six weeks, you can see signs that are bases for hope in terms of the three components to the Lebanon problem: Lebanon internal reconciliation, the Israeli dimension and the Syrian dimension. Now, they've been away for a month or longer. It's going to take some updating, some thoughtful care about the options.

We have ideas. We believe that it's important that the United States support for making progress in Lebanon be sustained. And we think the Congress will come to agree with that.

Q But we seem to be getting mixed signals in reference to this progress in the Middle East. On the Syrian side, for a period of two or three weeks, officials were coming out here and telling us Syria was being cooperative. Now, today, in the meeting Larry described Secretary Shultz as saying Syria intransigence was the problem. Are the Syrians cooperating and do we see them helping us towards a solution in Lebanon?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm glad you ask. And when I've just said that the three pieces show some signs of hope, I didn't impute that specifically to Syria. I don't intend to. I think that we have been frustrated by Syrian ability, directly or working through surrogates, to frustrate the good-faith efforts on the part of the government to reach compromise.

And we believe that the offers on the table are there for negotiation and that there can be accommodation that meets the interests of the factions and the government for real political accommodation, for economic sharing.

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for perhaps better control over the civil administration locally and things like that.

But we do think there's a basis for progress. Syria has not been helpful on that score.

Q Do you --

MR. SPEAKES: That will have to be the last question, Sarah.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: John had his hand up five or ten minutes ago.

MR. SPEAKES: John's been waiting. And that is the last question.

Q Well, I've had my hand up for quite awhile, too.

Q Just to return for a minute to arms control. Historically, the United States has been up and down in spirit or in their economy and so on through decades. The Soviet Union doesn't seem to have changed its modus operandi -- that it continues to build to stay even, or in the seventies, the U.S. has said, ahead.

What historical precedent is there to believe that the Soviets will now come to the bargaining table? Is there a historical precedent that we haven't seen before?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All of us live in a system -- and because we live in it, we take it for granted -- but you live in one of the most dynamic creations on earth. We are always changing Jean Francois Revel's recent book in which he says the United States is in constant revolution. (Laughter.)

I'm not going to get off on a kick, but I think, because we churn out decisions in the space of a day, there's the mirror-imaging assumption that that happens overseas. And it clearly doesn't. I mean if you talk to people that have been in Moscow for a long time, they deal in blocks of planning that are very ponderous and very intense and unchanging once taken.

Now it is influenced by important change on our side. We've had a series of important changes that have matured and reached a point where serious reflection is in order. Now the Soviet system, we believe, can accommodate that. But it will take some time. And it is judgmental what they will conclude.

The President believes, clearly reflected in his strategy for the past three years, that it will lead to positive results. But none of us can say that today. We have to wait and see what they have to say.

Q Is that recommended reading again?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll write it down for you.

Q I have a question --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll be glad to talk to you, Sarah. Why don't we let somebody else --

MR. SPEAKES: We're right at 4:30 p.m. Our colleague has another meeting. You can ask it of the other senior administration official, he'll answer it.

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Q I beg your pardon, I want to ask it of this senior administration official, and I want to ask it now. (Laughter.)

MR. SPEAKES: You go right ahead. Here he is. Go ahead, answer Sarah before she gets out of control. (Applause.)

Q Back by popular demand --

Q Do I ask you privately?

Q Hope it's a good question, Sarah.

Q Go ahead, Sarah.

Q Now you mentioned the project for democracy. There seems to be two waves of thought on that and the administration and in some areas of Congress. Are you setting up standards for how we give money to individual labor leaders and politicians in these countries to overthrow those governments, if we think they aren't democratic enough? Or how are you going to work it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In no sense is it designed or structured that way. It is a voluntary thing. It is not imposed. It is offered. And if people are interested in taking advantage of training opportunities in this country or in other countries, we are pleased to encourage them. And if they're not, then that's fine. It has nothing to do with any kind of clandestine or covert activity at all.

This is a program related to a major private sector effort and the National Endowment for a Democracy where the Democratic party and the Republican party receive funds from -- federal, public funds -- to carry out training programs themselves, entirely removed from government management.

And in the government there is a corresponding effort to make available for countries who wish funds for training, assistance, exchanges that can, over time, develop the institutions of democracy. We take for granted Congresses and Legislatures and free press, but there are a lot of countries that don't have them. And we're willing to help them get them.

Q Well, don't you think those countries would think this was great interference?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If they don't want it, we won't do it.

MR. SPEAKES: Is that okay, Sarah?

Q Thank you.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 4:32 P.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release January 26, 1984

BRIEFING BY NASA OFFICIALS ON SPACE STATION PROPOSAL

Room 450
The Old Executive Office Building

10:05 A.M. EST

MR. SPEAKES: Good morning. We may have some late arrivals that we'll make provisions for. As you know, in the President's State of the Union last night, State of the Union address, there was a section called Developing America's Next Frontier, and he devoted a considerable portion of his speech to the manned space station and he directed the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to proceed along those lines.

We have with us this morning James M. Beggs, who is the Administrator of NASA, and he has with him his colleagues. They have a brief overview that they would like to give you as they begin and then be available here for your questions. Jim?

MR. BEGGS: Good morning. We're obviously delighted to be here. In the State of the Union message last night the President, of course, made a very strong and positive statement for space and that, of course, is something that this agency that I represent is very proud of and very pleased with. In that he outlined a very bold and imaginative plan that will carry the program well into the 21st century, because what we are undertaking to do is the construction of the next major step in our exploration and development of our space activities.

The space station which he outlined will provide a means for us to carry on the exploration and the development, both commercial and scientific, that we began 25 years ago. In outlining that comprehensive plan, the President charted the course that will take us well into the 1990s and into the 21st century. He has declared that the nation is ready to take that next logical step and that we will do that development in cooperation with our international friends.

He called for a government-industry partnership. May I say, with respect to that, we welcome the idea of commercialization of space. Since the beginning of this agency we have seen very large commercial benefits flow from it. The obvious one that is referred to most often are the communications satellites, of which there are now a number serving countries around the world. But there are many other commercial benefits which have come from the program and we expect that the commercial aspects of the space station and the involvement of the private-enterprise system in both the development and the operation of the space station will be extensive.

We believe that this next step is one that is currently very timely. The reason for that is that we are reaching the operational stage of the shuttle. The space shuttle gives us routine access to space. We are flying it now with very little difficulty. This year we will fly it approximately nine times -- I say approximately because one of those flights is a little bit tentative -- but nine times. Next year it will be 12 times and the year after that probably 16 times and then, finally, out in 1988, we will build up to a flight rate of 24 a year and, should the market continue to expand and I expect that it will, we will go from that 24 a year to perhaps 30 or 40 flights each year

Some of those flights, as we reach the initial operating capability of our space station, will be to serve the space station. The

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shuttle is the means by which we will carry the pieces and parts up. It is also the means by which we will service the various experiments and commercial endeavors that will take place on the space station.

The American people have always supported their space program and I am pleased that current polls of the public indicate that the support of the program remains high. It is, I believe, truly something that is in the American spirit. It is what Shakespeare referred to as the "dauntless spirit of resolution." And, indeed, we have it today and we will continue to have it as we continue to explore on the endless frontier.

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Now, I'd like to introduce to you John Hodge, who has headed the Space Station Task Force in NASA for the last two years and who has worked with the agency in general and with a number of our industrial partners in proceeding in outlining the various techniques, technologies and system concepts that we're going to have to develop in order to end up with a space station. And the station you see here in model is but one of a number of different concepts, so, John -- and after him, Bud Evans, who has headed up the Commercialization Task Force in the agency, will talk to us a little bit about commercialization. John.

MR. HODGE: Thank you, Jim.

Let me mention just some of the characteristics of the station and explain something of the model that we have here.

Perhaps one of the most important points about the space station program as we presently envisage it is that it consists of both manned elements and non-manned elements. It is a combination of both a manned program and an unmanned program.

The model you see here is the manned part of the program, but we will, in addition to these manned elements, have large, unmanned free-flying satellites that co-orbit with this station.

The important thing to us here is to make sure that we get a proper mixture of the -- those things which men do best and those things which are best done in an unmanned fashion.

The other thing that the model here typifies is that the shuttle and the station are a matched pair. They're complimentary with each other. When we first did the studies relating to the shuttle back in early 1968 and '69, it was done with the idea that we would have a reuseable transportation system and a place to go. And the place to go is the space station, as you see it. A matched pair, in fact.

Another characteristic of the program, as we see it now, is that we intend to pursue a rather extensive definition period. We believe as we enter one sort of maturation period of space flight, when we start to do things in a more routine way, that we have to learn how to do things less expensively. And one of the techniques to do that in a management sense is to extend the definition period. We are in the middle of the first year of that definition period. And over the next two years, we will do extensive studies so that, in fact, as we start to build hardware, we have reduced the technological risk and the design risk as far as possible.

I should point out in that sense we have not yet decided on a configuration. What we have done is settled on a number of functions to be performed by the space station and we can do that with a half a dozen generic kind of configurations. And that's what we've been looking at now for the last six months or so. This is one of those configurations. We call it a "building block approach." Some of you may have seen some of the other configurations we're looking at with a larger delta truss or a T truss. And it's going to take us most of the next year to decide what specific configuration, in fact, makes most sense and can be done for the least cost.

Another important thing is the question of technology. What technology are we going to use? All programs have this dilemma of pushing technology as far as is appropriate, but not going too far as to increase the risk. And in the next year, again, we have

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to select that level of technology which is appropriate for the space station to build it.

Incidentally, we will be using the shuttle to develop some of those technologies. For the first time, because we have a reuseable system, we can test new technologies in an experimental way in space and bring them back. That really is a major characteristic of the shuttle and will be very useful to us. And, incidentally, one of the major uses of the space station itself is the fact that we will have a module where we will be testing new technologies continuously in space. In many respects, what we have is a research center in space, a Langley Research Center in space, i. you like.

As we begin to put the station together with its various

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characteristics and capability, what it is beginning to do is to provide a permanent infrastructure in low-earth orbit, a place to go with the shuttle. And then what it is doing is providing us with a bridge to the future; it is the next step -- as Jim has called it right from the beginning, the next logical step -- in a series of ventures as we look forward into the next century.

There are four fundamental functions that we see will be performed by the space station. It is, of course, first and foremost, a laboratory, a laboratory for science, a laboratory for technology, and a laboratory for the research associated with commercial ventures. It is a place where you can service systems as facilities in space get more and more expensive. It is not appropriate for us to allow them just simply to die. What we need to do is to be able to service them, to refurbish them, to change the instruments, and to use them until such times as the bus itself runs out.

Now the servicing function -- which, incidentally, is right on the end here -- will allow us to take any satellites which are in orbit and in need of service and are in a similar kind of orbi to the space station itself. The third kind of capability, which is a real major one, is to act as a transportation mode, a collection-and-distribution center, if you like. The shuttle will go to the space station and then from the space station, in later versions, we will be able to stage high-energy upper stages to go to higher energy orbits such as geosynchronous or out to planetary kind of distances.

And, finally, and perhaps the most exciting of all, is that we will be able to construct systems which are larger than one shuttle payload bay. There are many scientific endeavors which are now being looked at where we will require facilities which are significantly, in size, in excess of what's capable of taking up in the shuttle. Interestingly enough, the space station itself is the first of those facilities which will be much larger than one shuttle payload bay, and so the very construction of the space station is the first of those assembly functions.

Finally, I would like to say something about the attitude towards customers. We really believe that we have to build a facility here which is for the customers. And from the beginning we have been working with the various constituencies who are using space right now to be sure that, in fact, we do have a customer-friendly system. They have participated with us to date and they will continue to participate with us as we build into the future.

A significant part of that customer relationship is the commercial side of space. As Jim has said, we really do have commercial space at the moment in the form of the communications satellites; people are making money at the business of being in space. We are beginning to look at the business of being in space in a broader sense. The McDonnell-Douglas and Johnson & Johnson effort on electrophoresis in the shuttle is another example of that. I personally believe that we have not begun to dream about the things we are going to do in commercial space

Bud Evans has been working on that subject within NASA, putting together new policies and new approaches to that problem, and he's going to talk to you about that now. Thank you.

MR. EVANS: Thank you, John. What John has discussed is one aspect of the President's program to open a new chapter in the history of space. That chapter that he's talking about is building a new place to work in space and, obviously, looking at the model, that's going to be a very impressive place. What I'd like to talk about is a different aspect of the President's program. I'd like to talk about developing a new way to work in space.

We've been moving rapidly from an era of exploration to space exploitation, from experimentation to expanded commercial use of space to benefit people on earth. You might call it "Business Goes into Orbit." Whatever you call it, the bottom line is that it's a way to increase the investment and involvement of the private sector in doing

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things in space to benefit people. And that's the main point, is we want to benefit people here on earth. And we've done this before, as both Jim and John have mentioned, in the communications field. We think the time is ripe to move on to other fields now. A word of caution before I talk about what some of the potential benefits are for our people.

First of all, it takes a big investment to do commercial ventures in space; they're not cheap. There's no panacea in space. It's a tough environment and it's an expensive one to work in; however, while the risks are great, so are the opportunities. Both natural and manmade risks inhibit us today, but we can eliminate these. Building and launching research and manufacturing equipment for use in space costs 10 to 100 times more than comparable facilities on earth. Laws and regulations enacted long before private use of space was even envisioned impede investment in space today.

To realize the opportunities that space can present to our nation and to the world will require three things: it will require resolve; it will require a commitment of resources over a number of years; and, probably most importantly, it will require creativity and imagination on the part of our people.

Now, what are the potential benefits of this new way of working in space? There are many, and they include the ability to produce medicines that we can't produce on earth, at least not in large quantities. These could possibly lead to helping cure a number of serious diseases on earth today such as diabetes, certain types of cancer, and kidney diseases. The ability to produce supermetals, lighter and stronger than anything we presently know. The ability to locate many of the earth's needed resources more cheaply and efficiently. This will help us understand and protect our environment in ways we can't do it today. The ability to produce more efficient optical fibers for cheaper communications.

I want to emphasize that none of these are sure things; however, all have had experiments before them that show that they may be technically possible and, most importantly, industry has shown an increased interest in pursuing them, which might lead you to the question, "Why now?" If there are so many benefits, why hasn't business been doing this before? Well, there are a number of reasons. The first is, we didn't have a shuttle to get to and from space reasonably routinely and cheaply. Second of all, we've now developed facilities so that we can transport our scientists and our engineers and our technicians into space to accompany their commercial ventures. Thirdly, we've got a number of experiments under our belts that show that the potential for making products to benefit large numbers of people and, therefore, to earn large returns, is possible.

And, finally, the President's vision of these opportunities and his proposal to begin towards building a space station, showing industry that if it invests in developing the necessary equipment and processes, that it will be possible for them to have a place to produce and harvest their products.

Now what's needed if we are to achieve these benefits over the next decade? It has often been said that our nation is built on three pillars of knowledge and strength: industry, academia, and the government. We need to activate all three of these into a creative and dynamic partnership and there are four steps for doing this. First, we need to create a positive, consistent national policy. The President took a bold step in his State of the Union message last night to do that. NASA will soon issue a strong policy to help assure this positive climate.

The second thing we need is to establish economic incentives. Tax laws and regulations which discriminate against doing business in space must be changed. Thirdly, we must expand research. For its part, NASA will, in partnership with industry and academia, work to expand the research necessary for developing products in space to benefit people on earth. Finally, we must eliminate regulatory barriers. Laws and regulations predating space operations should be updated to accommodate the commercial use of space.

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Now action is under way to see that all these steps are taken. Once these steps are taken, we will be on our way to providing opportunities for greatly expanded use of space by commercial ventures. I want to emphasize: the challenges will be great, but so are the opportunities. We at NASA look forward to doing our best to aggressively implement the President's policy to increase the benefits that space can provide to our people. With that, I would like to open up a question-and-answer period.

Q Mr. Beggs, can you tell us what part the military will play in this space station?

MR. BEGGS: So far they've shown very little interest. The initiative, of course, is directed towards the civil applications and both John and Bud have described a number of those. There are a number beyond that that we expect to be exploiting with the use of the station. But we have to date very little, if any, military interest in the station.

As you know, it is our responsibility by law, by statute, that should we discover anything in our experimentation and work in the way of new technology or scientific results which benefit or has potential benefit to the Defense Department, that we're required to pass it on and we, of course, will do that. But, other than that, there's no direct involvement by the military in the station.

Q But they do have in the shuttle?

MR. BEGGS: Excuse me?

Q They do have in the shuttle, I say.

MR. BEGGS: They are a customer for the shuttle and I hope -- I sure hope they stay as a customer in the shuttle, because we need their payloads as a part of our activities with the shuttle. So far, that market, the military market, has been slow to develop for the shuttle. But we're hopeful that it will provide up to perhaps a third of the capacity of the shuttle. So far, the best that we can project for the next five years is that they will be providing about 25 percent of our market.

The rest of the market is coming from the commercial and scientific field and we're very pleased with that part of it. It is growing dramatically and we've been able to make up some of the deficit that occurred as a result of the Defense Department not flying, by loading on more commercial and scientific payloads.

Q Mr. Beggs, a frequently heard comment from scientists is that these thick-ticket items like Project Apollo, like the space shuttle, like this coming along now, soak up all the money, with the result that there's very little left over for science. And the fact is that you haven't have had an interplanetary shot for several years and won't have one for a couple of years more. How do you respond to that?

MR. BEGGS: I think it's a bum rap. (Laughter.) Let me tell you why I think it's a bum rap. If you look at the NASA budget over the years, going back for 25 years, and you look at the funding in total, both through the halcyon years of Apollo and the low years of the mid-'70s and now an increase in the funding during the latter stages of the shuttle development period. The amount that we have devoted, the amount this country has devoted, to space science and space and planetary exploration has remained a constant. They get their share of the budget. The problem and the thing they complain about is that their share, while it remained the same, decreased during the mid'70s and, indeed, it did, because the budget went down.

But if the budget goes up for this space station, they will get their share, because they always do. What we expect in the space station is that we will provide a place to live and work and for

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the scientists to carry on their experimentation that will be significantly more productive than anything that they have had in the past. Just this past week we reviewed the tapes on the space lab flight, the last flight of the shuttle, and they were truly remarkable. I think all of us in that room were struck by one singular fact; and that is that there was really a great deal of real time interaction going on with the scientists on the ground and the astronauts in the space lab.

For the first time, I think, the light dawned that there was a very important aspect of being able to work directly in real time with their experiments in space; they could modify, they could change, they could build on the results that they were getting as the experiment progressed. And I think we can do the same thing with the space station, only in spades, because we will be up there permanently.

Q Let me follow up on that, if I may. Specifically about interplanetary science, you haven't had any for several years, you are in a slow-down period now, what guarantees can you give that you will renew your efforts in interplanetary exploration in the period covered by the development of this thing?

MR. BEGGS: I believe that we will have a good -- I started to say reinvigorated -- you know, it's not a bad program as it currently exists. We have the Voyagers still flying, they're still alive and well, and we're spending large amounts of money to continue to acquire the data from the Voyagers as they move out to the edge of the solar system. We'll be launching Galileo in 1986 to go back to the giant planet Jupiter and put a probe into the Jovian atmosphere, and that will be indeed a very major scientific planetary experiment.

We have the Venus mission which will go off towards the end of the decade and I think that if you watch the budgets for the next couple of years, the planetary scientists will be very pleased with this President's reaction to their program. He is supporting the planetary program and will continue to support it.

Q Mr. Beggs, when do you expect to orbit the space station and how much will be put in the 1985 budget for it?

MR. BEGGS: I can't -- I'm not going to answer the second part of the question, because you'll have to wait and see the budget. I would lead you down through a trail of what's -- or you would lead me down through a trail of what the total budget contains. I think you will be pleased when you see it, whatever your interests are in space. With respect to the first question, we're saying early '90s, and the reason we're saying early '90s is, as John described, we're going to go through a good definition phase for this program.

As you know, we had troubles on the shuttle when we set a fixed date and then we ran into some difficulty and went three years late. We want to do this project right, plan it very specifically to be sure that when we do set a target date, we're going to be able to meet that target date. But we feel from our studies to date that an early '90s date is possible and in the cards, and that's what I think we'll be working towards.

Q So you bend no metal until about two years from this point?

MR. BEGGS: We will start bending -- we will probably start contracting for metal-bending in about a year-and-a-half or so. But we will not be bending metal for the next year, but we will be working closely with the industry over the next year, year-and-a-half.

Q Jim, what would have been the effect on NASA as a viable development agency if you had either failed to receive a White House commitment or would fail to receive congressional approval of the station?

MR. BEGGS: That would be a very severe setback. I think the response that I've seen so far from the Congress is a very positive response. You are always, I guess -- it would be foolish

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for me to predict what the Congress will do, but I do expect a positive response from them and I think that they, too, recognize that the importance of moving forward with the program is an all-important part: it is of great significance, I think, that we're ready and willing to take the next step and I think they'll respond positively to it.

Q How significant a commitment is it, though? The White House describes it as an $8 billion project. Some say it may be much greater than that, maybe $20 billion, but the White House is proposing $150 million in the '85 budget. That's less than 2 percent. Does that really represent a commitment? Would another President, a year from now, pull the rug out from under that?

MR. BEGGS: Well, I don't expect there will be another President in a year or so. I expect that we will have the same President. Look, this program has been supported by many Presidents. The President referred last night to President Kennedy, a Democrat, who initiated the Apollo Program. It was a Republican, President Nixon, who initiated the shuttle program. It is a Republican now who is initiating the space station program. But those programs have been supported by every President since President Kennedy.

The space station is but the latest endeavor and our program has not been a partisan issue, never has. If you have read the recent think pieces that the Democratic party has put out, there are large sections on the importance of maintaining our thrust at research and technology and references are made to the space program. This administration, this President, have been very forthcoming in supporting the program. I believe it's recognized in the country that exploration on the frontiers of knowledge is extremely important.

Now, with respect to the amount, all programs, all of NASA's programs start relatively small and they build and we are saying that we can get an initial capability for about $8 billion -- that's an initial capability. We don't expect the program to stop at that point; we expect it to go on and one would hope that the funding that we have, once we get that initial capability, will enable us to expand our activities over time to bring the necessary experiments and the necessary equipment up there to take full advantage of the station. So it will cost -- there will be more money spent on it in the out years. All we're saying is that for initial operating capability, approximately $8 billion.

Q Would you define initial, Jim? Is that an $8 billion model?

MR. BEGGS: This is one $8 billion concept, yes.

Q With the unmanned support platforms? Does that include --

MR. BEGGS: It would include -- John, do you want to comment?

MR. HODGE: At the moment we're talking about a facility of this kind which has four pressurized modules on it. The solar system, solar power system, is 75 kilowatts of power -- that is a very extensive and very large amount of power and largely, I might say, for the commercial aspects of the thing. There will be two large platforms, probably around 25- to 35-kilowatt platforms, that will be composed of the resource part of this without the manned elements. Then you can see on there we have a little maneuvering tug which we're calling an orbital maneuvering vehicle which will take you backwards and forwards between the unmanned elements and the manned elements.

Q That's part of the package, too?

MR. HODGE: That is part of the package.

Q The President spoke quite a bit about internationalization of the project and I would like you to comment on what talks are being held and the degree of ESA -- European Space Agency -- dissatisfaction

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with the way -- and their role. They say they now want a more extensive role in any future projects.

MR. BEGGS: Let me talk to the last point, first. There have been some articles in the foreign press about dissatisfaction with the space lab. I think to the extent that our flight rate at this time is not as high as we projected it, we're all dissatisfied. If you go back to our original projections, by this time, that is, moving in 1984, we expected to be flying 30 or 40 times a year instead of the 9 times.

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But we went three years late and so there is some unhappiness that is occasioned by the slippage that we had, that three-year slippage, because they expected to fly the space lab earlier. They, in anticipation of that, went out and spent money on experiments which, in essence, have been sitting on the shelf until we could fly them.

Now that we are flying the space lab, however, I can tell you that my friends in Europe -- and I talk to the ESA people almost bi-weekly, I am almost always in contact with them -- are very happy with the results they have achieved. In general, the reception in Europe was overwhelmingly favorable. The press reports, the public reaction was overwhelmingly favorable to the first flight of the space lab. We will be flying it again late this year and it will have some very interesting scientific experiments on it. So I think, in total, on balance the Europeans are very satisfied with the investment they've put into it. They would, of course, like us, like to see it be flying more often, but they are satisfied with what they are getting.

With respect to the future, we have had a number of discussions with the Europeans, as John gone through his investigations of various techniques. They have invested themselves in studies looking towards what they could do, what part they might take, in the construction of the space station. They are very interested. They have stated that to us a number of times, that if we go forward, they want to be a part of it. So, too, have the Japanese, so, too, have the Canadians. As you know, in the past there has not been any NASA program, at least none that I am familiar with, which has not involved some degree of international cooperation and collaboration.

And, as the President's initiative and the President's statement last night, that we want our friends and allies to join us here, I think that was a very wise and important decision by him to invite the international community to participate with us on this. What they will do, I think, remains to be worked out. But we are going to invite them to take a very active part. We hope they will spend a lot of money with us, because to the extent that they use their resources to collaborate with us on something like this, they will not be using their resources to compete with us in space, and that's important, too.

Q Mr. Beggs, could you --

Q -- the military did not give you a lot of support. There was some talk that maybe they wanted their own station or they would be uncomfortable sharing some of their intelligence-gathering activities on a civilian station. How do you see that shaking out? Do you think they will press for their own or would they be welcome to share yours in certain situations, or --

MR. BEGGS: As far as I'm concerned, they would be welcome to share the facility that we will construct. They would be welcome to add a module of their own, which would give them the security and draw from the common utilities that we will construct. If, at some future time, they want a station of their own, certainly the design work that we do and the technology we develop in our program will be very useful to them, available to them, to construct the type of station that they might want. However, I should emphasize that throughout the studies we have done the military has been very consistent that they currently have no requirement for a space station.

Q Would you compare your concept, please, with the Soviet space station concept? Theirs is going to handle three times the number of men, presumably, and they will be up there considerably ahead of you. Does that make your concept a kind of shoestring and a little too late?

MR. BEGGS: No, our technology is better than theirs. I still think we're a decade ahead of them in this field and I think that with the initiative the President has announced here that we will remain a decade ahead of them. They've been flying several series of space stations -- the current Salyut is the seventh of that series -- it is a relatively small station now. As you have pointed out, they have announced they intend to expand that significantly and by perhaps the second half of this decade have flying a 10- to 20-person facility. That remains to be seen.

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They have not yet operated for the first time a shuttle capability. They've announced as well that they intend to do that. We'll see how soon they come on line with that. We know that that takes a lot of work and a lot of effort and I feel that once we get our very highly automated system up, which contains lots of new technology, that we will be far ahead of them. John, do you --

MR. HODGE: The important thing here is not to measure it by the number of people we have currently in orbit, but the productivity of those people. We intend to make great use of automation as far as the operation of the space station itself is concerned, so that we can reduce the amount of time that men are needed to make it operate, and then use the men to do what we want them to do, which is the technology and the science and the commercial aspects of that. It is the productivity of the people which are going to be important and, as I pointed out, this is 75 kilowatts of power, which is a significant increase over what we have ever done before.

MR. SIMS: Time for one more question, please. Could this be the last one now.

Q What will be the lead center for the space station development and will the station require development of a fifth or sixth orbiter?

MR. BEGGS: The station itself does not require the fifth or sixth orbiter. We will continue to study the need for more orbiters as we proceed down the line into our flight increases. But the station itself will not put an undue load on the fleet and will not, in and of itself, generate a requirement for a fifth orbiter.

As to the lead center, we haven't selected one yet. Obviously the two major manned centers, Marshall and Johnson, are candidates for that role. But we intend to keep a number of the centers involved in our study efforts in this first phase, because they all have something to contribute. As John pointed out, we want to automate this highly to make it as productive as we can. We want to make sure that we use the latest technology in all of the utilities and various techniques that we're going to use to make it operational, because to the extent we do that, it will reduce the long-term cost. And we sure want to do that because, as Bud pointed out, there are a lot of commercial people who are looking forward to using this and we want to be sure we have a system that is utilitarian, relatively inexpensive, and very, very easy for them to get to and experiment, do their research, and ultimately move into production.

Q When will you select the main center?

MR. BEGGS: Probably next year, maybe late this year or early next year.

MR. SIMS: Thank you, Mr. Beggs. I am going to ask the Director to take a few minutes for photographers with this model here. If you would not crowd up, please, and give us a few seconds.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 10:45 A.M. EST

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
VISIT OF FOREIGN MINISTER ABE, JAPAN

THURSDAY, JANUARY 26, 1984, 2:35 P.M.

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I'll just be very short here. Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe arrived this afternoon and will be in Washington through January 31. Actually, he'll be spending the weekend down in Georgia where there are a lot of interesting U.S.-Japanese joint ventures on the way, and they have a very important consulate in Atlanta.

In Washington, he'll meet with the Vice President, with Secretary Shultz, Secretary Weinberger, Secretary Regan, Secretary Baldrige and special trade negotiator Brock, as well as other officials from various departments; probably at least the Deputy Secretary of Agriculture.

We anticipate discussions of both global and bilateral issues, including important discussions on the follow-up to the President's November visit to Japan. Topics for bilateral discussions will undoubtedly include trade and financial issues, investment, energy cooperation and defense.

Global issues will probably include the Soviet

Union, arms control, China, the Korean peninsula, Kampuchea, the Middle East, including the Iran-Iraq war possibly, and international economic issues.

Just a word or two about the Foreign Minister. We're very pleased that he was, I think somewhat to everyone's surprise, including his own, continued on for a second term as Foreign Minister. Usually, that's a one year rotation in Japan.

The Secretary's had very, very good relations with him. They decided when they first met back in January of last year that it would be important to have regular consultations, and therefore they made an agreement to be sure that they met at least four times during the course of the year. As it turned out last year, they were only able to manage nine meetings.

There is a good, strong relationship there, and we're very pleased at the continuity.

The Foreign Minister is also a very important figure in the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan and was just recently designated -- I believe the title is Acting Head of the Fukuda faction. Fukuda himself, the former Prime Minister, is still obviously the nominal head, but that makes the Foreign Minister the heir-apparent in that

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faction. It's one of the important factions making up the LDP.

He has been an exceptionally active Foreign Minister; I think probably doing more foreign travel than most of his predecessors, having gotten into some, for Japan, rather new initiatives in such areas as the Persian Gulf and seeing many, many people in Tokyo.

In fact, when Ambassador Mansfield paid his first call on the Foreign Minister after the announcement of Abe's reappointment, it turned out that the Ambassador was the one thousandth visitor that the Foreign Minister had received during his time in the Foreign Ministry, and I think there were champagne bottles broken out to celebrate that occasion. So we have a very good relationship with him, and we have many tough issues to deal with but we look forward to having him here.

Q Is he here for substantive talks as a negotiator on some of these issues troubling us, or is he just here discussing a wide range of them without any more depth?

A Both, I think, is the answer. As I think you probably know, during the time of the President's visit to Tokyo in November, the President asked Vice President Bush on our side to lead the effort in follow-up on a number of the difficult issues that were still outstanding between us, particularly in the trade and economic area.

That designation of the Vice President, among other things, was an indication of the importance that the President attaches to the relationship and to progress and follow-up on these issues.

After the new Nakasone government was formed, the Prime Minister, on the Japanese side, set up a slightly more multifaceted mechanism, but in that mechanism Foreign Minister Abe has the responsibility for external economic affairs and principal responsibility for handling these negotiations.

I might underscore that neither of these is supposed in any way to supplant existing negotiations. We have a great deal of active negotiating going on through a number of channels. Deputy trade negotiator Mike Smith is on his way back from Tokyo right now after several rounds of discussions on agriculture and other subjects.

The Foreign Minister will definitely be pursuing a number of these subjects in detail, not only with

Secretary Shultz but also in even more detail with Regan and Agriculture and Baldrige and others.

Q Will he see the President?

A I don't know. That's possible, but I don't know.

Q Is there anything he can add that we would be interested in knowning on this trip about the Japanese defense budget? Will there be discussions when he sees Weinberger?

A I'm sure that the defense effort will be a subject of discussion with Weinberger. Our principal focus is not to talk about budgets but to talk about -- pardon, it sounds like jargon, I suppose it is -- roles and missions. There are certain functions that need to be performed and certain capabilities that Japan has to have in order to perform those functions. The effort is to get those capabilities, not to achieve some arbitrary budget level. I think that's been a constructive turn in our defense dialogue.

Back in '81, when Prime Minister Suzuki was here, there was agreement on those broad missions, and there's been more detailed agreement at working levels since then.

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Of course, your ability to carry out those functions in the end does require you to spend money to acquire the capabilities to do it.

In that sense -- while obviously we would like to see Japan able to carry out those missions next year if at all possible; we would always like to see it faster -- the 6.55 percent increase that was announced a few days ago is both a substantial real increase measure; that is, after allowance for inflation since Japan's inflation is currently running so low. We estimate that as probably better than a 4 percent real increase in defense spending.

Given the really severe budgetary constraints they're under and the fact that most categories of the budget including very important and politically sensitive social services are being cut back, we at least appreciate it took a considerable effort to get that level. Whether that level keeps Japan on a rapid enough pace toward carrying out those functions is something that's hard to analyze until you've seen a little more detail of what's really in the budget and what isn't.

Q What is the understanding now on exactly what functions the United States will want to see Japan perform, and exactly what capabilities it would like it to have to perform those functions?

A Basically, I first of all underscore --

Q And how was that expanded since the Suzuki visit?

A It hasn't expanded. I think it's been specified at a working level. I think the basic definition has remained, and it's entirely the defense of Japan, I underscore -- the defense of Japanese territory, territorial seas, territorial airspace, and, I would put it, certain important sealanes. I mean, these happen to be the two key sealanes south of Japan and roughly to a distance out to about a thousand miles, but that doesn't -- I mean, that thousand mile figure's gotten a little too much attention. It doesn't mean that you draw a circle around Japan of a radius of a thousand miles and suddenly Japan's taking care of all of that.

There are a couple of major sealanes, north of the Philippines, heading up to Japan, where Japan would provide naval escort. That's what we're talking about. So it's the defense of Japan entirely, and that's a role that we're comfortable with and Japan is comfortable with, and I think the other countries of Asia are comfortable with, and no one wants to see an expanded role beyond that.

However, if Japan can properly carry out that role and provide more fully for its own self-defense, then our forces, which play a critically important role in stability not just in Northeast Asia but in Southeast Asia and in the Indian Ocean as well, can be used more effectively.

So it has benefits elsewhere, but those are really indirect benefits.

Q How do we stand on the telecommunications issue now?

A One of Mike Smith's several negotiations in the last -- I guess he's been there about ten days -- has been a renegotiation of the agreement with NTT, the Nippon Telephone and Telegraph Company, to provide access for U.S. manufacturers to that major market. Of course, it isn't a market; it's a monopoly purchaser, but we want to assure that our manufacturers have equal access and sales to NTT.

We had an agreement with Japan to provide that. It worked somewhat, but not as well as -- we weren't entirely satisfied with the way it had worked. We've had now some fairly extensive negotiations on the renewal, and I believe that you'll have to get more details from STR, but I think that's basically wrapped up and will probably be signed on Monday.

Q Who signs that? Shultz and Abe, or USTR, or --

A I think most likely Brock would sign on our side, but I can't tell you for sure.

Q What are the outlines of it? What does it entail?

A It's basically -- and I don't want to get into too much detail, because I'd really rather you got this from them -- but it's a 3-year renewal of an agreement to provide equal access for U.S. manufacturers and sales to NTT. It includes some provisions on sharing of R&D with NTT laboratories, and the intention is to provide substantially increased U.S. sales of telecommunications equipment to Japan.

This is an area in which we feel our industry is probably the most competitive in the world, and that under really open conditions we would have a significant market share.

Q How does satellite service fit into that, if it does fall? Is there a tie-in?

A There is an issue over satellites, and tied in; that in the course of this it turned out that NTT wasn't completely free in how it handled purchases of satellites because there was a separate national policy which, for reasons of national security, developed some ten years ago that satellite development was going to be a national policy in Japan. One of the things we wanted to make sure of during these negotiations was that we wouldn't

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repeatedly turn up other areas in which there was some other policy not mentioned in the agreement that prohibited NTT from purchasing from foreign companies, and I think -- again, I don't want to pre-empt STR -- I think we have those assurances.

We still are unhappy about the lack of access to the satellite market, and we will continue to talk about that.

Q Does this forthcoming agreement also include value-added networks and computer software?

A No. Those are two more issues. You've almost got my list there now. There are two new issues that have come up within the last few months that caused us considerable concern that are in this high tech area.

I might underscore, too, in talking about the NTT agreement and also the issues I'm about to mention here, we're talking about areas of high technology that are really the markets of the future, and they're areas where we feel the U.S. has strong competitive advantages if we can get equal access to this important market. They are areas where we feel it should be easier to deal with the problem of protection because you're talking about in effect infant industries where the vested interests aren't quite so strong.

So we put a lot of emphasis on trying to be sure that we have equal and fair access to these early developing high-technology markets in Japan. Two issues that Spencer asked about, one concerns a proposed regulation that would limit the participation of foreign-owned companies, or, as a matter of fact, any company with a foreign ownership share greater than 20 percent from participating in so-called value-added networks, which are computer networks where data is processed and then passed around through the network. And we consider that a significant and very unsatisfactory market restriction if it's put into force.

The other issue that was mentioned -- also very important to us -- again, it's still just in the proposal stage in Japan -- is a provision -- it concerns the regulations being developed for protection of software. We have a number of concerns about that, in particular that the term of the protection provided to holders of copyrights on software would be of too short a duration, and that there would be provisions for compulsory licensing, where you couldn't enjoy the protections of your copyright unless you submitted to compulsory licensing of the property itself. We feel that's inadequate protection for what you call the intellectual property of American firms, and so again it would be a significant barrier to entry.

These two things, I'm sure -- these two subjects will be talked about quite a bit here, and we would hope that the results of these discussions would be a modification of the changes that are being considered.

Q Two questions: What assurances will Mr. Abe get that the Administration will continue to oppose local content legislation? Secondly, what is the Administration's view on the unitary tax which is before the courts in California?

A On the broader question of local content, I think the Administration's opposition to it is pretty strong and pretty well known. I think the point that we made to the Foreign Minister is that if we are to be effective in our efforts to prevent this kind of legislation--which we think is legislation that would have serious consequences for Japan, but also for ourselves--that to be effective in doing that we need demonstrations from others that in fact, the free trade system works well in both directions, and that progress on the kinds of issues we're discussing here -- and the so-called "trade frictions" that we have -- really can be quite important in our efforts to keep free and open markets in the United States.

The unitary tax issue that you mention is one where the Japanese have some very strong concerns about the fact that a number of states are imposing taxes on foreign companies that, would, at least I gather, raise the issue of taxation of profits that these companies earn outside of the United States. It's, obviously, a very, very tricky area of tax law in this country.

C-2 The Treasury Department has -- I think it's Treasury's commission, isn't it? We have a commission now that is studying the issue and looking at its implications. It also, presumably, will be a subject of discussion in the investment committee that was established during the course of the President's visit to Japan. We agreed on a commission on bilateral investment whose main purpose was to, from our side, try to find ways of reducing barriers to U.S. investment in Japan. But in this case, we're talking about a potential barrier to Japanese investment in the United States, and obviously, it's a two-way street, so we have to look at it.

Q Can I ask about something you mentioned earlier? You said the Iran-Iraq war would likely come up -- you said it might come up. That would be because Japan needs the oil from the Gulf, presumably?

A No, it's more than that. Japan does need the oil from the Gulf; so do our European Allies. In the end, in fact, so do we. None of us can afford the sort of disaster that would happen if that war escalated and cut off oil supplies.

But it's also, in addition to that, it's the case that Japan has fairly extensive economic relations with both Iran and Iraq, and has diplomatic relations with both. The Foreign Minister, in fact, has visited both capitals.

C-3

We are interested in all the possible channels that we can use to try to, obviously, if possible bring an end to that war, and certainly, at a minimum, try to discourage an expansion of that war that could spread to the entire Gulf.

Q Can you be more specific about what you expect the Japanese to tell you on that score? Or would you be suggesting something to them that they carry to Tehran and Bagdad?

A I think we'll be interested in their impressions and what they know from their contacts, including I think some recent contacts. Also, I'm sure we'll have some suggestions for them about what we think are the most pressing problems and the most useful kinds of messages that can be passed.

We're basically talking about passing messages. I don't think, unfortunately, that outside parties have a great deal of leverage. But just having channels through which we can communicate the dangers of some possible courses of action is in itself valuable.

Q Would you be specific enough to say that the U.S. will pass a message to Iran?

A No.

Q Passing messages only to Iraq, in other words?

A You're asking the wrong person, in fact, as to what specific things we would have to say; but also, I think if you got the right one up here, he'd say the content of those

I-20

C-4

messages is not something -- If we wanted to pass them, we could just put them out in public. I mean, the point is that doing these things privately and having a confidential channel of the kind the Japanese provide, we think is often useful.

Q How recently did Mr. Abe visit those capitals?

A (To staff): Bill, do you remember the dates? June, I believe.

Q Do you see the Japanese as trying to avoid Japan becoming a potential campaign issue in the United States? And if so, do you see the Japanese pressing to wrap up some more of these negotiations before the campaign season starts in full fury?

A You would have to ask them about their motivations. I think it's certainly the case that this is a -- I think, as Ambassador Mansfield says, I'll quote the Ambassador, he says, "This is the most important bilateral relationship in the world." There may be some others that are as important, but this is clearly at the top of the list; and it is in our interest as well as the interests of Japan to try and make sure that it comes across as a positive, constructive, and cooperative relationship and doesn't become a political football.

Q What progress has been made in any of the other specific negotiations or issues between the two countries, I guess starting with beef and citrus?

C-5

A I'm not going to get into speculation about progress. I guess in terms of other issues on the agenda, I think I have mentioned beef and citrus; mentioned several others. There probably would be some discussion of cigarette tariffs and cigarette marketing in Japan.

There will probably be some discussion of energy issues and our interests in promoting Japanese investment, particularly in the coal industry here in the United States. I'm sure a very important issue on the agenda, particularly in the discussions with Treasury, will be the efforts to liberalize Japan's capital markets and a number of measures that we think would have the net effect of strengthening the yen, and thereby, in fact, among other things, improving our competitive position in the United States, in Japan, and in third markets.

I believe, with the other things we've mentioned, that's-- Oh, and tariffs. Excuse me. There are a number of substantial Japanese tariffs on products, particularly alcoholic beverages, forestry and paper products, farm machinery, and processed agricultural products, where we think, again, that we could be highly competitive if these tariffs weren't there. So I think those tariffs will be issues.

Q Do you expect agreements on any of these issues?

A I expect the NTT Agreement to be finished. I'm not going to make any predictions otherwise.

II-23

6 Q The Japanese say that these joint auto ventures like GM/Toyota and Chrysler/Mitsubishi will, automatically, solve the Japanese car import problem by providing more domestic competitors. The AFL-CIO says it will merely switch the American consumer from one domestic product to another.

Does the Administration favor such deals as the GM/Toyota one in California?

A I don't want to get into the specifics of that one. I know there are union issues on both sides. I do think the more general proposition -- we certainly favor Japanese investment in this country. We're trying through that joint commission that I mentioned to find ways of encouraging it, and, where there are barriers, reducing it. I know we've heard from the governor of at least one state that Japanese investments have given a healthy boost to their economy. While I'll duck the specific, the general principle we're very strong on.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 3:00 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
SECRETARY SHULTZ TRIP TO LATIN AMERICA
FRIDAY, JANUARY 27, 1984, 3:41 P. M.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I thought what I might do is just quickly tell you the schedule outlines, and then some of the things that we look forward to at each one of the stops. I'll go through the schedule first and then get to things that we're looking forward to.

We depart here at an uncivilized hour on the 31st, Tuesday, early in the morning. We go to San Salvador and we'll spend most of the day there, and we'll arrive very early in the morning in Caracas on Wednesday, February 1. We'll be in Caracas through Friday morning.

Friday morning we depart Caracas for Rio de Janeiro. We'll be in Rio through Sunday evening when we go to Brasilia. We'll be in Brasilia from Sunday evening until Tuesday, the 7th. Depart Brasilia early Tuesday morning enroute to Grenada and Barbados, returning here Wednesday morning.

That's the overall schedule. The things that we would like to address while we're there, I think if you look at the schedule and you know of the things that are going on in the different countries in the stops involved, you can readily see an overall linking theme through all of them would be the theme of democratization in the region. Each one, different elements: elections just held, elections being held, elections being planned.

In Venezuela -- in El Salvador specifically he'll be meeting with President Magana; Vides Casanova, political leaders. The Secretary is going to review, aside from the prospects or anticipations of the elections, reforms in the human rights. This is a continuing dialogue that we've had at various times, also at high levels, including the Vice President, now the Secretary of State.

We'll be looking at the economic development aspects of their infrastructure that has been attacked by the war. The question of military assistance, the question of how they are doing in the military, and the dialogue and negotiations, both the internal dialogues and the external dialogues in the Contadora process.

In Venezuela, as you know, we have good relations with the outgoing President. We look forward to the same with President Lusinchi. He is no stranger to many involved in this area. Some of us have already met with him prior to his taking office and since his election and before his election.

Venezuela, as you know, has been a key player in the Contadora process, and we would hope that they would continue to do so. They also, as you know, were a key player from a donor point of view in this CBI and related activities.

In Brazil we're going to attempt one more time to bring the final report together for the presidents on the five working groups that, you may recall, were established in December of '82 by President Reagan and President Figueiredo. The groups went to work. We had hoped to do the final step in October, but, as you may recall, the trip was cancelled at the last minute.

In addition to that, it will give the Secretary a good chance to discuss with the Brazilians the economic and financial questions before Brazil, how it weaves in and within their Abertura process which has had one election and is looking forward to another one at the end of December for president; and the interlink between the economic progress they're making within the framework of re-democratization of Brazil, and an opportunity also for President Figueiredo to renew his acquaintance with Secretary Shultz, a relationship that is very warm.

In Grenada we will be celebrating the independence. Give us an opportunity to get with Sir Paul Scoon, the Chairman of the Advisory Council. Give the Secretary an opportunity also to visit the medical school and chat with the students who have now returned -- the U.S. students who have now returned to the school.

At Bridgetown we look forward to a meeting with the OECS prime ministers. There will be a series of bilaterals with them and also group meetings to discuss both the --

Q In Grenada?

A Pardon?

Q In Grenada?

A No. This is on Barbados. And to discuss with them individually and collectively, of course, and collectively the regional security within the area, economic programs, how the CBI is evolving, these ongoing things.

I should say also that, given the opportunity in Venezuela, depending on schedules of the people involved, we would like to take the opportunity while we're there to have appropriate bilaterals with heads of states and other foreign ministers.

Q Like Contadora members?

A Well, yes, depending -- it's difficult. The object of the exercise is to try to take maximum advantage of that time to have bilaterals with the various heads of states and foreign ministers that will be there.

On that note, I will stop and attempt to answer your questions.

Q When you say you're talking --

Q This democratization --

A Want to flip a coin?

Q When you say you're talking with political leaders in Salvador, as well as Vides Casanova, is the political leaders -- is that d'Aubuisson, is that Duarte?

A It will be the ones -- yes. I think the answer to your question, all those you have mentioned have been invited. I don't have the full guest list, but the object of the exercise is the leaders of the parties, the presidential candidates, will all -- I think there is one event in which we're bringing all the political leaders together to chat with them.

Q This --

A Just a minute. Let's take it in order. He spoke up first.

Q No. This is in the same meeting?

A Yes. It's envisioned in one meeting with the political leaders.

Q You have mentioned the theme of this trip being democratization. I'm wondering why you didn't include Argentina. Was there any consideration of doing so?

A It's already a 7-day trip. There were a variety of countries that were looked at, and all I could squeeze out of the 7th floor was seven days. We're hopeful maybe there may be an opportunity if President Alfonsin is in Caracas to chat with him. He's one of the possible bilaterals.

Q I wanted to ask you, also in El Salvador, if the Secretary will again remind them of the situation of human rights and the death squads and military aid, whether there would be a linkage there?

A As I told you, there's no doubt in my mind, and no doubt in the Secretary's mind when he talks about going to El Salvador, human rights is an element that's in the front end of his mind.

It will be a continuation of the dialogue that we do have with them on human rights, and we will be discussing military assistance too.

Q But right down to specifics, the nuns' case, the labor leaders, the various Americans, the stages at which these cases happen or may not happen to be in the justice system?

A It has been my experience that most senior U.S. officials in dealing with Salvadoran officials normally do get into where are we on specific cases of interest, in addition to the general and overall pictures of it. Yes. I think that would be a fair assumption on your part. It's obviously of great interest to the Secretary.

Q Will Secretary Shultz ask for any assistance in providing evidence on the connection between Miami-Salvadoran exiles and death squads in El Salvador?

A I think that the answer to your question is no -- I think. And the reason I say "no" is that there's been a lot of publicity about this Miami connection and all the rest of them. Let me just put it in perspective as I understand it.

There are a lot of people from not only Central America but the Caribbean that live in the Miami area. There's a lot of money transactions that goes on in any case of exiles or people that are transplanted. Our laws are fairly specific on how one can or cannot transfer monies. It is the mission and the intent of this government to uphold the law.

Now, as to any special effort that is necessary in upholding the law, I don't really think that the Secretary of State is going to get into something that is really a judicial process and a matter for the Department of Justice. That's why I said "no."

(Continued on next page)

Q I was referring to, in fact, what I understood to be the Administration's efforts to so-called "crack down" on the Miami exiles.

A Yes. Well, I've read a lot of stories about the effort to so-called "crack down." Let me tell you what I know, and that is that the Administration is going to enforce the law; and if there is, in fact, illegal money transactions between Miami, El Salvador, and any other place, then effort is going to be made to go after it. I think you have to put what you have characterized as "crack down" in that context.

Yes.

Q As I recall, the Secretary said at a news conference a month ago that he was kind of impressed with the way the Nicaraguans had changed their rhetoric, and he wanted to find out whether there was any reality behind that rhetoric. It so happens that he will be in Caracas with Daniel Ortega next week, and I wonder if he will take advantage of that opportunity to meet with him.

A I was not sure Daniel Ortega is going. But still, take your assumption. All right. When Daniel Ortega was in Buenos Aires, and the Vice-President was the head of the delegation, there was an opportunity in which they met. It was a social occasion; there was an exchange of pleasantries; and that was it. I'm sure if that kind of situation exists again in Caracas with Secy Shultz, that the same thing will occur. As to whether there will be something beyond that, I have nothing for you at this time on it.

That was a long-winded answer, wasn't it?

(Laughter)

Q On the same subject, I will ask if Mr. Ortega is on that list that you mention of the possible bilateral meetings that --

A No. In line with this question at this time, I don't have any information on Mr. Ortega ....

Q On the question of Brazil, if I can ask, is there a possibility that the Secretary may be carrying some formal agreements to be signed with the Brazilians on military assistance or military manufacture, nuclear energy?

A No, no, no. I think what you have coming out of a working agreement is one Memorandum of Understanding, not in the military area; and there may be one on the industrial-military side of it, but it's not any firm type of contract or treaty, or the rest of it.

There are some understandings in the working groups, and we'll be able to get you some more specifics on that prior to the trip.

Q The Brazilian astronaut, has he been chosen?

A No. Let's remember: the Brazilians and the Americans have talked about a payload specialist, which is a crew member, but not astronaut. Whether the Brazilians have chosen him or not, I don't know of it. I mean, it's a Brazilian choice, if they make it.

Q The President offered to train this man.

A Oh, absolutely, that's correct. And I think at the working level, there is understanding that that looks like it's a very feasible idea. But as to the selection, that's a Brazilian choice.

Q Just a technical matter on Grenada, you said they are going to celebrate the independence.

A That's right.

Q What exactly are they celebrating?

A It's their independence from Great Britain when they became an independent state.

Q Not the U.S. intervention?

A God, I know it's been a long time, but has it been a year?

Q (Laughter) A month, 2 months, you know --

A Wrong date. October 25th. We're going in the first week of February. (Laughter)

Q Flora Lewis had a piece the other day about Grenada, and specifically, the OECS, and the possibility remote apparently right now, of putting together some kind of multi-island security force. Would that be --

A Yes, that's not a new idea. It's a regional peace force, a regional security force. I'm sure that that is a subject for discussion, the theory being that all these islands have never had large military -- (1); (2) they cannot afford it; (3) they've had their eyes wide opened by the Grenada and also other small type of insurgencies launched, either out of Grenada or other places. Therefore, the discussions they have had to date -- and we have had some periphery with them -- is the establishment of some kind of mobile peacekeeping force, reaction force, or something that could be stationed in one land or drawn from, or something of this nature. So that would be, I think, a very legitimate topic for discussion with them.

Q That particular article, if I may pursue that,

A I didn't read the article; I'm just addressing the subject. O.K.?

Q She suggested that one of the ideas that had been under consideration was that the British would train the force, and the United States would provide the ships that would be the transportation for it to move around, but that neither the United States or Britain had very much enthusiasm for the idea.

Why would we be opposed to it?

A If you're going to have a rapid deployment force, I think, by definition, you don't move them by ships -- but that's another matter!

Whether there is enthusiasm or not. I didn't read the article. Let me just tell you that I think Great Britain has an interest in the security in that area, and we have an interest in the security; and if we can help in a modest way with technical assistance or something of this nature, fine. I don't think it is envisioned that either Great Britain or the United States would be part of any kind of mobile force at this time.

Q Sir, [redacted] in the bilaterals, is the Secretary planning to see the leaders of Honduras?

A I'm trying to remember. I don't think the President of Honduras is going. I think its Paz Barnica, the Foreign Minister, is going, as I remember; and he is a possible.

Q Possible?

A Yes. When I say it's possible, you've got to remember now, you don't know when these guys are getting there, what their schedules are. It's like 3-D, trying to put these together.

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B-

Q At the Barbados meeting, will they be discussing the situation in Suriname?

A Where?

Q In the Barbados meeting, within the bilaterals?

A I think in a tour d'horizon, that the Secretary is prepared to discuss Suriname as well as the Middle East or Far East, or something, with any one of the Foreign Ministers. It's not a subject that we have flagged in Barbados to speak about it -- two separate areas, really.

Q Will they be day-long meetings there in Bridgetown, or how is that going to be arranged? Separate meetings or one group?

A No. It's both. You know, there will be a bilateral, for sure, with Prime Minister Adams, who is the host. There will be an opportunity to meet with him. I think there may even be an opportunity to have lunch or dinner with him, and then there will be kind of a working meeting. The details have not been worked out totally. We just have the time frames blocked for them.

Q Are you going to be able to do your supplemental request for El Salvador by the time of this trip?

A No, I don't think so. That's a White House decision, because it's part of the over-all --

We're leaving Tuesday morning.

Q In fact, won't it happen while you're on the trip?

A It may. I'm not trying to be washy with you, but when it gets out on "the other side of the street" --

Q You've finished, and sent it to "the other side of the street," as you say?

A Pardon.

Q It's been finished here and sent to "the other side of the street?"

A Well, no. Things are never finished. (Laughter) They always seem to come back; but basically speaking, a lot of the "grunt" work has been completed on it.

Q You're talking about the total package now, as well?

A Yes. You're getting way out of my area. I only worry about 33 countries, and you're talking about something that covers 154.

Q [redacted] I would assume that some of these people will be bringing up with the Secretary and yourself the recommendations of the Kissinger Commission. What do you plan to tell --

A Yes. We're looking forward to their comments, too.

Q Well, what do you have to say to them? I mean, do you think there is a good chance this thing is going to be passed on the Hill, and the President will send them the funds?

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A No. I think what we'll do is be able to tell them, as we go around, what the President's intent is, and that is what has been, a lot of it which you know, and just explain some of the details with them as we go. And that is, the President has in essence taken the body of the Kissinger Report and embraced it, and is now translating it into legislative form to put it forth.

Each country has different interests in different parts of it, and I think we'll be prepared to discuss with them those things that are of interest to them.

(Continued on page 16.)

Q Back on Grenada, if I may. Is it possible that the Secretary may carry a proposal or an agreement or an announcement that the Americans will finally build that airport that the Cubans began, one; and, two, that they will rebuild the mental hospital that was accidentally bombed by American aircraft?

A The answer to the first one is no. The answer to the second one is an interesting aspect, and I just can't give you a yes or no on it. I'm not trying to withhold for any big hoorah I just can't answer it.

Q The answer to the first one was, no, there will be no announcement?

A There is no big surprise, and here's how to build --

Q But not "no" the airport won't be built?

A No. That's right. Let's talk about the airport for for thirty seconds just so you understand what the "no" means.

The airport is an article of faith in Grenada and the eastern Caribbean. That we are aware of, one. Secondly, there is a study being undertaken by AID now on a contractual basis to see what it would take to finish that airport. It's not a simple deal. It's like buying a car; if you want a stereo, if you like air-conditioning.

If you look at the big plan the Cubans had, you would make that -- there are many other ten thousand foot runways in the Caribbean but there are none that have zero/zero landing instrumentation, nighttime, and all the rest of it as envisioned, a big terminal. So what are you going to do -- complete a runway? Do you finish the shell of the terminal; do you put in all the fancy instrumentation; do you make it all weather; do you make it all night? These are different things.

A study undertaken by AID would look at what the levels would be. There is no decision within the United States Government to pay for completion of that runway.

Q Shultz' plane will be landing there, will it not?

A That's correct.

STAFF: A plane.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. I haven't stayed up with that battle lately.

STAFF: A plane; not necessarily the plane. I think that's right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the latest is that -- the key is not whether it lands; it's whether it can take off. Three thousand hours as a pilot, I'll tell you that's what counts. You can always get in. It's getting out that is the difficult one.

Q Is he going to hold news conferences along the way?

A Oh, plenty of them. (Laughter).

Q Seriously?

A I'm serious. More than John Hughes wants. (Laughter) Yes, there are planned news conferences, I think, at every stop.

Is that right?

STAFF: There will be in Salvador, will be in Venezuela, will be in Brasilia, will be in Grenada, with no filing facilities so we go straight to Barbados. And I think there's a final one --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's a thirty minute flight and we get to read the copy. If we don't like it, you don't file it. (Laughter)

Q The Chief of Missions meeting will involve all of South America and all of Central America?

A No. The Chief of Missions meeting in Rio will involve all of South America.

Q Only South America?

A Yes.

Q When you say -- or I guess your colleague said "a plane." I understood we were going from Brasilia to Grenada?

A That's correct; so it's "the plane." I think it's "the plane." He says it's "a plane." We'll let you know when the time comes. Either way, it'll be courtesy of the U.S. Air Force, and they're all right. Believe me.

Q In Grenada, will he be urging that the government hold elections as soon as possible?

A I'm sorry, I missed the first part.

Q In Grenada, will he be pressing for early elections, and will he possibly be meeting political leaders such as Eric Gairy?

A Let's take the first question first. Rather than urging for early elections, I think that what would be primary in the Secretary's mind is to get an update as to Sir Paul Scoon's and the Advisory Council's plans as they evolve. We know what the outline is. Sir Paul Scoon said it many months ago. You have an interim government, and then a provisional government that will put the election together which will lead to an elected government. We are somewhere between Phase I and II on this, and I think the Secretary will look for an update on it.

We have no reason to believe, and have never had since Day One, that there's any foot-dragging on elections. So therefore there wouldn't be that impetus to ask to push for early elections. From what I've gathered in my trip to Grenada in chatting with him, they want to go as soon as they can and do a proper election, and I think that's what one can expect.

And the second part -- oh, yes, Gairy.

Q You remember him?

A Yes. Flying saucers, wasn't it?

Q That's right.

Q Bermuda Triangle.

A I don't know whether they'll be an opportunity to meet with the non-appointed political leaders there, including Gairy. You know Secretary Shultz well. He doesn't run away from not meeting with people. I wouldn't see any problem with it. Maybe a question of time.

Q In Brazil, is the Memorandum of Understanding that you spoke of likely to be released while the Secretary is in Brazil, and can you give us some rough idea of the subjects that will be covered in it?

A The Memo of Understanding will be -- the Memorandum of Understanding will be on a specific one of the five working groups, and I would assume that that one will be released at that time. It'll be made public. In fact, there's a ceremony involving it.

What Foreign Minister Guerreiro and Secretary Shultz are going to do is put the final touches on the reports to their respective Presidents. I don't think at that time the reports on all five working groups will be made public; only after they have reported them to their Presidents.

Q Which of the five groups is the Memo of Understanding?

A Let's see if I get it right. Fair, if I get it wrong; correct me. There is a Memorandum of Understanding -- the interesting thing of what came out of these working groups is they've already assigned certain agreement working arrangements, but I believe this one is on industrial/military cooperations.

Q Does this mean that the Americans will help the Brazilians manufacture some weapons?

A No. It may mean the Brazilians will help the Americans find a more efficient way of making cascavels. It's a two-way street. Okay? It could mean all kinds of things.

Q Go back to Salvador,and the large political leaders will be invited --

A Yes.

Q Have been invited?

A I assume they have been invited by this time; yes.

Q Well, if you assume, then you don't know whether D'Aubuisson has accepted?

A That is correct. I have not seen an accept/regret list. That's correct.

Q Have you asked for that?

A I don't have to. They normally do it. These guys are fairly efficient.

Q Will we know by Monday?

A I don't know whether we'll know by Monday, but I'm sure that --

Q If you're going say regrets for Tuesday, we ought to know by Monday, should we not?

Q Have you ever worked much in that area?

A Yes, lots.

Q Then you know that that's still a maybe answer. I've had a ten minutes of eight calling of people for sit-down dinners. Not an unusual event.

Q At a news conference this morning at the Carnegie Endowment there was a suggestion by a panelist that the Lusinchi Government in Venezuela might not be as friendly toward the United States as the Herrera Campins Government with respect to the Contadora process and other regional issues. Do you have any thoughts on that?

A Yes. I heard a rumble about that about two weeks ago. I had the pleasure of meeting with President-elect Lusinchi for a long meeting; two-hour breakfast. It was a good breakfast, too. I didn't get that impression at all. I found him to be a very straightforward, open person who understands what needs to be done in the Contadora process. I don't see any dramatic change in either direction or intensity of interest and/or affinity with the United States. I was very impressed with him.

As you know, aside from these foreign policy issues, he's facing some significant financial challenges also.

Q Along those lines, one of the problems -- the reason they stopped supplying oil to the Nicaraguans is they weren't getting paid. Any indication that this new government might resume supplies to the Nicaraguans and figure out some sort of extraordinary payment schedule?

A No. I didn't see any indication of that. Overall, I think they're beginning to see the necessity for good fiscal prudence. To answer your specific question, no, there wasn't any mention of that.

Q Thank you.

A Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 4:10 p.m.)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release January 30, 1984

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
AMBASSADOR EDWARD ROWNY

The Briefing Room

10:03 A.M. EST

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Good morning. President Reagan and I have met to review where to go from here in the START talks. The President again confirmed his deep and personal commitment to arms control and his hope for improved dialogue.

The President agreed that the START negotiations have made more progress than is generally realized and that we're now in a position, when we return to the table, to make a breakthrough based on trade-offs of U.S. advantages to balance off Soviet advantages.

The President reaffirmed the basic outlines of our proposal which would amount to real arms control, because it calls for deep reductions to equal, verifiable and stabilizing goals.

There's a good deal in it for us, and for the Soviets as well. The President also noted that we modified our original proposal to take into account the Soviets main concerns that it was too restrictive, too complex, and addressed only U.S. concerns. We made our proposal less restrictive, offered less complicated alternatives and collapsed the two phases into one. And, as the President said, places everything on the table.

With a good faith response from the Soviet Union, these moves could bring us closer to an agreement.

Next, I reported that I had carried out the President's decision of last October to encorporate the build-down concept into our proposal. This concept would be good for both sides, because it would have both sides reduce in a way which contributes to stability.

Build-down, as you know, was originally proposed by several Senators and Congressmen and has strong bipartisan domestic support. We will continue to seek Soviet agreement to it.

And finally, I told the President that I had carried out his decision to begin exploring possible trade-offs of U.S. interests and advantages for Soviet interests and advantages. Really -- Soviet -- U.S. interests and concerns for Soviet interests and concerns.

Specifically, we believe our advantages in bombers and cruise missiles can be traded off for their advantages in ballistic missiles.

When the last round ended, my Soviet counterpart did not agree to resume the START talks in February, saying the Soviets needed to reassess the situation. The President agreed that the best way to continue to make progress toward an agreement is to return to the negotiating table, and pursue our offer to deal in concrete trade-offs. We are ready to resume the talks at any time.

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Q What is the progress that you've made so far? And do you think that they will go -- have you explored the trade-off enough to see whether they would acquiesce?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: No -- the progress we've made are in the other issues, such that the Soviets agreed with us that the launchers alone would not be a basis. But, they said launchers plus nuclear weapons. We haven't agreed on what those other weapons would be, but we've made progress there.

Q General Rowny -- I'm sorry -- are you prepared to trade off the missiles that are in Europe -- the new Pershings and Cruises --

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: No -- I'm talking about START --

Q I know exactly what you're talking about. And there have been calls for blending the two talks, increasing potential for a trade-off by bringing the European missiles into a START context. Has the administration reached the point where it's prepared to trade off Soviet concerns about new U.S. Pershing and Cruise missiles for our concerns about their heavy ground-based ICBMs.

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: See -- the Soviets have said they must take into account the fact that

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we have missiles being deployed in Europe, and we've said, "Yes, you deployed SS-20's in Europe." They broke off the talks in INF, did not break off the talks in START, but they said they want to reassess the situation. When they are ready to come back, when they reassess the situation, we just have to see what they have to say.

Q Are we willing, though?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Willing to what?

Q Trade the European missiles.

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: We're willing to listen to any serious proposal the Soviets might have.

Q And negotiate on it?

AMBASSADOR ROWNEY: We're willing to listen to any -- We're ready to return to the negotiating table, we're ready to --

Q And allow this to be on the table?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: We're -- The best way to answer that, I think, is that we want to listen to any proposal that the Soviets have. If you are suggesting, I don't know whether you are, that we should propose a merger, we're not.

Q Have they proposed a merger?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: They have not proposed a merger.

Q What if they proposed a merger?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: That's a "what if" question. If they do, we'll see what they say.

Q Are we against a merger of the two --

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: We say that a merger would not solve any problems, you see. You can't solve anything procedurally that you can't solve substantively.

Q Ambassador, are you under any greater pressure this year to get a treaty because it is an election year?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: No.

Q Why not?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Because the President has always had a deep commitment to arms control, and he's told me, and others, that he's not going to make arms control a political issue. It's an issue which is of interest to the country, and it's always been that. He's made good proposals, he's modified those proposals, and under pressure, we've always strived for arms control. We're going to continue to do so.

Q Do you think the Soviets will go one way or the other this year, that is, to move toward a treaty to be helpful to Ronald Reagan, or to stay away from a treaty because they think it would hurt him?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: I think this is a decision they're going to make. I think that's something they -- In my estimate, it's in their interest to return.

Q Mr. Rowny --

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AMBASSADOR ROWNY: So I think that they --

Q Well, you've always said they were going to, that we would have a treaty, and last year you predicted by the end of the year we would have something.

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: No, I've had a lot of caveats on that, but I did say that, you know, that there would be progress toward an agreement and there is progress toward an agreement.

Q But deployment killed all of that, didn't it?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: The Soviets said that the deployment of INF missiles in Europe caused them to break off the INF and caused them to reassess the whole situation. They are reassessing.

Q Mr. Rowny, you seem to be signaling here, something that, at least I haven't heard before, and that is that you don't favor a merger of the INF and START talks, but if the Soviets come to the table and suggest such a thing, we're ready to listen and talk about that possibility.

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: I think that's a fair statement. So we are not seeking a merger, we think that a merger would solve nothing. You can't solve these problems just by combining the talks. On the other hand, if the Soviets want to return to the negotiating table, and want to give us serious proposals, we're going to listen to what those serious proposals are.

Q You aren't going to close the door -- although you don't favor a merger, you're not going to close the door on a merger in negotiations -- on combining the negotiations?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: I think that's a fair statement.

Q Do you have any idea about a time frame for when -- have the Soviets given you any indication as to a time frame when they might be willing to come back?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: No. No, all they've said was that in December when I proposed that we return in February -- February the 8th, they said that they cannot make a date for the resumption of talks because they want to reassess the situation. And they said they want to reassess it because of the INF talks.

Q No private communication since then about a time frame to --

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: No.

Q The Soviets say we have violated SALT treaties in the past. Do you know anything about our violations, what have they been?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Well, Larry Speakes addressed that earlier today --

Q No, he didn't.

Q He didn't.

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: -- and he and the State Department will say more about that. I stay in very close touch with what's going on and we have not violated the treaty. We stick by our treaties.

Q Excuse me. We have not done any violations, so you completely deny -- wait a second -- you completely deny the Soviet charges?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: I dismiss them, yes, as being groundless. And what I've heard are issues which have been rehashed and I thought were settled once before.

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Q General, I'm trying to get to this point. You're saying it's in the Soviet interest to come back. Are you saying that they might get a better arrangement with Reagan this year than they would if he's re-elected?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: No, not that they're going to get a better arrangement. I'm saying that when I started to explore with them the real concrete trade-offs and say, "Look, this is what we've got that you're interested in,

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bombers and cruise missiles, and we're interested in reducing those ballistic missiles that you have, particularly ICBMs." At that point, the INF talks had been broken off by then.

And, I think, uncharacteristically they didn't ask any questions. It would have been in their interest to ask some questions and to find out what we're talking about. I'm saying that we have some concrete proposals now on trade-offs which would be in the Soviets' interest, and I think they realize that.

Q -- their interest to reduce our bombers and missiles if they would just make a -- give us a little --

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: That's to give us some counter-reductions in their ICBMs --

Q Let's go over that, General. Is that why you say here you agreed there was more progress than realized and that you're in a position to make a breakthrough? Would you scan that breakthrough for us?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: What I'm saying is that over the 18 months there have been a number of moves on the part of the Soviets. And I don't want to spell those out in detail. I could for you sometime, but -- First, I've mentioned that they agreed that launchers alone was not of interest. They agreed to come down to 1800. They made some more moves on verification.

When we made our changes and modifications, they removed certain parts of their proposal which were offensive to us. It had to do with Trident submarines and have to do with -- What else was the other thought that -- their other, their second --

MR. WATSON: ALCM bans.

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Oh, yes. Their ALCM bans. They were not as demanding on those. Then, also, towards the end of the talks last December, they agreed to my proposal to talk about confidence-building measures which they hadn't talked about before. So, we had some meetings on that.

So, over the year and a half -- and we've also said that there are certain things in our interest and their interest, in our interest and theirs -- to bring forward from SALT II. So, all that's been done. So, now, we were in a position to get down to concrete actions and say, "All right. Now, let's get down to the nitty-gritty. What is it that you're concerned about and what are -- we're concerned?" It was at that point that the Soviets broke off INF.

Q You didn't bring in the trade-off, nitty-gritty until after they left INF is what you're saying?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: No, I brought it up. I had two tasks from the President in October. One was to explain to them the build-down and seek their agreement on buildup. That took the first part of the talks. I had then laid down to Victor Karpov the idea of exploring trade-offs. The next day they walked out of INF. So, when they came I said, "What's your reaction?" And they said, "We're not going to talk about this at this time." But it was in a rather, I'd say, muted tone.

We didn't get back to the real thing that I wanted to do -- was to explore trade-offs. I'm saying that's what we have to offer them now. And I think that's what they're interested in.

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Q Do you have any feeling at all that they might return to the talks, General?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: It's hard to speculate about what the Soviets are going to do. You know that. But --

Q Well, I know --

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: I've told you that I think that it's in their interest to --

Q Well, that's not my question.

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: -- come back, so I -- based on that --

Q My question is based on either the conversations between Shultz and Gromyko or conversations you may have had or any other diplomatic contact, whether or not --

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: It's --

Q -- there is any indication at all --

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Yes.

Q -- that the Soviets are ready to resume START talks?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: The indications are that they did not break off my talk. They did not say that they were breaking off in START. Their tone was different. They simply said that they were not ready to set a date for resumption.

Q Have they given any indication they're ready to set the date?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: No.

Q Then why do you come out and use a word like "breakthrough"? Doesn't that seem rather grand considering that the talks are suspended? You can't cite any affirmative evidence that --

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: No. Saying a breakthrough if they're ready to resume, come back to the talks, we are in a position to move forward. That's --

Q Isn't that a pretty big if?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Sure.

Q General, when you've talked to us in the past, you've said that it was going to be very hard to have any progress or any agreement in the START talks, but how about some progress in INF? Do you think this breakthrough you talked about is possible without the Soviets coming back to the INF table?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Oh, yes. I think that these are two independent things, two independent negotiations. I think that the Soviets are interested in strategic arms, as we are.

Q That's different than what you told us in the past, though. You've linked the two pretty closely.

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Well, the Soviets linked the two pretty closely. And the Soviets are the ones who have made the linkage and I still think that, yes, there has to -- We're not -- Let me put it this way, we're not going to enter into a START agreement which sells our allies down the river. We're not going to get one that's to the detriment -- So these two, you know, are linked to the point that we're going to protect our interests, which in Europe, which are our allies' interests. So we're not going to -- We're not dismissing that. So to that extent, sure, the two are related.

Q Mr. Rowny, given the Soviet tension since World War II to make sure that the United States -- and to build and build and build so that the United States -- they're equal to or above the United States in nuclear weapons and other weapons, why do we think now that there should be a change in the Soviet mentality? What tells us now there's going to be a change in the Soviet mentality that when we build to their level or above that they are not going to continue to build that much quicker?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: I think the major changes that, as Harold Brown said when he was Secretary of Defense, when we failed to build, they built. When we built, they built even more. The change is that this President has recognized that you have to have the twin avenues of approach. One is to take care of your own security. Modernize your forces. You have to do that to take care of your own security and having done that, you're in a better position to negotiate. This is different. This is a modernization of our forces and that does make for a difference.

Q Robert McFarlane came out here -- Or let's say a -- with other senior administration officials the other day and we talked about --

Q So much for that backgrounder. (Laughter.)

Q -- the possibility --

Q Jesus. (Laughter.)

Q -- talked about the possibility of the Soviets not coming back to the table.

Q Gotta start young.

Q Talked about the gamble the administration has taken in building. We heard some officials say that there is a real possibility now that the Soviets won't come back to the table, that the gamble that we've taken to build and deal from a position of strength may not work? Do you agree with that?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: There are all kinds of signals coming out. I've also read in the paper that a high Soviet official has said that, you know,

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they are ready to come back and that the election doesn't make that much difference. So, you know, there are all kinds of signals I'm saying that it's certainly in our interest to get a deal. I believe that it's in the Soviet's interest to get a deal. And I have reason to believe that they think it's in their interest to get an agreement to reduce the level of tension, to reduce arms.

With that, I can't speculate too much on what they're going to do. I don't really know. But I think that -- putting myself in the Soviet position and listening to what they say, that it is in their interest and therefore they'll come back to these talks.

Q Do they know with any precision what tradeoffs you have to offer them or did you never get a chance --

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Didn't get a chance to get it with any precision and I really didn't want to get any -- precision. I wanted to explore different types of concepts to see what --

Q -- you've got a package in your possession --

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Got several.

Q -- that you're ready to put out before them if they come back.

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: We have several different ways of approaching this to see what would be of best interest to them, what they would be interested in.

Q They don't know what they are yet?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Pardon me?

Q They do not know what they are?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: No. No, they didn't probe any further and when I said, "I'm ready to talk more about these." They said, "Well, we're not. We have to -- "

Q General, are you out here to help the President today as a candidate on the war and peace issue? (Laughter.)

AMBASSADOR ROWNY. No, I'm here because the President meets with me periodically. I've met with him since I've been back. I wrote him a memo. I've met with him again. I meet with him several times between the talks. He has not changed his commitment to arms control and he made that point this morning.

Q -- timing, General? What about the day after he announces for re-election?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: No. We set this up some time ago and -- some weeks ago and so --

Q So was the --

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Well, all right. But --

Q General, speaking realistically, since war and peace are definitely issues in the campaign, what can you say to the American people about the status of negotiations by this White House, this President with the Soviet Union as to a possibility of at least a thaw between the two countries?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Well, I can say that the President made a talk here on the

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16th of January where he made proposals to resume the dialogue. He repeated that in his State of the Union address. He has authorized me to make certain changes along the way to our proposals, saying that we want to stick to our basic objectives. We'll reduce as far down as the Soviets want to go, but listen to their concerns, listen to their complaints. He then authorized further moves, such as the build-down, such as exploring trade-offs.

So, he has authorized me to continue to bring the horse to water now. The horse has to drink.

MR. SIMS: About one more question -- Bruce? Then George.

Q Two weeks or so ago -- and I wish I had his words in front of me -- Mr. Nitze was out here. He sounded far more negative than you did on the prospect of even considering bringing the two talks together. Has something changed since then, or do you have a basic disagreement with Mr. Nitze?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: No, no. Nitze and I agree and Nitze and I are in agreement and the administration has agreed with our recommendation that a merger proposal -- proposal for merger -- is not in our interest and it would solve no problems.

Nitze's counterpart walked out, and, you know, he had reason to be pessimistic. My counterpart has not walked out. He says he would not resume.

MR. SIMS: George?

Q General? I have two questions: Number one, you differentiate here between the START and INF talks as far as the Soviet position. You say they've walked out of INF, but you don't believe they've walked out of your talks?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: They have not walked out, no.

Q -- so START could resume where, do you think, INF probably would --

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: That's right. They have never said they were walking out of START, or -- and they haven't gone beyond saying that they have to reassess the situation. Now -- let's take them at their word. They're reassessing the situation.

Q Is it no longer our position that merging the talks would be detrimental or -- for negotiations, because then we would have to negotiate with our allies, or consult with our allies on START also, as well as INF?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Those issues have not gone away, those issues are still there. That's why we say we're not -- it's not our policy to propose a merger, nor do we think that we believe that a merger is going to solve these problems that were not solved before.

Having said that --

Q Will they create more problems?

Q Let him finish, let him finish his sentence.

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: They might. They might create some more problems, yes. They might --

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Q Well did --

Q How do you --

Q Did they accept the --

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: (Laughter.) Having -- having said that -- in response to your other questions -- if the Soviets, say that they want to talk and then begin bringing in other issues, we're going to listen to any reasonable proposal they have.

Q Did they go for boat build-down?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: They were cool to it.

Q Why do you think the Soviets have accused us of violating these treaties?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Doing what comes naturally. Look through the history of what they do. When you -- you accuse them, they -- their first move is to come back, you see. That's standard negotiating practice in -- Soviet treaty -- Soviet behavior, but --

Q Have they asked you for any clarifying --

MR. SIMS: We've had the last question several times. Let's let the Ambassador go. We'll have his statement text in about two minutes here.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 10:26 A.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE
VISIT OF PRESIDENT SPILJAK OF YUGOSLAVIA

January 30, 1984

The Briefing Room

11:07 A.M. EST

MR. SIMS: This is a background briefing for your information only, not for publication. The briefing is on the visit of President Spiljak of Yugoslavia.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Good morning to this huge crowd.

President Spiljak is the President of the State Presidency of Yugoslavia. The State Presidency rotates every year. He has been in charge now for some months and leaves in May. So he is President through May.

This is the way that Yugoslavia has been ruled since Tito's death in May of 1980, that it has been a rotating state presidency.

The main purpose of the visit is to reaffirm our support for Yugoslavia's independence, its unity, territorial integrity, and non-alignment. We're all conscious that since Tito's break with Stalin in 1948, Yugoslavia's independence and the stability of the Balkans has been important for stability in Europe as a whole.

With the Olympics in Sarajevo, I think we're all conscious that World War I broke out in that part of the world. It is an area in which there is potential instability and, therefore, it is important for us to work closely with the government of Yugoslavia to preserve their situation, their integrity, and their independence from the Soviet Union.

I think it's fair to say that of all the communist countries in the world, we probably have the most extensive and most cooperative relationship with the Yugoslavs that we have with any of them. And that goes back through many administrations.

A second major objective for the visit is to continue to work closely with the Yugoslavs in their difficult financial and economic situation. Like many countries, the last two years have been very hard for them. There's been a 20 percent decline in per capita income in Yugoslavia. They have an $18 billion debt to the West and the United States took the lead a year and a half ago to help them through their difficulties by launching something called, "The Friends of Yugoslavia Effort". That succeeded last year.

We, together with fifteen other countries, with the World Bank, the IMF, the BIS -- the Board for International Settlements, and with over six hundred banks, helped the Yugoslavs to turn around their situation from a $1.4 billion current account deficit in 1982 into a $100 million current account surplus in 1983.

Q Well, what's the $18 billion debt?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's their total debt to the West. Their total hard currency debt is $18 billion.

Q Well, what's the $100 million?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: 1.4 -- the $100 million is a current account surplus. That's an annual figure. $18 billion is their long-term, medium term, et cetera, debt -- total debt.

Q Well, how can they have a surplus with a debt like that? I know I'm --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They've managed to service their debt so that they're now in a situation where they can maintain interests payments, et cetera, and they still are managing, when you take into account their exports, imports, to have a $100 million current account surplus.

The third purpose of the visit is to talk with President Spiljak about the East-West situation, their relations with the Soviets, and ours, and the overall situation in Europe.

President Spiljak was invited to visit with Mr. Andropov in December. That visit was postponed because of, presumably, Andropov's illness. But it is still on in principle. The Yugoslavs are astute observers of the Soviet scene, have been for decades, and, therefore, we feel it is useful to talk with them about what's happening in Moscow.

They share our concern that the Soviets left the negotiating arms control tables in Geneva and, like us, would like to see the arms control process put back on track so we will be talking with them about that.

A fourth purpose of the visit is to underline the importance of our --

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cooperation in the sports field. Sarajevo is of course the site for the Winter Olympics opening next week, and Los Angeles is of course the site for the Summer Olympics. And our two Olympic committees have been working extremely closely. The head of the L.A. Olympic committee told me recently that he has never seen such extraordinary cooperation in security planning, logistics, et cetera, and that he believes the Winter games are going to be a big success, that the Yugoslavs have managed to get all set up. So President Spiljak will be going out to Los Angeles on Thursday to meet with our Olympic people, and to give a speech, to tour our facilities, and that's part of the symbolism of the visit. In the same vein we will also be signing on Thursday a tourism agreement with Yugoslavia. Commerce Secretary Baldrige, and Yugoslav Vice President Dragan will be signing a tourism agreement on Thursday.

Q -- have to be in L.A. then --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Here. No, the signing is here. It's before the party goes out to Los Angeles.

Q What will that do?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can give you a little description of what it will do, just one second. It provides for simplification of travel procedures, development of new commercial opportunities for tourism-related merchandise and joint ventures in tourism facilities, improvement of tourism statistics, and encouragement of direct cooperation between U.S. and Yugoslav cities to promote tourist traffic. Finally, the visit will also focus on the problem of terrorism worldwide. The Yugoslavs have suffered from terrorism in this country. Some of their missions in the past and houses here in Washington have been bombed. They are concerned about the terrorism problem here, and in other countries as well, and we, of course, are very concerned about terrorism worldwide. So one of the subjects for the visit will be cooperation to try to control and eliminate terrorism.

Q Is that --topic of the discussions with the President, or is that something that's going to be discussed somewhere else?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think both. That's all I had in the way of prepared --

Q Are there special security arrangements being taken to protect him during the visit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They are the usual security procedures which are, of course, special in the sense that they're very extensive, but they aren't any different than we do with other Heads of State, heads of government.

Q You said they're concerned about the break off of the arms talks. Are they concerned as well about the deployment of the missiles in Western Europe?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: About both deployment of Soviet missiles and of American missiles, yes.

Q Would you like to break down their degrees of concern, which ones are they more concerned about?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think they're equally concerned with both because both, from their point of view, raise the level of tensions.

Q And they are not in any way abasing -- Hungary for those --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, they're not a member of the Warsaw Pact. They are an independent and non-aligning country as I mentioned -- important to recall that they broke from the Soviets, from Stalin, in '48 and they've never gone back into any alliance relationship with the Soviets.

Q Are there any immediate outstanding issues that they will try to address?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I've been over the general turf. They are going to be very interested --

Q No, but I mean differences.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Between us and Yugoslavia?

Q Yes. Right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, our bilateral relationsh is really extraordinarily good. It's as good as it's ever been. We have a lot of things we're working on together like the economic package for this year -- and we'll be discussing that in some detail. They'll be having meetings with the International Monetary Fund when they're here, which is coordinating a stabilization program for Yugoslavia. So they'll be substantive discussions about that, and some other things. But there is no sort of sharp problem in the relationship that needs to be resolved.

Q Have they been coming regularly, these, you know, one year presidents -- Have they been coming to the United States since Tito?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, this is the first visit at that level since Tito died.

Q What about Yugoslavian participation in the proposal for a Balkan freeze zone, a nuclear freeze zone on the Balkans -- was that their proposal?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it was a Greek -- well, there are a number of countries that have been interested in that. The Rumanians have been, the Bulgarians, the Greeks have been interested and the Yugoslavs are also interested in that.

Q What is the U.S. view of that proposal?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFICIAL: We oppose it. As we oppose nuclear weapons free zones in northern Europe. You know, there is a similar concept for the Nordic area. We believe that Europe, in terms of its security needs is an integrated whole and that you cannot take pieces of it away. You've got to look at the overall picture.

Q But wouldn't it be to the U.S. advantage to have part of eastern Europe in a nuclear free zone?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The countries that would be involved in a Balkan nuclear weapons free zone do not now have nuclear weapons. So, we don't gain anything in the sense that you'd be removing nuclear weapons from that area.

Q So why wouldn't it be a good idea, then, to make it a nuclear free zone so there never would be weapons there?

SENIOR ADMINISTATION OFFICIAL: We feel very strongly that if you're going to have a nuclear arms control agreement for Europe, it's got to include the areas where there are weapons and that would include the Soviet Union and eastern Europe if we're going to get into that part of it. But the approach we've been pursuing, which, as you know, is the Intermediate Nuclear Force Talks in Geneva, does get at the most serious problems now. And we think that we'd be sidetracking if we started to pick up another effort in the Balkans or in the Nordic area, that that wouldn't get at the fundamental security problems presented by the SS-20's and, from the Soviet point of view, presented by our Pershing and cruise missile deployments.

Q There was a lot of concern around the time of Tito's death that the change in leadership could cause Yugoslavia to drift back toward the Soviet Union. What's your view of that? Has that happened or are you still concerned about it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it is a concern that, you know, we have to keep watching. The main ingredient, I think, is Yugoslav nationalism. They don't want to become a puppet of the Soviet Union. They are fiercely independent, as they demonstrated in the fighting against the Germans during the Second World War. So, the only condition under which they would slide into a closer relationship with the Soviets would be out of compulsion. If their economic situation got so bad, for example, and if the West was unwilling to be helpful, you could foresee a situation in which they might -- some elements in Yugoslavia might feel compelled to establish a closer relationship with the East.

Q Have the Soviets tried to exploit their economic problems?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: One thing that's saving us in that regard is that the Soviets are having their own economic problems and they have not been able to help countries, even countries in the Warsaw Pact like Hungary have not received much in the way of Soviet assistance during this period of austerity for all of them. And that includes the Yugoslavs who have not -- not been helped by the Soviets.

Q Have the Soviets been trying to play on some of the nationalities within Yugoslavia to try to separate them from the central government, play, you know, on the -- Which nationality is that guy representing now?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He's a Croatian and --

Q And the next time it'll be a Montanegrin or somebody --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right.

Q -- like that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, there'll be a rotation.

Q -- play on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Periodically, you get some reports. But there hasn't been a major effort by the Soviets to do that sort of thing recently. But our concern is that if you got a very desperate economic situation there, then national tensions could rise and you could have that kind of playing around by the Soviets. But in the presnet context, that isn't a problem --

Q -- this rotating thing has worked reasonably well?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. It seems on the surface a little bit unusual to have a President who's only in office for a year. But given the national makeup of Yugoslavia, where you have all of these different groups, it, in fact, has worked quite well. And there is a Prime Minister who has more tenure under him who is a woman named Planinc who has a little bit longer tenure in office.

Q How long is his visit here in the U.S.?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He'll be arriving here in Washington tomorrow and he'll be here in Washington until Thursday. Then he goes out to LA on Thursday. He'll be in Los Angeles on Thursday and Friday and then he comes back and departs from New York on Saturday morning early.

If you'd like, I can give you the events here in Washington, if that's helpful. He'll be arriving tomorrow afternoon at the Washington Monument at 4:40 p.m.

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and then his meeting with the President is at 11:30 a.m. Wednesday morning, which will be followed by a working lunch and departure statements at 1:30 p.m. Wednesday. And then he -- he then goes into a series of meetings with Acting Secretary Dam, Secretary Weinberger, Treasury Secretary Regan. The Vice President has a dinner for him on Wednesday night.

Then on Thursday morning he has meetings with Mr. Brock, with the House Foreign Affairs Committee, with the Vice President, with Commerce Secretary Baldrige, with the Senate -- he has lunch with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and then he goes out to L.A.

Q Was the subject of the talks with Weinberger?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have had both a dialogue with them on military concerns -- security concerns -- and we have had some modest amount of military sales. And there is also a program where our troops can go and use Yugoslav recreational facilities on vacation, so there are --

Q What are we --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- a variety of things -- a variety of small things that we do in the security area with the Yugoslavs.

Q What do we sell them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We've been involved in some anti-tank weapons and there are some other things relating to aircraft -- some radars for airports, and there are other things that are under consideration.

Q Anything you could tell us about?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry, I don't want to beyond that. There's nothing -- I don't want to seem mysterious. There's nothing very big there. This is not a major arms sales relationship. It's very modest.

Q They get arms from the Soviets, too.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. The Soviets are their major foreign supplier. However, the Yugloslavs also produce most of their own weaponry and export to the Third World. I've forgotten what the exact figure is, but it's in the range of 80 to 90 -- I think 85 percent they produce themselves. And they buy from a number of Western European countries, too, the Swedes, the French, the Swiss --

Q Some of those weapons, I know, show up in Central America, for example. Is there going to be some discussion about the Yugloslav sale to the Third World? Are we going to encourage that they don't do that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We will have a discussion on the Third World. To my knowledge, there have never been any Yugloslav weapons in Central America.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 11:21 A.M. EST

DRAFT

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ON-THE-RECORD BRIEFING
THE HONORABLE M. PETER McPHERSON
ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
U.S. AID INITIATIVE IN AFRICA
MONDAY, JANUARY 30, 1984, 2:30 P. M.

MR. McPHERSON: Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. Let me make a couple comments that may be helpful, and then let's just move right into questions. We're dealing with, by our estimation, about four to five million people who, absent any outside help whatsoever, we think would be under threat of starvation in Africa.

One of the countries which has been called to special attention recently, and that is Madagascar, where there have been found to be substantial problems in inland -- the transportation distribution within the country. That's not a unique problem. That often ends up to be a major obstacle.

We have been under discussions with CARE -- a private voluntary organization -- who have now some people working at the situation in Madagascar, and it is our expectation to provide about $2 million for inland transportation there in Madgascar, and we think it will somewhat help the situation.

(Staff member conversed with Mr. McPherson)

MR. McPHERSON: I beg your pardon. I'm talking about Mozambique -- the $2 million for Mozambique. (Laughter) Little different, isn't it?

Mozambique -- you've read and heard in recent days the problems there, and that will be $2 million for CARE.

Why don't I just open it up to questions.

Q Can you clarify something at the beginning about these figures? Is the 500 million, for example, for the long-term development going on top of earlier projected figures?

A Yes. Let me give you those figures exactly. For Fiscal-84 we've asked for $943 million -- we have $943 million. For Fiscal-85 -- now, that's a figure that hasn't been public at all until today -- we're going to be asking for 1 billion 63 million point 6, to be precise, from Congress.

Q 600 million -- 1 billion and 600 --

A 1063.6.

Q One oh --

A 1063.6. That's up from 943 million. Now, the 73 is included in that last figure I gave you -- the 1063.6. So even without regard for the initiative, in fact the '85 number is up.

What we're saying is that we will ask Congress for Fiscal-85, for $75 million toward this initiative. We will ask Congress in Fiscal-85 for the budget that the President sends up in the next couple days, for $75 million.

In the four years thereafter -- the four fiscal years thereafter, we will be asking for the balance. This will be a five-year program where we expect to ask for $500 million, for a half a billion dollars.

This fund -- we expect to have no less than five nor more than ten countries receive benefits from this fund in any given year. We don't want to have too many countries because we don't think it will have -- it will be a big enough carrot, as the Secretary was suggesting a moment ago, nor too few, really, because we think it can have broad applicability.

Q When you speak of economic reforms, what do you mean? Are you asking these countries to move in the direction of free market capitalism? What do you mean by an economic reform?

A Probably the biggest single inhibitor of economic -- or agricultural production in Africa has been the tendency of African countries to pay farmers substantially below market prices, below what they would get if there was a free market. Often the prices may be as low as half what you would get on a free market.

They do that because essentially they wish to provide cheap food for urban dwellers. Farmers tend to be poorer than the recipients of the food in the urban areas, and in fact what you have is a tax on the farmers for the difference. What that means is that the farmer can't make enough money to get fertilizer to put on his land or to buy hybrid seed, or whatever, to increase production. There isn't an incentive to produce more.

The net effect of this has been just to -- production which has fallen off dramatically. That's one of the major reforms. And in some places, like Madagascar, like Somalia, in recent times they've addressed those problems, and it looks like production is going to respond -- begun to address those problems.

Another very common difficulty is that the state controls the purchase and the marketing -- what they call state marketing boards -- in these countries, and those very inefficient operations have often almost been a strangling apparatus on agricultural production and efficiency. Those are two primary concerns, and I would say at least at this juncture a dominant concern to us.

Other economic issues which we think have an impact -- exchange rates and so forth -- but our focus in this initiative are on those agriculture policy changes.

Q May I follow up something that the Secretary said? I didn't understand his answer to me when I asked about the dairy surplus which some countries, as you know, are protesting.

Is the United States giving surplus dairy products to the African countries to resell as the U.S. is planning to do with Jamaica?

A Through this program, no. Through other programs, there is a distribution -- there is through our other PL-480, Title II programs and Title I programs, we are providing some dried milk, yes.

Q What are --

A We think -- pardon? -- we don't think -- I don't know of any place where at this time I think that the milk is dampening local production.

Q What other countries besides Jamaica? What other programs besides Jamaica?

A Well, all over the world we provide some milk. I mean --

Q This is the one that's under protest, is that the U.S. is providing the dairy for the countries to resell and then use the money.

A Well, let me see. There's several countries around the world. Let us provide that list to you. But we have what is called a Title II Modernization Program in several different countries.

Q On the farm production end of it, the Secretary said the Zambia was making progress. The last I heard from Zambia, the main problem was that the European farmers had all disappeared, and their cooperation wasn't -- these government cooperatives weren't making it. What's happened to change that?

A There remain major problems in Zambia in our judgment. These cooperatives, in fact, haven't been very efficient, but the government has in fact raised the prices that the farmers are receiving. They've begun to address one of the central problems. It's not everything.

And I would say that places like Madagascar perhaps have gone further, and Somalia too, and Sudan too. But there have been some major changes in Zambia.

Q If we're talking about spending -- about having ten countries, so you're thinking about maybe $7 million a country in a year.

A It depends, yes.

Q And you're also talking about the problem being that prices are very low to the farmers to keep prices low in the cities. Are you talking about countries, then, starting to subsidize more heavily food to the consumers by raising agricultural prices? I mean, what do you do with the $7 million, for example, that goes into a country?

A Let me give you an example how this would work. If farmers' prices are raised at the farm gate, so to speak, it may not automatically and quickly happen that farmers will raise more, because they may not have, for example, any money to buy fertilizer. And fertilizer is often a critical component, obviously, to the increased production.

Q The government may not have any fertilizer for them to buy.

A That's right. They may not have any fertilizer. So one of the ways to get the system going in an upward spiral might be to provide fertilizer. And I would say that's one of the key fashions that we envision happening.

Q Can we tie that money to purchases in the United States, or the United States --

A Well, we usually do, but it depends on how it is distributed. If it were done in cash with a general understanding that they would buy -- that they would increase fertilizer from whatever revenues, then it wouldn't be tied. But often it would be, and if we had the lead time, we probably would expect to do that. Our fertilizer industry is really very competitive.

Q I just noticed what you said were some of the problems there is subsidies and marketing and pricing problems. A couple weeks ago the U.S. backed, after a long battle, an IDB loan to Guyana for a for a rice scheme, and it wasn't backed and protested for a long time because of these very issues you mention.

A Precisely.

Q Is this going to become a greater trend whereby U.S. AID programs are administered with conditionality for countries that hope to receive U.S. assistance for agricultural policies?

A Well, in fact, for three years we've made -- we've put major emphasis on this. This policy highlights and really, I suppose, targets these policy reform efforts, but it has been a mainstay of what we've been doing at AID for three years now.

We think that frankly you just aren't using your resources efficiently if the policy context isn't right. And we look at ourselves as sort of development bankers, and we need to put our money where there will be economic growth. So we think it's a good thing.

And I would argue, moreover, that what we're doing is having the maximum impact upon poor people, helping poor people the most. What's involved here is these farmers that in effect are often discriminated against are the poorest people in their country usually, and what we're saying to countries, if you want our help on some things, we would like to have you help those poorest people in your land more.

So, yes, there has been quite a lot, and we expect there will continue to be more. Incidentally, a key part of this is to strengthen the donor coordination role of the

World Bank and other donors. We've consulted just exhaustively really, or extensively anyway, with the Bank and with the other donors around the world.

There is growing interest in this policy dialogue, as we call it. A lot of donors are thinking about it. The World Bank has gotten quite deep into it, and we think that this initiative will highlight these kinds of concerns and support that whole effort.

I think that this will have quite a lot of impact for the money that's there, but the impact will be well beyond the money that we ourselves spend in my judgment.

Q I just wanted to get back to the political considerations. Now, two of the countries that you mention, so far as receiving long-term and short-term assistance, are Somalia and the Sudan which are strategic allies, more or less, of the United States. The Somalias have a facilities -- strategic facilities agreement with the U.S.

A Right.

Q Two countries that are not on there are Angola and Ethiopia. Now, is Angola and Ethiopia -- I know there are a lot of poor farmers in both of those countries, too. Are they going to be penalized or excluded from the long-term aid as long as the political issues remain outstanding?

A Angola and Ethiopia are classical examples of a lack of policy reform. They are classical in the sense that they have paid their farmers far below market levels, they have state marketing systems. Frankly, one of the bigger problems in my judgment in Ethiopia in terms of food needs right now is that they simple haven't put in place the incentives.

I think it's pretty important to think of this program as really an incentive program to give poor peole more income. Essentially what we're looking at is how to keep -- how to help the poorest people in these societies who in Africa over a period of years are simply eating less.

People on a per capita basis in Africa have fewers calories today then 10, 15 years ago. I mean, the only way -- and you can't have for who knows how many years an international charity operation. The population keep growing and growing. We've got to figure out how to have these people be able to produce more for themselves, and at this juncture

Ethiopia and Angola don't have in place -- and I think that's especially true perhaps for Ethiopia -- a system which will encourage their farmers to do more.

Q On the Sudanese question, the Arabs sunk millions in the Sudan. It was going to be the granary for the Arabic countries and so forth, and nothing has ever happened.

How are we going to be any better?

A Well, I've looked at the irrigation systems that the Saudis and others spent so many millions, and hundreds of millions of dollars in Sudan, and what -- and that was, I would argue, a good example of my case in point here: That the Sudan Government controlled the prices paid to the farmer, in fact, told the farmers what they had to grow, for a number of ways, in effect, kept a lid on the income the farmer could get, and the results proved what's there.

Now, the Sudan Government is beginning to look at that, beginning to move in some of those areas, and as an old Michigan farm boy I looked over that land in Sudan and I said, "Goodness, I think a lot can be produced here." I think if the incentives are right, it will work.

Q I'd like to follow up the question back here just a minute. I'd like to get you to say whether Ethiopia and Angola are likely to get any money under this program which you said was designed to be an incentive to provide policy reform. If it's a classic example of a lack of policy reform, is the Administration going to give them money as an incentive to reform their policy?

A I think we'd be happy to look at what they do as time goes. We don't envision giving monies to countries under this program sort of "on the hopes." We expect to see realy progress before monies should be given under this program.

As has been noted by the Secretary and discussed here by me today, there are a fairly large number of countries which in fact have made such changes. What's happened is in the last three or four years there's been almost a sea change in the way African country leadership looked at their problems. They historically were fairly statused to a centralist in their control of their economies, but in many cases they've found it just hasn't worked.

This is not a matter of ideology; this is a matter of economics. The question is, how do poor people become the most productive?

Q But let me ask, the obverse is that these countries are also terrified of food riots in the cities. If the price is going to be raised to the farmers, who's going to pay? I think someone asked earlier, every time a country tries to raise even slightly the price of grain or wheat or bread, they come close to being overthrown.

A Well, this is obviously a very sensitive political matter. It is true, however, that a number of countries in Africa in recent years -- Sudan, as an example -- have raised prices of goods, and, if done slowly and carefully, or at least carefully, some of the political problems can be averted.

But the other side of this, frankly, is if you can make your own farmers more efficient, produce more, the facts are that over a period of time the commodity prices should be able to go down.

There are some examples in various countries where lifting the prices in fact meant that prices to the consumers went down -- lifing the prices to the farmers. Well, Egypt has tried this. I wouldn't like to parade Egypt as an example of massive economic reform, but in the last year -- President Mubaraka, when I was there a couple months ago, was telling me about the lifting of prices on fruits -- watermelons, various kinds of vegetables, some limited price increases to the consumer. When the government lifted the price, in fact the price went down, because with the play of the market there was simply more available. I thought it was a very interesting phenomenon.

I'm not arguing that's going to happen vastly --

Q He better not lift it on bread.

A That's not going to happen in a large area, but the facts are that we -- I think that if you are able to increase agricultural production so that there is a broader supply, the cost to the consumer in these countries won't be as great as on the face it appears.

I don't mean to minimize this problem, because in fact this is a very delicate situation. It has to work. We in fact see our money being -- helping in this adjustment process.

Q Mr. McPherson, I'm trying to put together these figures and to relate them to a briefing we had about a month ago, about a $100 million program on short-term drought relief.

Is that the same program except slightly reduced? Are the figures announced today -- that $100 -- slightly pared down? It was about a month ago we had a briefing with you.

A When we talked about a possible supplemental?

Q Yes.

A The supplemental that we're talking about is we have now, including the figures today, announced -- or have committed out of current reserves $84.7 million, to be precise. We have a handout which you will all see that will have these figures. $80.4 million for disaster assistance for Africa this year, and we are asking for Congress for an '84 supplemental for another 90. That's the whole package.

Q A GAO report some time ago criticized AID missions in Africa for not having the political clout or the expertise on advising governments under food policy.

Are they going to beef up that end of it? I mean, is a lot of technical assistance coming with this money?

A We've done a lot. Yes. We think that -- you can't very reasonably give technical advice to people unless you really know what you're talking about, and our effort to beef up our economics staff and our capability has really been very extensive.

Q Where does Zimbabwe fit in the picture here? Is some of this money going to go towards ameliorating the funds that were cut for what the Zimbabweans said were political purposes earlier on?

A We're not -- we're prepared to look at Zimbabwe and any other country in terms of how they stand on the economic reform picture. Remember, we don't have these monies in hand, it will take a while before we get them, so we'll have to look at the facts then. And my examples in no way suggest that those countries are earmarked for what we do here.

There's one other point I wanted to make, and that was about IDA. As some of you know, our position on

IDA is that of the 750 and of the new -- of this new replenishment that IDA countries should be given -- in effect the preference should be given a fairly substantial share, so we don't view this in any way as a substitute for our IDA position, because in fact we think that IDA under the seventh replenishment should have a substantial African component in any case.

And what we've got here is a situation where we just can't talk about keeping people alive. We want to help make their lives worthwhile. What we've got is a program where we're trying to deal with potential large-scale starvation, and hence the drought assistance. At the same time, this is something that has to be worked on over a period of years, and I believe that this dual approach -- a drought assistance and economic policy initiative to help poor people over a long term have better lives -- is in fact a fairly imaginative and really an integrated approach to how we deal with these problems.

Q Can I ask one brief question? Isn't this just another attempt to tie foreign aid -- getting away from the basic human needs approach? I mean, the increase with the $75 million in '85 is not that much more than what you got last year. You're just earmarking a few extra dollars for countries that follow our agricultural policy.

A I would argue, Jim, that the countries that follow pragmatic economic policies that end up helping pay their poorest people more is the essence of basic human needs.

Q Okay. Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 2:50 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
VISIT OF FOREIGN MINISTER ABE, JAPAN

MONDAY, JANUARY 30, 1984, 3:15 P.M.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We'll start with just a few comments. Japanese Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe is today concluding what in our view has been an important and highly useful visit to Washington. Actually, he leaves tomorrow morning. I guess he concludes it tomorrow.

We welcome Foreign Minister Abe's return to the Foreign Ministry and to the key position that he is playing in strengthening U.S.-Japan relations.

During the Foreign Minister's visit here, which began on January 26, he met with the President and the Vice President. He had two meetings with the Secretary of State. In addition, I might say a social occasion Friday evening. He met twice with special trade representative Brock, with Secretary of Defense Weinberger, with Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan, and with Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige.

As we have said a number of times, the U.S.-Japan relationship increasingly is becoming an international relationship. The topics on the agenda between the Secretary and the Foreign Minister clearly reflected this. They included Soviet relations, arms control prospects, a number of Asian regional issues, including China, Korea, Indo-China, ASEAN affairs, the Middle East, including Lebanon and Iran-Iraq, and international economic issues -- particularly issues of aid and debt for the developing countries.

The other very important aspect of the Abe visit concerns the follow-up to the President's November trip to Japan, and in particular the effort to achieve significant progress on a number of outstanding bilateral issues, particularly in the trade and economic area. The Foreign Minister did not come here to negotiate specific issues but he plays a very important role within the Nakasone Cabinet in the follow-up process. He has been given responsibility for coordinating Japan's external economic affairs.

In our meetings with Foreign Minister Abe, we sought to impress upon him the importance that we attach to achieving significant, concrete results on our outstanding trade issues. I am sure that he is carrying back to Japan a very clear, unified message from the U.S. Government on the need for early and substantial progress on these issues.

At the same time I would say he certainly conveyed to us not only the determination of Japan to deal with these problems but also in many important areas the difficulties it faces in doing so.

We are pleased to note that the Foreign Minister and Ambassador Brock this morning signed a three-year renewal of the NTT Agreement. We are looking for similar examples of progress in the months ahead on such important issues as the question of agricultural quotas, tariff cuts, high technology trade and investment, energy cooperation, and capital market liberalization.

I'll be glad to try to answer any questions you have.

Q I suppose that Foreign Minister Abe stressed the great need to have dialogue with the Soviet Union during the meeting with Secretary Shultz, and Japan is going to have a working-level meeting with the Soviet Union at Moscow, possibly this coming March.

Foreign Minister Abe himself, I suppose, is ready to have a meeting with the Soviet Foreign Minister. What is the United States response to those Japan-Soviet dialogue. Is the United States Government welcoming such kind of dialogue?

A I might mention, by the way, that Deputy Foreign Minister Nakajima also had a separate meeting with Under Secretary Eagleburger, and the question of East-West relations was also an important subject in their discussions, and I believe he's the official that would go to Moscow for those talks that you mentioned.

I think that we have a very common sense of purpose with the Government of Japan in this whole area and, indeed, with all our Allies. One of the points that was stressed very strongly on our side is the great value of the strong unity shown by the western Allies in dealing with the Soviet Union. We believe that in the long run that unity is a key to successful efforts to negotiate.

We remain very interested in seeking useful agreements with the Soviet Union on outstanding issues. We're somewhat dismayed by the position that they're taking right now, but we think that the best way to make progress in solving those problems is, in fact, through the unity of ourselves and our Allies.

Q Wasn't there an agreement at the time that President Reagan was in Tokyo that the Japanese were going to appoint a single official to sort of deal with the trade problems, and this is sort of a temporary thing; that Foreign Minister Abe is to deal with the exterior parts of it, and I've forgotten who the Assistant Deputy Secretary who is doing the inside stuff.

II-401

A When we were in Tokyo, all that happened was that we informed the Japanese side that we would make the Vice President in charge on our side. In doing so, we recognize that there is no precise counterpart in the Japanese system. In fact, no position remotely comparable.

Let me say a word about how they're organized. A summary evaluation is that what the Prime Minister has done is to put himself in overall charge of the follow-up effort, and it's really hard to imagine a more serious arrangement from our point of view than for the Prime Minister himself to be taking on a kind of personal responsibility to see that the effort works.

Under him, he has designated the Economic Planning Agency Minister -- his title is Director, Toshio Komoto -- as responsible for interdepartmental coordination on the Japanese side. He's designated a senior LDP leader, Masumi Esaki, as responsible for internal party coordination. And he has designated Foreign Minister Abe as in charge of the External Economic Affairs. That is to say, the negotiations themselves.

I think that this represents a solution that seems to best fit the Japanese system. And as far as the seriousness of it, we are in fact very heartened both by the Prime Minister's own role and by the number of senior party leaders that have been brought into the process.

(Continued on next page)

Q You have made quite clear what the U.S. message to Japan on these economic problems is. What prospects for progress do you see in each of these field you have listed?

A I think if I could describe the issues for you -- I think if I got in the position of predicting results, it would be a mistake; but I think we have had very strong expressions of determination, from the Prime Minister on down on the Japanese side, to working with us to solve these problems. I think both sides recognize the importance of making progress here; and I'd say that despite the difficulty of each individual problem, overall, I feel optimistic.

Q Have you noticed any lessening in determination since the election in December?

A No. I think we went through a period when, understandably enough, the chief focus was on putting together a new government, and as it turned out, bringing new Diet members into the party in a way that I think has significantly strengthened the LDP membership within the Diet, and I think strengthened the position of the government.

After that period, we have been very impressed with the way the Government of Japan has gotten down to business on these issues. And while occasionally, it is mentioned that the election results pose a new difficulty, I think we have kept emphasizing the point that, difficult or not, we have got to make progress. And I think that message is agreed upon.

Q When you say, "We have got to make progress," who, exactly has got to make progress? And progress on what -- that the Japanese have to make progress on liberalizing their trade and we have to make progress where?

A Unfortunately, there is a certain asymmetry here that corresponds to the fact that we have a very asymmetric trade relationship right now. The deficit runs in one direction, and there are a lot of points on which we've got to have some help from Japan and we've got to have an opening of Japanese markets.

At the same time, that does require mutual efforts to reach agreement on difficult issues. You can't come to an agreement simply by one party doing all the work. And there are issues that the Japanese have raised with us. I think, most importantly from their point of view, there is the question of the unitary tax which the Foreign Minister took up with Secretary Regan.

Q [redacted] to what extent was the issue of relations with China discussed? And did you discuss the application for China's membership in the ADB?

II-411

A We didn't discuss that specific issue. We did have some general discussion of our relations with China and of the forthcoming visits of the Prime Minister to China in March and of our President to China in April, and recognized the importance to both of us, of both our countries' having good relations with the Peoples Republic.

Q In the area of high technology, were there any assurances from Mr. Abe regarding this government's concerns over new moves within the Diet and the LDP to restrict U.S. sales of high technology, especially the VAN and the Copyright Law on software?

A He certainly heard about those concerns again rather forcefully, and I think they understand just how seriously we would view those new regulations. He wasn't in a position to offer us a solution to the problem, but I think it was very helpful to be able to air it at that level.

Q The beef and citrus purchase agreements run out at the end of March, and there was a report that Yamamura, the Agricultural Minister, was supposed to come this week, but he is not coming. When and how will you handle that?

A That's, on our side, really up to Ambassador Brock. I don't know. There, obviously, are a number of ways we can continue further discussions, including a possible ministerial visit in the future. There is some distance between us on that issue, and it is a difficult one so we're going to have to work in bridging it.

Q You said you discussed on Korean questions. What, actually, did Japan give the assurance to the U.S. on stability in the Korean Peninsula, including support for the four-party conference? The President --

A I think, as I've said in some other briefings, when we look at the North Korean proposal for talks, we look at it, first of all, with a very large dose of skepticism based on the fact that this proposal comes from the government that carried out the Rangoon atrocity. At the same time, we see the objective of reduction of tension in the Korean Peninsula as being such an important objective that if there is even the smallest possibility that this is a serious move in that direction, we will want to be sure to explore it, and we are looking very carefully at ways that might be explored, talking most importantly with our Korean allies, whose interests are most directly involved, but also with others. This discussion here with Foreign Minister Abe is a step in that process, trying to figure out how best to explore the present situation.

Q The Foreign Minister said in Japan recently that he would like to see Japan taking a very active role in the Korean discussion. Did he some way indicate that Japan should be included in the peace talks in Korea?

A I don't want to get into characterizing his views or his positions. I think we would see -- and I don't think anyone would disagree with this very much -- that the most important key to progress is getting the two parties directly involved to talk to one another. How one can facilitate that and what modalities are best for achieving that are very tricky questions to work out; but I think the priority on the dealings between North and South Korea is something that I think any observer would agree with.

I'll take one or two more.

Q On aid to developing countries, how did Foreign Minister Abe respond to U.S. request for economic aid to the Caribbean countries?

A I think, again, you really have to ask him for his position on this, but we have very much appreciated the increased efforts that Japan has made over the last five or six years in providing economic assistance to critical countries in the general vicinity of the Persian Gulf, countries whose economic progress and stability is important to the stability in that critical region.

The need in the Caribbean is one that we have sort of more recently become conscious of ourselves, and we are hopeful that here, too, even though it is in some ways seemingly further away from Japan, that nonetheless Japan will respond to the need in this area also.

As you know, the Kissinger Commission recently finished its report on the Caribbean -- Central America -- and among its recommendations was the recommendation for a very substantial increase in economic assistance for that region. The Secretary actually mentioned that report in his discussions with the Foreign Minister, and indicated our hope that Japan will be able to play a role there also.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 3:38 p.m.)

EMBARGOED UNTIL NOON WEDNESDAY, FEBURARY 1, 1984.

DRAFT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ON-THE-RECORD BRIEFING
ON
FOREIGN AID

M. PETER McPHERSON, ADMINISTRATOR, AID
WILLIAM SCHNEIDER, JR., UNDER SECRETARY
FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
RONALD I. SPIERS, UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT
TUESDAY, JANUARY 31, 1984, 2:30 P. M.

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. Just to remind you of the purposes and ground rules before we get going, the briefing this afternoon is on the proposed FY-1985 State Department budget, including foreign assistance -- both security assistance and economic assistance.

The briefing, while ON THE RECORD, is embargoed until noon tomorrow, February 1, so we will expect everybody to stick with that.

We're going to have three presentations seriatim, and then go to questions, so if you'd hold your questions until each of the speakers has had a chance to make his initial presentation, I think that will facilitate things.

The leadoff will be Ronald Spiers who is Under Secretary of State for Management. He will be followed by William Schneider Jr., Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology. And then M. Peter McPherson who is the Director of AID.

As I say, they will each make their presentation, and then we'll go to questions. Ron?

MR. SPIERS: As Alan indicates, our purpose is to brief you on the budget which will be made public tomorrow, give you an opportunity to ask any questions that you have. Be in three parts: State Department's operating budget which I will deal with, foreign assistance, and the aid budgets which Bill Schneider and Peter McPherson will talk about.

Although from my perspective it's one of the most important, since it provides the money and people and support services to conduct our day-to-day foreign affairs and foreign relations, it is the least in money amounts, controversy and general public interest. I'm speaking of the State's operating budget.

The State Department operating budget request this year for 1985 totals $2.7 billion. That is 250 million above the current estimate for FY-84. About half of this amount, $1.3 billion, is for salaries and expenses. In addition, we're seeking $259 million for our foreign buildings operations, $588 million for contributions to International Organizations and Conferences, $50 million for narcotics control.

Now, clearly, $2.7 billion is small when compared with the amounts which go into defense intelligence. From mine and the Department of State's viewpoint, the contribution of the Department of State to maintenance of peace and security is at least equal in importance.

As you know, it's our responsibility to manage our relations with some 140 nations, to represent the United States in over 40 international organizations, to provide the political leadership of this country with the best economic, political advice and assessments that we can, and to man this headquarters and some 250 posts abroad.

Also, the Department of State generally is the provider of support services for other agencies in U.S. missions overseas, including communications, security, logistic services, and the like.

This Administration has undertaken major programs to rebuild our defense and our intelligence capabilities. We in the Department of State believe it is also now the turn of our diplomatic capabilities.

Over the last 20 years, the number of American staff personnel has declined. This decline has been sharpest in political and economic staffing, our cutting edge, because we have had to shift resources from these functions to meet expanding consular and administrative workloads. As a consequence, our political staffing overseas is down 22 percent, economic down 30 percent, in the last decade.

Political and economic work, however, has expanded. We have new categories of interest: refugees, narcotics, science and technology, and the like.

Today we have 145 Embassies and Missions abroad. 20 years ago it was 116. We believe that we remain too sparsely staffed overseas to adequately report, analyze and promote American policies and interests. However, in speaking of the need to rebuild, we're speaking about relatively small staff increases for 1984 or '85. We are asking for 742 additional positions and the funding that goes with them. The biggest single block of these are for reporting and analysis.

Before concluding and inviting Bill Schneider up, I want to mention three special priority concerns and needs, and the first is security. We propose to spend about $118 million -- that's 9 percent of our total salaries and expenses -- expenditures on security. That's a $14 million increase over the current year. The terrorist threat is growing. We owe our people the best possible protection. Most Foreign Service people recognize there is no way to provide absolute security. Some risk will always go with the territory in the Foreign Service, and this will continue to be the case. Nevertheless, there is much that we can do to protect against and deter threats.

Communications: We are asking for $194 million to continue to replace and modernize the diplomatic telecommunications service.

Buildings: $259 million to manage and develop our property, physical property, abroad.

About $5 million to open some new posts: Wuhan, China; Ponape and Madura in Micronesia; Windhoek and Luanda; and in the Comoros.

I think perhaps it's best to withhold any questions, and let us get through with the presentations, so, Bill, would you come up?

MR. SCHNEIDER: Thank you very much for so thoroughly attending this briefing. I want to discuss very briefly the broad strategic and political rationale that makes foreign assistance a critical element of our overall national security program. Peter McPherson will then discuss how we use specific programs to help friends and allies get back onto a path of sustainable economic growth and development.

The foreign assistance program for Fiscal-85 totals approximately $15 billion, including Central America, of which $1.5 billion is for multilateral assistance, $13.7 billion is for bilateral assistance, including both loans and grants. Looked at differently, 60 percent of the program is economic and 40 percent is military. You have some charts in your possession, but in the interests of saving time, the charts are fairly self-explanatory.

In Fiscal-84 we are seeking supplemental appropriations of about $1 billion, of which roughly $400 million is for emergency economic assistance to Central America and $259 million is for military assistance. The President will be addressing the Central American supplementals in the next several days, and an explanation of specific programs and country levels will have to wait until then.

Foreign assistance relates directly to the nation's foreign policy objectives; for example, peace in the Middle East, democracy and modernization in Central America, strengthening NATO, and support of our friends in Africa and Asia. This translates into defense cooperation -- *the* defense cooperation necessary for our own national defense planning as well as providing access for strategic minerals and resources such as in the Persian Gulf or in southern Africa.

Foreign assistance is a high leverage program which can foster political and social progress and revive economic vitality among our neighbors to the south. It means exports for U.S. manufacturers and jobs for U.S. workers.

As the basic resource to implement our diplomacy, foreign assistance underpins U.S. credibility and gives the United States the ability to promote peaceful and democratic solutions to national and regional problems, be they economic, political or social.

Specifically in discussing military assistance, you should note that it is focused primarily on countries of major strategic importance to the United States, such as Israel, Egypt or Pakistan, or in countries with direct U.S. defense ties that are necessary to ensure the ability of the U.S. forces to deploy overseas when needed.

Broadly speaking, our overall foreign military asistance distribution pattern is similar: for Israel and Egypt about 28 percent, 29.2 percent for Base rights and frontline/military access, and about 10 percent for Central America and the Caribbean.

Two commissions this year, the Carlucci Commission and the Kissinger Commission, have recognized the mutually reinforcing nature of economic and military assistance, as well as the need for increased levels of assistance overall.

The Fiscal-85 budget increases bilateral economic assistance in an effort to promote sustainable LDC economic growth, and on the military side, as noted in the chart up before you, we are significantly increasing the concessionality of our assistance.

The major structural reform that we are proposing is in the military assistance accounts where we are proposing to bring the entire FMS loan program on-budget. For many years, the Congress has urged this step. At the same time, the Congress and the recent Commissions I've mentioned earlier, have expressed growing concern about the heavy drag of military assistance repayments as a burden on the economies of some less developed countries. By moving the foreign military sales program on credit, we can now provide concessional assistance to selected countries or market-rate loans, or a combination of these tailored to meet specific economic situations.

In addition, the other major element of this move, of putting all of the accounts -- the loans on-budget, is that assistance to Israel and Egypt will be on grant terms, although at somewhat lower levels than in the past. The improved credit terms will improve the character of our overall program with these countries while diminishing the economic effect of their defense programs.

For over a decade these programs have received the largest share of our overall security assistance program. The need is no less great in Fiscal-85. Yet in both countries, debt payments are a major economic constraint, consuming about a third of each dollar in export earnings, with FMS payments a significant fraction of that sum. By shifting to an all grant program, we are able to slow the spiraling increase in FMS repayments while actually reducing the overall program size by about $425 million.

And, as we proposed in Fiscal-85, programs in Africa, the Caribbean, and Central America will, owing to the economic condition there, be largely on grant terms under the military assistance program.

Sixteen countries, such as Pakistan, Portugal, Turkey and Tunisia, and so forth, will receive a combination of programs of grant, military assistance program funds, foreign military sales loans on a concessional basis, and foreign military sales loans on a market rate. Adding the concessionality has proven a major factor in this year to enable us to lower overall military assistance levels from Fiscal-84 by a total of $177 million.

Peter McPherson will now address the economic dimension of our foreign assistance program and its contribution to our foreign relations. Peter?

MR. McPHERSON: Thank you, Bill. Early in the Administration and shortly before Cancun, the President laid out a basic philosophy on economic assistance abroad. He pointed out that our economic assistance program, of course, had a foreign policy component, if for nothing more than long-term economic growth in the Third World was clearly to the United States' benefit.

He also emphasized that our program should be one of self-help, should be one of encouraging and fostering an environment of economic growth that would create income for poor people, not simply have a charity program.

Following that, various initiatives have been put in place or begun. The Caribbean Basin initiative was a combination of tax, trade, as well as, of course, economic assistance. The Kissinger Commission report in recent times has been basically embraced by the President, and that report, as most of you know, strongly embraces growth -- change and economic growth, and change of economic policies in the countries in the region.

Just yesterday, the Secretary of State stood here and announced a new program of the Administration on economic policy initiative for Africa in which there is an emphasis upon giving money to countries which make important changes in their policies so as to encourage agricultural growth, policies such as paying farmers more so that the farmers will produce more. The Secretary talked about this initiative as not being a big stick program, but a big carrot program. I like to think much what we do in the foreign aid program is indeed just that.

These various initiatives have been, as implemented by AID -- all of our programs, really, implemented in the last three years -- have basically followed what we call, or utilized what we have been calling, our four pillars. Those four pillars being:

Pillar one, an emphasis upon working with countries to change their policies to more growth oriented policies, like paying farmers a reasonable rate so that they will produce more, so that they will get more income.

Pillar two is our science and technology effort which emphasizes changing the environment through technology so that, in fact, people can be more productive. Things like our very extensive investment in a malaria vaccine, our investment in higher-yielding sorghum and millet for seeds that the Sahel can use, and so on.

Our third pillar has been to put money into building institutions, institutions like primary health care programs, like agricultural extension systems, and so forth, institutions and training, and essentially again looking toward people being able to better help themselves.

And our fourth pillar being the use of market forces, the private sector. And we've used this, I think, quite unconventionally. For example, in our family planning programs, emphasizing that the market could really work a lot better on distribution of contraceptives. And in Bangladesh at this time we've got, we think, roughly 50,000 outlets for distribution of contraceptives through our program.

In each case what we've done is tried to take the basic concepts of self-help, of economic growth, so that poor people in these poor countries can be in a position to have income and not simply have charity, because we think that's the long-term answer for them and really for the world.

What this involves overall for Fiscal-85 is a program of $9.3 billion. That's up from $8.8 billion in Fiscal-84, including the supplementals. That's a 5.6 percent increase. Now, this includes the whole range of economic programs, the so-called development assistance program the economic support fund program (ESF), the food, the multilateral program, the banks, the Peace Corps, Micronesia, refugees, and so forth, the whole ball, really, basically. As Bill was pointing out earlier, some

57 percent, almost 60 percent, of our foreign assistance program being economic assistance.

One last word about where we are on this is that this program, we think, makes good sense for America. I like to think of economic assistance as being almost an investment in America in the sense that roughly two-thirds of our economic assistance comes back as purchases of goods and services from the United States within 18 months, as well as the growth of these countries obviously creates markets for our businessmen over time. Some 90 percent of the population growth in the world is in LDC's, and we simply have to be part of and create that growth for our own benefit.

Clearly, the foreign policy purposes are very important here, and, of course, I think that America is really quite willing and anxious to provide some of these economic assistance, if for nothing more than humanitarian purposes. The drought in Africa, where yesterday we announced a supplemental for '84 of some $90 million where three to four million people are under threat of starvation if no one were to do anything at all.

In short, this is a program which I think benefits our own interest, and it has a clear importance to the world. It's nice to be here. I know all three of us will welcome your questions.

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Q Just one technical question before you get away: When you just gave that $9.3 billion figure, did you say that includes ESF?

MR. McPHERSON: DA, PL-480, the banks.

Q In other words, in the figure you're giving, you moved the ESF from the military assistance to your counting it as --

MR. McPHERSON: That's right, because, for example, in Egypt and Pakistan, we programmed a substantial portion of ESF for everything from family planning to agricultural programs, or whatever, and for our purposes it looks to us like it's properly counted as such.

Q Can I just follow up on that numbers question? The $9.3 billion relates how to the $7.9 billion that we got?

MR. McPHERSON: At the top figure you'll see the banks, and so it's a totalling of the bank figure on the top of the page with the $7 billion-roughly figure down below.

Q Again, on that, how does the $7.9 relate to the $5.6 that you mentioned in the thick summary --

MR. McPHERSON: Let me tell you how it relates, but please don't get too confused and worry about the $5.6. The 5.6 is merely ESF and DA. O.K.? But the simpler way to look at this thing is, the $5.6 is part of the $9.3. The simpler way to look at this is to simply focus on the $9.3

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B-2 figure, which is a combination of all these economic-related programs.

Q What are the constant dollar changes in both economic and military assistance from '84 to '85?

MR. SCHNEIDER: In one of the charts we've provided you -- it's Chart 2; it shows the constant dollar figure, and you'll note that in constant dollar terms, both the military and economic assistance show a slight decline.

Q Do you have any numbers? It's hard to read that chart.

MR. SCHNEIDER: Excuse me?

Q I can't really read the numbers very accurately.

MR. SCHNEIDER: Well, in constant dollar terms, it's a little going from a little under $7 billion in military to just slightly over $6 billion -- No, sorry. That's current dollars.

Do you have a copy of the -- This may be a little more visible here (indicating chart).

This hash line here (indicating) is the constant economic dollars, which shows a slight decline from '84 to '85. It's slightly under $5 billion, and going down to perhaps $4.5 in constant dollar terms. Military in constant dollar terms starts around $3 billion and goes to slightly under 3.

Q You don't have a percentage change calculation on that?

MR. SCHNEIDER: You mean the rate of decline in constant dollar terms?

Q Yes.

MR. SCHNEIDER: I don't have it. It's easy enough to get. I just didn't produce that number here.

Q Hasn't your percentage split changed since last year -- 60% econ, 40% military? Is that a slight difference from last year?

MR. SCHNEIDER: It's approximately the same. There might be a small difference, but the difference is small. There is no fundamental change in the ratio between economic and military.

Q On page 8 of your computer print-out are the figures --

MR. ROMBERG: Excuse me.

Q Some questions about the computer print-out.

MR. ROMBERG: Who do you want to ask?

Q Either one.

First of all, on page 8, you have "Central America."

MR. SCHNEIDER: Yes.

Q It's the first time I can remember that you didn't spell out each country. Could you do that?

MR. SCHNEIDER: Yes. I mentioned in my remarks these numbers should be treated as approximations. The President

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is going to make the final decision in an announcement the end of the week on the country allocations, so these numbers should be treated as not the final numbers. We can get you a revised printout at the end of the week, if you want, that will have the details laid out.

Q And the second question, which is more technical. Why this time do you have different categories for the pages for the Caribbean, then South American, and then Central America? Is there a reason for that? I mean, it used to be one --

MR. SCHNEIDER: It's just that owing to the results of the Kissinger Commission being published and there being specific recommendations associated with it. This is just a way of highlighting the allocations. That's all.

Q Two figures here: Under the Program Summary, the footnote that talks about $389 million in the '84 supplemental related to the Kissinger Commission. Is that all economic?

MR. SCHNEIDER: Yes, that piece is all economic.

MR. McPHERSON: That's merely suggested at this time, not a final number (inaudible)

Q I understand. On the next page, you refer to the Jackson Plan figure of $904 million for Central America. That, I assume, the same question -- I assume that's all economic?

MR. McPHERSON: That would be '85, though.

Q Yes. I understand.

Q Mr. Schneider, how do we factor in the cost in budget terms, of the change from loan to grant for military assistance to Israel and Egypt? The fact this isn't being repaid will have some net cost to us, yes?

MR. SCHNEIDER: That's true, but the cost in present value terms is small because the repayment terms are fairly extended; and when you compute the present value of repayment 20 years from now, the economic value of that is really relatively small, so the cost for the Israel and Egypt program in going from grant to loan is very modest.

Q Is there any way to quantify that, though?

MR. SCHNEIDER: It can be quantified by doing a present value calculation, but I haven't done the calculation here. I have in many cases, when I was at the OMB, looked at the cost of going loan and grant, and because we haven't in the case of Israel and Egypt fairly extended repayment terms and long grace periods, the economic value of the repayment is almost a grant. It's almost on grant terms because of the ease under which the payment terms are offered

MR. ROMBERG: John?

Q Yes. May I ask two questions? First, to my McPherson: When you talk about the Jackson Plan, you say $9.04.4 million. How does that square against the Kissinger Commission report about which you said in the briefing not long ago that you expected, the Administration expected to ask for roughly that amount over five years.

MR. McPHERSON: Our projection here remains roughly over the five-year period suggested in the Kissinger report, that there would be a sum of that general range.

Q So, in other words, it would have to increase in subsequent years?

MR. McPHERSON: Yes.

Q Second question to Mr. Schneider.

I know you said that the President will spell out what he wants on Central America, but I notice you have listed Guatemala as a potential recipient of military aid. Can you tell us anything at all about what that means? And also how you figure that squares against the criteria for aid, as set forth in the Kissinger Commission's report?

MR. SCHNEIDER: Unfortunately, I can't discuss any of these until the President has his chop on it by the end of the week, so we can discuss it subsequently, if you wish.

MR. McPHERSON: Let me add a comment about the economic assistance for Central America. The Kissinger Commission envisions budget authority for economic assistance of roughly $6 billion or so, though that is not absolutely the line -- and envisions some guarantees of a couple billion, so what you're looking at there is a budget authority figure-- not guaranteed.

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Q One last one: I can't find it here any place, although it may be. Why is there no breakdown of how you expect to distribute money among multi-lateral lending institutions?

MR. McPHERSON: Oh, we'd be happy to provide that to you. Those aren't secret figures at all; those are well-known figures.

Ralph?

Q Secretary Schneider, could I ask you, since your paper that you distributed points out that ESF is, technically, security assistance, if you include ESF In the military aid category, what would the percentage breakdown be for FY-84 and FY-85?

MR. SCHNEIDER: It would put the military assistance, if you wanted to count it that way, over 50 percent; but the user is prohibited from using ESF for military purposes. So for that reason, we, in doing a characterization of how we describe the distribution between economic and military assistance, we combine all those accounts whose purpose is primarily economic. The reason ESF, for accounting purposes, gets lumped with security assistance is that ESF, that is this kind of economic aid is given to countries where we have a direct strategic interest, such as Central America, Israel, or Egypt as distinct from other types of economic assistance which we provide, which is done in our more general interest

B-8 in promoting world economic development.

Q Can I follow that just briefly? The figure was 57 and 43 percent for FY-85. What was the exact figure for FY-84?

MR. SCHNEIDER: I don't have the precise figure in my head.

Q Mr. McPherson, you knew the one for '85. What was the one for '84?

MR. McPHERSON: I think it was about 58 percent. It's almost precisely the same. We haven't really varied at all. You know, I honestly -- I think this discussion between ESF and DA that it really isn't as broadly understood as it might be. You take a program like Pakistan where we have ESF, and we're using ESF for the Family Planning Programs, for agriculture production programs, for a whole range of things. And Egypt, with ESF, we're building electrical plants. It would just be a mischaracterization, I think, to consider those programs military in nature.

As Bill pointed out, we have DA programs, Development Assistance programs, in countries like Bangladesh where we, frankly, don't have that much of a strategic foreign policy interest; but nevertheless, almost $200 million is going to Bangladesh because we think that the humanitarian need, with $120 per capita income, is such that we ought to respond.

-9 Q Mr. Spiers, on the State Department operating budget, the amount for International Organizations, does that reflect our pulling out of UNESCO? And how much is saved by that?

MR. SPIERS: We don't pull out of UNESCO this year. I think there are $25 million in that for UNESCO. The UNESCO pullout, if it is implemented, will be the year after that.

Q Question for Mr. Schneider: In your opinion, are Israel and Egypt better off having their total military assistance reduced, yet converted from loan to grant?

MR. SCHNEIDER: Yes, very much so. The reason is as follows: Those two countries, Israel and Egypt, are the two countries that have the largest fraction of their external debt in the form of military debt,primarily to the United States. When commercial markets look at Israel and Egypt and see that this debt problem, instead of getting worse, will taper off and begin to decline as a serious problem, it reevaluates the interest rate which Israel commercial borrowers need to pay in international markets to borrow. The lower cost of interest to the Israeli borrower results in an increase in income to the Israeli economy that is far larger than the $300 million or so less that they might get in the form of loans. So it is, unquestionably, a very good deal for the Israelis and the Egyptians.

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Q On the question of off-budget and on-budget, in other words on the FMS, does that mean the budget will show a --

MR. SCHNEIDER: -- $4 billion increase.

Q -- $4 billion?

MR. SCHNEIDER: Yes.

Q O.K.

Q A question for Mr. Schneider: If you aren't going to give us a breakdown on Central America, could you at least give us an estimate of how much is in military aid and how much is in ESF for '85, for say, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, in overall figures?

MR. SCHNEIDER: As one who is obliged to enforce this rule on other agencies when I'm in OMB, I'm now have sympathy with how people "got off the reservation," but unfortunately, I'm prohibited from discussing country allocations until the President does this.

Q To follow up, if I may? But you will have to tell the Congress at some point tomorrow in a Congressional document. Don't you have that available? Is that a classified document now?

MR. SCHNEIDER: As of now, it is a classified document, yes. Sorry I just can't do. I'd like to lay it on you, but I can't.

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Q Mr. Spiers, could you tell us how much the new Embassy at the Vatican will cost to house and staff?

MR. SPIERS: I don't think there is any plan to build a new Embassy at the Vatican. I think that there will be a minor increase in staffing levels. We've had an observer there, an observer officer.

Q Unpaid?

MR. SPIERS: Yes. And I don't know whether he is going to accept salary. I assume that he will be nominated and approved as the new Ambassador, and I don't know whether that is going to change his cost.

Q You have no idea?

MR. SPIERS: I think that there will be a small increase in the cost of the sustaining of a mission to the Vatican, but I wouldn't expect it to be very big.

Q A million dollars a year or something?

MR. SPIERS: Oh, I would think less than that. $500,000, I'm informed.

Q Let me bring you back to those figures you can't give us. Mr. Schneider, in the President's budget summary, there is a supplemental of military assistance for '84 of $259 million and an amendment to the '85 budget proposal of $124.5.

MR. SCHNEIDER: Yes.

Q Some of us might be tempted to suspect that that was mostly for El Salvador. Are those the figures you're telling us to be leery of?

MR. SCHNEIDER: Well, I'd start there, yes. (Laughter)

Q Just to follow on that, the amount for the West Bank and Gaza is not broken out. I wonder what that is, and how that compares to what was requested last year.

MR. McPHERSON: It's roughly the same, and it is mostly for private voluntary organization activity, PBO activity.

Q What amount? What dollar amount?

MR. McPHERSON: Do we have a dollar amount. We'll get you one in just a minute.

Speaking of numbers, someone asked earlier the bank numbers. We have now made those available. The Press Office will have those. We'll give you that number in one minute, if that's all right.

Q Mr. Schneider, you mentioned earlier that the foreign aid is to promote foreign policy and U.S. interests. How are the users, as you also said, being monitored to make sure that the money that the U.S. gives out to promote these U.S. policies and policy, how do you monitor those? I have in mind, for example, the settlements issue, where it is assumed that some of the money is being spent on settlements on the West Bank.

B-13 MR. SCHNEIDER: Without specifically tying it to countries, we have audit arrangements in the various agencies that are responsible for managing programs, to assure that the purposes for which the funds were appropriated are implemented. These audit services are quite active, and I think they insure that the program is delivering what it was intended by the Congress.

Q Could I pursue this ESF thing a second, because it creates confusions when you're talking of following this through Congress about how much is military and how much is economic aid? Is there still a theoretical assumption that the money provided under ESF frees up a certain amount of revenues in the possession of the recipient country that can be devoted to military spending purposes?

MR. McPHERSON: Ordinarily, the countries in which we provide Economic Support Funds are in fairly bad financial shape, and they need them for clear economic purposes. I suppose thatyou can always make the argument that one dollar frees up another, but I --

Q That was the argument that used to be made.

MR. McPHERSON: I think the facts are that the net impact is economic.

(Continued on next page.)

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Q Then why continue this as a category? Why don't you just put it in --

MR. McPHERSON: Why don't we all fold it into economic?

Q Yes.

MR. McPHERSON: People thought about that, but this focuses the program on countries where we have a foreign policy interest of great importance as opposed to the other -- it's the way the historical categorizations evolved, I suppose.

MR. SCHNEIDER: Also, many of the countries for which we have a security interest, where we're providing economic support funds, have an economic situation such that they don't have any high quality source of foreign exchange reserves. It may be, as in the case of El Salvador, they have a war going on, they really can't earn any foreign exchange. So by providing them with economic support funds, say, for balance of payments purposes, they can use the hard currency to buy machinery and fertilizer, and so forth, to try to keep their economy going.

In most of the individual countries, where we provide ESF, this is the predominent issues, I think.

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MR. McPHERSON: That's an important point to make, let's say, to El Salvador. There simply isn't very much hard currency around. We put our money in there and in turn track how it's used, track how the dollars are used. In other words, you can't use the dollars that we provide to buy military hardware. What you do is you buy, typically in El Salvador, a businessman would buy our dollars with local currency and then those dollars will be used pursuant to a tracking system we have to purchase a part for a machine that is critical to keep a plant going to keep people at work.

Q I notice that you only have $50 million earmarked for IFAD in 1985. How do you intend to finish our commitment to the first replenishment of ninety?

MR. McPHERSON: As you indicate, there is a $90 million outstanding commitment for the first replenishment. We would be asking for this $50 this year and in the subsequent year we would ask for the balance.

Q And also for southern Africa, I see that Zimbabwe is only getting $30 million.

In light of the drought situation down there and the other difficulties in the region, don't you think that's a little short for them?

MR. McPHERSON: We have fulfilled the promise that we made at ZIMCORD for a total of three times seventy-five that was made there, and we're now proposing a program of $15 million ESF and $15 million DA for a total of thirty.

In addition to that, depending on the circumstances, we will continue where we are now of providing some food for drought assistance.

Those drought assistance decisions are, of course, made at the time, and we're talking about Fiscal '85 so we'll just see how it goes at that time. But Zimbabwe as well as, really, no other country in Africa is being discriminated against on some political basis when it comes to the drought and starvation situations.

Q Mr. Schneider, on the basis of last year's experience on the military assistance program funding by Congress, how philosophically can you go up to the Hill with a $920 million request this year compared to a $750 million request last year when it was cut by -- what? -- 30 percent or something?

MR. SCHNEIDER: There's a couple of dimensions to that. First, last year, we did not have a regular bill. We went on a continuing resolution. And under those circumstances there always is some residual optimism that the Congress will return to the subject and pass a regular bill where justice can be done. But appreciating that, that isn't necessarily the case given the difficulties that Congress has had with a regular bill. I think what we will try to show is that the circumstances in the world as far as American interests have changed sufficiently with respect to the ability of recipient countries to carry the burden of further debt.

What we have tried by going on-budget is being able to offer more of the debt we do put out on concessional terms but would try to appeal to the Congress on the grounds that American policy interests are not going to be satisfied wholly by providing debt instruments to the recipient countries and that we need more grant.

I think if you look at what was happening to the grant program, say, in 1980, when it was around $100 million, the Congress has generally seen fit to increase the grant component fairly substantially in MAP, for instance, so I think they're not beyond appeal on this one.

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Q Two questions. One, just so I get straight on this on-budget/off-budget, I notice in the FY-84, there's a $4.4 billion FMS guarantees which does not appear in the FY-85.

MR. SCHNEIDER: That's right.

Q Was that a budget item?

MR. SCHNEIDER: No, that's what gets shifted to going on-budget.

Q That was not on-budget?

MR. SCHNEIDER: That was not on-budget in Fiscal '84. The innovation, if one want's to call it that, would be putting it on-budget.

Q The other question is, you referred to the Carlucci Commission in your military side. Have you people given any thought or recommendations to the administrative recommendations that your two agencies and groups be merged into a new body?

MR. SCHNEIDER: I think from experience in State that we found a pretty good combination with the institutional arrangements that we've worked out to have an integrated foreign assistance budget that deals with both the economic and military assistance in a comprehensive package that we can present to the Congress.

Peter might want to some comments on this also.

MR. McPHERSON: I think that's basically where we are. We thought the Carlucci Commission was very thoughtful and helpful in just a number of respects and certainly helped us within the Executive Branch to look at our organizational structure. But as we've thought about that recommendation since then, we basically have concluded that the role that "T" in State and AID have worked out in coordinating these aid programs, these assistance programs, has been quite constructive, and we probably will not immediately pursue that particular recommendation.

Let me throw back to another question, and that was on this whole loan grant issue. As a person who looks pretty carefully at several of these economies, I think it's clear in recent years, while we've been piling guarantees, military assistance programs on countries, we're beginning to go too far. Some economies have begun to have problems with the interest rate of the guarantees and the paybacks that we're going to begin to accrue.

This is a very important innovation, in my judgment, to begin to move some of these military assistance programs back onto a grant basis.

Q Mr. McPherson or Mr. Schneider. You still haven't explained to my satisfaction. If it's such a good idea and almost cost-free to change these from loans to grants, why don't you do it for the rest of the recipients of ESF beyond Egypt and Israel?

MR. SCHNEIDER: It's a question of how far you want to go on grants. If we can provide FMS guarantees to a country at market rates where the repayment period is short, then there is a substantial subsidy if you go from loan to grant; or to put alternatively, there's a substantial cost of going from loan to grant.

On the other hand, there are a few countries, of which Israel and Egypt are among them, where the repayment terms are fairly protracted. As a consequence, the economic cost of going from loan to grant is relatively small, and under these immediate circumstances justified.

In some cases, there is also a benefit in terms of the psychology of countries. Some countries don't want grant assistance. They want loan assitance because they have a theory that they are in some psychic way indebted to the United States if they take it on a grant basis.

Q Did you say it would cost only $300 million more to just give the money to Egypt and Israel rather than loan it to them?

MR. SCHNEIDER: No. I didn't give a figure because I hadn't done the present value calculation. By going from loan to grant with Israel and Egypt, we were able to give them a program that has, in fact, more economic value while reducing the total size of the program by over $400 million.

Q Mr. McPherson, the Congress approved a mixed credit program last year. Are those figures in this budget, and how much would they be and from what account?

MR. McPHERSON: The mixed credit program that Congress really urged upon us basically, urged us to work through our program and find something, was directed at our so-called commodity import program countries. There are very few of those; Egypt, Pakistan and a couple others.

We're looking within that CIP program in those particular countries to provide the mixed credit program that Congress envisioned. In fact, we are still in the process of working out guidelines, and so forth. There really isn't a figure. That's the point, Jim. There is not a figure at this time for what the mixed credit program will have in '85.

Q Mr. McPherson, back on Central America again. On Page 8, you list $1.3 billion as the total in economic and military aid for Fiscal '85 for Central America. What's the comparable figure for Fiscal '84 minus the supplemental that you're going to send up?

MR. McPHERSON: On the economic side, in Fiscal '84, it will be about $450 million on the economic side. I may be a little wrong in my figure. On the military side -- we're talking supplementals; right?

MR. SCHNEIDER: It's less than $100 million.

MR. McPHERSON: In '85.

MR. SCHNEIDER: Because $64 to El Salvador. I don't have the exact figure with me.

MR. McPHERSON: In Fiscal '83, it was about $624, as I remember for the economic side.

Q You're talking about roughly a tripling of the amount; is that correct? $450 plus $95 as opposed to $1.3 billion?

MR. McPHERSON: Yes. If you assume -- it depends on how you calculate it. We assume, speaking generally now, roughly a $400 million supplemental on the economic side for Central America on top the roughly $450 that Congress appropriated, in addition to get to that figure that you mentioned.

Q A tentative question for Mr. Schneider. On the first page of the printout, it says "Central America (non-add), 259.1." What does the "non-add" mean. I don't understand that phrase.

MR. SCHNEIDER: For illustrative purposes, it is not added into this total. That's correct. It's not added into this total.

Q Could you explain that?

MR. SCHNEIDER: Sorry. On the first page of the printout, Central America is broken out as a separate number and there's a parenthetical comment that says "non-add." The reason that's there is because these figures are already embedded in the accounts above it in the development assistance and ESF, and so forth. It's just broken out here separately to identify the explicit Central American number.

Q Mr. McPherson, for purposes of comparing with other countries AID program , how much of this entire program is what the international agencies call official development assistance which is their kind of standard measurement of AID in terms of GNP? What DAP calls ODA.

MR. McPHERSON: All the ESF is --

Q The ESF is?

MR. McPHERSON: The Economic Support Fund monies are. I'm just trying to look through this and see whether anything wouldn't be -- I believe that everything here on the economic ledger, that full $9.3 would be calculated that way. Not the peacekeeping amount which really shouldn't be there in any case. But the $9.3, roughly, is all so-called ODA.

Q For both Mr. Schneider and Mr. McPherson. On Central America, does the Jackson Plan, the $388.9 supplemental of the $904 for '85, how much of an increase does that represent to the region over '83 and '82? I think you addressed this but I lost in the technicalities. In other words, how much is economic assistance increasing for the region?

MR. McPHERSON: If you assume a supplemental as part of the base, you get a 22 percent increase --

Q In '84; right?

MR. McPHERSON: In '85.

Q Twenty-two percent over --

MR. McPHERSON: Over '84, if you assume a supplemental. If you don't count the supplemental, then you've got a substantially larger increase.

Q How much -- are we doubling. We've heard the figure of doubling and triple economic assistance under the Kissinger/Jackson, whatever language you used. Does this represent --

MR. McPHERSON: I really would like not to be quoted on this, but just to try to be helpful, what you're talking about is roughly doubling of the assistance.

In '83, you had a $624 million economic assistance figure for Central America. Congress apprpropriated $450 or so, but everyone understood that during the year there would not doubt be reprogramming. So I would have expected, without a supplemental or anything else, that we probably would have reached a $600 million figure. So we're probably talking roughly doubling. That was a range that we had in mind.

Q For Mr. McPherson. The $500 million for Africa over the next five years, is that $500 million over and above what would have expected to --

MR. McPHERSON: Let me tell you how that program works. We asked for $75 million in Fiscal '85 with the public statement of an expectation of asking for $500 million --

a half a billion dollars over the next five years, including '85. Those monies, as I was suggesting earlier, would not be earmarked by Congress by country but rather would be given to countries that were showing particular progress in their economic reforms. If you were to talk about those countries today -- though today, of course, we're not making those allocations like Somalia, Madagascar and others -- that really in the last year have just made enormous changes in how they're doing business.

Q Was this in addition to the normal African programs?

MR. McPHERSON: The overall Africa program will go up in excess of $75 million, but it's part of. We will put in Africa all economic spigots -- DA, PL 40 and ESF -- $1063.6 million. That's up from a little over $900 million last year.

Q Mr. Schneider, what is the rationale for not including the money for the proposed Jordanian strike force in the foreign aid legislation as opposed to moving it to the Defense Department's budget?

MR. SCHNEIDER: Unfortunately, I'm obliged to live by the classification system, and this alleged program is classified; and since I'm the one that has to make license plates, if I talk about I'd prefer not to discuss it here.

Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 3:30 p.m.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF
PRESIDENT SPILJAK OF YUGOSLAVIA

February 1, 1984

The Briefing Room

1:48 P.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Good afternoon. Many of the themes that were addressed in private were also contained in the two departure statements. So I would just draw your attention to them.

In the Oval Office when they first met, there was, of course, a getting-to-know-you session. There was a good deal of talk there about the Olympics. The President expressed great pleasure at the cooperation that both countries have had in preparing for the Winter Olympics in Sarajeva next week, and the Summer Olympics in Los Angeles.

There was a discussion of terrorism in that context, of our mutual desire to see that terrorism be eliminated.

Q In the context of the Olympics?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. You'll recall Munich -- so it's an appropriate, relevant connection.

We have been working closely with the Yugoslavs in preparation for the Olympics on security issues.

The President expressed, as again he did in his public remarks, our strong support for Yugoslavia's independence, nonalignment, and territorial integrity. He expressed real pleasure at the state of relations -- bilateral relations.

President Spiljak emphasized how important the relationship is for Yugoslavia and expressed particular appreciation for the efforts that the United States took a leadership role in -- in organizing the economic program last year. And now we are in the midst of another effort this year.

President Spiljak gave the President a good description of the situation in Yugoslavia -- of Yugoslavia's efforts to turn around a difficult economic situation. He pointed to the fact that deficits in 1981 of $3 billion have brought down in 1982 to $1 billion, and that this year there is a surplus on their current account. So that was a positive factor that President Spiljak pointed to.

He also noted that Yugoslavia's trade with the West has been increasing. He went over at some length the Yugoslav situation with the International Monetary Fund. There are discussions -- there have been discussions -- going on in recent weeks, including this week, with Mr. De Larosiere who is the head of the International Monetary Fund and with Mr. Dragan who is accompanying President Spiljak.

There was Deputy Treasury Secretary McNamar who is participating in the talks emphasized that we have been offering our

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good offices in connection with this economic package, that the IMF is, of course, independent and makes its own decisions, but that we are in agreement with the effort by the IMF and Yugoslavia to bring down Yugoslav inflation and to bring about a. real interest rate in Yugoslavia.

The Yugoslav's President Spiljak emphasized the desirability of avoiding trade restrictions, atong interest in expanding bilateral trade with the United States; he expressed pleasure over the tourism agreement which is going to be signed tomorrow. Also emphasized that Yugoslavia is now studying new legislation which would encourage foreign investment in Yugoslavia, something that the United States has long been interested in increasing the amount of Western investment in Yugoslavia, and President Spiljak expressed hope that there could be an expansion under new and more liberal legislation for foreign investment.

There was a very extended discussion of the relationship with the Soviet Union, the overall East-West relationship. The President stressed,

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as he has many times recently in public, his strong desire to move into a richer, fuller dialogue with the Soviet Union to get back to the arms control table in Geneva and to bring about some concrete results in the lowering of tensions and the lowering of the number of nuclear weapons in the world. The President specifically said that his personal objective is to eliminate nuclear weapons altogether.

President Spiljak noted that he has been invited to the Soviet Union, that, in fact, he had been planning to see Mr. Andropov recently, that those -- the plans have been postponed, but he gave an extensive review of the Yugoslav understanding of what is going on in Moscow.

I might say that this government has great respect for the Yugoslav ability to understand Kremlinology and therefore the President found interesting what President Spiljak had to say about their sense of what is happening in the Soviet Union.

In brief, President Spiljak's view is that there is a great level of distrust between both sides, distrust present in Moscow, that this is a burden on our ability to move ahead in the dialogue and to achieve the results that he believes the Soviets want and, of course, our President had stressed that we want.

He, however, said that he felt there were some good signs. Foreign Minister Mojsov, for example, pointed to the fact that in Stockholm there had been some good things happening, that the Soviets have agreed to go back to the negotiating table in Vienna on conventional force talks and, therefore, the Yugoslav assessment, with which we agree, is that there is, in a very cautious way, there are some positive signs on the horizon in terms of the East-West and specifically U.S.-Soviet dialogue.

However, both sides in the talks today were cautious about that. Both underlined that it will not be easy and quick, but a strong desire was expressed on the Yugoslav side as well as by our President that we get on with the arms control process and with a broader dialogue.

There was also an extensive discussion of the situation in the Middle East, where Yugoslavia, as one of the leaders of the nonaligned and given President Tito's deep involvement in the Middle East, there is a long history of Yugoslavia playing a role in the Middle East. In fact, it's our understanding that President Spiljak will be going to the Middle East soon. So there was a good discussion, particularly over lunch, of the dynamics of the Middle East with Bud McFarlane participating actively along with the President on our side and with both President Spiljak and Foreign Minister Mojsov on the Yugoslav side talking about the situation in the Middle East.

There was a good deal of discussion about the situation in Lebanon as well as the larger Palestinian -- Arab-Israeli question.

Sorry. I'm just going through my notes because I want to make sure that I'm not missing any subjects that were covered.

Well, I don't think I've missed anything. Those are the major elements that were covered.

Q Did the Yugoslavs offer any opinion on whether or not the Soviet Union might soon decide to resume talks either in INF or START and when that might be?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, they didn't make any specific predictions. They felt, as I said, that there was a general, gradual and difficult improvement; but they made no particular predictions about when the talks in Geneva might start again.

Q Did they cite any particular examples of why there's been improvement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. They felt that their own talks with Gromyko in Stockholm had been constructive. They pointed to Secretary Shultz' talks with Mr. Gromyko which had briefed them on previously. They pointed to the fact that the Soviets, as I've mentioned, did tell Secretary Shultz in Stockholm that they are prepared to go back to

Stockholm that they are prepared to go back on March 16th in Vienna to the MFBR conventional force talks.

Q Was there any discussion of the possibility Yugoslavian troops can play a role in Lebanon?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I really don't know. That didn't come up.

Q Did they suggest how this gradual improvement might be followed up or what steps might be necessary now to continue whatever fragile dialogue there is or expand on it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't want to go into detail of the conversation, but the general sense we had from the Yugoslav side was that they believe that this was a time to take, even if you could only do small steps, that it was a time to try to bring about greater mutual confidence, a time for gestures, if you will.

Q Did they suggest any gestures even if you can't tell us about them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They had one or two suggestions, yes.

Q What --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry. I don't want to go into them. I think if the Yugoslavs want to talk about I think that's up to them, but I'd rather not.

Q What other, besides distrust, what other things did they say was going on in the Soviet Union?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We had a discussion of the leadership situation, which is an obvious problem. They felt that the Soviet Union wanted very much to get back to a path of peace. They felt that there were some objective needs in the Soviet Union which indicated that they would benefit from this. But again they underlined the deep suspicion in Moscow of our approach and the need to get over that through a richer dialogue.

Q Can you expand on that deep suspicion? I mean, what does that mean -- skepticism about sincerity in negotiating in Geneva or is it broader than that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's partly historical. I think both the President -- our President Reagan and President Spiljak felt that there were historical elements in this. But it also is just the history of the last few years in which we feel very strongly that the Soviet Union has taken a very aggressive stance which we, of course, have had to respond to.

The Yugoslavs pointed to the fact of deployment of new missiles on both sides, not just the American missiles but missile deployments on both sides which have raised new suspicions and distrust.

Q I had assumed you meant when you said there was discussion of the Soviet leadership, the state of affairs concerning Andropov and -- Is that what you said was discussed and can you say anything about what the Yugoslavs' point of view was on the situation there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry. I can't get into what they said about Mr. Andropov.

Q Is he alive?

Q Tantalizing.

Q Did they say he was alive?

Q Were there any points of disagreement in assessing the American and the Soviet Union situation? Okay. And the second question: were there any talks about Central America, Grenada and Nicaragua and so on?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that on the question of whether or not there are disagreements in our assessment, no; that in general there was a very -- a larger element of agreement on the assessment of the situation and also of what needs to be done.

On the question of Central America, yes, there was some -- a brief discussion of the situation there, but not nearly as extensive as the discussion of the East-West and the Middle East situations.

Q How about Cuba?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No discussion of Cuba --

Q On economic -- Yugoslavia's --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- per se. Not of Cuba per se. There was of Central America and the situation there but --

Q On Yugoslavia's economic problem, particularly its foreign debt, were there any specific requests made by the Yugoslavians or any specific promises offered by --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. Deputy Secretary McNamara pointed out that we're well along in terms of the government side of this. The governments have been meeting in Paris and the government side of the package is more or less finalized.

The bank -- private bank side is also finalized more or less. Everybody is now waiting for the Yugoslav IMF conversations to come to a successful conclusion. So, we're not in a position now where the Yugoslavs have to ask anything of us or we of them.

Q For those of us who haven't been following it very closely, was essentially is going to happen from the government side and what, hopefully, will happen as far as the IMF goes? What's --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's very similar to the situation last year. We're dealing as we are in many situations of this sort with the debt that's coming due, on what to do about that debt, how to arrange it so that Yugoslavia can manage its trade

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situation and can build up a greater reserve. So we're talking about both government and private debt that coming due.

Q Rescheduling?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's not a classic rescheduling operation. It's broader than that because it involves some new money and -- So it's like the Friends of Yugoslavia package last year, which was a complex package involving everybody, the World Bank, the Board for International Settlement, the INF, private banks, etc. It's a complex financial cooperation package, which we believe will allow them to build up their reserves further. They're beginning to turn the corner.

Q President Spiljak was referring to some kind of initiatives by the nonaligned countries. Could you tell us in which areas those initiatives were undertaken or are being undertaken at the moment?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, I think you'll have to ask the Yugoslavs. I'm sorry. We didn't get into any detail into specific, nonaligned approaches. We did discuss the Middle East at some length and what the nonaligned approach in general terms is to that. But beyond that, I'd have to refer you to the Yugoslav side.

Q But did he mention the initiative specifically or just in some general terms?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: More in general terms.

Please.

Q You mentioned one of the positive signs as being the Yugoslav-Soviet talks in Stockholm. In what respect? Like in respect to the Yugoslav-Soviet relations or East-West --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, East-West relations.

Q And can you be sort of a little more specific about what encouraged them in that meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think it's the same thing that encouraged us and that is that the Soviets, in private there, were talking about the need to get on with dialogue and about some areas where dialogue, they could see, was possible immediately, even though the nuclear arms control talks are in abeyance for the moment.

I mentioned Vienna, of course, Stockholm was a place in which all of us talked a great deal about Stockholm, about the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, about confidence-building measures and the Yugoslavs are very interested in seeing that that process, the process of working out confidence-building measures succeeds. So that's one of the things.

They came away with the same sense we did, which is that the Soviets want to work in Stockholm to bring about some results.

Q But you're talking about dialogue outside the main arms control -- They saw no particular sign of hope for the main ones, the long-range --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not a specific sign in the sense that they, anymore than we, got a date from the Soviets when they would go back to Geneva, no. But they have the same sense that we do that the Soviets are looking for a way to be able to return to the nuclear arms control talks. And you can see that in the Soviets' public comments as well. There is a certain flexibility in some of the things that they've been saying recently that

Mr. Andropov has been quoted in his interviews in the formulation that he uses about -- that the West, the United States, should express readiness to go back to the situation before the deployment of our missiles. They are trying formulations now that have a certain flexibility in them. And the Yugoslavs see that as we do.

It's not enough yet -- I don't mean to say that we're about to go. I don't want to use the word "breakthrough" -- (laughter.) We're not about to go immediately back to Geneva. Neither they nor we believe that.

However, we both believe that some of the worst is behind us and that we, in a very difficult and slow way, are moving in a slightly better direction.

Q So they picked up the sense in this movement -- I mean, in these meetings, nothing specific. But they do want to go back.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: At some point, yes. Yes.

Q -- START and --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They didn't make specific whether it was both or just, in general, nuclear arms control talks.

Q Did they indicate in those discussions that this is something that at some point in the future is likely to lead to a resumption of the talks or did they indicate the Soviets will need some kind of a specific incentive or inducement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They urged us to be flexible. They did not get into any question of what, you know, specifically needed to be done to get back to the arms control talks.

Q But they had -- suggestions --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not dealing with this.

MR. SIMS: Last question. Any last questions?

Q Did you say --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Dealing with U.S.-Soviet relations in general.

Q When you say "arms control," you don't mean missile control? Which --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Nuclear arms control means missile control, yes.

Q It's the same thing?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. Yes.

Q About Central America, were there any disagreements in -- matters facing U.S. policy with regard to the region?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are differences of view about Central America. I can't say that in the discussions today they were particularly expressed, no. But there are differences in our views on Central America.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

Embargoed for Release at 10:00 a.m. EST — February 2, 1984

BRIEFING BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, MARTIN FELDSTEIN ON THE ECONOMIC REPORT

The Briefing Room

9:33 A.M. EST

MR. FITZWATER: This morning's briefing is on the Economic Report by Martin Feldstein, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. The report is embargoed for 10:00 a.m. this morning. And we have extra copies for any of you who didn't get one earlier.

DR. FELDSTEIN: I'm sure you've all had lots of time in the last few days to read the report. I don't have a formal prepared statement. But let me just make a brief remark about the report.

There's no way to summarize it; but there are certain themes that run through it. And one that's clearly prominent in the first two chapters and that comes up again in some of the other discussion is the problems of the budget deficit. That's something that we in this report and that the budget message also pointed out as the single most important problem that has to be dealt with in the years ahead. We can't count on growing our way out of these deficits. And if we don't deal with them, we can't have the kind of economic recovery that we want. Unless they are reduced over the next several years down to a small fraction of our GNP, we're going to continue to have abnormally high real interest rates. We're going to continue to see that investment is depressed, as a share of GNP. We will continue to have a lopsided recovery in which a strong dollar has adverse effects on our export industries and those that compete with imports from abroad.

And in the longer term, as the report and the budget both make clear, the interest payments on our national debt will represent a very large share of total tax revenue, 30 percent or perhaps as much as 40 percent of personal income tax revenue by the end of the decade will have to be devoted to paying the interest on the national debt. So reducing the deficit has to be one of our highest priorities.

I am, as many of you know, quite optimistic that these bipartisan negotiations that are scheduled to begin next week are going to be fruitful, that what we couldn't accomplish by sending up the kind of budget that was sent up last year can be accomplished in quiet negotiations between the leadership of the Republicans and the Democrats in the Congress and the administration.

Q Excuse me. Are you announcing that the Democrats have agreed to meet next week?

DR. FELDSTEIN: No, I'm not announcing any news. I believe that --

Q -- again next week.

DR. FELDSTEIN: I believe that Mr. Wright and Senator Inouye are expected to come next week. And I believe that's been public information for quite a while.

Q It's news to us.

Q And you're characterizing --

DR. FELDSTEIN: -- I'm not intending to break any news -- Not saying anything that I don't believe I've read in the newspapers.

Q You know, heaven forbid, news should break out here, Dr. Feldstein; but to what was this -- What were the difficult choices, the difficult decisions that we were told yesterday would have to be made in 1985, if there is no progress on the deficit? What kinds of choices?

DR. FELDSTEIN: I wouldn't even put it that way. I would say that difficult decisions are going to have to be made in 1985, even if, as I expect, these negotiations are fruitful.

Q What can you tell us about what we face right after the election?

DR. FELDSTEIN: I can't tell you very much because it's still clearly unknown. But even with success, $100 billion plus in these negotiations, we will have significant deficits in the years ahead. And the only way that they're going to be brought down is to go beyond what the President called "the less contentious issues" and to take on some of the tough parts in the budget.

But I'm not going to say more about the specifics of that until we get to 1985.

Q You're saying that there are going to have to be taxes, there are going to have to be spending cuts.

DR. FELDSTEIN: I'm saying these negotiations I expect that -- to get a compromise, to get $100 billion plus over the next few years agreed to quickly, we're going to have to have additional tax revenue, we're going to have to trim back on the size of the defense authorizations and we're going to have to have domestic spending cuts.

All that has to be done now. And I think it can be done and be done quickly.

Q In these negotiations, are you saying?

DR. FELDSTEIN: In these negotiations.

Q What day next week --

DR. FELDSTEIN: I can't be telling you something you don't already know. The administration has said over --

Q -- negotiations was going to focus on -- We were going to focus on the less contentious issues.

DR. FELDSTEIN: Yes, but that would include dealing not only with domestic spending but also with increased tax revenue through closing loopholes, going beyond the items that are in the budget. And, also, we expect we'll require trimming back the defense appropriations.

Q Is some kind of general tax increase inevitable? Is that something we're going to have to do in 1985?

DR. FELDSTEIN: I don't think we can answer that at this point.

Obviously, what we're talking about is finding another, roughly, $100 billion beyond what can be done in this downpayment package. And we have to see just how that can be done.

Q Marty, how much worse is the economic situation going to be because you're waiting and not solving the problem now? Because you're putting it off because it's an election year?

DR. FELDSTEIN: I don't think , if we get these negotiations to a fruitful conclusion,the economy will suffer. Let me be more explicit. I think if we get negotiations settled in the next few weeks that produce $100 billion plus of deficit reduction over three years -- and I think $100 billion is the minimum, by no means the ceiling -- I think if we get $100 billion plus over three years and that's interpreted correctly as a downpayment, as a first step to be followed up in 1985, then I think that there will be the kind of confidence in financial markets and among business investors that can keep this recovery moving in the way that we have forecast it.

Q But what if all that's accomplished is what the President has proposed? How much worse is it that he, in his budget, has decided to do nothing in 1984 and to wait until 1985?

DR. FELDSTEIN: I think that -- Our attitude, as you should know, is that these negotiations really supercede the budget, that the budget is not what we want to see happen in 1985, that the budget is a --

Q So why did you send it up, Marty?

DR. FELDSTEIN: Because last year we tried to do the opposite. We sent up a budget that called for substantial spending cuts, called for a large contingent in tax increase and it got no where. It was just -- no reception at all in the House of Representatives. And the result, I think, was that we made no progress.

Therefore, if we're going to make progress, we have to do it a different way. We have to get the key people together in a room to talk about what can be done, rather than turn it into a public debate.

Q Marty, since when is the budget supposed to be a political assessment? Isn't it supposed to be a budget?

DR. FELDSTEIN: It is a budget. It is a budget that explains most of the things that have to be done in the coming year. But it doesn't explain how we can make the additional cuts and tax increases that are required. It describes the funds that are going to be needed to run all the agencies and all the programs. But we do need to find, beyond that, additional cuts.

Q Dr. Feldstein, you're saying $100 billion from the negotiations over three years and then another $100 billion you must get --

DR. FELDSTEIN: A year. A year.

Q -- in fiscal '85 and beyond, each year?

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DR. FELDSTEIN: No, no. Let me be clear. What we're looking for in the negotiations is a $100 billion cumulative over three years, '85, '86 and '87, at least $100 billion.

If we get $100 billion total, that will presumably mean something like $40 billion or $50 billion a year in 1986, '87 and beyond. That, obviously, won't get the deficits down to a balanced budget. The only way we're going to do that is to come back after the elections in 1985 and make the more difficult decisions that will reduce the annual deficits by $100 billion or so.

Q Don't you have to go to a tax increase to do that?

DR. FELDSTEIN: We're going to have to wait until '85 to see what can be done then.

Q Why?

Q But realistically -- you can't get it all from spending, can you?

DR. FELDSTEIN: I think you're going to have to wait and see what happens in 1985. Unless there is -- Let me say this -- unless there is a significant change in priorities, we are going to have to have more tax revenue.

Q You've said repeatedly the waiting until '85 to enact some kind of budget plan will put such a dampening effect or demand in the economy that it's going to have some effect on GNP growth. You've said that throughout this year. What kind of effect will a package of this proportions, that you're telling us is absolutely necessary, will have on economic growth?

DR. FELDSTEIN: The crucial thing is what people expect about future years. If they see this downpayment as a serious effort, and as an indication that Congress and the administration will be able to go on working together, then, I think, the economy can produce the kind of solid growth over the next few years that we're forecasting.

I think that's the crucial part -- whether or not they see this as a downpayment to be followed up in '85 by additional legislation that'll continue to shrink the deficits in the coming year.

Q Dr. Feldstein, aren't you really being dishonest on the -- You're saying you need tough choices in 1985 but because you have an election, you don't want to say what those choices are. With a President seeking re-election, isn't that really dishonest not to say what it is that you want, intend to do in 1985?

DR. FELDSTEIN: I think the President has said in very general terms what he wants to do. What he has said --

Q -- exactly the opposite. You've said he said he doesn't want new taxes. You say that -- you're going to need new taxes. He says he doesn't want to cut defense spending. You're saying that he's going to have to.

DR. FELDSTEIN: I'm going to tell you what I think the President has said, and then you tell me where you think I'm wrong. What I believe the President has said and what the administration has made very clear about these negotiations is that in these negotiations, in the $100 billion over three years --

Q I'm not talking about the negotiations.

DR. FELDSTEIN: Okay. Well, that's what I was talking about when I said that we're going to have to do something to --

Q No, you said that after the election that you need, unless there was a significant change of priorities, you'll need additional taxes.

DR. FELDSTEIN: Because you mentioned defense. The defense I --

Q I was talking about taxes as well.

DR. FELDSTEIN: Let me clear because maybe not everybody else is as clear as you are on this. In the negotiations --

Q -- clear.

DR. FELDSTEIN: -- everything is on the table -- in the negotiations everything is on the table. That includes taxes, it includes defense, it includes domestic spending. Now, what happens after the election? I can't say what's going to happen after the election. We face a deficit even with this downpayment that is on the order of two and a half or three percent of GNP.

Q What I'm saying is for a candidate seeking re-election, doesn't he have an obligation to say what will happen after the election?

DR. FELDSTEIN: What he said is -- what he has said is that he believes that he wants to start on the spending side. He wants to start on the spending side and see how much can be done on the spending side. What he said when he came and spoke in this room about a month and a half ago is that if one sees that spending has been reduced as much as possible, cost of government has been brought down as much as possible, and that still doesn't balance receipts and outlays, then something has to be done on the receipt side. And he's emphasized that he wants the Treasury to develop options for substantial tax reform in a way that burdens the economy less.

Q Aren't you not telling us what you want to do in 1985 because you're trying to duck a political issue?

DR. FELDSTEIN: I'm not even going to be here in 1985 so I don't know what the administration is going to decide in 1985.

Q You're not even going to be here tomorrow after this. (Laughter.)

Q Dr. Feldstein, how in the world can you be optimistic about the decision for compromising negotiations when the Democrats are not going to go for significant domestic spending cuts and the President has already overruled advisors like yourself on the prospect for real tax increases or defense cuts?

DR. FELDSTEIN: I think you're wrong. What has been said repeatedly -- Jim Baker said it on television awhile ago; Dave Stockman and Don Regan and I all said it in the general press briefing yesterday -- is that everything is negotiable this time. We expect there to be a trimming down in the proposed defense outlays in this budget. We expect there to be more tax revenue than is in this budget, and we expect to get domestic spending cuts.

Q You're a dead man. (Laughter.)

DR. FELDSTEIN: You haven't been listening to what my colleagues have been saying recently. All this has been repeated over and over and over again.

Q I've only listened to what one person has been saying and he hasn't gotten the word.

Q What does the President mean, then, when he says not on your life that we're going raise taxes to reduce the deficit?

DR. FELDSTEIN: What the President means is we're not going to have a general rate increase for everybody. What he is prepared --

Q -- for the poor, huh?

DR. FELDSTEIN: No, now, in these negotiations. What he wants to do -- Allow me to deal with that in a minute, Sam.

Q Okay.

DR. FELDSTEIN: What he wants to do is to include as part of this package additional tax revenue. Recall that in this budget there are $33 billion over the next three years in additional tax revenue. But it doesn't come from an across-the-board increase. It doesn't raise marginal rates directly. What it does is raise tax revenue by closing tax loopholes. In the President's mind that is a fundamental distinction -- raising marginal tax rates by an across-the-board increase and closing tax loopholes.

Q How much additional can be raised above the $33 billion through the same process?

DR. FELDSTEIN: Again, I don't want to anticipate in detail what the negotiations are going to have to focus on but you probably heard yesterday when Bob Dole and Dan Rostenkowski were on television and said that they could quickly agree to $50 billion over three years, if they were given the opportunity. I think that the leadership in the Congress really can deal with this and deal with it in a very fast schedule.

Q Marty, speaking of 1985, there is really no secret as to where you're going to have to cut because cuts in discretionary programs, as Stockman said, it is fortunate that

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you are already down to the bone. And he mentioned the places where it's going to have to be cut. Indeed, he mentioned them yesterday, didn't he? So you are talking about such things as entitlements. You are talking about such things as medicare -- are you not?

DR. FELDSTEIN: We don't know what we're talking about for '85. (Laughter.)

Q That'll get on. (Laughter.)

Q I realize, I realize that --

DR. FELDSTEIN: Well, right now we have the budget that has just been presented -- to be discussed, and negotiations to be dealt with. Why can't we wait until a year from now to talk about next year's budget?

Q Because there's an election campaign on, and you are saying, rather frankly from the podium yesterday, that you just don't want to get into the politics of this year and present these targets for everybody to shoot at. But the fact is that there are a hell of a lot people out there who are worried about what is going to happen during the next four years. You implied, very strongly, that the first priority of the President, as you quoted him, was to first see if he could get domestic spending down, as much as possible, and then go to the rest. Now, that domestic spending -- there are few areas left. Will you not acknowledge that they include medicare and entitlements?

DR. FELDSTEIN: I don't want to point to any particular part of the budget for 1985. There have been no discussions -- there --

Q Will you tell --

DR. FELDSTEIN: -- have been no decisions within --

Q Will you tell, will you tell us that --

DR. FELDSTEIN: -- this administration about 1985.

Q -- Will you tell us that social security entitlements and medicare are out of bounds in the next four years?

DR. FELDSTEIN: I can't tell you anything because there's been no discussion in the administration about the budget to be submitted a year from now.

Q Why is it that Stockman in the Fortune interview specifically -- and yesterday -- mentioned that?

DR. FELDSTEIN: Medicare is clearly a problem part of the budget. The medicare outlays do not meet medicare receipts over the next decade. There has been a quadrennial commission that has reported and said that the medicare program is going to be hundreds of billions of dollars short over that period, that either has to be made up by additional revenue -- earmarked for that -- or otherwise, or it has to be made up by finding ways of trimming the medicare program.

But at this point, no decision has been made other than the very small changes that are in this budget for medicare.

Q Marty -- what you and Dave Stockman were saying yesterday, and you again today, is that there's some sort of secret plan to deal with all of these problems, but don't ask us until after the election. I mean, is that fair to the voters?

DR. FELDSTEIN: I will swear to you that there is no secret plan.

Q There's no secret plan -- it's taxes and spending cuts in places like medicare.

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DR. FELDSTEIN: There is no plan. We have to face that problem. It will have to be dealt with in '85. There are going to have to be very difficult decisions, because we're talking about substantial numbers of dollars, but at this time there is no plan.

There's an approach. The President said he wants to go through the budget, see what is politically and economically possible on the spending side, before he turns to the revenue side.

Q Respectfully, after three years in office, doesn't this man have an obligation to have a plan --

Q No --

Q -- which he can present to the voters?

DR. FELDSTEIN: He has been making progress in bringing down domestic spending, and I think we just have to wait and see what happens in 1985.

Q Will you bring the deficits down?

DR. FELDSTEIN If the negotiations work, the deficit will be coming down.

Q Do you disagree with Mr. Stockman who said yesterday that next year they were clearly going to have to look at entitlements? He said that in plain English, look at, meaning --

DR. FELDSTEIN: There are proposals in this budget which deal with what I think are sometimes called entitlements. There's the pensions for -- they're not low-income means tested entitlements. They are things like civil service and military pensions. And we propose in this budget to delay the COLA increases in those.

There are a lot of things that would fall under the rubric of entitlements that have to be dealt with now as well as in the future. There are small changes in the Medicare and Medicaid program that were in the Congressional Reconciliation bill last year that we hope will be part of the discussions in these negotiations.

Q But Mr. Stockman said there's going to be a very tough bullet to bite next year, which implies strongly that there's going to be a major whack taken at entitlements next year once the election's --

DR. FELDSTEIN: I don't know whether that's going to be possible. I don't know whether that's going to be proposed. All I know is

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the President had made it clear that he is committed to getting these deficits all the way down. He's committed to eventually balancing the budget. That's going to require very substantial reductions in outlays or increases in taxes.

And I know his starting point. His starting point is to look at the spending side.

Q How do you know he's committed to getting the deficits down? That's not what he's saying.

DR. FELDSTEIN: Because he has said that repeatedly inside this administration.

Q Not at the cost of taxes or defense increases.

DR. FELDSTEIN: Let me refer you back to what he said to all of you when he came into the Briefing Room about a month and a half ago, which he said that he wants to bring down outlays, reduce cost of government as much as possible. But if that doesn't balance the budget, if that doesn't bring spending and receipts into balance, then he will look at the receipt side.

Q But he's also --

Q That's not what he's saying in his campaign speeches.

Q Yes, he goes out there and he tells these people --

DR. FELDSTEIN: Just repeat to you what he said to you in this room. I can't give you a better citation than what he said to you personally.

Q I'm suggesting it's been outdated.

Q You said that the negotiations, the deficit negotiations supercede the budget and the budget is not what you want. What do you want in terms of defense spending? You must have a bottom line.

DR. FELDSTEIN: We don't have a specific bottom line. We are prepared to negotiate. We understand that the $305 billion for DOD that is in the authority request for 1985 will have to be trimmed as part of these negotiations. How far? More than the President would like, less than some of the people we're negotiating with would like. But we'll have to wait until we see what that negotiation leads to.

Q Secretary Weinberger yesterday testified on the Hill, said just the opposite. He said that we couldn't accept any cuts in this $305 spending authority request. Why do you then today say what's negotiable and we expect that there will be cuts?

DR. FELDSTEIN: I haven't heard the Secretary's statement but I know what was our understanding in the administration when we announced that we wanted these negotiations. That has been said over and over again. Nothing is ruled out, including defense and taxes.

Q So the $305 -- is that a fake figure that you put up artificially high so you could bargain it down?

DR. FELDSTEIN: No, no. That figure was, as you know, cut down by about $17 billion from the figure that was carried over from last year.

Q Yes, but you're saying that this figure is artificially --

DR. FELDSTEIN: It is clearly less -- it is clearly less than the Defense Department would like, but we have to make changes if we're to get those deficits down and there is a complete commitment to doing that.

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Q So why didn't you give the actual figure on defense that you really were willing to accept?

DR. FELDSTEIN: The reasons which I'm sure you're fully aware of, that if we had proposed not $305, but $301, that would be the starting point for any negotiations --

Q So --

Q Negotiating position, right?

DR. FELDSTEIN: It was the position that we came to internally before the agreement to negotiate was decided upon.

Q Dr. Feldstein, how can you say --

Q Feldstein. (Laughter.)

Q How can you say that --

Q Here we go again.

Q -- taxes are not ruled out of negotiations when the President has ruled them out in two weeks of speeches?

DR. FELDSTEIN: Let me repeat what I said to somebody here before. A general across-the-board tax increase doesn't fit even within the scope of the kind of downpayment plan that we're talking about. But we have not ruled out at all -- we have not ruled at all additional tax revenue. We expect there to be additional tax revenue. We expect it to be a substantial part of this $100 billion or $100 billion plus. There's no debate about that.

There's no debate about dealing with defense. That's something that the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of OMB and I said very clearly to the entire press corps yesterday. So that is not a point of contention.

Q But the President doesn't draw that distinction. He says, no taxes. He doesn't say, no general tax. He says, no taxes.

DR. FELDSTEIN: The budget -- you've seen this budget before?

Q I know, but I'm only telling you what he says when the words come --

DR. FELDSTEIN: And what does it have in here? Whose budget is it?

Q Well, what's he doing? Talking out of --

Q Well, we don't know. You wrote it though.

Q And you don't like it.

DR. FELDSTEIN: The President agreed to authorize the additional tax revenue that is in this budget because he makes an important distinction between closing tax loopholes and raising marginal tax rates across the board. There is no direct impact on marginal tax rates in these proposals.

Q So you're saying there's not going to be a request for marginal tax rates.

MR. FITZWATER: Marty has testimony on the Hill, so we'll just have to take one question.

Pat.

Q Well, wait a minute.

Q You said that the downpayment on the deficit is

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important because it's necessary to send the right signal. How important is the actual dollar amount that's cut, this $100 billion figure, or is the more important thing just to show that Tip O'Neill and Ronald Reagan can sit down in civil fashion and discuss and make some progress on economic business?

DR. FELDSTEIN: We look at 1986, and '7, and beyond. We're going to need more than thw reductions that can come out of this negotiation. We're going to need more than $40 or $50 billion a year. So it's just a starting point. But, obviously, the more you do now, the easier it's going to be to get those deficits down later. So doing $20 billion a year now just wouldn't be enough. The more we can do, the better.

Q It's the working together that's the key? Is that what --

DR. FELDSTEIN: It is very important. It is very important to indicate that we really -- and I think the language -- calling this a downpayment, is very important because it emphasizes the commitment to go on reducing these deficits in the future.

Q What day do the negotiations begin next week to the best of your knowledge?

DR. FELDSTEIN: Well, since I seem to be saying something that was a surprise to you I should probably stop there, but I believe that there will be a meeting next week.

Q Do you know when?

MR. FITZWATER: We don't have it -- no date's been set.

Q You say in your report that you don't want to have such big downpayment because it could suppress the growth and that it should be gradually and only step by step over the next few years. So how much do you really want this year?

DR. FELDSTEIN: Well, what I said in the report was that a large reduction of the deficit in '84 coming suddenly could be a mistake if it were too large. But I think we're talking about FY '85, '6, and '7 in these negotiations. So I don't expect any significant change in '84 at all.

Q Dr. Feldstein, there are a number of people, as you well know, in this administration who say they're basically suffering your presence until you leave in September, but that you're not --

DR. FELDSTEIN: They didn't say it to my face.

Q Well, that you're not a player anymore. What is -- what are the messages that you are getting? I mean, do you have any role in this administration anymore or -- what's your status here?

DR. FELDSTEIN: Of course I have a role in this administration. I have the same role that I've had all along in the discussions about the budget that's been prepared and in generally advising the President.

MR. FITZWATER: Thank you very much.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 9:58 A.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON CENTRAL AMERICA
DEMOCRACY, PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE

February 3, 1984

The Briefing Room

9:18 A.M. EST

MR. SIMS: This briefing is ON BACKGROUND attributable to a Senior Administration Official. We're going to have to finish this before 10:00 a.m., because the briefer has another meeting, so I'll move along and give you some information on the President's schedule as well.

It's ON BACKGROUND attributable to a Senior Administration Official. It's embargoed until 10:40 a.m. when the President makes some remarks.

Q Excuse me?

MR. SIMS: At 10:40 a.m. This briefing, as I said, is embargoed until the President speaks to a group in the East Room. The East Room event will be a writing pool, photo coverage -- open photo. We will have an embargoed fact sheet at the conclusion of this briefing and hope to have the text of the President's remarks, also embargoed, at the conclusion of this briefing.

Also on the President's schedule today, Alois Mock, the opposition leader in Austria will be meeting with the President at 9:30 a.m. He's just returned from a fact finding mission to Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Columbia with the International Democratic Union delegation.

At 9:45 a.m. the President sees Swiss Vice President Kurt Furgler. Their discussion will be on issues of peace, progress and international stability, particularly the international economics area. And the President meets with Eugenia Charles of Dominica at 1:45 p.m. We expect to have a White House photo on each of these three.

Larry's briefing today will be at 1:00 -- what did we say -- at 1:30 p.m.

Also, the President is going to have some remarks for elected Republican women officials at noon.

Q Noon or 1:00?

Q At 1:00.

MR. SIMS: Well, okay, the remarks are at 1:00 p.m. and that will be writing pool and photo coverage.

Q Is he going to Camp David?

MR. SIMS: He's going to Camp David this afternoon.

Q What time?

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MR. SIMS: Don't have a specific time right now.

Q The Republic women is --

MR. SIMS: It will be writing pool and open photo coverage.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Good morning. The subject here is the President's proposed Central America Democracy, Peace and Development Initiative. And let me tell you what I'm going to do. I'm going to first give you a little overview of the relationship between this and the National Bipartisan Commission Report, then go to the highlights of the proposed legislation that we will be sending up, we anticipate, this coming week, starting with economic and then military, then moving to the question that I know many of you are very interested in, of conditionality, and finally talking a little bit about the Central American Development Organization, CATO, which is recommended by the Commission.

Now, on the overall situation, we believe that the recommendations of this Commission come at a very crucial time in the development of Central America. And we find it significant that the 12 commissioners which included both parties as well as independents concluded that, "Central America is both vital and vulnerable and that whatever other crisis may arrive to claim the nation's attention, the United States cannot afford to turn away from that threatened region."

We share the judgment of the Commission, that there is an acute crisis in Central America which endangers fundamental strategic and moral interests of the United States, and therefore, the President has decided to seek legislation and to carry out appropriate actions not requiring legislation to implement all of the Commission's recommendations.

The -- in short, the legislative and non-legislative program is in consonance with the Commission's recommendations.

Now, we agree not only on the more specific kinds of recommendations about money, but also some of the thrusts of the Commission's report, particularly with regard to economic policy reform, with regard to the desirability of regional integration and the like.

With regard to the money, I think it's important when we start going through the numbers, to remember that for the Fiscal '85, economic assistance will be 7 times the amount of military assistance that's in the proposal. And in the FY '84 supplemental, the ratio is a different, because it's a little bit more loaded toward the, or weighted toward the military side, but even so, when you take '84 supplemental and '85 money together, it is 75 percent economic and 25 percent military assistance. In short, a three to one ratio.

Q Seventy-five --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Seventy-five economic and twenty-five percent military. That's supplemental plus '85.

Q What about just the supplement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll have to get that to you in a moment. Let me go through the different numbers, I think it is -- on the supplemental -- why don't I just take that right now, though I would like to do this in an orderly way.

For the supplemental, it's 400 and 259, so it's --

Q 400 is military?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: 400 economic, 259 military. So even in the supplemental alone, it is almost two-to-one economic. And I'll go into the reasons why there is a little more, proportionately more, in the supplemental than over the whole program where it, as I say, 7 to 1 economic.

And we also very much support the principles reflected in the report on Democratic self-determination, on economic and social development, benefiting all on a fair basis; support the respect for human rights advocated in the Commission report, and the notion that there has to be cooperation in meeting threats to the security of the region.

We recognize that we need bipartisan support in Congress and we do seek it, because we think that this bipartisan support is important in responding to what the Commission has called the threat to American national security in the region. We seek a 5-year endorsement from the Congress so that there is the confidence in the region and there is an incentive in the region for making progress on human rights and introducing policy reform.

In short, we believe that we need a program that has economic, political, diplomatic and security dimensions -- all four. They all have to go together, even any three of them by themselves really won't do it. It has to be a package.

Now, let me get down to the specifics. With regard to economic assistance, for FY '84, that would be the supplemental, the Commission recommends, as I said before, $400 million. And, that is the area in which our requests will be.

Q Does that mean it will be $400 million?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It may vary, very slightly, from $400 million because we have to have programs for specific countries and so forth, but it will be within --

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let's say, within five percent of that.

Q That's $400 million added to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What was already approved for '84.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On economic assistance. Somebody had that --

Q -- 450.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- 450.

Q That's FY '84?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: FY '84.

Q So it's 450 plus 400 -- is supplemental?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They're always double --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right.

Q Yes.

Q Just economic?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're talking about economic now. I'm only talking about economic assistance. I'll come to the military later. Let's try to keep it separate for the moment, and then we can compare --

Q You have to divide that up by countries yet?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have. Let me go through this, may I? And I think I'm going to be able to answer almost all of these questions, but probably more effectively. And then -- or efficiently in any event.

Let me point out that the need for the increased economic assistance rests on some facts. One is that there has been a grave decrease in the gross national product of these countries. Gross domestic product has fallen in the last several years by 35 percent in El Salvador, 23 percent in Costa Rica, 14 percent in Guatemala and 12 percent in Honduras. And that, in and of itself, is a cause of social and political unrest. And we -- the economic program here is designed to address that problem as well as provide a base for long-term development.

Now, with regard to the -- that was just the supplemental, the $400 million. We do accept the recommendation of the Commission for $8 billion over the next five years, that is to say, FY '85-'89. Of that, $6 billion will be cash, and the rest will take the form of insurance and guarantees.

Now, the most important aspect of the $2 billion which isn't cash is that the Ex-Im Bank will have a trade credit program which is designed to provide credit which has tended to dry up to the private sector in Central American countries. For FY '85 itself, we expect to request about $1.1 billion for the area in appropriated funds and $600 million in insurance and guarantees.

Now, this is the way to think of that: the program has to build up a little over time in order for it to work. Moreover, at the beginning it'll be more heavily weighted toward the most immediate needs, such as balance of payments support. Development projects take time, take time for expenditure and so forth. And they will become more important as we go through the five years.

Yes?

Q What do you mean by --

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Q Could you explain insurance and guarantees a little?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Beg your pardon?

Q Insurance and guarantees -- what is that specifically?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: For example, the Export-Import Bank will have a program which will provide credit where credit is not available from commercial sources for imports into these countries -- so they will be guaranteeing commercial bank loans. Is that right? You may want to explain this in greater detail.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, this will be credit for up to one year in length. We've been very careful to limit it not to even medium-term credit because the ability of manufacturers and others to import parts and whatever has been quite limited in recent times and we think this will take up some of the gap. Imports like a part for a machine.

Q What about guarantees? What specifically -- insurance. I'm sorry. Insurance.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Mostly we're talking about the CCC --

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- and the Export-Import regular guarantee program, that type of activity.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: For the direct bilateral aid -- talking now about the money as opposed to the guarantees -- the figures for FY '85 will be for El Salvador something over $300 million. For Costa Rica something over $200 million.

Q Wait a minute.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We'll be giving you these figures.

Q This is the $1.1 billion now we're talking about?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. The $1.1 billion.

Q -- fact sheet?

MR. SIMS: Yes. You'll get the figures in a fact sheet.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We'll be giving you a fact sheet. But I'll slow down anyway because you can get it in your notes. But I'm just saying don't worry too much because we'll be giving you this in the fact sheet.

A little over $300 million for El Salvador. A little over $200 million for Costa Rica. Honduras, over $100 million. And Guatemala, about $100 million.

So -- Let me say, however, that while El Salvador will be the largest in total amount, it won't be the one that will receive the most in per capita. There'll be two others that will receive more on a per capita basis, so that you've got to look at population

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of these countries in assessing where the -- in writing your stories and trying to get straight what's happening.

Q Where is the other $400 million?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Where is the other $400 million? Well, we're -- There are more countries -- and I'm not sure that I have that here so that I can give it to you. It is more than these amounts, so there is where part of it goes. In other words, I said, "More than, more than, more than." And I'm not sure that I can answer that question specifically. But there are more countries in the regions than the ones I have mentioned.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What is it? I --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, they say these don't add up to $1.1 billion. The other countries -- Belize -- Belize --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're talking about for '85?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, '85.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not all countries are listed there.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right. So they say what countries are there.

Q How about the others?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Belize,-Panama --

Q -- what's Belize getting?

Q What others are missing?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're still working out some of the final numbers. Indeed there was some question --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What we're trying to here is not to give you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In consulting with Congress, particularly --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're not trying to give you the budget request. What we're trying to give you is what's going to the central countries about which most of the news stories have been written.

Q Why don't you divvy out the fact sheets?

Q -- can you just give us the other countries that are going to be --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICAL: Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, you've got -- Let me just read off the countries where there'll be a program. Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama. And then there'll be some regional programs that are --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That are separate but regional wide in focus.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right.

Q Does that include the Central American Common Market --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's an example of a regional --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's an example. That's about $100 million there, isn't it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Over --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Over time.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Over a period. And we have to work out just how much that will be because -- number of complexities in getting the market really going. But that certainly will be a focus of some of the monies.

Q Are there only two other countries? Belize and --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The regional programs add up to quite a bit, which are not given directly to particular governments --

Q Can I follow up on --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it depends. I think there's a limit to how much time you want to spend on this because my time is --

Q Let him finish the presentation.

Q -- Common Market. Will funds available to the Common Market be also provided to Nicaragua, through the Common Market?

MR. SIMS: Why don't we do the briefing and then take the questions --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, we're getting ahead of ourselves --

Q You don't happen to have the fact sheets, so that we could be looking at them?

MR. SIMS: No.

Q Excuse me.

MR. SIMS: Do you want to help type?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The uses of the money are quite diverse. At the beginning, particularly, there's going to be quite a bit of it going to go for balance of payment support, simply because these countries are not able to import the way they

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had been able to import and this is having a drastic effect on their employment and on the just general social and economic system there. But we'll also be using this money for housing projects, for infrastructure, particularly of a labor intensive kind; for education; for training and scholarships and for many of the other purposes that are set out at length in the Kissinger Commission recommendation, including a special funding for the National Endowment for Democracy, which will be earmarked for Central America.

Now, military assistance: As I said before, the concept of the Commission Report, the concept of the administration, laid out very clearly in the President's speech to the Joint Session of Congress last April, is that military assistance is essential to provide a security shield under which these economies -- El Salvador in particular -- can make progress on the economic front and in the development of democracy, so that there is a military assistance component.

The Commission, I note, stated that they thought the worst solution was a long-term stalemate because that would be incompatible with economic development. Therefore, our current thinking on assistance is as follows with regard to numbers. For El Salvador --

Q This is for what?

Q Which program is this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Military assistance.

Q Yes, which year?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'm going to give it to you by year.

First of all, we will be seeking military assistance only for FY '84 and for FY '85. Whereas, there will be on the economic side a whole five-year program, in addition to the supplemental for which we will be requesting funds.

For El Salvador: $179 million --

Q For what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- for FY '84 supplemental assistance and $133 million for FY '85. Now, the

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FY '84 continuing resolution already made available $64.8 million, so this would total, if you put together '84, '85 and requests and the continuing resolution for '84, about $376 million for two years for military assistance to El Salvador, and this is quite congruent with the language of the Kissinger Commission Report. Now, there is a certain front loading, as I mentioned before, in order to break the military stalemate and provide the security shield that I was talking about. For the rest of Central America, we now plan to propose $80 million in FY '84 supplemental military assistance and $123 million in FY'85. Most of this would go, well let me put it differently, Honduras would be the major recipient.

Q What is the current FY '84, please sir? Already approved?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: For the rest of Central America?

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't have that. Maybe we could get that for you. I just don't happen to have it on the table here --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Military number for '84 without supplemental.

Q Without El Salvador?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Without El Salvador. In the continuing resolution?

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Without El Salvador --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We'd have to compute that.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Could we get that for you. I just don't have it.

Now, to come to the conditionality question. Let me go through this and go through the CADO, and then I know you have questions about conditionality. Yes.

Q Could you give us a breakdown on the $80 million for '84, and also the $123 million for '85?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we don't have a breakdown of the $80 million for the rest of Central America at this point. We want to consult with Congress. It will be, as I say, disproportionately for Honduras, but some of the other countries will be getting small amounts.

Q Will Guatamala also be eligible for the $80 million and the $123 million?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, this is one of the questions that we want to consult further with, and one of the reasons that I don't have the answer to that for you at this moment. Now, I want to take up two more topics, and then let me go through the conditionality and through CADO. I think it'd be the most efficient way to do it. I know you want to ask questions about conditionality.

The Commission recommended that military aid to El Salvador should be made contingent through legislation requiring periodic reports upon demonstrated projects -- progress, excuse me, in reaching certain enumerated objectives, such as free elections and reduction of death squad activities. And I would urge all of you to read what they actually say on page 104 because the recommendation is very concrete and it's somewhat different from proposals that you're hearing certain places on Capital Hill, and I think it's important not to assume, as some stories do, that what is being proposed by the Commission is what is being proposed by certain Congressmen. It is not. Now, I think there is agreement, and real agreement, within the Executive, the Congress and the Commission, that human rights progress is essential in El Salvador. It's essential if there's to be a successful or reasonable outcome of the military struggle. It's essential for the protection of U.S. security and moral interests, and, therefore, that U.S. assistance should be conditioned on this progress as well as on other priority objectives. What we want to do is we want to work closely with the Congress to ensure human rights progress, while preserving the President's ability to pursue an effective foreign policy, and more specifically, we want the way this works to be effective and actually to achieve progress -- real progress on the human rights front.

Let me now go on, as I say, to CADO, the Central American Development Organization.

Q Wait -- (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All right.

Q Give us a break.

Q Spell it out.

Q Let's explore this.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All right, well, we won't have time, then, for the CADO.

Q Fine.

SENIOR ADMINSTRATION OFFICIAL: Fine.

Q We don't want CADO.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All right, you're not interested in CADO? That's all right with me. (Laughter.)

Q Either the elder or the younger. (Laughter.)

Q Spell it out.

Q Do you agree with legislation --

Q Good for you --

Q Spell it out --

Q -- or do you not agree with legislation?

Q And would the legislation reserve the right to the President to decide whehher the aid is cut off --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: One answer at a time please.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All right. Let's go into this carefully, now. We'll forget about CADO.

We believe -- first of all we accept the Commission recommendation which says -- Oops, I've got the wrong page reference here.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: With respect to El Salvador -- I'm quoting from page 104 -- "Military aid should, through legislation requiring periodic reports, be made contingent upon demonstrated progress toward free elections, freedom of association, the establishment of the rule of law, and an effective judicial system. And the termination of activities of the so-called death squads, as well as vigorous action against those guilty of crimes and the prosecution, to the extent possible, of past offenders. These conditions should be seriously enforced."

That is the recommendation. We accept that, not only completely, but wholeheartedly and enthusiastically.

Now, what we propose to do is to consult very closely with the Congress, and we have been doing it -- the course of this week, there's another meeting this morning -- I have had conversations with members of Congress, I will be having more, in order to work out a basis that is acceptable to the Congress and effective.

Now, what do I mean by effective? What I mean by effective is any system which involves Uncle Sam telling the people of Central America exactly what they've got to do, chapter and verse, is not going to be effective. It is not going to be effective phycholgically. It's not going to be effective in practice. I may make somebody feel good, it may make us feel good -- but, what we want is a system that's effective. And that's what we want to talk to the Congress about.

Moreover, we cannot accept a system which involves all or nothing conditionality. That is to say, where there are a set of criteria which have to be met word for word, and all met, or there is no funding -- we think that has proved to be counterproductive. And I note that there has been more human rights progress in Central America during the period in which there hasn't been such legislation than there was previously in a similar period of time. And therefore, we believe, there has to have a system with more gradations in it.

And in particular we will be seeking, with regard to the military assistance and the economic assistance, the authority or the right not to make it all available for -- in the year in which it is appropriated, so that it can be withheld as a carrot and as a stick to assure real progress. Moreover, we will be reporting much more fully on many more topics that bear on human rights progress including social and economic development to the Congress on a regular basis, so that the whole picture is before the Congress and not just particular numbers or particular facts. Although those will be there too. Everything that was provided before will be provided, but a lot more will be provided so that one can get the whole picture and understand.

Q Who do you want to see deciding progress? And who do you want to see determining the level of the gradation of the funding depending on the gradation of progress? Is that to be decided solely by the administration?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the Congress will obviously be appropriating funds. So the Congress will be able to make a

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judgment. We believe that the administration is in the best position to make the kind of week-by-week, month-by-month, judgments as to whether to speed up or slow down the flow of money as a way of providing an incentive and some leverage on the situation.

And it's that allocation of responsibility which is what we want to consult with the Congress about.

Q Do you want Congress to appropriate all the money you're asking for. But as you give these reports, it will be the administration who decides whether they have fulfilled the qualifications in this statement, whatever it'll be. It will be the one to turn the spigot on and off, not Congress?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is fundamentally true, but we want to work with the Congress on the exact mechanism because we will be making these reports and the Congress has certain legislative powers, too.

Q Well, will you allow them to have a hand on the spigot?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: So, we believe the administration is in the best position to control the spigot.

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But, we recognize the Congress's interest in the subject and certainly their power of the purse.

Q Are you saying that the administration agrees that there should be new legislation requiring periodic certification in order to continue aid, or are you saying that Congress should just rely on its appropriation mechanism and allow the administration to pursue its present policy of submitting reports voluntarily on itself?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We think there should be legislation on the subject requiring the President to do certain things with regard to achieving certain objectives. The exact way in which that works -- the exact way in which that works is what we are now consulting, very actively, the Congress on.

Q Are you going to submit a piece of legislation or wait for Congress to write it and then either accept or reject?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL· We are going to submit a piece of legislation, but only after we have completed our consultations on this subject.

Q What would be the extent of the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And we hope to do that next week, but --

Q What would be the extent of the requirement in such legislation on the President? Requirements simply to report and consult, which he's already doing voluntarily, leaving the amount of control -- the amount of withholding of money up to the President, or the administration -- unilaterally?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We think that the balance of -- I'm going to say exactly what I said before -- we think the administration's the best position to control the flow, but we want to report in a situation, consult on a current basis, with the Congress, so that this can be done jointly with the Congress on a consultative basis over the period as time goes on. What we are opposed to is a system in which there are a set of criteria where there is automaticity -- automaticity established --

Q What?

Q Wait, wait --

Q Auto-ma-tis-- (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Automaticity --

Q You've done it again. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Automatic cut off of funds.

Q Automaticity?

Q Say that again -- you don't want automatic --

Q Doesn't the Kissinger Commission remember what --

Q But how specific is the legislation?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The legislation -- it is -- that section is not written, because we're going through the consultations.

Q As you contemplate the legislation, will it only be on consultation rather than the withholding of money?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We not only -- we are proposing legislation to enable us not to spend money in any particular year, for any particular country, in order to achieve progress in human rights. We are affirmatively for that.

Q -- rather than negatively for that -- (Laughter.)

Q -- affirmatively for -- negatively against -- (Laughter.)

Q So the legislation will give the President the power to withhold the money? Once appropriated?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q It will stand on his --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In other words, it will be no year money can be spent later, or it can be --

Q It will expand -- on his current powers of rescission or power --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's not designed to do that. It's not -- we don't anticipate that question arising.

Q It's still vague -- it's still on the table?

Q That would be the effect --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It will still be there, it will still be appropriated. It could be diverted to other countries, and we will undoubtedly have arrangements with the committees in doing that --

Q It could also be speeded up?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it can't be -- money that's not appropriated can't be spent. But, sure -- the idea is that it can be speeded up.

Q Wouldn't this legislation, in effect, limit Congress's power of appropriation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not designed to -- there are many --

Q -- by expanding the President's powers of impounding?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- many examples of money that doesn't have to be spent in a particular year that is available until expended. It does not have to be spent in the year in which it's appropriated.

Q You suggested that we read the specific language on the Kissinger Commission report --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q -- on conditionality.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

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Q Many people, including people who are members of the Commission, say what this calls for automaticity --

Q Oh, God -- (Laughter.)

Q -- the way you just put it -- you said you agree with this. On the other hand, you're now, sound like you're saying you don't agree with it. Can you clarify that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They -- if they think it calls for all-or-nothing certification, I must say they use a different language than I use.

Q -- you can say that again -- (Laughter.)

Q Thank goodness. (Laughter.)

Q -- it is cut off at regular intervals?

Q You continue to say that this is not designed so that the Congress has less power -- you're saying it's not designed so that the President can do, figure things -- but in fact, if it goes into effect the way you're saying it will, that's the end result. The President can, in fact, diminish Congress's power to authorize money because he can turn the spigot on or off, as he sees fit. Is that not true.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But that is true in many, many areas of the domestic budget for example --

Q No, but -- but in terms of the domestic budget -- we're talking

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about military aid for El Salvador.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right.

Q We're talking about a highly controversial --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We are opposed to all-or-nothing certification. I'm not -- I've said that repeatedly.

Q But should Congress not have the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Now, that is not power the Congress has used elsewhere. It's reserved it largely -- -- I'm not -- Don't press me on all historical examples -- but has concentrated on El Salvador.

Q Does Congress not have the right to turn on and off the spigot?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It has that power through the appropriations process.

Q When you get this appropriation that you want in a vacuum, say, that human rights is at a mid-level where you would like it, you lay out month-by-month spending for the year or two, how then can he speed it up? By speeding it up, you'd run out six months year. So isn't this, in effect, only the right to cut off money?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think perhaps in a first year it would be. But if some money is carried over to a subsequent year, then you have the possibility of speeding up.

Q Well, would you fund it -- arrange the payments, at a lesser level, so that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Might do that. Might do that. There are lots of possibilities here. And it depends upon --

Q -- so you want it to be a carrot on a stick.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right.

Q You might give them less money at the beginning, holding out the promise --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right.

Q -- of more later --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Absolutely.

Q -- within the dollars you've --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's certainly a possibility.

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Q I'd like to shift just slightly. Is there anything at all in here for Nicaragua? Anything for the Contras? Where does money for the Contras show up? Can you address that?

Q What was the question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question has to do with the Contras.

Q Also, anything for Nicaragua generally --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is nothing in the legislation that we plan to send to the Hill which would provide money with regard to the so-called "Contras." And, as you know, we do not discuss that funding and -- But I do want to assure you that that's not part of this legislation. Period.

Q Can you address the question that was raised by Ambassador White as to whether the administration is covering up information about Presidential candidate D'Aubisson?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll come to that in a second. But you had a second part to your question?

Q Yes. Nicaragua generally. Anything at all in here for the government of Nicaragua?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's no provision for military assistance for Nicaragua.

With regard to economic assistance and the possibility, for example, that Nicaragua might be part of the CADO organization, the Commission has an approach to that, which I refer you to, which ties economic funding more loosely than the military funding to democratic processes and political -- excuse me -- economic policy reforms. And so in principle, Nicaragua might become eligible; but it seems to me that a lot would have to happen before that were the case.

Q What about D'Aubisson? Don't leave before you answer that question.

MR. SIMS: Your briefers have to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I promised to answer one question here. Let me take that and that'll have to be the last question.

Could you give it to me again so I've got it clearly in mind?

Q Ambassador White has charged that the administration has covered up information about Presidential candidate D'Aubisson. and his relationship to those murders. Can you address that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think -- What I can say is this, I'm not -- I have not read the full text of what he said; but what I understood he was saying is that there was certain information that was not being followed up on through prosecution.

With regard to that, I understand that the Justice Department has information available. They are the agency which undertakes the investigation of crimes in the United States. We stand behind the enforcement of the U.S. laws fully. And we have provided, on a regular basis, and this goes back years, information with regard to the violation of American laws, including with regard to this kind of activity. So I don't know -- The fact of the

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matter is, I don't know what he's talking about because we don't --

Q He said it was withheld from the Kissinger Commission. He said in his testimony yesterday that the information was withheld from the Kissinger Commission.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Withheld from the Kissinger Commission. Well, I don't know anything about that. I don't know the -- I'm just not prepared to address it. I'm not sure the Kissinger Commission even went into this question as such; so I don't know what "withholding" exactly means.

The fact of the matter is with regard to the violation of U.S. statutes, that's a question for the Justice Department, including the FBI, and we provide information to them as we receive it. That's --

Q -- D'Aubisson involved or not? Do we have any information that D'Aubisson was involved in the killing of the Archbishop?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't have any information on that. I understand that that's been a subject of endless inquiry over the years, including in the Congress --

Q When you say, "I," you mean you personally or does the State Department have any hard information?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have nothing to provide you on that subject. I'm simply not prepared to -- personally to answer --

Q Are you implying that the El Salvadoran government is covering up? You said Justice and perhaps State are providing information on these crimes and nothing --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I'm not implying that.

END 9:56 A.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Santa Barbara, California)

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE SITUATION IN LEBANON

February 7, 1984

Pt. Mugu NAS, California

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I assume all of you have seen the statement. I don't really have anything to add in terms of an opening set of comments. So I'll just take your questions here for a little bit.

Q How many troops are there ashore that would go aboard ships? Like 1,200.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right now, the number is on the order of something between 1,200 and 1,500 and eventually we have in mind that all of those -- Well, let me correct that -- Most of those would go back -- redeploy to the ships.

As you note, one of the remaining missions that we're assigning the MNF will be to provide security to our Embassy and other U.S. personnel, for instance, in the Ambassador's residence. And the present plan would leave a contingent of forces ashore to provide that security. And those would probably -- Although the plan isn't firm yet, but they may very well come out of the MAU so I wouldn't want to say that all of the MAU is moving back to the ships.

Q -- are there any limitations on the amount of force that can be used by the ships offshore? I mean, would the 16-inch guns be used?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's certainly a possibility, if it requires the use of the 16-inch guns to silence guns that are firing into the greater Beirut area.

Q Is this the 24th MAU?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know that, Jerry. You'll have to check with the Defense Department.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: 22nd.

Q 22nd?

Q What are the other members of MNF doing? Are they redeploying as well?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have consulted over the past day or so with the MNF co-contributors and they are assessing the situation and at this point we don't have their precise plans. I would ask you to talk to those embassies to get the details of what they plan to do, if it's been decided yet.

Q What sort of time-table is there for this redeployment?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, as the President says, he has asked Secretary Weinberger to provide him with a time-table, but -- ON DEEP BACKGROUND -- the order of the magnitude that we're talking about, and I wouldn't want you to, you know, this is not the time-table -- but the order of magnitude that we're talking about for the first increment to be completed in about a month.

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And the subsequent phases over a, at this point, an indefinite period of time, depending on the political situation on the ground, the build-up of the Lebanese armed forces -- and I think that's as far as I want to go on that point.

Q You mentioned phases -- how many phases?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's not necessarily clear how many phases there will be. Again, it will depend on our evaluation, in conjunction with the government of Lebanon that has requested this move. It will depend on our combined judgment as to how many phases it should be done in.

Q Do you know how many are in the first phase?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Orders of magnitude -- something probably, again, we're going to wait on Secretary Weinberger's plan, but probably something on the order of 500.

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Q But not for a month?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not necessarily. What I said -- would be completed within a month.

Q What would be the earliest you'd envisioned them moving out?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Doug, that's a little hard to say. Most likely we would not wait until the end of this time period I've given you before we would do something. But, you know, it will depend on the situation on the ground. We have been working with the government of Lebanon for many days now, actually, on a re-defining, reconstituting our MNF presence there. And the recent fighting has made this planning much more difficult. And the present situation on the ground will have an impact on that timing. But in the end, the government of Lebanon agrees with us -- that the kind of MNF presence that we're talking about now will be more helpful to them.

Q Why did they ask us to redeploy?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Because they feel that the other aspects of the plan, such as the accelerating of the equipment delivery and training to the Lebanese armed forces once this immediate political problem is sorted out, and the improved counter-battery capability, and our new rules of engagement will be more beneficial to them than the present arrangement has been.

Q What would satisfy this condition about reconstituting the government of Lebanon -- that's -- that's broadly favored -- does that mean pulling together a new cabinet or what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right. In other words, at the moment, President Gemayel is the only constituted part of the government. The cabinet has fallen, and he is in the process of negotiating and consulting with the various political factions within the country to form the government.

Q This is the administration's belief -- that we save Lebanon without a massive deployment of forces?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, I think that's -- you know, all along we have not been talking in terms of a completely independent military action. What we have talked about is a combination of political and military parts to the plan. And we still have hope, and I think genuinely so, that they will be able to reach a political agreement to form a government of national unity.

Q Well, was this a quid pro quo -- that they wanted more naval gunfire, and that we wanted to begin re-deployment -- is that it -- your way of putting it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think all parties involved here had concluded that the present arrangement was not the most efficient under the existing circumstances of increased terrorism, and they obviously agreed with us [illegible]

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that this was a better arrangement.

Q What direct impact will this plan have on the factions of Moslem gunmen who are controlling West Beirut now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In terms of immediate impact, probably not very much, other than the signal that we are sending to the Syrians by what we are doing that the U.S. has not given up on the government of Lebanon. We still support the government of Lebanon. We think that it is a viable entity.

And the immediate fighting in the streets of Beirut is a problem for the government of Lebanon and the Lebanese armed forces to control. And we, all along, have said that we did not want to become involved in the factional fighting, and, by and large, we haven't unless the units have fired directly at our units.

And the rules of engagement that we're talking about -- or the new portion of it applies to the Syrian controlled territories and that the new rules of engagement don't make any changes in the way we respond to the factional fighting.

What we want to do is to provide an umbrella that ensures the -- that helps ensure, or at least enhances the safety of the U.S. and MNF personnel in the greater Beirut area. At the same time you have the added advantage of that to provide some definite support to the Lebanese armed forces to keep the Syrians and their proxies up in the Menton -- that's the mountain area to the north and east of Beirut. It keeps the units from up there from intimidating the government and the Lebanese armed forces.

You know, the -- I'd like to make just one point. The logic of this is that the U.S. presence in Lebanon has been requested by the government of Lebanon. We feel that that presence is important as an indication of the U.S. support to the government of Lebanon. As long as we have people there on the ground, it is our responsibility to try to enhance their security and their safety. Thus, we have the rules of engagement that we have.

And we have the added benefit that at the same time we're providing that safety, it does provide support to the Lebanese armed forces.

Q Have the Israelis been informed of the rules --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, they have.

Q -- and what was their reaction to the redeployment plan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I've read the cable a few hours ago, Doug, and I frankly can't remember. It's generally positive.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We'll take one more and then we'll shut off.

Q Do you expect Secretary Weinberger to provide President Reagan with a plan while he's in Santa Barbara?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would think yes, that the answer to that question is probably yes. I'm thinking about, you know -- it depends on how long it takes to stabilize the situation in Beirut. But I would think in the next few days that we will have a plan.

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Q In terms of the air support, do you foresee fly-over bombing raids to wipe out the Syrian positions? Is that what you're talking about?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The decision on what part of the force out there will be used is up to the military on the scene, and they will use whatever is necessary to hit back at batteries that are firing into Beirut. And if they need close air support, then that will be provided. But that will be a military decision on the ground. It is authorized in the rules of engagement.

Q Is there any chance the President might cut short his vacation here to return to Washington?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No plans to at the moment.

END

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
SOUTHERN AFRICA

/1984/
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 198~~3~~, 4:00 P.M.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

MR. CARLSON: Good afternoon. This is a background briefing on the Subject of Southern Africa. Your briefer, a Senior State Department Official, has a few remarks for you, after which he will be glad to take your questions.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Just a few opening remarks: You have all been watching a period of quite intense diplomatic activity on the southern African front involving Mozambique, South Africa, Namibia, Angola -- the travel of various Americans and others to places like Cape Verde and South Africa. I just returned from a swing through southern Africa myself, South Africa, Zambia, Mozambique, Tanzania, Malawi.

You have also been seeing a number of public pronouncements by the various parties, specifically on the Namibia negotiations -- statements by the Angolans, statements by South Africa, including the Prime Minister's speech on January 31 in Parliament, statements by SWAPO, media coverage by the key Front Line leaders, and so on -- and I thought it would be useful to try to interpret some of that and answer any questions that you have on what is taking place. I expect that there will be more such meetings, statements, and press announcements in the coming weeks involving these key parties in various capitals.

I think the main point that I would want to make is really two-fold. We are three years into a policy whose purpose has been and remains; to define an agenda for the resolution of conflict problems; to make possible peaceful change in this region; to define our role specifically in that process -- our role as an honest broker or catalyst; and, to provide an opportunity for the peaceful settlement of disputes and for peaceful change.

Our policy in the region is a peaceful one, and the opportunities exist on many regional fronts. What we're seeing in the most recent weeks, I think, is pretty clear evidence that the agenda we have defined is relevant to the region. I think specifically of the announcements being made on both sides about progress in Mozambique's relationship with South Africa, that reciprocal relationship. I think of the current disengagement offer which has been made, and has been accepted on all sides, in southern Angola leading to a period of restraint, and hopefully, peace that could be developed into a ceasefire and provide a more constructive climate for negotiation of the larger issues that will lead us to a Namibia settlement.

We see a clear receptivity in the region to the message that we have been arguing for for three years. We see a positive mood, a positive climate. We see no one rejecting anything; we see no one asking us to go home.

I'll get more specifically to where things stand on the Namibia/Angola negotiations in a minute, but I wanted to make that general point about what we were trying to do, and what appears to be the general climate in the region.

The second point I want to make of a general nature is that we are not here today to announce breakthroughs or to cast on the waters of the media a note of bullishness or optimism. We are at a very fragile point in the evolution of southern Africa's history. It may turn out to be an historic point, but it's much too early to make such predictions, and we're not making that prediction. It is a fragile situation, particularly as concerns Namibia and Angola. There are many things that could go off the rails; there are many questions and suspicions that remain to be answered and bridged, so we are simply pointing out that a process appears to be underway which has real potential.

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Now, for the more specific aspects: Our immediate goal in which we find strong support on all sides, that is from South Africa, from Angola, from SWAPO, from the Front Line States, from our allies, from the United Nations -- I just met today with the Secretary General -- is to try to strengthen and consolidate this disengagement that has begun. What we have is, basically, a broad political understanding, and things are moving in the right direction; but we feel, as others appear to feel, that it would be useful in the near future to move towards more specific understandings, to work out problems, to serve as a channel of communication, to air grievances, and to track down information. So there may very well be in the very near future additional meetings, whether at Cape Verde or in Europe, or in southern Africa itself, to seek to do that between the parties most directly concerned.

But I would stress that none of the key actors in this exercise have rejected any of this, and so it does appear to be on the tracks at present, albeit in a very fragile climate where you have a number of contending armies disentangling themselves. If that disengagement can be solidified into something that is more concrete and can be extended, it is our view that this could make possible progress on the broader issues of an overall regional settlement involving Namibia and Angola.

It is also our view that the situation on the eastern side of southern Africa is playing positively into this Namibia/Angola equation. We are seeing a situation in the region in which, for the first time in some years, people are saying at the same time, "Let's explore the road to peace." It is a road that has to be built. People are starting from different directions, and they have to see if they can arrange to meet in the middle. But that is the script from which people are speaking.

There are other examples as well. There appears to be a tolerable level of co-existence relations developing as between Lesotho and South Africa; Zimbabwe and Botswana and South Africa. But again, it's fragile.

I think the only other point I might add, and then I would be happy to take your questions, is that we're dealing with a region of great divisions and gulfs of suspicion. Historically, a number of the key parties and key leaders have not had close relations. One has to have a special taste to get to know some of the actors and parties involved, and work with them successfully, and they with each other.

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Our goal has been to do precisely that, to acquire credibility, to acquire familiarity, to acquire, ultimately, influence as a catalyst, nothing more. We cannot impose peace on southern Africa. But by maintaining contact with everyone and not cutting ourselves off from anyone, we seek to advance this broad process I have been describing.

I think I'll stop there and take questions.

Yes.

Q Prior to the pullout, is it accurate to say that there has been an increase over the last three years in South African attacks in area, the amount of destruction that has been in Angola? Is it accurate to say that?

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: You're talking specifically about Angola?

Q About Angola; about the South African attacks into Angola.

A There is no question that the level of suffering in Angola has been severe in recent years, that the situation of war and loss of lives, property damage and so on has increased in recent years as a function of what are, in effect, two interrelated wars.

Q O.K. As a follow-up to that, isn't the need greater by the Angolans to have the Cuban troops there for the South

Africans -- I think the last invasion went almost 150 miles into Angola -- isn't there a greater need by the Angolans to have the Cubans there if the South Africans keep striking deeper and deeper, exacting a greater amount of damage?

A I think what there is a need for is a willingness to explore the basis for a settlement that has something in it for everybody. That's precisely what we've been pushing. We have not been pushing suicide on anyone.

The notion is sometimes bandied about -- and it always mystifies me why that would be the case - that it is our view, or someone else's view, that the Cuban troops should leave before anything else happens. It's ludicrous, and that is not what anyone has been proposing. There has to be a process that builds confidence, step by step, with something in it for everyone.

Q Just one other question, and this has to deal with UNITA. UNITA was not mentioned in the disengagement. Ambassador Fourie said that UNITA was not mentioned in the disengagement because of the fact that they were not operating in the area of the disengagement. Is this true, because UNITA has been claiming several successes, and these take place in the area that is under the limit that the South Africans reached during their last engagement.

What is the level of UNITA's involvement in southern Angola, and will they be included in the disengagement talks?

A   I would simply say this, that a period of restraint and disengagement offering opportunities for everyone to think and act creatively is in the interest of a political solution. That, of course, would have implications as well for UNITA. But the arrangements we've been talking about refer directly to the parties that have been involved in the province or the province and a half of southern Angola which is where the SWAPO/South African clashes have been taking place.

Q   In that area? Has UNITA operated in that area?

A   We don't see much evidence of a further complication by that factor in this particular area of disengagement.

Q   Is UNITA indirectly involved in these talks, as it claims?

A   The parties involved in the talks that concern independence for Namibia I think are well known, and they are the sovereign governments involved.

You know, as I said before, there needs to be a capability for us to maintain communication with everybody, and we do precisely that. But UNITA is not a party, specifically, in the Namibia talks; and I suspect that the issue of the disengagement will have its own implications for UNITA as it does for the other parties, but we're not negotiating or seeking to bring them to the bargaining table on that issue at this time.

Q My question was whether they were indirectly involved.

A If it is taking place -- and I wouldn't rule it out -- it is not through our doing.

Q I'm a little confused as to what exactly the disengagement, the 30-day initial period means on the ground with respect to South African troops in Angola. Can you say to what extent it is anticipated that they will withdraw from Angolan territory? Does it include a total withdrawal of all South African personnel from southern Angola, or a partial withdrawal?

Can you nail that down at all?

A Yes. There was some confusion earlier about that because there had been that significant South African operation into southern Angola in December and January. The forces involved in that operation pulled out some two weeks prior to the disengagement announcement of 31 January which the Prime Minister of South Africa just made. The 31 January announcement confirmed South Africa's intention to proceed with the disengagement. That disengagement is now proceeding, and its objective is the withdrawal of all South African forces that remained as of that time. So that's the way I think I would characterize it.

Q The objective within the initial 30-day period?

A That's right.

Q Just a follow-up on that question: You were saying that this disengagement affected those troops who were involved in Operation Askari.

A No; I said just the opposite. I said the troops involved in Operation Askari had all been pulled out two weeks prior to the January 31 announcement.

Q What about those troops who were there, the South African troops who were there in Angola before that operation? he Angolans claimed that South Africa has been holding N'Giva for the last two and one-half years and parts of the border right on Namibia. Are those troops, or have those troops been pulled out?

A I'm not going to get involved in a detailed military briefing -- we don't have the maps for it; but what was announced on the 31st was the beginning of a disengagement process of whatever forces were left as of the 31st of January. That disengagement is underway.

Q Does South Africa have troops in Angola right now?

A I think my statement speaks for itself -- a disengagement process is underway.

Q So there are troops there?

A Yes. Maybe we're speaking a different language.

Q How many troops are there? Do you have an estimate?

A I don't have any estimates, no.

Q For those of us who don't follow this on a very close, day-to-day basis, it is my recollection that it has been to this Administration a stumbling block -- the question of the Cuban presence in Angola. And you say here that it is not a precondition that they have to go, and then we can get a deal. But where are we on that particular issue? Is there a willingness for the Cubans to leave Angola, all other things being equal, or not?

A I think two points should be made. We are not seeking to establish a doctrinal relationship between the two, or a juridical relationship between the two. It remains our view that the report of the Secretary General of the U.N. back in August is an accurate statement of South Africa's position. It is prepared to decolonize Namibia in the context of a commitment by the Angolans on the withdrawal of Cuban forces. This, of course, we have been seeking in our

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bilateral talks for some time. It is our view that this effort to get a climate of restraint and of respect for frontiers established on the ground in southern Angola could well facilitate the whole negotiations in which we have been involved.

We had a recent round of bilateral discussions with the Angolans at Cape Verde January 20-22, as you know, and we expect that there will be further discussions in the very near future, so I don't have a definitive answer for you on this; this remains to be seen. When and if we succeed on that point, it will be as a result of the sovereign decision of the Government of Angola, not as a result of anything else.

Q In the course of negotiations over Namibia over X number of years, on many occasions things have seemed so close and turned out once again to be yet so far. You have spoken about a new climate of receptivity. What has changed now to cause this?

A Well, of course, we're talking about many different parties, and one could answer that question in the context of, say, SWAPO's attitude, or the Angolan Government's attitude, or South Africa's attitude. I won't try to answer each of these, but I think there is in general a growing recognition on all sides -- and this includes the Frontline leadership as well as the other parties that I've mentioned -- that there aren't any military solutions that are in the interests of anybody in southern Africa. They are not available. And the pursuit of military solutions will lead to open-ended scenarios of escalation that are not in anyone's interest.

So that certainly would be one factor that may have entered into the situation. There are other factors that are different for each of the parties we're talking about, and they have to do with the views and decisions of individual leaders and what-not. But I really can't go beyond that.

Q Is there any reason for the -- let's say the Frontline states to believe that things -- that South Africa is doing or going to endure when in the past perhaps

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they haven't worked out that way?

A Well, I would say that the response that we have had in the last days and weeks from the Frontline leaders we've spoken with has been strongly supportive, first of all, of the principles that we have a special role to play in this.

Secondly, of the principle that the way to get this thing done is to build step-by-step, and the first step is to have this disengagement succeed in southern Angola.

We don't see anybody raising questions or doubts about it. We find far more doubts and questions being raised in the major American news magazines than we do by the leaders of the governments we're dealing with, which, of course, is nothing new.

Q So you said that the United States is trying to act as a catalyst in improving the level of communications between South Africa and its neighbors. Is the United States considering setting an example by establishing normal relations with Angola without waiting for the last Cuban private to leave?

A I'm not going to indicate specific formulae on that question. This is the situation we face now of no diplomatic relations with Angola. Ironically, we're having more relations with the government without having relations than we probably have ever had historically. But, in any case, the situation we face now is the same as our predecessors have faced, going back to the Administration of President Ford. So our policy in that regard is fully consistent with the way American administrations have seen the situation for some years.

Having said that, the issue of our relations and recognition of Angola is one that certainly can fall into place in the context of an overall settlement. I can't go beyond that in terms of any precise formula. There are many things to be negotiated here. And I'm not saying we've negotiated them yet; we have not.

Q Is there still a -- would you describe the role of the Contact Group now in light of these initatives? Is there still a role for the Contact Group? Has the apparent withdrawal of France or its lessening of interest, or whatever its withdrawal amounts to, has that been any kind of setback for these initiatives?

A No. I wouldn't say it has. The Contact Group is an institution of considerable importance because it is in fact a party to some of the agreements that are involved in Resolution 435 and the associated documents and understandings. So, clearly, the institution of the Contact Group remains important and remains relevant.

At the same time many of the questions that we've been discussing and are dealing with do not specifically concern the U.N. plan, Resolution 435; they concern broader issues. So I don't think there's been any real damage suffered from the situation you're referring to. Our clear understanding of the French position is that France has suspended its participation precisely because the Namibia aspects of the problem have been solved. 435 exists, it's been agreed by everybody, there were no remaining issues connected with 435. So, you know, it doesn't stand in our way.

Q There are rumors that an anti-regime Mozambican has been expelled, and this appears to be the first tangible proof of any success after your recent visit. Are there any assurances from South Africa's neighbors that they will stop providing bases to terrorist groups?

A I certainly would not consider that that specific action you refer to is a result of my visit. As I said in my opening remarks, there is not going to be any Pax Americana in southern Africa. What does develop is a result of agreements or understandings or the failure of agreements and understandings between countries that are neighbors that live in the region.

There has been a good bit of forward movement. As between South Africa and Mozambique, there have been four commissions meeting, as you know, on such questions as transport and tourism and energy and security affairs. Those meetings have already produced tangible results that are, I think, more significant than that one particular item you refer to.

Q Do you have any evidence that he has in fact been expelled?

A No. I don't have anything further to add on that. No.

Q Have the Angolans been willing to agree in principle to a calendar for the withdrawal of Cuban troops at all? Was that mentioned at all in your talks, and have they said that they would agree to a calendar on troop -- Cuban troop withdrawal?

A I think it's fair to say that the agenda of our discussions with the Angolan Government, both the most recent one at Cape Verde and the ones that will come, includes everything that both sides want to have on the table -- everything.

Q Have they agreed to it in principle, though, a calendar for withdrawal?

A I would not put words in their mouths. We're at a very delicate stage of the negotiation, and I would just leave it at that, I think, for now.

Q With respect to the steps that -- the meetings that followed to which you've alluded, could you outline some of the meetings that may take place in the very near future besides U.S.-Angola? For example, another meeting between South Africa and Angola, the state of play with respect to all the dancing around SWAPO and the internal administration in South Africa? Could you outline what we might be able to see as indications that things are on track or may not be on track in the next few weeks?

A I think the meetings that one may see in the next few weeks will be of at least three kinds. One is our own bilateral discussons with the Angolans. Another is possible discussions between Angolans and South Africans, which we may, or may not, be part of concerning the immediate situation on the ground. There may also be some contacts -- further contacts between SWAPO and South Africans or between South Africans and the internal leaders of Namibia. Now, these are all possibilities. I don't have announcements to make with dates and places and so forth.

Q Can you tell us what the state of play is now with respect to the announcements that have come from SWAPO and South Africa and Windhoek? I mean, can you describe that at all, because a lot of it's confusing to us.

A Well, sure it is. I can try, but it is a somewhat murky situation with little bits and pieces coming out of different capitals.

What is very clear is that the announcement of January 29 out of Lusaka by SWAPO constitutes an acceptance of the terms of disengagement. So I think that in addition to the fact that Angola has signified its adherence to the understanding and South Africa has confirmed its intention to proceed with it, there's not much more you need. But it is a very fragile situation on the ground, as I've said, and it would be useful to proceed to more concrete terms and understandings.

As concerns the desire of SWAPO, or the resistance of SWAPO to meeting with South Africans or Namibians, this is an open question. I think there have been a lot of hints back and forth, and there may well be a meeting, but I have no firm news on that.

Q Could you go beyond the fact that the realization that a military solution is not relevant? Say, for example, the impact that the drought may have had, the impact on the domestic situation in South Africa regarding this disengagement process?

A I'm not sure I fully understand the question. You mean is the drought driving people to negotiate?

Q Did it have an impact?

A I wouldn't see it as having a direct impact. There are good years and there are bad years in the harvest in southern Africa. Right now they're having some rains. In fact, they're having floods. It is a fact that a number of the countries of the area have severe economic problems and problems of starvation. But it is not my impression that anyone is being driven by Malthusian factors to the negotiating table. No. You asked another question about South Africa. I'm not sure I understood.

Q The domestic situation within South Africa. I believe there's something to the effect that they found that, I believe, the number of people who support, let's say, forays into Angola or holding onto Namibia is significantly smaller than was believed.

A Well, you may have some information there or some reports that I haven't seen. I'm just not familiar with any such polling type data. But, you know, there's no question that after the referendum back on November 2 that the Prime Minister has a mandate.

Q Malawi is not a member of the Frontline group nor has it been involved in the discussions. What was the purpose of your visit there?

A It was two-fold. Malawi is a very close friend. We have many common interests. In many respects we see the world in similar terms. Its leadership has been around far longer than ours. And it was useful to compare notes on the whole regional security picture. I might stress in that regard that progress on the Mozambique-South Africa front is of direct concern to Malawi. It's a land-locked country whose transport possibilities in a rational world are through Mozambique. So we obviously discussed that question more specifically.

Q If I can come back to the earlier question, what exactly are our terms for establishing relations with Angola? I mean, has every Cuban got to go down to the last doctor? I mean, what exactly are the terms?

A No. I'm not going to go beyond what I've said. We are in the midst of negotiations.

Q But you said you went back to the Ford era. I'm a little unclear there. The situation was different. Could you spell it out for us?

A The situation then, as today, is that there is a very substantial presence of extra-regional forces in the country, and the circumstances of independence led people to think then, and to think now, that this raises some questions about that country's orientation. That is the fact historically. But, we are in the midst of a negotiation which is aimed at resolving all these questions. They all can be. But they haven't been yet.

Q But you don't want to specify what terms we're willing to open a U.S. Embassy in Luanda?

A No. I wouldn't do that. Thanks.

Q Thank you.

Q Is Angola independent enough to make decisions for herself, do you think?

A We see quite a bit of evidence of an interest in sovereignty and security on the part of all the governments of the area. Angola's participation in all these activities I've been describing, including their talks with us, would certainly seem to indicate a positive answer on that, yes.

Q Is there any indication that the Soviet Union is having any effects -- any influence on Angola's attitude to the negotiations as they're now taking place?

A We don't see a great deal of evidence at present, but there clearly is a very close relationship there, and no doubt a lot of the influence that may exist that is not visible.

Q Could I follow up just briefly?

MODERATOR: Take just one last one.

Q You have met with your Soviet counterpart, I think in Geneva about -- I don't know, 18 months ago or so -- have you met recently with anybody comparable from the Soviet Union with respect to recent events?

A Have I?

Q Yes.

A No.

Q Has anybody on your staff?

A Secretary Shultz met with Gromyko in Stockholm, but that's about the only such contact. Yes.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 4:44 p.m.)

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ON THE RECORD BRIEFING BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE ELLIOTT ABRAMS ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 1984

MR. CARLSON: This is an on-the-record briefing on the Human Rights Country Reports. The briefing is on the record but I would remind you it is embargoed until twelve noon, as are the reports.

The briefers are Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Elliott Abrams, and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Charles Fairbanks.

I think Assistant Secretary Abrams has a few remarks for you and then they will take your questions.

Thank you.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS: Thank you.

This is the eighth set of country reports on human rights practices compiled by the United States Government, and the fourth that has been issued under the Reagan Administration. It documents human rights practices in 163 countries up to the end of 1983 and, in a few cases, into the first weeks of 1984.

It is a unique document. Private organizations such as Amnesty International and Freedom House prepare very valuable human rights reports, but their scope is much more limited. No other governmental or non-governmental body in the world prepares a human rights report comparable to this one.

In preparing this report, we have tried to avoid sensationalism or polemical language. Moreover, we do not explicitly compare human rights practices in different countries, nor do we issue human rights "ratings." That is not the purpose of the country reports. The purpose is to compile facts about human rights practices, and present the factual situation to Congress.

It is fair to say, I think, that the more experience we have in compiling human rights reports, the better they tend to be in terms of accuracy, objectivity and sharpness of focus. For this reason, we think the reports for 1983 are the best we have ever prepared.

There are a few differences in the categories this year. We found the term "killing," which we used last year, too broad and have substituted the more precise if more verbose phrase "unlawful or arbitrary deprivation of life."

Similarly, there has always been confusion over the precise differences between "torture" on the one hand, and "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment" on the other, so we have combined them as is done in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Finally, the former subsection "invasion of the home" was being interpreted too literally, to refer to the home physically only, so we broadened it to better meet the need for the discussion of totalitarian abuse of human rights as contemplated in the Universal Declaration. The new category is "arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home, or correspondence."

We continue this year with a strong emphasis on political rights and on giving as much information as possible on the question of political rights.

First, on participation in governing the country, we have tried to indicate when that participation is real, and when it is not. For example, there is a great difference between membership which can even be imposed in a mass organization organized by, run, and controlled by the government, on the one hand, and a real political participation in an open political system in which people do in fact choose the rulers of the country. So we've tried to give some information about what the real participation is.

We continue to give more information on trade unions, because it is our sense that the trade union movements are both a measure of and a means of political participation by the

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peoples of various countries. We've tried to show which trade union movements are free and which are not.

We've tried to indicate who actually rules the country in question. That is, it is not enough to say "This is a one-party state." There are some one-party states that have a large bureaucratic party that really does control power. There are other one-party states where, in fact, only one man really rules entirely on his own. There are others where a small ethnic group rules or a clique. So we have tried to distinguish where does the power really lie.

We've tried to give more information about elections, saying not only whether they exist but how free they are. Are there multiple candidates? Is there a real choice? Are the returns counted fairly?

Similarly for parliaments or legislatures. We have tried to indicate not simply whether they exist, but whether they are real. Do they ever reject legislation? Are all votes unanimous, or are there sometimes split votes?

In the area of free speech, we have tried to go beyond the question of public free speech, which is obviously crucial, but to cover, as well, the area of private speech. That is, are people even free to discuss political matters in private? Does the government have an informant network which prevents that?

Finally, we've tried to give information about the press, as in previous years, and tried to be more precise about the condition of the press. For example, who owns it? Is it government-owned, or is it not? What is the degree of government control? What is the amount of censorship?

We have reprinted parts of the introduction to last year's report as appendices to the current report. These appendices describe the philosophy underlying our human rights policy and the preparation of the report itself.

This year's introduction is new and deals with the relationship between democracy and human rights. It explains the significance of the President's initiative to promote the growth of democracy as the best protection for human rights, and it also explains why working to promote democracy is crucial to any human rights policy.

I would like to highlight some of the more significant human rights events reported this year. As I am sure all of you know, Dr. Raul Alfonsin was elected President of Argentina and was inaugurated on December 10th. What many people don't seem to realize is that the recent inauguration of President Alfonsin is only the latest in a series of victories for democracy in Latin America.

Since 1980, nine Central and South American countries have either held initial free elections, or declared their

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intention of doing so soon: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Peru and Uruguay. This is an accelerating trend. The previous four years, 1976 to 1980, only one Latin American country, Ecuador, moved from military rule to democracy. The stereotyped image of a Latin America entirely run by dictators is becoming increasingly outdated.

But if the human rights situation in Latin America is gradually improving, the human rights situation of the Baha'is in Iran is increasingly desperate. In August 1983, Iran's Revolutionary Prosecutor General issued an order that effectively banned all Ba'hai religious activity, and provides the legal foundation on which virtually all members of the faith could be charged with crimes in Iran. This is more than simply religious persecution. It is an attempt by the Iranian regime to criminalize an entire faith -- a situation without parallel anywhere in the world.

I also want to draw your attention to other human rights trends. In Turkey, there has been some movement toward a more open political system. In Nigeria, on the other hand, the democratic government was overthrown by a military coup on the last day of 1983. And in Afghanistan, Soviet occupation forces have continued and expanded the use of reprisal attacks against the civilian population in militarily strategic regions

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and areas of greatest resistance activity. The loss of life and the degree of brutality are enormous.

Finally, let me end this very brief human rights *tour d'horizon* with a few words about the situation in the Soviet Union. 1983 witnesses a deterioration of the human rights situation in the Soviet Union. Christians, Jews, free trade union organizers, and independent peace activists all have suffered intensified repression for having independently promoted cultural, political, religious, or economic ideas, even those such as peace and disarmament which the Soviet Union claims are fully compatible with official Soviet policy.

Let me conclude by saying that we are delighted that the Country Reports have in the past few years maintained and increased their reputation for honesty and objectivity, and are becoming something of a standard reference work in the field of human rights. I want to repeat one cautionary remark I made last year about the length of the reports.

Some readers have assumed that the length of a particular report is in itself a judgment on the seriousness of the human rights situation in a country. That is completely unwarranted. The length of the report is influenced by a number of factors, including, first and foremost, probably, the availability of information, the openness of the society, and not least the energy and skill of a particular reporting officer.

With me today, as you know, is Dr. Charles Fairbanks, who is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Human Rights, and who oversaw the compilation and production of the report, and we will try to answer any questions you may have.

Q Before getting into the substance in a country-by-country basis, I wondered if you could go into some of the rationale behind the change in terminology involving "killing" to the "arbitrary. . . . deprivation of life?" I mean, that may strike some as an Orwellian new-speak kind of shift, and I am sure you were conscious of that, and could you elaborate on that?

SECRETARY ABRAMS: We are trying to move in the other direction.

SECRETARY FAIRBANKS: I would say "blame the lawyers," because after we, for the first time inserted a specific section on killing, we had complaints from certain people with legal training that this was -- since there are executions carried out after judicial process, since there are killings in war which are not quite what we normally mean by human rights violations, that this rather strange and cumbersome title was the most accurate, and I would say that that is probably true, in our judgment. I mean, it does describe precisely what we are talking about, though it is rather long-winded.

Q Mr. Abrams, here on page 525, on the Cuba segment of the report, you mentioned that several Cuban-Americans have disappeared in Cuba. I hadn't seen that before. Can you explain how many and who they are or what may have happened to them?

SECRETARY ABRAMS: These were cases where people went down to visit -- people who had been born in Cuba and had been here, in some cases for many years and went back to Cuba, visiting relatives usually, and were apprehended by the police, and are being kept.

We have tried, we have a representative in Cuba, and we have repeatedly sought information from the Government of Cuba about these individuals, and, as the report indicates, no information has been forthcoming to us or to relatives in the United States who inquired.

As you see, we have information from one individual about what happened. He was accused of engaging in espionage and he was questioned and then he was released. But this is a serious issue in Cuban-American relations, that Americans of Cuban background go down to Cuba and are simply captured and kept by the Cuban Government.

Q But do you know how many may be involved?

SECRETARY ABRAMS: I don't recall the exact number. I think we are talking about something on the order of a dozen.

Do you recall?

VOICE: It's about that.

Q Do you have their names?

SECRETARY ABRAMS: I don't have them memorized, but I can -- we can certainly get them for you.

Q Why has so little been said about that issue by the Department?

SECRETARY ABRAMS: We have made representations to the Government of Cuba and we have tried to use whatever influence we have, directly or indirectly, to get them out.

Q But the glare of publicity can often be of some assistance.

SECRETARY ABRAMS: Well, that is one of the reasons that we put it in the book, that we are hoping that more people will become aware of it. It fits appropriately in the category of disappearance, because people are just picked up and put into jail and kept there, and no excuse for it is given by the Government of Cuba when we inquire.

Q Would you talk about the human rights situation in Eastern Europe and how this might compare with the Soviet Union?

A Well, it varies. One should not paint with a broad brush. The situation in each country varies, and also changes independently of the situation in the others. It is not the case that if the human rights situation in the

Soviet Union deteriorates, therefore the situation in the Eastern European countries deteriorates, as well.

I guess I have said briefly what the situation was in the Soviet Union, that is, there was a continuing deterioration really in all ways with regard to human rights. In fact, the late Mr. Andropov came to power in November, formally in November of '82, when General Secretary Brezhnev died, and this report actually covers, what, twelve of the fifteen months in which he was General Secretary, and it is a period of human rights deterioration.

The situation has, I think it is fair to say, not deteriorated as markedly in any Eastern European country. Even Czechoslovakia, I think, though the situation is really very bad, has not deteriorated as much in the last twelve months.

I think we note in here small degrees of progress in Yugoslavia, and no deterioration to speak of in Hungary. The situation, I suppose it is fair to say, in Romania and Czechoslovakia are the two worst in Eastern Europe from the human rights point of view.

Q Mr. Abrams, beyond South America, do you get any sense from the reports over the years on whether human rights situations generally are getting worse or better or about the same around the world?

A No. There is this clear trend in Latin America.

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I don't think that we can say there is any clear trend in Asia or Africa or the Near East of improvements or deterioration in human rights. I think it is notable that everyone continues to maintain at least rhetorically his complete commitment to democracy. That is, there is a total rhetorical victory for democracy in every regime. It explains what it is doing in democratic terms. They have all climbed on to the rhetoric of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and human rights rhetoric. But, of course, that doesn't have that much of an effect on behavior in many countries.

Dissident activity, I suppose this is an encouraging thing. Despite the fact that one can say, "I think there is no overall trend towards greater, great, progress for human rights," there is a remarkable amount of dissident activity on behalf of human rights throughout the world which no amount of setback seems to be able to crush. The Soviet Union itself is an example of this, but we find it throughout the world, and that at least gives cause for some optimism, despite what is in some ways not a happy picture.

Q You have described the situation in the Soviet Union as a continuing deterioration. Would you use the same phrase to describe what has been happening in China during the last year?

SECRETARY ABRAMS: No, I would not. I would say that probably the single most significant event that we note in here is the so-called anti-crime campaign, which has resulted in a very large number of arrests and some executions. But the last few years in China have seen a trend towards at least more routinized, pragmatic government, which, in its elimination of arbitrariness, has certain beneficial effects for human rights.

I would not say there has been a steady deterioration. Do you wish to add to that?

SECRETARY FAIRBANKS: No.

Q Has there been a steady progress then?

SECRETARY ABRAMS: Well, I don't know that there has been that much progress in 1983. I think if you look back over, say, the last three or four years, there has been progress, because you would be covering the period of when the present rulers are expanding their control and are attempting to maintain a regime that is more pragmatic and bureaucratic than its predecessors did. But I don't think we have seen what one could call significant progress. I don't think that one can say there has been a lot of change in 1983.

Q Could you talk a little about your information gathering techniques in countries that are friendly to us versus countries that are not? Do you rely exclusively on Embassy people doing this, or do you use other sources like

Amnesty International?

SECRETARY ABRAMS: The real distinction is not between countries which are friendly or unfriendly, it is between countries where we can really get in formation and countries where we can't.

The countries where we can't, we note in here there are a number where it is just awfully hard to get information. Albania and North Korea would be examples of that.

What we do is, first drafts of these reports come from our Embassies. They make use of the usual sources you would expect -- local human rights groups in the countries to which they are accredited; the local press; information they receive from the local government.

We then do what often seems to me to be about 90 redrafts here in the Department. We always use the information from Freedom House and Amnesty, which are the two private organizations that do global reports, and, as you will see, we mention the findings of Amnesty and Freedom House, I think, in every single report in here.

We also use information that comes from a wide variety of human rights groups. In part, just to ask the Embassies to explain the discrepancies; that is, if one group is reporting 300 disappearances, and the Embassy is reporting zero, then we ask the Embassy to explain that. And we mention the discrepancies in here, as you will note. But we use as many sources as we can, and in most countries it is possible to get a fairly wide variety of sources of information.

In some countries, it is just very, very difficult, and we have noted that, and in fact it does have an impact here. There are some reports in here of countries that are very bad human rights violators that are very short just because you can't get much information.

Q There seems to be a softening of the section on the Israeli West Bank this year. You referred last year to the Israeli human rights problem in the West Bank. This year you talk about a complex human rights situation. Isn't there a softening of the language?

SECRETARY ABRAMS: I guess I wouldn't characterize it. I think this is -- I hope it is an accurate report, but I wouldn't characterize it as a softening or hardening or anything else.

Q Would you say it is a problem, a human rights problem, on the West Bank?

SECRETARY ABRAMS: Well, we do say that. We draw the distinction. There is a separate report on the West Bank, because we draw the distinction between the human rights situation there and the human rights situation in Israel. And we note the significant limitations on freedom

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of speech and press and various other freedoms in the West Bank, and, I mean, what in a sense may be the central fact, which is that Israel is governed democratically and the West Bank is not.

Q Looking at the countries, among the 162 that I regarded, as Israel is, as allies and friends of the United States, which among them have you noted the greatest disappointments or setbacks in human rights terms in 1983?

SECRETARY ABRAMS: Well, as I mentioned at the outset, probably the most disappointing event was, from the human rights point of view, the coup in Nigeria, with which we have a close relationship, and whose democracy was very valuable for a number of reasons, not simply for Nigerians but as a model for others in the Third World and particularly in Africa. So that was a great disappointment.

Q The Philippines, Korea?

SECRETARY ABRAMS: Well, it is relatively rare, I should say, for a country to have in one year a major change in the human rights situation, except if there is a change of government -- for example, by a coup, as in Nigeria.

The Philippines, you know, is a mixed picture, because you had a major blow to human rights with the assassination of the opposition leader, Benigno Aquino. On the other hand, in the aftermath of that assassination, you had a significant loosening up of the political situation in the Philippines, with a significant increase in freedom of speech and freedom of press and freedom of political activity, opposition, political organization. It is a little bit reminiscent of what happened in Argentina after the defeat of the military regime in the Falklands War, where the war itself was, from many points of view, including human rights, a calamity, but in the aftermath, there was a clear loosening up of the political situation.

I think that is the only country where I would mention that kind of significant change.

Q On page 561, you say, "Salvadorans who were deported back to or, for other reasons, returned to El Salvador were not subject to any official penalties, harassment, or reprisals." Are you concluding or saying that, there have been numerous reports that they have been, that all efforts to find evidence to support these claims have been unsuccessful.

How strenuously did you seek independent confirmation of this, and if you have found confirmation, would you have put this in here since it would require a change in the U.S.'s immigration policy?

SECRETARY ABRAMS: Well, if we had found confirmation, we would have already have changed our asylum policy, and if we ever do find confirmation, we will change it. We have made a number of efforts over the years, going back probably three or four years, I don't remember the exact dates -- the Embassy in El Salvador made in the early 1980's two -- I hesitate to use the word "studies" because I don't want to give the impression that I am talking about some kind of mammoth scientific survey -- but two efforts to take names at random of people who had been deported back to El Salvador and find out if anything had happened to them, if they had been persecuted.

Those two efforts proved to the satisfaction of the Embassy and to us in the State Department, though, I should say this happened -- I am trying to remember if it was under the Carter Administration or this one, I am just not sure -- but in any event, prove to the satisfaction of the State Department that there was no persecution.

In addition, there is no logic to it, as we tried to analyze it. That is, hundreds of thousands of Salvadorans have been leaving El Salvador for a decade or more because of the population problem, and being returned either voluntarily or involuntarily from countries as various as Honduras, the United States and Mexico, and it would be crazy for the government to persecute them, because it is a common pattern of life in El Salvador to go abroad to find work and then return home.

We have done other things to try to check. For example, we asked last summer -- I think it was in June --

people at Tutela Legal, which is the human rights office of the Archdiocese of San Salvador, and they said that they hadn't heard anything about this. It is an interesting thing that we hear about the persecution of fifty percent, seventy percent, of the people who return to El Salvador from American Human Rights groups, but we do not hear it from the Salvadoran Human Rights groups. And when we inquired of Tutela last summer, they said, "No, they were not hearing reports of a pattern of persecution of people whom we had deported."

Now, we have another such study, which is either underway or is going to start soon, again on a fairly small scale. The ideal would be to get an international organization of some sort, an independent organization to do a study, and we have talked to some about it, but there has been a certain degree of reluctance on their part to get caught up in what is, after all, a political struggle in the U.S. over Central American policy, and to be seen as a pawn of either the Administration or its opponents in that struggle.

It is also very difficult to gather this information because there is heavy conflict in at least the eastern part of El Salvador, but we will continue to make these efforts. We have made efforts in the past and every single effort we have made has turned up no evidence of a pattern of persecution.

Q Do you see the death of Mr. Andropov changing

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the human rights situation in the Soviet Union?

SECRETARY ABRAMS: I don't know. I think it is impossible to answer that. I mean, even if we knew who his successor or successors would be, it would be difficult to answer that. But in the absence of that information, I think it is really impossible. I think one can only say that fundamental changes are ruled out by the nature of the Soviet system.

Is that it?

Q Yes, thanks a lot.

(The briefing concluded at 11:35 a.m.)

final

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
VISITS OF PRESIDENT MUBARAK AND KING HUSSEIN
FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 1984, 2:00 P.M.

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Normally, we brief the two visits separately, but in your interests and our interests, because they're coming so close together, we'll brief them together.

Let me start by saying, I can't tell you at this point whether Andropov's death and funeral arrangements will have any effect on the schedules. That remains to be seen.

Let me start by running through the Hussein schedule. Then I'll run through the Mubarak schedule, and then take questions on both of them together.

Hussein has been in the States for a few days. He came over, first of all, for a check-up, and then has been vacationing in Colorado. The President invited him to stop by Washington as long as he was in the country.

He'll arrive in Washington on Sunday afternoon. He'll have Queen Noor with him but no high level officials with him because his visit to the United States has been a private one, so he does not have a Foreign Minister, a Prime Minister or any officials of his government with him.

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On Monday, he'll meet with the Secretary of State in the morning. Then with the President, and then have a luncheon with the President.

The time of his departure is not absolutely worked out yet; Tuesday or Wednesday is what I can give you now.

As for the agenda with Hussein, obviously, Lebanon and recent developments will be very high on the agenda. We've not had a chance to discuss the latest developments there or the latest developments here with Hussein. Likewise, we'll be wanting to discuss the peace process, what the prospects are, or Hussein entering the peace process; what the effect of what is happening in Lebanon would be on that.

Thirdly, Hussein will be interested, certainly, in his own security situation in Jordan and our traditional assistance in helping Jordan provide for its legitimate defense needs and in helping in economic assistance.

We have just submitted our assistance proposals to Congress for next year, for FY-85. Our proposals are

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for $95 million in foreign military sales credits; $20 million in economic assistance, and $2 million in what's called IMET, military training.

In addition to that, we have sent to the Hill this week a proposal to sell Stingers to Jordan, so the informal notification, informal 36(b) notification is now up on the Hill.

Q The what?

A The Stinger. The Stinger is an individually fired surface-to-air missile.

Q What's the dollar on that one?

A Dollar amount, I don't have. The numbers I do have. The numbers are -- let's see, a total sale would be 1,613 Stinger missiles. This would be only for the actual sale of the first tranche, or first quarter of that, which would be 315 systems. That is, missiles plus launchers, with an additional 98 missiles for reserve.

Q What does that mean -- one-quarter of the 1,613?

A Roughly. The idea was to put it into four quarters but when you're seeking authorization, you might as well seek authorization for the full amount at the original time.

Q No idea of the dollar value?

A I've got it. I just didn't bring it down. Sorry.

Q $38 million, something?

A That's not a classified amount. It's not a large, large dollar figure.

Q $40 million?

A Something like that.

Q Something like what?

A Forty.

Q Million?

A Yes.

Q Can you talk about the supplemental request?

A I can't really say very much about that subject. What I could say is that the United States and Jordan have common interests in security instability in the Gulf area. We've both had relationships with helping those states strengthen their security and their ability to deal with threats to stability.

I think we would be discussing ways we would cooperate in that.

Q What does that number come to?

A I think all that's out on the record.

Q When are you planning the declassification on these --

A I don't know; I don't know.

Q It was indicated that it was going to be done very quickly.

A Chances are, John, I will learn that in a call from you or one of your colleagues.

Q Against whom would these Stinger missiles be intended to be used?

A Jordan has a real problem in its air defense capability in that, over the last few years, it's capability has declined dramatically in relation to the increase in air power in potential threats against it.

Q You're talking about Syria?

A Certainly. Certainly Syrian air power is a major element that the Jordanians have to take into consideration. Syria and Jordan have not always been friendly, and they're certainly not particularly friendly right now.

Also in -- when was it? -- the fall of the 1980, Syria mobilized on Jordan's northern frontier.

We view this as a legitimate defense requirement on the part of Jordan, and that is why we're going forward with this sale proposal to the Congress.

Q Why don't you go on to Mubarak.

A Let me hit Mubarak, then we can come back. Mubarak has been traveling in Africa. Was in Rabat yesterday, and this morning a very cordial visit with King Hassan, completing the formalities for Egypt's re-entry into the Islamic Conference Organization.

He is in Paris this evening. I expect that he will be meeting with Mitterrand either tonight or tomorrow, and then will come on here on Saturday, arriving in the afternoon. He'll be accompanied by Mrs. Mubarak and Foreign Minister -- Deputy Prime Minister Kamal Hasan Ali and Osama al-Baz, his security advisor.

On his schedule, he'll begin Monday morning with a meeting chaired by Secretary of the Treasury, Don Regan; will include Peter McPherson, Bill Brock, Lional Ulmer from the Department of Commerce. In the afternoon, he'll see the Secretary and also the Secretary of Defense. Then, on Tuesday, he will have a meeting with the President and luncheon with the President.

Tuesday evening, we expect that there will be a meeting with the Vice President.

The agenda is going to look quite similar in terms to what I discussed with you on Hussein. Lebanon will certainly be a very high item because Mubarak has been traveling in Africa along with his Foreign Minister and Osama al-Baz. We have not had a top level discussion with the Egyptians about the latest developments and will want to do that.

We'll also want to discuss elements of the peace process with him, in light of the reinstatement in the Islamic Conference, in light of Arafat's visit to Cairo not so long ago, and in light of Egypt's own relations with Israel and Egypt's treaty with Israel. We'll also be discussing economic and security assistance. Two Egyptian Ministers on the economic side have been here this week discussing the economic picture and Egypt's debt situation, and what the problems are going to be for Egypt as it looks out in meeting its debt to providing for its economic needs.

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We've also just submitted our program for next year, proposed program to the Congress for Egypt, and it is a -- let me go through that, the aspects of it.

The largest amount is the foreign military sales program which will be $1 billion 175 million, and this year that would be on a grant basis. In addition, $750 million in economic assistance. In PL-480, Title 1, $225 million, and Title 2, $12.8 million. Just to complete the picture, there's $2 million in military training program.

Q The military aid is a grant?

A Yes.

Q Is this $750 economic a grant, too?

A I believe so.

Q It is a grant?

A I believe that's right.

Q Both are grants?

A Yes.

Q The same as Israel?

A Yes.

Q Any chance the two might meet?

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A Nothing that I can say definitely. They'll both be here. You might address it to the embassies.

Q Has it been explored with each of them, whether they would be prepared to meet here?

A Are you talking about meeting the two of them or meeting with us?

Q No, no. As far as I know, they have not meet except at the Non-aligned Conference; is that right? In a separate bilateral?

A They have met at the Non-aligned Conference. Other than that, they haven't. They're coincidentally going to be in town at the same time, and visits that came up in very different ways and in very different spheres, so I don't have anything for you on whether they would be meeting together.

Q My question is whether we, the United States Government, or you, the United States Government, have explored with each of them their willingess or readiness to meet the other one while the other one is here.

Have you raised this in the preliminary discussions about the visit with them?

A Not in any real specific manner but I don't know what might come out. I want to leave that question open. I think I have to, quite honestly.

Q Isn't there just a yes or no? Has it been discussed with them by our Ambassadors, or by you or by anybody in terms of their readiness?

A Not in a definitive manner, but I don't want to exclude the possibility, or include the possibility at this time. We're just a little in advance of what might happen. That's all.

Q That Non-aligned Conference took place when?

A Sorry.

Q Was that last year's in Delhi we're talking about?

A It was in Delhi.

Q And does that mean they have not met since when, prior to that?

A I don't know. As far as the relationships between the two countries, they recently did conclude a trade agreement which is well post-Camp David. It's within the last few months.

Q Have you heard from the Egyptians? Are the Egyptians considering President Mubarak going to Moscow?

A I don't think so, but I am not sure. That's just so recent. Let me tell you why I don't think so, and that is, there is no Soviet ambassador in Cairo.

Q So if there's no meetings this week, it would be more likely because the President decided to leave town?

A That would be my guess.

Q When do you think that will come together, whether this goes through or not -- today, tomorrow?

A I think the Secretary just addressed it, didn't he, on that, and left all the possibilities open. It's something that we're now really wrestling with.

Q Could you deal with the coincidence that Hussein was here originally for medical purposes and was taking a brief holiday; Mubarak has been invited by the United States to be here while Hussein is here. That sounds as though you fellows were getting ready for a big number that you don't want to talk about.

A No, no. That's misleading. That is not the case. The Hussein visit was scheduled and planned first.

Q As a medical --

A We knew he was coming; he wanted a short vacation. It was courteous and also useful to invite him to Washington. He came. It was set at that time.

Q Mubarak?

A Mubarak expressed some interest to us in coming around this time, and it turned out that that was the best date on the President's calendar.

Q Did we try to invite any other Arab leaders here at this time?

A No.

Q We did not?

A No. It really was coincidental. I see where you're driving, and I would like to caution you away from the idea of any big, new initiatives or big, new breakthroughs or something like that.

Q How about a big extravaganza of a rendezvous?

A I've already addressed that.

Q Apart from the coincidence, have you had discussions in recent days or recent weeks about King Fahd coming here?

A No.

Q Let me ask you please. Assuming that there will be, in an election year -- and I'm not being facetious at all -- but there would be some attempts to move the peace process, as it's being called here, how does the Administration want to tackle the peace process, and will the presence of these two Arab heads of states would be used in that direction to accelerate -- that is, if there is going to be any peace process in this election year?

A I think the President and others in the Administration have made clear that if there is a chance for progress in the peace process, the fact that it's an election year is not going to hold us back from contributing our full support to it.

Q So you're waiting for a chance. You don't want to, as previously, to create the chance to do something, to take the extra steps, so to speak, to promote the peace process?

A I think if we saw steps that looked like they were worth taking, we would try to take them; yes.

Q Let me just ask one more thing, please. Does U.S. conditions for a dialogue with the PLO remain to be the same --

A Absolutely.

Q -- after the visit of Arafat to Cairo?

A Yes, there's been no change.

Q And the meeting with Mubarak, as a head of state that has -- an Arab state that has a peace treaty with Israel?

A There's been no change in the U.S. position or conditions on talking with the PLO.

Q Is Arafat,as far as you know, still planning a visit to Jordan in February, sometime this month?

A Yes. That is supposedly on, but I don't know as anything has been announced formally. That's been a kind of rolling date that has been talked about for the last three weeks or so.

Q Can you take the question about what Hassan said quoting Mubarak? It came up the other day when

Murphy was on the Hill. Hassan saying something to the effect that Mubarak had said that Camp David is empty now that the Egyptians have gotten the Sinai back and for him, essentially, it's a dead agreement?

Murphy was asked whether the U.S. had queried Mubarak to find out whether that report was accurate. I regretted to see that Murphy sort of cast some doubt about the accuracy of the press.

Have we done anything to find out about that?

A We have been back to the Egyptians. We are assured at the very highest level there is no change in Egypt's commitment to the Camp David process or to the Egyptian-Israel Treaty. Egypt's commitment remains firm.

Q But did he say what he said to Hassan?

A I don't know.

Q Just something housekeeping on the schedule. He arrives Saturday -- Mubarak -- and you have him have his first meeting Monday. What happens on Sunday; anything?

A Let me see if I've got anything. My guess is he rests. All I have on my schedule is "private program." I'm sorry, I don't have anything. I don't know.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 2:30 p.m.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF KING HUSSEIN

February 13, 1984

The Briefing Room

1:40 P.M. EST

MR. SIMS: This briefing is on background attributable to a senior administration official for information and not for publication.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President and President King Hussein have -- the President and the King have had a very good meeting continuing over lunch. The President was very pleased to find the King feeling so very well. As you know, the purpose of his visit to the States was to have a medical checkup, which he did last week out in Cleveland, and he spent the last several days on a holiday in Colorado.

On the subjects discussed, and I -- oh, I should say that there was a meeting before the meeting with the President with Secretary Shultz. That will be followed by a further meeting -- the time and place to be worked out with King Hussein's -- on King Hussein's schedule, but during the period that he remains here in Washington.

In addition to the appointments that you know about for tomorrow with Secretary Weinberger, General Gabriel, there will be one further session with Secretary Shultz.

So with both the Secretary and the President, we had a very thorough discussion of the situation in Lebanon and of Jordan's security needs in the context of the currently unsettled situation in the region. It was a very thorough exchange of views on the status of the broader peace process and the factors involving Jordanian participation in the process.

The President and the King compared notes on developments elsewhere in the region, particularly the conflict between Iraq and Iran and its implications for stability in the Gulf.

I think the way the King opened his comments in the first meeting with the Secretary set the tone for both sessions. He said, "We come, we sit again as old friends."

There was discussion of his overview of the region. He's particularly pleased, he noted, with the development of relations between Eygpt and Iraq. Also, the increasing exchanges between the United States and Iraq. He pointed out the search for logic and stability in the Middle East is never easy. But it's not all that dark a picture.

On Lebanon, the President assured him of our commitment not to abandon Lebanon, and also, of our commitment to the broader peace process. The King gave us his views on the situation there and his emphasis that the Palestinian problem, and not the Lebanon problem, is the main one and the one to keep our eyes on. And he discussed the hundreds of thousands of Palestinians in Lebanon today, in the Gulf today, the uncertainties about their future.

Both the President and the King reaffirmed their commitments to 242 and to the President's initiative of '82. Among the other

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subjects discussed were the military threat to Jordan posed by Syria and the reconvening of the Jordanian Parliament last month and a number of other questions. But let me stop here and try to field questions, please.

Q Does the United States agree, or does the President agree that Syria poses a military threat to Jordan? And, if I can get two in for the price of one, last week

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Mr. Eagleburger at least twice on pulling the Marines from Lebanese soil would pose dangers to moderate Arab governments like Jordan as well as to Israel. Did the King reflect any concern or is that now water under the bridge?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry, the first part?

Q The first part simply is does the United States agree with the King, who's long been hostile to Syria, that Syria poses a threat to Jordan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You don't have to go too far back in the area's history, of course, to track the hostile feelings of Damascus towards Amman and towards the King's leadership; the mobilization of 1970, the movements of 1980, in that short space of time. None of us can have any doubts about Syrian attitudes towards the Hashemite Kingdom. The threat is real and we are unequivocally on Jordan's side.

Is he concerned about the pullout of Marines from Lebanon? He didn't talk in those terms. I think he has been concerned for some time now that Lebanon was not the main arena of the problems for the area and that the Lebanese problem is going to assume its real dimensions -- only when you can tackle the Palestinian problem, begin to develop solutions on that, will Lebanon and the crisis that we have all focused on these last months sinks into a better shape, fits into a better shape, a smaller dimension.

Q Does the United States Government still think the pulling out of the Marines poses any kind of threat to the moderate states? Or have we changed our minds?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: . I think the point is that our commitment to Lebanon, our desire to reset the presence of the Marines, as was explained, discussed, agreed upon, with President Gemayel -- reset, redesigned, restructured, whatever word is best -- that is evidence of our continuing commitment to Lebanon, our intent not to walk away from Lebanon, to walk away from the moderate Arabs. So I think that this redesign of our presence is accepted; it's not that pulling the Marines out doesn't make a difference.

Q But in recommitting, do we also sort of commit to an escalation? I mean, using those big guns on those ships is a bigger way to commit, so are we committing to some kind of bigger involvement here?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The ships did not fire on their initiative; they fired in response to firing into greater Beirut. And as the artillery on the ground responded to the firings from the hills, so the ships did. It is responsive, it is in reaction to firing; not seen as an escalation, no.

Q The Jordanian strike force, and what discussions you had about it and how we stand on that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We haven't had any detailed discussions as yet in the visit. This, as you know, continues tomorrow -- he'll be with Secretary Weinberger tomorrow, a further session with Secretary Shultz. I certainly expect it to be discussed in the course of those meetings.

Q Did the King express any feelings that the May 17th agreement is an obstacle to further compromise between Gemayel and the other factional groups?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He didn't really get into the, call it, details or the dynamics of Lebanese politics.

Q So did he talk about the May 17th agreement with the President?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I believe there was no discussion with the President about May 17th.

Q With the Secretary?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, it came up with the Secretary.

Q Did he express an opinion on this?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, it came up with the Secretary, but --

Q Was there -- did he express an opinion on this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: His main concern on Lebanon is that it has become a diversion and his concern about the future of Lebanon is that you're heading -- or risk heading -- into a partition of Lebanon which he definitely does not want to see. He sees that very clearly as a prescription for greater instability.

Q What was the President's reaction to the King's remark when he said the Palestinian problem, and not the Lebanon problem, is the main one. What did the President say?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't want to characterize the exchange any more precisely than that. We understand just how complex the Palestinian problem is -- the ramifications it has for Jordan, for all the states of the region -- the implications for Israel. There was no real debate on the question.

Q Did we agree that the Palestinian problem is the more serious one?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: More serious than Lebanon?

Q -- than the Lebanon problem.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Lebanon is a manifestation of it.

Q But, it is the more serious -- does that suggest that maybe our policy is headed toward a greater emphasis on --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I said the President reaffirmed his commitment to the broader peace process to be based on his initiative and 242. I think the King was reassured by that.

Q You said that we are unequivocally supporting -- we are unequivocally on Jordan's side. What does that mean in terms of support -- physical support, financial support, military support, et cetera?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That was said in the context of the --

Q Assessment of Syria --

Q Syria --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Assessment of the Syrian threat and possibility of the -- of a further physical move by Syria against Jordan as happened in '70 and '80.

Q I mean, what will we do in the event Syria does move?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're not going to spell it out.

Q Over the weekend, Israeli Prime Minister Shamir said that if the May 17th agreement is abrogated, that it sends a message to other moderate countries that if the U.S. works out deals between the moderate countries -- moderate Arab countries -- and Israel, that the U.S. is willing to allow those to be abrogated. What is

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our view about the importance of --

MR. SIMS: This briefing is about the meeting that was just held --

Q I understand that --

MR. SIMS: And he said that May 17th didn't come up. We've got about five minutes -- do you want to talk about this meeting, or --

Q Wait, wait --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They're very interrelated.

Q It's hardly --

MR. SIMS: We're going to be back tomorrow. There are other meetings. We talked May 17th with Larry. He's addressed it. I think you ought to move on and talk about --

Q Yeah -- and Larry, one of the things he said -- was he referred these questions to --

Q That's absolute baloney.

Q Since the -- representation came into the subject, since now there will be negotiation between Arafat and King Hussein --

Q -- take that question.

Q Can we have the previous question?

Q Could you take that question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All right. Let me try once and once only -- once again.

Q What? Do you want the question again?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes --

Q It was tough enough the first time. As Israeli Prime Minister Shamir said over the weekend that if agreements between moderate Arab countries and Israel are abrogated that it sends a bad signal to the moderate Arab countries that the U.S. is willing to cave under pressure to let those agreements be dissolved, abrogated, whatever. What is our view of that? I mean, what is the signal that it sends? And how seriously would we view the abrogation of that agreement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Our view is that it was an agreement seriously and intensively negotiated, represented a very extensive set of compromises such as any serious negotiation involve. We witnessed it and we stand by it. We have never said that if the parties themselves -- Israel and Lebanon -- found it desirable to review it, to work out some modification of it that we would stand in their way. But we do take the agreement seriously. We continue to take it seriously.

Q Yes, but we're not talking their working out an agreement. Israel's made its position on the May 17th agreement very clear, that they don't want it abrogated. The question is -- we're talking about a unilateral abrogation and our view of that.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the agreement, and I know it's been

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said many times the agreement, the bottom line was total withdrawal of Israeli forces. That remains a very desirable goal for Lebanon, for ourselves and for Israel. If you don't have May 17 agreement, you're going to have to have something else.

Q You spoke about the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Which is not going to be easy. So don't lightly toss aside a hard fought and hardly negotiated agreement.

Q About --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am slightly deaf in one ear.

Q About the -- no representation.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q There will be negotiation between Arafat and King Hussein in the coming future. Did that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We -- Yes, that's what we understand. The King did not elaborate at all on his thinking about that negotiation.

Q Didn't the administration -- Sir, what is the administration's --

Q This is follow-up, please.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q This is the issue of self-determination, the three jewel words that the King and President Mubarak was trying to get out of United States administration in relation to President Reagan's initiative of September 1st. Did the issue of the rights of self-determination of the Palestinians came out in these meetings? And what is the position of the administration on it right now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The position of the administration remains what it has long been, that self-determination, on which our nation was founded, is certainly a principle that we cherish. It has become in the Middle Eastern context a code word for an independent Palestinian state, which we do not support.

Q Sir --

Q How --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- there was someone --

Q Yes. What is the administration's view of the significance of the meeting, apparently last night, between King Hussein and President Mubarak? And was there a report on that at today's meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, there was no discussion of it. That was a meeting, I believe, involving just the two couples and we don't have a readout from any one of the four present.

Q Without offering a readout, do you feel --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I didn't get one so I can't offer it.

Q Yes. Without offering a readout, do you feel it's significant that they met? Does this advance the process at all? Have they met before?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think there's been communications between them. There have been emissaries back and forth between the two capitals. That's not new. They did meet physically at the New Delhi Non-Aligned Summit back in the fall.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They also met in Saudi Arabia.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And they met in Saudi Arabia? Yes. Okay.

So it's not a first meeting. It's not, you know, historic, icebreaking in that sense. But they've stayed in contact and I think they took advantage of the fact, which was presented to you as a coincidence, which some of you didn't accept last week. It remains a coincidence that they're both here in Washington.

Q -- talk about the Iraq-Iran war?

Q -- the first question, I have a couple of points. One question: Did the King reiterate his position regarding joining any peace process before Israel completes its withdrawal -- the withdrawal of its forces from Lebanon as one precondition --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, he didn't get into that detail. There's no reason to think --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was never a precondition --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was not a precondition my colleague says. So the fact is the King is very much concerned about developments on the West Bank. Again, no secret that the arrangements for the Palestinians must touch on land and not just people, which is a difference, of course, between his outlook and that of the government of Israel.

Q My second point is, Mr. Rumsfeld is on his way, I understand, back to this town. Do you envisage any meeting between Mr. Rumsfeld and King Hussein or President Mubarak? And what sort of role do you actually see for your two Arab visitors in solving or personally taking a solution for the Lebanese crisis?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, nothing is planned in terms of a meeting between Mr. Rumsfeld and the two chiefs of state. He did call on King Hussein about 10 days ago in Amman. He saw President Mubarak within January, I don't remember the exact dates. He's not coming back for that. He's coming back for consultations with the administration.

He has the two hats, of course, the Lebanon crisis and the peace process,

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so what role we envisaged to close Arab friends, to moderate Arab states which we see as having a very key role in the peace process, and certainly Ambassador Rumsfeld's discussions with him covered those general issues as well as the specific issue of Lebanon.

Q Do you think that there's any possibility of reviving the peace process in this election year, or just leaving aside the election, while the Lebanon crisis is still going on? If so, what is the administration going to do about it? Are you going to send somebody out, are you going to have soundings? Where do you go from here?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the peace process never stopped. It is true that Lebanon became an obsession, has become an obsession. It may be that the boil has been lanced in the last couple of weeks.

Q Where do you go from here, then? Do you take soundings now? Do you send out some --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, this is part of Rumsfeld's job, after all. He is taking the soundings on the regional basis, discussing the ideas, trying to set the framework, and we work through Ambassador Rumsfeld and through the individual embassies.

Q Was there any indication on the United Nations peacekeeping force replacing the MNF?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. It did not come up. It may come up later but it hasn't come up specifically.

Q Can you elaborate on your --

Q Was there an indication that the withdrawal of the Marines to the ships had in any way improved the atmosphere for the talks to take place? You were imprecise about the terms that the King used to discuss that.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'm imprecise by training. (Laughter.) No. I think, though -- in all seriousness, I think the King has been -- it's not that relaxed a briefing. The King has been concerned, as I suggested earlier, that Lebanon, which he considers a part of the problem but not the core of the problem, has diverted energies, has diverted attention to the more basic problems of the area.

Q How has the boil been lanced in the last couple of weeks?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the -- part of the very fact of the decision to take the Marines from the airport, have them remain on the ships, may be part of it.

Q What's the rest of it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the internal political developments in Beirut, which are still being played out. There is nothing very precise you can talk to yet but the fact that, among others, that the Sunni leadership, traditional political leaders of Lebanon, had a couple days' discussions in Damascus, have returned to Beirut, are not calling for the overthrow of the President, dissolution of the constitutional arrangements. These are among the signs. Perhaps that is a little too poetic to talk of lancing a boil.

Q Who's obsession was it? Was it an obsession of U.S. foreign policy?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Whose obsession? I think it was a national obsession for ourselves.

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Q Could you elaborate a little on the Iraq-Iran war that they discussed? What did actually they discuss?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the continuing dangers of that war, the fact, as you know, that fighting has just restarted on the ground, I think in the Dezful sector, in this last 24 hours, the ever-present danger of that sliding into the Gulf and interrupting the transit through the Straits of Hormuz, those dangers, the fact winter is coming to an end and as the ground dries and clears, you're probably going to get increased conflict.

Q Can you say, as a result of today's meetings, that King Hussein is any closer than he was before he got here to participating in negotiations

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with Israel over the Palestinian question, or is that where it was before today's session?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think there's any ground to see change in his attitudes or his approach to the whole peace process. Today's meetings didn't shift his assessment.

Q Can I ask you to qualify two things you said that seemed to be in conflict. One is that we have not changed our commitment to Lebanon, that just moving those Marines to the ships means that we're just as committed as ever. And your second comment -- that this "boil has been lanced" now that the Marines are off the ground -- explain how those two fit together?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is where we go OFF THE RECORD and --

MR. SIMS: I want to get back to the purpose of this briefing -- it's a readout of the meeting --

Q Yes, but -- he offered them --

Q Bob, he's already said it, and he's asking for an explanation.

MR. SIMS: Okay, I understand that, but he's got to go to a meeting with --

Q I know, but don't leave us without explaining what you mean, because we'll get a confusing set of --

MR. SIMS: Let's stick to this meeting --

Q -- headlines out of this briefing -- and you'll be upset if you don't clarify --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Absolutely. Could we make --

Q Since we're leaving -- since he's leaving --

Q Shhhh. He's answering --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let's make this one the last one that isn't directly on the meeting. Once more, now. Again.

Q Okay. My question is: you've said that there's no change in our commitment to Lebanon --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Correct.

Q -- that just because the Marines are being moved to ships we are committed to helping Gemayel restore and gain power --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q And yet, you also say that "the boil has been lanced" because the Marines are no longer on the ground there. And I'm trying to find out if we're as committed as ever, how this boil gets lanced if we are not focussed and obsessed still with Lebanon?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In redesigning, resetting the U.S. military presence in Lebanon and our efforts to work with the government of Lebanon on behalf of the Lebanese Armed Forces, on behalf of, of course, the political dimension as well as helping to strengthen the central government -- the Marines, having gone underground

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were no longer fulfilling even the symbolic purpose that they were sent there for. Moving to ships we retain them in the area with their surge capability to return if the conditions require. But, we redesign our programs to be of more direct benefit to, what we consider, a very important task of rebuilding, or modernizing the Lebanese Armed Forces. You know of the training programs that's gone on for the past 13, 14 months. These will be maintained. These will be, perhaps, better focussed on areas such as counter-terrorism, working with the artillery on counter-battery fire, on counter-intelligence.

Why is that inconsistent with the other statement about lancing the boil? Lancing the boil is -- what can I say -- kind of on the psychological side. The Marines, their presence in Lebanon, had become a national obsession. Defenseless, pinned down by recurrent shell-fire, unable to defend themselves effectively -- the focus of attention went that way rather than on the positive contribution which we intended them to make by initially committing ourselves to the multinational force. So I don't think it is inconsistent.

Q But you're just saying -- to follow that up -- you're just saying that it was a national obsession with us, and not productive domestically here -- you're not saying --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And not productive to the government of Lebanon either, because it raised questions of our durability. And it was not in the last weeks, in particular, an effective assist on the ground to security at the airport.

Q Did the King explicitly commit himself --

Q Can the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You'll have to make this the last one. Last two -- all right.

Q Did the King explicitly commit himself to Reagan's September 1, 1982 peace plan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He's referred to the 242 and the initiative, Dick and --

Q Implicit.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Implicit, rather than explicit today, but they both were -- there seemed absolutely no disaccord on the question of 242 and how we, the sort of problems we have to tackle together.

Yes sir?

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Q Since the King kept emphasizing, as you told us, that the focus in the Middle East is the Palestinian issue, how did the administration satisfy those emphases? Did you propose anything new? Did you ask the King do do anything new? What can you tell us that you told the King to satisfy him, if he is satisfied?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We haven't satisfied the King.

Q You have not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Have not.

Q So nothing new, really, on the King's emphasis about the Palestinian problem?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Nothing new. We reviewed our respective positions on it.

Q What have we not satisfied the King on? I'm sorry.

Q On the Palestinian question on being central to everything that's wrong --

Q How do you mean the word "obsession?" When you say a national obsession.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I watch the television along with you.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 2:10 P.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF
KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN
AND
PRESIDENT MUBARAK OF EGYPT

February 14, 1984

The Briefing Room

2:37 P.M. EST

MR. SIMS: This briefing is ON BACKGROUND and may be attributed to a Senior Administration Official.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we started at -- started with a meeting with President Mubarak in the Oval Office, a small group, and the two delegations met in the Cabinet Room, totaling about an hour, and then returned to the Oval Office for a trilateral meeting where King Hussein joined the two Presidents.

Yesterday I did brief you on the bilateral talks we had with King Hussein. I'd like to start with going back a bit on the Mubarak visit. The subjects, some of which were touched on again today in the White House but covered in considerable detail with Secretary Shultz yesterday, were Africa. He has just come to Washington from a visit to five African nations. He felt his trip had been constructive in particularly working to reduce tensions in the Horn of Africa.

He urged expanded economic programs for sub-Sahara in Africa. We described our efforts to combat the drought, support food production. The Namibia problem was discussed.

On Lebanon, Egypt is concerned about a collapse in the situation, believes that a peace force is important, and that if the MNF is to go, then there should be a phased replacement of the MNF by a United Nations force. There was no great precision, no details on how that would be put together. We had considerable discussion about the problems of getting a U.N. force into Lebanon today -- as you know, the UNIFIL sits there below the Awwali but in a peaceable area -- how to get troop contributors to volunteer their forces for the situation, that is, Beirut and the disturbed areas, many of which extend far beyond even the greater Beirut area, the problems of inserting a U.N. force or, of course, even recruiting it in the first place.

They discussed the process of national reconciliation, how essential that was; we had no disagreements at all on that. And he had rather the same attitude that King Hussein had that I described yesterday, the Lebanon problem has or will assume its proper shape, will shrink down in size if energies, attention, can be turned back to the peace process.

On Eygptian-Israeli relations the President made -- President Mubarak -- made a very strong, gave a very strong stress to his support for Camp David and for the peace treaty h Israel. He described the efforts and the origin of those efforts when the Islamic Conference was being convened in Rabat to invite Egypt back into the Islamic Conference on a conditional basis and he described how he had flatly rejected any conditions, that Egypt is a sovereign nation, Egypt is not going to do one thing for the interests of appealing to the Islamic Conference or to the Arab League which, in his sense, conflicts

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with Egyptian sovereignty. Egypt has signed on under Camp David to a peace treaty with Israel and it is not going to diverge from that and there is no dispute within Egypt to that position. He was very firm on that.

On the peace process, they support, the Egyptians support, the Hussein-Arafat dialogue and getting Hussein as soon as possible into negotiations. They are convinced that Arafat has opted conclusively for a political solution and that he can deliver.

Q Would you repeat that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That Arafat has opted for a political solution and can deliver a political solution.

They encourage an American dialogue with the PLO. But basically they see Palestinian participation as envisaged in Camp David as vital to getting the negotiations renewed.

I mentioned the context of the Islamic Conference, his attitude towards Egyptian relations in the Arab world, and there was a very strong stress at several points in the conversations about improving relations with the Arabs does not diminish support for peace with Israel. And they believe that the rising Egyptian influence in the region is going to be giving a strong support to a broader peace negotiations.

There were discussions with the Secretary, also referred to again with the President, about the economic situation, military assistance issues. We reviewed the proposed program for all grant in fiscal '85 under the foreign military sales.

Well, those -- that was the range of topics covered before the meeting at which King Hussein joined.

Q What is his position on the President's proposed peace plan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIAL: Yes, supportive of that, supportive of Camp David, the peace treaty and the President's initiative. I think that has been public from the beginning, hasn't it?

Q Were any decisions reached on how to proceed or was all this talk back and forth? What did the President mean by an exchange of territory was necessary and direct negotiations between the Arabs and --

MR. SIMS: Do you want to hear about the trilateral meeting first and then go to questions?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Can we get a copy of the President's statement?

Q And Mubarak's.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I didn't get a copy of that. Thanks.

Let's do the trilateral and then open it to some bland questions. (Laughter.)

Q What kind of questions? The bland leading the bland.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right. (Laughter.) We thought it was a very useful exchange; it was a very animated exchange of views with two leaders who are among our closest friends in the region. We had a common viewpoint on several issues, not on all. There was no breakthrough. We didn't promise a breakthrough; neither

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one of them came expecting a breakthrough. No decisions were taken, no new plans were made. That was not the purpose of the two bilateral and then the trilateral meetings. We're interested in as frank an exchange of views as to where we stand, where the region stands, where Lebanon stands, and what can be done to reactivate the peace process.

On Lebanon -- some of this is going to be redundant but I do want to emphasize the subjects that were covered -- a very strong desire to restore peace to Lebanon was reviewed in the trilateral. The President assured both that our long-term objectives have not changed, especially the withdrawal of all foreign forces. We explained our thinking about the need to strengthen the constitutional authority in Lebanon and the legitimate institutions and our efforts to encourage broadening the base of government in Lebanon. There was no disagreement on any of those points.

There was discussion about the security needs, security assistance needs of Jordan; again returning somewhat to the ground we covered yesterday. We do see a threat to Jordan from the North, from Damascus. And we want to find a way to be as helpful as possible to Jordan in preparing to deter that threat.

On the peace process the agreement was to refocus attention on the broader process. The President assured them that he is not going to shy away from the peace process during this year, an election year. He made clear our commitment to the Camp David accords and reviewed the factors which will be involved in moving forward. There was agreement on the need to broaden the negotiations to include Jordan and we found King Hussein clearly looking for the context, for the framework, in which he can enter the negotiations.

There was discussion of Iran-Iraq, of the Gulf war. They welcome the warming up of U.S.-Iraqi relations. They both have been urging that for some time past. And they recognize the threat that the conflict in Iraq-Iran poses to regional stability immediately in the Gulf region, but beyond.

We will be continuing our studies of how to cope with state-sponsored terrorism and organizing our efforts, which are clearly going to have to be on a broader scale than just the Marines in Beirut.

Well, you have the departure statement of the President. I don't have a copy of what -- I think King Hussein spoke extemporaneously and President Mubarak did speak from a prepared text. Let me say at the outset you can't control a statement of the departing chief of state. We certainly can't -- we certainly don't endorse it by standing there. Okay.

Q Did the President have a copy of Mr. Mubarak's statement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, he did not.

Q Could I ask you about what he means, the President, our President, by exchange of territory. What territory does he have in mind and who would be the recipient of this exchange? The PLO, Jordan, the U.N., Syria --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The sentence in the statement says, "The tragic events in Lebanon show that the occupation of territory by outside forces does not lead to peace, but rather to continued conflict and turmoil."

Q No, I mean when he moves along to describe the outline of the settlement.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And, "I reaffirm my commitments to -- and that of the government -- to the principle set forth in September, '82, particularly to the principle that the Arab-Israeli

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conflict must be resolved through negotiations involving an exchange of territory for peace." That is the heart of 242 --

Q No, I mean Egyptian-Israeli negotiations were rather simple. There were two parties and there was a definable territory. Now you're talking about a comprehensive settlement. You have Syria, you have the PLO, you have Jordan, you have Israel, you have various territories. The President is saying territories should be exchanged for peace. Who's he got in mind to get this territory?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, if you're asking specifically about territory, the West Bank. The American position is unchanged. We do not support an independent Palestinian state. We support a West Bank entity in association with Jordan.

Q An association doesn't mean ownership, does it? Now he's talking about exchanging territory.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The beauty of association, and it's a word -- I guess I said yesterday I had an advanced degree in imprecision -- association was chosen for a very good reason.

Q The President is speaking more specifically than association. That's why I'm asking you the question.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, he said an exchange of territory for peace. He didn't get into ownership or the exact nature of that association.

Q When Mubarak urged the United States to deal directly with the PLO, what was the reaction? What is the President's view?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have no change in our views whatsoever on the PLO, and that until the PLO has found its way to accepting 242, 338, Israel's right to exist. We have no intention of engaging in negotiations with the PLO.

Q Do you have any indication that they're going to change?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, sir.

Q Any indication that -- sorry -- did the Egyptians propose to you a change in the PLO covenant to drop the paragraphs where the PLO covenant says Israel has no right to exist?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That was one thing that was discussed, of how could we begin to even conceive, even if there was an acceptance of 242, 338 and Israel's right to exist, the covenant is one of the clear stumbling blocks to such discussions.

Q My question is did the Egyptians propose readiness, did they tell you about readiness of the Palestinians, of the PLO, to drop from the PLO covenant these paragraphs?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't want to get too much into characterizing the Egyptian position, but as a general proposition their view is that in the course of the negotiations such things will fall into place, such things will become details and they will not be obstacles. Yes, ma'am?

Q Did you have any bilateral talks on the possibility of a U.N. peacekeeping force being introduced into Beirut? Did Mubarak express an opinion on the Soviet condition regarding the removal of the U.S. fleet from Lebanon?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, he didn't. We talked to the Egyptians, I believe this was in the meeting with the Foreign Minister day-before-yesterday, about our concern that the mandate for the U.N. be very carefully prepared, because the situation in Lebanon is not just a problem focused in those sites where the multinational force sits, not just on those sites covered by greater Beirut, but it spreads throughout Lebanon, throughout the areas of the refugee camps, the confrontation lines, and our position is to ensure that whatever is developed -- and, of course, the talks are just getting going intensively in New York -- that two things be kept in mind: you want a broad geographical mandate and you want a long duration so that you don't get the fits and starts of going back to voting every six months as you've had on UNIFIL.

Q Do we view the Soviet conditions as being the opening gambit in these negotiations, or as being real obstacles?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we don't have an answer yet on the Soviet -- but I think that's a fair statement, that it's an opening gambit and is not going to be taken that seriously, the conditions they set out.

Q What is our reaction to Mubarak making this suggestion that we now talk to the PLO? Did he do it to embarrass Ronald Reagan and, if not, why did he do it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think what you've got is a restatement of a very old, longstanding Egyptian position. This is the way Sadat spoke, the need for a U.S.-PLO dialogue, goes back over the years. No, I don't think that

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Mubarak was in the least bit interested in embarrassing Reagan. He was interested in setting out Egyptian policy which has been enshrined in a number of statements over the years.

Q Why did you come out here and announce to us that you can't control the statements of other Chiefs of State and we don't condone it by standing there -- what were you talking about?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I was making a general philosophical position that -- (Laughter.) -- we don't control statements by Chiefs of State.

Q Were you embarrassed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I'm very rarely embarrassed.

Q -- conflict between --

Q Do you think it's proper for you to come out and repudiate a Head of State's statements?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I said I couldn't control it, nobody could control it --

Q Why would you assume that we identified the two?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I didn't assume. You had a choice of three Heads of State to --

Q Right --

Q I figured they're individuals.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- to refer to.

Q Could you clear up -- just a moment --

Q Do you see a conflict between the support for President Reagan's peace initiative [illegible]s expressed and President Mubarak's warning today that no nat[illegible]d presume to speak for the PLO? Peripherally, some pointed [illegible] at President Reagan glanced directly at King Hussein at that point.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we think that King Hussein is the one that's going to lead the delegation if there's going to be a delegation. And we -- our policy and the policy that was enunciated in that, in President Mubarak's departure statement, that we're just, we're not in agreement.

Q What about the King Hussein's statement that -- quoting President Mubarak -- that Camp David was dead and -- did you ask President Mubarak about King Hussein's remarks?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't want to go into the detail of what we did or we didn't ask, but I can assure you that we got a series of very flat, very resounding endorsements of Camp David and the peace treaty. And I did describe the atmospherics a bit surrounding the Islamic Conference's invitation.

Q Does King Hussein have clearance from the Arabs to be the representative, and to take this lead?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q That's been the problem up to now, hasn't it, and he hasn't been able to get authority to do it?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's a continuing problem, but I understand there's going to be some fairly early talks between King Hussein and Arafat and it's going to be the facts of those talks, I assume, that will run the --

Q That, you hope, will give him the authority to be the lead negotiator, then?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Correct.

Q The very fact that these talks were held today was seen by some as advances, as progress anyway, in getting this Palestinian problem solved, at least progress in getting to the table and talk about it. Was there any progress made in that regard?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think whenever you get two leaders like the King and President Mubarak together with our leaders -- and this is, I guess, this is a first -- or a least a first since that visit by that Fez delegation where you had a group of Arab leaders visiting the White House back in '81, I think --

Q -- two --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: '82, sorry, '82. This is a rare event and, yes, as I said, the exchanges were very lively, very animated. Did it result in progress, any changes, any breakthroughs? I can stop well short of breakthroughs. No breakthroughs.

Q Did Reagan participate --

Q Progress --

Q Progress?

Q -- in these lively exchanges?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President did, indeed, participate.

Q Progress? Changes?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Airing of concerns, airing of views about the need to get going, to renew the focus, renew the drive on the peace process. And this lead, I think, very naturally from not only the two visitors' concerns about the peace process, but from the dilemma that has faced every nation that's tried to deal with the Lebanon problem. See the bridge they make in their mind is that you don't get anywhere in Lebanon in a major sense until you've moved ahead on the peace process.

Q Were there any specifics -- you said that there was an agreement on the need to get Hussein involved in the peace process -- were there any specifics on how to get him involved, and how would you, if I can just --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the road which was blocked, the talks which broke down last April

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between Hussein and Arafat. And those talks will be resumed in the very near future.

Q Will, definitely?

Q Do you have a sense of time on that or not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Weeks. Weeks. No, I don't have the date.

Q If I could just follow, there seems to be a contradiction in Mubarak's statement. On the one hand, he said no other nation can speak for the Palestinians other than the PLO. But on the other hand, he welcomes the Hussein-Arafat dialogue. Is the point he's making that if Arafat okays Hussein then Hussein can do it? Or is he saying that he doesn't feel that under any circumstances anyone can talk for the Palestinians?

MR. SIMS: Let's have one or two more.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it's -- I think your first proposition is the one. That it's got to be a grant of authority to speak on behalf of the Palestinians which he believes must come through the PLO.

MR. SIMS: Can we take some in the back.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And he thinks that's achievable.

Q Both Mubarak and Hussein feel that Arafat is committed to a political settlement and they feel that he can deliver. Did they say that if he was not able to directly negotiate for the PLO, that his ability to deliver that political commitment would decrease?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If he can't --

Q If he can't talk directly to the U.S., do they feel that his ability to deliver will diminish?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They feel that the ability to talk to the U.S. would support the peace process and movement in the peace process. But this is -- has been a standoff for years.

Q But would they say that his ability would diminish if he was not able to talk?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no, they did not say that. They put it in a positive sense that talking with Washington would be a positive assist to the peace process.

MR. SIMS: Just two more. Dave and Bob Allison, and then --

Q That won't do it.

Q The Lebanese radio reported about 30 minutes ago that Gemayel was going to have an announcement of historic proportion. Do you know what that announcement is? Is it resumption of the talks, or what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I heard the same broadcast. I note it is St. Valentine's Day. I'm waiting.

Q Sending you the May 17th agreement with a red ribbon and black crepe.

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Q Kiss, kiss, got to go, bye.

Q Black kiss, white envelopes.

Q Did Mubarak elaborate on talks concerning Namibia?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, he described the situation in Namibia as he saw it and we described our position about the presence of troops, and I can't say here again you had a breakthrough, but President Mubarak has been very concerned to get a solution in Namibia.

Q May I ask -- what was the President's reaction --

MR. SIMS: One last one.

Q Yes, one last. What was the President's reaction when Mr. Mubarak said that there should be a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and that that was a precondition? Did the President take the opportunity to say that's --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He didn't -- none of the - except perhaps the Syrians, none of them are saying it's an absolute precondition. It's -- I can't think of a single Arab leader that isn't saying that total, quick Israeli withdrawal isn't, as they see it, the key to getting the Syrians out, getting a solution for Lebanon. But precondition -- it's only really Damascus that's setting that in concrete.

Q Well, what's our reaction to that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We got an agreement.

Q What?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: May 17th.

Q You ain't got an agreement long.

END 3:04 P.M. EST

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
SECRETARY SHULTZ SPEECH
BEFORE THE WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL
ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1984, 11:30 P.M. /A.M./

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: I will make a few opening remarks and ask that my colleague join me as well, and you'll see why in just a minute.

The speech that the Secretary will give tonight in Boston is a major statement of the Administration's Africa policy. It will be the first statement in this Administration by the Secretary of State on African policy.

I will recall for you that the Vice President in November 1982 spoke in Nairobi and laid out the main themes of our Africa policy. Larry Eagleburger spoke last June as well, and this is the Secretary's important contribution to the definition of our approaches in Africa.

The speech, as you will see, falls into several portions. The first is the basic definition of American interests in Africa, our strategic interests, our political interests, our economic interests, and the very real and deep human interests that this nation has in the African continent and in our relations with the countries that are constituent parts of that continent.

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The speech proceeds to its first major theme, and that is the economic crisis in Africa, the economic crisis in its many features, and on this score I will ask my colleague to fill you in with some more of the details. The economic problem and the responses to it by oursevles, by Africans and by our Allies, are a matter of some complexity. But I would underscore for you that the speech and what the Secretary will say in this portion of it, is an indication of our sensitivity to the broader economic problems facing the third world. Roughly defined, if you will, they are the problems dealt with in the North-South Agenda.

But given their specific applications and the specific natures of those problems in the African continent, the speech addresses how we will deal with those aspects that are more germane to Africa. The speech will define in further detail that which you heard already, what we have in mind with the policy initiative that the Vice President and the Secretary have referred to in the past.

The third major theme of the speech is regional security. I don't have to tell you that Africa is a troubled continent and that the meaning of the mature partnership that the Vice President defined in Nairobi is one in which the United States will respond to Africa's many needs, including its security needs.

There will be no development, there will be no political stability in the continent, obviously, without security and the United States has a role to play, not necessarily, if you will, only in the East-West perspective. We have to address the real problems that are faced inside the continent. The continent of Africa is part of the global system and the East-West perspective is very much present there for how else would one define the presence of substantial numbers of external combat forces -- Cubans -- on the continent of Africa.

The United States, the Secretary will point out very forcefully, is not Africa's gendarme, but we will act in partnership with our friends on the continent and with our Allies where it is necessary to act, and we have acted. The examples of Chad and the Horn are rather sharply drawn and defined. But we will not be the security guardian of Africa. And I think the point is rather well made in the speech, or they're clearly made, that if you look at the weight of the matter the Soviets outspend us five-to-one

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in the provision of military equipment and assistance to Africa.

The third basic feature -- or the last basic feature of the speech is southern Africa, where, as all of you know, we have spent a great deal of time, a great deal of effort, to advance three basic causes.

First, overall regional security, the cause of Namibia's independence, and the issue of change inside of South Africa itself. The flow of our discussions is outlined in the speech, the flow of the negotiation, the growing sense that we feel of realism in southern Africa, a willingness of all the parties to reach out and try to find common ground, one with the other.

The example of Mozambique is carefully underscored. But our efforts to bring about a broader regional understanding are touched upon as the Secretary addresses the Angolan problems, the problems of security between Mozambique and South Africa and the other states in the region. It goes over carefully how we have pursued the Namibia settlement; how we have pursued it in the context of U.N. Security Council Resolution 435, our efforts with our Allies and with the governments of the area.

The speech closes with a statement of United States policy with respect to South Africa. It underscores the key and cardinal point that the United States holds in repugnance the system of apartheid. At the same time, we see change taking place in South Africa. We recognize that change. We see a complicated balance sheet of some positive developments, many negative developments, and we do not pretend that the United States has a blueprint for South Africa's internal design. But we feel that the United States is relevant to the course of change in South Africa; that we must and, indeed, are using our influence in quite practical and tangible ways, and that that course is one that we will stick to and persevere with.

The Secretary makes the point quite clearly that it is both in the interests of the United States to avoid an explosion in South Africa itself, to promote peaceful change, to be involved, to be committed, to be engaged.

There is no interest of the United States in disengaging, disinvesting or upsetting ourselves from an issue of political significance and moral significance.

Ladies and gentlemen, that is the basic structure of the speech that you'll be reading and some of its highlights, but given the special economic complexities

I would ask my colleague if he could join me for a moment in going into those in a bit more detail.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: You will recall that the Secretary here, a couple of weeks ago, announced an economic policy initiative for Africa, and the speech elaborates on the reasons for that initiative and our interests in it and the background to it.

The African situation is special and yet it's part of the world problem. Africa was hit very hard by the recession, commodity prices have declined dramatically in the last few years and most Africa countries are almost totally dependent on one or two commodity exports.

You're well aware, I think, from the attention that's been given to it, to the climatic factors; a devastating drought going on now in many parts of Africa, across the Sahel and in southern Africa.

I was with Senator Danforth and I know he's given a number of press conferences on this, and we know that those droughts have hit periodically in Africa, and they are devastating. They wipe away years of progress. But when you look at the African economic situation, you realize that the problems and the crisis go back behind the droughts and well before the world-wide recession.

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Because what we find is that for twenty years there has been economic stagnation in Africa; for twenty years there's been a declining per capita food production. There's been declining growth in GNP, so there is something more here, something very fundamental. And that is the debate that is going on now within Africa and within all the institutions working on Africa.

What the Secretary lays out in this speech is our recognition of these factors and the fact that it's important, as the emergency assistance is and as important as our traditional assistance is, there has to be a new responsiveness and a new flexibility in dealing with what's been called by the World Bank "a production crises;" what it's been called in other context, "a policy crises." That much of African policy and economics has been to deny incentives to producers to try and do through administrative controls what they should have been relying more on the market to do. And the resulting inefficiencies and distortions have deeply hurt African economic growth.

What is significant is that this debate is going on in Africa. That almost every country in Africa is now going through a very fundamental re-thinking of economic policy. We and the other donors in the World Bank and

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the African governments are talking through the ways in which we can assist in a restructuring of the economic policies and the economic systems so that Africa can start to grown on a more sustained basis.

Food production is such a prominent aspect of this. Much of the data that you see on African economic crises is in terms of food production; the steady decline in per capita food production, the rising level of imports of food. But since agriculture is so central to all Africa economies, when you see a food crises you know that there is a general economic crises in Africa as well.

One of the things we have to keep in mind is that in Africa we are not the major donors. Our economic aid program to Africa has been going up steadily. It's been going up every year. As the Secretary indicates, the economic aid levels for Fiscal '85 are 23 percent above those for FY-83. But even though our economic program on a bilateral basis now exceeds a billion dollars a year, we provide only ten to fifteen percent of the total aid flows going to Africa.

So a very important part of this response to the African economic crisis has to be a concerted one with the other donors as well as with the African governments. Much of our diplomacy on the economic front in the last two years has been a process of consultation and coordination.

If all the donors are moving in opposite directions or each of them are putting on their own projects with their own conditions, the African governments are torn in a dozen different directions.

The economic policy initiative, which the Secretary describes at more length in the speech, is a kind of capstone to the efforts that we have been working on for the last few years. It provides further incentive to African countries who are undertaking these kinds of policy reforms. Remember that the policy reforms and the restructuring that the African governments are going through are politically very difficult. They involve a redistribution of wealth from more privileged parts of the population, mainly, the urban parts of the population to the rural. They mean taking political risks for many African governments, and they need encouragement to do that.

The economic policy initiative provides a form of encouragement, of support in a flexible way to African countries that are taking those steps.

Then, the Secretary turns to other measures that we have either underway or under consideration on the economic front, because the problem isn't simply an aid problem. It's a trade problem, a problem of investment. He specifies a number of measures that we are taking to try and improve opportunities for Africa in the export sector, in attracting investments, et cetera. So It is more than an aid response. Very clearly, an attempt to try and respond to the special characteristics of Africa's economic crises.

Q The Secretary refers to the communications among the key parties about Angola and southern Africa. There are new stories today out of Johannesburg saying that delegations from the United States, Angola and South Africa are going to meet on Thursday in Lusaka to discuss achieving a lasting ceasefire.

Could you tell us what is going on and how this fits into the thing the Secretary is talking about in his speech about these communications, and so on?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: I think the Secretary has

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defined quite clearly in his speech the role that the United States has played over time in southern Africa, the role of catalyst, the role of bridge-builder, the role of a stimulator of a peace process within clearly defined limits.

The present circumstances that you're looking at in the Angola context in South Africa are important. South Africa has committed herself to a disengagement from southern Angola. That disengagement is an important political fact. If it is secured by all the parties, it opens the way for a negotiation of the important outstanding political features that lie before us. You know what those are. They're the implementation of 435, and in that context issues like these the South Africans underscored clearly at the end of August 1983 when they pointed to the fact that an understanding on Cuban troop withdrawal would be part and parcel of their agreement to leave Namibia.

Negotiation is a long-standing one, as you know. It is taking place, as you just referred, Mr. Oberdorfer. At the present the three parties are coming together and have actually been together in Lusaka, Zambia.

The objectives before us at the moment are precisely those: To pin down the disengagement and make it into the sort of political reality that opens the door to a negotiation of the outstanding political issues. That negotiation is going to be tough one. It's going to take time. We are not looking forward to any instant breakthroughs, but we are looking at a serious commitment on the part of the South Africans and of the Angolans to come to some understandings, and that spirit which lies behind the present round of talks is indicative of the direction peoples' minds are going as they begin to face the longer term issues.

Q You mean to say there is a serious commitment or you're trying to get one?

A There is a serious commitment, but that commitment needs to be pinned down, made mutually comprehensible among the parties. We can play a role in making sure that's happened. That's why we're there on the ground.

Q Last week the Angolans and SWAPO said that South African troops still remain in southern Angola. Do you have any information to either support that or to --

A I can tell you that the disengagement is well underway.

Q I understand that. That was the statement that was made last week. Are there South African troops in southern Angola now?

A If you would let me finish. The disengagement is underway; the parties are meeting right now to talk exactly about the situation in southern Angola, and I think since that is a matter of diplomatic dialogue between those parties, I think they ought to have the privilege to work that through themselves. But let's look at what is happening.

Senior representatives from three governments are meeting in Lusaka. They are meeting because there is an atmosphere of seriousness, an atmosphere of purpose, and they are moving in concert to deal with what is, in my judgment, an important departure -- the disengagement -- and that the road it opens up in the future.

Q Are UNITA and SWAPO going to be brought into these disengagement discussions at a later date? Is there any plan for that?

A The disengagement discussions refer to South Africa's presence in southern Angola and the disengagement of that presence. The discussions are taking place between the South Africans and the Angolans with ourselves there as the third party.

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Q Does the United States contemplate or is the United States considering putting in Americans as truce-line observers or in any way using American military or Foreign Service Officers in that function?

A At the moment, the conversations in Lusaka are under way and we'll have to see what the outcome is. I have no way of predicting the final outcome of those discussions.

Q But you're not denying that as a possibility now?

A I'm not confirming it; I'm not denying it.

Q What is the prospect with respect to talks between form of the South African Government and SWAPO, about which we keep hearing reports to take place in the near future or something?

A I think what we're looking at today is what we're looking at -- and that is that the South Africans and the Americans and the Angolans are meeting in Lusaka and we'll see what next steps will bring. But I'm not predicting any early meetings that would involve SWAPO, no.

Q O.K. What is your understanding of where the SWAPO-South African exchanges lie today -- just as a description, not as a prognostication.

A Well, I don't have a great deal to say about it. The South Africans and SWAPO have not started formal exchanges in any manner. They would find their way at some due and appropriate occasion in the context of the implementation or the beginnings, or the planning for the implementation of 435. But nothing is moving today that would require or permit me to make any comment.

Q Your colleague said this is a capstone of the Administration's policy on Africa. It's now more than three years into this Administration, less than a year to go in this Administration. What took so long?

A You mean on the economic?

Q Yes.

A Well, we've been working on this for some time; and what has been taking place over the last few years is developing methods whereby the donors could come together with the African countries in a comprehensive way to look at the economic problems -- the debt problems, the destabilization problems, the policy reform -- and we didn't have those mechanisms, frankly, and it wasn't clear what was required of everybody.

What we've seen now over the last two or three

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years is that the methodology is being developed. It's been developed with Sudan. It's been developed with Sudan; it's been developed with Somalia, with Kenya -- with more and more countries. We've had the World Bank and the IMF working more closely together, creating a framework and laying out the parameters of the problem to which not only the donors but the creditors can respond in a meaningful and flexible way.

We've been more flexible with our own assistance in the last two-three years.

Now that this has sort of taken hold in Africa and we have a system, what we want to do with the economic-policy initiative is to give it much more momentum; and we've consulted with the other donors and they're moving in the same direction, and they welcome this as a way of giving more momentum to the process elsewhere in Africa -- more encouragement to it.

Q One detailed question. Do you have any idea of what is the accumulated debt burden of the African countries?

A I've seen various figures. I've seen it run as high as 66 billion dollars, but I've seen lower figures. So it's hard to get a firm fix on it. But what you can see is that from the seventies, when most African countries had very low debts, up to now the debt has risen dramatically; nd there must be a dozen or more African countries that are rescheduling their debts every year.

So the debt factor has to be brought into play on this, and the creditors and the donors. Here's where your IMF-IBRD coordination is very important because we've got to look at that problem and the development problems together. We weren't doing that before.

And that's what's been evolving in the African scene recently.

Q I'm late here, so if you're done I apologize. I notice in the text, having been an aficianado of the various South African texts in the past few years, I don't see Cuba mentioned. Is it?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: Yes.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: Yes. Go back in the regional security.

Q But on page 16, when you're laying out the plan, I mean -- oh, I see, the removal; O.K.

But is this a new -- that last paragraph. Do you still want parallel withdrawal?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: Absolutely unchanged.

Q I'd like to ask you a follow-up, the question on the economic-policy initiative. In interviews in the past couple of weeks with African Ambassadors, they have described the policy as being counterproductive in the sense that you're attempting to modify or work with them to change their policy bilaterally rather than through the multilateral institutions who have traditionally been charged with this sort of policy manipulation.

Have you gotten much of feedback, first of all, so far that people will accept the money in exchange for altering their policies?

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: Actually the response has been very good, but it's not because we plan to simply negotiate bilateral policy changes -- just the opposite. What we see these funds being used for is to support policy changes that, in the ideal case, are precisely negotiated in the multilateral framework. This is supportive funds. And one of the things we don't want is all the donors going in and each trying to articulate a different set of policy changes. The African countries don't like that either.

Sometimes our sector programs go beyond the multilateral institutions.

Let's say we're concentrating in agriculture. We will become specific on the agriculture front, but we're trying to be in the context of this multilateral framework.

Q Can I follow on that --

A Yes.

Q On the one hand, you're doing this kind of unilateral initiative. On the other hand, you're saying that all this has to be concerted with all the other donors, and you've tried to put that light on this initiative. And still, on yet another hand, the United States dramatically reduced its commitment to the multilaterals as stated in IDA.

How is it that this essentially bilateral approach doesn't show a certain lack of confidence in the Bretton Woods institutions.

A Some of you were here when the Secretary talked to the economic-policy initiative and was asked a very similar question. He pointed out that our decision on the IDA contribution was made on the basis of what we felt realistically would be voted by the Congress within the time frame of the IDA VII replenishment. To make a larger commitment and have it stretched out over four or five or six years is not going to help the developing countries, so we made a decision on what we felt we could gain support for and assure the international institutions of a particular flow.

In addition to that, because the African countries constitute most of the least-developed countries of the world, we are working within IDA and the World Bank to see a larger share of IDA funds going to Africa and the other least-developed countries. And so we see the total effect to be very supportive of what the multilateral institutions can and want to do in Africa.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: I'm just looking at the clock, but let's try one more question.

Q Considering the climate and the amount of time you put into this, can you imagine South Africans withdrawing completely without there first being in place some neutral observers who they will trust?

A Well, I think that, frankly, is an issue that's going to be worked out around the bargaining table in Lusaka. I'm not going to prejudge exactly how it's going to happen, but what I will go back to and stress again with you is that you've got a rather remarkable phenomena. When you look at the fact that two countries have been intermittently at war for a number of years, that they're meeting now to work out how you move from war to disengagement, you've got a significant fact. And while that fact has to be measured in a very clear context, it's one step; and it's a step that only opens the way for what will be very tough follow-on negotiations. It is an important fact in and of itself.

Q How can you have progress beyond the disengagement if there's no change in the insistence that the Cuban troops leave Angola? How do you see that unfolding if there's no change in that?

A Well, the political issues remain to be resolved. We are seeing a process now in which people are coming together. They are coming together in a serious manner. I really don't have anything else to add. We'll have to see how it proceeds. But you know the direction we're going in, and we're dealing with people who are looking for peace.

Q What are our conditions for normalizing relations with Angola? Does every last Cuban soldier have to go?

A I think we're kind of getting outside the framework of the Secretary's speech, and we are running up against time and I've got to see Alan Romberg.

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Q Let me just ask you this question. In the follow-up to this question where you had no comment essentially about U.S. forces down there now, until yesterday or today the only troops anyone ever talked about were the UN UNTAC.

Given the public angst in this country about our 1600 Marines in Lebanon and about not sending anybody more down to Salvador, just letting that one hang out there about the possibility of American forces down in southern Africa could cause a lot of concern or anxiety if in fact that's not to be the case.

I mean is there any way you can talk to this?

A No. I thought I was trying to be very careful and say that there is a negotiation that's in progress in Lusaka; there are a lot of issues being talked about.

I am not going to comment on what the details are nor am I going to comment on any sort of role the United States would play. The United States has played a role and it will continue to play a role of catalyst -- of bringing two sides together to try to find the grounds for

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a settlement.

Now, of course, we are very sensitive to all the facts around the world. We're not looking for new jobs and new ways to do things. But I do genuinely believe that we have a role to play, the parties want us to play that role of being a catalyst in this negotiation. It's in that framework that I would look at the way the discussions may evolve in Lusaka. But it's too early to say, and I can't comment in a hypothetical manner.

Q You're leaving open that possibility of American troops being sent there.

A I am not leaving it open and I'm not shutting it. I'm just saying very simply that it's too early to go to that assumption or that statement of where we might be. It's premature and it's not appropriate to go that far.

Q How many Cubans do you now estimate are in Angola?

A Oh, I think we're carrying the figure of about 25,000.

Q Thank you.

A Yes.

(Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the BACKGROUND briefing was concluded.)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release February 16, 1984

BRIEFING
BY
SECRETARY DONALD T. REGAN
ON
RECENT ECONOMIC INDICATORS

11:18 A.M. EST

MR. FITZWATER: This is a briefing on the most recent economic indicators by Secretary of the Treasury Regan. It's on the record for sound and camera. The Secretary will have a brief opening statement and then take your questions. We'll have copies of his statement at the end of the briefing. Mr. Regan?

SECRETARY REGAN: Thank you, Marlin. Figures released today on housing starts, personal income, utilization of industrial capacity, and initial claims for unemployment insurance all underscore the strength of the current expansion and indicate that the economy continues to move ahead at a steady pace early in 1984.

On housing starts, new home starts jumped 15 percent in January to an annual rate of 1.9 million units, the strongest pace by far in the current expansion. Personal income: personal income jumped $31 billion, with an annual rate in January of about $10 billion more than in the prior two months. Much of the rise was in higher wage and salary payments, up at an annual rate of $23 billion, the best gain in the recovery, and reflecting continued improvement in employment and work hours as well as moderately rising wage rates.

Capacity utilization: the rate of utilization of industrial capacity increased to 79.9 percent in January, up from 79.2 percent in December. The utilization rate has recovered more than 10 points from its 1982 low of 69.9.

Initial claims for unemployment insurance dropped to 344,000 in the week of February 4th. These latest figures compare with new claims in the 430,000 range in the last two months of 1983. All of this economic news, along with the news released earlier this week that retail sales were up 2.2 percent in January and industrial production has risen 1.1 percent, gives us firm indications that the economy is moving on a steady, solid, and sustainable track.

Any questions?

Q What about the deficits, Mr. Secretary?

SECRETARY REGAN: As far as the deficits are concerned, we are attempting to work with the Democrats in both the House and the Senate on a special program to see if, apart from the regular budget cycle, they can be cut further.

Q The Democrats say that in the first meeting they laid out a proposal to you. Have you responded? Is there another meeting scheduled?

SECRETARY REGAN: Well, I think the facts would show that in the initial meeting we laid out on the table some spending cuts, some revenue increases, about $47 billion of spending cuts, about $42 billion of revenue increases, together with the savings that that would have in interest on the debt. The result of that was about a $100 billion package. They have yet to respond to that that we put on the table. They have not put anything on the table.

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They had a couple of throwaway lines similar to, "Well, why don't we try what President Ford has suggested and price out what's stretching the defense from five to six years -- some of the programs would do." We have done that homework and we are ready to talk to them further when they'll come back to the table.

Q Mr. Secretary, you said that you want to reduce the deficit further with this $100 billion plan. Isn't that $100 billion included in the President's budget?

SECRETARY REGAN: No, it's not. There are some cuts in spending in the -- suggested in the President's plan. There are also some revenue increases, but together they don't total this amount.

Q How much do they total?

Q What would the deficit be in 1987 -- fiscal '87 -- if your plan was accepted, what you put on the table?

SECRETARY REGAN: It would be somewhere in the neighborhood of about $130 billion to $140 billion, in through there, I believe, in '87. I could check that figure for you.

Q Mr. Secretary, I didn't get a chance to follow up. How much would they total?

SECRETARY REGAN: How much would what total?

Q The items contained in the budget versus the items contained in the $100 billion plan.

SECRETARY REGAN: Well, it depends upon which are accepted and the like. We can't answer that question until we know whether all of ours get accepted there and all of our budget cuts get accepted in the plan --

Q How much have you laid out in the budget?

SECRETARY REGAN: In the budget? We laid out about, I think it's $31 billion of revenue increases over the same period of time versus about $42 billion in the new plan, and we had on the spending cuts side about, I don't know, $15 billion or $20 billion versus $47 billion.

Q What can you tell us about yesterday's meeting between the President and Paul Volcker?

SECRETARY REGAN: Very little. The meeting was another in a series of meetings that are scheduled in advance -- it wasn't an impromptu meeting. The President and the Chairman have been meeting this way over the past three years on occasions. It's a chance for them to exchange views on the economy and the outlook for it, for us to understand a little bit more about what they're doing on the monetary side and for them to understand a little bit more about where we're progressing on the fiscal side.

Q Mr. Secretary, were any disagreements expressed? Did the President have any complaints about the conduct of monetary policy and, conversely, did Mr. Volcker make another pitch for reducing the deficits?

SECRETARY REGAN: Well, I would suggest that in general terms that the President expressed hope that deficits would be reduced further, particularly if we could get cooperation from the Hill Democrats and, at the same time, the Chairman hoped that some of the new things that are coming in the monetary field, the CRR and things of that nature, wouldn't make the job of corralling the monetary aggregates too complex.

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Q -- about whether the President had any complaints about the conduct of monetary policy?

SECRETARY REGAN: I don't think that the President complained about it. All he asked was, and reassured the Chairman, that he had no desires for, any need for excessive money supply nor did he want the money supply too tight. He wanted enough money supplied that would allow for the growth that both the Fed and the administration are projecting in the 4-1/2 percent real growth area, and for an inflation rate of 5 percent or less.

Q Mr. Secretary, are we now having an increase in the money supply that is, as the President said yesterday, commensurate with growth?

SECRETARY REGAN: Over the last two months the money supply has grown at better than a 10 percent rate. I would characterize that as sufficient money.

Q Well, is there a risk of inflation -- reinflation?

SECRETARY REGAN: I wouldn't think so, because the rate of increase in the money supply over the past six months has only been 7 percent and --

Q You're satisfied?

SECRETARY REGAN: All we're saying is it's their job to supply that type of money for this growth and that rate of inflation, and they said they would try to hit it.

Q Was the '84 election mentioned during this meeting, or was that --

SECRETARY REGAN: Not to my knowledge, no.

Q -- is that the context in which this discussion took place?

SECRETARY REGAN: No. If you're asking are we turning the heat on the Fed, no, absolutely not.

Q Then why is the stock market falling?

SECRETARY REGAN: One minute. Over here, first.

Q Well, there have been reports that you were upset with the money supply and that you felt that it was too tight. Are you denying those reports? It's not true, then?

SECRETARY REGAN: I, as a matter of fact, thought that that was a little bit exaggerated, that report. I've been having studies in the Treasury regarding money supply, because the aggregate suddenly changed, as you know, in the past 10 days. They changed dramatically from the figures that were initially released for the year 1983, and now the changes, plus seasonal adjustments. It changed them dramatically and I was trying to get a handle on how they've changed and what the significance of that was.

Q If I can follow up, are you then satisfied with how Volcker is handling money supply at this point or not?

SECRETARY REGAN: Well, all I'll say is if the Fed -- this is not a one-man job -- but if the Federal Open Market Committee will supply those funds, we'll be satisfied, yes. Now your question.

Q What about the stock market? Why is it falling?

SECRETARY REGAN: What about the stock market? Any number

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of reasons. I think the primary reason is that you normally have a rather large correction in any bull market; it's characteristic of every bull market there ever has been. We've had a bull market since August of 1982 without a major correction. I think that we're having that major correction now, and the market can find any number of reasons for that.

I would suggest that one of the prime reasons for it is the unusual yield differential between stocks and bonds -- it's over 7 percent at the

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current moment. In addition to that, there have been worries about our economy. There have been worries about our inflation, any number of things of that nature, including our deficits. So, the market has seized upon these as an excuse, and it's off.

Q Then, you don't see it as a fundamental vote of no confidence looking down the road six or eight months in the economy as administered by the President?

SECRETARY REGAN: Sam, we used to have a saying on Wall Street before I left there that the stock market predicted nine out of the last six depressions. And the market always does things of this nature. No, I'm not -- I don't think that is of that type significance at all.

Q Secretary Regan --

SECRETARY REGAN: Yes.

Q -- is there any concern that with the weakening of the dollar that the time deposits from abroad would not come in at the rate the Fed had anticipated in setting its targets for monetary aggregates?

SECRETARY REGAN: Well, thank goodness, I'm not getting a question about a weak dollar. For two and half years we've been getting questions about what's the effect of a high dollar on our market. Isn't that pernicious and isn't that wrong and shouldn't we be trying to weaken the currency? And now that we've finally got a five or six percent retreat of the dollar -- or a strengthening of the mark against the dollar -- we finally get this question.

Q What's the answer?

SECRETARY REGAN: The answer --

Q What's the question?

SECRETARY REGAN: -- no. (Laughter.) No, I don't think that a decline in the dollar means that we're going to lose the capital inflows from abroad. I might expand on that a bit by saying that there are two types of deficits that capital from abroad is supposedly financing. You have to be careful which you're referring to. There is a large trade deficit, and if you subtract from that our remittances from abroad on the capital we've invested over there, we come to the current services deficit.

That current services deficit by definition has to be made up by importation of capital from around the world, but that is not going to finance our budget deficit. Foreigners are only buying about nine percent of all the United States securities that we're issuing -- in 1983 -- or have issued in 1983. So, you can't say that foreigners are financing our deficits. That is a wrong statement.

Q I have a --

SECRETARY REGAN: Yes.

Q -- very serious question for you. How confident are you that the recovery will be sustained through election time?

SECRETARY REGAN: Very confident. If you look at the work of 46 economists and economitrician organizations that make up the so-called Blue Chip Analysis, their most recent forecast that came out on February 10th indicates that every one of the expects continued growth through '85 -- not just through '84

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Their average is now about 5.2 percent growth this year. I know of no economist -- major economist -- who is predicting a recession this year.

Q But you admit that you need to have that money supplied from the Fed in order to sustain this?

SECRETARY REGAN: Oh, certainly. You have to have it. It's like blood in the system.

Q So, was he twisting his arm yesterday?

SECRETARY REGAN: No, sir. Not in any shape or fashion.

Q What was he doing?

Q Mr. Secretary --

Q Mr. Secretary --

SECRETARY REGAN: Having a conversation about the economy and what's going on.

Q Mr. Secretary --

Q Mr. Secretary --

SECRETARY REGAN: Go ahead.

Q -- can you tell us why Mr. Feldstein -- Dr. Feldstein -- is not here today in the normal role of the Economic Advisor reporting on these economic indicators?

SECRETARY REGAN: Well, ever since --

Q Has he been muzzled?

SECRETARY REGAN: -- ever since January of 1981, I have been and continue to be the chief economic spokesman. And occasionally I do appear here in that role, and that's why I'm here today -- as the chief economic spokesman. (Laughter.)

Q Oh. We haven't seen you in this role normally when housing starts --

SECRETARY REGAN: Perhaps you haven't been looking. I've been trying to indicate it, but -- So, I'm here today to give this news.

Q So the Treasury Secretary is the chief economic spokesman, not --

SECRETARY REGAN: Has been since January 22nd, 1981.

Q Should Dr. Feldstein be fired?

Q Mr. Regan --

SECRETARY REGAN: Back there.

Q -- should Dr. Feldstein be fired? (Laughter.)

SECRETARY REGAN: I'll come back to you, Sam.

Q Will you take this follow-up? (Laughter.)

SECRETARY REGAN: I'll come back to that.

Q I wasn't sure of your answer -- you are concerned about the current money supply or are not?

SECRETARY REGAN: Pardon?

Q Would you clarify that? Are you concerned about the current money supply?

SECRETARY REGAN: I said in answer to a question up here regarding that that we let the Fed select their own targets, we let them be the determinant of what is enough money supply for continued growth in a non-inflationary way in this economic system.

Q -- notwithstanding what the Fed does, are you concerned, you know, right now?

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SECRETARY REGAN: Am I concerned right now about what?

Q The current growth of the money supply.

SECRETARY REGAN: No, I just answered again a question here, that 10 percent growth over the last two months was plenty of money to sustain this kind of non-inflationary growth and over the year last year 9.3 percent. That was enough to have a 6.1 percent growth and a 3 percent inflation. So we were satisfied.

Q At the very least, it's acceptable at the moment?

SECRETARY REGAN: Yes.

Q Will Dr. Feldstein be fired?

SECRETARY REGAN: I wouldn't see why.

Q Well, the why would be that he is a disloyal person in that the administration has set a course, wrongly or rightly, and he is at variance with it publicly.

SECRETARY REGAN: I can tell you this as a person who has been a chief executive officer in a major corporation, any chief executive officer is well served by having differences of opinion around him from his advisers. If he doesn't, he has a bunch of "yes" men and that doesn't serve him well. And in this administration we do have sharp differences of opinion on economic policy among the President's advisers.

The President himself is the chief economic spokesman for his own administration and he determines economic policy, takes the advice from among his advisers that he wishes to accept. In private industry, we are accustomed then to falling in line and pursuing that policy.

Q Well, that's it. At Merrill Lynch, if I were your customer in those days, would you have tolerated one of your executives saying publicly that Merrill Lynch was unsound and warning that perhaps down the line the money market fund might fall apart?

SECRETARY REGAN: I wouldn't want to characterize it that way, because I never had any public disagreements when I was head of Merrill Lynch. (Laughter.)

Back over here.

Q Mr. Secretary, you said in the fourth quarter of last year, when growth slowed down to 4-1/2 percent, that you were happy, because this eliminated fears of overheating. Now we have figures in a much faster growth. Is there any concern of overheating and possibly, again, running into Fed trouble?

SECRETARY REGAN: I don't think we'll get into the overheating stage, and I'm not prepared at this moment to change our forecast for the quarter. In spite of the excellent figures for January, we still have two more months to go in the quarter. We have projected a 5 percent real growth for this quarter. If it came in two percentage points over that, I wouldn't consider that to be overheating.

And I think that this is a pure indication that the course that we've plotted is the one that's being followed and we're sticking to it.

Q Can I assume, Mr. Secretary, on the dollar, will the recent movement and continued movement affect inflation in this country?

SECRETARY REGAN: I don't think that the downward movement of the dollar need bring back inflation to this country; it depends upon how it's handled from a monetary point of view. Obviously, if we don't have as much foreign capital coming into this country, we

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could make that up in increased exports, because our exports become more competitive with those of foreigners. There are many manufacturers who have told me that, product-wise, we're in a great position, from a cost of point of view as well as a quality point of view, to compete with other industrialized nations. It's just been the strong dollar that's prevented our really being able to compete.

So if the dollar goes down and we can compete that way, we'll increase our exports.

Q Mr. Secretary, you noted before that you haven't appeared here in a while in this briefing room. Why did you pick today? Does it have anything to do with the fact that this is an election year and will we see more of you as the election gets closer?

SECRETARY REGAN: I'm not running for anything. No, it merely is that it so happens that there's been a conflux of good economic news and to try to put it all together and set a stage for it, I was asked if I would do this.

MR. FITZWATER: Let's have a final question.

Q If he's wrong, he may be running from something, though. (Laughter.)

Q In answer to Sam's question about whether Dr. Feldstein should be fired, it was reported in a news magazine that you had asked the White House to have Feldstein fired, that you had gone to Baker. Is that report incorrect?

SECRETARY REGAN: That report's incorrect.

Q What is the truth of that? Is there --

SECRETARY REGAN: I, from time to time, do make my views known on comments by others in the media regarding economic affairs, and that just happened to be one of those days.

Thank you all very much.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 11:41 A.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON
THE REDEPLOYMENT PLAN

February 16, 1984

4:12 P.M. EST

MR. SPEAKES: This is a briefing on background. I would suggest those of you who cannot abide by the regulations that they be on the background, please excuse yourself. If you cannot do that and wish to break the normal regulations we have here, then you may do so and endure the wrath of your colleagues and we will have to take that in consideration when we're trying to provide information to you on a background basis.

Q Well, I'm going to say that you identified the briefer in public at noon as [redacted]

MR. SPEAKES: We always identify the briefer.

Q You were on the record.

MR. SPEAKES: If you want to play that game, Sam, you may.

Q It's not a game --

MR. SPEAKES: If you want to play it --

Q You're the spokesman on the record out here. Do you want to take it back now and say it wasn't on the record?

MR. SPEAKES: No, no --

Q Do you want to accuse me of violating --

MR. SPEAKES: Wait a minute, let me speak. Do you know that every time we introduce a briefing here on background we identify the briefer?

Q At noon, Larry.

MR. SPEAKES: I understand that. But if you want to play that game, Sam, you can play it.

Q I will.

MR. SPEAKES: If you want to get up and walk out of here --

Q All right.

MR. SPEAKES: -- as a gentleman would do, and one who is a professional and one who would recognize that we do these things on background or, I hasten to say, Jody Powell was right.

Q Larry --

Q Ohhhhh.

Q -- I am going to identify [redacted] as the briefer --

Q [redacted] wouldn't you like to be identified --

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Q -- that you identified this noon.

Q -- for history's sake? For history's sake.

MR. SPEAKES: He prefers to do this on the background and he will do it on background.

Now, if you want to play that game, Sam, you may. But I think we will take that into consideration when we do future briefings and try to keep this press corps informed by bringing the people that are involved in the decision-making processes down here to meet with you.

So --

Q We've indicated our position.

MR. SPEAKES: -- you have made your choice. I think it is very unprofessional. I think it is not at all the right thing to do. But so be it and --

Q Your lecture on professionalism has been noted.

MR. SPEAKES: Okay. Note it. And I hope you will take it to the highest levels within your organization.

Now, the briefer, as we always do, identify the briefer as [redacted] And he will brief here --

Q May I ask a question?

MR. SPEAKES: Yes.

Q Why is he being on background and why can't we use his name? And what's the reasoning that you won't let us use your name?

MR. SPEAKES: We prefer to do it that way.

Q Is there a reason?

[redacted] I can give you a long sermon on that --

Q He doesn't have --

MR. SPEAKES: Go ahead, [redacted]

Q No, no, I mean, is there a reason that we can hear anywhere?

MR. SPEAKES: Do we want to sit here and debate this or do you --

Q Well, I want to ask that question.

MR. SPEAKES: -- want to get down to the policy business?

Q I want to ask that question.

MR. SPEAKES: Well, that's the way we prefer to do it. That's the way we're doing business. If you don't like it, there's the door.

Q Words have meaning.

Q What?

Q How are we identifying you? What is the --

MR. SPEAKES: Senior administration official.

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Q We can't even say "White House"?

MR. SPEAKES: What?

Q White House?

MR. SPEAKES: If you would like to say "Senior White House," you may. If ABC takes exception, they may go their own course.

Q No, I believe he is a Senior White House Official. I don't take exception to that at all.

Q Let the briefing begin.

Q Thank you.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: To the extent that I may have contributed to the contretemps, I'm sorry. I volunteered to answer questions. I think it's apparent that in the past days and weeks there have been an interest among you in getting some precision on the factors influencing decisions as well as the facts and so I offered to come down today and in days to come more often than I have to try to do that. And I said it, however, in the context of what I am here to do as opposed to what I'm not here to do, and the President looks to the Secretary of State to be the articulator of his foreign policy, and I think he should.

So I don't want to get involved in that. But I do think it's useful to me, and I hope to you, to just answer questions where there is a lack of precision. And I'll try to do that more often. But I think it's healthy --

Q May I ask one question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- to do that on background so --

Q May I --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- that there's no misunderstanding as to where responsibility for the public articulation of foreign policy lies.

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Q Is there a decision? What is the decision you want to -- you'll be happy to answer questions on?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm answering questions that I thought that you and others had posed, Sam, about --

Q Well, maybe. But Larry Speakes said at noon that you would be down here to announce the President's decision on the so-called Weinberger Plan for the withdrawal of U.S. Marines to the ships from Beirut. Now, if you're not, fine. But that's why, I think, most of us think you're here.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm here for what I've said I was here for, and I think perhaps after you listen to what I have to say, if there is any ambiguity, I'll be glad to talk to you further about it.

Q If there's a decision, what is it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As I say, I came here to answer questions. Has anybody got one?

Helen?

Q Yes. Has the President signed off on a plan for redeployment of the troops from Beirut to the 6th Fleet, and what is the plan?

Q Thank you.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President's announcement last week asked that the Secretary of State and Defense consult with the government of Lebanon pursuant to the President's decision to redeploy the U.S. MNF contingent to sea and to offer other measures of support to the government of Lebanon.

He asked that they consult with that government and with our partners in the MNF. A round of those consultations has been completed, and based upon those, the Secretary of Defense has submitted to the President his proposal for how that redeployment should be conducted to assure a stable transition into this new phase.

He has recommended to the President that that redeployment commence and occur over time under circumstances and under procedures that will give us the best prospect of stability. The plan has been received by me, and I intend to submit it tomorrow morning to the President. It is not contentious, and as a consequence, I anticipate the President will reach a decision to approve it tomorrow.

For purposes of your own understanding of that, you can be confident that the redeployment will commence tomorrow.

Q Tomorrow?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct. Well, that -- approval will be granted tomorrow. And I would anticipate that movement will take place in the next two or three days -- the first movement -- and will carry on in a stable, orderly fashion in the coming days and weeks.

Q Over a month?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President's estimate at the time and based on the Secretary's recommendation was that it could be accomplished within 30 days. That remains the Secretary's expectation.

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Q Who do we anticipate will take up the positions left behind by the Marines at the airport? And what is your understanding of the current capabilities of the LAF?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The new garrison or responsibility -- the responsible unit there is something that will be determined in the days ahead. All of us are aware that the political situation there is in some flux. The possibilities include Internal Security Forces of Lebanon -- the ISF -- conceivably the LAF. The determination of that will be influenced by the political progress that is made in creating a stable situation in Lebanon and the attitudes of those in a position of influence -- Amal, Druze and others nearby -- based upon their self-interest in the continued operation of the airport.

Q Were we going to -- Don't you have to determine who are we moving into the airport before we leave or will we leave and just let them fight it out if that's what it comes down to?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, of course, we intend to try with the government there and with our MNF partners to leave a stable situation there.

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The success in that is governed by the progress that is made in talks that all of you are reporting now under way both in Beirut and in Damascus, too. Lesley?

Q What about the U.S. fleet? What is the situation with the fleet? Is it possible that they could be moved off the coast? Is that an open question now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think I understand. When you say is it possible that "they," "they" the Marines?

Q The ships in the U.S. fleet that are off the coast, could they be ordered to sail away from the coast now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have no reason to do that nor would I anticipate that to be the case. The ground forces, the Marines, will go aboard ship, but they will remain in their current disposition offshore. Chris?

Q What is the standing of this so-called eight-point plan. We've been told that the administration has some problems with it. Can you be at all specific as to what the problems are and how seriously do we take it as a possible solution to the Lebanese situation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The reports of the plan reflect its consideration by the government of Lebanon, and other reports have indicated that were the government to approve, that it would be tendered in Damascus. The United States has not been asked to take a position on it, nor have we. The future of it and its prospects are a function of Saudi diplomacy and its discourse with the government of Lebanon and, ultimately, Syria.

But the U.S. position on various aspects in isolation are well known. The President yesterday made clear his continued support of the May 17 agreement. He pointed out that United States, while not a party to it and, consequently, not in a position to say yay or nay, helped in its negotiation in good faith and believes that it does provide, because it provides for the withdrawal of Israel, that it is a useful instrument.

The Secretary of State made the very relevant point that for those who seek to dismiss it or set it aside, the responsibility inures to find a way to accomplish the withdrawal of Israeli forces.

Q But if I can just follow up, given those concerns and obviously the Israeli vehement statements that they would be very upset and would stay in Lebanon permanently, were the agreement to be abrogated, do we really think it has any serious hopes for resolving the situation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't want to comment further on it, Chris. I've said that the U.S. position on the agreement is well known and hasn't changed. And --

Q Well, but it has changed, hasn't it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- the future of the --

Q Didn't you tell Gemayel --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- this concept will have to play out in Saudi diplomacy.

Q But hasn't it changed? Didn't you tell Gemayel when he was here that we would not look with favor on an abrogation? And the President told reporters, I think yesterday, that if he abrogated it, we wouldn't change our policy.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think, if you check the transcript, the President said that we would continue our efforts to make peace.

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Q We haven't been given the transcript. It's in the paper. The quotes are in the paper. Go on, that what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That the United States would continue its efforts to make peace wherever -- for as long as there's promise of that.

Q Yes, but the question was would we change our policy toward Gemayel if he abrogated the agreement, and the President said no?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President, then and before and since, has said that we continue to support the government's efforts to reach accommodation with the opposition and that we will continue to seek to contribute to a peace process in any way that we can.

Q In isolation --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Excuse me. Go ahead and then Andrea.

Q In isolation, we have problems with the abrogation of May 17th. But how about looking at this Eight-Point Plan as a package? Emphasized to us earlier by an official that it was accepted by Gemayel as a package. And do we have a position on it as a package?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not going to comment any further on it. Our position on the agreement and our presumption as to the future course of this concept is as I have said it and we can't prejudge how it will come out either in Damascus or, subsequent to Damascus, back in Beirut. So it's just premature to prejudge that.

Q Are we in any way attempting to influence what happens in regard to this package, even if we can't take a public position?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is not our package. To the extent that it is important that people know where we stand on elements in it, we have made clear where we stand. And the President said it publicly.

Q Could --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Excuse me. I said Andrea.

Q Jumblatt has said that it's too little, too late and that this is a demonstration of the failure of American policy in Lebanon.

Well, first of all, do you have any expectation that the Syrians will be able to influence Jumblatt to go along with it and that there is any hope for the package?

And, secondly, could you comment on the failure of American policy?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Statements of that kind seem to me -- well, out of place for someone in a position of leadership if they aspire to some solution. Mr. Jumblatt has said on other occasions that he hopes for a peaceful settlement.

Well, to then cast dispersions on someone's concept of how you can get there isn't very helpful.

On your second point, whether or not Mr. Jumblatt is swayed by Syrian efforts is conjectoral. Historically, at times he has been and at others he has not.

I think that the latter part of your question, while natural, is, I would say, tactical. And what all of us, I think, need to do is to look at what is happening here in the framework of two years of effort. There have surely been setbacks, bad ones. But I think we have to recognize there have been substantial gains.

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Q What are the gains?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are certain --

Well, I think the gains, first of all, were that two years ago we faced a situation that was extremely unstable in which we had a high number, over 10,000, PLO in a position and actively carrying out violence against Israel. Today, that violence has been very, very substantially reduced. The security climate on Israel's northern border has fundamentally changed and that's no small accomplishment.

Q They don't think so.

Q That's not our accomplishment. That's Israel's accomplishment.

Q They invaded.

Q That's not an accomplishment of American policy, is it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The condition after the movement of Israel into the country still included these same 10,000 plus PLO in the country. And it wasn't until the MNF went in there that the United States was able to broker the departure of, first, about 5,000 out of Beirut and, more recently, an equivalent number out of Tripoli to the north. That the government was able to do that was reliant importantly on that MNF presence.

And I think, too, that you can't ignore that as fractious as the Lebanese population is and as fractious as their political parties are, that what is occurring is an effort

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to establish a government reflective of the demography of the country. Now, that hasn't even been tried for 40 years. The fact that it is being tried now is a reflection of a willingness of a government to take some risks that it surely would not have been able to take or willing to take if it hadn't had Western backing.

Q I want to follow up your --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And the MNF provided that.

Q -- initial answer to me about Jumblatt. You were suggesting that Jumblatt was somehow sabotaging an attempt at a peaceful solution. Are you suggesting that the package is somehow a possible peaceful solution that this government could accept even though you have problems with discreet portions of it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Andrea, I didn't say that, that he was sabotaging anything. I said that at a time when he, the Amal, the government -- all have a stake in peace and an interest in peace -- that when someone has an idea, to dismiss is not terribly helpful. That isn't to say to assess a judgment by us on the plan; anybody's plan, it seems to me, ought to be given a serious hearing, whether it's the government's or the Amal or his. If he has one, it would be useful to hear it.

Q May I follow on --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Steve. Then, I'll go to Larry.

Q Is it now the approach of the administration to sort of take a less direct role in the region or in negotiations that previously we have, as you say, been the active broker, both with the Secretary of State and with two highly visible special envoys in the region shuttling around? Is it now our view basically that we've -- that the U.S. has done just about all it can as a broker for the time being and that we are sort of deliberately sitting back and seeing whether other parties can do something without the taint, if you will, of American participation? Is that not what we're seeing here?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm glad you bring up the point because that is the core issue here, I think, Steve. And I assert and I invite your criticism that the striking outcome here -- perhaps two -- is that there is even more deeply felt today an awareness of the imperative of solving the Palestinian problem. And there is, together with that, the recognition that only the United States can advance all the parties toward that solution.

The singular documentation, I would say, to that assertion is that we have had in the past two days here two heads of state who have come and reaffirmed their commitment to the United States and their invitation to the United States to remain engaged as the critical link without which there can be no peace process. So, it is terribly worthwhile and important to note that this, far from being ruled out, is being underscored by those who have the greatest stake in it.

Q By whom is it deeply felt?

Q But -- wait. Wait a second. Isn't it clear though --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: By the visitors and by us.

Q -- with the Secretary of State leaving town and other actions that, you know, the administration is sort of waiting for people to re-recognize that what you say is the truth?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't see --

Q I mean, what --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- why you say that, Steve. It's hardly waiting when we have two heads of state come to town to talk about next steps in the peace process. It is hardly reticent on their part when they volunteer to do that.

Q But it isn't a Secretary of State who's shuttling through the Middle East now. It's a Saudi prince, and the American Secretary of State's going on a Caribbean vacation.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think really, though, Chris, if one wanted to find historical antecedents, I doubt that Henry Kissinger refused to take a day off in the eight months of Saudi -- or of Middle

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East diplomacy in the 1974 period.

Q You don't see any significance to the fact that it's the Saudis that are carrying out the diplomacy now and not us?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Listen, the --

Q No one is asking this question in an accusatory way, just trying to analyze -- you know, these things ebb and flow. It now seems like you're saying that maybe the United States has a more constructive role to play in refocusing everybody's attention back to the West Bank and the Palestinian problem, and that, perhaps, because of events of the last few days, perhaps even including the President's decision to redeploy, we can't play a constructive role right now in Lebanon, itself. Now, that's a perception that -- if you look at this that's, I think, what you kind of conclude. Is that completely wrong or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The United States, as I said, is acknowledged by the states in the area -- and I would include all of them, Syria as well -- as central to the peace process. And I submit and I'm very puzzled by even the assertion that the presence here of two heads of state attesting to that should even leave it in doubt.

The United States intends to remain engaged. The states in the area insist upon it. We intend to do so. And I think we've manifested that in the meetings we've had this week.

Q But he's asking about Lebanon.

Q He's asking about Lebanon.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me take three or four in the back. I'll stay, don't worry about it. Right here in the middle.

Q Can we get back to the Marines just for a second?

Q Yes, please.

Q Can you tell us how many Marines will start to leave tomorrow, and at the end of 30 days, how many do you anticipate will still be there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'll give you some precision on the last part because it doesn't impinge on military plans. At no time would anybody in a peace-time exercise acknowledge how many are in X place or Y place. It just is not good security policy to identify when X number are going to move and so forth.

The President's decision tomorrow will set in motion, surely within two or three days, movement. And the phasing of that is a function of what is orderly in the military sense and coordination with the MNF allies and the turnover of those responsibilities to a successor regime around the airport.

The remaining mission ashore is both, as the President said, to provide training assistance to the Lebanese and also to assure the protection of Americans, the official presence, still there at the Embassy and the Residence. That will be at the same level basically as it has always been. This has been a watch of some 60 Marines who are on duty in the location of the Embassy and there are three reliefs of them there. And that presence will stay.

Q How many army trainers?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That varies over time, and has always. There have been something on the order of 100 to 150 that have been there historically. That number can go up and down. It would not be a dramatic change in that number in the future.

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Q Would you reject the idea that the Weinberger plan calls for about 500 army trainers?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the composition of the -- call it, the American presence in-country includes trainers, the security people at the Embassy, the -- call it, managerial people involved in the security assistance program, and so forth, and I believe the Secretary's estimate is about right on that.

Q 500?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In fact, that is --

Q 500 total?

Q 500 -- but those are trainers or total U.S. personnel?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Those are total U.S. personnel.

Q That will be left after the redeployment?

Q Military personnel?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct.

Q Including the Marines? As security?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct.

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Q Wait a minute, does the 30 days start tomorrow, the next day, or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. Doug?

Q Tomorrow or the next day.

Q How can you remove large numbers of Marines from their positions at the airport until you've worked out who's going to take their positions?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, you do have to do that and we are doing that. You can move --

Q But does that mean we won't get a large number out until you've worked out who's going to move into their positions behind them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, at the beginning I pointed out that there is a considerable flux in the political situation there. Now optimally it would be good for the government to come to terms with the Amal, the Druze, and everybody else, and for all of them to say okay, we should put ISF into the airport. Now that is, call it, best case. The worst case may be that while they all agree on the purpose, they cannot agree on who does it, and thus the situation at the airport, which is not, after all, strategic to a faction's influence or future power, could become a matter of armed truce.

I think realistically, however, that each of the factions there, whatever may be their attitude toward political accommodation, sees value in avoiding violence over something that is inconsequential to their future. And so for that reason I think a presumption, which I take in your question, that there's going to be a lot of violence around there is not consistent with the self-interest of Amal, or Druze, or anybody else.

All of that rhetoric to the point that I think there can be a stable outcome regardless of who takes over, whether it is the internal security force, the Lebanese army, or a stalemate-accepted truce between Amal and Druze, and those that are present. In the back?

Q Let me go back over the figures with you. Did you say 200 Marines per watch would be left?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sixty per watch times three, and there's some command and these bullets band-aids people, so it probably gets up to the order for security of about 200. But in addition to that, you have the trainers, and you have the managerial people, and that number would fluctuate. It would not exceed what the Secretary of Defense said of about 500 people. Jerry?

Q The MAU has a large amount of equipment, supplies, stores, ammunition, food, et cetera. Are they going to take all of that ashore -- I mean back to the 6th Fleet ships?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q And I have a follow-up --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Go ahead. They will take everything they own.

Q Even the food?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q And, secondly, they're being described as surrounded. The fact that they're surrounded on all four sides, but yet pass freely through, is that by arrangement, agreement, or are they passing with a flag of truce, or just how is that happening?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is by informal arrangement and, again, I take you back to the kind of logic of the situation. That is natural, I guess, to worry about people that are armed being around you; that's a sensible impulse. But when you ask what is the interest of those people, there is no interest served for the Druze, for the Amal, and so forth, in stirring up a fight with the Marines. Indeed, the Druze have said their objective is that the United States leave. Well, the reality on the ground is that there is no hostility there and it's our expectation we can preserve that.

Q You seem to be saying that -- could I follow that up?

Q Do you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There, and then there, and then Larry. I'll get you.

Q If the situation in Lebanon deteriorates very quickly, is it possible all the Marines will be pulled out much faster than in 30 days?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is best done in an orderly fashion within the time frame I've given you. The local commander is prepared for all contingencies. He can telescope it and we're confident that he's prepared to conduct this in a fashion that both assures the safety of the people and tries as best we can to leave a stable situation there with our MNF partners and so forth.

Q The plan the President will approve tomorrow, does it include a contingency for that? To telescope it a lot and very quickly if the situation warrants?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the Secretary's proposal included the assurance to the President that the plans have been made for assuring a safe redeployment under any circumstances.

Q I was just wondering if you report any progress on the formation of a U.N. peacekeeping force and whether, in the long run, you think that is or is not very realistic to expect?

Q Ask one more question about the Marines? And then go back?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, let's do this one and then Larry's and then you.

I've seen the same reports you have and the French have made suggestions of greater use of U.N. people. We have urged for a long time -- when I was out there, I urged, in September, a U.N. presence. And we think that would be very useful, particularly with regard to the -- ensuring the safety of the Palestinian refugee camps.

On that point, I guess as a footnote, it -- there are right now over a thousand PLO there and they have a very high interest in assuring the safety of those camps. But I don't want to finesse the point. Yes, we are interested in a U.N. force under terms which assure its effective functioning there and we'll consider such proposals as are made.

Larry.

Q Back at the time of the Suq-el-Gharb action last fall and immediately thereafter, there was a certain taking of pride around here at the way the LAF had developed with U.S. help and training. And then there was some months after that where, presumably, there was more help and training. Why do you think it deteriorated -- the LAF deteriorated so quickly, is the first question. And the second question is, does it have any fighting capability left as far as we know?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The difficulties in overcoming sectarian factional differences that have existed there for the past ten years are very complicated and the positions taken at every faction are ones bitterly held, profoundly held.

Now, steps in overcoming those are necessarily tentative. The government has proposed a framework it believes fair. It has asserted that the formation of an army which is integrated by all and reflective of this reconciliation with Moslem-Christian balance and everybody acknowledged that.

The willingness or the impulse for any single faction -- Druze, or Amal, or someone else -- to influence the army and service by soldiers in it is a reflection of their confidence in the political process. It doesn't have anything to do about an army -- about the army, per se, and how it functions now. So it's a political expression of the factions' leadership to urge their Moslem soldiers to leave. That is -- I don't ignore your point -- that the result is the same if the army cannot function because of it. But I think it's not the same thing to say that the army wasn't any good. The army was subverted, if you will, by the political leadership of the several factions.

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Their skills seemed good. The political overlay in which they functioned was the problem.

Yes?

Q I have two questions. The first is: When the Marines are redeployed to their ships, do they then cease to be part of the multinational force?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q What?

Q -- question --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question was: "When the Marines are deployed afloat, do they continue to be in the multinational force?" And the answer is yes.

Q Can I ask --

Q Wait -- the way you formulated the question, the answer is yes, the way she formulated the question, the answer is no --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry --

Q -- just for the record -- they are consistent?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry, I -- do you want to say that again?

Q I just said, When the Marines are redeployed to ships, do they cease to be members of the multinational force?

Q Good job -- thank you.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. It was stated, "When they get aboard ship, do they cease to be a member of the MNF?" and I said, "No," because they don't cease, they continue.

Q How long will they be members of the multinational force?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The multinational force has provided, I assert, and continues to provide, a constructive influence. Our contributions, both training-wise and presence-wise, are in that -- in the context of trying to be helpful.

The situation, again, is one of flux, and depending upon a political evolution in the country, the government of Lebanon will seek, I am confident, to establish their own control at some point. And the United States will deal with them in trying to make that transition, when, and if, it occurs, as smooth as we can.

Q Can I follow up --

Q Do you have -- the question of --

Q -- follow up --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Follow up here, and then I'll go to you.

Q My second question was, earlier you seemed to be indicating when you said -- Why would these people, even though they're armed, want to harm the Marines -- you seem to be indicating that you did not feel they were in any danger. Is that the case?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it would be feckless to say that somebody in Lebanon is not in danger. (Laughter.) There is always the risk that somebody's going to harm you. As a conscious, deliberate, premeditated act of violence against the Marines, my assertion is that each faction has important incentives not to do that, or reasons not to do that. I didn't say that there isn't a risk. There is a risk.

Yes?

Q Could you explain to us what these trainers are going to be training, considering that the army is in a state of dissolution? And could you tell us -- is there anything you can add to the statement that part of the new U.S. presence there will be a counter-terrorist force?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the whole motive for the U.S. review of our posture there was that there were -- that threats had emerged with which the Marines were not best suited to deal. And the question, is there a way that the United States can better help Lebanon deal with those threats? And, one of them clearly, is terrorism.

If, between ourselves and the MNF partners, the British, the French, the Italians, we could provide both the internal security forces -- which we're not allowed to train -- and the Lebanese army, which we can, a better ability to deal with that would be useful.

So, yes, part of the temporary training that we're willing to provide is counter-terrorist training. And the timing of that is again a function of when stability -- when the political situation shakes out in Beirut.

Q May I --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. You had a follow up from before.

Q Can you -- from February 7th on for several days, the decision was that we were going to withdraw 500 Marines within a month and then the timetable was open beyond that. Why did we speed it up to withdraw practically all of them within 30 days? Can you speak to that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The original planning was based upon an existing situation in Beirut at the time we completed it. And all of us could see that the importance of the MNF -- the importance that the government of Lebanon placed on it in its current role -- was one which probably would take a matter of time, and there was never any great precision on it, but that it had to take place over a period of months to establish the confidence there that the new presence, the reoriented role of trying to train them on -- to deal with the real threat, terrorism -- could take place, and that this natural evolution in our force disposition ought to be done with some deliberation so as to maintain constancy throughout.

Q But -- the question is -- why are you withdrawing them faster than --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's what I'm getting to. (Laughter.)

Now, the events of last weekend in which the Amal and Druze forces took charge and control of West Beirut, created a very different situation in which the Marines, themselves, as perceived by the government of Lebanon, could be a vulnerability not only to them,

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but of course to the Marines themselves and to us, and where they and we agreed that it would be less difficult for them to deal with one less point of -- well, I'm getting too wordy -- (Laughter.) -- where they and we agreed that the -- we could get on with the business of training them toward the mission that was most urgent if the Marines went ahead and moved offshore right away, because neither -- they could not foresee, nor guarantee, what the situation would be around the airport, around South Beirut or West Beirut, so they said the best course is for you to demonstrate your constancy to us by beginning to reorient your presence, get it aboard ship, and that's one less problem we'll have to deal with.

Q How nice of them --

Q They were safer -- (Laughter.)

MR. SIMS: Two more questions here.

Q I thought you said --

Q I think that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Charlie?

Q You have said they're not vulnerable and you have said they are vulnerable. I don't know which you mean.

Q Both. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the --

Q You said they left, they're leaving, because they're vulnerable, but you said there's no need to rush because they're safe.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it is a change of heart, really -- and it is a little ambiguous, Charlie -- (Laughter.) -- the fact is that it's very -- whenever you're in the government of Lebanon, or if you were in the government of Lebanon today, you would want as few issues each day in your in-box as you -- (Laughter.)

Now, if there is constantly the matter of the Marines there having to do business informally with two of the factions which are opposing your government -- that's not something which you want to contend with. You'd rather not have a foreign presence that is doing business with factions that are opposing you. You'd also, flatly, not like to have somebody which -- whatever may be the real threat -- there is a perceived threat by many that there's risk there. And that creates political vulnerabilities and it creates, possibly, military vulnerabilities.

And so, they and we agreed that -- look, there will be one less issue on your plate if we can get those people aboard ship and we can do a better job of supporting you if you do. Now, I think --

Q But --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- that is -- that's a conclusion any sensible person would reach when the conditions changed as they did.

Q Are the French and the Italians leaving also?

Q You said -- you said you're now working --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Here and then here.

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Q You said you're now working on who would come in behind the Marines at the airport. To reemphasize or try to get some clarification of a question you answered earlier, is it conceivable that lack of success in that effort would hold up the withdrawal -- would prolong it to longer than 30 days?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't expect that. And you say, "is it conceivable?" -- I think there is --

Q If you don't resolve that, would you prolong the withdrawal?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am very confident that we will be able to complete this redeployment in the projected time frame and I don't believe that the ex-post environment there will be a hindrance to that.

MR. SIMS: Can we get Ben and then Helen. And then we're going to have to end. He has to leave, so we've got two. Ben, then Helen.

Q If the Marines are now passing through the Druze lines under an informal arrangement -- if they are in fact safe and no longer vulnerable, doesn't that invalidate our justification for continuing the shelling?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, first of all the premise is wrong. United States shells whenever somebody shells us. Now that happens from time to time and there has really been a lot of misinformation here. When you go back to last week, and I really urge you to do that, on Monday and Tuesday, the -- and that's after the authorities were all there for us to fire -- the United States was extremely restrained there. It wasn't until Wednesday when we got rounds inside the Ambassador's residence or compound that the United States reacted with some considerable firmness. Now we had passed back both to the Syrians before that. And at the time that the United States intended to react, our restraint reflected our hopes and our efforts to create some climate of calm in which the diplomacy could play out. Well, it wasn't. At least it wasn't being acknowledged by the other side. So we shot back. But it hasn't been a situation where we have been willy-nilly just shooting for the sake of it at all. It has been shooting back when Americans have been shot at.

Q Now on the fleet --

MR. SIMS: Helen --

Q May I ask --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Helen and the Lesley. And who'd you say --

MR. SIMS: Helen and -- take Lesley.

Q What happens to Italy and France and their -- Italy and France, their troops, in the MNF? Are they all being pulled out?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I should not and I cannot speak for them. I'd have to refer you to those governments. In our consultations, they --

Q It is one force, isn't it? Surely --

Q He was about to answer.

Q Oh, I'm sorry.

Q In your consultations, what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The consultations have reflected a common theme of each of them believing that the MNF ought to be preserved and -- but I wouldn't comment on their intentions in terms of numbers or anything else. The Italians have a field hospital there which has been well received and which they feel is very useful. The French have had other roles and missions to play and they have expressed renewed commitment to play a positive role in Lebanon. But I cannot and I shouldn't get into what their immediate -- what any change they might make.

Q On the fleet, are you wanting to leave the impression that it is non-negotiable that that fleet could be moved away, if that were a condition for bringing in a UN force?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, I would. And the reason I would has nothing to do with Lebanon. Bear in mind, the fleet's been there for 38 years. And it is there not because of Lebanon; it's there -- has been -- as part of the European Command's naval component.

MORE

Q Right there off the coast where it is now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Often it is. My point is, though, that the freedom of navigation in the Mediterranean cannot be an issue here. That will be --

Q That's not what she's asking.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, if you're asking about the three-mile limit, United States operates in or out of that as a practical matter. We haven't often operated inside that but we operate in and out of that as a function of the mission there and their presence is keyed to the mission. For as long as there's a mission, we will operate where we need to operate.

Q Could you clarify that? I mean, I am a little confused about what you mean by the mission. If the government of Lebanon says we agree to this Eight-Point Plan -- we want a U.N. force and that means we'd like you to move further off the coast. Is that a possibility or not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I wouldn't give any serious consideration -- I saw, for example, a report that someone had suggested that those units had to move beyond the range of tactical aviation. Out of the question.

Q Is there any concern --

MR. SIMS: He has been here for almost an hour, you've had three or four questions, he has another appointment. If you want to have these sessions, we're going to have to have them begin and end.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 5:01 P.M. EST

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
PROPOSED LEGISLATION ON REPORT OF THE NATIONAL BIPARTISAN COMMISSION ON CENTRAL AMERICA

Washington, D. C.
Friday, February 17, 1984, 2:10 P.M.

MR. CARLSON: Good afternoon. This is our BACKGROUND briefing on the Central America Democracy, Peace and Development Initiative. We have handed out down in the Press Office -- I hope everyone has gotten it -- the text of the President's transmittal letter, the bill which he transmitted, draft bill, I guess you would call it, and that includes section-by-section explanation towards the back of it, as well as some background information that was prepared.

The briefing is on BACKGROUND. You can attribute it to senior Department officials.

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I know that there have been previous briefings on the report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America. There was a briefing at the White House on February 3rd about the general thrust of the proposed implementation of the Commission's report. I will not repeat all of that, but what I would like to do is emphasize just a couple of key points - first of all, that the Commission developed a consensus that there was a need for immediate action as well as long-term effort to address problems in Central America, that this was a matter of both strategic and moral interest to the United States, that the problems involved economic issues, policy, political issues, the distribution of wealth within the region, security. It based its report on three principles of: economic development, the development of democracy and human rights, and cooperation in maintaining security.

The President has adopted the recommendations of the Commission as a package. The legislation that he is sending to the Congress today incorporates all of the recommendations of the Commission on which legislative action is required. There are some elements of the Commission's report that do not require legislation. These will be pursued by appropriate executive and administrative action.

The bill -- I could walk through with you briefly -- is divided into three main parts. There is a statement of policy which reiterates the issues of social and human progress, economic growth, political reform, and security identified by the Commission and gives policy direction to the Executive in a general way. This is followed by a title on Economic Assistance and Human Development in which there is authorization for assistance programs in fiscal years 1984 and '85 under the headings that appear in the Foreign Assistance Act, as well as --

-- and this is a novel feature -- an authorization of appropriations for Fiscal Years 1986 through 1989 into a separate account from which then the allocations would be made after we were in a position to evaluate what the most desirable allocations would be, on the basis of the first year's experience.

The title on Economic Assistance includes some new substantive authorities. One is the Trade Credit Insurance Program, which does not exist under the existing Foreign Assistance legislative framework. This would allow trade credits of up to a year's duration administered through the normal processes of the Export-Import Bank, to be guaranteed by AID in order to stimulate the credit needed to promote trade in the region.

There is a provision on Land Reform which would allow foreign assistance funds to be used for the purpose of compensation of nationals of the country whose land is taken in a Land Reform program, if the President determines that this will further the national interest.

There is a Central American Development Organization provided for in this title. This legislation provides a sense of the Congress that the President should enter into negotiations looking toward the establishment of a new multilateral organization to be called the Central American Development Organization. It lays out some principles to be followed in the pursuit of negotiating objectives, and I think key among them are that this be an organization that would involve the governments and the private sectors, both the business community and the labor community of the recipient countries. In the process of political, economic, and social development planning, the Organization would have an ability to approve or withhold its approval from a portion of the funds that would be allocated to each country for bilateral economic assistance each year, and the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government would be expected to come into agreement with the Organization on that 25 percent. These are set forth as principles. The President and the Congress would retain the ultimate control over whether U.S. funds are spent.

I think I skipped over a provision on legal reform, which would allow a limited amount of money -- up to $20 million in each fiscal year -- to be used within the countries of Central America and the Caribbean for purposes of promoting better administration of justice without regard to existing constraints on assistance which involves law enforcement forces.

Then, the third title of the bill is Military Assistance, and the bill contains authorizations for the Fiscal Year '84 and '85 only. It does not, as in the Economic Assistance title, seek to authorize funds beyond Fiscal Years 1985, the difference being that we have planning, we have a comprehensive program in a five-year basis for the economic side. We do not have that kind of a program for the military assistance, so it is a Fiscal Year '84 and '85 request only.

Finally, the military title includes a provision on reporting which directs a report to Congress every six months on the situation in El Salvador which will set out what El Salvador is doing to achieve political development, economic development and security, the President's assessment of what El Salvador is doing including the specific goals of human rights, free elections, freedom of association, dialogue and negotiations to achieve peace, the rule of law and an effective judicial system, the curtailment of extremists' violence, and so forth.

The President is also directed by this section of the bill to ensure that assistance provided under the title, military assistance, is provided in a manner which fosters progress toward these objectives that are to be addressed in the report, and that the President in every appropriate instance shall impose conditions on that military assistance in order to achieve those objectives.

Then, there are some miscellaneous provisions at the end. The one of significance, I think, is the definition of Central American countries. This identifies 9 countries. When we say

"Central America," then somebody says, "Does that include Panama? Does that include Belize?"

We identify Central America as including those countries as well as the -- What are we? 7 countries. I'm sorry. In the 7 countries, Panama and Belize are included as well as Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. There is no money in the bill for Nicaragua, but Nicaragua is a Central American country potentially eligible for assistance under this legislation.

Let me stop at that point with just a brief run-through, and open the floor to questions which my colleague and I will try to answer.

Q What is the rationale for giving military aid to Guatemala when the Human Rights Report says that conditions are still bad there?

A Conditions in Guatemala are troubling. There is a human rights problem there, and there is no question about it. There is also, in Guatemala, a large country that is an active participant in the Contadora effort, a country that has scheduled elections for this year looking toward a constituent assembly. There have been some indications of efforts by the government to address the excesses by personnel who should be responsive to government control. We think it is important to have some potential benefits for Guatemala as a key country in Central America. You can't have all carrots and no sticks.

There is, we think, an important interest to be served in having some assistance to Guatemala as part of the package.

Q On Guatemala, if I may follow up, there is no money for Guatemala in '84, though , right, is there? Is that correct?

A I don't think there is any '84 program.

Q Is there anything new?

A $20 million supplemental for Guatemala, for development assistance.

Q But no military aid, right?

A No.

Q All right.

Q What do you do about the 1977 ban? Do you repeal it or what do you do about it?

A The enactment of this legislation, if it authorizes money for Guatemala, it's a law and the money is authorized, and the previous limitation would be overcome by this.

It's a policy judgment for Congress to make. Either they decide that there should be some limited assistance for Guatemala -- in which case they authorize it -- or else they do not.

Q The Kissinger Commission had recommended the same conditions for Guatemala that it recommended for El Salvador. Those aren't in here, are they?

A I don't think the Kissinger Commission recommended any legislation on Guatemala; I think they recommended a similar policy toward assistance to Guatemala in the human rights area. We don't have a quarrel with that.

Q With no conditions? They didn't recommend conditions? I thought they did.

A I don't think they recommended legislation.

Q On conditions with respect to El Salvador, you've been talking with Congress now for some weeks about the conditioning requirement and how it would be included in legislation.

A Uh-huh.

Q Are you optimistic that what is set forth here is going to be acceptable? And isn't it just the same as what was offered after the certification veto, essentially?

A No. There are two differences. One is that this is legislation, whereas at present there is none; and secondly, there is policy direction given. What there is not, and what has been a problem with various formulas we've seen in previous years either in the law or proposed, is that we don't try to set out a legislative formula or a self-destruct form of words in the bill that will then come along and apply in some future circumstances a year or two later, and we don't try to impose a standard that it must always get better forever.

We think that it is difficult to craft any kind of a piece of legislation that really can be an effective instrument day-to-day in trying to carry out these programs. We agree with the basic principle; we agree that we should seek to achieve improvements in human rights, in political reform, in economic reform. We don't think that you can legislate that, cast it in concrete in any precise way that will then prove workable over the long term.

The legislation contains what we think is a reasonable and appropriate way to deal with this issue.

Q But do you believe that this formulation is going to be accepted by those Congressmen who are critical to getting this package passed? There just doesn't appear to be anything that the Administration is giving with respect to this. It still gives complete discretion to the President and his judgment as to the human rights situations and others, so --

A It gives him general guidance, and leaves him with the discretion as to how to apply that on a day-to-day basis in the conduct of an effective foreign policy, for which he has some accountability to Congress over time.

If members of Congress have other ideas, you know, then we'll hear what they have to say; but this is what we think is a reasonable way to deal with the issue.

Q But based on your conversations with Congress, they've been going on for a week --

A I'm not going to say what Congress will enact, or what one member or another might think of this. This is our position, and this is what the President is sending forward, and we'll see what happens in the legislative process.

Q You have made a point earlier on of having adopted and tried to put in legislative language the recommendations of the Kissinger Commission.

A Yes.

Q They had very specific language on this point that we are now discussing. Why didn't you use their language on the question of --

A On the question of --

Q On the question of conditionality.

A What they said was that the assistance should be contingent through legislation requiring reports, and that's what the bill does.

Q It says it should be conditioned. I don't see any language saying it should be conditioned.

Q It's according to how you parse the language.

A But they parsed it --

Q I don't want to be a grammarian here.

A I know. But the point is, they parsed it. It was more than grammar that was involved, and we both know that. The point was, they worked very hard on very specific language in all parts of their report including that; and you have picked up their language in their proposals in other parts. What is the Administration's reason for not using their language in --

A I don't think we have done an injustice to the Commission with this language.

Q You would maintain, in other words, that you have used their language?

A I would maintain that this is consistent with the recommendation of the Commission.

Q I would like to ask you a followup question on the conditionality clause. Assume that Congress, the House and the Senate, again approve certification language as before -- all or nothing.

A In lieu of what we propose?

Q What would the President do? What would be the recommendation?

A Well, I don't want to predict here, you know, that the President will never accept anything than what is in this bill, and I don't want to predict what he will accept. I think that we have a situation here where the Commission has identified a serious national issue, an issue that needs national attention

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on a bipartisan basis. In trying to implement the recommendations they have made after six months of study, the President can't do it without legislation from the Congress. The Congress can't address it without the President. There has to be some restraint, I think, on the part of Congress in what it puts in this legislation. And I think there has to be some willingness on the part of the Administration to listen to what Congress has to say. We have a serious problem. We're going to have to try to cooperate to solve it -- and I don't mean to pick on "conditionality" as the subject of that observation. I mean, generally, across the board, in dealing with this legislative initiative.

Q Are there any five-year projections or estimates about military assistance?

A No.

Q None have been made at all?

A Well, there are always -- Within the Department of Defense, I'm sure that somewhere there is a chart that estimates for lots of countries, lots of things going into lots of years. There is no Administration position beyond Fiscal Year 1985.

Q There is no Administration ball park figure, then, beyond '85 that you're working with?

A No.

Q What are you planning to do to bridge the gap between the military aid that runs out shortly in El Salvador and the time that Congress appropriates more for you?

A We simply don't know enough about that yet. We have identified a potential problem, that the assistance could run out. The continuing resolution, as you know, provides substantially less funds than had been made available in the last couple of years, and a percentage of that is not available for obligation until there is a verdict in the case of the four American churchwomen. So we are working with roughly half of what we had last year to work with. This in a period where, as they prepare for elections, we can anticipate the likelihood of guerrilla offensives, as we saw in 1982, and as now even the public statements of Ungo the other day are hinting, "Well, gee, there is one group we can't control and they may do some bad things." He made a statement to that effect the other day.

We have to look at that situation and we have to make an assessment as to whether they are going to get through or not, or whether they are going to face a real problem in trying to maintain security for these elections, which are crucial. And if something needs to be done, then we are going to have to consult with Congress, and nothing has been decided on that.

We are looking at what the options are, and I read in the newspaper about what some of them are, but there is no decision to go forward and do anything in particular.

Q Just to get some of the flavor as to how closely this legislation parallels the Kissinger Commission report, could you say, are there any recommendations in here which were not made by the Commission? And, conversely, did you reject any of their recommendations out of hand for whatever reason?

A No, we didn't reject any of their recommendations out of hand. I think that there are probably going to be differences of emphasis or differences of degree. It attempts to provide the legislative part of a comprehensive plan accepting all of the Commission's recommendations, and nothing comes to mind. On the other hand, I am sure that if we parsed the legislation, parsed the report, we would find something that was said a little differently, but I really don't have an example in mind.

Q There is nothing totally new in here that was not mentioned by the Commission.

A I don't think so. There is an example, I think, that is mentioned, which is that this provision for authority to use foreign assistance for compensation in a land reform program was addressed by the Commission in terms of emphasizing the importance of land tenure and equitable distribution of wealth, but there was no specific recommendation that the legislation should be amended. But if you accept the conclusions they reach, this is a logical extension of what to do legislatively to implement what they were saying.

Q How about the police question, aid to police forces?

A They addressed also the system, the administration of justice in Central America. And what we are dealing with here is, first of all, we have had some apprehensions about the things we are already doing -- and we have been doing some things for most of this year -- looking at the way the courts operate; their simple management resources; skills of judges and prosecutors; selection of judges; all of these things, and you get into something like training prosecutors, and you get a question, "Gee, is that assistance to law enforcement?"

So partly the legislation is to avoid that problem, but beyond that, as we began to look at what makes this system work and not work, a big part of it is what goes into that system. So that if you have a properly trained and properly selected judge and you have a skillful prosecutor, and you have an investigator who gives them a coerced confession and no physical evidence, and the case is thrown out, the system hasn't worked. So we have asked for relief from the prohibition on assistance to law enforcement, so that we can do training for investigators and for law enforcement. We would like to do that in the context of regional programs of cooperation, not as a U.S.

initiative, but we think that is an important part of making the justice system work, and it is something that these countries want and need.

Q Where is that?

A It is in Title II. What is it, 207, thereabouts?

Q 208.

A 208, page 10.

Q But on that, specifically, on the question of police, I guess that doesn't -- you are not saying then that the Reagan Administration plans to initiate a police training program in any of these countries, is that correct?

A We do not contemplate a renewal of anything of the nature of some previous programs that have existed in the past and that were legislated against, indeed, by the prohibition now on the books.

What we are saying is that we would like to have the authority to participate in programs that train not only judges and prosecutors and public defenders and court clerks, but also corrections personnel and investigators, and that that is an important part of a comprehensive approach to helping the countries in Central America make their legal systems function more effectively.

We are asking for a limited authority so that it could not exceed $20 million in any fiscal year, and we are asking for a limited geography -- Central America and the Caribbean. And we are asking Congress to let us try this and see if they like the result.

Q In terms of this language, quite apart from what programs you intend, would this language have the effect of lifting the old ban if it were passed?

A There is a purpose test here in that you have to be working to strengthen the administration of justice in Central American countries and the countries of the Caribbean.

I am sure there will be legislative history that will make that more elaborate, and I am not sure beyond that what --

Q But as of now, in this proposal affecting this region, would this language have the effect of overriding or lifting the earlier ban?

A It would provide an exception to that ban for the purpose of programs to strengthen the administration of justice, yes.

Q Is there any money in the program for the 10,000 scholarships that the Commission proposed?

A Yes.

Q Do you know where that would be in the Bill?

A I don't know if I brought my chart with me that tells me that.

Q 205.

b-6 A In section 205, somebody is saying. I think that is only a part of it, though. I think some of it is in the economic assistance money, as well, isn't it?

Sections 202 and 205, yes. It is really in both. It comes out to $10 million in fiscal year '84; $49 million in fiscal year '85, and $230-odd million in fiscal years '86 to '89.

Q Would Radio Marti get any of this money?

A No.

Q On page 8 in the briefing book, there is a paragraph on the regional military training center, which is described as temporary and austere, and the FY '84 supplemental program calls for $25 million and FY '85 $20 million, which doesn't sound either temporary or austere.

A Well, have you seen it?

Q Some of us have, yes.

A It is --

Q The original amount was to start up with $7 million, and now a lot more money is being put into the pipeline. Are we heading towards a permanent RMTC there?

A Not as far as we are concerned. It is a Honduran facility and there are obvious disadvantages to mud and tents, and preferences for a little concrete, especially in the rainy season. I don't think that makes it cease to be austere.

b-7 The future plans that the Government of Honduras may have for continuing the use of that facility for something, I can't address, but we don't have any contemplated permanent U.S. role in that facility.

Q But there is no time-frame in here, though.

A No.

Q And there is no doubt about what that $25 million and $20 million will buy.

A Cinder blocks last longer than a year, yes.

Q But there is no doubt that that would make it a permanent facility, whether it is a Honduran facility or one that --

A Well, nothing is permanent. If you build something with blocks and mortar, it is not going to fall down after a year, nor is it necessarily going to be there forever. But it is certainly more comfortable and in many ways more efficient to have some construction of facilities than it is to have the most severe kind of austerity in what you are expecting people to live in.

Q Two questions on the military aid section. The b-8 first is, why are there fairly dramatic increases in military aid to Panama and Costa Rica? The second is, on El Salvador it says on page 12 in the briefing book that assuming that the guerrilla threat will gradually decline over the next several years, then El Salvador can do thus and so.

We have heard this before each year, the military requests have been larger, and it is argued that this will turn things around, and that El Salvador can then proceed more prosperously.

What makes you think that even this vast infusion of aid is going to reduce the insurgency, and what kind of aid is contemplated in that?

A The requests have gone up, particularly last year when we did seek a significant supplemental appropriation, but the amounts in fact made available have not dramatically gone up, and indeed this year it has gone down.

So we are a year behind in meeting some of the resource requirements that we think should have been met a year or more ago, and that is a large part of the reason why you have a substantial increase proposed for El Salvador for this year and next.

I think that a more effective Salvadoran armed force would be an effective instrument in diminishing rather than b-9 increasing the insurgency and the level of hostilities in the country. Our judgment is that the insurgency has not gained in popular support over the last several years. At the same time, the prolonged stalemate is a wearying process, and the likelihood that the armed opposition will come into any kind of a democratic process, I think has diminished, because they have some hope of victory through that prolonged stalemate.

We think that if the Salvadoran army was in a position to do more and do it better, that the likelihood is that we would see more of the opposition willing to participate within a democratic structure as an alternative to revolution.

Incidentally, a better performing army would better protect the economy and the political and social institutions that are often targets of the guerrillas, and, in that way, enable the reforms to move forward that would remove some of the differences that divide that society.

The assistance that is proposed -- and we will be having to develop this in greater detail in the days and weeks ahead -- focuses primarily in three areas, and that is training, where we have been saying for some time now that we think a substantially increased training program is necessary; communications; coordination among the units within El Salvador is in a far from desirable state; and transport, so that you can enhance mobility and coordination among the units in the country.

b-10 The military problem, as the Commission has said, is really all wrapped together with all the other problems, and we think that there has to be progress on the military front in order for there to be progress in the economic, social and political areas, just as progress in the economic, political and social areas contribute to a lessening of the military problems.

Q On the training, would that then include the construction of these basic training camps within El Salvador?

A There is one that I understand is proposed within El Salvador -- you say "camps?"

Q Yes.

One at La Union and at Zacatecoluca, and another one in the western part of the country proposed.

A I was aware of one, and you are ahead of me on the idea of three. There was the idea, as you know, you now have a lot of independence among the original district commanders in recruitment and training, and the idea of nationalizing that process and making it a more homogeneous rather than fourteen different armies is one of the objectives in the training program.

As to specific where will facilities be located and how much will they cost, I'm sorry, I should know more than I do on that, but I am really not prepared for that.

Q Did this Bill go up today?

A Yes

Q Could you address that Costa Rica and Panama?

A Let me answer somebody else's questions.

Q I wanted to know what kind of assurances may be contained in this legislation for Congressional worries that the aid would not reach its supposed ultimate recipient in the wake of some of the reports recently on Central Bank mismanagement of funds and the nonaccountability for AID funds?

A Let me just say a couple of things about this Central Bank report. I think it is important that that was a study that was done at the request of the Central Bank, and under contract with AID, I believe, and it was an effort then of the Salvadoran Government and the U.S. Government to identify problems and deficiencies in the management and operations of the Bank, so that those problems could be addressed and solutions found.

The capital flight problem is significantly diminished, partly because much of the capital that would have flown has flown, but partly because the bank has done some things that have been effective in imposing better controls, and the fact that there are also deficiencies and problems, I don't think is reason to believe that there should be no aid or that there should be no effort made to solve them. It is a b-12 how you look at it.

I think that the fact that this is something that the Bank asked for, and that the U.S. Government helped to set up, should be some reassurance to people who are concerned about the integrity and the efficiency of the process.

Q Is there anything specific in the legislation that deals with the accountability for the aid?

A There are lots of other laws.

SECOND STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: There really isn't a major problem in either the foreign exchange in the Central Bank or in the normal project aid which we are doing in all the countries.

We reviewed very carefully the system that the Central Bank has in place, and we think it is relatively effective at keeping capital flight from taking place.

Our resources amount to perhaps seven to ten percent of the overall foreign exchange reserves of El Salvador, so it is much more important that we have a system that works for all the foreign exchange and that we look at AID specific dollars with a magnifying glass to be sure they are absolutely pure.

We think the system is sound. We think it can be even better, but we are satisfied that our foreign exchange is going b-13 into their reserves, and those reserves are being used to finance essential imports. There is no major problem on that accountability.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 2:50 p.m.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Release at
1:30 P.M. EST, Tuesday,
February 21, 1984

February 21, 1984

BRIEFING BY
FRANK CARLUCCI
ON THE REPORT OF
THE COMMISSION ON
SECURITY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

The Briefing Room

11:00 A.M. EST

MR. SIMS: This briefing will be on the record, but it is embargoed until 1:30 p.m. today, when the President meets with the Commission on Security and Economic Assistance. And we have the Chairman, the Honorable Frank Carlucci.

MR. CARLUCCI: Thank you, Bob.

Q -- fact sheet --

MR. SIMS: We will have a fact sheet at the conclusion of the briefing available in the Press Office.

Q How helpful.

Q Yes --

MR. CARLUCCI: Well, I was going to say I assumed that you'd all read the report. (Laughter.)

Q No.

MR. CARLUCCI: That seems to be an unwarranted assumption.

Let me just make a brief comment about the report because the achievement of the report lies, in my judgment at least, not in the spectacular but in the fact that it lays out some clarity of purpose and in that it brought together a very diverse group in support of several fundamental concepts. One is the importance of our mutual assistance programs. And we chose not to call them "foreign aid programs," but "mutual assistance" deliberately. These programs are really the most tangible tool a President and Secretary of State have to implement U.S. foreign policy.

Secondly, the group concluded that current funding levels are inadequate to meet our overall objectives.

Third, the group came down hard on the complementarity of the different programs, the mutually supporting nature of programs ranging from the multilateral banks to PL 480 to security assistance and economic assistance. In particular, it concluded that economic and security assistance were opposite sides of the same coin and the continue to debate, which was more important, was a sterile argument.

Third, it emphasized the need for an integrated approach, consistent with its view on the mutually reinforcing nature of the program. The Commission suggested that instead of deciding what the program levels ought to be topped

The Commission strongly emphasized the need for a unified bipartisan approach to our mutual assistance programs if public support is to be increased. This is perhaps the most significant recommendation. It is really a call for leadership on this fundamental issue.

There are a number of other recommendations in the report that are laid out quite clearly. And I'll leave those for you to read and take questions at this point.

Q Historically, sir, when you call for bipartisanship, hasn't it been Republicans who have spoken the loudest against foreign aid? And I'm talking over the long haul, the last 30-40 -- since World War II.

MR. CARLUCCI: Well, you tend to get different viewpoints. Generally, one assumes that Republican support, military aid and not economic. And Democrats support economic aid and not security assistance. What the Commission said is, "Look, that's just not a valid argument. These programs ought to be pulled together and made more mutually reinforcing, which is inherent in their structure, in any event."

All I can say in answer to your question is that we had a number of Republicans on the Commission, people like Henry Hyde and Bob Castin, attended virtually every meeting, worked extremely hard and I think are supportive of the conclusions that the Commission reached.

Q Mr. Carlucci --

Q -- lot of demogoguery on this and -- (laughter) -- I guess on the House floor and sometimes on the Senate. Were the Republicans on this Commission cognizant of that and said they would try and dampen this?

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MR. CARLUCCI: The Republicans on the Commission indicated that they, the Republicans and the Democrats, the members of Congress on the Commission, all indicated that they would work to support the recommendations of the Commission. There was absolutely no demagoguery whatsoever during the deliberations of the Commission.

Q Mr. Carlucci, you mentioned that funding levels are inadequate. Could you be more specific as to what type of funding we need and whether or not there's a constituency or support on the Hill for more funding?

MR. CARLUCCI: The Commission did not view its mandate as entitling it to get into the funding levels for the respective components of our mutual assistance programs. The only judgment we made was that, given the multiple goals of these programs which we've laid out in the Commission report, the overall resources that are being put into the programs are inadequate and that any new initiatives, such as the new initiative for Africa south of the Sahara and the Caribbean, requiring new resources would have to be additional if we're going to achieve the objectives that the country has set forth.

Q Do you see any support -- any support for additional --

MR. CARLUCCI: Any -- Yes. Hopefully, the Commission report, which as I said brought together a diverse political group, will enhance the prospects for support on the Hill.

Q Did you conclude that the aggregate that's being committed right now is inadequate or is it the way that it's being spent?

MR. CARLUCCI: The aggregate.

Q What is being spent?

Q Isn't that an unrealistic recommendation, though, in the light of the concern over the deficit spending?

MR. CARLUCCI: Of course, it is incumbent upon the President to set priorities, and we can't second-guess his overall priorities. We were giving a given area to examine. The first step that we took was to lay out our goals, and then during the course of our deliberations, we measured our programs against those goals. And we had a responsibility as a commission to conclude that the funding levels were inadequate. Of course, it's up to the President --

Q Mr. Carlucci, how much is being spent right now on foreign aid?

MR. CARLUCCI: It's all listed in the Commission's report. It's about 16 --

Q Yes, but we don't have it.

Q We don't have it.

MR. CARLUCCI: -- $16 billion. The '84 --

Q Well, can you give us --

MR. CARLUCCI: -- figure -- let me see if I can find it.

Q That's FY'84?

MR. CARLUCCI: Let me get you the exact figure in here. The '84 request is $15.2 billion.

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Q Well, what -- Can you -- When you say that that's inadequate, can you give us a frame of reference as to what kind of increase you're talking about? I mean -- doubling it or 50 percent more? Give us a --

MR. CARLUCCI: No, the Commission didn't attempt to make that kind of a judgment. Essentially it was a quasi-subjective judgment, that, given the mutiple goals, given the need for security -- achieving our security goals, our economic goals, our humanitarian goals and our political goals, the levels that we have allocated to security assistance are clearly inadequate. And as the report points out, when adjusted for inflation, the level of real assistance has declined by 18 percent from an annual average of $16.5 billion during the '68-'72 period to $13.6 billion in 1983. And I think those figures speak for themselves.

Q Mr. Carlucci --

MR. CARLUCCI: Yes.

Q -- did the Commission make about how the administration, whether it was successful or not in the use of foreign aid as a policy tool?

MR. CARLUCCI: The Commission concluded that foreign assistance -- mutual assistance is a fundamental policy tool of the executive branch, that by and large the programs had been successful. We did not attempt to go into a program-by-program evaluation; indeed, we recommended that a broader evaluation mechanism be established. In recommending a reorganization which would put the focal point of the budgets of the different programs in an FBI-type organization in the Department of State, the Commission had in mind bringing these programs not only closer together to each other, but closer to our foreign policy process.

MORE

Q Mr. Carlucci. there have been a lot of reports lately that a lot of foreign aid is being mishandled, it's being abused, it's not getting to the right places. Was that factored in in any way in your report? Does it alter, do you think, support for your Commission report or play any part?

MR. CARLUCCI: Well, the Commission, obviously, is concerned -- was concerned about any charges of this nature. However, it was really beyond our scope to investigate individual instances. I can tell you from my personal experience that every effort is made in these programs to see that they are administered consistent with the law and consistent with the highest standard of ethics, and effectively and efficiently. And we have all kinds of audits and reports that are required to demonstrate this.

Q Mr. Carlucci, you said that you didn't make a program by program assessment and you have no recommendations for what would be adequate funding, so on what basis did you decide that funding was inadequate?

MR. CARLUCCI: Well, on the semi-subjective judgment of the members, all of whom had considerable experience in this area, coupled with an examination of the individual programs. We held seven Commission meetings. We had two -- maybe -- I think, three public hearings where people came and testified. We took extensive testimony. And after listening to that testimony and examining the programs, and then looking at the very lofty goals that we set for these programs, the considered judgment of some 41 people was that the funding level was not adequate.

Q Are there some programs that are more inadequately funded than others?

MR. CARLUCCI: Oh, different programs have different advocates. Some people felt that PL 480 was too low. Others felt that economic assistance was too low. Still others felt security systems was too low. We didn't attempt to reach those kinds of judgments.

Q What is the foreign policy result of the inadequacy?

MR. CARLUCCI: The foreign policy result of the inadequacy is that we fall short of achieving our political, economic, security, and humanitarian goals. That we're unable to provide resources sufficient to conduct, for example, base rights negotiations. That we're unable to provide resources sufficient to meet the security needs of, say, a country like Tunisia. There are a whole range of needs around the world, whether you're talking about Thailand, Tunisia, Morocco, which cannot be met as a result of the inadequacy of resources.

Yes, sir, way in the back.

Q Would you tell us what does not get accomplished as a result of inadequate funding levels? Let's say, for example, in Thailand or in the example that you gave -- Africa. What are the objectives? What does not get accomplished?

MR. CARLUCCI: Well, you have in many countries a very difficult time negotiating for the kinds of bases that we need.

Q Where is that?

MR. CARLUCCI: Well, we had -- we had a very difficult time, for example, getting adequate resources for the Azors and Portugal. The same thing applied to the Spanish base negotiations. It's a question of robbing Peter to pay Paul. There's always some re-programming that goes on whenever you reach a base agreement.

MORE

In the economic area, the needs are enormous. One of the areas that the Commission recommended for additional resources is Africa south of the Sahara and the Caribbean. The administration has announced a new initiative. In this case, it will be a zero sum gain unless you ask for more money because clearly we do not have the resources to meet these needs.

Q What's not getting accomplished, or where are we having difficulty accomplishing something in Thailand?

MR. CARLUCCI: In Thailand? I think you've got a security problem that is not being sufficiently addressed. Fortunately, there has not been an invasion of Thailand, but that continues to be a threat. You've got enormous economic need if the country is to continue on the Democratic path. I think there's a lot that you could describe in a country like Thailand that is not being achieved.

Q Could you describe it --

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 11:15 A.M. EST

ON THE RECORD

FINAL

BRIEFING

BY

AMBASSADOR LEONARD MARKS

ON

WORLD ADMINISTRATIVE RADIO CONFERENCE FOR HIGH FREQUENCY BROADCASTING

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1984,
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

11:00 A.M.

MS. DOUGAN: Thank you. I see mostly familiar faces.

As perhaps you're aware, the World Administrative Radio High Frequency Conference ended over a week ago, but it took quite a while to get our very hard-working delegation back here in the United States. There are a few of them who still have road maps for the whites of their eyes.

This Conference is one that has perhaps not received a great deal of public attention, in part because, I think, we did better than damage control for a change in our negotiations, and it is something that is going to have more long-term significance rather than short-term results. As Ambassador Marks will explain to you, this was the first of a two-part conference which was to determine planning principles for technical parameters for the use of the high frequency radio spectrum.

Any of you who have been tracking the theory for years know that over the last four years, there have been a number of conferences that have attempted to tackle this issue and to plan for the high frequency spectrum.

There was a presumption going on in that this was going to be a very difficult conference. that we were going to have a lot of political ramifications to it, and that we would do well to be able to come home with something besides our tail between our legs. We are very pleased that we did much better than that, and we had a number of concrete and specific positive results; and I think in a large measure we'd like to particularly attribute thanks to our very hard-working delegation and very extensive bilateral negotiations ahead of time -- perhaps the most extensive advance preparatory and bilateral efforts we have had prior to a major WARC Conference.

We were particularly fortunate to have as Head of Delegation a person who has had a long term experience, not only in the communications industry, but as he pointed out one time, he went to his first conference related to high frequency in 1948; he was also one of the fathers of INTELSAT, and perhaps, to many of you best known as Director of USIA under the Johnson Administration.

He is certainly not only a veteran in the communications policy arena, but also a statesman; and I think this was very well demonstrated in both the outcome and the conduct of the High Frequency Conference.

I would like now, with considerable pleasure, to introduce to you Ambassador Leonard Marks who chaired our delegation.

AMBASSADOR MARKS: Thank you, and let me try to give you the background of the Conference, and set the stage for what actually happened. In 1979, a World Administrative Radio Conference was held under the aegis of the ITU, and at that time the Third World countries, the developing nations, felt that there ought to be a separate conference to determine how high frequencies would be divided. High frequencies are used for short-wave broadcasting like the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, BBC, Radio Moscow, and a host of other countries that use these frequencies for international and for domestic use. I underscore that many of the countries use the same channels to tell their own people what is going on. So with increasing congestion, it became very important for them that there be some measure of relief, and that the interference that resulted from too many requests for the same amount of frequencies be aleviated in a way that would give them an opportunity to improve their services.

So the Conference was set for 1984. As Ambassador Dougan pointed out, the Conference that we have just concluded in five weeks was a planning conference. How can we plan the better use of these frequencies for international high frequency, and in some cases, for domestic use.

When the Conference was established, an agenda was set forth, and it was determined that at the end of the five weeks a report would be delivered to a second session which would take place in October 1986. And during the interim, between the end of the first and the second, a period of testing would be undertaken to see whether the principles and the decisions that were made in the first meeting could be applied to improve the situation.

As Ambassador Dougan indicated, the Conference had high political overtones -- North/South, East/West, the New World information order, all of the rhetoric that had gone on in previous conferences.

Please remember that in 1982 the ITU held a plenipotentiary conference in Nairobi, at which time several weeks were devoted to the question of credentials, the seating of the Israeli Delegation, and a vote was taken -- and this was on purely political grounds. None of those political incidents occurred at this Conference in Geneva. There were no political attacks on any country; there was no question of credentials. The issues were technical on how can we improve the present congestion that exists in the short-wave spectrum. I'm pleased to say that the Conference resolved many of the questions by referring to a computerized system which would use the planning principles enunciated at the Conference to provide more channels with greater coverage and less interference.

A 100-page report was delivered. It was accepted by the Conference without a dissenting vote, by consensus. There were differences of opinion, but they were resolved; and now, the planning process will be undertaken for the next two years by the ITU under the aegis of the IFRB.

What did we accomplish? We started with the concern that the small countries, the small users, would want a rigid, a priori system, that they would be given channels that would be useful to them 12 months of the year, regardless of seasonal variations, regardless of any of the climatic conditions that affect these broadcasts. That would limit the utility of the band. It would severely restrict the number of channels that could be allocated around the world.

Thanks to the preparatory work that we, and I'm sure other Western countries, did during the preceding six months, the small countries, the so-called Third World countries, came to the Conference, and within a matter of days recognized that rigid, a priori planning will not work, and that concept was abandoned.

We were concerned that there would be a limitation on the power which is necessary in order to transmit a signal to the coverage area. Reason prevailed, and no such limitation was ordered.

We were concerned about what would happen when a signal is jammed. Harmful interference results when, through deliberate or accidental operation, two stations operate on the same frequency, or adjacent channels, and interfere with each other.

The United States, as you know, suffers from interference, as do many other countries. During the course of the Conference, the Dutch introduced a resolution in which they pointed out that they monitored 85 different transmissions, from stations located in the Far East, Middle East, Africa, and the Americas. They found that of these 85 programs, 32 were affected by jamming. Of the 32, 16 were affected by a jamming station on the same channel, and the other 16 on an adjacent channel. As a result, programs from all parts of the world were affected. So this is not just a phenomenom between the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the United States.

For the first time in the history of the ITU, the phenomenon of harmful interference was recognized, in two ways: First, the report that was adopted provides that in the event of harmful interference, the administration concerned shall have the right to request the prompt assistance of the International Frequency Registration Bureau in finding another frequency to help restore that service to the level of reliability achieved in the plan.

In addition, a resolution, as I said, introduced by The Netherlands was approved, and it provides, first, that administrations shall avoid harmful interference; second, that the IFRB shall monitor programs all over the globe to determine the extent of harmful interference, and to inform the second session of the Conference of the results; and third, it invites countries to take part in the monitoring programs in accordance with this resolution.

Hopefully, that resolution and the provision in the planning methods will have a therapeutic effect, and will improve the situation that exists. Some countries that are causing harmful interference by negliger [illegible] be put on notice and correct that. Countries that are doing it deliberately we hope will be embarrassed, and as a result of the publicity, cease these jamming activities.

Where do we go from here? In the next two years, there will be an inter-sessional group consisting of countries located in all parts of the world, sending their representatives to Geneva to devise the software program that will be undertaken by the IFRB through its computers; and in 1986, the results of those tests will become available. In '86 we will have revealed whether or not we can have an improved, more efficient plan for the use of these frequencies.

I'm pleased to report that not only was there no political discord, but that the Third World recognized -- the have-not countries, the small countries recognized -- that they must rely upon the more sophisticated technical facilities available, and that under the aegis of the ITU, we will conduct such a program with results that I'm hopeful will lead to a better and more orderly use of the spectrum.

I'll take your question.

Q Mr. Ambassador, would you care to speculate why the Russians were willing to go along with the jamming, that is they didn't oppose the anti-jamming resolution?

A I can only speculate. You'd have to ask them for the real reasons, but let me give you the speculation. First of all, as a result of preparations we made in visiting countries all over the world, particularly the smaller countries, and educating them to the phenomenon that existed not only between the Soviet Union and the United States, and the Soviet Union and Western Europe, but everywhere -- everybody is affected by jamming, I believe that they realized that this was a phenomenon that had to be dealt with.

Secondly, I am convinced that the Russians recognized, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe recognized, that the ITU is a technical body. It's not the United Nations General Assembly; it is not a forum where political issues should be debated.

There are political overtones, but if you convert the ITU into a political forum with the same kind of rhetoric that exists in New York at the United Nations General Assembly, you will destroy the efficiency of this organization.

The world needs an ITU in order that we may provide communications on a logical, technical basis. If political issues intervene, we may have the same consequences that have occurred in UNESCO, and that would, indeed, be deplorable. So it is my feeling that maybe these considerations led to the very orderly meeting that we had, and to the very constructive results of that report.

Q It has been discussed that the United States discussion of pulling out of UNESCO, threat, if you will, had some bearing on the de-politicization of the ITU. Would you comment on that?

A I do believe that had its effect, yes. I think that the United States has noticed that UNESCO having become an agency dealing with highly political issues beyond the competence -- and also there were other reasons for it -- may have had some effect on the activities of countries, and that it was a very useful one.

Q As a follow-up, can you attribute any of the depoliticization to the influx of the computer? It seems like everything the ITU does any more is done by computer, and people have to shut up and pay attention if they're going to catch

A   I believe there is a psychological effect to that, yes. We're all in awe of the computer, except when it sends you bills for which you are really not indebted. But there is a feeling that we are in a technological age where we should utilize the tools that we now have available to us; and certainly, the next two years will demonstrate whether the computer age will bring benefits to this field.

Q   Are any LDCs suspicious of the technology?

A   If they are, they didn't voice their concerns at this meeting. There were groups of countries that raised serious engineering and allocation questions. Primarily, they were Algeria, India, and Iran. But their questions were dealing with technical considerations in favor of small users, a degradation in the quality of the signal consistent with the economic means that these countries have.

The issues were not, "You have it, and we want it," nor were they the typical rhetoric of the North/South confrontation which has occurred in other agencies.

Q   Mr. Marks, would you say that given the fact that the Third World countries have accepted the technical premise of the developed countries, at least so far, that the pressure is really on to deliver, in two years, a plan that will satisfy them? Don't you think that you're vulnerable now to charges of double-dealing if you don't come up with something they would really be satisfied with?

A Now wait a minute. This report was agreed to by technical experts from all countries, large and small, North, South, East, West. Everybody recognized that we now have to test the efficiency of the method proposed, and whether or not the computer can bring about the improvement, so there is no one country that imposed its views on another. There was no United States view, or no British view, or no Soviet view. This was a combined effort by everybody.

If it fails, then it is the responsibility of the Conference, and all countries, and all engineers, and not one group.

Q I'd like to present a question along the other line. I heard a tape of a BBC broadcast in which you participated -- a summary of the Conference results -- and my impression was that Mr. Mancell of the BBC was a little more skeptical about the results, and that in fact, one of the results of the Conference may be that the large broadcasters may have to give something up, and that you certainly won't have as many frequencies for your short-wave broadcasting as before.

Whether they would prove to be efficient with the use of the computer, and so forth, is a question that still remains. Is that a correct assumption?

A I didn't hear Mr. Mancell. I can only speak for my comments. So I can tell you that as far as I'm concerned, the planning method that has been recommended here should bring about an improvement for everybody -- a more efficient use of the spectrum and better utilization of the new bands that will be added.

I neglected to mention that in the 1979 conference, it was agreed that in 1989, new frequencies would be added in the high-frequency spectrum for the use of short-wave programs. And in 1994, an additional segment would also be added. That should result in about one-third additional capacity. That will be factored into this computer program.

And as long as we're talking about the future, one of the big issues that we faced before the Conference opened was single-side band, which will provide for an additional one-third increase in the capacity.

The introduction of the single side-band transmitters or the single side-band receivers will, of course, necessitate expenditures by every country for new transmitters. It will require expenditures by the public to buy new receivers. The smaller countries felt that they should not be rushed into this because their economic resources did not permit it. We agreed to go along, and in 1986, a definite date for the transition will take place, but not before 20 years. But that will be a very large improvement in the facility. So I cannot help but feel

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that the addition of the 89 frequencies, the addition of the 94 frequencies, the introduction of the single side band, will ultimately give a large measure of relief, if not a complete satisfaction of all demands.

Q A State Department document, just a summary of what happened, says, "The Conference agreed to test a planning method developed largely by the LDCs."

Could you elaborate on that -- what it is that they brought to the planning process, what concessions, if any, were made?

A Well, everybody entered into the spirit in determining, "How can we use this resource to greater advantage?" I'm not going to give you any technical parameters, but for example, the signal to noise ratio, should it be one number or a lesser number? There were compromises reached; a limitation on the use of single transmitters versus multiple transmitters; what happens when you have an overloaded band.

All of these matters were considered by committees in which the LDCs played a large part. And I said that India, Iran, and Algeria were dominant in these discussions.

The plan was evolved by the whole conference, not by any one group.

Q What I'm wondering is if there are any planning principles, if you will, that can apply to the Space WARC or some of the upcoming conferences?

A I'm not going to comment on the Space WARC. That's a whole new subject, a different part of the spectrum; and some of the arguments that we had at this meeting will, of course, be made at the Space WARC, but I'm not in a position to judge whether or not they apply.

Anybody else?

If not, thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 11:25 a.m.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER SIR ROBERT MULDOON

February 23, 1984

The Briefing Room

11:13 A.M. EST

MR. SIMS: As the crowd slowly gathers -- this briefing is a background briefing attributable to a senior administration official.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Prime Minister Muldoon, accompanied by his wife, is making an official working visit to Washington from February 22nd to 25th.

President Reagan will meet with him and host a working luncheon for the Prime Minister at the White House tomorrow. In addition, the Prime Minister will be meeting with Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense Weinberger who's hosting a lunch for him today, Secretary of Treasury Regan who he just met with, and Special Trade Representative Brock.

He will also meet with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee --

Q Quiet, quiet.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- Senate Banking Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Vice President and Mrs. Bush will host a dinner for the Muldoons tomorrow evening. Following their stop in Washington, the Muldoons will visit New York, New Orleans, Austin, San Antonio, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Honolulu.

New Zealand and the United States share a long tradition of close cooperation and friendly relations. As partners with Australia and the ANZUS Alliance, we work together to ensure our mutual defense and to foster stability in the Pacific.

In addition, New Zealand and the United States share common goals and points of view on most of the major international issues we face today. We value New Zealand as a close friend upon whom we rely on for support and understanding. The visit of Prime Minister Muldoon is another step in the ongoing process of high level frequent consultations that we conduct with our closest allies.

I might mention too that New Zealand, while a small country and very far away from most other countries in the world, nonetheless, plays a significant role on the world scene and has, I think, a truly global outlook. That's underscored, among other things, by the commitment of New Zealand forces to the Sinai peacekeeping operation. It's underscored by the role New Zealand plays in promoting stability in Southeast Asia, with its contribution of a battalion of troops in Singapore under the Five Power Defense arrangement. And somewhat closer to New Zealand, it's also underscored in the leadership role that New Zealand plays in the South Pacific working with a large number of newly independent countries in that part of the world who need a great deal of help, particularly economic assistance and technical support. And New Zealand's played a leading role in helping those countries and in building relations between those countries and others, including ourselves.

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And the Prime Minister, himself, as a man who's been on the world scene as Prime Minister for nine years, he's also Finance Minister, has, in fact, very broad views, and I'm confident -- in fact, I know already from this morning's discussion with the Secretary of the Treasury, the discussions here will touch not only on bilateral issues -- and there are quite a few trade subjects of importance -- but also there were -- I think going to have very broad discussions about international financial problems, about East-West relations, and about general global developments.

I'd be glad to try to take questions.

Q Are there any outstanding issues between the two countries?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think there are a number of -- let me answer that first -- there are some outstanding issues. The thing that's more striking is --

MR. SIMS: Would you hold it down back in the back, please. Nobody up here can hear.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- and very important to us and something we are anxious to preserve is the common outlook on so many issues. We've had strong support from New Zealand in international fora on a variety of issues, including most recently on Grenada. As I mentioned already, we, I think, take rather common but not identical approaches in the Middle East and found New Zealand supportive.

And -- so there's a great commonality. I start from that point. Okay. There are differences, there are problems. I guess it's not surprising, particularly in the present international economic situation, and most of those are coming up in the trade area.

I guess two that are of particular concern to New Zealand -- one concerns the whole question of dairy surpluses. New Zealand depends for more than 20 percent of its export earnings and a significant fraction of its GNP, therefore, on the sales of dairy products. It's probably one of the most efficient dairy producers in the world. They've been very concerned by EC policies of subsidizing dairy production and then selling it on the world market. And they have been concerned about the possibility that with our large dairy surpluses, we might end up doing the same thing.

We have consulted frequently with them. Most recently, over an issue concerning surplus -- donation surplus dairy products by the United States to Jamaica that is under discussion now. We, of course, are pursuing that because of our strong concern about the Jamaican economy and the stability of the Caribbean. The government of New Zealand is concerned, both in this case and the broader precedent, that aid programs may become commercial programs and is anxious to have safeguards about it.

We've consulted about that. I would -- you'd have to ask them their view. I would hope they've at least -- the assurances we've been able to give them.

Another area in the trade area which will, I guess, be particularly a subject with Secretary Brock is on the subject of New Zealand's export incentives program; something that they had agreed with us earlier as part of their subscribing to the GATT Subsidies Code that they would phase out export incentives by '85. Given other pressures and other trade liberalization actions that the government of New Zealand is taking, it has already told us it's going to find that deadline difficult to meet. We have difficulties in slipping it. So that will be an issue I'm sure we'll be discussing now.

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But I would say generally and go back to it before, it's a good, strong working relationship and we've stood by one another well, I think.

Q Are the trade issues going to be thrashed out in the meeting between the President and the Prime Minister or are those going to be relegated to the sessions with Secretary of Agriculture or Brock or whoever?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Relegated isn't the right word. I think the way -- the pattern is as I think more or less normal is that you start to get into these issues and you find that they get very, very detailed very quickly and require, in fact, hours of expert negotiation. So they will tend in their detail to be handled by their specific departments. Frankly, it leaves a lot of us out very quickly.

But the basic point -- the importance of resolving these issues is something that I think needs impetus from the highest political level and I would assume those kinds of concerns will get aired with the President. They get resolved in a more working level.

Q Can you tell us what was discussed at the meeting this morning?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: With Regan?

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The principal focus was on international financial situation. The Prime Minister has been one of the leaders in calling the world's attention to the, by now I guess, commonly recognized major problem of debt burden that the -- a large number of developing countries are bearing.

He has also expressed some concern that our recovery is not going to be strong enough or long enough to significantly ease those problems. That's one point on which Secretary Regan was very strong in assuring him confidence that we have at least two more years of strong recovery in the United States.

That we agree on the importance of that problem. In fact, that's one reason -- that's the principal reason the President made -- put such a legislative priority on getting new appropriation for the IMF passed in the last session of Congress. The Prime Minister feels there are basic structural problems with the present international financial system. We're not as convinced of that. We're, I guess, even less convinced that at this stage, at any rate, that a conference without some more specific proposals to discuss would strengthen those institutions. But I think the discussion this morning was a very helpful one and part of a continuing dialogue we've been having with them.

MR. SIMS: Any more?

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 11:21 A.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF
PRIME MINISTER MULDOON OF NEW ZEALAND

February 24, 1984

The Briefing Room

1:37 P.M. EST

MR. SIMS: This briefing is ON BACKGROUND attributable to a Senior Administration Official.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't have any prepared remarks. I'll just make a few observations and then take questions.

It's been a very good visit. It's a meeting between friends, both friendly countries and two leaders who consider themselves friends. In that sense, it is an important visit. It means, I guess, that there are fewer controversial issues, fewer contentious issues because we are friendly; but, in fact, also there is an outspokenness. The Prime Minister is not afraid to speak his mind when he disagrees with us as much as he does when he agrees with us, and that kind of exchange is beneficial also.

We discussed among many other topics during the course of meetings with the President and meetings with other Cabinet officers, our important relations as members of ANZUS. We very much appreciate the role New Zealand plays in ANZUS, the welcome that it provides to American ships as part of ANZUS. We appreciate the fact that the New Zealand government understands our policy about ship visits and about the fact that we can neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons on our ships.

We appreciate the role, very constructive role, that New Zealand played in the review of the ANZUS that was conducted at the council meeting last summer.

Slightly further afield, but not very far, as the President noted in his remarks, we very much appreciate the leadership role that New Zealand is playing in the South Pacific, a region of a large number of very small countries, none of them with robust economies, all of them struggling to create new political institutions, and New Zealand has played a very important role and one that we will continue to count on in making that part of the world a safe and stable region.

We talked about many other issues during the course of these meetings, international issues, the situation in the Middle East, East-West relations and the prospects of arms control, the international financial situation which is one, of course, on which the Prime Minister has very extensive views, very well-informed views. He's been observing this both as Finance Minister as well as Prime Minister for many years. And, while we don't agree on all points, we certainly benefit from the kind of discussion we've had.

There are also some difficult bilateral issues, as I mentioned in the pre-briefing. I think we made some progress, at least in appreciating a little bit better the concerns of both countries. The Prime Minister made very, very clear the enormous stake

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that New Zealand has in its dairy exports and enormous damage that can be done to New Zealand's economy by dumping of surplus subsidized butter and other dairy products either by the EC or by the United States.

We discussed in some detail the AID's program in Jamaica about which New Zealand has expressed concerns. There are no current plans, either in concept or in writing, to repeat that kind of AID program anywhere else, and we have made very firm commitments to New Zealand that should any such plans develop we would be consulting with them at the very earliest stages to make sure that New Zealand's interests are properly protected.

The Prime Minister also expressed very forcefully New Zealand's concerns about the commitment to eliminate export incentives and the problems they face in doing that by the March 31st, 1985 deadline. Ambassador Brock made equally clear the concerns that we have and the place this fits in our overall concerns.

The Government of New Zealand, I understand, will soon complete its review of its Export Support Program. The U.S. will review the situation thereupon in early 1985.

That's really all I have to say in the way of remarks.

Q You sounded kind of ominous -- what you said about the dairy there -- there are no current plans to repeat these and should they develop, we'll consult with New Zealand -- well, you know New Zealand's position, so what good does consulting do? Is the U.S. going to repeat this to other countries? And, on Jamaica,

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how much is the U.S. going to give Jamaica and when is it going to start?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Don't make it sound ominous. It's not ominous. I think one of the very useful benefits of both the representations that the New Zealand Ambassador's made here and, even more importantly, the points the Prime Minister has made during his visit here is that our bureaucracy is at all levels, including the most technical levels within AID, aware of the potential damage that can be done through a program like that.

They assure us and assure the New Zealanders that they have no similar programs in mind. And I can say that, if it should develop that in some other country a dairy donation of some kind would seem to be a useful aid program, we would be consulting not simply by way of informing but also to try to ensure that the proper safeguards are instituted so that it is a genuine aid program and doesn't take away a commercial market.

I might underscore, too, that we have with the Jamaica donation itself, and I'm not sure of the exact size of it -- Do you know the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Two thousand tons of cheese; two thousand tons of butter annually. But it's still under negotiation. It hasn't been finalized.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And that's a roughly $5 million program.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not sure of the value, but it's --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As you may have heard, two thousand tons of butter, two thousand tons of cheese. And my recollection, but that's only recollection, is that order of magnitude is $5 million. As part of that program, Jamaica's undertaking a commitment to maintain its usual commercial purchases of dairy products.

And we have committed to the government of New Zealand that we will review at the end of the first year of that program when it goes into operation -- we will review, particularly with an eye to the fulfillment of that so-called usual marketing requirement.

So, I don't think -- it shouldn't be seen as ominous. I think we put a lot of mechanisms in place, both to see that New Zealand's legitimate commercial interests in Jamaica are protected and, more importantly, that, should any further aid programs be developed, that they would be protected at an even earlier stage.

Yes?

Q Is there any possibility that the March 31, '85 deadline for the phasing out of export incentives would be put back?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Presumably, that's one of the things that would be looked at when we review the situation early in 1985. I can't say anymore than that. Might have to ask Brock's office.

Q Sir, back to this butter situation, do we -- I'm really asking you from -- are we sometimes letting New Zealand have butter so that she can maintain her commercial markets when they need bolstering? And, then, we let them have the butter to sell, rather than try to grab the market ourselves?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. Let me explain. I think for the New Zealand press representatives here, this is all

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very familiar territory. I think Americans don't appreciate that what we're dealing with is, I think, the most efficient dairy industry in the world from the farm right through the processing.

Q Are you talking about ours or theirs?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Theirs -- remarkably efficient and terribly important to New Zealand's economy. Ours is pretty good, although, I think, it's somewhat subsidized. The European one, which is enormous, is very, very heavily subsidized. And that's, of course, causing a problem for the entire world market in dairy products and particularly for New Zealand.

We are not selling our dairy surpluses on the world market, and we have given assurances to New Zealand that we understand their concerns in that regard. What -- this specific Jamaica program is not a commercial sale of U.S. dairy products; it's an attempt to use a commodity that we have in surplus to help an important country in the Caribbean that is in bad economic straits and can use some -- in this particular area -- some specific assistance. And it's an aid program. It's not a commercial thing.

Q Well, why don't we sell our surplus butter on the world market? Why do we let somebody like New Zealand have some surplus when they need it and not go after the trade ourselves?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We are talking about products that we have heavily subsidized. We're maintaining prices here in the United States. One of the things that we're trying to do in our general trade policy is to develop some

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common programs among the producing countries, so that those countries that are efficient producers are the ones that sell and we don't end up finding world markets flooded with products that have really been financed out of taxpayer dollars at home.

Q Are you saying then to me that we should let New Zealand be efficient and go ahead and sell and we should -- We're not so efficient, so, therefore, we shouldn't try to meet this market?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Certainly we can sell commercially. There's no problem with that.

Q I thought you said a while ago we were not selling commercially on the world market.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. We will sell commercially. What we're not going to do is take surpluses that we've accumulated at government expense and then dump then, sell them at non-commercial prices in order to take markets away.

Q Well, if you sold some, you'd get rid of the surplus, wouldn't you?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You're getting into agricultural policy that's beyond me. I'm sorry.

Q I don't understand at all what you're saying. We should not try to sell, or we should not get rid of our surpluses, that we should just let New Zealand have some of that surplus when she needs it to bolster her own market --

Q No, no, no, no.

Q Um-um, um-um, um-um.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: New Zealand isn't selling surpluses. New Zealand is selling commerically-produced products --

Q I realize that.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- not subsidized by governments. We're talking about large government stockpiles the United States has accumulated. We not in the process of disposing of those stockpiles, not going to destroy commerical markets. We have a serious problem with the Europeans who are doing the same thing and that is a problem that we're addressing in a broader trade context.

Yes.

Q Can we come to the Prime Minister's initiative on a new Bretton Woods Conference? Is the administration's position unchanged notably that it sees no case for a reform of international financial institutions?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think that's our position. I think we're -- we don't see the case for a new conference. We think that -- I suppose it's certainly the case we see that the international financial institutions are basically sound institutions and ones that we want to treat with the respect that, therefore, they deserve. But we acknowledge, and the Prime Minister's been one of the first in calling attention to it, that there is a major problem with the large debts that a number of Third World countries have accumulated and that the problem of how to manage that debt is a very serious one. And I would not rule out that some changes, some new policies might not be in order in addressing that. But I don't think we have any agreement

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on what these policies would be. And we continue to feel that a large conference is not the way to develop them.

Q You hold to your view, then, that a recovery in the American economy will eventually trickle down to the benefit of the rest of the world?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We don't believe that's the be-all and end-all. We certainly believe that the recovery in the American economy is a critical one, the recovery of other major industrial economies along with it is critical and that that will make many of these problems easier to solve.

But the Prime Minister's point that these debt problems have become so large that they will still be around even if two years from now we turn out of recovery and back into some economic trouble and we've got to have some long-term solutions I think is a point that is recognized and is accepted.

So we think our recovery is critical. We don't think it's -- answers everything.

Q Have you heard anything from the Prime Minister on this visit which has caused you to rethink your position on these kinds of issues?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'd be the wrong -- I mean, I think the most important audience there is Secretary Regan and the people in the Treasury Department and you'd have to ask them. Certainly there was a very lively exchange and I think that kind of thing is --

Q You were at the meeting with the Prime Minister there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Was Secretary Regan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Which other people were at the meeting besides Secretary Regan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The meeting with the President today?

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Secretary Regan had his own meeting with the Prime Minister. I think he was -- his deputy was in the meeting with the President. Other people attending it were Secretary Shultz, Ambassador Brock, Secretary Baldrige, Deputy Secretary of Agriculture, Mr. Lyng, as I already mentioned, the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. McNamar and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Taft. I think that's the full list. And the NSC Advisor, Mr. McFarlane.

Q Sir, you said at the beginning that the Prime Minister was not afraid to speak his mind when he disagrees. Were there issues today in which he was forced to speak his mind in disagreement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think this point we have discussed about the new Bretton Woods system is a very clear example of where he has a view that's different from ours. I think we both benefited -- I know we've benefited -- let him

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speak for himself. I think we definitely benefited from the dialogue that has gone on, as a matter of fact, over quite a few years. Secretary Shultz recalls discussing some of these similar problems at a much earlier stage when he was Secretary of the Treasury and the Prime Minister was still, at that time, the Finance Minister also I believe.

Q Could you tell us what he felt about the Middle East and also what he felt about the defense part.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I make it a practice to let the other side speak for itself as to what it said. I will say that on the Middle East, New Zealand really has -- again all the more remarkable for a country that is so small and so far removed from the immediate scene -- played a very constructive role. And in particular the contribution of a contingent to the Sinai Peacekeeping Force is something that we very much appreciate.

There was also a great deal of common concern and interest in the situation in the Persian Gulf and the war between Iran and Iraq. I know, speaking for our own side, we are continually working to try to do what we can to encourage a peaceful resolution of that conflict and suppose most importantly to at least keep it from escalating and expanding even further.

Q Did they discuss the role of the Soviet Union in the Pacific area? Was that brought up at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, and the Prime Minister -- I think we agree with the view that he has often expressed, that if you don't attend to the economic and political development problems of these small countries early on, you may ten or twenty years from now be faced with new Grenadas in the South Pacific. And while they're small countries and they are very far away and it's very easy to ignore them, that kind of neglect over many years ends up creating situations that are ripe for subversion. So, I'd say we appreciate the fact that he is continually calling to our attention special problems of these countries and, I think, has contributed importantly, not only to New Zealand's own policies, but through encouraging ours.

MR. SIMS: Can we have -- one or two.

Q I just want to follow up if I may, please. On the Jamaica butter deal -- has it officially commenced, or when does it begin?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it hasn't. I don't --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's still under negotiations, and will be for awhile yet.

Q Thank you.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Larry?

Q You mentioned the U.S. policy of not confirming the presence of nuclear weapons on U.S. vessels. Was that concern raised, specifically about the possibility of such weapons in the New Zealand waters?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it was specifically discussed, and we expressed appreciation for the fact that the Prime Minister and his government understands very clearly the reasons why we have that policy. That for reasons of deterrence and for reasons of intelligence that we simply can't confirm or deny the presence of

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weapons on ships and that -- for our ships to be welcome in some of those ports, that point has to be clearly understood, and it clearly is by the New Zealand government.

I guess I can take one more.

Q You were talking earlier about the Prime Minister not being afraid to speak his mind. Did any of the exchanges become heated?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. (Laughter.) He can speak his mind and very forcefully and a great deal of good humor remains.

Thank you.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 1:55 P.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF PRESIDENT KIRCHSCHLÄGER OF AUSTRIA

February 27, 1984

The Briefing Room

1:01 P.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm briefing on the visit of the President of Austria. Overwhelming interest I can see.

President Kirchschläger arrived this morning, will be seeing the President tomorrow, state dinner tomorrow night. Kirchschläger's return luncheon for the Vice President on Wednesday, after which he sets off on a trip to Chicago and the West Coast. Will be leaving -- going back to Austria next Sunday or Monday.

Article in The Post this morning, I think, put it in rather good perspective. Tne first visit by an Austrian chief of state since the founding of the Austrian republic.

There will also be a meeting --

Q When was that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I beg your pardon?

Q When was that? In 1950 --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, 1955 at the time of the State Treaty, yes. There were no visits by Austrian chiefs of state during the inner war period when we didn't have so many state visits.

Q This is the first since --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: First since 1955. First ever.

Q And it's a full-scale state visit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is a full-scale state visit. The only thing which could intervene to cut back on it is if it snows tomorrow morning and it's tough on the South Lawn.

I think that's about all I'll say. The Secretary of State will be meeting this afternoon with the Foreign Minister of Austria, Mr. Lanc, who accompanied President Kirchschläger. Science Advisor to the President, Dr. Keyworth, will be meeting with the Austrian Minister of Science, Dr. Fischer, who also accompanied the President. They'll be signing an understanding on science and technology.

Q Any problems?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Any problems? Where? In the visit?

Q No. Between the two countries.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have no basic bilateral issues with Austria so we expect the conversation will focus on multilateral issues -- East-West relations.

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Q Do we have any resentment of its neutrality?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. We, as a matter of fact, are treaty bound to support its neutrality as signatories of the State Treaty so we accept and support Austrian neutrality.

Q Well, is this strictly ceremonial then?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no. I think they'll have very substantive discussions of issues that are not bilateral issues. East-West relations where Austria has a very keen interest being on the frontier, if you will. A neutral country in Europe with important ties both with the East and West.

Austria does play an important role in other areas. The Middle East although with Chancellor Kreisky's retirement, they're somewhat less outspoken on Middle Eastern questions.

Q Is Austria concerned about the INF deployment?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Austria has not taken an official position on the INF deployment question, but they've expressed their hope that East-West arms control discussions could resume as soon as possible, as has the President, as has this administration.

The Austrians, more generally, are concerned about the state of East-West relations, feeling that in their own position they benefit when East-West relations are better and suffer when they're worse.

Q And will the President be sounding him out on his visit to Moscow? Will the President sound him out on his visit to Moscow or was that -- that was --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, President Kirchschläger visited Moscow quite awhile ago. It's been almost two years. I think he'd be interested in the President's views on -- President Kirchschläger's general views on what's going on in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union. But President Kirchschläger was out two administrations ago as far as the Soviets are concerned.

MR. SIMS: Will that do it?

Thank you very much.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 1:05 P.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
BY PRESIDENT KIRCHSCHLAEGER OF AUSTRIA

February 28, 1984

The Briefing Room

11:47 A.M. EST

MR. SIMS: This briefing will be in English -- (Laughter) -- it's ON BACKGROUND attributable to a Senior Administration Official.

Q The Colonel says Kirchschlaeger translates as "the man who strikes churches" -- is that right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it's not. "Kirsch" would be "church," but it's not -- that's not how it's translated.

Q What is the translation?

Q "The man who strikes kirschs."

Q "The man who doesn't strike churches."

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: "The man who doesn't strike churches." The President and President Kirchschlaeger just completed their meeting. It lasted about an hour. Major issues covered in terms of time were Central America -- but I think probably first, and foremost, East-West relations. The President outlined his views and found, I think, a good area of agreement with President Kirchschlaeger. They both agreed that the resumption of the MBFR negotiations in Vienna on the 16th of March are a very important event.

The President indicated that he hoped the Soviet Union would return to the two arms control negotiations on nuclear weapons -- INF and START.

President Kirchschlaeger, of course, agreed that he, too, hopes that these negotiations will resume. They agreed -- the two Presidents agreed -- of course, that there was no way of knowing right now when they would, when the Soviets would return to those negotiations.

Q Our President said there's no way of knowing?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He said at this time it's difficult to predict, but he remained hopeful that the Soviet Union would return to the negotiations, yes.

On Central America, the two Presidents discussed the outlook for the elections in El Salvador. Both agreed that this was a very important event in terms of the political process in that country. On bilateral relations, the President expressed satisfaction with the fact that we have no outstanding problems, a point with which President Kirchschlaeger agreed.

The President expressed his appreciation, our appreciation, for the very important role which Austria has played ever since the re-establishment of the Austrian Republic in 1955 as the point of first asylum for refugees from Eastern Europe. Initially, of course, in 1956 with the Hungarians and subsequently Czech, Polish imigrees, and also, of course, very importantly, the Soviet-Jewish imigrees.

Let me take any questions you may have.

Q Well he -- the visitor seemed to place much on -- talking about messages between the two blocks that are very hopeful --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: President Kirchschlaeger you mean?

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, President Kirchschlaeger welcomed the President's speech of January 16 and the concrete proposals which it contained. He expressed satisfaction with the fact that Secretary Shultz had met with Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm the next day. As I say, the two Presidents were hopeful that the resumption of the arms control discussions in Vienna on the 16th of March will represent a forward step and, perhaps, initially -- lead ultimately to a resumption of the two nuclear arms control discussions.

Q Did they discuss Gromyko's speech as reported yesterday by Tass?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That was noted. The fact that Secretary Shultz was there -- and discussed this briefly -- that Foreign Minister Gromyko had made a speech in connection with his campaign for re-election to the Supreme Soviet -- a very important and momentous --

Q Did -- pay any attention to those election speeches?

Q Did Shultz agree with --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the outcome of those elections, of course, is --

Q What did Shultz say -- did he see it as a tough speech? An unyielding speech? How did he characterize it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Secretary characterized the speech as being a standard Soviet statement -- not tough, not mild -- I think, one way or another. Said there were no surprises in it.

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Q Well, did they see that as a setback to this improving climate that Mr. Reagan had hoped for, or what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no. There was no indication that that speech was a setback.

Q Was any mentioned made of the President supporting --

Q Would you repeat that, please?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry, I'm hearing several questions at once here.

Q You speak very fast.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I beg your pardon?

Q You said no indication of what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There was no indication given that either -- that this speech, Gromyko's election speech yesterday was a setback in any way or in the process of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Q Was any mention made of a speech -- of a letter purporting to come from the American Ambassador von Damm asking for radar defense cooperation with Austria?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That subject did not come up. I might just say, by the way, that it's been demonstrated, I think, to everyone's satisfaction that letter was a forgery.

Q What about --

Q What is it?

Q I don't even know what the letter is.

Q Yes. Can you explain? (Laughter.)

Q That letter was a forgery.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I shouldn't have even -- I should have pleaded ignorance on this. There was a letter which surfaced in Austria about two weeks ago allegedly from Ambassador von Damm to the Austrian Defense Minister proposing -- I beg your pardon?

Q Helene von Damm?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, Ambassador von Damm. Helene von Damm, Ambassador to Austria allegedly sent a letter to the Austrian Defense Minister proposing enhanced U.S.-Austrian defense cooperation. It has, I think, been conclusively demonstrated that this --

Q It was a forgery?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm getting to it, for heavensakes. (Laughter.) The letter was a forgery.

Q You go so slowly though. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sorry. You guys are just too quick for me. You know, Burt's on vaca -- on a trip, and I'm not used to this.

Q Vacation.

Q Ohhh.

Q Vacation. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry, no.

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Q Burt's in Barbados, is he?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Burt's out of town. I'm not used to this kind of tough questioning. The letter was a forgery. Everyone recognizes it as such except the Communist newspaper in Vienna.

Q What about the MBFR? Was there any discussion about a new U.S. negotiating position?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we didn't get into the substance of the negotiations. Austria is not a participant. They simply provide the locale for the talks.

Q Is there a new U.S. negotiating position?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The United States is discussing the negotiating position with our allies. There's not going to be a specific proposal that I'm aware of, no.

Q There's not going to be a specific proposal?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not aware of one but we are talking with our allies now on the MBFR negotiations. I'm not familiar with the new position.

Q Are you denying the proposal in The L.A. Times today?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I haven't seen The L.A. Times article today so I can't --

Q You say there is not a formal --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I beg your pardon? I haven't seen the article. This is not really germane to the discussion we're on right now.

Q Well, you mentioned MBFR.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I mentioned the fact that the two presidents welcomed the resumption of the MBFR negotiations on the 16th.

Q Ah, that's it.

Q That's right. You brought it up.

Q All right. Are you saying there is no --

Q Let him do it.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think what he said was that's all they discussed in here because this is merely the scene.

Q No, but you tell us about the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As far as The L.A. Times story, which I still haven't read, and any other reports there may be on new proposals, what we're saying is that we're going back on the 16th. We're discussing with our allies the position which we will take at that time and we have nothing further for you.

Q But you're not denying, again, that story really?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm certainly not denying something I haven't read.

Q All right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm just giving our position.

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Q I'm a little confused.

Q I missed the beginning of this.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The story is not germane to the briefing here today.

Q Yes, it is.

Q You said you were not aware there was going to be a new position and your colleague seemed to indicate --

Q That's right.

Q -- there may well be a new position that we're discussing with the allies. Could you two reconcile that?

Q Are we in consultations with them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We are in consultations with our allies. That is correct.

Q Well, is there going to be -- I mean, is it your best understanding there is not or there is going to be a new U.S. position at the MBFR talks?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is my understanding that we're currently consulting with our allies on the position to be taken at the time when the MBFR negotiations resume in Vienna on the 16th of March.

Q Well, what did you mean when you said you didn't know about any new proposal?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have not read The Los Angeles Times articles. I'm not sure what proposal you're talking about.

Can we go on to more discussions on the visit?

Q Did President Reagan in front of President Kirchschlaeger analyze the change in East-West relations since Andropov's death and Chernenko's raise to power and, when yes, which way did he?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There was no specific discussion of that subject. I think there was agreement that the leadership situation in the Soviet Union is as yet somewhat uncertain. It's a transitional period.

Q Did the Austrian President say that he thinks there is a change in the attitude by the Soviet Union?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He did not make that point, no.

Q Middle East -- did it come up?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Middle East did not come up during these discussions today.

Q I missed the beginning of this, so you may have mentioned --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well --

Q Did President Kirchschlaeger make any suggestions as to how the U.S. might act to any new initiative to bring the Soviets back to the table?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, he did not. As I said, he welcomed the President's speech of January 16 and the concrete positive proposals contained in the President's speech and expressed the hope that these would lead -- or these proposals would lead to improvement in the East-West relationship. But he did not make specific proposals of his own.

Q When you talked about the hope that the negotiations on the 16th might lead to resumption of the other arms talks, is there more than hope? Is there going to be some kind of --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, there is -- The idea was that as these negotiations resumed, it is a step forward. And, perhaps, it will lead to an improvement in the atmosphere. But that was the only way in which these talks -- there was a relationship drawn between these talks and other negotiations.

Q When they agreed that the elections in El Salvador were important, did they think that the elections in Nicaragua -- did they mention those at all and say that they would be important?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There was agreement that the elections in Nicaragua, if they are to be significant, will require considerable preconditions in the sense of opening up the media to opposition parties, parties other than those participating in the government or to the Sandinistas themselves and it would have to be a political process.

The point was made, I think, and agreed by both sides that an election is something more than just the vote itself on the day of the 4th of November, in the case of Nicaragua. There's a long process, preparatory process which is required.

I think there was agreement on both sides that this process has not yet been seen -- the evidence of this process in Nicaragua has not yet been seen.

Q Did President Kirchschlaeger invite President Reagan to a trip to Vienna or is that up to a next summit? Did they discuss the possibility of a next summit -- on the possibility of having such a summit in Vienna?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The answer, I think, is no to all of those questions. There was no invitation to the President and there was no discussion of the next summit or whether that next summit might be in Vienna.

Q Is Gromyko going to win in this election? (Laughter.)

Q Any discussion of Gary Hart? (Laughter.)

MR. SIMS: All right. That's it. (Laughter.) Mike, last question. Last --

Q -- science and technology, what's involved in that?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I beg your pardon?

Q -- exchange of letters on science and technology --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Science Minister Fischer and the President's Science Advisor, Dr. Keyworth, will exchange letters this afternoon involving increased U.S.-Austrian cooperation in basic scientific research.

Q Radar defense. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

MR. SIMS: Thank you very much.

Q Where is Burt anyway --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Burt's on his way back from Bonn. He was in Bonn yesterday. He's on an airplane right now.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 11:59 A.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
ON THE VISIT OF
PRIME MINISTER KARIM-LAMRANI
OF MOROCCO

March 1, 1984

The Briefing Room

2:04 P.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Prime Minister, Mohammed Karim-Lamrani, who was accompanied by five members of the Moroccan Cabinet and a senior member of the Moroccan military, making a two-day official working visit to us, yesterday and today. He has just had a meeting with the President, with the Vice President, spent much of yesterday morning with the Secretary -- Secretary of State and will be having a further session with the Secretary late this afternoon.

He and his delgation have been having other interviews with members of the Executive Branch and several sessions on the Hill.

The discussions have focused on economic questions. During their visit here the delegation is meeting with the IMF, with World Bank officials, as well as with a wide variety of members of our government, concerning the current economic situation in the country.

For our part, we have taken the occasion to review our development and security assistance programs and are about to conclude several ongoing negotiations. You just witnessed the signing -- conclusion of one which was the agreement on the new VOA facilities in Morocco. Later today, there will be initialing at the office of the Special Trade Representative, a bilateral investment treaty with Morocco, which we hope is going to enhance the investment climate for American firms looking for possible locations for their overseas investment.

The visit -- the idea of the visit came about last December as a result of the talks between Secretary Shultz with King Hassan in Rabat. They agreed it would be useful for both of us to get together at senior levels and review our programs with Morocco in more detail than was possible during the Secretary's brief stop at that time. The Prime Minister was newly appointed in December of late November and is a man of very long experience in both the private and public sectors of Morocco.

Well, let me take any and all questions to the limit of my knowledge on Morocco. Thank you very much for withholding all others.

Q Could you spell the Prime Minister's name, please?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Hyphenated, Karim, K-a-r-i-m, L-a-m-r-a-n-i. First name, Mohammed.

And we have a list of the delegation, which I can leave after the briefing.

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Q Did the United States pledge any money for Morocco as any part of these agreements were being signed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the agreement -- and I'll ask my colleague to talk to you about the VOA agreement, that does involve expenditures in the country over the next several years for construction funds, be a source of stimulating some employment. We've gone over the existing programs, which are under the AID Public Law 480 Code, ESF funds for -- which will be -- this is the first year, fiscal '84, the first year -- a small amount of ESF. Foreign military sales, MAP, military education. There are about six programs of which the ESF is a new one, but six programs we've had over the years with Morocco. And what we've done is listen, at this point in time, with his focus on the economic sitation, coming to this country in what is the tenth year of drought.

You know, we've all focused on the Sahalian drought in Africa over the last several years which has been extremely severe and with starvation conditions across much of Africa. It is a little less well-known that Morocco, itself -- the whole rainfall pattern has been disrupted since about '74, and the crops -- the water supply, the water table has dropped productions way down. So they've been afflicted by that general African problem.

Q Does this radio relay station have anything to do with the towers at Kenitra?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Could you hold it for my colleague and he'll talk about the whole radio relay project.

Q You mentioned the national security issue --

Q Well, wait a minute.

Q -- Do we have use of any bases in Morocco --

Q The answer is no, right?

Q Wait. Was there no more money, or -- I can't --

Q There was never an answer.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're looking, we're looking. We're not -- yes, okay. We're not talking about anything just yet. We're looking hard to where we can -- if we can. At this point in our fiscal year, it's very hard to look around the barrel and see what's left, what could be reprogrammed from other programs where it won't get used by September 30. That's the effort that's underway and it's -- in the areas of existing programs like FMS, like our AID PL 480 programs, but I don't have figures to give you right now. We're working on it.

Q So there's no -- right now, there's no pledge of increased aid?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're working on it. There's no -- we don't want to make a pledge that we can't sustain in terms of getting money out of -- what means getting out of other programs where the money isn't being spent, where the pipeline is backed up -- that sort of problem.

Q How much was authorized, anyway, for '84 in military aid and economic aid?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: For '84, you've got a total -- do you want just the global total?

Q For economic and military.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Economic and military total runs $139 million under the continuing resolution on the Hill. And that is $139.125 million, if you want to get specific.

Q How much of it is military?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Military? FMS, foreign military sales is $26.75, and MAP, which is grant, is $30, so that's $56.75, plus a small amount under the IMET program for military education training -- $1.475.

Q What's involved in this military security agreement that you mentioned that's going to be signed later today? What's

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involved in that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no, no. No, that -- boy, I'm really misreading my notes if I said military security. No, it's an investment. This is with Ambassador Brock's office, Special Trade Representative. Bilateral investment treaty.

Q Was there any discussion of Mid-East problems?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. The -- certainly, when he met with the President, the Prime Minister, after bringing the King's greetings, said he hoped -- these included the hope from the King that the President would sustain his efforts in the peace process, and the President assured him that we, indeed, will remain engaged. But they did not get into more detail than that. But we had talks about this at the State Department.

Q Was there discussion about Lebanon?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not specific, no. Not in those --

Q Nothing about the Gemayel meeting with Assad? Neither of the two sides had --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. We're both waiting for readouts on that.

Q Do you understand Gemayel headed to Lebanon or to Saudi Arabia?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Mixed reports. In this briefing on Morocco, I am not getting diverted from the essential message.

Q Well, isn't it a little --

MR. SIMS: Radio time. Does anyone want to talk about the radio?

Q Wait. Isn't it a little odd, though, that there would be hardly any mention at all? I mean, afterall, Morocco held a big summit and it's been -- I mean, it was just scant -- are we to understand that there was hardly any conversation about the situation in Lebanon?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The primary focus of the Prime Minister's trip was on the economic situation. They've got a very tough scene today in Morocco, against the background of this decade-long drought and the need for the country getting into structural economic reforms.

You recall there was a problem back in January -- riots over the question of lifting or diminishing the subsidies on food supplies. They have talked with the IMF. They have discussed a package over there, I understand, of tax -- I'm sorry -- short-term, medium-term measures with the IMF which could help get Morocco out of the present difficulties. The IMF generally puts forward a series of conditions and then the country meets those conditions. They have standby facilities, that sort of thing.

They've been discussing primarily economics. So, there was not -- beyond the economic area, there really was not much discussed on the peace process or on the overall political scene.

I might just mention on the economic side, you've had a country that is like so many in the continent and in the third world. As the requirements for energy have gone, the price has gone up even faster. Food imports against the lowered production, the drought conditions -- it's all amounted up to a very, very heavy burden on the Moroccan government.

But I don't have a story for you on the political side.

Q All right.

Q We weren't looking for that.

Q Oh, no. We didn't want a story -- (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I appreciate your tolerance --

Q Thank you very much.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- and look forward to our next get-together.

Q -- heavy foreign debt -- Morocco? Is it --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- regret. I'd have to refer you to the Moroccans on that. I don't know the overall figure. The one guy that was supposed to come bugged out just before this meeting. So --

Q Bugged out?

Q Bugged out? State Department --

Q Cousin Ron --

Q -- there was no bugging out? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. He

Q -- cuts and runs.

Q -- redeployment. (Laughter.)

Q -- redeploy himself in the State Department

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let's see how long I'll last.

The Voice America today broadcasts from Morocco using transmitters virtually all of which are over 40 years old. Virtually

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all of our antennas are over 30 years old. The components on control panels were built in the 1920's. They're not manufactured any longer; in fact, when one breaks down, we have to take them to our own machine shops because replacement parts are no longer made.

Q How many of them are left?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Beg your -- Oh. (Laughter.)

This is part of the administration's modernization program, the administration's $1 billion modernization program. In December, we signed an agreement with Sri Lanka to vastly increase our transmitting facilities there. The signing of this agreement today -- These two agreements mark the first time since 1962 that the United States has signed government-to-government agreements to significantly upgrade and improve and expand broadcasting VOA to the world.

All this is a part of a worldwide, $1 billion modernization program for the Voice of America which we have proposed to Congress.

And happy to answer any questions.

Q Where is VOA now going to be able to go into that it wasn't going before you had this modernization in 10 years?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's a matter of a vastly increased signal. You can show -- if you're using a 40-year-old, 35 KW transmitter, you can say that you're broadcasting to Eastern Europe or to North Africa or to West Africa. You can say your signal's getting through. I can say a ham radio operation can get through half way around the world, too. It's a matter of strength of signal. It's a matter of predictability of the signal. When we were --

Q Was it going to Afghanistan or anything from that point or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We would not be broadcasting to Afghanistan from there. It's a bit too far away. But you're talking on all the countries of Eastern Europe; you're talking about possible broadcasting to the Soviet Union. We have broadcast to the Ukraine, for example, from Tangier in the past. We're talking about a vastly increased signal to Europe and one which can be counted on. We'll be --

Q It's a relay station, right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We'll be replacing -- It's a relay station. We'll be replacing these ancient transmitters with 500 KW state-of-the-art transmitters, modern antennas -- the type of station

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which means you get a clear signal from WMAL in Washington.

Q How many relay stations you have presently in Morocco?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, one relay station. In Tangier.

Q Now, will this reach farther into the Soviet Union? How far in will it go with a clear signal?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The one -- the clear one-hop signal would extend through Eastern Europe. Second-hop signal, which is less dependable, will reach into the Soviet Union. I haven't checked, frankly, the maps --

Q Will it go as far as Moscow, for example --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We would not be broadcasting primarily to Moscow from this particular station. We have stations in Munich, in Great Britain and others.

Q -- be southern --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right.

Q Does that mean that now you have two relay stations or just a modernization of this --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We'll be replacing this station with a new state-of-the-art relay station.

Q How long will it take?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's not going to take as long as the engineers say it's going to take now. I figure -- It takes -- The irony is the Voice of America has not built anything for more than 15 years. My friends at BBC say that it takes them an average of three years, beginning -- to install a new transmitter facility. We estimate three to five years.

Q -- how much money's involved in the Moroccan project and what portion of this billion-dollar modernization proposal has been authorized or put into place here?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We received earmarked authorization last fall from Congress for $165 million as the first stage of the six year modernization program. This facility is estimated to cost something like $175 million. It's going to be one of the most significant of our new facilities, one of the largest and one of the most powerful.

We will be, of course, seeking -- and my colleague has some fact sheets on this -- we'll be seeking $113 million from Congress this year for this worldwide modernization program. This is much like a pipeline situation, like the space program, where you go each year for additional monies for projects you've already undertaken. Over five years, it's estimated $1 billion.

Yes.

Q Is this transmitter built atop a very high tower?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The transmitter is on the ground and the transmitter goes to antennas which are -- antennas and antenna facilities and that's how the signal goes out.

Q How high are the towers?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: How high are the towers? High. (Laughter.)

Q How high is high?

Q Very high.

Q How high --

Q I'm thinking of the tower of Kenitra that are --

Q He's been thinking about that all day. (Laughter.)

Q -- that was in there for 25 years and serving some purpose for the United States government all this time.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We only broadcast from Tangier, Jerry. And I think -- I don't really know about the facility you describe. The antennas I've seen around the world broadcasting for Voice of America look somewhat like the antennas at local radio stations, except there are many, many more of them in large fields. This facility, for example, will be 600 acres plus for the transmitting part.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 2:23 P.M. EST

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STATE DEPARTMENT
BACKGROUND BRIEFING

on

CERTIFICATION OF AID TO EL SALVADOR

FRIDAY, MARCH 2, 1984, 10:05 A.M.

MR. CARLSON: Good morning. This is a BACKGROUND briefing on El Salvador. Your briefer will give you a few remarks and then he will take some questions.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Thanks. It's a great pleasure to be back, as my friends say in the piranha tank. (Laughter)

My hope is that I would give you two or three minutes of something on the elections and perhaps something on the military situation, and if you like, in response to questions, discuss any and all other issues -- human rights, death squads, all the obvious kinds of things.

On the elections process and what is happening there, let me begin to say that despite what many of your colleagues are printing, neither I nor the Embassy nor the United States Government has a favorite party candidate or coalition in the elections. Secretary Shultz announced that position: it is a position we have maintained. We believe the elections are important, not that the elections are going to solve all the issues of El Salvador, but they are an extremely important step in the progress that El Salvador is making from a situation in which small groups -- military and the oligarchy -- in the past had dominated the governmental process to one in which there is a free choice. That evolution began with the coup in 1979 of the reformist officers. The elections of 1982 marked an important step because they represented a choice of a Constituent Assembly. That Assembly wrote a constitution and fixed the dates for the presidential elections that are coming on the 25th of March.

Those elections will lead to the election of a president, and following that, next year, there will be elections again for a National Assembly, which should then complete the evolution to a freely-chosen government for El Salvador.

These elections will be the first, I guess, observers tell me, in which it will not be known in advance -- for 50 years, at least -- who is going to be the President of El Salvador, and that's my current reading. It's a close race.

The new constitution provides that if one of the candidates does not receive a full majority on the first ballot, it will go to a second ballot, and the top two will run off. Currently, Mr. Duarte and Mr. d'Aubuisson are running, in the view of most of us, ahead of the pack. If that is the case, then they would, presumably, enter a runoff, if one of those, or someone else, fails to get 50 percent on the first ballot.

The present process is hard fought; it's a tough political campaign. In some respects, it makes New Hampshire look like a garden party. Nevertheless, it has all of the attributes that one would expect to find in a democratic process and not a demagogic process. And it will be very important to recognize that the next stage will probably be one, if it plays out that way, of coalition building, because the two who survive the first round will have to pick up votes in support from those who do not. So we would look at it, I guess if you were to graph it, with polarization out to the edge. It's kind of an inverted hourglass graph -- it will be going toward polarity, certainly in the first round, and the process could well lead away from polarities and toward coalitions in the second round.

The guerrilla attitude toward the elections is extremely interesting. As opposed to 1982, they said recently they recognized they made a mistake in physically and militarily attacking elections in El Salvador, and as a result they were not going to do that. At the same time, individual guerrilla units have already begun the process of claiming that some of their actions, assassinations, some of their actions in small towns in El Salvador prohibiting the participation of those people in elections, or they should face, as they have said, "dire consequences" have indicated splits in their ranks. It's a difficult problem for them. In a way, the indication that they don't intend to attack militarily these elections is a kind of back-handed compliment, even though they desparage the process.

We think that whatever they may be saying -- and they said some of this prior to 1982 -- there ought to be, and will be, planning for quite a heavy guerrilla offensive. The military situation has been at a stand-down, with the government retaking the initiative in recent months, since the beginning of January, and we would expect that that stand-down in part represents not only government offensive operations and initiatives, but in addition as well, the fact that the guerrillas are resupplying, resting, and reequipping for some events in the period of the elections.

We think that the elections will mark not only a further bifurcation in the ways, if you like, between the military in politics, but they could very well present a presidential winner with a mandate. Indeed, if he has a majority, he or his coalition will have a strong mandate to go ahead -- commander-in-chief of the military, a basis for programs for the future, which could lead, in our view, to very positive directions. Such programs, for example, as an increased dialogue looking toward the 1985 elections, something that has been suggested by the Kissinger Commission Report is something that ought to be looked at realistically in part, because there is the recognition that one of the reasons the guerrillas would not participate in the Presidential election certainly is their expectation for only a very small turnout, a very small support in the vote, which would be traditional, certainly, for their side of the political spectrum in El Salvador. Another is that those elections will be broadly based, and that there could, conceivably, be people -- mayors and congressmen in El Salvador -- who could be elected from their side of the house, and as a result, it would provide them a chance to achieve some results. A new government with a mandate, I think, could look with more confidence on that process. Indeed, the elections themselves might be one of the things that could drive that process forward. Another success -- and, obviously, our hopes are for success; we're strongly positive on the electoral process -- could achieve that.

The Balloting, we expect, will go forward in a clear and clean way. We have provided assistance to their electoral council for a registry to be prepared. It meets what we consider to be some of the highest modern standards of preparation. A register will be used in the election, and indeed, there will also be opportunities for people to vote outside their normal polling place.

Anybody in El Salvador over 18 can vote. The registry is equivalent to the holding of a National Identity Card, and we believe most Salvadorans over 18 hold National Identity Cards.

so there will be a simple process of presenting your card and yourself. Ink will be used to mark fingers and cards; it will be visible ink to prevent double-voting. So we think it will be a clean process.

International observers have been invited from some 60 countries, including both government observers and parliamentarians, and academicians. The last time there were 1500 journalists, by someone's count, so there will be plenty of opportunity for people to gauge the process and to report on it.

The military situation in El Salvador, as I mentioned just briefly, has been one of succeeding cycles in which currently the government has the initiative. Its major efforts have been in implementing a plan, in a second department -- the first was begun a year ago in the summer of '83 -- called Usulatan. The plan is to provide security, follow up with reconstruction and development assistance on the civilian side, to develop a civil defense force in the area as a way of providing to the people and to the economy, stability, security and development incentive in order to build control and development in the area.

The recognition is clear that the war in El Salvador is one for the people and the economy, primarily, and not one for territory.

We don't believe the guerrillas have succeeded over the years -- and certainly not in recent times -- in attracting an increasing share of the population to their side. In their counter-offensive run between September and December, they did attack some 75 isolated towns and villages, some strategic points. They did succeed in occupying for a time some points previously under the control of the government; some of those the government has already taken back. It's a see-saw war, and very much in the sense of the Kissinger Commission Report, it's my perspective that it will continue to be a see-saw war without much change unless there is additional United States support. Certainly the kind of support embodied in the Jackson Plan and the supplemental proposals of the Administration are designed to try to move away from that, not that that support will create a military victory and that that will end the problem, but that that support will create the increased security required to move ahead on the intensive programs, in the economic sector, the political sector, the judicial sector to provide the long-term base for change. The military is absolutely necessary, but certainly, not sufficient for a success of the United States policy in the area. It's a combination that makes for the success.

Finally, on the human rights area and the death squads, the visit of Vice President Bush followed by the visit of Secretary Shultz were key points in the development of our approach.

Vice President Bush arrived just after an upsurge in right-wing death-squad violence. The effort then was a three-pronged approach, both in time and objectives, to bring about a new concentration on Salvadoran leadership, on the absolute necessity to do something about the problem.

A series of specific actions developed in a kind of compact between the two governments, and a series of sort of result-oriented judgments about what should happen, and within a short term, the idea of by exiling military officers and bringing pressures to bear on investigations on civilians, to create a clear view that participation in this kind of activity there, then, and immediately had a cost attached to it -- a cost on isolation from the government, a cost that indicated that the Salvadoran Government was prepared to take action against these kinds of activities.

The second stage involved the creation of an investigative unit which is going ahead, the issuance of orders governing the terms and conditions of arrest, which incorporate fair standards -- no arrests in plain clothes without identification, notification to families, no use of torture or force, no use of places of imprisonment which were not official -- those kinds of things which have been the traditional *modus vivendi* of the death squads have been outlawed by order.

A third stage has to do with judicial reform. With the best investigation, with the best deterrents in the world through investigation and government action, without a system that is capable of punishing offenses, obviously, the best will in the world isn't going to work. They have been involved in judicial reform at the strong suggestion of my predecessor in 1982, in his speech in the autumn of that year, and that process is proceeding. They have a commission. It will cover a wide range of judicial issues, including qualifications for the bar, protection of people, technical evidence -- all the things that a modern judicial system has that the Salvadoran system does not yet have. That commission is expected to report before the new government takes office in the middle of this year.

We believe we've made some progress. We believe it's a good beginning. We believe there is still a very long way to go in these issues, but that there has been a change and the results, we believe, indicate it. One of the organizations in El Salvador that keeps statistics on this, the Tutela Legal, which is connected with the office of the Archbishop of the Roman Catholic Church, not known as one of the greatest admirers of the American Embassy, I might add, has indicated their view that the statistics of the death squad have come down.

The general trend in political violence statistics beyond that, ours and others for the last four years, has been down. We believe that with these steps that will continue. We believe, finally, that progress has been made on the American murder cases, on the nuns' case, which we hope can come to trial this spring. There have been strenuous efforts made to keep that on track by the Salvadoran Government and the judiciary. Nothing is simple on these issues in El Salvador. Nevertheless, we believe that it is nearing the point of trial, and we believe it is nearing the point of trial on the basis of an understanding which was reached between the two governments on how it would proceed some time ago -- some six months ago. We believe they are on track in El Salvador with the kinds of commitments they've made about moving that.

On the murder of the labor advisers, the key witness is in jail pending his testimony, which is critical in the case. Another case of a murdered American has been raised to the final trial stage and is pending an appeal by the defense on that stage of the trial. So there has been progress, agonizingly slow for all of us, but nevertheless, progress in those areas.

Let me end here and then open it up to your questions, if you would.

Q [redacted] there are estimates made in this building and elsewhere that military aid, the military supplies in El Salvador may run out between now and the end of the election. Let me ask you a few questions: If that happens,...... Do you agree with those estimates? Number two: If that happens, what would be the consequences? And number three: Do you expect the President to exercise his executive authority and send emergency military aid there?

A Yes, I agree with the estimates because I and the Embassy and my military group had a direct role in contributing to them. We're the central point of information. It appears to us that at the end of March and beginning of April we begin to run short of some critical items. I believe that without those critical items, it will be increasingly difficult -- maybe even more serious than that -- for the Salvadoran military to protect the electoral process, especially if, as we expect, it will have to go to a second ballot. Under their law, the second ballot would take place within 30 days of the certification of the results of the first ballot, so that would put it sometime near the end of April or May, so we have a critical time period coming up.

Beyond that, of course, is the critical time period for the installation of a new President and Vice-President in El Salvador which takes place on June 1. So looking ahead at those periods and contrasting that with expectations as to when funding might be available through supplementals or otherwise, It is of serious concern. It is a question that is currently being looked at. My sense is that no decisions have yet been taken within the Administration on what to do about that, but that it is an issue of urgent concern, as the Secretary has made clear in his testimony in recent weeks on that subject; and I'm not in a position to go beyond, at this point, what he has said except those points that I've made to you.

Q Following up on that question, a number of questions: One is, what are the critical items they might run short of? And secondly, just doing the arithmetic, essentially $45 million has been available to be spent since the other $20 million is encumbered by the Specter Amendment, and we're five months into the fiscal year. One assumes that that money is being used up. There must be some kind of deadline, and Congress shows no inclination to act.

Yesterday, the Subcommittee refused all supplementary aid, refused to consider it. So what -- It seems like you're out of money.

A If I can say this, if it is an expression of concern on the Congressional action, I share it. If the point is that we're going to run out of money, we have in a sense that the money available has been obligated -- that's my understanding, in any event; and more importantly, we're going to run out of supply, and that's a key issue -- pipelines are relatively long -- and so in some areas we might expect as early as late March from the figures that I have seen and examined, some things to run out.

I think the Administration will want to present its case on this when decisions are made at the appropriate time, and then have available for your perusal the "for instances."

"What is it that we will run out of at any particular time?" I'm not at this point able to give you that, but I hope that that kind of information will be made available when the decision is made.

Q Would you be, then, equating a coming disaster if you don't get the extra money?

A Let's not try to characterize it in "coming disaster" kinds of terms, but let's put it in terms that I have used here, that it is a serious situation, that it will get increasingly worse, and that the process is one of defending and protecting an electoral process, an essential democratic process in El Salvador. So that heightens the concern that I have. I suspect that that concern is shared by many in the Administration in Washington, from my conversations here this week.

Q Sir, reports from the field by impartial journalists from different parts of the world would seem to indicate that the rebels are very well armed with American weapons, initially supplied to the Salvadoran Army, which in general still tends to fight aggressively, doesn't like to fight at night, doesn't like to pursue the guerrillas. Why should Americans pump more cash into that kind of a rat hole?

A Well, let me take exception to the assumptions in your question --

Q Please.

A -- because, certainly, just look at the last two months. There have been a number of night operations in the military, some very important and successful ones. The impartial journals may have missed them down there, but we have seen them. Secondly, if you take a look at the weapons -- we have -- we've looked at, for example, the captured M-16s over the last couple of years, and looked at the serial numbers. The serial number indications that I have been given indicate that 30 to 35 percent of the M-16s available over the last couple of years (a sample of several hundred, I understand) came from Vietnam, that is they are traceable to Vietnam, and then they disappeared. Another 30 percent, I have been told, are not traceable because the Defense Department records for those particular periods of time are not available, but they matched the Vietnam times; and as a result, we would assume some percentage, maybe up to a third of those; the rest, the other third, seem to be a sort of cats-and-dogs type of origin --

some in Nicaragua, some from El Salvador, some from places in the United States. Obviously, the guerrillas have benefited from the international arms trade to some extent. But that gives you an indication of the sources.

It is true that the guerrillas have captured weapons from the Salvadorans. On the other hand, it is true that this sample indicates that there are other sources. Those sources are fairly considerable, and those sources point very directly to Nicaragua and to others as the source of a lot of the M-16s that the guerrillas have that have been captured by the government.

Q To follow up, sir, have you called in additional assessment people to make sure that the information you're getting is fair, honest, and accurate?

A What information?

Q Well, from your own military staff. There has been a history in some American operations around the world of fraudulent, or at the very least, inflated intelligence being given to Ambassadors at different posts to tell them what they want to hear.

A Sure. I have several ways of checking. To begin with, the military group reports to me; it's responsible for the training and equipment of Salvadoran military forces. Secondly, I keep, as a separate and completely different entity the Defense Attache office, which is responsible to me, to report to me and to the government what they see and hear, what they understand is going on. They have no obligations to anybody else, and I firmly enforce that strict accountability to me and to no one else. So I often get reports that cover both sides of issues; and we have a variety of information. We speak often to journalists -- I may speak to 6 or 10 a week -- sometimes and we trade information, as we often do with journalists. So that's an additional source.

The Embassy Political Section has access to a wide range of people and is a capable reporting organism, and it certainly is not beholden to any other section of the Embassy. But I understand the concern. We apply what I think are reasonable rules to provide a multiplicity of information and an opportunity to cross-check. Would be delighted to have suggestions as to how we can do it better.

Q Sir, I know you have, to some extent, tried to address this already, but it's very hard for us to write a story about supplies going slim in El Salvador if it turns out later that we're talking about the fact that there aren't enough uniforms that don't have holes in them or maybe the soles of their shoes need repairing or something like that. Are you talking about bullets and numbers of guns that will run out, or are you talking about spare parts for large equipment that is going to be sitting on driveways unable to be used during the time you need security? You've got to give us some idea of what you're talking about.

A The totality of what we provide will, over the next two or three months -- some of it beginning in March--begin to run short. The totality includes, with $45 million now and only an $80 million program last year, we're at the half-way point of the fiscal year, some indication of why we believe we're running short. The totality includes such things as munitions, which are a very large share of our program; spare parts for helicopters. They have very few trucks in their inventory; they often have to use civilian trucks; they have a very small number of helicopters, but they are absolutely essential to provide them with the tactical mobility to handle the problems that are normally inherent in a guerrilla war. They include such things as M-16s to equip newly-trained units and to replace any that might be lost among units. They include things such as ammunition for machine guns and mortars, for their 105 mm artillery, which is the largest they have. So it runs the whole panoply of things, but very little that we provide is non-essential;the program is so small. I've been told it's only a one, two, or three percent of the total U.S. world-wide military assistance program at its $80 million level per year. —

Q If I can follow up, the need for more helicopters is different from the question of running out of supplies. I mean you may judge that they need more helicopters to do the job, but that's a distinct thing from not having enough to continue what they're doing.

A Decisions will have to be made back here as to whether more of one thing or spare parts for another thing are required. You can concentrate and focus attention immediately, however -- I have no trouble doing this -- on the ammunition, on the weapons, and the spare parts that are required to sustain what is happening.

Beyond that, there is clearly, for example, and has been a subject that's been agonizing me for six months, a need to provide for some medical evacuation capability in the country. We provided and trained some 600 medical corpsmen with the medical assistance team last year; but we have, and they have, in effect, no way to get their people from the battlefield, no dedicated way -- they have to take a hit-or-miss opportunity on their existing helicopters, which are fully occupied in fighting, to get people back. So we have death rates that sometimes approach one in three, which compares to perhaps one in nine casualties for the United States in Vietnam where this kind of capability existed.

These are the sorts of things that I think are urgently needed in El Salvador.

Beyond that, obviously, as I indicated to you before, additional tactical mobility is required. All those things have to be put in priority; they have to be looked at by the Administration and decisions made.

Q Sir, can I take you back to the election just for a second?

A Delighted.

Q I know you have said the Secretary has said you are neutral as to the result, but realistically, given what was said on the Hill yesterday about support if Mr. D'Aubisson is elected, given what you've said about moving away from the oligarchy -- someone said a d'Aubuisson election would reinstitute the oligarchy -- given what you've said about the possibilities for dialogue after the election, dialogue with the guerrillas which Mr. **d'Aubuisson**, obviously, is not interested in, don't you have to be concerned and a little more than just neutral in what could happen?

A The United States is supporting a democratic process. As the largest aid donor, it certainly is a country which has a substantial interest in relationship with El Salvador. Our neutrality in the election process is the keystone of this effort, and the election process is extremely important.

It's another step on the road to democracy, and I can only repeat again what the Secretary has said and what I have been saying, that we are neutral.

Q Just the Hill example, I mean you have great difficulty getting aid now. What would it be like with a d'Aubuisson presidency?

A Luckily, I don't have the capacity to speak for the Hill. I do have the capacity on this platform and down there to speak for the Secretary and the Administration, and I repeat again the neutrality.

Q Sir, you're talking about neutrality in the election process. Your predecessor was a very important figure in the determination of the interim president after the last election. Are you saying you would not participate in the selection of the president?

A The selection of the president is to be by ballot in elections by vote. It's a direct vote for president. We are not prepared to participate in favoring or being positive toward or negative toward any candidate. We are neutral.

Q Or any coalition?

A Or any coalition.

Q Could you develop the idea of what a mandate for the president -- whoever wins -- might lead to toward negotiations, as I thought you suggested?

A Sure. I think that you must compare the situation after the election with the situation before. We have a situation now where the Constituent Assembly, voted in by about 80 percent of the voters in El Salvador in 1982, and composed in the main of four major parties, has been the responsible body for choosing a transitional and provisional government. That transitional and provisional government has no direct mandate; it has an indirect mandate. That mandate is, in effect, through four parties who have wide-ranging differences as well as capacities, as they have shown to agree.

The new president will have a direct, popular mandate. It must be, by their Constitution, more than 50 percent of the votes cast in the election in which he is chosen. That particular mandate, whether it's gotten by the man as an individual or through a coalition formed by him to win the election, will be a striking and important difference.

President Magana, who has done a sensational job, has not had that kind of mandate. He has not had the opportunity to go to whomever and say, "I am the Chief Executive, I am the Commander-in-Chief. More than 50 percent of the people have put their name on the line with me, and these are my programs, these are the things I ran on." So it will be a strikingly different situation in any kind of a political context in El Salvador to have that mandate, and that's what I was talking about. That mandate would give that particular individual an opportunity to develop his programs and policies, whatever they might be. The hope is that out of those programs and policies would come an increased impetus for the process of dialogue.

We also believe that the elections themselves, if you're looking at the dialogue, will be an example again to the left, as they were in '82 -- that's our hope -- that the process of bullets is going to be defeated again by ballots, and that the road to power is not through bullets, and that they take another look at participation in the election.

Q You have the new president -- let's go ahead down the calendar -- you've elected him; you have a majority president with a mandate and so forth. If you then had a dialogue with the left, wouldn't you then absorb a policy which the Administration has consistently rejected -- that is the idea of negotiating the sharing of power? Is that what you're getting at or not?

A No, no; I think quite the contrary.

The Administration has supported a dialogue in El Salvador; the Administration has supported the position of the Government of El Salvador to enter into that dialogue, with the object of negotiating or discussing or agreeing, whatever form of words you want to use, about the participation of those people on the left who want to, in the democratic process in El Salvador, the idea that they would be part and parcel of an electoral process leading to a government.

Q The Electoral process -- you're not thinking of going beyond that? This new president would not, from your view, be thinking in terms of a power-sharing?

A No, and I think all the presidential candidates in El Salvador made it clear that they are not thinking of power-sharing; they are thinking of negotiations.

Q What would he have to say to them? They've got guns. They've been fighting for a number of years. I'm the new president. What do I have to say to these people that would make them lay down their arms without getting any power?

A They can surely say what they have been saying, that "We've been through a new election; a large percentage of our people have spoken; they've made their choice; the process of elections continues; it's the way of the future here; we're a democratic country. We, as a government, are prepared to talk to you about the participation of you or your group in the electoral process, to define that; freedom of access to the media; security" -- all the kinds of things that have been a pre-occupation. That's, I think, the viable way, the road to the future.

Q You're assuming --

Q Do you believe, as the Kissinger Commission does, that inadequate military aid levels are worse than no aid at all?

A Certainly as bad as no aid at all, and maybe worse, because they perpetuate a stalemate, perpetuate the killing that goes on in the war; they perpetuate the incapacity to bring the question to a solution through negotiations. I think I would find it very congenial to be with the Commission on their conclusions on that point.

Q But isn't it rather discouraging to see that the attempt to forge a bipartisan consensus has failed its first test miserably, as reflected in the vote of the House Western Hemisphere Subcommittee yesterday?

A Well, I guess one has to be optimistic in a sense of looking at that and recalling conversations of many of the people who participated in that consensus, that there is a negotiating process that goes on in this government, as it does in many other governments. Our hope is that that is a negotiating position and only a negotiating position. It, certainly, from my point of view, is not a position that will do the job.

Q How much contact does your Embassy have with the FMLN?

A My Embassy does not have contact with the FMLN. Those contacts were the responsibility of Dick Stone; and I presume, although I don't know what his mandate would be -- I'm just guessing on this -- presume that Harry Shlaudeman would continue with that responsibility, but that's the locus of those kinds of contacts. That official, that Special Ambassador, is responsible for the regional negotiating context.

Q I'd like to ask you about the arms flow again from Nicaragua to El Salvador. Exactly how is it coming through? In what quantities roughly? Is it-- Without that arms flow, would the insurgency be containable, more so than has been in the past? Does the insurgency rely on it? And what efforts are being made to interdict that arms flow?

A Certainly, with respect to the arms flow -- and I'll speak to you in general terms -- there is an intelligence sources and methods question obviously tied up in here, but I'll speak to you in general terms and tell you that without that arms flow, it would be much, much easier on the government side to deal with the military side of the question of the guerrilla activities. There is no question in my mind about that.

That flow seems to go up and down, but we see plenty of evidence of it continuing. As I said earlier, I'm not in a position, not able, for the obvious reasons, to give you the details that you seek on those particular points. What details I can give you on the M-16s, as at least a rough indicator, I have, but I can assure you that we see it continuing.

Q You mean --

A It continues in al the obvious ways -- by sea, by air, and by land.

Q Your predecessor indicated in a similar briefing here, although he was ON THE RECORD, that it was coming in, at one point that they had switched, that they were relying less on land, which had pretty much shut down, he said, and less on boats because of the navy, and more on aircraft.

Would you go along with that?

A No. I think that we see continuing evidence both by sea and by air, and some reports they are more difficult to achieve, they are more difficult to get, of land. There are still open land borders in the area that make movement by land also possible. Movement by road, movement by animal, and movement by human beings carrying material, I think, are all a continuing part of the process. We get that kind of information from people who rally to the government, from people who are captured.

Q Coming back for a minute to the question of neutrality, don't you, by taking that position of neutrality at this point, set up the possibility -- in fact, since you suggested that Duarte and d'Aubisson are the two front runners, if you will -- more than a possibility, a good probability, that if one of those candidates is elected, the Administration, the United States effort to send a great deal more aid to El Salvador would be, in effect, repudiated at some point by the Administration, and it would say, "Look, we're not interested in sending any more money down there," and that would say that all the money that has been spent so far and the effort that has been spent so far has been a waste?

Don't you set yourself up for that situation by saying that "We've got to be impartial as to who is elected"?

A We can circle around this question any number of ways, and I've spent hours in El Salvador with it, circling. The point that I would give you is only that I would want to reemphasize to you that we are neutral.

Q The point is not the neutrality on the election process. We understand that you support the election process; but it's hard for anybody to swallow the belief that the Administration is neutral on the candidates themselves.

A If the election process is to be supported -- and that's our primary significant objective -- the democratic process, free, fair, and just elections, then the only position for us to take is to be neutral.

Q Could you please explain why a visa was denied to Mr. d'Aubuisson last November? And what would be the answer if he applies again now?

A I don't know that he has applied. I understand that he may have made a statement today that he may be applying, but I haven't received any confirmation. And the position that was made very clear, I take it from this platform last November, was that his visa was denied for foreign policy reasons.

Q Sir, you know that there has been a threat by one of the major death squad groups to assassinate journalists. I'd like you to comment on that, please, and put it in the context as you see it of the political process which this country is so strongly committed to seeing go forward in Salvador.

A Let me say -- maybe I could be permitted to go ON THE RECORD -- speaking for my Embassy, I absolutely deplore, I think it's reprehensible, the issuance of those kinds of threats against anyone, any time, any place, but particularly against people whose responsibility is conveying the truth of what happens in El Salvador to the people of the world outside of El Salvador.

ON-THE-RECORD

Let me go back ON BACKGROUND, and say that we have, and obviously continue to have, these small maverick groups who issue these kinds of crazy communiques. We have no indication in their actions they will notdo what they say; on the other hand, we will do all that we can and continue to do all that we can to try, with the Government of El Salvador, which is dedicated to stopping that kind of behavior, to see an end to that sort of behavior.

Q To follow up, does that particular unit, according to your intelligence sources, have a track record of killing?

A I don't know which unit issued the communique; but you have to understand these are all pseudonyms, these are all cover names. I don't even know whether, in fact, among those units or others there is a consistency in the use of names. We don't have that kind of information. But if maybe afterwards you could get me the name of the unit, I'd be glad to tell you what I know about them.

Q It was ESA.

A The ESA does have such a track record.

Q On the Nicaraguan pipeline, can you tell us if the U.S. military maneuvers in Honduras have had any effect on that pipeline?

A I believe that they have, and I believe that's been a positive effect. I believe that has helped both to understand how the pipeline functions and to help the governments in the area to deal with the process of reducing the flow. I wish I could say that it was 100 percent effective, but I can't.

Q Is that a reason for continuing the exercises there?

A I think that's a decision that will have to be made in light of a whole lot of factors, not just that particular area. I would say that the effect that it has in my judgment is one reason for continuing the kinds of activities that have been part of the exercise program.

Q Sir, you project sort of some controlled optimism or hope, if that's the word, about what may evolve in El Salvador. What gives you that sense that the El Salvador experience may not end up like the helicopter on a roof in Saigon?

A I think that's a synthesis of having been there for six months as much as anything else, getting to know and understand Salvadorans, seeing their determination, getting a feel that, above all -- and I think almost every Salvadoran would agree -- the objective is to find some kind of peace in the country. There is not much unanimity on too many things, but I would say all across the board among Salvadorans, there are very few who don't want that objective for the country; and they are united in that more than anything else.

I think we will see that in the coming elections. It is certainly the hope of the United States Government that those elections will be successful and convey again that determination to whoever is elected that he has a mandate in that direction.

Q When you were president of Salvador, (inaudible)

MR. CARLSON: Let's make this the last one.

SENIOR OFFICIAL: When you get through saying, "If I were president of El Salvador," it's time to quit. (Laughter)

Q I don't want to ask you to speak counter to Administration policy, but clearly the issue on the Hill is conditionality and tying aid to conditionality. Why would not some form of certification, whatever the language is, not work, as so many members of Congress seem to insist upon?

A Well, your invitation not to speak counter to the Administration's policy is welcome and accepted (Laughter). I would say this: I think if you look carefully at the record, the acceptance of the Kissinger Commission Report in its totality is an acceptance of what that report contained with respect to conditionality, and I think the Administration has made that clear.

The problems with the Hill are symptomatic by the disaster that was produced yesterday, which is all conditions and nothing else. And it seems to me to be a host of conditions that are unmeetable. They are unmeetable in El Salvador; they are unmeetable in Louisiana; they are even unmeetable in Brooklyn. And as a result of that kind of proposal, it's clear there would be no policy of the Administration in the area, there would be no support. So in a sense, zero money and 150 percent conditionality is certainly not what the Kissinger Commission Report was talking about. Indeed, that's a far cry from the report.

Q But the certification that used to exist before the veto was something on that order. What club, what power, what sanction do we have if we don't impose some -- as the Democrats argue on the Hill, and some Republicans?

A I think the question, hopefully, will resolve itself around the terms and conditions of conditionality since the principle is accepted and the working out of the conditions, the process, the reporting, the determinations and so forth has to go on between the Administration and the Hill. Luckily, I don't have to bear the burden of that negotiation.

Q I guess my question is, is conditionality is a potential sanction needed to bring about the changes in El Salvador that you want?

A I think that it's clear in the acceptance of conditionality that there is a belief in the acceptance of conditionality that serves a purpose. That would certainly be my view, that it does serve a useful purpose, but it has to be carefully phrased. It has to be put together in a fashion that is doable, and it obviously has to carry with it -- because conditionality without either carrots or sticks is meaningless.

Q Thank you, sir.

A Thanks.

(The briefing concluded at 11:55 a.m.)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON UPCOMING VISIT OF CHANCELLOR KOHL
OF FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

March 2, 1984

The Briefing Room

11:07 A.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're going to spend a few minutes on the visit of Chancellor Kohl -- give you some logistical information and then some broader, substantive --

Q -- geopolitical --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- not geopolitical. (Laughter.) Not on Friday. (Laughter.)

Q I need some nuances. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Some names.

Q -- nuance already.

Q He who holds the land bridge to Asia rules the world.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Kohl arrives here Saturday night. His meetings actually begin on Monday -- that's March 5-6. And he will depart on the 6th. The origin of the visit -- I've got a memo here which isn't correct -- the origin of the visit is actually a discussion that the Chancellor had with the Secretary of State in a visit last December where they had an opportunity to spend a couple of hours talking about the overall international situation. And it was quite a relaxed and productive meeting.

And they agreed that if possible in the next few months that the Chancellor should have a discussion like this with the President. And what we have tried to do in planning this visit is make it a real working visit in the sense that -- very little ceremony, very little fanfare, trying to emphasize as much real discussion and dialogue as possible. And that has been something that we've tried to do in working on the visit.

It will be the first meeting that the President and the Chancellor have had since Williamsburg, and that was a meeting immediately following the actual summit in Williamsburg last spring. He will see the President in the Oval Office for a session and then have lunch. On the 5th, he will have breakfast with the Secretary of State -- on the 5th -- and will visit -- will talk with, not visit, will talk with Don Regan and Cap Weinberger on the 6th.

He will meet with the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the 5th, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the 6th, and he is hosting a dinner for the Vice President on the 5th. He will, I think, have several -- the Chancellor will have several press contacts; I think there's a Press Club luncheon that you're aware of. And he is giving a press conference on the 6th.

He will also meet with some representatives of Jewish groups. The topics, I think, are fairly obvious -- be talking about the state of the Alliance, the prospects for East-West relations, the status of several arms control negotiations, trade and economic issues -- discussing, already, I think, planning for the June summit. They will -- the Chancellor was in Moscow for the Andropov funeral and had an opportunity to meet with Chernenko, so there'll be a good opportunity there to discuss the new Soviet leadership.

And there are, of course, some bilateral issues. For our part, we will want to stress the very strong leadership role that the Chancellor is playing within the Alliance at the current time, especially the courageous leadership he provided on the INF deployment question. And we will want to continue the growing personal relationship between the President and the leader of one of the closest allies of the United States.

Yes?

Q The Chancellor has spoken out on the advisability of the meeting between the President and Chernenko.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is nothing new. The Chancellor,I think, both privately and

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occasionally publicly, has called for a meeting. And I know that he supports the President's view that if a meeting is going to take place that it should be a substantive meeting and one that produces real results.

Q Is there any value, given the Chancellor's view though, that there could be some value in just meeting with Chernenko. Is there any value seen in --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, you're asking me a question on the value of a "getting-to-know-you" Summit, and that's a different issue. I just know that, in the past, that when the President and the Chancellor have discussed that, that they have agreed that a Summit should be substantive and there should be a good opportunity to produce results.

I don't know whether his view has changed, and what, obviously, he will want to tell the President during this visit.

Q How much a problem is it in interalliance relations that certain trade on economic matters seem to be coming to a head. I mean, we do hear critical little noises from Bonn and other European countries -- the German Finance Minister Lambsdorff is in town right at the moment complaining about the deficit and, for good reason I guess -- how much is that going to overshadow the otherwise amity of this visit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't see it as a problem area that's going to overshadow an otherwise positive meeting. I think this is a real working meeting and these are serious issues and they will have to be discussed, and I think both sides want to discuss them. And I think -- I'm glad you raised the question -- because I don't think that people who write about U.S.-German relations or U.S.-European relations are emphasizing to sufficient degree the economic difficulties that could lie ahead. We are very concerned here about growing pressures of protectionism on the Hill. The Europeans are thinking about taking protectionist measures in the area of agriculture. As you know, there is a real debate in Europe about the future of the EC budget and its relationship to the common agricultural policy. And this is not the sexiest issue in the world, but at the same time, it means jobs, it means a lot of money, it means exports.

And I am one who thinks that if there is -- if there will be a very serious strain within the alliance over the next year, it will not occur in the area of East-West relations, or security, or arms control -- it will occur in the economic realm.

So I think this will be a very good opportunity for the leader of Europe's biggest economy to discuss these issues with the President. And this is part of a process which will be, I think, will begin with the Chancellor. We will have the French President here who happens also now to be the President of the EC. And so that will be a venue for discussing these issues. And we move up to the June Summit in London, so this is a very important topic. And, I think that in general, though, both the President and the Chancellor agree that we have to avoid protectionist measures even though the pressures on both sides of the Atlantic are very, very strong.

Q Will the President be able to operate concessions or comfort on either the steel imports or the West German concern about the high interest rates hurting their recovery?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, on the interest rates -- first of all, I think that the German economy is beginning to show some healthy signs of recovery. I think the official German estimate is growth this year of 2.5, 3 percent, somewhere in that range, which is very good. I think -- so there is more optimism now in Germany and in Europe as a whole about their prospects for recovery.

And I know that issues like the strength of the dollar, interest rates, deficits, all of those issues will come up. I don't think, though the President and Chancellor will want to be -- micro-manage these questions -- they will want to discuss them generally, and talk about the prospects.

And I've forgotten your first point about the --

Q On the steel tariffs.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think that -- I don't know whether, I can't say whether that specific question will come up. I know the broad question of protectionism and efforts to fight protectionist forces will certainly come up.

Q Will they discuss MBFR and has the NATO Alliance agreed on a new position to bring to the March 16th resumption of the talks?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm

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quite certain they will discuss the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction talks in Vienna. We have a new round of those negotiations getting underway in -- the 16th of March. And we have had some discussions with the Germans on that question. And we will want to consult with other allies.

I think that people forget that the U.S. -- that those negotiations are not U.S.-Soviet negotiations, they are block-to-block, if you want to use that phrase there, alliance-to-alliance negotiations. And we are in the process of thinking about those talks and we'll want to hear the German views and we will want to consult all the allies.

Q Well, do we have a new proposal?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. As I pointed out, it's an alliance-to-alliance --

Q Well, does the -- NATO have a new proposal?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're in the process of --

Q -- got a proposal, though --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're in the -- No. That is a misnomer. The Germans have been thinking for nearly a year about these negotiations. They have substantially contributed to a lot of the thinking about this. And it would be very wrong to conclude that at any -- if any new proposal is tabled in those negotiations that this is a U.S. initiative alone.

Q Well, it was formulated by us. Wasn't it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is not correct.

Q Well, who formulated it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The alliance.

Q Well, why do you have to consult if it's already been formulated? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I haven't said it has been formulated. I said we're in the process of consultation and I said if we have a new proposal.

Q Oh. (Laughter.)

Q What's the attitude of the administration --

Q You got that?

Q -- toward the intra-German -- excuse me -- intra-German detente in a time where the detente between the Super Powers seems to be dead?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, first of all, I disagree with the assessment that -- Well, I won't -- Whether -- What -- How one defines detente is another issue. But we are supportive of contacts between the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR. That's our attitude.

Q What is the status of the formulation of the new MBFR proposals? With only two weeks left, are you just putting final touches on it? Still some disagreement on basic points?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What we are doing

Q No, that's not the question. Is it almost finished?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that when you're in the process of consultations it's a mistake even on background to say whether things are almost finished. Everyone will have a say on the subject.

Q You are saying, then, you anticipate a new proposal.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I'm not.

Q You don't anticipate a new proposal.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I'm not saying that either.

Q If there were a new proposal, would you expect it to include some of the features that were reported earlier this week?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's possible, but, again, this will not be a U.S. initiative. Other countries will have their views. As I say, the Germans have been thinking about this problem for some time. Their views will be important, as will the other allies.

Q But do you view the Soviet proposal, which apparently does change the kind of exit and entry -- (laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Go ahead. Want to hear it. (Laughter.)

Q Was that a signal that there is some flexibility on their side?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They have -- Last summer, they have introduced some ideas on the question of verification and we have studied those ideas.

Q And what is your sense of those ideas? Are those ideas positive or not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Anything that makes the process of verification and the so-called "data problem" in those negotiations easier is a step in the right direction.

Q Is on-site verification going to be possible?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that's a totally different subject. That's not -- That --

Q How many years have these --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That has nothing to do with the data problem.

Q -- negotiations gone on?

Q No, but it has to do with our proposal.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Those negotiations began in 1973.

MR. SIMS: One more?

Q No.

MR. SIMS: You got it.

Q What about a discussion of high technology exports to the Soviet Union? Is that likely to be a topic?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that the issue could arise. I can't predict, but I think it could come up.

Q We don't plan to raise it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I said I think that issue could arise.

Q What do you think about merging INF and START? (Laughter.)

MR. SIMS: I think the last question --

Q Don't you have an important meeting to go to? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll tell you, I would be happy, but it would take me at least --

Q I've got time.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- 55 minutes.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 11:22 A.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF CHANCELLOR KOHL
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

March 5, 1984

The Briefing room

1:52 P.M. EST

MR. FRANKLIN: This is a background briefing on the visit of Chancellor Kohl. The briefer shall be referred to as a Senior Administration Official.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Good afternoon. Some notes here that I made for myself -- I'm just sorting them out. I will try to run down the issues that the President and the Chancellor were able to touch on. I think that I will begin with the general question of the state of the Alliance, because, as you know, there's a great deal of discussion going on in the press and elsewhere on the Alliance. And, I think as you could tell from both the President's and the Chancellor's statements that both leaders are very upbeat and optimistic about the prospects for the transatlantic relationship.

In specific terms, the Chancellor made the point that there should never be any doubt about, in Europe, about the American commitment to the security of Europe, and that in Europe there should never be any doubt about the importance for European security of an American presence in Europe. And this was something that the President readily agreed to.

In discussing military subjects there was an emphasis on the successful implementation of the December, 1979 decision which was reflected in both leaders' statements, that is, the missile deployment issue.

In the economic area, there was a strong emphasis on working on both sides of the Atlantic to avoid protectionist pressures and thus keep the world trading system open. And, as a result, to enhance the economic recovery underway here as well as the -- give new impetus to the encouraging signs of economic recovery underway now in Europe, particularly Germany.

And finally, in the political area, there was strong agreement on the common approach of the European allies and the United States to a dialogue with the Soviet Union. And they -- in common agreement that this current period of transition in the Soviet Union, particularly following the successful implementation of the missile deployment, provided the West with a great opportunity in discussions with the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries -- an opportunity that should be seized.

And both leaders emphasized their strong support for a fuller dialogue with the Soviet Union. And in anticipating -- I think an obvious question here -- and that is the issue of a Summit meeting, of course the issue did come up. And both leaders agreed that if such a meeting could be carefully prepared and had the prospects of achieving real results, that such a meeting should be held.

Now, very briefly, going into a little bit more detail on he subject matter: the Chancellor spent a good deal of time describing he current domestic situation in the Federal Republic.

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I mentioned the encouraging signs of an economic recovery there, mentioned the discussion of protectionism. He, obviously, is interested in avoiding protectionist measures agreed to on Capitol Hill. And the President here assured the Chancellor that he would continue his strong opposition to protectionist measures even in an election year.

There was a description by the Chancellor of the European status of the European community at the current time, problems that the community faces agreeing on its budget and a strong statement of support by the Chancellor for President Mitterrand, who is in the Presidency of the EC now and trying to solve some of these problems because the Chancellor believes very strongly that the European community is an essential instrument for European economic and political cooperation and essential, too, for the Federal Republic's definition of its own foreign policy role. Thus, he said that he would be a leader or at the forefront amongst European leaders pushing for more political and economic integration in Europe. And -- as some of you have probably heard his metaphor of the trans-Atlantic bride, he feels that the European pillar for that bridge must be strong and this means closer cooperation and consultation amongst the Europeans in the EC and assured the President that this closer cooperation would not come at the expense of the United States, that it was not an either/or question, that European cooperation would enhance relations between the United States and Europe.

On the question of the Soviet Union -- and there was quite a lengthy discussion between the President, the Vice President and the Secretary of State and the Chancellor on the outlook in Moscow, views on Mr. Chernenko. And there was also a lengthy discussion on arms control with the emphasis here on the preparation of a new draft treaty on chemical weapons which would ban the world-wide deployment, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. And, as you know, the United States is currently engaged in putt together a draft treaty which would be tabled at the CD, that's the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in the near future.

There was, in addition to chemical weapons, there was a discussion of the Vienna negotiations, that's on mutual and balanced force reductions. And, as you know, there is no secret that we are currently examining a new proposal with the allies on mutual and balanced force reductions and, again, the President and the Chancellor felt that this was an important initiative to take in the near future.

There was a discussion of the inter-German relationship, that is the relationship between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic in East Germany. And the Chancellor had an opportunity to explain developments in that area and -- as well as other eastern European countries, including Poland.

And I think that is a -- that is, I think a list of the important --

Q -- seemed unhappy about interest rates.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- important issues.

Q Didn't he blast the interest rates --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question of interest rates came up. I would not characterize his comments as "a blast."

Q Well, what did he say? Or how would you characterize those comments?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He, I think, reiterated what nearly every European visitor to the White House does, that -- their concern over the interest rates. But this was not a centerpiece of the discussion.

Q -- respond to that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, he didn't respond. But I think it's easy enough to sort of state our position, which is that we're unhappy

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about the size of interest and are working to get them down, and in fact, they are about half of what they were when the President entered office.

Q Kohl's reference to new proposals that implied only to the areas of the chemical weapons and MBFR, and not -- he was not talking in the context of the other arms negotiations --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Chancellor did not call for or press the President for new proposals in START or INF.

Q Does the summit meeting have to be based on an agreement on missiles, or can there be a summit meeting without a breakthrough on the deadlock on the missiles?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think -- we publicly and privately, I don't think, say what precisely has to happen for a summit. I think we keep our requirements fairly broad, that is, the desire to have a carefully prepared summit, and the desire to have a good opportunity to achieve real results.

Q -- so results have to be in the missile field, or can they be in some other field?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I've just said -- I've just said that we -- I don't think it's wise to pin ourselves down in terms of our own policy-making to say just exactly what progress has to be made in specific areas.

Q Following up on that -- you associated Kohl with those two U.S. criteria -- careful preparation and the prospect of results -- and yet he, in his departure remarks, I believe, cited only careful preparation. Is there --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't think we've thought of these as two essential components and looked for those two. I think you're looking for differences that don't really exist.

Q Is there anything of significance --

Q Well, what is new about it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's really nothing new about it.

Q Is there anything significant in this discussion between the two wherein they've both basically repeated past positions on a summit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Is there what?

Q Is there anything significant about this conversation regarding a summit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I guess it's how you define significant.

Q Well, you define it.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I wouldn't define it. I'm just reporting what happened.

Q Well, what do you make of the discussion between the two?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think the most important aspect of the discussion was that they were able to talk, as I said before, about this being a time of real opportunity with the Soviet Union and a real desire to work --

Q Why do you say this -- why do they think there's a real opportunity now? Could you elaborate a little more on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think, first of all, the Soviet Union has been dealt an important political setback in the missile deployment area. Thus, from our standpoint at any rate, we assume that they are carrying out a reassessment of their earlier policy. They tried to divide the Alliance and failed. So, it appears to us, at any rate, that this is a moment for them to be thinking about new alternatives.

Secondly, you have a new leadership in the Soviet Union and that is an obvious time to be thinking about new approaches.

And, thirdly, you have what I might call an outstretched hand. You have in the statement taken by the NATO Ministers, NATO Foreign Ministers in December; you have with the President's speech in January 16th; you have with the statement made by the President, the occasion of Andropov's death and the visit by Vice President Bush to Moscow; and the meeting with Mr. Chernenko. You have a clear sign that the United States and the West as a whole is prepared to talk with the Soviets.

So that, to us, when you put those aspects together against the backdrop of strong Alliance unity and cohesion -- this is the time for opportunity, it seems to us.

Q Is there any -- at any level, diplomatic level, right now, is there any exploring of whether a summit could be put together this year?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it's how you describe exploration of a Summit. If you're asking me if we're contacting the Soviets and looking at a calendar and looking at dates -- the answer is no.

If, on the other hand, you're asking us whether we have said to the Soviets, and are telling the Soviets, the circumstances under which we'd be prepared to meet -- the answer is yes.

They know very clearly when, and how, we would be prepared to have a serious meeting. The Chancellor made it very clear, I think, and, I think he spoke for the President when he said, we're not interested in a purely propaganda coup, or a political stunt. This, of course, was a primary reason that the President decided against going to Moscow for the funeral.

Q At what level, though, are we doing that? Has that level escalated --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no. We have high level discussions, and have had high level discussions, with the Soviets for some time.

Q On this issue? On this --

Q What are the -- Was there anything that moved the prospect of a summit forward from the conversations today? Secondly, what are the prospects of a summit before the election this year?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't say what the prospects of the summit are before the election. And I think that your questioning is kind of getting -- you are leading or creating the impression that the two, the Chancellor and the President, spent most their time on the summit -- on a question of a summit. I would say that was a minor part of their overall discussion.

Q We're trying to find out if there was any movement on the summit because -- as a result of the talk today.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think what's important on the question of a movement towards a summit is what happens in the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

Q On the summit, again, where you said there's no difference between the views of the two leaders, when Kohl said he only had two qualifications -- not a propaganda coup and well prepared. Is that definition amenable to President Reagan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it is, but I think what you need to do is -- I can give you my own perspective, that I did not detect any important differences between the two sides, given the fact that this was not the centerpiece of their discussions. But I would suggest you ask Chancellor Kohl, see what he says.

Q No. I'm trying to find out what Reagan view is --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think --

Q -- because Kohl did not mention results, and Reagan did.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, all I can tell you is just what I've said.

Q When you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I did not detect any major differences on the question.

Q You talked again about this being an opportunity now --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Why don't we give somebody else a chance --

Q Yes, if I --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's not because your questions are so tough.

Q -- I'll change the subject -- Was there any discussion at all of possible German arms sales to Saudi Arabia?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, the subject came up. The subject did come up.

Q What is the question?

Q What did we tell him?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We said that it was a matter for the German government to decide. And we pointed out our own support in the past for Israeli security. But that is a well-known position.

Yes?

Q Could we just go back to the question of the summit again? Does State and does the administration define any meeting between the heads of state as a summit or, in fact, is there something --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that --

Q -- is there --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- I don't know what State defines. I would have thought that any meeting between the heads of state is a summit meeting. I think that's how the definition --

Q Well, I mean, in fact -- after Andropov died, in fact, the White House portion of this administration was suggesting at least that something short of a full-fledged summit, something where no enormous developments could take place but which -- it might still meet the criteria of carefully prepared and capable of getting meaningful results, could transpire.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that's very interesting,

Q Well, was there anything along those lines that happened?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I --

Q And could you say more precisely what was discussed about Poland, you mentioned?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay.

Q -- answer my question please?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, what is it?

Q My question is: was there something beyond a major meeting of the two heads of state that would not involve an arms control --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

On Poland, the subject did come up, both with the meeting with the Secretary of State and the President. And, I think, the first thing I would say is we were just simply interested in hearing Chancellor Kohl's views on Poland. West Germany's obviously close to Poland. They have a lot of contacts there. And their views are important to us.

I think that, in particular, the Chancellor talked about the possibility of an initiative that can be taken with Poland through private sources to enhance the agricultural sector. And this is something that we have talked to the German government about before and something that, in principle, we're prepared to support.

Q Sir --

Q When you talk about the new opportunities for relations with the Soviets -- some of these people have met with Chernenko -- was there some feeling that Chernenko was more disposed towards a new, closer relationship, detente, whatever with the West than Andropov was?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think they -- everyone recognizes that Sovietology or Kreminology is a kind of black art and that it's difficult to make these predictions. But they're recognizing Chernenko's relationship with Brezhnev -- and some of the statements he has made in the past as well as some of his more recent statements, such as his speech last week -- that he is interested in -- it does appear that he's interested

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in a dialogue. And I think both the Chancellor and the President are determined to reciprocate.

Q Are you also saying that the U.S. will have new proposals on chemical weapons and MBFR?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't class those two together. On chemical weapons we have said, the Secretary of State has said publicly, that we are working on a draft treaty and we hope to table it in the next few months. In the area of MBFR, this is an alliance-to-alliance negotiation and we are in the process of consulting on this subject with the allies, so it's really not -- we can't make unilaterally a prediction. But, I think both the President and the Chancellor indicated their support for moving in this direction.

Q How many troops --

Q Would this administration consider sort of a get-acquainted-type summit without a detailed agenda a propaganda stunt?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I haven't said that and I don't think the President would. I think what he has said before is that a summit meeting that is not properly prepared and did not have the possiblity of making some progress as having the danger of raising expectations about what might be achieved that would be disappointed afterwards.

Q So it's not a valid concept -- in the President's mind?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think I have just pointed out the problems that the President has seen with that kind of getting-acquainted meeting.

Steve?

Q You said the Chancellor didn't recommend any steps to move on START and INF -- does the Chancellor and President Reagan have identical views about the wisdom of any new initiatives from the West or from the U.S. to get those negotiations reconvened?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that's going too far. I don't know precisely what the Chancellor's view on that is. I simply -- as I said before -- he did not say or did not press the President for taking any steps. Our position is that we're prepared to listen to Soviet ideas if they have some views that are different than simply returning to the negotiations. We think the best outcome would be for them to come back to the INF and the START negotiations. We also believe that making concessions merely to bring the Soviets back to the negotiating table will not have that effect -- it will have just the opposite effect: that if they think that by staying out of the negotiations that this will stimulate further concessions, they'll just stay away from the negotiating table.

Q You mentioned the subject of the German-German relations. What did the Chancellor say about the development of the GDR?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think -- it's hard for me to be brief on this question, because this was much more -- and I guess I should try to underline this for you in terms of the general discussion -- that this was very much an informal session, where there was an opportunity for both sides to talk about the background of policies, history, and their thinking on different subjects so that they could understand each other's viewpoint.

I think mainly the Chancellor was just talking about the new developments there; the fact that inter-German relations appear to be improving; the fact that that is taking place in the context of an East-West situation which has been fairly chilly recently is an interesting development, it was one that we were interested in hearing the Chancellor talking about. The President asked several questions about the GDR. I think it's fair to say that most Americans don't know what's going on in the GDR. We don't have a lot of contact with the GDR.

So, I think it was a good opportunity for the Chancellor to explain what German policy is, and what might occur there.

Q Well, what did he attribute the thaw to?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Chancellor? I think the strong desire on -- for one reason or another -- of the Honecker government to maintain its improved relationship with the Federal Republic.

Q Is there any disappointment expressed regarding Chernenko's recent hard remarks -- or any opinion at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't think that was our interpretation of Chernenko's -- you're

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probably talking about Gromyko's speech. (Laughter.)

David.

Q You mentioned that there was --

Q Mix it up, did you, [redacted]? (Laughter.)

Q You mentioned that there was agreement on Kohl's position that there should never be any doubt about the U.S. commitment to European security and that suggests that there may be some doubts around at the moment. Did Kohl go into --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, let me say he was saying that -- he was not saying that there is no doubt. He was saying that it was absolutely essential within the alliance that, on the one hand, the Americans recognize their commitment to Europe and, on the other hand, the Europeans recognizing the importance of America for European security.

Q -- on that line, how many American troops do we have in Germany and is Kohl worried about these being reduced?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Roughly 200,000. And I don't think Kohl is worried about those troops being reduced. And he has heard, I think, from a number of senior officials, including the President that there are no plans to reduce those troops. He did emphasize -- he did note that -- his disagreement with various proposals for reducing those troops.

Q Are you referring there specifically to the Kissinger proposals?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Can I follow up on that? Doesn't the fact that Kissinger was appointed to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board sort of undercut the administration's attempts to distance itself from that proposal?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not at all.

Q Was Kissinger mentioned specifically --

Q Why not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Because it's not the -- it's not the function of members of the President's Foreign Intelligency Advisory Board to publicly write proposals for restructuring the NATO Alliance. I think that's pretty obvious.

Q Why was he put on it, then?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know.

Q Was Kissinger --

Q You don't know when --

Q You've been quoted as calling those proposals bizarre. Is that an accurate quote?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q And was that met with criticism? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I was -- what I was quoted as saying -- and I don't think I was referring in the quotes to any -- to Henry Kissinger's specific proposal. What I said was bizarre was that in the aftermath of withstanding one of the greatest challenges of its history, which is the Soviet campaign against missile deployment, and having succeeded in withstanding that challenge, that it's somewhat bizarre for anyone to call for widespread structural reform of the

Alliance. I'm a great believer in the approach of "if it ain't broke, don't fix it." Yes.

Q Did Kissinger come up at all, can you just say?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q You said that it was the administration's feeling that Chernenko was interested in dialogue. Can you tell us what specifically leads the administration to believe this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think that you just read his speech last week.

Q Other than his speech. Were there other elements?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There was a conversation with the Vice President in Moscow.

Q Did the Chancellor or the administration have any --

Q Anything else?

Q -- have any feeling --

Q Just those two things?

Q -- that there is any new steps or initiatives the Alliance can take to encourage dialogue or is the ball in the Soviets' court right now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think we've taken a number of steps. You heard me talk about them this afternoon. We're talking about a chemical weapons treaty. We're talking about possibly a new proposal in the mutual balance force reduction talks. We're negotiating hard in Stockholm on confidence-building measures. There are a lot of things we're doing.

Q Beyond that, is that --

Q Did Kohl make the point that the Kremlin, in his view, is under great pressure from the East Europeans to be more forthcoming toward the West?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

MR. SIMS: One more question.

Q In the discussion of trade, was there any discussion of specific trade disputes between Europe and the U.S.?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, there was. Yes, there was. There was the discussion of possible moves by the EC to impose restraints on agricultural exports to Europe, and there was, I think, a recognition that if these could be avoided, that we would head off an action, reaction sequence which could lead to protectionism on this of the Atlantic. Both sides would have to exercise responsibility on this very sensitive issue.

Q Is there --

Q Can you just explain on Kissinger who brought the subject up and what was discussed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think I said -- I'll just try to restate what I said because I don't -- again, I don't want to over-emphasize this element of the

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overall discussions. But the Chancellor made it very clear that troop withdrawal proposals at this time would be counter-productive. And I think that should make it clear how it was addressed.

Q One can infer from that that he then raised it and made a judgment about it -- about Kissinger's proposal as a kind of -- as a bad idea.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't necessarily steer you away from that. (Laughter.)

Q Did Kohl --

MR. SIMS: One more.

Q Yes. Did Kohl say that he felt satisfied with the way the MBFR petition is going? Did he say it's moving too slowly?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, he didn't. He seemed satisfied.

Thank you.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 2:21 P.M. EST

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BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL
ON
CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS FOUND AT LORTON PENITENTIARY
MONDAY, MARCH 12, 1984, 4:10 P. M.

MODERATOR: Good afternoon. This is the BACKGROUND briefing that we discussed before on the subject of Lorton. It is ON BACKGROUND for attribution to a senior official of the Department. He has a couple of words for you, and then we'll take your questions.

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: The only words I have are to explain what the Inspector General is and why I'm the one who's up here. Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act created an Inspector General of the State Department Foreign Service which is patterned after the Inspectors General of virtually all the departments of government who were created in the Inspector General Act of 1978.

Inspectors General have a statutory independence and autonomy from the departments in which they operate. At the same time they do report to the Department head, for instance, I have the authority, as do all Inspectors General, to demand documents from any part of the system, to demand anyone speak to me in the system, I can subpoena, no one can refuse to be inspected or audited, and there is a range of statutory authorities that I have at the same time that I am responsible to the Secretary of State. So that it's a rather strangely defined kind of a relationship, but it is one of independence as well as part of a system.

I have no operational responsibilities. I may not by law have operational responsibilities in the Department, because I'm responsible for reviewing, auditing, inspecting what everyone else is doing in the Department and investigating as well.

The Secretary of State, when this very unhappy incident occurred last fall and came to light at the end of the year, was very concerned about it. He wanted to have the best possible independent checkup made of the whole issue to see first what happened, who was responsible, how it ever could have occurred in the first place; and, secondly, to see what could be done to try to close every possible chance to prevent a recurrence if we possibly could do so.

For that reason, instead of turning to the management of the system or to the Office of Security to do the investigation, he turned to me as someone who had relative autonomy and independence to do a special inquiry of the whole subject, and then to make a report and recommendations to him. And that is exactly what happened, and it was as a result of this inquiry and these recommendations that the three individuals who were discussed this morning by John Hughes were referred by my office to the Director General for possible disciplinary action as a result of the inquiry.

So any questions you have, I'll do my best to answer.

Q Does a reprimand make any difference to anybody's career?

A I guess it's hard to predict that. It would depend pretty much, I suppose, on whether something came up in the future of that individual, whether for promotion or reassignment or any other responsibility, during the year that the reprimand was in the file. It stays in the file for a year, a formal reprimand. And I can only suppose that it probably would. I don't know -- you'd have to put yourself in the position of someone making a decision like that.

Q And then after that year, it disappears. There is no --

A After that year if there is no other action of a reprehensible sort during the year, yes, it disappears from the file.

Q Were any of these people FSOs?

A I don't want to say anything which would identify the people involved.

Q Can you address --

Q Were they specifically supposed to look at those -- all of the equipment, and they didn't do it?

A There were a number of regulations and security provisions in the Foreign Affairs Manual, as you can review yourself. It's a complex document, but it's also an unclassified one on security matters. There are a number of provisions which everyone is supposed to take to properly carry out the security provisions of the government to take care of classified information.

The three individuals involved were found by the inquiry to have behaved in such a way as to cast doubt on whether or not they had properly carried out their responsibilities in relation to this incident, and for that reason were referred over to the Director General.

Q If you were an outside observer of this situation and you had seen the reports of the kinds of documents that were involved, and you now saw the kind of punishment that was meted out, what can you tell us to dissuade us from drawing the conclusion that this will broadcast to the rest of the bureaucracy that in the event you are caught inadvertently or advertently releasing highly classified intelligence information to prisoners, you will receive a verbal admonishment and a letter in your file for a year? How do you counter that impression, or don't you? You don't think it needs countering.

A No. I think it does. I think it's a legitimate question. The findings of the inquiry were really, I would say, twofold. The first was, as I have mentioned a moment ago, that these three specific individuals had not carried out the regulations to the letter in a completely proper way, and in the view of the Inspector General, their conduct should be reviewed for possible disciplinary action.

The second aspect was a conclusion that in many respects our regulations have not, over a period of time, been carried out with the meticulousness that they should have, and in a few areas the regulations and procedures themselves needed some tightening up. So that we have made a whole series of recommendations. I've forgotten how many, but it's a couple score, probably, of recommendations for different types of improvements and better implementation of existing regulations.

So that I think what you really have to do is to put these two things together. The individuals involved, although responsible for not carrying out what they should have known they should carry out -- it was in the rules they were living by -- also were part of a system which in fact over a number of years we now find because of this incident was not watertight and was not operating as perfectly as it should have.

We have therefore proposed all of these changes and improvements, both in the way in which existing regulations are implemented, and in some cases in the span or the regulations themselves which will, we believe, make it at the least very, very difficult to have a repetition of this kind of thing, and we hope it will prevent any repetition.

Under those circumstances, it seems a little difficult to call the three people who were, according to the inquiry, directly involved in the incident -- to put all blame on them and to punish them in a highly severe way when in fact an historical system has to share the blame for what has occurred. It is the historical system and the improvements necessary in it that we're now addressing, and I believe in a short time -- we have a system in the Inspector General's office after we do an inspection and audit, we put out a number of recommendations of a very specific sort. And we have a compliance system which is really quite tough to be sure that over a defined period of time those recommendations are implemented.

We're now in that process. A number of bureaus of the Department are involved in the recommendations. We're in the process of compliance now to be dead sure that all those holes are stopped up and the changes are made which will prevent any repetition. I think I'd give a long-winded reply in answer to your question as to why these three people got off easily and someone else would get off easily too. I think it would be incorrect to regard these three individuals as responsible for something that's developed over many years.

Q Isn't this a classic illustration -- one that I don't remember, a repetition of anyway, it's quite a few years -- of this system just covering up for itself, protecting its own people? Isn't this a whitewash?

A I don't think so. Who would you have responsible? The Secretary of State of today? The Director of Intelligence and Research? The Director of Security? Or today the individual Director of Management, the Director of the Foreign Service? Those individuals, I think, have not made specific decisions which have caused this to happen. You can look at it as a --

Q But there is responsibility, would you not agree, that does go higher than the three officials involved?

A I suppose you would have to say that a -- yes, that I think it's in a sense the system as a whole has been shown by this event to not have been a proper --

(Continued on following page)

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Q But who is responsible for the system as a whole?

A I suppose all the people that have worked in it and developed it -- put it together.

Q I know, but somebody is responsible.

Q Aren't the managers who manage the system on a daily basis responsible for reviewing the very procedures you're citing, and for making sure, especially when the President and other high Administration officials have made it clear that they are very concerned about leaking of classified information?

Aren't the managers of today responsible for checking on those procedures to be sure they are "water-tight," in your words?

A As I say, the procedures have needed some improvement. It is more a case of procedures and regulations which were failing in some respects, but essentially fairly sound -- their not having been implemented. Over a period of time, there has not been the kind of meticulous attention to things. I suppose "familiarity breeds contempt" in some respect when you're dealing with a very high volume of classified material over time, and a jolt is required sometimes to bring people to focus the attention again.

It is, I think, difficult to say that when, as administration follows administration, a new Director or a new

Under Secretary comes into office, that although perhaps in a very strict interpretation you could say that he is responsible for everything that has come before him which he has now inherited, the fact of the matter is that I think, realistically, it would be very difficult to expect that he would be able to start from a kind of a zero budgeting operation and begin again to review all the things that taken (inaudible)

Q Put it the other way: Aren't you saying, then, that nobody is responsible?

A I suppose you could turn that way; I would say it's a collective responsibility, but you could -- Yes, if you wanted, you could say, "Is it half empty or half full?"

Q Is it very hard to say specifically what the weakness is? Is it a case that it is too vague. It says, "You shall not let Secret equipment out of the Department," but doesn't say you have to open every drawer and look inside? Is that what the weakness is?

A There's that kind of thing. Let me read you a few -- just a generality of the types of recommendations that came out of our investigation. These are just to give you a notion of the sort of -- inquiry, not investigation -- but the sorts of, the categories of improvements and changes

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that we have recommended to the Department and are now in the process of seeing that there is compliance:

> "To strengthen specific aspects of the regulations requiring amended and more comprehensive excess property certification procedures; expand guidance on security aspects of word-processing or other automatic data processing equipment, and cross-reference where appropriate."

In other words, this applies to a better organization of the regulations, more comprehensible and lucid regulations.

> "To bring the current practices in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research into conformity with Department security regulations, to better safeguard classified information;"

to be sure that this particular Bureau from which these safes happened to depart is very correctly carrying out the general Department regulations.

"To insure that the IBM 100 and other word-processing or ADP equipment not approved for classified information be identified, properly cleared, and removed from classified operations." I think, as we've said, one of the problems was the clearance of classified information from automatic data processing equipment, which was not in fact supposed to have been utilized for that purpose.

Another was to make certain that the warehouse where material or equipment declared surplus or excess, the warehouse where it is stored, is very specifically and properly brought within the security operations of the Department in a more direct way than has been the case in the past.

> And then lastly, "to realign certain functions of the office of security and to be sure that the office very effectively keeps people properly briefed, keeps the whole system more directly aware and more aware from the standpoint of a personal responsibility of what they are doing and what is required of them."

Q We have two different issues. We have the data-processing issue with respect to the typewriter and the --

A Yes.

Q -- the files that actually made it. Are you able to say if an individual was disciplined for the typewriter incident and (2) for the Lorton paper incident? And secondly, isn't the system, whatever the system is, as good as the individuals who operate it? And a systematic change will only be as good as the people who adhere to that system?

Realizing that, do you think the appropriate disciplinary measures have been taken, again going back to an earlier question -- have people been seriously told that"you have made a major mistake?" Do you think that the disciplinary actions recommended match the crime, so to speak?

A Let me see, on the question whether the people in the system -- I think it's true. Certainly, no system is any better than the people carrying it out. But I think it's a more complex question that in that you have regulations and you have a system that operates; you have people who operate that system, day after day, year after year. They must be reminded; they must be rebriefed; they must be told again and again what their responsibilities are because people tend to not pay sufficient attention. All of us are that way, I think, in carrying out the regular rules that we have in our lives. This is one part of what we're doing.

Q Was it the responsibility of these peoples' supervisors to constantly remind them, is that what you're saying?

A I think that -- Yes, it is. It is the responsibility of those responsible for security in the Department, for those responsible for the management of the overall machine, and for the supervisors of the individuals. All must (inaudible)

Q Then, is not that line supervisor being held accountable, the person who is there, was directly responsible for seeing to it that they do carry out regulations? Where is this line supervisor?

A I've not identified who the three people were. You're jumping to a conclusion that one was not a supervisor.

Q Jumping back to the two separate incidents, if we could, were the disciplinary actions taken with respect to two different branches, whoever might have been in control of the data-processing equipment, in one area, and another person in, let's see, in Intelligence and Research, or were all three in the same bureau, the same branch? The two,clearly, are not associated?

A I don't think that information is public, is it? I'm afraid I can't --

Q They are not associated incidents. That's why I'm trying to figure out was everyone disciplined as a result of just the Lorton papers that got out? Or, the typewriter incident was a completely an entirely different set of circumstances.

A It was a completely different set of circumstances, but I'm afraid -- without -- my objective, as you can see,is not to divulge who these individuals were. The more you specify, the more easy it is to (interruption)

Q Can you at least specify -- you hinted that possibly one of these people might be a supervisor of the other two. Is that the case?

A I'm not going to be able to tell you more about what (inaudible)

Q What if we jump to that conclusion?

Q You told us not to jump to another conclusion. What if we jump to the conclusion that one of these was a supervisor? Would you tell us not to jump to that conclusion either?

A You may jump to that. No. Sure, I would tell you that because I really don't want to tell you what -- (inaudible)

Q Could you tell us physically what happened to the papers? Were they -- Did the workmen move into a classified area where they shouldn't have moved, and removed a file? Were the papers taken from a classified storage area and moved into an un -- I don't get a sense of the movement of the actual files.

A I'm not going to go into a lot of detail on it at this time, but I will certainly try to answer that. It's a reasonable proposition: in essence what has happened is that safes which were declared surplus were moved out of the State Department, to the warehouse, and subsequently to Lorton without

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having been properly tripple-checked to be sure there was nothing in them. That's --

Q Directly out of a classified storage area or out of the Department, an office in general?

A Well, both. I mean, you first come out of a classified area and an unclassified area, and then on to --

(Continued on page 16.)

Q Has the Department determined yet the full extent of the security breach, and can you determine that, just how many, if any, copies of this material was made?

A This is the subject of an FBI review over at Lorton which is talking to the prisoners and other people there, which is not yet completed.

The intelligence community -- it is already engaged in it -- it will, of course, do a very careful assessment of the extent of exposure or possible damage to security.

Q That's not been completed either -- the damage assessment?

A It's very difficult to do that until you know what the prospect was of the material getting out beyond the inmate who reported it.

Q So at this point you cannot say definitively just how much damage there was; you haven't made a complete and final damage assessment?

A No, nor will that be made public.

Q The statement that the Department issued today said "Justice has indicated that it will not pursue criminal prosecution against State employees."

It seems easy to draw from those words the conclusion that the Justice Department -- that the FBI as part of the Justice Department determined that there were violations of the criminal law that outlaws mishandling classified information, but that the Justice Department made a determination that it would not pursue prosecution of those violations. Is that a fair conclusion?

A At the same time that my people were doing an inquiry into this whole subject here, the FBI separately did an inquiry here in some collaboration with us but it was a separate operation, and they went on to do their study over at Lorton where the State Department does not have responsibility.

The Justice Department, on the basis of the findings which we shared with them of our group, and based upon their own findings, decided that they did not have interest in prosecuting these individuals. Whether they felt that criminal violations had -- a felony had taken place or committed by these people and decided they could not support it, I don't know.

At any rate, they said they were not going to pursue it. In other words, in a sense, I suppose you could say that the Justice Department's conclusions were not unlike those of the Director General in the decision against taking stronger action against them.

Q Did the Justice Department tell you when it reported that it would not prosecute; that there were no violations of criminal law, or did they tell that there were violations of the criminal law --

A No, they did not say there violations of criminal law. They simply said they were not going to prosecute. They did not comment on that point.

Q Did you know if their investigation is complete; aside from the Lorton investigation, the State investigation?

A I believe it is, yes.

Q Could you tell us, please --

A In fact I know it is. That part is complete of the FBI.

Q Earlier on you said that the Secretary, when he was informed about this, asked for a full investigation, et cetera. Was it the Secretary who decided that the punishment, such as it is, was sufficient? Did it sign off at his level that there would be these reprimands which stay in the file for a year and somebody gets an oral reprimand?

A The Director General is a manifestation of the Secretary of State, and his recommendation is approved by the Secretary of State.

Q So that it is fair to say that what we now have before us is the result of the Secretary having cleared it?

A Yes.

Q That's what he wanted; right?

The other question I had was that if all of these papers, these classified documents, had been in my possession, not working for the Department of State, what would have been the legal action taken against me as a citizen of this country but not an employee of the U.S. Government? Any idea?

A I don't know. I'm not sure what is being done against the inmates over there. That's the situation you would be in.

Q Not quite. What I'm trying to get at is that if somebody is in possession of these classified documents in an improper way, as the building determines propriety in this case, what happens when somebody who is within the system does something that is wrong, by your definition, and what happens if you're outside the system and you end up doing essentially the same thing? Will the punishment be the same?

Would you, for example, if I were in that position, just send a letter to NBC and say this guy did the wrong thing, stick it in my file?

A I don't think that the analogy is there.

Q The analogy may not be. Grant you, it's not perfect. But what I'm trying to get at is the care with which this Administration has expressed its concern about classified documents, about leaks, you didn't have to be a great genius in or out of this building to know that this Administration feels very strongly about the issue.

Then there's this hemorrhage and out of it comes a massive investigation producing three mice, and I'm trying to understand where -- how the punishment fits the crime; how, if this is not -- and I asked you the question before, and you really didn't answer it -- whether this not an example of all of you gathering around the corral and protecting your own because it's too embarrassing to do anything else?

A I think the main concern that the Secretary has had is to halt the hemorrhage. That's what we focused on, what we've done.

Would you regard punishment as more important than taking the corrective actions required to stop it?

Q Fair enough. I was just trying to ask the questions and looking for answers on your part. That's the way these things get set up.

So could you try to answer the question?

A The question is --

Q I can't put it anymore bluntly. You're protecting your own people. And if it weren't an example of the protection of your own people, probably the result of this investigation would be quite different. And I was asking you whether you don't think that's a proper kind of conclusion.

A I suppose one thing -- although there's no particular point in my turning to the Justice Department, but certainly there's some interest in the fact that the Justice Department has made a somewhat comparable decision.

Surely, if there was a sense of explicit, serious, personal culpability on the part of individuals, they would be prosecuted, I would suppose, and they're not being prosecuted.

Q Did you bring in other agencies,who handle classified material in great volumes regularly, in to consult on this? I mean, in correcting the procedures that you think went awry?

A We've discussed the whole problem with the broader intelligence community; sure.

Q From which agencies, then, do you draw the bulk of the lessons to be drawn in the corrections and all?

A I think it's the entire intelligence community, headed by DCI with whom the whole thing has been discussed in full, and we're discussing with them the corrective actions we're taking to be sure that what we're doing is the most satisfactory correction we can take in their eyes as well as ours.

Q One more, if I could. Would you be willing to say at this point that in the event, after the investigation at Lorton is complete -- understanding that it isn't yet -- but after it is, in the event that a prison inmate at Lorton is determined to have made a Xerox copy of one of these papers and given it to somebody, or made a copy and it found its way out of the prison somehow, that the State Department will recommend to Lorton and to the FBI, the Justice Department, that that inmate be punished in a method comparable to the punishment of these employees who -- or State Department employees who allowed reams of the documents to leave the Department?

A I just can't comment on it. I don't know. I doubt if we would make any recommendation on prosecution. It would be up to Justice. I don't know what we'll do.

Q Thanks for coming.

(Background briefing concluded at 4:36 p.m.)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

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PRESS BRIEFING
BY AMBASSADOR THOMAS PICKERING
ON SITUATION IN EL SALVADOR

The Briefing Room

10:06 A.M. EST

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: I'd like just to say at the outset and then perhaps open up for questions that I had a very good opportunity to brief the President on the situation in El Salvador; discuss with him the progress and process in the elections, their importance to the democratic process in El Salvador as an important step or stage in that process; to describe for him the current military situation, the reasons that motivated me to recommend a need for an additional increment of emergency assistance and the strong value that Salvadorans and my embassy and I attach to the plan that he submitted in support of the Kissinger -- the National Bipartisan Commission recommendations to him and the plan he submitted to the Congress in support of that.

We discussed as well progress in the human rights area in El Salvador, progress on the land reform issue, which is extremely important, and discussed some aspects of what's happening in the economy there -- a broad and general overview. He indicated to me his very strong personal support for the two packages, the emergency assistance package which we will need to support the elections, which are vital to the democratic process in El Salvador, and the continued long-term economic and military assistance incorporated in the proposals which he has sent to the Congress in carrying out the recommendations of the National Bipartisan Commission.

Q You're calling this military package an election package?

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: It's a package to support elections. That's been the major reason why we have put it forward. The view is that, as many of you know, elections will take place on March 25th. The Salvadoran constitution requires the winner to have a clear majority. It's our expectation, and I think the expectation of most observers on the scene, that it is unlikely in the first ballot that one of the candidates will receive a majority. There are eight candidates and three major candidates.

As a result, there will probably have to be another round of elections in El Salvador at the end of April or the beginning of May. During that period of time, as I think has been made clear to you in the past, we expect that the military supply situation will become acute, that the assistance provided by the Congress this year is literally just a little over half of what was provided for the 1983 year, to say nothing of what was requested in the supplemental.

And as a result, additional assistance will be required to sustain the military and to provide them with a slight increment of mobility.

Q There's no more medical supplies going into El Salvador now because of lack of funds?

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: The medical supply situation is caught up in this as well in terms of the military. I think we're talking about military medical supplies.

Q Are they receiving medical supplies now or not?

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AMBASSADOR PICKERING: Yes, there are medical supplies being received on the civilian side to deal with the civilian hospitals. That's part of their budget, and it's part of our aid assistance program.

Q But the military's not getting any medical supplies?

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: But the military assistance -- everything has been obligated under the military assistance. It covers all the lines of

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military assistance from ammunition to medicine.

Q Well, is the answer Yes or No? Are they getting medical supplies and military supplies or not?

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: They have some medical supplies, but they will run out. I can't give you an exact figure on the medical supplies, but they're incorporated as well in the $93 million request that covers provision on an emergency basis of assistance to the army --

Q I asked -- if I may just press one more time -- the President said yesterday that they were getting no more medical supplies, if I understood him correctly. Our information is that medical supplies were going in yesterday to El Salvador --

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: I don't know what the source of your information is --

Q It's the President -- which does raise this question --

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: But, the President makes it very clear, and the President's correct, that there are no more medical supplies in the pipeline to go in, unless they have been paid for by this earlier $44 million. But, there is no more money to provide additional medical supplies, to provide additional ammunition, to provide additional rifles. That $44 milion that's available has been fully obligated. What's coming in in the pipeline is not going to be enough in a number of areas -- one of those is medical supplies -- to keep --

Q Before March 25th?

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: No, we're talking about the period between the first and second elections -- and that is more attuned to the middle of April, certainly in May.

Q Well, Mr. --

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: Each, each of these supply lines, of course, has a different period. There isn't an absolute accuracy and equality -- it's a war, and the use of supplies in a war is not predictable.

Q Can you characterize how serious you see the threat to the election process right now -- given the military effort by the left on the one hand, and the supplies running out -- characterize how serious the situation is.

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: I would characterize the issue as serious. I've used the words serious, acute, important, vital -- all of those, I think, are apt characterizations given both the importance of the democratic process to El Salvador and the need for additional assistance right now in order to provide the army with the requisite supplies to defend that process, to see the country through that process,through the inauguration which takes place in the first of June, through the summer period. There is no anticipation we have now from statements you all have reported from the Hill, that it is likely that the bigger package, the supplementary package, will be considered before the summer. All of this has to be predicated on some judgment about those circumstances.

Yes?

Q Looking past these immediate elections, are you concerned about Congress's willingness to approve that bigger package this summer if D'Aubisson wins?

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: I'm concerned about the Congress's willingness to approve that package any time under any circumstances.

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I spent a week on the Hill two weeks ago, spent yesterday on the Hill, and it's of vital importance to us. I think that, as you know, we have taken a position in the elections with respect to any candidate, that we are going to be absolutely neutral in our public statements and in our private assessments and analysis with respect to candidates. And so, I will not venture into questions here which in any way at all indicate a favoritism or non-favoritism with respect to the candidates.

But the question is important with regard to the issue of that assistance -- yes. That assistance is extremely important. The Congress is looking at it very carefully. We hope, certainly, they will pass that assistance and in due time.

Q Did you tell the President that human rights progress was being made in El Salvador?

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: Yes, I did. And I certainly believe that progress is being made. Certainly not all that we would want or hope for, and not as rapidly as we would want.

Q Can you be specific?

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: Sure. I can tell you that in figures for political violence in February were the lowest in any months since the Embassy has been recording statistics on this -- since 1980. And the figures for political violence in February were 68 deaths as compared to the high months of 1980 where they were over 850 per month. No statistic, obviously, is acceptable if it indicates any deaths -- and our objective is not to compare 68 and 880 -- and say everything is splendid -- it's to say that the process is down, that that's the trend with respect to the statistics that all of the people who keep statistics on El Salvador produce, even though those statistics are not always the same.

Yes?

Q Is Mr. D'Aubisson involved in the death squads?

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: Mr. D'Aubisson has received, and been talked about in public many times on these issues. I think our point of view, and our statement on that, has been very clear. We have seen this information. We have reviewed it, and we have examined it. We have not found that that kind of information -- that the information we have -- is conclusive, as I have said in a speech in November -- conclusive for a court of law kind of evidence with respect to him or with others. But, that's as far as I can take that particular point, and that repeats what we have said in the past --

Q Why don't they bring the murders of the four American women to justice --

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: I'm sorry -- let me take -- and then I'll get to the church women's case.

Yes?

Q The way I follow it, there are 1,400 troops, Salvadoran troops in training -- 1,400 to 2,000 -- who have no weapons,

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and who would presumably be used for election day security around the country -- at the polling places. Is that an accurate description, and can you expand on that?

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: Sure. That is an accurate description. There are 1400 troops in training for whom we currently have no M-16s. We expect a shipment of M-16s within the next week or two, but that shipment will not be sufficient to cover all the troops that we expect to have in training in the period covering the elections and the inauguration. That is, for the next three, four, five, six months. So the 2000 figure represents what the short fall will be for the next six months. The 1400 figure represents the current actual short fall for the present time.

Q Do you have other weapons for them?

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: Similar to the M-16? You mean rifles?

Q M-16s -- anything else?

Q M-1s?

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: No. The standard weapon we provide under our military assistance program -- the standard infantry hand weapon is the M-16 --

Q Do they have anything to shoot with? I mean, do they have any weapons at all, whether it's standard or --

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: They have, within their own inventory, troops equipped with G-3s, some with oozies, some with other weapons -- FALs. But the 1400 were talking about means that in effect there are no weapons for those 1400 from any sources now in El Salvador, and they are counting on this delivery of M-16s to deal with that.

Q Mr. Ambassador --

Q Can you break down the $93 million request into the money that's going to go to resupply and ammunition and medical supplies, and the amount that's going to go to expanding the armed forces?

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: Sure. None of it goes specifically for expanding the armed forces if you're talking about numerical expansion. In other words, they're not waiting to recruit another 12,000 guys.

They money is roughly broken down about $50 million in what we call the continued sustainment which is analogous, in effect, to what we provided last year. Last year, there was $81 million. The additional $50 and the $44 that have already been provided have very little for any increase in major equipment.

The remaining amount is divided --

Q That's the same -- in equipment?

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: That's everything -- uniforms, training, ammunition, that kind of thing. Basic equipment. In addition to that, the rest of the package would include about a third of the additional part of the package, a third of the roughly $40 million, for medical evacuation including four helicopters and a number of ambulances. Last year, the President decided to train Salvadoran medics. Four hundred were trained by U.S. trainers. That's improved the field care of the wounded.

The wounded have to get from the field to the hospital and there's no way to do it. And, currently, loss rates among wounded in El Salvador are about one in three. And the effort is, obviously, to provide a capacity to get people from the clearing stations -- from the casualty stations to the hospitals where the saving record is good.

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The second part of that package is a mobility package. It involves providing the army with a few additional helicopters -- nine or ten are currently envisaged -- and a number of trucks. Currently, the army has to rent civilian trucks to move. That's designed to offset the real tactical advantages that the guerrillas enjoy by picking and choosing where they attack and the army has to defend everything.

Now, there is a slight bit in there of communications equipment. But that gives you a sense of that one -- do you want to go for your question?

Q Go ahead.

Q I lost you on the figures. I figured you were breaking down the $93 million package and then you made the reference to one-third.

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: I am. I'm breaking down the $90 million into two parts -- $93 - roughly, $50 and $33.

Q Oh, I thought I heard you say one-third of a hundred.

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: $43 -- I'm sorry. And the $43 is now being broken down one-third for medical and the rest for helicopters and communications.

Q Now, how about the women?

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: The church women's case is currently scheduled for trial within the next month or two. We have since October been on track with the Salvadoran government as to exactly how their case proceeds. Under Salvadoran law, there are fixed times to do certain things in bringing that case to trial.

The defense, as it does in any country, has the right to make certain kinds of motions. Most recently, I have been told that most of their rights to make motions that will delay the case have been exhausted. But generally speaking, we believe that's on track. That could come to trial as early as late April, perhaps as early as the middle of April if we have some astounding success in keeping things moving. But it's in the final stages and we're all hoping that it will be done fairly soon.

Q Over a year ago it was in the final stages of going to trial. I've forgotten what happened. You can refresh my memory.

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: Over a year ago, someone introduced new evidence that maintained --

Q Well, why won't someone introduce new evidence two or three months --

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AMBASSADOR PICKERING: Because the periods under Salvadoran law for the introduction of new evidence have been passed.

Q Mr. Ambassador --

Q The law isn't being followed, is it?

Q Mr. Ambassador, the President seemed to imply yesterday that if Congress doesn't vote this money that El Salvador, conceivably Central America's going to go down. It's going to be lost. Is there some feeling that -- did he get into a political issue here of Congress being responsible for losing El Salvador?

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: I don't know how Congress is going to see it. When I've been up there, the Congress has indicated to me their personal preoccupation with that particular problem. The question is clearly what kind of assistance is required just to keep Salvador afloat for the next period of the fiscal year, to say nothing of the urgent request to try to provide an increase in assistance to do what should have been done years ago and what continues to need to be done -- is to provide more security.

A third of their military force roughly has been trained and equipped by the United States after this four years. So, there is still a long, long way to go to reach anything like what would be considered to be favorable or helpful with respect to the military forces. And a military force that's one-third trained and one-third equipped is basically not a very effective military force.

Q But isn't there --

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: So, the issue is now for El Salvador I can't speak for Central America as a whole -- is there sufficient willingness on the part of the Congress, working with us on this particular issue, to provide the assistance necessary, the bare minimum assistance necessary, to get through the election process, an extremely important process, and through the remainder of the year on the basis of just "stay alive" kind of assistance.

Q But how do you -- If I could just follow up with one question, Bob. I mean -- How do you explain the fact that the U.S. has poured tens of millions of dollars into El Salvador and with all the action in Honduras -- from what we hear, the flow of arms from Nicaragua has really cut back -- and yet we're still in this dire situation?

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: I think it -- You have to look at what it costs to equip and train a counter-guerrilla force and how you should best do it. Unfortunately, there have been tens of millions, but that hasn't been sufficient to train more than, I said, a third of the force and equip more than a third of the force in El Salvador.

Our plans are, with the kind of supplemental request that has been made, to follow the Bipartisan Commission report, to provide additional training and equipment for the remainder of the military force, to get it in a position where it can provide security.

Q That doesn't answer his question. You've -- the United States --

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: And I've said -- Well, let me get to the answer of his question.

Q Yes.

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: And I have said that, without sufficient security, then, obviously the country is in danger and

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in difficulty --

Q But what's --

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: -- and the army provides that security.

Q What's happened to all the assistance and all the help we've been giving for four years? It sounds like we're backward. We're --

Q They raked it off the top.

Q We're in the -- Have they raked it off the top?

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: Absolutely not.

Q Yes, they raked it.

Q Well, what's the -- Why have we invested all of this and we're behind?

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: Because what we have put in has been less than one or two percent of our total worldwide military assistance. And while the numbers seem very large, the question is really what is required and what is sufficient. The President this year said $243 million are required to do the job.

He's gotten thus far $64 million, a third of which is being held up. So, he's gotten about a sixth of what he thinks he needs to do the job this year. In past years, he's --

Q What -- how about -- what -- You're still not answering --

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: -- gotten still a small percentage.

Q -- why have we been pouring whatever money we have into this country? As Chris says, the flow of weapons coming in has been at least curtailed. Why are we in, as you put it, a "staying alive" situation? What --

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: Because what we have provided in the past has been enough merely to buy a continued stalemate in the changing military situation in El Salvador.

MR. SIMS: Can we have one more question on -- the back here? We've got to do this other briefing or we won't have any.

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: You ought to take a careful look at the record, but $60 million in a country like El Salvador on an annual basis has been just enough to buy a continued stalemate.

Q And what makes you think if you double that you're going to -- it's going to be -- make a big change?

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: Because the people that we have trained and equipped have indicated that they can fight and deal with the problem and that, if more people can be trained and equipped, we have an expectation we can increase the security.

MR. SIMS: Ben, last question please.

Q Mr. Ambassador, we have said that we want to be neutral in the elections. Do we -- what happens if Mr. D'Aubisson wins? Are we going to support him?

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: We have said that we are neutral in the elections, but we will accept the outcome of a free, fair and democratic election. And we have said we will condition our

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policies with respect to the person who wins on the basis of the policies that individual pursues toward us. That's been our statement and I'm sure it will continue to be our statement with respect to that question or with regard to any other candidate.

Q We will support Mr. D'Aubisson?

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: We will support the results of a free, fair and democratic election in El Salvador without reference to the candidate. And that's been our position and will remain our position.

MR. SIMS: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Q Bob, just -- When do you need this $93 million by? When does it reach the breaking point?

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: We've already indicated that some of the equipment required will run out at the end of March and the beginning of April. We need to have the money in advance in order to order it. Often, it takes 60 to 90 days to get equipment there. If we have to fly it, of course, we have less money for equipment and more for transportation.

Q By when?

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: We would like to have it as soon as possible.

Q Did the President say that he's going to use emergency powers to you if need be?

MR. SIMS: We've covered that.

Q That's a pretty important point.

MR. SIMS: We've covered that.

Q -- that last question --

MR. SIMS: We've covered the emergency powers --

Q -- by general consent --

MR. SIMS: -- times. The President has the opportunity --

Q Well, what did he say about it today?

MR. SIMS: -- and -- so --

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 10:25 A.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER SOARES
OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC

March 13, 1984

The Briefing Room

10:30 A.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me first give you an idea of Prime Minister Soares's schedule here -- talk a bit about him, and then go on very briefly to sketch out the likely agenda.

He's been in the country since Saturday. He's been in New York. He's having -- had meetings over the weekend with Portuguese community and business leaders. Yesterday he flew to Colorado Springs where he visited NORAD Headquarters. He arrives this afternoon in Washington. He will be hosting a dinner this evening which will be attended by the Vice President at the Portuguese Ambassador's residence.

Tomorrow he has an 11:30 a.m. meeting with the President, lunch with the President, 3:00 p.m. meeting with the Vice President, 4:00 p.m. with Don Regan, 5:00 p.m. with Undersecretary of Commerce Olmer, at 6:00 p.m. with Assistant Secretary of State Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, who I think he'll also be meeting with this afternoon, in fact.

On Thursday, he'll lay a wreath at Arlington. He'll visit the OAS. He has a meeting with Secretary Weinberger. The Secretary of State will host a lunch for him, and in the afternoon he'll meet with Congressional leaders.

On Friday, he goes back to New York. He'll spend the weekend in New York where he'll be meeting with members of the Portuguese community again, and departing on Sunday for Lisbon.

Now, Soares is a figure of some international stature in addition to being Prime Minister of Portugal. He was a pivotal figure in the Portuguese revolution and its aftermath, and played a critical role in the establishment of democratic institutions in that country. There was a period after the Portuguese revolution, of which this is the 10th anniversary, in which the establishment of Parliamentary Democracy was by no means certain in Portugal. You had what essentially was a military government --

MR. SIMS: -- can we hold it down a little bit in the back of the briefing room?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- with substantial communist influence. And Soares and his Socialist Party -- Soares has succeeded in mobilizing a Socialist Party in the aftermath of the revolution, and played, as I said, a major role in the evolution of a full democratic system; and was, if I remember correctly, the first democratically elected Prime Minister of Portugal. He took office again after elections last year -- took office in June. The Socialist Party and their social democratic coalition partners have 70 percent of the seats in the Parliament. It was an important election victory. He campaigned on the need for an austerity program to right the Portuguese economy, and he has -- since coming into office -- made good

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on his promises and put through some very tough measures which have had the effect of correcting the Portuguese balance of trade, and stabilizing the economy -- albeit, at some considerable costs in terms of real wages and other hardships.

He's also very active in his capacity as a socialist leader. He's a Vice President of the Socialist International. And, both in and out of office, he has played an important role in the Socialist International and in its activities in areas like the Middle East, Central America and on arms control and other issues in which the Socialist International has played a role.

Let me briefly sketch out the issues that I think he'll be interested in talking about, or we'll be interested in talking about with him. And then I'll take your questions.

The Portuguese are very interested in Africa -- particularly Southern Africa. They had, as you know, major colonial holdings in Africa, which were decolonized more-or-less coincident with the Portuguese revolution a decade ago. In recent years, both the current government and its predecessors have made a major effort to reestablish their ties in that region to improve their relations, which had deteriorated, with the local governments, and to be come more active in aid -- advisory roles -- and general level of presence. This is an activity

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which we support. In some of the countries, we're talking with the Portuguese about coordinating their and our aid programs so that they can both be more effective.

The Portuguese are very interested in what's going on in Southern Africa in the agreements that are being negotiated between -- to some extent, with our assistance -- between the South Africans and some of the neighboring states. And they've been very supportive of this process and want their influence to encourage both sides -- the South Africans, the Mozambiquens, and the Angolans -- to play a positive role in these negotiations.

Another issue on which, I'm sure, Soares will be interested is Central America. He's spoken out on those issues; he's played a role through the Socialist International and has a continuing interest in the issues of that region.

Finally, he's planning, I gather, a trip to the Middle East. I don't think a date has been set but he is planning on visiting some of the countries in the Middle East, and I'm sure he'll be interested in the discussions on that region, as well.

In addition to these, there are the usual bilateral and European related questions. The Secretary visited Portugal in December where he signed the Mutual Security Agreement with Portugal, which both -- as a result of which there's substantial U.S. military assistance and economic assistance provided Portugal, as well as U.S. use of the Azores base.

Well, I think that that pretty much gives you an idea of what they're likely to be talking about, and I'll be glad to take questions.

Q The two other -- the two other base or facilities agreements being negotiated in addition to Lajes -- there are a couple of other negotiations going on.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The only other one I'm aware of is for a satellite tracking station which is, essentially, a technical agreement for a very technical facility, not a military facility. And that's the only one that's being discussed.

Q What areas of disagreement are there that we would like to bring up with him?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think there are many areas of disagreement with the Portuguese. We've had very good relations with them under all of the democratic governments that have been in office. Soares has been very close to the United States, very friendly. I think that there may be differences of nuance on questions of the Middle East or Central America, but basically, we found that Soares has played a constructive, helpful role in the socialist international discussions on that. He is a very pragmatic, sensible man. And he's had experience himself with the difficulties of establishing a democratic system with the efforts of some, including the communist party in his country, to undermine that kind of system. And so he's played a pretty tough role in those kinds of issues.

Q Well, would we like to use him as an intermediary in the Middle East or Central America?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think he -- I don't think we would envision using him or he would envision himself as an intermediary. But I think that we both value his counsel and believe that the role he played would be a constructive one, on balance, and helpful.

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Q So he'll get a short lunch tomorrow.

Q What's the kind of -- does he have any proposals for Central America, in particularly, El Salvador and Nicaragua?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: None that I'm aware of. Not in terms of specific initiatives or proposals.

Q Has he taken public positions --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not aware of any specific public positions. In general, I think he has been very skeptical of the democratic credentials of the Sandinistas and supportive of the building of democracy in Nicaragua -- in El Salvador.

Q On the common market, does the United States fully support Portugal's admission to the economic community?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Without qualification.

Q He's got two meetings with Chet Crocker. Can you be more specific about the role that he and the Portuguese are playing in the South African negotiations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it would be wrong to suggest that there's some sort of intermediary playing a direct negotiating role. They do maintain a presence and have influence, more in Mozambique than Angola at the moment. They have sought to use their influence to move the process in the right direction. They've been consistently helpful. They've provided us good advice. They have information that we don't always have access to. And whenever they've been asked to do so, they've lent their support.

I think that they're -- in addition, as I said, we are talking about coordinating our aid programs. We're already doing that in Bissau which is one of the former Portuguese colonies, and looking at it in

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some of the other areas, so that our money and advisers and others can be used most effectively. And they'll be talking about some of those concrete things, I would guess, in addition to sort of the big picture of diplomacy and the possibility for progress in Southern African negotiations.

Q There seem to be some movement -- or indication of movement -- on the question of the Cubans in Angola. I would think that there, in particular, the Portuguese would, maybe, know more than we do. Do you have any prior indications before the visit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think that their relations are better with Mozambique than Angola at the moment. But those are the kinds of things that we've -- that they've been valuable in, in terms of their contacts and ability to supplement our own information. I don't know of any sort of specific role they're likely to play in that.

Q What is the size of the military aid program?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me see, I think I've got the figures here. FY '84 -- it's $45 million foreign military sales, $60 million MAP, which is a grant assistance, $40 million economic support funds, and $2.4 million military training.

In the '85 request, which is up on the Hill now, is $55 million foreign military sales, $70 million Military Assistance Program grant, $80 million economic support -- which is a doubling of the $40 million of the previous year, $3 million for training. The gross totals, therefore, are $147.4 million in FY '84, and $208 million in FY '85.

Q Was there an economic program as well?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The figures of $40 and $80 million are economic funds. They come under the Military Assistance Program, but they're for economic use. Traditionally that money has been spent in the Azores to assist the economic situation in that region, which is traditionally one of the poorer ones of Portugual. The $80 million this year will allow $40 million to be spent in the Azores and $40 million in Portugal. So, for the first time, there will be part of the economic assistance directly spent in Portugal.

Q Would theirs be without strings attached to it, or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's no strings attached to this except the normal parts of those programs, but there's no special --

Q That aid program is linked, is it not, to the base?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 10:42 A.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF
PRIME MINISTER SOARES OF PORTUGAL

March 14, 1984

The Briefing Room

1:32 P.M. EST

MR. SIMS: This briefing will be ON BACKGROUND. It's attributable to a Senior Administration Official. We also have with us his colleague.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think as Bob Sims said, we have my colleague here who can correct any mistakes I might make.

The meetings this morning covered a number of topics. I think I'd mention Central America first. There was a good discussion, where the President was able to explain the U.S. approach to Central America, El Salvador and Nicaragua. They talked about the findings of the Kissinger Commission. There was some discussion of the evolving views of the Socialist International, as some of you probably know, the Portuguese Prime Minister plays an active role in the Socialist International and from our standpoint, a helpful and constructive role.

There was discussion of the forthcoming elections in El Salvador. And also, some interesting comments by the Portuguese Prime Minister on the evolving role of the Catholic Church in Nicaragua.

Beyond Central America, there was a good deal of talk about the Portuguese economic outlook, the domestic situation in Portugal, the Portuguese effort to become a member of the European community. The Prime Minister explained the major effort that he has taken to revive the Portuguese economy. And both the President and the Secretary of State praised the progress that has been made. There was discussion of the performance of the Portuguese government in working out economic austerity measures in response to guidelines or proposals laid down by the IMF. And there was general agreement that that effort has been successful.

The Portuguese Prime Minister pointed out, as well as other members of the Portuguese team, that Portugal is a very attractive area of economic investment, with comparatively low wage rates in Europe -- and the efforts that the Portuguese government, together with private Americans as well as officials like our Ambassador, are making to stimulate investment in Portugal.

There was discussion of the Middle East. As some of you may know, the Prime Minister met with Yasser Arafat in Moscow at the Andropov funeral. And the communists are reported to the President that discussion -- the discussion of the situation in and the possible emergence of peace talks involving Jordan, Israel and the Palestinians.

Then, I think it would be fair to say, there was discussion of the general situation in Europe -- East-West relations,

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prospects for arms control talks -- and Caspar Weinberger, who attended the meetings in the Cabinet Room as well as the lunch, talked about the success in completing the base negotiations, the importance of Lajes in the Azores to U.S. and NATO defense programs, and the hope that we can continue those programs, in particular focusing on the large increases that we have requested this year from the Congress in security and economic support assistance for Portugal, and the increases that have already been approved by the Congress in recent years.

So, with that, I'll be happy to take your questions.

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Q Did the President have any particular in mind when he said the United States would do everything that's feasible to help Portugal overcome its economic problems?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we are attempting to help the Portuguese economy. I think, as some of you know, they have had a difficult decade moving from an authoritarian government through protracted revolutionary situation and now to a firm democratic position. In this process, though, their economy has suffered. They have the comparatively low gross national product, about half that of their neighbor, Spain. And the new government, which I think has been in power now for only eight months, if that's correct, has undertaken some very difficult, very controversial measures to get the Portuguese economy going. And we are trying to help.

For example, for FY '85, in foreign military -- in FMS, foreign military sales credits, we're asking Congress for $55 million. That's a $10 million increase over the FY '84 figure. In military assistance -- MAP -- we're asking for $70 million, another $10 million increase. And in economic support funds, we are -- we would like to double our FY '84 request, that is to $80 million. So we're talking about a total of about $208 million all together. And in the past, we have also provided Portugal CCC credits. So we face a very difficult budgetary environment here in Washington, as you well know. At the same time, we would like to be as helpful to the Portuguese as we can.

Q Was that $80 million -- is that an increase over last year's?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It doubles. It was -- FY '84 was $40 million. So we recognize the Portuguese as very loyal, very stalwart allies, and we are working very hard to have that reflected in our security and economic assistance programs.

Q What was said about Southern Africa?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry, I neglected that. I should have pointed out that that was a very important part of the discussions with the Secretary of State, and it did come up today. The Portuguese have, of course, a traditional role in the area as a former colonial power in Mozambique and Angola. There was a discussion of the contacts that the Portuguese have had in the area, a discussion of our diplomatic efforts. In fact, the -- I think the first person that the Prime Minister saw upon arriving in Washington was the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Chet Crocker. And I think it's just fair to say that what we are trying to do is coordinate our policies in such a way that there is an opportunity to bring about a settlement in Namibia, to reduce the government of Angola's dependence on Cuban arms, and to see if we can establish new ties with Mozambique.

The Portuguese have a great deal of experience in the area. They have insight, historical ties that we lack. And so we are trying to work very closely together on trying to bring about greater stability in that area.

Q Was there any discussion about the current status of talks --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, there was.

Q Can you tell us what was said about that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think it was more -- and my colleague may want to add to this -- but I think it was more of a briefing where both sides were just sharing notes and agreeing that the current effort was a worthwhile one and that we should continue it.

Q Was there any discussion of the Portuguese acting as intermediaries on our behalf in the region or simply as advisers?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think -- well, I would put them -- I wouldn't call them either advisors or intermediaries. They have their own interests in the area. They're active on their own. In no way are we asking them to deliver messages for us. They have their own messages to deliver. I think that we have -- both countries have different roles to play, but what we're doing is staying in close touch and trying to work out a cooperative or coordinated strategy.

Q Was there any discussion of U.S. support for Contras?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There was a discussion of the situation in Nicaragua, but if you mean

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did the Portuguese raise this question, the answer is no.

Q How do they see the evolving role of the church in Nicaragua?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think they are somewhat disappointed in developments in Nicaragua since the revolution They share with us a concern that the drift has been towards an authoritarian, one-party, communist state. And they are concerned, as we are, about the implications of that for the church.

Q But he mentioned the Contadora group, was that -- Did he suggest that that would be a better tack than what the administration's doing now? Or what was said about that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we support the Contadora group. And, in fact, as one of the important initiatives under the Contadora principles is elections, free elections in both El Salvador and Nicaragua. So there was no real disagreement about the support for that initiative.

Q Could you expand on the new ties the U.S. wants to have with Mozambique --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not the person to do that. I would just note that there have been developments in Mozambique, relations and contacts between South Africa and Mozambique and that's one of the topics that was discussed during these meetings.

Q You mentioned Secretary of State Shultz. Did the President participate in the discussion about southern Africa?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm trying, now, to -- because these meetings tend to run together. I do not think southern Africa came up in the meetings. Although, I must say, there was a brief meeting with --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Briefly.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There was a -- It did come up briefly?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Just briefly.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it was discussed briefly.

Q What would the United States being doing on modernization of the Portuguese armed forces?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we are doing a good deal, as I pointed out with the figures that I mentioned, both in military assistance and foreign military sales credits. A lot of those -- Of course, a lot of those are credits and the math goes for the purchase of modern U.S. equipment.

Q Would this involve sending advisors and that kind of thing, training?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we have a military assistance program with Portugal. They're our NATO ally.

Q Where does he stand with the EEC? How does that --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the Prime Minister explained his desire, along with the desire of Spain, to accede to membership in the European Community. And there was a discussion of some of the current problems that the European community has with its budget, with reforming its common agricultural policy, a discussion of the relationship between that and Spanish and Portuguese accesssion. And I think there's a general feeling that accession will take place at some stage in the future.

Q Does the United States have any interest in military facilities for use on the Portuguese mainland?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, this is a question that has come up. It was not -- By the way, it did not come up in today's session, but it is something that we have --

Q What question was that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This was a question of whether we have any interest in the use of facilities on the mainland, as distinct from the Lajes Base in the Azores, this is a question, as I said, that has come up and it's an issue that I think that in the future we will discuss with the government.

Q Would that include a NORAD satellite tracking station or are you talking about --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Discussions on that question are now underway with the Portuguese government. In fact, the person who is conducting those discussions is right here, my colleague.

Q Is it limited to that? Is it limited to a tracking station? Or what else might you have in mind?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: At this stage, that's what it is limited to.

Q What about --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And, as you know, the Portuguese Prime Minister had an opportunity to visit NORAD in -- at Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, and based on what -- the sense that I picked up today, talking to people in his party, that was an enormously successful visit and that they have a better understanding of just how NORAD fits in to the broader security interests of NATO in the West.

Q What did he have to say about --

MR. SIMS: Last question, please.

Q What did he have to say about his meetings with Arafat?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think that would be appropriate to really go into too much detail, other than just to simply say that he discussed Arafat and the PLO's changing position in the Middle East political equation and raised the possibility that there were opportunities here for the peace process.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 1:47 P.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF
PRIME MINISTER FITZGERALD OF IRELAND

March 15, 1984

The Briefing Room

10:05 A.M. EST

MR. SIMS: This briefing is on background for your information only.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Prime Minister FitzGerald arrived here in the United States on Saturday, has spent the intervening time between then and yesterday afternoon when he arrived in Washington in New York City. The program in New York was essentially arranged by the Irish government and included the United Nations, a call on the officials of the city of New York, and a fair amount of programming with the Irish-American community. He also appeared on a number of -- or several television programs.

He arrived here yesterday afternoon. He met with the Vice President last night. He hosted a dinner in honor of the Vice President last evening. This morning he is addressing, at 11:00 a.m., a Joint Session of Congress. There will be a reception on the Hill followed by a luncheon in his honor hosted by the Speaker and, essentially, a group -- an informal group on the Hill called the Friends of Ireland. He will also be meeting with the Treasury Secretary and the Secretary of Interior.

Q That's today?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Today.
Tomorrow morning, he will be meeting with the Secretary of State. He will have a meeting here at the White House with the President at 11:30 a.m. followed by a luncheon in honor of the Prime Minister and his wife hosted by the Reagans. The luncheon will be an enlarged luncheon. It will not be the normal official visit luncheon, but it will be more the type of a state visit -- the type of function that would normally be held in the evening.

Following the White House luncheon tomorrow, the Prime Minister will be leaving Washington in the afternoon. I think he's heading back to Europe.

And I think maybe the best thing to do is to turn it over to you for questions.

Q Do we have any problems with Ireland?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Essentially, we do not have any problems with Ireland --

Q Any issues?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think each side has its agenda. If I can look to the Irish side first -- Irish leaders have, in the past few years, tried to come here around St. Patrick's Day, come to the United States around St. Patrick's Day. Two years ago, the then Prime Minister Haughey visited Washington on an official visit. As Prime Minister FitzGerald, himself, said the other day, this is the time of the year that the Irish tend to be able to get a hearing in the United States. And he is here for -- to obtain a hearing not only to discuss problems of Ireland with the administration, but also to discuss issues related to Irish questions with the Irish-American community. I think this is very much on the mind of the Prime Minister.

Q For example?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me return to that in a second, and just say that from our standpoint, our relations with Ireland are good, but point to the fact that in the second half of the year, the Irish assume the Presidency of the Common Market, The EC. It's useful to have a meeting with them and to go over issues related to EC developments with them and --

Q When does he assume the Presidency?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: July 1, and will have the Presidency for the second half of the year. So there --

Q He is coming into that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He will assume -- the Irish government assumes the Presidency in rotation on the first of July.

The President will also be visiting Ireland, as you know, in early June, and it will give him a chance to discuss with the Prime Minister the agenda of that visit and to prepare for it properly.

Q So the question remaining was, what are these issues that the Irish want to have a hearing for?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, essentially, from the Irish standpoint, the area of most concern to them is the question of Northern Ireland. And Prime Minister FitzGerald, without putting words into his mouth, Prime Minister FitzGerald is very much concerned that the problems of Ireland be resolved by the parties themselves, that they be resolved in a constitutional and democratic means, and he is very much concerned about outside -- unhelpful, outside influences that assist -- or that support those elements who are not working for a peaceful resolution of the question of Northern Ireland.

Q Is he speaking of material support -- sending arms and financial aid to the IRA?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't speak for him, but this is one of his concerns. That Americans of Irish heritage primarily not get themselves involved in supporting of non-constitutional means of changing the situation there.

Q What do the Irish want the U.S. to do that it's not now doing to stop the gun-running to the IRA?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm aware of no recent requests of anything more than they have. They have, in the past, discussed with us efforts to control the flow of material to the terrorists in Northern Ireland and we have actively pursued that in the past.

Q What's the best estimate of how big that flow is now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm afraid I just don't know. I would answer indirectly in saying that in general, terrorism has declined in Northern Ireland, although I would note that yesterday, unfortunately, there was an act of terrorism against the leader of the -- the political leader of Sinn Fein, which is the political arm of the Irish Republican Army, and so terror seems to beget terror.

Q Is that a legal party -- the political wing of --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, it is political, and, in fact, Gerry Adams who was shot yesterday, was elected in the last elections to the Commons.

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Q What sort of announcement --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- He hasn't taken a seat.

Q Sorry. What sort of announcements or statements do you anticipate at the end of the meetings tomorrow? What sort of subjects?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It essentially will be in the form of a toast. I don't know the contents of the toast of the Prime Minister, but I think the thrust of the toast from our side will be that we -- to emphasize the friendly relations we have with Ireland and to reiterate the points the President made in the St. Patrick's Day statement last year regarding the -- our hope that the questions of Ireland are resolved -- the problems of Ireland are resolved peacefully, constitutionally, and we support the efforts of those involved.

Q The President, I think, in the past two years has said -- has indicated the United States would be willing to help Northern Ireland with some sort of economic aid if there can be a peaceful resolution. Is there some actual plan in mind -- amounts, types of aid, what sort of industry will be helped?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, there is nothing in mind. We are encouraging -- we do encourage private investors to invest in Ireland, both North and South.

Q John DeLorean.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: 300 -- over 300 American firms are active there. Short Brothers, a Belfast firm has just received a contract from the Defense Department for the production of some airplanes for the United States military.

Q Well, I'm thinking mostly of any possible government --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But, at the present time, there's no proposed government plan.

Q What initiatives are being taken by the Irish government to help -- to try to resolve this situation in Northern Ireland peacefully, and what initiatives have we taken?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry, I didn't get the first part of the question.

Q What are we doing to try to reach a peaceful solution, and what is Ireland doing?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: From the standpoint of the Irish at the present time, they have asked that aside from understanding for their efforts and an attempt to control the gun-running, that we support their efforts to enhance dialogue over the issue and stand back. They have not asked for our direct involvement in the process.

The Irish, themselves, are engaged -- the present Prime Minister has resumed dialogue with the British. He met with Mrs. Thatcher last November. I believe a further meeting is set for later on this spring. The Nationalist parties of Ireland, both parts, are engaged in so-called New Ireland Forum, which is something that Mr. FitzGerald has given support to. That Forum is expected to provide a report within the next month or two. I would expect that the Prime Minister might address the drift of that report while he's here in Washington, but it's -- since it has not been finalized and while the -- as I understand it, the questions have been identified, the tone of the report and the manner in which the questions are going to be addressed hasn't been finalized. So he may not be in a position to get into a very concrete discussion of it.

MORE

But these -- from the standpoint of the Irish government, the dialogue with the British and the New Ireland Forum are the avenues which they are pursuing most directly at the present time.

Q How successful has the United States been in putting the squeeze on some of the gun-running activities? Do you have any examples of that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, there have been in the past, and I don't have them at hand, but there have been efforts, successful efforts, to -- by the law enforcement agencies here to thwart the illegal exportation of arms to Northern Ireland, and some people have been indicted. In fact, there have been sentences involved. We have also sought to work with the Irish community here to encourage them to refrain -- the Irish-American community to refrain from activities.

Q Well, in that connection, has the administration had any contact with New York City over the last few years when they've chosen these people to be in their St. Patrick's Day parade, which really annoyed -- I understand, anyway, they really annoy the Irish? Has the administration been involved in any way in any mediation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Last year was the real problem, and --

Q Well, they've done it again this year.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This year it is in a slightly different situation. If you look at the election of the grand marshal, and there is an election of the grand marshal, the candidate supported by the -- shall we say, the radicals, as it were, did not do very well, and, in fact, Mr. Gleason has been elected the grand marshal. An honorary grand marshal is Michael O'Rourke, who is a fugitive from justice in the Irish Republic and is under detention here pending a decision on whether he will be extradited.

Q Is that a subject --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This has not been a subject of discussion with the officials of the city of New York because it is not an official New York parade. This is a parade organized by the Irish-American community. The Irish government, itself, has issued a statement regarding the parade this year in which it notes with regret Mr. O'Rourke's election. However, the Irish government, itself, will attend the parade and will only desist from participating in those portions of it where supporters of terrorism are present. In other words, the Irish Counsel General and representatives of the Irish government will leave the reviewing stand.

Q In that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is an Irish matter.

Q In that vein, you say the Prime Minister is leaving Friday. Where will he spend the 17th?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm afraid the -- you ought to address his party. As of last night, his precise program was not set and he does have a commitment in Europe with the European community, I think, on the 19th -- 18th or 19th. So they haven't decided themselves what he's going to do.

Q Do you expect Tip to lobby him to become the -- for support to become the Irish Ambassador? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think circumstances will have to change before -- (Laughter.

Q Don't bet on that. The President might appoint him.

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Q That's right. A good way to get rid of him.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He just appointed somebody.

Q Is the O'Rourke thing likely to come up in discussions while the Prime Minister is here? I mean, we're still --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's a matter -- you know, it's a matter in the judicial and it's the process here and I don't expect it to come up. But -- other than to note the question of terrorism. And the Irish feel very strongly -- the Irish government -- about the question of terrorism.

Q Why don't the British just get out of there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well --

Q That would be too easy.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: How do you --

Q Do they have that much of an economic stake?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think there are a lot of issues here. I mean, first of all, what do you do with -- you've got two communities, a million versus 500,000, and how do you --

Q Take care of the 500,000?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: How do you take care of the 500,000 Catholics or the one million Protestants? That's the first thing.

And secondly, there are a whole series of economic problems. For instance, the British government provides $2 billion in aid, essentially, if you do all the calculations, to Northern Ireland. The standard of living in Northern Ireland, even with the terror, is substantially higher -- the per capita income -- than in the South, in the Republic.

Q But do they want to identify with Ireland -- the Catholics do?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Some of the Catholics clearly do. Many of the -- most of the Protestants clearly do not. And it's a matter of trying to work out over a longer term grounds in which some sort of resolution of this issue can be achieved. But, certainly, unilateral withdrawal certainly is not -- would not bring about a peaceful resolution -- reconciliation of it.

Q Can anybody reasonably or intelligently be discussing partition?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think we're in the position to do that.

Q No, you're not. But can anybody on the ground there be?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think at the present time -- one of the things we're most interested in seeing is how this forum comes out because all of the issues are being floated and all the ideas are being floated as part of this ongoing --

Q Where are they meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The forum itself, is taking part in Dublin. And they've done a lot of studies and polling and attitudes, and it's really been a -- as we understand it, a rather comprehensive effort at seeking dialogue. The Church has been brought in because it plays such an important role in the North --

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in the South, and it becomes a factor in the North in terms of the Protestant view towards what would happen should there be any sort of identification.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 10:20 A.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release March 15, 1984

PRESS BRIEFING
BY AMBASSADOR JOHN NEGROPONTE
ON HONDURAS

Mr. Speakes' Office

10:06 A.M. EST

MR. SIMS: This will be on the record but not for audio broadcast. If any of you want to interview the Ambassador while he's here for broadcast purposes, what have you, you can contact the State Department -- Jonathan Miller or Otto Wright, 632-6751, and we will make a transcript of this, make it available to the rest of the press corps.

Ambassador, would you like to talk about the meeting with the President and then answer some questions?

AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE: Yes, why don't I talk just a little bit about the situation, the way we see it from a perspective of serving down in Honduras, and then maybe take some questions.

Honduras is a country very concerned by what's happening in the region, particularly with the -- there's a strong desire to consolidate their constitutional democracy which has been in existence since presidential elections in 1981. They're looking forward to holding elections again in November of 1985. There is tranquility and internal stability in the country and there are no threats to the constitutional process that we can discern -- internal threats to the constitutional process that we can see on the horizon.

The Honduran military are fully supportive of the constitutional process. But I think there's a deep preoccupation in that country that goes all the way from the leadership of Honduras right down to the average Honduran situation about the impact that regional political instability can have on their future. Not only their political future, but their economic well-being. And in that regard, they're especially concerned about two factors. First is the continuing civil war in El Salvador.

They're very eager that we be able to provide the necessary assistance to the government of El Salvador to bring that situation under control because there's a general conviction that if Honduras -- if El Salvador -- excuse me -- were to fall into communist hands, that Honduras would be targeted next and that the risks for that country -- to that country would be significantly increased.

And secondly, there is a great concern about developments in Nicaragua. First, the military buildup there, the fact that Nicaragua has plans to develop a military establishment larger than all of the Central American countries combined. Secondly, it's policy of supporting the guerrilla efforts in El Salvador; and third, its Marxist-Leninist orientation and ever closening ties with Cuba and the Soviet Union. So, in that context, Honduras is definitely one of the countries affected by what's going on in the neighboring countries and looks to the United States to play a supportive role. They're not asking us to do the fighting for them in the region. In fact, they frequently say, what we want is the necessary economic and military assistance to stand on our own feet. They're not looking to our direct military involvement in the region.

But they are very supportive and they welcomed very enthusiastically the Bipartisan Commission Report, both because of the fact that it recommended significant increases in economic and military assistance, but also because it recommended a longer term approach to the region which they, as well as we feel is necessary.

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So, with those few remarks, maybe you've got some questions.

Q What advice did you give to the President for -- situation report did you give to the President?

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AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE: I spoke to -- I mentioned to him the concerns that the President of Honduras whom I had seen on Monday has about the various Congressional programs, the various proposals that the administration has put to the Congress -- that they be successfully passed through our Congress. And the President of Honduras, in fact, has sent his own Foreign Minister up here who, together with the Foreign Minister of Costa Rica, has been making the rounds on Capitol Hill and elsewhere within the executive branch and with the media during these past several days to show the importance that he himself attaches to the situation.

He's not only exhorting us to act, he's sending up his Foreign Minister, too, in support of these things. And the other point I made, which is very high on the minds of the Hondurans, is their difficult economic situation and their hope that these bipartisan commission recommendations can be implemented rapidly because of the critical economic situation.

Q Did he advise you that the whole program's in trouble despite the Senate vote yesterday?

AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE: We did not get into the discussion of the tactical situation. It does fluctuate somewhat from day to day, but I think that there's a hope and a desire that these things go through as quickly as possible. But I'm not the parliamentary expert on the House.

Q Can I follow that up a little bit? I think the issue in Congress at this point could be divided into two parts for Honduras specifically.

AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE: Right.

Q One is the military construction --

AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE: Yes.

Q -- that the Defense Department is conducting there for semi-permanent or temporary facilities. And the other one is the attempt in the House, I think, to cut some military aid for Honduras from $60 million something to $41 million.

AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE: Yes.

Q Is that one of the concerns that you discussed with the President or that the President of Honduras discussed with you?

AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE: Well, let me say about our military assistance to Honduras, to try and put it in context: first of all, the basic thrust of it is to try and help them improve their own capacity to defend themselves. And we have a military assistance program that, so far in 1984, is budgeted at $40 million. There's a supplemental request into the Congress, and we'll see what happens to that. But the emphasis is on improving the quality of their own armed forces.

In addition to that, there are some military construction activities, but I think there's been a certain amount of public confusion over the issue of what's permanent and what's not permanent. The only permanent facilities, if you will, are assistance that we are extending to the Honduran government with full authorization of the Congress to improve one airfield at Palmerola. That's the principle item. There is funding pending for another airfield in Honduras to which we would have access for various kinds of contingencies, such as search-and-rescue, reconnaissance and overflight.

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In addition, there was some construction activity of a very temporary nature conducted during the recent exercises that took place from August of last year to February of this year. But these were -- and I want to emphasize this -- were -- in no way could be considered permanent-type installations. They were dirt airstrips and so forth.

Q Wasn't there a de facto permanent U.S. military presence there? It seems that there have been, like, wall-to-wall exercises, training exercises, there for the past couple of years. And that seems to imply to some people here, as I say, a de facto --

AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE: I want to stress the thrust of our approach is to avoid any kind of direct U.S. military involvement. And the basic thrust of the policy is to try and help them improve the quality of their own armed forces, not with sophisticated weaponry but with improved training and so forth, to be able to handle their own situation.

It is true there have been military exercises conducted in Honduras practically on a regular basis since 1965. Now, admittedly, in light of the regional situation, these exercises given developments in recent years, have become larger in scope. But they still are temporary. They begin and they end. The exercises started in August and did end in February, and

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there were as many as 3,000 -- 5,000, in fact, U.S. forces exercising there during the peak of those exercises. And now the level of our military presence in Honduras at this moment is back down to about 1,700 personnel.

Q Well, what are they doing there --

AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE: A number of them are engaged in reconaissance activities concerning the region and will be there probably until at least after the Salvador electoral process, after which it's visualized that a number of those activities will also be --

Q What kind of reconaissance? I mean, what are they looking at? Are they watching the situation in El Salvador or checking on guerrilla movements or --

AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE: Well, I'm not technically competent, in fact, to give you a breakdown of the various kinds of activities, but it's mostly aerial reconaissance which is involved in gathering information that could be useful in helping --

Q Helping what?

Q -- Honduras --

Q Helping what? Helping?

AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE: Acquire information which -- concerning activities which might effect the Salvadoran elections.

Q So after the Salvadoran election period --

Q Who --

Q -- who are they looking at? What are they looking at?

AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE: Well, I just don't want to get into the technicalities of the intelligence operations. I said they were reconaissance-type aircraft and I think that as far as any kind of technical explanation, I -- get myself in hot water --

MR. SIMS: The Pentagon has discussed this in some detail over the 10 aircraft and given out a number of --

AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE: Yes, I'm not trying to be evasive. I think that I might give you --

Q Can I follow up with something you said on the --

AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE: Yes, sir.

Q You said that the level now is 1,700 and that after the electoral period -- And then you -- Can we say that after the electoral period in El Salvador, not necessarily the March 25th election, but, say, the run-off period, you will withdraw some of these 1,700?

AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE: The plan for the next several months is that these figures will fluctuate between 800 and 1,700 personnel.

Q 800 to 1,700? So they could go --

AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE: There is another exercise planned in the May-June time frame.

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Let me add here that because this is an issue that attracts more public attention, I think sometimes we have a distorted picture of U.S. programs and activities in Honduras. Our economic aid program, as it stands right at this very moment, is 2½ to 3 times larger than our military assistance program to Honduras. We had a $100 million economic aid program to Honduras in fiscal year 1983. We have 250 Peace Corps volunteers and Peace Corps trainees in Honduras. So we feel that we've got a very balanced program there and the focus isn't exclusively on security issues by any means. In fact, a great priority is spent on the questions of economic and social development.

Q Mr. Ambassador, can I go back to --

AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE: Yes, sure.

Q -- your discussion of the 1,700. You said that a majority of those personnel are involved in surveillance, reconaissance --

AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE: I said a large number. I don't have the detailed breakdown at my fingertips, but a large number of them are, yes, in flying those aircraft and in associated activities.

Q A Bronco is a very small airplane. What do 1,700 people do --

AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE: Well, in addition to that, there is a field hospital, there are a number of heliocopters. We've got the Regional Military Training Center in -- on the north coast of Honduras, where we have 117 special forces, enlisted men and officers, engaged in training. That's Salvadoran and Honduran troops. Those kinds of support activities. The figure adds up to about 1,700.

Q I guess it shouldn't surprise you, the Sandinistas yesterday said that an invasion is being planned --

AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE: Well, you know, that's the kind of charge that they -- if you look back at the record, they have put that out off and on over a four- or five-year period. It's --

Q We now have a permanent presence there of 1,700 minimum --

AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE: Well, it's -- I would -- First of all, I would question the use of the word "permanent."

Q -- ground reconaissance --

AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE: No.

And, secondly, they are not deployed in any kind of menacing fashion. In fact, the Regional Military Training Center is on the north coast of Honduras, far removed from Nicaragua. And the largest number of forces are also located at Palmerola Airfield, which is in the center of the country. We do not have people up close to the border or in any way deployed in a menacing fashion.

And, also, I think that -- if you don't mind me suggesting -- I think that the Nicaraguans frequently put out these kind of allegations to distract attention from their own very massive military buildup, which has been rather dramatic. They have 80,000 to 110,000 people under arms in their country, which compares, for example, with 15,000 soldiers in the Honduran Army.

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Q Why do we need the $21 million in covert aid for? What is so urgent about that?

AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE: Let me say on this whole question -- we've made our position. We've put it forward to the select committees that deal with these questions, and I'm not going to elaborate on what administration witnesses have been saying to the pertinent Congressional committees. But I would refer you to the Kissinger Bipartisan Commission Report which makes the point that, as a general proposition, that Commission felt it would be unwise to dismantle pressures and incentives on Nicaragua in the absence of demonstrable progress on the negotiating front --

Q Well, Ambassador --

AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE: -- and I subscribe absolutely to that report.

MR. SIMS: Mr. Ambassador, your time is our time, but I was told that you have an appointment on the Hill -- so you'll have to tell us when you're ready.

AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE: Perhaps two more questions, if you don't mind, and then you'll have to excuse me.

Q Why has the President not described the support -- whatever support is being given to the contras -- as an effort to apply pressure on the Sandinistas?

AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE: I've just cited the Kissinger Report -- and I seem to --

Q Right --

AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE -- recall that the President referred to that report in very positive terms. And I know that in my discussions within the administration, that people subscribe to that language --

Q Last year we were told it was to interdict the arms flow to El Salvador -- that would suggest --

MR. SIMS: Policy's always been described in those terms and justified in those terms.

AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE: Again, I refer you to that statement, and I think that it puts it in a somewhat broader context of trying to achieve some satisfactory negotiated outcome in the region and to contribute to some kind of acceptable, comprehensive, political solution.

Q So can we accept the premise, then, that the Kissinger Commission is reflective of what the administration's goals and objectives are?

AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE: I'm saying I think we can subscribe to that statement that, I believe, is on page 116 of the --

Q What's the --

AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE: -- of that report. Perhaps one more question.

Q What's the value of the arms --

Q Yes, I want to ask you about what your analysis is, or

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why you think that Congress isn't buying all these arguments. The President's been making them for months. Everybody, you know, has been pushing Congress --

AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE: I'm really not the person to give you an expert analysis on the Congress's actions --

Q Well, why isn't the argument selling as a whole to the American people?

AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE: -- but I would, I would say this: I've been down -- I've been serving in Honduras for two-and-a-half years, and it seems to me that during that period I've been able to feel, palpably sense, a higher priority being given, not only by the administration, but by the United States as a whole to the problems we face in Central America --

Q But you're point is not selling --

AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE: -- the Joint Session, the President's addressing the Joint Session of Congress, the bipartisan commission report, and I think the just generally greater attention that's being given to the region. We have five times as many --

Q With them -- with them, though, you can't muster the support. That's my question.

AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE: Well, I don't want to prejudge how, what the outcome of the effort is going to be, because I've learned from watching it from a distance that you never really know when the last voice has been heard until all the returns are in.

Q Is your job secure?

AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE: Mine?

Q Who's supplying the arms --

Q Yes.

AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE: Well, I feel secure.

Q Who's supplying the arms going from Nicaragua to El Salvador --

Q You're not going to be moved from Honduras? -- so, at the State Department, you're -- okay?

AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE: Yes. As I say, I'm not aware of any such problem. One last question.

Q What does Sam know that you don't --

Q What's the volume of arms going from Nicaragua to El Salvador now? Do you know?

AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE: I'm not sure I can quantify it, but there certainly are indications of both sea, land, and even air traffic of arms from El Salvador -- or, from Nicaragua to El Salvador.

Q Is it growing and growing?

AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE: Well, these are hard -- these are difficult questions to quantify. But certainly the amount of Soviet and Cuban arms deliveries to Nicaragua last year were at unprecedented heights. And I think it's reasonable to suppose that a certain amount of that was destined to supply the Salvadoran rebels.

MR. SIMS: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE: Thank you.

END 10:26 A.M. EST II 801

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON DOWNPAYMENT PLAN

March 15, 1984

The Briefing Room

5:06 P.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: From my point of view, I think the main features of this -- show the continued determination to reduce deficits. And this package certainly should relieve the pressures on those who are concerned about higher interest rates resulting from crowding out. And this should ease the job of the Fed in its battle on the monetary front because of the less crowding out. It leaves in place all of the incentives of the Reagan program.

Q Have you got a statement you're reading from, sir?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Just some notes.

And I would think that, put those all together, and I think this should ensure the continuance of the recovery.

Q Do you think it'll satisfy Dr. Feldstein?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll have to let Dr. Feldstein talk about himself, but, in all seriousness, I think this is the administration's program. This should satisfy all members of the administration.

Q [redacted] how is this going to do anything? This is simply an agreement among Republicans.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: First of all, you've got to remember that the eight Senators -- involve the Senatorial leadership -- are now pledged to get this through the Congress, through the Senate first. The House Republican leadership is also there. They're pledged to fight for this. As far as the revenue portion is concerned, that's already in place in the form of a bill that's been passed on a bipartisan spirit in the Ways and Means Committee.

So, if you believe what the remainder of the Democrats have been saying about wanting to reduce budget deficits, you have to think that they would go along with this package.

Q Sir, how much

Q Will the administration --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: A follow-up here and then I'll come back to --

Q Will the administration then support the Rostenkowski bill in the House?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right from the start, the administration has had representatives working with them; the financial experts, the Treasury tax experts have been working with them. And in general, we agree with many and most of the

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provisions in the Ways and Means bill. We know that it'll go to conference. We don't know what the final bill will be, and that's why in this handout here these figures are a target. They will not be the exact figures, obviously, that will be finally agreed on.

Back there.

Q Sir, of the menu of items that came up four weeks ago, how much of that is contained in this package that was agreed on today?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would say a lot of it is in there, speaking particularly from the revenue point of view. That figure was $33 billion over a three-year period; we're now at $48 billion on this target, but that $33 billion included a cap on health items which is not in this package anymore.

So, I would doubt that much more than maybe 25 percent of what we had originally proposed is in this package now.

Q How much of -- given that, how much of a reduction is it from your deficit? I mean, you're a 169 in '85.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right. We were originally at 180 on the budget that we submitted to the Congress. This now --

Q So, in fact --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- picks it up at 169.

Q So, over a three-year period, you've claimed deficit reductions of 150. From your budget, how much have you reduced the deficit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let's see. We're approximately -- We averaged 180, did we not, over the three-year period?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll have that --

Q [redacted] --

Q Does this --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Go ahead. Back there -- a follow-up.

Q The 169 figure contained -- 169, 150, 143 deficit reductions here. These were all based on the total deficit. What would it be compared to the deficit excluding the federal off-budget?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Excluding off-budget? This is --

Q -- budget --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is just on-budget. This does not include the off-budget.

Q Well, the figures add up -- from '85 to a $195 billion deficit which is the total deficit, is it not?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me answer that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, go ahead.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's not right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Want to step up here or you want to take it --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, when you get done.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. I'll wait --

Q Can we get some explanation of the defense figures also? What the percentage for --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's --

Q -- FY '85?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: My colleague will hand that. He's got all those percentages there.

Go ahead.

Q When Senator Domenici first proposed this 5 percent real defense increase, we were told over here that it was hard to imagine a program at that level that would provide an adequate national defense. You seem now to be signing off on that number. What's changed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I would say that this figure here is a compromise figure with the leadership. Something that we think is do-able. It does reduce our defense marginally. It certainly slows down the rate of growth in it. But, nevertheless, it is something that we think that both Houses of Congress will approve of.

Q Did the President get his request for -- to be shown some programs that would be trimmed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This was gone over very carefully.

Q Which programs?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, you'll have to get details on that through the appropriations process. But this was gone over by Senator Tower, by Secretary Weinberger. It was gone over by other people in the appropriations process and that will be noted.

Yes.

Q How willing was the President to go along with the defense cuts? Because we've been hearing for a couple of weeks now that defense was the hangup? Who was it a hangup with? Was it Weinberger? President Reagan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I would say that the Defense Department, obviously, wanted to get as much as it could. It thinks it needed that much. The opinion of others was that that wasn't politically feasible. And some place in between had to be

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a compromise.

The President held out until he was absolutely sure that the other two legs were in place and that this was agreeable to all sides. And then he signed on.

Q Are you saying this is agreeable to Weinberger now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q A tax question --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Go ahead.

Q The President said these were loopholes and --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Mainly.

Q -- not tax increases.

Well, I was going to ask, for instance, about income averaging. Is that a loophole?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, for those that could benefit from it. And all we're doing there, we're extending it now to three years and 140 percent, rather than the 120 percent that it is now.

Q Over four years. It's now four years.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Four years. Yes.

Q -- capital health care, does that mean -- from this package -- does that mean you're going to forego it this year?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not sure. That's an item that was supposed to come up in the Senate Finance Committee this afternoon. And I don't know what's happened to it, whether they have discussed it or not. But Senator Dole was trying to find some additional revenue raisers to fit in with some of the revenue losers that he's enacted. So I don't know what's going to come out of that.

Q That means the administration is still --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We'd like to see it, yes. We'd like to see it -- at least an initial downpayment on that to establish the principle.

Yes.

Q Are there any taxes in here on alcohol and tobacco?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Senate version does have that. You see, we, in this -- Again, I repeat, we have put this as a target. We don't know what the final items will be, particularly after the conference. So we are not hung up on any one specific item, as long as it will total around the $48 billion. But alcohol is in the Senate Finance version.

Q Tobacco?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Tobacco to the extent of 12¢ a pack. It's now 8¢ -- It is now 16¢. It was due to go down to 8¢. It will remain at 12¢.

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Yes.

Q Are you suggesting this keeps the Fed from raising the prime rate either tomorrow or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That doesn't raise any prime rate. Let's get that straight. Banks raise the prime rate.

Q Well -- but, I mean, the banks raise it; but based on the Fed's policy. Do you think this keeps the Fed from --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I would say that it makes the job of monetary policy a lot easier to see this fiscal act of reducing $150 billion over a three-year period out of the public sector back into the private sector. It makes that much money available for others.

Q If this package was approved, should the Fed expand its monetary targets?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're not going to tell the Fed what to do. We're going to let the Fed guide -- what this is. The Fed has called for deficit reductions. These are deficit reductions.

Q How much of the $48 billion in your tax loophole package was in your budget already?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, again, I said we had $33 billion as a figure --

Q Over three years --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Over three years.

Q What was the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is now $48. Now, many of the items that we had in have been taken out, new ones have been put in.

Q How much of what's in there now was in your budget?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In what? You see, again, I come back to what I'm trying to tell you. There's a Senate version, there's a House version. We don't know what the final version will be, so I'm unable to tell you unless you specify --

Q This list that we've been handed is not definite then, or does not --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Notice what it says. It says there are similarities in these items between the two versions. And there's an additional $10 billion or so that's still to come -- the different items of each, and has to be reconciled.

Q Can we ask some questions about spending now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: One back here, and then I'll be out.

Q What will happen to interest rates if this package passes, will they --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have no idea, except that I'll repeat that this makes the job -- or should lessen the fears on crowding out, let me put it that way. Because there will be $150 billion less that the federal government will be taking than had been previously expected.

Okay, my colleague --

Q Can you give us the defense numbers?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Those are on the bottom of the page.

Q Can you give us the percentages as far as --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Those are on the bottom of the page, too, if you'll --

Q Is that BA or outlay?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Defense growth is always measured in BA. This is the national defense function which includes DOD. This is the way they do it on the Hill in the budget process and in the budget resolution.

Q The 5 percent is the BA?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, the 5 percent is real BA growth of 1984 -- the budget resolution mark, compared to the number of 299 that we've agreed to for 1985 on the defense function.

Yes?

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Q To get back to the question of what we were told several weeks ago when Domenici first proposed 5 percent -- we were told that that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The real issue is the dollar level, okay? And there are all kinds of different ways of measuring the real growth rate. We have one set of inflators or inflation assumptions, CBO has another, there's the question of the starting point --

Q But --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- now if I can just finish this -- the problem with the original Domenici plan was the number -- and that's what counts -- the defense budget authority number for 1985 we felt was unacceptably low. His number was 293 for the defense function. If you look on this paper, you see we have 299, and that's the agreed level. Our original request was nearly 313.5, 314.

Now, the second point was, his proposal was on a three year basis, and on a three year basis he cut more than $80 billion in defense budget authority. And there was no way that the Secretary of Defense and other, including John Tower and many others in the Senate -- Ted Stevens -- felt that that big of a defense budget authority cut, and that's really the thing that drives the defense program in terms of what we do, was compatible with not absorbing unacceptable risks in terms of our defense program.

So, this is substantially different, and less of an impact, but still a very major change in the total number of defense dollars.

Q What's the comparison in terms of 3-year budget authority to the $80 billion that Domenici has proposed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay, if you will look at the very bottom of the page, it says "Change from Administration Request." This agreement would cut 14.4 as you can see, in '85 -- 25 -- and then 17. So it's -- 57 rounded.

Q So 57 compares to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: $57 billion -- that compares to '81. We felt that $57 was the absolute limit over 3 years that you could absorb in terms of major changes in the defense program in terms of giving up on some important objectives, or taking security risks that we felt not acceptable.

Q The President insisted that it be demonstrated what programs were at stake. What was he told by the Senators, and can you tell us what programs were trimmed here? Or was that issue put off to the Appropriations Committee?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, that was discussed a lot among those who were the defense experts in the process. And, frankly, this thing was worked over and over and over between the leadership in the defense committees and the Senate -- Senator Tower, Senator Stevens, Senator Domenici, from the budget committee -- and obviously people from the administration and the Defense Department. And these numbers were the result of going through a quite difficult process in terms of figuring out what you would have to give up to get down to that number.

Q Can you tell us?

Q What are they? What are we giving up?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, what this then becomes is a ceiling, an overall level, for the authorization bill to

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be marked up and for the appropriations bill later. Now, at some point, we are going to be working on a line-item basis. Remember, there are about 2,000 or 3,000 line-items in the defense authorization and appropriations -- we'll be working with line-item details with the committee to indicate where these adjustments have to occur.

Q You don't want to tell us --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Nobody has a --

Q What was the President told, though?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon.

Q That's the point.

Q What was the President told. What things was the President told he'd have to give up in his budget --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Now, look -- I'm not going to go through all of the conversations that occurred as to what you could possibly give up. There are a lot of different ways to get to 299. But basically what he was told is that we can maintain the defense modernization that we have underway in the conventional area, most of the systems that we think are important -- that this will not impinge on our strategic program in terms of the three or four basic programs that are important -- MX, B-1 and the Trident --

Q Domenici cut that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- if I could just continue. That this will provide enough funds, although with some reduction for readiness and for pay. Now, you're going to have to sqeeze back in all four of those areas on the margin to live with these dollars.

Q Which four?

Q List them again.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In every area in the budget you're going to have squeeze back on the margins, but you can come up with a mix that is not going to undermine the fundamental thrust of strategic, conventional modernization, readiness and an adequate pay level for the forces.

Q Does this effect the Star Wars Program? The space defense program?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we're talking about a $300 billion, $299 billion, budget. That program in 1985 is less than 1 percent of that, so it obviously doesn't have to have any direct effect, and hopefully it won't.

Q What proportion, then, of this effects readiness, maintenance, operations -- versus weapons procurement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That -- the only thing you can say right now is that there will have to be some balanced reductions taken. I don't think anybody can take, right at this point, the 14.4 and down to the nearest $10 million dollars, tell you exactly what accounts it's coming out of. That will happen as you finally write that long, detailed appropriations bill. But to arrive at this number we had to do some fairly hard looking at each of the major components of the budget to see what could be done and what was compatible with not taking unacceptable risks. So, I won't take any more questions on this, because this is as far as the answer could go.

Q Domenici --

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Q What about entitlement --

Q Domenici, you said, had an outlay, or had a BA reduction of over $80 billion.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: $81 billion.

Q His outlay savings was somewhere in the $40's, right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right.

Q You've come down with a BA reduction of only $57 -- and you're still claiming an outlay reduction?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's because he, in that original proposal -- and one of the problems with it -- was that he took all of his BA cuts, or disproportionately budget authority cuts. And that's what Congress votes. You know, the outlays happen after somebody delivers a weapon, or somebody gets their paycheck. But he took his budget authority reductions disproportionately in procurement, and they were so large that they would have impinged on some things that we think are highly important --

Q So to achieve the outlay reduction, you're going to have to take them elsewhere from procurement, right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, as a result of being so heavily weighted towards procurement, he got fewer outlays over the three years, because it takes 8 years to build a ship, and 5 years to get some of the more sophisticated planes on line and so forth --

Q Can you run over the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- that's the reason for the difference.

Q The point earlier about the deficit totals --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. Can I answer that question that was raised? All of the calculations on this paper are from the current services baseline. In other words, we go all the way back to the starting point -- the built-in revenues under current law, the built-in costs of all the entitlements --

Q July of 83?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it's the January budget current services baseline. That is -- those numbers are all in there -- what it would cost in both the revenue, or on the outlay side, and what the revenue would be generated on the tax side, under current law. Now, all of these reductions -- the $150 billion package -- are either revenue increases to current law taxes, or revenue -- or they are spending reductions from (a) our defense request, or (b) current services baseline for all the non-defense programs.

Q What does that mean?

Q That means that if I add up $25 and $159 and come up with -- my guess is $194 -- that $194 corresponds to the

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180 deficit in the budget had all our policy recommendations in it. If you stripped all of those out and went back to the starting point, which is to say the current law baseline for revenues and our defense request and current lost spending on all the other programs, you would go back to 194. That's right.

Q -- budget deficit is increasing.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q Let's go back to the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: How much of the 150?

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, none of the defense is in there, obviously, none of the defense savings, so that's 40.

On revenue, we had net of 33 billion. Now, it was gross at 40; but then we had some revenue losers for some of our initiatives. So in the budget, calculating the deficit net of 33. This is 48. So in net revenue terms from current law, there would be that additional amount of about 15 billion.

On spending, there is a different way of getting to the spending than we have in the budget. The discretionary appropriations freeze is across the board, not program-by-program but for all non-defense appropriated accounts. We have ups and down, but it would probably net out pretty much the same. So on the spending side, it's fairly close to our budget, although a little more. On the defense side, none of it is in our budget because we --

Q Your $150 billion savings in the deficit, how --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that's from the --

Q In 1985, you've only cut your budget by $11 billion really. There's an $11 billion difference in your deficit.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, but our budget -- now, come on, you know this -- our budget had a variety of cuts --

Q All I want to be able to explain to people is when the President talks about his downpayment of $150 billion or $25 billion in '85, he's really only talking $11 billion more than the deficit that he's already presented to the country in January.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, but that deficit that he presented in January assumed that Congress would enact all these revenue measures. It assumed that Congress would enact some of the entitlement changes that we had in the budget and that it would hold discretionary spending down.

Now, what we're saying is we have an agreement here to do just that. And that agreement adds up to $150 billion.

Q How much would it have been --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There wasn't -- The President's budget in January wouldn't have been $180 billion deficit, if Congress had sat on its hands all year, if there hadn't been any agreement, the deficit would have resulted in 1985 at

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$194 billion because no tax law would have been changed, no entitlement law would have been changed, no appropriations would have been constrained.

Q Why don't you want to give us the number that compares with the 150?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: With the 150?

Q You know the number. What --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, let me calculate it, if you want to have it. 40 of it isn't in there, of the 150, because that's defense savings. We didn't propose those in January.

Q No, that's not what I'm asking. What I'm asking is is over three years your deficits are 169, 150 and 143 with this package. How much is that less than the deficit you've presented in your budget?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: $74 billion.

Q Thank you.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But the deficits in our budget assumed a lot of things that would be enacted that are included in this package. So I hope no one makes the point that this isn't 150.

Q How come --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On the basis that this whole system does budgeting, Congress and the budget resolution and so forth, we always start from the built-in baseline, the current law baseline. And this is 150 and it's legitimate and hard and genuine from the baseline that would occur if nothing happened.

Q Why isn't that 74 the same as the 40 in defense that you're saving plus the 15 in additional revenue increases --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Because you've got more debt service savings and the non-defense is a little higher than what we have in the budget. We --

Q Can you give the corresponding percentage figures -- the President asked -- on the defense only numbers. The President had asked for a 13 percent real increase on military only. What will the increase be now in '85? And then '86 and '87?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it's at the bottom of the page here.

Q That's using CBO numbers, though.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, well, our deflaters are somewhat different.

Q What's -- what's --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have a lower inflation assumption. I mean -- And --

Q I just want to keep apples and apples --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. Using our inflation, which is 4½ percent for the defense market basket, rather than CBO's which is 6 for '85, the growth is about 7½ percent or some fraction for '85.

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Q And for '86?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't have that one right in my head; but it's not more than 5 percent, I'm sure.

Q Now, on the outlay side, what are the real reductions in outlays from what the administration proposed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The numbers that you see at the bottom --

Q -- proposed in '85, military only outlay increases, real, from 9.3.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, that's the growth rate.

Q Right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. What's the --

Q What is it now? Or what would it be now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll have to calculate that for you. Nobody pays any attention to the outlay real growth rate. Whenever you hear the real growth rate argument, it's

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on defense budget authority because that's what Congress appropriates. That's --

Q And that's the 7.5 figure --

Q The deficit reduction side is only on the outlay.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q To reduce deficit comes only with cuts in the outlay.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I know, but, first, you reduce budget authority. That means that fewer checks are written. Eventually, less checks are cashed. As the result, outlays are lower and the deficit's lower.

Q -- and it's outlay reduction that you're claiming is $40 billion.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Over three years, that's right.

Q Therefore, if it's broken down over '85, '86 and '87, there's some numbers --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q -- and those numbers represent percentages.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, those numbers represent dollar reductions at the bottom -- $6 billion the first year, $16 billion, 18.2.

Q Is it fair to say from what you've just said that if you take the President's -- budget with 13 percent after inflation, that what you've done is you've reduced that B.A. growth from 7.5 percent?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Under the same deflator, that's right.

Q -- in half?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's in half.

Q Okay. Thank you.

Q Can you just run over the entitlement --

Q -- your sentence on the big-ticket items back here. Do you predict no impact on the MX, B-1 and Trident at all or is there a slowdown in their production?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that is still dependent, obviously, on the precise line-item mix of changes in reductions that the Authorization and Appropriations Committees will work up. It is our intention to fully protect the highest priorities, and clearly MX, B-1 and Trident are right up there at the top of the list. And those can be protected. You can still get $57 billion worth of defense authority reduction over three years without impinging on those items.

Q [redacted] can you just be more specific about some of the non-defense cuts?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What would you like to know?

Q Entitlements, COLAs, appropriations -- freeze --

Q The entitlement and the others.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. Almost all --

Q -- telling us about --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- of that FSC, for anybody that -- that stands for Senate Finance Committee -- this is a rack-up of what they have in the bill that's got bipartisan support as of 4:00 p.m. this afternoon. Now, that may get adjusted before they vote it up.

Q Can you just basically brief us --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. Basically, what --

Q Sorry.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- you have in there is provider-side changes in Medicare, the reimbursement rate. For instance, for hospitals -- will be adjusted down. There'll be freeze on position fees. The reimbursement rate for durable, medical equipment that is provided by home health agencies will change. A whole variety of small or majors of that sort.

In addition to that, there is a cap on Medicaid reimbursement to the states the Congress put in in '81 and had bipartisan support. That expires in '84. This would extend it. No change from current law, but it's a savings because without extending that law, the cost would go back up.

Then, there are some minor changes in there that are less than $1 billion -- if you can get the details from the committee on.

Q And what of the Grace Commission have you decided to accept --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. On the Grace Commission, they have put into the Senate Finance Committee bill three things. One is an authority for debt collection so that people who have overdue federal debts could have those offset against tax refunds that are owed by the -- them by the IRS.

Second, there is some tightening of authority for income verification between programs in order to reduce some of the overpayment that occurs in a lot of federal benefit programs. Third, there's an authority for electronic transfer of funds in terms of federal payments that will save dollars because it's more efficient. Now, we couldn't do that administratively and so the Senate Finance Committee's put that authority in the bill.

Q Does your discretionary freeze assume what level of spending? The spending in '84 was a supplemental?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q -- assumes you -- that's all your El Salvador and your foreign aid money and --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, as well as some other things --

Q Right -- Wick --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- the pay supplemental and we've got a Wick supplemental.

Q Have you got a breakdown of this so we can get a copy of --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Which part?

Q Of the non-defense, discretionary --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the best way to get an answer there is when they report that bill out of the Senate, there will be a very long list of what's in there. That is the starting point. We'd hope to get that passed in the Senate. Obviously, when you get to conference, some of these things are going to be adjusted.

But I think the Senate Finance Committee will issue a paper with all the items in it as soon as they vote it out of committee.

Q So, for now, you prefer not to do that?

Q Can you explain again how the -- an appropriations freeze is actually a reduction?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Because under the conventions by which the current services base line is calculated it is assume that every discretionary program, for instance, Head Start, will get the

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1984 amount which was about a billion dollars, plus an allowance for inflation. And when you have a freeze, at least in the aggregate, there is no allowance for inflation. Now, some programs probably will get a little bit for inflation, others might have to come down a few dollars from the 1984 level.

So this is not our idea. This is the way that CBO calculates what's called the current services baseline, the starting point from which all budget proposals, plans, reductions on the Hill occur and it's the convention we use. There's nothing untoward in this.

Q How does the tax freeze then work? In the opposite way?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The tax -- everybody invents terms to make it sound like what they're doing is popular. Rostenkowski came up with a nice term there which was that a lot of the stuff that was in the 1981 bill that had a delayed date of effectiveness -- '85 and '86 -- would not be put into effect. And that's -- so that was a freeze. I mean, there are all kinds of freezes.

Q All relative.

Q Could somebody -- on the tax side, though, what is net interest exclusion?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In 1985, you would figure up the amount of interest you paid, amount of interest that was owed to you -- whatever the net figure was, if it's interest paid, interest earned -- 15 percent of that excess interest earned by a taxpayer was to be excluded from income. That will not be done now.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Is there anymore --

Q And to claim the interest savings, $18 billion, is that savings over what it would have been under the President's budgets?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it's just a straight calculation that CBO will do for you. You take all the changes to current law revenue, all the changes to current law spending, and as a result of that lower deficit than those policy changes, you'll have less debt services. It's a standard calculation. Everybody does it.

Q Straight calculation of the 150 figure or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. In other words, there's a $132 billion in policy changes -- defense revenue and non-defense spending. By having $132 billion lower policy debts in over three years, you will save debt service of an $18 billion magnitude over the three years.

Q Isn't it fair -- is it fair to say, as some of the staff types were saying a moment ago -- that it looks like the stumbling block was on the BA, on defense, between the Tower level and the Domenici level, and that what happened was a close to splitting the difference -- perhaps a little bit closer to Tower than to Domenici, and that that was the breakthrough in this whole thing? Is that basically what happened?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I -- there are a lot of different ways to characterize an outcome when you get people who disagree as severely, let's say, as Senator Hatfield and Senator Tower might or we might, or some of those in Congress. And so, any process of compromise can be described as coming somewhere towards the middle of the field. But there --

Q You don't reject that general assessment?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'm not going to characterize it. That's your job.

Q When the President originally talked about $100 billion downpayment, was that $100 billion beyond his budget?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, as we said at the time, that was $100 billion worth of things that part of which were in his budget -- about half -- part of which were --

Q He went before the country and said that he wanted to reduce the deficit more than what he had in his budget. He offered to do an extra $100, right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we never said that at the time. We said --

Q That would be part of the budget.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Some of it was in the budget, some wasn't.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: A lot of you want to make a big point about whether it's an addition to or extra, or whatever, but the key thing is that if no laws are enacted, you go back to the current services baseline. And so, this package is $150 from what would happen if we didn't have an agreement and some legislation.

Q If you had editors, you wouldn't be so baffled at all these questions.

Q Yes. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh. Well, I know it's not your fault. I don't mean to suggest that some --

Q But, basically, if, in fact, the President's budget was approved, then, in fact, it would be a $74 billion reduction over the three years?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Even beyond that, if Congress is willing to do everything in his budget. But some of the things in his budget are in this agreement.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 5:38 P.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER FITZGERALD

March 16, 1984

The Briefing Room

2:04 P.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As you could tell, I think the first thing to note is that a visit by the Irish Prime Minister is not a normal event. I will get to the business of the meetings, but there was a good deal of good cheer, a good quota of good stories in the various meetings.

Q Who was the guy who was supposed to be the entertainment up there? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know.

Q God -- I want to applaud whoever had the foresight to shorten the program -- (laughter) -- for which the President apologized.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't have anything to do with that.

Q That came up in the elevator. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But, no, I'd like to say a little bit about the meetings themselves because -- First of all, Garret FitzGerald is a very interesting and intelligent politician. He is a man with a great deal of experience. He has been a Foreign Minister for a number of years. He's been the leader, he's been the Prime Minister of Ireland, not just now but earlier on. So, he has a great deal of experience.

And he has views on a number of issues. He was very interested in listening to both the President and, earlier this morning, the Secretary of State talk about East-West relations. He was interested in the future of the U.S.-Soviet dialogue and is very supportive of U.S. efforts to improve relations with the Soviet Union and, I think, listened at length to the President talk about his hopes in this area.

FitzGerald is also interested in Central America and in a visit last spring that the Vice President paid to Dublin. There was a discussion then and, again, the President and the Secretary of State were able to talk about Central America, both the concerns we have over the future of Nicaragua and concerns about internal developments there, as well as our hopes for the election process in El Salvador. And, again, we think that the Irish, who have their own lines of communications, mainly in terms of their religious links through missionaries to the area, have some views. And, so, it was a good exchange, no disagreements or debates, but it was a good discussion.

As some of you know, the Irish will take over the Presidency of the European Community in July. And they are on the verge of making some important decisions on such questions as the Community budget, the future of the common agricultural policy, and they have important implications for trade ties between the United States and Europe, so there was a discussion of those subjects.

And, of course, the question of Northern Ireland

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came up. There, I think, for obvious reasons, the Prime Minister took the lead in explaining their views on that very controversial subject, a sensitive question. The President applauded efforts that the Irish Prime Minister had taken recently to improve lines of communication with London. The Anglo-Irish summit -- process of summits -- there was a meeting last November, and he described his discussions with Mrs. Thatcher. I think the plans are for another meeting to take place this spring. And we strongly endorse an Anglo-Irish dialogue over the question of Northern Ireland.

And the Prime Minister was also able to explain what was happening in the new Irish forum. And our response, as the President said in his toast, is that we are heartened by any efforts to improve communications, not only between London and Dublin but between the various communities and

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traditions in northern Island itself.

So I think those were the main issues. So I'd be happy to try to answer your questions.

Maybe let me add just one thing and that is that while the Irish economy is mainly agricultural based, the Irish have made real progress in recent years in attracting American investment to Ireland, particularly in the high technology area and the President was able to say that we would do what we could to encourage that development.

Q Any talk about further U.S. efforts to stop the in -- flow of arms from the -- into Ireland from the U.S.?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, yes, there is complete agreement between the United States and the government of Ireland on the need to undertake efforts to stop that flow of arms and we are prepared to cooperate in every way we can to see that that happens.

Q Is there any new -- a stepped-up effort or any new discussions of -- you know, working groups --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we think we have the policy and the programs in place. It just requires consistent follow-up.

Q Is there any legislation that needs to be formulated to improve on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not sure. But I don't think there is.

Q Everything's in place --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right. We believe it is. And -- something we're very dedicated to doing. It requires the cooperation of the courts, of course, and it requires the cooperation of private American citizens. But I think you heard in both the remarks of the President and the Irish Prime Minister there are very strong feelings that people who, for misguided reasons, think by giving aid to terrorist groups that somehow they're serving the interests of Ireland are dead wrong.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 2:12 P.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

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BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND

March 21, 1984

The Briefing Room

2:35 P.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We thought we'd give you a little briefing before the French President arrives tonight. I will go through both his itinerary here, as well as some of the issues we expect to come up. And as usual we will privide you a readout following the President's meeting with President Reagan on Friday.

We see the visit as a key event in a series of important meetings. You know we recently had the Chancellor of Germany, Helmut Kohl, here.

In April there will be a meeting of the O.E.C.D. in Paris which will discuss Western economic issues.

As some of you know, at the end of May there will be a meeting of the NATO foreign ministers here in Washington.

And then of course in June, the President will travel to Europe to attend, among other things, the NATO Summit -- not the NATO, the Industrialized Summit Meeting in London.

All of these meetings fit into a broad pattern focusing on economic, political and military issues. We believe that they will demonstrate or reflect the degree of Alliance concensus and cooperation on security and economic issues. In short, we think that the Mitterrand meeting will go very well.

As I said, he arrives tonight at 7:00 p.m. And tomorrow we'll have the arrival ceremony at the White House. He will meet with the President.

There will be a State luncheon hosted by the Secretary of State and Mrs. Shultz at the State Department. He will then address the Congress in joint session.

And tomorrow night the State dinner hosted by the President and Mrs. Reagan.

On March 23rd the French President will meet again with President Reagan, which is fairly unusual in a State visit, to have two substantive sessions.

There will then be a press conference. The French President will then attend a wreath-laying ceremony at Arlington.

The Vice President will host a small working luncheon for President Mitterrand.

And then there will be a series of private meetings with officials of the IMF, and some officials -- a small group from the American Chamber of Commerce.

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There will then be a reception for the French community. And the French will host a dinner in honor of the Vice Preside

On March 24th, President Mitterrand will appear, or will tape "Meet The Press" before departing for Atlanta.

He there will attend a luncheon hosted by the Mayor, Andrew Young.

He will visit the High Museum and the King Memorial in Atlanta. Sf

He will meet with Mrs. Caretta King, and then depart for San Francisco.

He will stay from March 24th to the 27th in the San Francisco area. There, among other things, he will visit the University of California

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at Berkeley, Stanford University, Davis, where he will see a solar energy plant, meetings with the cultural and scientific community around the San Francisco area. He will attend a reception by the Mayor and will make an address to a joint dinner of the Commonwealth Club and the World Affairs Council in San Francisco.

On March 27th, he will visit Galesburg, Illinois, where he will visit the Secretary of Agriculture John Block's farm and have meetings with farm leaders. He will stop in Pittsburgh, Carnegie Mellon for a ceremony honoring Raj Ready, world's leading computer specialist.

On March 28th, he will visit his favorite American city, New York, where he will meet with the New York Governor and the Mayor of New York and make an address to the Economic Club and then will depart for Paris.

We do not have a formal agenda for the meetings. We expect, given the time assigned for substantive talks, for a whole rnage of issues to come up, obviously Alliance questions, Western security issues. As you know, the President has been very supportive of INF deployment in Europe and of efforts to strengthen NATO security. We expect, of course, the Middle East to come up; the war between Iran and Iraq; Africa, of which the French President is an expert and very interested; economic issues, including the relationship between the United States and the European community.

In addition to President Mitterrand, the French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson will be on -- amongst the delegation, as well as representatives from the Senate and the French National Assembly.

Just for your background, for previous French visits, Giscard came in 1976, Pompideau in 1970 and DeGaulle in 1960. All three of these former leaders also addressed the Congress.

And with that, I'll be happy to answer any questions if you have them.

Q Well, are there any key issues? Are there any controversies?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't know if controversies is the right word. In fact, to tell you the truth, there are remarkably few controversies. We have had disagreements with the French on a range of issues in the past; but at the current time, I think on most basic issues, we find ourselves in agreement. In terms of key issues, I would note that yesterday's meeting of the European Community Heads of State did not appear to reach an agreement and President Mitterrand presently -- the French presently are in the Presidency of the EC, so I know the President and the Secretary of State will be very interested in hearing a first-hand report from President Mitterrand on the problems that the European Community faces. But I think this is an opportunity less to settle problems or controversies and more to work out common approaches and strategies.

John.

Q Notwithstanding what you've just said, the French seem pretty upset about the lack of consultation prior to the American withdrawal from Lebanon. And, in addition to that, I mean, generally on the Middle East, they seem to be -- I don't mean lack of consultation, complete absence of consultation and the fact that -- they're saying that the May 17 Accord was doomed from the start and they have been telling us that and that our Middle East policy, particularly on the Palestinians, is just coasting, quote, unquote. Are those not serious enough to be taken seriously?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think they are controversies and that was what the question concerned. I have not heard French complaints about the absence of consultation. The French pride themselves in an independent policy, following the President's decision to withdraw from Lebanon, the Vice President visited President Mitterrand and spent over an hour discussing the situation in Lebanon and the Middle East. So I think we have succeeded in staying in close touch on Lebanon and Middle East policy generally. We don't expect the French to see all of these regional issues

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precisely the way we do. What's important is that we can discuss those differences. I think the French make the argument, and I think, without prejudging or trying to predict what President Mitterrand will say while he's here, but they note that there are differences with the United States; that they do pursue an independent policy, but the important thing is that on issues that really count, and on matters that really count, we can depend on them. And that has certainly been the case in the past.

They have a very active foreign policy in nearly every part of the world, and in most of those areas, we're very supportive of their efforts to play a large role.

Q Consultation doesn't count -- we don't do that as an issue --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, we think consultations are important, but again the French, unlike, say, other members of NATO -- of NATO's integrated military command -- probably place less emphasis on consultations.

Q In the past the Europeans have come up with their own Middle East plan. There's now talk again, particularly led by the French, that they would like to come up with something now, particularly in the absence of any U.S. activity. Will you actively discourage the Europeans from doing that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, no, but I think that I have not seen any of those reports that you point toward. I am not aware of any European effort to produce a separate Middle East peace plan.

Steve?

Q With interest rates and -- American interest rates -- and ongoing problems for the last few years between French and American -- French-American relations, is there any special concern by the Administration that this week happens to be one in which interest rates happen to be one in which interest rates are going back up?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think as Chancellor Kohl, during his visit there, that Europeans generally have some concerns about certain aspects of the American economy. But I think we shouldn't obscure -- let that obscure -- the fact that the most important thing about the American economy is that it is growing. And all the European leaders are pleased by that prospect. They hope that, because of the American recovery, that their own economies will begin to show signs of recovering. And I think, again without trying to predict what Francois Mitterrand will say, I think generally speaking he will be very encouraged by the growth of the economy here.

In the past, some of the Europeans have been concerned about the strength of the American dollar. As you know, the American dollar now is beginning to slip somewhat in European currency markets, and that's something that, I think, might encourage the Europeans, although they're then likely to argue that the dollar is too weak, rather than too strong. But, again, if you look at the -- at French internal economic policy, you'll see that it has changed over the last two years, and more and more I would argue that most of the major Western economies, or governments, are pursuing the same economic policies. You don't see the kind of inflationary policies pursued by the present French government that we saw eighteen months ago. We don't see the policies of nationalizing industries that we saw. If anything, we see a process of real convergence in the general economic strategies pursued by all the major European governments.

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Q Has Mitterrand shelved his push for a new Bretton Woods agreement? He was pushing hard on that last year at Williamsburg.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the way to answer that is we have not heard very much -- we haven't heard that proposal recently.

Q Do you sense that since last year this thing has been on the way out?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the French are still very much interested in thinking about and working toward, perhaps, coordinating currencies. But, again, we haven't heard, or haven't seen a push for a new Bretton Woods, along the lines that the French President discussed at Williamsburg.

Q How does he feel --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sorry --

Q Does President --

Q -- sorry --

Q President Mitterrand is a Socialist. And he has in his government Communist Ministers. It's usually said in this country that President Reagan is conservative. Why are these both men are on so friendly terms? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The reason -- I'm hesitating to answer that question -- is that I don't think it's -- it makes a terribly great, a lot of difference really, about sort of whether Mitterrand is a member of the French Socialist Party, or whether President Reagan is a member of the Republican Party. I think the important thing is both are leaders of two large, Western countries that generally see the world in very similar terms. They both see a problem stemming from the growth of Soviet military power. They both support, very strongly, human rights in -- throughout the world. Both, I think, are very strongly supportive of a cohesive Western alliance. I don't -- I think that they have had opportunities to talk before. And I think, again, on most basic issues, they agree.

Q What kind of common approaches will they be working on? Iran-Iraq -- the President's -- some way to keep the Straits open?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we are concerned about the potential for the Iranian-Iraqi conflict to spill over into the Gulf. And, the French, like the United States -- and also including the British -- have a very strong interest in maintaining the freedom of navigation through the Straits, so I'm sure that this will be a topic that will come up.

Both leaders are also concerned about the military trends and the need to maintain a strong, conventional defense and nuclear deterrent. And I think both leaders also support an enhanced dialogue with the Soviet Union.

Q King Hussein, in his interview with The New York Times last week, suggested that -- since he didn't think the United States was getting far in peace treaties in that area -- that perhaps the peace treaty efforts should be joined by the permament members of the U.N. Security Council, Britain and France -- has anything happend there? Is that likely to be a subject of discussion between he and Mitterrand?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not aware of anything happening there, Dan, and I tend to doubt that that will be -- that specific proposal -- will be an item for discussion.

Q In the past Mitterrand has been highly critical of U.S. policy in Central America, especially given that his visit comes before their elections day, do you expect him to keep quiet on that subject?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would just simply say that over the past year or so, there have not been any major disagreements between the United States and France, either in private or in public about Central America. And I'm sure because -- I'm sure the subject will come up. I know the President is very interested in the topic. He raises it with nearly every foreign visitor, so I'm sure it will come up. I can't guarantee there will be total agreement, but I don't see any potential for vast disagreement.

Q How does he feel about the restructuring of NATO? I know they don't participate in the military part of NATO, do they, at all, so --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think that the general thrust of, for example, the Kissinger proposal, which was to give the Europeans greater responsibility within NATO, I would guess is something the French can readily support. And, I would just call to your attention that the French recently have talked about revitalizing the Western European Union, which is -- as a possible venue for the Europeans to do more working together for the common defense of Europe. So I think that if the French President has ideas on this score, that I know we will be very interested in hearing what he has to suggest. But, the French have always strongly supported an effort on the part of the Europeans to do more for defense. They spend a lot for defense. They have a very active conventional and nuclear program in that area, and --

Q They do it for themselves, they don't do it for the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I would also point out that, for example, there have been recent proposals by the French to create a quick reaction force to be used, not just to protect France in time of war, but to protect neighbors, like Germany. There is an expanding pattern of Franco-German contacts

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on security questions, meetings between the French and German Defense Ministers. So, while you're correct, that they are not members of the integrated military system of NATO, I think that they gradually are taking on a broader role in terms of the defense of Europe as a whole.

And this is something that, of course, is up to them. But at the same time, it's a development that we support.

Q The French have been the leaders in sort of -- part of the EEC reform package would be to limit imports on some American products like farm products. Would that be brought up? Is the U.S. side going to bring that up?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we bring that up with every important European visitor; the issue of combatting protectionism is one of the key issues on our agenda. We worry that if the Europeans take protectionist actions that protectionist measures enacted by the Congress will become inevitable and that we have a tremendous stake in U.S.-European trade. And, so, we tell all European visitors that actions to curb U.S. agricultural exports will -- could lead to protectionist measures here and that in the long run everyone will suffer.

I might note, though, that it is our understanding that no measures were agreed to yesterday in Brussels curbing U.S. agricultural exports.

Yes?

Q On the quick deployment force, was there any -- were there any negotiations between the French or any discussions between the French and NATO on how that would be used in conjuction with NATO forces?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- no, there haven't been as far as I know. I just know that there have been discussions between the French and the Germans about this force.

Q When he goes to Normandy, when the President goes to Normandy, will he be seeing Mitterand in Paris or is there any talks --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: My understanding is that he will see Mitterand at Normandy. Whether or not there will be an occasion for a formal meeting is -- I can't -- I don't know. I don't think the planning is far enough along.

Q Will the MBFR be in the agenda because it seems that the U.S. --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sorry.

Q The MBFR? MBFR talks in Vienna? It seems that the U.S. is still consulting with the Allies about getting a new proposal on the table. When do you expect on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You mean in this upcoming meeting?

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, of course, the French do not participate in those negotiations, but I think if -- I'm sure the subject of arms control will come up and we will exchange views on the Vienna negotiations, on the conference on disarmament in Geneva, chemical weapons and the progress we're making putting together a draft treaty banning chemical weapons as as the Stockholm conference on disarmament in Europe.

MR. SIMS: Can we have one last question or no last s. Thank you.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO CHINA

March 21, 1984

The Briefing Room

3:05 P.M. EST

MR. SPEAKES: The briefing today is on background. You may attribute it to a Senior Administration Official.

This briefing today is the beginning of our Press Office effort to make your coverage of the President's trip to China as well informed as we possibly can.

Between now and departure time, we expect to have a series of briefings. Some of them will be here for all of you who wish to attend. Others will be in other parts of the White House complex for smaller groups of reporters who need more indepth treatment of specific subjects by our experts.

We hope to have Secretary Regan here to report to you when he returns from his trip to China, which he is now on. And --

Q When is he due back, Larry --

MR. SIMS: I think he gets back the 26th or 27th, somewhere in there.

MR. SPEAKES: And as our pre-trip grand finale, we will have Secretary Shultz for an on-the-record briefing expected on the 18th of April, the day before we leave for the West Coast.

When we're on the trip itself, in Beijing and Shanghai, I would expect to have daily press briefings as we customarily do. And we will also have with us Paul Wolfowitz, who will be available to give you readouts on the day's activities, usually taking place toward the end of the day Far East time. And that would be during the early morning hours on the U.S. East Coast.

Bob Sims, as always, will be my right-hand man in all press matters, both before and during the trip.

Sheila Tate will be the First Lady's Press Office and will be with us on the trip.

Pete Roussel will manage the Press Office on the trip.

Mark, as usual, will have the pool assignments and accompany the pools.

Robin, Kim and others on our staff will be in our Press Office their usual 18-hour-a-day schedule.

We're already getting an extraordinary amount of cooperation from Bud McFarlane and the NSC staff, as well as the State Department and USIA.

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I wanted you to be familiar with a number of people that are assisting us and will be available to assist you in the pre-trip sessions, as well as on the trip, should you have specific needs for information on the trip.

Gaston Sigur, who is Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director, Far East NSC Staff, he is a former Director of the Institute of Sino-Soviet Studies at George Washington University. As you recall, Gaston accompanied us on our Japan-Korea trip, has a depth of knowledge on the President's Pacific Basin policy, as well as strategy. He accompanied Secretary Shultz on his trip to China a year ago.

Bill Martin, Bill is Special Assistant to the President and Deputy Executive Secretary of the NSC Staff. Bill is also an expert on international energy matters and was part of the pre-advance trip that went to China several weeks ago.

David Laux, who is Director of Asian Affairs of the NSC Staff, is a China specialist of longstanding.

And Roger Robinson is the Director of International Economic Affairs for the NSC and he is currently in China with Secretary Regan.

Also, we have returning with us, Rob Neavitt, who is Director of East-Asian and Pacific Affairs at USIA. He will accompany us on the trip and he was with us on the Japan-Korea trip.

Rob is the overall coordinator of our worldwide public diplomacy effort associated with the President's trip. And because cultural relations are part of -- with the People's Republic are an important part of our trip, Rob will be one of those with whom we will arrange background briefings with you on that subject.

In addition, his USIA associate, George Beasley is on loan to us from VOA for the next six weeks. He was also on the pre-advance trip. He speaks Chinese and between now and the trip time, George will be your point of contact in our Press Office for assistance in obtaining information, advice or access to our policy makers for your special needs. George will be located in the Old EOB. George, stand so -- you'll be our point of contact. George will be in the Old EOB on a full-time basis. He can be reached at 395-6965 or through Bob Sims' office, which is 456-2947.

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For questions about the logistics of the trip, our expert, as always, is Mark Weinberg in the Press Office who was on the pre-advance trip, and also Charles Bakaly, who all of you have worked with on our trips abroad, is equally adept in the logistics of the trip.

Also, you should know that some of your colleagues have made the pre-advance trip. Jim Gerstenzang of the AP who represented the print media; Joe Peyronnin, CBS; Mike Duffy, the TV pool; Steve Skinner, ABC; Scott Goodfellow, NBC; Jim Schultze, CNN; Richard Rosenbaum of the radio pool; and Chick Herrity of the still photographers.

Now, we're going to make available to you two versions of our trip schedule. One you will receive now. That is a for publication schedule, and I will go over the events and you can follow them with me. In addition, at the conclusion of the briefing we will make available a not for publication schedule. That schedule contains some times and some names of events and persons that we're not yet fully locked in on. But this is for your planning.

You will also receive the China background notes which are the State Department background notes. And finally, when Secretary Shultz briefs, you will have the customary complete press book that's available.

Now, today's briefing is not intended to be a travelogue but we will give you some of the history and some of the reasons for the President's trip to outline our objectives and to discuss our bilateral relations with the Chinese on principal issues that we expect to be factors on the trip.

Now, if you will follow with me on the schedule, and I can cover some of the logistics, and then I'll turn it over to my colleague for the detailed information.

First of all, as you know, we leave on Thursday before Easter going to Santa Barbara, and then leaving there on Sunday morning, Easter Sunday.

The President and Mrs. Reagan arrive in Hawaii. They will attend Easter services at St. Andrew's Cathedral, an Episcopal church, on Easter Sunday.

While in Hawaii, on Monday, April 23rd, the President will be briefed by the U.S. Pacific Command, by its commander-in-chief and his staff.

The President will leave Hawaii on Tuesday, April 24th, crossing the International Dateline and arriving in Guam on Wednesday afternoon, which is essentially the same day for us but will be April 25th.

There will be a welcoming ceremony and the President will have remarks. He will then attend a reception by the Governor and the Trust territory leaders.

On Thursday, April 26th, at 2:05 p.m. local time, which is 1:05 in the morning Eastern, Air Force One arrives Beijing Airport in the People's Republic of China.

The arrival ceremony will take place at the Great Hall of the People, and a meeting with a Chinese leader. Now, for your information, it is customary for the Chinese not to announce the names of their principals at these meetings this far in advance.

That evening, the President har a meeting followed by a courtyard reception with toast and a dinner to follow.

On Friday, there's another meeting in the Great Hall in the morning, an afternoon address to Chinese community leaders, and then two more meetings with Chinese leaders.

That night, the Reagans will go to a banquet at the Great Hall of the People. There will be toasts at the banquet.

On Saturday, April 28th, the President is interviewed on Chinese television. The potential audience is 350 million to 400 million. (Laughter.)

And another leadership meeting followed by a working lunch.

Q Plus another 50 million here. You forgot to add that in.

MR. SPEAKES: That afternoon, the President will visit the Great Wall. And that evening, he attends a reception with the American community and hosts a reciprocal dinner with more toasts at that dinner.

Sunday, April 29th at 11:30 a.m., the President will leave Beijing for Xian, China -- one hour and 35 minutes on Air Force One.

The events there include a visit to the Mausoleum to view Terra Cotta figures that were part of the archeological find there.

He returns to Beijing, leaving Xian at 4:35 p.m. arriving back at Beijing at 6:00 p.m.

On Monday, April 30th, at 8:55 p.m., farewell ceremony at the Great Hall.

And at 10:40 a.m., Air Force One departure for Shanghai. There the President will visit the Shanghai Foxboro Company for a systems section briefing and a tour of equipment displays at this location. That is where U.S. industry is involved in a cooperative venture with the Chinese.

The President then visits Fudan University in the afternoon, has tea with Madam Shasheda, a Smith College graduate who is president of the university.

He has a classroom visit with Chinese students, makes remarks, then addresses the students and faculty of Fudan University.

That evening, there's an official banquet at Shanghai Main Exhibit Hall with toast.

Q Who are the hosts of that?

MR. SPEAKES: Pardon?

Q Who are the hosts of that -- a Chinese mayor?

MR. SPEAKES: The host is the mayor of Shanghai, I believe.

On Tuesday, May 1st, the President visits Rainbow Bridge Township, which is a child care center there as well as a kindergarten classroom where there will be a performance by Chinese children, and visits a private residence.

At 10:35 p.m., it's wheels up for Fairbanks, Alaska. The President arrives there at 3:20 a.m. local time, after an eight hour flight, eight and a half hour flight that crosses the International Dateline.

He essentially goes to bed then and spends the remainder of that day, May 1st, in Fairbanks. On the next -- spends the next night.

And on Tuesday, May 2nd, the President will meet with Pope John Paul II.

Q Wednesday?

MR. SPEAKES: Wednesday. This meeting will include -- yes?

Q Any time on that meeting yet?

MR. SPEAKES: I think around 10:00 a.m. local time.

This meeting, which covers issues of mutual interest, will be an occasion for a brief stopover for the Papal aircraft en route from Rome to Seoul, Korea.

The President is scheduled to return to Washington at 9:55 p.m. on Wednesday, May 2nd.

In addition to the piece of paper you received, you will also receive a separate schedule for Mrs. Reagan for the days in Beijing and Shanghai.

So, with the travel schedule behind us, I'll bring on the Senior Administration Official to give you his message.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As you just heard, the President will be visiting Beijing, Xian, and Shanghai during April 26th to May 1st.

Might make a note, too, those of you who have to pronounce these words on television or radio -- The best approximation I think you can get for those X's in Chinese transliteration is an "sh" -- Xian. If you want to work on refinements, we can offer you some linguistic help. But that's pretty close.

And Shanghai during April 26th to May 1st. Although we may have some refinements to make, the general concept of the trip is clear.

In Beijing, the President will hold meetings with a number of China's senior leaders. For the reason that you were just explained -- that is, that it's not customary for the Chinese to announce which of their principals will be in these meetings this far in advance, I can't today get into the question of which specific leaders the President will meet.

I can tell you, however, that we are very pleased with the Chinese arrangements overall; including, quite specifically, the generosity with which they have made the time of their most senior leaders available.

The President will be having about 10 hours of meetings all told with senior leaders in China.

He will spend approximately a day each in Xian and Shanghai. He will be the first president to visit Xian, which is the cradle of ancient Chinese civilization, and the repository of world famous archeological treasures from 2,000 years ago, specifically the remarkable Terra Cotta statuary army that was unearthed not long ago.

In Shanghai, the President will be visiting one of China's most cosmopolitan cities, a center of education, commerce, light industry and high technology and also, as noted, be visting an example at the Foxboro Company of the U.S.-China joint venture.

In light of the pace at which our bilateral relationship with China has developed, it is, in a sense, surprising that President Reagan's trip to China will, in fact, be the first by a serving U.S. President since President Ford went to Beijing in 1975. That is to say, in spite of the consistent development of U.S. policy toward China through four administrations, no U.S. President has visited China since the death of Chairman Mao Zedong, since the emergence of a more pragmatic, outward looking leadership in China or since the reorientation of China's national policy toward the paramount goal of economic, scientific and defense modernization.

Also, no U.S. President, importantly, has visited China since normalization and the establishment of diplomatic relations between our two countries. So this is a very important first in that regard.

Premier Zhao himself has aptly observed that there are numerous possibilities for bilateral cooperation inherent in the relationship between two countries that are respectively the world's largest developing country and the world's most technologically advanced nation. We agree with that view and we see opportunities for important and concrete U.S. cooperation in China's ongoing modernization effort.

The President has stated his personal interest in cooperation with China's efforts to build an economically-prosperous and secure nation. Such a relationship, in his view, will not only enhance opportunities for U.S. trade and commerce, but, perhaps even more importantly, will contribute to peace and stability in the region and globally.

I think it's correct to view this visit as part of a process, both in the sense of -- as we tend to see the visit by Premier Zhao back in January and the President's visit now -- as, in a sense, a single event separated by three months, but also a part of a process of development of relations that began some time ago and will continue into the foreseeable future.

In a broad sense, the President's visit represents the maturing of this extremely important and extremely complex relationship. It will help us to consolidate our relations by affording an opportunity for the President and Premier Zhao to continue their dialogue, for the President and other senior Chinese leaders to get to know each other.

In terms of specifics, we will be dealing with a very broad range of issues and will have an opportunity to air our views in some detail, not only on bilateral questions, but on recent international events.

I think it would be premature right now to speculate on what specific subjects will dominate the President's agenda or specific meetings. I think it is useful to reiterate a point that Secretary Shultz has made on a number of occasions, that in our relations with China, we have now matured beyond the stage of alternating bouts of euphoria and depression, where we either forgot that there are differences and problems between us because we were so overwhelmed with the importance of what was taking place or we became so overwhelmed by differences and problems when they emerged that we thought the whole relationship was in jeopardy.

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We are now in a stage where we are managing in a business-like fashion one of the most complex and most important bilateral relationships that this country has. Specific agreements, understandings and treaties are the natural consequence of such a relationship and we may well have some signings of specific agreements during the President's trip.

But we also recognize that our relationship does not require showy spectaculars and that the interests of neither side are well served by pressing ahead prematurely to reach agreements simply for the sake of having agreements.

I think, though, some measure of just how rich this relationship is and how complicated it is can be gotten if I just run through in a very summary way a list of the kind of topics that we have on our bilateral agenda now, topics that are likely to come up in various of the President's meetings in China. We have a whole host of economic and trade issues. I think, as you know, we are

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working on the subject of peaceful nuclear cooperation and trying to negotiate an agreement that would make that -- open up that area of cooperation between us.

We're seeking to work out agreements that would provide the necessary guarantees for U.S. businessmen to operate well in China; specifically, work on a bilateral tax treaty, bilateral investment treaty. We are involved in one of the most extensive and most important exchanges of scholars in the world. There are not only 10,000 Chinese students in the United States, but American scientists, including social scientists and students all over China.

We have important civil aviation relations and a civil aviation agreement. And we have problems there which we have, for the time being I think, successfully worked out. We are discussing defense cooperation with the Chinese. We have made a major step forward in the liberalization of U.S. technology transfer to China which remains a very important subject on the agenda where we anticipate that U.S. sales of advanced technology to China in 1984 could well double to the neighborhood of $1.5 billion.

Q You said two?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: $1.5 billion --

Q Oh, to $1.5 billion --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That would be a doubling from the '83 level.

We have a very important trade with China in textiles -- Chinese textile imports to the United States -- also a difficult subject because of our concern to avoid disruption to U.S. domestic producers; very important to our bilateral relationship as well.

We have an important U.S. export trade in grain to China that's covered by a bilateral grain agreement.

We have science and technology exchange, under our Science and Technology agreement that has twenty-one separate protocols -- one of the most extensive S & T agreements with any country in the world. And we are considering new areas such as telecommunications, fossile energy, information, and management training as possible areas of cooperation there.

We cooperated with China on census taking, information. We have begun discussing with China the very important issue of arms control. The Chinese have made a number of important decisions on their own to join the International Atomic Energy Agency; to put their nuclear exports under IAEA -- that is International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards; and have declared publicly their policy not to assist other countries in the development of nuclear weapons.

Those are examples of where China's role in the arms control process can be important and where we would like to see it grow.

We have important cultural relations with China, and we have been in intensive discussion with them about our official cultural exchange for the next year in planning a number of specific programs.

And this list is in no particular order, but I come last -- and very far from least -- to the fact that our relationship with

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China has a reach that goes far beyond our two countries. It effects the stability of the region, indeed, of the world. We discuss with the Chinese our respective policies on a number of very important issues such as Afghanistan and Kampuchea in particular. We're -- our efforts, I think, jointly contribute to a more stable world and regional situation. And we are exploring with them now the possibility of efforts to reduce tensions in the Korean Peninsula, to name another slightly different example.

That very long list -- and it could be added to, in fact -- of topics that are on our bilateral agenda, and no doubt will be on the President's agenda in Peking, I think gives you a feel for how important this relationship is and also how complex it is.

I'll be glad to take questions.

Q Will there be a signing of a nuclear treaty -- a nuclear agreement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If it's completed. And let me --

Q Where does it stand?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Where does it stand? It -- we have made a great deal of progress through very extensive negotiations that has brought us to the point where, I think, there is now only one really hard issue. And the question comes down to whether that hard issue is too hard to solve.

We are up against very strict requirements of U.S. law with respect to the conditions that any agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation has to meet. And, I believe, we've negotiated already eleven of these under the terms of the law with various countries, including Canada and Australia.

One of the requirements of that law is the requirement for U.S. consent for the reprocessing and other handling of fuel

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that goes through reactors provided by the United States. We can't waive that requirement. We have to have an agreement that meets that requirement. We've tried a number of different formulations that might meet that requirement in more or less acceptable ways. None of them so far have been acceptable to the Chinese side.

Q Do they want to reprocess, or what is the problem?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we have a requirement of law -- they feel as a matter of principle that what they do with their own fuel, even if it's processed through one of our reactors, is a matter of national sovereignty and they're not -- so far at least -- willing to -- or we haven't found a formulation that can bridge that difference.

Q Can you update the Taiwan issue in view of recent statements by the Chinese posing arms sales to -- American arms sales?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We know -- we recognize that the -- that our differences over Taiwan are one of the important differences in this relationship. We can't resolve those differences between us, but we have signed three important communiques of the Chinese, including the most recent one in August of 1982 governing arm sales. The President has made clear that we intend to live up to the commitments we made in those communiques, just as we expect the Chinese to live up to their commitments.

That then becomes a device for bridging and managing our differences. The ultimate resolution of those differences has to be by the Chinese themselves. The Chinese in Taiwan and the Chinese in the mainland. Our only requirement is that that resolution be a peaceful one.

Q One follow up. In view of the list of issues in which you cooperate, you say, very closely, do you feel or do you not feel that Taiwan is not really a major stumbling block to the development of relations in other respects?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, let me say, our view is to try to make progress on as much as we can. We have -- we feel that we have done what we can to manage our differences over Taiwan and that further progress on that issue is up to the Chinese. That is, the Chinese on Taiwan, the Chinese on the mainland. Whether the continuation of that difference retards progress on other issues is a hard thing to judge. Our feeling is we want to go ahead and make progress on as many other issues as we can.

Q What advanced technology are we going to sell them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We could get you some more detail. The Chinese have already purchased a great deal of advanced U.S. technology. I believe the figure was $800 million in 1983, about $400 million -- let me check those --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: $300 -- $350 million, and then $800 last year.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: $359 million in '82. $800 million last year.

Q $359 --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In 1982. $800 million in 1983.

Q What sort of --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It includes computers, aeronautical equipment -- both aircraft themselves, navigational equipment. It includes now, I think, under the new liberalized guidelines, we would expect to see a lot of interest in micro-electronic manufacturing equipment, semiconductors, advanced scientific instruments. These are some of the principal categories.

Q Can you clarify on the nuclear agreement, you said the stumbling block is the U.S. consent on the reprocessing and handling of fuel. Does that mean U.S. consent for any reprocessing and handling that they might do or U.S. consent for the purpose to which they might put that? I mean, I'm just a little confused about what exactly the law requires U.S. consent for.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We can get you the exact language of the law, but I believe it's -- and we probably should -- it essential requirement is that the U.S. has to give its consent before any fuel from a U.S. reactor, regardless of its origin, is reprocessed, stored, or further enriched. And the conditions under which we give that consent, I would think -- and we have talked about this some -- would essentially be if we had assurance that it would continue to be applied to peaceful purposes. But the law isn't specific about the conditions under which the consent would be given. It only requires that our consent is necessary.

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Q -- this reactor isn't -- does -- would have the capacity to reprocess --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, reactors don't reprocess. Reactors take fuel and tend, when they're done with the fuel, to leave a higher quantity of plutonium in the fuel. And if you want to get that plutonium out, you have to reprocess it. So, it's -- the consent is required if you want to reprocess the fuel, for example.

Q Is it still the case that no formal communique is planned? And if that's the case, why is that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's been the general practice, in this administration at least, to generally stick to our own statements at the end of trips and let the other side speak for itself. And I might say, generally speaking, personal observation is that it leads to a greater amount of frankness and a greater amount of information than the kind of thing that you can -- where you end up with the least common denominator.

Yes?

Q Would there be an agreement where the -- we will sell them computers and other scientific equipment that we do not sell to Russia now? Would there be -- the agreements state that they cannot make their own machine and sell it -- Because they do; I mean, as you know, they duplicate something immediately and do a very good job.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In general, I think -- let me -- The question you're asking, I believe, is about the question of counterfeiting and copying of technology, which is -- I guess it's fair to say we've found that a number of East Asian countries are rather talented and, among other things, are very good at picking up our technology and producing their own versions of it. And you get into a very complex area of law of patent and copyright protection for these things.

That is, in fact, broadly a subject on our agenda with the Chinese. We would like to see, in fact, improved protection for that kind of -- what a firm will call "intellectual property." Basically, it's up to a firm to make its own decision as to whether the conditions attached to a sale are sufficient to protect its interests. Our point to the Chinese government consistently has been that if you will give American firms greater assurance that their "intellectual property" -- that's the term that's used -- will be protected, you will find American firms more willing to sell their stuff to you.

Q Yes, but the Chinese have never honored any -- patent or so forth. I mean, they've done their own. And, also, you say about a lawsuit. That doesn't mean anything to them.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I disagree. I think the record of living up to agreements is pretty good. And I think there's this -- the breadth of the relationship that I've described is also a kind of assurance that, if you want to keep it going, if you want it to develop and progress, you've got to inject into it a phrase the Chinese use often -- "mutual trust and confidence." You can cheat an American company and scare off 100 for the future. I think the Chinese are interested in, in fact, providing the kind of atmosphere in which American companies will invest and work in

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China with some confidence.

Q Are the Chinese aware that the President is using this trip in part -- as part of his re-election campaign in 1984? Is that a concern that they've expressed or is -- have they made any statements --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President is not using this trip as a part -- election campaign.

Q He isn't? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The -- And I might say this was a trip that -- In fact, the pair of visits, and I've referred to it as a pair, is one that we would like to have seen take place a long time ago. The original invitation to Premier Zhao was extended back as early as 1981. It was finally agreed -- when the Chinese agreed to Premier Zhao's coming here, we agreed to make it a package of two visits.

Q Secretary Shultz said the other day -- yesterday, I think it was -- that, in the administration's view, that President Reagan is not the Soviet -- candidate that the Soviets would like to see re-elected. Do we feel that the Chinese have a candidate?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would advise them -- (laughter) -- to follow the same advice that we try to follow ourselves, and that is not to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries.

Q -- you said that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It rarely works the way you want it to either. So --

Q Will Secretary Shultz or others go on to Tokyo after this meeting to brief the Japanese or will there be some kind of --

Q Or to Taiwan.

Q -- exchange with Japan on these visits?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me say the -- as a general principle, there will certainly be briefings of our

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friends and allies in the region about this visit, which I think is important to their interest as well as to our own, and we recognize that. We recognize their interest in it, and within the limits of what's appropriate diplomatically, we will certainly brief them.

I can't give you the details on how that will be done right now.

Q You seemed to suggest earlier that there might be more than the nuclear agreement kicking around and ready for signing. Can you give us any better idea what kind of negotiations are taking place right now, what else we might see in terms of concrete agreements signed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The one specific one that is, in fact, taking place or has -- I think Secretary Regan's finished his discussions of the tax treaty in Beijing and those went very well and we believe that will be ready for the President's signature. And that is quite important. It's part of --

Q Bilateral tax?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Bilateral tax treaty that lays out the rules under which American firms operating in China would know what part of their taxes have got to be paid to the Chinese --

Q He has initialed that, hasn't he? Yesterday or today?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I believe he has, yes.

Q Is that the only other --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Is that correct?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, it was initialed.

Q Is that the only other outstanding issue that could be resolved by then?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we might have a nuclear agreement. We might -- although I think this is a very long-shot -- have an investment treaty. I think more likely, we won't. And there may be a number of other smaller agreements.

Q Well, if -- I'm sorry.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes?

Q Will the President reaffirm the Shanghai Communique and, you know, reaffirm that we are going to dwindle down our arms sales to Taiwan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The arms sales communique is the August 17th one. The three communiques that I referred to earlier are the Shanghai Communique signed by President Nixon in '72, the communique on normalization of relations signed by President Carter, and the August 17th arms sales communique by President Reagan.

And when I said earlier the United States and the President have made clear -- the President has made clear the United States is going to live up to these communiques, I meant all three of them. And he has reiterated that on several occasions.

Yes.

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Q Could we ask, just as a reference, if those three documents can be made available to us?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sure they can.

Yes?

Q Secretary Regan said when he got to Beijing that the U.S. was interested in a new -- extending the grain agreement, which we already have problems with the Chinese over. Is this something that's going to be discussed, and is it possible an agreement would be signed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's true that we have some problems. We have -- the Chinese did not buy the full 6 million tons that they were supposed to buy in 1983. We have been assured that they will make that up in 1984 and buy the required 6 million in 1984. We would also, I think -- although you should really address this to the Department of Agriculture -- I believe we would like to see that agreement extended.

It, on the one hand, provides China or other countries that sign such agreements assurances of adequate supplies from the Unites States and at the same time, of course, it provides an assured market for U.S. farmers. So I think it's mutually beneficial.

Q Two questions. One on Taiwan. You say that the U.S. view is basically we've done about all we're going to do and now it's really up to the two Chinas to work things out. Does the People's Republic share that or do you expect that to be an issue -- do you figure that to be a source of some discussion in the meetings with the President?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think you should really ask them their views, but obviously, when I say we have differences, our views are not the same. I think we have bridged the differences. We've made them more manageable. But it's a problem and I believe they will continue to raise it as a problem.

Q The second thing, I was reading an article in the paper the other day about the harassment of Western reporters in China and the fact that some of the security forces there are upset about the continued Westernization, modernization. Can you discuss the internal tensions within the Chinese government about the move toward the West by the present leadership?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think it's fair to say that the -- China's gone through a lot of very important change in the last ten years, even in just the last five years, coming out of the Cultural Revolution, undoing some of the damage that was done then, and this very important and difficult opening to the West and the outside.

I think there are bound to be strains

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and we see signs of those strains from time to time, but I think there's also consensus within the leadership on the importance of continuing that.

Yes.

Q Just one question on grain. I'm not sure what you said in reply to the question, I think, as to whether there was a possibility of reaching a new agreement next month, during the President's visit.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, I think -- No, I --

Q I didn't quite understand you.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I -- At the moment, our discussions on grain are focused, most importantly, on making sure that the present agreement is carried out faithfully. I'm not sure at what point we would want to introduce the idea of a new agreement or whether it would be done this early.

Q How long does the present agreement go for?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It expires at the end of this year.

Q Is it the sense of the administration that the Soviets are concerned about this trip? And, also, what does the trip do in terms of improving East-West relations, or Soviet-U.S. relations in particular?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The purpose of the trip is not to make the Soviets concerned. We don't believe that our relationship with China should be played as a card simply for the benefit of a third party.

I do think the fact of a strong U.S.-China relationship, that this trip both represents and helps to reinforce, is something that is a discouragement to Soviet acts of adventurism and, in that way, contributes in the long-run to healthier and more stable East-West relations.

Q Is there any concern at all to be raised by the U.S. side in the talks in Beijing over human rights inside China? The administration, I think, has received complaints from, for instance, Catholic and other religious groups over alleged persecution or harrassment of their people inside China. Will that be raised?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think I've said that we recognize that this is a relationship between two countries of a very different political, social and economic systems and those differences include the way in which we handle issues of human rights, issues of civil liberties and freedom of religion.

It's also the case, as I think you know, that this administration believes as a matter of policy that the way to handle issues of that kind with friendly countries is through private diplomacy and private discussion and not through public talk about it.

Q Well, is this a matter that's going to be discussed in private then?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know right now.

Q Could you elaborate a little bit on how trips like this can help discourage Soviet adventurism?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I said that a strong U.S.-China relationship, I believe, helps to discourage Soviet adventurism. And I believe a trip like this trip most specifically and importantly helps to strengthen and develop that relationship.

Q How does a strong relationship with China help to discourage Soviet adventurism?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Take a specific case of a Soviet -- Vietnam, which is an ally of the Soviet Union and heavily backed and armed by the Soviet Union, which currently occupies a neighborhing country, Kampuchea, and in the view of the Southeast Asian countries, threatens the rest of -- the security of the rest of them, the cooperation between the United States and China, I believe is a -- And you would find this a consensus, I think, of experts on the region, is a major inhibition on further Vietnamese aggression.

Q You mentioned defense cooperation as an item on your bilateral agenda. Can you elaborate on that? Do you expect any arms sales to China in the foreseeable future?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is an area where I think both of us, partly for similar reasons, partly for different reasons, are proceeding very carefully. The President, some time ago, made it clear that we would consider Chinese requests on a case-by-case basis for certain defensive weapons. We have had technical discussions with them, concentrating particularly on the possibility of cooperation in the area of anti-aircraft missiles and anti-tank missiles. We've had, in recent months, a couple of important technical exchanges,

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but so far still I don't -- we haven't had any, that I'm aware of, direct Chinese requests to manufacture for sale of U.S. weapons. And I wouldn't want to speculate whether they will, or when they might.

Q Has there been any informal discussion on the possibility of the Chinese purchasing F-16s?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not at all that I know of.

Q What's the question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He asked whether F-16s were included in the items being discussed, and I said, not at all that I'm aware of.

Q What about the satellites and, you know, communications --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't believe that's on the list either.

Q Can you give us a brief rundown on where the state of the Korean negotiations --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You see, now, communication is a very, very broad area. There, there may be some communications --

Q -- where the state of Korean negotiations are now, and the U.S.-Chinese role in that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are a couple of very public proposals on the table and the North Koreans have proposed talks between them and the United States in which they have said they would permit the South Koreans to participate. The South Koreans have, themselves, proposed direct, bilateral talks between them and North Korea.

We are consulting particularly closely with our South Korean allies to see whether, perhaps, between these positions there are some ways either that talks can be approached or, alternatively, that some practical steps can be taken to reduce tensions.

I have to say that we are extremely skeptical of North Korean motives, particularly since this most recent overture came just at the time that they were planning and carrying out the atrocity in Rangoon, where they attempted to murder the President of South Korea, and in the process, murdered fourteen of the very best Korean officials.

At the same time, we feel that the subject of reduction of tensions in the Korean peninsula is one that is so important that we don't want to ignore or pass up any genuine opportunity to reduce them. We do feel the Chinese government shares our view on the importance of tension reduction. We've had a number of diplomatic exchanges with the Chinese on the subject, and we certainly are interested in the ideas they might have as to how this dialogue might be furthered, or how practical tension reduction steps might be taken.

Q Well, what do you think the motive is -- in wanting these talks -- if not --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS: Between the North Koreans or the Chinese?

Q North Koreans.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's hard to speculate on motives, especially of people who are as closed as the North Koreans are; but, let me put it this way -- the most obvious motive is simply a propaganda one, to divert attention away from what they did in Rangoon. The most hopeful, but probably least likely motive, is that they are seriously interested, themselves, in reducing tensions. I say it is least likely, but even a small possibility is too important to ignore.

I think in the case of the Chinese, I think they share our concern that a war in the peninsula would be very dangerous to the interests of all the countries in the region and ourselves as well.

MR. SIMS: Can we have one or two more? I think we've had it for an hour here.

Q Sir, in comparison with what we have achieved during Zhao's visit to Washington this last January, what new -- substantively new -- do you expect of the President's trip to Beijing?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'll wait until after that trip to compare. I think we'll move forward on a number of issues and that's -- when you look at the huge number of issues that there are -- that's where the relationship is at now. As I said, it's not measured in terms of breakthroughs, it's measured in terms of sometimes small, sometimes large progress on a host of issues.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 3:53 P.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
ON THE MARCH 25th ELECTIONS IN
EL SALVADOR

March 22, 1984

The Briefing Room

1:03 P.M. EST

MR. SPEAKES: Before -- As we begin, let me clear up the matter that was asked me about Meese's status as he continues as Counsellor to the President. He has been Counsellor to the President. He will continue as Counsellor to the President. Thereby, whatever duties he had previously have not changed through this process and still continue. So those people who have always reported to him will continue to do so.

The one exception is that Meese will not be involved in any matters dealing with the Justice Department while these things are proceeding.

The briefing this afternoon is on background. You may attribute it to a Senior Administration Official. The subject is the March 25th presidential elections in El Salvador.

As usual, there are always a number of news-worthy Central American topics that you would like to ask questions on, but this briefing will be confined to the elections.

We're also making available a briefing book with background information on the election.

Q Larry, can I ask --

MR. SPEAKES: Yes.

Q Why isn't Meese having anything to do with the Justice Department if he's carrying on his regular duties?

MR. SPEAKES: So that he will not be accused of trying to influence of the outcome of the preliminary inquiry and so forth.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll just make a few opening remarks about the election.

I've been following Latin American elections for a long, long time and I find this a particularly interesting one.

One way to look at this election is as part of a -- as a stage, really, the next stage in a process that began in October 1979 with the coup, went on through the March 1980 reforms, land reform, banking reform, through the constituent assembly elections two years ago, the promulgation of a new constitution in December of last year. Now, we have the election of a president and vice president in El Salvador. And early next year, there will be local municipal and legislative elections.

This is a long and a very difficult process, the goal of which, of course, is to transform Salvadoran society, its political and social order and to create a stable and democratic order.

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In the election there are eight slates, eight parties running candidates. As you know, they are going to follow the -- which is now becoming quite common in Latin America -- the French system of runoff if you don't get 50 percent or better.

The runoff will take place -- if there is one -- 30 days after the Central Electoral Council certifies the results of Sunday's election. I can't really estimate how long that's going to take. It will depend on how many challenges there are and a number of other

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factors. But we expect, if there is a runoff, for it to take place in late April or early May.

The polls -- There have been a lot of polls taken in El Salvador, a number of them commissioned by the parties. They're quite inconsistent, except on two points.

One is a very high percentage of those polled say they intend to vote. The other is that they seem to agree, the polls, that nobody will get 50 percent, so there will be a runoff.

I, however, remember very well in Argentina that none of the polls showed that anybody would get 50 percent there before the election of October 30. And as you know, somebody certainly did.

There are -- These will be I think very interesting elections. Not just who finishes first and second, but how these various smaller parties do. Clearly, if there is a runoff, these parties may indeed have something to say about who wins, about what kind of informal coalitions are put together. So that I think it will be an election worthy of some analysis.

The -- There are three differences in this election -- between this election and the one of March of 1982. The first is that there will be a registry this time. A registry has been prepared, much as as we have a registry in our own elections. This is a system that we contributed to. We helped finance a computer system in which all the national identity cards were run through and checked, duplicates removed, people who had died taken off. In order to vote you will have to present your identity card at the place specified for your voting.

However, there will be certain special voting places where there will be a national registry where you can vote if you can't make it to the place that you're supposed to.

Another difference is in the ink. Last time the-- in El Salvador, as in most places in Latin America, you dip your finger in the ink, in indelible ink, so that you can't vote twice. Last time the ink was invisible. (Laughter.) -- Invisible unless, except under a special device. You've probably seen these things in dance halls and whatnot. Anyway, it didn't -- It created quite a bit of confusion and this time the ink will indeed be visible. (Laughter.)

The third difference is that there'll be no telegraphic returns. Last time the returns were telegraphed to San Salvador from around the country. This time a very complicated, and -- but I think a very secure system -- has been devised so that the official returns will be slower in coming out.

However, all the parties will have poll watchers. And I would assume that the parties will be announcing their version of the results quite soon.

I'd just say one final word about the turnout. As you know, last time about a million and a half people voted -- Around 80 percent of what we calculated to be the electorate. This time the registry system might hold it down somewhat. It is a little more difficult and complicated, although I can't tell. I would -- I would presume they'll have some difficulty with this system on its first trial.

The -- But as I say the polls show an intention to vote on a very large scale. The -- The Central Electoral Council has announced that only 22 of the 260 municipalities in the country, will there be no elections. These 22 are -- are generally underpopulated and in territory in which the guerrillas are operating. It's a smaller number than last time.

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We do have indications, a number of indications, that despite public pronouncements to the contrary that the guerrillas are,in fact,embarked on an effort to disrupt the elections.

The military, the Salvadoran military,are in the field attempting to create the conditions in which the maximum number can vote. Okay?

Yes?

Q On this -- On this question of identifying those who vote --Wasn't one of the reasons in 1982 that they were marked with invisible ink was because the left had announced that those who had the ink marks on their hands would be assassinated?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's exactly right.

Q Now is there not that same threat this year?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, this may be. However, publicly they've said not. Publicly the FMLN/ --

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FDR has said that there would be no reprisals. But that's right, that was the idea.

Q Well, publicly they said that there's -- Do you think, though, even though that publicly they have not announced reprisals that those who did vote last time and those who remember that threat in 1982, will think twice before going to the polls and being marked with indelible ink?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think not, that's just my -- What do you think?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the feeling is that El Salvador is an intimate country and that -- and nobody really felt that the invisibility of the ink protected them much. The guerrillas might not have known who you voted for, but they could tell whether you stood in line for five hours to vote. And since there were no reprisals in '82, even though the guerrillas probably didn't know who were voting, and because there was such a high turnout and they would have to take reprisals against a broad cross-section of the population, the feeling was that that consideration wasn't so important.

Q I have -- Wait a minute. One more followup on this.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q The President often refers to this woman who stood in line and was wounded, and there were documented accounts of some of the polling places being harrassed by guerrillas. They were shot at, basically. Were there any cases of actual reprisals after the election, as had been threatened?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're unaware of any, no.

Yes.

Q Do you see -- Do you know what the divisions are in the left, given the fact that Villalobos and ERP made critical comments, but not absolutely saying they'd disrupt the elections, this new urban terror group? Is there a split between the FMLN and the FDR? How do you see that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I -- This terror group that you're referring to, the Clara Hernandez Front, apparently is a split within the FPL, rather than between the FMLN and the FDR.

I think that there probably are differences, but they're nuances. I would assume that those in the FDR, Ungo and the other spokesmen for that part of the front, because it is their responsibility, are very interested in the kind of image they -- Certainly they suffered a public relations defeat the last time. And I think this idea of projecting the notion that they would not attempt to wreck the elections is part of that. But the fighting people, on the other hand, seem to have different ideas.

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Q But how do you interpret Villalobos' statement? Will there be an effort to extract -- to prevent people from voting on something?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think there'll be an attempt to disrupt the voting, yes.

Q What's the government doing about those people whose identity cards have been taken away by the guerrillas? Can they definitely not vote?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They definitely cannot vote.

Q No emergency provisions for that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is no -- If you tried something like that, I mean, you would really open the door to widespread fraud. But this is a very small number. Yes. And it's also random. That is, you know, it doesn't really -- it doesn't favor one candidate over another.

Q So you think that under the system that has been devised this time it's impossible to have the same fraud as there was last time?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think, as far as I can determine, there really wasn't very much fraud last time. There was, obviously, in any election there are certainly irregularities. But as far as I can determine, it was a minor factor.

Q But there were reports that more or less between 20 and 25 percent of the voting were a result of fraud.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that the system they run through the computer system has pretty well disproved that. They did not find the number of double identity, duplicate identity cards they believed they would. And these allegations, I think, it's important to bear in mind, were made in the middle of -- a long time after the elections and made in the middle of a very fierce political campaign.

Q The President now has a $93-million military aid request for Salvador up before Congress. And the administration has said that to pass that before the election would send a strong positive signal to Central America. Do you think that campesinos out there in the outlands of El Salvador would really get the message? Would be encouraged to vote one way or another by this vote?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's difficult to tell whether that message gets all the way out to the campesinos. I think that the object of what the President said is, number one, is you've got to keep in mind we're talking about an electoral process that'll run through May. Now, more than likely, there will be a runoff, as my colleague said, so we're talking about a program designed to cover a whole process. Now, I can't answer your question as to whether it goes all the way down to the campesinos.

Q Can you answer one question? Will any of that material get down there before the elections, even if the Congress acted right -- immediately and the money was appropriated --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It would certainly get down there before the finish of the process as we envision it to be, which is through the end of May.

Q But it wouldn't get down before the elections on the 25th.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On Sunday?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Next Sunday?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It would be difficult for it to get down there before Sunday.

Q Has anyone in El Salvador asked why there is so much United States concern for human rights in El Salvador, as compared to so apparently little concern for human rights, say, in Nimbabwe?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me just -- Let me -- My colleague is in a very difficult position. He is up before a Senate confirmation --

Q Then will you answer it? Could you answer it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think, as Larry said, is we will try to focus on the elections.

Q Well, this has to do with the elections. I wonder if the El Salvadorans wonder if we have a racist policy. We have more tolerance of assaults on human rights in Zimbabwe than we do in El Salvador. In other words -- expect more.

MR. SIMS: That's off the subject.

Q -- we expect more.

MR. SIMS: That's off the subject --

Q It's not off the subject.

MR. SIMS: -- Lester --

Q It's on the election. I'd like to know. Have you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, let me see if I can be responsive to your question.

Q That's great.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. There is no doubt, I think, that there is a lot of attention placed on -- not just by the United States, but by other groups -- on the human rights issue in El Salvador, as opposed to Zimbabwe. I would give you that as a given. I don't think that reflects the government's position on human rights, which it has a feeling across the board on.

Q Well, isn't there any resentment of that by the Salvadorans, that we haven't --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You would have to ask the Salvadorans, but my feeling is --

Q You haven't detected any?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, I have detected among some Salvadorans --

Q You have? Oh.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct.

Q That's interesting.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

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Q You said that you expect that there will be some attempts to disrupt the voting. Are you confident right now that the Salvadoran Army is well enough supplied and well enough trained to keep the attempts at disruption from becoming a major problem?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is -- We certainly expect that they can. Now, whether -- You know, this is very difficult terrain you're talking about in the middle of the civil war. So far, they seem to -- they are -- they have the initiative right now, let me put it that way.

Q Do they have the equipment?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They have the equipment, maybe for one round and not for two.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, and the other thing is that with the problem that they face is this, that when you -- when your known supply has run out -- at the end of February, we were out of money, stuff was still in the pipeline going to them. And they know that as of right now, there is no certainty anything else is coming. And -- You don't have to be a Salvadoran military commander, you can apply that to your own household and how you run it, if the train stops and you're not going to get any more or you don't know you're going to get any more, it effects the way you use it. Do you stay in your barracks or do you go out and try to gain the countryside?

So, if you want to know whether there is supply in country today to hold that election, the question is, yes. What you can't quantify is if the guy says, "If I use this last round today on this election, where will I be Tuesday or Wednesday or Friday or whatever."

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, back there.

Q Would you attempt to be a little more specific on what kinds of activities you expect in their effort to disrupt the election?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, we expect -- We've already had some of it, in the first place. There have -- several -- four, I believe, members of the Assembly have been assassinated. There are two kinds of activities involved here. One is urban terrorism. The other are activities in the countryside, assaults on bridges, on towns, particularly. I expect that there will be attempts of that kind. There have been already.

Q And all of this disruptive stuff is coming from the left, in your --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As far as we can determine, yes.

Q At what point does it become too late for that second round to get down there? Is there some point at which it becomes necessary to send some kind of emergency aid, to use some other powers to send money down there, if the Senate doesn't vote?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The problem with pipelines is that some are longer than others and they run out of some supplies before they run out of others, so you have what is an additive factor on which you have to make a decision that you think that they are now past the critical point. They are already

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critically short of a lot of supplies. But there's a variety of things. There are medical supplies -- I mean, aside from just bullets -- there are medical supplies, there are uniforms -- there are other aspects.

And as time goes on, those lines get longer as to what it takes to fill them up. And so, there's no one point that says, "Bang." It's a cumulative aspect of all of this --

Q But, to follow up if I can. You're not going to get a vote this week, it would appear, given the nature of the Senate proceedings. When? What kind of deadline do you need for --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President has instructed us to use every means available to urge the Congress to address the issue in the proper manner. And that's what we're doing. And I believe that Senator Baker, this afternoon, will be attempting to bring a bill to the Floor of the Senate.

Q A question for either -- some of the Senators who didn't want to have a vote before the election were saying that this would be a -- that the purpose of the administration's rush is that they are afraid that D'Aubisson is going to win the election; and, therefore, it would be extremely difficult to get support in the Senate for the appropriation on Monday.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Do you want to handle that, or do you want me to -- (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, I would just say that, I think -- (Laughter.)

Q How strongly do you feel about it?

Q Totally false -- (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- feel as strongly about it as I do. (Laughter.) Leave me outside -- (Laughter.)

Q -- but is it "Hogwash?" (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think that no matter how inconsistent the polls are that there's any real possibility that D'Aubisson's going to get better than 50 percent in the first round, which is what the --

Q What is your measure of the assessment of this recent story in The New York Times about D'Aubisson, and its effect on the elections? Hasn't that been sort of -- momentous?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't -- as to its effect on the election there, I don't think that has a major impact on it.

Q Do you think that Ambassador White still retains credibility in the United States?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You'll have to ask Ambassador White and the people who cover Ambassador White. I think he ran into a surprise yesterday --

Q Regardless of what the polls show, is the Administration concerned about an eventual D'Aubisson victory which, indeed, would make it more difficult for the administration to get future military funding for El Salvador?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Our interest -- in the first place -- we're neutral, and we don't have any --

Q -- in the elections. And I understand that, but --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- we don't have any candidates. Our interest in the process and the policy, rather than in the personalities. Certainly, I think as my colleague has said, if D'Aubisson were to emerge as President -- In the first place, I think it's important to remember that because of the way the election is structured, whoever is the next President of El Salvador will clearly have a majority of Salvadoran people, having voted for him. So I think that we would be most interested in whoever the next President is, and what kind of policies he intends to pursue, and certainly we would want to talk very carefully and very thoroughly with whoever that person might be.

Q Regardless of what policies he may announce, would it not be more difficult to get a consensus from Congress on future military aid for El Salvador if Roberto D'Aubisson emerged as President of El Salvador?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It might.

Q Can you comment, please, on these reports about the CIA paying the police officials?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know a thing about that --

MR. SIMS: Larry addressed that this morning.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes?

Q Did the polls indicate what voters expect to happen after the elections are held?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's a good question. (Laughter.) The last -- I think the last time there was a very strong feeling among the populous of El Salvador that there would -- that elections by themselves would be the answer. I don't think that's true anymore. But, on the other hand, I think all of them see this, as I said earlier, as part of a process that in the end would lead to a peacful solution.

The parties of -- most of them have pronounced themselves on this issue -- and you'll find that most of them hold out the possibility of a dialogue

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with the guerrillas in order to reach a situation in which everybody can participate in the next elections -- It's worth pointing out, too, that the FMLN/FDR could hardly expect to do very well in a presidential election, certainly not to elect a president.

However, the next round of elections -- local, municipal, legislative elections would seem to me at least to be much more appealing to them, where they could win some seats.

Yes?

Q If whoever's elected does decide to work with the guerrillas and go forth with some sort of dialogue, would the administration respect that process?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Our, our view of course is that there must in the end be a political solution in El Salvador, and that solution has to be reached through the Democratic process. I think -- As I said, these -- The parties favor a dialogue as has been offered to the guerrillas in the past about how they can participate in elections.

I also, in my former role, as Executive Director of the Kissinger Commission -- We have some text on that, some suggestions as how that might be done.

Q What would be the first task of the new special envoy to Central America? Would it be to try to persuade the guerrillas in El Salvador to --

Q To get confirmed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, to get confirmed, that's right. (Laughter.)

Q The next round of elections in El Salvador would be the municipal elections, the legislative elections in '85? Would it be the task of this person to try to get them to join that process?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm really not going to answer that question for the reasons stated earlier. If my colleague wants to, that's all right with me.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You know, from a chronological point of view, what is -- What is important in the Contadora process is the -- coming up with the three different groups, political, economic and security, attempting to draft some kind of documents or papers due to their foreign ministers by April 30th. And as soon as we can get Ambassador Shlaudeman confirmed in the Senate he will be picking up the traces there to consult with the different countries as they try to make that date, in order to take the 21 points and reduce them down into language that they can agree with.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 1:31 P.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF PRESIDENT MITTERAND OF FRANCE

March 23, 1984

The Briefing Room

10:38 A.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: President Reagan and President Mitterrand had two lengthy substantive sessions in addition to the State dinner last night.

There was the meeting yesterday morning and there was a working breakfast this morning.

In both of the meetings, there was -- first sketching a little bit of the atmospherics -- a sense, at least I, an observer, had a sense -- that these are two men at ease with one another, able to talk openly in a relaxed manner about some serious subjects.

In yesterday's meeting, the bulk of the conversation concerned East-West matters and security issues. The two Presidents exchanged views,in a very philosophical sense, about the Soviet Union, the leadership transition there, what it might imply for the West. They shared the view that the Soviets would be welcome if they choose to come back to the nuclear arms control negotiations. The two Presidents agreed that no concessions should be made to bring the Soviets back; but also shared a determination to try to solve the problems created by the levels of armaments in the world.

As far as the future is concerned, they both agreed on the need for an intensified East-West dialogue. And you saw that President Mitterrand touched on that in his speech to the joint session of Congress yesterday. And they agreed on the importance of maintaining the West's determant strength.

For the part of the United States, we're committed to an adequate deterrance and to negotiations to diminish world tensions. The President made that clear in his address of January 16th, and the approach to U.S.-Soviet relations he outlined at that time remains his policy. As he said at that time, it's a policy for the long haul.

The U.S. continues to regret the Soviet refusal to resume negotiations on strategic and intermediate range nuclear weapons. It would appear that Soviet leadership is going through a period of introspection --

Q Could you slow down please?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure.

-- It would appear that the Soviet leadership is going through a period of introspection and is attempting to divert attention from its unwillingness or inability to engage us in negotiations for genuine nuclear arms reductions.

The U.S. is prepared for a dialogue across the board and insists only that the talks focus on ways to solve real problems. We also believe the Soviets should not be allowed to escape responsibility for intransigence in the effort to achieve substantially lower levels of nuclear weapons, via smoke screen or propagandistic proposals in other areas.

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We're serious in our intent and will engage them seriously when they are are ready. But there should be no doubt where the responsibility lies if there are delays in the process.

Q You call this a conciliatory statement? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As I said, the two Presidents had a philosophical discussion. The two, I think, shared a confidence in the ability of the West to meet problems.

On Central America, the two Presidents exchanged views. They discussed the indigenous factors which have led to instability in the region, and the Soviet role. They also discussed problems in Africa and the Middle East.

President Reagan acknowledged France's ability to play a significant and constructive role as evidenced by French actions in Lebanon and in Chad.

At the breakfast this morning, the President offered to France, the possibility of accommodating a French astronaut on a space shuttle flight next year. President Mitterrand responded favorably in principle and said details would have to be worked out after they've had time to study the matter.

Also at breakfast, there was a discussion of the U.S.-Western European economic situation. And President Mitterrand discussed the just concluded EC Summit in Brussels. Both Presidents agreed on the need to combat pressure for protectionism on both sides of Atlantic.

President Reagan expressed his concern to continue levels of agricultural exports to the European community. On East-West trade, the two sides share the view that one has to be careful and prudent about the sale of items or equipment or products of strategic value to the East. They also agreed that there is benefit in non-strategic trade.

President Mitterrand talked a bit about his trip over the next week around the country; particularly, his visit to Illinois, where he'll visit Secretary Block's farm; and said specifically that he wanted to visit the farm belt to experience firsthand and to discuss U.S. agriculture.

The two Presidents talked about international terrorism this morning -- agreed that it is a major problem.

They also exchanged comments on the economic recovery that is underway in the United States. And President Mitterrand talked about some favorable economic indicators in France.

At the end of the breakfast, the two Presidents had a short private moment together in the Red Room. President Mitterrand mentioned the contribution of the U.S. and other allies in D-Day and President Reagan referred to President Mitterrand's role in the French resistance during World War II.

I'll be glad to try to take your questions.

Q Sounds like a big dialogue was mainly on the Soviet Un and there were absolutely no conciliation at all. Was there any -- in this philosophical discussion -- any new initiatives, in terms of you're not going to make any concessions on so-and-so-and-so, but is there anything in the works to entice the Soviets to come back or are you just going to stand there in a rock hard position?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The two Presidents

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talked philosophically about the Soviets, I think, because we're all at a time when it's difficult after a change in the Soviet leadership, to determine what really people are thinking in the Kremlin.

The two Presidents did not discuss new initiatives in the sense that we ought to take a new and different position to induce the Soviets back to the table. The two Presidents agreed that it would be impractical to make concessions to get the Soviets back to the table. But they agreed that we'd all like to see them come back, and we're ready for a productive dialogue when they come back.

Q We keep hearing about -- the same phrase, I mean, for the last six months -- this is a period of introspection in the instance of when Andropov was there, and now Chernenko.

The French say that that is to some degree a smoke screen for saying this is the worst relationship we've ever had with the Soviet Union, and that -- and that Mitterrand told the President that something needs to be done about this and was very strong on this point.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's not an accurate description of what President Mitterrand told President Reagan. That was not said in the meeting.

I think it's hard for all "Kremlinogues" to try to figure out what is going on. You can say it's a question--time of introspection in Moscow; you can also say it's a time of jockeying for position in what seems to be a semi-permanent succession.

Q But not so --

Q But not a -- the lowest point of relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union since the Second World War?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I don't think -- I don't think we would accept that characterization, and such a characterization did not come up in the meetings between the two presidents.

Q How about since the Cold War?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I beg your pardon?

Q How about since the '50s? Really, I mean, Gromyko calls the American attache in, gives him hell, and so forth -- the --

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the whole atmosphere is very angry.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't agree with that characterization.

Q The Dartmouth group that just returned said the same thing. I mean, essentially --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They found a very cold reception in Moscow. Now, whether that implies Moscow's inability to decide what to do in terms of a next step or how to find a way to get back to the negotiating table is hard to tell. It's the toughest place in the world to read what's going on.

Q President Mitterrand says he would probably go to Moscow this year. Did that come out in any --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That did not come up in these conversations. We understand that from a magazine report in Paris.

Q How would the administration view such a trip?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We haven't addressed it specifically. But in general, it certainly is an independent French decision. But if it led to a constructive outcome, I think there would be an acceptance of it here.

Q Mitterrand said in his interview on McNeil-Lehrer -- these were his own words -- that there's a simpler case, that the Soviets can't come back now, after they've made all the threats about the INF and lost, but that they still would like at some point to come back. So that's why it's hard to understand now why we don't leave it open for them to come back. Keep making --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think we have left it open. If they want to come back, we can have our negotiators back in Geneva next week.

Q But we keep saying that -- your statement was not very conciliatory. It was not very -- you were -- didn't seem to be just sitting back and letting them come back when they're ready. That's like -

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't think we should take the rap for the Soviet walk-out, though. So in that sense, the statement stands for what it is.

Q Just to clarify something, you said the first day, they dwelt mostly on East-West and Soviet matters.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q But Mitterrand's idea of going to Moscow wasn't mentioned?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It wasn't discussed in any detail, no.

Q Was it discussed at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: By implication in the sense that there was a discussion of East-West contacts and how the dialogue might be resumed. But basically -- I'm not going to get into the specific, explicit details of what the two Presidents said in a tit-for-tat sort of mode but --

Q Did Mitterrand tell Reagan he was going to go to Moscow?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not specifically as [illegible]

Q Well, how unspecifically did he say -- (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, they talked about the possibilities for resusitating a dialogue.

Q Did he talk about the possibility of going to Moscow?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He did not go into any detail about any planned personal trip he had.

Q It's hard to believe that these two Presidents would get together and talk about the Soviet Union without one of them mentioning in some detail that Mitterrand is going to go to Moscow and talk to the new leader. What were they thinking about? If they didn't bring it up, it seems to me a failing on their part.

Q Philosophical discussion.

Q So how do you explain that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't accept the premise that's in your question.

Q Well, to what extent did they talk about it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: About East-West relations?

Q No, for God's sake. What are we talking about? We're talking about going to the Soviet Union by Mitterrand.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I told you it was not discussed in any detail. What more can I say?

Q Well, the President wasn't interested in the fact that Mitterrand is going to go to Moscow?

Q You didn't say it was not brought up. The subject was discussed.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The subject of East-West contacts and about possible ways to resusitate dialogue was discussed.

Q And in that context was the point brought up that Mitterrand may go to the Soviet Union -- in the context of how those talks may be resusitated?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not necessarily in that context.

Q Well, was it brought up in any context?

Q In some other context?

Q I don't understand why you're --

Q Why are we having such problems?

Q -- why are you dancing around this?

Q Is there some underlying -- you don't want to announce the trip before it's official, is that what you're doing?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think it's incumbent on the French to announce what they're going to do themselves.

Q How about was it understood in their conversations that Mitterrand was going? I mean --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I wouldn't say that.

Q Can you tell us any more about the possibility of resusitating the dialogue -- what kind of ideas did they have for --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it was a much more general, philosophical discussion. It wasn't saying next week or next month somebody ought to do X, Y, or Z.

Q But did Mitterrand repeat that he thinks they want to come back and they were talking about ways to encourage that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That was -- you know, it was a general discussion in the sense that that's one of the interpretations, that maybe the Soviets are trying to figure out a way to get back that will save face, but one doesn't know that concretely.

Q Well, this big statement you gave us about, you know, the Russians are to blame and it's their responsibility and so forth -- that comes from both countries?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, that's an American view.

Q Did the -- I have a couple of questions. One is, did the question of a U.S.-Soviet summit come up

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and did Mitterrand have any views about the President's criteria for a summit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q The idea of a U.S.-Soviet summit never came up?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Did they discuss the weather? No -- let me ask you another question. There has been some discussion either as a concession or a way of increasing the dialogue of submitting some treaties that were never ratified by the Senate to the Senate, like the 150 kiloton limit. Was there any discussion of that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Was there any discussion of letters that the President might have sent to Chernenko?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. There was a discussion of the dialogue, but not any discussion of any letters.

Q What is this readout about? (Laughter.)

Q What is the dialogue between --

Q Discussion of the dialogue?

Q What dialogue is there between the President and the Soviet leader?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm describing the discussions between the two Presidents, not --

Q You said there was a discussion of the dialogue.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right.

Q Could you -- what was the nature of that? How did --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that we have been in contact with the Soviets over recent months and have been trying to make it clear to them that we would welcome a resumption of the nuclear arms control talks, and that, thus far, the Soviets have given no indication that they are capable or willing to return to the talks.

Q Did the President mention anything that he -- did the President say that he had written to Chernenko?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not going to get into a sentence by sentence --

Q No, I don't --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- description of the account.

Q -- I wouldn't want you to, but, I mean, just that question.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, he didn't say specifically, "I have written to Chernenko", no.

Q What is their hold out position of why they don't want to come back if we've had that many contacts and we have opened our arms, and so forth? What do they say? I mean, not -- do they say not until you do this, or do they lay down conditions? I mean, I know the deployment of the Pershing missiles are -- but they've accepted that now, haven't they, basically?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'm not here to speak for the Soviets. You can look at their public statements which have talked about the fact that the deployment of the missiles in their view altered a situation, and they imply or assert, depending on who the speaker is, that somehow a new situation has been created that has to be taken into account. But they haven't -- they haven't put forward any specific statements that if X were done then Y would happen.

Q Well, do you assume that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What has -- I have more the feeling as an observer -- and my colleague who's had more experience than I in Soviet affairs might want to comment -- that the Soviets basically seem a bit blocked right now.

Q Why?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Why? Because there's been a change in the leadership.

Q Why do we keep suggesting that there's jockeying for power there? You've done that today, and Ambassador Hartman --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I've suggested that as an hypothesis, not as a fact.

Q Well, I know, but you -- there are a lot of things you were being very closed-mouthed about, and the fact that you're suggesting that there's a jockeying for power and Hartman did yesterday -- why is that? I mean, to the lay observer, it would appear that Chernenko has gotten all the top positions so far. Why do we think there's some jockeying going on?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: My colleague, alone, might tell you there will be another transition sometime in the fairly new future and I suspect --

Q Well, he's a year younger than President Reagan. I wonder about that.

Q At his -- are you speaking of his death?

Q He is 72 and the President is 73 --

Q He may pump iron, too. Who knows?

Q -- so is there a jockeying for position here in the West Wing?

Q You know the answer to that.

Q Does Mitterrand speak English?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He did not speak English with the President.

Q Do you know whether he speakes English at any time?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: My own personal knowledge? I've never heard him speak English. I'm told he speaks some English.

Q He does?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q They spoke through translators?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct.

Q Maybe they forgot the translator. Is that why so many issues were not brought up? (Laughter.)

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Q Are the Soviets waiting until after the November election?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Ask the Soviets.

Q I thought that Mitterrand had some complaints about some U.S. economic policies -- that the U.S. was dumping agriculture products in Europe at the expense of French farmers and that the U.S. was considering a tax on wine. Did he raise any of these -- on French wines being imported. Was any of this brought up at all? I mean, did he --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, there were no complaints of that nature at all.

Q Did the President repeat some of his statements to the Congress yesterday about the fact that, in Central America, it's more a question of homegrown, indigenous problems than it is of outside Soviet, Marxist influence?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. As I said at the outset, the two talked about both the indigenous problems which generate instability and the fact that there is a Soviet role.

Q Well, can you -- can you give us -- there seems to be some disagreement between the two on that subject.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not in this meeting. I mean, the meetings were, I think, pretty well characterized by an absence of disagreement.

Q You're saying there was no disagreement on the question of the reason for the revolutions in Central America today between Mitterrand and Reagan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There was no disagreement in the meetings. That doesn't mean that the two men share a total identity of views, but in the meeting, there was not a disagreement.

Q How did he enjoy California wines?

Q Was any coordination in Lebanon discussed about the multinational force?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not coordination, per se. There was a recognition that we've both been through a long, difficult process there. And there was a discussion about the hopes for some sort of resolution in Lebanon and the need -- the need for the Western powers to try to exercise a positive role there.

Q What was productive about the meetings?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: These weren't planned as decision-making meetings. There were no communiques planned. There were no treaties or agreements sketched out by the bureaucrats in the weeks ahead so that the two would have an agreement. The meetings were what they were billed as -- a chance to visit and exchange views.

Q At the Secretary of State level with Cheysson and Shultz, was there any discussion during this time here about the possibility of the French President going to Moscow?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Secretary and Cheysson are going to have their separate meeting this afternoon, so that is -- the meetings thus far have been with the two Presidents and their teams.

Q Do you anticipate that to be a more substantive meeting than those between the two heads of state?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would hope that it is equally as substantive as the ones that have happened here.

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Q Can we go back -- was there any discussion of economic issues such as U.S. interest rates and currency issues -- that sort of thing?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. Interest rates, per se, didn't -- were not discussed this morning.

Q Did they decide --

Q I'm sorry -- I don't understand what that means.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You asked whether there was a discussion of U.S. interest rates. My answer is no, there was not a discussion of U.S. interest rates.

Q Currency and currency relationships?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The fact that at Williamsburg the seven economic powers agreed last spring to try to work on the International Monetary System and that they would be reviewing this at the London Summit which comes in June, yes.

Q Aside from statements against protectionism which is pretty standard fare, did they talk in any way about how to resolve the differences over agricultural trade?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not in specifics, no.

Q They did not talk about how it would be handled, how it would be approached?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I mean, the differences are potential rather than current, if you will. They are potential if the European community takes certain actions against American agricultural exports. The community did not agree on any actions Monday and Tuesday in Brussels at all, so the differences remain potential.

Q But was there any talk about how to avoid greater protectionism by easing off on exports?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q I mean, it's clearly perceived as a problem. Was there any discussion of ways to avoid it becoming a worse problem?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not in explicit "if you do this we ought to do this" measure, no. It was -- these weren't negotiating sessions.

Q I'd like to go back to the language. The moment in the Red Room just before Mitterrand departed, was a translator used?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, there was an interpreter present.

Q When they walked down the stairs without an interpreter, they seemed to be conversing. How were they doing that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: President Mitterrand spent some time in England as a young man and, I am told, speaks a fair amount of English.

Q Because the President does not speak -- President Reagan does not speak French, does he?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 10:59 A.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release March 27, 1984

PRESS BRIEFING
BY SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, DONALD REGAN
ON THE TRIP TO CHINA

The Briefing Room

10:15 A.M. EST

MR. SIMS: Ladies and gentlemen, I am pleased to introduce the Secretary of Treasury, who has just talked to the President about his trip to China, Japan, and Korea, and will now discuss it with you. Mr. Secretary?

SECRETARY REGAN: I first have an opening statement and then I'll take questions. I am just back from a 10-day trip to The People's Republic of China, Japan, and Korea. This morning I'd like to touch on the China portion of the trip, where my Chinese counterpart, Chinese Finance Minister Wang Bingqian, and I co-chaired the fourth session of the United States-China Joint Economic Committee. This fourth meeting was very successful and I was pleased to discuss the President's upcoming visit.

The Chinese gave me a warm and cordial welcome and I expect that the President will be treated to a friendly and productive visit. The Joint Economic Commission meets roughly once a year, alternating between Beijing and Washington. In addition to the formal JEC sessions, I had meetings with Premier Zhao, Foreign Minister Wu, Finance Minister Wang, and Trade Minister Chen. During these meetings I had the opportunity to discuss how the United States and the PRC could work together to increase our economic, trade, and financial ties. Also, I had an opportunity to address outstanding problems between our two nations and how President Reagan's upcoming visit can serve as a catalyst to find their solutions.

As a result of the trip, I have a better understanding of China's economy, its potentials, and its problems. As you know, while there we initialed a bilateral tax treaty which President Reagan and Premier Zhao will sign next month. The treaty reduces the uncertainty for investors of both countries about the tax consequences of investing in each other's country. In addition, we agree with the Chinese to try harder to conclude an agreement for protection of investors prior to the President's visit. The Chinese negotiating team is here this week for further discussions.

I was also pleased to be able to tell the Chinese that our Overseas Private Investment Corporation and China's Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade will co-sponsor a United States investment mission to China this fall. We expect 25 to 30 United States firms to participate. They'll primarily be in the light manufacturing, construction, agri-business and electronics. Expectations of success for that trip appear high.

I also stressed to the Chinese the importance of fully implementing existing agreements in order that we can confidently proceed to new areas.

Now I will take your questions.

Q I gather from existing agreements you're talking about grain in particular? Where do we stand on that?

SECRETARY REGAN: Well, grain is one of the current ones.

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As far as we stand, they assured me that they will abide by the treaty, the agreement, and will perform in accordance with that this year.

Q What does that do for textiles and so forth? What's the relationship?

SECRETARY REGAN: Unless you're wearing gunnysacks, I'm not sure.

Q No, no. The question was whether they were retaliating against us.

Q Just answer the question. (Laughter.)

SECRETARY REGAN: Gee, if you can comment on mine, I can comment on yours. (Laughter.)

As far as the grain agreement, we would assume what that means is they will order and sign contracts for all of the purchases that they have agreed to in that grain agreement. As far as textiles are concerned, as you know, we have a multi-fiber agreement among all the nations of the world. And their quota has been increased under that over the past several years and will remain, in the future, where it is currently.

Q Did they give you any indication what they might accept in terms of terms on a new long-term grain agreement?

SECRETARY REGAN: No. I stressed the need to complete the current one before we get into discussions on the next one.

Yes?

Q Are you saying that we would -- you said -- you're quoted as saying that the U.S. would welcome the grain agreement. Is this regardless of the fact of whether or not they would make up the shortfall in purchases from last year?

SECRETARY REGAN: Well, I made that statement after they assured me that they would abide by the current treaty or the current agreement.

Q So you're saying it depends on --

SECRETARY REGAN: Sure. First things first. I mean, we want to see fulfillment of the current agreement before we get into discussions on the other one.

Q Argentina says it's not going to pay interest on its debt that's due in a few days. What does that do to the banking system of this country?

SECRETARY REGAN: Well, if they miss the March 31st deadline, that means that many of the loans have to be marked as non-performing. There will be a meeting -- I think there's a ten-day period after this happens before the regulators, the comptroller of the currency and the Fed meet to characterize these loans. And if they declare that these are non-performing loans, then the banks have to take a hit to their earnings for whatever the amount of interest is that's overdue.

Q Do you see this as an effort by Argentina to put pressure on the banks for more favorable terms?

SECRETARY REGAN: Well, I think the Argentine finds itself in straits where they claim they don't have enough foreign exchange on hand to pay this. They're looking for a new type of agreement. It's my understanding, although communications have been poor this morning

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and I wasn't able to communicate when I was in China that well, but I've talked with my Deputy, Tim McNamara, who's down there, and he says that there is a lot of work going on to see if some type of accommodation can be made prior to the March 31st deadline.

Q What do you mean by "accommodation"?

Q Are you concerned about this?

SECRETARY REGAN: Well, the banks' representers are down there at this Inter-American development bank meeting and the Argentine Finance Minister, Mr. Greenspun, is at the meeting also. So there have been conversations going on among the banks, the Argentine financial authorities, and other interested nations.

Q What would you like to see the Fed Open Market Committee do on money supply?

SECRETARY REGAN: All we want them to do is supply enough money to make possible the type of recovery that they see for this year for their 4.3 percent real growth and inflation around 4 and a half percent.

Q Are they providing enough now or would you like to see them loosen it up a little more? Regarding -- as the interest rates go back up.

SECRETARY REGAN: We're not telling the Fed what to do as far as the money supply is concerned. That's their area of expertise.

Q I know you're not telling them what to do, but are they giving enough now or do you think they need to loosen it up?

SECRETARY REGAN: Well, I haven't taken a look at the statistics in ten days, so I'm a little bit behind the curve on that one. But I noted with interest that some of the administration are saying that.

Q Well, a month ago, you were in this room -- you said that money growth was now sufficient. Do you stand by that?

SECRETARY REGAN: Pardon?

Q About a month ago in this Briefing Room, you said that the current rate of money growth was sufficient. Do you still --

SECRETARY REGAN: It was at that point. I haven't -- frankly, I haven't checked the statistics. I don't know what they are at this point.

Q But the interest rates are higher.

Q But interest rates are going up. Another half on the prime -- while you were gone. Out of town, right? (Laughter.) And the forecast that they'll start to creep up even more this summer.

SECRETARY REGAN: Well, that remains to be seen. There are some who are forecasting that the second quarter -- and I happen to be in agreement with that -- won't have the same amount of real growth as this first quarter. And if that happens, they'll be less pressure on interest rates.

Q Some people thing the pressure is because of the huge deficit.

SECRETARY REGAN: I know. (Laughter.) And we're working on that deficit.

Q Mr. Secretary, the President, in his speech this morning to the insurers says the deficit which pessimists predicted would keep going up is now coming down. It's being brought down by economic growth. Can you tell us more about how the deficit is coming down?

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SECRETARY REGAN: Well, there is a standard law in economics that for every one percent of unemployment the -- it reduces receipts to the U.S. Treasury of about $25 billion to $30 billion annually. Accordingly, when we had 10.7 percent unemployment above what might be called "full employment," that was a matter of -- oh, close to 5 percentage points, which will be $125 billion-$150 billion of the deficit accounted for by what would be called "cyclical factors."

Now, I think that's probably the reference the President had, that as unemployment comes down, cyclical factors will reduce that deficit.

Q Well, actually, the President said the other night that he wasn't worried about the deficit. It was big enough to take care of itself.

SECRETARY REGAN: Sounds like a Gridiron joke to me.

Q Are you satisfied, though, that the Republican's downpayment -- another $150 billion -- is enough to prevent a run-up of interest rates?

SECRETARY REGAN: Yes, as a pragmatist, I think that's about the limit that we could get this year in deficit reductions.

Q My question is whether or not that's enough to --

SECRETARY REGAN: I believe that if that amount actually does pass the Congress, and better sooner than later, if that happens, the money markets will be reassured that the federal government does intend to get its deficits under control.

Q If Argentina doesn't pay back this interest like it has threatened to do, what effect will that have on interest rates?

SECRETARY REGAN: On interest rates? Nothing per se. The main effect will be on bank earnings.

Q Won't banks cut back on their lending? On the amount of money that's available for lending?

SECRETARY REGAN: No, I wouldn't think so.

Q Does the strength of the recovery mean there is less need for the administration to worry about deficits?

SECRETARY REGAN: No, because we want to keep the recovery going. The average length of a recovery, you know, in the post-World War II era is about 38 to 40 months. We'd like to have this at least an average recovery, if not better than average. And deficits are one of the problems -- nagging problems that could hurt in this endeavor.

Q So do you think the economy is expanding too fast now? Is it overheating --

SECRETARY REGAN: Well, "overheating" would have a reference to inflation, not the rate of real growth of the economy, as to whether the economy's growing too strong to have no idle capacity, therefore, price increases and the like. I don't see evidence of that as yet in the inflation figures. And if, as most people say, the second quarter, indeed, is going to be a lot less strong than the first quarter, then you wouldn't expect overheating.

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Q Mr. Secretary --

MR. SIMS: Mr. Secretary, could I interrupt for a second to say the travel pool will form in the Lower Press Office? And does anyone have any more questions about the Secretary's trip?

Q Can you put some specifics --

SECRETARY REGAN: This will be the final one.

Q -- behind the President's broad statement that the deficits are now coming down? What -- the economic recovery means they're going to be brought down by how much? How many billion are we saving as a result of unemployment? From our original projection and what's the projection today?

SECRETARY REGAN: I can't characterize it exactly. But I would say at this point it's at least -- close to $100 billion less than it would have been had this unemployment continued at the 10½-11 era.

Q Over three years or over just this one specific year? Which year is it $100 billion less?

SECRETARY REGAN: In the out years. This is cumulative and by 1985, that's where it would be.

Q For God's sakes, go to bed.

MR. SIMS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

SECRETARY REGAN: Yes, I know, it's 20,000 miles and my body --

Q You get a free trip to Rome, though --

SECRETARY REGAN: -- says its midnight.

Q -- on your special bonus mileage. (Laughter.)

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 10:30 A.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release March 28, 1984

PRESS BRIEFING
BY AMBASSADOR HARRY W. SHLAUDEMAN
ON CENTRAL AMERICA

The Briefing Room

10:27 A.M. EST

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: I did have the great pleasure of meeting with the President this morning. I'm -- the occasion -- I'm leaving tomorrow morning on my first trip to Central America and had the opportunity to review the trip ahead and the mission ahead with the President. He emphasized to me, certainly a conviction I share, that there must indeed be a political solution in Central America, that the Administration's policy is directed at that, bringing together all of the various strands at play.

I think the fact that I met with the President, and that I'm leaving so soon -- that was only confirmed on Tuesday -- is, I would say, a signal of the interest of the President and the administration in this diplomatic mission. And I'm very pleased to be undertaking it.

I intend to do the five countries of Central America, and meet with the chiefs of state and the foreign ministers. A little later on, I will make another trip to do the four Contadora countries.

As you may know, there's a timetable, a calendar working in the Contadora process. The three working groups on security, political matters, and economic affairs are scheduled to report on April 30 to the foreign ministers. This will be quite detailed reports to form the basis for what is -- it is hoped will be a comprehensible and verifiable treaty for the region. And I'm particularly interested in educating myself on the process, and seeing in what ways we can be helpful.

Q Does the United States support such a treaty for the region?

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: Yes, indeed. The basis of the work of the working groups is the list of 21 objectives set down by the -- by the Contadora countries with the Central American countries. And a treaty -- a verifiable, comprehensive treaty including the 21 points -- all of them -- would indeed, in our judgment, form the basis for peace in the region.

Q Have you received specific assurances about your role as the President's special envoy down there as to ensure that matters of personality or jurisdiction don't frustrate you in your mission, as I think your predecessor did?

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AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: Yes, I have, really have no expectation of any problems whatsoever in that field -- (Laughter.)

Q Why?

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: I've been around a long time. I expect to be able to handle any problems that might arise.

Q When you leave tomorrow, which country are you going to first, sir?

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: I'm not going to say that for reasons, I think, you're familiar with.

Q Well, I just wondered if it was on the record.

Q Question?

Q What was the question?

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: "What was the first country I go to."

Q What's happening in Latin --

Q Doesn't -- the Contadora nations are calling for withdrawal of all foreign forces in Latin America. Do we support --

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: Central America.

Q -- in Central America. If we support that, is the U.S. prepared, once this treaty is signed, to withdraw its forces, not only in Honduras but in El Salvador?

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: As I said, the 21 points, including that one, form, in our opinion, the basis for a -- if, embodied in a verifiable and comprehensive treaty, I think, would form the basis for a settlement, certainly in the interests of Central America and in our own interests.

Q Well, does that mean that we're prepared, then, to withdraw U.S. military personnel from Honduras and El Salvador?

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: If in the -- you have to look at all the 21 points. If they are all included in the treaty, yes, I would say exactly.

Q Mr. Ambassador?

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: Yes?

Q To return to that question of which country you're going to go to first -- the State Department yesterday said you were going to Honduras first.

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: They shouldn't have. (Laughter.)

Q Were they right, though?

Q Are they right? (Laughter.)

Q We want to -- let's come back to --

Q What are you going to be doing --

Q Let's come back to this withdrawal business. If all the countries who signed the treaty abide by the 21 points, is that the point where you say we would withdraw? Or what -- I mean, you really ought to clear this up.

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: The 21 points include a large number of very important -- treat a large number of very important issues. And they're all interconnected. And part of this calls for the withdrawal, and it is -- it's not spelled out, you know, exactly when. They haven't reached that point in terms of language. It calls for the withdrawal of foreign advisers and foreign military elements. But this is all connected with a number of other points, including democratization, and an end to the arms race, an end to the support of subversion -- it's a very comprehensive set of objectives.

Q Mr. Ambassador, as you said, you've been around a long time, are you optimistic that this treaty has a chance of adoption?

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: Yes. Yes, in the end, I think, some sort of regional arrangement of that kind will be in the cards.

Q What's your present view?

Q Do you have any reasonable hopes of accomplishing anything in which the government of Nicaragua, given the current state of events? And, secondly, are you going to check out the qualifications of Nora Astorga? (Laughter.)

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: (Laughter.)

Q Be careful. (Laughter.)

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: The answer to your first question, Jerry, is maybe I can answer it when I come back. And on the second one, that's not in my particular --

Q Mr. Ambassador, what do you do, and what does Mr. Motley do --

Q Give us your present view of --

Q -- how would you describe the different roles?

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: Well, Mr. Motley is the Assistant Secretary who is the operational officer in the Department of State responsible for Latin, or Central American policy. And I have been given the task of representing the President in attempting to facilitate diplomatic and political solutions in the region. I intend to work very closely with Mr. Motley whom I know quite well, and I don't see that any problems will arise.

Q Who becomes the spokesman for the American position with these various countries --

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: Well, obviously, I'm going to be doing the traveling and will be speaking with them, but Mr. Motley is not only perfectly capable, but should be in a position to state the U.S. interests.

Q What's your present view, if I may, on whether military aid to El Salvador should be tied to a certifiable progress on human rights there?

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: I think there's no -- as you know I worked on the Kissinger Commission report, and --

Q Your present view?

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: -- yes, I don't think there's any quarrel about the need for improvement in human rights and the fact that this is, indeed -- that assistance should be conditioned on

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progress on human rights. The question is, in what form? And that, I think, is a subject for negotiation.

Q On the report which you worked on seemed to suggest it should be a certifiable form, certified by the President to Congress.

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: That's not what it says. It says that it should be conditioned in legislation. It doesn't refer to certification.

Q Do you agree that it should be conditioned in an absolute sense?

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: Yes, I -- again, I think this has to be worked out. I think that obviously you must have progress on human rights,

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and that this, as we said in the report, this is tied to the question of military assistance, and there is a condition there. Now, exactly how you do it, what kind of language you put it in, is another matter.

Q Just one final question, if I may -- do you see that you then have any difference or no difference with the administration on this position?

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: No, I have no difference with them.

Q Mr. Ambassador, Gary Hart is saying that we should get all U.S. troops out of Central America now. What do you think of that?

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: I'd rather not comment on that. I --

Q Well, why not? It's -- he's a Senator.

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: Well, I wouldn't agree that we should get all the troops out, and I don't know what else I could say about it.

Q Do you think it's a legitimate political issue?

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: That, I don't know.

Q Well, what would happen if we withdrew unilaterally right now?

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: If you withdrew from where unilaterally? From Central America entirely?

Q Central America.

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: I think my own view would be that the insurgents would win in El Salvador.

Q Aren't they going to win anyway?

Q You said that the administration wants a political solution. Is there any conflict between that and the aid to the Contras, and what do you see as the function of that aid?

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: My understanding is that we don't comment in public on aid to -- on the question you raised.

Q Not even as to what the purpose of it is?

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: I just refer you back to the Kissinger Commission Report which advocates maintaining, as it says, "pressures and incentives in order to promote negotiations".

Q You indicated you were hopeful about the long-term, longer term prospects for some kind of a regional agreement. I mean, do you see the key to that, the impetus, coming from the military pressure that's being exerted right now against the Left with the backing of the United States, or through the Contadora -- some kind of regional initiative from the countries themselves?

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: I think the two things work together. And I think it's -- obviously, the Contadora process is a Latin American initiative,it is the initiative of those four countries. They are the ones who carried it forward. They, with the five Central American countries, are the ones who will, in the end, create the treaty or the settlement, as you said. But you have -- on the other side, you have the security problem, which, I think, has to be addressed. I think there has to be, again, incentives and pressures.

Q Mr. Ambassador, then if the Cubans and the Soviets, and the other Eastern bloc nations withdraw their personnel from Nicaragua, would the U.S. then be willing to withdraw its personnel from Honduras and El Salvador?

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: Again, in terms if you have a comprehensive, verifiable treaty covering all 21 points.

Q In other words, you're saying the U.S. would not unilaterally withdraw from Central America?

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: That's right.

Q Mr. Ambassador, critics of military aid got some more ammunition from the story that approximately half of the Salvadoran rebels' weapons are American weapons captured, and that that's further evidence that we ought not to give more military aid, we're just fueling the conflict.

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: I'm not -- I have to confess I'm not thoroughly briefed on that point. I'm not sure it was exactly -- if it was said that way, I'm not sure that's exactly right. I think the point, however, is that in any guerrilla war, you are going to lose arms to both sides and this is happening on both sides. I think the statement was also made, which, as I understand it, is the critical one, that the ammunition -- the munitions are not -- the munitions are coming into El Salvador across the border. This -- you know, the guns aren't much good without the munitions.

Q Mr. Ambassador, what is your position on terrorists events such as the blowing up of the facilities in the Port in Nicaragua?

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: I have no idea.

Q Well, do you have a view on that?

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: No.

Q What about the suggestion by many people down there that it was a CIA operation?

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: Again, my understanding is that we don't address these things.

Q Well, does that mean we condone that sort of --

MORE

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: I say again, we don't address these things --

Q Well, you say the munitions are coming in across the border. I thought that flow had been pretty much stopped. There were all kinds of claims of success.

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: I believe the testimony yesterday was that that is not the case. But I was not present for the testimony.

Q Is the situation now worsening again, that the munitions are coming back across the border or --

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: I think this is -- the munitions have been flowing -- I have never read that that traffic was stopped and I would be very dubious that it was.

Q What do you think we've accomplished in our three years of massive intervention in Central America, when we weren't really there before with high-powered military aid and so forth? What has been the progress, really? I mean, where are we? Aren't they more in war today than they were in 1981?

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: Well, you could look at it the other way. If we weren't there, what would it be?

I think the fact is that some progress has been made, considerable progress.

Q In what way?

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: I think in El Salvador. As I said here when I briefed on the elections, this is a long and difficult process. But I think considerable progress has been made. And I think -- one thing you might -- at least the way I look at it, is that clearly El Salvador, which was the most difficult country of the region in terms of the social and political structures, is clearly not the same country it was in 1979. And I think the basis there is -- the basis is there for lasting progress. And I think we've contributed to that.

Q -- answer your own question and tell us what would have happened if we weren't there?

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: In my view, the -- at least two countries, Nicaragua and El Salvador, would be under Marxist-Leninist regimes in which I don't -- I recommend to those of you who haven't read it an article recently in the Atlantic Monthly by the great Peruvian novelist, Mario Vargas Llosa, in which he talks about this question of whether Latin Americans really merit democracy or not. It's a brilliant piece of analysis, with which I happen to agree.

Q You say Nicaragua might have become Marxist if we weren't there?

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: I said there would be two -- (laughter.)

Q Well, do you think that Castro has been stopped now and that we will forever never negotiate with him?

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: I have no idea. The Cuban issue is not one I'm ready to --

Q Well, isn't it all a part of the same package?

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: Well, certainly it's true that Cuban intervention, in my judgment, is the primary element in this problem. But I haven't seen any indication on his part that he's prepared -- and this goes back many years now -- that he's prepared, really, to talk about these issues.

He is prepared to negotiate -- and this goes back to at least 1975 -- to negotiate what he calls "bilateral issues," which have to do with expropriations and the like. But I have never seen any indication --

Q Do you think the Cubans are the primary element in the problem?

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: I think Cuban intervention is -- as we say in the report, obviously these problems have very deep historical roots and obviously social injustice, closed political systems created the situation in which you have the crisis. But I think it is Cuban intervention that gives it that extra and, in my mind, very dangerous dimension.

Q Mr. Ambassador, you said that you think in the end, in the long run there will be some sort of regional treaty --

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: I certainly hope so.

Q On what do you base that? And what incentive is there for the left or the Nicaraguans to enter into such an agreement?

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: There are a number of incentives in the end for them, to give you one example, the Central American Common Market. I think it's very hard for me to envisage real economic progress in Nicaragua, and I hope that's what they're interested in, without close economic cooperation with the other four countries. This -- In many ways, this is a unit, this region. That's simply one example of what I think are a number of incentives for them to join in.

Q Mr. Ambassador --

MR. SIMS: -- one more --

Q -- did the President discuss the prospects for the military aid package before Congress?

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: We mentioned it, that's all I can say.

Q What did he say about --

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: I'm --

Q Is he worried about it?

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: I'm not -- He refused to answer that question. I'm not able to.

Q What did he say to you besides -- wants a political solution?

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN: He wished me luck. (Laughter.)

Q In Honduras?

Q Around here.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 10:46 A.M. EST

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ON-THE-RECORD BRIEFING
BY
THOMAS R. PICKERING
UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO EL SALVADOR
THURSDAY, MARCH 29, 1984, 3:00 P.M.

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon everybody. We are on the record. This is an On-the-Record briefing by Ambassador Thomas Pickering, our United States Ambassador to to El Salvador. Ambassador Pickering was asked to come to Washington by members of the Congressional delegation that went down to monitor the elections. He's been here for a day or so; returning to El Salvador tomorrow, and he is now all yours.

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: Thank you, John, very much. As John mentioned, I was up talking to the Congress about the elections in El Salvador which took place last Sunday. They were interested in what had been happening since they left two days ago. I made it clear that we now have 95 percent of the report on the vote. This comes from the political parties, but you have to understand that the political parties participate in the counting. They receive copies of the reports of each balloting at each polling place and have a very effective system of adding them up.

I'm made to understand from reports from El Salvador that, in fact, the two leading political parties have pretty much agreed as to the outcome of the figures. But 75 percent or more -- perhaps as many as 1.4 million people who are actually able to exercise their right to vote despite the guerrilla attacks and despite the confusion surrounding the introduction of a new balloting system, the late arrival of ballots in many polling places, and so forth, is not nearly as significant as many had at first feared the downturn in voting participating would actually be in the elections.

As you may know, the parties are now seemingly close together on the fact that Mr. Duarte has about 45 percent of the vote; Mr. D'Aubuisson, about 30 percent; and Mr. Guerrero between 18 and 19 percent of the vote in this current election.

That will mean that there will be a second election, a runoff election. We're not certain of the date because that has to be set by the Elections Council within thirty days of the official tally. But we expect that perhaps the 29th of April or the 6th of May are likely dates coming as they do after Easter and Holy Week celebrations in San Salvador, and with a sufficient time to conduct political campaigns.

We expect that the next weeks will be very busy ones in the electoral process in El Salvador, including, obviously, discussions among the parties as to what the parties who did not win this round will do with their votes and with their voters.

I also mentioned that, when I was up on the Hill in particular, a large amount of attention has been directed to the military in politics in El Salvador. They reported, and I was pleased to reaffirm their report, when they spoke to the President, that it appeared very clearly that the military had stayed out of politics and done an excellent job in protecting the election.

I was happy to note, as well, that the largest Campesino union in El Salvador made it a point in their public announcement welcoming the elections and the results. They indicated they felt the army had done a good job in staying out of the elections and protecting the elections.

This brings me to the second point that I was making on the Hill, and that was clearly that the assistance that we provide is running out. No more money is available and none has been available since February. When I was here with you a little while ago, I catalogued for you the kinds of things they were running out of.

We can add to the munitions I spoke about then and the communication sets and the personal equipment and the rifles, additional very critical spare parts, medical supplies, replacement helicopters for those that had been lost in the fighting over the last three months. And, in addition, an increased sense, if one can already heighten the sense of the need,for the medical evacuation helicopters and the ambulances which are included in the proposal before the Congress.

We have had a chance to look again, and medical statistics in El Salvador indicate that there is still a very high loss rate among those that are wounded, perhaps one in two and on some occasions; certainly one in three, which compares to eleven percent as the U.S. statistic, I understand.

The people who were down there saw this first-hand, had a chance to be briefed by senior Salvadorans, and I had a chance to talk to them again on the Hill in the period I've been back ,to emphasize my very strong feeling that the next round of elections will be significantly more difficult to protect and defend than this round. In this round, over fifty soldiers lost their lives defending the elections in the three-day period around the elections.

We expect, as well, that the military will have to conduct defensive operations in order to carry forward with its protection. And it just doesn't mean putting guards out on polling day. Those offensive operations require support. When the soldier turns around and doesn't know where his next bullet is coming from, obviously, it has a tremendous critical effect on his and his officers willingness to conduct offensive operations. And, similarly, in any country where there is a grapevine in operation, and there is among military all over, when supplies run out, people know about that long ahead of time, and the psychological impact on the military's capacity to conduct the kind of offensive operations required to protect the elections is real.

So I made a very strong point in all of my discussions of the urgency of the assistance, of the hope that we had, who are close to the situation in El Salvador, that the Senate and House would soon pass the proposals before it.

Q Mr. Ambassador, the Defense Department has said that American forces in your country, in El Salvador, have come under combat fire three times in recent months, and a Washington Post report lists a number of developments that have taken place since last August which suggest that American advisors, trainers, and other American personnel in El Salvador are coming increasingly into a combat role or a combat position in El Salvador. How do you respond to that?

A To begin with, there are "no forces" as such in El Salvador. We have trainers and we have people who support trainers and attaches.

Combat fire, I'm not sure I know what it is except that maybe fire aimed in anger. In any event, I think the Pentagon has confirmed to Senator Sasser, and I can confirm to you, that Americans in the armed services have been present on several occasions, perhaps as many as three that I can recall since my time there, in which towns in which they were located -- rather large towns -- and barracks in which they were staying, had come under fire. Some of it was in the nature of harassment fire and some of it was in the nature of directed fire.

On no occasion that I know of did any of them have to fire back or were put in a position where they needed to fire back. They did, in fact, what they were supposed to do, which was to find shelter and stay out of the way.

There is no certainty in a situation such as El Salvador that there will be no incidents. As you all know, if you've been there, many people in the Embassy are recipients of very heavy security protection; security protection from terrorist incidents, obviously. But in the nature of an exposed place in the middle of a guerrilla war, that kind of thing has happened and may happen again.

Q Regardless of whether or not there is any certainty about whether they would come under fire in these kinds of incidents, isn't it true that -- accurate to say that these three incidents that you mentioned and the carrying of automatic weapons, rather than small sidearms, and the accompaniment of reconnaissance missions with combat forces on the ground -- Salvadoran forces on the ground -- indicate a combat role by American troops?

A No, not at all. You're obviously lumping a whole bunch of stuff in one question. I think if your purpose to do that is to say that there's been some escalation, I would say no. These kinds of things have been a part of the scene in El Salvador for sometime. They don't represent escalation.

Let me address, first, the question of the carrying of defensive arms by people engaged -- by U.S. people -- engaged in training in El Salvador. This is an old story.

We've explained, I think, from this podium many times, that situation as I have in El Salvador. But let me just repeat to make it clear to you. Following the murder of Lieutenant Commander Alfred Schaufelberger in May of 1983, we took the opportunity to review the Embassy security posture. In the course of that review, it became apparent that people who, for example, were defending me and other Embassy officers -- security officers -- were permitted to carry a certain kind of small, automatic sidearm, the CAR-15.

At that time -- it happened in August, before I went to El Salvador -- it was decided that Americans should not be treated differentially. And when military trainers came into situations or in the course of their work into situations which required that kind of defensive arm, they were permitted to carry it. That's a decision made some months ago.

A similar defensive arm, the MP-5, which I understand is West German, was also provided for in those cases where there were not sufficient CAR-15s. We don't believe that represents an escalation. It represented, in fact, if anything, the maintaining of a common standard of security in defense.

On the issue of reconnaissance, that, too, is an old story. It has been talked about before. I believe the Secretary of Defense made it clear. My colleague in Honduras made it clear to the press when that equipment arrived, that it was there for reconnaissance purposes and to support the Salvadoran elections, in particular. It related to infiltration and activities in El Salvador. I don't believe that represents anything new.

Q Does it still relate to infiltration? What do you mean by "other activities in El Salvador?"

A Clearly -- I'm not going to go into the operational details, but I think it's self-evident to you as to everyone else that when you look at a situation in a country, what you see is what you get. You don't put on a pair of glasses that says these see infiltration and these don't see anything else. And the collection of information is being done with the full permission and cooperation of the governments involved.

Let me go to Jim.

Q Tom, a couple of statistical questions. One, how does the 1.4 million voter turnout compare to last year?

A Last time, those who succeeded in casting votes -- ballot votes, null and in abscentia votes -- was something over 1.5 million. We reckon this against a base of 1.8 million. It's a complicated base to arrive at. If you want me to go into details, I will.

Last time we reckoned that 1.5 and something million was about 80 percent of the registered voters expected to turn out. We believe the 1.4 million will be something above 75 percent.

Q Another statistical question. If the Senate finally does turn out this $62 million dollar package, will that solve the bullet problem prior to the elections?

A We have made it clear that we are very anxious to get that package because we believe that package will help us move through the end of April/May elections, through the transition period in June. But probably after the end of June, we will have to be back again for more. The hope had been that the $93 million package, as I said when I was here earlier, would get us through the end of the fiscal year with what's the sort of bare minimum required to be able to keep the Salvadoran Army functioning, carrying forward with the bare minimum necessary operations. It's not conceived of as a see-change kind of package.

Q Why are we just being told about these incidents, Mr. Ambassador? Senator Sasser says he inquired about them during a visit and was not told about them either by the military or by the Embassy.

A Senator Sasser, to my knowledge, has not been in El Salvador since I have. I'm quite certain of that. I've been away for a few weeks, so I might have missed him.

To my knowledge, these were all incidents in the public press, and the presence of the American trainers in the city where the attacks occurred is public knowledge. I don't know that there was any other requirement. If there was a legal requirement, then perhaps that ought to be addressed to the legal people. I'm not certain.

Q When was the earliest of them?

A Let me just finish one.

The earliest one that I'm aware of was the September 3 attack on San Miguel.

(Continued on next page)

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Q Mr. Ambassador, can I ask you for your reaction to the specific phrasing as it is put in the Post here, "U.S. aircraft are providing reconnaissance and communication support for Salvadoran troops during combat operations."

Is that right or wrong, or what?

A I am not going to discuss for you the intelligence and operational details of what is happening. The information collected is reported, and to the extent that it can be within intelligence guidelines, is shared with the Salvadorans. Obviously, information put in the international mail is not as reliable or as useful as information conveyed directly. But I'm not going to go into the details, the specific operational details of that.

Q But you're leaving the central issue that has caused a certain amount of excitement here today on this very question, because you say you won't go into it. Is the United States flying missions for reconnaissance so that they can radio it to ground troops on the ground for direct action against the insurgents?

A We have made it clear that we are collecting reconnaissance, that we're collecting reconnaissance in real time. That's all been made clear. We're not going to discuss the operational details of how things are moved, or indeed what reaction is taken, although I think you can count it as certain that reconnaissance is not valuable unless it is provided in time to be useful.

Q Is not reconnaissance in that effect, then, an advisory role, Mr. Ambassador?

A No, I don't ~~think~~ believe it is at all. We have exchanged information with many governments around the world for many years, and I don't believe those governments would consider us in an advisory role.

Marvin.

Q Mr. Ambassador, could you on this point explain to us what your understanding is about the military guidelines? Maybe that could help get over this. Originally, a year or so ago, we were told that Americans have nothing to do with combat, that there were 55 people down there, et cetera, and now you get into something like the "recon" where it seems as if American planes are involved in part of combat operations. They're not on the ground, but they are providing information from above.

A I think "combat," as we looked at it in the rules, means getting yourself engaged in a position where you might get shot at and have to shoot back. _Time_ Magazine provides information: maybe somebody uses that as base information for what's going on. That's not combat. So I would try to draw those clear distinctions.

If you don't like _Time_ -- _Newsweek_. I don't mean to be partial.

Q No, no, no. I'm just trying to understand what your understanding is about the military guidelines currently functioning.

A The military guidelines are directly drawn up to avoid any conflict with the War Powers Resolution, which I think has a very specific sense of what combat is involved here, and as a result have to be read in the light of that resolution; and from the legal advice I have, are capable. in effect, of avoiding any conflict with the War Powers Act.

Q Has it changed in any way --

A No, it hasn't.

Q -- in the past year?

A It has not changed in any way.

Q Are you saying these reconnaissance planes are not flying over guerrilla positions, or there is some undertaking that they won't be shot at?

A I'm not going to talk about the rules of engagement; all I will tell you is that the rules of engagement are set down in a way that avoids conflict with the War Powers Resolution, and are in consonance with the thing that Marvin was just, the rules that Marvin was just discussing.

Q Well, Mr. Ambassador, I don't think anybody suggested there was any conflict with the War Powers Resolution;

on the contrary, it's possible that these actions being taken by American forces in El Salvador require some reporting under the War Powers Act. That's not a conflict with them. That's what we're getting at.

A Well, again, I'm not the expert on what reporting requirements there are. I'm sure the press people would be pleased to try to provide you with an answer to that. That's a factual question.

The point I was making was that there was an implication in the question -- maybe I'm getting paranoid from being in Salvador too long --

Q The sun.

A -- that in fact that was happening. And if that wasn't the implication in the question, then we're both on the same ground, that is not happening.

Q Shouldn't these actions be reported?

Q Mr. Ambassador, you said that when this equipment -- I assume by that you mean airplanes -- arrived, it was made clear that it was being used for reconnaissance and intelligence activities. There seems to be a big collective failure up here among people who remember this having been made clear.

A I don't know. I don't know. I wasn't in the --

Q Most people remember it as Marvin described it to you.

A I wasn't in this room, but I do read the press, and it was my clear understanding of what was published in the press that that was made clear.

Q When was this?

A Weeks ago -- three, four weeks ago. I can't give you the date. Maybe we can dig it out.

Go ahead.

Q Mr. Ambassador, on the basis of what you're saying, I take it you're confirming this statement I read to you before, that "we are providing recon and communication support for Salvadoran troops during combat."

A No, I'm not. And I think you have to take my words very carefully as exactly what I said.

Q You're saying, this is not the case?

A I'm not going to go into the details that one would have to go into to make that kind of confirmation.

Q But if you say that they are, in fact, obtaining real-time intelligence, and real-time intelligence is only of value during that particular time of operation --

A That's correct.

Q -- then I don't know why this statement is not right You may not want to confirm it, but --

A I don't want to confirm it because there are some things in there that are not correct, and I'm not going to tell you at this point what they are because they relate to operational details.

Q Well, I was only asking you about one sentence.

A Sure, right.

Q Not the whole story.

A And that's the sentence.

Q Mr. Ambassador, the Defense Department, when answering questions today about the Sasser charges, says that the American military personnel were in non-combattant roles in field camps. Are the cities you're talking about considered "field camps?"

A Yes, in fact, the Salvadoran system is to have a barracks, a "cuartel" in Spanish, located on the edge, or sometimes near large cities. Those happen to be,in the main, like area headquarters and training establishments; and that combination is where American trainers work.

Q Just to follow up on that, a little while ago, you said that combat, as you see it or as the Administration sees it, would be a situation in which they would have to fire back, they would have to shoot back if they were fired upon. Can we use that as a rule-of-thumb, as a benchmark now that--

A No. I think -- I was giving you "Pickering's ready rule-of-thumb" and not the lawyers'. I think you'll have to address that one to the lawyers.

Q Could we find out what the policy is?

A I think you'll have to address that one to the lawyers. And I have a great difficulty in trampling around the War Powers Resolution, because while I understand what rules are being applied, I think you need someone who is competent legally to review that for you, and give you a better sense of what that really means and so on.

Q But under "Pickering's rule," --

A (Laughter)

Q -- if any of those people who had been fired upon had fired back, under "Pickering's rule," at least, that would have been considered combat?

A No. We always have maintained that if fired upon, our people have the right to defend themselves. But we have a similar rule which says you shouldn't get into a position if you can find any way to avoid it, where you are fired upon or are required to fire back.

Q Mr. Ambassador, could you try to help us in this way perhaps?

A I'm always trying to help you. Go ahead.

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Q Could the Salvadoran military right now, on its own, protect the government and protect the system that is now in power?

A I believe it can.

Q To what extent, therefore,is American help so desparately required?

A Because it is running out of the things that it needs on its own to defend the government, the electoral process, and the other things. In fact, it's ability to do that is not a "make or break" question. It is reduced in its ability to do that from what it was three weeks ago, before the elections, because it has in fact used up things that are not coming back. That process will continue. It is, in my view, likely to continue at an accelerated rate, and that is likely to make the conditions for protecting the election at the end of April that much more difficult, that much more serious, that much tougher for them; and as a result, their experience in protecting the elections this time, in which 22 towns were not able to vote because of guerrilla attacks, may well be increased, and might seriously jeopardize the electoral process.

I had one way in the back.

Q Just a couple -- can I take one more crack at the reconnaissance thing?

A Sure.

Q Can you say, under the way you have described it to us at this point, that U.S. reconnaissance aircraft are not directing fire at this time?

A I would say that I am not going to discuss the details of the operations and the intelligence missions, and that we are getting into the operational details of intelligence questions here.

Q All right. Let me ask one more, and this is a statistical question: In the breakdown of the amount of helicopters you would like to have under this assistance program--I believe you're asking for nine combat-type helicopters -- how many are medevac helicopters?

A All right. Let me say this: There was an agreement reached at the end of last week to reduce the $93 million request of the President to $61.750 million. The part that was ostensibly dropped from that request was the portion that we called the "tactical mobility portion." That included 9 helicopters and over 200 ground vehicles. That has been dropped. I'm not certain that the rules would require that we not spend other money -- and I would be strongly in favor within the $61 million of replacing helicopters that have been lost since the beginning of the year (2 and possibly 3); but that is a choice that t military

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logisticians will make. In addition, in the medical evacuation package, there is a proposal for four medical evacuation helicopters, specially equipped, I believe, to do that job.

Let me get a question here because we've been dancing for a while.

(Continued on page 23.)

Q Fred Ikle was quoted as saying the other day that half the guerrillas' weapons were captured from the Salvadoran army and they were American weapons, and I believe a senior American official who looks a lot like you was up here about six weeks ago and gave a different set of figures. Could you reconcile those two?

A Yeah. Sure. I believe that after looking very carefully at what Fred had provided, it was based in effect on a study done of one area of El Salvador for a very limited period of time, a matter of months, and as a result is not valid for the whole country for the period of time that's of most interest to all of us over the last three or four years. And in fact, I would go back to such statistics as the fact that upon reckoning about perhaps only 7 percent of the individual items of armament, equipment, and that kind of thing have been lost to the guerrillas by the Salvadorans, and I would go back to my statement which I made to you here ON BACKGROUND, which I'd be delighted to make ON THE RECORD, that a look at about 200 M-16s, either taken from the guerrillas by the government or on which records were captured in a documentary form, in the form of serial number records, indicate that -- between January '83 and January '84 this material was acquired -- indicate that 38 percent of those came from Vietnam, 29 percent are not traceable because the serial number information isn't available, or because the actual weapons had the numbers filed away. Only five weapons in that group -- less than three percent -- had their origin in El Salvador, and the rest of the group was from here, there and everywhere, and indicates to us that the guerrillas had contacts in the international arms trade which also provided M-16 weapons.

That I think is a clear indication in statistical terms, as clear as I can give you with respect to one type of armament, but a very important type of armament both to the military and the guerrillas, and I think it says very clearly that at least 38 percent and perhaps some percentage of the unknown 29 percent came from Vietnam -- we would expect maybe another third or up to 50 percent; that a very small portion of those captured weapons had its origin in U.S. military equipment shipped to El Salvador; and that the guerrillas also relied on scooping up M-16s wherever they could in the international arms trade at some point at least in their shipping stuff in.

We know that those weapons did not come in freely through Salvadoran ports or airports, but came in through the infiltration routes.

Q Back on the voter turnout, I'm having trouble reconciling this 75 percent or more turnout with the reports that we had of massive confusion, people going to the town --

A That's exactly why I told you that, because the people who observed the confusion -- and there was confusion, I observed it -- did not stay around long enough to see those people vote and made assumptions about the people who turned and walked away and didn't vote, which I don't believe are valid.

I interviewed people late in the day who were waiting six and seven hours. I also was aware and at a major voting place in San Salvador City, the major stadium, where there was a large crowd of people waiting to vote at 3:00 o'clock. At 3:15, when I was there, the Election Commission decided to let anybody vote anywhere they wanted. They formed lines and went ahead and voted. I came back at 5:30, and a half an hour before the polls closed, and all those people had voted. So I think (a) there was a super hype on the confusion, a very sad and misleading conclusion that everybody had walked away. I think that not only were you, the press, victims of those conclusions, but some of the observers initially felt that that was the conclusion.

On Sunday evening after the election I talked to the press and said, let's wait and look at the statistics. Let's see the results before we make those conclusions. Let's compare it to the best base that we can, which is

1982. I think that comparison holds up pretty well.

Q Mr. Ambassador --

Q Have you --

A One follow-up, and then I'll go back to you.

Q Have you examined, or have your people down there examined the actual voting to make sure that no one is cooking the books to make --

A Not only did our people do it, we had 280 international observers, 600 press. The Embassy, of course, had its people accompanying them. They went to many different places. We had in the course of the day eight trips by road and four by helicopter in the morning and a similar one in the afternoon, all to different polling places.

I have found no one down there who says there was fraud, that there was malfeasance. Quite the contrary, despite the turmoil that was apparent early in the morning, the Salvadorans sorted themselves out. I've never seen such patience in a crowd. I've never seen such willing kind of mutual cooperation. I found people who volunteered to help campesinos read their ID cards and tell them where in the confusing placement of ballot boxes they should go. The parties all did that.

I think despite the fact that some of the press said it was a triumph of bureaucracy over free elections, I think it was a triumph of the people over the bureaucracy is the end result of that.

Q Yes. But what kind of offensive operations are planned to defend the runoff?

A Without discussing specific details, the army conducted a two-phase plan to defend the current election, and it's quite clear that something like it will have to be done to defend the next phase. The two-phase plan involved a series of offensive operations. One series was based on continuing to expand what's called the "national plan" in a particular department, a state of El Salvador. Salvadoran military provided increased security and cleared out some guerrilla-base areas, and then brought in behind it a civil structure to do reconstruction and economic development and to build civil defense forces.

A second area was increased defensive operations all over the country, largely focused on major guerrilla-base areas in three areas where the guerrillas have long had the capacity to stay for periods of time except when the army comes in. In the north, in a department called Chalatenango, in the north in a department called Morazon, and in the south along the coast in a department called Usulutan -- those I think helped to disrupt them. I observed the elections for part of the day in Morazon, and it was clear that military operations on the part of the guerrillas there were down. In other places they were up. But the guerrillas' major effort was not to conduct military attacks -- they did that only in the case of some 22 towns -- but to cut the national electrical grid, and it was cut for 12 hours the night before the election. Obviously, you can't defend every power pole everywhere in the country all the time, so it's a very vulnerable system, and it was cut on a timed basis so that it took the government until the middle of election day to get the electrical power back on. Also quite a feat because it isn't easy to put a whole country's electrical grid back into place.

Secondly, they took ID cards away from peasants. ID cards are easy to steal from defenseless people, and they're what's required to vote, and they tore them up or they put them in big sacks and took them away.

The third thing they did was that they went into towns and burned ballot boxes, registers and voting papers, and, as I said, in some 20, maybe 22, towns that occurred.

We think the guerrilla disruptive action possibly affected about 35,000 potential voters on the basis of the number of registered voters that were registered in the towns where the voting did not take place.

Q Mr. Ambassador --

A Yes.

Q As you know, one of the reasons the Congress is reluctant to go ahead with the full sum of money is they want to see what's going to happen as a result of the presidential elections.

Recognizing the sensitivity of that question, could you give us some sense of what changes might take place as a result of the presidential election?

A I would think that two or three things will take place as a result of the presidential election, recognizing the sensitivity and our extreme interest in maintaining a neutral position in the electoral process.

First, a president will be elected with a majority, and for the first time in 50 years someone that wasn't known in advance. This will give him the sort of political standing that his predecessor and his predecessors have not had, as someone who has a mandate. So certainly it will give the president increased policy flexibility.

I mentioned in my opening remarks there will probably be some informal coalition-forming. That might also affect in a sense future policies. If one or the other of the candidates has some success in forming a coalition, then presumably coalition-forming may influence future policies of the government.

Third, I indicated to you that I thought the military were doing a good job in staying out of politics and defending the elections. They have also committed themselves to accept the results. We feel that they will do so, their performance has been good to date, and we see no reasons to believe that they will not do so. But this will be a key test because it will mean for the first time in a long while the military were not the arbiters of presidential politics -- the people were -- and it will mean something in the long-term democratization of El Salvador that the military are doing what they were supposed to be doing,which is dealing with the security situation in the country,and the people were dealing with the political situation, and the leadership that emerges will thus have a strong standing with respect to the military in the future of the country. So the bifurcation of the ways I think will be importantly enhanced by successful elections over this period in El Salvador, and I think those will all make a difference in the future of the country.

Q Mr. Ambassador, are the full details of what we are doing militarily, which you don't feel right in confirming here, being reported some place on the Hill now, and, if so, where?

A I don't know. That would be a question that you should address to the Pentagon. After all, the military activities are within their charge.

Q So you're not certain that the full scope of the reconnaissance --

A I don't know.

Q Mr. Ambassador, isn't it -- picking up Dennis' question, given the --

A Let me just say this: I want to assure you I know what's going on down there, but I'm not sure I know about what the reporting requirements are or who does what to whom. I just presume they are doing what they're supposed to do.

Q Given the controversy here at home over the Administration's policy toward El Salvador, isn't it possible that your refusal to be pinned down on some of these points that we have raised with you about U.S. planes operating reconnaissance for the Salvadoran troops in combat -- isn't it possible that this refusal will only provide fuel for critics of --

A No. I don't believe so, because I think I've given you a very clear picture of what's happening in my description of the issue.

Q Not on this --

A A very clear picture. But I'm not going to accept the words of one paper's description of that in a few areas that I believe provides some operational or other kinds of details. But in essence I said to you very clearly, and you said to me very clearly, exactly what's going on.

Q Well, one of us is clearer than the other.

A Okay.

MR. HUGHES: Let's take a couple more.

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: One right here.

Q What role do you think Mr. Guerrero is likely to play in the upcoming April elections? He ran a pretty strong third actually.

A He did run a very strong third, and I am certain that he will play an important role because he and his party followers control just a little less than 20 percent of the vote, which is a critical factor, obviously. I can't tell you exactly, but when I spoke about coalitions, obviously, he would be someone who would have to be looked at in that sense as a potential coalition-former. Indeed, some of the other parties would be too. One of the other parties gained three and a half percent of the vote, more or less. That's not insignificant as you look at the close way the totals might fall out in El Salvador.

Q Presuming that the election confusion has been remedied, or will be, what prediction would you make for a turnout in the second runoff?

A I don't make predictions on turnout in El Salvador. (Laughter)

Q Again, can we look for --

A I did say last time, however, that I thought it would be less than the 1982 figure because of the complications being introduced by the new system. It's a register system, it's a fairly complicated system, it provides for people to vote outside of their home districts as long as they're in El Salvador, and it was a first-time try. It was a system in which the American experts said it would take the Salvadorans a year to get ready. They did it in six months, but not without having to pay the price of some confusion.

Q Would you predict less a.m. confusion next time?

A I certainly hope there will be. (Laughter)

MR. HUGHES: I'm going to have Marvin have the finish.

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: Okay. Marvin?

Q Okay. Assuming for a moment that you get the $61-$62 million that you need in the short-term, and it runs through June, give us an estimate of how much money you feel the El Salvador Government needs over the next year.

A Sure. You've had that already given to you. In the proposal the President sent to the Hill to carry out the recommendations of the National Bipartisan Commission report, $178.6 million in 1984 supplemental assistance to El Salvador, in addition to 65.4 in the CRA. In addition, there was another 130-something military assistance for 1985. Together that totals somewhere shy of $400 million for the two years, and that's what the Administration request is.

The emergency request to get through the Fiscal Year was $93 million, and, as you know, the package that's now been worked out is 61, and that's in our view sufficient probably only to get just a little past the inauguration of a new Salvadoran president in June.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 3:40 p.m.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Office

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON REPORT TO CONGRESS ON ASAT ARMS CONTROL

April 2, 1984

The Briefing Room

2:07 P.M. EST

MR. SIMS: This briefing will be on background for your -- It's attributable to a senior administration official for your information and not for publication.

Q Will we have the report, Bob?

MR. SIMS: We will have -- we have copies of the report and will pass them out at the conclusion of this briefing. Don't crowd up here. We'll get them back to you.

Q Why can't we get them now so we --

Q Why can't we have them in our hands? How can we ask intelligent questions?

Q -- look at them.

MR. SIMS: He will describe it and answer your questions, if you want to.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you very much. As you know, this afternoon, we sent over to the Congress an unclassified copy of our report on U.S. policy towards ASAT arms control. A series of classified annexes will also be going over to the Congress. Last year, the Defense Appropriations Act required that we submit such a report, and we have done so.

As you know, there is an extensive body of international law dealing with space, militarization of space, and arms control with respect to space. The Outer Space Treaty basically made clear that the United Nations Charter applies to outer space.

We have, in addition, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, which prohibits the testing of nuclear weapons in outer space. The Outer Space Treaty, by the way, also prohibits the basing of nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction in space. And the ABM Treaty of 1972, which is in perpetuity, also bans ballistic missile defense systems from outer space.

So there is an extensive body of international law related to space. Nevertheless, the question has been raised as to what about provisions which might ban the use of anti-satellite systems. As you know, the United States and its allies are highly dependent upon resources in space for its deterrence and defense. And the Soviet Union has become increasingly dependent on space base assets itself, not only for fairly routine communications type activities and intelligence related activities, but also as part of its program to provide for the targeting of weapons systems.

So, as you know, the Soviet Union has had for about a decade an operational ASAT system. The United States has been developing an ASAT system of its own. The Soviet system is a co-orbital system. It flies up -- flies next to the satellite it's going to destroy, detonates, and destroys it. The U.S. system is planned to be a direct ascent intercept system using a small missile that would be launched from an F-15 fighter.

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In response to the Congressional report, we have done an extensive survey building upon the tremendous work that had been done before over the years and also extensive work of our own. U.S. policy is that we will pursue the peaceful use of outer space, both for our arms control reasons -- verification -- for commercial reasons where applicable, and for deterrence reasons -- to keep the peace.

Okay. In reviewing the issue of ASAT, we have been aware of the critical role that having an ASAT system plays both to deterring the use of an ASAT system by a potential adversary, but also in terms of deterring war itself because space-based assets can be used by an aggressor to plan the -- an aggressive attack and the fact that the survivability of some of his space-based assets may be called into question acts

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as a deterrent, both to conventional attack and to nuclear attack. So we have had to weigh, in considering our approach to space-based arms control, several complex issues. One is, the complex issue of arms control ASAT definition and verification.

What is an ASAT? And, I think, most of you are aware that just about anything that can put a satellite into orbit can be used to damage a satellite in orbit, and so can other systems. So, for example, you can modify a space booster to be an ASAT system; you could modify ICBMs, SOBMs to be ASAT systems. There is some threat associated with high energy lasers that would be ground-based, some of them in experimental mode, that could be used as an ASAT system. In short, defining what is an ASAT system, and then having confidence that you have prohibited its existence is a very, very difficult task.

The second thing is that the requirements for verification have to be fairly tight in ASAT arms control. Because it only takes a limited breakthrough or a limited capability to do the United States and its allies significant harm.

So, on the one hand, you deal with the problems of verification; and, on the other hand, one sees the deterrent advantages of having some ASAT capabilities. So, in weighing this, we have studied, and will continue to study, ways in which we can limit weapons with respect to outer space. But, we do not see, at this time, any way to establish an effectively verifiable ban on all ASAT systems that would be in the national security interests of the United States and its allies. However, we will continue to pursue other measures with respect to space arms control such as, perhaps, limitations on specific types of anti-satellite systems. And that work will continue. And also other measures related to actions with respect to space. You might call these confidence-building measures; some people call them rules of the road, or measures to deal with incidents in space.

So, I would invite you to take a good look at this report. I think it makes very clear the details of the issues involved. And I'd like to open it up for questions and discussions at this time.

Q I don't understand why, if you're talking specifically about this report, you haven't given us a copy of this so we could ask intelligent questions based on this report. I mean, we're kind of asking -- it's a pig-in-a-poke here -- aren't we?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the report is sent to the Hill. And we'd agreed upon this release time. We'd like -- wanted to give you a briefing before giving you the report. That's the purpose for doing the briefing. He's described the report to you, and if you have questions, fine. If not, we'll give it to you.

Q Well, does the report say we're going ahead with this program? And does it break any treaties that we're involved in now? And if you can't find verification, is that a good reason to build weapons?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's a number of important questions there. Let me go through them. We are not planning to break any treaties. It's not the policy of this administration. It's not our style. (Laughter.)

Q Is that a question for debate? (Laughter.) Or, is that a statement?

Q You're going to break SALT II in a couple of months.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is not true. That is absolutely not true.

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Q It's not true?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Absolutely not true.

Q What did you say?

Q -- it wasn't true.

SENIOR ADMINISTATION OFFICIAL: Let's get back to the subject at hand which is ASAT arms control and not some of these other off the wall --

Q When do we get this report?

Q I rest in --

Q Where does this leave the question of whether you can test an ASAT against a target or not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the ASAT program is continuing on the development. The report that you have here --

Q That we don't have here.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That you don't have here.

Q Can we adjourn this until we get the report? This is ridiculous.

Q When are we supposed to get this report?

Q Yes. Let's get -- come on.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Do you want to end the briefing? We'll give you the report.

Q Well, how can we brief if --

Q I'd like to ask one question without the report. Is the President going to ask for more funds in the future for an ASAT program, and if so, how much?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. The program will continue as funded, on the schedule that we've got today.

Q What is the dollar figure today, and what will it be next fiscal year?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't have that. I can get that for you.

Q Who are the prime contractors?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What's that?

Q Who are the prime corporate contractors?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are a number of contractors under the Air Force. We can find that for you.

Q Let's go back to the question he was asking -- the first question --

Q Jerry's question --

Q About the target --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. Jerry?

Q Where does this leave the question of whether a test at a target can be undertaken, or is it still prohibited under the Congressional action?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have taken no action thus far that is inconsistent with the Tsongas Amendment. This report addresses, somewhat indirectly, the Tsongas Amendment, but we have not provided the type of certification. This report is not the certification that the Tsongas Amendment requires.

Q Even after having submitted this report, you are still going to be prohibited from conducting ASAT tests at a target?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We are going to continue to comply with the law as we understand it --

Q Well, what is it --

Q How do you understand it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- which is the Tsongas Amendment.

Q How do you understand it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That we are prohibited from testing against a target --

Q Why go ahead with the development then?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Because we need this system as a deterrent --

Q Well, then eventually you will test it.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: At some point we are going to have to address this issue.

Q Well, obviously. Why else would you do it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Because --

Q Then you are going to break the treaty at some point.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is no treaty prohibiting the test. The only thing we have is legislation -- an Act of Congress -- which says that we shall not test this particular system in a certain mode until we have undertaken certain acts --

Q -- to break the treaty --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- which is to certify that it is in the interest of the United States, and to certify our arms control policy. And we have not given that Presidential certification to the Congress.

Q And it doesn't counter the ABM treaty in any way?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. Absolutely not.

Q Why haven't you given certification? Is it because you're not making a good faith effort --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Because we're not at that point in the program.

Q Why do you say we need this system? Why is it so urgently needed, and why can't we do without it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Increasingly the Soviet Union is using space-based assets as a part of its offensive military capability. In addition, we are increasingly dependent on space-based resources for part of our defensive capability. To deter attacks against our systems, and to deter the use of their systems for offensive operations, we believe that we need to develop an ASAT capability. And that's what we're proceeding to do.

Q We are not dependent, I mean, you're kind of talking about offense and defense here, but you're implying that the United States is not dependent on space-based systems for its offensive capabilities. You're saying the Soviets are --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have, across the board, whether it be at NATO, whether it be in the Pacific, we have a defensive posture. Our forces are sized that way. They are postured that way. They train that way.

Q But you're saying that the Soviets have an offensive system which is based largely in space or has key components in space, you're saying that our system, which you're calling a defensive system, and could not be an offensive system with the same systems in space?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. What I'm saying is, a significant part of Soviet investment in their space program is for systems which are used for the targeting of American forces and to deter their dependence on that.

Q We don't do that?

Q Do we do that?

Q We don't do that -- we do not use space-based systems to target our resources.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I haven't said that. What I have said is that we have a defensive posture across the board. You can to NATO and look at it. And you can see the difference between our posture and how we use our space resources, and their posture --

Q Do we have --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- and how they use their space resources.

Q The question is, though, I mean we avoid the question here, in that -- we have an offensive, our offensive targeting, offensive capability, is it not also dependent upon our space-based resources?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not in the same way.

Q But, is it not, to some degree? I mean, you're saying we don't have any offensive systems that are based in space?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have no offensive systems based in space. What I am saying is that our systems in space are used differently and support the defensive posture that the West has traditionally had. And that is clearly not the case for the Soviet Union.

Q Is it the administration's reading of the Tsongas Amendment which I understand is a different legislative requirement from the one you address here -- Is it your reading of the Tsongas Amendment that you will be able to certify, in effect, that it can't be verified and then go ahead and conduct a test against an instrumented target during fiscal '84?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Since we are not, at this point, addressing certification with respect to the Tsongas Amendment. I wouldn't want to go overboard in interpretation of the Tsongas Amendment. What I would say is the characterization you have given is not our position.

Q Would you tell us what our position is?

Q Are you addressing the issue of verification in this report?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes we are.

Q Are you saying it cannot be verified?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What we're saying is that with repect to a comprehensive ban on ASAT systems, we do not know how to make that verifiable.

Q What about the idea of a test ban?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All right, we have said in the report that we are continuing

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to study more limited types of approaches to ASAT limitations. Among those that would be studied are limitations on the testing of specific types of ASAT systems, and that study is continuing.

Q Is verification on testing much easier?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It depends on the system. The answer is, in some cases, yes, but for some systems, they could be tested and it would still be very, very hard to verify.

Q Once we have an operational system from the F-15, is it going to be very, very difficult for the Soviets to verify on their side if we were -- that we would be able to -- they would be able to verify whether or not we were corresponding to some agreement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Given the variety of systems that can be used in an ASAT mode, it's hard to say that the F-15 approach is any more difficult to verify than a lot of the other ASAT possibilities that are available to the Soviet Union.

Q Once we would both have operational systems, doesn't that preclude any further progress on an agreement? You're saying now that we can't have any progress even with the Soviets having a fairly low level operational system. Does that open a way for a race that really does not have much potential for limitation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I wouldn't agree with that characterization. The simple fact of the matter is that a comprehensive ban on ASAT systems is in and of itself extremely difficult to verify. Not just these specific systems, but a wide variety of others that might be available.

Q Can you explain --

Q Given the difficulties of verification that you've just outlined, doesn't it follow logically that the administration is going to sooner or later -- probably sooner -- will have to ask Congress to repeal the Tsongas Amendment?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We'll have to address that at that time.

Q What does -- aren't you -- I mean, aren't you leaning in that direction?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, what we have said is that a comprehensive ban on ASAT systems is not verifiable. Okay. We will continue to pursue space arms control in a vigorous way and that's where we are.

Q Since when?

Q What can you do --

Q How can you --

Q Hello?

Q How can you pursue this in a vigorous way when, on the one hand, you're saying you can't -- there's no way you can have a verifiable treaty? I mean, the reason the question --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What we're saying is a comprehensive ban is not verifiable. We have not figured out a way to do that.

Q So how are you going to pursue it vigorously?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are other ways, as I say. We are going to continue to look at more limited approaches to limiting ASAT systems, perhaps banning specific ASAT systems, and we are going to look at other ways of addressing and enhancing the space arms control regime, which already exists, such as in the area of confidence-building measures.

Q One other question --

Q Do you see a verifiable system -- do you [illegible] a verifiable system between now and the time you want to run a tar [illegible] test later this year?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: For a comprehensive ban? I do not.

Q I mean -- you do not? But aren't you answering directly the Tsongas Amendment and saying that you cannot sit down with the Soviet Union and talk on a mutual verifiable system?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On a comprehensive ban, what we are saying is this is not the certification that the Tsongas Amendment calls for.

Q I understand that.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But what this does say is that we do not see how you could negotiate a comprehensive, verifiable ban on ASAT systems, on all ASAT systems, given that we don't know how to define an ASAT system, given that so many capabilities exist that can damage or destroy satellites. Given all of that, we don't see how you could do a comprehensive ban.

Q But the other ways you're exploring, you don't see any possibility there, either, do you?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're still working on those and I wouldn't want to prejudge the outcome of that at this time.

Q How do we know they have an ASAT system?

Q You've left the door open -- you've left the door open for the possibility of a treaty that would ban the testing of certain types of ASAT systems. I think that's what you said.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have not ruled that out, although I want you to be aware that, again, verification difficulties there are tremendous.

Q Given the technical limitations, what types of ASAT systems might --

Q On what?

Q Wait a minute --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't want to speculate at this time.

Q Can I just follow up on what you mean by verifiable? When you use that term, it seems to me what you're saying is there are so many different types of systems including systems that have peaceful uses that could be converted, that that is what creates the verification problem?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct.

Q So it's not that we don't have the technical capabilities of knowing what they have. It's just there are a lot of things that could be altered.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You can make an intelligence estimate and say we think they have these and that those are being prepared to use as an ASAT system. But, in addition, you can also say that all of these other things, too, could be ASAT systems without us knowing it or having confidence that they are, in fact, not being used that way.

Q By submitting this report, how much have you freed up in money?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: $5 million I think it was.

Q $45 million?

Q Well, what's this figure of $19.4 --

Q $19.4.

Q -- here in the preface?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, excuse me, 45 days, yes. The $19.4 -- that's right.

Q Are you going to request additional monies for -- will you be requesting additional monies for -- is there a request in the '85 budget for more money for ASAT development?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not that I'm aware of.

Q And do you anticipate --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, wait, in what budget?

Q The '85.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no. There are no --

Q How about -- how about in the future?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- supplementals to our existing budget.

Q To 19.

Q Yes.

Q Do you have any intention of trying to overturn the Tsongas Amendment before fiscal year '84 runs its course?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right now, we're just addressing this report which is going to Congress now. The issue of certification under the Tsongas Amendment is not before us.

Q When does that issue come before you in your view? I mean, when do you get to that point?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: When we reach the point where we have to test against a target in space.

Q Do you have any view when that --

Q Are you talking about this fall for that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Currently, we're looking towards that time frame.

Q So you have to deal with the Tsongas by this fall? Yes? Or else it would hold up your test?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we clearly have to address the Tsongas Amendment before we conduct the tests that are covered by the Tsongas Amendment.

Q And when is that?

Q The fall?

Q When is that? Which time frame?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that is in the fall of this year sometime.

Q When will you release the name of the prime contractors? You say there are many. Such as who -- AT&T, IT&T, Martin, Marietta, General Motors?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, no, there are numerous contractors.

Q Well, why don't you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Bolling, Vaughn, Hughes. There are a number of contractors involved in this program.

Q How do you know the Soviets have an antisatellite, highly sophisticated, developed program?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We've seen them test it.

Q You've seen them test it. So you could verify it?

Q What do you mean, you've seen them test it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We can verify that there is this one system that we are certain is being tested as an --

Q But because you don't know of the possibility of others, then it's bombs away. We have to go and develop all these weapons in space and not even try for a treaty?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. What we are saying is that even if we could ban that system, we couldn't effectively verify that they haven't retained the system for use when they need it.

Q Well, all it is is a matter of trust, then.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We can't verify that there aren't a large number of other systems such as possibly the use of the ABM interceptors at the Moscow site that could be used also in an ASAT role. There are ground -- high energy, ground-based lasers, experimental lasers which could be used in an ASAT mode.

Q So it's a question of trust, totally.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's a question of -- yes. Well, it's a question of can you verify, given the difficulties of defining what it is. As you know, in the past, it has been asserted by some that our own space shuttle program is an ASAT system. Indeed, it has been cited because it can go up, take our satellites and repair them, and put them back in space.

Q Well, if the Soviets have proposed a comprehensive treaty and to work for one, why don't we do it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Because we don't see any way to define it, any way to verify it in a way that makes sense.

Q What is wrong? You could be working toward that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We've examined the Soviet draft treaty extensively and the more you go over it, the more difficult it becomes because you see the tremendous verification and definitional problems.

Q When is the last time we sat and talked to them about it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We are discussing these issues in the conference on disarmament in the U.N., 40-nation conference. The Soviet Union is a member of that and we've talked with them about that. In addition, we've talked to them about related issues in START and treaty defense issues.

Q We have talked -- we have talked to them specifically about their proposal on antisatellites, have we?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have talked to them about these issues in the U.N. and in the Conference on Disarmament.

Q Do we think that the Soviet Union is acting in good faith here and wants a comprehensive ABM treaty or ASAT treaty? Do we believe that they want this or do we believe that they're just biding time so that they can build a system?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think they know better than we what their motives are. Our problem is basically this: we don't see how the proposal they have put forward would contribute to the stability because it would be so difficult to verify and because it would undercut deterrence.

Q I understand that.

Q Why don't we talk about it?

Q My question is what do we think of their motives? What does the United States government think is the motivation? Do we believe that the Soviet Union truely wants a treaty or do we think that the Soviet Union is probably biding its time so it can build a proper system?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, I don't want to speculate upon their motives. All I'm saying is that the vehicle they have put forward is defective.

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I don't want to speculate upon their motives. All I'm saying is that the vehicle they've put forward is defective.

Q So?

Q So does that make their motives suspect in our -- from our perspective?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIAL: I won't comment on that.

Yes.

Q In making this decision to proceed with development -- testing -- did we take into account the impact this would have on resuming START and INF? Because the Soviets seemed to have signaled that if we were more positive in our response on ASAT that perhaps that might then lead to a further thaw and get us back to INF and START.

Are you concerned that by taking the position you're taking today that you're postponing even further any possibility of resuming the nuclear arms talks?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There should be no preconditions for the returning to START and INF. These are central negotiations for which outcomes are clearly there that are verifiable and in the interests of both sides. They ought to return immediately and there ought not to be any preconditions.

With respect to the other arms control issues before us, we will proceed evaulating each on its own merits as being in the interests of the United States and its allies and the prevention of war. And so we will address ASAT as ASAT, we will address CW as CW, each of those.

But clearly, the Soviet Union owes it to the world to return to the START 9-F talks on their own merits and not make things such as this a precondition.

Q That wasn't my -- my question was in terms of the impact, not what they should or should not do.

The question basically is by what you're doing today, aren't you going to have a negative impact on the Soviets' readiness to come back to INF and START? Not so much what you would like them to do.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't believe so; but we're continuing to discuss a variety of issues with the Soviet Union and we would like to be discussing START and INF with them in Geneva and if they would return, we will do so.

Q You seem to be saying that ASAT is an impossible subject to negotiate. I mean, aren't you kind of consigning it to an unlimited --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I said a comprehensive ban on all ASAT systems --

Q Well, right. But, I mean, so aren't you basically saying that there's going to be no way for us to limit the building of any satellite weapons in space because it's impossible to negotiate a comprehensive ban?

Q Right.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What we have said is we're going to continue to look at ways in which we might limit specific systems.

Q But that -- what you're saying is it's going to be impossible to stop the arms race in space, in terms of anti-satellites because a comprehensive ban is impossible to verify?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, what --

Q Right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think you have to ask the question, "What is it we're talking about?" Right now, the Soviet Union has one system clearly devoted to the ASAT role, some other approaches that may be devoted to the ASAT role. The United States has under development one system that would be devoted to the ASAT role.

Okay. Basically, we are looking at this as a deterrent system. We don't have in mind a whole series of additional ASAT programs, what we're talking about is just basically establishing a deterrent against their use of ASAT and a deterrent against their use of space-based assets in an aggressive manner. And that's where we are. We're not talking about an arms race in space.

Yes.

Q Was the draft treaty that the Soviets submitted last August, was that the last and most recent diplomatic move on this issue and was there any sort of prior U.S. proposal that was formally made?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I believe that was their last initiative. They have made some public statements that elaborate upon that initiative. But --

Q Has there been any diplomatic activity since then on this issue? Has there been any contacts --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no.

Q Did they agree to scrap their system if they had a ban? A comprehensive treaty?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIAL: The Soviet Union has proposed a moratorium on the testing of ASAT systems. That moratorium would apply in the following way: They would be able to keep the system that they have developed and had deployed for some years and we would be precluded from finishing the testing of our system.

Q Why can't that be negotiated if that's the point?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Because that would not be in the interest of the United States. We would be precluded from having the deterrent capability of an ASAT system and they would be able to retain --

Q But if they agreed to scrap --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- at least one and maybe the ASAT systems.

Q You could ask them to scrap their?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Do we have any evidence that the Soviets have actually destroyed or damaged any United States satellites?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q What was the question? I didn't hear the question. What was the "no" to?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question was: "Do we have any evidence that the Soviet Union has actually destroyed or damaged a U.S. satellite?"

Q Do we suspect that they have?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't want to comment any further.

Q Was that --

Q That was not an unequivocal "no" though.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That was a very unequivocal no --

Q Do we have any unclassified evidence -- classified evidence that we may not be --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that would be classified. (Laughter.)

Q Could you answer yes or no to that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I cannot answer to that.

Q Question --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes?

Q Isn't the Soviet system limited to deployment at lower orbits at this point?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. It operates at altitudes much higher than the U.S. system, but in terms of geosynchronous, for example, we do not give it a capability against geosynchronous satellites.

Q What percentage of our global communications in intelligence satellites operate above that capability?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not sure what the percentage is. But a number of very important satellites for us do operate above that area.

Q So you're saying the most important ones are out of range of the current Soviet capability?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I didn't say that. But some very important ones do operate out of range of the current co-orbital system.

Q Would a system that could reach higher orbits be dependent upon extensive testing that would be picked up by U.S. monitoring?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's not clear.

Q Well, I'm not -- the report says, on page 11, that the Soviet proposal calls for the elimination of existing ASAT systems as well as a ban on the development of new ASAT systems. That would imply that the Soviets have offered to scrap theirs.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is correct.

Q Well, why did you tell me otnerwise?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I didn't tell you otherwise.

Q You did.

Q You said they proposed a moratorium and they would keep their system.

Q -- said they would allow us to keep --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. What I am saying is -- this goes back to the verification system -- how is it that you know for sure that these, being small systems, have not been retained? Second of all, given that there are so many other ways to damage or destroy satellites in space, how do you know that they have not retained some other capability -- capabilities which are rather easy to develop and maintain? That's the problem.

Q So, the only flaw in their proposal is, again, the verification one, which is different from what you seemed to imply before. They're proposing to scrap their system, according to the report, and you say that's not good enough, because we wouldn't know if they really scrapped it. Is that -- that seems to be what you're saying.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What I'm saying is: even if they did scrap it -- even if they did scrap it, we could not tell that other systems such as the ABM system around Moscow, spacelaunchers, other missile boosters, experimental high energy laser systems that are ground-based, could not be diverted to do the very same mission.

Q Well, we have the same capability.

Q That's different from the answer you gave before, which was that they could keep their system, and we wouldn't be able to build one.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, they could keep many of their systems, perhaps. You see, that's the problem.

Q Well, we could do the same thing.

Q But you didn't qualify that in your answer.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, then let me qualify that now. I mean, even if --

Q It's about time.

Q Well, it is misleading. You said --

Q It's extremely misleading.

Q You said that they would keep their existing system, and according to their proposal they wouldn't keep their existing system.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, all right, first of all, they have not provided in their proposal the types of verification measures that would be necessary to verify that they had even gotten rid of their existing system. And it's not even clear to what degree that would be possible at all.

Q Then why don't we negotiate -- why can't it be negotiated?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We are discussing these issues in the Conference on Disarmament in the United Nations --

Q Doesn't sound like you're negotiating very strongly.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What I'm saying, Helen, is -- if you can't define it, if you can't verify that you've limited it, if it's very important that you do so, and if the other side has available to it a wide variety of other measures that can do the same job; and if that is very destabilizing for them to have that capability, and you do not have an appropriate deterrent against it -- then such a non-verifiable agreement is clearly not in the interest of the West.

Q Going back to the --

Q Why don't the Soviets have the same concerns on their side? It seems that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Because they're not afraid of an offensive strike from the West.

Q No, now wait a minute. If you're saying that we can't have a treaty because it's not verifiable because they could have all sorts of things that could be easily converted, doesn't the same reasoning apply to their side? That we have all sorts of technologies that can be converted?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, because this is an open society, and they're quite well aware, as you're quite well aware of what we're doing in this area. It has been itemized each day in the newspapers and in the Congress.

Q Why is it a classified report if it's an open society?

Q Could I just get some clarification on some points --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Could I just finish on this one point, though? You've reached the fundamental difference. Clearly, with respect to the history of arms control between the United States -- or, let's say the West and the East -- the West has preferred concrete, precise measures that are verifiable and enforceable. The East has preferred broad, declaratory policies or general statements that rely on goodwill and national, technical means of verification. and a little beyond that. And that is a fundamental problem in this area. So the answer is, what we do is well known to everybody. What they would be doing would not be well known to anybody. And that's the fundamental problem.

Q Can you envision any --

Q Just to get back to this, because there seems to be some confusion here which -- I just want to make certain that I understand this correctly. The point is the Soviets have already tested a system. If they physically destroyed that particular system as it now exists, they have tested it, and they know it works; and, therefore, they could rebuild that, even though they show us that they've discarded the system that we know they've tested.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct. That's the verification problem. That's why I insist I --

Q They could rebuild the exact same system -- and they would know it would work, and we're not in a position to know that about any system that we might build in secret.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that's very possible.

Q Are the treaties we have with the Soviet Union verifiable?

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Q If, in fact, the problems of the definition of verification are as insuperable as you've just outlined, why, then, even pretend that we're going to continue discussions on specific ASAT control things? It would seem that either one or the other is correct. Either this thing -- the genie's out of the bottle, there's no way of retrieving it, and then why even go for a specific limitation agreement; or, the situation is not as bad as you paint it on verification and you still have some prospect of, for arms control in this area. It seems to me you can't have both.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What we are looking at are measures which will enhance the security of the West. We believe we should continue to pursue measures in this area which may be stabilizing and worthwhile. What we have found is that we don't see how we could verify a comprehensive ban on ASAT systems, giving the difficulties of defining and verifying.

Q Would you go for, say, limiting "X," "Y" and "Z" and you've got "A" through "U" that are wide open for exploitation by the other side, aren't you being, almost by definition, foolish to simply go for "X," "Y" and "Z" limitations, if you're going to have a vast range of other ASAT possibilities sitting right there and staring at you?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Arms control has a number of objectives, and trying to achieve some certainty, some control over specific systems, may be in the interest of the West. We are not ruling that out. Limiting specific systems is easier than a comprehensive ban, although it is not easy. And -- but, we are going to continue to look at ways in which we might do something like that, or other steps in space arms control, or space confidence building measures which might be useful.

Q Can you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But we don't want to slam the door now, just because in this one area it is such an insurmountable problem.

Q Can you envision an agreement that would stop us from going ahead with this F-15, ASAT system? Or is it your feeling that the most stabilizing thing we can do is to get the -- an operational system as a deterrent to theirs?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're still looking at what steps in space arms control we might find that we could take beyond the comprehensive space arms control regime that now exists. That would be helpful.

Q And you would seriously consider a system that would, an agreement, that would stop us from putting that system up -- the F-15 ASAT system?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If we could identify a -- what we have said is that any -- you know, we are looking at space arms control for how it will contribute to a stable balance. If that would contribute to a stable balance or were otherwise in our interest, we would do so.

Q But you don't think so? You don't think so at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't want to prejudge the issue, because --

Q Basically you're saying --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- that work is still underway.

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Q But isn't the point of what you've said today is that you have prejudged it -- and that is that an ASAT system by the United States is almost an inevitability now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The point is that we have bent over backwards not to prejudge it. Given the magnitude of the problems that we face, we have said --

Q But you now judge --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- what we have said now is that a comprehensive ban is not verifiable and not in our interest. But, we are looking to see whether there are other steps which we can take.

Q But if a comprehensive ban

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is not verifiable and not in our interest, doesn't that necessarily lead to the conclusion that we should have a system?

Q Well, and didn't you also say that we should have a system for deterrent value? I mean, you've said a couple things --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. What I am saying is that the justification for the current system is that it is a valuable enhancement to deterrence. It's a deterrent against ASAT use -- and by the way, and don't underemphasize the point -- it is a deterrent against the use of space to assist an aggressor in an offensive operation. So, it deters in both ways.

For example, by deterring conventional aggression, it deters the chance of a conventional war. By deterring a chance of conventional war, it deters the chance of a nuclear war. It has a tremendous deterrent effect. To give that up, you would have to achieve something of comparable value in promoting defense. What we are doing is looking to see whether or not there are steps like that.

Q You said we have very important space-based systems that are beyond the range of the current Soviet ASAT?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- current co-orbital system --

Q Right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- as we've seen it tested, yes.

Q Do we have positive indications that the Soviets are developing a system that could target those ASATs?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have seen no evidence of their testing a system such as the co-orbital system in that mode.

Yes.

Q Could you support one thing you said about three minutes ago? They, the Soviets, are not afraid of an offensive strike from the U.S. What do you mean by that or can you just explain that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In my -- The United States and its allies have a defensive alliance. We posture our forces in a defensive mode. We posture or we train our forces in a defensive mode. We do not emphasize strikes in the -- Eastern Europe. That is not the concept of operations for the West. The Soviet Union knows that well.

Their forces deployed forward in Eastern Europe are not only forces of occupation in Eastern Europe, but are also forces poised to coerce Western Europe. They make that very clear. That's the difference. They know that. We know that. You should know that, too.

Q Thank you.

Q In light of how wide open everything is, is there some thinking that we should have broadened the F-15 system?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q You say there is no plan to not abide by SALT II? Those stories have all been wrong?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Those stories have all been taken out of context, and we haven't been evolving policy. And what it says is as long as -- shows constraint --

Q Right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- we will show restraint by not undercutting --

Q But isn't there something to go ahead with the Trident and by 19 -- by the end of the year, then we will break the treaty?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not this year. No. Next year, we assemble the Trident submarine --

Q Then the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Then, technically we would go over to MIRV --

Now -- but let me put it in context.

Q Okay.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Soviet Union has not dismantled to the SALT II levels. We have not ratified SALT II.

Q Right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And the question is, we are trying, by our not-undercut policy, we've been trying to create a regime of restraint and create conditions that will make it easier to negotiate the kind of arms control agreement, such as START, that we need.

So, for example, we want to protect certain types of provisions, we want to protect a negotiating climate, a whole series of reasons why one would, and we did, adopt a policy of interim constraint.

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Q But now we're not going to stick with that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we haven't changed it. What happened was -- You're asking the question is -- is the interim constraint -- why is the interim constraint interim? And the answer is because it's --

Q No, no, I'm not. I'm asking --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- policy.

Q -- are the stories true that we are no longer going to abide --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They are not true.

Q Who in the administration is conducting a review of the -- the same interagency group or what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, it's chaired by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and all the other agencies are --

Q Do you know how much is in the budget --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can get it for you. The -- Bob, on the ASAT budget items, do you want me to --

MR. SIMS: Yes, we can haul them out here and post them.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Post them.

MR. SIMS: Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Post them.

MR. SIMS: If you can give them to me. I don't have them. Okay. Sure.

Q You'll post that, Bob?

Q Isn't the real danger that you worry about -- more sophisticated system and higher orbits? Isn't that -- I mean, isn't the one now that they have would eventually be fairly obsolete given the kinds of satellites we're going to be putting into orbit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not necessarily. This system is a problem as well. But each is a different problem and it's a complex issue. For example, we are very dependent on resources in space. Everyone knows that. We have also gone out of our way to try to improve the survivability of our systems in space and to provide for redundancies. So, for example, yes, it's cheaper and more efficient and sometimes quicker to use a satellite communications system than land lines or sea lines. But we do have other ways to communicate. So it is not as if we're totally dependent.

But at the same time, if we were to lose those assets, that could greatly limit our capability to communicate with our forces in the broader comprehensive way.

Certain narrow ways, you know, main messages can get through quickly. But what about the total support of our forces in

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Europe, for example --

Q Yes. But the more sophisticated Soviet systems that they would be developing, don't those things require a lot of testing?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Some don't, you see, and that's the problem.

Q I mean, there -- you're saying there are some systems that they can use that require no testing?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What I'm saying is no evident testing at us. That is to say there are ways they could test the basic mechanisms of an ASAT system and we could not prove that that's what they were doing. For example --

Q Say, for example -- Okay.

Q Docking maneuvers.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: When they do a docking maneuver with their own space system, how do you know that that wasn't in fact also a test of an ASAT? Because the basic mechanism is the same.

Q You get close to another vehicle --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You get close to another vehicle and so --

Q -- push a button.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- in short it is just -- this is perhaps the toughest area of arms control and that is defining and knowing precisely what is an ASAT's capability.

And, as I say, there are so many other -- electronic warfare can damage satellites and how do you define what is electronic warfare when so many of your commercial transmitters -- you see the problem.

Q Well, by that definition then -- any sort of maneuver of any kind in space could be interpreted as an ASAT test, could it not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You don't want to --

Q -- you brought up the example of the space shuttle.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And we didn't bring that up. That's been brought up to us.

Q Well, you brought it up in this briefing today -- In that regard, then, aren't you saying that there is no way possible that an ASAT treaty could be arrived at and that testing of ASAT systems by the United States is inevitable?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What I'm saying is today we don't see any way to have a verifiable comprehensive ban on ASATs. It may be that you can define a certain type of ASAT. It may be that you can agree to some kind of limitations on that ASAT. Maybe you can do that. And then you may decide that such a thing is useful to do. But we have not reached that point in our work. All we have said is that with respect to the overall questions of a -- of the comprehensive ban --

Q But --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- that is a very tough problem to resolve.

Q In that regard, then, development of an ASAT system by the United States is inevitable?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have a program to develop an ASAT system. And we are continuing on that program.

Q If we continued it, how long would it take for the actual docking, if we kept at the present schedule, President Reagan's spending and testing, how long would it be --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It would be a number of years afterwards.

Q What would you say? Five years or so --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Approximately.

Q -- to get one up there --

Q It's very clear, I mean, people on the Hill may be -- for ASATs and it's very clear --

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the Soviets and that they are trying to lump this together with their attempts to stop the development -- You don't mean that since it's the same people, it's the same argument and they, you know, they try to speak of it as one thing?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is not the same thing.

Q I understand that. I understand that, but what I'm rather interested in is whether the administration is going to make any attempt -- and actually go to the population at all because I mean it's clear that you're not going to get the press to explain this thing in any way that's going to make it possible for the population to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think we give you all more credit than that.

Q You've got, you know, all of your --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I mean, this is the toughest, the toughest, probably the toughest arms control issue there is because of the verification of -- a limited breakdown capability is so dangerous. And so you really have to have fairly tight certification. And this is an area where tight verification is about as difficult as any. Probably more difficult as any.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 2:56 P.M. EST

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
/Deputy/ ON
VISIT OF/PRIME MINISTER MacEACHEN
MONDAY, APRIL 2, 1984, 4:30 P.M.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: Thank you. The meeting today was the seventh in a series of meetings that Secretary Shultz and Minister MacEachen have held.

I think it's important at the outset to note that the delegations essentially mirrored one another For the U.S., in addition to the Secretary, Deputy Secretary Ken Dam attended along with the State Department's chief economic advisor, Under Secretary Alan Wallis.

By way of characterizing today's meeting, Secretary Shultz noted that he welcomed the chance to meet with Mr. MacEachen. He thought the meeting was worthwhile and businesslike. He stated that we see progress on some issues and successes on others. He indicated he felt that good faith and goodwill was evident all around, and that there is a sense that something is different and better about the relationship.

The Secretary noted that our two-way trade is approximately $120 billion a year, and when you compare that to the U.S. two-way trade with the European economic community of approximately $90 billion a year, it puts the perspective on the importance of the U.S.-Canada relationship.

By way of response, Mr. MacEachen indicated that he thought today's meeting was one of the best they had had if not the best.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: Thank you. Ladies and gentlemen, I've been in all of these meetings and I can tell you that they've been very successful. The relationship is dramatically improved since George Shultz' arrival on the scene and his direct intervention in our bilateral relationship. This also applies to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Allan MacEachen.

As George Shultz said in Halifax six months ago, this tremendous trade relationship, which my colleague has just referred to, tells us two things. It tell us we must be doing something right, and it also tells us that we're always going to have problems. I think we're resolving those problems, and I can honestly say that as a former businessman this is the most businesslike of of all our meetings thus far.

In very general terms, the areas that we discussed were acid rain, the national energy program, for sectoral free trade and defense. So I'm quite prepared to answer any questions that you might have.

Q The United States is reported to have asked Foreign Minister MacEachen to add El Salvador to his itinerary. I'd like to know why that was asked: what the point of it was, and what reason he gave for not agreeing to it?

A He hasn't made any statement on that.

Q He told us that at the Embassy.

A He hasn't said; he hasn't agreed. You must know something I don't know. I don't know about that. He has said privately that he feels that initially there wasn't any, perhaps reason, with an election going on, but he was open as to whether or not he would, in fact, go. And that's the way it was left with me, at least, last night.

Has anything been said subsequently?

Q Yes. That he's not able to work it into his schedule.

A Well, I'm sorry about that. I think it would have been a good exercise to show Canadian support for free elections. I'm sure it's because of late scheduling. He was only asked to do it, I think, on Saturday.

Q Why was he asked on Saturday to do that, since Canada, after all, did supply observers and therefore could be construed to have supported free elections?

A It wasn't an afterthought, by any means. It's up to the Canadians to schedule their own visits. But it was thought that it would be a good idea, that this idea might be surfaced. And as it turned out, it couldn't be rescheduled.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL. It's really not that unusual. I might point out that other countries make suggestions about our itinerary when our Secretary is travelling to various parts of the world, and this suggestion was made in that same spirit and light.

Q Would you say that the U.S. feels that -- it sees no problem with the amount of time he's spending in Nicaragua, vis-a-vis the amount of time he's spending in El Salvador?

A We really don't have any comment on his itinerary.

Q Except that you wish he would go to El Salvador?

A That we made that suggestion; that's correct.

Q Would you characterize the discussions on acid rain, and if you've made any progress and how things stand?

A I might point out that, as you're well aware, the positions of both sides are well known at this point. The discussions were very frank, very direct, and both sides reiterated positions that have been public these last few weeks.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: I think it was a very frank exchange. I think, as my colleague says, our positions are known. There's no doubt that this is something -- is a serious problem that America and Canada is doing to each other, and no doubt we're going to have to do something about it.

The question is, what are we going to do. We say, and I believe with justification, that the scientific evidence is not such, as you know, precisely how best to place our billions.

Again, I emphasize, there was an atmosphere of businesslike cordiality, and that was welcomed on both sides.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: I might add, discussing that particular subject, there were some specifics that were mentioned. For instance, the U.S. Government takes a fair amount of pride in the achievements it's made in the last fourteen years in improving air quality and controlling suspected precursor pollutants such as sulphur dioxide, nitric oxides and hydrocarbons.

Under the Federal Clear Air Act, we've had a reduction of approximately 25 percent in sulphur dioxde loading since 1973, and 43 percent decline for the projected 1980 level that would have resulted from the increase in utility growth in the absence of controls.

In addition, it's important to note that the U.S. automobile emissions standards have reduced emissions for new vehicles by 90 percent for hydrocarbons and 75 percent for oxides of nitrogen. These are all things that have been accomplished in the last fourteen years.

It's true that we've suggested that we need to accelerate research into the causes and effects of acide rain rather than entering on a program of control right now.

But I think you have to look at it in terms of our experience with the overall clear air subject.

It's also important to note that the U.S. Government has not rejected the possibility of adopting a plan for additional reductions in sulphur dioxide emissions. In fact, what we have done is choose not to endorse the Canadian proposal calling for a 50 percent reduction in existing levels of SO_2 emissions until a more coherent picture is available regarding the causes and effects and remedies for acid deposition.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: Let me add to that, if I may. We've sent, pursuant to the Clear Air Act of 1973, over a $150 billion to reduce SO_2 anolex emissions. There's nothing equivalent to that, even on a ten-to-one ratio in terms of Canadian participation.

On a per capita basis, SO_2, which is widely regarded as the principal component of what causes acid rain, the emissions per capita in the United States are one-third less than what they are in Canada. So we don't feel that we've either not been doing our job or dragging our feet.

Q Was that figure $150 billion, say, in

per capita terms also?

A No, that's the total.

Q So when you said that Canada hasn't done anything like that, that wasn't a per capita statement?

A No, no, that's right. In fact, Canada really hasn't done very much at all-and the Canadian press is saying that, and I said it in Canada because it's true.

Q What specific trade issues came up in these discussions?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: The overall question of the sectoral free trade initiative and how it's going, I think both sides indicated that they felt progress has been made and that there had been some good discussions.

In terms of specific sectors, the one that seems most logical and most likely to move in the near term future is agricultural machinery. But it's important to note that formal negotiations have not taken place yet. These are informal discussions. There also were some comments made about some of the international trade commission studies in copper and steel and some other areas, and about the status of those actions.

Q Did you discuss the Export Administration Act?

A Yes. That was discussed in very broad terms. It's part of our general discussion of extra-territoriality. It's important to note that in the area of extra-territoriality, the conflict of laws, that there has been some very real progress since the Halifax meeting. There was a Memorandum of Understanding that was signed on anti-trust, pre-notification consultations; we've had extensive meetings on a mutual legal assistance treaty on criminal matters, and we expect to have some progress there. In addition, we've had a series of meetings on the document subpoena question, and also we have meetings scheduled for the end of this month on the general area of Export Controls and the special relationship that exists between Canada and the United States.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: If I may just carry on for a moment there, Jim, you know this whole question of sectoral-free trade, in my view, at least, was really one of the most discussed, most significant. We've cut out 90 percent of our tariffs between the two countries. We have, as you know, the greatest trading relationship in the world. If we can knock out these non-tariff barriers -- and this is an iniative made by Canada initially -- we can do a very great deal for both countries.

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Of the United States' Gross National Product, only 8 percent comes from foreign trade, whereas 32 percent of Canada's Gross National Product comes from foreign trade, 70 percent of which is with the United States. So the case can be made that in the long term, whereas there would have to be good arrangements on both sides, that it could even benefit Canada on the basis of Gross National Product more than the United States.

Q The salmon talks on the West Coast have been stalled for some time, and Minister MacEachen indicated that there might be some sort of a political impulse taking place now to,? I don't know whether to assume to start them again, or some sort of activity surrounding them. Can you give me some sort of an idea what that is?

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: Jim, we're going to re-energize the impulse. (Laughter)

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: That's right. It's true that that issue has not been resolved. There were lengthy negotiations that were held in Vancouver and Seattle the end of last year, the first part of this year. The meeting in January in Seattle lasted for approximately two weeks, with large numbers of people in both delegations. I think our delegation was 80 strong -- and that's an indication of just how complex this issue is. Some people have called it one of the most complex fishery issues in the world, if not one of the most complex issues overall. There is an effort being made to get the discussions back on track. I believe there will be some discussions between the negotiators who headed both teams when there is a mutually convenient time.

I think it's also important to note that there needs to be an effort made outside the bounds of a potential treaty to manage the fishery for this coming year; and that can be done with technical groups at your provincial and our state level. I think there have already been some exploratory meetings in that area. But it is a complex issue; it's an important issue, and it is one we hope we can re-energize, as you stated.

If you recall at Halifax, both Foreign Ministers suggested that the negotiators make a special effort last fall and the first part of this year. I think an effort was made, but some complexities that did develop around the nature of the fishery because of the El Niño Current and some other problems made it very difficult to bring that negotiation to a settlement; but --

Q Just a couple of things: First of all, has there been an agreement on when the next meeting will be and where it will be?

b-4 A The next meeting will be one of the shorter variety. Those usually take place on the periphery of a multilateral event like a NATO Ministerial or the ASEAN Meeting, and I suspect one of those multilateral meetings will be picked out and selected as the time for the two of them to get together. That has not been done.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: Generally, every quarter.

Q As a follow-up to that, would you anticipate any progress at all being made on the acid rain issue in 1984, based on the discussion this time on which, obviously, both sides did nothing but repeat their existing positions; and obviously, there was no progress or movement of any kind.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: I would point out that in the FY-85 budget that has been submitted, as the President pointed out in his State of the Union message, we're increasing our research effort into the causes and effects of acid rain, and also into control technology. We've offered to share the results of that research and those studies, many of which have a return date of the near-term future; and ask that the Canadians work with us on the results of those studies. So in that sense, yes, there are things that would be taking place, that we hope both sides would be involved in.

Q In 1984?

A In 1984, that's right.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: You want to remember that the Canadians haven't themselves gotten together on a national or on a provincial basis. They are talking about perhaps budgeting, at some time down in the future, a billion dollars a year, in general terms; whereas even applying the 10-to-1 population ratio, I've mentioned to you what we've already done. So things are in process.

And remember this, if you can, on acid rain that 50 percent of the acid rain that falls on Canada is generated in the United States or also, in other words, is generated in Canada; and 25 percent of the acid rain that falls in New England is generated in Canada. So it's something we're going to do something about, because we're going to have to do something about it.

As to the question of what the best approach is, some people have said that whereas we believe that the mix of roughly 2/3 sulfur dioxide to 1/3 nitrogen oxide is the mix of acid rain, we don't know exactly how it's formed in the atmosphere -- that's what is required by science. That's the hold-up and the drawback on going full-fledged ahead on something, that we really don't know quite what the answer would be

If we were to cut SO_2 by two-thirds, there is no reason to think that acid rain would be cut by two-thirds. In any event, we're going to share, as Jim says, the scientific knowledge that we obtained, with Canada.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: If I might add one last thing to -6 that point, there are a couple of developments that I'm sure the Canadian experts on this issue would be interested in. For instance, there is a recent study which seemed to indicate that there had been a stabilization in the acidity/alkalinity relationship in Northeastern Lakes. That's very interesting to our scientists; I'm sure it will be interesting to yours.

Also, there has been a suggestion that the models that everyone has been relying on to predict acid deposition would not have predicted the level of deposition that is present relatable to the INCO smelter, which has been substantially shut down. Again, it is information like that that is becoming available on an ongoing basis that we intend to share with Canada, and I'm sure that they would be very interested in. I see that sort of thing taking place over the next few months and the rest of this year.

Obviously, if you're planning to spend a billion dollars a year into the foreseeable future, you would be very interested in modelling your program in the most effective way possible. If we'll be spending something potentially quite in excess of that one billion a year, we'd want to do the same thing.

Q Regarding Central America, how much would it help to bring Canada on-side in supporting U.S. military activities

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in Central America? And how much was there here at these meetings in trying to bring Canada on-side?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: Well, I work with Canadian Affairs here at the State Department; I really don't have the expertise to respond to that sort of a question. We could try to get you an answer from our --

Q Do you have a thought on this?

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: I think Canada is a great ally of ours, and together we share the joint defense of the North American continent, with the NATO Allies.

We would seek as much cooperation that we can get from Canada. It's not imperative, but we certainly, as witnessed by the fact that we did ask Al MacEachen to go to El Salvador, we'd certainly like to involve them to the extent they felt it was desirable in their national interest.

Q Was there much persuasion today, last night?

SECOND OFFICIAL: No; no serious persuasion. It's a matter of really two friends who represent, far more importantly, two friendly countries and say, just merely, "If you can work it in, we think it would be desirable because it would show Canadian interest in developing democracy in Central America."

Q Was there discussion about what message Mr. MacEachen might take to Nicaragua?

FIRST OFFICIAL: None. None that I know of.

Q Did you talk about the sports pool question at all? Did either side bring it up? And did either side bring up the question of the CIA experiments with LSD in Canada?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: No to both of those questions.

Q The London Economic Summit is coming up. Any discussion on what might be any any iniatives?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: The session this morning started out with discussions of multilateral economic topics. And with the London Economic Summit -- there is an OECD coming up. There was a fairly extensive discussion of the preparations and some of the thoughts and positions that both countries had that went into those meetings.

Q Thank you.

A Thank you very much.

(The briefing concluded at 5:00 p.m.)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release April 3, 1984

PRESS BRIEFING
BY AMBASSADOR JAMES GOODBY

The Briefing Room

10:46 A.M. EST

MR. SIMS: Ambassador James Goodby was the head of the U.S. delegation to the Stockholm conference -- has just met with the President. He's here to talk about that with you.

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: Good morning. I have copies of the statement I'm about to read which will be passed around after I've finished it, so I don't think you need to take notes.

I just reported to the President on the first session of the Stockholm Conference on Security in Europe, and have discussed with him the prospects for the next phase of this negotiation. The administration is now assessing the current situation in the Conference, a process which will culminate with the President's issuance of instructions to the United States delegation for the second session beginning May 8.

As regards to the first round of the Conference, it was expected to be an exploratory session which would establish the positions of the participants, define the issues, and open up new lines of communications between East and West, and with the European neutrals as well. And it did just that.

The 16 NATO countries introduced a six-point plan designed to reduce the risk of war through surprise attack or miscalculation. Proposals also were introduced by Romania and by eight neutral countries in the Conference.

The delegations representing the Warsaw Pact advanced their own ideas in the course of the plenary meetings. The results of the first round suggest that possibilities for agreements exist. Every participant in the Conference spoke favorably of putting into effect certain procedures which would create conditions of greater predictability in the military situation in Europe.

An example of this would be mandatory advance notification of certain military activities. Difficult issues remain. In its proposals, the Soviet Union has chosen to stress declaratory measures of little real consequence or ideas which are being addressed elsewhere. It has attacked the very concept of greater openness in military matters.

Except for the seven Warsaw Pact countries, however, all participants in the conference have expressed a preference for negotiating practical agreements which would require countries to clarify the intent of certain types of military activities, thus, making the military situation in Europe more stable and more predictable.

President Reagan has made it clear that he attaches great importance to the subject matter in the aims of this Conference, as he does to the entire Helsinki process, of which this Conference is a part. He has made it clear that he expects the United States delegation to establish a dialogue with all the participants in the Stockholm Conference and actively search for common ground on which sound agreements may be based.

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As for the next round, the Western delegations expect to begin an exchange of opinions with the other participants on the details of the measures which we hope to negotiate in Stockholm.

By the end of the second round on July 6, we should have a better picture of the outlines of a possible agreement aimed at reducing the risk of war in Europe.

That's the end of my statement. If there are any questions -

Q You said the Russians are against the mandatory notification on maneuvers?

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: No. Not necessarily. They have spoken favorably themselves about the possibility of that kind of an agreement. What they have attacked is the idea of openness, but I assume that's partly posturing.

Q What do you mean? Observers or what?

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: Observers, verification of these kinds of agreements, and that sort of thing. But frankly that's one of the things we have to work at next round and find out more where their real position is because a certain amount of this obviously is I think negotiating, posturing, and that kind of thing.

Q How about the hotline?

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: Well, the hotline is, of course, a bilateral thing. But it's one of the arrangements we're talking about also in Stockholm -- trying to multilateralize the hotline, if you will, trying to find a way in which all the countries that are represented there, of which there are 35, can find a more effective way of communicating.

Q In a party line? (Laughter.)

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: It would be a party line, a very effective party line. Right.

Q Thirty-five countries would get on at once in times of crisis?

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: Well, no. The idea would be that you have something that can immediately inquire about a certain activity that's taken place. Let's say, some military manuever that might not have been notified or was improperly notified.

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The idea is you want rapid consultations. That's the way you diffuse a crisis. And that's --

Q In England?

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: -- what we're aiming at.

Q In January, you said you wouldn't foreclose the possibility of seeing the resumption of the START talks in the spring. Don't you want to foreclose that possibility today?

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: No, I wouldn't. I think that the logic is still the same, that there's every reason to get back to the negotiating table and try to do something to level off this nuclear situation.

Q Well, there's every reason to get back, but is there any kind of indication that the Soviets want to go back?

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: I have no private indications that are probably not known to you about that point.

Q Have you any reason to believe that they would given the political situation?

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: I think that I have nothing really to add to what I've said before, namely that the logic of the situation suggests that it's important to get back to a negotiating table. That's what we're aiming at.

Q What did the President -- did -- what'd the President say to you? Did he discuss this?

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: We talked about my issue, which is the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, in Stockholm.

Q Did he know a lot about it or -- what did he say?

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: We discussed what we expect to have happen in the next round. We talked about some of the Soviet ideas. We talked about ways and means of getting ahead in this negotiation next round.

Q But if I may --

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: Sure.

Q We -- set that aside. What did he say? What was his participation?

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: He spoke -- I don't want to go into great detail, what the President said to me privately -- but he spoke at some length about his picture of the non-use of force, as we've been discussing it in Stockholm. That was one of the central issues that we've been discussing, simply for the fact that the Soviets have been talking about that, and that's what we're mainly discussing

Q Did he extemporize or did he --

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: Yes.

Q -- read that?

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: He extemporized. Sure.

Q Mr. Ambassador, yesterday we were told that the U.S. was rejecting the idea of some comprehensive ban on antisatellites. Can you really offer any hope that your set of negotiations are going to be a way to improve relations between the U.S. and the Soviets? You

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sound like the main thing they're interested in, which is this declaratory statement about the no-use of force, is something we're not interested in.

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: What we're saying is that we don't think a declaratory statement by itself will add essentially to our security because that kind of agreement is already in place. It has not worked very well in the past. There's no real reason to expect that it'll have any more real consequences in the future than it has had before. What we're aiming at is some very specific concrete agreements. I mentioned advance notification of military activities; we would like to exchange forecasts on an annual basis of large military activities. We'd like to improve communications between the various countries.

We'd like to have verification, observation of such exercises. And I think there is a chance for negotiating those, but it's going to be a hard slog. It's not going to be one of these easy things to do. And I think if we can negotiate some of those arrangements we're talking about, we'll be able to do something about surprise attack and miscalculation. There is a possibility -- remote, I think -- that war could begin through some sort of miscalculation or misperception at least.

Q But we are rejecting their proposal for a declaratory statement about peace and non-use of force?

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: We have said that those are insufficient conditions to provide an adequate outcome to the negotiation, that what the Conference is all about is -- was agreed in Madrid in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe last year -- was that we are trying to give some force, some meaning, some new expression to the idea that force should not be used in international relations. And when you give new expression to this, you're talking about adding to this understanding we already have through the UN Charter and elsewhere. That's the general purpose of it.

Q Why do you have any reason to hope that there's going to be an agreement with the Soviets?

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: Because they spoke in -- favorably about the idea of trying to expand on existing confidence-building measures which have been implemented for the past eight years. There've been over two million troops in the field -- have been notified; over 100 notifications have been announced. And we think there's a -- I think there's a good chance that we can improve upon those procedures and add to it with some new ideas that we've developed since 1975.

Q How would you characterize their reaction now to the specific proposals that the NATO Allies have put forward?

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: Well, it's a picture, a mix between saying there is some possibility of a rapprochement between our positions and criticizing certain elements. They have not been very specific, to be honest. As I said, their proposals have been announced in plenary meetings, which is not necessarily the best way of

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conducting a negotiation. We've had a lot of private meetings, but we have not gotten down to the specific criticism of what it is they like or don't like about our proposals. We'll do this in the next round, I have no doubt.

Q Are you --

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: Somebody in the back has been asking for the floor.

Q Do you detect any change in the Soviet position, either substantial or superficial, or positive or negative, since the change in leadership in the Kremlin?

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: No, I'd say from my perspective which is only Stockholm, a high degree of continuity. The speeches that they were making at the end and things they were saying privately were very compatible with what they were saying in the beginning. So I did not detect from where I was sitting any particular change at all.

Q Mr. Ambassador, how has the deployment of U.S. cruise missiles interfered with any possible progress in the Stockholm talks?

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: Well, I don't think it interferes. There was some discussion of that in Stockholm, of course. And the general position that all the NATO countries took was that we're glad to talk about those things, but let's talk about it in Geneva. There's a place there that is now ready for discussion. We're ready to go back overnight.

But in terms of the negotiation, I don't think that it effected the proposal the Soviets made or the proposals the neutral countries made and so I don't see any direct impact.

Q Do any of the participants in those talks, specifically the Soviets, I guess, see the presence of these cruise missiles as contributing to the possibility that a miscalculation will be made?

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: Well, of course the Soviets generally speak about their concerns about nuclear war in terms of first strike and that kind of thing and we're consistently pointing out that we've not deploying first-strike weapons in Europe and that, indeed, we're not talking about first strike of any kind, that we're in favor of non-use of any kind of force, as we have said repeatedly But one of the things we'd like to do is to get at the problem of how does a war begin. And a war is not very likely to begin through a nuclear exchange. Very unlikely. I think the most likely way -- and this was borne out recently by some studies in one of the universities and elsewhere -- that the most likely cause of a war is the little incident, the border incident, the misunderstanding and it escalates and gets out of control. And that's what we're targeting on.

Keep in mind that we're doing something really rather different from what these other arms control negotiations are doing. And I think there's a place for the kind of thing we're doing in the sense that we're trying to get at the direct causes of war. I think this is a useful thing to do, not being done elsewhere. And if we can get some kind of an understanding that, in a nutshell, each of the countries in this process agrees to inform other countries in advance about the meaning, the intent of certain specific activities and they give as much advance warning as possible -- even a year in

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advance, if possible, this, I suggest to you, is going to do something about those -- what I call the "proximate causes of war." And I think that's important.

Q Would you say that --

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: But it's only beginning, as Shultz -- Secretary Shultz said in the opening speech. If we can get some of these things implumented and in place we can build on that.

So this is one of the first steps, and I think an important one.

Q Mr. Ambassador, you said there was a good chance, in your opinion, for some sort of agreement. In what time frame? Is there any change of an agreement this year?

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: Well, I think there's a good chance over the long run. Now, let me say what the long run is. This is a part of the Helsinki process, which is a conference on security and cooperation in Europe. They have review meetings every five years to review implementation of the Helsinki Final Act. The next one takes place in November 1986 in Vienna. And I think clearly by that time I would expect there to be something emerging from this.

But, frankly, I think it all depends on the kinds of assessments that the Soviets are making right now about whether they want to move into this area in a serious way or not.

I think there's some prospect, but I really can't say how fast it's going to move.

Q So you're saying it could be two or three or more years away before --

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: -- possible or could be sooner. But we've had one round, right? Nine weeks. And I think the next round is going to be much more of a testing time of how -- what the progress might -- is likely to be.

I mentioned that it ends on July the 6th. I think I could give you a little better picture at that particular point. Because what we will do is get down into some of the detailed critiques that we haven't had a chance to do so far.

Q You say there is a lot of notificiation now --

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: Yes, there have been over a hundred of them.

Q Did we have notification on the Sea of Japan?

AMBASSADOR GOODBY: Well, these notifications involve essentially ground troops and up to now, in fact, these notificiations have not extended very far into the Soviet Union, only 250 kilometers.

One of the things we're aiming at -- one of the things the Soviets have agreed to -- is that we will have notificiations extending all the way to the Ural Mountains. So that is going to do a lot, I think, in terms of the objectives we have. But it does not now cover sea activities.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 10:59 A.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO CHINA

April 3, 1984

Room 248
Old Executive Office Building

11:15 A.M. EST

MR. SIMS: This briefing is on background.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Unaccustomed as I am to these things and without the main partner here with me -- Here he is. Thank goodness -- saved.

Sir, would you please join me and before we have a chance to coordinate, we'll just plunge ahead. I have to get out, as you know, at 11:45 a.m. So why don't I open with some general remarks?

I believe that one, you're all going on the trip. And two, that you were briefed -- that my colleagues did a briefing here on March 21, or at least he did, and that you were in on that. And it looks like a darn good -- I look at the transcript and it looks pretty good.

Therefore, I'm going to take a slightly different track. And I thought I would, first of all, give you some flavor from a recent trip to China that I was part of, and that is Secretary Regan's -- Secretary of Treasury Regan's visit there -- because I think it would perhaps be useful for you.

He went in his capacity as co-chairman of the Joint Economic Committee and clearly in the minds of all his hosts and his interlocutors, he was an important Cabinet member visiting China just before the President went. And it was quite obvious in the way he was handled, and in the way he handled himself, that this was in the minds of both sides.

Now, in this connection, apart from the workings of the Joint Economic Committee cohosted by the Chinese Minister of Finance, Mr. Wang -- Secretary Regan had four bilateral conversations with the ministers of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, Madame Chen, with his host, Minister Wang, the Finance Minister, with the Foreign Minister Wu, and finally with Premier Zhao. They were all lengthy and quite interesting. It became abundantly clear, at least in my mind, that the Chinese side looks upon this visit as we have, as part of a pair.

And I will take you back to the visit, and the atmospherics, and the results of the Zhao -- Premier Zhao's visit here in January and just underscore the fact that both sides went into the two visits as a pair -- as a part of a process, as a part of a maturation and a constancy development in the relationship. I think that's important because naturally, the tendency on our side, coming up to such an event is to -- is to view it simply as a single and it was, indeed, viewed from last year, and handled by both sides as a pair, as part of a continuing process.

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Secondly, in the thrust of the remarks on the Chinese side during the Secretary of Treasury's visit, naturally they were economic -- and here we touch a great area which I think will be of very specific interest during the visit. The Chinese laundry list -- (Laughter.) -- contained the predictables. That is, complaints about discrimination on the U.S. side, vis-a-vis China as an economic entity.

What do I mean by that? I mean that there exists -- I mean that there exists in the foreign -- for an example, there exists in the Foreign Assistance Act a lumping of the PRC with the Soviets and the Soviet blocs. And the response of the Secretary was that as given to the Chinese during the Zhao visit.

This administration has indeed tried before and will continue to try to remove those obsolete references -- lumping the PRC together with the Soviet Union in terms of such things as the Foreign Assistance Act.

Secretary Regan immediately went on, however, to remind the Chinese that that does not, repeat,not mean that this administration contemplates a foreign aid program -- a loan program for the PRC. Rather the emphasis, the proper role there, is on the private sector, and his message --polite but repeated and quite clear -- was that it -- remaining the proper role of the U.S. private sector as far as what they want -- that is long term investment, technology, and so forth -- they should therefore create, maintain, and enhance the conditions under which that would take place.

And that takes you then to a related set of circumstances. Secretary Regan initialled the tax treaty that will be signed by the President and Premier Zhao during the visit. That is essentially a treaty which would avoid double taxation.

You could get details later on. Since it has been initialled, you could get the finer points. But the key thing is it's aimed at avoiding double taxation.

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In this regard, it was also noted that the two sides had been for some time engaged in talks about a possible -- a possible bilateral investment. Bilateral, if you want to call it that. An investment agreement. Now, here you get into the question of such key items as expropriation, repatriation, elimination of discrimination, national treatment -- the conditions -- the meat and potatoes of private sector's involvement in investment and presence -- economic -- financial presence in China.

In that regard, the Secretary had had discussions with American business men in Beijing and he was aware that some of them had been living in Chinese hotels for about seven years, and that when -- that some of them were saying to him that when they went down to collect goods to be imported, there were different customs duties levied for the same product in different ports, which is not supposed to be, and so forth. So his -- the thrust of his major remarks along this track, to summarize, were that we'll work to eliminate those discriminatory references. At the same time, we do not contemplate, we do not have in mind a foreign aid program for China. Rather, investment and involvement is in the private sector and if you want to get and keep them, you've got to create and enhance the conditions for them.

Q Just reminders -- what are the restrictions against communist countries in the Foreign Assistance Act? What is China complaining about specifically?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is in the Foreign -- in the existing language of the Foreign Assistance Act, and the year, I've forgotten, specific prohibition for U.S. foreign aid concessionary loans to the communist countries, predominantly, the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc.

Q Is that the only or the main prohibition?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is -- that's my appreciation of it, yes.

Q On just that point, who is against changing the law? When you say you're striving to change it, who is the enemy, domestically?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, let's put it this way. We've emphasized to the Chinese that the Congress's failure to make this adjustment is not anti-Chinese. It's, rather, been bogged down in the larger problem -- the minute someone starts talking about amending or adjusting the Foreign Assistance Act, then all kinds of different constituencies, et cetera, get into it.

So it's been explained to the Chinese and they understand that this has not been held up by an"anti-Chinese constituency".

Q Are they pushing for concessionary loans? Is this a big item on their agenda?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They -- let me put it this way. They repeatedly, with major interlocutors, refer to very large development schemes, particularly hydroelectric power and peaceful nuclear power generation programs for which they would like to get as a developing country with a per capita GNP of about $320 or something like that -- for which they would like to get the right kind of loans. That is, low term -- low interest, long-term.

Q Is the administration doing anything, actually, to try to get the Foreign Assistance Act changed, or is that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q What --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, with both Houses.

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Q Is anything on that pending -- likely to be -- anything on that likely to be --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The administration has been in dialogue with the relevant committees and so forth in both Houses.

Q I don't mean dialogue. I mean, are there -- is that up for some -- is there any likelihood that any action would be taken on that this year?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me throw the question back to you. You tell me whether the, in this year, 1984, the Foreign Assistance Act is going to pass, and I think I'd be better prepared to give you an answer.

Q Could I follow up on that, though? You seemed to indicate that this was primarily -- or exclusively a symbolic issue because even if you got the Act amended, you wouldn't provide them any assistance, or would you? Suppose -- let's look to '85-'86, now -- that the Congress finally does what you want it to do. Would you then provide some concessionary loans to the Chinese for, for instance, these hydro-nuclear development projects?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: My own personal answer is I do not see that in the cards. I think when you look at the Sahel area in Africa and when you look at so many other desperately impoverished countries in the world, and when you look at the domestic climate as far as foreign aid, in general, and the distribution there of, I think the priorities would lie elsewhere.

Q On the complaints of American business men -- are we looking for some general policy change from the Chinese on housing or customs or are we simply looking for them to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATON OFFICIAL: We're looking for, as I indicated before, the meat and potatoes

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that make, that attract and keep foreign investors.

Q Well, what do we want them to do? What is the meat and potatoes? What changes do we want from them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think you would want -- I mean, it's difficult for me to factor out this or that. We've got a tax treaty that will be signed. I'm hopeful -- I would label that as very cautious optimism -- we've got a Chinese team now in this country on -- on further talks on the bilateral -- on some form of a "bilateral investment agreement" -- some form of it.

It'll -- It's a long, hard road -- I feel more optimistic than I did a couple of weeks ago.

Q But that's not going to cover housing, or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it would not of itself cover those things. So it's a combination. It's the total package.

Q What would it cover? What's in that bilateral agreement that you expect to get out of --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- which I hope to get, with -- optimism, and that is such things as I indicated before on the question of what do you do if this expropriation, that is repatriation of funds, profits, dividends, and so forth -- arbitration, nondiscriminary treatment against American versus other investors, the relative treatment of foreign investors versus domestic investors and so forth.

Q Does the administration scale back what kind of provisions it wants in an investment treaty in the hopes of getting something that the President will be able to sign when he's in China?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't put it that way. To the contrary I would say that as we go into any such process, we have to bear in mind that we have several others around the world that we would want to gain, and we wouldn't want to go with something weak and useless.

Q Has the agenda for those talks, though, been scaled back some, or have certain issues been winnowed out?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Within the investment forum?

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: To my -- to my knowledge, full range is being discussed, and intensively right now in Washington.

If I could go on to another one --

Q Before you do --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Is it still doubtful then that the investment treaty will be signed during the President's visit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I prefer at this stage to be cautious. Let's see where the talks bring us in the next week -- in this week.

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Q What other issues will the President make a big push on in addition to investment --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, both sides are -- have been for some time, as you know, engaged on talks on an agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation.

You will recall that last year, 1983, there were three intensive rounds -- and then during the visit of Premier Zhao in Washington -- those talks again intensified. We are still basically hung up or poised, however you want to describe it -- over the question of consent rights for such materials as might be used in process through U.S. supplied facilities.

Here you have the old story of U.S. law, on the one hand, which -- in which there's a stringent provision for obtaining consent rights, versus the other party, be it Chinese or whatever, which has concern over such questions as principle and sovereignty. We're talking about materials which would be used to develop ten years or more down the road. That is, hypothetically, let's say that we got an agreement, we put in, we supply a U.S. reactor, U.S. fuel rods start off but ten years down the road, some other fuel rods are put in -- be they Chinese or a third country. And it's consent rights over these materials, over which we're currently poised.

Q Well, does this get -- are you talking about the use of fuel, and product fuel processing, are you?

Q So you don't think there will be an agreement signed on nuclear this time?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's still in my own mind, a slim chance. But let's see whether in the interval between now and the President's arrival, we get some further movement on that.

I would point out another economic issue to you, and that is the -- the Maritime agreement which lapsed -- after a one time extension, it lapsed last December 17. The basic hang up there is over an adequate sharing of cargo by the U.S. side.

On the Chinese side, they want -- in effect, they want most-favored-nation-treatment, easy access to our ports. There were discussions last year. They did not produce

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adequate results. The agreement lapsed. A U.S. delegation led by Admiral Shearer will leave shortly for Beijing, arriving, I believe, on April 8th. Let's see whether we get any movement on that.

Q If some of these issues are still unresolved -- that, the nuclear and the other, by the time of the President's arrival, will those simply be held in abeyance, then, until after the visit or will negotiations continue while he's there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would imagine that they would certainly go beyond -- if they weren't resolved before, they'd go beyond the President's visit.

Q No, I mean --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Would we have negotiations there? I think it would -- That could vary greatly. For instance, the nuclear business is highly technical in many ways and you'd have to have the right people around.

Q What about the big political issues? Taiwan, etc., etc., the Middle East, on which there are differences?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would, myself, accept very wide-ranging discussions over a broad spectrum. On some of them, there would be confluence or parallelism. I could site -- what immediately jumps to mind --

Q "Confluence -- "

Q What?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q What's a "confluence or parallelism"? (Laughter.)

Q Both. Both.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Confluence or parallelism.

Q Density of view --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would -- what leaps to mind are such issues as the Soviet problem and specifically the manifestation thereof in Afghanistan, the Soviet support for the Vietnamese and their continued occupation and so forth in Kampuchea.

Q How about arms to Iran?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Arms to Iran? Well, I think you know the administration's position on arms to either of those two parties locked in -- in the combat they are. That is, this administration does not sell to either party and we certainly do not favor arms sales to either party in the present circumstances as we and others hope for a peaceful resolution.

Q Do the Chinese sell to either party?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Say again?

Q Do the Chinese sell to either party?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Chinese?

Q Sell to either party?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't have anything at my fingertips. Let's put it this way, we would, on background, since we're on background, we've spoken with the Chinese as we've

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spoken with a great number of parties on possible sales to either party and we will continue to do so.

Q Will the President ask them to stop?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let's see what happens between now and the President's visit.

Q -- Taiwan, which you didn't -- you didn't directly address Taiwan. How much of the discussion do you think will be focused on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In any major visit of this sort, be it the Premier's, to which I referred before, or the President's, of course, there would be a discussion on Taiwan.

My prediction would be that they would refer to their interpretations of the communiques, that they would put a marker down as far as arms sales of defensive arms to Taiwan and that our side would reiterate its full commitment to the various communiques -- I'm speaking of the Shanghai Communique of 1972, the Normalization Communique of December 1978 and the August 17, 1982 Communique.

Q When you say, "put a marker down," do you mean that the Chinese are liable to say, "We need a date certain"? Are they going to push for that kind of a thing? For a cutoff?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In their view, they, first of all, dispute the relevance, if you will, of the Taiwan Relations Act. They say that it has no place, they refuse to recognize it and they would continue to complain that the level of arms shipped to Taiwan exceeds what they expected.

We would reiterate that from our viewpoint, those shipments are in accord -- the level of shipments are in accord with the provisions of the August 17, 1982 Communique.

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Q Is the trend of arms sales to Taiwan up, down or flat and what are the administration's intentions in the foreseeable future as to the level of arms sales, both quantity and quality of weapons?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The administration's approach to that is embodied in its adherence to and in the language which was put out in connection with the August 17, 1982 Communique.

Q Yes, but what is the practical effect of that? Do you, for instance, envision an early date when you could stop arms shipments to Taiwan on the theory that Taiwan no longer needs these arms?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, if you'll recall the statements and the atmospherics of August 17, 1982, you were talking about a scenario whereby the PRC adhered to a peaceful approach to this problem and in the light of that the U.S. side countenanced a gradual diminution.

Q Yes, but the practical --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But there was no cutoff date, no finite --

Q No, I'm not asking about the Communique; I'm asking whether you have, in your own mind, in the administration a date when you could say, "Well, they're strong enough; they don't need more American arms?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Without any reference to the Communique. You hadn't reached that point?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No --

Q What's actually happening -- That part of my question you didn't address. Are we selling about the same? What's the pattern?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The figures for '83 and '84 are -- I -- we can get because they're public figures given to the Congress, estimated figures -- were in the region of about $780 million.

Q Each year?

Q Each year?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q In each of the two years?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q And what's contemplated for fiscal '85?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would contemplate for fiscal '85 an estimated $760 million. These are estimates -- I -- And there will be -- I would contemplate the possibility of fluctuations.

Q It appears that you're saying that you're not looking for any progress on this issue nor are they, that you're just going to repeat the previous statements from the three communiques. Is that essentially what you're saying?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think -- No, I would put a different cast on it. I think that what we're shooting for here is continued, steady management of the problem. But differences are there; let's both sides move on with responsible management.

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Q Are the figures you are citing here military sales or military assistance?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sales of military equipment --

Q What about other forms of assistance from the U.S. to Taiwan? Economic assistance, other forms of loans? There are no other, no other of any kind --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, they pay; they pay.

Q No, but I mean, even international economic assistance in various forms. Is that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's not in that -- that's not in that figure.

Q No, I know, but, I mean, what is that figure? Are we providing more economic assistance at a time when we're slowly reducing --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know whether we're providing them any economic assistance since about 1961.

Q Is that a fact?

Q How do those military sales compare historically? I know -- I think the '82 Communique said, what? That they would use what as a baseline and go -- and keep below --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, you have an index factor, and in the various dialogues -- the Chinese, that is, the PRC side takes this or that base, and we say that in recent historical terms, when you crank in the inflation factor of 1979, 1980 and so forth, that we are within our undertaking under the August 17, 1982 --

Q What is the baseline -- 1979?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We'll have to get that for you. I think it's '79-'80.

Q How much were we selling at that time to them? I mean, just so we have an historical comparison.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You have adjusted figures so that we hold, I think, an inflation-adjusted figure in excess of $800 million.

Q But neither side realistically expects the other's position to change on this matter as a result of the discussions next month, is that right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: My own personal assessment is that both sides will generally adhere to their well-established positions.

Q Are co-production schemes increasing as the arms sales decrease or are the arms sales figures including the co-production that we're beginning to do with the Taiwanese?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We've for some time had an F-5E co-production. That goes back into the '70s, and that continues. And that would be included --

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Q Are American investors helping in the increase of the Taiwanese indigenous military industrial prospects?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm aware, in that regard -- I, personally, am only aware of the F-5E co-production. I'm not aware of others.

Q You don't know whether American manufacturers are helping to start up the Taiwanese foreign industry?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm unaware of anything concrete apart from the existing F-5E co-production.

Q Can I go back to the nuclear just a second? At the time of Zhao's visit, we were told that there's also a critical time factor. That if this problem continued to be unresolved, that the Chinese have, in effect, a French option, and they've already begun to order French nuclear power plans -- Is time working against us on this if this drags on much longer?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it's understandable that in such circumstances you get various stories from various quarters, the thrust of which is, if you don't, somebody else will. Bear in mind, you're talking about non-proliferation regimes so that while that kind of argumentation may be used, I don't wish to belittle the problem, but I would not that while that kind of argumentation may be used in an effort to move the process along, say, through commercial channels, you keep coming back to non-proliferation regimes and the necessary assurances, therefore.

And so, I consider that, basically, we're in the boat together.

Q In weeks --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATON OFFICIAL: It's about a quarter of. Maybe I can take one more and --

Q Are the Chinese -- does the Mainland want to buy arms from us? Are we going to give them any arms?

Q Do the Chinese want to buy arms from the United States?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What?

Q The PRC.

Q PRC.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Historically speaking, I would give you the following. One: the Chinese went through a period of great, almost total, reliance on the Soviet Union for over a decade in the arms field, and they bitterly resent -- I think, looking back, they bitterly resent having been put in that position, and from their viewpoint, having suffered by it.

Therefore, my own perception is that the Chinese will always be -- first, last, and always -- concerned with their own quest for self-sufficiency. That's the first thing.

The second thing is that they would always be uneasy and leery about anything which might be perceived domestically as over-dependence on any one producer. As you look back over the last ten years, and so forth, you see their purchasing, or their attempts to purchase either goods or technology, know-how, and so forth, are usually spread. And I would say that that would probably be their basic posture.

Now, obviously, the gap between the Soviet holdings, if I

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can use that broad expression, of hardware, deployment, technology, and so forth, and the Chinese are, at least in my mind -- that gap not only continues to exist, I would warrant that it's even expanding at this stage. So there will be ongoing Chinese concern about that gap with a Northern neighbor.

At the same time, there is, obviously, great sensitivity about characterization of an external relationship in terms of "strategic relationship". The Chinese don't like that.

YOu see at the same time the improvement of the surface -- some aspects of the surface relationship between the PRC and the Soviet Union. You've had an increase in trade -- from 300 million to 800 million. and it looks as if it's going -- targeted for 1.2 billion in this next year.

You have scholarly exchanges increasing from a very low base -- say, students -- ten by a couple of times. You have the opening of checkpoints, frontier points. You have an exchange of diplomatic visitors. Indeed, in May, Arkhipov, the highest ranking Soviet official, will visit China in May after the President's visit.

What does this tell me? It tells me that the Chinese and the Soviets are moving with the superficial aspect, but at the same time, I consider the three fundamentals, as the Chinese describe them, the obstacles, are there. That is, Kampuchea, Afghanistan, and the Soviet presence in the broadest sense of the word along that enormously long Sino-Soviet, Mongolian border.

And with that, I think I'll have to beg out.

MR. SIMS: I know we all have to leave, but what I didn't know is that the other senior administration official also has a tight schedule. Maybe he can take one or two questions.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'd like to just make one or two comments --

MR. SIMS: All right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- before I take any questions.

One, I think you have to see this trip in a couple of ways. At least, I hope you look at it in a couple of ways. He was talking a lot about the possible agreements the President might or might not sign while he's in Beijing. I think you have to look at this trip as a special one in this sense.

We've had -- this will be the third American President now. When Nixon went, it was a breakthrough. It was a real change of course. A re-establishment of relations after a long hiatus.

When Ford went in '75, it was to show that the United States was really serious about this and intended to pursue good relations with China.

And with this President, I think that we can see here that what we're saying by this is -- both with Zhao's visit here and the President going there -- that this relationship with China is here to stay. We've got difficulties, of course. We have problems, as we have in all kinds of bilateral relationships. But this is on firm ground. It's maturing and we'll settle the differences and the problems. And I think you have to see that as we deal with specific agreements. That is, we may or may not have certain things ready for the President to sign when he's there. But it doesn't matter. If they're not signed in May -- I mean, in April, they'll be signed in May or they'll be signed in June.

It's a progressive thing, and it's an evolving thing. But it's here. It's on firm ground. And then I'd like to make one other comment.

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Not that the relationship with China -- the trip to China is not significant of its own, but it's more than that. You have to see this in terms of the overall policy that this administration is adopting in Asia, and the importance of the East Asian-Pacific region to us.

The President's trip to Japan and Korea in November, this trip to China coming very soon afterwards, is no accident. This is an indication of just how concerned this administration is with Asia, with the region, and what it means to us.

As you know -- you know the figures. That his trade with the Pacific Basin last year was greater than across the Atlantic. And I think this, in itself, is a tremendously important fact. You have a region in this part of the world which is fundamentally stable. It's seen tremendous economic growth. And it's one with which the future of our country is heavily entwined. And I think you have to understand this visit in those terms as well as the importance of a visit to China, per se.

Those are the two points I did want to make.

Q Would the Chinese give Reagan a less warm welcome if he were to follow up his visit with a summit with the Soviets? In other words, are they sensing that this is especially important to the President because it may be his only big summit this year?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think they specifically see that. I think you have to realize this thing was in the works for some time.

Q I know, but when Regan went over there, we got these stories that they're really preparing a very warm welcome.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think they are preparing a warm welcome, but I think it fits in with the whole way in which they see the relationship develop and the importance of it to them.

Q Could you answer the question of whether we're going to sell arms to the PRC a little more straightforwardly than your predecessor?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: How did he say it? I don't remember what he said.

Q Well, he didn't say --

Q It's difficult to remember. If you're in a hurry, you don't want to --

Q Are we, or aren't we? Or, if we are, are we going to put it off until after the trip? Is that part of the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, you know we've talked about selling arms to them for a long time, defensive arms. This is not new. We had this Chinese group over here, you know, last month discussing this.

Q Where does it stand?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, they talked about it. They found out what's available and met with our government officials. They met with private enterprise people. They met with the industries, and so forth. They haven't bought anything yet. But there we are.

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Q Are we offering something to sell?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, I think we had some good talks with private industry, yes.

Q There were --

Q What was the answer?

Q There was a report several weeks ago of some kind of oblique approach by the Chinese or discussion with the Chinese on the possibility of them buying a couple of squadrons of F-16s. Have there been such oblique approaches or overtures or discussions?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not to my knowledge.

Q The issue hasn't come up at all.

Q The answer on arms sales appears to be yes, but what kinds of things are we talking about?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You'd have to talk to the Defense Department about that. I think we're talking, though, basically -- as we say, it's defensive weapons. Anti-tank, anti-aircraft.

MR. SIMS: That's what we're talking about. Defensive weapons.

Q Stingers?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not sure if they're all that specific or not. You'll have to talk to them about that.

Q There was a report a few weeks ago -- there was a report a few weeks ago about Bill Casey meeting with his counterpart. Are we working on some sort of intelligence ageement with the Chinese?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, not to my knowledge. There's no working on any kind of an intelligence agreement. I mean -- no.

Q Do we have an intelligence agreement with the Chinese?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, not specifically.

Q Are we sharing intelligence information with the Chinese?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We talk to them about lots of things.

MR. SIMS: All right. I know the senior administration official has to leave and all of you do, too. Let me remind you that next Friday here at 11:00 a.m., we'll have another senior administration official for a backgrounder on the trade and commercial aspects of the trip. We'll welcome you all back then.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 11:52 A.M. EST

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
SOVIET EXERCISES IN THE BERLIN AIR CORRIDORS
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 4, 1984, 4:00 P. M.

MODERATOR: Good afternoon. As you know, this briefing is on the Soviet flights in the Berlin air corridors. It is ON BACKGROUND. Your briefer can be referred to as a Senior Department Official.

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: We're bringing a map which might help a little bit in describing what we're talking about, and I take it -- I was told when I was asked to come down that there are a lot of questions about really what we're talking about. Maybe I can go into that a little bit before we get the map.

In the first place, we're not talking really about har~~r~~assment, we're not talking about interruptions of flights, we're not talking about conflicts in the air with the Soviets. What has actually been a fairly regular feature of our relations in Berlin ever since 1945 is the problem that you can imagine that we have of managing such a complicated situation with a country which isn't exactly our closest friend. There are quadripartite arrangements for most of the aspects of the Berlin situation, most of them worked out in 1945-46-47, which have functioned, some well, some less well, since then.

One of the ones which has functioned most successfully, even during the airlift, even during the Berlin crises in '58 and '60, '61, has been the operation of air traffic.

Q Functioned well, you said?

A Functioned well. Yes. To and from Berlin. And this air traffic is based -- and when I get the map here I can show it to you a bit more clearly -- is based on a quadripartite document that was agreed in 1946, which sets up the air corridors to Berlin, which sets up flight rules, and which sets up procedures for obeying or working out these flight rules. Over the years we have had disagreements or discussions or debates on how to manage these flight rules. What has happened now is that we're in the middle of another one of these discussions.

As you can imagine, management of air traffic in the territory over the German Democratic Republic is one of the more complicated things around. You have Soviet military aircraft, East German military aircraft. You have military aircraft of the three Western allies, British, French and American, which fly in the corridors. You have civilian aircraft of the British, French and Americans which fly in the corridors. You have civilian aircraft of the GDR which flies outside the corridors. You have civilian aircraft of other nations who have bilateral civil air aviation -- civil air agreements and traffic with the GDR, and this includes not only Romania, Hungary and the East-bloc countries, but includes such countries as Holland and Austria, Finland, Sweden.

Q Flying in or out?

A Flying to the -- there is one international commercial airport which serves East Germany.

Q No I meant as far as the corridor.

A Oh, outside the corridors.

Q Outside.

A Outside the corridors. So you can just see what you've got. You've got sort of interlocking pancakes of flight space, and managing it is really very difficult. As I said, over the years it has worked out quite well with the Soviets basically by using the principle that is also used in the United States, I understand, on military aircraft: That is sort of delineation of space. That is, we have always said we will fly in this space, and they have all said they would fly there. But that doesn't always work because the Soviets, especially this time of the year in the spring, have military exercises, and these exercises also have flights which go what we would consider across the corridors.

Over the years -- and this goes really back way into the 50s -- we have had discussions and often problems with them over the question of which areas of the corridors can they reserve for their use. This is fully legal.

One other thing I might stress is that this is fully legal. This is in the '46 document that I mentioned. It speaks of a use of airspace by the allied powers and the Soviets are one of the allied powers, so they can request -- notify us of the need for airspace if they wish to.

The only point -- and here we're now coming down to the nub of the dispute which has come out in the press -- the question is we want them first to give us enough notice that they want to use the airspace. We want them to reserve the airspace in a manner which doesn't in any way hinder our own operations. (Staff aide entered room with map) Here we are. Now we're going to get the real picture here.

We also, of course, want them to understand that we have legitimate needs which also have to be taken account of. Usually this has been the case. I might mention one of the aspects -- maybe it's one of the more colorful aspects of Berlin, so I might mention it any case -- since 1948 there has been very little common four-power activity on Berlin. In 1948 the Soviets walked out of the Allied Kommandatura, and they haven't been back since.

There are only two remaining areas where we work each day as a common four-power directorate, and one of them is the Spandau Prison where we have a very expensive prisoner sitting there, and one of them is the so-called Berlin Air Safety Control Center, BASC as it's usually called.

Q Berlin Air Safety Control Center?

A The Air Safety Control Center, which in fact has functioned through thick and thin, good times and bad times, since 1946 -- 1945-1946 -- to do exactly what we've just been discussing. That is, to coordinate air traffic. This center is manned by Air Force officers of the United States, France, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. They have a little control room, and they have all kinds of communications and everything. They are not air traffic controllers in the sense of radar screens. They don't have any radar screens. What they do is notify each other of use of airspace, exactly what we're talking about. From time to time the Soviets have told us about desires for use of airspace which we don't exactly agree with, and what we're in the middle of now is exactly that. That is, they want to use airspace in a manner which we don't want -- which we think is, shall we say, too generous to their needs and not generous enough to our needs.

Q They're abusing their privilege, is that --

A We would say. I mean, they wouldn't say that, of course.

Q Are they abusing it?

A Yes. Most of the time they are. We can't always tell, of course, but --

Q They're abusing the what, did you say?

A This was a characterization by one of your colleagues that one might say they're abusing their privileges. I would say that's a fair way of putting it.

Q Is the problem here that they haven't notified us, or --

A No. They notified us. It's just a question that sometimes they do it at somewhat short notice and we think it's a little bit --

(Staff aide began positioning map on easel)

A Maybe we can put it there on the floor.

Q How much notice was given?

A Oh, it varies, and I wouldn't want to get into that, because it's not really the point.

Q The stories that have been written seem to indicate that there is some hazard or danger to civilian aircraft. Is that true, possible, or not?

A It's theoretically possible. Some of the reservations that they've made, what we have had to do is change flight patterns in a way which we'd rather not do it. As I said at the beginning, there hasn't been any har~~r~~assment, there hasn't been the slightest -- well, "slightest" is too strong a word maybe -- there hasn't been any real hazard to air safety.

Q But does this involve just the planes having to fly at different altitudes, higher, lower?

A It involves them having to change their landing patterns, and they have to make big swings and things like that, which we would much rather not do. As you know, air traffic controllers are very conservative people, and they want to have it done in a very certain way, and at certain times we've had to change it.

Q Can I just interrupt you?

A Yes.

Q If you can just itemize or develop what the word "abuse" means. You talked about short notice. Abusing how? Just give a sense of it before you go to the map.

A We fly every day into Berlin several dozen flights, commercial flights, by commercial airlines, plus flights by military aircraft. They fly according to procedures which have been, as I said, in practice for a long time. We have air traffic safety considerations, etc. We would like to fly these flights in a certain way.

When they make reservations for airspace, they at times -- not always I hasten to add, but at times and often enough so that we think it's a problem, and that's the main point here -- make these reservations both in a fashion and to an extent which we think is not acceptable to our desire to conduct the air traffic in a correct way.

This means sometimes that they do it on short notice. They tell us at, say -- these are just illustrative times, but they, say, tell us at 9:00 in the morning that they're going to close off certain airspace or they want to close off certain airspace at noon, just give us a few hours' notice. They do it in a way which closes off airspace which our planes need for landing approaches, for example. All of these sorts of things. What we have been saying to them is that we don't question your right to request use of airspace, we also don't question the safety considerations involved because it is a question of aircraft flying across the corridors, but what we do question is the extent of your reservations and the often short notice that you are giving us for them. That really is all it boils down to.

Q Is this a new pattern of behavior on their part?

A No. Not at all. This has been going on for years and years.

Q Has this hurried -- speeded up in some -- is this --

A No. What has happened --

Q Why is it an issue now?

A It's an issue because somebody talked to the papers about it, to tell you the truth.

Q That's the only reason?

A No. We have protested to them, and what has changed is not the pattern and not the things they're doing. What has changed is the frequency. They're doing it with much, much increased frequency.

Q All right. Could you please tell us where the overflights are taking place, at what altitude, and why it has to be close enough to the landing zones to interfere with the approach pattern?

A No. I can't tell you that, because I'm not a Soviet and I don't know why they're doing it. But that's, of course, what we've been telling to them. But let's go to the map now --

Q What's the frequency, before you get off that?

Q Let's find out these altitudes, please.

A I can't even tell you the frequency. It's several a week. Some weeks it's zero.

Q Several a week?

A Yes. Some weeks it's zero. Some weeks it's -- and the altitudes are -- again, I would just be guessing, and I don't think they're appropriate to this. It's not really the problem of what the altitudes are.

Q To return to my earlier question, then, in fact there is a new pattern in that this is more frequent.

A Yes. That's what I said.

Q During what timeframe has this been more frequent?

A It's been building up for about the past four years. When I said it's not new, that's what I mean. It's not something that just happened last week, and there are many explanations for it, one of which we have observed, and this goes beyond my competence. But it seems to be that the Soviets are using a different kind of close air support for their troops in the GDR, which means that they fly more low-level missions. As I said, when you ask me details about that, I won't know them, because this is just what we've been told by our people.

Before we go any further, let me show you on the map because that might clear up a lot of things. Hope you can hear me.

(Indicating map) There are two points here. This map only shows one of them. According to the arrangements that we have with the Soviets, there are two access points to Berlin. First, there are the three air corridors. There's one from the north, one from the middle, and one from the south.

These corridors start at the border between East Germany and West Germany. As far as our practical problems go, the flight coordination, actually they go further. Secondly, what this map doesn't show is you see that little gold pin there, that's the point from which the whole system was surveyed, and it's important. It's where the Berlin Air Safety Control Center is in West Berlin. It's important because from this point, there is a 20-mile circle which goes out like this (indicating), which is called the Berlin Control Zone. That circle is also considered part of the four-power apparatus, and it's part of the coordination that we do. So we have free flights, not only in these corridors but in this 20-mile circle, and that is where we make our landing approaches and things like that.

Q 20-mile radius?

A 20-mile radius. Right. 20 miles out. What happens is that the Soviets will tell us, "As of 1500 hours on Wednesday, we are reserving airspace from ground level to, say, 3500 feet," something like that, and then they will give us some longitude and latitude coordinates to show where this is. Very often, for example, about this spot right here in the center corridor, because underneath this area, which is a rather large area, is a major Soviet training zone -- training area, whatever you call it, exercise area. This exercise area is often used for exercises in which low-level ground support is flown, and so it's where they want to cut across the corridors.

The other point again to make is that most of the main Soviet air bases are down in this area, and so when they fly, they fly like this (indicating). That cuts across the corridors.

Q What is the required altitude for flying the corridor now?

A There is no required altitude. The corridors, as far as we're concerned, go from the ground level up to the moon, if you will. But, as a matter of practice over the past 25 years, allied aircraft have flown somewhere between 2500 feet and 10,000 feet. Again, it's a de facto thing. There's no four-power agreement which says we will fly at any altitude. We would say that we can fly at one inch or we can fly at 500,000 feet, but because of this very complicated air traffic control system, which I mentioned earlier, we have just as a matter of practice limited ourselves to certain areas.

(Continued on next page)

Q This exercise area would be just about where you start your descent?

A Not quite. You start your descent more about there. One of the problems has been that they have been closing the corridor nearer to Berlin where the people do start their descent. That's necessitated some curbing around and things which you'd rather not do.

Q A couple of questions regarding frequency. Some of us who are older than others lived in Germany in the early Sixties. As you probably know, although you're younger, that --

A I was alive then, though.

Q -- that this kind of thing is part of a continuing crises over air space.

A That's right. That's what I said at the beginning. That is something which we've gone on for a year.

Q It began to calm down about the mid Sixties So therefore frequency becomes important in this in a political context. Was there a long period in there in which things were fairly stable, or has this been a chronic off-and-on again problem every since?

A It's been off and on. In the early Seventies we had a spew of these things. As I think I mentioned earlier, starting about 1979, we've noticed a gradual increase.

You're right, of course, and I should probably speak to that point directly. I think Mr. Hughes mentioned it also earlier.

One of the reasons why, of course, this has gotten into the press, and I suppose why we're standing here right now talking about it, is that in all of these Berlin matters one always looks for a political motive. One always wonders if this is the beginning of some kind of Soviet initiative or whether they're trying to squeeze us as they did in the early Sixties.

All I can is -- I think Mr. Hughes might have said this at noon also -- at the moment we see no broader political meaning to this. We don't see any connection to any other events around the world. We see it as problems arising from too many planes wanting to use too much air space.

Having said that, however, that doesn't mean that we're just saying, let the technicians take of it. Because one of the reasons that we have a special Berlin section in the State Department is that we watch all this stuff very carefully, and so we are watching it. We have literally catalogued every reservation, and we know exactly what they have been doing and we have been talking to them about it.

Q The three Allies protested, you say?

A The three Allies have protested it.

Q What do they say to the protest?

A They have so far said our protests weren't justified. I don't want to go into the exact words because, first, it's privileged and, secondly, it's also the property of the other two Allies as well as us. But I can tell you that they have said we've got nothing to worry about.

Q And, also, they're perfectly within their rights under the 1945-46-47 agreement to do what they're doing?

A To want to use this space.

Q As they're using it?

A That's right; sure. But just two points to that. First, as I said, we think -- as somebody said --

they're perhaps not using it the way we want to; and, secondly, to follow up on the gentleman's point --

Q Not using it the way we want them to?

A That's right. And, secondly, one always wonders, and that's why, again, there is interest in this. That's why we follow all these things very carefully.

Q Is there any class of aircraft they're using. You would guess fighter support, but that could also be supply aircraft. Are they using all types?

A That's a question I can't answer. I just know it's Soviet military aircraft.

Q Is there anything in the timing of this that you can pinpoint more recent?

A Sure. To quote a famous book, "It happens every spring."

Q No. I mean, more recently. When you talk about closing the border nearer Berlin where people would start their descent. Is this something that has occurred in just the last few weeks?

A That particularly kind of closure is new this year. It started --

Q Closing of what?

A In past years, they have usually just closed the air space in the center of the corridor. This year, for the first time, the closure has gone all the way to the end of the Berlin control zone, which is twenty miles out from Berlin. That is true; that's the first time that's happened.

Q Are they suggesting an alternate corridor?

A No. They're just saying -- they're telling us that they have the right to use it, and they're not hindering our flights which happens to be true. As I said at the beginning, there has been no interference with out flights. There's been no danger to flight safety. There's been no necessity of cancelling flights. If you're a passenger in a plane going to Berlin, you would never know any of this is happening.

What it really is is a political administrative coordinating question. The reason I mention the political aspect, which because we consider the stable management of the Berlin situation to be so important, that we follow very closely, and if we see things getting a bit out of kilter we're very rapid to raise it with them as we've done this time.

Q When you say a closing of the twenty miles outside of Berlin, that's that circle?

A That's the circle.

Q They don't close the whole circle?

A No, they don't even close the circle. What I mean is that -- I'll show you again here. (At the map).

Traditionally, if they were going to have a closure, they would say take this much right here. (Indicating) This year, for the first time, they have said we're going to close the whole corridor, from here to the end of the circle wich is about here. (Indicating)

Q Up to the circle but not in the circle?

A Not in the circle.

Q When they say they're closing it, that means no other planes can fly in it?

A That means they suggest to us that we stay out of it because it might be hazardous to -- again, "closure" is, in a way, a misnomer. They don't say we're going to shoot you down if you go in there. What they tell us is, it's probably in your interest not to be in there because you might bump into a fighter.

In other words, they're reserving the space. This goes back again -- that's why I mentioned it at the beginning -- to the principle that we use. And the principle that we use is, since the pilots can't talk to each other, since we have no common radar system, since we have no communication links between the Soviet aerodromes and the U.S. Air Force, and people like that, we have used the very simple but effective principle of staying out of air space that you know the other's using.

Q When you talked about "the first time," this is the first time they've closed the whole center corridor? Is that what you meant by "the first time?"

A It's the first time that these reservations have included closures which go the whole length. As one of the things is, when we start talking about precedents, we've been doing this so much for so many years that just about everything has happened. There have been closures of entire corridors before.

Q What does "the first time" mean?

A "The first time" means that the pattern of reservations that they have been informing us this year -- in other words, regular statements: We will be using this air space -- that the pattern for the first time includes the area up to the end of that circle.

Q How long has that been going on?

A I don't know the exact date, but it's this spring.

Q A month or so?

A Yes, a couple of months.

Q Do they close it to an unlimited altitude?

A No. They take a little slice of pie.

Q They close it up, say, 35 --

A Yes, 3,500/4,000; something.

Q You can pass over that unrestricted?

A Yes, sure.

Q How long a time period do they usually give you for the closure?

A That's so varied that I wouldn't even want to characterize it. Sometimes it's a one hour closure; sometimes it's five hours. It's never 24 hours. It's hours --very carefully delineated period, from a couple of hours.

Q So if I'm willing to fly the corridor at 10,000 feet and make a very steep descent, once I get to the Berlin traffic zone I could probably be safe?

A Not probably. You would be safe. Or if you want to, as we've done in a couple of cases, instead of making a steep descent --

Q Would you address the issue --

Q Wait a minute, John.

Q I'm sorry.

A Instead of making a steep descent, make a circle around and come in from the other direction. It takes you five more minutes but you've done it.

Q UPI reports that commercial airliners have been buzzed by Soviet planes?

A Yes, there have been reports of that. That happens from time to time, too. Again, that is nothing unusual. If you go back 15 or 20 years, we have a recurrence of -- buzzing, of course, if I may use the term, a journalist word. We say "sightings."

Q What does it mean, in practice?

A "Sightings" means when you see one.

Q You see the whites of their eyes?

A When you see one -- again, this goes back to these principles of air traffic control. It's the same way out here at National Airport. If you see another airplane, you think you're in trouble.

So we have the very strong principle that planes are far enough away so that you don't see them. And if you see one, it's considered an incident.

Q You don't mean "buzzing" in the sense of a Soviet fighter moving close to a commercial airliner?

A Yes.

Q You do not mean that?

A No, not at all. Again, I haven't seen that report. That's why I referred --

Q "Buzzing" is very alarmist, and that's not the point you're making?

A It's not the point we're making. The point we're making is that there are sightings. But what happens is, you see -- and that's again when it ends up in a news report like that, it tends to be called "buzzings" because that is the way it is reported to journalists.

I know of no case where there has been like a fighter coming in and saying, "take that white man," or anything like that. (Laughter)

It's been people seeing aircraft; looking out the window and seeing a MiG. But the fact is -- again, I'm not pilot, no expert on this at all -- but the fact is that -- I'm told by pilots -- if you see another airplane, especially a military airplane, you're worried about it. Not because they're going to shoot you down but because the margin of error is so great that you just don't want to see another one.

Whenever an allied pilot sees one of these things in the corridor, he reports it. It's an incident, and that's what you're getting in that.

Q Can you tell us when this representation was made?

A No, I can't, because it's on different dates and it also includes the behavior.

Q So it's more than --

A Within the last few weeks.

Q It's been more than one?

A It's been more than one. Well, yes. There have been more than one for two reasons. One, we did it in Berlin and we've done it in capitals. But there are three capitals and so each of them did it on a different date in a different way.

Q You're talking to a protest here?

A Yes.

Q Could you help us out? Get a sense of the mileage of the corridors. Would you know that of the three?

A Roughly. The center corridor is about 175 miles. The north corridor is a little bit more. It's about 200 miles. And the south corridor is, of course, a lot more; it's 250-275. Those are very rough.

Q How far out to the corridor from the radious will they restrict that corridor for use for commercial aircraft?

A It's all different. Again, what happens is that they reserve a space from ground level up to an altitude and then between certain longitudinal co-ordinates. It varies. It would be unfair to characterize it because sometimes, as I just mentioned, it's been more or less the whole corridor up to the circle; sometimes it's maybe a slice 15 miles wide. It's not very much at all.

Q Now that we've made our protest, what do we do about it? Where do we go from here?

A We've all kinds of methods that we can use. But, basically -- and maybe I should stress this because it's an important part of the whole situation -- basically, what this is is a question of international political back-and-forth.

In any Berlin matter, where we want to do things peacefully, obviously, our activities are limited in all but the most dramatic cases -- and most dramatic cases we have to go back to 1960-61 -- are limited to political pressure, and we've got various ways of doing that.

Diplomats, as you know, from hanging around here, tend to like to protest things and they think that's the most horrible thing you can do to anybody is to protest, and we've protested. If those protests don't work, we protest again. We may escalate the level. We may do various things.

Q Just to be completely clear, there is absolutely nothing in this, the timing of it that is coincident with the other military exercises of the Soviets?

A That is our very strong view, yes; the North Atlantic maneuvers, and all this. That's what you're referring to?

Q Yes.

A Our very strong view is that there's nothing coincidental that has gone on.

Q There's nothing that's happened in the last two or three days, the tide that might in some way --

A No, not at all.

Q What is the width of the corridors?

A I'll refer now to my Bible. I'm not sure. I think it's 25 miles. I'll look it up. In fact, I can probably get your the length. No, I guess I can't. I'll have to look through here for a second, so just bear with me.

I think it's 20 or 25 miles.

Q Good enough. We have no sense of it being any political signal against the background of East-West tensions?

A Not at all; no.

Q One other detailed question. Could you put a name on that training zone in the middle of the center corridor that you referred you as the place that they usually close?

A No, I can't. I'm sorry.

Q Do the maneuvers go outside of that specific --

A Oh, sure. They have training zones all over East Germany. That's not the only one.

Q But the maneuvers that come each spring might be anywhere along that center corridor?

A Yes. They're in the training zone, and there is a delineation. I don't know it specifically, but there is one. The important point is that their airfields are more in the southern part of the GDR and they fly across.

Q You said you've had these comparables to-do's over the years. How does this rate in the category of problems with them -- middle or severe?

A I'd say middle.

Q Middle. There have been worse problems?

A Many, many worse ones. Yes, sure.

Q Are the Allies upset that they even have a training base or area right under the corridor, or did that develop some way so that there was never a protest about it?

A I don't think that -- no. In the first, we have no control over it. And in the second place, it sort of developed over the years.

One thing to remember -- this is an aside but it's perhaps interesting -- is that this whole system was set up when the snazziest, most sophisticated plane we had was a DC-3, and it was set up for a DC-3 like environment and we're now flying jets of all various sorts. It may be a little bit antiquated.

Q Thank you.

A Thank you.

(Briefing concluded at 4:35 p.m.)

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DRAFT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL

April 4, 1984

Room 248
Old Executive Office Building

4:15 P.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me get the preliminaries out of the way. What I will do is go through -- I'll paraphrase what I think the President will say as part of his opening statement so that you'll get the gist of what he's going to announce, and then we'll ask my colleague, if he shows up, or whoever comes to answer questions you may have about how we got to this point.

Q What are the rules on this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What I'd like to do is embargo this until the press conference. The reason for doing this backgrounder is because I realized that at 8:00 p.m. you're dumped an announcement on chemical weapons and it's a little difficult to meet deadlines. So we wanted to tell those of you who have to work quickly and that's as much as we know at this point.

Q Is there a transmission embargo or just a release embargo?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's an embargo for wire transmission.

Q Are you the briefer?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We were waiting for you.

I'll be your briefer after all.

Q Great.

Q We don't have the text of what the President is going to say, right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, but let me first -- and let me introduce my colleague because he is involved in this. And as I said before David came in, it's embargoed until the start of the press conference.

This is a statement that -- it's out of date in the sense that it's made last year, or in '82. But it gives you some background for those who don't have it on chemical weapons.

The President will open the press conference tonight with a statement saying that in two weeks he will send Vice President Bush to Geneva to present the 40-nation Conference on Disarmament a new American initiative for a comprehensive, worldwide ban on chemical weapons. He will say that our proposal will prohibit the production, possession, and use of chemical and toxic weapons.

Q Production what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Production, possession, and use of chemical and toxic weapons.

He will note that the shortcomings of earlier chemical weapons treaties have been made tragically clear in recent years. Chemical weapons have been used against people in Afghanistan, in Southeast

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Asia, and in the conflict between Iran and Iraq. The use of these weapons, he will say, also has serious implications for our own security.

Q For our what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: For our own security. The Soviet Union's extensive arsenal of chemical weapons requires the United States to maintain a limited retaliatory capability of its own. We need this capability to deter a chemical attack against us or our allies. And without a modern and credible deterrent, prospects for achieving a comprehensive ban would be significantly diminished.

Our comprehensive treaty proposal can bring the day closer when the world will prohibit all chemical weapons. But verification of a chemical weapons ban won't be easy. An effective monitoring and enforcement package will be mandatory to ensure international confidence in such an agreement.

Therefore, the United States is developing what the President will call bold and sound verification procedures. He'll then go on to say that this latest initiative reflects his continuing strong commitment to arms control. The administration seeks to move forward in several areas.

For example, we're participating in promising new multilateral negotiation dealing with confidence-building measures in Europe and in the recently resumed East-West talks on reducing chemical -- conventional forces in Europe. Working closely with our NATO allies to try to make progress in all of these areas.

He will then say that he can't report these promising developments without expressing a deep personal regret that the Soviet Union still has not returned to the two negotiations on nuclear arms reductions, START and INF, which it left, walked away from, late last year.

The United States and many other countries have urged repeatedly that the Soviets return to these talks. So far, the Soviets have ignored these requests. The President will say that he hopes the Soviet leadership will respond to our new initiative, not only by negotiating seriously on chemical weapons, but also by joining us in the urgent task of achieving real reductions in nuclear arms.

He will call the Vice President's mission a vital one and wish him Godspeed.

Now, that's what he will say, more or less, at the beginning of his press conference. Neither he nor can I --

Q May I interrupt, please? You're speaking here -- we didn't, unless I didn't hear, establish groundrules.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm a senior administration official.

I'm not prepared to discuss the details of the treaty that will be put forward in two weeks when the Vice President goes to Geneva. The trip planning, I believe -- my colleague knows better than I -- has begun, but it is of fairly recent origin, so the details --

Q What is the date of that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Roughly, the 17th and 18th.

Q Of April?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Of April.

Q In Geneva?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

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Q And this is a resumption of the disarmament --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's the 40-Nation Commission -- Committee on Disarmament which meets regularly at Geneva.

Q Is the UN --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it is -- UN relationship, but it is -- yes.

Q Do you know who will be representing the Soviet Union at this session that Bush will attend?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I do not know who will be there, and as I said, I don't know precisely what date he will table the draft U.S. treaty. I don't know who will be in the delegation to go with him. And those details are being worked out because the President has recently, within the last two weeks, decided on the framework for the draft treaty and on, even more recently, has decided that the Vice President should be the one to table it for the United States.

Q I guess my question is, is the U.S. making some effort to try to see if there can be some reciprocal high-level Soviet participation at that time?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think we would welcome that, but I don't know of any particular activity to make that happen.

Q Do they know Bush is coming? Have they been informed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Do you know?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Geneva?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q No, the Soviets.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Soviets? I don't know that.

Q Well, isn't this a Chernenko initiative, really, of throwing it out on the whole business of the chemical --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Soviets have been interested in banning chemical weapons in Europe, but our interest has been -- and we have indicated that we were -- when Secretary Shultz was in Stockholm at the opening of the Conference on Disarmament, the European Security Conference, the one that Ambassador Goodby represents us in -- he said we would propose a comprehensive treaty banning chemical weapons.

Q Didn't Bush also raise this last year in Europe?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't believe that he did. There has been a lot of discussion within the administration on the merits of proposing this kind of treaty. A treaty which, to be effective on chemical weapons, would require verification provisions which the Soviets have not shown an inclination to accept. However, we believe it's in everyone's best interests to make an effort to achieve this kind of a treaty and we're going to go forward with this.

Q Why are you addressing verification problems here unilaterally but you were unwilling to do it with the anti-SAT stuff?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not sure I understand your question.

Q Well, on ASAT, you made a judgment that verification would be impossible. Here you're saying we have verification procedures that the Soviets have not shown a willingness to accept but we're going to make a stab at it anyway.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we'll have to see what their response is. And ASAT is quite different. And our study of that indicated -- and you read the report -- the great difficulty even in defining what an antisatellite weapon is. A lot of the problems that relate to ASAT verification do not apply when it comes to chemical weapons.

Q There are differences -- you made a judgment there saying it's difficult and we're not even going to try. Here you're saying it's difficult, but we think it's worth a try.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we think it's achievable in this case and certainly is something that we would hope the Soviets would agree to.

Q Is it technically achievable or politically, diplomatically achievable?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We think it's both. We think that we'll have the proper -- we will have verification provisions that would be sound enough to give us a satisfactory treaty in our view.

Q What are the bold -- can you characterize the bold and sound verification? Are you talking on site?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That I can't do because -- let's leave it to Vice President Bush to discuss that.

Q You called this -- the Secretary of State has already announced that this treaty was going to be proposed.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q So the only thing that's new is that -- and I believe that at the time, he and others said that verification problems stood in the way of the administration's going ahead with this. Obviously, now those have been resolved internally within the administration. So the only thing new is whatever breakthrough the administration has achieved within its own deliberations about what kind of verification approach is required. Why can't you give us some at least generic sense of what that would entail? We're speaking on background. It's so murky, really, beyond that.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'm just not able to do that.

Q But you do say that we will propose a verification process?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q And you won't say whether it's on site or whether --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, obviously, it's going to require some intrusive measures that would --

Q What measures?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Intrusive measures that would be --

Q Will the President provide any details --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- different and some things that the Soviets have agreed to in the past.

Q Your use of the words, "production, possession, and use" were words he'd use?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Okay. The other thing is, what do you interpret the Soviets to mean when they talk about continuous on-site inspection?

Q That's what they have said for Europe? Is that what they have proposed?

Q Well, that's what they did a year ago in Geneva, yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know. That's why I need --

Q You don't know --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's why I need a briefer here. (Laughter.)

Q Oh, I'm sorry. Okay.

Q That possession would mean distruction of our stockpiles of nerve gas and so forth?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But it's continuous on-site inspection distruction of chemical weapons.

Q You characterized the Soviet position on this referring to Europe and saying they didn't agree to verification. But isn't this an answer to what Chernenko proposed in March -- recently, which seemed to be some progress?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it is a further -- it's actually an enlargement of a more limited proposal that he put forward, as I understand it, which would apply to the geographic region. We're interested in applying it on a global basis.

Q Did the Iraq-Iran thing stir this or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It had its impact. I wouldn't say that it was a specific causal factor. The President and Secretary Shultz had discussed, before he went to Stockholm, the issue of chemical weapons and the desirability of some movement on that, and he did signal -- I agree with you -- he signaled that we were going to do this and some people thought it might be a long time before we could -- within the government, come up with

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an approach to this. It has not taken a long time. I think this is another indication that -- of the effort to put forward proposals that would reduce armaments.

Q Will the President --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Particularly this -- most stabilitizing kinds.

Q Will the President provide any more details, particularly on a verification procedure, tonight --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think that he would. I think it's his intention to wait until the Vice President goes to Geneva and -- we wouldn't want to read the mail of -- that he's going to deliver to 40 nations in this conference.

Q Why is he going? Why is Bush going?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Because the President attaches significance to this proposal and has trust and confidence in the Vice President because the Vice President himself has long-standing personal interest in this --

Q Does he go -- twice on nerve gas?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't know how --

Q Promise to his mother.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know how -- I'm sure that his mother will be pleased -- (laughter.)

I think that there's no question asking the Vice President to go and present this is an indication of the importance the President places --

Q What is the current inventory of these weapons that the United States has? And, I mean, we're -- I mean, others may know --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Steve, I just don't know. I'm hopeful that some of Jon Howe's speech of a year ago, that some of us would be there. But I don't have --

Q -- figure?

Q -- details gone to the Soviets yet?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Did he say "yes" or "no"?

Q Is --

Q Details to the Russians?

Q Do you know offhand of any impeding debates or vote on this? On these weapons, their production or if it's coming up soon?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Domestically?

Q Any of the budget appropriations or authorization bills? I mean, are we facing --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's nothing before us that's imminent on this.

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Q -- surely seeking production funds for the binary.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have been denied production funds for -- what? -- three years in a row now on this. And continue to say, as the President would say tonight, that we need a modest deterrent, that we need --

Q -- a bargaining chip?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- newer rather than old weapons of this type. And --

Q It's the binary stuff that's been denied?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q But there is production of other kinds of nerve gas or chemical --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think that we have any production funds at all. We've had a complete stonewall on this one --

Q So whatever the U.S. has is just leftover --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's old stuff. Right.

Q Is this part of an effort to get the Congressional funding to modernize U.S. chemical weapons, either as a bargaining chip or as a deterrent or whatever? I mean, there is this language, I gather, in the statement --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, this treaty proposal is not related whatsoever to our legislative proposals here, although we are going to continue to pursue those and we do need to modernize that aspect of our deterrent. But, no, putting a treaty on the table in Geneva -- we're not doing that in order to effect the votes of Congress here.

We think that the proposal for a modest deterrent stands on its own merits and should be judged on its own merits.

Q You can't find out for us fairly readily what request the United -- the administration has pending on this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. If you want, I'll make a phone call.

Q That'd be great.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q How many treaties --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: My colleague probably knows.

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Q -- is the U.S. engaged in?

Q You know, right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- asking for production funds for -- the funds that were denied last year.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But I don't know --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know what the number is exactly. It's in the forties. Forty or fifty.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Forty, fifty, sixty maybe? Somewhere --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- bomb and -- artillery --

Q How many bans have we been involved in since World War I on this stuff? Haven't we been outlawed through the years in different forums?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, since 1925 and -- I think -- and so forth. There's a history of it in this set of remarks as to where we've been in the past --

Q But there are no -- treaties?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are a number of international agreements that effect this; but -- and I think they're spelled out in there; but --

Q There's was one in the Nixon administration, wasn't there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's nothing of the nature that we're proposing.

Q How come there's no contact with the Soviets and the President's announcing -- It seems to smack of this type of public diplomacy -- of public relations diplomacy we say generally isn't a good idea --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't mean to say that there's no contact with the Soviets. We're in contact with them on a lot of things and we certainly have --

Q -- specific proposal.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- made it -- they are aware from Stockholm to now that we intend to table a treaty. I just mean that our approach to them would be through the 40-nation committee, rather than through some bilateral approach.

Q When did the President decide to announce his intent -- send Bush to Geneva -- Do you know?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Within the last few days. Within the last few days.

Q Why was it decided to announce it at the press conference?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think he wanted to -- I think he considered it important and wanted to give it as much attention as possible.

Q And not in the speech on Friday, for instance?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the speech on Friday will be much more of an overview on the rationale for

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policy, the objective of our foreign policy, the things that are needed, particularly in the relationship with Congress in a bipartisan approach to achieve our objectives. We all have goals that we agree to; but when it gets down to specific proposals to achieve those goals, we have not been able to see the kind of bipartisan approach that the President thinks we need. So I think you'll find that that speech is short of specific newsworthy proposals or announcements. At least if there are any in it, I haven't spotted them yet. I don't want to discourage you from covering the speech; but it is more of a -- theoretical and philosophical and thematic, rather than specific in announcements.

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Q Is your proposal to negotiate -- I mean, you're tabling the treaty at the Committee on Disarmament. Is it your intention to continue to pursue a treaty through that form or to break off into bilateral negotiations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we would -- we would intend to continue through that.

Q The only new thing here is the verification procedures?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What's new is the worldwide ban proposal and what makes it possible is that we have -- we will propose verification procedures that we would think would make the treaty worthwhile.

Q Wouldn't it be possible to get -- I mean, we're going to have to scramble around now to try to get other people to tell us a little bit about what has been agreed to in the verification area.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right.

Q Wouldn't it make more sense to try to get that information to us in some simple way now? And also, there are a lot of questions -- I mean, the Soviets made a statement about on-site inspection that was generally welcomed by the US I think at about the time of Bush's visit to Moscow. So there's some history here, and if we don't know -- I mean, is this the story of the two guys coming together and converging on a position? Just, is it possible to answer any of the important questions -- where we stand now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think it's -- you're asking me to say what the Soviet response will be, and I'm not sure that we --

Q No, no.

Q No, I'm not asking that. I'm asking if somebody could give us a brief, simple summary of what's in the verification proposal in the treaty that will be tabled, and talk about how that fits with the current Soviet position.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that's the -- unfortunately, I looked in to the possibility of doing that for you and I'm just not going to be able to do that. I know that many of you with your skills and sources will find out. But I'm not going to be able to go into that.

Q Why isn't -- aren't you or the administration prepared to tell us what these bold and sound verification procedures are? That seems to be what's new --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we are prepared to tell you when we table the treaty, but we're not prepared to tell you tonight. I mean, it just -- in the view of those who are conducting the diplomacy, it is one thing to tell you that we're going to have a treaty and propose certain things, and another thing to make public the treaty before we go to the table and present it to the diplomatic --

Q You seem to be going halfway there, though, and just withholding the new part.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I would if I could.

Q And it's on background.

Q Well, did we believe the Soviets when they said they are proposing on-site?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, in a number of -- you know, from what Ambassador Goodby said the other day as far as what

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they said about their willingness to have confidence-building measures that would go not just a short way into the Soviet Union, but to the Urals, and what they've said about inspections as far as chemical weapons in Europe are concerned is encouraging.

Q What did they say? What specifically did they say?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't -- I don't have the history of exactly what they said.

Q That was said at Stockholm by the Soviets?

Q I think it was right around --

Q Goodby said something about it.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't -- no, I think it was before that. But I don't --

Q But is Ambassador Goodby involved in this? I don't understand.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He's not involved in -- I was making a point that there seems to be some change in the Soviet's at least declaratory policy about on-site verification.

Q The question is whether you're taking the Soviet proposal and accepting it but widening it on a global basis.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think we would consider this our proposal. We'll have to see what points of agreement there are.

Now, you have just about exhausted my wealth of knowledge on this, and if my colleague can tell anymore about the Vice President's plans -- do you have any --

Q Will he be taking the dog with him? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We don't really have specific plans yet. He'll give a speech.

Q Who will be President when both he and the Vice -- the President and Vice President are out of town -- out of the country?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President will be in the country on the 17th and 18th. In fact, he'll be in --

Q He'll be in Santa Barbara.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He'll be in Washington on the 17th and 18th. We wouldn't leave anyone else in charge.

THE PRESS: Thank you very much.

END 4:40 P.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
New York, New York

BACKGROUND BRIEFING BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ON THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS TO THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP FORUM

April 5, 1984

Savoy Room
The Plaza Hotel

4:35 P.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I thought I would say just a few things and then take your questions. It might be useful at the outset to talk about why the President is giving this speech tomorrow. You will recall that the setting is the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies and a seminar convened to address the issue of bipartisanship. The President will treat that in his remarks, remarks which, in sum, provide a foundation of President Reagan's national security policy,foundation in the sense of addressing the nature of the world in which we live in broad terms, the interests that we have overseas, principles which guide his administration in pursuing our interests, threats to those interests, and specific policies that we believe will be effective in addressing four separate challenges.

Well, why give a foundation speech? In sum, the President believes that it is a responsibility of every President to try to illuminate for the American people the nature of the world in their time, to give them a reason for understanding why an isolationist policy is not possible for the United States, and to go beyond explaining why they should care, if you will, about matters beyond our shores to what is the nature of the world, what are the threats we face, what should our interests be, and how should we defend them.

The President believes that that is part of his stewardship and everyone else's, because there is, frankly, still a very enduring isolationist sentiment among the American people. While there is a subconscious understanding that oceans no longer separate us from conflict as they have a generation ago, there's still a lack of full appreciation as to why we cannot avoid foreign intrigues. There's a fairly fragmented community of opinion on this issue.

There is a growing number of people that understand that we need resources overseas. While we were a self-reliant nation for much of our history, we need resources, not only stragetic resources, but simple goods for manufacturers that we simply don't have in this country. In addition, a growing community of people understand we need markets overseas to sell our products and that this helps us.

There is a smaller community but, we hope, growing that also cares about the condition of the world in political terms, that understands that American interests are served by having more democracies overseas and by having free-enterprise systems in which the welfare of the world at large gradually improves. Well, all these are kind of, as I said, foundation concepts,

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one could say not of particular news interest, and that is true. But a President owes it to the American people to set forth certain fundamentals in broad terms and then to follow it up, and I expect there will be follow-up, with specific focus treatment of regional and functional policy,the Middle East, Central America, arms reduction, international economics, and so forth. So this is the core from which later will be derived the specific focus treatment.

The most fundamental issue of concern to Americans is how do you keep the peace and, indeed, that is, at the outset of the speech what the President takes on. He asserts that our fundamental goals are a safer world and a climate in which American values can prosper. He asserts that the way that [illegible] peace is kept is through assuring that there will be effective deterrents in the military context, deterrents of worst-case or strategic nuclear attack by maintaining modern ready forces, and deterrents of low-order conflict by modernization and assurance of ready conventional forces, but that that is not enough; we must also have ways in which to reduce tensions in the world.

Specifically, we must seek arms reductions and we must have policies designed to prevent violence by assuring that there will -- that we can remove or relieve the conditions in which violence prospers.

Economic growth: The President deals right at the outset, and your fact sheet reflects it, with the principles that guide him and have in shaping policies to deal with the several challenges we face. And the eight principles listed in your fact sheets are well known and I won't dwell on them. I thought it useful to note that when we talk about realism, for example, the President's intention there is to state that he doesn't believe that we can afford to mirror-image our adversaries, to impute to the Soviet Union values that we have here at home, to expect them to perform as we do to reach decisions based upon an eleetorate that espouses the same values.

The other elements or the other principles are recurrent in the President's remarks throughout his administration· strength and the need to restore the foundation of deterrence in military terms economic strength, policies that are designed to assure economic growth, that is, a free and open trading system, a sound international financial community; intelligence, that is, knowing what is going on in the world, sharing the burden with allies, both in financial terms as well as in collective security commitments; NATO, our relationships with friends in Asia, the Middle East, South America· non-aggression, that is, that we will not start wars, we seek no territorial ambition, we will not occupy other countries; dialogue toward the resolution of disagreements between ourselves and our adversaries, notably the Soviet Union; across the spectrum of our interests from arms control, bilateral issues, regional issues, and human rights and, finally, bipartisanship at home, a quality without which we can never fully succeed in our foreign pursuits and which has been on the decline since the Vietnam war and Watergate.

The challenges open with identification of the imperative of reducing the level of nuclear weapons. The President believes strongly that arms control is our highest priority, that it can

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only succeed, however, if we go about it sensibly and without illusions that unilateral disarmament can work. That indeed, in order to succeed, you must have something to trade. And that was the basis for his strategic modernization program the first years.

He treats in detail his arms control program right now; his commitment to START and to a reduction in the level of warheads; the destructive power of systems in INF, an equal outcome of equal warheads between ourselves and the Soviet Union at intermediate ranges; in MBFR, a reduction to equal levels of conventional forces in Europe. He references as well the need to improve channels of communication and establish greater confidence between ourselves and the Soviet Union against misinterpretation of what we're doing. By that we mean things like hot-line improvements, better discourse between our militaries, prenotification of exercises, prenotification of missile launches, and things designed to avoid the possibility of accident or miscalculation.

He mentions as well the need to get on with negotiations on the reduction of chemical weapons, and announced last evening his intention to send the Vice President on April 17th to Geneva to present a treaty calling for a ban on production, stockpiling, transfer or use of chemical weapons.

In each of the challenges the format the President takes, if it escapes you from the fact sheet, is to say what the policy is andto say how the Congress can help. It doesn't leap out at you, but in this particular area, for example, in saying how we should go about dealing with arms reduction. Implicit in that are several things the Congress can do.

First of all, to avoid simplistic politically-oriented solutions -- such as a freeze. Appealing on the surface, but having many flaws to it, notably the difficulty in verification, the delay it would engender in reaching real reductions if we took time to negotiate a freeze, which would surely be as complex as START and INF already are.

Secondly, the need that they resist cuts in our deterrent capability because of the harm that this does to our arms control position. For if you have nothing to negotiate with, there is no reason for the Soviets to negotiate. In addition, it would be useful if the Congress could avoid the impulse toward urging preemptive concessions to the other side, borne of the illusion that if we set the example, perhaps the Soviets will follow suit and we will see reciprocity. Historically, the President believes, that has not been borne out. He often cites President Carter's well-meaning cancellation of the B-1 bomber, which was not reciprocated by the other side. Similarly, our capping our land-based missiles in the late sixties, perhaps in the expectation there would be a reciprocal gesture by the Russians. They exceeded our levels, and went beyond then by about 50 percent.

However, some things do work. And here the President refers to the ABM experience, where we had tried, for some years, to get the Russians to come to the table -- but, we had no program. We had no ABM system. And it wasn't until the Congress approved the ABM that we got the Russians to negotiate, concluded a treaty, and it's on the books, and we have no ABM. In short, unilateral disarmament doesn't work. Readiness to keep the balance has, historically.

The President turns, then, to a second challenge which is regional stability, and how we preserve it. His identification of this challenge expresses his view that in the nuclear age it is not nuclear conflict that we must be most concerned about. Indeed, it is

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greater likelihood of low-order conflict and of Soviet efforts to expand their influence through the traditional means of subversion, fueling insurgencies, outright aggression, or terrorism.

The President believes that there are answers to these problems and he discusses them briefly. They are basically to mix in various parts, in different parts of the world economic assistance, security assistance so that people can defend themselves and avoid the need for American forces, and diplomatic mediation. The President then goes through several regions of the world and identifies the policies that he has prescribed for solving the problems in each. In Central America he focuses upon the Bipartisan Commission's proposals, which are heavily oriented in a 7-1 ratio toward dealing with economic and social problems. The President stresses that development, investment, and growth cannot take place without a threshold of security behind which all of this can prosper. And for that to happen, we must contribute security assistance to these countries so that they can defend themselves, restore stability, and provide a climate in which investment and all of these other development schemes can take hold.

With regard to Southern Africa, he acknowledges that here our policies have been low-key diplomatic mediation which is beginning to show some result. This is also a documentation, in the President's judgment, of the realization by many developing countries, after 20 years of experimentation with socialism, that it is not working very well. We've seen Mozambique begin to turn away from the Soviet model, to seek assistance from the West, and restore a more stable relationship with its own neighbors to turn away from subversion.

The President also acknowledges that security is essential in developing countries to avoid the risks of proliferation, for it is only when states feel insecure and threatened when they resort to investments in nuclear weaponry. His call two years ago for comprehensive nuclear safeguards among supplier states, which will lead to a conference later this year, is his answer.

He deals with the Middle East and focuses upon the Iran-Iraq conflict and reaffirms his commitment to assure the flow of commerce through the Gulf and reaffirms his commitment to renewed effort to promote his September, 1982 peace plan for the Middle East. In this challenge he refers to what the Congress can do in several areas, first of all, by providing the tools of economic assistance and security assistance in full measure. The Congress has historically short-changed these programs, believing they could have it both ways, that is, that you could avoid a label of disinterest or of undermining the policy if you simply didn't give quite enough but, in point of fact, we're in a competitive time where the Soviet Union's security assistance in many of the same areas, and its determination to subvert basically pro-Western regimes, requires that we at least do enough to deter that and, over time, to rid these countries of the foreign influence.

So that these countries can develop, the President says the second thing the Congress can do is to avoid protectionism, which is self-defeating in terms of U.S. exports as well as any hope that these countries can take off from primary products and into developing manufactured, semi-finished goods. He refers to the CBI, to the National Bipartisan Commission recommendations

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for the five-year, $8 billion program as essential in full measure, and calls for the Congress to support it fully.

The President also refers to the requirement for restoring bipartisanship across the board if we are to succeed in arms control in providing the resources and staying power to establish regional security and economic development. He thinks that this is not a matter in which the Congress should cede responsibility and stay hands-off; indeed, they have a terribly important role to play. But it is one in which, if there is to be a -- an effective U.S. foreign policy, the squabbling between or among 535 Members has to come to a stop. And this can only happen through Congressional leadership joined by a more active, consultative process between the Executive Branch and the Congress. The President acknowledges the need that we have to have both a strong Congress and a strong Presidency, and commits himself to improved cooperation and consultation with the Congress; listening to their views and then forming policy. But, once it is formed, calling upon the Congress for its solid support of it.

He refers, in passing, to our history -- most recently in Lebanon, where Congressional misgivings, second-guessing, was surely a basis for encouragement overseas, and perhaps, contributed to Syrian entransigence seeing, as they may have, that they could wait us out -- for Congressional pressure would lead us to leave, over time.

He refers again to the need, in the Central American context, for the Congress to provide the full measure of support proposed by the bipartisan commission.

In the coming year, we will have a number of tests of the United States' staying power. In the arms control context, it will surface in the form of whether we can maintain our weapons modernization -- Trident, B-1, MX. It will surface in the regional context in whether we can achieve enactment of the bipartisan -- National Bipartisan Commission -- the Kissinger Commission's program. It will surface in the context of the International Monetary Fund and sustaining our commitments to it. And it may surface in the context of supporting United States deterrents and military application of power, should it be called for, to deal with terrorism or regional conflict.

The President pledges his own best efforts to deal with the Congress constructively on these -- to forge a policy that serves our interest and expresses his confidence that we can do this.

I'll be glad to take your questions. John?

Q In a campaign year, to -- to say all of these things, and certainly they're restatements of policy and certainly important things, but to shift the onus on Congress and say it's been Congress's fault that we failed in Lebanon, and it's Congress that's going to fail us, if we fail in Central America. It's our policies that are good, solid policies, but it's Congress's fault. Aren't you opening yourself up to a lot of campaign year political charges that, you know, you haven't been able to come through in these areas, so now it's time to tell the American people it's Congress's fault?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think to the extent that the President and I discussed this speech for quite a long time, then either I have failed, or something has gone wrong if that comes across as the central message of the speech. The President does not intend, nor did any of us, first to say the Congress is to blame for what has happened or what might or might not in the future. He does feel that we need to

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restore a practice of consultation and of removing foreign policy from ex post second guessing, that there must be a very solid, active, consultative process leading up to the policy formation and that provides for disagreement. And we expect that.

So it isn't to try to ascribe blame in the past, nor to anticipate it in the future. It's to call for an evolution, really.

Yes.

Q If the President, by some reason, happens to be wrong in a foreign policy initiative, isn't it also part of the system that the other party calls him to account? I mean, he could be wrong somewhere, couldn't he?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's possible. (Laughter.)

Q Who's going to say -- I mean, isn't it the role of the Democrats in this case to say, here's where you've gone wrong and we'll do better? It sounds from what you said at the end of your opening that that's second guessing and out of the ball park, out of bounds.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it is a matter of both process and motive. In process, I mean that, of course, members and Senators should be encouraged to disagree in the formative -- in formation stages. That they should be heard and the President ought not only to listen, but to take into account and apply what they say before he reaches a policy decision.

It is, as well, to say that once that policy is formed, that it can seriously undermine its hope of success if there is a continuing repetition of this earlier disagreement.

Now, getting to your point -- what if they still don't think it's the right thing to do? Historically, we have had disagreement and we have had members in their private correspondence and at meetings to say and express their serious misgivings, particularly where it involves the possible loss of life of Americans. But if it is allowed to be accepted that criticism, for other motives, criticism on issues which have been decided and do not, in the first instance, involve the risk of Americans, but involve criticism for narrow, regional, ethnic, economic, sectorial preference, then they damage the national interest. And that those can all be taken into account before you reach your policy decision.

Q Well, when is this -- in your view, when does that policy become made? When the President enunciates it or when Congress has paid for it? I mean, are we clear at all that some policies have been, in fact, made and then second-guessed before the process had been completed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, surely, it isn't a viable and sustainable policy until the Congress has appropriated the money for it.

Q So what do you have in mind? I mean, where a -- in Lebanon, where a policy had been made --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, again, I'm saying that this entire speech is not issue specific. It is a foundation speech. It's one that talks to principle. But it is not his purpose to grind axes about this or that regional or functional problem in the past, but to kind of set out a preference or ground rules.

Yes.

Q I recall Ronald Reagan long before he was President, and even up right until he was President, being very critical of foreign policy -- the Panama Canal, SALT treaties. How do you square back his position then with his position now that we shouldn't have -- we should have bipartisanship?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, to begin with, I think there's been a certain evolution in his thinking. (Laughter.) And I don't apologize for that. I think Presidents realize a certain

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condition and effect of partisan political debate.

I think that it's important to point out that -- I know of no instance in which the United States was engaged in the use of military force, in which there were Americans at risk, in which the President has ever been a critic of administration policy.

Q He questioned the Iranian rescue mission.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not until it was over.

Q Well, that's not exactly falling in line, is it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What's your point?

Q Well, that's my point. He questioned it and American lives were at stake and, in fact, lost.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: American lives, after the fact, were not at stake. And the fact that the government formed a --

Q It failed. The Americans were still being held there. They were still at stake.

Q It was after the rescue mission that he --

Q He criticized it.

Q He criticized it during the general election campaign.

Q Sure. They were still there.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That doesn't have any effect on the risk at which Americans are under those -- in Iran. In other words, it's one thing to say that before the mission is launched the President stands up the day before the helicopters go in, says, "I don't agree with this." That's wrong in his judgment. When a policy has gone -- and we may face the same situation in other circumstances in the future -- it is sensible to comment upon it.

Q You say the speech is not issue-specific, but he does defend his policy and reiterate his policy on the whole bargaining chip concept which he's used over and over again, that is the military buildup must go on, the Pershing and cruises must go in in order to make the Soviets negotiate seriously. Well, all that's been done for years and the Pershings and cruises are in and the Soviets are boycotting both major negotiations. What is the wisdom in just reiterating that when, clearly, the Soviets have not behaved the way he predicted they would behave?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The deployment of the Pershings was defended and promoted both because the military balance required it -- that is, the Soviets had a monopoly and we had zero -- as well as the proposition that you mentioned that it -- only then could you expect them to negotiate seriously.

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Now, the fact that the Soviets have chosen not to negotiate doesn't alter the validity of the principle. Historically, the Soviets have only negotiated when there has been something to gain from their side. And if we have no systems at all, there is no reason for them to negotiate. So, to reiterate, a valid principle for conducting arms controls is a sensible, again, foundation kind of thing to do. Maybe I miss your point.

Q Well, my point was a little broader than just the Pershing and cruises; but certainly one premise that he based the military buildup on, going back to the '80 campaign, was that this was the way to get the Soviets to behave reasonably in negotiations. It appears to have had the opposite effect, the Soviets, if anything right now, are flexing their muscles and bumping into our aircraft carriers, etc., etc. There has been no analogous reaction now as there was to a Congressional vote for the ABM 10 or 12 years ago.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that's a very good point. And I think I'm going to take it head-on. Are things any better or not because of Reagan's policy? Well, you can draw your conclusions. But let me assert that, first of all -- and he says it in the speech -- five years ago, we were not deterring and now we are. I think that's a measure of whether or not the policy is sensible.

Now, one can point to places where the Soviets are negotiating; but more importantly, when one reviews from 1970 to '80 the history from Angola to Ethiopia to Indo-China to Afghanistan, South Yemen and stops and considers that that has stopped, I think that you've got to deal with that, that deterrence has improved.

Now, your point is correct, that they have not come back to the table in Geneva. I don't think that one can entirely assume that, with all that's going on in the Soviet Union, and three leaders in four years, and the very evident [illegible] --

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policy that they've pursued in the past four years of seeking to separate us from our allies, and that having been set back -- hasn't entered into their decision process. And the reality that the incentive represented by the modernization program must, indeed, be unavoidable for the Soviet Union, and give the Soviet military a real interest in coming to terms to restrain those programs, has a logic to it, and it has an historical corroboration to it that I think's difficult to dispute.

Q It seems to me that it would be fair for us to conclude from what you've been saying, that once a foreign policy has been set, such as the sending of troops to Lebanon or the build-up for a bargaining chip, and once the Congress has agreed, that open dissent and debate among the American people -- sections of the American people, ethnic groups of the American people, as reflected through the Congress -- should then cease.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think, first of all, let's treat situations in which Americans are at risk and call it "all others." I think that where Americans are at risk, and their lives at stake, and the policy has come after the discourse between the President and the Congress, and -- being attentive to popular opinion as well -- and that Americans are vulnerable, that Congressional concerns can continue to be expressed. But if -- but there are ways for them to be expressed: In meetings with the President, in correspondence to the President, in caucuses, and in private where there is -- which is quite different from seeking resolutions and seeking to assert a fundamental change in policy before it has had an opportunity to play out. Now there is clearly, a requirement for judgment and sensitivity on the part of the Congress and the President. This is not to say that for a matter of years and years a President should be able to pursue a policy that is clearly failing. But, it is to say that when that has -- that point has not been reach, to publicly -- and without reference to the President -- call for a change in the policy, can place Americans at greater risk, and is inappropriate.

In the back.

Q So my conclusion -- the conclusion that I'm drawing, then, is fairly accurate then. That such open debate -- either in the Congress or among the American people--if the administration believes that Americans are at risk, or even if Americans are at risk, such debate shall be in private. Open debate shall cease.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I didn't say that at at all, Saul. You're saying a fundamentally different thing than I'm saying. I've said that full and open debate and criticism is fine before the decision. Full and private criticism is fine after that. And, indeed, because that is to be encouraged, and once it is evoked in sufficient volume to the President, he will probably change his policy because he, too, is reaching the same conclusions. It can produce the same outcome.

Q Are you saying -- full and private debate after the decision is reached? Full and private debate?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q I'm unclear how Congress forced the President to withdraw the Marines from Lebanon. The War Powers Resolution under which he was operating was still in effect at the time that the decision was made to withdraw them very suddenly.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, okay, let me point out again here that, what appears to be, I think, created as a purpose of this speech, and was surely not the President's intention in crafting it. I don't want to encourage -- if you want to ask an academic question, then I'll be glad to answer it. But, the point of the President in giving the speech is not to ascribe a responsibility for what happened in Lebanon.

It is to call for and encourage a closer working relationship with the Congress. Now on your question, in point, the very public and shrill calls for a change in policy by members, Senators, leaders, at a time when the policy had not yet proven wrong could have been interpreted by the other side to show an inability to sustain the policy and to encourage a policy of delay and obstructionism and to make clear that there were very apparent limits, both in time and in substance, to what that policy would contain, that's all.

Q But at the time that the troops were withdrawn, the President could have maintained his policy at some political cost to himself. Isn't it somewhat disingenious to claim that Congress forced his hand when he was unwilling, apparently, to pay that cost?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, again, the President is not saying that the policy loss was suffered as a consequence of Congressional actions. He is saying that it contributed but the point of that is not to lay it off on the Congress; the point is to say that in the future we have to have a better relationship.

Q Well, last night he was pretty strong in saying that Congress contributed heavily to this, to this failure in Lebanon. He was pretty clear on that.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, to say that it has contributed and to say that it was responsible are very, very different, though, John.

Q But he also says in the background sheet that second-guessing severely undermined the policy and, indeed, where we have found it in regional stabilization, it has been because Congress has failed to provide support. Is that blaming them or is that just giving them part of the responsibility?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it is making a generic reference to what -- to a recurring phenomenon historically. It is not to say that every time something hasn't worked that the Congress is to blame for it, but it says that as a matter of principal that can be the effect, if Congress doesn't provide the resources.

Q But where's the olive branch in this? I mean, his language last night, which you may not think is related to this, but it certainly appears to be connected, was very tough at the Congress. Is he admitting some blame himself for not having consulted them fully in advance of other policy decisions that proved unpopular, or what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The text of the speech includes quite a lot of treatment of the responsibility of the President to reach out and solicit Congressional advice, to take it into account before he reaches decisions, to consult carefully with the leadership and, over time, before and after the policy is formed, to continue to invite Congressional criticism, so it may be in the crafting of the fact sheet, but the purpose -- again -- would have been as well served by leaving out, I guess, any reference at all to Lebanon or to Central America, because the President's point is not a point of issue-specific criticism; it is a matter of trying to engender future bipartisan support to which he commits himself.

Q In that context, does he directly question in any way the wisdom of the War Powers Resolution in his speech? For instance, does he call for a Supreme Court test or anything like that? Does he bring it up directly, the War Powers Resolution?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, he doesn't. Yes?

Q The President's remarks on the Iran-Iraq war and his 1982 Middle East plan, which you mentioned, are not referred to

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in the fact sheet. I am just wondering if the President will deal with other major issues which have not been mentioned in the fact sheet?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q -- that you'll brief us on?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, the regional and functional issues that are in the speech I have treated and there are no others. Yes?

Q You said in the coming year the President is going to need Congressional support if U.S. deterrence and military application of power should be needed against terrorism, and then went on to indicate that the President is willing to set up what sounded like a framework for how to act. Do you have something specific in mind that makes you think you might be called upon to apply military power, and what sort of thing -- do you want some kind of advance permission from Congress to do what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I'm surprised by the question. All that's intended in what I said and what's in the speech is to say that as a recurring

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possibility that Congressional support for a decision to use force, were it to occur, and we do not expect it -- we have no particular expectation that it's going to happen -- it's just that, as a generic policy action, should that happen, that Congressional support is essential. That implies, or is intended to imply, as much a Presidential responsibility to, before the fact, consult with the Congress, get their advice, take it into account, as it does a Congressional ex-post responsibility to stand behind.

Now, in the way of frameworks, I didn't intend, nor does he, anything more than to say that he commits to a habit and a practice of close consultation and this calls for the same thing on the part of the Congress.

Q So, you're saying that the President would be willing to consult with the Congress before applying military power -- against terrorism?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Of course.

Q Is the overall tone here more conciliatory? I mean, it's hard to tell from the fact sheet, but -- and from our conversation here, it seems as though Congress may take offense at some of this. Is the overall tone more conciliatory than we're being led to believe, or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I certainly read it that way, and that's why I'm obviously puzzled by the reaction. But, yes, the President -- first of all, in talking with me before the fact, and -- you can lay it off on me, if you wish -- because he said that, after talking through the several challenges that we face, he said, well, you know, it is important that we try to advance a little bit more the concept of bipartisanship. And let's do that. And let's make clear that we want to establish a better working relationship with the Congress. And that this has several applications in arms control, in regional policy, in economic policy -- and let's touch on those. And that's what we've done, but it was not at all designed as a vehicle, or a tract against the Congress. And it isn't that.

Q You said earlier that criticism of policy, once policy is agreed upon, should be limited to full and private criticism. Given the fact that events change rapidly in this world, and given the fact that Members of the House are re-elected every two years, and given the fact that it takes public debate and a public vote to change policy -- how is the constitutional system going to work under your scenario?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, let's be clear. What I said was that in circumstances where American lives are at risk. That's fairly narrow. However, in the course of everybody's term of office, they can, if from day one, they disagree -- whether writing a letter a day, or exercising their personal judgments through their own leadership, or in meetings with the President, or whatever, collectively have quite a substantial effect upon the President's thinking.

Q Is that what happened in Lebanon?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think that in Lebanon there was a less willingness to deal in a deliberate, private fashion, and a greater impulse toward spontaneous comment about it.

Q They voted to give him eighteen months to keep them there -- keep the Marines there.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not after the Marines were bombed. Yes?

Q They did -- a little bit, though. Prior to the bombing, as I recall, the administration backed away from any

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discussion, or suggestion, that the Marines were, in fact, at risk. And that it wasn't until the bombing, or when a number of the Marines were killed, at which point the administration conceded then that under the terms of the War Powers Act, the Marines were, in fact, at risk; and the War Powers Act, under the most strict application could then be brought into effect? So, don't we come head-onto the political application of such things as -- when American troops are at risk? I mean, it's the same kind of a deal. You can say Marines are or were at risk after the bombing, but up until then, the administration insisted that they were not, at least under the terms of the War Powers Act.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think you have a valid point. I think that part of the ambiguity that does exist here is

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because we are dealing, we, and the Congress, with a new phenomenon that is complicated and difficult to deal with -- terrorism -- that the natural impulse of Congressmen, of the public at large, whenever violence occurs is to back away form it. And that's a natural impulse. But what we must achieve -- and it's a responsibility of ours, it is not something we're blaming somebody for -- is an understanding that to back away, to not consider the implications of that, for encouraging that very thing to happen again, is something that we simply have not yet done.

We think that we can foster, over time and discourse with the Congress, an understanding of what is sensible policy for dealing with these things and get Congressional support for it.

I don't know if that quite goes to your question, but it wasn't, and it isn't in his speech, intended to be a passing of blame or anything of that kind. It is to evoke and to pledge a mutual commitment to improving this process in the months and years ahead.

In the back.

MR. SIMS: In the interest of getting the pool members over to the Plaza, how about one more question.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In the back.

Q Yes. How close did your private debates come in getting Robert Goodman out of Syria?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I miss your point. What is your point?

Q Well, the question is, how close did private discussions, private debates come in getting Robert Goodman out of Syria?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Are you talking about Congressional and Presidential private debates?

Q Within the administration.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, if your question is, were we trying diplomatically to secure his release -- yes, of course. Had we? No, we hadn't.

Maybe I miss your point. If it involves a Congressional issue -- we weren't -- as far as I know, we weren't getting any proposals from the Congress. But maybe I don't understand your question.

Q That's okay.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you.

END 5:29 P.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO CHINA

April 6, 1984

Room 450
Old Executive Office Building

11:10 A.M. EST

MR. SIMS: This briefing is on background attributable to a senior administration official. He will talk about our commercial relations with the People's Republic of China. There are three handouts here for your edification at the end of the briefing. Feel free to take them.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you very much.

I will bow to the Girl's Basketball Team any day of the year. But I'm happy to be here. One of these handouts here we actually sell for $5.00. (Laughter.) So just leave your money there in the cup. But it is a brand new publication that we put out that we are really quite proud of here called, "Doing Business With China", and it's about 55, 60 pages, and is really quite first-rate, I must say.

Let me just make a few introductory remarks and then we can go to what's on your mind.

First, I want to talk a little bit about 1983 be - cause I think it sets a good foundation for 1984 here in terms of problems and prospects in U.S.-China trade. 1983, as many of you know, was a year of very high drama in U.S.-China relations, and a time of serious trouble in U.S.-China trade. The value of two-way trade continued to decline from 1981's historic high, which was $5.5 billion down to $4.4 billion.

Q Four point?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: $4.4 billion.

The reason for that is that U.S. agricultural exports declined about 64 percent compared to 1982. And I'll give you that later on. U.S. exports of manufacturers increased by 14 percent. But they obviously failed to compensate for the drop in agricultural exports.

Meanwhile, Chinese exports to this country remained steady and so, for the first time, the United States suffered a $71 million deficit in its trade, the first since 1977.

Now, the year began in an atmosphere of gathering crisis and with repeated Chinese lecturing about the number of dark clouds on our commercial horizon. If I had a dime for every time the Chinese told me about a dark cloud, I'd be a millionaire. The trade issues have become heavily politicized and have replaced Taiwan as the principal irritant in our relationship.

The major problems were two, export controls and textiles. And we feel like the history of the past year is the story really of our efforts to deal with those two problems. First of all, textiles -- following the expiration of the U.S.-China Textile Agreement and a breakdown of negotiations in January of 1983, the U.S. instituted unilateral import controls on Chinese textiles. Beijing immediately retaliated by barring further contracts for U.S. synthetic fiber, soybeans, and cotton, and they announced a reduction in the planned purchases of

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U.S. agricultural products. In fact, what happened was the Chinese simply stopped buying American grain. And they did not resume buying American grain until a new textile accord was reached in July.

The U.S. textile industry, as many of you know, disagreed with the terms of the agreement that we signed with China, and the industry, as a result, filed a countervailing duty suit claiming that China's duel export exchange rate conferred a subsidy on its textile exports. Now, this was an exceedingly interesting case. It was the first of its kind against a non-market economy. And it threatened to result in a 40 percent duty on Chinese textiles and ultimately, on all Chinese products. This is pretty serious business because about 40 percent of Chinese exports to the U.S. are in textiles. So, in other words, in our view, it represented a mortal threat to U.S.-China trade.

Beijing responded with extreme concern and a refusal to cooperate with the Commerce Department's investigation. And it appeared, as I -- not to put too fine a point on it -- that the future of our commercial relationship with China was at stake. Fortunately, in some respects, when the parties stood eyeball to eyeball, it was the U.S. textile industry that was the first one to blink -- it withdrew the petition in return for this administration's promise to provide additional protection against market disruption from textile imports worldwide. So it took it out of the U.S.-China problem and made it a global issue.

Q When was that withdrawn?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was withdrawn -- let's see here -- December, December 16th, I believe.

Q December, '83?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, sir, December, '83.

The Chinese reacted to the countervailing duty case by again stopping their purchase of U.S. grain and by the end of last year, by the end of 1983, they had fallen about 2 million tons short of the 6 million tons that was required under our bilateral grain agreement.

Q The 6 million was for one year?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Six million for one year. And they bought about 4 in '83, so they were 2 million tons short.

Now, the second major issue was export controls. Despite this administration's best efforts, the year began with export control licenses for China still similar to some problems that we experienced with other countries. The formula, roughly, was that we agreed to license technology to the People's Republic of China at roughly double the level of technology that we authorized to the Warsaw Pact countries.

Q You're talking '83 now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, sir.

Q Okay.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: '83. Those were the guidelines. We found this very hard to implement because, frankly, there was an awful lot of stuff that we didn't license to the Soviet Union, so if you multiply two times zero, you get zero. And as a result, it was pretty hard to implement this policy in many respects.

There's also another problem -- that it's very difficult to take the general prose statement and try to translate that into technical guidelines comprehensible to a licensing officer in the Defense Department or the Commerce Department. So there was some understandable confusion here.

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U.S. businessmen complained and the Chinese raised this issue of export controls to a cause celebre in our bilateral relations. Premier Zhao Ziyang told Secretary Shultz over a year ago in Beijing -- if you remember that trip that the Secretary took -- that the U.S. -- that China regarded U.S. policy on this issue as a test of whether we considered China as a friend or a foe. The issue was taken to the President, and when Secretary Baldridge made his trip to China in May of last year, he was able to tell the Premier that the President had decided to move China into the category of friendly countries.

The new guidelines implementing the President's decision were published in November of 1983, last year. And American businessmen and the Chinese have responded with enormous satisfaction at this and the rush of new license applications.

Now, the importance of the change -- and the reason I'm spending a little bit of time on this -- in our export control policy transcended, obviously, its commercial implications. It's been repeatedly noted by the Chinese leaders as the turning point in U.S.-China relations. And it made possible Secretary Weinberger's trip to China in the fall of last year,

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Foreign Minister Wu from China's trip to the U.S in the fall of last year made possible the talks, in our view, on nuclear cooperation and made possible Premier Zhao Ziyang's visit to Washington in January of this year and the invitation to the President for his trip to China in three weeks.

So, where do we stand now? A lot of these dark clouds here have been removed, replaced by the warm glow of Premier Zhao Ziyang's visit here to Washington and the expectations that we have for the President's trip in three weeks.

Why has this turned around? Why do we think that the realization of the commercial is at hand in our relationship? And I think one of the reasons why is because there is a natural complimentarity in our two economies. Ahd let me be specific about that.

The Chinese have put particular stress in three major areas -- in energy, transportation and in telecommunication sectors. Let me be even more specific here. It's my own view, shared by, I think, many in the U.S.-China trade, that we are on the eve of a whole new phase in our economic, commercial and trade relations with China. And the reason for this can be summed up in four words: oil, hydropower, coal and nuclear power.

First of all, oil. China has what is regarded as one of the last great commercial reserves of oil in the world offshore in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. Last year, eleven American firms signed reduction-sharing contracts to start drilling on that oil. And I think it's safe to say that in the next five to seve years we will see U.S. investment in the offshore oil alone amounting to somewhere between $10 billion to $15 billion -- and that could be on the conservative side -- in assisting China to develop in its exploration, production and development of this offshore oil.

Now, we're talking about megabucks. We're talking about things here that simply dwarf what we've been talking about before in the U.S.-China trade.

Secondly, in coal. China has the second largest reserves of coal in the world. And the interesting thing about this coal is that it's found near the surface -- in open-pit, surface coal mining. Those are the kinds of mine techniques in which U.S. industry is superb in. You saw an article today perhaps in the paper, The Wall Street Journal, on page 33 about Occidental signing an agreement with the Chinese to develop Pingshuo Coal Mine which will have in its production, in its peak in 1985, just a short time away -- '86 -- production of about 15 million tons of coal which will make it the largest coal mine in the world.

Thirdly, in hydropower. China has by far the greatest potential for hydropower in the world. And, again, the interesting characteristic here is that the flow of the water that comes out of the mountains in the west -- goes into the east is so rapid that what is required is advance technology mainly in high-arch dams. Chinese build wonderful low-arch dams; that's not necessary for these major projects that the Chinese have in mind to develop their hydropower potential. They need high-arch dams of which the United States is the premier in the world. Here again, we're talking about enormous projects here on down the road. So -- see one or two of which are coming up here this year and next year.

Lastly, nuclear power. The Chinese have extremely ambitio plans to build nuclear power plants in China. They intend to build twelve nuclear power plants in the next few years. Each power plant is at least a billion dollars. Again, the Chinese have made it crystal clear to us that they want American technology in this effort. They regard our technology as the best in the world.

So, what do these four things have in common? First of all, they involve long-term, cooperative efforts, not just short and $100 million sale of wheat, corn or soybeans or whatever.

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or cotton, but long-term efforts. U.S. oil companies will be in China 50 years. Same thing with coal and hydropower companies and nuclear companies.

Secondly, they involve huge transfers of capital, technolog transfer, human resources. There will be hundreds, there will be thousands of American technical people stationed onshore to support the oil offshore effort.

And, thirdly, they involve a natural fit of China's enormous natural resources with American technology. So, in our view, we're not gilding the lily, we're not exaggerating when we say we feel we're on the eve of a new phase in our relationship. And in our view, the trade, commercial and economic ties will, in fact, be the ties that will bond the two countries together.

Thank you.

Q But is it correct, sir, that there are serious problems in negotiations on American assistance for nuclear power, investments, etcetera, etcetera, etcetera? You painted a very rosy pict of what could happen in the future. What's happening now in the negotiations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The nuclear situation -- I think you remember you saw a statement here made by Assistant Foreign Minister Zhu Qizhen in China about two days ago which he made public, the problem that is involved here in our nuclear negotiations, the probl of consent right. It's a serious problem. I won't gild the lily. I mean, we feel like we're about 95 percent there toward a nuclear agreement, but their remaining 5 percent is a tough five yards to go for the touchdown. and it is clear in our law -- we have no negotiating room on this matter at all.

We have made it crystal clear to the Chinese that we've gone about as far as we can go and the ball is in their court.

Q So, what you're saying before you go on to investment, that unless the Chinese give way these dreams will vanish?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In nuclear --

Q These dreams of American technology --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In nuclear energy, I think we're going to have a tough time because it is -- it will be illegal for U.S. firms to consult --

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- or sell technology, anything unless there's a nuclear cooperation agreement, that's correct.

Q Can we go on to the investment treaty --

Q Well, before we leave nuclear, Ralph, it's still the question of what happens to the reprocessed fuel, right? Is that the central issue?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, that's right.

Q And we are asking them to do exactly what to comply with our law?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: To comply with our law, they have to ask for our consent to use that,

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even if it's not our fuel, if it's someone else's fuel, or their own fuel, if it goes through an American supplied reactor, they still have to ask us for it. Now, that's a more stringent law, a more stringent provision than other countries have. But it's in the '63 law, and there's no going back, we're not about to rewrite the law, it's there and we have to live with it.

Q May I follow -- that point?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure.

Q Is there any thought being given in the administration to proposing a revision or an amendment of some sort to accommodate China on this particular issue?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q No thought at all?

Q Why not?

Q We change our laws all the time. There must be a reason --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I think there is tremendous support on the Hill for this provision here. And I think there's real sensitivity on the Hill, too, here, for any time that we enter into a nuclear cooperation agreement with a country that -- while China is a friendly non-aligned country -- nonetheless, it is not an ally. And so, we want to send up an agreement to the Hill which we know will be looked at with a fine-tooth comb, and it's got to adhere to the law.

Q Is that the only remaining issue in the nuclear cooperation --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Pardon me?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, it is.

Q Why is that --

Q Well, when Zhao left in January, that was the only remaining issue --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right. That's rig

Q -- if the Chinese are refusing to sign this agreement and if that's the only remaining issue, and it's April now, it seems to me that one might cynically describe negotiations on a nuclear agreement as deadlocked -- which isn't quite as rosy as --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It -- it is an ongoing problem here -- ongoing negotiations. We have been talking back and forth with the Chinese. We have been exchanging different drafts, trying to find the appropriate way to make an agreement possible here. That's still going on, so the process has not stopped here, but at the present time, we have pinpointed the problem I think -- and the problem is still there.

Q They've already started to let some nuclear contracts though, right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, they have.

Q How many have they let? There was one --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, they have signed a letter of intent with one U.S. company. Letters of intent -- sort of notoriously meaningless, really -- except it's simply a matter of intent. There is great business, we know, there in China --

Q Yes, we're not --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- we know it too.

Q They have signed agreements to buy, they have, in effect, bought nuclear technology from other countries, firms, because we haven't been able to get this agreement off the ground, right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They have not yet signed contracts. They have signed agreements. And there is a distinction here. In my view, it is still -- I may be naive about this, I may be overly optimistic -- but there is still a chance here for American technology, nuclear technology, to get in on the first floor of this thing. It's not too late, yet.

Q What is the time frame, then? How much time do we have? When do they want to sign contracts? Obviously we can't --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, they would have signed contracts yesterday, you know. This has been holding it up here, but I think from the Chinese point of view, they've been willing to hold up contracts with Fromotone and other bidders in Europe, because they want American technology. And they said repeatedly to us -- "Look, Fromotone is a step-child of Westinghouse. We would prefer to go with the mother than the daughter. Fromotone is a license to get Westinghouse -- they've got this technology of a Westinghouse. We'd prefer to go right to the source." They said this repeatedly, and I think they believe that.

Q Well, how long are they willing to wait. I mean, is there --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know

Q -- is there any -- you are really giving us a rosy picture here, but nevertheless, it seems that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's a rosy picture, but I don't mean to give -- I mean, I can -- everyone has their own shopping list of the problems in doing business with China, and I can stand up here for another fifteen or twenty minutes and tell you about the difficulties we have in doing business with China.

Q Have you? (Laughter.)

Q Is there any possibility of an agreement --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But, this is a problem right now that we've focused on. It's a serious one, and we hope to have some progress on it.

Q What are the chances of a nuclear agreement on this trip?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know. That's an honest answer. I don't know.

Q Is the President going to raise this issue personally?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That again, I don't know.

Q How many agreements have the Chinese signed? Or, how many of the eleven plants have been signed as --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: None.

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Q Don't they have a deal with the French to build a couple of --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes they do -- Guangdong. Again, this was what we were referring to here is an agreement, but not a contract yet.

Q Are we --

Q Is it just one -- one?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. There are two nuclear reactors in Guangdong that would supply power to Hong Kong.

Q Two of the eleven?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, two of the eleven.

Q And are there any others besides those two?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, there are. There are some outside of Shanghai. These are the ones that --

Q Do the French also have an agreement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. -- in which the -- in which a U.S. firm has signed a letter of intent with the Chinese.

Q When?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Just a couple days ago.

Q We're talking of $11 billion --

Q -- what's holding up --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Your timing may or may not be what's available.

Q There's a total of $11 billion at stake here, in round numbers? Roughly?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'd put it -- you know, I said 12 power plants. Each power plant's roughly $1 billion in just the equipment alone. In A & E -- you know, in consultancy -- each power plant adds on about another $1 billion. So, we're talking more in the order of about $20 billion, somewhere on that order -- we've got about $12 billion here.

Q What is the difference? You said a great -- they sent in a great -- out of the eleven reactors you mentioned, you say they've signed an agreement with the French on two and they have signed a letter of intent with an American firm on the one?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right.

Q What's the difference between the two documents.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The letter from -- I would say the agreement goes beyond an agreement of intent.

Q Okay.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The statement of intent is simply more a wish -- or simply more of an agreement to agree -- or to continue on with the harder negotiations on the specifics.

Q Can they sign an agreement with an American firm at this point?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

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Q Have they signed an agreement with --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, no -- let's put it this way. No U.S. firm would sign an agreement given the constraints right now.

Q Okay. Have they signed agreements with any other firms from other countries besides the two to the French?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q So, we got two out of the nine gone, right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, but they're not gone. That's what I'm saying. I don't -- in my view -- I don't think they're gone. Now, I could be disputed by other administration people, and certainly people in the private sector that they are, in fact, gone, gone, gone. I don't think so.

Q When does the agreement with the French kick in? When do they have to start -- when do we lose it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, they signed the agreement here about 3 months ago.

Q So, it seems to me they ought to start building pretty soon.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, but before they build, they have to sign contracts, and those have not been signed.

Q Is Promotone the French firm?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, it is.

Q And -- I'm confused -- are there eleven plants, or twelve?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Projected. Eleven plants projected over the next few years.

Q And you use to figure twelve --

Q You said twelve.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Twelve plants, I'm sorry.

Q A total of twelve?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: A total of twelve.

Q And the French have two in agreement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The French have two in agreement, that's right.

Q So, we've got ten left, not nine.

Q How many do the U.S. have an agreement -- in Shanghai?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, they have an agreement on two with provision with -- sort of a possibility of maybe four more. Again, what we're talking about here is, I think, Chinese discussions with American nuclear vendors about the remaining power plants to be built. And these talks are going to go on for an awful long time. Even after we get a nuclear agreement obviously. It's going to be a while.

Q Which is the --

Q Can we move to the investment question for a minute?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure.

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Q Particularly the issue of protection of U.S. technology and so on -- What -- How big a stumbling block is that, related to the nuclear thing. Can you give us an idea of where the scale stands on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure.

Q Because even if there are agreements on the nuclear thing -- the technology and the investment stuff -- still stands in the way doesn't it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: To some extent. We are, as you know, still having talks with the Chinese about our investment treaty. We've had four rounds of talks now with the Chinese. We just stopped the talks here a few days ago. We're going to pick them up again. It's safe to say that it's going to be difficult to reach the kind of comprehensive investment treaty that we want to reach.

This is the first time that this government has tried to have a BIT -- a Bilateral Investment Treaty with essentially a planned economy. And it's meshing apples and oranges here, and it's proving very difficult to do. Just by way of example, the West Germans and the Chinese signed a BIT not too long ago, a few months ago. It was just a three page document. It took them 7 years to negotiate the 3-page document. We looked at that 3-page document, and we think it's wholly inadequate for our investment purposes here, to reassure U.S. investors, it would be worthless for us. So, these things take time. And it's going to be more time before we have the kind of agreement with the Chinese that will be useful to our investors. Now --

Q No agreement on this trip you're saying?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Is the national treatment issue a stumbling block?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's one of them, yes.

Q What about the taxation treaty?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The taxation treaty -- I think that was announced here by other briefers, that the President will sign --

Q He will sign?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- a taxation treaty. That was initiated by Secretary Regan a few weeks ago in Beijing.

Q Can you run through the stumbling blocks on the investment treaty? You mentioned a couple of them --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't really want to be too specific on this since it's under negotiation right now. But, in short, there are provisions relating to how American investors are treated vis-a-vis potential Chinese investors. A second issue is arbitration -- third-party arbitration. The Chinese don't really like to take people to court. You know, they have a different system than we do. They like to sort of talk and use a lot of common sense and arbitrate so forth -- and we like to rush into court. I guess those are really the two biggest ones.

Q What was that first one again, so I -- could you repeat that?

Q -- treatment of --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Treatment of U.S. investors as opposed to potential Chinese investors. We're asking for a national treatment.

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Q What about in the event of expropriation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's pretty much been covered already in the OPIC agreement. I don't think there's an issue --

Q And repatriation of profits?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's an issue -- repatriation of profits is an issue, although a big dent has been made in that issue in many of the joint venture agreements that have now been signed in '83 and '84 here -- so we're, I think we've made some progress here.

A major Chinese concern in the Bilateral Investment Treaty is something that we can wholly understand. And that is, that they are now in the process of putting flesh on the skeleton of their legal system. And commercial laws are popping out all the time from China. And they're very much to our liking. However, they still have a long ways to go. And the Chinese do not wish to lock themselves into a Bilateral Investment Treaty that would tie their hands in a way that they couldn't pass or change or modify new commercial laws in the future. That's a serious problem, and it's understandable.

Q What's national treatment mean in layman's terms?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: National treatment means, in layman's terms, that a foreign investor is treated the same as a national investor -- as a Chinese investor. As opposed to most-favored nation treatment, which is that all foreigners are treated the same.

I think the Chinese are actually reasonably flexible on that point. I would not regard that as a, as the major stumbling block. But it certainly is one of them.

Q How much, if any, effect will there be on this trip of the presence -- I think next week -- of a Soviet trade and investment negotiating group which is going to be on the ground, I think, just a couple of weeks before Reagan will be. Do you see that as a playing off -- one against the other -- or is it a coincidental scheduling or what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. It's not a playing off against -- one against the other here. That's been scheduled for a very, very long time and it's simply reflective, I think, of the increase in trade between the Soviet Union and China in the last year. That trade has doubled, or maybe even tripled here in the last year. And this is something that the Chinese wish to do, and that's fine. So, I don't think it's going to have any effect on us.

The President is not going out there as a trader. He's not going out to push individual projects. I hope I didn't mislead you by -- when I talked about these different projects here in hydro power and oil and so forth -- that the President is going to technically dissect that shopping list and present some sort of project list to the Chinese. He's not going to do that. The President is going out there to inform the Chinese that we are -- that we intend to be helpful in their economic modernization program. In general, broad-brush strokes. And he's made that very specific by his decision last year to change export licensing. The export licensing change is going to result, in this year, of anywhere from $1 to $1.5 billion in high technology products over and above what it would have been if we hadn't had this change in our export control policy.

Q Well compared -- you said that the Soviet, Sino-Soviet trade had doubled or tripled in the past year. Give us some idea of comparison -- our trade with them declined last year by --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes --

Q -- by about a quarter, I guess it was -- 25 percent. Are they talking about a puny amount of trade between those two? Or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's roughly at about, you know, I'm a little bit on shaky ground -- about $1 billion --

Q Soviet-Chinese?

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Q Soviet-Chinese?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Soviet-Chinese.

You know, I could be off on that. Forgive me. I may not have that exactly right. That's a figure that sticks in my mind.

Now, I would say that in 1984 -- and I'll make a prediction here -- that U.S.-China trade will be the greatest that it's ever been in our --

Q Commercial history?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- commercial history.

I'd say that the estimates will be above 5.5, which was the historic high in 1981.

Q Do the Soviets have a deficit with China, too? Trade deficit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know.

Q How does the 5.5 compare with the '83 figure?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: '83 was 4.4; '82 was 5.2.

Q And '81 was 5.5 --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, sir.

Q The one-to-one --

Q Can we shift to textiles for a minute --

Q Before we do that can we just round off one point here on the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Before the new guidelines on technology transfer, what was the figure on that for '83? Just to give us some basis of comparison?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's a little hard to sort of translate it out for you here because the guidelines went into effect in November, but we were already processing licenses before that --

Q Well, you said that because of the agreement for '84 it would be $1 billion to $1.5 billion higher. Why don't you just -- do you have the figure for '83, which would be a pretty good comparison?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In technology?

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. It's about $500 million, roughly, you know, in the high technology.

Q Is the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And it's going to be, as I say, probably $1.5 billion to $2 billion in high technology this year, as a result of the change in the guidelines.

Q Stay with the high technology. Do you expect -- or have they brought up the Helms Amendment to the Senate Export Administration Act?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, they haven't.

Q And on high technology, you talked about turning points. Wouldn't you agree that the technology category change is also an enabler for arms sales? That is, weapons carrying high technology items or -- high technology components?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: To some extent, yes, but not major --

Q Do the Chinese still have a concern on the high tech in terms of -- they still are subject to COCOM review and also to a national security review?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, I think they do have concerns on that regard, although at the time that we made a change in the export control policy we told them that they would remain subject to COCOM restriction and international security restrictions, too, because they were a nuclear power state.

Unlike India, China has the ability to actually deliver that nuclear device.

Q But they're different -- they're treated differently than Great Britain would be treated.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, they are.

Q -- France would be --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, they are.

Q And is that a bone of contention, still?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that the Chinese would like to see us take them out of COCOM. COCOM, of course, is a voluntary organization. It operates on the basis of a consensus. And I don't think there'd be much support, frankly, for removing China from COCOM or establishing a separate list, for instance, for China. I don't think that's possible.

Q Haven't we, in fact, asked them to do that? Asked COCOM to do that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q What is the status of the negotiations with COCOM on China?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, when we first had this -- made this policy announcement in May, we explained our change in policy very carefully to the COCOM allies. Over time, I think they have all accepted this change and so the processing, now, at COCOM has greatly accelerated as a result of that deeper understanding of what has prompted the U.S. to make that change.

There was, initially, a large backlog of U.S. export cases at COCOM, primarily because the U.S. was processing cases much faster, as a result of our change in policy, and they flooded -- literally flooded into COCOM. And COCOM is a small, understaffed, overworked bureaucracy, like we all are in the U.S. government here. And they were backlogged. We have now put some resources into that, as had the other allies in the COCOM system, to increase the processing time so that now we have greatly reduced this backlog. And, also, I think it's safe to say that we're processing cases just as quickly as they come in. I mean, there is no delay there.

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Q Well, I thought the Secretary said at a hearing at one point there were two remaining issues. I think the first was re-export authorizations and the other one was the COCOM negotiations. And that you got the re-export assurances --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right.

Q -- from the Chinese --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right.

Q And you came out with the policy and everybody said, "Well, we're still talking to COCOM. But don't worry, folks, it's on the way." And we never -- I mean, there were supposed to be negotiations going on.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't think the Secretary was saying that there was going to be a change here in COCOM at any time -- an early date here. I don't think so. I don't think he meant that at all.

Q On textiles now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes --

Q Okay. Recently -- Well, since December 16th when the President issued the new directive, haven't there been like something on the order of 14 calls on different categories of Chinese textiles?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, that's too many. There haven't --

Q Well, how many have there been?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think there have been about eight. I'd have to check that figure; but, roughly, in that area.

Q And wasn't there a team that was just over there to talk to the Chinese about this? Could you bring us up to date --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, there was. But that's a normal process, though. Many times we make calls. We go over there to talk about it. "A call" means simply a call for talks. It doesn't actually mean a slapping on of a ceiling. It means that we're going to -- you know -- that we intend -- that we wish to talk about that particular category because there are some problems in that category.

Q And were those eight areas resolved when the team went over there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. No, that's what the team went to talk about.

Q But they're now back, aren't they?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The team is back, right.

Q So did they resolve the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know because the team just got back, literally, a couple of days ago here and I have not talked to them.

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Q What do you -- Could you sort of characterize what you think the textile situation is now, if that's still a problem with the Chinese?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's still a problem. It's always going to be a problem in our trade relations for two reasons. First of all, Chinese exports, as I mentioned -- or about 40 percent of those exports are in textiles and apparel. And this is crucial to the Chinese effort here to earn hard currency.

The second problem, though, is that it is -- it happens to be the most sensitive import area in the U.S. trade. The textile industry is flat on its back. The capacity is way, way down, the most of any other industrial sector that we have in the economy. And, therefore, the President stated that he was going to limit the growth in foreign exports to the rate of growth in our domestic demand, which is about 1½ percent.

Now, the Chinese would like for us to remove all restraints in our textile quotas here. They'd like to sell as much as they could. This is not going to be possible; but, in my view, we're not treating the Chinese badly. Four years ago, they exported nothing in textiles or apparels to this country. Now, they are the fourth largest supplier to the U.S. So they've grown tremendously in the last four years. The rate of growth has been phenomenal. And I think what we're doing right now in some areas is we're trying to perhaps, reduce that very dramatic rate of growth. But Chinese textile exports to the U.S. are still growing. Not as fast as it was.

Q What does that come to in -- annually now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, 40 percent of the Chinese exports are in textiles, so --

Q -- billion?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not quite that. No, no. Chinese exports to this country here last year were --

Q Oh.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What? We had 4.4 and our deficit was 71. Call that a wash. 2.2 is Chinese exports to this country, 40 percent of 2.2.

Q Are the Chinese still not buying American grain because of the textiles?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Any indication that the textile industry is --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- the Chinese have pledged to make up for the two million ton shortfall of

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this year by purchasing a total of 8 million tons in calendar year 1984, and we certainly do expect them to do that.

Q Have they been buying it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. We certainly expect that to continue -- that they have committed themselves at the highest levels to live up to the grain agreement.

Q What's the grain agreement --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me -- just as a general statement, I might pause here and throw something out at you. We are going to continue to have trade problems with China. We're paying, in some respects, the price for twenty-two years of total ignorance here. From 1949 to 1971, we've put more men on the moon than we've sent to China. So we have a situation now in which both sides are operating from, shall we say, a base of ignorance. We have a long ways to go. We have a lot to learn about each other's countries here.

And the second point I would make is maybe more of a subtle, psychological point, but I think it's a serious one -- is that we differ from the Chinese in perceptions of trade problems. And what I mean by that is that the U.S. view of a commercial trade problem is that it's just a natural part of commerce and trade. We have more trade problems with Japan and Canada than we do with any other countries in the world, and yet they're are closest allies. We don't get all bent out of shape or all shook up if there's a trade problem.

The Chinese actually have a different perception. They regard trade as trade between friends and that there shouldn't be trade problems. And if there is, there may be a problem in the friendship. So that a trade problem is quickly escalated to a matter of principle. And sometimes, minor trade problems then can assume an importance way out of scale to what they should, in our view. I think both sides are making progress, though, in this area as we learn to understand how the other system's laws and institutions work better here.

Q Just at the risk of bringing up a somewhat unrelated thing, what efforts, if any, have the administration made in the past few months dealing with Taiwan in anticipation of the President's trip -- on trade issues and as a result of these trade issues with China? What discussions do you have with Taiwan to assuage their worries, or whatever?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We really have not had discussions with Taiwan to my knowledge here about this. We, of course, have a huge trade deficit with Taiwan right now which is just enormous. It's staggering in size. It's one of the largest deficits that we have with any country in the world as a presage of two-way trade. So we regard this as a very serious matter and we've -- the Taiwan officials and people know that to be the case.

Q -- the problem at this point of trying to -- we're not trying to assuage them. It's really the other way around?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it's certainly the other way around. In fact, we have some very serious problems in our trade relations. Taiwan is the sixth largest trading partner that we have and we value that trading relationship very much and we intend to pursue it. At the same time, though, as I mentioned, between friends, there are bound to be trade problems, and there are serious trade problems with Taiwan.

Q I'd like to ask you an historical question. Going back even before 1949, isn't it true that we have looked upon -- historically, we have looked upon China as this great untapped market, and that it's been largely one of unfulfilled expectations? And why is your rosy scenario that you're giving out now any more likely to be different than the kind -- the historical past?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the major differences here is that in the past, the Chinese I don't think have been willing to open the door to Western trade nearly as much as they are right now. Now, before '49, of course, there was tremendous American and Western presence in China. But they hadn't gotten to the point in their economic development where they could launch projects of the kinds that I'm talking about here. It's simply a matter of economic development.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It seems to me that historical note is not a bad place to stop.

MR. SIMS: Let's take one or two more, and then I'd like to make --

Q Can I just go back to a couple of points?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure.

Q Which is the American firm whom they've designed this letter of intent?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know if I should mention that. I'm sorry, I --

MR. SIMS: What was the question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question is, what is the American firm --

Q Which American firm signed the letter of intent to furnish nuclear plants?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's certainly been in the press.

MR. SIMS: Yes -- you'd better research it, Leo.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. Everyone knows what it is. I guess I should not be in the position to --

Q Okay. The other question I wanted to nail down in terms of our obvious reluctance to give them a loophole on the reprocessing rights, that is obviously related to a proliferation concern. In other words --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. No, it's not. Proliferation concerns are no longer major concerns of the U.S. government. Premier Zhao yang made a -- what we consider to be an extremely useful statement when he was here in January about Chinese desires not to engage in proliferation.

Q But what is the underlying rationale of our law that does not allow us to make an exception of China in this -- is that related --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'm not sure that I'm really qualified to -- answer to that because I wasn't there when the law was written. I don't know the kinds of considerations in '63 that went into that particular provision of consent rights. It's clearly related to an effort by the U.S. to control the technology of it and to ensure that that technology is put to the use that the country says it's going to be put to, and so forth.

Q So we're afraid that without this protection, somebody can go military on the nuclear thing?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, that's one possibility, sure.

Q Is that -- with non-proliferation, sir?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sir?

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Q No? Well, could you -- I don't understand your reply.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On proliferation?

Q The reason why you insist on consent rights.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Because it's according to our law.

Q Yes, but to avoid what, or to do what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: To avoid having the Chinese utilize other American fuel or American reactors to manufacture other products. And I think this is, in some respects, understandable. It's -- as I say, that provision, that particular provision is unique in American law. It is not --

Q I understand that.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is not present in French and German -- French and British law.

Q We're just trying to find out if --

Q -- if the use of the word --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry I can't be more explicit on that because I just don't --

Q I'm sorry -- haven't the Chinese indicated their willingness to join the full-scope safeguards of IAEA --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, they have. They've already joined IAEA.

Q Oh, I see. Doesn't that provide the answer then?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. No, it does not provide the answer to consent rights. It does provide the answer to safeguards. There were three major issues -- safeguards, proliferation, and consent rights. The first two have been adequately solved and do not present a problem anymore.

Q You are talking about the provision in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right.

Q But you're saying it's not a proliferation concern?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We do not have a concern about proliferation anymore -- that's right.

MR. SIMS: All right. Thank you. I'd like to mention -- remind you we've got the books here. We have another -- we'll try to get a transcript of this by the end of the day today in the Press Office if possible -- certainly by tomorrow morning. But I think we can make it by the end of today for you to pick up. And we will have the next in a series of briefings by a senior administration official on Tuesday, April 10th at 10:45 A.M., and Camilla McCaslin has a sign-up sheet. You can do it here today if you'd like to.

Thanks very much.

END 11:56 A.M. ES

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF PRESIDENT JORGE BLANCO
OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

April 9, 1984

The Briefing Room

11:08 A.M. EST

MR. SIMS: This briefing will be ON BACKGROUND. It is attributable to a Senior Administration Official.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Good morning. Did they give you a schedule at all of --

Q No.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. Would you like one?

Q Sure.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: For whatever it's worth, huh? (Laughter.)

Q It's the price we're paying.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They only told us we were going to be wearing a tie for the occasion.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They told me, it was -- it says Senior Administration Official. (Laughter.)

President Jorge Blanco will be doing a State Visit. He will arrive today at 2:00 p.m. at Andrews. The official part of the visit starts tomorrow. At 10:00 a.m. he will come to the White House, be greeted by the President, and then meet with the President in the Oval Office and then in the Cabinet Room. Secretary Shultz will be giving a lunch for him. He will be having, in the afternoon, bilaterals with Secretary Shultz, Secretaries Shultz, Regan, Block -- sequentially, not together -- Ambassador Kirkpatrick.

And then in the evening, the President will be hosting a State Dinner for him here.

Wednesday, he'll be meeting with the President of the World Bank. He will address the Organization of American States. The Vice President will host a lunch for him. In the afternoon, he will meet with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and House Foreign Affairs Committee, and Senator Kennedy. There will be -- he will host a reception that evening.

Thursday morning he will leave for Springfield, Illinois to visit the home of Abraham Lincoln. President Blanco, among other things, is a fan of Abraham Lincoln's.

Q Aren't we all. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He will go to Chicago, where he'll be meeting with --

Q -- consider the alternatives. (Laughter.)

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- with a CBI group, and then he'll be going to New York Thursday. There will be a dinner hosted by Dr. Kissinger for him.

Friday morning there will be a breakfast with David Rockefeller and other business leaders. He will meet at the United Nations with a Latin American group. He will be hosted at a lunch by the Americus Society. He will meet later in the day with the Mayor and with Cardinal O'Connor.

On Saturday, he goes to the University of South Carolina where he receives an Honorary Doctor's degree. From there he will depart for the Dominican Republic.

Q Whew. He's going everything but playing hockey. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Did you say "hookey" or "hockey"?

Q Hockey. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is the first State Visit of a Dominican President to the United States. President Jorge Blanco, in his capacity asked President -- did visit the United States unofficially in July, but not on a State Visit -- a working visit, in July of '82.

Q How are you pronouncing his first name?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Jorge.

Q Well is he President Jorge or President Blanco?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Blanco.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no --

Q No?

Q He's referred to as Jorge, right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No? Go ahead.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: His first name is Salvador.

Q Oh.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: His last name is Jorge Blanco.

Q What does he hyphenate it? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. In the Spanish, the Blanco is his mother's name, and they put that at they end, but --

Q Yes, but what should we call him?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You either call him President Jorge Blanco, or if you want to shorten it, President Jorge. Not President Blanco.

Q Oh, okay. Ahhhhh.

Q Soooo -- you were wrong -- (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, but I didn't call him that. So, you straightened me out.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, no. I don't straighten him out. (Laughter.)

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Anything else on his name we need to cover? (Laughter.)

Q So, why is he coming here?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As I said, it's the first visit from the Dominican Republic --

Q So is it Jorge or Jorge Blanco?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The latter is -- Jorge Blanco.

Q Jorge Blanco.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Jorge Blanco, yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Are we all done with the name?

Q -- let's practice --

Q The rain in spain -- (Laughter.)

Q Well, some of us are in that medium, you know -- to say it.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question earlier was "Why is he coming?" As I said, it's the first visit of a President of the Dominican Republic, the first official State Visit. The Dominican Republic is a large democracy, some 6 million people in the Caribbean area. It's larger than any of the other English speaking Caribbean countries there. They have played a significant role under Jorge Blanco in expanding their commercial and economic ties to the rest of the region. They have been a good ally to the United States, and I think it's fitting that there would be a visit among the Presidential visits of the Dominican Republic.

Q Well what are they going to talk about?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Obviously, what's uppermost in President Jorge Blanco's mind is their economic situation. They're facing a serious economic condition now. Their main products are all -- have suffered as a result of the world recession. Their products being coffee, cocoa, mainly sugar, all too a hit in prices. And so, even though they've managed to keep their inflation rate down, in the 7-8 percent bracket, they are suffering a liquidity crisis.

They are currently in negotiations with the IMF attempting to arrive at an IMF agreement. And so the economic --

Q Good to see you.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- hello, Sam -- The economic dimension will be uppermost in Jorge Blanco's mind, I'm sure.

Q What does he think about our policy in Central America?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He has been a supporter of our policy in Central America. Yes?

Q Is he going to increase aid?

Q Do you have numbers in terms of their economical problems?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure. Their total external debt is in the neighborhood of $2.8 billion -- $1.7 of that is public, the rest of it private. They're attempting not only to roll over their

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debt, but to stretch them out. It's a similar situation that you find in the other debt countries. As I said, their inflation now is running 7 to 8 percent. The IMF is -- not an unusual event -- is asking them to take some stringent internal measures, which include pegging their exchange rates to the parallel rate as opposed to their official rate, which would mean -- in a factor of about, in increasing it -- they would like to, about a factor of 3 to 1 above what it is now. And that's the one that will cause an internal belt-tightening in order to bring it off.

Yes sir?

Q I see that he was the Attorney General in the Camanyo government, in 1965, and if memory serves, that was the rebel side that had some problems with the U.S. Has he undergone a political change of any kind?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. It's not a -- I think what you've seen in the Dominican Republic since their election in '66, has been -- both parties there, the Revolutionary party and the other party have, through the elections, have held the top office. So what you've seen since '66 is a democratic process. He was not the first one of his party to be President. Guzmon was also from his party.

Yes?

Q May I follow up on that? At the time that the Marines intervened, as I understand it, he was in the group that we considered a threat to democracy, but now we look at him as sort of a model of democracy. And I'm trying to figure out -- has he changed? Or has our view of him changed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think what you -- your characterization oversimplified it. He may have been in a group in which there was negotiations and how they perceived -- after the intervention. But, the net effect has been through two opposing parties over some 25 years, and through some 4 or 5 elections, the democratic process has prevailed.

Q Do you feel comfortable about the U.S. rejecting beforehand any kind of international court ruling on Nicaragua?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: To be responsive to your question, the answer to that is yes. And I believe also that the Press Spokesman covered it fairly adequately. I don't have much more to add to what you got already this morning.

Q Well, one question that I just, that I don't think --

Q The decision? He didn't cover it at all here.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that isn't what I was told.

Q Well, he -- all he did was refer us to the State Department statement over the weekend. He said nothing on it.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I see. Well, we get caught playing this round-robin game with you. Go ahead.

Q Well it isn't.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Do you have a question?

Q You set up the round-robin.

Q What was your question?

Q My question was, do you feel comfortable in disobeying international law?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No -- it's not a matter of disobeying international law. I think the statement speaks to it very well.

Q Well, I have a couple of questions, and one that I don't think has been dealt with adequately is --

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Speakes and Secretary Weinberger yesterday absolutely denied any contingency plans for the use of U.S. combat troops in Central America. But we had an interview on Nightly News last night with Otto Reich in which he said, "Yes, there are contingency plans." Now, which is it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that the Spokesman and the Secretary of Defense put it very well. I have nothing to add to that.

Q And Otto Reich is -- you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have nothing to add to it. I stand by what the Spokesman and the Secretary of Defense said.

Q There are no contingency plans?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I stand by what they said.

Q Do you have anything on Jesse Jackson leading a delegation to Nicaragua?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. Just as I walked in the door, somebody informed me that he had announced that he was going, and that's all I have.

Q What do you think of it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's not an unusual event for Presidential candidates to travel. Both of the remaining Democratic Presidential candidates have travelled to Central America, and the other six that didn't make it -- or five or whatever the number was -- they all travelled earlier this year. It's not an unusual event.

Q To Nicaragua?

Q Is this responsible --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q -- of him?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q Is this responsible of him to go at this time when the tensions are running high and we're mining their harbors and so forth?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that that's a decision that Presidential Candidate Jackson has to make. I see nothing unusual about it.

Q You welcome his attempt to negotiate?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He's not in a position to negotiate really.

Q Have we answered Britain's protest against the mining of the Nicaraguan harbor?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think that there was a formal protest per se as -- in that sense. But I'll have to get that answer for you.

Q Do you regard the mining of harbors without a declaration of war to be state-supported terrorism?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Run that question by

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again, please. I'm sorry.

Q Do you regard the mining of harbors without a declaration of war to be state-supported terrorism?

MR. SIMS: I wouldn't -- Look. We've been through --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

MR. SIMS: -- that this morning. Larry didn't get into that game. There's no reason for this briefer to have to play that game.

Q Well, he can answer the question if wants --

Q Well, we resent it boing called a game.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- look. I think that the perimeters of which you've asked the question are fairly theoretical. Let me just tell you --

Q Theoretical?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't think you've laid out any more perimeters than that. Let me just try to answer your question if I can, and then we can get back to the Dominican Republic.

Mining of harbors by whomever it may be do not necessarily have to be state-sponsored terrorism.

Any more questions on the Dominican Republic?

Q You call that an answer? (Laughter.)

Q What does that mean?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q What does that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: How's that for a short affirmative question -- answer?

Q Doesn't make any sense.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q Doesn't make any sense. What does it mean?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'm sorry. I was trying to be responsive.

Q But it doesn't answer the question.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it does.

Q Well, "doesn't have to" -- could you explain that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Why don't we go back to Dom Rep. I think, as the man said, this is supposed to be on the Dominican Republic.

Q Are we supposed to be --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I was trying to be responsive to your question.

Q -- giving them more aid because of their financial problems?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's always a -- External aid to a country in economic -- facing economic challenges can always be helpful. There's also a limit to what the United States can do for all of the countries involved. We are looking at different ways where we can be helpful in the context of what some of our other friends face.

Q Well, what are we giving them now? Are we giving them any aid now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, and I don't have the specifics. Maybe David -- do you have specifics on it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We -- this fiscal year, it's $34 million in ESF --

Q Can't hear back here.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- pending the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, the question was, what are we giving them now. There is pending under the Continuing Resolution $34 million in ESF.

Q What's that?

Q What's ESF?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's the Economic Support Fund.

Q And for what fiscal year? Is that '84 or '85?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- '84.

Q What is --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What's in the FY'85 budget?

Q What's ESF --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: - requested 45 in the '85.

Q Economic Support Fund.

Q Well, I know, but what is that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- 45.

Q What is ESF?

Q ESF.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Economic Support.

Q Yes, what is that? Is that part --

Q Is that AID?

Q -- of Caribbean --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. It's a category of aid that normally goes towards budget support -- internal budget support.

Q The biggest export is sugar?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct They are probably the largest importer into the United States.

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Q Do they get support price on -- or a quota?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, they do. They get a support price under the quota arrangement -- the worldwide quota arrangement. That's correct.

Q Do they get a pretty healthy quota from us?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They don't think so. The way the thing was done pro rata -- it was based upon the history of the last five years prior to the quota being put in. As to their imports in the United States. As they were, with one other country, always the largest importer to the United States -- sugar -- they got proportionately a large share.

Yes, sir?

Q Did we increase the Dominican Republican quota when we reduced Nicaragua's sugar quota?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think we allocated

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at that time, just as the Central American countries reallocated.

Yes?

Q Do you expect them to ask for an increase in their quota?

Q -- stop Nicaragua --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm hearing two questions here, I'm sorry --

Q Do you expect them to ask for an increase --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: One at a time, or we're going to get in trouble.

Q -- in their sugar quota for exports to the United States?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, you have to understand that that's a macro thing, in the sense that it effects a lot of exporters of sugar, and so you just can't take it one country at a time. You have to take it within all of them. I don't think at this time that you can envision -- that if there's any increase in quotas it will be done proportionately based upon the old formula. Their old formula was hard enough to arrive at as it was.

Q What's the world price of sugar?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Somewhere above -- 7 cents, 7 or 8 cents -- dropped from 21 cents.

MR. SIMS: Can we have about one more, and then you can move to the next event. Anything else Helen?

Q Well, how much do they lose on every pound of sugar they produce?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It depends on what their production costs are, and I don't know what the Dominican Republic's production costs are.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Jerry, in actuality, they gain, because they get 22 cents a pound for sugar they import into the United States; whereas, on the world market, they get 7.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The difference is between what it costs them to produce and the world market price.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Roughly that's about 12, 14 cents --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: So they lose on the world market price.

Q You say they are supportive of all our policies in the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no. No, I didn't say they were all supported. The question that addressed it -- how were they on Central America -- and I said that President Jorge Blanco's been supportive of our policy.

Q Of which one?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Of the Central American policy.

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Q Of Central America -- all of those --

Q Including the mining of the harbors?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Next question.

MR. SIMS: Thank you.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 11:23 A.M. EST

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[NOTE: This briefing did not in all respects clearly reflect U.S. policy on the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in the matters raised by the Government of Nicaragua. For more complete and authoritative U.S. statements on the question, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1984, pp. 1051-1053 and 1095-1102.]

File Copy

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
U.S. DECISION ON ICJ
MONDAY, APRIL 9, 1984, 2:25 P.M.

FIRST DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: You all have the statements and so on, and perhaps we can just move to questions.

Q Would you start by helping some of us with the story about the six month business, that you were supposed to have come in six months prior to an expected complaint?

A That is based on the declaration that was filed by the United States in 1946, which provided that it would be in effect for a space of five years and thereafter until terminated by six months' notice. That relates to termination.

On this one, in particular -- some of these matters that may be coming up in the litigation before the Court with Nicaragua -- I'm going to have to restrict myself from commenting on exactly the arguments that we would be using. We don't want to try this thing through the medium of the press, but we'll confine ourselves to filing our briefs before the Court. Maybe we should just say that we're confident that the action we took on Friday will be effective in terms of limiting the scope of the U.S. adherence to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court for the period of time specified.

Q I'm not arguing that point. There is something that has to do with a six month requirement; you come in six months before somebody complains about an action you have taken.

A What you're referring to there, that is not a rule of the Court. The Statute of the Court does not have any such requirement.

There is a statement in the U.S. declaration that was filed, our unilateral declaration that was filed in 1946 where we indicated that prior to terminating our adherence to the Court we intended to give six months notice.

Q So there is no six month ruling of the Court that you have to come in, in fact; that's what you're saying?

A No. That is correct.

Q What difference does it make that the

United States took this action, or notified the United Nations on Friday rather than having done it, say, tomorrow?

A The difference is that when a case is filed before the Court, the jurisdictional framework that applies is the one you had on file at the time the case was initiated. So we could not have taken this action effectively after Nicaragua had filed their complaint. By taking it prior to that time, now the Court's jurisdiction over the United States with respect to this type of subject will be defined by the amended or modified declaration of adherence that we got in Friday. Whereas, if we had done it tomorrow, they would still be looking at the 1946 declaration as being the sole document that was applicable.

Q Could you go over the sequence and timing of the filing for us, please? What prompted the filing on Friday?

A Okay. We've had indications of various types over a period of time that Nicaragua might be considering action of this nature. We had information last week that made it much more concrete and imminent that this was about to come about. In other words, their action that they, I'm now informed, have in fact taken today in filing a complaint against us.

Because of the consideration that I mentioned earlier, that if you're going to take the step we took, it must be done before the case is filed against you, we moved rather rapidly to implement that action before the week was out.

Q Just to clarify in my own mind, you're not then making any bones about the fact that the U.S. basically went to the Court to do this to avoid having to answer Nicaragua's charges on this particular case? It wasn't something that you were thinking of doing for a long time and as a matter of policy it just happened to pop up?

You did it to avoid this case?

A It was done with the prospect of this type of complaint in mind.

I wouldn't say it was done to avoid answering the charges. While I haven't seen yet what charges Nicaragua has specified against us, I think there was always the temptation to take them on in a head-to-head combat and bring out the activities that they've been engaged which we consider to clearly be unlawful and to expose those.

I think the real consideration was that we did not feel that that type of litigation, over what is really a narrow aspect of the entire range of problems in Central America, would be productive to the result we're seeking, which is a comprehensive settlement in the region. I think you have to recognize that the Court's competence is to deal with legal issues. And while there are certainly legal issues involved in Central America, and we have some of our own vis-a-vis Nicaragua, that is only one element and a small element of the entire range of problems.

There is a forum that is operating now -- the Contadora process, which has been endoresed by the competent regional body, the OAS -- which is capable of and is dealing with the entire range of issues. So to take the legal issues, this narrow part of the problem, and divert that off into another forum in a long drawn-out litigation, pleasing as that might be to lawyers who like to go and argue points, and also as nice as that would be from the standpoint of demonstrating Nicaragua's activities, it really doesn't contribute to the final resolution of the issues in the region, and that was the primary consideration.

Q What happens on Nicaragua's complaint now? Will it be heard anyway?

A Yes. This is a bit of speculation because the Court obviously will have to make its own judgments. We are advised that the Court is informing us of the Nicaraguan complaint. I believe they already have informed our Embassy, but cables haven't gotten through to us yet.

Under the normal process, then, we would respond and the Court would have to decide whether it had jurisdiction over the matter. We feel with the action we've taken they will conclude that they do not. But that is a matter the Court will have to consider, and both Nicaragua and the United States will undoubtedly appear for that purpose.

Q It could be adjudicated with or without us, and they could still have the propaganda forum that you're concerned about?

A No, it's a question of -- this is not a case -- I think you're thinking of something like the Iranian situation where they didn't challenge jurisdiction; they just didn't show up and it went ahead and was adjudicated without them.

In this case, the step we've taken, we believe, clearly takes this matter out of the jurisdiction of the

Court. But the jurisdiction of the Court is an issue that the Court itself decides, if there is any debate about that. Obviously, we will appear and will litigate any issues before the Court. We're not ignoring the Court or saying we won't comply with its procedures. We've taken a step that is lawful to limit the scope of jurisdiction to which we've acceded. If that is to be debated, that will be debated and adjudicated by the Court.

Q Is it likely that both the United States and Nicaragua will go before the Court to argue whether it has jurisdiction or not?

A I think that is a fair assumption but, again, that's a matter that will depend on the proceedings of the Court.

Q What are the precedents with respect to limiting jurisdiction of the Court for specific disputes? The ones cited here are Australia, India and United Kingdom -- can you tell us whether any of those gave notice in advance of any -- or what were the circumstances surrounding notice?

A Surrounding notice? I believe they were all effective immediately. Yes.

Q Can you give us the instances of what took place; what the nature of the --

A I have a sheet to that effect. Basically, the one involving the United Kingdom, the facts as we understand them werethat the U.K. and Saudi Arabia had agreed to arbitrate a dispute, commercial dispute, I believe. The United Kingdom at some point decided that that arbitration was being prejudiced because they alleged the Saudi party was bribing the witnesses. The arbitration, therefore, broke down.

Apparently, the British had some suspicion that the Saudis might take the case then to the ICJ, and so they issued a declaration similar to the one we did to exclude from their accession to jurisdiction any matters which had at one point been subjected to arbitration. It was, again, to avoid a specific case.

Q That was upheld by the Court?

A I don't think it was challenged before the Court. I think it was just considered to be effected. That was in 1955.

Another case was in 1970; Canada, when it extended its jurisdiction over marine pollution into the seas, also at the same time took action to exclude Canadian claims of rights over marine issues from its accession to the jurisdiction of the Court.

Q Was there a specific case at issue at the time or was that done to pre-empt something that was imminent?

A It was done to pre-empt.

Q And who was the complainant, or the prospective complainant?

A I think there they made some assumptions about who might be the prospective claimants. As I recall. that was done when they passed their legislation, that they just took that as an act to guard against any potential litigation.

Q Was it challenged?

A No. Other instances were India in 1956, having to do with a possible application by Portugal concerning its rights of passage to its former enclaves in India. And Australia, in 1954, where they were concerned that the Japanese were about to apply because of an extension of juisdiction over pearls fisheries. And the Australians, again, limited their accession to avoid that situation.

Q Were any of these latter two, as well as the first two, were any of them brought before the Court where the Court had to hear arguments about jurisdiction?

A No. I think in those cases the other potential parties to the dispute recognized that the jurisdictional issue was so overwhelming that there was no point in them bringing their action, although I'm speculating to the motives of the other possible parties in those cases.

Q This will be the first time that a question of modification of jurisdiction by one state may actually be contested before the Court; is that correct?

A To the best of my knowledge.

Q What is the purpose of the two-year time line?

A Two years was obviously an arbitrary figure but it was one that was not without some common-sense rationale. As I mentioned earlier, the main concern we had here was to allow the Contadora regional peace-making process an opportunity to reach agreement and to have those agreements implemented. Given the schedule and given the realities, and so on, two years seemed like a reasonable and ample amount of time to allow that process to go forward to its hopefully positive conclusion.

Q In the course of making this decision, did the U.S. decide that it would refrain from using the Court within those two years in connection with Central America as well, or does it reserve the right to change its mind and come back and use the Court if necessary?

A There are two possibilities. We can always change our mind in the sense of further modifying our accession to jurisdiction, in its broad sense.

There is also the possibility that every state has of agreeing with another state or group of states to submit a particular issue to the Court.

In fact, this is something important to note, that with the exception of forty-some-odd countries, most of the countries of the world do not accede in any way to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court _in toto_. What they do have is the opportunity to, by agreement with other states submit particular cases, and a number of them have done so on that basis. But the bulk of states don't have this kind of standing jurisdictional document we do.

Even within the forty-some-odd that have acceded to compulsory jurisdiction, many of them have major reservations or exceptions built into their accession so that it does not cover all categories of cases in a number of cases.

Q Will the United States consider itself bound by the Court's decision on the jurisdictional issue whichever way it comes out?

A It's fair to assume the United States has long supported the Court. We support the U.N. Charter and we abide by decisions of the competent bodies.

Q So, in other words, if we lose on this jurisdictional issue, we would proceed to the merits of Nicaragua's charges, and if we lose on that we would do whatever the Court directs us to do?

A Again, I think you're speculating as to how a judicial process might go forward. But I think it's enough to say that we take seriously our obligations under the Charter and [illegible] the Statute of the Court.

Q What other cases -- name a few cases that are major cases that are pending that the U.S. has now before the Court? Could you name any in which the other parties have done what the U.S. just did?

A I'm not aware of any where other parties in litigation with the U.S. have taken such action. The case that is now before the Court to which the U.S. is party is the case with Canada concerning the maritime boundary in the Gulf of Maine. That case was taken to the Court through agreement between the United States and Canada.

Q Any others?

A We don't have any others pending at this moment that we're party to.

(Continued on next page)

b Q Is this the first time the United States has taken action of this kind to carve out some part and say it wasn't in the jurisdiction?

A Yes and no. In 1946, when the U.S. acceded to the jurisdiction of the Court for the first time, we carved out a couple of exceptions at that time. One is the so-called "Connolly reservation," which excludes from the jurisdiction of the Court any matter within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States as determined exclusively by the United States. That's a fairly broad standard that we, by saying something is within our domestic jurisdiction, exclude it.

There is also one called the "Vandenberg reservation" which deals with multilateral treaties to which the United States is party, and which basically says that any dispute arising under a multilateral treaty where the decision of the Court would affect other parties to the treaty, if those parties aren't before the Court, then we're not bound by the jurisdiction.

Q How do you answer the statement of the Vice President of the American Society of International Law that this is a potentially bad precedent for the United States,as the country which sponsored all this process, to be saying, "Well, we don't want to play by this rule in this case"?

A I don't know that it's not playing by the rules. The rules do permit countries to lawfully do what we have done, and it's been done before.

Q I meant the rules of the International Court of Justice?

A I mean, that's what I'm saying: The rules of the Court do permit you to modify your accession to jurisdiction at any time.

Q You're saying "jurisdiction"?

A Well, you're talking, really, a broader, philosophical issue --

Q Yes.

A -- of whether a country should submit itself to the jurisdiction of the Court on all matters at any time, regardless of the other factors that may be involved. As I mentioned, the United States has traditionally had some limitations on its accession, in any event, so we've never had the total accession to jurisdiction.

I also might point out that this action that we've taken, the effect of it is to defer any litigation about these matters for the space of two years. It is not saying that we will never litigate any matter in Central America -- or indeed even the matters that may be complained of; rather, that this is not the appropriate time, given the ongoing peace process in the region for us to be diverting attention into such litigation.

Q Isn't it pretty clear that for the United States, or let's say Country A, to mine the harbors of another country, not citing any treaty, whatever it thinks its provocation is, is a violation of international law?

A I'm not sure I understand the question.

Q Isn't it pretty clear that for one country, whatever its provocation may be or think it may be, to use its para-military forces or money, or whatever, to mine some other country's harbors and send people across the borders to attack them is a violation of international law?

A Well, that's exactly the kind of issues, on the merits, obviously, I can't comment on -- any activities that may or may not be undertaken. Mining is certainly not inherently an illegal action under the law of war -- and I use that term in the legal sense, not in the practical one.

Q If we declared war, it would be O.K., is that what you're saying?

A No, no. The law of war -- the distinction I'm trying to make applies to any kind of armed conflict. It's, unfortunately, the term that is used; it's a term of art in international law, "the law of war," but it doesn't mean "war" in the declared war sense. The only point there is that whether activity such as that is lawful or not lawful depends on all the facts and circumstances. Action in self-defense is legitimate, and obviously, if it's an armed attack, it's not. But that's a separate issue.

Q In other words, you believe that you could make a legal defense possibly for the mining of the harbor?

A Well, we aren't in the position of having to do that. As I say, I'm not going to comment on what --

Q I'm just going by the drift of your comments here, that you think you could, in certain circumstances, concoct a legal defense for mining a harbor?

A Again, I don't want to comment on what we would have to defend or not defend. I think, as I indicated earlier, that there was a certain temptation to proceed with litigation in order to demonstrate the merits of the case on both sides; but we felt that that was not the most productive course to be followed at this point when we have a peace process underway.

Q I just want to be clear on one of the things you're saying here in specific terms and not philosophical: Nicaragua has filed a complaint before the World Court. We are saying that we will now go to the World Court and argue with Nicaragua on whether the World Court has jurisdiction over this particular complaint, is that right?

A That's correct.

Q And if the World Court rules that it does have jurisdiction, regardless of what the World Court then says, we're just not going to abide by it for a two-year period. Is that it?

A No, that is not the import of our Notice. It doesn't say that we will not comply with orders of the Court. What we are saying is, we have excluded from our accession to jurisdiction.

Under the rules of the Court --

Q What is the difference?

A Under the rules of the Court, a country cannot accede at all to the jurisdiction of the Court, or it can accede totally, or it can accede to certain categories of cases and not cert categories of cases. What we've done is exclude cases involving Central America from our accession to jurisdiction for that period. As to the effectiveness of that, we are quite confident that that is effective and removes the matter from the jurisdiction of the Court. But the Court determines its own jurisdiction, and we have to defend or put out our own case before the Court, and the Court will make a ruling. We're fairly confident that we know what that will be. But I'm not saying,and the effect of that Notice was not to say, that the United States is putting notice that it will not adhere to the orders of the Court.

What we're saying is that we have created an exception to our previously-existing accession to jurisdiction to limit the scope somewhat for a temporary period, and that we believe that will be effective in terms of convincing the Court that this is not within its jurisdiction. But the Court defines its jurisdiction.

Q But that is an assertion of an American position, right?

A Yes. But it is one that has legal effect because it is up to each country to define the terms of its own accession to jurisdiction. The Court, then, will look at that in terms of deciding whether you have indeed acceded or not acceded to the jurisdiction of the Court.

Q Maybe it's a policy question that your colleague might want to take a crack at: Was it necessary to do this, sir, because, as many people on the Hill are alleging today, the U.S. Government simply did not have confidence in its own policy and in the correctness of its policy, and simply had to go on record in advance and say, "We're not going to deal with any kind of legal interpretation on this matter. We are removing it from a legal interpretation."

SECOND DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: The short answer, obviously, is no in the sense that I think it's clear that the decision was taken on the basis of what the net consequences were going to be of allowing Nicaragua to go ahead and litigate this before the International Court. And I think it is germane to a question that was asked a little earlier in that sense: Consider what would likely be the case in something of that type, that is to say you have a very narrow cross-section of the Central American conflict, one in which Nicaragua claims to be the aggrieved party, taken before the Court. But there is an entire spectrum to the Central America issue that is not, or it is anticipated would not be included in their complaint. That, then, would necessarily invite others, or at least would invite consideration of all the other dimensions of the problem; and that, I think, by necessity, would turn into a very time-consuming process of litigation, which would be in substance, very similar to that which is already taking place within the Contadora framework -- that is, the deliberation of all these issues and sort of the weighing the relative merits of these issues.

It really turns into, then, the question of what is the most effective way to proceed? And which is the way that is most likely to serve our national interests? -- to have all of this hashed out in the context of a legal suit in the International Court or to take place within the regional institution that is charged with it already. It's very much our determination that it be the latter.

Q Why didn't we just await the complaint and then

b-8 claim one of the exceptions we already have?

FIRST OFFICIAL: I think if you look at the exceptions as I described them earlier -- obviously, you could try to make arguments on these. I don't want to get into the kind of arguments we would be making before the Court, but we felt it was a prudent measure to make it clear through the action we've taken.

Q Prudent?

A It's a litigation tactic is the bottom line on this.

Q Hypothetically, were the Court to rule against us on this, we would still have yet another fallback position, then, wouldn't we? We could further declare that this is a matter within our own purview, and that's the end of it?

A I wouldn't stop you from making that speculation, but again, I don't want to get into the kinds of arguments we will be making in our briefs before the Court, because I think those should be tried before the Court and not in the press, ahead of time.

Q Are there provisions in the Court now for handling cases involving classified information, provisions that would prevent the U.S. from having to disclose information that it doesn't want to disclose?

A   No, there are not, to the best of my knowledge. And this raises one of the rather unique aspects about this case, that, as I mentioned earlier, the bulk of states have not acceded to the jurisdiction of the Court at all, and some that have, have done so with major reservations. I mean some reserve any matter involving hostilities, or armed conflict, or any matters of that kind from their accession.

It's really the first time we have been able to determine that any situation where there is an ongoing military activity, where even any part of that has been brought before the Court, and it obviously presents a whole series of complications which the Court has never faced before, to deal with a situation of that kind.

(Continued on page 23.)

Q Seems like that would be something you would like, rather have some lawyer arguing about it rather than people killing each other. I mean, rather than feeling that that's a bad --

FIRST OFFICIAL: If you had confidence that the outcome of a court case would resolve the problems of Central America, I think everybody here would say we're for that. The problem I was alluding to earlier is that you've got really a selective approach to issues that have been pulled out, and that the Court is capable of dealing only with certain aspects of the problem. A lot of aspects of this problem are not subject to a legal determination. They require a negotiated solution. The law doesn't provide for a solution to every problem that arises in the world. A lot of the problems in Central America are very complex and will require negotiated agreements amongst the parties. So while the Court in theory is capable of dealing with some aspects of it, the feeling was that it was better to have all the aspects dealt with in the forum that they are being dealt with and to try to achieve a comprehensive solution that does have at least a prospect of really resolving the conflict and stopping the killing.

Q By taking this action, though, don't you in -- aren't you in effect saying that, "Yes, the United States is involved in the mining of the Nicaraguan harbors."

FIRST OFFICIAL: Not at all.

Q Then why bother taking the action if you're not involved in it?

SECOND OFFICIAL: Let's see if we can cut through some of the veneer on this problem in the sense of looking at what has transpired in the Contadora process, how it's developed over the course of the last year, where it seems to be heading, and how this kind of thing has affected it.

Beginning in the period of the agreement on the 21 points, we began believing that the Contadora process was in fact making substantial progress. It isn't progress that's likely to bring about an immediate resolution of the conflict in Central America, but, nonetheless, it was progress in the sense of agreeing to an agenda which all of the countries of the region could agree to and which the Contadora Four could agree with, and which in fact is entirely compatible with our own objectives, and that was substantial progress.

The January declaration this year was a further element of progress in that regard. I think that we would consider that the acceptance of the democratization principle by Nicaragua and the fact that it scheduled elections is a further indication of progress in that area. So there are a number of steps that are proceeding that, from our point of view, are proceeding in a very positive way.

Throughout this period Nicaragua has been brought kicking and screaming to some of these conclusions. There's no secret, for example, that it took a great deal of pressure on the part of the Contadora Four countries to get Nicaragua to sign on to the Document of Objectives, for example. Thoughout that process they have tried a series of end runs on Contadora which would break out of the Contadora process those things that were of particular concern to them, which would fail to address the problems of the other countries of the region. They took it to the United Nations back last summer. They have surfaced their so-called four treaties within the visit by Miguel D'Escoto here to Washington. They took it to the United Nations again just last week.

All of these things have the net effect of trying to isolate those two or three issues within the Contadora process that they feel are most important from their point of view and disregard everybody else's concern. Part of our motivation in taking this step is precisely to prevent that kind of step from being taken again and to sort of focus back all of the attention, all of the negotiations, all of the looking at this issue, back into that Contadora process where all of the issues are treated equally.

Q Did we understand you correctly in response to Greg's question to say that if this jurisdictional argument failed, that you would then fall back on your other exception, so that in effect this would not come before the -- on its merits it wouldn't come before the Court in any event.

FIRST OFFICIAL: Again, I'm not going to go into the precise arguments we'll be making.

Q But you didn't steer him away from that I guess is what you were saying. Is that right?

Q It's an open option.

FIRST OFFICIAL: We will make all the arguments available to us in the case as any litigator would.

Q One procedural question for you (First Official), and one for the Second Official, a more substantive one.

The procedural question is you keep alluding to the "rules of the Court." Are these codified rules? Are you speaking of -- I don't understand. I understand that countries can admit themselves to be bound by the ICJ and then can provide reservations for their jurisdiction, but is there -- what can we look at that is written down that defines that?

FIRST OFFICIAL: The Statute of the International Court of Justice is an annex to the U.N. Charter, so if you get a document with the Charter, you will see the Statute there.

Q Okay. That takes care of the procedural question. On the substantive question I was going to ask, with the success of the Contadora Group you've got a declaration now by the Contadora Group which says that the mining of harbors and military maneuvers in Honduras, and so on, as well as other activities are intensifying the conflict, and that they would appreciate that such behavior cease. To what extent does the United States intend to respond to this call, especially when it is as specific as speaking of mining of harbors as a fact?

SECOND OFFICIAL: I think it's clear that the Contadora countries would like a whole series of things to be accomplished, and those series of things are included in the Document of Objectives. It is also clear that they have to be resolved, each in the context of each other; that is to say, that they're interrelated items. It isn't going to be possible to bring about a reduction of one person's problems when the other guy's problems aren't being dealt with. I think in the context of an overall solution to the problem in Central America, in the context of the 21 points, I think all of those concerns are likely to be met.

Q This is the first time they mentioned, specifically, one particular act about which Nicaragua has claimed specifically and which is brought to the attention of the Security Council. Do you think that

that whatever the merits of this act -- whether the United States is doing it or not doing it -- the best interests of Contadora are served by insisting that we will not do anything until all these other items are taken care of together?

SECOND OFFICIAL: I think of insisting that it's necessary to resolve all of the problems within a single comprehensive agreement, yes.

Q Stepping aside for a second from the legal aspects of this situation, don't you think you hurt the support for the Contadora money on Capitol Hill by -- "contra" money on Capitol Hill by taking this action?

SECOND OFFICIAL: Obviously, in taking the action that we've taken, we've had to weigh a lot of considerations, and there are positive sides to taking it, and there are negative sides. I think we've dealt with it in a very forthright way and in a way that's in keeping with our security interests. We didn't resort to sort of positions that might have been questionable on the surface in terms of claiming any particular, say, sort of different kind of a solution to this problem; we simply exempted ourselves from the consideration of the Court with the interests of trying to promote the negotiations within the Contadora process. We thought that the long-term benefits of pursuing that route outweighed any of the short-term negative consequences.

Q Can I try one more? I don't mean this to be an unfair question. At the time in 1979 when we were preparing to go before The Hague with our complaint against Iran when they took the hostages, if they had pre-empted this action by saying they were not going to allow this to be within the cases they would allow to be brought before the Court, what would we have done?

FIRST OFFICIAL: That's a hypothetical question. The fact is they didn't take any such action, and we did have a jurisdictional basis that the Court examined and found that they did have jurisdiction in that case.

Q They also wanted the money.

FIRST OFFICIAL: But it's a question of law, really, whether a country has or has not taken effective action to limit the scope of its adherence to jurisdiction before the fact. As I indicated earlier, it's not something you can do once you're in the midst of litigation. You have to do it before a complaint is filed.

Q Can I follow up on that? Is it written anywhere in the U.N. Charter or the Statute of the ICJ that a country that has in 1946 acceded to jurisdiction with two specified exceptions can at some later date add a third exception? And, second, if it is, doesn't that create the whole thing into sort of a game, a race to the courthouse? If we get there first and withdraw our jurisdiction, we win; if Nicaragua gets there first with their complaint, they win? What kind of a rule of law is that?

FIRST OFFICIAL: As far as the first question, what the Statute of the Court provides is that states may at any time accede to the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to specific cases, categories of cases, or *in toto*; that the nature of that action is the filing of a declaration with the Court. It's a unilateral step. Therefore, it obviously can be amended by similar action.

Q Isn't that obvious, really? I mean, it's a unilateral step to accede to the U.N. Charter. Does that mean anybody who wants to --

FIRST OFFICIAL: No. There you're agreeing with other parties on a treaty, the U.N. Charter. But I think the point is it can be done, it has been done in the past, and what that says about the rule of law is a nice philosophical question. The fact is that the United States has really been in the forefront of countries in terms of having acceded to the jurisdiction of the Court early-on; most countries have not. The fact that it may not be useful in terms of trying to achieve a result -- namely, a comprehensive settlement to a problem to go to the Court at a particular time in a particular circumstance -- doesn't mean that the Court is any less meaningful.

We're trying a case, as I mentioned, before the

Court right now. The Court was utilized in the Iran case by the United States. Other countries have been and are utilizing the Court to resolve various disputes. I think the point that's important, though, is that the Court is a capable and viable instrument for resolving legal disputes, or disputes that are capable of a legal resolution. What we're saying is with respect to this case, to pull out a couple of legal aspects of a broader and complicated situation is really not going to contribute to the overall result that everyone is seeking, and it's really a choice-of-forum question rather than any issue as to the respect for that forum or the abilities and effectiveness of that forum.

Q Did you cite a section in answer to that question, or did I miss it?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Of the Court Statute --

Q A section for support for a third exception.

FIRST OFFICIAL: It's Article 36 of the Statute of the Court is the one that lays out the procedures for acceding to the jurisdiction of the Court.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 3:05 p.m.)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release April 9, 1984

PRESS BRIEFING
BY LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
ON HIS TRIP TO THE SOVIET UNION

The Briefing Room

3:05 P.M. EST

MR. SIMS: This briefing is for sound and cameras. Your briefer is Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. He has met with the President beginning at 2:30 p.m. for a half an hour today. General Scowcroft is back from a trip to the Soviet Union with the Dartmouth group, which he took in March; from a trip to China with the UN Association which he took at the end of March, beginning of April; and he is Chairman, as you know, of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces.

Q The Scowcroft Commission.

MR. SIMS: The Scowcroft Commission reported to the President on April 11, 1983. While owning the receipt of that report, the President requested General Scowcroft and other members of that Commission to further study the arms control aspects of the report.

Q That's two days from now, Bob.

MR. SIMS: 1983?

Q Oh, 1983. (Laughter.)

MR. SIMS: As its final act, the Commission submitted a letter report to the President March 21st, 1984, which we provided to you at that time.

The President has now reviewed the letter report, and we have a Presidential statement on it, to release to you at the conclusion of this briefing.

General Scowcroft.

Q So we're going to get the statement after the briefing?

Q After the briefing?

Q Typical.

Q Why don't we get the statement first?

Q Yeah, can you tell us why that is?

Q -- so we can ask him about it.

MR. SIMS: You've got the report.

Q Yes, but we're going to get the President's statement --

Q Thanks to the General and his associates for a job well done in the service of his country.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Not bad. (Laughter.)

Q Tell us about being snubbed in Moscow.

Q Yes.

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GENERAL SCOWCROFT: The President asked me to come by today principally to talk to him about the final report of the Commission on Strategic Forces. As Bob mentioned, this report focused primarily on arms control. Since our earlier report had emphasized, for obvious reasons, the MX and missile portion of our 3-part recommendation, what we tried to do in this report is to, again, try to find some common ground on arms control in which a consensus might be developed; to point out what arms control can realistically, and cannot be expected to do; how one goes about the details of negotiating between the Soviet Union and the United States when the force structures on each side are so asymmetrical, are asymmetrical to each other; what kinds of things one ought to emphasize both in reductions and modernizations, that is, improving stability; some comments about particular aspects like verification, the freeze, ballistic missile defense, confidence-building measures -- but again, designed to fill out the third part of our, if you will, triangular report that we made about a year ago.

Now, I'd be happy to deal with your questions.

Q What's your view?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I beg your pardon?

Q What is your view? Is there a possibility the Russians will return soon to the negotiating table?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: It's not my impression that anything will happen very soon.

Q Why?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, I think you really ought to ask them. I think, you know, that the President has made a number of initiatives. You know, at the very least, you can go back further, but at least in January, first of all, we have a very good arms control proposal on the table at Geneva for START negotiations. The President gave a very forthcoming speech in January; he sent Vice President Bush to the Andropov funeral. There have been a number of efforts to establish a serious dialogue, and so far without results.

Q Can you explain why? Why you think they --

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Just, as a personal judgment, I think it may include at least two things, and that is that despite what the General Secretary said Saturday, I think they are not interested in assisting Ronald Reagan's re-election campaign if they think that that would help. And I think, another, it may relate to the internal political situation within the Soviet Union.

Q Were you stiffed over there? Tell us about that.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: You mean, as the Dartmouth group? We had very difficult --

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Q No, you carried a letter and they wouldn't receive you -- What was the story on that?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I think I'll just reside no comment on that one.

Q Wait a moment. I don't understand. Maybe -- something I don't understand. But you carried a letter from the President and they wouldn't see you except for a minor official. Was it that they wouldn't see you or they didn't see you soon enough and you therefore withdrew?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I'm going to no-comment from the first part of your statement to the end. Okay?

Q That's all we've had in this White House today is no comment.

Q Yes, but --

Q That's --

Q -- explain why you won't -- What's the problem.

Q -- that it's true. That, really, you -- understand that will suggest it's true.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: In part, I don't think it's useful.

Q That why you let the Tass statement stand as the last statement on this --

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I'm not going to let anything stand, you know. I'm just not going to comment on that part of it. You know, comment on the --

Q -- negotiations until November?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I beg your pardon?

Q You don't see anything until after November?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I think the prospects are not bright.

Q Well, you talked about the internal situation. What specifically? Is it Chernenko not in charge? Is that the problem?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, you know, I think there's nothing more difficult for Americans than to analyze what goes on within the leadership in the Soviet Union. But that is at least one possibility for a position which, at least from my perspective, you know, is a rather unusual one.

Q Sir, did you --

Q Go ahead. What do you mean "unusual" --

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, unusual -- you know. One of the primary Soviet aims up to now has been to try to divide the Europeans from the United States and liberals from conservatives and

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so on and so forth. To the extent that they are resistant to talks and absolutely stonewall serious efforts to resume a dialogue, it seems to me that they tend to defeat that goal.

Q So, again, how does that relate to the internal situation, sir?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: That's just a guess.

Q Are you trying to say, though -- I thought when you had first brought it up that you were trying to say that maybe Chernenko's position isn't as solid -- or his voice isn't as heard as we might think, that there are --

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: That's a possibility. Another one is that we really don't know Chernenko. The only thing we know about Chernenko is that he was very closely identified with Brezhnev and, you know, for us the age of arms control is the age of Brezhnev. All of our -- our sustained arms control since 1968 that we've had -- discussions that we've had since 1968 have all been with Brezhnev.

Now, you know, all -- really, all we can do is speculate about Chernenko's views, about his position, about others who may have very different views than prevailed under Brezhnev. That just is one possibility to explain something which I think on its surface is not easily explained.

Q General, the administration claims that despite the current atmospherics, it has stabilized relations with the Soviet Union and says that we're closer to peace now than you are -- have been in a long time. Given your experience in previous administrations, do you accept that statement?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, I don't think -- I don't know what "stabilized relations" really mean. But I think you can say, you know, if you compare the political or psychological atmosphere between the two powers, it's as bad as it's been in my memory. If you look at the objective situation between the two, I think you could make an argument that it is somewhat better in the sense that the Soviet Union is at least aware that they're not likely to get something for nothing.

Now, so, you know, I --

Q Than you would have under Mr. Ford? I mean, what are you saying that they used to think they could get something for nothing?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I think, you know, that there were some residual thoughts along those lines and I think -- you know, the defense budgets over the last three years have shown the kind of growth that obviously has to get to their attention, that's what I mean to say.

Q How often has the President spoken over the telephone to the Premier over there?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Oh, I really can't answer that. You know, I'm not in the administration and I couldn't say -- A telephone conversation with Mr. Brezhnev or with any Soviet leader is very difficult because it has to be made through interpreters. There have been communications. There have been -- There certainly have been written communications I think you're aware of.

Q Sir, I'm having a little time here trying to figure out what you were able to do or accomplish or what you saw or heard

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while you were over there. What did you accomplish on this trip?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Very little. One thing I'd like to point out is that, for those of you who don't know, the Dartmouth Group is a private group of Americans. They've held annual discussions, more or less annual discussions with Soviet counterparts since -- Oh, for about 20 years now and it was an attempt to maintain an informal arms control dialogue whatever the state of official business, that was the reason I went. And what I'm saying is while those discussions are off the record and are private, it was a very negative visit.

Q General, what was the reaction of the Soviet Union to the Harvard Group? I mean, I think it's two professors in Harvard who contend that it really wasn't yellow rain, it was bee dung. Are they receptive to that theory?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: We didn't talk about that.

Q You never discussed that?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Not that particular issue, no.

Q General, yesterday, Defense Secretary Weinberger said that an arms agreement without on-site inspection wasn't worthwhile. Do you share that view?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, I think it -- It depends what it is you're trying to verify and I think you're making a statement more all-inclusive than he meant.

I think, you know, that the sophistication of some systems and the nature of some systems might indicate that we need something more than national technical means. Now, whether that's on-site -- On-site doesn't do everything for you either. But I think we need to use our imagination as indeed we have since 1968 in divising kinds of verification procedures that we didn't think were possible, even at the time of SALT I. And I think the Soviets increasingly recognize that. They no longer ritually insist on national technical means. Instead, they say that the means have to be adequate to the system's being verified.

Q General --

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Now, what that means, I don't know. But --

Q Do you agree with the administration position that an anti-satellite ban, weapon ban couldn't be verified?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: It's very difficult. It's very difficult. That doesn't mean that some things could not be done; but one of the problems is a carrier vehicle, anything that could launch -- anything that can launch a warhead can launch an anti-satellite. It's a very complicated sort of a thing and it's my impression the administration is still looking at what can usefully be done there.

Q General, you say the political and psychological situation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union is as bad now as you can ever remember. Does Ronald Reagan bear any responsibility for that?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I think, you know, the administration rhetoric has certainly given the Soviets a negative view of the possibilities of dealing with this administration and in that sense I think, yes. As you remember, I commented that I think that they were not interested in contributing -- doing anything which would contribute to the reelection of the President.

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Q Did you tell that to the President?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Yes, I did.

Q What did he say?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I'll let --

Q He told you a joke, didn't he?

Q Did you recommend any ways to change the atmosphere?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: No jokes, Sam.

Q Did you recommend any ways for him to change the atmosphere or improve it? The climate.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Yes, I did; but I'd rather not talk about those.

Q General --

Q -- you feel --

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I beg your pardon?

Q Given the current state of Soviet-American relations, politically, psychologically, objectively, would you say -- is the world a safer or more dangerous place now than it was during the Ford administration?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I think, you know, that kind of micro-measurement is not possible.

I think that by and large the chances of nuclear war tend to be decreasing and I would say that, you know, without taking a cross-section at any particular date in time.

Q Why do you say that?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I say that because as -- strangely enough, as the numbers of systems grow, as they get more complex, more diversified and as the strategic balance becomes, remains, recovers to a more equal

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a more equal level so that they're not obvious incentives in a first strike, and as each side learns more about the other, that the chances of a nuclear war tend to decline.

Q General?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Yes.

Q You have mentioned the poor relationship with the Soviet Union. It's as bad as it's ever been before.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Yes.

Q You say, you've talked to the President about that. Do you have a sense that the President from your discussions has a good sense that in this administration the situation is as bad as it's ever been? Does he have a good idea of that or is he passing that off?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I think he does. But what I would poin to is the fact that, I think, there is no question that the President is sincerely interested in meaningful arms control and in a serious dialogue with the Soviet Union. Now --

Q But does he have a sense that policies, and you've said his policies, he's a certain -- he has to assume a certain responsibility for this poor relationship --

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: That's my own opinion.

Q Right.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I --

Q But does he have a good sense that this is the worst relations have been in many years with the Soviet Union -- his administration?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I think he realizes that relations are not good.

Q General Scowcroft --

Q You said that the Soviets don't like the President's rhetoric. But is it your view that the President's rhetoric is working? Is it giving them pause in essence, and is that why you think nuclear war is less likely?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: To a certain extent, it probably is. I think one of the reasons that the Soviets engage in arms control is that they are very much afraid at heart of American technological and productive capability. And they don't want to see that turned loose. Now, there are many other reasons they could want arms control. And I think that anything which indicates that that might be possible certainly tends to get their attention.

Q General Scowcroft, I'd like you to --

Q As a former National Security Advisor, could you comment on what you think the probity is of this administration not going by the decisions of the World Court in relation to the Central America -- in relation to Nicaragua?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Yes, I can, but I won't. (Laughter.)

Q General --

Q General --

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Yes.

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Q -- I'd like you to clarify --

Q Must mean that you have negative view.

Q -- what you said about the nature --

Q Well, why wouldn't you support it?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Look. I'm out here on a particular set of topics, and I don't -- You know.

Q I'd just like to clarify what you said about the nature of Dartmouth. You said it was private American citizens --

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Yes.

Q -- and their Soviet counterparts. Aren't the Soviet counterparts government --

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I did not say private Soviet -- That's an anamoly. There almost is no such thing as a private Soviet citizen, of course. Now, what the Soviet counterparts do is theoretically take their official hats off and sit in the meetings as private individuals unaccountable, theoretically, for what they say. That's about the closest you can come.

Q Now, along the same lines, on the evening of March 26th, there was a national television broadcast in the United States called, "Henry A. Kissinger: Soviet Agent of Influence." Now, you're an employee of Kissinger's firm. Do you know of any action that Kissinger is claiming to attempt to counter the evidence that was presented in that half hour documentary?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I'm not familiar with that documentary, so I can't say. I was in China. (Laughter.)

Q General --

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: In all honesty, that's the first I've heard of it.

Q Do you know if your boss is familiar with it?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: He hasn't mentioned it to me.

Q I'm talking about a half hour national broadcast on ABC.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I'm sorry. You've caught me absolutely flat. Maybe that's why nobody's heard of it.

Q Ahhhhh. (Laughter.)

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: (Laughter.) Sorry. Expunge that. I couldn't resist that. No, in all honesty, I haven't heard about it. He has not mentioned to me. I don't know.

Q -- what do you say to that, Sam?

Q Boy, that was a clean one, Sam.

Q General Scowcroft, on the question of rhetoric --

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Yes.

Q On the question of rhetoric, the President lately has been expressing his -- at least his good intentions toward negotiations. Can he have it both ways? Can he convince the Soviets he's going to be tough like he has and, then, kind of knock them over the head with an olive branch every week -- (laughter) -- Is that -- Do you think that's the correct way for him to approach this current situation?

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GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Yes, I think it's a correct way.

Q Why?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Because we've [illegible] to start from where we are today. And I think where we are today is the President sincerely is interested in serious negotiations

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with the Soviet Union. I think that's the proper -- the proper approach.

Q Won't the Soviets view this simply as -- for domestic consumption on Reagan's part and wait him out?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: That's what I said in one of my interpretations of what they might be calculating.

Q Do you think that's a foregone conclusion, then, based on --

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: No, I don't think it's a foregone conclusion, because, the Soviets, depending on how they assess the election, could also perhaps, want to negotiate before rather than after. I don't, I don't know -- you know, when you talk about the Politburo, and the internal politics of the Politburo, and how they may look at the United States, and especially how they may look at American elections, you know -- it's very tough.

Q Could you tell me --

Q But you said we're getting to know each other better. But we're really not, are we? I mean, does this --

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: No. What we're getting to know each other better about is some of our strategic concepts, and why we do the things we do. It doesn't necessarily always enhance the relationship to understand each other better. But, I think -- no, I think from that standpoint, from a military, in a strategic sense, we do understand things a lot better than we did 50 years ago.

Q General, is the distance the President is putting between himself and the Congress healthy in terms of foreign relations?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, that's a little separate kind of a subject. I think one of the things that we emphasized in our report a year ago, and in the letter we just gave the President, was the importance of trying to establish a consensus -- a core coalition -- within the U.S. government, and hopefully in the society as a whole on some of the central issues of arms control and our strategic forces. For the last decade, we have not had a single major arms control agreement completed and ratified, and very few major weapons systems either have gone through, or gone through without a bitter kind of a debate. What we're trying to do in everything that we did is to try to find some common ground, that maybe is not optimal from anybody's particular perspective, but that has enough common elements in it to reestablish a kind of a bipartisan consensus.

Q But General, on that very point of linking, for instance, the MX to progress on arms control, there are a lot of people on the Hill, including people who last year voted for the MX, who say they got the bad end of the deal. That they believed you, believed your Commission Report and the administration, voted the MX funds, and got nothing in return in terms of results.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I think that -- I think that if that's what some believe, then they do not understand the changes between the initial administration's START proposal and that which is on the table now. It's really quite fundamentally different.

Q Could you -- are you concerned that, whatever their perceptions may be, as long as they do believe that --

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Yes --

Q -- that the MX funding, for instance, might be denied this year, because they are not seeing concrete results on arms control?

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GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, and as I indicated, I'm not sure that they will see any concrete results this year. But what I'm saying is that what is on the administration's proposal, on the table in Geneva today, forms a sound basis for a serious negotiation with the Soviets. It's a good proposal.

Q Are we in any way responsible for the break-off of the talks? Do we have any responsibility for that at all? We've -- the President's talked specifically about -- the Soviets walked away, it's their fault -- does the United States have any responsibility in this break-off?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I honestly think we do not, in the break-off. Certainly the Soviets, after having threatened dire consequences all this time, had to do something. And this is, in part, what they chose to do -- is to break off the talks -- is to state that they were going to pose an analogous threat to the United States that we were posing to them. And -- but, you know, I think the particular measures they chose were theirs. And I don't see that NATO, or the United States, or both, have any real responsibility for the breaking it off.

Q Aren't you really saying that the President's been wrong in the rhetoric? Because the proposal is good, we've done all the right things.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, the early comment on the rhetoric was, you know, "What has it done to the relationship?" And I think one has to

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say that some of the rhetoric, especially early on, has exacerbated relations.

Q But don't you think some of the Reagan moves also have? The very hard-line belligerency?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, if you look at -- you know, if you look at the actions as opposed to the rhetoric, you know, they're really not.

Q He's been kind of soft on the Russians, hasn't he?

Q The MX and all that stuff?

MR. SIMS: Can we have one more quick -- one, two -- Bob and Chris.

Q General, would you elaborate on your earlier remark in which you said you believed the Soviet Union is trying to divide liberals and conservatives?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, what they want to do is make as much trouble for U.S. and NATO programs as they can. And that is -- that has taken the form of appearing the white -- the guys with the white hats on and the United States, in particular, both domestically and with respect to our allies, as the bad guy, as the ones preventing any kind of an agreement. That's what I meant. And that's -- you know, that's been a useful -- it's been a useful policy for them which they blow from time to time like they did in the general elections. But that's, I think, basically what they've tried to do.

Q I just want to make sure, was it today that you suggested the President cool his rhetoric, and can you tell us what his response was?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: No, I didn't. No, no. We didn't --

Q So when you told him to -- gave him that advice, it wasn't today? On his rhetoric.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: No. I don't remember -- did I? I don't remember --

Q You said you gave him some suggestions for improving --

Q You acknowledged --

Q Suggestions.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Suggestions, but we didn't talk about rhetoric.

Q But was that today?

Q Suggestions on how to improve relations, right?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I gave him some personal thoughts on what might be useful as next steps.

Q A summit meeting?

Q Could you tell us --

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: No, I'd rather not.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 3:30 P.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

DRAFT

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO CHINA

April 10, 1984

Room 248
Old Executive Office Building

10:55 A.M. EST

MR. SIMS: This briefing is ON BACKGROUND attributable to a Senior Administration Official.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would like to go quickly to your questions. And let me just make a couple of comments at the beginning. I have been involved in the science and technology cooperation with China for some time now, and I would rate it as, certainly as successful, as any such cooperation we have with any foreign country. It is taken with extreme importance in the People's Republic, largely because of its impact upon the Chinese modernization program. There is an enormous effort to develop the talent and the kind of knowledge they will need to develop China on the back of rapidly evolving technology.

There are approximately 10,000 Chinese students in the United States today, half of whom are supported by the Chinese government, and half privately. I think that is taken, perhaps, as the single most important aspect of the entire cooperation. But, we in the scientific community used to joke, that if you want to see some of your colleagues, the best thing to do is get on a boat on the Lei River, or someplace else in China, because the presence of American scientists in China is so prevalent.

But, with those introductory comments, let me go immediately to your questions and try to make this as effective as possible for you.

Q What about the report that there will be Chinese astronaut on the upcoming Shuttle operation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There has been, for some time, discussion about the possibility of having a Chinese astronaut. As you know, our space program has seen foreign astronauts, and will certainly see more and more foreign astronauts as the Shuttle program becomes more, becomes fully operational.

Right now, I think, our discussions revolve around the attendant, very strong symbolism, and we have yet to determine whether this will be a clear initiative proposed by the President in his discussions in China. But it is certainly a strong possiblity, one that has been discussed within the U.S. and Chinese space communities for some time now.

Q What --

Q What -- excuse me, what's holding up the final decision as to whether the President will bring it up in China or not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it will heavily depend upon what the Chinese response is to this opportunity ahead of time.

Q Did we offer this -- and we're waiting for their . response?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President can offer it. And --

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Q Wait --

Q Slow down --

Q Wait a minute.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Preliminarily, it has been discussed between NASA, my people, and our cohorts in China.

Q But you haven't heard from them yet, basically is what you're saying.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. A group just got back just a few days ago from China -- a group who were discussing both space cooperation and space science, the possibility of the astronaut and direct broadcasting. That group has only been back a few days, and I think the --

Q So the reports in the Science magazine, or whatever it is, that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- Are somewhat premature --

Q Are -- that, the President's actually going to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- but it has a very good possibility.

Q -- announce it are premature?

Q Is there some stumbling block, something we want the Chinese to agree to, before they send somebody out?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I really don't think there's a stumbling block, but I think we should be aware that the Chinese -- as you all are -- that the Chinese very much value their nonaligned position. And, I believe that -- my own opinion is -- that the Chinese will quite enthusiastically support this. But the opportunity is being, I presume, being discussed among the leadership in China, and I think we will get a response well before the President leaves.

Q Is this part of a larger package on science cooperation. Are we also proposing to put up a payload for them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're proposing to cooperate on a particular scientific experiment that could involve a Chinese astronaut.

Q Are we -- earlier you --

Q Can you tell us about this --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can say this, that there's nothing the least bit sensitive about it. It's a pure physics experiment in studying space plasmas.

Q Will you, did you mean to suggest that -- in your earlier remarks -- the Chinese value their nonalignment. That for the Chinese, this sort of thing is a major political decision, as well as a scientific decision?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't assess how major it is, but clearly --

Q Well, let's leave the word -- let's take the "major" out.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Clearly, it is an important consideration for them.

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Q Can you -- speaking on a related question -- since you're offering to take astronauts from other countries, what ever happened -- The President, when he was in Brazil, offered to take the Brazilian astronaut. Whatever happened to that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: My best understanding is that is still clearly in the planning. For example, if we would agree to take the Chinese astronaut on this particular science experiment, I think it would be approximatly four years before it was actually culminated, because we have to build the satellite and design the experiment.

Q Would you be very disappointed if the Chinese said, "Thank you for the offer, but no thanks."

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. And I'll tell you why I wouldn't --

Q I don't mean you, personally as a science adviser. I mean would the administration be disappointed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think so. I think clearly there is progress, and I think you will see it on this trip in improving relations between us and the Chinese. Clearly, the progress is upward. Clearly, the cooperation in science and technology is well entrenched, strong and evolving on a daily basis. And this is one opportunity, and I don't think the denial of it is a setback.

Q Will this be --

Q For those of us who aren't of a scientific bent, what is "space plasma"?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is matter above the atmosphere -- rare, non-dense matter, and studying that, the exo-atmosphere, outside the atmospheric environment, is -- gives us a heavy handle on how the sun, for example, how the sun and earth interact.

Q Is there some reason why the Chinese are particularly interested in this topic?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, it's rich science, that's all.

Q It's not specifically Chinese in some way?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Is most of the other cooperation, though, more closely applied to China's modernization?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Most of it is directly applied, but not necessarily more than this. I think the Chinese are enthusiastic about opportunities that will train their own scientists and develop their own research establishment, environment, and universities. Their investment, if you wish, is in their talent, and I think that is a very, very fundamental motive.

Q Could there be a new exchange agreement signed? And will it let more Americans go to China and have more freedom than they now have. They complain about that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: When Premier Zhao Ziyang was here in January, we signed a 5-year extension of this very broad, encompassing science and technology agreement, so there's nothing new to sign. As far as the complaints and concerns that we hear about access, I think these constrain our cooperations in a very, very minimal fashion across the board. We will continue to hear them, because to most American scientists, Chinese culture is complicated, and

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and to most Chinese scientists, American culture is rather complicated. I think as we understand the differences in each other's societies, those will go away, essentially.

Q Who suggested the space plasmas, did we or did they?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They had been interested and our -- the scientists in both sides have been discussing this area for a long time. It's a major thrust in our space program today, and because the missions are not tremendously large like some of the planetary missions, it's a rather logical area for us to collaborate in. It's pure science.

Q How much does it cost?

Q Do they have to pay much for it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not much compared to the really gigantic missions like the planetary missions to photograph the rings of Saturn and so on, but it certainly involves many --

Q Will they have to pay?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- many tens of millions of dollars. They will -- It will require substantial effort on the part of the Chinese scientific community, which will involve substantial expenditures of their own resources within China.

Q How many Americans travel with Chinese now on scientific -- for scientific purposes?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We don't actually monitor that, but I would certainly say this: It's thousands, many thousands.

Q Would you list for us, perhaps, like a laundry list of areas in which exchanges take place? What kinds of technology are they interested in? And what kinds of technology are we able to glean from going to China?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure. I won't give you a complete overview, but for example, there's an extensive cooperation in medical research, cancer. There is in Shanghai a rather uniquely controlled situation where generations of people have been living in the same environment, with health statistics, for a long time. And access to that relatively controlled situation has given us a lot of information about epidemiology, incidents of cancer, how it correlates with diet. And in turn, they have learned quite a bit about modern biology.

Q Is that one of the places the President will visit when he goes to Shanghai?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes -- well, he will visit Shanghai.

Q Yes, but I mean, is that one of the -- is he going to that facility, or that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's not a single facility. It's health statistics monitoring of exactly what has been happening -- incidences of disease in Shanghai.

In agriculture there has been quite a bit of cooperation, as we have interest in acquiring what the scientists call "germ plasm" which means, essentially, the seeds and samples of different strains, some of which are different than ours, and are resistent to different types of insects. We are quite interested in their experience there. They are quite interested in our experience. And the further experience that genetic engineering can offer us in developing drought and disease-resistant plants.

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In an esoteric area, elementary particle physics -- the world of these giant accelerators -- the Chinese are building in, outside of Beijing, a major particle accelerator, and there has been close collaboration between them and the United States in the design and the development of this for several years. And that is -- these are all, you see, areas of, yes, potential industrial fallout, and economic fallout; but also, they're all areas where you, inevitably, you are developing a talent base that hasn't been developed in modern China.

Q If cooperation in technology is so wonderful, why are there indictments outstanding in a couple of cases, on both coasts, on attempts or conspiring to smuggle technology from the U.S. to China.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, one thing you've got to carefully distinguish -- whether those are national efforts or individual efforts. And so far, that hasn't been clear on any of those cases. But, remember, we have the same exact kinds of, occasional problems, with our very closest allies in Europe. Certainly technology transfer has been an issue of the last, of discussion and concern, in the last few years between the U.S. and the People's Republic.

I think that the steps that the President took last fall . to liberalize technology transfer constraints, and that's on -- literally purchase of American instruments, high technology instruments -- I think it removed the vast majority of those concerns.

Q Would there be any impact if it developed, in these cases, that it is not an individual effort, but was government inspired?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's hard for me to answer "ifs" because I don't know exactly what the case would involve. At the moment, all I can say is this -- the science and technology -- I think you will -- trying to help prepare you for what you will see in China -- I think you will find that it is an area of extremely positive cooperation with very few problems. And technolgy transfer has been reduced from a major impediment in improving relations to an almost negligible impediment, in spite of occasional --

Q Just what is it that they're most interested in buying in terms of high-tech stuff?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: More than anything, and Larry, I must emphasize this -- is talent. I really think they are focusing upon developing something they lost in the Cultural Revolution, and didn't have, for that matter, very strong beforehand, and that is the kind of talent and skills that they need to be able to use the experience of other developed, of developed nations

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in their own economic modernization.

Q But, still, they are -- they were frustrated for a number of years about the various prohibitions on the sale of devices, the sale of hard goods in the technology field.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, areas that continue to push certainly are computers, electronics, bio-technology. All of these are, of course, if you think about it, they are the most rapidly growing markets in the world.

Q This may seem like a strange question; but would you -- do you have a figure on the top of your head as the number of -- the percentage of the population in China, for example, that has running water, the percentage that has sewer facilities, the percentage that has hot water, that kind of thing, the percentage that have bathtubs in their homes and so on? Are they interested in buying that kind of technology or are they talking about bio-technology and computers?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think they are, at the moment, particularly interested in developing two things, which is an industrial base for economic growth and an infrastructure, transportation, communications. I think that

I think that you will see -- some of you who have been to China before will also note that certainly the standard of living is improving. For example, the prevelance of television sets in private homes is very, very rapidly improving and I think that's a part of the infrastructure development.

Certainly in the rural areas, there are still --

Q Can you give us some numbers on TV sets?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't. I just don't have --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Seventy million.

Q How much do they cost? It takes a month to buy a bicycle.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't tell you how many months people have to work in China to develop television sets. As you will see, it clearly is a developing nation.

Q But they're not installing electricity and they're not installing sewer lines or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, they are paying real attention -- they are paying real attention to their ability to provide electricity for an expanding industry as well as for homes. Certainly, you probably know that China has a rather successful national health program and you will find, for instance, that the shots you have to have before you go are zero or minimum and disease is quite well controlled. So, to that extent, they have controlled their health problems and through sewage much more than many Southeast Asian countries have --

Q Do they still use high sulfur-coal in heating Beijing?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have detected high degrees of pollution in my experiences in Beijing.

Q Um-hum.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And I've always been told that it's unusually bad when I've been there.

Q Are they interested in trying technology to solve that problem or -- I mean --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They are -- Yes, they are -- as you probably know, very interested in acquiring nuclear energy, partly to take advantage of their own resources and skills, but also because of the potential environmental impacts of the alternatives.

Q Has there been any movement on that work toward the nuclear cooperation agreement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, over the last three years there's been tremendous movement. When the Chinese agreed to join the International Atomic Energy Agency, the international means by which we all adhere to non-proliferation objectives, that was a tremendous step forward.

Now, the debate has focused down on to the narrowest last issue before there is nuclear cooperation, which is the exact means of consent, the exact means by which our non-proliferation act can be implemented and honored and yet their national sovereignty be entirely preserved.

Q -- stuck there for several months. That's specifically what I was asking about.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICAL: Well, several months -- Zhao Ziyang was here just two months ago -- two and a half months ago -- and at that time he made clear statements and the first really clear high-level statements about Chinese commitment to non-proliferation objectives. And --

Q Does that mean there'll be an agreement signed while the President is there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I doubt it; but it's a possibility.

Q So what's the hangup if it's such a narrow issue and we've come such a long way?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well -- two and a half months since Zhao Ziyang first stated this in this country. Two and a half months to get something done in Washington is a long time?

Q We were led to believe at one point, though, that there might be an agreement signed. Now, we've been told that there probably won't be an agreement signed. You seem to minimize the problem and saying it's just focused on one single narrow issue and so it would seem to me that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not so narrow and trivial that it can be overcome in two and a half months.

I think there will be a successful negotiation. But I don't think it will occur between now and the President's trip and I would be delighted if it did.

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Q Would you expect --

Q When do you expect --

Q -- in Beijing by the Chinese government during the President's visit of some sort that would clear the way on the consent rights issue?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would look forward to it; but I wouldn't look forward to it with great optimism.

Q When do you expect the nuclear proliferation treaty to be signed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's very difficult for me to tell, but just extrapolating from the past, I think there's a very good chance that it would be accomplished this year.

Q For laymen, please explain in a little more detail just what that hangup is in the use or re-use of nuclear fuel.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have a non-proliferation act that has very, very strict, carefully specified requirements and it says that any -- essentially, if I may translate, it says that any element of U.S. technology sold abroad must have -- I believe they're called consent rights on exactly what happens with the fuel after the expended fuel. And the Chinese very much wish to adhere to the basic objectives but feel that their fuel placed in a U.S.-built reactor should be their problem under their agreement to join the IAEA.

Q So that this is -- even if -- this has nothing to do with the sale of U.S. fuel to them. It's -- whosever fuel it was, our law says we have to sign off on what happens to that fuel after its life cycle.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Precisely.

Q But can't they get that from someone else or from Canada, for instance, who sells to those countries?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They can and will acquire the technology elsewhere if the United States does not -- cannot cooperate with them.

Q Also, the uranium and all the rest of it.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They have large deposits of uranium within China.

Q Have they detoned any other bomb, except the one that they did before?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, yes. They have a --

Q How many, if you know?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know the total number, but they have a rather --

Q Underground?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- sophisticated nuclear weapons development program and have conducted tests routinely now for many years.

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Q -- tell us about the --

Q -- announcement on the astronaut? Is there anything else that we should look for in terms of specific announcements on expanding the scientific-technolgical cooperation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not at the President's level. I think there may be new -- some new protocol, if you wish, sub-agreements under this overall blanket agreement that could address telecommunications. Fossil energy, for example. But I don't think they will be high priority --

Q You mentioned direct broadcasts before. Can you shed some light on that?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That also is a technology transfer issue that I don't believe has any serious impediments. The level of technology that the Chinese wish to acquire is not the most advanced technology that we produce, but it has not been resolved yet.

Q Why are we reluctant to liberalize our fiber optics technology -- in scientific exchanges with the Chinese?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not -- I'm really not aware of all of the particular problems with fiber optics in itself. I suspect that it has to do with the very advanced high-speed data processing technology that goes along with fiber optics. Fiber optics are used because you can transmit a tremendous amount of data along them. It means at each end you require the most sophisticated technology we have.

Q What can you tell us about the nuclear testing program that the Chinese have and are there any agreements there that are pending?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know of any agreements that are pending. The Chinese -- As you know, cooperation and discussions between the Chinese military and U.S. military are at a very early state. It very much began when Secretary Weinberger visited the People's Republic. But as far as any particular agreements in the area, I don't know of anything that is --

Q We haven't given them our laser beams and all the rest of it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- in the immediate offing.

(Laughter.) No, I think if you look at the Chinese priorities while you are over there, I think that you will see economic modernization at the very top of the heap. And I think acquiring the year 2000 defense technology is not really their most immediate objective.

Q On the nuclear non-proliferation concerns, is -- one thing I don't quite understand -- is it what happens to the expended fuel that we've sold to them or is it the expended fuel that other countries have sold to them? That anybody has sold to them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Either. Both. They're either that they themselves mined and built, other countries sold them or that we sold them. And they have -- mind you -- they have agreed to very -- to rather strigent controls by joining the International Atomic Energy Agency and adhering to the rules that are implicit with that membership.

Q What can you do with the expended fuel?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Build nuclear weapons.

Q Do the International -- refresh our memory -- the International Agency rules deal with the use of spent fuel?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, yes.

Q So, this consent issue business is a question of national rights built into --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's a -- yes -- it really is a legalistic question --

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- at this point. That's why I say it's narrow. It's legalistic. Once the Chinese -- the PRC --

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accepted the same non-proliferation objectives that other members of IAEA have -- and that was a major step for them.

Q Well, what do they have to do or not do under International Agency rules regarding spent fule?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They have to -- my understanding is that they have to explain to IAEA examiners exactly how the entire fuel chain will proceed from the mining all the way out to the disposal of it. And, in other words, it must be displayed to the satisfaction of the IAEA investigators that that fuel nor its -- neither that fuel not its byproducts are given to another nation.

Q To another nation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: To another nation.

Q But not diverted to Chinese production of a, b, c, d, etcetera?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not absolutely certain of that, but I don't think it's very relevant. The Chinese have their nuclear weapons -- nuclear reactors for producing their own weapons material and they --

Q Are they into breeder reactors at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q -- refresh our memory, what is the administration's position on those restrictions, on our restrictions?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President issued a policy statement in 1981, if I recollect, which made it clear that we had -- that we would rigidly adhere to the Non-proliferation Act, that we would use the International Atomic Energy Agency as the principal implementing body and that we would strive to be a -- I've forgotten the exact words but -- a strong player in the international nuclear energy environment.

Q But you'd like to see that law changed, wouldn't you?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, that law --

Q No -- I mean the specific section of the law that's the hang-up now in negotiations --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's not as much a matter of the intent of the law as it is the law being so terribly specific that it can force these lengthy negotiations with Congress, with other nations --

Q You'd like to see it changed if you could?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I -- Yes, but I'm not sure if you asked me exactly how I would write the changes, how I would do it.

Q Well, that -- Wait a second.

Q -- that in the movement on the Hill --

Q -- present administration --

Q -- to tighten the law?

Q That disagrees with what -- that disagrees with the briefing of last week in which the administration people were saying they had no intention of trying to get the law changed, don't want to get the law changed because they know Congress won't?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. Understand me clearly, the objectives of the Non-proliferation Act are completely consonant with

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the policies of this administration. What we are faced with here is a problem with the exact statement in the law, faced with another nation's sovereign concerns, is delaying a cooperation to which, I think -- where we have ironed out the basic differences. And what I am simply saying is that the law, as it stands, is a very excellent policy but is one that is extremely rigid in its exact definition.

Q How has this law affected our sale of power plants -- nuclear power plants to other countries?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It has provided both the controls that we so desire and has, needless to say, has required months of very extensive negotiations for the majority of sales that we have been able to succeed in --

Q Are the terms applied uniform to all foreign countries or is there a distinction here because China is not a NATO Ally or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The terms distinguish between signers of the Non-proliferation Treaty and non-signers of the Non-proliferation Treaty.

Q Yes. But because they haven't signed the Non-proliferation Treaty, the terms apply more strigently to them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Isn't it true that Proxmire --

Q Do you expect any development on the Non-proliferation Treaty?

Q -- wants to make it even tougher?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't expect to see any changes on the Non-proliferation Act nor the Non-proliferation Treaty. And I believe that a nuclear cooperation with China can be negotiated within those two treaties.

And back to the original question of two and a half months: We have come a long, long ways in three years in these discussions with the Chinese. And I don't think we have that much further to go, although I can't specify exactly when it will be concluded successfuly.

Q Can you -- the President's going to be visiting this Shanghai Foxboro Company in Shanghai -- can you tell us what he will be seeing in the machine shop and the production facilities that he'll visit and what he'll see at the University there? Is that a part of the science and technology aspect of the visit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think what the President will simply see at the Shanghai Foxboro Plant is modern -- relatively modern manufacturing technology introduced through a joint venture into China.

Q What do they make?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Ballbearings if I recollect, but I'm not certain of that.

MR. SIMS: Some of us have to go to the next briefing. I don't want to take away from those who want to stay if --

Q Can I ask you one last space question? Did we -- I remember -- the -- Brazil -- on the astronaut -- Didn't he do the same thing with Japan when he was in Japan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, we had a -- Brazil and very much so. Brazil and Japan and -- European allies --

Q I'm sorry. Say those again -- Brazil, Japan, West

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Germany?

Q That's what is sounds like to me, but I -- clarify.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We've got to ask NASA, but Brazil, Japan -- it's been tentatively discusses, I believe, with India, China --

Q Can we get to be part of this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry.

Q We're talking about the -- I asked --

Q We're interested --

Q Speak up --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sorry.

I cannot specify with completeness exactly which countries we've discussed an astronaut because I simply don't remember them all. But I think it is rapidly expanding. Brazil was a major issue. Japan has been. Western Europe; I think initial discussions have occurred with India. And I think we'll see lots more in the future.

Q And what -- Go ahead.

Q Is there some particular reason that the President picks foreign trips to give away these seats on our Shuttles? It seems -- just seems to be a recurring theme. Is that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it's not -- we've tried very hard to make it more than giving away seats on a shuttle. What we've tried to do is to incorporate foreign astronauts with foreign participation and, for that matter, support for major experiments. And in other words, we try to incorporate it into an expanded worldwide space program using --

Q Well, do they bring any -- for example, the Chinese -- would they bring any expertise to this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, yes. The Chinese have a rather active space science community. This particular satellite that I talked about to study space plasmas is an area where they do have considerable expertise. And they would both bring talent and application of those talents in building some of the instrumentation.

Q Isn't this also a way of drumming up business for the Space Shuttle?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure.

Q For the future?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure, the -- that's what I meant by an expanding worldwide space program

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using U.S. launch capabilities. The shuttle gives us an enormous flexibility and what we'd like to do is to push space science as rapidly as we can with that capability, and it involves bringing in other people, scientists, and instruments.

Q Are we simply waiting to see how the Chinese react before we make the formal offer? Is that what's going on?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure.

Q Haven't we made the offer already and we're waiting for them to respond to it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Made the offer. The President can make the offer. If my people or NASA people go over and talk to their counterparts in China and say, "What do you think would happen," that's not the same thing as an offer.

Q Well, have you done that? Just to be clear on it, is that what's happened so far?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Absolutely.

Q Your people have gone over and said, "What would you think if..."

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: For many months we have been discussing --

Q Okay, and if their reaction to all this is fine and the President is there, that's when he makes a formal offer?

Q It's an offer that you know they're not going to refuse, right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If I knew it --

Q He makes the offer if he knows he's not going to be refused. Is that the point?

Q Why is this different from the way it was done with Mitterrand, because in Mitterrand's case, as I remember, the President did make the offer and then Mitterrand turned around and said, "Thank you and we'll consider it," did not accept right away Are the Chinese more sensitive than the French or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Look, I think there's something that's quite delicate here --

Q Am I right on my facts, incidentally, on the French?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not sure. I think that's basically correct. Look, there's something that is rather different about China than talking about France or West Germany or Japan. China is a non-aligned nation. They are very sensitive to their position as a non-aligned nation and their position as a leader of the Third World. And there is, therefore, a symbolism associated with a Chinese astronaut in a U.S. space program that is somewhat different than a French astronaut in a U.S. space program.

Q Can I ask a clarifying question on the nuclear non-proliferation thing? I don't think I was clear enough on the question earlier. Do you anticipate on this visit that China will make any announcement with regard to its willingness to sign the non-proliferation treaty? Not do you want to see any changes in the

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treaty. Do you anticipate any change in their position on the treaty?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I really don't.

Q There was a story kicking around -- I forget just where, and it was a little far-out, perhaps -- to the effect that we were offering them or would offer them assistance in underground nuclear testing technology and capability as an incentive for them to foreswear atmospheric testing, and perhaps sign on to the partial test ban of many years ago. Is there anything to that story?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not that I know of.

Q You're familiar with the story?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, I am, and let me tell you what I think you're seeing. Relations between the United States and the PRC have obviously, over the last 10 years, improved enormously, and there are a lot more people involved in that interaction. And there are a lot more ideas that we hear surfacing about how the cooperation should occur. This question of the astronaut, for example, seemed a very logical one for the space scientists originally to be discussing -- some of them brought it to me and it just emerged.

This issue that you refer to is one I have heard people -- I have heard tossed around. I've never heard it tossed around within the government; I have never heard it raised to the issue of an initiative that would be discussed. In other words, there are all kinds of hypothetical discussions going on of what we could do ultimately.

Q So this would play no part --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not that I know of.

Q This would play no part in this visit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not that I know of.

Q Could we go back one more time on the shuttle? Are we also proposing to bring up for them some sort of payload or satellite, and what would that be?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me explain what our scientific cooperation is. A bunch of United States scientists and a bunch of Chinese scientists would sit down and lay out an experiment that they wanted to do in space, and then they would divide up who is going to build what portion of it. And then the Chinese would come together in a few years and they would constantly interact with some instruments. We would have some instruments. We would put them together in a single payload, we would launch it, and we would take the data together and analyze it and publish it in scientific journals with Chinese and U.S. scientists' names on it.

Q And you seem to continue to imply that there is some problem or hang-up about symbolism. What is it the Chinese are asking for?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Of the astronaut only.

Q Yes, what is it they're asking for? What is the problem?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They're not asking for anything.

Q Well, what's the symbolism --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They are interested in this scientific experiment, they are interested in the cooperation, and I am being totally presumptious now in speculating, but I suspect strongly that there is discussion within the Chinese leadership as to how important the symbolism of a Chinese astronaut is; in other words, how much does it push their non-aligned position one way?

Q Can we go back to exportable technologies. Which technologies are you going to recommend be included in the next round of liberalization besides the seven that have already been liberalized?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have been involved in the past in some of the particular individual controversies. I haven't been involved in trying to prepare the next list -- that's a Commerce Department's job. I think the President gave very clear guidelines on exactly what he wanted to do and, you know, what we're really trying to do is to create as many precedents as possible, so that each issue doesn't have to become an issue that goes before the Export Advisory Review Board.

And so we're simply expanding the list. It may be telecommunications --

Q Okay, telecommunications, machine tools --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But I have the same sources as you do. I read this and Aviation Week is the best source of all. What I'm trying to say is, we are not, as a matter of policy, expanding the area of technology transfer. What we tried to do is to establish criteria and now we're trying to make that criteria --

Q But don't you have some input into the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- crystal clear.

Q -- interagency review group chaired by the National Security Council on the liberalizing of -- somehow the determination has to be made which technologies represent national security risks and which don't, and presumably the President or the National Security needs some input from the Science Adviser to that interagency review board.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's been very carefully spelled out in the document that the President signed that permitted this liberalization. The guidelines are very carefully spelled out. The interagency group's job is to take that policy guidance and translate it into fact. Yes, my people serve on that and what we try to do is to define the level of technology, but when it involves a particular instrument, an oscilloscope or something, that's a matter of interpreting that object with respect to these guidelines. The fact that the next category --

Q Somebody has to figure out exactly what the performance capabilities are and then be able to figure out how to apply license or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And its relevance to defense applications'

Q Okay, so telecommunications -- are fiber optics being contemplated?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know. I honestly don't know.

Q Numerically controlled machine tools, those sorts of things?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would -- it's got to come up at some point.

Q Could you please explain that "non-aligned." That troubles me, because what does it mean, exactly?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: India is a non-aligned nation.

Q Yes, but they went ahead and built a bomb when we gave it to them for help.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What's the basic --

Q What does non-aligned mean in relationship to us?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It means neither allied with the United States nor allied with the Soviet Union.

Q But they do send people to Moscow --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But they send people to the United States, also.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 11:34 A.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF
PRESIDENT SALVADOR JORGE BLANCO
OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

April ~~9,~~ 10 1984

12:05 P.M. EST The Briefing Room

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: President Reagan met with President, as we learned yesterday, Jorge Blanco -- all last name -- in two sessions, one in the Oval Office and an expanded meeting in the Cabinet Room. The discussions ran longer than the program. In fact, they were terminated by the President having to make this call. They ran about thirty minutes past the program.

President Reagan talked with President Jorge Blanco about the democracies in the Domincan Republic and thanked him for his efforts on the CBI. As you know, the Dominican Republic was the first one to sign up for it. They were enthusiastic about the program when it was first unveiled, and President Jorge Blanco was up here in July of '82 to explain the importance to the Caribbean on it.

The discussion then evolved around several subjects -- the international economic scene, Central America, the El Salvador elections. And interesting enough, then a discussion led by the Dominicans pointing out that when the Dominican Republic went to the democratic path in the mid '60s that it was able to do so because it had two strong political parties in place. And pointing out the two strong political parties in El Salvador and the necessity of building a democracy in Central America is based upon the ability of having political parties that are strong in that area.

In the area of international economics, and more specifically the economic challenges faced in the Dominican Republic, President Jorge Blanco gave a very thorough but brief analysis of their economic challenges, pointing out, for instance, that their primary commodity for export being sugar is now running somewhere around five or six cents a pound on the world market and that it costs them somewhere between fourteen and fifteen cents a pound to produce it. That was given as illustrative of some of the challenges they face.

That, generally, was the theme of the discussions. And when it ended, as it had to for this call, there was enough left on the agenda -- the President indicated -- in the subsequent meetings that President Jorge Blanco will have with Secretary Shultz and Secretary Regan this afternoon, they'll be able to follow up on those specifics that were discussed but not necessarily resolved.

Q What did he say about Central America?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What they talked about on Central America was the fact that there was a destabilizing effort there, that it was working against the forces of democracy, and that there was a need to face them on both fronts. That is, a need to eliminate the guerrilla activities in El Salvador, and by the same token, it led into that discussion I talked to you about, about the necessity that if you're going to build democracies in Central America, you have to have the strong political parties in which leads to elections.

Q Did they discuss the mining?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Did they discuss any activity at all or U.S. aid to the Contras? Anything at all to do with Nicaragua?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

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Q No discussion about that at all?

Q They discussed Central America and they didn't discuss at all Nicaragua?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They did not discuss the items you talked about. That's correct.

Q They did not discuss -- well, how did they discuss Nicaragua, then? In what context?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, they discussed it in the context that Nicaragua was the source of the destabilization. The Cuban and Russian presence in Nicaragua and their penchant for exploiting their revolution.

Yes?

Q Let me ask the question another way. Did they discuss the pressure which the President has said needs to be kept on Nicaragua?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, they did not -- that -- I wasn't trying to take his question in a very narrow sense. That element was not discussed at all.

Q Were finances discussed as to how much money we --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What was discussed was -- President Jorge Blanco did a very, as I said, a very excellent job of analyzing their short-term and mid-term programs and needs and President Reagan discussed in broader terms his intention to help as much as possible, given the Congressional restraints and the demands on other monies, and I think the more specifics will come in

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the discussions with Secretary Shultz and Secretary Regan.

Yes.

Q Did the President assess for Jorge Blanco the state of the military situation in El Salvador?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They talked about it briefly. President Jorge Blanco -- I gave him a briefing and had a discussion with him last night for about two hours on the military situation in El Salvador.

Q You briefed whom?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I briefed President Jorge Blanco. I mean, we had a discussion. I didn't talk, obviously, for two hours.

Q Did he express any concern to you about the mining of --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICAL: No.

Q Has there been any expression at all during his visit of any concern about any activity the United States is supporting, either the mining or the Contras or anything of that kind?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: None.

Q Has there been any expression of support, as opposed to concern?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Ahhhh.

Q Could you amplify on that just a --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: President Jorge Blanco shares the President's views that you have to eliminate that move to try to take governments over by force, rather than the democratic method in Central America and he recognizes that -- in his discussions -- by pointing out the Russian and the Cuban presence in Nicaragua. He recognizes that that's the source of the problem.

Q Well, does he recognize -- or does he agree that it should be taken on by force?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He --

Q Force taken out by force.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He didn't put it in those words.

Q Well, what is he supporting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He is supporting, as I said earlier, he is supporting the necessity for creating a climate in which you can have democracies grow in Central America. That was his whole theme and that was the interesting part of the discussion was his -- was the way he outlined the necessity for the building of political parties once you have a peaceful climate.

Q Will you be -- you personally or anybody else from the State Department that you know of -- be going up to the Hill to try and sort of remedy the mess there, their feeling that you didn't brief them properly on all that's going on down there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me -- rather than -- I don't share your characterization; but let me see if I can

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rephrase it to get to your question. I think that there may be senior U.S. officials going to the Hill today. I'm not sure of the details of it. I've been with --

Q But not you?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: More senior than me.

Q Casey?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm only called "senior" when I come up here on this podium. (Laughter.)

Q Casey?

Q But can you --

Q Are you talking about Shultz and Casey?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know who will be going up.

Q Can you give us a little sense of what the strategy will be to try and make amends?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's not a question of making amends. I think that there may be a difference of opinion as to whether there was adequate information and/or briefings of the Senators.

There is a process in which different -- on different subjects, different elements of the Congress are briefed. I have never had the luxury of having a member of Congress tell me that we have told him too much of any subject of interests of that nature.

Q Can you tell us which Senators were briefed in advance of the U.S. decision not to abide by the World Court on Central America?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't give you that list: but I'm sure that -- we'll try to get it for you.

Q Were there any?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Well, I mean, who could it have been when the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee wasn't included on the list?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't answer your question other than the fact that I know that members of the Senate were briefed.

Q You said President Jorge Blanco agreed on the necessity for creating a climate to advance democracy in Central America. Did he discuss any specifics as to how that should be done?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. What he talked about was the necessity for having a climate and then once you have the climate, the necessity for the formation of strong political parties.

Q He didn't offer any advice --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. No, he didn't.

Yes, ma'am.

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Q What's your assessment of the chances of getting the $21 million that's still pending on the Hill, given that the Speaker is saying there's no chance in the House?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't really have an assessment.

Q How quickly will that money run out? When will that money run out or when will support for the guerrillas run out if you don't get more funding?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't address that question.

Q You said you'd addressed the military situation.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q You said you told him about the military situation --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct.

Q -- last night. What is the military situation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The military situation is that given -- what we're learning is that given the where-with-all of the Salvadoran Army, through their restructure and through U.S. training, is able to more than hold its own with the guerrillas. They've proved it --

Q -- Lebanon, too.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. Well, you asked me a question and I tried to answer it for you.

Yes.

Q This is a little murky in my mind, but the President talked about one of the important things for democracy in the Dominican Republic was two strong parties. Wasn't it also a couple of Marine battalions around that same time -- (laughter) -- battalions?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He did address that subject and he said that, you know, you could have Marine battalions around -- he didn't use those words, but, I mean, in essence, he was addressing the same thing you have spoken. He says, "But democracy is not going to take off unless you have the formation of the parties." In other --

Q But, I mean, wasn't it the so-called coming of democracy to the Dominican Republic coincide with about that 1965 U.S. -- use of U.S. ground forces in --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, but if I understand the way he was putting it, he was putting it in the sense that there was a climate in which democracy could thrive. Once having a climate, you then need the political parties.

Yes, sir.

Q There's a lesson of history for this administration --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not necessarily, no.

Q Is there any kind of a feeling inside the -- say at the State Department -- that perhaps the situation with Congress on the decision to duck the World Court on that matter and the harbor mining was badly handled?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q None at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You asked my opinion, I told you no. There's -- you know -- I don't know how many guys wandering around that building. But I'm just telling you what I'm hearing.

Yes.

Q I want to make sure we understood you correctly. Were you saying that the appropriate members of Congress were fully informed on both the facts of what was happening and on the legal question of the World Court?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: A fact of what was happening. I'm not sure I understand that.

Q Well, the military operation, the mining of the harbor.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, let me just answer that portion of the question to tell you that according to the procedures as we understand them the appropriate committees are kept informed of any activities worldwide. To my understanding, that was done.

With regards to the -- before the Court, it is also my understanding that the appropriate members of Congress, including the Senate -- that's going back to the earlier question -- was -- were informed.

Q There are a couple of things in The Post this morning, one of which is talking about the military situation and you people expect or fear a big fall offensive by the guerrillas in El Salvador and also the secondary question of -- that this is all a holding action until after the election when you're really going to go in in force. Can you speak to both of those as to whether those are true or not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I can speak to the first, that I think that it would be logical to assume and we have reason -- more than -- going on that, that there is a plan to increase the activities emanating from Cuba in El Salvador sometime later this summer or early fall.

And what -- your second question?

Q Well, can you do -- Well, before we get into the second question, what more can you tell us about that? I mean --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I can't really tell you much more than that, other than the fact that there are -- indications --

Q But it comes out of Cuba?

Q He says "logical to assume." Do we have knowledge that such plans are going forth?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- we've got more than going on just "logical to assume." Yes, our informations would lead us that -- Go ahead.

Q In El Salvador?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct.

Q In El Salvador. From Cuba --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Emanating from Cuba. That's where the arms come from. That's where the training comes from. That's where the command and control comes from.

Q Through Nicaragua?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right.

Q Can you compare this to other offensives in the past where there was a lot of talk there was going to be

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some huge offensive around the time of the election and --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct.

Q -- they take place.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right, although actually you've got mixed signals --

Q Question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Just if I could finish answering this one, if I may.

Q Before you respond, we couldn't hear his question.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Repeat the question, so I can answer it.

Q Well, the question is what level of activity are you talking about compared to other offensives -- rebel offensives -- in the past, because we heard a lot about a big offensive around the time of the election.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All right, what you hear at the time of election, as you may recall, was -- yes, all right, fair enough. What you heard prior to the election were two different songs. You heard from the political side of the guerrillas in Mexico City, that which they called the "Esquerda Festiva," the Festive Left, from the political side, "We're not going to interfere with this election." And then you heard from the hard-core military guerrilla commanders, "Yes, we are, we're going to keep..." and you saw the manifestations of it yourself, so did your colleagues down there, you know, don't vote, and all the rest of it.

As a matter of fact, I think they attempted to disrupt that election, and they failed from a military point of view. Now that is one aspect. A separate and distinct aspect is a concerted effort to up the ante on the part of the guerrillas -- more guerrillas, more arms, more this, that, and the other -- in the summer and later in the year. And we are beginning to get indications that that, in fact, is being planned.

Q Is there a big increase in supplies finding their way into El Salvador?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What we're starting to see now is indications that that is what is being planned.

Q If I can ask the second part of my question, which was what about the story that this is all a holding action and you're really going to go in on November 7th?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't -- you've heard the President's spoken on that subject very clearly as to what his intent is there and that is the plan which we keep following.

Q Well, wait, is that -- what are you saying about it? Are you just saying that's not true?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is correct.

Q That is not true --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is not.

Q There isn't any plan at all to go in --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is correct, there isn't any of this after November 6th type -- yes?

Q In terms of the stepped-up guerrilla offensive that you fear for later this year, what about the capacity, ours as well as Salvadoran, to interdict these supplies? Some months back we heard that this thing was becoming highly efficient and that the thing had wound down to a mere trickle. Are we now saying that the thing is open like a sieve and we stand by helpless just in terms of the supplies?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have never been of the school of thought that it's wound down to a mere trickle, so -- and I have trouble following the way your question was postured. I think -- in my estimation, it has never wound down to a mere trickle, one; secondly, what I'm telling you is that if there is an increase, as indications are, as planned, then I think you can assume that there would be an increase in that level of traffic. And it seems like we've strayed awful far from the Dominican Republic in the last 10 minutes.

I've tried to be responsive to you.

Q Could I go back to that, then?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Where's my vaudeville hook? Go get What's-His-Face. (Laughter.)

Q What's-His-Face? (Laughter.)

Q Hey, Sims, you're in trouble. (Laughter.)

Q -- chopped liver. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm late for my lunch. Listen, people don't buy my lunch very often and I'm already missing it, so I'll take one more question, if I may.

MR. SIMS: -- give my name, I'll call an end to this. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Mr. Sims, help me out, please.

Q If I could pursue just one more question on Dominica --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you.

Q -- there was an OAS force -- mainly U.S. forces, but under the flag of the OAS -- that facilitated the elections in the Dominican Republic. Was there any discussion today of any such force being used again anywhere in Central America or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. Thank you.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 12:24 P.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO CHINA

April 10, 1984

The Briefing Room

2:33 P.M. EST

MR. SIMS: All right, this briefing is on background attributable to a senior administration official. Before it begins, or as it begins, we'll pass out two fact sheets on the subject of U.S.-China cultural affairs.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wanted to talk to you in general about the educational and cultural affairs between the U.S. and the People's Republic this afternoon, and as long as you want. But I thought I'd begin by dealing with the specific relevance of those agreements to this particular trip and what will happen in connection with them while the President's there.

We expect to have prepared for his signing when he gets there the Implementing Accord to the Cultural Agreement. The Cultural Agreement, itself, is one of the things that has been given to you. It was signed in 1979 during Deng Xiaoping's visit here and has been updated by Implementing Accords since then. And the one the President will sign will be the Implementing Accord for '84-'85.

At the same time, if all the crates arrive and the other vagaries that art exhibits are subject to, we hope to have opening in Beijing the Brooklyn Museum Show, images of rural and urban America. I'm sorry I don't have something I can hand out to you. This is the catalog for the show. I'll be glad to have you look at it. It's all in Chinese except for the names of the artists. It's a very fine exhibition, and it's the first event under the new Implementing Accord that the President will sign.

Educational affairs are subject to a separate accord. I think probably most of you heard my colleague who talked about the Science and Technology Agreement. In 1978, there was an understanding struck between the U.S. and the People's Republic on educational exchange. That understanding -- and you have a copy of that. That is one of the things that was handed out. That understanding then became a protocol to the Science and Technology Agreement, and it is under that protocol that we carry out educational exchange between the People's Republic and the United States.

We can talk more about what happens specifically under each of those agreements. But I feel constrained to make the point that the educational and cultural relations between the United States and the People's Republic from 1971 to 1978 was almost literally the only show in town. That was how the two countries initially took measure of each other, coming out of a period of isolation and trying to learn how to do business with one another. Most of that was done through the exchange of delegations. From '71 to '78, it was almost all delegations -- some sporting events. Ten to twelve people coming for thirty days talking to counterparts on everything from sports to seismology. There's a whole range of things. And it really, in many ways, formed the foundation for the dramatically burgeoning relationship that exists now.

Since '79, it has gone on, of course. The cultural and educational exchanges have themselves expanded dramatically, but

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at the same time around them all these other arrangements, commercial and technological, have grown up, and while they've tended to, by comparison, dwarf them, they remain both an important symbol as well as important in terms of substance in the relationship between the two countries.

Before we go to questions, I would like to just highlight one thing that will be part of this new implementing accord, which I think illustrates the character of the cultural relationship between the two countries and, in particular, the confidence, I think, that both feel -- and certainly the Chinese feel in opening themselves up to a broad range of interchange -- and that is that one of the specific provisions of the implementing accord is that there will be exchanges between Radio Beijing and the Voice of America.

The Voice of America, as I or any other U.S.A. person will be quick to tell you, operates under a charter that they guard rather fiercely, to report the news objectively. And they do. And the news part of the Voice is an objective reporting service, although obviously a good part of the VOA broadcasts are also editorial opinion and, in this case, the opinions of U.S. Government officials.

Voice-of-America-listening in China is very wide. Our best estimates, and they can only be estimates, are that there is upward to 18 million urban intellectual, educated Chinese listening to the Voice of America, if not every day, at least regularly. And it's encouraged, in fact. And here, embodied in this cultural accord, is a provision for an exchange of people, materials, scripts, program material, schedules, and so forth, and we expect an exchange delegation some time in the course of the implementing accord.

Perhaps rather than go on from there, although I'd be happy to, we might go to some questions, if you have any, about the status of the relationship currently or historically or anything else that you might like to try on me.

Q Are the cultural relations -- were they broken during the Hu Na case and is that what's being restored now or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. Yes.

Q Could you give us a little bit of background on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The '82-'83 implementing accord was signed in Beijing by the Director of USIA, Charles Wick, and in '81, and that was what was in operation when the Hu Na incident occurred. The Hu Na incident -- probably most of you remember -- a tennis player, a young woman Chinese tennis player, who sought asylum here, and in the course of the uncertainties about that, the Chinese suspended cultural exchanges under the '82-'83 accord.

I might point out they did not suspend educational exchanges.

Q How long was it broken off?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Until -- until the President signs the '84-'85 accord.

Q This was broken off when?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was '82.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: April '83.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Eighty-three, April, '83.

Q So there've been no cultural exchanges from then until this is signed now?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No official cultural exchanges. One of the characteristics of the change that has occurred is that whereas initially there were only the official exchanges, there are probably more unofficial ones now. As we are presenting this Brooklyn Museum show there and the Chinese, in May, the reciprocal for that, which is an exhibition on five modern Chinese masters, will open at the Corcoran in May -- while we're putting that together, there are, in fact, at least two other major Chinese exhibitions in the U.S. right now; one that will open in Houston on the treasures of the Shanghai Museum, and one in Seattle on 7,000 years of discovery, an exhibition of Chinese navigational and scientific instruments.

Q Are students --

Q Are these exchanges almost always reciprocal in the sense that you're still dealing with very much a case of we do this and they do that, and then we come back and do the next thing, or is -- does the new accord provide for a more free, less strictly scheduled exchange?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's really both. Initially -- the initial

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implementing accords were quite specific. We will send seven National Park Service people of this kind, and you will send seven of your -- of a certain kind. They are still couched that way. We're both going to do something in each section, but the new implementing accord is considerably more general than the -- It's framed more in the terms of encouraging this kind of exchange -- but always in terms of exchange -- if it's park services, we'll see some of their park service people, and they'll see some of ours.

I think our tendency is always to try to create institutional relationships outside of the strictly government to government relationship anyway. And this is certainly encouraged on our side. And the Chinese seem to have developed great confidence in their ability to deal with impresarios.

As you've heard many briefers say here, that a large part -- whether it was Gene Lawson talking about commerce, or Dr. Keyworth talking about technological exchange -- there's an initial step of understanding how each side operates. And we operate differently.

Where an impresario is the central figure in cultural activities in the U.S., it's government in China. But they have gained confidence in being able to deal with our system, and a great deal can go on without the intervention of government.

Q In other words, these students -- the 10,000 did they tell us? Students? -- Are they not cultural exchanges? Or are they not considered cultural?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Of course, with a small "c" -- in specific instances, cases, though -- we consider them part of educational exchanges. And I might just give you a little background on that. The Memorandum of Understanding that became the protocol of the S&T agreement under which we operate, called for a rather limited exchange: 750 Chinese students here, 50 Americans there -- that was basically it.

The Department of Education had some exchanges involved there. And since then we've started the Fulbright Program. But you're talking about a fraction of the percentage of that 10,000 plus, probably, of the students that are actually here.

Even under the terms of the agreement, the ones that we consider under the agreement, have already expanded to over 1,000 students here. And of that 10,000, probably only half of them come with any kind of -- at least that we've been able to identify -- institutional sponsorship: Chinese government, American foundations, and an American university. Something like half of them, at any rate, are here under private auspices.

Q What does "cultural" encompass?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it's obviously a very broad term. As far as USIA is concerned, in terms of operating, it's performing groups, sports, arts -- of all kinds -- what we usually associate with The New Yorker, and --

Q Are we satisfied that the Chinese have been open enough, or reciprocal enough, when it comes to educational exchanges in that direction?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In the broad sense, yes. We haven't had any problems in terms of numbers -- Well, haven't had any problems -- of course, there are operation problems. But, by and large, they're very open to American scholars coming to China. It is something of a different story when the scholars get there. They do have problems, and they have complained about their inability to get into certain archives, to get to certain sites that they would like to go to.

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It's a problem that both sides understand, and both sides have committed themselves to doing something about --

Q How many U.S. students are in China now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: At any given time, altogether, there might be 300; but, approximately 50 under the official agreement.

Q And 10,000 --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- Chinese --

Q -- Chinese here?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right.

Q Is the President going to raise this issue of free access when signing this protocol, or this agreement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As you know, the President has been briefed on almost anything that anybody is concerned about in terms of the U.S.-Chinese relationship. What he is specifically going to raise, and whether that would be something -- I just don't know.

Q What accounts for that large disparity between 10,000 Chinese here, and 300 Americans there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, what the Chinese --

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want from the United States is something very specific, embodied in the modernization program that you've heard so much about. The last time anybody took anything like a cross-section of the students that are here, approximately 90 percent of them are in hard sciences, and that's why they're here, they want to learn computers and physics and math, nuclear physics, and all the -- all the technology that the Chinese want in the here and now, they want in the future as well -- and it is this generation of students that is going to sustain the modernization of China.

Q Do they get Social Security like other students in this country, or do they -- where do they get their finances to live and that sort of thing?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I see. Well, the Chinese Government provides it for the Chinese-Government-sponsored students. In some cases, there are arrangements between universities or they get grants from foundations that help support them as well.

Q What are our students studying in China?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: By and large, the humanities, political science, sociology, anthropology.

Q Well, is it a case of a shortage of Americans interested in going there or are the Chinese holding the number down?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Shortage of Americans equipped to study there, and by equipped I mean --

Q Would they take more if there were more applicants?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think so. That's speculative, but I think they would be -- the Chinese are sensitive to the kind of facilities that they can provide. They don't want to be embarrassed by having students come who can't deal with Chinese counterparts because of language problems, say. There is that perennial problem in China of housing. So they have some sensitivities about it, but there's not -- in no sense any cap or limits put on the number of Americans other than the interest and the ability of Americans to operate in China as scholars. I mean, we're not talking about, you know, sending a few undergraduates for, you know, a kind of a happy month or so. These are -- we're talking about serious scholars who can go and deal with Chinese materials.

Q Under the new agreement, will VOA have a correspondent or correspondents stationed in Beijing?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have one now.

Q What change is involved, then, for VOA?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is a correspondent in Beijing now. The exchanges are part of this business of getting to know each other, how both sides operate, exchanging materials. It's not news-gathering as such.

Q What specific kind of programming are you going to swap?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't really know. Anything that they're interested in, we'll certainly be glad to pass to them and I assume they'll reciprocate.

Q Does the direct broadcast issue become involved in connection with this agreement?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You mean broadcasting into China?

Q Chinese interest in direct-broadcast technology and so on?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It could, but it isn't specified. But the subject's very broad. Let's go to the back.

Q This is a judgment call that I'm asking for, but how does the number of Chinese students studying technical subjects in the U.S. compare with the need that China has for this advanced technical education, with the universe that they need to fill?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is a judgment call and not one I'm prepared to make. You'd have to ask the Chinese. One would think, given the size of the country and the distance they have to cover, that 10,000 wouldn't be too many. But that's a guess.

Q I just want to make sure I understand. Is the only thing the President's going to do in either of these areas while he's there is sign the extension of the cultural agreement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, the implementing accord, to be accurate.

Q Is that basically an extension?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's -- it sets out in more specific terms what is broadly agreed to in the 1979 cultural agreement.

Q Are there any differences in this implementing accord from previous ones or is it simply just that it extends it for another two years?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's pretty much the same. There are some differences in detail and, as I say, it's less specific. It's broad -- --

Q And nothing on education in that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, not in that -- we are talking about both sides which would rather like to update the educational

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agreement, but that's only in the beginning stages. That would mention specifically, for instance, the Fulbright program which goes on but which isn't mentioned in the educational agreement.

Q Do the President's stops at the kindergarden class and at the University in Shanghai relate to this part of the aspect?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, sure. He's --

Q In what way?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, he is aware of all the aspects of the arrangement. And the importance of the cultural and educational agreement is certainly a major part of the relationship.

Q Who is he going to see there that's -- I mean --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Students. Students and faculty and administrators, a chance to talk to the administration and faculty of an institution that both plays host to American scholars there and sends scholars to the United States.

Q Can you describe --

Q What's the date, sir? The date of that accord. that you mentioned?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: 1979 was --

Q No, no, he sent a sign that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, the '84-'85 --

Q It was only one year?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's two. It's a two-year accord.

Q So '84 to '86?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: '84 -- Yes, that's right. From the end of '83 to the beginning of '86. So that's two full years. Right.

Q Can you give the role of Columbia University in the U.S. PRC Cultural Exchange as compared, say, with USIA's function?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know the details of what Columbia does. I know it's considerable. Columbia has -- But I just don't know the numbers. I couldn't make any kind of objective comparison without knowing that.

Q Is the CCTV interview related to this exchange or is that something --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Only to the extent that it involves USIA. CCTV, like the media overseas everywhere, is in the province of USIA, USIS overseas, and we have close relationships with them and work with them.

Q How broadly is CCTV viewed in China?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Quite broadly. We tried to come up with some figures on the watching audience and it's pretty difficult to do. So many people watch one set. And even modestly, we figure that there's probably 250 million people -- a potential audience of 250 million to 300 million people.

Q Is that going to be -- the CCTV thing going to be broadcast live nationwide?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. I believe it is live. Yes, it is live. Right.

Q And are they also going to broadcast his appearance at the University in Shanghai?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, not that I know of. They will cover it.

MR. SIMS: Quite possibly.

Q What?

MR. SIMS: Quite possibly. The -- Yes, quite possibly.

Q How about the speech at the Great Hall? Same thing?

MR. SIMS: What?

Q Definite or quite possible?

MR. SIMS: Quite possible.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 2:55 P.M. EST

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ON-THE-RECORD BRIEFING
BY
AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE RICHARD KENNEDY,
IVOR MANLEY AND HOWARD SHAPAR
ON
OECD NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 11, 1984, 1:47 P.M.

MR. CARLSON: This is an ON-THE-RECORD briefing on the subject of the OECD Steering Committee for Nuclear Energy, which is meeting here in the Department of State today.

The briefers that will be with you are the Chairman of the Sterring Committee, Ivor Manley; the Director General of the Agency, Howard Shapar; and Ambassador-at-Large and Special Advisor to the Secretary, Ambassador Richard T. Kennedy.

I think that the Chairman of the Steering Committee, Mr. Manley, is going to give you some brief remarks on what they're doing here in the Department; and then they will take your questions.

Mr. Manley?

MR. MANLEY: Well, good afternoon. I don't want to say very much except perhaps to explain what the Nuclear Energy agency is. It's that part of the OECD which brings together member states of the OECD into an organization which has an interest in the development and the promotion of nuclear energy.

It has a Steering Committee, a committee which is representative of all the member states; and it deals, so to speak, with the policy issues concerning the Agency. It manages the technical work that is done by a series of subordinate committees in the fields of nuclear waste, reactor safety, health physics, and issues of that kind.

The Steering Committee normally meets on a regular twice-a-year basis in Paris. But Ambassador Kennedy, who is at present the Deputy Chairman of the Committee, was kind enough to invite the Committee to meet on this occasion in Washington -- which is why we are here. And we've had a day and a half of dealing with our normal routine business.

This afternoon the American authorities have organized a special session at which an invited audience will hear comments by a number of speakers on how they perceive the contribution that nuclear energy can make to energy security.

And this is simply an opportunity, while a number of people concerned with nuclear energy are together, to have a discussion of that kind in a small informal seminar.

I think the Spokesman has already said that Howard

Shapar is the Director General of the Agency and is, therefore, of course, its senior executive. And I am the Chairman of the Steering Committee for the moment -- and normally, most of my time, serving as a Deputy Secretary in the Department of Energy in London.

Ambassador Kennedy, of course, I'm sure, is well known to you as the State Department Ambassador with responsibilities in the nuclear field concerned with non-proliferation and so on.

Now, I think -- shall I invite questions now?

You've all seen, I hope, the press release that is available, which describes in rather more detail the nature of the Agency and makes some references to recent U.S. initiatives in the work of the Agency.

Yes?

Q How does the NEA fit in with the IAEA work?

MR. MANLEY: Do you want to take that one?

MR. SHAPAR: The IEA is, of course, another agency within the OECD family. It looks at the broad range of energy issues -- not just nuclear but coal and whatever -- whereas the Nuclear Energy Agency is set up to deal with nuclear issues, not the broad range of issues looked at by the IEA.

MR. MANLEY: He did say the IEA and not the IAEA.

MR. SHAPAR: No. I said the IAEA.

MR. MANLEY: Ah!

MR. SHAPAR: I'll answer two questions for the price of one. (Laughter.)

The IAEA, which is located in Vienna, has as members a much greater number of countries than the NEA. It really includes the whole world -- or most of it.

We deal with some of the same issues, though we take special precautions to make sure that there's no duplication. And I should also add the fact that the IAEA has a very prominent role in connection with non-proliferation and safeguards, and that is not a matter that the NEA looks at.

Q Does the NEA have positions on safeguards ndathat sort of thing?

MR. SHAPAR: No. Safeguards is a matter that is left to the Vienna agency. The reason I think is clear. There are 21 countries in the NEA, whereas to deal effectively with non-proliferation and safeguards you need the world -- and the world is in Vienna, not among the 21 countries comprising the NEA.

MR. MANLEY: All member states of the OECD, of course, are members of the Vienna agency -- in the IAEA -- and I think all take a rather similar stance on the issue of non-proliferation, which is of interest to Ambassador Kennedy.

AMBASSADOR KENNEDY: Let me note just a couple of additional thoughts.

I am also, as I think most of you know, the United States representative to the IAEA in Vienna.

Howard mentioned the close coordination. In particular, this relates to the technical aspects of nuclear power development, nuclear energy development as a general proposition. And it's those aspects of the work of the Vienna agency which are coordinated very carefully with the work of the NEA.

As he points out, the perspectives of the two agencies coming at the same problem are different.

In the IAEA, when one is talking about nuclear energy development, nuclear power development, one is looking at a very large number of developing countries -- all of which are members of the Vienna agency -- the total of which, I think -- well, I know -- is something over a hundred now -- the bulk of whom are of the developing world. Their perspectives on the use of nuclear energy are rather different, obviously, than those of the OECD countries which are in the developed world and are indeed rather extensive users of nuclear energy. They are more likely to be the suppliers of nuclear energy sources rather than pure consumers, as is the case of most of the member states of the IAEA.

Howard was quite right in indicating that also in Vienna one of the principal concerns goes to the question of safeguards and non-proliferation, a matter which is of at best tangential interest to the NEA.

Q Mr. Kennedy, did you discuss at this meeting ways to stop the industrial nations' supply of nuclear equipment to other nations, particularly to Pakistan?

AMBASSADOR KENNEDY: No.

Q Well then, what were the issues of this meeting and what did you decide?

AMBASSADOR KENNEDY: Let me ask Mr. Shapar to outline for you the general content of the agenda.

MR. SHAPAR: Well, at the beginning of the meeting, we hear from the Vienna agency and what they're doing.

I say a few words about what I think the perspectives are for the future work program accomplishments in the last few months.

We hear from a representative of the International Energy Agency -- the IEA. We take a look at the program of the Agency for 1985. We take a look at the initial concepts on the budget.

And we get reports on substantive areas -- like what we're doing and have been doing in the waste area, what we've been doing in the area of nuclear safety and the back end of the fuel cycle.

MR. MANLEY: It all sounds rather boring, and I can see that's the reaction. (Laughter.)

And I understand that -- and, indeed, in a way, the management of the Agency's program is a fairly routine business as far as its Steering Committee is concerned. But what one has to remember is that the Nuclear Energy Agency represents a grouping of OECD members who, to a greater or lesser extent, have an interest in the development of nuclear energy. They believe that it is helpful to have a mechanism whereby their experiences can be exchanged on safety or on radiation protection -- on these technical issues -- and a series of technical bodies meet from time to time to bring about international collarobration.

I think if any of you have attended conferences of the American Nuclear Society or other such bodies, the theme often emerges about how important it is that people collaborate internationally on the problems that a nuclear power faces.

I'll give an example of that. We've had a discussion at this Steering Committee this week about public attitudes to nuclear power, an issue that will be very familiar to you in the American context. But it's also something which many OECD member states are concerned about -- the public attitude to nuclear power; the acceptability, if you like, to nuclear power in a democracy.

These are issues that need to be discussed at the sort of policy level -- not that policy can be determined in an international body because, after all, each government must tackle that kind of thing in the context of its own political setup and its own social system and so on.

But, at the very least, there is a scope here within the NEA for exchanges in information which help those member states that are interested in the development of nuclear power.

That's how I would put it.

AMBASSADOR KENNEDY: To go back, if I could, to the question which you asked, I said "No," and that's accurate, because I indicated to you that's not essentially the role which the NEA plays.

As Mr. Manley has so well pointed out, the objective of the Agency is to see how nuclear power, nuclear energy, can be harnessed as a major input to the energy mix of the OECD countries involved.

And, as he indicated this afternoon, for example, the role of nuclear power as a contributor to energy security is going to be examined by a number of speakers in a symposium. A symposium usually is associated with the Steering Group meeting.

The purpose of this meeting was essentially a managerial one -- that is, to give the guidance to the Secretariat as to the policy lines which are to be followed and the objectives which are to be pursued by the Agency over the next six months until a succeeding meeting.

Q Was there a discussion about the issue of the industrial nations -- and then this has already come forth with West Germany -- sending nuclear waste to China?

AMBASSADOR KENNEDY: There was not.

Q Well, all right. Let me follow up --

AMBASSADOR KENNEDY: Can I make a comment about that?

MR. SHAPAR: I guess. (Laughter.)

Q Let me follow up on that -- well, O.K. -- if you'll comment on it. Sure.

AMBASSADOR KENNEDY: Let me just make a comment about that -- on the question of the reported intention of China to accept nuclear waste from other countries.

For our part, at least -- and I think this was true, certainly, of a number of my colleagues -- and may be true for the Secretary as well; I'll ask Howard to comment -- from our perspective, we're not aware of precisely what is involved. We're not clear at all that a proposal of any concrete nature has been put forward by the Government of the People's Republic of China. And, thus, until we have a much clearer notion of what, if anything, is involved, we wouldn't have any comment and there's wouldn't really be much of a basis for discussing it. And so we haven't.

And I think that may well be the position of the Agency as well.

Q Well, is the Agency looking into it?

MR. SHAPAR: I should point out that China is not a member of the Nuclear Energy Agency.

Q Sure.

MR. MANLEY: Can I just add a point on that too -- in that I think, clearlv, nuclear waste is one of those topics that is discussed within the OECD grouping.

The point you make about China, the stories that one heard a few weeks ago, did raise a considerable political interest in London I remember. One group of people said,"Well, wouldn't it be nice if we could take advantage of such an offer and get rid of some of our nuclear waste to China?" Another group of people said, "Ah, yes; but it's not that simple" -- I mean for reasons that are pretty obvious.

Now, that raises issues that go much beyond the OECD, and in a sense beyond the NEA. In a sense you're back to the first question about the role of the IAEA, where these broader questions of nuclear trade are much more appropriate than in the case of the limited membership of the OECD.

Q Ambassador Kennedy, on a related issue, what is the status of the negotiations with China on a nuclear cooperation agreement?

AMBASSADOR KENNEDY: I'm surprised that you asked. (Laughter.)

Let me just say that, as you know, these discussions have been ongoing now ever since last summer in an active way. We've met several times, the last being during the visit of the Prime Minister.

I think thereis no secret in the fact that we've made very substantial progress in arriving at understandings -- both as to the general question of the posture of the respective governments on the question of non-proliferation in the general sense and also on the specifics which might be required if an agreement for cooperation within the terms of our law -- the Atomic Energy Act and the Non-Proliferation Act -- were in fact to be completed.

There remain questions. These questions have been the subject of exchanges through diplomatic channels since the visit of the Prime Minister; and, indeed, I anticipate in the very immediate future perhaps visiting Beijing again to carry out still further discussions.

Q Is it still possible something could be accomplished, something could be finalized, by the time of the President's trip to Peking?

AMBASSADOR KENNEDY: I wouldn't want to make any estimate on that. We continue our discussions.

Obviously, the discussions are aimed at reaching an understanding -- if that is possible -- always given the conditions required by our law and policy.

Q What do you rate the prospects of one of the OECD members or NEA members might sign an independent bilateral with China before the President's trip or during his trip?

AMBASSADOR KENNEDY: I guess I shouldn't estimate on their behalf, but I am not aware of any whose situation at the moment would suggest that was likely.

Q Do you know that one of the countries has a draft in the final stages?

AMBASSADOR KENNEDY: Oh, yes. Many do, I think. (Laughter.)

Q To what extent has the U.S. experience with Three Mile Island and other safety problems -- to what extent have those had an effect on interest in nuclear power worldwide? And can you express that in licenses, applications, plant startups or shutdown -- things like that?

AMBASADOR KENNEDY: Since my own view might be conditioned, let me ask Mr. Manley to comment.

MR. MANLEY: I don't think it would be right to attach too much importance to Three Mile Island as such. I mean it's not to say that it wasn't a very important event -- and it had, in my own judgment, worldwide implications for the development of nuclear power -- certainly, within the OECD area, of course, member states were interested in what happened at Three Mile Island.

The U.S. Government was very helpful in the immediate aftermath of Three Mile Island. It used the NEA as a means of informing other OECD countries -- especially those that had pressurized water reactors -- as to what was thought to have happened and the action that was taken subsequently.

I know, because I was at that time responsible for atomic energy within the Department of Energy in London, that we were seeking to launch a pressurized water reactor -- to have the option of going for a pressurized water reactor -- and it would be foolish to deny that in that sense Three Mile Island set us back, because it was perceived as something that indicated -- at least to those that were opposed to nuclear power and opposed to the pressurized water reactor -- that all was not well in the PWR field, if I can put it that way.

I don't think that it would be fair to say that some of the hesitations that many OECD countries have since experienced can be entirely blamed on Three Mile Island. There have been many other contributing factors too, like the fact that many electricity utilities in the OECD area have more capacity than they actually need because of slow economic growth that they've all experienced in recent years; and, therefore, they haven't been keen to continue with earlier development plans for nuclear power stations.

There are other factors too, like the great debate that's been going on.

I would myself argue that Jane Fonda had more impact on this debate in many OECD countries than -- at least as much impact as Three Mile Island, simply because of the debate which took place here which spilled overinto the media and in public debates about nuclear power elsewhere in the OECD area.

And I think, as I was hinting earlier on, I believe that most member states of the NEA would say that governments and industry concerned with the development of nuclear power need to demonstrate that there are reasonable answers to the fears that people have about the development of nuclear power.

Three Mile Island was one factor there. We've had our own problems at home, and those too had to have been taken into account in the efforts of the authorities to find the right contribution that nuclear energy can make to a balanced energy mix.

Q Is that a way of saying that for a combination of reasons the development of nuclear energy has slowed in recent years?

MR. MANLEY: Well, I don't think they would be -- I mean: no; I hope nobody would deny that.

I mean if you look at the forecasts that were made at the time of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation -- INFCE -- way back in nineteen-, whenever it was -- '78, I suppose -- look at those projections and compare them with what's happening now, yes, there has been a holding back, a delaying of various programs, a cancellation of orders.

I think it's a mistake to read too much into that.

Personally, I think that nuclear power still has its contribution to make; and that's why we're working on some of these problems, these technical matters, through the NEA.

Q When you look at the nuclear power programs in the OECD countries, it seems very clear that the one that is experiencing the most problem is in the United States. Would you agree with that? And, also, would you discuss on a scale what you think are the OECD countries that have the stronger programs? Code: clearly, France would be one of those.

And does the United States fall at the other end in terms of the problems that are being experienced?

MR. MANLEY: The United States talks about its problems rather a lot, in my experience. (Laughter.) And, in a sense, therefore, you may get -- I remember seeing -- was it Time magazine , about three months ago , with a front-page picture suggesting that all was doom and disaster in the development of nuclear power in the development of nuclear power in the States?

Well, I think that's an overstatement. I don't believe that it's anything like as bad as it's made out to be.

If you examine the various thrusts that have led to the present situation in the States, it's a combination of things -- the problems of the utilities or financing investment, The problem I mentioned about over-capacity and lack of growth and so on are as much a contributor to the present state of the U.S. program as any real fears or doubts about the economic contribution that nuclear power can ultimately make.

And certainly I'm not in the game of suggesting suggesting where the United States falls in the spectrum of OECD countries. I think -- I've said before publicly -- that what happens in the United States is very influential in what happens elsewhere in the OECD area. We need, and have needed for some time, leadership from the United States industry in achieving the potential of nuclear power. That explains why, for example, we in the UK are exploring the PWR option, because we think that the U.S. experience with the PWR is something that we want to tap into.

So in that sense I don't think it's right to write off the U.S. nuclear experience or the U.S. nuclear program. And I keep being told of the number of power stations, reactors, that are going to come on stream in the next -- you know -- sort of year or so, in spite of the cancellations and the much publicized problem cases that we all hear about.

Now, having said that about the U.S. program -- sorry for the apologia. Was I doing very well? (Laughter.)

AMBASSADOR KENNEDY: Could I just put a couple of those notes in perspective with some numbers?

MR. MANLEY: Please do; yes.

AMBASSADOR KENNEDY: You know, I think what Ivor says is exactly right -- that one needs to put that question in perspective. There is no question at all -- and he's absolutely right when he said no one should reasonably deny that there has been trouble in the whole nuclear power field over the past five years, and probably that will continue for a few more into the future -- and the reasons are very complex: the high cost of money, problems associated with the licensing process, problems associated with construction techniques -- all kinds of problems.

And the rate of low growth is obviously substntially lower than had been predicted when many of these programs were initiated 10-15 years ago in the utility industry.

Now, having said all that, let me just -- I did dig out some numbers, because they're interesting.

In 1983, the United States generated some 313-and-a-half megawatt hours -- gross -- of electricity by nuclear power.

Now, I don't want this to be an invidious comparison; I want you to understand that. But when one speaks of the comparative programs among the OECD countries and says, for example -- as is often heard -- "The French program is obviously the most effective," well, that's true, in one sense. That is, at the moment it's moving forward.

But it also has its problems, and I'm sure if you'd ask them they'd be glad to tell you about them -- much the same problems, indeed, that we are having in terms of low growth and requirement for power.

As a matter of fact, the generation by the United States in 1983 was more than twice that generated by nuclear power in France. It's three times the amount generated in Japan; and Japan certainly has one of the most active and effective programs across the board in nuclear power generation I think of any of the countries of the world, much less the OECD.

Germany -- the United States' generation of of electricity by nuclear power is five times that generated in the Federal Republic of Germany.

So, you know, when we say, "Goodness, we're at the bottom end of the spectrum," we're at the bottom end of the spectrum developing almost the total generation of the rest of the world put together. So, you know, it's a little hard to say which is the bottom and which is the top end of the spectrum here. And I think that's not the way to look at it.

Do I make the point that we have in this country an enormously viable and effective generating program in the nuclear field? And that's going to continue. The Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulator Commission are working to develop -- and I think they've already put forward -- licensing programs, proposals, which would,in Secretary Hodel's words yesterday, reduce the construction licensing time from something well over 12 to 13 years down to perhaps seven.

And one thinks of 15 percent mortgage money and construction financing. A reduction of nearly 50 percent in total construction time would obviously be an enormous improvement in cost factors for the utilities that would be undertaking such programs.

You should also know that while, for example -- and I don't want to take too much time here, but I think it's important, when one puts this in a world-wide perspective, you should recognize that the amount of coal generation that was cancelled last year by utilities was almost equal to the amount of nuclear generation that was cancelled in the same period.

But you hear an awful lot about the nuclear generation because it's dramatic and these are big long-time facilities that have been in production -- or into construction -- for a very long time with huge investments involved.

But the fact is the amount of megawatts -- electric -- which are being taken off the stream -- were taken off the planned stream in coal -- was about the same as being taken off from the nuclear-generating side.

And the reason is simply because of the cost to produce them, to put the plants on line, (a) -- and, (b), the decline in load growth.

Q Let me ask two questions related to the decline, however temporary it may be in the U.S. program.

Does that give you concern about the United States' ability to influence worldwide proliferation policies when we are not a major manufacturer or seller of nuclear equipment -- which may well be the case if our domestic orders don't revive?

And, secondly, do you think that our current problems are such that foreign manufacturers may move in and that if we resume ordering nuclear power plants that they'll come from overseas in this country?

AMBASSADOR KENNEDY: It's my impression that if you were to raise that question in Paris, Bonn, London, Rome, you would probably get the same answer that I'm going to give you -- and that is: "There sure isn't much business there at the moment."

And my impression is that all of the significant, important vendors are suffering from the same problem -- both domestically in terms of the total domestic need and in foreign orders -- because there just isn't that much out there; and the reasons are the same.

It's been a worldwide recession in many respects. And, also, again, in many countries, the same problem arises as arose here -- and that is that estimates of generating requirements were made way back before that recession -- and, indeed, even then, higher than probably were justified, given the fact that we've learned an awful lot over the last ten years about how to conserve and more effectively use generated electricity. So, you know -- (laughter).

Now, to go to the other question, if I were to assume that the United States was getting out of the nuclear business, I would have to say that I don't see how one can bring to bear the kinds of influence that we clearly would like to bring to bear on the non-proliferation side of questions. And the non-proliferation side we consider to be extremely important; as I'm sure almost anyone in this room will be glad to tell you, we bring it home to them at every opportunity.

We consider that an extraordinarily important consideration in the development of nuclear energy -- and, in particular, nuclear power -- throughout the world.

If we're not in the business -- if one were to make that assumption -- it obviously is much more difficult to bring meaningful influence to bear on those who are.

And that -- you know, I think it almost goes without saying. And I think if you were to ask any of the other vendor countries they would give you the same answer again.

MR. MANLEY: Can I bring you back to the OECD that I mentioned here? And I really endorse what the Ambassador has been saying. It's part of what I was just saying now about the leadership that I believe the United States can give in both the NEA context and in the Vienna agency, where I think Ambassador Kennedy will recall the anxiety that there was about the difficulty that took place -- what? -- 12 months or more ago --

AMBASSADOR KENNEDY: Yes.

MR. MANLEY: -- when there was a danger of the United States taking a remote position, as far as the Vienna agency was concerned.

I think that the leadership has been recognized by OECD countries for a very long time; and one of the values of the OECD mechanism -- and if I can come back to the spectrum question for a moment -- the contribution that the American industry is able to make, the contribution that the French program has been able to make -- my country and Germany and other countries -- the Japanese -- all have developed nuclear industries.

And what the OECD game is about through the NEA is ensuring that the experience of those with more advanced programs is made available to those with less advanced programs.

And we help one another in that sense, if you like, and that's what I mean by leadership. And that applies both in the development field and in the non-proliferation field.

Q Is there a change in attitude among OECD countries towards reprocessing plutonium use, given the U.S. example with the failure to start up Barnwell and the cancellation of the Clinch River project?

MR. MANLEY: Are you pushing this back to a previous Administration? I think that --

AMBASSADOR KENNEDY: It's your question, not mine. (Laughter.]

MR. MANLEY: Certainly we in the UK, and the French -- and the Germans, too -- have not been deterred from our belief that reprocessing is a necessary part of the fuel cycle by the attitude of the then U.S. Administration, when all this came up -- what? -- four or five years ago, more than that.

Q Well, the economics though have changed since that time.

MR. MANLEY: Ah, that's a different question --

Q O.K.

MR. MANLEY: -- O.K. -- and I accept that.

Looked at in terms of the development of the fast reactor and the use of the plutonium --

Q Yes.

MR. MANLEY: -- there isn't perhaps the same urgency as there was, except maybe for countries like mine.

We have Magnox reactors, and spent fuel has been retained in water and is corroding; and, therefore, there is an urgency for us to actually reprocess that spent fuel.

And that's a technical question.

Q Yes.

MR. MANLEY: I accept that the economics are looked at a little differently -- though in the long run I think most of the members of the NEA would argue that the fast reactor is the logical end of a thermal reactor program; and, therefore, in the long run, reprocessing and the use of the plutonium is something that will come.

The question of timing is important, and I accept in that sense the changes one makes.

MR. CARLSON: We're going to have to make this the last one because of the schedule for these gentlemen.

Q O.K. Well, Ambassador Kennedy, on the

China talks, now that they have met the IAEA conditions, is it just a matter of working out details on the U.S. cooperation -- or are there still fundamental differences that have to be resolved before there might yet not be U.S.-China cooperation?

AMBASSADOR KENNEDY: As I indicated, we are discussing with them a possible basis for cooperation.

As you know, in order for cooperation to occur, there must be a bilateral agreement for cooperation which incorporates the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act and the Non-Proliferation Act.

And it's in that context that we've been having our discussions with China. And, in most respects, all of the considerations have been accommodated by the two sides.

There remain questions which are still for resolution.

May I -- before we interrupt -- apropos of the discussion about the whole nuclear power program, it might be useful to you, I think very shortly this afternoon -- remarks which Secretary Don Hodel made to the Steering Committee yesterday morning at its opening meeting. It discusses a number of the very questions which have been raised here. And I know that those remarks will be available later on this afternoon.

MR. SHAPAR: Shortly after 2:00 o'clock they will be available.

AMBASSADOR KENNEDY: And we'll make sure that the Press Office has them.

They represent the viewpoint of the Secretary of Energy and the United States on the question.

Q Did you say after 2:00 o'clock?

MR. SHAPAR: It should be available now.

MR. CARLSON: It may take us a little bit to get them to the Press Office.

I'd also point out there are some more information materials from NEA in the Press Office and some reference works that might be of interest.

Q Thank you very much. Thank you again.

AMBASSADOR KENNEDY: Yes. Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 2:28 p.m., the ON-THE-RECORD briefing was concluded.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER PREM OF THAILAND
THURSDAY, APRIL 12, 1984, 11:00 A.M.

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Good morning. Prime Minister Prem will arrive here today to begin an official working visit. As you may remember, those of you who may have been covering for a while, he was here in 1981. This will be the second time during this Administration he will have been visiting here officially.

Today, when he arrive it will be a private evening for him, after his official welcoming. He'll meet with the Thai community. Tomorrow morning, his schedule calls for him to see Secretary Weinberger in the early morning. And then the most important part of the visit is the usual meeting with the President in the Oval Office, followed by a larger Cabinet room meeting and a luncheon; senior people on both sides.

During the afternoon tomorrow, he will meet with Secretary Shultz, and later he will be with the US.-ASEAN Business Council over at the U.S. Chamber, having one of their forums they call BIZNET where they have a discussion with senior American business people, usually those who have companies or banks that are represented in the country.

In the evening he will be the guest of the Vice President for a dinner at the State Department. And then on Saturday he will go up to New York where he will meet with the Secretary General of the U.N.; finish up a partially private schedule there; and then leave for Copenhagen on Sunday.

As you know, he arrives to us here today from Canada.

So those are the --

Q What about the Congressional meetings?

A They are possible. The reason I do not specifically say that is there is a good possibility that he will meet with some people on the Hill. But Hill schedules being what they are, and tomorrow being Friday, that is still being worked on.

Q The Weinberger meeting was presumably switched to the morning?

A That is correct. My understanding is, in part, it was because General Vessey wanted to participate also and that he was going to be either out of town or something in the afternoon.

Q It'll still take place at the Madison Hotel?

A That's correct.

Q What is the situation regarding the Thai request to have F-16s? That will come up, will it? We don't want to sell them F-16s; we'd rather sell them one of the FX models, isn't that the situation?

A Let me give you as much as I may and stop where I should.

The Thais, as you know, are flying rather old planes these days. They are a frontline state with a real problem which we recognize and respect. There's no question that they need a modern generation fighter aircraft.

We hope and expect that they are reviewing the merits and the costs and the suitability of all the candidate planes of which you're very well aware.

As you know, they have expressed interest in the F-16. Beyond that, I don't think I can go at this point. To give you a short answer to your question, yes, I definitely expect it will be a topic during their visit here.

Q They have been cleared for the F-16; the State Department has given permission for them to go beyond the FX?

A I don't want to give that inference at all. Where we stand today, they are looking at the series of planes and there has been no further progress or development beyond that.

Q The F-16 is already being sold to South Korea. What would be the problem with Thailand?

A The F-16/79 and the F-20 are both considered FX planes. They are in sort of one category; the F-16/100 or A version, or AB version is another category.

When one speaks of planes, there are three planes that fit into the parameters of what might be considered what they're looking for. Those are the three.

Q The three are the F-16/79, the F-16A, and the F-16; is that it?

A No, sir. The F-20, and then the other two versions of the F-16s. As you know, it's basically the engine that is the difference.

Q Do you have a team going out there from the Pentagon to, in effect, sell the FX if they can? When are they going?

A There are no specifics. A lot of data has been developed on sort of all the planes there; their capabilities, their costs, their likely costs into the future, and so on. I would not at all be surprised if a team were to go out to the countries that were interested, involved, or thinking in that direction, to try and lay out the facts as they appear evident now.

There are no dates for a team to go here or there.

Q It is a fact that the Administration considers that one of the FX models would be more suitable for Thailand than the F-16?

A I don't want to go too far in giving judgments. I would say that the data that have been developed show, as I understand it -- and I'm not an airman; my background was Navy a long time ago -- that there are cost advantages to the FX.

Q Cost advantages in the FX?

A That is my understanding of some of the data that have been developed.

Q Has there been any change in Thailand's defense needs or requests as a result of the fighting in Kampuchea?

A If one were to go back to the year 1978, I think you would say, yes. You're the country that appeared to have relatively peaceful borders at one time and no longer does.

If you're speaking of the more recent fighting near Preah Vihear or Preah Vihean, according to which pronounciation you choose, I'll just back up a little bit and point out that we are in the dry season. And last year during the dry season there were quite a few attacks, as there have been, and skirmishes, some serious, some less serious than in other years. We are now right in the heart of the dry season. There was a fairly serious engagement where apparently Vietnamese troops came into Thailand and were eventually pushed out, and the loss of some Thai military people.

I would say that it's a situation which has a cyclical aspect because there are wet and dry seasons.

Q What are the other kinds of armaments that the Thais are getting? For instance, have they now received that emergency shipment of, I guess, M-48 tanks in the closing days of the Carter Administration, they were an emergency order?

A I know they are interested in tanks, and I have to admit -- maybe I can get more for you on that as to whether an emergency shipment of three or four years ago was --

Q Remember when Muskie was out there for the ASEAN meeting, he offered and they accepted this emergency shipment?

A I could double-check that. I think we are not in default on any "emergency arrangements" that we agreed to, but I can't go back in my memory clearly on that and I don't want to mislead you.*

Q What sort of hardware are they interested in?

A Besides the aircraft, I think they have expressed interest in tanks and in a general modernization. They were a country -- I don't have the exact figures --

* The Carter Administration did provide an emergency shipment of M-48 tanks in June 1980.

who were rather modest in their military expenditures some years ago, and now they have a military problem. So they are sort of upgrading. Certainly, they're very interested in communications and transportation; to be more mobile, to be in better touch with their people on what is, as you know, not a terribily easily defined border area.

Q Do we accept that the Vietnamese have crossed -- the Khmer Rouge have actually crossed the border and are raiding inside Thailand?

A Our best information -- and obviously we do not have people there; we're getting all of our information from others, other sources; some are good sources -- is that, at least in that more recent one, that there was a movement into, across the border.

There are often cases where there are skirmishes in unmarked areas, and you're certain there's been a skirmish but you can't be certain exactly where, which side of the border it was on. That most recent one appears to have been .

Q Back on the F-16, would it not require a policy exemption to sell F-16s to the ASEAN countries, including Thailand?

A The present policy, as it exists, the F-16A -- I have to draw the line because there is an F-16/79 -- has not been approved for sale to ASEAN countries.

Q Has there been a decision taken on that as yet, or is that pending, or what is the status of that?

A That is a matter of sufficient importance, so I think it's sort of -- one might say it's under review.

Q Under review?

A I can't say a decision has been taken.

Q Is your perception of Thailand's military problem, that you say, limited to these cyclical incursions into its territory, or is there a more serious threat to Thai sovereignty?

A From outside?

Q From Vietnam?

A I suppose you get into the question of not capabilities or actions but intentions. There are those who say the --

Q What is your perception?

A If I were a person in their shoes, I would be acting on the assumption that one couldn't be certain.

I was serving out in Asia when the Vietnamese Foreign Minister came around and went out of his way to tell all the ASEAN leaders they had absolutely no territorial intentions in any direction. That was about a month before they went into Kampuchea. So all I can say is I think a prudent Thai leader would be careful, simply because you don't know.

Q Is there any way that the United States can improve the anti-piracy program?

A That's a matter under considerable engagement, or attention at the moment.

As you know, the Congress voted $5 million a year or so ago.

The efforts by the donor countries, including largely ourselves, and others, had been through the UNHCR. A lot of work has been done recently. A study has taken place. They are trying to work out just what would be the effective way of using the monies available and what would help.

Certainly, one thing that seems to be a general agreement is that better patrolling would help -- a few large ships, many small. There are a lot of questions you have to determine, but that seems to be one element that people think would be effective.

Clearly, also, to the extent that the Thai Government can find and prosecute people who are clearly guilty of acts of piracy. Recently, there were four. They were fairly old cases but there were finally convicted and given fairly serious sentences -- I think eighteen years. And because some of them pleaded guilty, the term was cut maybe to nine or ten years. These are at least two prongs of the effort.

(Continued on next page)

Q What would you like to see emerge as a result of this meeting with Prem?

A I suppose it would be fair to say that there are bilateral questions, but they aren't burning bilateral things in the sense of complicated difficulties to be worked out. For example, there will be a science and technology agreement signed by Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Siddhi, with the President and the Prime Minister standing by to witness. A degree of further strengthening what is already an allied and a good relationship. A chance to talk about the Kampuchea question, which some of you all have alluded to. A chance to touch on how do we deal better with the piracy question. How is the refugee situation moving? Express their and our interest in working together further on the narcotics question. I also don't want to underrate -- and perhaps I didn't mention it enough in the beginning -- while the Prime Minister is here, some of his senior people, his Commerce Minister and others, will spend part of their time in New York where they will meet with our business men and bankers, and I think the Asia Society is having a lunch for them.

So, because of the shortness of their visit -- which was their choice because of the pressures being encountered in Europe, instead of following a pattern of his spending some time in Europe and then coming here, he has in effect divided his forces somewhat.

Q When will the signing take place?

A Just before the luncheon.

Q Do you know what Thailand's external debt is?

A I think it is about $24 billion.*

Q Are they in a rescheduling process?

A No. They have been relatively -- well, I wouldn't say relatively, speaking as a minor member of a government that has got big debts itself -- they have been fairly conservative. Their debt service ratio is about 20 - 21 percent,* which is do-able in the world of today. They are considered a pretty bankable risk. Our major banks deal with them with considerable comfort.

In the last year or two, some of their products have not had such good prices in the world, but they are not in a situation - you can't compare them to some countries that are locked in the embrace of the IMF.

Q Do you know, off-hand, what the U.S. aid programs are for Thailand?

A It is about $100 million in security assistance, and about $30 million in economic assistance.

Q Going back to Kampuchea, is it our assessment that the recent exchange of fire between the Chinese and the Vietnamese was generally a warning to the Vietnamese not to push into Thailand, to be careful there?

A Neither side has chosen to share with us the rationale, but it has certainly been the case in the past, I think, that when the Chinese have seen the Vietnamese acting

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*Thailand has an official debt of $6.8 billion
*Thailand's debt-service ratio is about 10-15%

a little too rambunctious on the Kampuchea-Thai border, that they have somehow made their view known. It is a good inference. I can't say I have any proof, but the timing and knowing the point of view of Beijing, it certainly makes a rational person at least think about that.

Q Would the F-16 be an escalation of arms? Would it touch off an arms race with Viet-Nam?

A That is kind of speculative. It is hard for me to say. I think you have to deal with trying to find the best -- work with a country to find the best plane for their needs, given their economy and their threats, and so on. It is pretty hard to say. I dealt with the same question in Korea. If the South Koreans have this, are the North Koreans going to do that, and it is awfully difficult to come up with anything more than a guess.

Q Do you expect any discussion on the Thai problems with American oil companies on pricing and reserves?

A We have had no indication that that is going to be the case. Now, to touch back a little bit on my New York subordinate clause there, certainly some of the people -- not the Prime Minister himself, but some of his senior associates -- they are going to be dealing with will be our business people, including, obviously, the companies they really deal with. So you could certainly infer that they would have a chance to do it, to talk about it.

That has not been listed or given to us to believe that this is something that we must work out.

Q You mentioned the narcotics issue. What is to be discussed there?

A As you know, the infamous Golden Triangle includes parts of Thailand. Three years ago, I think it was October '81 when the Prime Minister was here, almost three years ago, the matter came up, and since that time the Government of Thailand has taken really some quite stern measures to try and beat back people that are almost opium warlords -- that may be too dramatic a term to use -- but they have pushed these people and some of them have left Thailand and gone across into the netherlands of Burma. They have lost men, they have had their own people killed in beating back this trafficking effort.

The other effort that they have to make, which in some ways may be harder to deal with for them, is the actual opium production, because traditionally their hill people have done that also, and the government there is making efforts to get them into crop substitution, and recently has done some eradication. But with the good weather they are having this year, you still face a possibility of an increased opium crop.

They themselves have a large number of people that have to be called addicts, I guess, particularly in the hill people. So it is not even the case so much as to whether or not how much may be coming out, but just the idea of a country that is producing that much, and it is something that has to be dealt with.

I think they are working on it, but because of its traditional crop connotation, it is somewhat harder to deal with than to deal with trafficking where the people are purely criminals.

Q On the refugee problem, how serious is that for Thailand, and to what extent are we helping?

A We have over the years since the refugee problem was a problem, taken about 300,000 refugees from Thailand -- not Thais, but people from other countries who sought refuge. Thailand has been hospitable about taking people for first asylum, but pretty clear that it cannot accept, except in some special cases, these people into its society. Therefore, they must find a settlement some place in the world. We are, by far, the number one; France is a minor second, and then you get down to small numbers.

The refugee population in Thailand was really quite big. A couple of years ago, it was 300,000 or so. It is now down to about 125 - 130,000, and we hope by the end of this year it will be below 100,000. But you are working with an equation over which you don't control all the factors. At the moment, the outflow from Viet-Nam is restrained. Our orderly departure program seems to help restrain the refugee or the boat people outflow, but if Hanoi were to undertake some policy that made huge portions of its population so unhappy that they were willing to risk the seas in a leaky boat, that is the sort of thing over which we have very little control.

But if present trends continue, the refugee population, if that is the right word, in Thailand will decrease below 100,000 this year.

Q Did you say that the U.S. itself had resettled 300,000 people from the camps?

A That is correct. This is over a period of some years, some five or six years. Other countries, also, but not as large a group.

Q What are the burning economic issues from the Thai point of view? What needs do they have?

A If we are talking, in a general sense, about the prices of some of their products, the last couple of years have not been so easy for them. Not disastrous, but not like a good part of the world, not such easy economic years.

With us, some of their problems are questions of a lot of countries. They wish we would take more of their textiles than we are prepared to do, and they are worried that each time they do well in a certain kind of garment, then we start to put limits on it.

There is a case where our tuna industry feels that they are beginning to dominate our market, and that will have to be worked out.

We are going back again in June for more airline negotiations.

These are problems or questions that are somewhat similar to those we have with some other countries in the world. They are not so rare, but they still have to be worked on.

Q Do you anticipate that the Thais will ask U.S. support for the KPNLF in Kampuchea?

A I think the Thai Government has been relatively content with our policy of moral support and political support that we have given the non-communist Khmer movements.

ASEAN has taken the lead, and of course I think the other ASEAN countries tend to defer to Thailand because they've got the major problem, and I think they are relatively persuaded of the wisdom that this should not become a sort of U.S.- Viet-Nam confrontation. The enormous majorities that they roll up in the U.N. every year I think is in part because the non-aligned world rightly views it as ASEAN taking the lead.

Q Has the increasing influence or increasing size of the Khmer Rouge had no effect on its relative contentment?

A I think that within ASEAN there is concern that the Khmer Rouge strength is increasing faster. I think most people believe that all the factions are increasing in strength, but that the Khmer Rouge is increasing faster , and I think there is a degree of concern.

I am not sure whether the Thai are the ones that have the most feeling like that, or perhaps you might find the Indonesians or Singaporeans even more concerned.

Can I limit it to two more? The clock tells me I am beginning to run out of time. No more? Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 11:26 a.m.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER PREM OF THAILAND

April 13, 1984

The Briefing Room

1:44 P.M. EST

MR. ROUSSEL: The ground rules for this briefing are that it is on background and attributable to a senior administration official.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, this has been a short visit but, I think, an extremely successful visit, which is not a surprise given our long and close relations with Thailand. We celebrated just last year the 150th anniversary of relations with that country. And, of course, our recent years' relations have been particularly close -- the relations of close allies. And the discussions were very much in the spirit of close allies talking to one another about common concerns and problems.

That included discussion of important regional subjects, most importantly, the problem of Kampuchea and related problems in Indochina that are of great concern to Thailand and all the ASEAN countries, and, of course, also concern to the United States. And we are steadfast in our support of ASEAN strategy on that issue.

We also had discussion of other aspects of important subjects in Asia, including, quite importantly, about China and about the prospects for the President's trip to China.

On specific bilateral subjects, I guess the most important things we took up were security assistance, refugees, narcotics, and some trade investment subjects. On the matter of security assistance, as I think you heard, the President in his departure statement affirmed our strong support for Thailand's security as a treaty ally. And we were very pleased that the President was able on this visit to tell the Thai that we are able to make a substantial number of additional M-48 tanks available to Thailand. This will represent an increase of approximately 80 percent in their present inventory, and it's something that will be available in the next few months that will help them deal with the very immediate problems on their border.

We also, of course, are working with Thailand in longer range to deal with that threat as it may develop and as it exists now. The President told the Thai in that connection that we would be going to the Congress with next year's request to seek extended credit terms on the Thai FMS so that there would be a longer grace period and a longer period of repayment, going from the present five years grace and seven years repayment to the ten years grace period and twenty years repayment, which should substantially ease the burden on Thailand of the modernization efforts it's undertaking.

Not that it won't in the end pay out of its own resources, but, in fact, given Thailand's impressive growth rate which has been six to seven percent in real terms over the last twenty years, there can expect -- be expected to be in a much stronger repayment position later than they are now.

And, finally, in that connection, the President affirmed our support for Thailand's need for an advanced aircraft, and we agreed

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that we would be sending a high-level briefing team to Thailand in the relatively near future to explain our view of the various alternatives available including to present data that is only recently become available on some of the aircraft where we have just gotten operational models to test. And that's a very important decision which we will be working closely with the Thai on.

In the area of narcotics, we -- the President very warmly praised the efforts the Thai government has made on interdiction of trafficers and distruction of refineries, and we also discussed further efforts in the area of crop eradication and in the area of controlling the flow of drugs out of Thailand.

The very important subject of refugees where the record of Thailand has been outstanding in providing first asylum for an extraordinary number of refugees from Indochina over the last five years. In fact, I believe, in total, Thailand -- I have these numbers here -- Thailand has taken -- has granted first asylum to over 600,000 refugees since April of '76, and 120,000 of those refugees still remain in Thailand. We have taken off a large number just in the last year and will be taking a substantial number this coming year, and the President affirmed our commitment to continue working with the Thai and with the other resettlement countries until this problem is solved.

In that connection, too, we're very pleased to note the recent successes in prosecuting pirates in Thailand and welcome the efforts by the Thai to deal with the problem of piracy, and also welcome the statements by senior Thai officials making very clear Thailand's policy against forcible push-offs of refugees.

As I said, also there was some discussion of trade and business matters, and there will be further side discussions with the various ministers in the Prime Minister's delegation. And there will be a number of -- they're also speaking to private businessmen here in Washington and in New York.

In general, I would just say it was a successful visit because this is a successful relationship. The Thai have, I think, shown real leadership in Southeast Asia, and part of the reason that the -- an important part of the reason that that region today is prosperous and stable beyond anyone's expectations ten years ago has been the leadership of the countries of the region, and Thailand in the forefront. And it's a pleasure to have that kind of leader, that kind of ally here in the United States.

I'll be glad to take questions.

Q On the advanced aircraft, I don't quite understand -- does that mean that the FX is still in the running?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are several -- there are two FXs actually. There's an F-20 and there's the F-16 with the J-79 engine in it. And, of course, the third one which the Thai have requested is the F16A, and we've told them that there is important new data particularly on the F-20 because we now have two operational models of it and we have some specific data and evidence about its performance which is very high, and about its maintainability which we believe is one of its chief selling points. And we have asked the Thai, and they've agreed, to receive a high-level briefing team, not from any of the contractors, but that will present an impartial air force view of all of the alternatives, and to consider a final decision in the light of this new data.

Q But in the meantime, the President's statement today -- does that mean that if they -- after seeing new evidence, if they choose, they could still have the F-16A?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we'll get to that when they've re-looked at the decision. But the President's statement certainly makes clear that we recognize Thailand's need for an advanced

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aircraft. And what we're seeking here is what will give them the best military capability. It's not a matter that any of these aircraft are too capable for Thailand, or beyond their ability to handle or support, or beyond what is needed to meet the threat, which is, I think, quite considerable, especially projected into the future. But it's a very delicate matter -- military judgment.

We would like to have our best military people talk to the Thai, and after that's done, then we'll see where we are.

Q On the tanks, would you give us the numbers of tanks?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I believe the number is 40, and their present inventory is roughly 60, I think. So it's -- I said, 80 percent. That's wrong. It's a two-thirds increase. But a sizeable increase.

Q Excuse me. Would you repeat that? How many tanks?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Roughly 40. And I'm not sure about the inventory number, so let me back off of that. It's 40 that will be made available this summer. And at a rather -- we've been able to get them under terms that the price to Thailand will be rather favorable.

Q Is that under U.S. military inventory?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think M-48s, we're sort of scarfing up from other countries that are taking them out of inventory. It may be -- Do you know the answer to that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not sure. Some of them we've provided to Thailand in the past have come out of U.S. inventory. Others have been modified from other countries. These 40, I'm not sure.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not sure precisely. We have some in our inventory, but many of our other allies have them to. So it's a constant -- and they are a very, very good tank, so it's a constant scramble trying to get enough for everyone.

Q You might announce that the briefing's underway because nobody back there knows you're briefing.

Q Did you say that Thailand now has 60 tanks that you will be adding to?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I thought we did announce it.

Q How much have we missed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: A lot.

Q Excuse me, did you --

Q Is that right?

Q The whole thing. (Laughter.)

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I thought they announced it.

Q No.

Q You said --

Q Go back to the beginning.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: (Laughter.)

Q Did you say Thailand now has 60 tanks and this 40 will --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not --

Q Approximately?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Approximately, it would be a substantial increase in their present inventory, and the number that will be made available is 40. Let me now try to --

Q -- M-48?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: M-48 tanks.

Q The piracy that you mentioned; it was mentioned yesterday. Are these the people who are attacking the boat people? What are we talking about -- about pirates?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The thing that makes it a matter of such concern -- I mean, they attack almost anything in sight, including sometimes various -- I mean, they will come on -- Piracy is a problem throughout that area.

The problem that we are most concerned about is that they come across refugee boats and not only rob and plunder but rape and murder to an appalling extent. It is truly brutal acts that get reported. The few people that do survive those attacks have just heartrending stories to tell. And the problem is that the people who are doing it are not -- they don't fly around in big ships labelled pirate of flying the Jolly Roger. They're ordinary fishermen who, when they run on refugee boats, turn into rapists and murderers. And it's a, therefore, very tough problem to solve.

They key to it -- I mean, they're a number of things that are key. We are working through the UN High Commissioner on Refugees with the Thai in a patrolling program designed to improve intelligence and so forth. We've long felt that the real key is land enforcement and prosecution of the guilty. And after a couple of particularly tragic incidents a few months ago, the Thai government just in March arrested a number of pirates and four of them had been convicted on the basis of testimony by refugees. Very stiff sentences were handed out, and that, we think, is a particularly encouraging sign and a good deterrent.

During this visit, the Thai were able to note that there has been, partly, I think, due to enforcement efforts, partly perhaps other reasons. There has been a decline in the rate of pirate attacks, but it's still much too high to be a -- something any of us want to live with.

Q What is the Manilla Pact that was mentioned?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Manilla Pact is -- I guess, signed in 1954 and it includes a number of countries. It one time was connected with the now defunct Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. But, in fact, it commits the various parties, including in this case ourselves and Thailand, to act to meet common

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threats in the area in accordance with Constitutional processes. It's what constitutes the basis of our security relationship with Thailand. And --

Q So, it's still in effect?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's still in effect. There was a Thanat-Rusk Communique that was signed -- do you remember the year -- I think --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- '68.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- '68 which, in effect, brought it up to date after the --

Q Who were the signatories to that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The formal signatories are the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, Great Britain, Thailand and the Philippines.

Q You were talking about military aid. You were talking about tanks, the number of tanks. What other kind of military hardware are we giving the Thai?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, let me first say we don't -- these -- They're paying for this stuff. We're not giving it to them.

Q Yes. All right. Then, we're selling them.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And let me summarize for those who didn't get called earlier -- the things the President has said today, most importantly and most immediately, the 40 M-48 tanks that we made available this summer; secondly, improved credit terms on Thailand's foreign military sales credits; and, finally, a commitment to work with the Thai in meeting their need for an advanced fighter aircraft to replace their present F-5s.

We presently provide Thailand roughly $100 million in foreign military sales credits. Those are at commerical rates. Thailand's total procurement, I believe, in this country is over $200 million out of its own resources, and that has increased enormously

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in the last five years as a result of Vietnam's actions in Kampuchea. It includes basic infantry equipment and communications gear. As you can tell, an M-41 tank is sort of the high end of what Thailand is buying. It's not fancy, exotic stuff. It's the kind of basic thing they need to deal with the serious security problem on their border that Vietnam presents.

Q In the context of the new fighter aircraft, is there -- are there negotiations underway right now with Northrop for the new Northrop aircraft for Thailand?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, a number of contractors -- I mean, both Northrop and General Dynamics, which produces both of the versions of the F-16, have been in Thailand regularly selling their wares.

What we want to do with this briefing team that will go out, hopefully soon, will be to present our best military judgment of the real differences between the alternatives and the real costs.

Don?

Q Did the President or Prime Minister Prem assess the situation between Thailand and Vietnam, or between Vietnam and China? And, if so, what is their assessment at this time?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There was discussion even more of the situation between China and the Soviet Union and the sense that China's basic concerns about the Soviet Union, and in particular about Soviet support for Vietnam, were not about to change. And China remained very concerned and, therefore, very actively involved in helping the ASEAN countries with the security problem that they face as a result of Vietnam's presence in Kampuchea.

Unfortunately, neither of us see much near-term prospect of a change in policy on the part of Vietnam. But that's ultimately where the solution does lie. We are -- the ASEAN countries and we supporting them are seeking a political solution to the Kampuchea problem. We are seeking to persuade Vietnam that it has to choose between keeping its forces in Kampuchea or having a constructive relationship with ASEAN and with the West. And we hope that eventually over time, they will choose the latter course, and we can then get down to a serious effort to produce that political solution.

Q Well, there's been fighting, as you know, recently.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The fighting is evidence of the continuing lack of change in Vietnamese policy.

Q That's what I'm getting at -- is how seriously are the Thai taking it -- the discussion here? Are they -- you're giving them -- you're selling them some tanks, but what are they -- do they expect somehow expanding military conflict with the Vietnamese or what is their assessment of the current state of the situation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think their assessment of the current state of the situation is that it's serious but it's roughly as it was last year. It was serious last year. We had incursions, possibly more serious incursions a year ago.

It's not, I think -- we don't see it as a harbinger of a major escalation of this conflict, but it's already a sufficiently disturbing one, and the presence of 160,000 Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea continues to be a serious worry.

Q This promise to supply the tanks to Thailand, is it a result of the fighting at the Thai-Kampuchean border?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's not directly connected to a specific event like that. It is a result of the general threat to Thailand that's posed by the large Vietnamese presence in Kampuchea and by the repeated border incursions that have taken place this year and last year, and we're afraid that until Vietnam changes its policy, will take place in the future. And we would like to see Thailand in as strong a position as possible to deal with incursions of that kind and to deter more serious ones.

Q Could you give us the cost for the tanks?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Roughly, $30 million for the whole package.

Q What does this science and technology agreement do?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It, in a number of ways, facilitates cooperation between scientific establishments. It's one of these sort of umbrella agreements that we have with a number of countries. I think I briefed quite a few of you about the very successful one we have with China. Under the umbrella agreement, you then proceed to develop specific protocols that define in more detail your cooperation in particular areas.

Some of the ones I think are of most immediate potential interests to the Thai are areas of science and technology related particularly to agriculture and to energy and environmental studies.

Q Is there any new agreements on cooperation and -- application between the two countries?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't say new agreements. We have -- I think, starting, in fact, shortly after the Prime Minister's visit here in October of 1981, saw -- and we take it as a direct result of promises that he made when he was here -- a greatly invigorated Thai effort to suppress trafficking and refining of heroin on the Thai border. And this is a serious and difficult business.

It's essentially a military operation in which significant numbers of Thai have been killed and others wounded. It's had a substantial effect in pushing heroin traffic and refining out of Thailand.

The problem that is much more difficult and that we discussed some today is the problem of poppy growing itself because now, in this case, one's dealing with poor farmers who need some alternative form of livelihood. And that's a much harder thing to go at.

Q Would you repeat the improved credits from FMS, please?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's -- we would -- this is something we would request with next year's FMS request from Congress. It would change the repayment terms from five years grace and seven years repayment to ten years grace and twenty years repayment.

Just have time for one or two more. Yes?

Q The pirates we're talking about are Thai pirates?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, they are of various nationalities, as a matter of fact. And I think -- they are criminals. They're not representatives of any country, and I think that's important to say.

The bulk of them seem to be Thai fishermen, that's right. And that's why the enforcement efforts need to be concentrated in Thailand. But no responsible official in Thailand is defending piracy, that should be clear.

Q Having come in late, what is it that we are prepared to do to assist this effort? Is that what that discussion was about?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On the piracy? Well, since the -- we have, in fact, provided several million dollars and have about nearly $ 5 million more that we're ready to contribute to the anti-piracy program that the UN High Commissioner on Refugees is working -- has been working on with the Thai government. The initial expenditures -- the initial program was less successful than any of us wanted, and therefore, we did a rather extensive study. U.S., Norwegian, and I believe, Dutch participation for the UN HCR to develop a number of improved measures. Those are being discussed with the Thai and we're prepared to put, as I said, up to about $5 million into that.

But the key isn't money and assets. The key is what you do with it and if you're able to convict and arrest people. And that's why we're particularly encouraged by these arrests last month and would hope that there can be more.

Q On this issue of the money, the $5 million for the pirates -- at the hearing on the Hill, I thought that some of the Congressmen expressed the hope that the $5 million they had marked for the anti-piracy program would not just go through the channels of the UN High Commissioner, but would be more immediate and more effective.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, you're correct in describing some impatience in the Congress in getting some action. And I think it may have been the feeling, as Americans so often have the feeling, that if, damn it, if we just -- excuse me -- just take it over, we could get the job done.

It isn't -- it's an international problem. A lot of it has got to be done by the Thai, and we want to keep other countries involved in the effort. We don't want it to simply become just a U.S.-Thai effort if possible. But that's -- we share the feeling of impatience, but we still think the UN HCR is the right vehicle to work through.

Thank you.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 2:08 P.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO CHINA

April 16, 1984

The Briefing Room

2:31 P.M. EST

MR. SIMS: This briefing is on the subject of the President's trip to China, and not other subjects.

Q No deals.

Q Directive 138?

Q April 3.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If you'll indulge me for just a moment, I've written down some thoughts that I thought would be economical with your time and then we'll get to your questions. The consolidation of a mature relationship with China should be viewed not only in terms of the mutual benefits for the United States and China, but also for its far-reaching implications for regional and global peace, stability, and prosperity in the years ahead.

This will be the President's second trip to Asia in six months. These trips, along with his global initiatives for a world economic recovery, arms control, demonstrate that the President is engaged in an effort to stimulate mutually beneficial economic, political, security arrangements with and among the nations of the world.

Premier Zhao's January visit to the United States and the President's discussions with him were part of this process and the process will continue with the President's China visit and beyond. A great deal was accomplished during the Premier's visit here, including the establishment of a rapport. Through their discussions, the two leaders reinforced a common goal of resistance to Soviet efforts toward expansionism, and the President contributed to a dialogue aimed toward achieving stability in the Korean context, an agreement on science and technology and industrial cooperation was concluded and highlighted the United States commitment to building a solid relationship with China and our interest in seeing China play a strong role in maintaining peace and stability in the Pacific Basin.

The President seeks to promote greater cohesion among the nations of Asia and the Pacific. The prospects for this are enhanced if the nations involved are strong, self-reliant, and a strong, secure China serves American interests.

In short, the President's purposes in his trip are to demonstrate his personal commitment to strengthening and broadening this bilateral relationship. I think it's important to stop and view, in the abstract, the scale of U.S.-China relationships as they exist today. The diversity of the relationship is a central qualitative point to this trip. Looking at the agenda in terms of Chinese interests and broader U.S. relationship, if you think just about energy, for example, whether oil, coal, hydro, nuclear, the scale of Chinese goals in these areas is truly enormous.

(China #7) MORE

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In each of these areas, the United States leads in the technology that can best serve China's interest for development. Chinese expectations and hopes of having between $10-15 billion worth of oil offshore exploration going alone by the turn of the century holds immense promise for American private-sector investment.

In coal, the resources are the second-largest in the world and it's largely coal of a kind that is easily extracted using technology in which the United States is the best in the world.

In hydro, China is or has the largest hydro-power potential of any country in the world and, again, its development could be enhanced by the United States' assistance which, again, represents the best technology in the world on this operation.

Finally, in nuclear power, China's ambitions to have 12 centers producing in excess of 10,000 kilowatt production potential by the turn of the century is an area where the United States, although in a clearly competitive position with many others, can achieve a major market share.

Well, I mention all these things not so much for the technical interest involved, but to raise the question why, why the Chinese interest in American investment in these areas. Well, obviously, there's a self-interest involved, but why the United States? Now it's clear that we've had a very ups-and-downs kind of relationship with China, and it seems to me -- and it's just a personal view -- that right now we are seeing a purposeful, conscious decision on the part of China that it wants the United States of America, as distinct from someone else, to play a very important role in its own efforts toward modernization in several sectors.

Now that represents as well, I think, more than just an economic decision; it expresses what the Chinese think about the United States, about its reliability as a supplier, about the quality of its assistance, the steadiness of the relationship, and its enduring potential in the years ahead.

The administration has, from its beginning, had to deal with some serious Chinese misgivings about this fundamental reliability and whether or not they ought to engage across a wide spectrum with us. Technology transfer and impediments of law as well as regulation have really called into question American credibility, but the point is that apparently, in the last year, the success that we've had in overcoming the problems of categorization of China, of removing bureaucratic impediments, and of getting a common agreement within the administration on how this agenda ought to be handled has been absorbed by the Chinese and they end up saying let's do it.

I think, finally, that when you think about what this could mean, if any of these things were to come to pass on any scale, what would it involve, it would involve, first of all, quite a number of Americans being in China, quite a number of Chinese being here -- there're already 10,000 or more students, Chinese students, here. But the implications of this kind of agenda are for literally tens of thousands of Americans being there, and that has an entirely separate impact, I think, when you consider the day-to-day knowledge that is absorbed in China about Americans and America and vice versa.

So I think that it

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isn't too much to say that we could well be on the eve of a new era in U.S.-Chinese relationship, an era marked by diversity, extending not only into commercial areas, but into commitment on both sides to deal with our perceptions and theirs of regional stability and how it's best achieved. It goes beyond these energy areas into agriculture. It goes into countless areas of cooperation and exchange, cultural and otherwise.

And, in concluding, I'd say that this Chinese commitment and American willingness, the visit of five Cabinet officers in the past 15 months, marking that diversity and commitment makes clear that this is not a relationship of convenience, that it does not depend upon any third country and that it will endure.

The consolidation of a relationship is something that doesn't sound like big news. It is important in the sense of marking a condition, a condition that has not heretofore existed, a condition of breadth, diversity, strength and enduring quality, that is of great significance.

I'll be glad to take your questions now.

Lou.

Q The report that the PRC is going to make more of a fuss on arms to Taiwan than we previously thought. What's your response to that? What's the latest that you can tell us about that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The agenda with China will include regional issues, bilateral, global, commercial and that, of course, will encompass our views on the resolution of the Chinese matter.

I think it's clear --

Q What? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- that our --

Q What matter?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- own attitudes with respect to the people on Taiwan, our commitments under the three communiques that have been issued with China, haven't changed. I think, clearly, there will be an exchange of views on the subject and I don't expect there to be any change.

Q Well, do you expect an intensification of the dialogue? I mean, they seem to be throwing out all kinds of signals that they are really putting this at the top of the list and are going to go after it in a much more strenuous way than anyone has indicated to us.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think we'll have to wait and see. I must say that I don't expect that there will be fundamental change on this issue during the trip.

Q Well, does --

Q You mean change of policy or change of what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Change in any respect.

Q But is there concern that the Taiwan issue, though, if brought up by the Chinese now in a very accelerated manner could preempt other things from being done? Other issues that the U.S. wants to bring up? Any other agreements that should be discussed?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think so. I think that our position that the Taiwan question is a matter for the Chinese themselves to decide, that our interest is in seeing that that resolution be peaceful, that this evolution can be, will be managed peacefully and I don't expect it to interfere with the pace or quality of our relationship on other issues.

Q But that's not what we're talking about. We're

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talking about arms sales as described in the communique, our version of it, versus theirs; it all hinges on that one point, and you're not addressing it.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I have addressed it to the extent that I've said that our position in the August '82 communique hasn't changed. Just for your information, for the people who haven't followed the details of it, the benchmark of U.S. sales to Taiwan is right now just under about $800 million. The expectation that these sales would decline over time as the Taiwan question is resolved peacefully we stand by. And the Chinese understand that. It was a matter that was clearly discussed when Premier Zhao was here. It will be discussed again.

My point is that I don't expect either side's attitudes to change.

Q Well, the U.S. takes the position, does it not, that as long as it continues to decline from the benchmark number, no matter how slight the decline, that the communique is being fulfilled and the Chinese are obviously signaling that that may not be enough, and that's what we're asking about, really.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: My point is that I don't expect -- I just don't agree, Bill. I don't think that our indications are that our separate positions on this will fundamentally alter the strength of the relationship or affect our ability in other areas to make progress. Yes?

Q What concrete changes in the bilateral relationship can be fairly expected as a result, or a direct result of this trip?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The purpose in what I had to say before, and I won't rehearse it, is that the several things that have happened that are manifested in agreements reached and advancing the resolution of problems between Secretary Shultz, Weinberger, Baldrige, Bill Brock, express, in the richness of that discourse in the past year, an engagement with the Chinese on a much broader agenda. And that fact in itself, as a collective measure of the quality of the relationship, is important.

Q So your position is that we would be wrong in looking for some quantitative change in the relationship as a result of the President's visit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The short answer is yes. Again, I won't belabor it and I -- with rhetoric, but every now and then it is worthwhile, in the course of a relationship that is now 12 years old, to see whether the trend is toward permanence and expanding to -- in scope. Two years ago I don't think you could say that. Now I think you can, and that's important. Larry?

Q Do you expect to see a fourth joint communique at the end of this visit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q How many --

Q Let me try again on arms. What I'm trying to find out -- I know what our position is -- has there been any indication at all that you received or this administration has received that the Chinese are going to press us harder on their point of view, that they are going to raise this in priority in the talks? I've gotten the impression we didn't think they were going to make a big deal of it and now there seem to be some signs that they are, and is that correct? That's what I'm trying to find out from you.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it's always been my expectation that this issue, which clearly is a very, very important issue for the Chinese, will be an important item on their agenda during this visit. And I don't believe I've ever represented anything to the contrary.

That expectation, during Premier Zhao's visit here, and now on the return visit, does not imply that it is such a contentious or is a matter of such fractious potential that it's going to damage the central quality of the relationship.

In the back, yes?

Q Yes. Do you expect to see an agreement on nuclear cooperation reached, and do you have any indication that the Chinese are going to acquiesce on the issue of U.S. control over spent fuel?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: To answer your question, I don't expect that we'll have a conclusion of an agreement there.

Q The nuclear issue.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The nuclear issue. We've had several exchanges; two out of three issues have been resolved and the balance in the third one, which you mentioned, hasn't. Our folks are there now and I think these talks will go on into the spring. But I would not expect it to be concluded on this trip.

Q Why do you think the Chinese have asked to re-open the talks at the eleventh hour, then?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, first, I wouldn't characterize it quite that way. It is a common interest on both sides to move it along, and we have in the course of last year, in the spring, fall, summer, and so forth, and now this is a sensible thing to talk about. But I wouldn't have high expectations that this is the last go at it.

Chris?

Q What are the prospects for any real progress on the Korean question, and how big a part of the agenda will that represent?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it will be discussed within the context of China's and our prospective on regional stability. I wouldn't expect it to be a central focus of the talks. Our own belief that progress can best be made by direct talks between the North and the South -- well, that remains our belief and it is useful to hear if there's been any different thinking on their part. But I wouldn't expect this to be a central item on the agenda.

Q China is also making an effort to repair its relationship with the Soviet Union. What is our attitude about that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We think that a reduction in tensions between China and the Soviet Union is constructive and we would welcome that. A reduction in tensions between countries like China and the Soviet Union is in the interest of everyone and if that's possible, we would commend it.

Q Why is it in the interest of everyone? Why isn't it in our interest to see that they continue to be at odds with each other?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, when two countries face each other, one with 50 divisions and the other with very substantial power, and share an agenda of disagreement involving Afghanistan and Indochina, all of them with military dimensions in them, disagreement and miscalculation can have the potential for violence. None of us want that and to the extent that a reduction of tension and a steady discourse on those subjects relieves the possibility for unilateral action by one side or the other, then that serves the interest of peace and that serves everybody's interests.

Yes, Steve?

Q You and the other briefers have referred at some length to the breadth and depth of the relationship now in the dozens of areas in which there are discussions and cooperation, and yet -- and have also told us not to expect any breakthroughs, any new agreements, too many of them, anyway, in these particular areas. And we're told now that the nuclear and investment treaty negotiations are sort of sputtering along. What is the -- is this the best time for this trip in terms of those agreements? Wouldn't it make more sense to have scheduled this trip at a time when those agreements were further

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along themselves, or when such a trip might have itself done more to push them further along?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think that the trip and when you schedule it expresses the President's concept of why you travel at all. I mean, he has said it in other contexts. And that is, when there is the record behind you of better understanding and of real progress, then let's acknowledge that and give it a clear demonstration of support.

Now, we had our disagreements and it took us a year and a half to establish a common understanding on the matter of arms sales to Taiwan.

Since that time, the -- we and they have taken off in a significantly broader agenda of cooperation. And I think if you compare corresponding periods in other administrations and what you've really seen in the way of Cabinet officers and their counterparts coming and going and you can just see across the board not only what has been done but the potential and to go and to say, both sides, "We believe this is important and we are both committed to it," is historically important. And to do that now because you've got behind you the underpinnings of that permanence is a sensible thing to do.

Don't get me wrong. I apologize for the long-winded rhetoric. What I'm trying to capture here is that there -- in the context of news, it is news in the sense of something qualitatively terribly important happening. Now, I recognize that's terribly tough to get anybody in the United States very much up for on evening news. So I sympathize.

Q I think, actually, this -- Well, I don't want to speak for the reporters, but if you could be more specific in providing, for instance, some examples of why this trip is appropriate now in terms of these specific agreements, then, you know, we'll worry about the news and -- but what we need is sort of something concrete, rather than just this belaboring of how the atmospherics have improved.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I had thought that you'd already gotten --

Q We have.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- pretty much of a summary on --

Q We have. And the briefings, I think, have been helpful. I don't want to belabor my question; but it was really that in terms of all these different agreements, or rather negotiations on all these myriad subjects that are going on and have been going on, what is the relationship between all those things which we've been briefed on and the fact that this trip is being taken now? What does this trip accomplish in terms of those myriad agreements? I think you've answered it, but -- in the way that you want, and that's fine, but that was -- I don't mean it's -- that you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, let me try one more time very briefly. In a nutshell, it's this: When you're trying to build a relationship with any country that has been dormant for many, many years, you've got to go through quite a lot of, first of all, setting of our perspective and theirs on why we are doing these various things. And that takes a long time between the Secretary of State and counterpart and heads of government. Then you have to overcome years of accumulated bureaucratic ideological and Congressional legislative restrictions on this. And we've plowed through quite a lot of those.

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But when you get all those together, then what you conclude is, all right, we are at the point now where this relationship can really take off. Now, let's acknowledge that. And, again, I would stress that this is a trip that the President is making to the Pacific Basin and it is of a piece with the conclusion of common points of view at Williamsburg with our European allies. And it represents the President's

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strong feeling that his first term had to involve reaching, conceptually and politically, understandings with our leading allies on how to deal with stability and building peace today. And we think that building peace is both political and economic in nature and we have gone very far toward that agreement at Williamsburg last year. Now, it is the second time in the Pacific Basin.

I think, too, and something I haven't mentioned is significant and that is that this is not American assertion of -- At least, I don't believe that it is just our portraying of something bigger than it is. When you look at what the Chinese are doing in this trip, the President is meeting for seven to ten hours with Chinese leaders. Now, stop and, I suppose, compare that to the analogues with other countries and visits. Stop and recognize that the opportunity to -- for a foreign visitor to appear before the Chinese people more than once and to reach them represents a decision by the government of China. Now, that says something about the relationship as well as the exhaustive agenda and the people with which he's going to sit down and spend hours and hours and hours. You simply have to ask yourself, does that truly say what I assert it does, that there is a qualitative difference that is important in historical terms in that relationship. And I think it is.

In the back and then up front.

Q What kind of discussion do you expect on military cooperation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think the discussions that are most important are the ones that have already gone on, Secretary Weinberger's visit and the agreement within our own government that's taken place with regard to technology transfer and the establishment of the criteria that make possible Chinese access to technology.

Now, this is not to say that China is today eligible for foreign military sales per se. That's a matter that still is in progress. I don't expect the President's visit to be one in which the details of hardware are going to be dealt with in terms of contracts and so forth.

After the Secretary's visit and the corresponding visit from the other side and the expectation that these working level exchanges are going to continue, by common acceptance, means that this is a process. So I don't expect there to be anything finalized on this trip. But it will be advanced in terms of learning more about the character of their interest and I think that it will be given -- the momentum it already has will be sustained, but I wouldn't go beyond that.

Q How would you characterize the nature of U.S.-Chinese military cooperation at this point?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think that our expectation that making available on a case-by-case basis defensive systems is a policy which serves our common interest and that it -- that interest is in stability and peace and that both sides will be defining just how that can best be done in the months ahead.

John.

Q Will there be a discussion, also, of the sales by the Chinese to -- of military hardware to other countries? Will we bring that up and -- in its relationship to the Middle East, to the Gulf region?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The subject generically of how each of us can contribute to stability in the several regions of the world will be an item on the agenda, yes.

Helen.

Q How about specifically, the question on sales to Iran or Iraq?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'd leave it as I've had it. Our view of how you achieve stability in the Middle East and theirs will surely be a matter exchanged.

Helen.

Q Could you personalize this trip now? How many briefings has the President had? Where is he in

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his briefings? What does he ask you during a 90 minute lunch, I mean? How much preparation -- What is his attitude?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The -- I'm trying to think now long ago it was -- about six weeks I suppose -- when the President, in his private readings, talked about how he viewed what could be accomplished, and how he wanted to prepare further. And he said he wanted to depart from the traditional approach which guys like me foist upon him. And that is to focus fairly narrowly on the political agenda and economics and so forth. And he said, I'd like to corroborate some of my own thinking, or have it challenged, by scholars, historians, people from within and outside the government, and let's do that informally, but deliberately, so that -- and let's add to the preparation period.

Before, just to give you a statistic, we usually have had for major visits, three preparatory sessions. Now this time it's up to five, with a likelihood of six. And the President, adding these at his own direction. And I think that expresses an enthusiasm for this visit.

Q What outsiders have come in to brief him?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There have been --

Q I mean, who are the outsiders?

Q -- Jerry Falwell --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The -- Betty Lord, Gwen Lord -- people who have recently traveled to China; professors, Bob Scalopino was in; people who go back to the beginning of the relationship, Dick Solomon, who kind of worked in the area for years; and a greater number and diversity of people within the administration that, historically, would not have played a big role, but have this time. It's been a richer --

Q Well, as a --

Q Have people challenged --

Q -- as a very ardent non-communist, how do you think he's going to view China and the people? I mean, what -- is it going to be an eye-opener? Or is he prepared for the change -- because he has been a ideologue, in this sense, against communism all his life -- all of his political life.

Q -- and Red China --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think you also have to accept that when the President came to office, in fact, before the inauguration, I was stuck by what were obviously the two thematic highpoints for him coming into foreign policy. One of them was Mexico, and hemispheric relations in this country, the North American accord and things like that. But the other thing that he focused upon was the Pacific Basin. And I think that is a natural expectation from a man who's adulthood was spent in California -- that to have a Pacific orientation. But, I think, too, that for me at least, it's been differentiated in the months since, on what he sees as the potential for a peaceful Asia in terms of markets, in terms of improving the quality of life for more than a billion people, and what that means as a leading component of stability in the world.

So he's focused upon it in that sense. Finding a way for there to be stability in Asia, and, I must say, he is very, very excited --

Q Get back here, Sims --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- about the prospect. The sheer scale and diversity and -- of China is, has been, thoroughly absorbed by him, as well as its potential for a very thorough-going, comprehensive relationship -- beyond economics.

In the back?

Q You said that there is at least one more, at least you think there may be one more preparatory session -- and that the President seeks to get the views from people outside. Is he planning on getting any advice from Richard Nixon on this, since he did start this ball rolling, and he has sought his views before?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would expect that in the course of his own private discourse with outsiders on this that that would take place. I don't know that, but I do know

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that he's in communication with former presidents periodically, and I would expect him to do that before leaving this time.

Yes.

Q He only has a couple more days.

Q We've been told in other briefings that a lot of the Chinese are eager to cooperate to advance their economic expansion, their military security, and so on. They also are very sensitive about remaining nonaligned, closely identified with the Third World, and therefore, not all that ready to jump into new commitments with us. How much of a limiting factor is this Chinese nonalignment in terms of making progress on the agenda you're looking at?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we recognize that surely not in this visit, or ever, are we going to see a change in China as a communist country. That, while we have some areas of agreement, there are a lot of them that we don't, and that we approach the security dimension of the relationship on a self-interested basis, without illusion, and that they have fundamentally different Marxist ideas about their relationship to the Third World. Now, we will talk about those.

We and they will discuss how we think individually. We can better improve stability, but I don't think we have any illusions about some convergence on these issues.

That said, it is surely in our interest for China to be secure, strong to the extent that contributes to stability in Asia. And that is an objective that stands on its own without affecting China's relationship with other developing countries.

Yes?

Q Will there be any conversation with the Taiwanese by you folks either before or after this trip?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Comments to the Chinese -- the Taiwanese?

Q Conversation, dialogue, with the Taiwanese here by you folks either before you go or when you get back?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, our exchanges unofficially with people on Taiwan go on all the time. And, historically, those exchanges have not been interrupted by high-level visits, and they won't be this time. Those will endure and go on, and yes, we will be in normal communication.

MR. SIMS: Can we have one more? And then we're going to have to form a pool for the Chinese students.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q You talked earlier about how the President's views when he came to office -- has his views changed about your relationship -- about how he views Taiwan, and also, how he views the PRC over the last three years?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President's view toward the relationship of the United States and the people on Taiwan has not changed in any respect. His view toward the importance of strong U.S. relations toward China remains as it was.

The components of that relationship, as they have matured and expanded, have been at his urging and his approval. But it doesn't reflect any fundamental change in the possibilities for U.S.-Chinese relations which he's always felt are important.

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Q Could you get the students to come out to us after they finish in there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll see what's planned.

END 3:14 P.M. EST

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
U.S.-MEXICO BINATIONAL COMMISSION
TUESDAY, APRIL 17, 1984, 4:15 P.M.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, ladies and gentlemen, as you know, we've been meeting today, beginning at the White House this morning where the President received Secretary Sepulveda, Foreign Secretary of Mexico, and Secretaries Silva-Herzog and Hernandez, Secretaries of Treasury and of Commerce, respectively, for Mexico. Accompanying the Secretary of State, on our side, were Secretary Regan and Ambassador John Gavin; on the Mexican side, Ambassador Espinosa de los Reyes.

The President was most cordial in his welcome to the visiting Mexican officials. He told them that he looked forward to the coming meeting with President de la Madrid, and that he and Mrs. Reagan sent warm regards and were looking forward, as I said, welcoming him here.

The meeting then moved from the White House to the State Department. We have been in meetings here all day covering a wide range of issues of mutual concern, including finance and trade, which encompasses subsidies, countervailing duties, GSP, investment, questions on Border Commission, border sanitation, environmental problems, fisheries, maritime boundaries, diplomatic reciprocity, third-country transit, Binational Commission, and narcotics.

At the end of the meeting, the Secretary of Foreign Relations of Mexico stated that he was extremely pleased by what had transpired so far, and that we should not let too much time go by between meetings and indicated that just the fact that we did meet was positive, even though in this particular case, as has been the case before, the actual issues and the actual matters that had been discussed have given us positive results and better understanding.

I should point out to you, by the way, even though this is ON BACKGROUND, that we just had a colleague of mine from the Mexican desk come in and also Licenciada Lajous de Solana, who is director of North American Affairs for the Secretary to Foreign Relations in Mexico.

The Secretary of State responded that the meetings indeed were fruitful and excellent, and suggested not only a continued series of meetings, but the possibility of continuing a practice, which both Secretaries have followed, of meeting at times when they are in the same venue and the same location, pending discussions and meetings of other international fora, and so forth.

I know you will want to ask about Central American concerns, but in order to make the deadline to come down here and see you, I left a meeting just as those considerations were being taken up. I can tell you, however, that above all, we agreed that the most important thing that we could do is to continue these meetings in the same context in which this meeting was held, that is a context of friendship and of mutual respect, which is to say that even where we had differences, they were handled cordially, amicably, and I believe, productively.

I'll take your questions, if you would like.

Q Sir, I was wondering, there have been a lot of reports circulating here that the U.S. was going to propose to the Mexican side some sort of exchange in support of U.S. policy in Central America, that the U.S. would be more willing to provide Mexico with assistance or trade -- matters along those lines. Is that true? Was that proposed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it was not. We have very specific considerations with reference to Mexico. We believe that Mexico's growth and advancement is necessary not only to their security, but to ours. We have, as a consequence, as you will notice, over the past several years -- and certainly in this Administration -- been very forthcoming in our assistance and our help. In 1981, when the petroleum market went soft, you remember that we helped by becoming purchasers for our strategic petroleum reserve. We have throughout these years given an average of $1.5 billion dollars in facilities to the Ex-Im Bank.

We had, in 1982, worked out again for the strategic petroleum reserve a billion dollar prepayment, which is now finished, now paid back -- it was paid back some time ago; last year, as a matter of fact. We provided, in fiscal year 1983, $1.7 billion through the Commodity Credit Corporation facilities for grain, oil, seeds, and so forth; and this year, we are providing in this fiscal year about $790 million. (?)

When the crisis developed in 1982, we also helped with swaps through the Fed; we participated by being the providers of at least one-half of the $1.85 billion that was facilitated to Mexico through the Bank of International Settlements. We have, in short, been extremely helpful and extremely cooperative in that area. We would like to continue to be, not because, I should point out, of anything more or less than enlightened self-interest. We believe strongly that Mexico should be strong, free, and prosperous if we indeed are to also enjoy the benefits of its productivity and its growth.

Q Sir, was there any discussion of the proposed meeting next month between President de la Madrid, President Reagan, and Prime Minister Trudeau?

A At this moment, we have nothing set up on the basis of anything but meetings between the President and President de la Madrid.

Q Was there any reaction on the comments of Secretary Sepulveda about the mining of the ports in Nicaragua in the meeting with Secretary Shultz?

A Up to the time I left, there had been no comments on that basis. I should point out to you once again that we have differences in certain areas, but the differences really are more on what avenues we take to achieve goals which we are very much together on.

We, I believe, have the same goals for Central America: detente, peace, freedom for the peoples there, and equity, justice andprosperity for the societies of those nations. We have some differences, as you know, on the avenues to achieve those same goals.

Q Did you discuss anything about the problem of illegal immigrants from Mexico coming into the U.S.?

A Yes, we did. Basically, however, that was very lightly touched upon, because as you know at this time, Simpson-Mazzoli is in the House, and we didn't think it was proper to comment on that at the time. You already know the Administration's position on that. The questions that we touched upon, however, had to do with third-country nationals coming into this country through Mexico, and with the question about third-country nationals going through Mexico back to their own nations -- being returned to their own nations.

There was the question there -- a very real one, I believe -- of the consideration for human rights, humanitarian concerns, concerns that we would have for any refugees, and we heard those very clearly and we shall continue to discuss those.

Q Do you know what the current external debt of Mexico is?

A The current external debt?

Q Yes.

A Somewhere between $85 billion and $90 billion. That's total private sector and public sector debt.

(Continued on page 7.)

Q Is there any repayment problem coming up?

A We certainly hope not. Mexico has been remarkably astute in handling its liquidity problems. As you know, and as I mentioned earlier, one of the architects of President de la Madrid's programs, Licenciado Silva-Herzog is here, and we feel that they have done a remarkable job.

They have also, as you know, developed an IMF program -- IMF-backed program. I forgot to mention that we also supported IFM with an additional $8.5 billion sometime ago when I gave you that laundry list.

In the case of Mexico, they decided to attack inflation and they decided to do this, among other ways, by reducing the deficit as a percentage of GDP from a horrendous nearly 18 percent that it was in 1982. They brought it down to 8.5 last year. That was their target. They just about hit it. They're targeting 5.5 this year. They're hoping to hit 3.5 next year.

Of course, next year there is going to be a bit of bubble on the loan, and in '87 there is an even more significant one. But we feel that if Mexico continues the progress that they have been making on the liquidity and on the fiscal and monetary sector, that their economic problems also may start to evanesce. We certainly are hopeful of that.

In this particular year we see a turnaround in the economy that the Mexican authorities are projecting as being valid, going from a minus 4.7 negative growth, in other words, last year in GDP, to flat now and to possibly one, maybe a little more than one percent by the last quarter of this year.

Q Under the same category of finances, was the Argentina situation discussed and Mexico's participation in that?

A Yes, it was.

Q Could you tell me, was there any concern on the American side that these countries -- Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela and the others -- that have helped out may be joining together in some way on this debt question?

A Once again, referring to Licenciado Silva-Herzog, as you know, he has said that this was a cartel not to avoid debt but a cartel to find a way to service it correctly and honestly, and with integrity. Licenciado Silva-Herzog happens to be the architect -- at least one of the architects, but I think the most important architect -- of this particular facility.

We think that it is enormously useful, and that it avoids problems not only for the specific countries that were touched, and not only for Argentina, but for the entire hemisphere; in fact, for the entire world.

Q Did you reach any informal or formal agreements during these conversations today on any specific subject between Mexico and the U.S.?

A No, nothing formal. Informally, what I've already told you is that it was agreed that these were useful meetings, that we should continue them frequently, that it was important to have these discussions in this kind of a context.

We intend to continue that. And, of course, the Secretary also pointed out certain issues where Ambassador Gavin is, as he called him, the designated hitter for our side and that we should pursue through him.

Q What do you consider to be the most significant thing that you achieved out of today's talks?

A Continuing good-will, continuing good relationship, an understanding of some of the differences we had on some of the issues that we confront daily, and a preparation for the very important, and we think very significant, Presidential level meeting that's coming up next month.

Q Did you discuss the agenda of the talks with the President and, if so, can you share some of that?

A The agenda that is upcoming?

Q Yes.

A No, sir, we haven't prepared that at this time. This was a preparatory meeting for that. I gave you the issues that we discussed here today in preparation for that.

Obviously, some of them will be touched upon at that time as well.

Q When you met with the President this

morning, did President Reagan at any point bring up an old plan he had for a North American Accord involving Canada, Mexico and the U.S.

A No, he did not; not today. What he did do is -- I think I told you already -- he was particularly warm; as a matter of fact, I think it's important to note this, and Licenciado Lajous de Solana can attest to this also.

The three Secretaries that are visiting from Mexico -- Secretaries Sepulveda, Silva-Herzog and Hernandez -- all remarked how delightful it was to see him, how warm and cordial he was, how pleased they were by the fact that not only had he received them but by the way he understood the issues that were being discussed, and by his feeling about the hemisphere as a whole. Because the President spoke about these two continents joined by Central America; these two remarkable continents that were so rich and so wealthy not only in resources but in their people, and how we must work hard to achieve true justice and true understanding and true progress for all of these people. He spoke of this hemisphere as the real hope of the world.

Q The issue of refugees and third country nationals, was it the Mexican position that the United States should not deport to Central America directly the Salvadorans and Guatemalans and, if so, what was the American response to that?

A The Mexican position is that there are very serious humanitarian considerations, and that we must be certain that we are not sending people to situations where they would be prejudiced. We appreciate that, we can understand that, and we certainly don't want that to happen to anybody.

On the other hand, we feel that on certain occasions that has been clearly stipulated, and that perhaps legalities, niceties, of the law have impeded our being able to transport people through.

It has been pointed out, although it was not necessarily pointed out in the meetings today. In our conversations that we've had before that, of course, the alternative is simply to charter aircraft and to fly people directly non-stop. In such a case, Mexico would not have a position, of course. But I think that it is indicative of the fact that here is an issue, although it perhaps may not be a very large issue in the scheme of the world it certainly is an important issue to anyone who is involved and that we must have a consideration of these matters and, indeed, we have. And we've dealt with it here, again, in a context of friendship and of mutual respect.

Q Was any discussion held on the problem that Mexico is facing militarily on its border with Guatemala? There have been cases of hot pursuit apparently of refugees from Guatemala. While it's not a bilateral concern, it does touch on this issue -- refugees.

A Indeed, it might be a concern to us under any circumstances because we are particularly concerned about Mexico's security, but the subject was not discussed neither specifically nor generally today.

Q On this external debt of 85 to 90 billion, do you know how much is owed to American institutions?

A Yes. And if the computer would just search around a little bit, I might be able to give it to you. $23 point-some billion; is that right? Could you recall?

STAFF: More or less.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: More or less. Okay. It's closer to $25.

Q What progress was made on the border sanitation issue -- Tijuana River?

A First of all, we go back to August 14 when the Presidents met before in La Paz, and at that time an environmental agreement was signed. Since that time, we have moved to have several meetings. And on March 8 and 9 of this year, last month, the commissions met. Our group, including people from the State Department, George High of the Mexican Desk, and others, and our team was headed up Fitz-Hugh Green of EPA.

A distinguished Mexican group came up and we discussed the very serious problems throughout the border. The meetings were held in San Diego and Tijuana. Specifically, we were trying to find some remedy and some immediate solution for the problems in that area.

The Mexican authorities have seen to it at this time that the breaks in the pipes, the spills, and the other conditions that were exacerbating the situation have been repaired.

(Continued on next page)

Some people have called that a Bandaid, I admit, but still they were very forthcoming about it. We are very grateful. We would like to see, of course, an increased amount of construction and of work on that situation. The population there is growing greatly, the effluents are increasing, we have had a previous problem of Imperial Beach being closed down. We are now coming to that season, we hope, that with the present repairs, that that's going to be avoided.

The Point Loma plant, as some of you may know, is taking a major part of the effluents and treating them and then sending out treated waste. But that cannot go on much longer because they have reached their capacity to deal with the urban areas that they're supposed to take care of plus what they're taking in from the other area.

We hope that there is going to be some work on that very rapidly, and I think there will be. We've had very good communications on that recently.

Q Resolved today?

A Sir?

Q Was anything resolved today?

A We certainly did step up the development of the resolution of that issue by the meetings last month, and that was touched upon today. I wish I could tell you -- I'm a southern Californian -- that it can be resolved just by snapping our fingers. I don't mean to be snide -- don't misunderstand me -- but you know that that's not the case. It can't be done, and we just simply have to be a little patient here, although we hope, as I say, that the major work is going to be done and is going to continue -- is going to be started in the very near future.

We have a couple of possibilities, and we can give you briefers on those, including the amount of money we think will take place, the kind of technology, including water hyacinth technology, which is a very interesting process they're using in San Diego and some other things.

Q It was reported in one of the wire services this afternoon that some official of the Administration said that during the meeting with President Reagan, he tried to justify the mining of the ports in Nicaragua by saying that it was done to stop Communism coming through Nicaragua. Was something like this discussed?

A No. It was not discussed.

Q So that statement is not accurate?

A I know nothing of that statement. It certainly is news to me.

MODERATOR: Let's make this, then, the last one.

A Okay. And then I'll have one comment I'd like to make if the question is not asked. I'm sorry -- let me just go three quickly.

Q I just want to know if Central America -- I know you said it wasn't raised here, but was it raised at all during the meeting with the President this morning?

A No. It was touched on simply tangentially. The subject of that meeting was not specifically those particular issues. That, as I told you when I came in, is an issue that started to be discussed, and I came down here. I shall go back up now.

Q Can you tell us how tangentially it was discussed at the White House?

A It simply went by on the basis of very much of what I said to you. We have some differences, but we must treat them as friends.

Q How thoroughly do you expect to discuss Central America in the meeting that's going on now?

A I expect it will be thoroughly discussed.

Q Perhaps you better get up there.

A That depends on my nanny. (Laughter) I'd like to say one thing -- yes. Go ahead, and then I'll say what I --

Q Yes. General Paul Gorman, head of SouthCom, made some rather startlingly harsh statements about Mexico before the Senate Armed Services Committee. One of the points he brought up was that Mexico repeatedly -- I'm paraphrasing, but appears to be a haven for all forms of subversion in the region, and from this forum they are able to apparently launch offensives of various sorts.

Could you comment on whether or not this particularly abrasive statement was brought up or was touched upon in that specific issue?

A Neither of those things. It was neither brought up nor touched upon, nobody mentioned it. Ambassador Gavin made what we hoped would be a definitive statement on that some time ago.

ON BACKGROUND, I would only comment that there seems to be a problem about geography.

I'd like to mention one thing that has not been asked. Apparently, as I understand it, this morning a Mrs. Richard J. Flynn appeared on the "Today Show" to say that her husband, who has been incarcerated in Mexico, is being mistreated, and that, if I understand this report correctly, the inference is that the American authorities are doing nothing about this.

Before responding to this specific item on Mr. Flynn, I would like to point out that our Embassy in Mexico has done everything possible to defend the rights and the interests of American citizens in Mexico whenever these particular cases have come to their attention.

We have worked there on, for example, the Schrock case. Professor Schrock is still missing, but that case has not been abandoned. I can tell you that that particular item was handled right up to the Ambassador and has had his consideration. The same thing happened with the case of a certain Mr. Tym -- T-Y-M -- Mr. Tym, who had some gold coins confiscated, and those coins were returned to him. Mr. Tym was released and is now living in his home in the Midwest. We have received -- the Embassy has received, I should say, and the Ambassador has personally received, some remarkably generous letters from Mr. and Mrs. Tym, thanking them.

We have had other cases where we have worked -- where our Embassy has worked with people who have felt they had problems, and who indeed in some cases have had very real problems.

In the case of Mr. Flynn he suffered a heart attack on the 22nd of February of 1982, after entering Mexico on February 11 of that same year. He was arrested by the Mexican authorities on March 13, 1982. The Embassy has been aware of the case, however, since February 26, 1982. He was sentenced on January 12th of this year, 1984, to six years in prison and to $1-1/2 million in damages for criminal fraud.

The allegation, as I understand it, on the show this morning is that he is being held hostage. That is not true. He is being treated no differently than anyone else, considering the charges involved, and remember these charges were brought by Mexican courts in their sovereign territory by a man who was involved in a corporation in Mexico and working there -- against a man who was involved in a corporation working there, I mean to say.

Mr. Flynn has changed lawyers on several occasions in Mexico. His American lawyer alleges that the Flynn case constitutes a trend in treatment of U.S. businessmen by the Mexican Government. We have not seen such a trend, our Embassy reports.

In addition to that, it has been charged by a certain Mr. Keegan, who is a lawyer for Mr. Flynn up here and for Mrs. Flynn, that there are political implications. We have investigated this case. We find that Mr. Flynn was charged with a purely criminal offense.

As to the question of whether Mr. Flynn has received adequate medical treatment, the Embassy has done everything it could to ensure that Mr. Flynn be provided with adequate medical attention.

It has been alleged also that the Embassy and the State Department have adopted a hands-off approach to the Flynn case. I want to repeat to you that our Embassy and our officials there have been involved since the first heart attack, which was prior to his arrest. He, Mr. Flynn, is visited frequently in prison by Consular Officers and speaks with them frequently by telephone. The Embassy has sent several diplomatic notes on his behalf to the Foreign Ministry. The Embassy has arranged for doctors to go to prison to examine Mr. Flynn and has written notes to the prison director in his behalf.

There's an allegation that he has not been able to speak with his wife. That has something to do with the use of the telephones in the prison, something to do with non-payment of telephone bills, which may or may not have to do with Mr. Flynn, but apparently he has had difficulty using the telephone. That's out of our control.

I would like to point out to you that our Consular Officers have been in touch, continue to be in touch, not only in this case, but in many others, and we reject the allegations that anything else is the case. Now I'll go up and see what may be happening in that item of enormous interest to you, and if you're still here and still interested, I'll try to come back and give you something on that.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 4:44 p.m.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON CHEMICAL WARFARE PROPOSAL
PRESENTED BY VICE PRESIDENT BUSH IN GENEVA

April 18, 1984

The Briefing Room

9:35 A.M. EST

MR. SIMS: This briefing will be on background. It's attributable to a Senior Administration Official. You already have the text of the Vice President's speech, I believe; if not, it's available here and we can circulate it through the room. There is also a book of additional information on chemical warfare that is available to you.

Later today, probably around 3:00 p.m. in the press office, we would have the full text of the draft treaty for you to look at. Since it's 66 pages, I don't think we will be having hand-out copies, but we'll be glad to let you peruse it when we have it available mid-afternoon in the press office.

Q Bob, can you tell us precisely what information, what documents, have been given out in Geneva?

MR. SIMS: I believe in Geneva -- I'm not sure -- do you know what's been handed out? The Vice President's speech has been delivered, this other material has been handed out there as well?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They had it available. Whether they used it, I'm not sure, but you're welcome to it.

Q They did have it all available, though, including the full text of the treaty?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The full text of the treaty we hope to have available some time this afternoon for you to look at --

Q I'm talking about over there -- for those of us who have --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It will be made available in Geneva.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I doubt that they had it available over there this morning, because it takes some time to put it together. In a few days it will be available as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament. But we will make it available here for you to look at this afternoon. It's 66 pages.

MR. SIMS: Did that answer your question? (Laughter.)

Q I'm trying to figure out what the date of the story is --

Q For those of us who have people in Geneva who cover the story, we just need to know -- want to know --

MR. SIMS: Well, I can assure you that you are getting a background briefing that is not being given in Geneva. (Laughter.) And the other document --

Q That was the wrong answer, Bob. (Laughter.)

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MR. SIMS: -- the other documents, I think it's safe to assume, are available in Geneva except for the draft treaty which may or may not be available to them there, but will be available to you this afternoon.

Q I asked the wrong question -- (Laughter.)

Q You got that? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Good morning ladies and gentlemen. As you know, today in Geneva the Vice President presented an American draft treaty on a complete worldwide ban on chemical weapons. This initiative by President Reagan is the result of almost two years of extensive legal and technical analysis by the administration.

It incorporates, in addition, the ideas of our closest allies, and is based upon consultations with them. It also includes ideas presented in the Committee on Disarmament over the past few years by other participants.

I want to say a few words, just by way of introduction, about the nature of the chemical weapons problem.

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It's important to understand this in the context of our presenting the treaty.

Chemical weapons are, first of all, relatively easy to produce. The production technology and the weaponization technology are not secret. They are, in fact, generally well known. The weapons themselves are militarily effective. And now, and in the future, nations who may see themselves as desperate, may, in addition, have a high incentive to produce and use such weapons.

It is also relatively easy to produce the weapons and to weaponize them on a clandestine basis. So the real issue of the problem is one, first of all, of verification and monitoring of production facilities and, secondly, an adequate system of compliance procedures, which allows for questions to be resolved in a timely fashion, lest the entire system of restraints be undermined.

Neither the Geneva Protocol of 1925 nor the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 have such procedures. They, in fact, say nothing and do nothing about verification.

The draft United States treaty is a concrete step to join the Soviet Union and others to undertake genuine bargaining over a treaty text. We have left the realm of the hypothetical now. The problem is a real one and our treaty goes to the heart of the problem. We look forward to serious consultations with the Soviet Union and with other participants on the elaboration of the treaty and we believe that with good faith and patience we can begin to shape a consensus in Geneva that will be translated into an international agreement.

Let me invite your questions.

Q What is new about this proposal? What is new from the Bush proposal that was offered last February?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The proposal that was made last February was presented in the form of our detailed views in essence, a structuring of the problem which invited and served as the basis for discussion and negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament. This is the first time a treaty text has been proposed, in this or other administrations, that an actual treaty text has been proposed.

Q Will you explain this compliance system and how that mechanism would function. Specifically, how would this concept of open invitation work?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are two problems with respect to verification. One is of declared facilites, declared production facilities. The other is of undeclared production facilities, possible clandestine operations. The treaty would provide for an initial on-site inspection regime for the monitoring of the destruction of existing facilities. Nations would be obliged to declare those facilities and then to submit to international inspection in monitoring the destruction of those facilities.

In the event, at some future point, that a question were to be raised, any nation -- about a residual capability, shall we say or a new capability, for that matter, any nation would have the obligation and the right, under the treaty, to request a timely international inspection of the problematic facilities that had raised the question.

Q Would that be carried out through a body like the Standing Consultative Committee under SALT and subject to the approval of all 40 nations or however many nations are signatories to the treaty or --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, the treaty provides for a three-tiered system of inspections. The treaty would establish a consultative committee, a technical committee and further bodies to be negotiated, which would have the job of overseeing the treaty and initating on-site inspections.

This will become apparent, I think, when you see the treaty text. I'll be happy to spell it out in more detail. But it'll be all in the text.

Yes.

Q What if you're suspicious of, say -- Well, for instance, what if the Soviets want to come into any chemical plant in the United States, would they have access or what if we wanted to go into Mrs. Chernenko's boudoir because we suspected chemical weapons? What are the limits to this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's a fair question. (Laughter.) Although,

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in the event, it's inconceivable it seems to me that the Soviet Union or any other nation would request inspection of Mrs. Murphy's boudoir. I mean, the fact is that according to the procedures we hope to establish and negotiate, there would be certain stipulations with respect to establishing the veracity and seriousness of a request to inspect. This is not designed to give the Soviet Union or any other nation a fishing license over government controlled facilities in this country.

And those procedures in detail would remain to be negotiated in the course of the -- finishing the treaty text in Geneva.

Q As you say -- as you say, producing chemical weapons -- the technology is well-known, the way you do it is fairly easy. Is there anything in the treaty that would give you leverage or give you -- provide nations leverage over terrorists who decided to take advantage of this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The treaty, as written and constructed, envisages state participation and state use on a legal basis of chemical weapons. So this is a -- the agreement is structured as an agreement between governments. There is nothing in the text in my opinion that would preclude cooperation with respect to possible chemical weapons terrorism. But it doesn't provide specifically for that.

Q Would it preclude investigation of possible terrorism by the state signatory and state --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right. In a case where one state raised the question of an undeclared facility on a national territory, presumably, that territory and that facility and the government which had nominal responsibility for it would be obliged to undergo and to submit to a verification procedure.

Q Supposing you do go in and find that somebody is producing chemical weapons, you know, in violation of the treaty, so then what? I mean, obviously, there is -- they don't care to live up to tho treaty. I mean, what -- do you have an enforcement mechanism?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's no -- in international law, there is no enforcement mechanism as such. I think what the treaty would do is to provide a series of restraints which would raise the risk or raise the ante of cheating, shall we say, and make that more difficult if not impossible.

Now in the -- at the end of this road, if somebody chooses to go ahead and produce, test, and weaponize chemicals, the nations of the world and this nation would have to face that situation as it comes. Obviously, that nation could no longer be a party of the agreement.

But in terms of providing actual sanctions, which I think is the thrust of your question, no, the treaty does not provide for sanctions.

Q The Soviets have already dismissed this even before it was formerly presented as propaganda and an election year effort. How seriously do we regard their dismissal? Do we regard that as a negotiating ploy on their part, or is it an indication that it is going to be very hard to negotiate a treaty?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I would characterize what the Soviets have said so far as a regrettable reflex response. But we're not going to take no for an answer, and we are encouraged by two things. First, a Soviet recognition or willingness, expressed willingness in February to allow for -- in the discussions of not this treaty, but the problem, a willingness to allow for inspection of destruction of chemical stocks on-site by an international body. This is the furthest the Soviet Union has ever come in acknowledging the justifiability of on-site inspection. We --

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Q But is -- when did they do that? You say in February, they --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In February, they did that in the Committee on Disarmament.

Q But it's still a quantum leap between that and this open invitation system that would permit inspection -- require inspection of undeclared sites.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Here, let me -- let me finish this question. We'd like to see that as a straw in the wind. We noted only today in response to the Vice President's speech that the Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Issraelyan, noted that the Soviet Union would study the treaty text carefully. We would also like to regard that as a straw in the wind.

We will also be

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initiating bilateral consultations with the Soviets in the framework of the Committee on Disarmament in which we hope to probe and test their genuine attitudes. So, while there is reason to be discouraged by this reflex response on their part, I think there is also reason to suggest that, given what we expect to be the genuine willingness of other nations to proceed along this course on the basis of this treaty, that the Soviets will come along.

Yes?

Q Mr. Issraelyan also said that -- or challenged U.S. credibility in his statement in response to Bush's tabling the document today. I'm wondering if the President -- if you would not be better off saying, continuing the moratorium on nerve gas production while tabling the document to allow the Soviets to get over any unease they might have about U.S. tactics in -- the last three years?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm afraid, David, that this would give the Soviets a lever over our own capability, and that's something we will not do. It is clear that the Soviets have a highly robust, well-thought-out chemical weapons capability, both offensive and defensive. The Soviet armed forces are structured to conduct a chemical campaign, and they have chemical weapons right down to the battalion level. They have a -- both defensive and offensive -- but they have a far greater capability than we have.

It is a simple truth that chemical -- as far as we're concerned, that chemical weapons were not used in the Second World War, even when the German nation was desperate, for fear of retaliation on the part of the Allied forces. The logic of that suggests to us, and of the Soviet position, suggests to us that we need to maintain a credible chemical deterrent.

Now, this does not mean that we have to match the Soviets weapon for weapon or we have to even match them in terms of the amount of stocks that we maintain. But we haven't produced any stocks of weapons for 15 years. The stockpile as it exists -- much of it is stored in bulk. It's increasingly obsolete. And what I mean by obsolete is increasingly incapable of being used actually. That undermines its credibility as a deterrent. And the administration's efforts, I think, have been extremely measured in terms of our funding requests, in what we need, and they'll offer sufficient time for the Soviets to respond in a constructive way on this treaty.

This doesn't pre-empt any kind of Soviet political or diplomatic response.

Q What is your funding request? Or what is your request to Congress?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In FY '85, it's for $105 million.

Q Now, what do you want to make?

* SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is essentially for -- all but about ten percent of it is for long lead-term production items. It is not for the manufacture of weapons, but for the beginning construction of facilities, which would, in the end, as necessary, be used to produce weapons. But that actual production is years away.

Q If we have a nuclear deterrent, why do we need to produce chemical weapons to have a chemical deterrent?

* This requested figure of $105 million constitutes approximately 10 percent of the overall U.S. chemical program. Approximately 73 percent of that program is for protective (defensive) measures, and 13 percent is for demilitarization of obsolete chemical weapons.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'm not sure I understand your question. You're suggesting that if, for example -- that an opponent would be deterred from using chemical weapons for fear of having nuclear weapons used upon him. Is that --

Q I heard the President say -- you know, talk about our nuclear weaponry and speak of it in terms of -- as a deterrent. If we have that, why do we need chemical weapons?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, because we don't want to be put in a position where in the event that chemical weapons were used against us, our only option would be to use nuclear weapons. I think most analysts inside and outside the government would recognize a fire break between conventional and nuclear forces and between chemical and nuclear forces.

Q Why -- why is there a fire break? Would you elaborate just a little bit on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Because of the penalty associated -- or at least the theoretical or perceived penalty in escalating from one type of force to another.

Q Chemicals are considered more controllabe than nuclear? Is that what you're saying?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What I'm saying, that you -- in moving from conventional to -- I don't want to structure this as a natural escalation process -- conventional, chemical, and nuclear. In the event, you know, it could work that way, but that's not the point I'm making.

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The point I'm making is that, given the destructiveness of both chemical weapons and nuclear weapons, one should do everything one can to contain and deter that class of weaponry.

Q I think the questions sort of suggest that chemical weapons are not very controllable, and they're this -- almost a kind of a last resort weapon, and do we really need -- you know, is there enough distinction between a limited nuclear weapon, for example, and chemical weaapons. Do we have to have chemical weapons?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, in our judgment, we have to have them for the reasons I gave you. I think you make a fair point with respect to some nations having access to chemical weapons -- not being deterred from using them, because they escalate the level of violence. That's clear. These weapons are being used almost as we speak here today. All the more reason for constructing some kind of international constraint regime which this treaty embodies in order to rule out that possibility in the future.

Q Is the fear that use of any kind of a nuclear weapon, whether it's tactical, or smaller, or not -- would reach us to a higher level of warfare that couldn't be stopped, whereas chemical weapons would not be so uncontained?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No one knows. No one knows under what circumstances in which -- circumstances in which these weapons were used against us, or in which these weapons were used in another conflict -- what options would be resorted to by the side against whom they were being used. We have tried to structure the problem in a way that makes sense to us, and this is not a view that's unique to this administration. It's one that's had a long history in the post-war period.

Q You said earlier that we need a "credible" chemical weapon deterrent, but we don't have to match the Soviets weapon for weapon. Why doesn't that same sort of logic or reasoning apply to nuclear arms, where it seems we are very much intent on matching them more-or-less weapon for weapon?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The same logic does apply to the nuclear arena. I'm delighted you asked the question. If you look at the configuration of Soviet nuclear forces in Europe -- Soviet tactical weapons and Soviet intermediate-range weapons -- what you see is that they far out-gun us. That in terms of numbers, they are -- (laughter.) -- they are far ahead of us. The NATO 1979 decision to deploy 572 weapons never envisaged matching a Soviet force, which now numbers some 1,400 warheads. So the same logic does apply.

Q What happens now in Geneva? I mean, it's on the table. What's the process from here on out?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The process is to meet in plenary sessions and -- there is a routine of established procedures in Geneva in which regular, plenary sessions are held of the Committee of 40; and in which bilateral contacts are established, in which we seek to explain the treaty, the logic behind it; and in which we solicit the views of others, including the Eastern participants as well.

Q Is your expectation --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We like to think of it as a creative process.

Q Is it your expectation that the discussions with the Soviets will be held in that plenary, rather than one-on-one?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As I say, there will be bilateral consultations initiated with the Soviets, but in the context of the Committee -- of the Multilateral Committee on Disarmament.

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Q What's the timetable? I mean, do you have any sense at all on how far down the road we're looking to negotiate a treaty like this -- assuming that there's any possibility of actually negotiating on it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, as the President said, this is going to take some time, obviously. We would look forward to -- and, needless to say, there is a political context here. We would look forward to detailed discussions and serious bargaining in the course of the Geneva discussions this summer. We hope it will be a very active summer, on this treaty.

Q Meaning what? That by the end of the summer, a treaty is possible?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I'm not saying. No. That we engage the Soviets and the Eastern side in discussion of a treaty text that we would hope would become a joint treaty text. But, in terms of -- the question you're asking is whether we're going to have a treaty --

Q Right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- and I can't answer that. Given the history of the problem, given the nature of the on-site inspection issue, obviously it's going to take some time.

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Q I guess what I'm really asking is are we talking about even the possibility of a treaty negotiated this year or are we looking into something that's a much longer-term process than that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it's entirely up to the Soviet Union. But I would say that we're looking to a longer-term process. I doubt that by the end of the summer we would have agreement on this.

What we would like to see is some -- What we would like to see is some forthright, straightforward discussion of the problem itself, which could isolate certain aspects of the treaty text and provide for agreement on those. That's, after all, how international negotiations on treaties proceed anyway.

Q You said that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We'll have a better sense of that in a few months.

Q You said that this was not designed to give anybody a fishing license. I wasn't clear on what would prevent that in terms of verification.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We will establish procedures.

Q They're not in the treaty now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Which are not in the treay now, which, as the -- annexes to the treaty say will remain to be negotiated, which will create, shall we say, certain roadblocks to -- certain legal and technical roadblocks to a fishing expedition.

No nation should want a fishing expedition. And, indeed, one of the problems that we have faced, one of the most complex legal issues that we have involved ourselves with over the past couple of years, has been this issue itself. Namely, what kind of existing legal barriers, constitutional and others, exist -- do we have to wrestle with in the course of negotiating this treaty.

But we think we've solved those problems.

Q If your logic about it is the need for a deterrent in the United States, can that logic be applied to other nations, then? I mean, would it not be logical, using your framework, to suggest that a nation like Iraq should go out and produce chemical weapons so as to have an imminent threat against a nation like Iran, which is already using chemical weapons against it? Or to take two neutral situations, a nation like, say, Jordan to prepare chemical weapons to deter anyone, such as an Iran from attacking them, using the logic that the United States is using for its $100 million request of Congress?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it's a problem, as you suggest, that can feed on itself. The Iranians, to our knowledge, have not used chemical weapons. Indeed, I think the logic of what I said earlier applies in that situation. The Iraqis, feeling, no doubt from a military point of view and political, increasingly desperate, have themselves resorted to the use of chemical -- lethal chemical weapons.

The question is, if the Iranians had a similar capability, would the Iraqis have resorted to those weapons. We think not.

Q Haven't you upped the ante here to the extent that verification, on-site inspection has been the hangup with the Soviets, doesn't this proposal, by suggesting more stringent on-site inspection, make it less likely that you'll get an agreement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, as you know, the previous administration conducted discussions with the Soviets in Geneva between '77 and '80. Those negotiations eventually stalled, deadlocked and came to an impass over precisely this question. The Soviets insisted that they -- while they wanted a chemical treaty, they would police themselves.

This administration has a principled and, I should say, stringent verification policy. We are simply not going to base arms control agreements on trust. And I think there's good reason for that, if you look around the world and you look at -- and see the chemical weapons that are being used, the Soviet association, in some cases, with that use and Soviet armed forces themselves.

So we simply have to insist on on-site inspection measures that work.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Could this be the last question so we can --

Q You said earlier that this was the first time the U.S. has put forth a treaty text, but that last February there were detailed views, I guess. Are we just talking about the form being different and that there are essentially no new ideas being put forth in this treaty text?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, in the course of -- We did not spell out our -- we spelled out our detailed views; but we did not spell out in legal language and in provisions, which could themselves be the subject of negotiation, in what the Vice President presented last year. He went

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over there, he discussed the nature of the problem, he indicated that we would be forthcoming in these discussions. That we felt if the discussions moved forward, if there were some sign of progress, some sign of Soviet seriousness, that we would be willing to come forward, make a further step. That, in effect, is what we have done now.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 10:00 A.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release April 18, 1984

PRESS BRIEFING BY SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE SHULTZ ON THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO CHINA

Room 450
Old Executive Office Building

11:00 A.M. EST

MR. SPEAKES: We reach this point in our China trip preparations with you becoming probably the most thoroughly briefed press corps in the history of Presidential travel. It's an unprecedented aspect of the trip that we've put so many briefings before you, and want particularly, as we conclude our series of briefings with the Secretary of State, to thank Rob Neavitt, George Beasley, and Camilla McCaslin who put these briefings together, as well as the briefers, Wolfowitz, Regan, Segur, Brown, Lawson, Keyworth, Neavitt, McFarlane, and today, Secretary Shultz.

Our briefing today is on the record. Our subject is the President's trip to China. And we trust you will confine your questions to this subject.

Q Wrong.

MR. SPEAKES: For those who have not already received a press book, they will be available outside the room by the elevator. With it is a schedule for the trip. You will notice that it does not list the names of the Chinese officials who will be meeting with the President because it is not the Chinese custom to announce names this far in advance.

Your briefing book does conclude certain biographies of several leaders including Premier Zhao, Foreign Minister Wu, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Hu, and the Chairman of the Central Advisory Committee, Deng Xiaoping. If that tells you anything, so be it.

In this regard, you will notice the President also has an unprecedented number of meetings with Chinese leaders in Beijing on Thursday, Friday, and Saturday. At least seven hours of meetings with the President and the top eschelon of Chinese leaders including a significant working lunch with a top Chinese leader on Saturday.

As we leave Guam, there will be another press book passed out for your use, and we will also be briefing on a daily basis in Beijing late in the afternoon, 5:00 p.m. local time. I will do a daily briefing. Assistant Secretary Wolfowitz will be involved, and the Secretary of State at times.

I think that concludes everything that I need to say. And Secretary Shultz has an opening statement after which he'll take your questions.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: This trip of President Reagan's to the People's Republic of China will be the first by an incumbent President since 1979, the first since normalization. Therefore, it is an important moment in this relationship. And I think, looking back, we can say that President Nixon created an opening to China. President Carter brought about the normalization of our relationships with China. Building on this bipartisan base, President Reagan has sought to make the relationship stable and comprehensive -- of course, attending to the strategic matters of common interest to China and the United States, building on

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the common concern we have with security and peace around the world, but also observing the potential for a major economic relationship between our two countries, and the large and growing number of personal ties that have developed of personal exchanges and cultural exchanges involved. So we see this relationship evolving into something that will be stable and enduring and comprehensive in nature.

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During the President's visit, he'll have extensive meetings with Chinese leaders and we expect to cover topics sort of across the board. He'll have two major addresses, a televised interview and a great deal of exposure to the leadership and people of China.

This trip and the Premier's trip here are high points in a process. A great deal has come before the President's trip and a great deal will follow on after it.

But the visit itself will give real impetus to the relationship and, from the standpoint of those of us who have been working on it very closely and hard, I think will help move the relationship forward in a most constructive way.

Questions.

Q What is the opportunity, sir, for a nuclear agreement to be reached?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, that's a subject that has been under heavy discussion for some time. Ambassador Kennedy is in Beijing right now involved in those discussions. I can't say when or whether agreement will be reached, but it's certainly possible. And we'll continue to work on it. We have our statutes and regulations that we must observe and they have their concerns and we work to try to resolve these in a satisfactory way.

Q What's the subject of the 7- to 10-hour talks since so much of the groundwork has now been laid in these various areas? What's the focus?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, there will be -- the coverage will be very broad. We'll undoubtedly discuss the bilateral matters between China and the United States, covering economic, cultural, military, perhaps the nuclear business, many other matters of genuine importance to us. We'll discuss our view of situations throughout the world and review that. So, together those matters give you a very full agenda.

I might say that I'm certain that we will not have enough time, even though there is a great amount of time because there is so much to cover. And, of course, you have to recognize that the actual talking time is about half because of the translation problems involved. So it cuts it down a bit.

Q In discussing our view of situations around the world, would you expect that the President will be asked to comment on the CIA bombing of Corinto Harbor and the other covert activities that have caused him so much difficulties here --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I would imagine that the importance of developments in Central America will be covered and I think here we see, once again, a demonstration of Soviet aggressive behavior in sending arms into the area and creating instability there.

So, certainly, we expect and want to describe to the Chinese our view of the situation and hear about theirs so that all of these matters will undoubtedly come up.

Q Are you confirming that we bombed this port?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I have just answered that question.

Q But is it only Soviet aggressive behavior? I mean, one could certainly question the CIA's behavior.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think that the subject needs a very good and thorough discussion and I'm sure the People's Republic of China leaders have read the bipartisan report, particularly since

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they know Henry Kissinger very well and admire him. But that report brings out the political dimensions of the problems of Central America, the economic dimensions, the things that we are trying to do to change the social structure there. All of these things, I'm sure, will get attention.

Q Mr. Secretary, in view of the fact that the Chinese did ask Ambassador Kennedy to come back when they did, do you think that it's possible that nuclear agreement can be reached while the President is actually in China?

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SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, it's possible. I think as you look at major visits of this kind, they tend to become a sort of focal point and concentrate people's attention on getting things accomplished if they can. On the other hand, I'm sure that we and the Chinese take the view that we don't want to agree to something for the sake of the visit. So, the negotiation is going on strongly, and I hope that agreement can be reached; but, it remains to be seen.

Q Do you expect any movement on the Taiwan issue, or will both sides stick to their previously stated positions?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, as far we we're concerned, the subject is treated in the Shanghai communique and the normalization communique and in the special Taiwan communique negotiated in August of 1982. And we will abide by those agreements.

Q Mr. Secretary, is it true that there's a great policy debate going on within the administration as to how to interpret the latest thrust of the directive on terrorism? You're a hard-liner, that Weinberger is a soft-liner, that you want stiff reprisal and preemptive action, and he doesn't?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I would expect that in our discussions with the Chinese, the various problems of concern around the world, including terrorism, will come up and we'll want to talk about it. As far as our government is concerned, we have discussed it thoroughly, and I think there is a general view of the importance of this problem and the importance of getting ourselves in the position to meet the threat adequately. There's no difference of opinion about that at all.

Q Now, you have said, sir, on the record -- publicly -- in the last two or three months, talking about Lebanon in the Mid-east when our troops were still there, that the United States might conduct a preemptive strike against a terrorist base if we had hard information that our forces were in danger. That still is your view, is it not?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: My view is that we must take -- that the problem is very important --

Q Who would that view --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: -- that it's likely to get worse before it gets better. Look what's going on in London right now. That it's essential for us to take all of the defensive measures that we can that are appropriate for our society and the mission of the places that we are worrying about, such as our embassies. But, I don't think that purely defensive posture is adequate. And we must think through, as a society, other aspects of this problem. And we're in the process of doing that.

Any more questions about China?

Q Is Congress going to be consulted on whatever we decide to do?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Any more questions about -- of course. Any more questions about China, or are we through with that topic?

Q Do we have any indication that the Chinese are sympathetic towards our views on Central America?

SECRETARY SHULTS: On --

Q Central America -- our position on Central America.

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SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I won't try to speak at all for the Chinese. They will speak for themselves and they're very interested in the subject. I know in my own discussions with the Foreign Minister we've literally talked about issues throughout the world, Africa, Central America, the Middle East and so forth as well as Asia, Afghanistan, Kampuchea and so on. So I know that there's a great interest in the subject and we expect that we'll have a good, strong exchange.

Q Since the Chinese are short of American funds, to what extent will our loans be to China to help them?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, there are Export-Import Bank possibilities and some other ways in which we might make funds available. But it's really pretty limited at this point.

Actually, the Chinese have done quite an outstanding job of managing their external debt. They don't have a major external debt and their foreign exchange position is a strong one. It contrasts very sharply with many other countries. So I think you would have to say that they have managed this particular

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aspect of their economic affairs very well.

Q Mr. Secretary, what progress would you expect from this visit on the entire scope of the two Koreas question?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It's hard to say what progress we might expect. I'm certain that the subject will get, as with these others, a very thorough discussion. We're -- both countries are very concerned about the Korean peninsula. We've discussed before. I think both -- it's fair to say both countries would like to see a reduction in tensions. And there are a variety of ideas about how to do that around, and we'll examine them.

Whether or not out of it will come something that can advance matters remains to be seen. But we'll certainly be trying.

I will myself be breaking off from the President's party very briefly and going to Korea and Japan from Shanghai to brief leaders in those two countries and then rejoining the President again in Alaska. But that is by way of suggesting the importance we attach to our Korean relationship.

Q To follow up on that, will you press or in any way attempt or the President attempt to urge the Chinese to take part in four-way talks involving ourselves, North Korea and South Korea? I think their position is that they don't wish to be involved.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: That's correct. And the questions that go under the heading of shape of the table will continue to get attention. Our view is, as we have stated and this is the same as the South Korean view, that the essential matter is to have discussions between North Korea and South Korea directly. And others, if they can be helpful, will be helpful in making that come about or helping to bring it about. But that's the basic relationship that needs to be concentrated on.

Q Mr. Secretary, the people in Taiwan have expressed their concern that their interest, their well-being might be jeopardized by the trip. Could you respond to that concern or address this issue?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think that the peace and security and stability in Asia will be advanced by the President's trip and the relationship between the People's Republic of China and the United States, not only in Asia, of course, but around the world. This is an important relationship and everybody benefits by that kind of stability. The President has stated many times he has no intention of turning his back on friends, old friends in Taiwan. And our relationship with the people of Taiwan and our commercial relationships are there. And there is no need to be concerned about them.

Q Mr. Secretary, could you discuss the symbolism of the trip and its importance?

Q Oh, that's a good one.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The symbolism of the trip?

Q I mean this is the first President in nine years to go to the --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Pardon me?

Q -- the first President in nine years going to China.

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SECRETARY SHULTZ: Not in nine years. No. I think in --

Q The last one was in '75.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It's -- I guess you're right. Yes. My mind was on 1979, which was the normalization date.

Of course, other Presidents have gone but not in office, and that's a little different.

Well, I think that the --

Q Ford.

Q Ford was --

Q President Ford --

Q Ford went in '75.

Q Gerald Ford.

Q - '75.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: In '75.

Q That was the last one.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Yes.

Q -- nine years.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Right.

Q Nine years --

Q Okay. We're all set --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Okay.

Q -- that aside. What is --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We've got that straightened out. (Laughter.)

Q -- the symbolism?

Q Get to the symbolism.

Q Yes.

Q I'd like to have an --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I'm thinking, you see. I have to -- If I were Arthur Burns, I'd light up my pope -- pipe. (Laughter.)

Q Light up your pope?

Q If you light up your pope, we'd be in trouble. (Laughter.)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: That comes in Alaska.

Well, I think there are quite a variety of things that the trip, in a sense, stands for over and above the direct substantive content of the trip and the relationship of that content to the various things being worked out between the countries before and after the trip. Certainly,

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it shows the basic sense of friendship between the United States, the people of the United States and the people of China. That has been the case for a long time, it's very deep and it remains and the trip symbolizes that fact.

I think, more broadly, this is the President's second trip to the Asia-Pacific area within a six-month period and he has sent me on one other occasion and, again, in -- later this year. So all of that shows the importance to the United States of the Asia-Pacific region. And we recognize that fact. Not to the detriment of any other region; but this is an area of the world with dynamic and growing economies, great strategic significance with personal ties with us and cultural ties with us that are of great importance to us. So China, as the most populous country in the region, is a kind of centerpiece. So all of these things, I think, are important dimensions of the symbolism of the trip.

Q Mr. Secretary, six months ago, when the President went on his last trip to Asia, he cancelled several parts of that trip, the Phillipines and some other countries, on the ground that there was very pressing business on the Hill.

Now, he's going to China when Congress is about to vote on his entire Central American policy, the money for El Salvador, the money for the Contras. On the basis of the criterion set by the administration six months ago, shouldn't he stay in town?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The earlier trip had to be -- the first part of it had to be cut off because we were coming to the end of a Congressional session, which is always a very hectic time, as you know. And the earlier information was that the adjournment would come at an earlier date. And, in fact, as we struggled with problems here, it was certainly fortunate that that decision was made and made in a timely way.

In this case, the President will be leaving before the Congress comes back and we will be back shortly after the Congress reconvenes and there will be plenty of time for action on these vital matters.

I might say that the -- there is the question, of course, of the emergency funds that are in conference and we'd like to see that conference take place. Then, there is the large supplemental, '84 supplemental to be voted on. And then, of course, there is the broader question of the basic thrust of our country's policy toward Central America that is posed by the legislation implementing the Bipartisan Commission Report. So all of these things are in train and we will be back in plenty of time to work on them all.

Q Mr. Secretary, the Chinese are known to want to buy some weapons from the United States. Do you envision a major program of weapons sales to China and what are we willing to sell them, what are we not willing to sell them?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, these discussions have been going on, highlighted by Secretary Weinberger's visit and then some visits here by Chinese military leaders, which -- and there'll be a follow-on visit. And I think both sides are sort of exploring that issue and we expect there to be military sales on a case-by-case basis oriented to defensive needs of the People's Republic of China. And this will unfold over a period of time. But it'll have to be judged as it goes along.

Q But are there some kinds of systems that we're not willing to sell?

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SECRETARY SHULTZ: The question of what it is appropriate to sell and what not is being sort out by the Defense Ministries involved and I think the process is actually going along pretty well.

Q Mr. Secretary, you mentioned what's happening in London a while ago. The Libyans say they're going to storm the British Embassy there if any action is taken in an overt sense against their Embassy in London. How are the British going to solve this problem?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, the British are experienced and ingenious and they'll solve it

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in an impressive way, I'm sure. And I'm not going to try to describe in any detail what I think they ought to do, but they have a difficult problem on their hands, and I'm sure they'll handle it well.

Q Mr. Secretary, how far will the United States go in a technology agreement? And, I want to know, will the United States allow China to reproduce some of our computers that we, today, will not sell to some foreign countries?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, the technology transfer issue has been a very important one. When I visited China in -- when was that -- February, '83, it was apparent to me from the discussions how significant this issue is to the Chinese. Of course we knew it before we left -- before we went. But, it came out very, very strongly. A great deal of work has been done on the subject, and we have liberalized our technology transfer rules for China quite significantly. And the levels of case approvals, and so-forth, has been going up sharply. So, I think on the whole, that ir working out well, not that there aren't problems. There are, of course, connections of our policy with the policy of our allies in Europe, in Japan, in COCUM -- and that we have to work through. But, in general, I think the technology transfer program is going along quite well, and some things are there to sell, and undoubtedly the Chinese are very interested in not only making purchases, but buying prototypes and seeing what they can do for themselves. And they're very ingenious people, and no doubt will progress.

Q Mr. Secretary --

Q -- but in some of the computers and some of the -- we will not sell today to Russia -- when -- will we sell that to China?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Certainly there are things that we are ready to sell to the Chinese that we will not sell to the Soviet Union -- absolutely.

Q Mr. Secretary, on that issue directly, are things settled enough that you don't think that this -- the technology transfer issue will come up on this trip?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I'm sure it will come up. It's a very important matter and we keep sorting it out. It's not a problem that you can put up there and solve, and that's it. It's a problem that you have to keep working at, in order to keep the understanding there. And, of course, technology itself is changing all the time. So you have to keep examining what's going on in a scientific sense, and putting your criteria along side technological developments in order to administer the program well. So, it's certainly -- it's going to get discussion.

Q Have the Chinese expressed disappointment in the American liberalization -- the administration's liberalization last year?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No. I think they're very pleased to see it. They're -- everybody always has the same attitude toward anything. It reminds me of Samuel Gompers, who most of you probably never heard of, but, he was asked what -- (Laughter.)

Q Ohhhhh.

Q He made up his quote often -- (Laughter.)

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SECRETARY SHULTZ: He was asked, what was -- what did labor really want? He says, "It's very simple. More."

Q More.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: And I think, by and large, that's what we want, and that's what they want.

But, I think that the program's going well, and a lot of headway has been made. There are still plenty of problems, and I'm sure it'll get discussed.

Q Mr. Secretary --

Q Mr. Secretary, you talked about the need for cooperation to try and stop terrorism. Now, as you say, we have a difficult situation in London. Can you envision any kind of cooperation to try to stop Qaddafi?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Oh, I can certainly envisage it. And, I think, it is important to recognize that the problem of terrorism is an international problem. It takes place somewhere. But it has broader dimensions to it. So, we need to do things in our own country that are appropriate for ourselves here, but we also will benefit a great deal from discussions with our friends around the world in the many dimensions of dealing with the problem.

Q How serious a threat do you regard Qaddafi, and what can be done specifically with him in this --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, it's obviously a serious problem, and we have said so for quite a long time. And I think, perhaps, some of the illusions that others have held -- they are, perhaps, beginning to lose.

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Q May I ask about what you plan to discuss in private about the Soviet Union and whether the President will want to address his views about the Soviet Union in his speeches to the Chinese or might it be more appropriate for him to not talk about that as much as he frequently does in speeches in -- on his trips?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The President's speeches will be available upon delivery, and one of my fundamental rules is don't scoop the President.

Q -- I'm asking --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: So, I don't want to comment on it. He will --

Q I'm asking --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: -- two major speeches.

Q May I, then, clarify my question which is: Will you be aiming to establish perhaps a different tone in addressing publicly the issue of Soviet-U.S. relations because of the particular setting that you're going to be in?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No. I think the tone and stance of the United States in our relation with the Soviet Union is quite clear and was stated very authoritatively by the President in January. That's kind of a reference point. And, of course, in our discussions with the Chinese, we'll want to talk about the Soviet Union, as -- along with a lot of other problems around the world.

And they are acute observers of all these things, and we expect to learn from them. And it may be that we can provide some insight, too.

MR. SPEAKES: Let's take Charlotte. And then Bruce had a question. And Bruce will have the honor of asking the last question and also the first question from the front row concerning China.

Q How do you know? (Laughter.)

Q It's not the first.

Q That's not true.

Q You refurbish the relationship always.

Q Mr. Secretary, would you explain how the U.S. national interest is served by selling arms to a communist country that has the atomic bomb?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I think the Chinese have security problems like other countries do. They have a long border with the Soviet Union, with lots of military force there. They have a Soviet satellite state, Vietnam, on their -- another border as an aggressive country occupying Kampuchea, threatening Thailand. They are concerned about Soviet behavior in Afghanistan, which is, again, a bordering state. So, there are plenty of security concerns.

And on issues of that kind, we share their concern. And, so, I think that it makes sense.

Q In your answer on Taiwan before, you seemed to indicate that we are simply going to restate our position on Taiwan based on past agreements. Is it your expectation that -- or are you trying to -- that the Chinese are going be satisfied to do the same or that you have some sense from the talks so far that they're likely to press beyond that?

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SECRETARY SHULTZ: From our standpoint, this subject has been addressed and it has been the subject of carefully worked out understandings that reflect themselves in the communiques. And we intend to live by the statements in those communiques. And that's our position, and we don't -- we're not going there to negotiate a new communique or in any way to try to shift the ground from the existing agreements. Those agreements will be honored by the United States. And the President has said that before and when the subject comes up, I'm sure we'll say it again.

Thank you.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 11:34 A.M. EST

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
NATO's MBFR PROPOSAL
THURSDAY, APRIL 19, 1984, 11:07 A.M.

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Thank you, and good morning ladies and gentlemen.

Last fall the President directed us to explore potential areas of flexibility with respect to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Negotiations in Vienna. In December of last year our NATO Allies, along with us, mandated a total review of the Western negotiating position.

For sometime now the Alliance has been working on the package that was tabled today in Vienna. With this major new initiative, we intend to bring new momentum into the talks which have been stalled for sometime.

The initiative represents a significant change in the western position. It alters the long-standing western requirement for formal agreement on specific numbers of all eastern military personnel as a pre-condition to any western reductions. This represents a significant change in the western position.

These talks have been deadlocked, as I'm sure you know, for some years now by a major problem. That is, the inability to agree on the size of Eastern forces in Central Europe.

We believe that the Warsaw Pact currently enjoys an advantage of some 180,000 ground forces. The east also has not gone far enough to satisfy a basic requirement for any arms control agreement in our view -- namely, effective verification -- although they have made some moves that are encouraging.

To revitalize the negotiations, we have now introduced this new proposal. It is a major demonstration of flexibility on our part, and let me explain why. As I said, the intiative changes our requirement for prior data agreement on all Eastern forces in the area. Instead, we are now asking for an exchange of data -- for an exchange of date only on part of the ground forces of both sides, namely, the combat and combat support forces.

These are the ground forces which represent the greatest military potential in the area. In such an exchange, we would set aside the service support forces where much of the existing discrepancy over numbers resides. The exchange we are proposing would be based on new categories of forces to be agreed by both sides. These categories would be difference from the counting exercises of past years which fail to reconcile our differences.

This kind of an exchange, we believe, gives both sides a fresh start.

Rather than asking for agreement on the information to be exchanged, we propose that the exchange of data would be satisfactory -- and this is an important point -- if Eastern figures came within an acceptable range of our own estimate. In other words, we are no longer insisting on agreement on a specific figure.

The western proposal also contains a new approach to the reductions and limitations process. The only reductions which will be specified before the treaty comes into effect are for the United States and Soviet forces, and only for the combat and combat support forces of those two countries.

Immediately after the first stage of U.S.-Soviet reductions, a collective no-increase commitment would go into effect covering the overall forces of all direct participants. This represents an important move to meet the Eastern position.

To compliment the new approach on data, we also propose improvements to make verification more effective. These include a better exchange of information on the forces in the area and improved cooperative observation and inspection measures by both sides. These would be strictly reciprocal arrangements, and our verification approach would increase the confidence that all provisions of the agreement would be properly carried out.

We are determined to break the log jam in Vienna by now initiating bargaining which can lead to an agreement. It is to achieve this that we have decided within the framework of the Alliance substantially to alter a requirement which has been central to the Western position since the beginning of the negotiations. And it is to this end that we have also built on constructive elements in the Eastern position and moved to accommodate Eastern concerns on important issues.

Let me say in conclusion that the West is not tabling this proposal on a take-it-or-leave-it-basis; that we are prepared to discuss any and all aspects of our ideas and that we recognize and acknowledge this as a process of bargaining and mutual compromise.

Q I'm sure there are lots of questions, but let me ask you a couple quickly.

Have these talks been held under a confidentiality agreement, and, if so, why are you now going public in laying out -- to the extent that you have, laid out an American position?

Apart from that procedural thing, can you give me some examples of support forces, where you say most of the argument has been over that are distinct and we can be sure that they're not interchangeable with real combat forces? In other words, what kind of personnel are you confident or strictly support and can pick up a rifle and become combat?

A With respect to your question about confidentiality, yes, of course, the negotiations are confidential. But I think, at least, in their broad outlines, given the fact that they have been going on now since 1973, the basic issues are well known publicly. Nothing that I've said to you today violates any rule of confidentiality.

We think it's important -- and our Allies will be making similar statements -- we think it's important that the public and the media, as well as the Eastern side understand what these proposals consist of.

With respect to your second question, we consider Eastern forces in three categories: Combat forces, combat support forces and service support forces.

We have a better handle on the actual numbers in the first two categories because we associate manpower with particular equipment. It's easier for us to know how many men, for example, it takes to run a tank than it is for how many men to service that tank.

This means that, quite logically, the data discrepancy over how many is greatest over how many service support services there are. We can argue about how many minutes it takes to service a tank. So we think by focusing on the first category, the numbers will be closer and we will be more able to reach agreement.

Q How do you define an acceptable range you mentioned? What is it?

A It will fall within some percentage figure, obviously. I can't answer your question now, and I'll tell you why. We don't know what the Eastern figures -- once we disaggregate these categories, we don't know how far apart we'll be. That, too, will be a subject for negotiation, both within the Alliance and within the Administration. That is to say, what margin of uncertainty, so to speak, we could accept.

Q Does it have to be two or three percent, or something a lot more substantial than that?

A Again, it's hard to say. I noticed in the Times story this morning that somebody was quoted as saying five to ten percent, and I think that would be a fair way to put it.

Q Could you comment on when the last Warsaw Pact Proposal was made? What was in it, and particularly on the exit/entry points, inspection, the fifty or so inspectors that would be -- I gather these would be Warsaw Pact people, West Germany and west, and we would have some of our people or NATO forces in the East? How will that work, and how much of that was contained in the Warsaw Pact Proposal?

A We haven't actually negotiated with the Soviets on the specifics of our verification packages. We have our own ideas solidly in place. I'm sure they have a good idea what it is we have in mind. An agreed position on what would constitute an actual visit, how many people, what would they look at, how long would they stay and so, all of that remains to be negotiated.

Up until last June, when the Soviets did make some new suggestions, they had been adamant, or in effect adamant in opposing on-site inspection as such. We have argued for years that in order to monitor the reductions themselves -- how many Soviet troops would be leaving the area -- we simply had to have agreed exit and entry points through which and only through which the Soviet troops could move.

They suggested in principle, and we assume this means that they would agree to it, to establish those exit and entry points. We are encouraged by that; we think it's a step in the direction, and we are trying to build upon that now.

One thing our position envisages is -- in fact, it's central to our position -- is a greater exchange of data on the specific categories that we're talking about. So we would be asking for disaggregated data in each of these two categories and for specific types of units within each of those categories. But there again we think that in reality the numbers there aren't far apart, and it ought not to present a major obstacle.

Q What is your working estimate now of the Warsaw Pact strength?

A They have approximately one million ground forces in the guidelines area; 970,000, I think, is the figure.

Q What would be your estimate of what the combat percentage of the 970 would be?

A It varies from national force to national force. But generally speaking the so-called "tooth-to-tail ratio" -- that is, the ratio of actual fighting forces to service support forces -- is about 85/15 in the Warsaw Pact.

Q Eighty-five combat?

A Eighty-five percent combat to 15. As I said, it does vary. That's the kind of thing that would be subject to some negotiated understanding within the range that we envisage.

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Q If I could just follow up, if you could work on that basis, if they came in with that 85 percent figure, and given the dispute over -- what is it -- 170,000 that the West thinks the Russians have --

A 180,000.

Q 180,000, would that then accommodate a way of resolving the dispute?

A Yes. I mean, theoretically, with a serious intent on the part of the Soviets. We are asking for reductions to 700,000, to total forces of 900,000 in the guidelines area, 700,000 of which are ground forces, 200,000 of which are air forces.

Now, those figures have been agreed and accepted by both sides. So the trick is getting from our 970,000 to our 700,000.

Q Does that work in stages, in two stages, the way of the ten percent cutback and then the second stage?

A The way the stages would work is that in the first stage, in the first year, the United States and the Soviet Union would take asymmetrical reductions -- 13,000 on our side, 30,000 on their side. These would be taken in combat and combat-support forces.

We would then verify that those reductions had been, in fact, achieved, and that process of verification will allow us to determine how many forces are still i the region.

If that were satisfactory, the other participants in the quidelines area would then begin to take their reductions.

Now, in answer to your question specifically, our previous proposal saw the reductions period as seven years. We have now compressed this into five years, which is, by the way, what the Soviets proposed as a reductions period.

Q Could you give the figures for NATO, both for the 1 million equivalent and what you call the tooth-to-tail ratio for NATO?

A Again, the tooth-to-tail ratio varies in allied forces. In our own case -- and don't take this as gospel, I am giving you rough figures -- generally speaking, our tail is larger than the Soviet tail, that is to say, in the West. In our case, it is roughly 30/70; in the Dutch case, it is something like 40/60; in the German case, it is less than 30/70. I think it is about 20/80. So it varies. These forces are not structured along a common pattern the way that Warsaw Pact forces are, so there is some variance. Some services have more barbers and more cooks than others.

Q . What is the ground force figure for NATO?

A The ground force figure for NATO is about 800,000.

Q I want to make sure I understand what you are saying. You are saying that the main dispute that has been holding up the agreement has been a dispute involving about 15 percent, approximately 15 percent.

A No. I am saying that the dispute is over 170,000 ground forces -- the difference between 800,000 and 970,000.

Q But you say the dispute has been mainly over support personnel.

A The disagreement over what forces are where tends to reside in this third category of service-support forces.

Q So basically the new proposal in effect says we will concern ourselves mostly with the 85 percent and less with the 15 percent.

A That is right. It says in effect, listen, we think that the range of our disagreement is smaller with respect to these two categories -- combat, combat-service -- so let's focus on those numbers and let's accelerate the process and facilitate the process by disaggregating those categories.

Q · If you do that, then you abandon these other numbers that you were just giving, the reduction from 970,000 to 900,000. You don't worry about that number any more, once you have reached an agreement on the combat?

A You don't worry about it now, but obviously in getting down to your 700,000 ceiling, total manpower ceiling in the guidelines area, you would have to worry about it.

Q So if you are keeping the 700,000 ceiling -- I guess what my confusion is -- if you are keeping the 700,000 ceiling, why does it make it any easier to reach agreement if you are aggregating the forces one way or another. You are still calling for a firm number of reduced troops.

A Eventually, that is to say, when we reach the 700,000, after a period of five years, there would have to be agreement on total manpower. What we are saying is now that we don't insist any longer on prior agreement on total manpower. This ought to enable a bargaining process, a process of exchange of information, in which we can begin to pin down the forces.

To answer your question directly, eventually we would have to have -- we would have to know that the 700,000 figure had been met, and we would have to have some idea, of course, of the amount of service-support forces in the area, as well. But right now, it really shifts, it kind of turns the negotiations on their head to focus on what we think is the area in which it will be easier to agree.

Q But there must be cuts, as well, the 30,000 by the Soviets, and the 13,000. That is part of the acceptance of the percentage.

A That is part of our total treaty package. First we would agree on all combat, combat-support forces in the region of all participants, and we would sign a verification package.

Then we would sign the agreement. The first year of that agreement would comprise a reduction of Soviet and U.S. forces, respectively 30,000 and 13,000, and those forces to be taken in combat and combat-support elements.

Q I am just curious. Some of these figures are not that new. I mean, I recall the Democrats, when they were in office, suggesting a way of breaking the log jam in a similar fashion. Jonathan Deane, for example, proposed something along these lines several times. Why did it take this Administration so long to get around to proposing this kind of a way of breaking the data base problem?

A · I think one thing you learn in the MBFR business is that there is really nothing new under the sun; that is to say, most of these ideas have been surfaced before in various administrations and considered. This particular idea has never been presented before in this way, although it has been an idea that obviously people have discussed.

On the numbers themselves, we have, as I pointed out, agreement on the 700,000 and 900,000. The figures of 13 and 30, while not formally agreed, are certainly familiar, and it may be overstating the case, but I think it is tacitly accepted. So we want to build -- it is a negotiation -- we want to build on what is tacitly accepted, and what would be easiest to agree upon.

Q Does the political campaign year have anything to do with your putting this proposal forward at this time?

A No. It is simply a function of this work, which has been extended in detail, coming to fruition at this point.

Q You say several of the allied countries, maybe all of them, I don't know, are having briefings like you are having here -- would you say that this would make it more difficult for the Soviets to reject the proposal, or do you think it would encourage them to be more forthcoming? I am still as much concerned with the public relations angle as I am with the 13,000 or 30,000. You know, it is an election year, we all kind of know that, and the President in his news conference, his last one, recited all the new American initiatives, all of which were old ones, really, so I wondered what effect -- if we are all serious, if you all are serious about arms control -- I wondered what effect you think this might have on going public with your conciliatory approach, what effect this might have on the Soviets, whether that would encourage them or stiffen them?

A Well, it is yet another step on our part to initiate a dialogue and expand that dialogue in line with the President's January speech.

The question of how the Soviets will react will depend in part, and I think it is fair to say that we are just putting our heads in the sand if we don't realize this, will depend in part upon how they choose to play the overall relationship between now and the elections.

A third function, a third factor, of course, is the proposal itself. Now, I am not rank-ordering those factors for you, but I think they will all contribute.

We are encouraged by the move they made last June. We are encouraged by the statement that -- the very preliminary statement that they made in Vienna with respect to studying this seriously, and I think they are under some pressure from within their own alliance where there is considerable interest in MBFR, and from European public opinion which they, I am sure -- in which they would like to be perceived as forthcoming in arms control, and so on. They are under some pressures now to respond constructively.

Q Are we under the same kind of pressure, particularly from the Germans, to be as constructive as the United States is now being?

A In this case, of course, this is our initiative.

Q I mean, we read in the Times this morning how the British took a stiffer stand, but indeed weren't you pushed along in this direction by the Germans and some of the smaller countries?

A No. This is very much our initiative. That is to say, it originated as our initiative months and months ago.

Q The refinement of our initiative.

A The refinement, of course, takes place within the alliance. There is a healthy give and take, different governments have different perspectives, but we always -- and there have been different points of view expressed, of course, but this is no different from the way this has worked in the past on MBFR.

Q Is it purely coincidental that this comes one day after the chemical draft treaty?

A I know you won't believe me, but yes, it is purely concidental.

Q There is no considered effort again to seize the high ground, as it were, and to at least show that there is some momentum?

A No. We wanted to have this proposal on the table in Vienna before the round adjourned today, and that is what we have been aiming for.

Q What is the timetable for that? If the round is adjourning today, when will it resume?

A They resume, I think, in about four weeks, and then it continues through July. Then they take their summer recess and they will come back in the fall.

Q So you would expect the Soviet response when they resume in four weeks.

A If not sooner. They can always come to us in bilateral channels, but as these things work, it will probably be in four weeks' time.

Q Thank you.

A Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 1:30 p.m.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Santa Barbara, California)

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO CHINA

April 20, 1984

The Biltmore Hotel
Santa Barbara, California

9:00 A.M. PST

MR. SIMS: As I recall, we agreed this was on background and a senior administration official. No one will be able to figure out who it is. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me just give you a piece of news.

Q Good.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Which you will have before anybody else has. I just talked to Larry and he said that he would post this. You guys can go with it and he'll post it over in the Press Room later. It isn't that big a deal but it is a little story, and that is that the President, today, by mid-day probably, will have called all three former Presidents to talk about their trips to China and brief them on some of the items for discussion that will be discussed with the Chinese leaders, and get from them their thoughts since they've all been there or have talked with the Chinese leadership before.

Other than that, I thought I'd just give you a little bit about how this trip was put together.

Q Good.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We began discussions with the Chinese over a year ago about an exchange of visits. And that was really decided upon after Secretary Weinberger's last visit. And Premier Zhao agreed to come here and I went on to China following the Korean and Japanese trip of the President last November. I met with the Chinese and went all over China looking at various things.

Before I left, the President said to me that he wanted his trip to China to include two things, and that was as much substantive meeting time as possible with as many of the Chinese leaders as possible, and he also wanted a dialogue with the people as well as the leadership. Well, we have over seven and a half hours -- eight hours now that we've expanded the second Zhao meeting -- in Beijing with the Chinese leadership, which is an extraordinary amount of time when you think about some of the trips we've been on and the meetings that have taken place.

In addition to that, the President will have three opportunities to speak to the Chinese people through Chinese television. And Chinese television is far wider spread than you think. I think something like 80 percent of the homes in the major cities have television sets.

He'll do that with a major address at the Great Hall, first of all. It's about a 35 minute speech. He has, the next day, has a television interview on Chinese television which will be

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a Q and A after an opening statement by him. And finally, he'll get to speak with the Chinese people in a dialogue with the students at Fudan University in Shanghai. I don't think that's ever happened in modern China where a visiting Head of State has had a Q and A session with university students.

All of these things were readily agreed to by the Chinese. There really wasn't any hesitancy on their part. I think a lot of that was because the Zhao visit was so successful here and he was allowed to do a lot of things that he wanted to do.

I think the President looks at this trip not just as a trip to China, which is extraordinary in itself for him, but as part of his overall Asian policy. An extension, if you will, of the trip we had last year. And even though President Nixon spent some time in California, I think Ronald Reagan really is the first Pacific President we've had, and he thinks in those terms.

The preparation for this trip, from his standpoint, has been extraordinary also.

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I don't think he ever put quite the amount of time that he's put into learning about the People's Republic and discussing that with Americans who are Chinese scholars and people who have been familiar with China for some time. We had two luncheons in the White House where we brought first -- the first time, we brought people from -- experts from within the government in for about a two-hour luncheon, a dialogue with him. There were no papers exchanged; it was really just a dialogue.

These were the sort of people who would prepare briefing papers for Secretaries. And then the Secretaries would read them. And we decided to bring in the experts at the expense of the Secretaries. And it really worked out well.

The second luncheon we had were outside people who were familiar with China -- Win and Betty Lord and Brent Scowcroft and a professor from Berkeley, I can never remember his name -- Scalapino -- do you know?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Bob Scalapino.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And that was very successful. We, of course, had the traditional national security-type briefings where all of the Cabinet Secretaries gave their thoughts. I think one of the things that's -- makes this trip more interesting is that we have the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Treasury and the Science and Technology Advisor -- all on official visits to mainland China in the last year. They've all reported back directly to the President.

And they all gave an update to him this last week also. He's had volumes of the traditional type of briefings coming up through the national security system. He's also read more outside articles and books than I think he has on any other trip. He will get, in addition to his conversations today with the three former Presidents, he will have yet one more briefing in Guam which will be conducted by the Secretary of State.

Q Is he doing all the phone calls today to the former Presidents?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Do you think that all these briefings have had an effect on his view of China in any way? Has it changed his thinking, do you think, and -- I don't know -- maybe made it easier to deal with Taiwan, the Taiwan question or any other aspect of U.S.-Chinese relations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't -- I can't answer that. I don't think it's changed his view on Taiwan, certainly, but I think -- You -- we'd have to ask us that question after we get back. (Laughter.)

Q Did you say he gets all these briefings -- can you just sort of give us some kind of idea of -- surely they're not technical. I mean you don't go into all this, all that stuff that's done at the -- at different and varying levels. You know, we've gotten all these briefings about these complex treaty agreements and all that kind of stuff. Is his curiosity more a general --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Both. He asked questions on the technical treaties, as a matter of fact, at the last National Security briefing and got about a 20-minute briefing on the tax agreement.

Q Yes.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But I think it is more -- most of these briefings have been more general, but they have gotten into specifics.

Q So, here's what you can expect and here's what Zhao is like and he, you know, he doesn't like and don't ever say this word because that means something to them -- that kind of thing?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not very much of that.

Q No? Just --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, there wasn't very much of that. And, of course, he and Zhao got along so well when he was here that he has a pretty good idea of how to deal with him. He also saw an extraordinary film that was put together by the government in cooperation with the government of the People's Republic, which went through his entire schedule, and I've never seen anything like it. They went with our -- took our advance people and then put this film together from other Heads of State who visited China. And he actually saw about a 35-minute film of his entire visit, exactly where he's going to be at each time.

Q Has there been a change in thinking -- in his thinking about China or his approach to China over the time he's been in office that -- I think a lot of people would have said, you know, in 1980 that the thought of Ronald Reagan going to China would be, well, not the first thing they would think of, but now he is. Has his approach changed in any way that you could detect or quantify for --

Q Or evolved -- evolution --

Q -- evolved -- maybe that's a better way to put it, yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think --

Q Not necessarily just with respect to Taiwan but on the whole?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that -- he has always been one who said it's better to be talking to people than about them. And these people want to talk. It's clear from the meetings that the Secretaries have had and the progress we've made on agreements -- are making on agreements that these people want a relationship with the United States. And being or having spent as much time as he has in California, he knows the contribution of the Chinese people.

And I think he sees a tremendous trade market for the United States over there, and that's not something he's going to pass up. So, all of those are important reasons for going. I think also that he sees a willingness on the part of the Chinese to deal.

Q It sounds like a man who's putting practicality above whatever ideological problems he might have. Is that too clear-cut, too --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't know whether I'd comment on that.

Q You talked about how cooperative the Chinese were in setting up the schedule. Are there any interesting or amusing vignettes you could share with us on some of the trips you made in putting this thing together?

Q Mostly because we heard it was sort of disastrous trying to -- because they wanted you to, you know, they wanted him to see a lot of different things, and you were saying, "Well, we've got to have this kind of security." And there were a lot -- there was a sort of spate of stories awhile back about how the advance trips were difficult.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Of course, the advance trips -- I didn't go on the advance trips. I went over and looked at everything, and then the advance trips went over and put it together. I had the easy job; they had the hard job. But I don't remember anything -- do you -- that was particularly amusing. (Laughter.)

Q -- let you take a chair. (Laughter.)

Q -- successful?

Q Why do they object, for example, to his using a helicopter to go from place to place?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Because they don't have any helicopters.

Q Couldn't you pack his in a C-141?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We are using helicopters but not to transport him. We're using helicopters for emergency evacuation only. But since they don't have any helicopters, they -- I mean, they --

Q No maintenance either, I guess, right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that wouldn't be a problem for us.

Q Do you see any risks in this trip, any risks on the part of the President in this trip? I'm not talking about physical risks --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Political risks?

Q -- political, diplomatic, any pitfalls that he has to avoid?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think the Chinese people have indicated a desire to make this trip a successful trip. And the planning has all gone very well. Ronald Reagan is a good representative of this country and a good diplomat. He usually does well. I expect that we'll see a positive net result of the trip.

Q You do expect them to bring up Taiwan and talk about it? They have to, don't they?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They always do. And the President's answer is always the same.

Q If all the pictures come off as you expect and the whole trip falls together, maybe you can describe for us a little bit the kind of image that you hope will emerge from this? That would help us frame the trip.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think what you'll see is a -- the image of a pretty tough six or seven days. I mean, if you look at that schedule, you'll see that, as the President reminded me yesterday on the plane, there isn't much breathing time in there. There isn't a lot of sightseeing. He is going to go up to The Wall and the Xi'an visit. But by and large, it's a serious working visit. Not only is it a serious working visit as far as the Chinese leadership is concerned, but there's a lot of time spent

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in there with the Chinese people seeing how they live, visiting that township or commune or whatever you call it, visiting a joint business effort in Shanghai. A possible stop that we're going to make is to a village on the way to Xi'an. All of those things fill up the day. And then you have one of those banquets every night, with the exception of th3 night we go to Xi'an.

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Q You're known by some people as the manager of the body, controls where the President goes -- his time, whatnot. Have you tried to pay special attention to -- obviously, it's a busy schedule -- but, has it been cut back from what it was originally?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I always try to manage the time so that we can avoid mistakes. But, unfortunately, on these trips, things just continue to keep getting added and added. I think, in many ways, it's a tribute to President Reagan. Everybody wants to talk to him. They want him to see everything. You compare, for instance, the number of foreign visiters that we've had -- three and a half years to the last five Presidents -- it's extraordinary. And it's because everybody wants to see him.

It is a busy schedule. It has not been pared back. It's been added to, it was just added to yesterday when we added some more time, at the insistence of the Chinese, to the Zhao, second Zhao visit. So it's going to be a tough schedule. And on top of that we've tried to build in -- which has gotten cut back -- about an hour and a half each morning and an hour and a half each late afternoon for Washington work which has to be done. I mean, there are simply things that have to get done -- there are other things going on in the world as we all know.

Q How much will this trip serve to reinforce the political standing of the Chinese moderates? How much of a factor is that? Reinforcing of Deng -- trend toward modernization?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't answer that, I'm not a Chinese expert. I just don't know. I would --

Q Well, isn't it true that there still is a sort of struggle between Deng Xiaoping and the old Mao gang of four when --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes --

Q -- that has not yet really been decided?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, but I really don't know anything about -- I don't know anything about the politics of China, I really don't. I know that to be true, but I don't -- I would assume that this visit would be a big plus for China. And if that's a big plus for China, it's a big plus for the government that's in control.

Q You do know about politics in the United States. What do you think -- How do you see this trip as a political asset for the President in a campaign year?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, normally, if you look back at visits like this, trips like this, the President would enjoy a "blip" for awhile -- what it does to the overall image, if it's a successful trip, and I think it will be, I would think it would be helpful.

Q I was wondering if we could touch on a couple of logistics things just quickly. As radio reporters, we have a situation where we are involved in doing word pictures -- the counterpoint of television. I was wondering if you might be able to just shed a little light on The Wall, and Xi'an and the kinds of things he's going to be doing so we can kind of anticipate what we're going to be seeing. I guess those are the two major --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, there isn't a heck of a lot --

Q -- color stops, if you will --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right. Well, you probably will, I would think --

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Q Or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- the same day we're at Xi'an.

Q Or could you point out other things that we might look for for those kinds of descriptive kind of spots?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're going to try to do a stop in a village on the way. You've got an hour and forty minutes in the motorcade coming and going from the airport to Xi'an.

Q An hour and forty minute motorcade?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. (Laughter.)

Q Whew.

Q I'm going to buy a novel. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No -- just look out the window.

Q Look out the window --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's your only chance to see rural China.

Q That's true.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And it's going to be very interesting.

But there's a couple of villages on the way and if we can convince the Chinese security people, we want to stop and just see those. And I think those will be very interesting.

Q So that's not definite yet, then?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q That's just possible. Okay.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'd just as soon that would not be --

Q Sure. Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- talked about until we do it.

The Wall, there really isn't, I mean --

Q He's going to walk --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- he's just going to go see The Wall.

Q -- walk.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Yes. But there should be sufficient pool access that we'll be able to see him or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, yes.

Q -- it'll be tight -- But what we want --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no, no --

Q -- with -- in our situation is maybe one of us will go forward and the other six of us are kind of left out. We're kind of like still photographers in that regard. And I'm just trying to get a gauge for what's going to be available to us --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think you'll be able to see pretty well, all of you, at The Wall.

Anyway, Xi'an -- we go into this kind of a big plastic dome that covers the diggings and it has a railing, a walk all the way around the 300 figures out of the 6,000 that they have cleaned up. And everyone of those 6,000 7-foot terra-cotta figures --

Q Incredible.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- has a different face, if you can believe that.

Q Each was an individual in the court, right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right. Right.

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And they have the horses and the soldiers there. And all of that will be explained to him, that this was the first Emperor of China's -- the guards around his tomb. The tomb itself, which they say probably will be one of the most extraordinary archaeological digs ever, hasn't -- they haven't started on that yet.

Q Will that be an open coverage site where we're going to be there? Or will that be a --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it's going to be open coverage.

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Q Will we be able to say, "There's the President looking over the terra-cotta, bla-bla-bla-bla -- ?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, you will. Yes.

Then he'll go into a museum where they have some other things that they -- really extraordinary things that they got in the diggings. I guess they did get those out of the tomb.

That all lasts about an hour and then we get back in our car, motorcade for an hour and a half.

Q Back again?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right.

Q Still, it's a chance --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In Shanghai, I think the University classroom will be -- obviously have to be pool.

Q That's not the kind of situation that's a problem for us.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q It's --

Q How were the students selected? How will the students be chosen that will take part in that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sure very carefully. (Laughter.)

Q Right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Don't quote me. (Laughter.) I don't know.

Q Has anyone from the White House met with any of these --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, I don't know. Well, I'm sure they've met with -- the President of that University is a graduate of Smith College, a woman, obviously.

Q And the Q&A's that you mentioned at the beginning -- are those -- does he know the Q's before he gives the A's?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know. I don't think so.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- students. I don't think so.

Q You think the students will be as off-the-cuff as things get there -- here?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, the students, I know, we have no --

Q How about the --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know. Do we know --

Q -- the TV interview? Are they going to give him the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He may have some idea of the areas. But I don't think we can be sure of the questions.

Q Well, it just seemed to me in Japan, I think, he knew what they were going to ask him.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q I mean, he had them in front of him. But you don't think that's --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know yet, at this point.

Q On the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- away. A whole week. (Laughter.)

Q -- the three former Presidents, do you -- can you help us flush that out a little bit by what issues he may want to bring up with each one --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q -- have you got any feel for any specific questions he might have that would --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q -- just to add a second line?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Okay.

Q What about the visit to the plant in Shanghai? What --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Foxboro plant.

Q -- they produce ball bearings, is that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right. Isn't this the plant from Massachusetts?

Q Foxboro.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The other color event in Shanghai that I think will be interesting will be this township, so called -- what they call a "township." Because he'll actually be with the peasants out in the field and he will go into a nursery where they have children and then he will go into one of the residences there and see how they supposedly live.

Q Will we be able to rotate through in that situation or -- I can talk to Larry about. That's not a --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sure there'll be some kind of a pool.

Q Okay.

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Q When do you expect him to see Deng Xiaoping? I realize that you don't see the paramount leader first.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Have we announced it yet?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We haven't; but --

Q No.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- it was pretty clear from Larry's introduction of Secretary Shultz that we expect meetings Thursday, Friday and a very important, climactic meeting and lunch on Saturday. If that gives you a hint. (Laughter.)

Q -- get it. (Laughter.)

Q Will the President use Air Force I inside China?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. First one ever to do so.

Q Was that a serious -- I mean, was that ever a problem?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Very serious.

Q Was it a matter of pride with them or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know what the answer to that is. I mean, some people say it's security. Some people say it's a matter of pride. I think it probably is more pride than security.

Q They tell us at the Asia Society that China has just recently re-legalized the 21-gun salute for a foreign leader since doing away with it during the Cultural Revolution. They said he may be the first one to get a 21-gun salute since then. Do you know? Is that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I didn't know that. That's interesting.

Q That was fascinating.

Q Yes --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll check --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's a lot of interesting things going to happen on this trip.

Q Do you know if he will?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know that.

Q When you go through this schedule with him is there anything that strikes his fancy in particular. I mean, he's going to say, "Oh, wow, that sounds like it's going to be -- "

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Xi an thing was particularly -- he is particularly curious about that.

Q And that seems to be the thing that --

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Q When you say he's going to be out in the field with the Rainbow Commune, right out in the rice paddy or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't know whether he's going to be in a rice paddy. (Laughter.)

Q Give him one of those hats and the boots. (Laughter.)

Q I'll try to get a picture of --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it would more likely be --

Q Will he get in old clothes and go out and actually --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, he isn't going to wade through the mud.

Q Oh, come on.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He might look at baskets of rice or something like that.

Q No, I mean is it going to be a formal thing or ranch clothes?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have never been there. Oh, no, he would have -- isn't that -- that's on our departure. That's on the way to the plane.

Q Oh, so he would --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is May Day, by the way.

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Or Labor Day, as they call it.

Q Is there anything special -- I mean, other than the obvious special nature of meeting the Pope -- about the meeting that the President will have in Alaska? Or is this just a ship passing in the night, as they say?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's nothing special. I think there's kind of a special bond those two fellows have, given what they've both been through. And they, of course, have corresponded and they, of course, met once, talked on the phone.

Q How have the Chinese been about security? I mean, do we expect that their security will be very, very tight as well as our own?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think the Chinese are very, very thorough and very, very unobtrusive. Their security is very good.

Q It won't be quite as obvious as inside Korea? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think so.

Q Good.

Q She's in his motorcade. (Laughter.)

Q With a submachine gun staring you in the face. (Laughter.)

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Q Can I ask --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Did you see the other day where they sold their first privately owned vehicle?

Q No.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Did you see that?

MR. SIMS: Yes, to a successful entrepreneur.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: A family who had made $20,000 a year, if you can imagine.

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Interesting that Nakasone was there the next day. Probably getting ready to ship a car. (Laughter.)

Q Can I ask you real quick -- since you brought up Ford, Nixon, and Carter. (Laughter.) I knew there was another one. There was a story that circulated -- this is off China -- but there was a story that circulated a while back that the President was seeking their support against the bill that was in -- or the resolution in Congress on moving the Israeli Embassy and was going to put out a joint letter from the former Presidents and him if he got pushed that far by Congress. Is there anything to that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know anything about it.

Q No?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I really don't.

Q Do you know anything?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- what came of that. I think they all had the same position as the President has.

Q Was there an attempt by the White House to get them to do something sort of public about it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know. They've all been briefed, but I'm not sure of any attempt.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Did you get enough?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Is that it? We will --

Q One more question on Air Force One in China. I know that on some of the previous trips, there was a Chinese navigator aboard. Is that going to be true on the internal -- the flight to Xi'an?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I haven't heard anything about that. It wouldn't surprise me, but I haven't heard anything about that. I -- first of all, they've never had -- they've never flown a plane around there. I mean, this is the first time. So I don't know.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The press is looking forward to flying with the Chinese.

Q Somebody told me if there's not enough room, you stand up. Was that you?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- are wonderful. (Laughter.)

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Q Oh, well.

Q Wait until you use the facilities on there.

(Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'd forgotten about that.

Q Just eat and smile, don't ask what it is.

(Laughter.)

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 9:30 A.M. PST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO CHINA

April 20, 1984

The Roosevelt Room

3:01 P.M. EST

MS. SMALL: This briefing is on background. It is attributable to a senior administration official.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you. I'll try to be brief and take your questions.

I'll start off with China, and just have one or two things to say. And then if you'd indulge me, I wanted to get one thing, kind of -- I guess just off my chest -- about the recent public discourse on Central America -- but I would say not Central America so much as the problem of how we deal generically with the kind of problem we face there in the late twentieth century in the world, and the need, the responsibility on our part to try to engender a better public understanding of just what are the equities, what are the policy implications of limiting ourselves to a total war, a total peace approach to this problem.

On China -- at the outset of the President's speech in Georgetown last week you may have seen set out in pretty simple terms what his purposes were -- to build a safer world, a world in which democratic values and economic growth could prosper -- fairly simple, not novel. He went over several principles which would guide his policies in trying to get those outcomes. We went down over those -- nonagression, strength, deterrence, economic strength, dialogue with adversaries, bipartisanship. Those principles and those purposes the President spent pursuing for the past three years. He believes that last year, I guess, foremostly at Williamsburg, we had culminated a long effort to achieve agreement between ourselves and in that case the summit partners on these principles and on specific regional application of those principles primarily in the East-West context, on how we ought to do business economically with the Soviet Union.

After that the President turned his attention to the Pacific Basin, and this is the second trip to the basin in the last six months. And I refer to it as that more than the China trip because it is of a piece with his hope to engender, through dialogue with Japan, Korea, Australia, the ASEAN countries and China to establish a framework for the resolution of disputes for mutually compatible economic policies, for stability and peace in the area. He thinks, and is based on a lot of years, looking westward from California, that the Pacific Basin in terms of markets, in terms of the vulnerability and security terms that it represents today is a terribly, terribly important part of the world and that we need to do quite a number of things between now and the 1990s to be sure that it remains stable. And this visit is part of that.

The U.S.-China relationship has advanced quite a lot in the last year. I think -- you can take my word for it --

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kind of the pace and the quality of our dialogue has expanded and increased quite a lot. When you think about five, six cabinet officers going over there in one year's time -- I guess 14 or 15 months time -- as different, it's quite a lot more than have done it in the past. Corresponding visits this way express the substance of what has become a kind of a new plateau or level of U.S.-China relations.

The President in this trip, in short, is expressing the personal importance that he attaches to building this relationship on principles of mutual respect, mutual interest toward, as an outcome, stability in Asia. It does demonstrate quite a new level of engagement with the Chinese.

Let me divert for a moment on that point. When you stop and put all of the possible U.S.-China relationships together, it is very, very impressive. Stop and think for a minute about energy, and we won't go on at length about this -- but oil, hydro, nuclear, coal. Oil, they hope to make about $10 to $15 billion worth of offshore exploration, foremostly with U.S. companies in the next five years. In coal, they have the second largest reserves in the world. Most of it, near the surface, which requires technology that the United States is the best in the world at. In hydro, they've got more hydro potential than any country in the world -- largely undeveloped -- again, in an area where U.S. technology is better than anybody else's. Finally, in nuclear, they say they want to have 10,000 kilowatts, megawatts on line by the turn of the century -- twelve different centers in the country. The United States has good technology, it's in competition with a lot of other countries for it. But the potential there, when you put it all together, is enormous in terms of pure financial terms.

I think beyond that, though, what is more significant to me is that the Chinese obviously want it to be America. Why? I think if you asked that question a year ago it was very uncertain. And I think you might have gotten a different answer. And I'm saying that they want it, and I believe that, and you can see it manifested in trade delegations that go over from our private sector. But, why? Well, I think that there has been a change in the last year in which they have come to terms with the fact, first of all -- President Reagan is a person of some starchiness and principle. But I think they've come to translate that to constancy, and that is a principle that they respect. Constancy in its application has sweet and sour. I mean it has implications vis-a-vis the people on Taiwan; it also has implications vis-a-vis contracts and sustainable commercial relationships. And they've decided that this is a steady supplier that can be relied upon and to go and to try to engage as broadly as possible with us.

Also important, it seems to me, is that what happens if these things materialize? It means money, but that is of kind of secondary importance to me. It means enormous numbers of people going to China, and coming here. And that has a political effect to it. Anytime that you're sending tens, and indeed maybe hundreds of thousands of people to another country, they cannot help but influence the thinking within that country. Similarly, when you see today, 10,000 Chinese students here, and what that means in terms of a four year education or more, going back home -- in terms of their exposure to what is possible. Now I don't mean by that to say that I think over time we've got some kind of convergence between socialism and democracy -- I don't believe that. I think the political leadership of China is quite ideologically devoted, and I don't see any prospect that that's going to change. But I do think that there can be a stabilizing quality introduced by greater exposure of Chinese to Americans, and greater Chinese benefit from that.

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The last thing I wanted to say is that there will be several agreements signed and we'll talk about what you would expect us to talk about -- a bilateral agenda that is commercial, political. We'll talk about regional issues in Korea -- neighboring countries from Indochina and Afghanistan. We'll talk about global issues, obviously, and our views individually of the Soviet Union and its current leadership. That's what you expect and that will happen, indeed.

But I think the point here is that there has been a fundamental set of conclusions reached in China in the past year without the compromise of any of our own principles. And on terms where there's every promise manifested across the board from cultural to scientific to commercial to political -- that this relationship has reached a new stability that it didn't have a year or two years ago.

I think, too, and I'm guessing here that for the Chinese to see now after twelve years, their relationship sustained by liberal Democrats, conservative Republicans -- gives them some greater sense of confidence that the relationship is here to stay and that it doesn't depend entirely upon the actions of some third country, like the Soviet Union.

Let me close by just kind of wringing my hands a minute about Central America. I think the administration has a responsibility to try to frame the issue of what is involved better than we have what's involved in Central America. I'd even be more broad, but you haven't got much time.

In the past year, you've seen a lot of manifestations of anxieties among Americans about anti-nuclear concerns, anxiety about war at the nuclear level, worries about violence of several kinds -- terrorism, covert actions -- and I think it expresses an uncertainty, an ignorance but an ignorance well deserved, because the government -- neither ours nor predecessors -- have really tried to explain to the American people very much about what is the nature of our threat in the late 20th century here.

Well, I think that trying to frame that issue in simple, understandable terms is a responsibility. And assuming that one can persuasively argue that nuclear war is unlikely -- I think you can -- but that there are threats and that we don't have to speculate on them -- we have seen them in the past nine years from Angola to Ethiopia to Indochina to Afghanistan to Salvador. And the question becomes, how do we cope with that. Particularly when it is in an area where our own vital interests are engaged -- whether for resources or for vital waterways, trade routes, what have you.

Now there are long arguments and you've all heard them before, that you try to prevent the conditions from emerging in a country that make Marxism attractive, and that is true. And you must have that content to your policy. And that is indeed the 7 to 1 ratio of the Kissinger Commission, devoted to that very economic, social, long-term preventive. But the one part of that 7-to-1 ratio is security because all of these good things won't happen unless you have it.

Well, that security investment is overt. It is given to countries' militaries in the hope that they can stem the tide and we won't have to. But there is a dichotomy here. And it comes down to this -- that if the United States has a friend, it doesn't matter whether it's Isreal, Korea, Salvador, somebody else, and that friend is attacked by a third country, any third country supported by the Soviet Union or a surrogate using very violent means, overtly -- Do the American people really want the President of the United States to have no alternatives except total war or total peace? Would anybody suggest sensibly that we today ought to go to war with Nicaragua or that today, in April of '84, that's a viable policy option? I don't think it is.

But if the American people understand that look, here is what is going on in this part of the world, with the overt, unambiguous, violent support of the Soviet Union -- $400 million worth of military investment compared to our $45 million last year in Salvador -- violence of a inhuman level in terms of virtual genocide against an entire population in Nicaragua -- and we sit by and wring our hands about it, or go into supporting some very modest and ineffectual scheme to counter it, and suddenly it appears to be something at variance with American values. At least I think that's why you get leaks out of the Congress. I think they are honestly saying that we don't think this is compatible with the way the American government ought to act. Okay. That's a sensible, valid criticism. But if it is based upon a flawed perception of the nature of the contest, is it not incumbent upon any government to go to the people and say here is the nature of the contest.

Now it is entirely reasonable for anybody to argue where your interests are and what they are but once you get a handle on that and you say this is important and that isn't and this country is -- what happens when that country's threatened and it can't cope? And the only way that you can stem the tide is either by landing the Marines or doing nothing in terms of law and tradition.

Well, the other side has quite a longer agenda of options. If we will acknowledge that, I think we have the responsibility to say okay, what do we do? Now the outcome is uncertain and the American people say, well you don't do anything. You let it fall -- let the Rio Grande be the last bastion. Okay. But the responsibility is there I think to eliminate the issue. And perhaps if they don't say that, if they say well all right, let's compete in a way in which oversight assures against corruption and some purposes we don't support, then maybe we will be able to sustain a viable policy.

I'm sorry, the verbosity. I'll be glad to take your questions. Jack?

Q You touched on Taiwan in one sentence and then you skipped on. What implications for Taiwan are we to read into this higher plateau.

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in this new level of engagement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The disagreement over the substance, the content of U.S. relations with the people on Taiwan is well known. The President and Premier Zhao addressed it unequivocally when they met in January. The President's position was basically twofold, that our agreement in August of '82 we will adhere to, as with the previous communiques, that in a larger sense, however, the United States is not going to undermine the interests of the people on Taiwan and break faith with them to achieve some greater gain or some perceived gain with China, that it is our expectation that the Taiwan question -- it is not an expectation, it is clear -- is a matter for the Chinese to resolve.

It is our expectation it can be peaceful and that as that process takes place, the United States unofficial, commercial, and other relationships with Taiwan will continue. That's a long way of saying that this trip will not alter our perceptions of that issue nor alter our relationship to the people on Taiwan.

Q If I could return to Central America for a moment, I think one of the reasons for the confusion over your policy there is the differing explanations that are being given for the covert action. Some Senators think that the covert action is justified solely to interdict weapons; you seem to suggest that we have a moral obligation or a legal right to intervene because of genocide being committed -- I assume you mean against the Miskito Indians.

Are we pursuing whatever action we're pursuing down there in support of the four Contadora objectives, which are separate and apart from interdicting the arms flow? I mean exactly what is it that we have a right to do, and for what reason?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's a very good point. I kind of waxed beyond the narrow confines of the authority for whatever actions we support down there. And I was speaking generically. I was looking at a kind of problem that -- in which we and the Soviet Union have adversarial positions and how you deal with that. But I did not intend to imply that the purpose of U.S. activities is to counter specifically the Nicaraguan government's activities against the Miskito Indians per se. That is a manifestation of a policy that is sustained by this government being kept there with Soviet support.

But that is not why we have supported programs there, and the specific authority of those programs was tied to the relationship of Nicaragua to the battle in El Salvador, and to influence change, but not of the government -- to change in policies of the government of Nicaragua to positions in keeping with the promises they made in 1979. But that doesn't have anything to do with the Miskito Indians, you're right.

I think -- but this is hearsay for me, because I was not a part of the notification process -- that the original authorities were briefed well as far as accounts given back to us here of the briefings provided subsequently, that they were in full-faith accordance with the requirements of law. But I -- it is -- and it's something where my own testimony is hearsay; I was not part of that. I have no reason to doubt it. Today Howard Baker commented on it, I think, and seemed to believe that there was a complete effort made.

Q Isn't there something we have to learn -- that we all have to learn, in a sense, as a result of this experience and others before it, and that is that as things stand now, any

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controversial covert action operation, of whatever nature, of any size and significance, is sooner or later going to leak. And we just can't assume that it isn't going to leak.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Therefore, it almost has to be undertaken with the knowledge that it will leak and plan accordingly. And it's in that respect that this one went wrong, because when you engage in indiscriminate mining, it's not going to hold up after it's leaked.

So, the question, really, in the minds of many of us who've been watching from the outside, is why wasn't this thing seen more clearly at the time when the operation was scrubbed down and the decision was made to go ahead? Because it seems quite apparent that what happened was bound to happen.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'm getting close to the margin of what is appropriate in terms of confirming this or that particular activity. I think that the -- the views expressed have been an expression of a kind of a revulsion of indiscriminate violence, generally, and that's very understandable. I think that it was, in some cases, not thoroughly thought through, and when you look at what apparently was the nature of the problem, or the event, you find out that these are really pretty primitive, and apparently deliberately so, kinds of things -- mines.

I mean, if the United States couldn't make a better mine than that, we don't have any business spending 300 billion bucks. But I think, really, that misses your point, that it is a question of the American people's limit of tolerance for this kind of activity. And that is a very legitimate bitch and it's one where it deserves public treatment in a thoughtful way, and I think you will see that in the coming days.

Q He said that it's been a contradiction in objectives because, as I understand it, the Contras are being supported, at least partly, by American funds, and their objective is stated by Aldofo Colero as very specific and very different from the administration's objective.

How do you compromise these two -- is this not a source of the problem to exactly what the Contras, backed by the United States, and the United States acting alone are trying to do in Nicaragua?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think there is an ambiguity there --

Q How do you compromise that ambiguity?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not sure you can and I think that is an area that deserves a very fundamental review, in the instant case as well as more broadly. That's why I think that we've got to look to the country and the government stepping up to this thing and coming to the point where you don't have covert plans like this and I'm not proposing a boycott or an outlawing of it, because I think there are instances, quite apart from this kind of enterprise, where they are justified.

But I think that the American people have to answer the question: Are we going to not compete in this kind of engagement? Or if we are, can we not do it overtly with friends, and how?

I apologize. I've been --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's all right, keep going.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Last one, Ben?

Q You were talking about the duty of the government to inform the public on the nature of the great geopolitical contest in the late 20th century, and you repeated that several times, about how it's the duty of the government to inform the people. This being election year, do I hear that what you're talking about is that this is going to be a major frontal campaign theme, that Democrats are not properly alert to the danger of Soviet presence on the North American mainland, and this is going to kind of be three yards and a cloud of dust, just, bang, this is going to be right in the middle of it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, no. First of all, as all of you are very conscious, I don't know anything about politics, really, and what I've told you here is my own feelings on it, and I haven't been told to come out here and say these things. And it may never happen. It's just what I think we ought to do.

Q You spoke of a shift of emphasis to the Pacific Basin that's being discussed publicly by Larry Eagleburger, and I was just wondering to what extent is now the Pacific Basin more important than the European Basin to the United States?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I did not intend to imply that it has, either in security terms or political terms, greater importance. I think that it's importance today is expressed in the fact that more trade goes across the Pacific than the Atlantic and in the fact that absent very close working relationships, the potential for serious instability is higher there than in Europe. So the problems are more complex and more deserving of attention right now, I think. But I think, too, the opportunities are very high, not only in terms of markets but in terms of assuring stability and improving welfare for billions of people out there.

In that altruistic fit, I will leave you. (Laughter.)

THE PRESS: Thank you.

MS. SMALL: We were talking, obviously, about China and Central America. We will now turn to your agenda for the China -- up to now we've been ON BACKGROUND. Do you wish to be ON BACKGROUND?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll go ON BACKGROUND. If they wish anything for the record, they can let me know, and we'll --

MS. SMALL: Would you like some coffee?

Q Is that last one background, too, Karna?

MS. SMALL: Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, as you know, the President leaves for China early next week and I've just returned from there. I was in China three weeks ago for a five-day period, preliminary, in part, for the President's visit and, also, of course, as joint head of the China-U.S. Economic Mission. This was something that was set up under President Carter and it has been carried on by the Reagan administration. This was the one, two, this was the third time that it has met. It met here in '81 -- rather, in China in '81 -- here in '82, and again in Beijing in '84.

It's supposed to meet annually. The purpose of that Economic Mission, of course, obviously, is to further economic

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relations between our two nations. The interesting thing to me in going back this time, and in a very lengthy discussion with Premier Zhao and others there, is the way that the Chinese are gradually moving toward a market-oriented economy -- I won't call it a capitalist economy, but a market-oriented economy.

What they have tried to do -- they started this about five years ago -- they have speeded up their efforts in the last three. They started in the agricultural area and instead of the communes, as we all knew them -- on my first visit to the People's Republic 10 years ago, when the commune was so popular, and the like -- they have done away with that. They now call the commune the township.

And the township is a collection of small villages and the peasants make a contract with the-- through the village -- with the township to rent land under lease for up to 15 years. When I asked if that lease could be renewed, the answer was, "Oh, yes, depending upon performance." They also said that -- I asked if that could be passed on from father to son and the answer was, "Under certain modifications, yes." If the father died unexpectedly and the family had been conducting themselves well on the land, it was possible that the son could continue to farm the land.

The results of this is a contract between the individual farming family and the village. When that contract has been filled, anything that's left over may be sold for personal gain by the farming family on the private marketplace, as distinguished from selling to the state.

One example of this appeared -- well, I saw the picture in The Post, what was it, around the 9th or 10th, of a family by the name of Sun, and the Sun family were chicken farmers. And they had exceeded their quotas by so much that they had earned the equivalent of 40,000 yuan. Well, 40,000 yuan is the equivalent of about, as near as we can figure out their rate of exchange, 20,000 United States dollars. They were allowed to buy the first privately owned automobile in China as a result of this extra production and their achievement in selling chickens and eggs.

They say that agricultural production is up about 40 percent as a result of this experiment. They --

Q Up over what period?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Over -- well, prior to the time they started, let's say, five years ago. That's a good news/bad news syndrome for us because, obviously, they're a major market for our agricultural products.

They have decided to carry this one now into other industries besides agriculture. I asked what they were doing with the excess people on the farms if they've gotten production up this far and the like -- they would have, obviously start to have excess workers. And they said they were moving them into animal husbandry and into reforestation.

They want to try this experiment now in some of the heavier industries, where the state will bow out of the enterprise and it will be run on what we would call a profit basis. We will get into that in a minute as to what their definition of profit is.

I asked the specific question of Premier Zhao, "If you had two steel companies side by each, and in 1983 they were about one as profitable as the other, but in 1984 one is a lot more profitable than the other, will that enterprise be

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allowed to pay its workers more than the one that's not so profitable? And will the managers receive more for their work?" And to my surprise, the answer was yes. I said, "Well, that's what we would consider profit-sharing." But they have the equivalent of that now; they no longer are going to just as a state take money away from an enterprise. They are going to form a system of taxes and try to tax away 20 percent of what we would call profit.

Now the reason I keep saying that we would say profit and the like, they don't have a pricing system. And without a pricing system, I don't know how you determine profits. If you don't know what your costs are -- you do know your sales figures, obviously, but how do you figure out profit if you're not sure what all your costs are? And in state-owned enterprises it's rather difficult to figure out what they're actually -- what costs really are.

Nevertheless, they are continuing with this. What they want to do, they're going to have these what we would call enterprise zones, these economic zones, they're going to extend to 14 more of those -- they have 14 now, they want to extend 14 more -- particularly along the coastal cities. And here primarily will be where China will meet those other nations that want to invest in China; they'll try to hold it mainly in those areas rather than inland.

At the same time, workers will be allowed to go to those areas, but they will not be allowed to return to China except on infrequent visits. They want to contain, as much as possible, those workers there, because they will be paid higher wages than workers that will be further inland, and the like.

They want to keep people from going into the big cities and swelling the population of the big cities -- they want to try to keep them on the fringes, what we would call the suburbs of the cities, and develop light industry in those areas.

They know that they have a tremendous infrastructure problems, roads, sewers, bridges, all that type of thing, that will be needed in order to modernize that country. They're looking for an awful lot of help from us in the form of investment. We have -- and that will be one of the subjects that President Reagan will be discussing with various officials over there, how much economic assistance we will give them. The answer, in brief, is none, because we will be relying on our private sector to do this. We don't have state-owned enterprises and we don't have any agency of government that I know of that can make international loans at reduced interest rates, which is what they want and seek.

Prime Minister Nakasone, when he went there, on the other hand, was able to assure them that he had a little over $2 billion to loan at interest rates -- well, which are slightly below the Japanese rate, which is 7 to 8 percent -- he had 6 percent, 6 to 7 percent money. No way we can match that.

We told them, at least I told them, from my point of view, and I suspect the President will say the same thing, we'll be relying on our own individual enterprises, supplemented by such government agencies as CCC credits, export-import guarantees, OPIC, the Overseas Private Insurance Corporation, and other agencies of that nature supplementing what our individual companies will want to do.

There is a great deal of interest on the part of our American companies. OPIC is bringing a -- taking a group of 24 to 27 companies to China in September looking for joint ventures. These will be medium-sized companies, not some of our larger corporations, who obviously can do this on their own. So that's a quick bird's eye view of the economic situation in China.. What sort of questions might you have? Yes, please?

Q What is their reliability record in paying for what they're getting from our private sector?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The People's Republic -- it's excellent. We don't -- I know of no default with the People's Republic. We did have one tiff with them, I would say, in their linking an area where they're disappointed in our performance with an area where they have guaranteed to perform under contract, and we are trying to make certain that they understood the English idea of sanctity of contracts.

This is in textiles, where they're very unhappy with what we would -- the countervailing duty suits that were filed here regarding Chinese textiles. And they withheld their purchases of grain, although they had a grain contract on which they were supposed to perform.

Q On the question of --

Q Could I follow up on that with one other. What's their balance of payments situation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's excellent. They have a favorable balance of trade with the rest of the world at this point.

Q Following up generally on economic assistance, you said we can't match the money that -- in terms of Nakasone offered them -- wouldn't one way of solving this problem be for us to rely more on the multi-lateral aspects, specifically by being more generous in our IDA contribution to China, which is going to be limited by the $9 billion IDA that we've agreed to?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think so, because if we're looking for bilateral trade and bilateral economic conditions, which is what the President is seeking and what I was trying to do with the Joint Economic Mission, multi-lateral contributions would not result necessarily in bilateral additions to trade.

Q If you're going to get bilateral agreements, though, wouldn't it be worthwhile to subsidize interest rates?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well --

Q -- for the government?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's -- according to GATT, that's illegal. You're not supposed to do that. We keep hacking at the French for doing that, for example, in some of their sales to Egypt. That's why we did the so-called flour sale to Egypt at a reduced rate. That is GATT-illegal and we're trying to refrain from getting into such a price war.

Q Just a follow-up, again. The point on the multi-lateral/bilateral would be -- is to the extent that you plug the hole by the multi-lateral aid, you don't have to go so heavy on the bilateral.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we don't want to have for aid for China. China is a potential market -- it's a market potentially very great. It has, as you know, according to their own estimates, more than a billion people -- a tremendous market. They have foreign exchange, they have a balance of

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payments that's in surplus. They handle almost as much foreign exchange as some of the Western European nations in reserves. So I see no reason for aid to China; I do see a chance to trade with China, though. Yes?

Q Let me follow up on Nick's question for a minute. What is it that the Chinese have to sell the United States that approaches in dollar value all of this hydro-electric equipment and nuclear power plants and oil rigs and coal-mining equipment that was talked about a minute ago?

SENIOR ADMINISTRAION OFFICIAL: Well, first of all, they would like, obviously, to sell us more textiles. That's their single largest export to the United States. And the amount of their exports are up about 22 percent in '83 over '82. They can manufacture many of the same items that we import from Hong Kong -- cheap radios, hand-held calculators. They would be very good at cheap-type of rubber-soled -- well, whether you call them sneakers or walking shoes, or any other type of footwear of that nature. They'd also be very good -- what they would like to do is in the form of other simplified electronic devices, many of which we're now importing either from Taiwan, Hong Kong, or Singapore.

Q Along those lines, does anybody keep track to make sure that the investment does not impinge upon American unemployment, because China is a billion people and also one of the great cheap-labor markets of the world.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, specifically, do we say that if we import so many textiles from China, does that keep some of the people from working in our own textile mills? The answer to that is very hard to determine, but our textile mills currently are about at 85 percent or more capacity. They are selling all of their products. One of the great reasons for importing, particularly items of this nature, is to keep our rate of inflation down.

As you know, the deflator came out today for the first quarter and it's at 4.1 again. So we are keeping our inflation down; that's the good news of the trade deficit. The obvious bad news is, of course, that it will eventually result in a weakened dollar.

Q What's the chance for nuclear deals, sir, as far as our selling our nuclear peaceful --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They would like to be able to buy from the United States turnkey operations in nuclear power plants. They make no bones about that; they're up front on that. Our restrictions obviously have to be along the lines of their having an agreement with us, the non-proliferation agreement. That -- Ambassador Kennedy is over there now, they're working on that to see if they can get such a treaty signed, and if they can, the turnkey operation could then proceed under those safeguards.

Q Could you give us some idea of the President's sort of state of mind on this? After so many years of being so anti-communist China and everything, how is he personally preparing for this? Is he enthused, is he a little diffident --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think that as President of the United States he recognizes that a nation of a billion people is not something that he can ignore or pretend that it doesn't exist. He has to deal with it. Quite obviously, and this isn't my area of competence, there are political ramifications here, also, in dealing with China vis-a-vis other relationships in the Far East, other relationships in some areas

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of Eastern Europe.

So, as a result, the President recognizes that this is something he should be doing as part of his job as President of the United States, and that's why he's going there, as President of the United States.

Q Has he expressed anything personally about his --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Nothing that I'd care to repeat. (Laughter.)

Q What do you mean by that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not teasing on that. It's just that he recognizes that this isn't going to be an easy thing for him to do and it's also, from the point of view of physical, the travel over there, the difference in the time zones, and everything else, is going to be arduous. But, nonetheless, it's something -- it's a duty that he, as President of the United States, wants, and he would like to have good relationships, picking up on what two other Republican Presidents and one Democratic President have kept, namely, the Nixon opening up of China, followed by Jerry Ford with the same idea, and then Jimmy Carter.

Q President Nixon also opened up trade with the Soviet Union. Is this is a proper analogue? Is this what this administration would like to do there as well?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, so far the trade portion of that is going to have to wait on the political portion of that and we have made no overtures in the trade area with the Soviets.

Q How does the inability of the U.S. to provide those loans affecting relations with China?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Obviously they needle me. They cannot understand how I cannot loan out such money, that I don't have all the money in the world. Supposedly the Treasury of the United States, you know, is Nirvana -- that's the great spot where everybody can tap. And they cannot understand -- very frankly, I say this without jest, that the President of the United States couldn't, if he wanted to, give them a loan at a low figure.

And, you know, it simply baffles them that we can't do that and obviously they haggle, and have haggled, with many of our corporations about whether or not they could do it. Now there is a way around that. All of us that have been in international finance know a little bit about that; all you do is build it into the price. In other words, you take -- take a simple illustration, a million dollars at 10 percent. That's -- for the first year that's $1,100,000, so what's the price? You can say, well, we'll make the price a million-forty and we'll give you a 6-percent loan. Same thing.

So corporations know how to get around this.

Q If they start creating enterprise zones along the coast where foreign investors will be welcomed and where Chinese will be allowed to work, what does that say about Hong Kong's future? Does Hong Kong become one of those enterprise zones?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't want to

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venture a guess on that. Geoffrey Howe has just been there. Mrs. Thatcher has had her own conversations. The British are deep in the middle of negotiations at this point. I think that what they look at is Hong Kong as an example of what they could be doing in Quanzhou, and other places all up and down the coast, of what a model would be. Now what the exact future of Hong Kong would be is something else again. SP?

Q Are we in a position of helping China take export business away from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, so that the Chinese can pay for their imports from us?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, a little competition is a great thing and for these countries to have competition I don't think is too bad, because obviously that keeps the price down to us, since they're selling to us. As far as taking away, we hope that the United States market is an expanding one. With more people working and the like here in the United States, we should be having a larger market.

And the same thing for the rest of the world. A lot of their exports, of course, are not going to go just to the United States; they'll go to Third World countries. So they will be competing with those nations, certainly.

Q Can you --

Q Excuse me. Is this consistent with the President's stated objective, doing nothing to injure the interests of the people of Taiwan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that Taiwan at this point are much more sophisticated in the level of their products and the quality of their products than the People's Republic, and I think they'll have that advantage. And it's up to them to keep that advantage. So I don't think that it's hurting Taiwan.

Q The press, the Chinese press, recently has been pointing out the dangers of corruption by the West, of Western ways, warning the young people against falling for these ways too much. Did you feel there that they have a problem in terms of rationalizing their ideology vis-a-vis these rather extraordinary steps that you're describing? What kind of a mix are we getting here?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, all they've got to do is go back to pure communism. Remember, Lenin tried this --

Q And he failed.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- with the Gulags back in the twenties, and that's where the famous statement came from, you know, "They'll sell us the rope." That obviously was an era in which he saw the revolution wasn't working and decided to turn. It was quite surprising to Western Europe and to the United States that he did change so. So they have precedent in communism for this. So I think that their changing this way is not an unusual thing in a communist nation.

Q That's what I wanted to ask you. You get from your own personal conversations with other people, other than the Prime Minister and Deng Xiaoping, that there's a continuity that is fairly established and built in now to the system on this movement to a free-market economy, or that this is kind of a, perhaps, a will-o-the-wisp?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, my own horseback analysis is this is ingrained in Chinese culture, this individual trading, this individual farming, this self-reliance type of thing, and they're marrying that to the state's objectives, and the state's objectives is to, in their own words, modernize China. And they have the four-modernizations program, as you know.

And how do they further this better? By keeping tight state controls or by letting the personal desire of the Chinese people, by giving a few incentives, to work harder? And I think they've decided on that latter course. I think that's Deng has really meant to them.

Q Are there any strictures in law or government custom that would put strictures on trade with China in terms of the human rights situation there? I'm thinking specifically of the Jackson Amendment, or something like that.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There may be, but I don't know of them. And no one has brought that to my attention from the legal side of Treasury or Commerce or STR, or any of the other agencies. When I went there, I took representatives of all these agencies along on the mission and no one raised that question as to whether or not --

Q They --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- human rights violations, or anything of that nature.

Q -- most favored nation status in terms of free immigration, and things like that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They would require that type of thing, but obviously that's a question you'd have to leave to State, and State has not -- we have people from State aboard, and they have not said that they are violating it.

Q You briefly mentioned textiles before and their desire to sell more, is that going to come up specifically at any part of this trip and if it's not --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q It will?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think so.

Q What are we going to do for them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we're going to have to explain to them what these calls mean and what quotas mean, that obviously any developing nation, one of the fastest and first ways that they can get foreign exchange is to go into the textiles business, whether it's in the Carribbean area, Central America, Latin America, Africa, you-name-it. China is no different than anyone else in this area.

They start with textiles, they expand, then, into more complicated products. We simply couldn't take everybody's textiles, as much as they want to sell those. We have to have them, whether it's for Costa Rica or for China, we have to have a quota system.

Q But is there any possibility that those quotas will be eased for them or built up in any way?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They have been. They have a nice portion now -- I think they've got about 9 percent of our market and I can check that figure, if you want to use it, and at the current moment I think they have to learn to be satisfied with that as our --

-- proves to be a winner in our market.

Q What you're saying, in effect, is the Chinese are really going

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to draw a blank in terms of economic help out of this particular mission of the President -- no loans, no help on textiles -- nothing that specific in terms of economic aid. Is that right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Except that the, to the extent that the President of the United States, through his leadership, the very fact that he's going there signals our business community that it's okay for them to go to China and try to work out deals.

Q Private okay, but government no?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's the main part. The government will be more on a technical assistance, and we're more than willing to talk to them, to help them -- pardon the expression but we've had some of them over to our IRS to see how it goes in collecting taxes -- we have (laughter) -- one of the things when you get to be a modern country.

We have also agreed to work with them on a pricing system, and have tried to work with them in terms of seminars and things of that nature as to how do you come about, in such an economy, to a pricing system. On the government level, it will be that kind of technical help rather than specific government-to-government financing.

Q Could you give us some sense of the magnitudes that we're talking about? My impression is that the Chinese-American economic diet is going to be relatively thin for a very, very long time. Is that wrong?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: At the current moment it's about $500 million of investment that we have made with them, in about 50 enterprises. We just doubled that in one when Occidental agreed to work with them on their coal mines. And there are about four or five of the largest of our oil companies trying to do an immense amount of exploring right offshore in the southern China Sea. If that hits, there will be enormous investments in oil over there. So it will depend on just how fast and how far we can go with them and working with them on natural resources. Obviously, if they sign the nuclear treaty and we're allowed to go in there with turnkey operations on nuclear plants, that would make an enormous difference as far as this trade is concerned.

Q Sir, is there any danger of this --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- Seabrook, and I said please.

Q Sir, I was wondering, that weird Manchu bond case, is that still standing in the way?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is still out there.

Q -- still out there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- It's still out there. They can't understand that one. That's another one they probably will take up with the President, but it'll -- it does baffle them. There is a case dating right back to days, practically of Sun Yat Sen. And this case went through the courts, it died out practically, all of a sudden it gets revived, and they get hit with it. Now the Nationalist Chinese were never hit with this case. It was only after the People's Republic came back that the case was revived.

Now down in Birmingham, they refused -- the court said that they had to appear to defend themselves. They refused. They said that's none of their business. That's something that happened way in the dim distant past and they weren't a party to the case. And they refused to go into court. Well, when you don't appear to defend yourself, obviously, the case went against them. I think on appeal all they have to do is to get any decent American law firm and they'll probably win the case. But so far they've stubbornly refused to do it saying it's none of their business.

And what they're saying to the President is why don't you quash that, why don't you get rid of it, you know, throw it out of the courts. They can't believe the President can't do that.

Q They're -- there could mean --

Q There are three parts to this government.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Or is there a fourth?

Q Aren't there laws -- I believe there are laws that prohibit the importing of products that are made by slave labor, are there not? I mean your own customs chief has tried to invoke this law against products made from the Soviet Union. So wouldn't those be laws that would restrict these products from Communist China?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We know of no products that we're importing from China that are made with slave labor. Now it depends upon your definition of what's a slave and what's -- and the labor.

Q What does the law say?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the law is very vague on this. As to whether or not someone who works in a state owned enterprise is actually a slave or not.

Q In your definition is there anyone in Communist China who is not a slave?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Who?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the Sun family. They're producing chickens, they like their own land, they don't want to leave their land, they're enjoying it --

Q Sounds like some of our slaves.

Q Exactly.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I mean there are people you can't get off the farm in Missouri.

Q It's the same thing -- they have chickens --

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

4:09 P.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Beijing, The People's Republic of China)

BACKGROUND BRIEFING BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS ON THE NUCLEAR ARMS AGREEMENT

April 26, 1984

The Grand Ballroom
The Great Wall Hotel
Beijing, The People's Republic of China

6:02 P.M. (L)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me just say a few words briefing, not embargoed on what the meetings will be tomorrow.

The President is meeting in the morning with Premier Zhao for 90 minutes. The agenda will be generally global and international issues. He then goes at 1:00 p.m. to give the speech in the Great Hall, excuse me, 1:30 p.m. There were some questions asked about the audience. The audience is selected by the Chinese. It consists of about 500 to 600 people basically from two different groups -- one, people who have been involved in the aspects of U.S.-Chinese cooperation directly related to China's modernization program. That includes people who've been involved in business and commerce, graduates of the Dalien Management Institute will be there and people of that type. There will also be a lot of America watchers, people from the various institutes that study Sino-U.S. relations and, I guess what you might call intellectuals of that variety.

The host of the event is Professor Zhou, as in Zhou Enlai, Z-h-o-u, Peiyuan, P-e-i-y-u-a-n. He is a graduate of -- or at least attended Cal Tech in 1925 and is one of China's most distinguished scientists.

I'll say a few words in a minute, on an embargoed basis, about the general themes of that speech. After that speech he goes for a second hour and a half meeting with Premier Zhao, 2:00 p.m., this one on bilateral issues. And that is followed at 3:45 p.m. by his meeting with Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang. We view this as another very important meeting. In fact, Secretary Hu does not ordinarily meet with foreign leaders. I think his one foreign trip has been his very successful trip last year to Japan.

The President -- while Hu has met with a number of private American visitors, the President will be the first American visiting official to meet with the General Secretary.

Now, embargoed, I guess, until 1:00 p.m. tomorrow just a few comments about the themes of the speech. It will be a wide-ranging speech which will be a very strongly positive statement about Sino-U.S. cooperation, about the desire of the United States to build a strong and lasting relationship with China, and about our interest in cooperating with China in China's ambitious modernization efforts.

It will discuss some, in general principles, the American approach to world affairs, its basis in the values that we cherish, and a characterization of the approach and its very fundamental emphasis on our desire for a peaceful world and our view that our interests are best served by a world of independent sovereign nations -- that we see no need

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to dominate others in order for us to prosper.

The bulk of the speech will be to talk about the goals of our relationship -- not only the goal of working together to produce a more peaceful world but also very extensively the President will discuss our trade and economic relations, the cooperation that is developing in that area, and our hopes for further expansion of that economic relationship.

Now, let me -- the President in that speech will also be announcing the agreement on nuclear cooperation. And I believe the official announcement will come tomorrow morning at 9:00. So, embargoed until that time the following explanation and any questions on the nuclear agreement itself.

Let me just begin by reading you a statement explaining the basic points of the nuclear agreement. And I believe this statement will be made available afterwards.

Q We'll get it? When?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: A few minutes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Shortly.

The agreement for cooperation concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy between the U.S. and the PRC has been under negotation since 1981. The first round of discussions was led by Assistant Secretary of State James Malone. Subsequent negotiations, five rounds of them, were handled by Ambassador Richard Kennedy, who negotiated with the Chinese team,

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headed by the Commissioner of the State Science and Technology Commission, Mr. Jia Weiwen.

The last rounds in these negotiations was held in Beijing from April 16th to 19th.

China has an ambitious program to install significant power by the year 2000. U.S. companies with this agreement will now have the opportunity to participate in an area that is a priority for China's modernization.

The agreement provides the legal framework for the sale of U.S. nuclear reactors, components, nuclear materials, and technology to the PRC. The agreement also provides for the exchange of information and technology in various aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle including cooperation in health, safety, and the environmental implications of the peaceful use of nuclear power.

The agreement also calls for exchanges of information, regular consultations, and visits. It does not provide for the transfer of any sensitive nuclear technology or facilities such as reprocessing or enrichment plants.

Q Could you repeat that, please?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It does not provide for the transfer of any sensitive nuclear technology or facilities such as reprocessing and enrichment plants.

The agreement is not a commitment to supply nuclear reactors and materials. Rather, it is a framework agreement that specifies the guarantees and controls under which supply may take place. The actual sale of reactors, components, and technologies is a commercial matter that would be negotiated between U.S. companies and the PRC.

Individual nuclear exports must be licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission after the agreement has gone into effect. The agreement contains the provisions which are required for agreements with nuclear weapons states under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act.

Among these requirements are guarantees by the cooperating partner that, first, no nuclear materials or equipment subject to the agreement will be used for any nuclear explosive device or for research on or development of any nuclear explosive device, or for any other military purpose.

The second requirement -- that no nuclear material or equipment subject to the agreement will be transferred beyond the jurisdiction or control of the cooperating party without the agreement of the United States.

The third requirement -- that adequate physical security will be maintained with respect to any nuclear materials subject to the agreement.

And a fourth requirement -- that no material subject to the agreement will be enriched, reprocessed, altered in form or content, or, in the case of weapons useable materials, stored without the prior agreement of the United States.

Before any such agreement may be signed, the Atomic Energy Act requires that the proposed agreement be submitted to the President by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Energy and be accompanied by the views and recommendations of those two Secretaries, of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The Director of ACDA will also provide the President a nuclear proliferation assessment statement.

The President then authorizes signature of the agreement. Once signed, it will be forwarded to the Congress where it must lie for 60 days of continuous session before it may enter into effect.

During the period of negotiations, China has joined the International Atomic Energy Agency and has clarified its nuclear export and non-proliferation policies. China has indicated that it will require IAEA safeguards on its nuclear exports.

During his January visit to Washington, Premier Zhao said -- and I quote him -- "We do not engage in nuclear proliferation ourselves nor do we help other countries develop nuclear weapons." These have been very welcome steps, and I might say that the long process of producing this agreement, I believe, has been a substantial advance for our goals of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and bringing China into cooperation with the international regime designed to achieve that goal.

I'd also, just in conclusion, like to say a word about the relation of this important achievement to the visit as a whole. As

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important as it is, it would be, I think, very wrong to think of this as the main purpose of the visit. In fact, it is one of 25 or 30 or quite possibly more, topics on our bilateral agenda which the President will be addressing. We believe that this visit, and, indeed, the visit of the Premier to Washington in January, will advance our relationship on most, or all, of those agenda topics. In this case the advance is a very significant one, and it's the advance, in effect, across the finish line.

I might emphasize, we've made a lot of progress also during the time of Zhao's visit, which we've built on here. But, the most important thing the President is here to do is not any one of these 25 or 30 or 35 things, or even the sum of them. I think the most important thing is, in fact, the kinds of broad messages that only a President can deliver, or at least only a President delivers convincingly -- messages about the importance we attach to this relationship, about our commitment to it, about the kinds of things that the United States will bring to the relationship, about what we hope to get out of it, and about essential sensitivities of ours that need to be respected if the relationship is to prosper.

I'll be glad to try to answer questions.

Q How did -- what brought about this agreement? I mean, how did they overcome the -- who gave what, and who gave in?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think, I've been talking to a number of you about this issue at least going back to January, and saying that the problem was we have requirements of law that have to be met, and have been met. The Chinese had concerns about those requirements in relation to their very strongly held feelings about sovereignty. I believe they, in part, have been persuaded that the provisions of our law which have now been met in eleven other agreements are acceptable to other countries that strongly value their sovereignty. I believe they are convinced by various provisions of the agreement that we will carry out those provisions in a spirit of simply assuring the peaceful purposes of the agreement. That we will not, for example, attempt to use this requirement for our agreement for commercial advantage, for example.

In other words, I believe that, what I've said all along was the key to the solution, was not the United States giving in, since we certainly couldn't give in; and I don't think China's given in. I think we have found a creative solution that fully meets the concerns of both sides.

Q Can you tell me whether this agreement specifically provides for nonproliferation by the Chinese? Does it specifically in writing permit the Chinese not to proliferate?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is not a requirement of our law, and that is not in the agreement. The Chinese commitment in that regard is the public statement of the Premier and other official policy statements that the Chinese have made. It is the case that continued cooperation would require continued adherence to that policy, Ralph.

Q Does the language in that point 4, on no reprocessing or enrichment without prior agreement of the U.S., is that the same language that is in comparable agreements with other countries? And, if not, where is the creative solution you just mentioned?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is the requirement that all of our post-1978 agreements have to meet. And we have eleven of those, and this, I guess, would become the twelfth.

Q Same language?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is the same language. This -- the requirement applies to all of them, and, I might emphasize, it is tighter than our -- the bulk of our cooperation agreements which were negotiated prior to 1978 and under the provisions of the '78 law will, in fact, have to be renegotiated which is a lengthy process that we're --

Q What provisions, if any, for on-site inspection are included in this agreement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The -- Let me first say that because China is a nuclear weapon state, there is no legal requirement for safeguards as a condition of nuclear supply. Nevertheless, there are provisions in the agreement for consultations, exchanges of information and visits to materiels, facilities, and components subject to the agreement in order to assure that the provisions of the agreement are effectively carried out.

The agreement also provides for exchanges of views and information on each other's national accounting and control systems

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and on each other's physical protection measures.

We believe that the frequent consultations, the exchanges of information and the visits to facilities and materials subject to the agreement provide us with the additional assurrances we need that U.S.-supplied material and facilities are being used for peaceful -- solely for peaceful purposes.

Q Did the administration in discussing this with the Chinese take any position or tell the Chinese what position it might take on other nuclear legislative proposals in Congress, such as that by Senator Proxmire --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'm not sure what may have been said in the course of negotiations; but our position on the Proxmire amendment is very clearly in opposition.

That is an amendment -- if you haven't noticed now -- by now, we have operated under very tight legal constraints in the negotation. And we operate under an additional series of procedural checks that I enumerated that we have to go through before the agreement is finally signed. And then we have a provision for congressional review.

The Proxmire Amendment would add a provision for positive action by both Houses of the U.S. Congress and we feel would make it far too difficult to undertake nuclear cooperation with any country.

Barry?

Q I realize it's not part of the agreement, but have the Chinese given you any indication as to the extent to which they plan to take advantage of this? How much are they planning to spend?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's definitely not been part of our discussions. We have sort of general information I think a lot of you have of a very ambitious Chinese nuclear power program -- 20,000 megawatts is what's being talked about and that's easily 10 to 12 very large reactors if the full program were instituted.

Of course, there's no reason at all to think that even if the program is that large that American contractors would win all of the contracts. But this is a framework agreement and, as I emphasized, the specific negotiations on specific deals are things that have to be worked out by the contractors, not by the U.S. government.

In the back?

Q Can I ask you a question, not about nuclear --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay.

Q -- stay on nuclear --

Q Let's finish nuclear -- please. Two points -- can either House of Congress during the 60 days veto it or do both Houses have to act against it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Both Houses have to act.

Q Second point, the prohibition against reprocessing ore enrichment, was that raised very late in the

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was not raised late in the process. It was raised early on. I would hope it wouldn't affect the ability of American companies to participate here.

I think one of the things that we never had an issue about is, for example, the handling of U.S. supplied fuels in U.S. reactors and for some very long time in the future that's how these reactors will run. So, I think the Chinese are interested in our technology. I believe they share our assessment that it's the best in the world and I think that's what our contractors have to offer.

Q Is it true that the French and perhaps one or two others do not make that a requirement -- that particular point?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's no question that ours are the tightest requirements of any country in the world.

Yes?

Q We were led to believe that this agreement might be subject to different varying interpretations and that that was the way that the Chinese could save face on the issue of sovereignty. Could you explain that? Is there a way that the Chinese can interpret this differently than the way we would or the way U.S. Congress would?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is no way to interpret this agreement other than meeting the requirement of law that I read to you. I believe there are important things in the agreement that also meet the Chinese concerns that those requirements not be used for purposes other than assuring the basic purpose of the agreement which is that this cooperation be peaceful -- that is, as I mentioned, that assurances that it will not be used for commercical advantage and other purposes.

Q Now may I --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Saul?

Q Wait -- I'm sorry, Saul.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let's take one or two more on the nuclear and then --

Yes, sir?

Q When was this agreement reached?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The final text that will be initialed were finally agreed today. The basic — the key substantive problems were solved when Ambassador Kennedy was here last week. But as is usually the case with a negotiation of that kind where you do a lot of work very quickly and you're dealing with two languages, you then have to go back and check text and check translations and argue over some last minute details.

Q Were there any such changes since then?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There

President or who approved it finally today?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I believe it was the Ambassador.

Yes, sir.

Q Is it fair to say that without the pressure of the trip, without the desire to have this initialed while he's here that perhaps agreement might not have been reached this early?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, let me first answer what may be the question behind the question, that somehow we compromised on our requirements because of this trip. That was not the case at all. As I think I made clear, we view this trip as something far more important, in fact, than this agreement and we view getting this agreement right and meeting our requirements is simply an unalterable condition.

I think there's also no question now, to answer what you did ask directly, that both the Premier's visit and this visit here have energized people in a way that they don't otherwise work and that we made -- we solved a lot of problems during the Premier's time in Washington. And I think that certainly everyone wanted to have something like this to show at this time. And all of our negotiators knew their work was going to be under a lot of scrutiny at this time. So I think that helped move the process.

One last one on nuclear.

Q Could you be a little more precise about the creative solution to the reprocessing problem? This was an impasse that's been resolved and I don't understand how.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think I've explained it. The language meets the requirements of our law. We have given the Chinese explanations that these requirements do not infringe on their sovereignty anymore than they infringe on the sovereignty of Canada or Australia or, for that matter, the United States of America that has accepted similar provisions in its law. And, in fact, there were some -- similar provisions -- excuse me -- in the agreements that we have signed. And there have been exchanges in the last few weeks clarifying what our other agreements provide, which I think have been important.

I think there's also been language to assure the Chinese that this will not be misused and that is the essence of it.

Now, I will take other questions as well. Saul.

Q There has been some suggestions by what we talked about here with the television and the reports on some of the greetings that Chinese reception has been cordial correct, perhaps. Could you characterize for us, please, from your background what kind of reception you think the President and his entourage have been getting so far?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I had too many things to go on. One is the sort of general provisions for the visit which have been extremely generous and extremely forth-

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coming. I know we have at least one last minute hitch here that is causing some peoblems for some of you, but I think the Chinese have really stretched themselves. And part of what we're encountering is sort of the straw that broke the camel's back phenemenon. You can't keep coming in with one more and one more. We have gotten an awful lot, and they're not used to accommodating a visit of this magnitude.

The other indicator that I have was the meeting with President Li today, which I think was a very good meeting. It was solid. It was substantive. It showed an appreciation on both sides of the value of this relationship. And also, I think, a realistic assessment of the fact that, while we have differences, or obstacles -- to use the Chinese favorite phrase -- that the way to deal with them is not by talking at one another through the media, but by talking to one another directly. So I take that, again, as very positive.

Q You did have another indicator -- which was the reception at the ceremony. And you can compare that with other receptions and with what you would expect. Larry said that it was a standard reception. Is that how you would describe it -- as standard?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: For a Head of State I believe so, but that's a fairly rare event around here. I doubt -- I haven't compared it in protocolary terms to previous heads of state.

Yes sir?

Q Neither President Nixon nor President Ford got this kind of welcome, though.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We did not have diplomatic -- this, for those of you who haven't picked it up yet, is the first visit by a President of the United States to the People's Republic of China, with whom we have diplomatic relations, and that makes all the difference in the world. And, of course, that makes it -- I hesitate to use the word historic, because that's the kind of hype we're not interested in, but it is an historic event.

Q What about the live coverage of the speech tomorrow?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I was never told it would be live, and I'm not aware of any commitment, but -- don't get me into that issue, please.

Lou?

MR. SPEAKES: Let's get Lou and -- you can do more if you --

Q You're statement that this other -- we've gotten a lot from them, and this was the straw that kind of broke the camel's back suggests that this proposal was just made for the -- for today, or yesterday. Is that the case? I mean, in other words, there is a confusion which you really can help on, I think, which is whether or not we were told that the Chinese were going to do certain things about television coverage that they never -- they never agreed to do, and then they were asked to do it here and never did it, or whether they agreed and reneged. And that gets in the way of the point you're trying to make.

MR. SPEAKES: Okay.

END 6:33 P.M. (L)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Beijing, The People's Republic of China)

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND PREMIER ZHAO

April 27, 1984

The Grand Ballroom
The Great Wall Hotel
/Beijing, The People's Republic of China/

4:54 P.M. (L)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it's easy to say that it was an exceptionally busy day and a very, very full agenda. We had an hour and a half meeting in the morning on international issues. We had the President giving a major address and we had another hour and a half on bilateral issues this afternoon. I think you could characterize the discussions as very business-like, very substantive. The Premier and the President did virtually all of the talking, except for occasional references. The Ministers -- they seemed to be men who were really comfortable with one another -- enjoy the give-and-take. I think if you just look at the list of topics that were discussed you get a picture of what I've been saying a number of times about the comprehensive nature of our relationship now and the very broad range of issues that we covered. The morning agenda included global foreign policy approaches, U.S.-Soviet relations SINO-Soviet relations, Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Korean Peninsula Central America, the Middle East, Southern Africa, problems of economic development in the Third World and arms control. In the afternoon we discussed general approaches to economic relations between our countries, specific problems of investment, technology transfer and export controls, general approaches of trade problems -- discussed problems about our grain agreement, discussed the subject of defense cooperation, we discussed the access of scholars -- the problems of U.S. scholars in China, discussed the subject of Taiwan, nuclear cooperation and what the Chinese refer to as U.S. discriminatory legislation. That made for a rather busy day. The poor interpretors at times were clearly overloaded as the principals would get stirred up and the discussion was lively at times.

Just to say a word about the speech, which I think was an important speech and I think people have asked how do you summarize it -- I found one very interesting way of summarizing it. Just go back and look at the seven applause lines -- the seven lines that got applause from that Chinese audience and you see a consistent theme about, and apparently a welcome theme, about the U.S. desire to cooperate with China, particularly in the areas of technology and economics and some of the specific initiatives that we have been able, right now, to make some specific progress on, such as the nuclear agreement and the more modest way the new MBA program at Dalien.

Q We can't hear you.

Q Can you adjust the microphones --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You can't hear me. Closer?

Q Lean in.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay, I'll lean in.

Q What was that on the nuclear agreement --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I said the nuclear
ment -- nuclear cooperation. We have the nuclear agreement.
ct, the discussion about nuclear cooperation now is moved on
e consideration of the question of possible EX-IM loans --
bank loans to support sales of U.S. nuclear reactors to China,

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and then after that I mentioned what the Chinese refer to as U.S. discriminatory legislation.

The morning meeting began with an extensive tour de raison by the President of the overall approach to international relations and then his approach to a number of specific issues and I didn't time it precisely, but it went on at least a half hour and the Premier with a lengthy presentation of his own and then they got into some discussion of specific areas-- some of agreement and others of disagreement. I think in general to characterize the tone of our discussions we see substantial and very imoprtant areas of agreement between it. And it's not a surprise, see differences on some international issues and of course on some bilateral ones, but I think the discussions today bear out very much the President's comments that first the areas we have in common -- the interests we have in common are far

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more important than our differences. and, secondly, that the best way to handle those differences is through direct dialogue and negotiation, not through indirect criticism of one another in public.

We -- Among the topics that I've listed I would note on the subject of U.S.-Soviet and Sino-Soviet relations, it -- the President -- now we have -- the President talked about the Soviet approach to arms control, the fact that they want others to make all the concessions, that we won't accept that approach and remain firm, but we are prepared to have a constructive relationship with the Soviet Union as the President has made clear both in public and in private.

The discussion of Kampuchea was quite extensive. This is a subject where we have extensive common interests and where China plays a very, very important role -- perhaps in historical terms an ironic role -- being a major factor restraining Vietnam and Vietnamese aggression against Thailand and Southeast Asia.

The President talked about our concerns that what we're seeking in Kampuchea is a political solution and not a political solution that leads to the restoration of Pol Pot whom we find abhorrent. And I think one could say in general there is agreement on both sides that the objective is not the return, not the installation of a particular faction in power in Kampuchea but the goal is a political solution that would be based on free elections in which the Kampuchean people could determine their own future -- free for --

Q Did the Chinese agree to that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that the Chinese, in fact, have agreed to that, going back to the International Conference on Kampuchea held at the UN in 1981, but I would just say sort of in terms of tone -- and I don't want to speak for them -- but I think in terms of tone we heard more of that kind of thing today on both sides than in some previous discussions.

On Central America, the President stressed our approach of a heavy emphasis on economic assistance and our understanding of the critical role that economic assistance plays in Central America, at the same time emphasizing that there is a military problem caused by the Soviet Union and that we are going to do what we need -- that we are going to do our best to see that the right triumphs in this struggle.

Q -- do what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That we are going to do our best to see that the right triumphs.

Q The right? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The right side triumphs in this struggle. (Laughter.)

Put an emphasis -- since you've noted that with your laughter -- he put considerable emphasis on the role we see of free elections in both Nicaragua and El Salvador and that we see one of the essential differences being a willingness to hold genuine free elections.

Q What did they say to that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll come to that in a minute. Well, let me -- Okay. I'll just say I don't -- and I will say this again -- I believe when you're backgrounded by the

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Chinese side, they say what they said and not what we said; it's not my business to characterize their comments in these meetings. It is a matter of public record that they have criticized our policy in Central America. They criticized our action in Grenada.

I would personally characterize that criticism as not being criticism of strategy or disagreement with the -- our basic concern about Soviet expansionism and what it can mean in our hemisphere and globally. I think that is a shared and common concern. There is a disagreement about tactics, and I think, unfortunately, when you have to act and when you have a responsibility to act as we do in Central America, we can't simply take a policy that will be popular and pleasing to everyone. That's somewhat the same thing I think, that comes up in the Middle East which is another area of discussion. And where again I see there's some disagreement, I think it's not a disagreement about basic goals and it's not a disagreement -- there is agreement that the Palestinian problem is an essential part of the picture there that needs a solution.

We did discuss the question of

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negotiations with the PLO and with Mr. Arafat, and the President made clear his view that as long as Mr. Arafat continues to boast of his role in bombings of innocent people, as he did not long ago, and deny the right of Israel to exist, that it is hard to take the view that someone should sit down at the table and negotiate with somebody who denies their basic right to even be there. That is a point of difference between us.

Q They want us to negotiate with the PLO?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Like many of our friends. That is correct.

On Southern Africa, again, although I would say in comparison to earlier periods, I think both of us have noted that there has been some positive movement both between Mozambique and South Africa, which we welcome; and also what seems to be some movement on the Namibia front, and the President affirmed our commitment to a political solution in Namibia based on U.N. Security Council Resolution #435, and he also expressed our desire to see a removal of Cuban forces from Angola and a restoration of Angolan independence.

There was a fairly extensive discussion of arms control and of the motives behind our deployments of missiles in Europe. The President underscored his determination to carry through on the commitment that was made in the last administration to those deployments, but also reiterated his willingness to have deproductions on those missiles and, indeed, his preference to see them eliminated entirely.

He affirmed that our approach to negotiations on intermediate range missiles will remain a global approach, that we are not going to seek an agreement that simply takes care of the interests of our friends in Europe at the expense of our interests in Asia and the interests of our Asian friends, particularly Japan and China, who are also threatened by these missiles.

On Korea, which was discussed, the President reiterated our belief that the best way to hold discussions to seek a possible reduction of tensions and a long-term solution to the hostility between north and south would be through direct talks between the two parties. That if other countries could play a useful role, that the United States would be prepared to join with the PRC, either directly in 4-way talks, or to assist from the sidelines. I think, again, it's not a revelation of a confidence, but a matter of public record that the Chinese position continues to be to support the North Korean tripartite proposal. Our view is, apart from this difference over the format or the shape of the table, which is an important difference, that also there are a number of very concrete measures that can be taken even in the absence of formal negotiation that could contribute considerably to reducing tension in the peninsula. These include proposals for such things as notifications of military maneuvers and other kinds of military confidence building measures, and they also include such things at a human and political level as provisions for reunification of families and exchange of mail. And, in fact, in that regard, both the U.S. and China -- and we have noted and welcomed China's role in this regard -- have facilitated contacts between families in North Korea and South Korea with relatives outside.

The afternoon's discussions had a heavy emphasis on the economic area. The longest single discussion, segment of discussion, was Premier Zhao's interesting exposition of China's modernization plans and goals and expectations. And also of his views of how China's economic development could very rapidly lead -- could lead to a rather rapid growth of trade between our two countries.

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On a few of the specific points that were discussed, as I mentioned one point that is important to us, is this question of access of scholars. We have a growing number of U.S. scholars studying in China. A number of them have made complaints to lack of access to materials, or to people they want to talk to for research purposes, and I would say, at least, the response from the Chinese side was an encouraging one -- that this is a problem they are looking into.

On the grain agreement, the President expressed his concern that China live up to the long-term grain agreement which is now in its final 5 years, and welcomed the assurances that we have received both on previous occasions and today, that China would do so.

The subject of Taiwan was, of course, an important subject. I don't know that one can measure it in terms of time. And the Chinese concern, expressed on two points -- and let me, I think there's some confusion on this first one -- on the general subject of, what they characterized as efforts by some to upgrade relations, and also specific acts or resolutions in Congress -- the resolution in question is the Pell resolution. It's not a resolution calling for upgrading our relations with Taiwan, but it is a resolution that is widely seen as calling for a particular outcome to the Taiwan issue, and particularly to appear to be calling for Taiwan independence as the outcome. Our position as a government, and the President has reiterated it, is that it's not our business to resolve that issue. It's an issue for the Chinese, themselves, to resolve. Our only concern is that that resolution be a peaceful one. And on that basis, in fact, we have opposed the Pell resolution.

Q What does the Pell resolution call for?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't have the exact text, but it, among other things, calls for a resolution of the Taiwan issue in accordance with U.S. law; and I think you might understand why that's a sore point in this country here. And it is seen in the kinds of code words that get used as an encouragement to the Taiwan independence movement, which is a particular outcome of that issue.

The question of upgrading relations, which the Chinese raised, is not, as far as I'm aware, the subject of any resolutions in Congress. I think it represents a continued anxiety on their part, and that's what underlies quite a bit of this discussion, over the question of the U.S. living up to past commitments. The President has made clear, and made clear again today, that our relations with Taiwan are unofficial and will remain unofficial, and under the relevant U.S. law, in fact, are treated as unofficial.

There were also concerns expressed on the matter of arms sales. Again, I think as much as anything -- and, I'm in danger here of characterizing them -- certainly one of the concerns is that we, in fact, live up to the commitments that we've made. There's no question they would also like to see us go beyond it. And, after all, the Arms Sales Communique is one that bridges the difference between our position and the Chinese position that we ought not to be selling any arms at all. We are living up to the Communique, and we will live up to the Communique, and the President confirmed that.

The -- on the subject of technology transfer and export controls and, again, a comment that I would make that would characterized most of our discussions, is that where there were criticisms -- and this is an area where, despite where I would say is enormous progress, the Chinese do have criticisms -- the criticisms are not in a spirit of questioning U.S. good faith, but rather calling attention to problems and looking, and asking us

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to look for solutions to those problems and that is a much more hopeful and constructive way of going about it. We had made substantial progress and the President sighted some of the statistics that point to that, just in terms of numbers of cases of license approvals of high technology items to China. We've grown from roughly -- the level of roughly 1500 cases in 1981 to roughly 3300 in 1983 and nearly 1200 in just the first quarter alone in 1984 and if you extrapolated that out it would get you up to 4800 on an annual basis. In fact, we expect even further growth and the Department of Commerce projects, perhaps as much as a total of $2.8 billion of high-tech exports to China during 1984.

There are problems that arise still. That's true in the case of the administration of our export controls to virtually every country I know of. It can be at times a more time consuming process than we like and that's something we had substantially reduced and will work to reduce further and in the case of China, of course, there's the specific difficulty of COCOM, but that is one where we feel working with our COCOM partners that we have produced very good results and that in fact COCOM approvals are up substantially also.

That is basically the high points of what we discussed today. Oh, defense cooperation -- I can -- here's one I haven't mentioned. I think both sides welcome the progress that has been made in the technical discussions that have been held over the last few months since Secretary Weinberger's visit. This is an important area to both of us. We, sharing China's concern about the Soviet Union, would obviously like to cooperate with China on those defensive weapons that could assist her in resisting Soviet intimidation or Soviet aggression. It is, however, a very difficult area. It's not only highly technical, it's also one where both sides have considerable concerns that need to be taken into account and where our friends and allies in Asia have concerns. So we are proceeding carefully and methodically, but in a very positive way, I believe.

Q Is it your anticipation that some kind of an arms sale agreement will be concluded in June when the Minister comes to Washington?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would not anticipate an arms sales agreement. I think we're talking about trying to clear the way, assist the Chinese to make contact with those contractors who can sell them equipment that would be approved. It will be a matter of case-by-case approvals as we have said and I don't know when to anticipate them, but I don't think -- they were talking about a broad agreement. Yes, sir?

Q Would you anticipate that these conversations today have accelerated the arms sale process to China -- that because of this talk today, we're more likely -- arms to China than we otherwise would of?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I'd characterize the discussions today as taking note of some positive progress that we've seen in recent months and it's clear that both sides welcome that progress.

Q On the Korean negotiation question, can we assume that that basically is unchanged -- the Chinese continue to recommend tripartite U.S. - North Korea-South Korea -- we're not interested in that -- and our come back is four-way talks and essentially that has not changed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, if you're looking for sort of movement toward a dramatic breakthrough of the two sides sitting down and negotiating in some sort of format, I think I would say at the moment is unchanged. This, however. is also a problem -- having been with us for a very long time is likely to be solved,

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I think, in a very slow and patient way. And so, there has been change -- I think, change in other areas particularly, for example, the participation of the South Korean Davis Cup Team here in China at Kunming not long ago which was a kind of a first. It's just one of many small changes that are taking place that I think are contributing to a reduction of tension. More, in this case, in the area of some improvement of contacts between China and South Korea. But insofar as your question is pointed at the issue of format of talks, I'd say the positions remain the same.

Q Did the Chinese indicate that --

Q What was their response on the grain -- what was their response on the President's reference to their living up to the grain agreement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we had received assurances, and we received them again today, that they will live up to it and those are welcome assurances.

Q Did the Chinese indicate that their unofficial contact with the South Koreans will continue?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That wasn't discussed specifically today.

Q We were told by the Chinese that Zhao was very outspoken in his criticism of our Central America policy. They opposed our military use and they wanted us to rely more on Contadora. I gather from what you say that the President was just as adamant in defending his position. Was there any give on either side on Central America?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well --

Q Repeat the question.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question was whether there was any give on either side on Central America, and I was told that Premier Zhao had characterized his position as adamantly opposed to our use of military means --

Q They said that they can't support some of the practices of the United States in the region and they feel that the big powers ought to get out of there and leave it to Contadora.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, as I have said, they have also, in the past in public, said that we should have left Grenada alone and not done what we had done. I think the President's view on that and our view on that is very clear, and our view on the need to have a military component in our Central American policy in view of what the Soviets are doing is also very clear.

I don't -- I think it's our general feeling -- and I'm not just speaking about the Chinese now. I'm speaking about many other countries including many of our closest allies -- that it's sort of the popular thing to be against military means and if you don't actually have to take an action, then you don't have to come out in support of them. But, as I say, what I think was the case in our discussions which was a common recognition of the fact that there is a Soviet problem including in Central America and that problem needs to be dealt with.

Q My question was, did the discussion on Central America produce even the slightest change in either man?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the President didn't change his position, no.

Q Did the President say --

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Q Your answer to Lou on arms control seems to suggest that there was absolutely no movement off of the status quo on possible arms sales and defensive cooperation. Two questions on that. How long -- how much time in the discussion was taken up on talking about arms sales and defensive cooperation, and did the President give any indication on whether or not he thought in the future there could be such arms sales?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, let me repeat again, he -- they both noted that there had been progress. I am not saying that there is no change in the status quo, but I was asked the question whether the status quo had changed as a result of these discussions. It is changing slowly as the result of technical discussions that have been taking place and will continue in May, and I'd say they talked for a few minutes and took note of that. So, obviously, both of them endorsed that trend, but they were not, in fact, trying to specifically move the discussions forward.

Rick?

Q Two or three questions. You said at the outset that there were several rather lively moments in the discussion where the translators fell behind or had trouble keeping up with the pace of it. Can you give us a sense of which particular issues were that lively? Secondly, did the President push the Chinese at all on the issue of joining in international arms control efforts more, as we have been led to believe he might in the advance? And thirdly, did the Chinese at all refer to the Soviets as the main threat to their security, as they have occasionally in the past and sometimes not done?

Q What's the first part of the question?

Q What's the first and last part?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All right, the first question was, what were some of the lively moments in the discussion? I think clearly, one was where we got into the question of arms control and the question of our deployments in Europe and what lay behind them, what our purposes were. And I think -- let me check here a few other points.

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Q It was a shouting match?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it was not a shouting match. I wouldn't characterize anything of what I heard today as a shouting match at all. In fact, I think, that point on tone is, to me, important. I think even where there are criticisms or problems identified and even on the sensitive issue of Taiwan, it was not a shouting match. And I think there was a growing belief on both sides that the other side believes in the importance of this relationship and in working to maintain it. And that, to me, is the important message of where we are.

Q The discussions were lively?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The discussion of Kampuchea, the discussion of --

Q Central America?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: A little bit. I think, as you might imagine, the President feels strongly on the correctness of what he's doing there and -- on the fact that there is a problem caused in part and if I can repeat what I said earlier -- he made it clear, for example, in pointing out that three-quarters of our assistance is economic assistance that we understand the huge economic dimension of the problem, but there is a military dimension and that dimension is the flow of arms into the region is something that requires U.S. action.

Q Did they get into the specific issue of aid to the Nicaraguan Contras and the mining of the harbor? Did that come up at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That was mentioned by the Chinese side as an example of the kind of thing they would criticize.

Q A couple questions -- first of all, did the subject of Afghanistan and the new Soviet offensive come up? Secondly, did the President, at any point, suggest to the Chinese that their view of our policy in Central America is not entirely consistent with their policy in Afghanistan or Kampuchea? And third, did the subject of Chinese arms sales to Iran come up?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Chinese arms sales to Iran did not come up. The discussion of Afghanistan was relatively short because, in fact, I think we see virtually eye-to-eye on that issue. We are concerned, in fact, although we didn't discuss it today, with the substantial Soviet buildup on the border of Afghanistan and the use for the first time of heavy bombers and offenses against the guerrillas in Afghanistan.

Q What kind of bombs?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Heavy bombers.

Q What do they say about that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's a concern we have, I'm saying. That was in the question but it was not discussed today, specifically.

And the second part of your question, John?

Q No, it was -- you said Iran didn't come up?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Did not come up.

Q Okay. Did -- the other part of it was whether the President suggested to them that they were essentially doing in Afghanistan and Kampuchea what they say we should not be doing in Nicaragua?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, he didn't. Some junior officials have made that point on occasion. The President didn't today.

Q Did the Chinese at any point say specifically that they considered the Soviet Union the greater threat? How did they phrase that, if indeed they did?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Now you're asking me to characterize their position and I just don't want to do that. Let me say what ought to be absolutely clear, and I think it's one of the fundamental and very solid basis on which this relationship rests -- it is the fact that there are 50 plus Soviet divisions on China's borders and there are no American divisions nor will there ever be. That's the fundamentally different situation and I think while the Chinese are pursuing discussions with the Soviets and are seeking to somewhat reduce the level of tension between them and expand some of their other trade and other contacts -- that as long as the Soviets maintain this substantial threat on China's northern border and through their actions in Afghanistan and Indochina -- represent a threat, in effect, of encirclement from the South, I think that is going to be a fundamental factor affecting the Chinese view -- not only the Soviet Union, but also therefore of us.

Q Did they say that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATIONOFFICIAL: If you want to know what they said today you'll have to ask them. I'm sorry.

Q Judging by what they told us this morning, they did not say anything about -- you seem to be

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suggesting that they consider the Soviet Union the far greater threat, and this has been a theme of the discussions. There's nothing in the Chinese briefing this morning that suggests that they said that. That's why I'm trying to get a clarification.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sometimes people have concerns and they don't state them, but I think the concerns are there, and they affect our policy.

Yes sir?

Q Was there a discussion, mention, of the the SS-20s, of the Soviet Pacific fleet, of Camaron Bay -- were those topics mentioned?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On the SS-20s -- oh, I'm asked to announce that Pool #11 should form now for departure. Yes, there was discussion of SS-20s. I think we are in substantial agreement on the threat posed by the SS-20, not only to Europe, but also to Asia. And I think the Chinese would like as much, or perhaps more than we, to see them eliminated.

Q Could I back you up to the military sales again? Could you characterize the U.S. position? Are we willing -- is the President willing to see things like anti-tank missiles, anti-aircraft missiles to China?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He has made clear, repeatedly, that we will -- we are willing to sell, on a case-by-case basis, defensive items to China. Anti-tank missiles are a prime example of the kind of thing we are actively considering, and would certainly be interested in. And the President, as I said, made clear that, given our common concerns about the Soviet Union that certainly, it's in our interest to cooperate with China in dealing with that. Let me just say, on these questions here, the point is that China puts an enormous value on the independence of its foreign policy -- on its nonalignment -- on not being an ally of the United States or lined up with us against the Soviet Union. So that affects the way they talk, particularly the way they talk in public. I think if you look at the way they act, look at the role they're playing in Indochina, for example, I think you see that they are very concerned and very interested in working -- at least in many concrete cases -- in working with us. That doesn't mean, as you can see in Central America, it's not everywhere; but I'd say the areas of concern are -- and of common approach -- are substantially more important than the differences which often are in the area of rhetoric.

Yes sir?

Q Without asking you to prejudge what's going to happen tomorrow, how will the discussions with Deng differ in substance from the meetings today with Zhao?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it's always an interesting thing to try to read it afterwards. I think, given the breadth of the agenda, it's not awfully likely that they'll pick up something that is totally new. And, in fact, the Premier did remark at the end of this morning's meeting that he imagined Chairman Deng would want to discuss some of those international issues in more detail with the President. Based on past meetings with Deng, I would say often discussions with him are more to the point. Even if the basic position isn't a surprise, there's some particular twist, or some particular formulation that is not quite what you expected. But, I would think, that the basic policy lines that we would see tomorrow with Chairman Deng would be, essentially, the same that we've seen today. And, I would say that there were no surprises in what we heard today, which is a good thing, and

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which, I think, characterizes a relationship where we have been dealing with one another across the board on these issues intensively in a way that I think we understand one another's positions fairly well.

Yes?

Q There was some speculation last fall, when the President came, or went to Japan and Korea, that Indonesia, Tailand, and the Philippines were cut out of the trip -- that at least the Philippines might be included when the President came to China now. Why did the President not go to the Philippines this time around? And are there any plans to reschedule that trip later on?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is a fairly long trip as it is, and it's a busy season. And that was the decision. The President said that he wants to reschedule that trip to Southeast Asia, whatever specific itinerary, and I would hope he is around to do that.

I think I'm missing this side. Yes?

Q Can you give us a little more detailed description of what the President said when Zhao brought up the mining of the harbors in Nicaragua?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, he pointed out that no one has been killed by these mines, and that they are aimed at interdicting the flow of weapons into Nicaragua -- weapons that are fueling a war in El Salvador, in Nicaragua's neighbor. Those, I think, were the essential points that he made.

Q Did Zhao seem, in any way, appeased by that?

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Did he seem to say, "Well, that makes sense," or anything --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He didn't say so. I think sometimes in discussions like this one makes a point by conveying a sense that you know what you're doing, that you're serious about it. And you're not necessarily looking for agreement. You're looking for respect and understanding of what you're about. And that's sometimes very important.

Yes?

Q Was there any talk about Chinese astronauts going up in a space shuttle and did President Reagan give Premier Zhao a letter from Senator Richard Lugar asking the Chinese to allow a Chinese man to marry an American scholar that was expelled from here a couple of years ago?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On the first question, I think you heard the President in his speech today mention that we will be exploring with the Chinese the possibility of space cooperation. We have discussed that subject at a working level starting only a few weeks ago and it has not come up in the meetings with the Premier.

The question of the letter that you mentioned we have with us but it hasn't been delivered yet.

Yes?

Q In his half hour exposition, did the President work from notes, cards, memory or what and did the subject of Mao guerrilla movements, etcetera in South America take place at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You said the Maoist guerilla movements --

Q Yes --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it didn't and I think if they're Maoist, they're Maoist only in a sense of sort of self-identification, not in the sense of any links with China.

The general style -- I think both of them had some notes in front of them. There was a good deal of spontaneity and particularly when they got into the specific exchanges over responding to the points the other had made. It was -- it seemed to be entirely without notes.

Q Since there's so much agreement on the question of Kampuchea, what was it about those talks that took up so much time? And what specifically provoked the moments of animated conversation you mentioned?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'd have to go through my notes and check on the animation. I think the point -- sometimes it's important to discuss areas that you do agree on. The concern about Pol Pot is in fact a point that isn't completely in agreement and yet it was welcome to us that the Chinese seemed to understand the need for a political solution that leads to free elections and not to the return of Pol Pot to power. And there was also some interesting discussion from the Chinese side about Nguyen Co Thach's recent trip with some of his recent initiatives which I think it would be not improper to say they consider rather hollow.

Q Did the President at any point make a proposal for greater strategic cooperation between the U.S. and China

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directly? Did he ever state that that was his goal?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He certainly didn't state that that was his goal and I -- I'm tempted to say that that is not our goal. We have a great deal of cooperation with China over matters that are strategic -- of strategic importance and when other areas of cooperation, new ones develop we -- one of the important benefits of this relationship is the ability to expand it. But the sort of suggestion that we're seeking a more formal relationship or we're unsatisfied with the degree of cooperation we have now would be wrong. I think, in fact, we have wrongly in the past at times or at least some Americans have had in mind making China an ally which I think would -- is not in our interest and certainly the Chinese don't want it. And as I've said, it's very important to them to -- they have said and said again today that China views its position as a nation of the developing world and the non-aligned world as critical to its foreign policy.

Q On the question of intermediate nuclear forces, was the discussion animated because China felt that the U.S. should be doing more to get the dialogue going or was it animated because China felt the U.S. should stop the deployment or remove the missiles that are already there or what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it was -- I think on the question of the negotiations themselves, certainly I didn't hear any criticism of our position or any suggestion that we're the party that's not willing to negotiate. It's very clear it's the Soviet Union that's not willing to negotiate and it's the Soviet Union that is staying away from the negotiating table and the President made that point and it was not disagreed with.

There was some discussion on the question of whether our deployments in Europe are leading to reactions from the Soviets and I think the President's point, and it's a point he feels strongly about, is that it is necessary for us to deploy missiles as long as the Soviets are continuing with their much earlier and much bigger and continuing buildup of their own but that we have been very serious in the proposals that we've put forward and that we have -- I'm going to have to break off in about two or three more.

Q -- the point extended to U.S. deployments of cruise missiles in the Pacific or any of American deployments in the Pacific, that it is in fact provoking the Soviets to respond?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it was only in the context of Europe.

Q A follow up. Was the President in a position where he had to respond to a suggestion that he adopt -- respond to the Soviet proposal that the United States withdraw the missiles in order to get the talks underway? Was that the point of the Chinese position?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, no, not at all. I don't think that was it at all. The President said, and I think I quoted him in going through it, that the Soviet Union wants others to make all the concessions and we're not going to do that. And I don't think they were saying we should make concessions to get the talks going. I think they were expressing a kind of generalized anxiety about the buildup of weapons on both sides. And the President was quite vigorous in saying that while we have to maintain our side of the balance that we are not the problem and that we are ready to reduce and we're ready, indeed, to eliminate these missiles.

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I can take about two more and am I missing some part of the room?

Q On the INF, the Chinese told us that Zhao proposed to Reagan that we stop deployment which then could get the Soviets to stop counter-deployment and then go to negotiation. The impression was that the Chinese are saying we've got the order reversed that you start with a halt to deployment, then go to negotiations. Is that what produced the rejoinder from Reagan that he wants, first, negotiations and then settle the deployment question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know what the Premier said in his public remarks. They may have been more pointed. He talked about in sort of terms of action and reaction. But I think even he understood clearly that it was the Soviets who were the initial source of this problem and that our counter-deployments were necessary. Obviously, I think he'd like to see us both doing this.

One last one.

Q One of your colleagues earlier today characterized the morning sessions with the Prime Minister as extraordinary -- extraordinarily positive, good. He used very enthusiastic language. Your language is much more subdued. Now, is that just a difference between -- is that a semantic difference or was the afternoon session less positive and less --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I guess I consider it very, very good when it's businesslike and businesslike means not ignoring your differences but talking about them. But I would say it's pretty positive when you come away with a conviction that the things you have in common are far more important than the differences and the differences, while perhaps more interesting are relatively less important.

Thank you.

END 5:41 P.M. (L)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Beijing, The People's Republic of China)

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH DENG XIAOPING

April 28, 1984

The Grand Ballroom
The Great Wall Hotel
Beijing, The People's Republic of China

6:05 P.M. (L)

Q Can we ask why the interview is going to be broadcast two hours later than we thought it was going to be?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not expert on it. I understand that -- I overheard in the Chinese Foreign Ministry today that they have little problems and just -- the translation and programming, getting the, for them, mountain of material -- they say they have to get in shape done. I'm told also, though, that this happens to be the peak, still viewing hour in China. It's prime time.

Q Did you have any conversations with them today in which they said whether or not they're going to broadcast it in full?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have not.

Q Is it your understanding that they would?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I honestly don't know. You'll have to ask my colleagues about that.

I was going to cover the Deng meeting here and try to be brief.

I wanted to say at the outset, coming over here in the car, I'm very conscious of what is a very, I'm sure, frustrating professional problem for you all. At the same time when the folks in the policy community and others have this kind of self-satisfied glow and walking around with these kind of happy smiles on their face, they're -- I can well understand when your own feelings are quite the contrary. That's not something that I guess we're supposed to worry about. It's -- But it seemed to me that --

Q We don't know what you're talking about.

Q What are you talking about?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm about to tell you.

The situation is that at a time when what is happening is a change in the quality of a relationship, that's not terribly newsworthy in terms of anything sensational happening. It's kind of like watching the grass grow. But historically whenever terribly important changes occur in the relationships between great powers it is seldom very newsworthy in the sense of there being a splashy event.

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What do I mean by that? Well, faced with some rather stark demographic, security, social problems, the Chinese leadership in the past year have made some rather fundamental decisions. And this is a decision that deals not only with the U.S. relationship, but far more broadly with their dealings with people beyond China.

They basically are expressed in an intention to undertake an historic modernization program for China that will lead it to a very active commerical, cultural, educational communications discourse with countries around the world, to include the United States.

The modernization program will focus upon industry, upon agriculture, upon science, technology, upon military accounts. In short, there is the beginning here of a period in which China's relationship with the rest of the world will be much more active, visible, commerically significant. And I think, too, that for me and for others in the policy community what it also means is that there has been a conscious decision to accept certain realities about the relationship of the United States and other countries. And, in short,

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to take those issues which have made that relationship a very volatile one for the past twelve years, and accept certain unchanging realities of this relationship, tried to ameliorate others, but in short, as I said when I began, when the volatility of the relationship is removed, the relationship becomes, I suppose, in a new sense much more boring and in a policy sense profoundly important.

With regard to the Deng meeting today, the meeting was opened by the President with a 45 minute presentation --

Q Shhhh

Q Quiet.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- that focused upon the global situation when he took office and the five policy principles on which he based his response to that situation. He stressed, in his judgment, the need to restore U.S. economic health at home, to restore the military foundation of deterrence, to undertake a determined effort towards arms reductions, to restore the strength of our relations with allies, and finally to adopt a new relationship with developing countries. And that led, in turn, to a region-by-region analysis by the President of the situation in Central America, Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and East Asia. The President expressed his view that the future for the United States lies in the Pacific Basin; that he personally had always thought of the United States as a Pacific country; that in seeking to build a stable relationship among all the countries of Asia and a prosperous process of economic development, the United States would enter that process as a partner, always acting through peaceful means and in concert with its friends and allies.

He expressed his pleasure at the improvement in Sino-Japanese relations, and reaffirmed his strong, personal support for Prime Minister Nakasone's leadership in Japan. He always said that he valued any improvements that could be realized in Sino-Soviet relationships to the extent that a reduction in tensions there would imply a more stable peace in the region as a whole.

The President stated that we seek strong, commercial relationships with Asian countries, and we seek a strong community of nations on the Eastern end of the Soviet Union, just as we seek a strong, stable community of nations on the Western end of the Soviet Union to assure stable deterrence.

The President came back to arms control and went through, again, the importance he places on it, the difficulties that we've had, and his reasons for why these difficulties have existed. He went into a detailed treatment of the INF part of arms control and made clear that our approach is global and will remain global; that the United States will not accept an outcome in which the threat is simply transferred to Asia.

The President had several more topics on his agenda. At that point he stopped and invited Chairman Deng to respond. This was at the end of about 45 minutes, and Chairman Deng held the floor for approximately 30 minutes after that point.

He opened by saying that the Chinese leadership had set its course for the remainder of this century and into the 21st century. This course would be a course devoted entirely to the maintenance of world peace

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and fostering peaceful development of China. He expressed the view that although the world situation is changing rapidly, the prospects for peace are good. He stated that those forces that are given to contributing to effective deterrents are increasing -- that the overwhelming number of people in the world want peace -- that in this context there is much the United States can do -- that China has no objection to the steps the United States has taken to increase its strength -- that China has supported that policy for years and believes it has helped contribute to stable deterrents.

The Chairman went on to discuss the situation as he saw it in Korea. He expressed the -- summarized the state of the relationship between China and the Soviet Union. He touched upon the high importance that China places upon obtaining technology from the United States -- stated that he was reasonably satisfied with the pace of technology purchased thus far. He thought it could be better and hoped that it would get better.

The Chairman, as well, expressed his view that an obstacle remaining on the agenda to the completion of improved relations with the United States was Taiwan. He expressed his view on more than one alternative outcome that could play out in the years ahead. He moved from there to the situation in Hong Kong. Expressed his optimism that this was a situation that could be resolved in the not too distant future. He expressed the sense that resolution of this problem could provide a model for the resolution of other problems. He stated that he believed that the United States must not assert that it is helpless or not in a position to contribute to the resolution of these problems and that it could surely do so. He then came back to China's internal development -- stated that U.S. cooperation in China's internal development is very much in the United State's interest. He said again that there are problems still and he hoped that the pace and quality of technology flows to China could be improved, although again stressing that he was reasonably satisfied at the moment.

He mentioned the problem represented by LDC debt. He hoped that the United States could continue its constructive role in the resolution of these problems. He stated, finally, that he hoped that the leaders of the two governments would continue to visit more often, more frequently, and in other sectors so that the relationship could be broadened, expanded and mutual understanding improved.

The President responded to these several points accepting, first of all, the need to have frequent exchanges. That the United States had no wish for hegemony. He went over our several opportunities for seeking hegemony when we had a monopoly of strength in the world -- that we did not then, that we shall not now.

He went over our 19 separate efforts at arms reduction and made clear that we will continue to try, but that we have had little response from the Soviet Union in recent times.

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Talked for some length about the Middle East and what the United States' policies are in seeking, on the one hand peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors, as well as assuring effective deterrents in the broader Iran-Iraq context than in the Persian Gulf. He adverted again to South Africa and the situation there and our hopes that we could continue to make progress and touched finally again on North-South issues and the confidence that the President had that a more active trading relationship could go far toward ~~improving~~ developing country situations, as well as private investment from the United States. The meeting broke for lunch then and the lunch conversation was entirely social and not policy oriented.

I'll be glad to take your questions.

Q You said at the very beginning that China has now accepted certain realities about the U.S. What are those realities?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, they span the agenda -- on the one hand, that the Congress as an institution has certain prerogatives that the Executive Branch is not entirely autonomous -- that their expectations that the United States could -- that the President of the United States could simply, by fiat, fulfill pledges -- isn't so. That expectations with regard to repeal or alteration of the Taiwan relations act are not an Executive Branch function -- that the probabilities of change are not high -- that, at the same time the basis for the resolution of the Taiwan question in SINO-U.S. relations as reflected in the three communiques was a valid basis for the resolution of that problem and needed no further expansion. Yes?

Q You quoted the President earlier as saying he will value an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. Could you expand on that? Can you expand on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He didn't. It was only a matter of two or three sentences about as I stated it -- just a summary that way.

Q You mentioned that the Chairman had said something about the resolution of the problem in Hong Kong perhaps being a model. Was he suggesting that however they work it out with the British in Hong Kong could be a model for resolving the Taiwan crisis?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: His comment was, apparently, rhetorical, although he said it just as I said it. He did not say it could be a model for Taiwan nor South Korea or anything else. He simply said, rhetorically -- that it could be a model.

Q Did you all read it that way?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICLA: Well, I wouldn't comment on that. Steve?

Q Can you amplify what you quoted the Chairman saying about observing that the forces of deterrents have been increasing and that China has no objections to these steps to increase strength, I assume by the United States? How did you and how does the United States view his -- the nature of his description? Did it sound like this was particularly approving of the United States military buildup in the region and the United States behavior in this particular area? Does it, in your judgment, slip over into other regional areas where they are perhaps a little more critical of the United States military force?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's a very good point. The answer is that today he said what I said that he said. He didn't say anything else that was -- diminished it. But I have to say that our meetings collectively here -- there have been expressions of disagreement over the U.S. policies in several regions of the world. The common thread running through those criticisms seems to me to have been that not so much

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what the effect of our policy has been on events in the area, so much as the risk that some of our policies may have led to lessened cohesion among our friends and presenting an opportunity for third countries to drive wedges between us. And, to that extent, if our policies lead to that lessened cohesion, they think that's bad.

Q Did the President do anything to assure them that there is still cohesion?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President talked, for example, about the situation in Europe and the expectations for events there in the coming year and expressed his confidence that the alliance would hold together and could weather the political difficulties we're going to have to cope with.

Saul.

Q -- you mentioned that the Chairman mentioned some alternatives about solving the Taiwan problem. Could you tell us what they are? Let me just say that the Chinese at their briefing quoted the Chairman as suggesting a Hong Kong-like solution. Did he specifically say that and what other alternatives did he talk about?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, when it comes to prescribing solutions to the Taiwan question, I would not intrude in that domain. I'd leave the Chinese to characterize that myself and I wouldn't comment on that.

Q Let me ask you this, were these solutions posed during the conversation as an incentive for the United States to more sharply reduce arms sales to Taiwan? Or they take other measures to -- that the Chinese would like us to take pursuant to three communiques?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The issue was cast in, really, discursive fasion in which he said that a principle -- the principal obstacle to complete normalization is Taiwan, that there can be many solutions. And he went over some notional outcomes, that the United States could play a useful role in that. And then he went on to other areas. But there was not a -- Well, that was the extent of it.

Q He didn't say what the useful role might be?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think it's possible, and here I don't know, but it -- he may have been reacting to earlier meetings in which the President's position has been the Taiwan question is one for the Chinese to resolve, that the United States will not pressure either side, that we will not become a broker. Now, if that is the point he was picking up on, it's possible.

Yes, Chris.

Q Two questions: One, I don't really have a sense at this point as to how critical he was of U.S. policy in Taiwan. Can you help us a little in terms of how critical and how harsh he was on that?

And, secondly, was there any movement on Korea from the set positions of the U.S. and China?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The position -- the remarks on both sides devoted to Taiwan seemed to me in keeping with and at the same level of conviction as have taken place with others in this meeting and with Premier Zhao in January, that there was no new ascerbity or point of friction raised by either side and it is clear that this remains a point of strong disagreement. But I would not say that it was expanded or worsened in this visit.

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Jerry.

Q Well, can you -- the second question about Korea and whether there's been any movement on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The position of both sides was pretty much as we have both stated it many times. It has come up again

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in other meetings that I've had this afternoon, but it did not come up in the Deng meeting in any -- we did not advance the problem toward four power, three power, two and a half power or anything else.

Jerry?

Q It seems to me that leaders and spokesmen, statements from both parties, are sort of designed for long consumption because they -- they impress me as having quite differing content, or at least tone. For example, if we only read the American statements, we would conclude that the United States and China are going to walk hand-in-hand together to cooperate against those that commit aggression and invade other countries like Afghanistan and Kampuchea -- to wit, the Soviet Union -- and, if we read the Chinese statements, the Chinese are talking no such way. The Chinese are talking about they hope we'll settle things down with the Russians, and they hope that they will, but their commitment is to the Third World. How can you account for that difference, if there is one?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I've got some, you know, just personal opinions about what I think is a difference in emphasis right now. And theirs is a different agenda. It is not incompatible. An independent foreign policy for China right now at the same time is possible, in some measure, because of the policies of the United States. Now, I don't believe that the facts that what you're hearing from the Chinese Foreign Ministry is an agenda -- Third World oriented, less concerned with security threats and the Soviet Union, means that they are at variance with us. It means that they have decided that those policies are viable and sensible, and perhaps, that they can afford to worry less about these other accounts.

Q Well where do they say that they're going to walk hand-in-hand with us jointly -- it was taken out, of course -- but, to cooperate against aggressors?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think that we have aired it. We put that much of a point on it. I think that what they would agree to is that in walking hand-in-hand, if you will, and that isn't certain, it is more in the process of modernizing China. Now that's said -- they concur in the efforts to assure deterrence of threats, of common threats, but it is -- it's just not something that is high on their agenda right now. I'm sorry, maybe I'm missing your point.

Q May I ask --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Helen and then in the back.

Q For two days, three days running now, two days -- the President has talked for 45 minutes and they've talked for 45 minutes -- Are they talking at each other? Is it -- will anything be changed in the way of issues aside from what we're going to sign? I mean, each one -- he is going over the same ground, really, to each separate official, and they are stating their positions.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, this is a very good point. And I guess it's something that is terribly boring, but it is --

Q No, it's not boring. I just wonder if there is -- Is there any meeting of minds?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. I'm here to

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tell you that I don't know when the United States, and three Presidents I have worked for, have been able to sit down and talk about something that mattered. I mean, we spend State Visit after State Visit, talking about the most mindless things in the world.

Q Why? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, because that's what's in the briefing book. And it is in these tertiary areas of whether or not we're going to resolve some ADB problem, or some tariff issue, or headwaters of the umtee-ump river -- I mean, today, yesterday, the day before, their leaders -- who, I must say, often times we don't disagree with, but the quality of their analysis of geopolitics is very high -- talked to us on those

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terms for most of the meetings, and our President responded or led with the kind of an agenda that was global in its perspective and the end product was that they learned a lot about what motivated President Reagan, what makes him -- what his values are, what his priorities are. Many, they agree. Some, they disagree. But they learned a lot about the man.

Similarly, he learned quite a lot about what makes them tick. And that's something that seldom happens. And from that point of view, it was extremely worthwhile.

In the back.

Q Would you explain for us what the "notionable outcomes",as you termed it, were that the Chairman mentioned on -- about Taiwan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That was asked earlier, and I'm sorry, I'm just not going to get into that mine field. The Chinese will have to describe their own notionable outcomes.

Q -- we can live with when we've talked about there being peaceful settlement of the reunification process?

SENIOR ADMINSITRATION OFFICIAL: This is a matter for the Chinese to resolve. The United States will not interfere to pressure either side.

Q Were their notionable outcomes ones that fit within the August 17, 1982 communique as we interpret it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's premature to judge that, Rick. They haven't even been put forward by China, and consequently, their viability is something that is yet to be determined. And in that context, we shouldn't comment on that.

Q As they were put forward today, were they in the ball park?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No comment.

Q One of the things that the Chinese have repeatedly asked for during these talks is a sharp reduction in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. In any of the discussions that you were present in, has President Reagan given them any indication that this request will be met?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President made clear that he would stand by the terms of all three communiques to include the August, '82 communique that deals with that issue. And the -- fulfill it in good faith. And it didn't go beyond that.

Q Is it your judgement that at the base to these talks that the United States and China are exactly where they were on Taiwan before the President came here, or has there been any progress or any slippage as a result of this visit and these talks?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think that our own appreciation of Chinese thinking on the possibilities was advanced during this visit and that is useful. The United States' position wasn't altered. But I guess that's the extent of it.

Yes?

Q Two questions. One, why did they drop their plans for a working lunch and just have a social lunch? And secondly, in your opening comments, were you suggesting that it's wrong for us to suggest in reporting this series of meetings the objections that the Chinese officials have made to a whole series of policies of this administration, in Central America, Europe, the Middle East, and Korea?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not at all. I think you ought to report any objection that they have. The only opinion, and it is an opinion, and I offer it, is that it seemed to me that the reason for the criticisms -- and there was a common criticism -- was that they didn't like a particular policy, be it South Asia or Central America, because it seemed to them that that policy held the potential of worsening the relationship of the United States with its friends and allies, as distinct from whatever effect that policy might have on the ground in X country or Y country.

Q Going back to --

Q The other question? About the working luncheon?

SENIOR ADMIN STRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry. The -- well, it wasn't changed into a social lunch. First of all, the meeting went over for about an extra fifteen minutes and it ended up being, I don't know, an hour and twenty minutes or so, and everybody got up and left and went into the dining room.

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It was a very warm lunch, and a lot of --

Q Szechuan food? (Laughter.) Szechuan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. The Chairman's from Szechuan and he was in good form today, talking about a lot of Szechuan foods and so forth, but it -- There was serious talk, I mean, I --

Q We had been told that this would be a working lunch and we were, in effect, led to believe that it would be an hour and a half of meetings, an hour and a half of lunch, so three hours of serious talk. And it sounds like there was a good deal less than that. And we're wondering why.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's just not so. The time for the meeting went beyond that time because people came running in and out several times at the end of it over about a twenty minute period, saying you're supposed to go to lunch. And we didn't do it, because we were in the middle of an important point. Once we got to lunch there were working things done. I mean, everybody around the table, in the course of the hour and a half we were sitting there, did ask about this or that. I cast it as social because it was a convivial kind of setting. It was a good lunch. But I shouldn't say that there wasn't anything useful done. There was. Quite a lot.

Q You mentioned in your elaboration earlier of the certain realities China now has of the United States. Among them you said that they should -- that repeal or alteration of the Taiwan Relations Act was not an Executive function. Did you mean to suggest that, absent Congress, that Reagan might consider some change in that Act? Or favor it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. In the back?

Q Well, the President came to China putting at least equal emphasis on battering the Russians, vis-a-vis helping to modernize China. Did I understand you to say that the Chinese in responding to that really place far more interest and emphasis on getting U.S. help for their modernization rather than joining the U.S. in a strategic collaboration against the Soviets? In other words, he didn't get the strategic part, he got more on the economic and trade thing -- Is that what you implied earlier?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't think that those two categories quite frame the spectrum specifically if you had to measure by the amount of time that was consumed in all the meetings in talking, if you will, about the global situation. That far exceeded the time that was devoted to the issue of modernization.

Q Yes, but that's asking how responsive the Chinese were when the President said the Russians are bad, they're a big threat, there are dangers to the both of us -- Your earlier comments seemed to indicate that they weren't ready to jump to our side and, you know, as Jerry said, to walk hand-in-hand with us against Moscow?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the reason I haven't tried to paint the Chinese as being -- as taking some kind of shrill position vis-a-vis the Russians is because I'm not going to characterize how the Chinese treated the Soviet Union. What I have said is that their position on our strategy, and on our view of the Soviet Union, was that our actions have been sensible as they have contributed to stable deterrence, as differentiated regionally, where, in certain regions, they did not agree with us.

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MR. SIMS: We're going to have one more question because we're going to move on to Larry.

Q Whether in the meeting, or whether in some other kind of private discussions with the Chinese officials, has anything been said about their excerpting of the President's address on the television rerun last night?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It -- I'm trying to think -- It did not come up in the Deng meeting, if that's what you mean.

Q No, I mean has it been at all discussed? And have they talked to you about it? Has it become --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They haven't talked to me. I believe there have been conversations, Lesley, but they've been with the public affairs community and they haven't been with me.

Q Is there an indication that they were annoyed in any way by the content of his speech?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not to me --

Q I don't mean to you -- (laughter.) -- you know what I mean.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'm sorry. I've been in meetings, really, until about half an hour ago, and I haven't really talked to anybody except about regions and arms control and junk like that. (Laughter.)

Q You have no sense that it has become an issue?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, no, but I wouldn't. I don't mean to mislead you. I think probably there has been some back and forth about it. And Bob or Larry could be more specific about it -- but, it just hasn't happened to me, that's all.

MR. SIMS: Thank you very much.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 6:45 P.M. (L)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Shanghai, The People's Republic of China

For Immediate Release April 30, 1984

PRESS BRIEFING
BY SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
ON THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO CHINA

Jing Jiang Hotel
Shanghai, The People's Republic of China

5:47 P.M. (L)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: President Reagan is just completing 5½ important and fruitful days in China.

Important tangible results that emerged during the President's trip include the initialing of an agreement for cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the signing of the tax treaty that assists Americans doing business in China, the signing of an accord on official cultural relations and the signing of protocols for the exchange of technical information and for the expansion of the Dalien Management Institute.

Today, we and the Chinese have also agreed to send and receive respectively a Presidential Trade Mission to China this summer.

In addition, we have agreed to discuss cooperation between civilian search and rescue authorities in the operation on the high seas outside the territorial waters of either party. This initiative grows out of the tragic sinking last October of the U.S.-owned oil drilling vessel, Glomar Java Sea with 81 crew members aboard. Our aim would be to develop more formal procedures for cooperation in the event of future such emergencies.

Beyond these specifics, in a sense, a number of more important things emerged during this trip.

First, it was clear the importance that both the United States and China attach to this relationship.

Second, we see the emerging and surging strength of the tide of cooperative efforts in a great many fields almost across the board.

Third, we see a search together in our discussion of foreign policies, a search together for peace and development in various parts of the world.

And finally, I would say, a demonstration that two countries with very different systems of government and cultures can find areas of common interest and work effectively together.

This is a general message that I think has great power and importance for countries throughout the world.

Now, if you have any questions, I'll be glad to try them.

Helen?

Q Well, aren't they still pretty upset about Taiwan and didn't they really kind of expect that the President might give in some way, go beyond his original position?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The Chinese have stated frequently, including on this visit, their views about the Taiwan issues. It's one in which we have different perceptions. At the same time, that issue has been treated in each of the formal communiques that have been negotiated between China and the United States. And we will, as the President has said, live by the statements in those communiques. And there was nothing added or subtracted in any way.

Q Mr. Secretary, has the United States gone as far as it's going to go on that Taiwan issue?

MR. SPEAKES: We stand by the various accords,

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including most recently, insofar as the question of arms sales are concerned, the accord of August the 17th, I believe is the date.

Q My question was -- is that as far as we're going to go?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: That is a general agreement. And it will be implemented,and we will live by it.

Q And nothing more?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There's been no change in it, and no, there hasn't been any negotiation of it, and I don't think there was any attempt on anyone's part to renegotiate the Communique. It stands. And it was worked out very carefully between the two governments. The final texts were signed off on -- certainly I can speak about the United States' side of it -- by the President personally. I happen to have arrived as Secretary of State at the time this was worked out, so I saw that very clearly.

Q Mr. Secretary, the Chinese television network did not broadcast all of the President's speech the other day. It's not clear what they will do with his speech today. The fact that they censored a portion of it -- is that read as, perhaps, a mistake on the President's part? To push so hard on particular issues that are too sensitive for them to broadcast?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, I think it is for the President to say what he wants to say; and it's for the Chinese to decide what they want to do insofar as what is exposed to their people. I understand that his speech today was carried live on television here in Shanghai --

Q In English.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: -- but at any rate -- well, he delibered in English, and if you're going to carry it live, you're going to carry it in English. And I imagine people can translate it. But, at any rate, there it is. So I think this is a question for each side to determine. But, perhaps a more direct response to your question -- the President says what he thinks. He's the same man whether he's in Washington, Beijing, London or wherever he is. And personally, I like it that way.

Q Mr. Secretary, to follow up on that if I may -- Would you explain why it is that the President chose to include in each of the addresses which he believed would be televised, references to the Soviet Union, if not by name, obliquely by referring to the troops on the border -- knowing that those references would be sensitive to the Chinese? What was the purpose, the motive that --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: In each of the President's speeches, he, in a sense, addressed a comprehensive agenda that has been under discussion and is of interest in both countries. And certainly that agenda includes the Vietnamese incursion and occupation of Kampuchea. Certainly that agenda includes the Soviet invasion and, as a matter of fact, the current offensive the Soviets are conducting in Afghanistan. We agreed with the Chinese on those points. And we've discussed them.. Certainly on the agenda is the Soviet manpower buildup on the Chinese border, and the deployment of a great many SS-20 missiles pointed at China. And, obviously, the Chinese are concerned about these things as they list them publicly, and I assume, privately, to the Soviets as the obstacles to better relations between China and the Soviet Union.

But at any rate, the President addressed the comprehensive agenda, and this is part of it. And he felt that he should state it in full.

Q What was decided about including a Chinese scientist on a future space flight?

SECRETARY SHULTS: I don't think there has been any decision about that.

Q Did it come up at all in the talks?

Q Question?

MR. SHULTZ: It didn't come up in any really direct -- the question was about including a Chinese scientist in a future space shuttle flight. The -- I'm sure there will be an effort stemming from both sides to cooperate in the field of space research. And no doubt that will be part of it, and it may be that there will be such a passenger on a future space shuttle. But it hasn't been determined, and was discussed, I think, initially at a technical level and may or may not go forward. But I'm certain that various aspects of cooperation in space will go forward because it is an exciting frontier for all of mankind.

Q Mr. Secretary, there's a story this

morning that the administration is planning some kind of joint action with the allies against Libya ranging from economic sanctions up to covert action. What can you tell us about that?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I can tell you that there is no such plan beyond -- However, I would say that from the standpoint of the United States, Mr. Qaddafi and the government of Libya have been doing all sorts of things that we regard as totally beyond the pale and we've been saying so for quite some time and most recently, of course, the actions of Libya in London are just another example.

So, I think that it is a kind of behavior that we find unacceptable and reprehensible and we call it to people's attention.

Q But has there been any discussion with the allies about any kind of action? I'm not asking whether there's a plan. Has there been discussion?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We have had innumerable discussions with various governments giving our view of Libya and at the same time there isn't any coordinated plan under way to do something about it other than to share views about the nature of this conduct.

Q Mr. Secretary, there's another story today that the United States is examining various options for changing the status of the American Embassy in Israel including possibly moving it to Jerusalem or possibly putting the consulate in East Jerusalem under control of the American Embassy in Tel Aviv.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The President's position is that he opposes movement of the embassy under current conditions and there's been no change in that. There's no compromise in it. That is his position.

Q Mr. Secretary?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Unnamed sources, to the contrary, notwithstanding.

Q Does the President or do you believe that the Chinese economy is becoming less socialistic and more capitalistic and did the President in any way view his mission or goal on this trip as being a salesman for capitalism -- trying to help the Chinese along on this?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I think using the words "capitalism" and "socialism" implies sort of polar notions and the fact is that within the Chinese society as they develop the responsibility system which they described with great enthusiasm to the President -- Premier Zhao did in Washington and again here in China and also the movement of the basic incentive ideas that are involved into many of the activities in urban areas as something that they see as contributing to productivity. And it does -- and it -- to us, it's not surprising that it should do so and certainly we'd encourage it. But the President didn't come over here to crusade about anything or to try to tell the Chinese how to run their affairs. That's basically up to them.

Q Well, Mr. Secretary, did the President change his view of socialist systems as a result of this trip?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Of socialist systems?

Q Yes.

[illegible] don't [illegible]

[illegible]

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't think that he has changed his view. He's very interested to see how socialist systems including the one here in China is evolving. And as I just said, there are several aspects of that evolution that are very interesting to the President and to those of us who have been oriented to incentive type and market type economies.

Q Mr. Secretary, when the President left Hawaii last week, he said in discussing his trip that he talked of "going forwardin a mighty enterprise to build dynamic growth economies and make the world safer by working for peace and exposing expansionist aggression. That is what our trip to China is all about."

In view of the fact that the Chinese, while very interested in the first part of that -- building of the growth economies,seemed very uninterested if not antagonistic to the idea of opposing expansionist aggression. How would you assess the President's trip overall?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think overall the President's trip has been a very big plus for the United States and I believe for China just as Premier Zhao's trip also was that. And the President's performance

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as he has gone along and today has been really fantastic. I think it's been just great.

Now, as far as your point about concern about aggression and so on -- the fact that a portion of a speech was removed when it was televised shouldn't be taken, I don't think, as a signal that the Chinese don't care about Soviet aggression. I'm sure that they do and I'm absolutely positive of that.

Q Mr. Secretary, are you concerned what will happen in China after Dong Xiao leaves the scene?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The question of what happens when a leader of great significance passes from the scene is always something that people speculate about and at least so far as I can see, and I don't want to pose as a person who is a deep student of internal Chinese affairs, but I have met now with important leaders and spent a great deal of time with them and as far as I can see there's been a more conscious and careful effort on the part of the Chairman to put in place successors and legitimatize them, than you see in other countries. So I think there's been a lot of attention paid to that. And at least from our standpoint we're undertaking significant efforts with China on the assumption that there will be that continuity and I see every reason to expect that it will take place.

Q Mr. Secretary, it was said before this trip that one of the President's aims was to speak directly to the Chinese people. And given the editing or censorship what he said here in the rebroadcast of his remakks, do you think he was able to accomplish that purpose?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Oh, yes. Very much so. He spoke -- of course, a great deal of his speech was broadcast directly. The coverage in the Chinese newspapers has been extensive. Practically the whole first page I saw of the Main Daily was said to me -- I don't read the Chinese, but those who do told me that it was all about the President's trip and the things that he said and so on. The speech today was covered here in Shanghai. What national distribution it gets remains to be seen, but I think beyond the particular things in a speech -- what must come across to people is here is this vibrant and exciting human being who has come here and who is talking about the future and the promise of the future -- and about cooperation and how cooperation can help fulfill that promise. And it must be a message of importance and excitement to the people of China.

Q Mr. Secretary, there have been some comments back in the United States that the President's trip perhaps is more of an electioneering venture than actually a trip to make Sino-American relations better. There has been an RNC camera team along on the trip. Could you comment for us on political aspects of this?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, first of all from the standpoint of the substance, I think it has been a very important trip. As I view the U.S.-China relationship, it has been a developing one, going back of course to President Nixon's opening to China -- building on the normalization that came about under President Carter and on that bipartisan base, being carried forward now in a comprehensive and we believe increasingly broad and promising and stable way. So we see this relationship developing. A lot came before the President's trip. A lot more will come after, but the President's trip and the Premier's trip earlier this year together represent sort of high points that help to point up the importance of personal contacts -- to legitimatize what we're doing, to encourage the flowering of it to other levels.

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and all of this, I think, is working. So from the standpoint of substance, it's good for the United States, it's good for China, and it's good for, I think, the general situation in the world.

Now, if that helps politically, so be it. It seems to me that -- here I'm just speaking as an individual -- but it seems to be that what is wanted from government officials is to work hard and creatively and effectively in the interests of the country. And that's what people want. And if they do that successfully, presumably, that's good politics. But the motivation is to do a good job for the country.

Q Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you could say whether or not there's any particular area in which the thinking -- either of the Chinese leadership or of the President and your -- and his advisors including yourself -- has been changed during this trip. Or has this been a trip which has essentially been a restatement of previously known positions whose importance has been in simply the meeting itself?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, I think that there are all sorts of subtle ways in which in a trip like this, the leaders learn from each other, adjust themselves a little bit. I certainly know in my own case I have -- I can't tell you the number of hours I've spent talking with my counterpart, Foreign Minister Wu. We had some time scheduled on this trip and we could see it wasn't anywhere near enough time. So we extended it for another couple of hours. We still ran out of time. But we have discussed in depth issues of mutual concern. And I think I have understood better how the Chinese are approaching some of these issues, and I hope they've understood our point of view better.

Some collaborative things have been worked out, and so on. So I think there are a lot of ways in which the sort of process that you suggest takes place, but I don't want to try to name topics, A, B, C, and D, and go down the list like that.

Q Mr. Secretary, senior administration officials speaking from a podium like yours a couple of days ago said that the United States felt that it had -- it was understanding better the Chinese thinking on Taiwan as a result of the meeting with Chairman Deng. In what ways did the U.S. understand China's thinking on Taiwan better, and does that better understanding -- can you be any more specific about how that better understanding might lead to a resolution of the Taiwan question?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I think that we came here understanding the Chinese position on Taiwan quite well. It's been probably the most discussed topic in going right back to, no doubt, Henry Kissinger's first meeting with Zhou Enlai. So I don't know quite what anyone would have had in mind on that subject. It has been worked over a great deal and the results of the discussion have been embodied in formal agreements and we intend to live by those agreements. And I think I'll just leave the subject at that.

Q Mr. Secretary, regardless of what was shown on TV or not shown on TV, did you and the President, during this trip to China, make any progress in bringing the Chinese closer to the American view with regard to strategic cooperation vis a-vis the Soviet Union?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I don't think we -- we did not aspire, and I don't think that we particularly are looking for some sort of formal way of aligning ourselves in that manner.

What we have done is discuss issues of common concern including behavior of the Soviet Union, and we've tried to explain to them our perception of it, not only in this part of the world, but in other parts of the world such as Central America. They've discussed their perception with us. It has not been sort of the -- a domineering topic in our conversations. Our conversations have had a very broad range and certainly an important one. And I think that that kind of sharing of information about our intentions, for example, on arms control, a global view that the United States takes in the INF negotiations, the views that we have about what's going on in Kampuchea, what they're doing, we're doing, and in other parts of the world is a very worthwhile enterprise.

But there's been no effort to construct any formal mechanism for it.

Q May I follow up on that, Mr. Secretary?

MR. SPEAKES: Let's take one here and one here.

Q Can I follow up on that?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: You pick them from here on.

MR. SPEAKES: All right. Let's get the follow-up back here.

Q I'd like to clarify this question about the American and Chinese view on strategic cooperation. The Chinese publicly have not responded to Mr. Reagan's remarks about making common cause against the Soviet aggression, or, as you put it, Soviet behavior. Are you suggesting that their position in the private talks has been any different from what they have said in public? Because they have seemed to have rejected this idea in public. Have they been more cooperative in private on this subject?

SECRETARY SHULTZ. We have discussed these issues and I think that the discussion has been very worthwhile from our standpoint. I don't want to stand here and presume in any way to speak about Chinese views. That is for them to state. And of course they have stated their views about Soviet behavior on many occasions. No doubt they, as we, would like to see a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. But that has got to be built as in any relationship on attention to outstanding problems and some prospect that they're going to be dealt with in a reasonable and constructive manner.

Q Sir, the Chinese leaders have been saying that they want to see not --

MR. SPEAKES: Speak up a little louder, please.

Q Chinese leaders have been saying that they want to see not just trend of reduction in arms sales to Taiwan, they hope to see a considerable reduction on sales to Taiwan. I want to know if the United States government is going to take some specific measures to cut down its arms sales to Taiwan considerably?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I'll just repeat what I've already said. That there is a communique specifically on that subject and the United States had a clear understanding of what it was undertaking when it made that agreement and that agreement will be carried out by the United States.

MR. SPEAKES: We'll take it here, Mr. Secretary. And if it's okay, it'll be the last question.

Q How intensively did you discuss Korea and was there any progress in trying to get some sort of conference on Korea started?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't know that there was any -- special progress on a conference about Korea, but the subject came up in I think at least two of the Presidential meetings -- perhaps in all of them. I discussed it with the Foreign Minister at considerable length because it's a subject -- the reduction of tensions on the Korean peninsula which both of us care a lot about and we discussed it with care and extensively.

Q During the talks with Chinese Foreign Minister on Korean question, does the U.S.-China agree to let the two Koreas work out their problems?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, there are a number of dimensions to the discussion of the Korean issues. One of them goes under the label "the shape of the table" -- that is, who is going to be there. And of course more to the point is the substance of what it is that we might work on and it has been our feeling, and I believe the feeling of the South Koreans as well, that the of course the countries that really have to do something about it if in the end tensions are going to be reduced, are the two Koreas themselves. So we have encouraged direct talks between those two countries. That has been suggested by the South Koreans a number of times the North Koreans have not agreed to that and there have been other suggestions like tripartite talks or quadrapartite talks. The Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Abe has recently made a suggestion. All of these things have to do with who's going to be at talks. But beyond that of course are various things that might be done, substantively, that would be helpful and there have been broad ideas put forward about overall

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relationships and there've also been a lot of rather detailed, specific things talked about and you can conceive of it either of both ways -- it's often fruitful to see if you can't do some small things together. And if you can maybe you can build on that. On the other hand, those others may say the way to approach it is in terms of some grand design and go at it that way.

So, those are all the kinds of things that we've discussed.

END 6:15 P.M. (L)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
VISIT OF PRESIDENT MASIRE OF BOTSWANA, MAY 7, 1984
MAY 7, 1984, 10:30 A.M.

MODERATOR: Good morning. Our first briefer will begin with a few remarks on the schedule and the visit and then take questions -- both of them will take questions.

FIRST SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Thank you. Good morning. President Quett Masire of Botswana arrives in Washington today. He will be met at the Monument Grounds, as is traditional, by the Secretary. Tomorrow, he will have lunch with Pete McPherson, the AID Administrator. He will meet in the afternoon with the Secretary.

On Wednesday, the President is going to meet our President for a working session, a lunch that follows, and then there will be a few wrap-up remarks for the press. The Botswanan party proceeds on Thursday to New York where they will be exposed to a number of bankers and businessmen, and then a private portion of the President's stay in the United States in New England before the weekend departure for Europe, and eventually back to Botswana.

We are very pleased about this visit. Botswana has been a longstanding friend of the United States, and that friendship is based on some important factors. Botswana, though a small country in population -- about 1,000,000 people; about the size of the State of Texas -- is a country that has been deeply committed an effective, functioning, multi-party democracy, democratic system ever since its independence. There is an election this year, and Quett Masire is standing again, standing in an election as his predecessor, Sir Seretse Khama, used to stand, in a free, fair, and open election, which will be particularly hot in the parliamentary sense as the seats for the Botswanan legislature are contested.

It is a country with a strong, independent, fair-minded judiciary, good strong judicial process, a strong stand on human rights, openness to refugees, of which southern Africa is more than generously endowed. Politically and institutionally it operates on many of the wavelengths that all of us do.

I would add that in the economic sector, this is a country that has had a commendable performance over the last years. Botswana in the 1970s registered about 8 percent growth rate per annum, and if you look at the rest of Africa, that's pretty startling. Of course, much of it has been in the minerals area.

But let's take a look: Botswana is a very poor country in terms of its people, but from about a base of $50 per capita at the time of independence, they are now up to $900. per capita income. So this is a country that has been serious about its development, serious about its openness to a free market system, a company that has been serious in the way it has used its resources. As your other briefer pointed out to me this morning, you won't see any monuments to spending inside of Botswana -- you won't see the typical presidential palaces or 747s or the other "gold calves" of modernism. Botswana has a frugal, sensible economic policy; and much of that is due to Quett Masire, the president himself, who during much of the 1970s, served in the top economic positions of his government, and made that country open to foreign investment as well as good competitive enterprise internally.

Sadly, Botswana is afflicted today with two separate blights -- falling international minerals prices, which have undercut its export markets, and a now-three-year drought of massive dimensions. I believe this year, Botswana will only be able, because of the drought, to produce about ten percent of the food grains that it normally grows for its people, forcing the government to import and put into the commercial distribution system, imported foods.

Botswana, beyond that, has been a quiet and firm correspondent of ours on matters southern African for as long as I can remember, going back to the Rhodesia settlement and all during the recent years over Namibia.

They want peaceful settlements -- they are a people of peace. The Botswanans are among the first of those who elaborated effective coexistence with South Africa because they are a people committed to peace.

We have a lot of views in common. The President is arriving here from a very recent Front Line summit in Arusha, Tanzania, and we'll have quite a lot to talk to him about, but I'll come back to that in a second.

Let me just go on and say that beyond common points of interest in southern Africa, great sense of moderation, good solid statesmanship, and good judgment, the Botswanans and we have seen eye to eye on most major, or many, of the major international issues. We are probably much closer together in the United Nations context than we are with many, many other nations in the continent. So we are seeing old friends this time. And it is with great pleasure that those of you who will encounter the Botswanan delegation will find courteous and very decent, very sensible people; and they will be glad to be here, and we are very glad to have them.

I believe if we look ahead just a tiny bit to the course of the next several days, there are probably three basic issues that we'll want to spend our time on and will be important in our dialogue with Botswana. We'll want to take a very careful look with them in southern Africa where the peace process stands, how they view events in the Namibia/Angolan context, how they take a look at events flowing from the landmark signature of the security agreement between South Africa and Mozambique at Nkomati in March. We will want to go over that ground very carefully. The President will, the Secretary will, and indeed I will. I think all of you know, by the way, that Chet Crocker is in Europe at the moment, and that's why I'm with you today.

(Continued on page 6.)

We will also want to compare notes on South Africa itself.

Botswana has a long and very intimate relationship with the South African state. It is part of the currency union, the trade context of the South African trade arrangements. Botswanans are very astute and true observers of trends inside of South Africa and they have very strong views. We'd like to hear those views and we would like to be able to compare notes with them on our thinking on where matters internal to South Africa are proceeding.

And, third, we'll obviously want to take a look at the very difficult economic straits that this sensible, proud and responsible country is facing today; a country that has a substantial amount of American investment. We will be looking for ways we can try to help.

We have been helpful. Since 1970, the United States has provided about $160 million in assistance. It's provided it in those key areas of rural development, agriculture manpower training. The Botswanans have proved themselves to be very efficient users of our assistance. They put it to good purpose, and we're proud of that relationship as well.

At the moment, we're looking at a program in Botswana of about $10 million in economic assistance and $7.4 million in security assistance. Botswana, given its geographic location -- and I don't have to tell you what the map looks like -- is a nation that is under threat, and this Administration made a calculated decision that it was important that we respond to real Botswana needs in the security field; we have a modest but useful, in the context of the size of that country's military forces, security assistance program.

We will also be looking at ways to respond to the exigencies of the drought and trying to come up with some help for them, but that will be worked on and discussed more fully during the course of the stay.

In short, there are no major issues that divide us. There is infinitly more that unites the United States with this very special southern African state. We are glad that the visit comes at this time. It's recognition of what Botswana stands for. It's recognition of what our relationship stands for, and it's a good time also to tell southern Africans that we remain deeply committed to staying in touch with them as this country continues its pursuit of the peace process in that part of the continent. So a good, broad signal to the Front Line.

I have with me, as introduced, my colleague. We'll be happy to take your questions.

Thanks very much.

Q You said that Botswana is a nation under threat. Why is it a nation under threat?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Look at its geography, I think that was the point I was trying to make. It has a border of some consequence with South Africa. There's a lot of movement back and forth across that border. There is a war in neighboring Namibia up along the Caprivi Strip to the north; the Rhodesian war is not too long over for our memories. There are still movements of people back and forth across that border. There has been a pattern of dissidence in the neighboring areas of Zimbabwe and the Matabele area, and that brings fresh pressures to bear on Botswana.

If you want to think of a country that is surrounded with difficulties and tensions, you've got one -- it's Botswana. Internally, it is a very peaceful, stable, calm and well organized state.

Q Is there any truth to the rumors that were heard early this year that SWAPO guerrillas have been infiltrating from Botswana into Namibia?

SECOND OFFICIAL: There was one occasion where a group of SWAPO people did go from Botswana into Namibia; yes.

Q How serious was it? Do you have any numbers of men; has it been fairly regular?

A To the best of my understanding, there were about fourteen people involved, and four of these were killed and the rest were captured.

(Continued on next page)

Q When you talk about per capita income going up from $50.00 to $900.00, is that constant dollars or inflated?

SECOND OFFICIAL: No. That would be inflated dollars.

Q Is Botswana going to be one of the states that is going to qualify for the Economic Policy Initiative?

FIRST OFFICIAL: I think, Ted, we have not made a decision on the EPI yet. We're looking, obviously, at governments that are putting a strong record of economic rationality and economic reform, but we'll be looking also at countries that need the resources in order to stimulate reform. I'm not including or excluding any nations. Our deliberations haven't reached that point yet, but it will be -- and I think Leon Dash's story is accurate on that point this morning -- a smallish group to make our resources effective, we'll make those decisions, and you'll be informed.

Q Is Botswana generally supportive of the policy of constructive engagement that's being practiced by the Reagan Administration?

SECOND OFFICIAL: I don't know if it's particularly supportive of constructive engagement in its limited sense. It is supportive of the present negotiations that are going on between South Africa and Angola, leading to hopefully a settlement of the Namibia problem.

Q What about our policy, though, of the internal reform in constructive engagement? How do Botswanans feel specifically towards that?

SECOND OFFICIAL: They would be in favor of anything that would change the apartheid system in South Africa, obviously.

Q Does Botswana have a free-market economy?

SECOND OFFICIAL: Yes. It has, I believe you'd call it, a free-market economy. It has a very capitalistic form of economy. People there are expected to work and expected to make a profit.

Q What is the current level of U.S. direct investment there, and will the Botswanan's be able to benefit from the Nkomati Accord through the use of hydropower from the Cahora Bassa?

SECOND OFFICIAL: It's not intended that they would have any power from there. I didn't get the first part of your question.

Q What's the level of U.S. direct investment in Botswana currently?

SECOND OFFICIAL: The only major investment is that by AMAX in the copper and nickel mine at Selebe Chikwe, and that is quite a major investment. AMAX owns 40 percent of the partnership between AMAX, Botswana and Anglo-American.

Q What minerals do they export?

SECOND OFFICIAL: At that mine, it produces copper and nickel mat, and the amount is a high grade of the ore which is shipped to Nickel, Louisiana.

FIRST OFFICIAL: They also have other mineral exports.

SECOND OFFICIAL: The only other major mineral export they have, of course, is diamonds, and in 1983 they were the world's largest producer of diamonds.

Q How many multi-party democracies are there in Africa now days?

SECOND OFFICIAL: My colleague could answer that better than I can.

FIRST OFFICIAL: I'm doing some quick math.

SECOND OFFICIAL: I think I represent the only one, but maybe there's another one.

FIRST OFFICIAL: There are several. Senegal, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Mauritius --

Q Gambia.

FIRST OFFICIAL: Gambia is multi-party? Yes, I guess it is. Sure.

Q Can we ask questions on other African subjects?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Go ahead.

Q How do you view the deteriorating situation in Sudan, and will Mr. Crocker be going there within the week?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Oh, I see. You really want to wander far afield. (Laughter) Yes. Mr. Crocker will be going to the Sudan.

Obviously, given the the strength of our ties and the importance we attach to the Sudan, we're following events very closely. The Sudan is key to us. There has been a series of recent developments that Chet will want to discuss with their leadership, and whether it's in the south or in the context of the Horn, there's a lot on the plate.

I think it really doesn't make a whole lot of sense, though, to do an Africa-wide press briefing. I thought you were going to stick to southern Africa and something related to Botswana, but --

If that's all the questions you have, we'll break up. Thanks.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 10:45 a.m.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON VISIT OF PRESIDENT MASIRE OF BOTSWANA

May 9, 1984

The Briefing Room

1:33 P.M. EDT

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Ladies and gentlemen, the President of Botswana and President Reagan met today in the Cabinet Room and lunched afterwards. I think you were there for the departure ceremony.

The President of Botswana arrived in Washington on Monday. He departs tomorrow for New York and then up to New England and returns home.

It's been a good visit. We have had a long and very close relationship with Botswana -- a country that came to independence -- 1966 and ever since then we've been very close partners of a country that is one of the firmest, most committed democracies in the continent of Africa. And there is a functioning legal and democratic system that works, the Botswanans are proud of and proud of maintaining the tradition.

There are other things that have made for a good relationship: They've managed a very sound economy, produced real growth -- about 8 percent per annum during most of the 1970's.-- The depression years have hit them hard as mineral prices have plummeted, a tough time as well for the last three years have been years of intense drought.

Botswana this year, for example, will only produce about 10 percent of its feed grains. Botswana is, as you know, situated right in the heart of Southern Africa on South Africa's borders. It experienced the long war in Rhodesia. It borders on Namibia. It has key interests in the peace process that this administration has been engaged heavily in, as its predecessors were. And Botswana has a lot to think and to say, and it's deeply affected by the outcome.

Well, if those are the general themes, let me come down to what basically we dealt with today and have dealt with during the course of President Masire's visit. And that is the issues at hand. We've talked extensively and the President and President Masire talked in detail about the peace process, the views of the front-line states, what's going on in Namibia, as we try to press forward for a settlement.

The work of the disengagement in Angola where after the Lusaka agreements of mid-February South Africa's forces have been pulling out of southern Angola and creating a new opportunity for a settlement. They touched on the regional situation and here Botswana -- the regional situation in terms of the pattern of violence that all of us have known in Southern Africa -- the threats to Mozambique, the threats to other neighboring territories -- and here, I think, Botswana has a very special existence.

It has lived in peace with South Africa throughout its independence. It has learned the meaning of co-existence and has practiced it. And we respect the way the Botswanans have pursued their life with their larger neighbors and the difficult situations around them. They've done it on the basis of respect, reciprocity, with sovereignty, and that the United States stands

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firmly by.

These were the points that were gone over between the President, the Secretary and the President of Botswana and his team, including the Foreign Minister. And they framed the visit. It's a very useful time for us, let me say in closing, for our diplomacy is active. We're on course. We're sticking with it.

We'd like to see an independence for Namibia. We'd like to see a positive outcome to our discussions with the Angolans and the hope for peace is fully shared by the Botswanan government with which we've met now. Thanks.

Yes, sir?

Q What are the views of the front-line states?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The front-line states have just met on the 28th and 29th of April in Arusha, Tanzania under the Chairmanship of the front-line Chairman, President Nyerere of Tanzania. I think they probably codified their views very clearly in that communique that was issued after the summit was over.

They understood and accepted and welcomed the fact of the Nkomati Accord of March between South Africa and Mozambique. And they

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welcomed the pattern of peace that's developed there. It's important for the region.

Second, they have made it clear that they welcome the disengagement in Angola and they hope that that can move on towards the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 and the independence of Namibia.

Third is they looked at the problem of South Africa, the front-line states addressed it as a problem that must fundamentally be resolved inside South Africa. And that is a view that, basically, we share, that cross-border violence is not the solution to change in South Africa, but rather purposeful commitment to a goal that all of us share. And, if I used American words, I would say, seeing the rule of -- that all South Africans achieve their voice in the rule of their country.

And those three points pretty carefully codify the position of the front line today and that was a position that was reviewed by the President of Botswana.

Q Were there differences in this meeting? And what did the President of Botswana mean at the very end when he said, "Least said, soonest mended"?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'm sorry, I missed that at the very end. There were no differences. The two Presidents exchanged their views very fully. We had no sticking points. It was a good meeting.

Q What do you think he meant?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can tell you what he meant.

Q Oh, good.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's a Botswana slogan or statement to the effect that if you talk to much, you'll say something that you shouldn't have.

Q So that was his way of saying, "I'm going to stop now"?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, "I'm stopping now."

Q Well, what do you think he --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's what that really means.

Q Well, it sounded as though there was something he might say that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think what my colleage's saying -- it's a courtesy.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's a common courtesy to end this speech by saying, "If I talk too much, I'll say something you won't like."

Q Fascinating.

Q President Reagan said that there were discussions of ways the United States could help alleviate the drought problems.

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Were there any specific pledges of more aid? And what are existing aid levels now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, our existing aid levels are about $10 million a year in development, supporting assistance, mainly in the manpower training, the agricultural fields. We have just over $7 million in security assistance as well to --

Q In what assistance?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Security assistnace, military assistance for Botswana's very small defense force, which is -- I described earlier -- they live in a troubled area and have to do something -- have to see to their security.

Our discussions today, indeed, that's quite correct, did focus on the dought, the hardships and the effects of the drought. The United States is responding rather quickly to one of the key needs of Botswana. During the President's stay here, he signed an agreement -- in fact, yesterday at Blair House -- for just over $3 million in edible oil -- oils for -- cooking oil for Botswana. The country will be hard pressed this year and they will be importing a great deal of food grains and we'll be watching to see how matters develop and maybe we'll have to step in with some more, but --

Q The $10 million was independent of any special aid for drought? That's an ongoing --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right. That is an ongoing phenomena. Correct me, but I think over the course, that is, since about 1970, we've put in $160 million in assistance. It's assistance that's been extremely well used. The Botswanans are careful and the money has been well well spent and we have an excellent aid -- an excellent relationship of cooperation.

Q Did the President ask --

Q But the only thing specifically -- Wait. But the only thing specifically for the drought is this agreement on edible oils?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct at the moment. We'll have to see how much further aggravated it is --

Q Did he ask for more?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, he didn't ask for anything further. He asked that we follow -- that we be sensitive and that we stay in touch.

He asked for us, also, to think about other needs that Botswana has and we'll, of course, take those into account. One of the most pressing is in railway transportation. Botswana depends heavily on it -- as a land-locked country -- on its rail system. We'll be taking a look at that.

Q There was a -- I'm not too familiar on this; but Congressman Fauntroy of D.C. apparently is concerned about a prisoner in the country. Did that come up? Clemency or -- you know -- is this an issue that was brought up at the staff level or at the Presidential level?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, the issue didn't come up. I am aware that it came up yesterday on the Hill. Let me say that -- very clearly -- that we have a lot of respect for the Botswanan

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judicial system. It is a -- in the fullest sense of the word -- a fair court system. It's rigorous in its procedures. The rule of law is strictly applied to Botswana. And I'm not going to stand here and second-guess their court system. They value it and they work with it very carefully. Human rights records in Botswana are absolutely excellent.

Q I have two questions. Despite what you said about aid, does the U.S. have any plans to donate any surplus dairy or grain products to Botswana or to any of the other nations in the region?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not for the moment for Botswana. We have a very, very busy food relief and food assistance effort under way broadly in Southern Africa. In Zimbabwe; the largest in the world, actually, in Mozambique. In Zambia. There's practically not a nation in the southern part of the continent that has not been dreadfully affected by the drought and black independence states in the area -- we're engaged in almost every one of them. I may have missed one that we haven't done --

Q As I understand, that's monetary aid, but what about our surplus products?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no. Food -- Title II -- we did some dairy product delivery for Mozambique, and we have the idea under review for one other country in the region but it's -- we haven't gotten very far with the review yet.

Q Which country? How much?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't want to talk about numbers because we literally haven't ascertained the requirements, not have we been in communication with the government.

Q Also you said that Botswana and the U.S. -- the President agreed on everything. You don't really mean that they agreed on the South African government, do you? Doesn't Botswana have some complaints about that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President and the -- the two Presidents talked about the situation broadly in the region. Botswana obviously lives in a tricky situation. We didn't -- there was no issue taken. We're fully aware of the kind of problems Botswana faces. It's a region-wide problem. We're trying to do something about it. Botswanans are pleased that we're as active and engaged and committed as we are in bringing peace to the region.

Q Is Botswana going to be one of the African countries that would be recipients of the $500 million special aid for Africa?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The economic policy initiative that is part of the FY '85 budget has -- and obviously has not yet been passed by the Congress -- we have not yet decided which countries on the continent will -- we will extend this special form of assistance to. But let me be careful about its purposes. The purposes of this program are to promote economic reform, to assist governments that are engaged in tough economic reform measures.

For example, as governments deal with agricultural pricing systems, we would like to be able to come in and give them a bit of a hand. We haven't made our decisions yet as to which the recipient countries have been, and so it's, therefore, premature to talk about Botswana's candidacy.

THE PRESS: Thank you very much.

END 1:50 P.M. EDT

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

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BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH ON CENTRAL AMERICA

May 9, 1984

The Briefing Room

6:47 P.M. EST

MR. SIMS: All right, this briefing will be on background. It's attributable to a Senior Administration Official. Let me add that we will have a fact sheet in addition to the tome you already have, which will be handed out.

Q Are the fact sheets available? It might be helpful --

MR. SIMS: When they're available, we'll hand them out.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I know you have deadlines. I'll be very brief. For a long time the President --

Q This is not embargoed?

Q Wait, did you say it was embargoed?

MR. SIMS: Background.

Q But not embargoed?

MR. SIMS: It's embargoed until the presentation.

Q I have no deadline. Go ahead. (Laughter.)

Q -- talking about the writing press, but that's all right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President has been concerned for some time, this goes back many, many months, at the need to explain to the American people the character of the threat we face in the last part of the 20th century, specifically the numbers of -- or the expressions of alarm have been devoted to concern over nuclear conflict expressed in freeze movements, concern over terrorism, concern over violence in many places of the world. The President thought there was an urgent need to explain to the American people how they should view these several possibilities. In his judgment,for about 10 years since the establishment of strategic parity between ourselves and the Soviet Union, the issue has not been a greater likelihood of nuclear conflict; indeed, that is not likely because of the prudence of leaders on both sides and the imponderables of the outcome of a nuclear conflict, and it shall remain so, he is confident, for as long as we maintain the balance.

To the contrary, the threat, as he sees it, has been played out and demonstrated; it's not a matter for speculation, and we have seen it occur from Angola to Ethiopia, South Yemen, Indochina, Afghanistan, more recently in Nicaragua and El Salvador, that is, the threat of low-order conflict and increased willingness of the Soviet Union to take risks, using surrogates, primarily, to subvert friendly states in the developing world.

And tonight he will focus upon that problem generically as well as with specific reference to Central America. The issue is framed on the second page of the text, where the President says the issue is our effort to promote democracy and economic well-being in the face of Cuban and Nicaraguan aggression, aided and abetted by the Soviet Union.

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The President develops this text, and I won't recite it for you, you've already read it. His concern is placed in context on page 4 of the text, where he says if we do nothing, or if we continue to provide too little, our choice will be a communist Central America with additional communist military bases on the mainland of this hemisphere and communist subversion spreading Southward and Northward.

Q That's on page 2.

Q Where are we?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I apologize. I'm reading from a big text print.

And, finally, he says that faced with that problem, what is required is a national commitment, not a Congressional commitment, but a commitment by all of the American people and the Executive Branch and the Congress working together. He says that so far our problem has been that we have not provided enough to avoid outright disaster; we have provided a little, but not enough to resolve the crisis. So El Salvador is being left to slowly bleed to death. And that is a central point of his argument that the problem is reversible, there is no inexorability

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to the subversion of friendly states. They can defend themselves if they are provided enough means to do it.

The United States' ratio of what is put into nation building, or economic and social issues as opposed to security assistance, is running more than three to one in Central America and the bipartisan commission ratio about seven to one.

The intention in Nicaragua to assure that their own revolution is expanded into other countries of Central America is documented, and the President stresses that in his remarks, quoting from leaders of the insurgency in Salvador trained by the Sandinistas: "We have the brilliant revolutionary example of Nicaragua ... the struggle in El Salvador is advanced: The same in Guatemala and Honduras is developing quickly ... very soon Central America will be one revolutionary entity ..."

The --

Q Who said that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is a quote from a leader of the Salvadoran insurgency. It isn't named in the text. It is Cayetano Carpio, who was --

Q So that's from a different --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They use a different quote, right.

Q Sir, excuse me, you're not quoting the President?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I take back the Carpio. We took his quote out of the text. I'll get you the documentation on that.

Q Do you know who it is --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: A Salvadoran guerrilla leader publishing in a TFLT journal. '81.

Q Does he have a name? Or you're going to get that, is that it? It doesn't matter.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICAL: The President believes that we have faced the problem before. He draws analogy to President Truman's actions after World War II, when communist subversion in Greece, well advanced after a two-year effort, was confronted by the Truman administration successfully by an assistance program which led ultimately to the formation of parliamentary democracy in Greece.

Turning to a reason for why now and why the urgency, the President, near the close of the speech, points out that

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evidence mounts of Cuban intentions to double its support to the Salvadoran guerrillas and bring down that newly-elected government in the fall. Unless we provide the resources, the communists will likely succeed."

And immediately thereafter, he frames the issue as: "Will we support freedom in this hemisphere or not? Will we defend our vital interests in this hemisphere or not? Will we stop the spread of communism in this hemisphere or not? Will we act while there is still time?"

One or two short points and I'll close.

First of all, there is often suggested the notion that the Nicaraguan massive increase in force is a response to the opposition that has occured in their country. The attachments to the fact sheet, that they'll pass out momentarily, point out the timing of the increase in Nicaraguan forces from about 10,000 in '79 to over 100,000 trained forces now, which predates any opposition in Nicaragua and was already well advanced.

The President makes the point that we are not talking about the commitment of U.S. troops in combat in Central America and throughout and, at his insistence, as he wrote the speech and edited it, removed any reference that would suggest that our problem to date is a result of Congressional inaction. He is calling upon the Congress for a cooperative effort. He relies upon the bipartisan report, which the Kissinger Commission submitted. And he calls for a national consensus and volunteers to work with the Congress to reach this consensus.

The central point and purpose of the speech is to call for the enactment now both of the authorizing and appropriations

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measures for the 1984 supplemental requests he has before the Congress and the full Kissinger Commission legislative passage -- the five-year program. I'll be glad to take your questions.

Yes?

Q A mechanical question, maybe. Officials were saying last week that there was at least one draft of the speech circulating and yet I read in the papers today that the President sat down over the weekend and began writing the speech from the very beginning -- himself, last weekend. Are both true? Or did he throw away the draft or is there something unusual about that? Could you explain how this speech came to be? Was there a draft prepared for him? Did he say it was inadequate and write his own -- own speech or what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President, as I said, several weeks ago, laid out the problem and said that he would like to speak to the country on it. We did submit a draft to him before the China trip. The concept he agreed with. He said he wanted to put it in his words. He did -- began again this past weekend and wrote virtually the entirety of it. It does have here and there excerpts from the previous draft and that includes contributions by the Department of State and Defense and his White House staff here.

Q Thank you.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Lou?

Q There is no reference at all to the mining in this speech. Yet that blanket statement that's on seven, page seven on our text, about how we have this legal right and moral duty in a kind of a sweeping statement would seem to include that. Would he include -- so we're clear on that point -- would he include the mining of Nicaragua, the harbors, as a -- one of the proper steps to resist this subversion?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, the President doesn't encompass nor refer to any covert action -- I don't mean to be cut -- nor would he, of course. He expresses here in the text that we must support the aspirations of the people seeking freedom in Central America but he doesn't intend that this speech serve as an endorsement for any particular covert action.

Helen?

Q Why did he decide not to -- because there have been many reports before this speech that he would take his case to the people and put Congress on notice, basically, that they were letting Central America down by not approving these funds a long time ago -- why did he decide to turn the other cheek?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I would say personally that while there are some in the administration that have seen the problem as essentially one of congressional inactivity, the President feels very strongly that that is not the issue -- that neither he nor any administration can sustain a policy which the American people do not support. And he wanted to go to the people on it and to invite, as he has in meetings with Congressional leaders -- bipartisan leaders, cooperation with the Congress on this.

Andrea?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Why doesn't he deal with the issue of covert actions since that is the primary issue that's disturbing people in this country and is affecting support for his policies?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, first of all, I don't think he would agree that the problem on the policy is American opposition to covert action. I think he believes that

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it is a problem of American -- not understanding how their interests, what interests we have, why they should care, why Central America is important, is it threatened, if we should care, and what we should do about it, can it work.

Q Well, in that context, isn't it appropriate for the American people to know how he feels about covert action so that they can make intelligent judgments about what we should be doing about this threat?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think, and I'm speculating, but the President has never felt -- and I think honestly if you look at the level of resources that go into one or the other, overt versus covert -- has never felt that any policy could be sustained foremostly by covert action. It cannot.

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When you look at what we put into economic, social, and military assistance, it dwarfs, by any standard of measure, anything that has ever been proposed for covert action. And so the President believes, rightly, that we must sell the policy based upon what can succeed, and it is overt policy actions, economic, social, security assistance, and diplomacy -- and I should have mentioned, and the President pointedly put in, our support for the Contadora process and the diplomacy associated with it. A negotiated outcome is the ultimate answer here.

Q I thought you --

Q Can you characterize how this speech, how the message here differs from last April's speech before the joint session?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In terms of goals, it is a reaffirmation of those goals, which have not changed: democratization, demilitarization, lowering of military power, ceasing the export of revolution to neighbors, and so forth -- those have not changed -- and economic development.

Q This is at least the fourth major speech he has delivered on this subject. You said earlier that he removed references to Congress being the obstacle. What, in his mind and your mind, is the problem of trying to sell this policy to the American people? It has been a problem.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: For the past two or three days when that question's been posed by others from the Congress and elsewhere, the President has said -- has cited reports in the news that two candidates currently for the Senate in one of our states, when asked, couldn't identify which side we are backing. And he said, "Obviously, if that's the case, the American people don't understand this issue." And he wanted to do that. It is a speech designed to illuminate the issue of the problem in Central America and the solution to it.

Q I thought the key vote tomorrow, probably, tomorrow in the House, was on the Broomfield Amendment, which has to do with fencing or unfencing the money in the fiscal '85 budget which, as I understand it, is the money the President requested. Why is there nothing in this speech about that particular issue, that is, whether there should be an affirmative Congressional declaration on his reporting on progress or not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Broomfield-Murtha Amendment is consistent with the National Bipartisan Commission recommendations and the President's bill. It is a multi-year bill providing for full funding of economic, social, and military assistance, so it expresses what he is calling for. But the President believes, and I am speculating here, that to so focus upon a given legislative event tomorrow, which is not the end-all and be-all of his purpose, would be to miss the point and people, after tomorrow, would say, well, that is behind us.

Authorizations are not enough. Appropriations won't be taken up tomorrow. Those are essential, as well as the broader purpose of just what is it we're trying to do and how that policy is threatened.

Q Well, then, if I may just follow, when he says, on our page 8, that he wants to get all the funds that he requested for fiscal year 1984, he wants, then, the full amount and not the so-called agreed-on compromise of $62 million?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is correct.

Q Let me make another stab at covert, can I?

Q Let me --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Go ahead, and then Lou after that.

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Q There seems to be, again, some potential confusion about the role of the Contras. The President talks about them again as freedom fighters. After the last go-round with Senator Moynihan on what their intention -- what our support is intended to accomplish, is the President meaning the portray the Contras as freedom fighters determined to overthrow the Sandinistas?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. The purposes of the United States Government in any activities that it supports there is not, in any case, to overthrow any government.

Q Does the President believe that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry, I promised Lou here.

Q I'm confused by your answers on the covert. The President, in this Briefing Room, and in interviews, has supported this activity, whether he's made it the prime thing we're doing or not, as an effort to discourage the Sandinistas from supporting

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the guerrillas in El Salvador. There's no way in which he is in any way backing off from that, is there? I mean, you're -- in briefing us on this speech, is there any change in his position about our support for the Contras as he has described their role? I mean, whether or not they're going to overthrow the Sandinistas or not.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, first, I don't -- I'm not trying to be cute by evading a specific reference of this administration's support for a conference. That is a matter of law and of what is covert and overt.

The President isn't changing his policy at all in this speech. The President refers to the freedom fighters in this speech in two or three contexts. In one, pointing out they're volunteering to lay down their arms and participate in elections. He doesn't, in any other context, say that we are or are not supporting them. He is not changing his policies by this speech.

Q He still wants the funding --

Q Can you tell us --

Q He still wants the funding for the Contras? Is that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I will say that the current proposals before the Congress remain there and remain fully supported by the President.

Q Is this something that changed? Because earlier today -- not so long ago -- we were told the President would point out the anti-Sandinistas have made Nicaraguan export of subversion very difficult, have exerted positive pressure on Nicaragua to negotiate. It sounds like he was going to make an issue of it and it's not there.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the speech still reflects that he supports the aspirations of the people. He has never, to my knowledge, intended to make a point of the Contras. The broader point of the full policy package is his purpose here tonight.

Q Does the President's feeling that the Congress is no longer -- is not the obstacle as manifested in this speech, does that contradict his statements at the Georgetown speech and also his last press conference?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I would have to say that I think probably I sowed more confusion on that Georgetown speech than anybody else. The President felt very strongly in the wake of the Georgetown speech that what his intention was for that had not come across and he wanted to be emphatically clear that it did come across in this speech. And it was that it was not a contest with the Congress, that it could not succeed without the cooperation of the Congress, and he wanted to cooperate.

Q I want to return to the Contras' reference. Larry Speakes, in his briefing on the record at noon in reviewing what the speech -- characterized the speech's themes -- told us that one of the themes would be that the anti-Sandinista forces have made Nicaraguan export of subversion more difficult and have exerted positive pressure. There is no reference to that effect in the speech. So the question is what happened?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: First of all, in defense of Larry, that was, in point of fact, in the text at the time.

Q All right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President has been --

Q That was Debbie's question of a minute ago.

Q Isn't that what I just asked you?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry. I didn't

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understand that.

Q It's the same quote.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President has worked on this speech throughout the day and this is the text to be delivered.

Q Why would --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That does not contradict what Larry says. The President would agree with what Larry said. (Laughter.)

Q Nice going.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The fact that we are interested in curtailing the export of violence from Nicaragua to El Salvador is clear.

Q Why was it taken out?

Q Yes.

Q I mean, it sounds as though it was taken out so as not to muddy the waters, or however you want to put it, on El Salvador.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I have to speculate on it, and if you want that speculation, I would say that, frankly, it is this point of law and principle -- that is, that you cannot, without fundamentally changing your position in law and in principle, discuss these matters, and should not.

Q You can discuss the purpose of them and how they're succeeding, can't you? And what is the purpose of our support of the Contras if it's not to overthrow the government? We've heard different explanations at different times.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, because of that same restriction, all I can tell you is that we are in our policies, in all the activities that we support, trying to stop the export of revolution and to facilitate economic growth and

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development in democratic states in Central America. And that's what all our programs are designed to do.

Q Well, but previously we -- aid to the Contras has been justified as stopping the flow of arms to El Salvador or exerting pressure on the Sandinistas to negotiate. Are those the specific purposes still and are -- is it succeeding in that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If you're quoting from leaks from the Congress, that is --

Q No, I'm quoting from things the President has said and I'm quoting from things that have been said in this briefing room a number of times.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would take issue with you, but I'm not disagreeing in your principle. What -- The President to my knowledge has never said that we are supporting the Contras to stop export of arms or revolution and to put pressure on. We do support those aims. It's a technicality; I'm not trying to disagree with your argument.

It's just a matter of public confirmation on that point. That's all.

Q Sir --

Q Sir --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q At the beginning of the speech -- and you, too, refer to there not being now a threat of nuclear war , but the danger is being ground down by communist subversion, or something. Is that just dramatic illustration or does it augur some major change in your strategic policy?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It doesn't --

Q I have never heard that before. I thought this was the big nuclear group. I didn't know this was the ground forces, conventional forces, administration. In other words, this seems to be the kind -- you seem to be reflecting criticism that's been leveled at the administration. Or is it a way of illustrating this type of situation, Central America? Which is not a nuclear battlefield, obviously.

Q Not yet.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is an expression of what the President believes, that is, that once the condition of parity was achieved in the mid-seventies, that the effect of that was to change Soviet behavior. The response publicly has been in recent years to say that that condition of parity makes nuclear war more likely than it was when we were superior. The President's point is that's not true and will remain untrue as long as a balance is maintained, and that's why he's put a modernization program in to do that.

But what is likely, and played out in country after country, is this low-order conflict. So he's trying to say that is the global problem and that is what we must contend with specifically in Central America.

Q The President says that evidence mounts of Cuba's intentions to double its support to the Salvadoran guerrillas. Can you tell us a little bit about this evidence that is mounting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is reliable, highly credible reports of decisions taken and actions under way to accomplish that end, and I'm sorry I can't go beyond that.

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Q On El Salvador for a second, if --

Q Can I go back to the covert just a second?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, go ahead.

Q How do you sell the American public on an action which is very controversial, the covert activities, when you refuse to talk about it, but you have your political opponents out all over the country talking about it and the whole American political scene talking about it except you?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well --

Q And the President gets a chance to talk about it tonight a little bit, and he takes it out of his speech. How do you go about selling the public on this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'll say it again. The President does feel strongly about this. You're absolutely right about the public portrayal or the public discourse on this policy. But the reality is that the policy relies foremostly on completely overt actions and that the vast majority both of resources, of diplomacy, and of all of the other dimensions of policy are overt measures which are central to success. Whatever might be put into covert actions is miniscule compared in importance and magnitude to the broader policy context.

We do not rely upon covert actions for the policy to succeed.

Q But the covert actions, i.e., the mining of the harbors, could bring down the whole policy in the public view.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, if this --

Q And yet you're not defending it.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If the point, and I'm a little slow, I guess, on getting it now, is that you believe that the legitimacy of covert actions as an instrument of policy deserves treatment, I personally agree with that.

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Q Why doesn't the President present this view if he believes in it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, he may at some point. He did believe strongly that in defending the Central American policy and explaining it to the American people that you had to focus on the 99% of the policy substance which doesn't involve any covert actions.

Q On that point, is the rather vague justification for covert language on page seven a substitute for the orginal draft reference to the pressure on Nicaragua to stop exporting revolution? What I'm referring to is the "El Salvador and its friends are certainly justified in defending themselves by blocking the flow of arms. The United States has a legal right and moral duty -- " Was that substituted for the earlier reference?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Where on page seven are you? I'm sorry.

Q Second paragraph.

Q Page seven, second paragraph.

Q What Lou quoted.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'd have to say that this speech has been altered in many ways and the composition right now -- it wasn't, to answer your question, in that particular paragraph. That particular paragraph --

Q It was the freedom-fighters paragraph on page six, bottom of page six, was it not?

Q -- the same. Was that more vague justification dropped in place of the more up front references that Speakes was referring to at noon about the successful pressure on the government to stop exporting revolution?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think that the paragraphs at the bottom of six and seven apply generically -- that the legitimacy of our policy actions, as contraposed to those of the Soviet Union, is a defensible position.

Q Was the language substituted or what was taken out of the draft speech?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I would say that there have been changes in those two paragraphs. There have been quite a lot of other changes. I'm sorry I -- I guess I don't track myself back to exactly what changed when. There have been quite a few.

Yes?

Q At what point was the critical language toward congressmen -- was that also done today -- the more direct criticism of Congress?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: From the beginning, the President, in his own writing, has never entertained any acerbic criticism of the Congress. And, so, from ground zero before last weekend, he never --

Q Was it in the original draft that was prepared for him before China?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The -- well, I think that's a little unfair to the President. People, subordinates, did suggest that there should be a more clear drawing of the lines and the President sharply disagreed with that.

Q Who are those at whom John Kennedy -- at whose gullibility John Kennedy would be appalled if he were alive today -- at the top of page six? Is this not a reference to the Members of Congress who have opposed the President's policies or is this reference by the others --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think there are enough public and private figures who have criticized the policy and making reference to earlier administrations. But I guess the answer is I don't know to whom he has specifically in mind there. But they're not -- I mean, that isn't out of line. There are a lot of people who critize it --

MR. SIMS: -- one or two more --

Q May I ask one question off-beat?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Helen.

Q Reverend Jackson is going to the Soviet embassy tomorrow to make a pitch for reinstatement of the Soviet participation in the Olympics. What would be the White House point of view on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I suppose I don't have any comment. It's a free country.

Q Could we ask about El Salvador? Do you have any -- D'Aubuisson this afternoon claimed that he has won the election in El Salvador. Does the administration -- will this, in any way, change the speech, in other words, whether he is elected or not elected, will that have any effect on his fundamental view, that is Reagan's military aid to El Salvador?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We rely upon the commission established to validate the results down there and that, as well as the reports of observers who met today with the President, seems pretty clear that the outcome is for President Duarte. But I haven't seen that report that you mentioned. It doesn't seem likely to me that --

Q Jesse Helms is saying that we rigged that for Duarte. He said it again today. He didn't use the word, rigged, but he kept saying that the State Department --

Q Bought.

Q Yes, bought.

Q Rigged is a dirty word.

Q And so people said to him, "Well, Larry Speakes says that's not true." And he said, "Well, if Speakes hasn't seen the evidence, he's the only one who hasn't." What can you tell us about Jesse?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think, really, that -- first of all, this government has not taken sides in those elections. The administration's expressed willingness to live with any particular outcome was repeated many times. In this part of the world and other parts of the world, our policies often lead us to support institutions, labor unions, parties, things like that. Those institutions from other sources -- private sources -- may get money, and help or harm their own cause. But that is not the United States government's position and we did not take sides here.

The observers today in coming in to see the President, as it regards charges against Ambassador Pickering -- Democrats and Republicans both -- were without any qualification, insisted upon their enormous respect and admiration for Ambassador Pickering and his performance down there.

Q Will you be on the record for the post-speech comments? Your answer on Jackson -- there's no need to be on background on that, is there? The Jackson question? It's a free country. It's kind of hard to say a senior official acknowledged that this is a free country. (Laughter.) I mean, we all know that. Can you say that on the record? I mean, I understand you briefed on the speech on background. But do you brief on Jesse Jackson on the record?

Q Careful, there's a trap there somewhere.

Q You can quote me --

Q I want to quote you that it's a free country.

Q I know there's a trap here someplace.

MR. MCFARLANE: Yes.

END 7:24 P.M. EDT

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF
PRESIDENT DE LA MADRID OF MEXICO

May 14, 1984

The Briefing Room

10:08 A.M. EDT

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I assume that, as normally, you don't have a schedule. Would you like for me to go through the schedule quickly, before we go into the Q's and A's?

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All right.

President de la Madrid will arrive at 3:30 p.m. this afternoon at Andrews Air Force Base, where he will then be helicoptered to the Washington Monument grounds and then escorted to his hotel.

The official visit starts tomorrow morning at 10:00 a.m. with a White House arrival ceremony.

Q Who greets him today? Do you know?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are no briefings scheduled per se.

Q Greets. Greets.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: May I go through the schedule, please?

Q He said, "Greets."

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Could I please go through the schedule, please?

Q He said, "Who greets him?"

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: At 10:30 a.m., President Reagan meets with de la Madrid. There will be two series of meetings, one, more than likely, a one-on-one, followed by their Cabinet groups.

President de la Madrid is accompanied by three of his Cabinet officers, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs Sepulveda, Secretary of Finance Silva-Herzog, Secretary of Commerce Hernandez.

At 12:30 p.m., Secretary Shultz will host a lunch for him at the Department of State. At 2:05 p.m. and at 2:25 p.m. there will be two wreath-laying ceremonies, one at the Lincoln Memorial and one at the Juarez Monument at Virginia and New Hampshire Avenues.

That night at 8:00 p.m., there will be a State Dinner in his honor.

Wednesday, President de la Madrid will address a Joint Session of Congress at 11:00 a.m. At 12:00 p.m., he will attend a luncheon hosted by the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Percy. At 4:00 p.m., he will meet with Secretary Shultz. And at 7:30 p.m., he will host a dinner at the

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Mexican Embassy in honor of their state visit.

On Thursday, there will be a departure ceremony at the Washington Monument grounds at 10:10 a.m. and he will depart by helicopter for Andrews Air Force Base at 10:30 a.m.

That is the --

Q There are no two meetings, as reported from Mexico, on --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is a possibility of a second meeting. The details and the timing of which have not been worked out.

Let me just tick off the issues that we feel will be discussed and then we can get to your questions.

First, on the bilateral basis, subsidies and a possible agreement between the United States and Mexico on Mexican subsidies of their exports to the United States, we are getting close on an agreement and I'm sure that there will be some discussion between the Presidents on that.

In the same vein of trade, there will be a general trade and investment discussion. We are also close in arriving at setting out a -- procedures on how to deal with investments -- that is, investments in Mexico, investments in the U.S. and trade between the two.

The issue of border sanitation, as you may recall, was a subject at La Paz and it continues to be a subject with regards to the --

Q What's that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sanitation. It's -- sewer water, clean air -- it's more clean water than clean air -- to the borders common to the two countries.

We feel that probably the subject of border cooperation, which is a continuing subject, will come up and we are working on a mechanism that will fit into the existing bi-national commission, so that we can address those issues of border cooperations between agencies on a little closer scale.

Obviously, Central America

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on the multi-lateral issue, on the multi-lateral front, will be a subject for discussions between the two Presidents. And then, we also feel that the whole issue of world, Third Country, LDC debt, dialogues within the hemisphere -- those subjects generally will be discussed.

Let me point out to you that it is not anticipated that any agreements will be signed between the two Presidents. This is not an unusual event in -- with regards to U.S.-Mexican relations because they are fairly intense on a broad range of things and we don't, like we do for some other countries, wait for the meeting of two Presidents in order to sign some kind of an agreement.

The fact that the Secretary of Finance, Silva-Herzog, and Secretary of Commerce Hernandez, have been in town for a couple of days meeting with their counterparts and others is just an ongoing manifestation -- ongoing process in which we go through with them. If there is a -- agreements and it is of the magnitude to be signed at the Presidential level, it will be. If there are agreements and they're not one that you sign at Presidential levels, the Cabinet officers can initial these agreements as they go along. So, signing an agreement is not a prerequisite for a state visit from Mexico. This is the third meeting that they've had since President de la Madrid was elected and so it's an ongoing process.

I will stop at that point and take your questions.

Q How about immigration?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q Explain the subsidies a little.

Q Did immigration come up?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me -- subsidies, first, and then I'll take immigration, if I may.

Pardon -- what was the question on subsidies?

Q -- we're nearing an agreement on subsidies. What is it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Reaching an agreement on subsidies. Under our law --

Q Have we reached an agreement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we are close to reaching an agreement with them. Under our law, as you know, under the countervailing duty laws, if U.S. industries feel that they are being subject to unfair competition in the sense that the goods that are being imported in the United States are subsidized by the government, they can then invoke the countervailing duties.

Mexico does not belong to the GATT, which is an area that covers this on an international fora, so what we're trying to do is arrive at some kind of an agreement with regards to what subsidies we are concerned about and our industries are concerned about.

Let me take the immigration, and then I'll come back to you.

Q Wait -- what kinds are you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q What kind of products and --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, it's a variety of products, normally non-agricultural. It can be steel, it can be other parts.

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Q Are you talking about a general agreement in principle, or agreements on specific product areas?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think what you'll find is a mixture of the two. In other words, there will be a general agreement in principle with regards to it and there may be some specific ones. As I say, this is kind of a moving target that's been worked on for quite awhile and including over this weekend.

Q What does it mean, in terms of Mexico? That they will withhold or they --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It means that we will have an agreement as to what we both agree are subsidies or not subsidies.

Subsidies are a very complicated issue. They can become direct, they can be indirect. It's just so that we have an understanding among each other as to what we would define --

Q What happens if they're subsidized? The products.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the complaint of U.S. industries, and in many cases, very valid, is that they have to compete with a product that is subsidized by some other government and so therefore, they consider that to be unfair competition .

Q So what will we do?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As I said, we would arrive at an agreement as to the definition as to what is subsidies, what aren't subsidies, and how you address them per se.

Q Would you tell us, please, some of the specific products that have been invoked by U.S. industry? Some of the items --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I will have to get that for you. I cannot do it off the top of my head.

Yes? You had a question?

Q Yes, about immigration. Was it a subject of discussic

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know if it will or not. The Mexican position has traditionally been that they do not address a subject that is under pending U.S. legislation with regards to immigration. It may or may not, in the side conversations that take place between the Secretaries of State and the Foreign Minister -- become an issue -- be an issue for discussion.

Q But it's not -- but it's not a --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is not an issue. Obviously, it's important to them. They watch it. But they've always taken the position that while U.S. legislation is pending, they don't formally bring it forward.

Q The whole question of the Contadora process -- the Mexicans are apparently concerned that we and some of the other countries are supporting it in principle, but doing other things, such as increasing military aid, that goes against the Contadora position and that we're not being terribly helpful. What is --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think that -- I can give you the general tenor of the -- as I understand it, of Ambassador Gavin met as recently as this week with President de la Madrid. Harry Shlaudeman was there the week before meeting with de la Madrid. The week before that, the Foreign Minister was here. Under all those occasions, the subject of Contadora, Central America, peace and the rest of it were discussed. And what you get is you get a general agreement on where we're trying to get that is a peaceful solution. But, on occasions, what you have is a frank exchange on some of the ideas.

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I would not characterize it, under any stretch of the imagination, that there is a serious difference on it.

Q Why not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, because I don't think that to be true based upon the conversations directly with Sepulveda and de la Madrid.

Q But they don't think that we're doing enough, and in fact, they think that some of the things we're doing --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me tell you something about this thing about we're -- U.S. doesn't do enough.

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You get that from everywhere. You get it from Nicaragua. You get it from Cuba. This issue --

Q Well --

Q -- are you comparing Mexico --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, just a minute. Let me just -- I'm trying to be responsive to your question. This issue of the United States not being responsive to Contadora is an issue that doesn't go away for whatever reason. I can just tell you that in our conversations with them we go through the things that we are doing in that sense, and I think that there is reasonable satisfaction on their part.

We have worked with the different countries on the technical aspects of how do you go about the very difficult problem of verifying arms. What you have to understand in the Contadora process is this -- that they are now at the toughest position that they can be, that is, take 21 points that they've all agree to, reduce it down to treaty language, and not only something you could agree to in writing but something that each one believes the other believes will be enforced.

So, you're at the funnel of the Contadora process.

Q Would you expect that the President will raise this whole issue of so-called Tet-like offensive in the fall as an issue with de la Madrid to warn him of how serious we think the threat down there is?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would envision that in -- and they have had as they did in La Paz, as you may remember, a long, long conversation on this subject. I would expect that in the exchanging of ideas and of informations that the President will make available to President de la Madrid not only his thoughts but the products of our intelligence analysis as to the future in that area.

Yes?

Q Do you expect de la Madrid -- two questions -- Do you expect de la Madrid to bring a draft treaty with him to show to the President? And, second of all, we're told often that the Mexicans often say one thing publicly for domestic consumption and another privately. Is that going on in terms of these comments about Contadora?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm unaware of any draft treaty that they're going to get forward. In the Contadora process, the state of play was on April 30th the working groups were unable to come up with a draft treaty. It was then decided among the nine that the four Contadora countries would take their hands at cracking -- at what the three groups had worked -- that is, the other five -- and try to further the process. And they're due to get that by the end of June.

I would be surprised if they have a draft treaty that the four of them could agree -- that they haven't even gone to the nine with at this stage of the game. And what was the second part of your question?

Q -- second part of the question is that we're told often that the Mexicans frequently say one thing publicly for consumption at home and another thing privately concerning Central America-U.S. policy.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me say this on that subject: That is not something -- You could make the same comment about members of U.S. Congress, and I don't say that in a derogatory sense. That is not an unusual event --

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Q You can say it about the administration --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- event in public-- That is not an unusual event in public life either national or international. Okay?

Q Are there signs privately that Mexico is more supportive of the U.S. or perhaps less supportive of Nicaraguans than there have been six months ago or a year ago?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I wouldn't say there are any signs either way. I think that they are -- what they are concerned with -- and as we are to a large degree -- is that the Contadora process -- how do you get through this funnel which is the most difficult part for it.

Yes?

Q Why did the President in his speech last week say that he supported the objectives of the Contadora process but omitted saying that he supported the process itself? What are --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think you're reading more into than -- and maybe it was inartfully drafted -- but the intent --

Q Well --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- well -- the intent is that he supports the Contadora process as well as the objectives. You have two things: You have the 21 points that have come forward under the Contadora banner, and then you have the Contadora process. He supports both of them. No doubt about it.

Q We're told he wrote the speech himself.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q We're told he wrote the speech himself. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, then, you can accuse of him inartfully drafting -- (Laughter.)

Q No, you just said it was inartfully drafted. (Laughter.)

Q Sorry.

Q Sir -- sir --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are some days that I would like to get fired but not today.

Q Can we put that on the record?

Q Is it --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Helen, let me get somebody else here. Go ahead.

Q A minute ago, you referred to the criticism from Mexico in the same context as the criticism from Cuba and Nicaragua. Do you view that -- the Mexican comments on --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. What I didn't get to finish was, you'll also hear that from other nations, too. And what I'm saying is it's not like only the Mexicans say. I think you can find a level of frustration on the part of those dealing directly with the program, and secondly, it's not a bad line to take -- if something is not going as fast as one would like, why don't you lay it on Uncle Sam's doorstep.

Yes?

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Q Does the Mexican government disagree with U.S. policy and actions toward Nicaragua now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think you would have to ask the Mexican government that.

Q But you suggested that there weren't any serious disagreements between the United States and Mexico about philosophies so I'm wondering if that might be a disagreement about approach or can you give us some disagreement that we have with them over actual implementation of Central American policy?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, as I said, I think you have to ask the Mexicans specifically on those items -- A lot of these disagreements, sometimes, are less than disagreements. They go over nuances on how one proceeds under a different set of facts. I think that's best characterized that way. Yes, sir?

Q Well, let me put it another way. What is our sense of what the Mexican attitude is toward this latest round of activity by the administration to increase drastically it's -- the amount of military assistance to El Salvador. Are the Mexicans concerned about that? Is it coming at a time when the President's devoting a lot of energy to that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The subject of El Salvador comes up in a general context of the whole Central American issue. But I'm not aware of any Mexican heartburn with a continued effort to defeat the guerrillas in El Salvador.

Helen, I let somebody else go a second time, so you can go now -- you had another question.

Q I think there's a widespread perception that this administration does not want a negotiated peace in Central America.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't know how widespread it is. I've heard that, and I can tell you --

Q I mean, he had one sentence in a whole speech on Central America -- one sentence saying we support the objectives of the Contadora. That's the only reference to a peace settlement -- a peaceful settlement --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I tell you what -- you and I ought to go through that script together, because I think there was more than one. The Contadora was mentioned once, in the beginning it was mentioned, in the end it was mentioned -- he reaffirmed his four principles that he lay down before Congress on April 27th, both within the first four paragraphs and in the last paragraph, and interspersed through there. I don't agree with that assertion that it's a widespread --

Q But there is no --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes?

Q But there is no perception that this administration is working for a negotiated settlement, in any active way.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I would tell you that I think the facts go the other way. Ambassador Shlaudeman, since he's been here; prior to him, Ambassador Stone -- I've been to Managua several times. We engage with them on a continuing basis. There is, uppermost in our minds, an attempt to grapple with the basic problem and go after the peaceful negotiation, because the President's fundamental thinking is that that is the way you resolve this problem.

Yes, sir?

Q There was a report published -- what?

Q Never mind.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Go ahead.

Q There was a report published a little while ago about a White House directive urging that, in these meetings coming up, that the President raise with de la Madrid the whole question of

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U.S. economic aid as leverage on Mexico to get Mexico to see things our way. Could you comment on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'm not going to comment on anything specific. I think you are referring to what I saw in a press reference to a NSTD. I'm not going to comment on that, but let me just tell you that the U.S.-Mexican relations -- because of the 2,000 mile border, because of all the issues that we have, I haven't even ticked off some of the ones that may or may not be discussed by the Presidents -- so, U.S.-Mexico relations, bilateral and also our multilateral stances, are under continued review and constant review to see where one fits in with the other. That's the extent of the comment on it.

Yes?

Q Isn't it true that the Mexican government, through the Foreign Ministry, has gone on the record as being opposed to any military solution to the problems of Central America as embodied in U.S. military assistance to El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica and the Contra?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think you can -- well, you can ask the Foreign Secretary. I'm not so sure I've seen it in those words. But let me tell you that the President's policy addresses all four of the issues -- in the Central American context and peace to the region, regional peace -- the President is not after a military solution, either, so if that's true there's no disagreement on that.

Q Well, I'm sure I've seen it in those words.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay, well, fine. I'm not disputing it, I'm just saying that if that is, in fact, true, then there would be agreement on that issue.

Q You mentioned their international debt. Do you know what that is currently, and do you expect de la Madrid to seek some sort of relief?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it's somewhere in the neighborhood of under one hundred -- $89 billion dollars.

As to their debt management right now, they are in good shape on their debt management. Their last renegotiation was well done. It was oversubscribed the banks. They've met their IMF targets. They've had a surplus in their trade that they didn't expect -- and so from a debt point of view, personally, as to where they are right now, they're in fairly good shape. Obviously, there is a future that everybody can look at. So, I would think that the issue of debt, overall -- Latin American debt, third country debt -- might be a subject. But not, as if -- he needs something tomorrow for his debt.

And -- I hadn't answered your question here on specifics -- products. They are cement, ceramic tiles, carbon black -- am I reading this right, George, do you say "toy balloons"? (Laughter.) That's a biggie. (Laughter.) And there's several others -- we'll try to get you a more formal one.

MR. ROUSSEL: For all those who want to cover the 11:00 a.m. event, you can have free access now to the lawn until a quarter of -- so if you want to go, you should go now.

Q Well -- wait, I have a question -- what about Costa Rica --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

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Q Do you expect that the U.S. decision to militarize Costa Rica is going to be a source of contention?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think there is any U.S. decision to militarize Costa Rica.

Q What about the interagency group that decided on -- on a much larger --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no. What are the facts of the matter are these -- that under our military assistance program for FY'82, or for FY'84, we had put forward $2 million for military assistance. Under the supplemental we have asked for some $7 million. So, I mean, that is something that has been done for quite awhile, and I don't consider that to be the militarization --

Q What about the requests from Costa Rica -- that doesn't --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is no decision, certainly, to militarize Costa Rica, nor even on that specific issue.

Q Have they made a request --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q Have they made a formal request?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There have been talks between us. Whether you want to characterize it as a formal request or not -- I'm not so sure that that's a totally accurate statement.

Q What's being discussed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In the aftermath, and this -- we're straying, so I'll answer this question, and then we'll get back to Mexico,

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if you like. In the aftermath of those attacks on their border towns, where there were no guerrillas present, and the rest of it, they became concerned with their ability to repel. And so they discussed with us an acceleration of the program that was embodied in it before Congress, with regard to things like small arms and trucks and these kind of things.

Q Same numbers -- just accelerated?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. That's the end of that one.

Yes?

Q I'd like to refer back to a question you were asked a moment ago about a decision to put some pressure to bear on the Mexicans to bring them more in line with our foreign policy --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I didn't make that statement --

Q Well, I know, but in terms of the question -- but in your answer you didn't -- you didn't say one way or the other whether that was an accurate statement or an inaccurate statement. Has such a decision been made? Is it being implemented?

Q -- can't hear --

Q What was the question?

Q Question, please.

Q Can't hear a thing --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question was back there, maybe you'd like to rephrase it. You brought it up.

Q Well it was simply, accepting the accuracy of the public report and asking you whether it is indeed on the agenda -- to use economic leverage to get Mexico to see things our way in Central America?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. What you get is, you know -- You get an exchange of views on a variety of things. They understand what things are important to us, we understand what things are important to them. The name of the game is try to accommodate everybody, to get everybody's agenda done. I think you have to put it in that context.

Yes?

Q Economic Minister Salinas, on Friday night in a speech to the Wilson Center, talked about the preeminent importance to Mexico of trying to resolve the problems with -- the long-term problems with the debt; specifically, trying to get the United States to use its influence to rework the different terms, not only for Mexico, but for all of Latin America. Can you be a little bit more specific about what the U.S. -- I mean, for example, does the U.S. attempt, or going to -- What are they going to do to reassure Mexico about --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, look, let me try and put it in perspective for you. I've been dealing with this Latin American debt question fairly close hand since September of 1982, starting first with the Mexican as a spin-off on others, then the Brazilian, and now -- all of them. And what you get is a continuing set of discussions that roll along depending on what the state of play is at that time.

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What is actively under discussion, and not -- between U.S. private -- U.S. private banks, U.S. government officials, debtor countries, other central banks, other private banks, other governments, is the three issues that count.

One is the interest rate. Two is the term of the loans. And third is the so-called grace periods and non-grace periods. In other words, somehow trying to alleviate the internal burden from a socio-political aspect of taking necessary economic ends.

And so those subjects kind of roll around. There isn't any one place that it's stopped at, at this time.

Q On this business of pressure, when Minister Sepulveda was here last month, the senior U.S. official who conducted the official background briefing after the talks, said flatly and categorically that, for reasons of enlightened American self-interest, if no other, there was absolutely no intent of using U.S. economic and financial aid as a means of pressure against Mexico. Mr. Sepulveda, speaking on the record, said he hadn't heard a word of that.

Your answer seems to be a little bit more equivocal.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I didn't mean to be equivocal. All I'm telling you is that you always let the other fellow know those things that are important to you, as you discuss all of the issues. I'm not suggesting the pressure thing.

Yes?

Q Is there any new loan package for Mexico this time like the one of '82?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not that I'm aware of. They're in fairly good shape. They don't come up for a renegotiation of their debt. Earliest possible would be late '85, I think.

Q Is it possible that you may bring it up at some point, like you did in Brazil, when you said there would be no loan package and then suddenly it was --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no. I think that -- I kind of remember that rather succinctly, and I don't think that's the way it worked. But no, if that was your worry, given your analysis of how that happened, which isn't mine, don't worry about it this time, all right? (Laughter.)

Q On this Bolivia --

Q Does the administration have a position on -- does the administration have a position on --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Did you see that sign in Sao Paolo when you went there?

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Where it says, "The people of Bolivia welcome the President of Canada."? (Laughter.)

Q The proposal for catholic interest rates, some kind of a catholic interest rate, perhaps a capitalization of it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. That's one that has been under discussion, mainly in non-U.S. governmental circles, for a while. And it has all kinds of ramifications that you can go through. It's -- one of the many ideas that people are trying to figure out is, in order to take these economic steps that you have to, from an economic point of view, how do you ease the political-social burdens within a country. That's one idea, by itself. We don't have any firm position on it.

Q You don't have a position on it one way or the other?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I'd say -- there's ups and downs on that. We could spend an hour and a half on it.

Q How about domestic interest rates?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon? How about the what?

Q Domestic interest rates.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's one of the things. You can get involved in all kinds of things.

Q Do you have a position on Michael Jackson?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You guys, why do you stay here so long? You've got Michael Jackson with a glove on his hand out there. What's the matter with you?

Q Pete -- Pete --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you.

Q How is it that -- how is it that --

Q No, thank you.

Q Oh, come on. Is that a way to act?

Q Come on, you guys.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 10:43 A.M. EDT

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF PRESIDENT DE LA MADRID

May 15, 1984

The Briefing Room

11:52 A.M. EDT

MR. SIMS: This briefing -- may I have your attention -- the briefing will be ON BACKGROUND. It's attributable to a Senior Administration Official.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The meeting was divided in two parts. There was a one-on-one that ran about 40 minutes more than was scheduled and then the two Presidents joined their respective Cabinet members in the Cabinet Room. The information I can give you on the one-on-one, we'll have to get a further readout for you later, because it was virtually a one-on-one.

Q With a translator?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. With interpreters only. And the subject, most of the time, was Central America, where both Presidents were able to lay out their thoughts and programs on the area. They both agreed that the search for peace in Central America was the primary objective for both countries. President Reagan had an opportunity to explain to President de la Madrid the Jackson Plan and its deliberations in Congress, and President de la Madrid was able to give President Reagan his thoughts on the matter and, also, his trip through Latin America in which he discussed it with other Latin leaders.

And, as I said, the meetings just broke; we've not got a full readout yet. We hope to have one for you later.

The second meeting discussed the bilateral issues, and basically they were broken down into four areas, and they were grouped this way: One was the fiscal-financial setting; the second was the whole area of trade and investments; and the third area had to do with border issues; and the fourth area was miscellaneous issues. And as the meeting ran over, we did not get into the last two in any depth other than to mention them.

The focus of the meeting was on the trade-investment area. As I think I indicated to you the other day, we're very close on a subsidies agreement, something we've been working on for two years pursuant to our laws that require consultations with Congress and the private sector that is ongoing at this time. We're also very close to getting a framework agreement on how to proceed on trade and investment issues and then there's -- in the investment area there are a couple of investment areas that still need some more work.

It was agreed -- we all agreed where we were and what needed to be done, and the three of them are interrelated per se, and so it would be difficult to push one forward without the others. None of these are in -- the type of things that Presidents would sign per se, yet it requires, obviously, Presidential attention. And so in the balance of this visit here the counterparts will be meeting on these specific points and trying to get them firmly resolved.

The meeting just broke up about 10 minutes ago, going beyond schedule. Yes, Helen?

Q The give-and-take on Central America seemed particularly harsh on the President's part. He was really saying wake up, Mexico, you're closing your eyes, you're pouring gasoline. Was that intended? I mean, does he feel that de la Madrid doesn't understand what's going on?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't think it's -- I don't think that President Reagan doesn't think President de la Madrid doesn't understand. You have to remember that this is their third meeting and at La Paz, as you may recall, it went on for quite a while. So what you're starting from --

Q Retaliation for La Paz?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no, no. We don't -- I see no reason to retaliate for La Paz but -- that's a personal problem. (Laughter.) You're going to get me started here. I'll start thinking -- all I could think of was Jimmy Carter, when you started saying that. (Laughter.)

Okay, Helen, thanks a heap for making me -- where was I? Anyway, one of the things I think you have to keep in mind is this is the third round. Those two know exactly that the other one understands this subject very well, so it's not a question of having to explain the facts of life per se; it's more to explain the perceptions, those things that they consider important to each other.

The other thing that you have to understand is that in order for a dialogue like this to take place, there has to be a warm and strong personal relationship between the two people and that exists. You could see it from the moment they greeted each other and how they address each other. That's two Presidents who have trust and faith in each other and, also, a warm personal understanding between them.

Q Do you think either will convince the other?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think it's a question so much of convincing as it is ensuring that the other understands the perspective from which he looks at it. It's not a question of factual per se as it is the importance that each attaches to different aspects of a very complex problem.

Q In your view, what was the reason for the unusually strong language the President chose to make the points on Nicaragua and that region? He's made the same points in less strong language before.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I was about to give you my answer until you made that last clause, but in my perspective I think I've seen the different languages the President has used on different occasions. I don't find it any stronger. Let's face facts. The President feels very strongly on this issue and so when he vocalizes it, I think you can expect it to be done in a firm manner.

Yes?

Q Why do you say, though, that there's faith and trust? It sounds as though President de la Madrid is indeed concerned that the President will do something in Central America that he doesn't approve of and -- faith and trust, does that exactly describe the feeling?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, I think so, yes. I think that faith and trust does in the sense that they have that ability to be able to speak to each other and if one gives them an answer, that it is certainly a believable answer.

Yes, ma'am?

Q Do you think that any of President de la Madrid's comments, his warnings, were directed at the United States, for instance, when he talked about the importance of abiding by

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international law? Do you think that was a reference to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think you have to ask President de la Madrid what his intentions were there. I didn't read it that way.

Yes?

Q Do you think, also, that --

Q How do you read it?

Q Yes, how do you read it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay, I read it as one of several items on a menu in which he subscribed to certain principles, and I think if you -- you could find that most people could agree with the texts of both speeches.

Yes?

Q Coming back to the GATT issue and trade,investment --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is an issue normally before GATT but, seeing as Mexico doesn't belong to GATT, it is not a GATT issue. Trade and subsidies, okay.

Q Do you think that there will be something signed during these two days?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, you have to understand that signing is not something that you can do on a subsidies agreement for the reason I just told you, in that there is an ongoing Congressional and private-sector consultations now. And that, by law, will take -- will continue long after, or after this visit terminates.

We could conceivably reach agreement on all three of these. We're very close on two of them because of the interrelation, and that was where the focus of the attention was and, from a bilateral point of view, is a major focus of this visit, is the interrelation of those three topics, the trade and investment and the subsidies agreement.

Q Did the question of El --

Q Do you expect some kind of joint communique or some kind of statement coming out of the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We don't normally use joint communiques here, and I don't anticipate that there will be a joint communique at this time.

Q Did the question of LDC debt come up?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question of LDC debt came up in the context of the difficulty that debtor countries face in meeting their payments while taking austerity measures in their countries, and the attendant sociopolitical impacts that they have.

Q Did President de la Madrid ask President Reagan for any measures such as a cap in the interest rate charged by U.S. banks to debtor countries?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no, he did not ask the President for anything other than outlining for him the challenges he sees ahead. He reviewed briefly Mexico's steps from September, '82, as you may recall, when that issue first came to light, through now, and then talked about the different components that need to be addressed in the future. He did not mention caps specifically.

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Q How does he like the Jack Anderson column?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I didn't ask him.

Q Was there a discussion of the United States deficit and its effects on neighboring nations being able to meet their own debts?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. What was discussed was, mention was made of the U.S. trade deficit in that it has two impacts. One is, the U.S. trade deficit obviously helps other countries and, secondly, from a domestic point of view, U.S. trade deficit, an inordinately large one, is not totally a healthy thing. It was put in that context.

Yes, sir?

Q Did the two guys talk specifically -- (laughter) -- about El Salvador?

Q -- two guys talking. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would -- let me put it this way -- I would assume El Salvador was mentioned, because of the discussion on Central America, but that's one of those that I would have to get a fuller readout before I could specifically answer your question.

Yes?

Q Are we going to get a fuller readout on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We'll try.

Q When and where?

Q And how?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right now I'm trying to make lunch in about 15 minutes, but I would think that some time after, and it's subject to Bob and the rest of them, some time after termination of the visit, shortly right afterwards, that we could maybe do --

Q Termination of the visit. Do you mean in two days?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, yes.

Q Was there any discussion --

Q Today's one-on-one, the readout's going to wait til --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'll tell you what. It's subject to being able to get a deeper readout. We are going to try to do what we can for you, but I'm going to have to talk with Bob as to how they want to handle that. All I do is get up here and do a speaking part; I don't figure out when or where.

Q Do you know, did the President discuss the likelihood of the offensive in El Salvador in the fall in specific --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know if that was brought up.

Yes, ma'am?

Q I don't think I understood your answer to the question about de la Madrid's reference to international law. You don't think it had anything to -- it was not in any way related to the

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President, President Reagan's decision to take U.S. policy in Central America above World Court jurisdiction?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You know, I think you have to ask President de la Madrid what he had in mind.

Q You said, "I didn't read it that way," so you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I didn't read it as sticking out. As I said, what it was, was a menu of all the things that we can subscribe to --

Q Okay, and what about --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And if you read -- if you look at his speech, it was one tick of several, and it was in there.

Q What about when he talked about rejecting interventionist solutions of any kind, I think, was the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's not a new phrase.

Q Okay, so you don't think that's directly related to our support of --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You'd have to ask him what he meant.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes?

Q Was there any discussion of President Reagan's view reiterated last week, that the turmoil in Central America could some day destabilize Mexico?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I didn't get that full a readout. I don't know if it was mentioned or not; it was not given to me in the quick brief that I got from the interpreter.

Yes, sir?

Q Would you quarrel with the characterization based on my reading that the two men agreed to disagree in their meeting about their perspective on Central America?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would not quarrel with it, with this caveat, and that caveat is that rarely do two heads of state that have as many issues before them agree on everything before them. I think you would find that a rare occasion.

Yes, ma'am?

Q Obviously, both leaders feel very strongly about this issue, and their views are very different on it. Does that pose any threat to their relationship? Does this put any strain --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think it's a testimonial to the personal relationship between the two. Did I answer your question?

Yes, sir?

Q When you said that trade, investment and subsidies are interrelated, are you saying that we would like to see the Mexicans make concessions on the subsidy issue in return for our opening our market more to their goods? Is that where the interrelationship --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think that basically, as you know, these things, if you know anything about the subsidies code, and the rest of it, it's an Excedrin-headache-producing subject, but the subsidies issue by itself -- two years of negotiation covering all of the things -- and then you have subsidies which affects countervailing duties, which affects the ability of products to come in. Then you have trade and investment, trade between the two, investments on both sides, so they both spill over.

You can take them as components by themselves, and the components seem to be getting there. It's as you bring them together that you get a little spillover. And so it's not really I'll trade you Board Walk for Park Place and then Get Out of Jail Free. It's not that kind of close linkage.

MR. SIMS: On that, could we have one more?

Q Was there a reference to the draft treaty, the Contadora draft?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know. I hope to be able to get further information for you. I don't know that it was referred to in the one-on-one.

Q Is it possible to get some of these just details without interpretation, just details, later today?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You'll have to ask Bob. I'm available to help wherever I can.

Q What's the answer on --

Q -- another meeting Thursday?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I believe that there is a breakfast meeting scheduled Thursday morning.

Q What's the answer, Bob? I mean, you know, we'd sort of like to find out what --

MR. SIMS: There is a breakfast meeting scheduled --

Q No, no, we'd like to find out --

Q Wrong question.

Q -- what happened today today.

MR. SIMS: We'll have to consult. Thank you.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 12:05 P.M. EDT

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO EUROPE
May 18, 1984

The Briefing Room

11:11 a.m. EDT

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't know how much time we've got. What I think I should do is really break this down into three segments.

First of all, going through the highlights of what will happen on the trip. Secondly, talking about the economic side of the summit, and we've got some expertise here. I'm not an economist. And thirdly, talk about the political side of the summit.

Let me begin with the trip. As you know, the President is scheduled -- and I think before I go into the highlights of the trip, I think we should all bear in mind that a lot of the details are now just being ironed out so this is the best fix we've got at this stage.

But right now, the President is scheduled to arrive at Ashford Castle in Ireland on Friday, June 1st.

On Saturday, June 2nd, he will be working in the morning, and in the afternoon, will travel to Galway. There will be a ceremony at University College --

Q Can you speak just --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- at University College at Galway. He will make some -- the present plan is that he will make some remarks at the University College.

Q Can you turn it on high volume?

Q Let's skip this.

Q Larry just --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You want it -- all right, I'm sorry.

Q Larry just gave --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay, let me talk about --

Q What's the purpose of this trip?

Q Here's the right hand. Here's the left hand. The right hand just gave that chronology. I'm wondering if the left hand knew what the right hand was -- had done.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Apparently it didn't, Sam.

Q All right, fine.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What would you like to hear about now? The summit?

Q Yes.

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Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All right. The summit is the tenth in a series, and I think most importantly, they have been a useful link for consultations on Western economic concerns as well as political topics.

I think while there has been an inevitable tendency to look for immediate results from these meetings, I think that history has demonstrated that probably the most important by-product has been the opportunity for the heads of government of the Western industrialized -- the most important Western industrialized democracies -- to discuss in a fairly intimate surroundings what's -- the concerns that are uppermost on their minds.

We think that, in the last year, since Williamsburg, which we thought was a major success, that progress has been made on international economic consensus, largely as a result of the growing convergence of economic policies that the President first advocated at the Ottawa summit in 1981.

The economic conditions in the summit countries today contrast significantly with those prevailing before Williamsburg last year. Most importantly, of course, the U. S. recovery has surpassed optimistic predictions in 1983.

And the strong recession-induced protectionist pressures in the United States and other industrialized countries have largely been checked.

In other words, the major industrialized countries have successfully resisted pressures for protectionism, and that has aided the recovery, which is underway in the United States and, now, in other Western countries.

And, finally, U. S. and Western European tensions over economic relations with the Soviet Union have largely abated. The kind of debate the grew up, say, at Versailles, after Versailles, and disagreements over issues like the pipeline have abated, and there's a growing consensus on East-West economic relations.

At the summit in London, the economic objectives, I think, can be stated as follows:

We want to promote policies that will assure the non-inflationary recovery in the Western industrialized countries.

We want to make sure that that non-inflationary recovery which is now apparent spreads to the rest of the world.

We think that if we can sustain growth, non-inflationary growth, within the industrialized world, that the growth of the developing world I suspect could average some 4.5% annually between 1985 and 1990.

Of course, that would go a long way to solving some of the current debt problems and other economic difficulties that the developing world is facing.

Secondly, we want to maintain and expand the open trading and financial system. We want to reaffirm the strong commitment made at Williamsburg and earlier to resist protectionism. We want to reach early agreement on a new trade round to achieve comprehensive trade liberalization. We'd like to encourage further work in appropriate institutions to promote market-oriented economic adjustment. We want to work for continuing organization

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of economic adjustment. We want to work for continuing management of debt problems under a five-point strategy. Current strategy is based on flexible case-by-case approach. And we believe it needs to be reinforced, not replaced. This is the theme that Don Regan has been emphasizing in this week's OECD ministerial in Paris.

We believe that our current debt strategy has shown its merits over the last year in coping with the most difficult debt crisis, such as Argentina.

We want to encourage greater coordination between the IMF and the World Bank to ensure that lending and adjustment policies are consistent. We want to help deal with African economic problems. And, as you know, we have proposed an African Economic Policy Initiative. And we would welcome other countries joining in on that initiative.

And, finally, in the economic area, we will also seek agreement to continue cooperative work in COCOM. That's the coordinating committee of Western countries, Japanese, NATO, OECD and the International Energy Agency in order to obtain a broadened consensus on economic and security implications of East-West economic relations. That, very briefly stated is the -- the economic objectives.

Now, on the political side, I think those of you who have covered summits in the past know that while the formal agenda focuses on economic issues, there is time for discussions of political issues. Normally, the meals where the heads are together is usually given over to political discussions. We expect that pattern to be followed this year.

And there -- we will probably break down the political discussions into three broad catagories. First, East-West relations and security questions. Secondly, the Middle East and -- including, for example, Iran-Iraq. And another third category would be other regional issues.

Just a few themes, again, and then I'll let you -- I'll be happy to answer your questions. We'd like to demonstrate --

Q Do what, sir?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We'd like to demonstrate, as we did last year at Williamsburg, that the interests of the summit seven democracies are both convergent and global; that these countries -- the countries represented at the summit have common political and security interests; that, since Williamsburg, a successful implementation of INF deployment in Europe; a concerted response to the Soviet downing of the KAL airliner; and the common consultations which are now taking place over Iran and Iraq -- I think all reflect the growing convergence and commonality of international concerns of those countries represented at the summit.

In other words, we hope to demonstrate that Japan, Europe and North America can work together successfully. There has been some debate in recent months over the question of whether there is a refocus of the U.S. interests and concerns toward Asia, away from Europe. We will want to underline the fact that the United States has global interests, is a global power, doesn't choose between Asia and Europe and can have strong ties with both. We believe that the NATO Alliance is healthy. And here, just to remind you that there will be a NATO ministerial meeting of the NATO Foreign Ministers on May 28, 29 and 30th -- that's --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- 29, 30, 31 --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you -- 29, 30, 31, just prior to the London summit. And the President will be participating in that ministerial meeting. So, we think that that will demonstrate a strong cohesion, solidarity within the Alliance and is, as I said, a useful prelude to the summit in London.

In addition to the strength of the NATO Alliance, obviously, the U.S. relationship with the Pacific Basin is growing, a very strong economic and political relationship. So our real interest with the summit, as in other meetings, is to foster a growing trend of consultation and cooperation at a variety of levels.

Now, you recall that last year at Williamsburg, the heads of government decided that they would release a statement on security and arms control. That was a decision taken at Williamsburg and as -- at this moment there is no plan, other than to have an extensive discussion of political issues, to release a similar statement or another statement. So there could be that possibility. Once the heads get there, they may decide that they want to release something publicly, but the real focus or emphasis would be on confidential consultations.

I just might add one thing which I neglected to add, and that is that in addition to those sort of broad subject areas in the political area that I mentioned, the East-West, Middle East, Iran-Iraq, and other regional issues, there will be a discussion on international terrorism. It has been traditional that the subject of terrorism be discussed at these summit meetings. And in view of the fact that the British are hosting this meeting and their recent episode in St. James Square, with the episode, or the incident there, it's clear that this will be a subject on the agenda.

Q To what extent do you think Central America will be discussed, and what is the President prepared to say there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I know that the President will be prepared to address Central America. And if it is -- there's an interest in discussing that when they do move to other regional issues, I'm sure it will be discussed. The President --

Q Several of these nations have been rather critical of our policy there. Surely, they'll want to discuss it, won't they?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not aware of the kind of criticism that you're referring to --

Q France.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: When we had a visit recently from President Mitterrand, Central America was addressed. But I'm not aware of any sharp public criticism. We have differences with all of the countries on nearly every regional issue, but -- and I'm sure the subject will probably come up and there will be a discussion on it. I'm not aware of criticism.

Steve?

Q Last year, it was the U.S.'s initiative that there be a statement on security issues, I believe. This year, obviously, with the British being the host, there might not be that role to play for U.S. initiative, but what's our -- what would the U.S. or what would the President like to see coming out of --

Q Lecture the Dutch.

Q -- this summit? For example, what would be your view about reaffirmation --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Our view is that you need something to say. And I think we won't know, Steve, until the heads of government get together at the first meeting and kind of discuss various issues. And a lot of things can happen between now and then. And I don't think anybody is interested in pre-judging what they want to say to the public.

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One of the things we have consistently tried to do -- and I think most of the other governments participating in the summit are trying to do -- is not try to over-structure these meetings where people, where leaders talk from points that bureaucrats have produced for them -- where they have an opportunity to really address what's on their mind. And I think that as a result, I think if there were something worth saying and there was an agreement by all the heads that it should be said, then perhaps we would see something. But at this stage, we haven't identified any specific issue area that looks like a candidate.

Moreover, as you pointed out, the British hosts will probably want to take the lead if anyone desires to do something like this.

The real emphasis -- let me just go back to this -- the real emphasis on these meetings is not so much on producing statements or communiques. The real emphasis is trying to create an intimate atmosphere where heads of government have an opportunity to talk about problems face to face.

Q Well, can I just follow? I mean, last year -- last year's statement, strictly speaking, substantively, did nothing but reaffirm existing policies. So it was felt that there was a need to do that because of the climate in Europe and to send a message to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, strictly speaking --

Q -- to Moscow.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- that's not correct because what it reaffirmed was a decision taken by the military arm of NATO. At the summit, there were two important countries that are not affiliated. What we had in that statement was a decision by the French government to support that December '79 deployment decision, and you also had a decision by the Japanese government to support that and to also endorse language that talked about security being -- or looking at security on a global basis.

Q Well, what I'm asking is what is your sense of the climate in Europe and of the attitude toward the Soviet Union -- of the Soviet Union toward the negotiations that might be clarified by a joint statement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, you mean if I -- I could give you my own personal views, but I have no way of knowing what the heads of government would think. I think that --

Q Well, what are your views?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that regardless of whether there is any statement or not -- and I don't -- as

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I said before, I doubt very much there will be at this stage. But I think there is agreement by all our close allies that the West, as a whole, and the Japanese want to pursue a strategy of being ready and open for a dialogue with the Soviet Union, that we want to maintain our cohesion, we want to maintain a military balance. But we're prepared to talk to the Soviet Union. And I think there's a desire that the Soviet Union come back to the negotiating table and negotiate in good faith.

Q With interest rates on the rise here in the United States and the strength of the dollar again rising in world money markets, do you expect the same kind of criticism of interest rates here, federal deficits and the pressure that was put on the U.S. last year to intervene in world money markets?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think that -- On the first question, I don't -- I mean, on the last question, I don't think there will be -- we don't see the same push, for example, in the International Monetary Conference, the sort of idea that the French were advocating a year ago.

I think there clearly will be some discussion of interest rates. There will be a discussion of the deficit. But I think the important point -- and I tried to highlight it in talking about the international economic issue -- is that the U.S. economy is growing, that we are beginning to see growth in other industrialized economies, that that is the solution to the economic problems, not only of the industrialized world, but the less developed world, and that it has been U.S. growth which offers a real opportunity for other economies to also grow.

And, for example, you mentioned the budget deficit, but an equally important factor is the trade deficit, which has given, for example, other competitors to the United States a real opportunity to expand their trade.

So I think that there will certainly be discussions of deficits and interest rates. But the -- I think what people will want to focus on, more than anything else, is how to sustain non-inflationary growth, which has been a key Reagan administration goal in every summit. And we've seen over the last three years, quite candidly, is a growing convergence on that strategy by all of our major economic partners.

There's a basic consensus now on major economic policy and on the need for non-inflationary growth.

Q What is the President prepared to tell the other members of the summit in regard to the deficits, on what kind of progress, or lack of progress --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think mainly what he will want to say is what we have been saying here. And that is that we would like, of course, to bring the deficits down and we have a program for doing that.

I don't think we will also say that it is a mistake to blame the interest rates purely on the deficit, that much of it has to do with some uncertainty in the financial community over whether or not we can sustain a low rate of inflation.

John.

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Q The fact is that at Williamsburg there were talks going on in Geneva. This is the first summit -- or the first of these summits that has taken place without any realistic hope of any kind of progress in Soviet-American relations. How much flack do you expect to get on that issue?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think we'll get very little because I think that they, like us, believe that it is the Soviet Union's fault that there are no negotiations going on. I mean, we didn't walk away from the Geneva negotiating table. They did. They walked away because we started the deployment of some missiles; but we were ready and willing to negotiate, and did negotiate for two years while the Soviet Union deployed over a hundred SS-20 missiles.

So we're under no pressure and expect to be under no pressure either in the NATO Ministerial Meeting, that will be held here at the end of the month, or in London, to make any concessions to return to the negotiating table.

I think everyone recognizes that we should negotiate without pre-conditions.

Q Do you expect that the waffling by the Dutch on the deployment of the missiles will impact -- will have any impact on how the allies of

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the summit will treat the medium range missile issue?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'm -- you know, now you're getting into questions about what these heads are going to focus on. It's not clear that they're going to spend very much time on the INF issue.

I mentioned East-West relations and security questions. It's impossible to predict. But my own personal view is, no, that it's clear that with or without the Dutch, that the Alliance is going to go forward with the deployment of those missiles in the absence of an arms control agreement. At the same time, we're ready to begin those negotiations the minute the Soviet Union is prepared to return to the table.

Chris?

Q Obviously, as you say, a lot can happen between now and then, but based on the situation in the Persian Gulf now, how important do we see it that there be a unified and public statement by Europe, North America, and Japan about a common policy on the Persian Gulf? And secondly, are we satisfied in terms of our current consultations on that that Europe is on board with the United States in terms of both diplomatic and military moves?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have had intense consultations, first of all, with the allies on Iran and Iraq. Those consultations have been going on for several months. So this is not something that we have just geared up in the last week or so. We have worked particularly closely with those countries that have some ability to influence developments in the region. Countries that have some military capability, for example. We have worked very closely with the countries in the region itself.

I suspect that the subject of Iran and Iraq will clearly come up at the summit. They will want to address the subject. But to talk again about a public statement, just let me say this very clearly -- we have no plan at this time for any public statements covering either Iran or Iraq, or any other subject. The key to a successful summit, in our view, is that the heads of government have an opportunity in a fairly informal atmosphere to address issues and to do it candidly.

Q If I can follow up, though. I mean, I think there is some sense that at this point, the European allies are not prepared necessarily to support -- or at least there is some doubt about whether they're prepared to support the U.S. militarily, if not diplomatically, in that area. I mean, do we feel it's important that they --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Prepared to do what?

Q Whatever would be needed in terms of military action to keep the Gulf open.

Q He's talking about would we go to war?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's certainly no signs of that. I mean, you're asking me to speculate on what countries might do in certain circumstances and that's a dangerous thing. There's certainly no signs that I can see that we have any fundamental difference with any of our close allies on the situation in the Gulf.

Q And in terms of what they're prepared to do along with us to keep the Gulf open?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATON OFFICIAL: I'm simply saying that we have had very intensive consultations, I think very useful consultations on the subject. And, again, I don't see any important differences between the United States and its close allies.

Q Either militarily or diplomatically?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct.

Q What's the possibility of a statement -- what do the British want in terms of a statement on terrorism, do you know?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, I'm not even aware of their desiring a statement on terrorism. I think that we traditionally -- and I'm glad, so that I can clear this up again -- traditionally, the subject of terrorism has been discussed at the summit meetings. We expect the subject to come up again, but we have no plans, and we're not aware of any plans for a statement.

Q If I can follow up on terrorism in a different sense -- I mean, between the IRA and Libya, I wonder is there any extraordinary security that's going to be under -- in effect in London to protect all of the leaders?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that by definition, anytime that you get the seven heads of the world's largest industrialized democracies together, you're going to have fairly extraordinary security precautions.

Q But do you think there's any -- particularly in view of the IRA and Libya?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not aware of anything emanating especially from those two concerns.

Q Will you be sharing with the other allies the new U.S. policy on terrorism, and will you be discussing efforts of active defense?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have -- I think -- I don't think, actually, that that kind of detail is -- would be addressed at the heads of government level. We have had discussions with our close allies on the subject of terrorism, explaining our views and listening to theirs.

Q Do you have any political objectives from the Irish trip?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think that --

Q Yes, we sure do. (Laughter.) They're here.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I have objectives. I have objectives which are -- you can laugh about it, but the fact is that as the Irish become -- take on the Presidency of the European Community on July 1st. It just so happens that the European Community is facing some very difficult problems, as you probably know, over the question of their budget, over the question of their expansion, possible expansion of the European Community, as well as the on the question of where European political cooperation will go. And so, I think it's very timely, in fact, to have a dialogue with President Hillery and the Prime Minister FitzGerald on the question of how they plan to exercise their leadership role in the Community.

Q There's talk about rather massive demonstrations timed for the President's visit. What kind of intelligence do you have on that, whether you think there will be any embarrassment concerning his visit there?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, there are a lot of small groups that would, I think, like to take advantage of the President's visit, in both Ireland and Britain, to embarrass the President. We don't think they will succeed. I will remind you that we had a fairly formidable demonstration in Bonn in the summer of 1982 on the whole question of nuclear missiles. It did not prevent that NATO summit from ending successfully. We doubt that any demonstrations in London will hamper the meetings. There will probably also be some demonstrations in Ireland on the subject of Central America, but, again, I think that -- they will not have any real impact on the success of the visit.

Q You mentioned the EC's problems on their budget. Is -- In practical terms, their disarray over their budget and their agricultural policy, does that throw up a roadblock on progress on protectionism and some of the other issues that have been discussed in the past? In other words, is the U.S. restrained from being able to take on some of these issues because of the divisions?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we're not restrained -- In a sense, Steve, I'm glad you asked that question because I should remind everyone that in addition to the seven heads of government, that the President of the EC Commission also participates in these meetings and that is Gaston Thorn. You'll recall that he was at Williamsburg -- but what it does is that it creates, potentially, because the Europeans -- the EC is facing a budget crisis. They are sometimes tempted, in order to raise money to take protectionist measures, for example, against -- their exports of U.S. agricultural products. We're concerned that if they take such steps that Congress will retaliate and we could have a situation where this -- our effort to sustain economic growth and expand trade could be set back by growing tariff barriers. And so we have maintained a dialogue with the community on this subject. And so far, I think, we have staved off a trade war between the United States fairly successfully -- the United States and the EC. And we hope to continue to do so.

Q When Kohl was here, he pushed for a summit, a get-acquainted summit, and he did feel that some concessions should be made. Has there been some prior agreement not to ask the U.S. for any concessions in terms of easing East-West tensions? Is that all fixed in the -- concrete?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I just want to emphasize, I don't see any major disagreements between the United States and its closest allies --

Q They don't all agree in the way the U.S. has performed in the East-West --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, they may not; but what I'm trying to say is I don't see any major disagreements between the United States and its key allies on the question of what our posture should be at this stage toward the Soviet Union.

In other words, I'm not aware of any call from any major ally, and I was just in Europe chairing a meeting on this subject earlier this week -- any call for the United States to make negotiating concessions to bring the Soviets back to

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the table. They, like us, believe that that would be a sign of weakness rather than strength and that if we were to begin making concessions, the Soviet reaction would not be to come back to the table, but to wait us out with the hope that this would then stimulate further concessions, that -- I think there is genuine agreement that we need to be firm, but at the same time be open to negotations.

Q But the question was on --

MR. SIMS: -- the last one.

Q -- the summit. The question was whether -- this subject of a U.S.-Soviet summit. You say, no -- negotiating concession; but that's not a negotiating concession.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no, on the question of a summit, I'm not aware of any calls, any public or private calls at this time, for a U.S.-Soviet summit. Now, if you ask me, do you think it's likely that Chancellor Kohl or some other leader might in private conversation with the President raise this, I don't know. It's a subject that could come up.

Again, the purpose of the meeting is to allow these people in a confidential

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atmosphere to have a pretty free-wheeling discussion and to raise those things that are on their mind.

Q Are you aware of any call by our allies for Reagan to lower his rhetoric?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that they're all -- they're very happy with the way the President is talking about U.S.-Soviet and East-West relations. His definitive statement on this was his January 16th speech where he said he wanted to move the relationship to one of constructive cooperation. And I don't think you've seen very many examples of excessive rhetoric on our side.

What I would point you toward is the Soviet press which has recently begun calling George Shultz a "dim-wit", comparing U.S. leadership to Adolf Hitler, and they recently called me "a petty snooper".

Q What? Nooo. (Laughter.) That's an outrage. (Laughter.)

Q That goes too far. (Laughter.) Goddammit, I won't stand for that. (Laughter.)

Q Can we identify him for this last statement?

Q As a "petty snooper"?

Q Yes, we have to have "petty snooper" on the record.

Q What did they call Sims?

MR. SIMS: As long as it's only the Soviets who are calling him that.

May I have your attention for one more minute. We will have a lid on from noon until 2:00 p.m., at which time, Larry Speakes will brief --

Q What did they say about Reagan?

Q A headline, a deadline?

MR. SIMS: A lid -- a lid.

Q From noon until 2:00 p.m.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 11:43 A.M. EDT

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①

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release May 21, 1984

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
PRESIDENT-ELECT JOSE NAPOLEON DUARTE
OF EL SALVADOR

The West Driveway

PRESIDENT-ELECT DUARTE: Well, let me first say that I had a very friendly talk with the President of the United States. I told him that by assuming the Presidency of El Salvador, I am also assuming the responsibilities that I placed to my people to confront the biggest problems of my country; the problems of violence, the problems of looking for peace, the problems of confronting the poverty, the unjustice, and to solving the problems of the economy.

All of that, I have placed to my people, and I think that if we accomplish our goal, with the help of God and with the participation of all sectors, we will make our country stand firmly in democracy.

Now, I put myself in your hands.

Q Mr. President, what are the chances of obtaining the military aid that has been sought by your country now?

PRESIDENT-ELECT DUARTE: Well, I don't know what is going to be the resolution of the United States Congress. That's not for me to say. But one thing is important -- the aid that is needed in the country now. Starting from the first of June that I will take office, it will be an aid to help democracy, to solve the problems, to look for peace, and to establish justice and liberty for our people.

Q Mr. Duarte, Amnesty International says it is your government and its security forces that are primarily responsible for the deaths of 40,000 of your citizens since 1979.

PRESIDENT-ELECT DUARTE: Let me say that, in the first place, I am not a government at this moment. I have not been in government for two years. So I think that whoever says that I am responsible for anything that happened in the last two years is mistaken.

Second, nobody can ignore the problems of the country. We all know it. You know it. I know it. The thing is not to look backward. The thing is to look forward. The thing is to have faith and to confront the problems and to try to solve them.

I don't know of the report of Amnesty International. I've heard that they normally present things on a sectoral basis. But whatever they say, I think that we have to understand that this is an expression of the crisis that our country, the crisis of Central America is living and that it needs a will, it needs an effort, and it needs an aid from all sectors because the country alone -- I, as a President alone, my party alone, or any sector of the country alone, or the country all by itself cannot confront this big problem. But all together we do. This is what I'm trying to tell my people.

I have called for a social pact, which means that all the Salvadorans working together to confront these problems. I talked to private enterprise. I have talked to the military people. I have talked to the labor people. I have here with me

MORE

the Campesino leaders, so that they will also know of our commiting, not only to my people and to my country, but to the world. That the world has great expectations for what we can do for our country, and we have the will to do it.

Q President Duarte --

Q President-elect -- how much American aid do you need, and what happens if you don't get it?

PRESIDENT-ELECT DUARTE: Let me say, I do not have the exact figures at this moment. I think that the United States has presented a very well conformed plan, which is the Jackson Plan, written down by the Bipartisan Commission, and I think that they have made a thorough analysis. They went up to our country, they analysed our problem, so they had the figures.

If the Jackson Plan is approved, then, we think, that this is going to be a real support for the democracy we want to establish in our country.

And the second question is only a supposition. If the United States will not approve the problems of aid for Central America, for my country, I would say that they'd be making a mistake. But, I have pledged to my people to work for democracy -- our people working for peace. I'll try to open up the space for all sectors -- a democratic space, so that everybody from the extreme right to the extreme left will have an opportunity to incorporate themselves into the democratic process; to have a national dialogue so that we can look for the solutions of our country. This is my aims, this is my program, this is my work.

Q Mr. President -- will you stop the killing?

Q Mr. Duarte -- how long do you think the war will last?

Q Will you stop the killing?

PRESIDENT-ELECT DUARTE: Will I stop the killing? I have never killed anybody.

Q I said, will you see that the killing is stopped in your country when you become President?

PRESIDENT-ELECT DUARTE: I tell you, I have pledged to my people that I'm going to work hard to stop the death squads, to stop the abuses of authority, and to stop the cultural violence that is in force in our country.

Q Will that be enough?

Q Did President Reagan give you any commitment --

Q Will that be enough?

PRESIDENT-ELECT DUARTE: I think that enough is to obtain peace -- enough is, sometimes, where the whole country will be safe and secure. And this is my aim.

Q Mr. Duarte --

Q This has been an old problem, Mr. President, how are you going to solve this now? I mean, after so many years of killing, do you have any new initiatives?

PRESIDENT-ELECT DUARTE: Yes. I think that we have been working in the process, during all these years, and the election has been part of this process -- to give the people of our country new

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convictions, new values that have been lost for quite a while.

When I came back from exile, I found a different country. I found a country who had lost faith, who had lost hope. And the only thing they had in their mind was hate. Now things are starting changing. The people they start believing. And I think that the first thing that we have to do is to strengthen faith. If we do that, then we have the starting point.

Now, you're asking me for the mechanics. I think that the mechanics are not to be just expressed as the thing that we're going to do. And I have the will. And I said it in my language, in Spanish I say, "I have the guts to do it." (Laughter.)

Q Mr. President, what did President Reagan tell you during the conversation with you?

PRESIDENT-ELECT DUARTE: Well, we talk about the problems of El Salvador -- all the effort he's been doing. And he told me that

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the United States is backing up the process of democracy. He told me that he feels that the problems of the area are important and that it's difficult -- he told me that it's difficult for El Salvador to try to sustain the solutions of the problem with influence of other countries, that the problem of the influence of Nicaraguan action in El Salvador is creating problems. I agree with that. And I also said that we had to get Central America a democratic area.

And I said to him that I visit some of the countries of Central America and one of the President told me to tell him that now Central America has a democratic majority and we will have hopes that some day we will have a Central American unanimous democrat.

Q Mr. Duarte, will the right wing let you govern? Will the right wing let you govern?

PRESIDENT-ELECT DURATE: Let me say that there are people who are on the right and that they are private enterprise and they'll be working. I already have talks with all the institutions of the economical right and they have agreed to discuss with us all the problems so that they can contribute in this social pact that I have called for.

There might be some extreme right people who do not understand that they are destroying the solutions that the people wants. But I think that they'll be isolated by the majority of the people.

We have won the election with 54 percent. I aim to win the other 46 percent. And I aim to win the people who did not want to vote or the people who did not want to participate. Because we all together, the Salvadoran, without discrimination is the only solution we can have. For that reason, I am calling for the extreme right to understand that their participation, their behavior, their conduct, respecting the democratic rules is part of the solution of our people.

And at the same time, I call on the extreme left to tell them, also, on this same line, that their conduct, their behavior, their attitude, their participation on the process is the only solution for peace in our country.

Nothing can be solved by violence, neither from the extreme right, neither from the extreme left. Only when we all understand that violence is not solution, killing people is not solution, destroying the minds of people is not a solution, but together, with faith, with hope, we can solve the problem.

Thank you very much.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON REAGAN IRISH ANCESTRY
AND THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO EUROPE

②

May 21, 1984

Room 450
The Old Executive Office Building

2:32 P.M. EDT

MR. FITZWATER: This is our second briefing on the President's trip to Ireland, Normandy and the London Economic Summit. Mike Deaver, Deputy Chief of Staff, will brief on President Reagan's Irish ancestry and the President's personal view of the trip. His opening statement will be on the record, and the Q&A to follow will be on background, attributable to a Senior Administration Official.

Following Mike will be a briefing on Irish political issues on background attributable to a Senior Administration Official.

Mike?

MR. DEAVER: The first thing I want to say is that there is absolutely no confusion with the Irish about whether this is going to be on live television or not. (Laughter.)

Q Is it going to be?

MR. DEAVER: No, it's not. (Laughter.)

Q What is --

MR. DEAVER: I'm sure some of it may be on Irish television, but whether it's live or not, I'm never going to get into that issue again. We were talking down here before we started, and Bill Henkel was there, and when we first started negotiating with the Chinese, I kept saying live television, and they kept saying yes -- little did I know that live television didn't start until 7:00 p.m. everyday.

The obvious reason for this trip was initiated by the call for the Summit and the agreement on those dates. And then President Mitterrand invited the seven other Heads of State -- six other Heads of State -- for the 40th Anniversary of the Normandy Invasion. And the President has been wanting to visit Ireland now that he's found out that his ancestors were, indeed, from Ballyporeen. We were in Ireland in the '70s, but he didn't really get a chance or, in fact, didn't even know at that point who his ancestors were. It was at that time that he found out he was related to the O'Reagans. But since he became President, all of the various research people have found his family tree.

He's corresponded with the people of Ballyporeen and the peerage houses over the last four years. And his son, Ron, visited Ballyporeen and saw, as we did when we went over in February, the record at the church that shows John O'Reagan baptized. All of you will see replicas of that. In fact, I think the parish priest will have the book with him to show the President.

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In addition to visiting Ballyporeen, the President will receive an honorary degree from the University of Galway which is celebrating its 500th anniversary. At -- that's really the only other thing he does in that part of the country -- when he visits Ballyporeen, he will visit the parsonage of the church. There are only about eight buildings in the whole of Ballyporeen. I think the -- he will actually walk down mainstreet, which is about three blocks long.

After visiting the parish priest, he'll go to the little church there, see the records, and they'll have a brief service. He'll then walk down to the pub where the Reagan lounge is. All of you can buy Reagan memorabilia. This guy's got a very good operation going. (Laughter.)

We'll see some Irish singing and folk dancing. The President plans to, as is the tradition we learned, in Ireland, to bring a gift when you return to your native land -- he'll be giving a silver chalice to the church. He will not see the actual burial ground of his ancestors, which is about eight miles from Ballyporeen and, logistically, is pretty hard to get to.

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Obviously, the President is interested in visiting his homeland, or that of his ancestors. But, in addition to that, I think you will see in the speech to the Irish Parliament a substantive speech, which will be not only directed to the Irish community, but all of Europe for that matter. The first draft of that speech has not gone to the President, so I can't tell you too much about it.

There'll be the usual state dinners, return dinners.

And on the 4th, we go to London. Basically, on those days, we will be involving ourselves with a dinner with the Queen -- a lunch with the Queen, bilateral with Prime Minister Thatcher.

Going over to Normandy on the 6th. And the first stop at Normandy will be Pointe du Hoc, where they will have a reenactment of the charge on the beach. The President will have about a 20-minute statement at Pointe du Hoc, which mainly will be remembering the sacrifices of those who are buried there and what that sacrifice meant and has meant for the last 40 years of peace and prosperity in Europe, be a reminder that it's important that we remain strong so we can defend Europe and our allies.

After Pointe du Hoc, he will visit the cemetary at Omaha -- Is that right? -- Omaha Beach. I believe there are 20,000 -- 9,300 stars and crosses that are maintained there. And after a brief visit to the memorial, he will stop at the two crosses of President Roosevelt's two sons, who are buried there. I think there are 26 brothers buried in that cemetary and one father and son. It's a very moving thing to see.

President Mitterrand will then join the Reagans for statements. President Mitterrand is visiting each other government's function that day.

Afterwards, we go to Utah Beach, where the President will join the other six heads of state. And the only person speaking at that ceremony will be President Mitterrand.

That concludes the day at Normandy.

And we go back to London where the President will basically be involving himself with whatever work is necessary that will come up as Washington work. And we will begin the bilaterals with the other heads of state, starting the summit on the 7th. Is that right? Yes. Over the working dinner with the other heads of delegation at 10 Downing Street.

On Friday, the President has a working breakfast with his staff and goes right into the summit meetings with a working lunch and a working dinner.

Saturday morning is a repeat of Friday. The only difference will be that there should be a joint press statement that day, concluding the summit with the Queen's dinner.

That's basically the schedule. I think, as I said at the beginning, the President's very excited, not only about visiting Ireland, seeing the birthplace of his ancestors, but making some, I think, significant statements to the European community, both at -- in Dublin and at Pointe du Hoc.

I'll be happy to answer any questions.

Steve.

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Q On the lineage question, I've heard you and others refer to his ancestors as the "O'Reagans", but some reports that I was able to find out of Ballyporeen -- there were a lot of stories a couple of years ago when they did the research -- and also, young Ron's account. He refers to them as "Reagan." And, apparently, it is Reagan in the register there. So if it was O'Reagan -- I'm just wondering --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Do you remember --

Q -- if you can clear it up?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- what the register said? It's hand scrawled -- some years ago.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think -- there's some that are Reagans and some that are O'Reagans and the way Father Condon said is in that period of time the "O" was just -- just something that put in front of a lot of names and it didn't have any real significance.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Here's an Irishman.

MR. O'LEARY: It certainly has significance.

(Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That was Mr. "Leary."

(Laughter.)

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Q Will he fly the channel by helicopter, both ways?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that's going to depend on the weather. We have all different plans --

Q But it is now listed that he go by chopper --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're planning -- that's the first --

Q -- from England to Normandy.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right.

Q How long a flight is that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What is that -- twenty minutes?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I beg your pardon?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The flight -- across the channel -- by chopper.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: An hour and five.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: An hour and five minutes.

Q Will the President make any reference to the Irish -- North and South Irish problem?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sure he will. He and the Prime Minister discussed that when the Prime Minister was here, and I'm sure he will.

Lou?

Q Is there any concern about these -- that these protests on the President and Central America will in any way mar his visit to Ireland?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You know, we have protests on that issue just about every place we go anymore, whether it's St. Louis or Dublin, so --

Q -- except China --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We didn't have any in China, you're right. (Laughter.) We just take those in stride and be prepared. Yes?

Q You've got, what, three days in Ireland. Is it just going to be confined to ceremonial and official events, or is he going to be out in the countryside riding horseback and doing all sorts of --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. There is no time for that, really. The first day, when he receives the degree from the Galway University, that's all he'll be doing, so he will have some time for rest there.

Q Could you speak to the domestic, political implications of his visit to Ireland?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, there's a lot of Irish here --

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Q Do you know how many?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have seen figures of 30 million -- 20 or 30 million who can trace their ancestry back to Ireland. A lot of them came over here during the famine. But, I think the same answer goes for the China trip. I assume --

Q -- A lot of Chinese here -- (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I assume that -- everything going well -- the President would get some sort of a blip on his job rating. I think that's been true for most Presidential trips, trips overseas, with a couple of exceptions.

Q Have you seen a "blip" as a result of the China trip?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, there was a slight blip -- couple of points. And, on the -- particularly on the handling of foreign policy.

Q Is it correct that we're going to be -- we being the press -- are going to be in Dublin and the President's going to be by himself, exclusive of a travel pool, or expanded pool, in Galway?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q So there will be --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pool everyplace -- let me just tell you, warn you right now -- that we have had extensive conversations with the British and their ideas about press relations are a little bit different from what you saw at Williamsburg, so we are doing everything we can to get our pools expanded to our normal rates, and to get the press to cover as many events as possible in London. But, I'll tell you right now, it's going to be difficult. And the press are not going to be located near where the Heads of State are meeting -- they're going to be across town. And, the logistics of all of this are going to be very difficult. And our staff is doing everything they can to work it out so that we can have as good a job as possible.

I would hope to meet with the heads of the various press organizations sometime this week to sit down and talk to them about some of these things so that, if they actually see some of the working plans, maybe there are some other things we can do that we haven't seen. But, bear in mind when you get over there, it's going to -- it's going to be different from Williamsburg.

Q But where are they meeting that's so far from the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They're meeting at Lancaster House which is right next to Buckingham Palace, and the press center is across town at the Connaught Rooms. Some of the briefings they're planning on doing are going to be by closed circuit television. We're going to get our briefers over to the Connaught Rooms and briefing rooms just as fast as we can after each of the sessions.

Yes?

Q What size of American contingent do you expect on this trip? Is it going to be larger than the one two years ago or smaller?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Are you talking about -- are you talking about government people or press?

Q Government people, primarily; but also press.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What are the numbers you're dealing with?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'd say it's very similar to any international trip we've taken.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Which is?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Including press and all, in number probably about 600.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- 600.

Q You're counting the press?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's everybody.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That also includes certain members of the press corps who don't travel on the press charter but in fact are located by their agencies, bureaus or networks into London. But they become a part of the whole group associated with the President's trip.

Q You talk about return dinners. There are no return dinners, are there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's a return lunch. I'm sorry, Helen.

Q Return lunch?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In Dublin. Right.

Q You said the President was excited about his visit to -- excuse me -- to Ireland. What's his feeling and his goal, if you will, for the summit? What -- In Williamsburg, I think, there was more of a focus or somewhat of a focus on the security issue in addition to the economics. And there was more controversy on the economic. What does he --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You're going to get a briefing on that in just a minute, but, basically, the London summit, as far as the President's concerned, is a continuation of the work at Williamsburg. And these, as you all know -- these summits really are opportunities for these leaders to get together and have conversations together, rather than any major substantive issues coming forth. But there will be some, and you'll get a briefing on that in just a minute.

Yes?

Q I'm a little more curious about the question of his roots because I guess this came -- this sort of dramatic information of finding a name in the registry occurred since he became President. How -- Can you give us some insight into, you know, how he learned of that? And you say he corresponded with them? I mean, how much interest did he take in --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He's taken a lot of interest since his first trip over there and has had visits over the last ten years by various people from Ireland. He has corresponded with people in Ireland. The -- I think when you meet this parish priest and hear him describe how they did go back and look through the records and the baptismal records and you see -- actually see it, I think it's pretty convincing.

But why now? I don't know. He's had an interest, as I've known, for at least ten or fifteen years in Ireland. They developed an interest about three and a half years ago -- the Irish.

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Q Yes. And, so, I mean, when they -- Did it happen early in the Presidency when he -- when this was discovered, that he said at some point, "I want to get to Ireland?" I mean, that kind of thing.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't remember exactly when he first started getting correspondence from the town of Ballyporeen. But that's the connection there.

Q It was before the assassination attempt.

Q Does he --

Q They corresponded and he sent a picture to them that -- the time of the assassination.

Q Attempt.

Q They wrote him? He didn't write them --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right. I mean, how would he know Ballyporeen?

Q Does he agree with the exclusion --

Q He might have hired somebody to find it out for him.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. What?

Q Does he agree with the exclusion of the Germans from the D-Day commemoration?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I haven't heard him comment on that. I don't know --

Q Speaking of D-Day, wasn't there originally a group of Polish freedom fighters, or whatever you want to call it, involved in that invasion? And were they invited? Is there any Polish --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have no idea. Do you?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I believe a representative from the Polish Defense Ministry will be present at the Utah Beach ceremony.

MR. SIMS: We will have a full briefing on that tomorrow here so --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Good. Anybody else? Yes?

Q Since terrorism is likely to be one of the topics of discussion in anticipation of the various demonstrations and the recent embassy -- Libyan Embassy incident in London, can you talk at all about the security preparations? Any extraordinary precautions being taken?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we never talk about the security preparations, but they've been working on them for some time. And they'll be as good as they always are.

Q I mean, anything extraordinary this trip?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I don't think there's anything extraordinary.

Q [redacted], you talk about problems of pools in London --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q -- and the British getting very tough on this. Is that for security reasons or other reasons?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. It's just their idea of how to handle it. I think that at the last summit they hosted they did it pretty much the same way. And we just disagree about some of the access.

Q Well, do we have any coverage of Buckingham Palace events?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There will be pool coverage of the guests arrival in that hall of portraits or whatever it's called, but that's it. There'll be no coverage of the dinner itself.

Q And how about the lunch?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would assume that the coverage would be pretty much the same. There won't be any coverage inside the luncheon.

Q When was the President's first trip to Ireland --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Now, I knew somebody was going to ask me that.

Q You said 1970.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was in the '70s and I was with him and I simply can't remember.

Q Was he Governor?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He was Governor. Right. He was on a trip throughout Europe. I think we went to five or six countries.

Q Are you sure of that? --

Q And is this the second or third U.S. President to address the Parliament of Ireland?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Excuse me.

Q What -- How many other U.S. Presidents have addressed the Irish Parliament?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I assume John Kennedy did when he was there, and that was it.

Q Is this it? He's the second --

Q -- Nixon --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

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Q Are you sure of that date? Because if you're right, then the President made up part of his autobiography when he talked about --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, Ann, maybe I'm wrong.

Q Oh.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I said at the beginning I wasn't quite sure of the date, but we'll find out for you.

Q Well, it's one of these facts that you get in trouble with -- I think he went there before he was a politician in the '40s.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. Well, he may have done that, but we were sent by President Nixon on that trip. So, I'm sure he was Governor at the time. We went to --

Q No, I mean, the point is that I think this is his third trip to Ireland.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It could be. I don't know about any trip before he was Governor.

Yes, Steve?

Q The -- I remember you went over to London some months ago to advise the British on -- offer some advice on the summit preparation. And did they take any of it? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, I think they were -- We had two good days with them, and we talked about a lot of logistical problems. And they changed Directors of the summit since that time so some of those -- (laughter) -- some of that free advice isn't there now.

Okay?

Q Why did they change Directors?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have no idea.

Q You couldn't give us any insight into, for instance, that special communications operation that you had in Williamsburg with the translators in the room and all that kind of stuff that you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There will be none of that. They're going to have the people in the room -- translators in the room.

Q Will there be shuttle buses? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sure there will be --

Q Yes, for Reagan. For Reagan? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. (Laughter.) Thank you.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 2:55 P.M. EDT

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON IRISH POLITICAL ISSUES

May 21, 1984

Room 450
The Old Executive Office Building

2:55 P.M. EDT

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think everyone received a copy of the Ireland background notes. If they haven't, I have some extra copies here.

In terms of statistics, I would just call your attention to the point on page four where they talk about the number of seats by the varying parties in the governing coalition and under "Political Conditions," the minor party, the Labor Party, has 16 seats instead of 6 seats.

Q We don't have a page 4.

Q We only have three pages.

Q 1, 3, 5.

Q 1, 3 and 5.

Q 1, 3, 5.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. There are some copies here --

Q That have 2 and 4 in them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That have -- that have -- that are complete.

Let me just say that the President's visit offers an opportunity to continue the dialogue that he --

Q No 4's.

Q What was the correction --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Under "Political Conditions." Do you see "Political Conditions"? The Labor Party should be listed as 16 seats, instead of 6 seats. And that's the minority --

Q Okay.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The trip offers the President the opportunity to continue the dialogue that he started this year with the Prime Minister, Mr. FitzGerald, in March. This was the second Irish Prime Minister to have come to Washington during this present administration. Last year the Foreign Minister, Mr. Barry, visited Washington, so that there has been a relatively steady stream of Irish visitors to the United States.

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The visit itself comes with two events to bear in mind and one is the publication of the report of The New Ireland Forum. It was -- The New Ireland Forum was a process begun by the present Foreign Minister who thought it was high time that varying groups in Ireland get together to talk about the future of Ireland, that is, the entire island, both North and South. It was a process in which the nationalist parties from both North and South participated. The Protestant majority in the North, essentially, did not participate in the process. The report was published on May 2nd. The Irish Foreign Minister, Mr. Barry, was here in Washington to present a copy of the report to the administration. The administration has issued a statement welcoming the report as a contribution to the process of seeking a constitutional settlement of the problems of the island and urging that the process of dialogue continue between the governments concerned and the traditions. Those are the Irish Catholic and the Irish Protestant traditions.

Additionally, the Irish assume the Presidency of the European Community for the second half of the year, the next six months. And so we will be maintaining relatively frequent dialogue with them. So the President's visit comes just prior to the assumption of the Presidency.

The Irish government is a coalition government, made up of the Fine Gael Party and the Labor Party, which is the smaller party and it's a center, left party.

My colleague has already mentioned the question of demonstrations, which are -- from our indications -- seen to be linked to policies in Central America, but will have varying dimensions to them and will bring together a number of different groups with varying points of views.

With that, let me just throw it open.

Q What will be the extent of those demonstrations, as you see --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's unclear. As I think -- as Mr. Deaver said, the demonstrations take place virtually every place. It's not clear at this point where the -- what the size of the demonstrations is going to be. I would expect some in Galway and some in Dublin and you may also have some members of the Parliament expressing some measure of protest by absenting themselves during the speech to the Joint Session of Parliament.

Q If I could follow up, when President Kennedy went to Ireland, there weren't any protests. In all the ways in which this trip was described to us early on was that this was a kind of a triumphant and happy visit for the President. Do these demonstrations, which appear to have sort of sprung up here, do they mar this visit of his?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think so. I think the Irish authorities are prepared to handle the possibility of peaceful demonstrations and peaceful protests, and certainly, these aren't something new in the course of the travels of American Presidents so I don't see anything --

Q If I can follow on that. The demonstrations might happen everywhere, but they are new in Ireland concerning U.S. foreign policy. What reason do you see for these demonstrations? Is it some -- are you saying it's something the Jesuits have started or is it wide-spread?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Mr. -- the Vice President was there last year and there were some demonstrations connected with his visit. One of the things to remember is that Ireland has one of they youngest populations in Europe. The average -- 50 percent of the population is under 25 years of age.

Unemployment is relatively high. So you have -- do have sectors of the population which are disaffected. So I think that is the background for some of the circumstances.

Regarding -- the principal issue seems to be Central America. the Irish do have interest in Central America to the extent that there are large numbers of Irish missionaries in Central America, some of whom have differences of view regarding policy in Central America and who are making these points back home, points that have obviously caught the attention of some individuals.

Q Are you saying that you thought that the fact that there was a large number of people under 25 indicated that there are a large number of disaffected people? Are young people disaffected or were you referring that to the unemployed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In the sense of the unemployed. There is a substantial portion of the population that is unemployed and this creates a circumstance which can contribute.

Q Correct me if I'm wrong, but the New Ireland Forum recommended eventual unification, right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is -- well, there are varying viewpoints. They really talked about three different approaches. The optimal one, and one in which some people consider the only approach. For instance, the former prime minister and opposition leader, Mr. Haughey.

The only solution would be unity. The other two options which are mentioned in the report are some sort of federation and some sort of joint rule or joint authority.

Q But the recommendation that everyone is locked in on is the unification, right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, certainly the debate that is going on with the -- over the interpretation of the report focused on the unity report. But there are some interesting things in the report, itself. For the first time, the Nationalists have acknowledged that there is another tradition whose interest -- whose consent has to be obtained, and that is the Protestant majority in the North. And so, this is a factor in it. While they talked about unity, there is also this other side of it. How do you achieve that unity given the opposition of 60 percent of the population of the Northern part of the island?

Q At what point does the administration's statement of support for their efforts go to?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It merely was a recognition of a process that was going on that contributes to dialogue towards a possible resolution in a constitutional manner of the problem.

Q Do you know if there has been a British government

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reaction to their --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, there has been a British reaction. There was a statement by the British government which indicated -- welcomed the report, indicated some areas of difference on it, and suggested that a more thoughtful and more considered response would be forthcoming at a later date.

But it's obviously a subject which I think the Irish will want to raise with the President.

Q Do you know if the President will raise it in any of his remarks?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think my colleague addressed the question already in which he said that he would expect that the Northern Ireland question would arise during the President's visit.

Q Well, in that context then, it could be an issue between him and Mrs. Thatcher as well.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is always a possibility -- a discussion.

Q Do you expect the President to go beyond this statement that the White House released recently?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't believe so. I think our position has been a position of the United States government, that this is a question which is most properly addressed by the governments concerned and the parties concerned. We hope they will work together in terms of dialogue and seek to resolve what is a difficult situation.

Q So you just expect him to reaffirm what the administration has already said?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct.

Q Would demonstrations against the policies in Central America, if they were big enough, could they endanger the political standing of the government?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't believe so.

There was a debate in the Irish Parliament regarding the invitation to the President and the overwhelming number of members of both Houses voted to reaffirm the invitation of the government to speak at the Joint Session. So I can't --

Q What was the vote?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q Do you know what the vote was?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think about 20 -- 20 members out of over -- well over 200.

Q Dissented, you mean?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In both -- there were 166 members of the House and 60 members of the Senate.

Q What were those numbers again?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: 166 members in the Dail, the Lower House, and 60 members, I believe, in the Upper House, which is not a direct election --

Q How many do you expect may boycott the Session?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There may be a small

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number. It's -- a handful.

Q Fewer than 20, I assume.

Q Will they boycott or just get up and walk out?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You'd have to ask them. I just don't know.

Q He has two major speeches in Ireland? On the honorary degree and --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is essentially one major address, and that is the address in the Parliament. There will be some remarks at the time of the --

Q Galway?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Galway presentation.

Q Are those going to be substantive remarks?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q Are they going to -- deal with substantive issues or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the President is still looking at the drafts so it's hard to say.

Q What does he get a degree for? What's the name of the degree?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Just -- it's an honorary degree. I'm afraid I don't know -- University College of Galway.

The President's presence in Galway is connected with the 500th anniversary of the founding of the city of Galway. There may be a Presidential proclamation connected with that also.

Q In what -- what do you mean?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: A Presidential proclamation marking the 500th occasion -- 500th anniversary.

Q Is there any degree to which sensitivities in Ireland would suggest the President soften some of his statements about importance of non-violence in settling the Irish question? In other words, does he have to be concerned about coming across in a lecturing --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Absolutely not. On this question, the Irish government has supported the statements the President has made in recent -- St. Patrick's Day proclamations -- the most recent, or last year and this year, in which he talks about violence. The Irish government, itself, is opposed to utilization of violence to resolve the issue.

Q So there is no reason to think that he would give a very, very strong statement on the subject while he's there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think you'll find -- as I say, the remarks are only in draft form, but I think you'll find them consistent with what the President has said before.

Q I'm asking about tone and asking preparatory to -- these things come up during the trip and I'd like to be able to know now --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think they will be fully consistent with what he has said before.

Q I'm not asking about consistency. I'm sure they'll be consistent. I'm asking about the tone that he uses, and whether or not there are certain considerations --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would expect no change in tone.

Q If I recall correctly, one of the things that the Irish government has been critical of the U.S. government for is the gun-running from the U.S. to the IRA and other dissident groups in Ireland. Is the President prepared to announce anything in that regard, any new --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, there's no new initiatives. If you look at the record, there has been a substantial decrease based on evidence we have in the flow of aid and guns to those who are involved in these terrorist activities. The FBI has conducted some investigations and there have been some criminal prosecutions along these lines. But I would expect nothing to be announced by the President in the course of the trip.

Q Is he taking any prominent Irish legislators -- Irish-American legislators with him like O'Neill?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Mr. O'Neill was just -- Speaker O'Neill was just in Ireland at the end of April. I don't expect any members of the party.

Yes?

Q What is the significance of going to Galway?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The significance is that he's on the west coast of Ireland and the city is celebrating its 500th anniversary and we were approached by the city authorities of

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Galway regarding the possibility the President might come in connection with that occasion.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

MR. SIMS: If I can -- Before you leave, correct -- and my colleague has done one for my colleague a couple of points. He mentioned the 500th Anniversary. It is of the city, not of the University.

And Pointe du Hoc --

Q Galway is 500 years old?

MR. SIMS: Yes.

Q That makes it pretty young.

Q The charter -- the granting of the charter.

MR. SIMS: Well, 500th Anniversary -- It is a 500th Anniversary celebration. We'll have to get you the --

Q Well, everybody's going to think the city is 500 years old, if --

Q It's not. It's the granting of the charter --

MR. SIMS: It's the granting of the charter.

Q -- I think.

MR. SIMS: Granting of the charter.

Q The city is a lot older than --

MR. SIMS: All right. The anniversary is related to the city, not the University.

And the Pointe du Hoc reenactment is the day before the President's there, not the day he is there.

Q You mean we're going to miss it?

MR. SIMS: I presume you will. I --

Q Any other corrections? (Laughter.)

MR. SIMS: The other corrections -- to correct myself. I want to be sure that you remember there's a 3:30 p.m. briefing tomorrow here, D-Day. Wednesday, 10:00 a.m., White House Briefing Room on trade. And Friday, 10:00 a.m. here, on Treasury issues.

Thank you.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 3:13 P.M. EDT

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release May 22, 1984

PRESS BRIEFING
JOHN O. MARSH, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
ON THE NORMANDY PORTION OF
THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO EUROPE

May 22, 1984

3:35 P.M. EDT

SECRETARY MARSH: What I'd like to do is give you a kind of an overview or background of the events that will mark the 40th anniversary of Normandy and introduce to you several of the other people who can give you additional details on specific parts of that and other dimensions of it.

As you're aware, this coming June marks the 40th anniversary of the Normandy invasion. In the Army we see that there's a very significant interest in it by a large number of Veterans groups that have indicated their desire to be there and participate in it.

The Army was designated the Executive Agent for the Department of Defense to coordinate events, not only in Defense, but also government-wide.

There are other events that are associated with this. For example, the liberation of Rome. We have formal ceremonies in Rome on the second day of June.

Later in the year, there will be commemorative ceremonies that will probably focus on the Bulge, operation in Market Garden, VE Day and other events.

It's not necessary to point out what an epic event occurred in the Normandy invasion You're very much aware of that. I would say to you that we know that there will be substantial representation from groups -- 4th Infantry Division, 1st Infantry Division, 29th Infantry Division, Rangers, 82nd Airborne and 101st, these Veterans have indicated their desire to be there. You're talking with men now that are -- most of them are -- 40 years after the event are now in their 60's. The American Legion, VFW, Disabled American Veterans and others.

If you look at the nature of the ceremonies, you might look at it from three different perspectives. Governmental: They are multinationl. The government of France is the host for the events that will occur on three principle places on the Normandy coast.

In addition to that, there will be a number of local events and ceremonies that will occur, not only in France, but also in England. And in addition to the ceremonies in France, there will be some other ceremonies that will occur in England June the 6th.

General Laughton Collins, better known as "Lightening Joe" Collins, who was a general officer, Corps Commander at the Normandy invasion, has been designated as the senior American military personnel and General Collins will be present.

There will be participation by United States forces that will be described to you later. Their function will be as a part of the commemorative group that will take part in the events. There will also be certain support functions performed by

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United States forces.

In our forces, it goes across the spectrum from Army, Air Force, Coast Guard, Navy. We also will have a significant number of programs that will be occurring that we are aware of here in the domestic United States. That will be described to you later on.

The individuals who will conduct the remaining portions of the briefing are Colonel Skates, who is actually on active duty as a reservist. He's been called back to active duty for 60 -- 90 days. He's a history professor. He'll give you a kind of a Normandy overview, which we believe will be helpful to you in putting it into a perspective.

The Chief of the Coordination Committee for the Department of Defense is Lieutenant General David Grange, the last remaining General Officer of the United States Army,

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who is a combat soldier from World War II, Korea and Vietnam. He had two parachute assaults into Europe. He was not in the Normandy invasion, but was in -- in Southern France at the time. He is the Chief Coordinator for this event. He will give you a detailed briefing on the events at Utah Beach, Normandy Beach and Pointe du Hoc. It will be concluded by General Barker who will give you an overview of U.S. activities, press assistance that we hope that we can be able to give you.

Finally, as you're aware, Normandy was the beginning of the end; VE Day would occur in less than a year, and then we would see the rebuilding of Europe, the Marshall Plan, the economic recovery of Europe -- the NATO Alliance, which today finds many of our adversaries as strong members of our Alliance.

At this time, I'll call on Colonel Skates.

COLONEL SKATES: Thank you, sir. I know that when people mention history, the audience groans, so I don't intend to give you a history lesson. I don't have time to do that. What I want to do is point out those things, those areas, that are of historical significance that relate to what you'll be seeing this June 6th -- that is June 6, 1984.

Before I do that, let me talk about two points, and I'll do this as quickly as I can. First, I want to tell you why Normandy was selected in as concise a way as I know how. I don't intend to go through those one by one.

Basically what the planners did, was simply take the coast of Europe from, about Antwerp -- well, Southern Netherlands -- down to the Brittany Penninsula. And they took these criteria and they set each area along that coast beside these criteria and tried to see which one fit those best. Now none suited those, all those criteria. Normandy came closest, although it didn't -- it fell short particularly in the criteria of ports. That's why one of the earliest campaigns was not toward the heart of France but up the Cotentin penninsula towards Cherbourg to get, to get a port -- which they felt was absolutely essential to the future of the drive across France and the drive into the heart of Germany. So, it was the best compromise, Normandy was.

Now, the second point I want to make before I get into the actual historical signficance of some of the sites that you'll be visiting on the 6th of June, let me say just a word or two about what came to be the driving considerations. That is, the factors which dictated a great deal of what happened at Normandy on June 6th, 1944.

The single greatest criteria, or single greatest consideration, was landing craft. It comes as a surprise to most people to realize, or when they find out, that we did not bring, on June 6th, 1944, overwhelming ground power onto the coast of Normandy. We had it; if we could have gotten the shipping and the landing craft, we could have brought overwhelming ground power. But a five division assault which Normandy was, on D-Day, was a close thing. The Germans could bring much greater ground combat power to bear in Normandy in those first few days than we could.

And the limiting factor -- it was not that we didn't have the troops available. It was we didn't have the lift -- the shipping and the landing craft, to get them across the English Channel and onto the beaches. So that was the prime driving consideration in the whole process.

The other one was, of course, weather -- tides, moonlight. There were several factors that had to come together all at one time which dictated the time. One was, of course, a period of good weather; another was a moonlit night, so that the airborne drop could occur. Another was tides. If you've never been there, you don't realize,

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I think, how broad the beaches are at low tide, and how very narrow they are at high tide. So they had to have a period early in the morning, at low tide, where they could land the landing craft with the beach obstacles exposed, rather than running over them.

Okay -- those two things, I think, will be helpful later on in understanding the historical significance of some of the sites. This is, of course, the overall scheme for D-Day. And those are the famous five beaches. From West to East: Utah, Omaha, Gold, Juno, and Sword. Of course, Utah and Omaha were U.S. beaches; the other three were British beaches -- British-Canadian beaches, two of them were British beaches, one of them was assaulted by a Canadian division.

We're going to focus in now on two of the American beaches and one other site which will be of interest to you on the 6th. of June -- that is, Pointe du Hoc. And I'll describe for you, as briefly as I can, what happened at each of those places so that you'll have that background when you go this June.

First, there you see Utah beach, and the drop zones for the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions, immediately behind the beaches. Now, as it turned out, the sea assault on Utah Beach, done on the 4th, or the 6th of June, the assault division was the 4th Infantry Division, was the least costly of any of the beaches. In other words, it went off smoothly, almost as it was -- almost precisely as it was planned, and with relatively few casualities. Now that came as a result of some good luck, of the terrain -- Utah Beach is very flat, it's not very good defensive terrain for the Germans -- in other words, there are no heights that they can get on, as they could at Omaha. And, finally, as a result of the good work done that night, after midnight, by the airborne divisions that were dropping in this area

Now, their main purpose was to secure exits from the beaches. This area was flooded -- here. So, as the 4th Infantry Division came across the beach, they had to be assured that those exists were open, so they could get off the beach. And that was the job of the airborne divisions, to secure those exits from the beach, to -- to secure river crossings, and to guard the right flank of the Allied Forces.

Utah Beach, then, is -- perhaps, the most unscenic area in Normandy -- and, for that reason, partially for that reason, was the least costly of the areas assaulted.

Pointe du Hoc, which you see here in a photograph, is, as you can tell, a dramatic piece of -- (laughter.) -- piece of terrain. It's just a spike that sticks into the English Channel.

There will be a ceremony there, a major ceremony, on June 6th this year. What happened there was one of the most famous -- one of the smallest -- but most famous episodes of D-Day, and that was the Ranger Assault at Pointe du Hoc. Three companies, of the Second Ranger Battalion, climbed those cliffs; landed by assault boat at the foot of those cliffs -- in that area -- put rope ladders up the cliffs, assaulted the cliffs. Their purpose was to neutralize gun positions, bunkers, that the Germans had put on top of the bluff. When they got there, they found the bunkers were empty.

They pushed on inland, discovered the guns that had been removed from the bunkers back in a field, spiked them -- destroyed them -- and, at that time, were counter-attacked by the Germans, and spent the next 24 hours literally fighting for their lives. They suffered -- of the roughly 200 men that assaulted the cliffs on the morning of June 6th, 75 of them came down when they were relieved a little more than 24 hours later.

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That became of course, a symbol of the tenacity of, and professionalism, that was embodied in the whole campaign. And, as I said, there will be on that Pointe, a major ceremony on June 6th of this year.

Q Is that campaign at the bottom or at the top?

COLONEL SKATES: Sir?

Q Is that ceremony at the bottom?

COLONEL SKATES: The ceremony is going to be -- well, you can't see it, this is sort of fuzzy -- but there is a German observation post -- incidentally, some of those bunkers are still there. They've been blown, and -- there are bomb craters all over here still. There's an observation post right here. The ceremony, as I understand, will be right here, behind that observation post and slightly to the side of it.

Q Can I ask you --

SECRETARY MARSH: General Grange is going to develop in detail --

COLONEL SKATES: General Grange is going to go into these ceremonies in more detail.

Q Okay. I want to ask about the assault for just one second. They did not encounter hostile fire --

COLONEL SKATES: No, no, if I implied that, I didn't mean to. In other words, they did not get up the cliffs without loss. The Germans were there on top of the cliffs, literally throwing rocks at them, and rolling -- dropping hand grenades down, and firing down at them. So, they did suffer casualities crossing that open ground to the foot of the cliffs and trying to assault the cliffs.

My point, the point I was trying to make was that the heaviest casualities they suffered, came as a result

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of the German counter-attacks later on in the day after they'd already secured Pointe du Hoc, after they'd already got up the cliffs. But I did not mean to imply that they didn't -- they did have casualties.

Q How high are the bluffs?

Q Was that the night that the weather was so terrible?

COLONEL SKATES: The weather was marginal all through the night. The weather affected -- it was clear, but the weather affected the seaborne forces more than it did the airborne forces. These people were, in fact, about 45 minutes late getting to the foot of Pointe du Hoc because of a strong current and because of some bad guidance they had gotten -- but also because of a strong current.

Yes, ma'am, the weather was bad. It was clear, but it was very windy and the sea was almost too rough to do it.

Q How high were those bluffs?

COLONEL SKATES: Those bluffs were about -- I couldn't give you a precise figure, but they're maybe 100 feet. Wouldn't you say, sir? About 100 feet. And they're precipitous.

MR. SIMS: We're going to take questions at the end. So if these fascinating details may wait until then -- we want to get through this and we'll come back and perhaps -- or else, talk to you later on.

COLONEL SKATES: Okay. The third area -- and this is also an American area. What I'm doing is zeroing in on the American areas and ignoring, of course, the British and Canadians, who actually landed more troops on D-Day than we did. But, for our purposes, I think we need to zero in on the Americans. That's a bad choice of words, isn't it.

Okay. Omaha Beach. There will be a ceremony there, a major ceremony on the afternoon of June 6th at the Normandy American Cemetery which sits on the bluffs above Omaha Beach.

Now, Omaha Beach, because of its terrain, because of the fact that the Germans defended it more tenaciously than they did at Utah, for a variety of reasons, Omaha Beach was the closest run of any of the five beaches. In fact, by about 8:30 to 9:00 a.m. in the morning, many people thought that the forces that had landed on Omaha Beach would not be able to stay there.

SECRETARY MARSH: -- you had a German unit that was running anti-invasion maneuvers which contributed to that.

COLONEL SKATES: That's right. There was a German unit there that intelligence hadn't picked up. They didn't know it was there. Also, the terrain, itself, is highly defensible. Omaha Beach is a broad beach but it's backed by, again, steep, precipitous bluffs -- cliffs -- of about 100-150 feet. And the Germans got up in those cliffs and set gun positions on -- rifle picks on top of the cliffs and prepared bunkers in the sides of the cliffs that could fire straight down the beaches.

The heaviest casualties of any units taken on D-Day were taken by units on Omaha Beach. The 116th Infantry Regiment, the 29th Infantry Division, which was a part of the Maryland-Virginia National Guard, which was a Maryland-Virginia National Guard Division -- took very heavy casualties in the first wave in this area here, on the right-hand side.

Q What was that unit again?

COLONEL SKATES: It was the 116th Infantry of the 29th Infantry Division. It was actually attached to the 1st Infantry Division that day, but it was organic. In other words, its parent unit was

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the 29th Infantry Division, which was the Maryland-Virginia Guard -- National Guard Unit.

SECRETARY MARSH: Virginia regiment.

COLONEL SKATES: Virginia regiment, yes, sir. It was a Virginia regiment.

The -- it turned out to be won by really the initiative and courage of corporals and sergeants and second lieutenants and captains, who just, on the beach, took the attitude, as one fellow put it, "We can stay here and get killed or we can try to move forward and get killed." And small units then began to work their way off the beach -- not up those cuts here as had originally been the plan, but straight up the bluffs. And they began to filter up in small groups and naval gunfire began to neutralize, began to work on the Germans pretty well and by noon, small groups were getting off the beach and up on the bluffs, and the Germans were pulling back. Very close on the attack --

Q Those cuts are breaks in the bluffs?

COLONEL SKATES: Ma'am?

Q Those cuts are breaks in the bluffs?

COLONEL SKATES: Right. Americans called them draws, but they're low places. The Germans had those places heavily covered by fire. And although the original intent had been to secure those cuts as exits from the beach because those -- up every one of those cuts ran a road -- and they wanted to do the same thing at Omaha they did at Utah, and that was get off the beach, and the Germans realized that, too, and they had those cuts covered by fire so that these small parties began to work their way up the bluffs, straight up the bluffs.

SECRETARY MARSH: Could you move over to Utah now.

COLONEL SKATES: Yes. Do you want to switch back to Utah?

SECRETARY MARSH: Yes, I think -- so General Grange can address the ceremony --

COLONEL SKATES: I'm running over but -- I'll be glad to take any questions afterwards, but we're running short of time here. If you want to talk afterwards, I'll be glad to do it.

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General Grange is going to run through the ceremonies themselves --

Q Colonel Skates, what's your first name?

COLONEL SKATES: Ray.

Q What's your last name?

COLONEL SKATES: Skates.

Q It is?

SECRETARY MARSH: S-k-a-t-e-s.

COLONEL SKATE: S-k-a-t-e-s, yes, ma'am.

Q S-k-a-t-e-s. And you're a colonel?

COLONEL SKATES: As my wife says, I'm not a real colonel. I'm a reserve colonel. I'm a history professor.

GENERAL GRANGE: -- let me --

Q Where are you a professor?

Q -- history professor -- where?

COLONEL SKATES: At University of Southern Mississippi.

Q Southern Mississippi --

GENERAL GRANGE: Good afternoon, everybody. I'm Dave Grange, and I'm the Chairman of the Coordinating Activity for Historical Observances. My committee's been together since February of this year. We number a grand total of about six. And, of course, Ray Skates is one of my lead men.

Since we've been together, we've identified about 80 -- roughly 80 events that'll take place in Europe between May and the end of 1984. Now, these take place in Italy, in Luxembourg, in France, in Belgium, Holland, in the United Kingdom. Now, most of these have been taking place ever since VE Day. There's nothing new about these events.

This being the 40th anniversay, some have taken on some added significance. And I think Mr. Marsh explained the reason why.

Of these 80 some events, 17 are important to us -- my committee -- because there's United States forces involvement. We're a joint organization, so we're interested in not just the Army but the Navy, the Air Force, the Coast Guard and the Merchant Marine, by the way, who was also there in considerable numbers on that memorable day on June the 6th.

I'd like to discuss just the French activity. But first of all, of those 17 major events where there are United States forces involved, three of them are significant. One is the liberation of Rome, and there'll be ceremonies on the 2nd of June there. The next events are in Normandy, and there are events on both the 5th and 6th of June. And then we move to Belgium on the 10th of June for a commemorative ceremony in Bastogne, not just to recognize the Americans who fought the Battle of the Bulge there, but that also coincides with the Belgium Memorial Day.

But let me get on to what's going to happen in Normandy -- that's what you're interested in -- on the 5th and 6th of June. On this chart, you see the major events. First of all, on the 5th of June, there are three: Pointe du Hoc,

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there'll be a reenactment of that assault by the 2nd Ranger Battalion. This is done by the 10th Special Forces Group, which is stationed at Bad Toelz in Germany. Also, on the 5th of June, there'll be a dedication of a memorial, and the time is still to be determined. It looks, as of this moment -- it'll take place sometime around mid-afternoon. A new memorial is being erected there by the American Battle Monuments Commission. It's our monument. The land was given to us by the French government just recently. And that monument is being dedicated to those soldiers who landed on all those beaches on the 6th of June.

And in the afternoon -- late afternoon -- on the 5th of June, there'll be a reenactment jump at Ste-Mere-Eglise where the airborne divisions landed -- pretty much the center of the impact area, those parachutists. But that'll take place late afternoon. And there'll be paratroopers there from the 82nd Airborne Division who are flying in from Fort Bragg, jumping in England, picking up some of their counterparts, their comrades-in-arms from the British Parachute Regiment, and then flying on to Normandy to reenact the drop at Sainte-Mere-Eglise.

On the 6th of June, Pointe du Hoc, the 40th anniversary commemoration of the Ranger landing is a major event because we believe that President Reagan will attend those ceremonies. That'll be the first one of the ceremonies he will go to, then to Omaha Beach for a memorial ceremony there and then on to Utah Beach, which is the largest by far of all three events.

We still haven't firmed up what's going to happen in August. That's the 15th of August -- was the date we invaded southern France. But we expect that that'll get some considerable attention, too.

Could I have the map, please? Again, just to get you oriented, Pointe du Hoc here is where the Rangers landed; Utah Beach where the 4th Division came in; and Omaha Beach -- our 1st Division came in, reinforced by elements of the 29th Division -- National Guard Division -- with the Virginia Regiment, the 116th.

Over here is where the parachutists dropped -- the 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions. This is the first United States Army under the command of General Omar Bradley.

Let me talk first now about Pointe du Hoc. Again, a spectacular shot. You can see the observation post. This is a bunker. This is all concrete-reinforced, built by Rommel when he was putting in the defensive positions in '43 and '44. A number of positions are still in tact and, as Ray mentioned, there are still guns and lots of bomb craters around.

The President will arrive here first. There to greet him will be the Ambassador of France, Ambassador Galbraith, General Rogers, the NATO Commander, a senior military representative in Europe will be there also.

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Very importantly, there'll be roughly 90 Veterans of the Second Ranger Battalion there, men who actually made that assault up that cliff in the face of the German fire, to welcome our President.

There'll be a plaque unveiled. The President will remain there for 35 minutes and then he'll move on to Omaha Beach.

Q Sir, the 90, how does that jive with the 75 --

SECRETARY MARSH: Of the 75, that takes into account those who could walk back down the cliffs. Those casualties would be those who were killed in action and those wounded in action, who have been evacuated by litter.

COLONEL SEATES: There was also another Ranger Battalion that did not come -- did not assault the cliffs. It came in further down the beach and some of those veterans are from that battalion.

Q How long did you say the President would be there?

GENERAL GRANGE: Thirty-five minutes.

Now, this is all very tentative. Those plans are not made by the Pentagon. (Laughter.)

Next slide, please. This is a cemetery at Colleville in France, American cemetery maintained by our government, and this is Omaha Beach. This is where the 116th Infantry came across the bluffs. This is rather high. When you see this smaller piece of ground, you wonder how they ever made it that day. And the first division, primarily the 16th Infantry, came across right here.

The President will arrive. He'll arrive off -- off the slide. He'll go into a guest house, which is located right here, to the guest building where he'll have a chance to freshen up, sign in. They have a guest book there and certainly they'll want our President's signature there.

He'll move to a chapel, which is located on this end of the cemetery, spend some time there and then move down to -- move back to the guest house, where he will welcome President Mitterrand of France.

Q So he walks back and forth? Is that how --

GENERAL GRANGE: There's some walking and there's some riding involved.

Q How many men are buried there?

GENERAL GRANGE: 9,630.

Q How far would you say the cemetery is from the beach?

GENERAL GRANGE: This is just a short walk. You can go from -- there are stairs here and there are all sorts of panoramic maps and sketches and you can tour this whole area. You can walk from the bluff down to the water in 10 minutes. It's very close.

Q -- in yards or something?

GENERAL GRANGE: In yards?

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Q Yes.

GENERAL GRANGE: If you were getting shot at, I guess they'd be shooting at you at about 500 yards. (Laughter.)

Q Okay. Thanks. I guess some people think in those terms. (Laughter.)

Q Are we going to get --

GENERAL GRANGE: When you look at that --

Q -- shot at? (Laughter.)

GENERAL GRANGE: When you look at that -- you look where, you know, there we were and there they were and you wonder --

Q How high --

GENERAL GRANGE. -- brave men there that day.

Q How are the graves marked?

GENERAL GRANGE: They're marked, as all our graves are marked, the name of the individual --

Q Right. But -- Is it a cross or -- Is it a cross or a star --

GENERAL GRANGE: It depends. It depends. There are crosses of David -- there are Stars of David. There are crosses.

GENERAL BARKER: No, he means the marker. The markers. What kind of markers there are --

Q Little flags?

Q Those too.

GENERAL GRANGE: That's right. Those too. That's the headstone. And it'll be "Private" -- you know -- "Joe Dokes, Infantry -- 16th Infantry," "116th Infantry."

Many of the people sleeping here landed here and this is as far as they got --

Q They're all Americans? All the ones that --

GENERAL GRANGE: They're all Americans there. There are 33 pairs of brothers there, by the way.

Q Is this where the Roosevelt brothers --

GENERAL GRANGE: The only difference in headstones are Medal of Honor holders and they have the Medal of Honor and that's a little gold inlay in the -- inscribed replica of the Medal of Honor.

Q Where are the Roosevelt graves?

GENERAL GRANGE: Right about -- right about here. Somewhere in this area. And you're right, there are two Roosevelts buried there.

Q Did everyone there die in the invasion or in the whole campaign --

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GENERAL GRANGE: I really can't answer that too accurately for you; but you can -- the date's on there. The date's on there, so many of these say "6 June" or "8 June" or "10 June;" but I would say the majority of them died in the Normandy campaign, which lasted for several months.

COLONEL SKATES: I think the General's right. Most of them died in either the Normandy campaign or in that area of France; but many of them did not. In other words, in some cases, remains were brought there from other campaigns. So by no means -- Neither thing is correct.

Q Like Italy, for example?

COLONEL SKATES: You cannot say that everybody who died at Normandy is buried there. Nor can you say that all of the people there died at Normandy. They didn't organize the cemeteries that way.

Q And there are some father-son burials?

GENERAL GRANGE: No father and --

SECRETARY MARSH: Thirty-three brothers.

GENERAL GRANGE: Brothers. Thirty-three pairs of brothers are buried there --

Q Is that the chapel, that white building in the background?

GENERAL GRANGE: This is the chapel here. This is the memorial on this end. There are large panoramic maps in here which show -- which pretty much show the map I just had up there a moment ago, the invasion scheme and all the units that participated.

The President moves here with President Mitterrand. President Reagan and President Mitterrand move here. They both make brief addresses. We anticipate -- These folks who are allowed inside -- security corridor -- there are about 4,000 Veterans that will be in attendance, but many, many more people there.

Q How many?

SECRETARY MARSH: Four thousand Veterans.

Q American Veterans?

GENERAL GRANGE: Veterans. Four thousand Veterans.

Q American Veterans?

GENERAL GRANGE: And some others, too, but primarily Americans.

Q Will there be any time when the President, Mitterrand, Trudeau and Thatcher are together at any of these ceremonies?

GENERAL GRANGE: Let me continue on to another -- the next slide. All right? I'll answer your question then.

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The President stays here for 50 minutes.

Q 50? 5,0?

GENERAL GRANGE: 5,0.

Okay, next slide, please. There's not too much -- the first two slides are rather interesting slides. This, again, is Utah Beach. It's drab, sand dune area. It hasn't changed a bit since 1944. The same pastures, several generations removed; the same herds of cows, and the same French farmers are there. And that is absolutely it. But you can see, it's sort of flat.

Although there's only 34 miles between Utah and Omaha Beach, the difference is night and day -- from a high bluff and rocky shale beach at Omaha to a flat, sandy, long beach, particularly at low tide, and low dunes -- no higher than 12 feet -- sand dunes at Utah Beach. This is where the 4th Division came ashore.

The President leaves Omaha Beach now and goes to Utah Beach. This is 17 miles in a straight line, as the crow flies; 34 miles if you go by road, which also haven't improved very much since 1944.

At this ceremony -- and this is strictly a French ceremony. The French are the hosts -- France is the host for all the things that are happening over there on the 5th and 6th of June. And they are the hosts, but at this particular ceremony, President Mitterrand is calling all the shots, what happens -- what's going to take place at the time.

Now, here, they'll be joined again possibly by eight other heads of state. Eight other heads of state. President Mitterrand is the host here. There will be representative military units from all the countries and there will be eight 100-man contingents from various countries who took part in the invasion on the 6th of June. There will be 2000 -- 2000, Ray? On the shore? Right.

COLONEL SKATES: We're going to -- the U.S. -- they've given us 2100 veteran spaces.

GENERAL GRANGE: Yes, 2100 spaces -- The French are controlling the overall block; there will be veterans who have preference to get in to see this ceremony.

Q What are the countries? Can you list them?

GENERAL GRANGE: United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, U.S. and -- Canada. I'm sorry.

Q What about the Poles?

GENERAL GRANGE: There will be Polish contingents in the area. (Laughter.)

Q What does that mean?

GENERAL GRANGE: Well, that's as much as I can give you now because we don't control the guest list. That's a French initiative.

Q Well, is this a touchy subject, having Poles there?

GENERAL GRANGE: No.

Q What was the extent of their participation on D-Day?

SECRETARY MARSH: They were part of the invasion --

GENERAL GRANGE: They were part of the invasion force.

SECRETARY MARSH: -- with the British and the Canadians. There were Czech and Polish units involved in that, if I'm not mistaken.

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Is that right?

COLONEL SKATES: Yes, sir. Yes, sir, that's right.

Q Sir, of the five areas, why did the French pick Utah for the main, overall ceremony? Is there any reason?

GENERAL GRANGE: None that I really know of. One of the reasons you could probably -- if there would be a reason, I would -- if I had to pick one, you can handle more people there and they expect to get 20,000 people in that area. It's a flat area. The pastures -- the cow pastures, you can put a lot of people in there.

You notice the cemetery. It's pretty heavily wooded. It's -- you know, it's beautifully landscaped but it's difficult to put a lot of people in there where they can observe what's going on at the memorial.

Q Do you have a name for the town or the village near the beach where the ceremony will take place?

GENERAL GRANGE: It's right on the beach. There is no town. There's one small cafe, a little road junction. There's no buildings there.

Q Will there be any German participation of any kind -- governmental or otherwise?

GENERAL GRANGE: There's none that I know of. But, again, we have nothing to do with it. Anything other than United States participation.

Q Will they bring in the honor troops from Germany? From West Germany?

GENERAL GRANGE: American troops?

Q Yes.

GENERAL GRANGE: Yes. It just so happens that out 1st Division is in Germany so those soldiers will be wearing the same patch that went ashore on the 6th of June, 1944, and we'll have some -- we'll have 4th Division soldiers over on Utah Beach.

And there are 2nd -- there's a 2nd Ranger Batallion alive and well today in the United States Army. And we'll have a color guard from the 2nd Ranger Batallion there with the veterans of the 2nd Ranger Batallion of 1944.

Q Sir, were we told you were -- you're the last officer who was active at that point? Could you tell us something about what you did and what you do now?

GENERAL GRANGE: What I did then, I was a PFC. I was a PFC in Italy when D-Day took place. I was in a parachute infantry regiment.

Q And how is it you -- the fact here is that you're the last man on active duty who was also on active duty on D-Day.

GENERAL GRANGE: Not quite true. I'm the last combat infantry soldier left, paratrooper. General Vessey was also in Italy long before I was there. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. And he's -- he's the last -- I guess he and I are the last two combat officers on active duty.

Q Well, what do you do now?

GENERAL GRANGE: I'm the Chairman of this committee, shortly to retire.

Q How old are you?

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GENERAL GRANGE: I'm 59. The Secretary already told you how old I was. He gave you that age -- (laughter) -- to fit into -- No sense in lying to you.

Q What is the exact title of this committee?

GENERAL GRANGE: It's the Coordinating Committee for Historical Observances.

Q Did you say there's a cemetery at Utah Beach?

GENERAL GRANGE: No, there is none. Now, you know there are numerous cemeteries in this entire area -- German, Canadian, French and American. And I'm sure they'll all be visited during this period. There are numerous activities that are going to be taking place other than the ones I'm talking about.

Q Well, what is at Utah Beach, then, in a physical sense? Is there some kind of a memorial there or just --

SECRETARY MARSH: Yes, it's going to be dedicated on the 5th --

GENERAL GRANGE: Yes, we're putting a memorial there now. It will be dedicated on the 5th. There is one memorial there -- a small one -- that was put there by a private organization, a very special engineer brigade which landed on Utah Beach on D-Day, 1944. That's a private monument.

Q And the President will do what at Utah?

GENERAL GRANGE: I really can't -- I don't know. He'll be there. I don't think he speaks. He doesn't speak at Utah. He merely attends --

Q There was no trouble organizing a ceremony involving --

GENERAL GRANGE: That's right.

Q -- all the heads of state and he will be one of them?

GENERAL GRANGE: He will be one of them.

Q Can you describe the ceremony to us -- what will happen?

GENERAL GRANGE: As much as I know about it right now, and it changes because it's a French ceremony, the dignitaries -- the heads of state -- are on a reviewing stand facing the sea. They're just forward of the dunes -- in other words, the dunes to their back -- they're facing the sea. So, I guess they will be at low tide, apparently, because they get that tremendous strand out there.

They'll have all the colors in the center -- all the representative nations' colors in the center. There'll be two French units on either side of the colors and then one each going out of all the other nations that are represented with their soldiers.

On both sides, there'll be reserved sections for the veterans -- all nationalities. This is strictly -- there'll be a speech by Mitterrand. There'll be certainly honors and the national anthems of all will be played. And then they'll either be a trooping of the line by all the dignitaries, all the heads of state, or there'll be a passing review by a reviewing stand. That hasn't been quite firmed up yet. And then all the troops will go by the reviewing stand.

SECRETARY MARSH: Dave, maybe we'd better make one point here so there's no misunderstanding. There will be an American monument dedicated at Utah Beach on the day before Normandy, on June 5th. And that monument is being placed there by the American Battlefield Monuments Commission. It's a granite -- how tall is it, Dave?

GENERAL GRANGE: Twenty-four feet tall, and it's red granite and it's -- what did I say? Four feet.

SECRETARY MARSH: So that monument will be there when they get there on the 6th and it will have been dedicated the day before. There's not been one such at Utah.

Q What will be written on the monument?

GENERAL GRANGE: I don't know. I don't know the exact words.

Q What security measures are the French taking against demonstrations? Are there planned demonstrations?

GENERAL GRANGE: I haven't heard of any. I haven't heard of any activities of that nature at all. There are certainly going to be tremendous security measures. In fact, one of the jobs that we have -- one of our missions is to identify -- and we've got a pretty good handle on veterans groups that are coming over. There have been 30 groups identified so far.

That ranges from the 1st Division Association to the Gold Star Mothers to the Disabled American Veterans, the Jewish American Veterans, the Italian American Veterans. All these groups, we're in constant contact with them. We've got a pretty good grip on how many are going to go with their families. There's a pass system.

People who are allowed access to the ceremonies have to go through a metal detector, same precautions you have here. And there are color passes which designate who you are -- whether or not you're a veteran. Veterans get preference. This is their show.

Q Do they have to pass through the detectors? The guests?

GENERAL GRANGE: Of course.

Q The veteran guests?

GENERAL GRANGE: They do.

Q Do you know how many American veterans will be there?

GENERAL GRANGE: We've identified close to 4000 now, but those are ones who are in associations and groups. And these are commercial tour groups. Now, goodness knows how many of them are over there -- out fishing in England, you know, on the 15th of May and decide to rent a car and go to Cherbourg and, you know, come across on a ferry -- or rather go to Portsmouth and come across to Cherbourg on a ferry and then just show up that day.

Q But aren't these closed events?

GENERAL GRANGE:

Q They're not closed?

GENERAL GRANGE: They're not closed as far as getting on the periphery of the ceremonial areas.

Q Like how far away?

GENERAL GRANGE: I really don't know. I think each one is going to have to depend on the terrain, and what the French security people think is safe and prudent.

Q I thought I had

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read that the normal tours in this area are all off for the 5th, 6th and 7th.

GENERAL GRANGE: No. Oh, no. We're mailing out blocks of passes to the tour group right now.

Q How long are the ceremonies that you're talking about --

GENERAL GRANGE: -- State Department, a sort of notice to travelers, that if you haven't made reservations ahead of time and are thinking, you know, to casually drop in and see the event and activities of Normandy, pleases don't go, because you're not going to find a place to stay. Reservations will be very difficult, there will be lots of security --

SECRETARY MARSH: They had a question on how long the Utah ceremonies?

Q Yes.

SECRETARY MARSH: How long the Utah ceremonies will be --

GENERAL GRANGE: The Utah ceremony goes for about 60 minutes.

Q -- about an hour --

Q At whose request will people be passing through metal detectors? Is that a request by the U.S. government for security around President Reagan?

GENERAL GRANGE: No, I think -- it's just the normal security precautions --

SECRETARY MARSH: We can't answer that. You'd have to ask someone else.

GENERAL GRANGE: The French -- since they're the hosts, I think that they would certainly want to be sure that it's secure as possible.

Q How many troops participated altogether in the invasion?

GENERAL GRANGE: In the invasion? Ray, do you --

COLONEL SKATES: Let me -- it seems like a simple question, but it's not. It depends on whether you're talking about the 24 hours of D-day itself. And that figure is -- I've seen estimates anywhere from 154,000 to -- the highest I've seen is 155,000. The best estimate's about 80,000 British, 70,000 U.S. And that includes the airborne contingents on D-Day itself.

GENERAL GRANGE: If you take the first wave, less than that.

COLONEL SKATES: Take the first wave, it's less than that. In other words, if you take the assault wave, you're talking about regimental size units, now they were beefed up regiments.

Q That includes all these other little groups, like the Poles and the --

COLONEL SKATES: Right, yes. Yes.

Q And what were the casualties figures of those --

COLONEL SKATES: Again, that's not a simple question.

SECRETARY MARSH: It varies by regiment. The 116th was 841 in the first 24 hours, as I recall.

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COLONEL SKATES: That's right. In that regiment -- you see, as he says, 841 people died the first 24 hours --

SECRETARY MARSH: That was total casualties.

COLONEL SKATES: I'm sorry -- total casualties -- that's about one -- almost a fourth --

SECRETARY MARSH: It was 24 percent of the regiment --

COLONEL SKATES: -- of the regiment. There were other regiments -- depending on where you were -- if you were on the right hand side of Omaha Beach you really caught hell. If you were at Utah Beach, you just walked on to shore --

Q Doesn't anyone know how many people died there?

COLONEL SKATES: About 1400 deaths in a 24 hour -- I can give you precise figures on the first week. The problem is pinning down official casualties for that date, because units were -- well, it's just a very complicated question --

Q That's just for the army?

COLONEL SKATES: I'm not trying to dodge any -- it's just a complicated --

Q Was that just the army?

COLONEL SKATES: Those are people on the beaches plus the airborne drop -- force plus the airborne divisions.

Q What was it for the first week, then?

COLONEL SKATES: First week -- I've got that somewhere -- it was 1800, there were 1816 people killed between 6 June and 14 June in the Normandy campaign. Another 9,450 wounded -- in that first week -- and about 7,600, and it seems to me it was about 7,688 -- I'll look it up precisely if you want it -- 7,688 missing.

Q And this includes --

COLONEL SKATES: Now, some of those missing, of course, eventually would be dead, turn up as dead. Well, that's -- again, the only way to put it.

GENERAL GRANGE: You know, a lot of the airborne units -- they didn't have a chance to evacuate anybody for the first 72 hours.

SECRETARY MARSH: And this is true of all the Allied forces --

GENERAL GRANGE: In fact, they rescued, I think, 2,000 people in the one division after 48 hours -- so those guys are out there wounded for several days before they even got to an aid station, so there's no way to report those kind of things.

Q Well, how do these casualties relate to other battles in history? I mean, is it something that was expected -- the casualty rate? Was it exceptionally heavy? Possibly light?

COLONEL SKATES: I think it was -- they expected everywhere except Omaha. And, at -- at Omaha it was heavy for those first wave units --

SECRETARY MARSH: Yes, and those two regiments there -- the 16th, the 116th --

COLONEL SKATES: -- it was very heavy for those regiments. Now again, it depends on what battle you're talking about. In some battles units get -- like the Battle of the Bulge -- units were just

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eliminated. I mean, they just disappeared in that German onslaught. And, so -- again, overall the casualties were lighter than they thought they would be.

MR. SIMS: Can we move on to General Barker and then take the rest of your questions, please.

SECRETARY MARSH: General Llyle Barker, our Public Affairs Officer, as you well know, will cover the activities that will take place in the United States. And there are a number of those going on throughout all the major installations here in the United States.

GENERAL BARKER: I'll just take a minute of your time. What I'd like to do is share with you that there are a lot of activities that are taking place in the United States as part of the awareness program, primarily led by veterans organizations. One of the most interesting ones, I think, here in Washington will be this parade that will take place on the Ellipse which will involve all the services and be a special recognition of the events that took place that day.

Also, there will be a major naval exhibit -- by the Navy of combat art at the National Museum.

Just to give you an idea of the representative types of things that are happening around the country, all these events are sponsored or hosted by military organizations that you see here, but with very heavy veterans organization involvement. They involve such things as planting of trees. They're using soil from the Normandy area. But other activities, so that all veterans throughout the country can actively take part in programs commemorating the date. And this just shows you some of the variety.

Throughout the country these things are taking place and being sponsored or hosted by military activities.

Just one other thing I'd like to mention, and that is, a lot of activities are supporting our programs. One of them, for example, the U.S. Football League, another, the Major League Baseball. All planned various types of activities on their games on the 6th or on the Sunday preceding for the U.S. Football League, to commemorate the veterans that participated in these events.

Yes?

Q Has the mention of the Russians been restored to Eisenhower's D-Day Proclamation -- that was stricken by the --

GENERAL BARKER: I really don't know.

Q Where were General Eisenhower and Montgomery at this time? Where were they located?

GENERAL BARKER: What I'm talking about here are those events that will take place -- yes?

Q No, I mean the Utah Beach --

MR. SIMS: Naomi, could we go through his and then get your questions, please.

GENERAL BARKER: Yes. Well, that basically covers -- what I wanted to get across is that there are very large organizational sessions or programs scheduled throughout the country that are designed to allow everybody to participate who desires to participate.

There are school programs, essay contests --you name the type of activity -- sponsored by the military and veterans organizations across the country. That's it.

MR. SIMS: All right. I think we can take some questions. Maybe some of you want to linger with the historian.

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Q. Do I understand that we have a kit which has the slides in it -- photographs and so forth?

GENERAL BARKER: Yes. There's a copy of all the visuals that you've seen here. It will be at the door as you leave. We also have some video tapes that we have made available to some of the networks on request. We have them available, and if any of you are interested in those, we can certainly make those available to you.

SECRETARY MARSH: Do you have a -- do you want to use that one now?

He's got one now if you want to see it. It's three minutes.

MR. SIMS: Shall we run the 3-minute one?

Q Yes.

Q Yes.

(Video is shown.)

MR. SIMS: If there are any more general questions, we could take them now. We've taken about an hour of the Secretary and others' time. I might ask -- particularly Colonel Skates if he could stay with you awhile. I'd like to close the briefing and let those who want to ask further questions hang in here, if that's all right.

Any other general questions?

Thank you.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 4:30 P.M. EDT

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON ECONOMIC SUMMIT TRADE ISSUES

May 23, 1984

The Briefing Room

10:03 A.M. EDT

MR. SIMS: This briefing will be on background. It's attributable to a Senior Administration Official. This briefing is on trade aspects of the summit. I remind you we have another briefing on Friday in Room 450 of the OEOB on trade issues, monetary policy, finance, debt, and so forth; and one next Tuesday at 9:15 a.m., also in Room 450 of the OEOB.

Q Has the Shultz thing been set yet?

MR. SIMS: We will not have, as far as I know, a Shultz briefing, although he will be doing a briefing at the State Department following the NATO Ministerial, sometime next week. But he will not be here the day before --

Q Why don't we have McFarlane, then? We'd like to have the political issues.

MR. SIMS: I'll let him know that you have requested his presence here.

Q Would you be so kind --

Q Yes, right.

Q -- on the record.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you. What I'd like to do is make a few comments by way of introduction and then go directly to Q&A's on the trade component.

First, I guess, I'd start by reinforcing what a number of other briefers have already mentioned to you, and that is that the British are following pretty much the Williamsburg format. By that I mean they're trying to keep it as informal, unstructured and low-key as possible. And that fits with what really is the intent of the economic summits which is to get Heads of State together to have as free a discussion, as informal a discussion, as possible.

Q -- been saying that for eleven years -- (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's useful to be -- to look at where we've been, I think, over the past 3½ years: Ottawa, Versailles, Williamsburg, and then into London. There have been some remarkable changes in the world economy over the past 3½ years. The Ottawa Summit was the President's first opportunity to explain his domestic policy to the other Heads of State, summit countries.

The President had much of this program to promote sustainable, market-oriented, non-inflationary growth in place by the time of Ottawa. But, I think it's fair to say that the strong emphasis that the President placed on stopping inflation and shifting resources to the private sector was greeted with some skepticism in Ottawa, as you will recall.

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At Versailles, the summit heads were really faced with a somber economic situation. We saw falling output, rising unemployment, higher interest rates. If my memory serves me, the summit countries at about that time were running an inflation rate of about 10 percent with negative real growth.

The sole bright spot at Versailles was that inflation was going down in the United States. A couple of other things about Versailles that I think are important are the concerns about exchange rates that were expressed at Versailles, and that led to an agreement to develop a framework to consult more effectively about how summit country domestic economic policies really affected the overall international economic system. And that consultative process, as a lot of you know, is continued through Williamsburg, and I expect it will be addressed at London as well.

Versailles also highlighted the need to gain a greater consensus on East-West economic issues.

By the time of Williamsburg, developments in the American economy had already begun to reflect the success of the President's policy that he first laid out at Ottawa. With the U.S. in the lead, I think that there was really new confidence expressed out of Williamsburg on economic recovery and the fact that it was becoming a reality.

Since Williamsburg, the recovery in the U.S. has spread to other summit countries. We expect that in 1984 the summit countries will have about 4.5 percent rate of inflation, and growth will exceed 4 percent.

Therefore, if you look at Williamsburg which is known in many circles as the "recovery summit," which it was in United States terms -- London is really the recovery summit in international terms. There is real optimism that's shared by our summit partners about recovery, and there's a recognition that the President's anti-inflationary policies, growth policies, are, in a large part, responsible for that recovery.

With respect to London, the key, I think there, is to discuss how to ensure that we have a sustainable, consolidated recovery, and that its benefits are spread to the rest of the world. And you can think of a number of important elements, I think, in terms -- underneath that umbrella. If you think of it as an umbrella, in terms of sustaining recovery, spreading its benefits to the rest of the world -- there are elements under that umbrella that are important in trying to attain that. One of them has to do with market-oriented adjustment in domestic economies -- something the President was very strong on at Ottawa and throughout the summit process.

Another element is managing, and continuing to manage, the international debt situation. Both of those issues, Beryl Sprinkel, Undersecretary of Treasury, will address on Friday.

The third element that I think is very important is the trade component, and that's the element that we're going to discuss today. And essentially what we're talking about there is maintaining open markets, providing expanded market access worldwide, doing things to try to improve the trading system -- in essence, what we're talking about there is further trade liberalization.

So, with that, I'll throw the floor open to any questions that you might have on the trade component.

Q Is the United States looking for any specific agreements or accomplishments in regard to trade out of this summit, or any movement toward a new trade round?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, first I'd say I cannot tell you what's going to come out of the summit --

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Q I'm not asking what's going to come out, I'm asking what the United States would like -- you ought to know that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What we seek, really, is a discussion in the trade area, built on Williamsburg, which was, if you remember, was directed toward maintaining open markets in the summit countries and to the furthering of the consultations and the movement toward further liberalization -- negotiations, multilaterally. I think that will be the same emphasis that we will have in London.

Q What about trade with the Soviets -- technology, and things like that? Will that dominate this whole thing?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, again, it's hard to know what will come out, but if you want -- my personal opinion is no. What we saw out of Williamsburg was that there was a consensus on East-West trade -- on the basis of the work that was ongoing in a lot of the specialized agencies internationally --like the OECD, like the International Energy Agency, like NATO -- all of these studies have been ongoing. They will continue to be addressed in many of those forums -- so the answer to your question is no.

Q Well, there was no consensus, was there? Didn't the Europeans want to sell more technology and we didn't want them to? It didn't sound like a consensus to me ---

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me give you an example of the consensus that's been reached in the economic area. We've had discussions in the OECD to change the export credit consensus that's been arrived at. And those changes that have now evolved really have pretty much eliminated subsidized credit financing to the Soviet Union. That's an example of the kinds of coordinated work that's been ongoing.

Q So there was none at all -- to the Soviets?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I -- subsidized?

Q -- credits.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, in terms of the export consensus, and that arrangement, it's

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an export credit consensus that's --

Q You said it's been -- the whole -- -- subsidized credits for the Soviet Union has been eliminated. Is that a fact?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. Pretty much eliminated. That's right.

Q What about the $250 million just announced -- what? -- two weeks ago or a week ago, something like that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not familiar with the specific case that you're mentioning.

My point really is that I don't think that we will see East-West economic relations as being a major issue for the summit, for London.

Q On trade issues -- this handout says one of the issues being pursued is the possible acceleration of previously negotiated tariff cuts. Just the other day, the OECD announced that they were advancing by one year the last Tokyo --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Is there something beyond that that the summit is going to consider?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well --

Q -- already done what this thing says the summit may do.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we haven't actually done that. What we're talking about is a followup to Williamsburg and to the OECD Ministerial of last year. And, essentially, we were seeking to -- over the course of this year -- reach agreement on accelerating tariff cuts that had been negotiated during the Tokyo round, subject to our own legislative approval and whatever approval was necessary in the summit countries. That is all contingent upon everyone doing that. I mean, it's not something that has been accomplished as of this date.

The other thing that I might mention is that, with respect to the least developed countries, we're also -- there was a measure of agreement between the countries that we would seek to reduce barriers to their imports as -- to the extent feasible.

Q At Williamsburg they mentioned a rollback, though. A lot of people took that to mean rolling back non-tariff barriers -- quotas. Will any of that come out of London? Do you visualize any quotas or other non-tariff barriers being eliminated or reduced?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, again, I can't speak to what might eventuate from the discussions of heads of state. But I think that there I wouldn't see any specific measures being announced as a result of the summit.

Q Can I follow up on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure.

Q Since the statement at Williamsburg on rolling back and halting protectionism, what are the major accomplishments that have occurred in the last year in fulfillment of that pledge?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, that's a good question.

Q Good one, Steve. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The --

Q Yes --

Q Let's hear it for Steve.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The progress, really, has been limited. I won't say that it's been as much as we would have liked. But there have been some things and Bart mentioned the tariff acceleration. I mentioned the least developed countries. There's also an ongoing exercise in the OECD --

Q What are the least developed countries?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, basically, what I said was that there was agreement among summit countries, OECD countries, to attempt to reduce barriers to the exports of the least developed countries.

The other element that is ongoing within the OECD is an exercise on dismantlement of trade barriers. There is analytical work that is going on -- has been going on in the OECD -- and the work will continue. When that work will be completed, I can't really tell you.

Q Could I follow up on that, too?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q You have quite a few measures pending, which might be decided before the President -- and bunching up in August or September, before the election. Is there anything in your papers which will be assurance for the Europeans, or the other participants, that these pending measures will come out in a way that you can say there is a progress in trade negotiation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If you're speaking about the Section 201 cases, which are the safeguard cases --

Q -- case, which is still pending, too.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICAL: Right. Those cases are still under -- in the ITC, the 201 investigation, the safeguard cases, are still under investigation. There will be no result, if my reading of the schedule is correct, until after the summit on any of those cases. There are four of them pending now. So that we couldn't really speak to those cases.

I will say that -- you know -- that the position that we've had is to -- stated position all along -- is to resist protectionism. I don't think that position has changed in 3½ years and I don't think it will change in the future.

Q And there will be no decision on the machine tool before the summit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't really tell whether there will be a decision before -- my best guess is that it's still in the review process and probably will not be ready for any kind of decision prior to the summit.

Chris.

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Q Can you tick off some of the specific trade practices that we're still upset about, the kinds of things that Europe or Japan is doing, that the President is likely to bring up at the summit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't know that he'll bring up any specific practices, you know, directed at individual countries. That's really not the nature of the discussions, at least not in the past. It may well happen; but I don't think so.

Q Can you tell us the kinds of things that we're upset about, though?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICAL: Well, let me put it this way, what we're trying to do in terms of new liberalization -- because that really is the side of the coin that we're most interested in -- and various countries have different agendas on what they would like to see on -- in terms of the components of a new trade negotiation. We would like to see an improvement in the existing international trading system. By that I mean, improvements in the way the international organization that treats international trade, which is known as the GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, how it functions. I won't get into the nitty-gritty of it; but things like dispute settlement, etc.

We also would like to see completion of something that's known as a "Safeguards Code," which is to look at how we take actions to protect our own markets from imports that may injure some of our private or domestic producers.

We want to look at agriculture. Trade in agriculture, as you know has been pretty much out of the real discipline in international trade and we'd like to see some progress there.

We'd like to see some discussion and possible negotiations on trade and services, trade and high technology.

You know, again, the overall intent is to liberalize trade, is to see that markets are open. And to try to do something about trade-distorting measures. Okay? That's also very important. And I think that's pretty much where your --

Q But, I mean, you know, in the past --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- subsidies --

Q Well, as I say, in the past, we've heard specific things about how the Europeans were subsidizing steel or agricultural products or the barriers that the Japanese were putting up on citrus products. I mean, we're not upset about those kinds of specific --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, those are basically bilateral issues, aren't they? I mean, we have dealt with those in a bilateral framework. I mean, we've had our discussions -- many, many discussions on agriculture or on steel or on other issues with the European community. We've had recent discussions -- continuing discussions with the Japanese on questions of market access. You mentioned beef and citrus. So those are mainly bilateral issues.

I -- Again, personally, I don't think that kind of specificity will necessarily arise, like -- I can't speak to what will happen in the discussions.

Helen.

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Q Do we have any specific proposals at this -- at the summit? Are we presenting anything new or are we synthesizing any of these goals into some kind of an active proposal?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, in terms of an active proposal -- I mean, the summit framework is to sit down ahead to discuss what the problems are and the ways in which we can deal with them.

Q Well, I take it you -- the Sherpas have already done that.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the Sherpas have met. There's no secret about that. And we've discussed the various issues that might be addressed at the summit by heads of state. As I mentioned, the one area that we feel very -- is very important is the trade side and that is because it is a critical element to ensuring recovery, to sustaining recovery and to spreading its benefits to the rest of the world.

It's also -- Sorry. Go ahead.

Q When you speak of a new round of negotiations in GATT next June, what's your priority?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't think that there is a single priority. I mean, the priority is improving the system, the trading system. That's one. And there are a number of ways you do that. You do it by further liberalizing trade, reducing barriers. All right? You also do it by increasing discipline over practices that may be trade distortive. All right? And that's, essentially, what we have sought in prior rounds and what we will continue to seek.

Andrea.

Q At what point or what level in London do you expect the non-agenda item of energy policy -- of oil imports and possible restrictions or sharing to come up? Would that be with the leaders? Would that be delegated --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: To be honest with you, I can't tell you the answer to that. I don't know.

Q Has there been any planning now, given the situation in the Persian Gulf, as to how to incorporate this into the summit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, there certainly have been discussions. Those are discussions that I have not been a party to. So it's an area which I don't -- It's not that I don't want to answer your question. It's just I really don't know how to answer it.

Q Who's been discussing it?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, there have been discussions between the National Security Council, between the State Department, in terms of the issue of the Persian Gulf. I mean, the President mentioned that --

Q But, specifically on the question of what the President talked about last night, that -- the question of sharing -- if the Persian Gulf is turned off, how would the countries that depend on that oil more than we do --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, I'm not
to any discussions on contingencies and that kind of question, so --

Q And you don't know who is?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't know who, specifically, has taken the ball. I know there've been discussions. The obvious place where that would reside is in the National Security Council and the State Department.

Q Would you expect that the administration would look toward the IEA on something like that and toward the agreed-upon formulae, or would there be any kind of new initiative?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Totally out of my area.

Q Would this, the internationalization of the yen be highlighted at this summit -- that Regan, Don Regan --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You'd have to ask [redacted] on Friday. He'd be in a better position to tell you where -- what the status is, or might be, of discussions. What I have heard has been that it's -- Bart smiles as I say that -- the discussions have been making real progress. More than that I can't tell you, but [redacted] will be able to mention more on Friday

Q Where does the trade issue fit into the agenda for two days? Is that the key topic?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is a key topic; it isn't the key topic. Where it fits in on the agenda is up to the British. Again, Mrs. Thatcher will be in the chair --

Q But it will be the Heads of State or government who will be discussing it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If it runs true to form, and if, on the basis of our preparations, yes, the trade issue will be discussed -- certainly by Heads of State.

Q Isn't there a schedule? I mean, hasn't the -- the couple of days been broken down into when they're going to discuss various issues?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There hasn't been a breakdown in terms of what specific issues will be addressed in what meeting, or over what luncheon or dinner. What they have done is they've broken it down in terms of the economic issues and the political issues -- but not any greater degree of specificity -- to my knowledge. The British certainly know that --

Q Mixed credit -- mixed credit packages, is that going to come up for discussion?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know. Honest answer -- I don't know.

Q May I ask a question on trade?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure.

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Q On two issues that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm glad that we got back to trade --

Q -- that there were two referred to before. One, on Japan, that although that's a bilateral issue, there is great -- there has been in the past a great deal of discussion about Japan's trading practices, and the United States had, in a couple of cases, almost appealed to the other allies not to beat up on Japan so much -- or so we were told.

Are you suggesting that the climate has changed if that is not going to be discussed this time? Or, are people happier with Japan? Has Japan changed its trade practices, placated people?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, I don't think that's the question. The question is that what we're seeking to do is to open markets, and, again, to liberalize trade. And certainly there are practices in all countries that we would like to see change. I mean, Japan is one. We all -- no one is pure, by any stretch of the imagination.

Q Well, it's hard to avoid the impression that there isn't a deliberate effort to fuzz up all of these issues --

SENIOR ADMINISRATION OFFICIAL: No, if I left that impression, I didn't mean to.

Q You do leave that impression because you asserted things about what is going on at thissummit, and those of us that covered them know that there was a lot more specifity than at other and, indeed, in other pre-summit briefings there was a lot more specificity about what the United States wanted to achieve. So, something has changed. That is apparent. I'm not even asking you to confirm that it's changed.

All I'm asking you is to explain why it has, it seems to have changed.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't know what the briefings were like in the past in terms of additional specificity. I mean, we can talk about bilateral problems that -- on the trade side -- that we have with other countries that might well arise at London. I was simply saying that I didn't think that the focus would be on specific trade complaints between partners.

Now, that's not to say that issues may not arise -- concerns about cases that are pending in the U.S., concerns about common agricultural policy in Europe, concerns about market access in Japan.

Q Well, let me ask you the question this way, if I might. What is the state of alarm and anger and concern among the allies this year about the trade policies of individual countries? Is the economic recovery muting some of those concerns that we've seen at past summits? Measure it against the last few years, where we are right now in terms of those concerns.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, well, obviously when you're in a situation where the economy is, world economy, is not good and domestic economies are not good, not growing -- there's no job creation, what have you -- I think it tends to magnify disputes. There's no question about that.

But I don't see this period as being much different than other periods in terms of the outstanding issues on the trade side that we have. We always have problems. We always -- that's the nature of the system. You know, I'm trying to grapple with your question, but

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I guess I'm missing something in there --

Q Could I ask one more trade related question? Is the current disarray in the European community, the disagreements that they've had over their subsidies or their budget and agriculture policy, is that a factor preventing a good discussion on this subject at the Summit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I would hope not. I think it's one of the reasons why there should be a good discussion of trade at the Summit.

Q If I could try --

Q In other words, he goes to these summits, and he has all these bilateral meetings, and it sounds to me like he's totally unprepared to bring up any bilateral issues on trade at an economic summit. And I see Steve's point, exactly. He has individual meetings with the Japanese, with all of them -- and he's got nothing to ask them this time. That's the impression you're leaving.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, if that's the impression I'm leaving then, let's try to change that.

Q Okay. What, specifically, will he bring up when he probably sits down with the Japanese leader. What does he want to get from him this time? Does he have any interest in reducing the trade deficit.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I mean, those are -- let me again try to put it into focus. You asked a lot of questions, all right?

The objective on the trade side at London, again, the umbrella -- sustaining recovery, and how do you do that? You keep markets open, and you seek further trade liberalization. All right? Now, under that, there are a lot of problems in the system. We have problems with Japan -- and continuing problems with Japan on market access. We have reached some agreements. But we still feel that our access in many areas, in the trade area, are less than they should be. We want access to their market on the same basis as they have access to ours. Okay?

With the European community: there are a number of issues that we have outstanding. Primarily, over the common agricultural policy. Two of those issues have to do with a tariff rate quota that may eventuate on corn glutin -- all right? Not sounding very sexy, but it's an important trade item.

Q Can you go through that again?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Corn glutin -- (Laughter.)

Q No -- the whole thing -- (Laughter.) What is the issue? I mean, explain the issue to us.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's a tariff rate -- would be a tariff rate quota on corn glutin.

Q Is that the sweetener?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, well -- it's a feed, essentially is what it is -- which they use. And they -- or we sell a great quantity of that to the European community. So that's one problem. They've also considered --

Q What is -- I'm sorry -- what is the problem on that?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it's all wrapped up with the review of the common agricultural policy. And essentially, in reviewing their procedures and how they implement the agricultural policy, one of the things that has surfaced has been the possibility of a tariff-rate quota on corn glutin.

Q Why?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, from our perspective it has to do with financing their own program.

And we have said in the past, Secretary Block has said in the past, that we do not want to, and will not finance the common agricultural policy. So that's one area.

The other has been that there's been some talk, which we don't believe will take place, but there's been some talk about a tax on oils and fats. Now, what that means is that our producers would be very unhappy, primarily our soybean producers. We've also had many discussions with the European community over that.

Q Are they trying to build their own production, or markets, or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, they have plenty of production. Their problem is they have surplus production. And what that -- the problem which has been between the U.S. and the EEC overall, over many years, has been that they subsidize this production and subsidize their exports of this production into the world markets. That does a number of things, one of which troubles our farmers a great deal, and that is, it displaces our own exports into those countries.

Q You don't expect the Summit leaders to talk about corn glutin, fats and oils, do you?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't --

Q That's the impression that you're now leaving.

Q Yes --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- all I was reacting to is --

Q -- it was because of this question back then --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was about -- the question about what issues there are between countries. Yes -- wait a minute, wait a minute.

Q -- if there's any agenda here at all on trade. I mean, you're leaving us with the impression that there are either these niggling little issues like corn gluten or everything's just fine.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. Let me go back -- let me go back --

Q Somehow, there's something in the middle there.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All right. Let me try to do it one more time. All right? One more time.

Q -- what are the issues between -- you didn't say that was going to come up.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What this summit is all about in terms of the trade side is doing the things in the trade area that are necessary to make sure that recovery is sustainable. All right? And in that context, we're talking about keeping our markets open, we're talking about improving the trading system, further trade liberalization, which can take the form of many different areas, which have yet to be agreed on, will take some time to be agreed on. But I mentioned a number -- trade and agriculture, trade and services, trade and high technology, et cetera. That's what the summit is all about. That's the kind of discussion that will be held in the summit.

Q Do you expect the other countries to bring up the U.S. deficit and its problems in terms of international trade?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'm sure -- I can't tell you, again, whether the question will arise. I'm sure that it will. The budget deficit question, interest rates, will certainly be an issue that will be addressed, yes.

Q Will we change our view on whether it's responsible or not for the trade imbalance? I mean, is our view going to remain essentially what it has been for the last couple of years in terms of what impact the deficit has on trade imbalance?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the trade deficit in trade terms, the important factor is that it provides for exports into the United States and provides a spur to economic recovery worldwide. Okay? If you're talking about -- if you want to talk about budget deficits and interest rates, et cetera, in that context, I'd suggest you talk to Beryl on Friday, raise the question with Beryl.

Yes, back here.

Q On the question of the new round of trade negotiations, if the U.S. has its way, could you tell us what we would like in the final communique on this subject, given that last year we called for a rollback of trade protectionism and that hasn't happened. You've admitted that it was only limited progress we made in that area. So what do we want the communique to say? What do we want the leaders to agree to as far as a new round of trade negotiations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: First of all, I don't know what the communique will bring. But again --

Q What do we want?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, our objective is, in terms of the trade side, again, is to have a reconfirmation really to resist protectionist measures. And the real emphasis will be on trying to work with all our trading partners, not just the summit partners, in seeking further trade liberalization, further negotiations.

Now, where that will end up, in what time frame, et cetera, no one, I don't think, can speak on that now.

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Q Does the U.S. have a target date for the start of a new round, and do you expect any progress towards that at the summit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we're hopeful that there will be progress.

Q Do we have a target date in mind? I know they take some preparation.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, they do take preparation. We'd like to see some real progress in 1985. And those rounds take -- generally take years to -- but we'd like to see --

Q You've got to start sometime.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's exactly right.

Q So when would we like it to start? Ideally.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, again, that depends on the consultations that we have with our trading partners. And it's not just in a summit context, you know. One of the mistakes that has been made in the past is to have a -- call for a new round by -- at a certain time by just summit countries because, of course, most of our trading partners are outside of that.

Q So you're not seeking that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q You're not really seeking a call for a new trade round by the summit countries?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that that's correct. What we're seeking is further progress and movement toward further negotiations, futher liberalization.

Q Are European agriculture --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Steve, you've had --

Q Okay.

Q Are you seeking, then, just the reformation of the -- that the working program will be finished on time, or what are you seeking?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think that it's important to have the GATT work program completed by the contracting party session this November. There's no question about that. But we'd like to see some consensus on the real need for a new round.

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If you saw the -- and read the language out of the OECD Ministerial, that was a fairly good indication of the -- what I think is a growing consensus on the need to really move forward toward a new round.

Yes, over here.

Q Has -- has there been any progress on overcoming COCOM reluctance to pass on -- on U.S. high tech exports to China? No progress?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I shake my head because I'm not, that's not an issue that I would see in the context of summit discussions. And it's not one that I'm familiar with.

Q Your previous answer, you mean to say that there's no consensus yet on the need for a new round?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, there is a consensus, I think, a growing consensus within the OECD countries about the importance of seeking further strengthening of the trading system and further liberalization. And -- and that, I think, is -- is something that is not just summit country related, but also beginning to be developed among our other trading partners as well.

Bill Brock had a meeting on May 10, 11 and 12 of about sixteen or seventeen trade ministers. And it was designed to just begin to brainstorm in terms of how we might handle problems in the trade area, further liberalization and that kind of thing.

Yes, right here.

Q Do you expect the bilaterals between Reagan and Nakasone to produce any kind of agreement on ending the -- the quotas on Japanese car imports?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we're into the -- just into the fourth year of voluntary restraints by the Japanese. I don't know wht the President may raise, but I don't believe that that will be an issue.

Q You don't think it'll even be raised?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have no way -- you know -- again -- you can't put yourself into that meeting. I don't believe it will be raised. I don't know that it would not be raised.

Q A follow-up to that, is the President prepared to say anything to Nakasone about the domestic content legislation now pending in Congress? Is he going to use that in any way to get some kind of concessions out of the Japanese?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I would answer it this way, we have opposed the domestic content as an administration, that legislation, since it was introduced. That position hasn't changed.

Q Well, can he give Nakasone any assurances that his opposition here will prevent implementation of the domestic content bill?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I really don't -- That issue, I mean, if you're already on record as opposing the domestic content legislation, I don't know --

Q Well, this administration, though, says that when it opposes legislation it means it will oppose it through Congress and will not talk vetoes. Is the President prepared to tell Nakasone that he can veto such legislation if he were to get concessions in return?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I couldn't speculate on that.

There is a question in the back. All the way in the back.

Q Last year, there was a great deal of reluctance on the part of the Europeans, in particular, to agree to -- in language of the communique that -- sort of pro-trade liberalization because of the degree of economic stagnation in Europe and high unemployment. On the basis of this Sherpa meeting, do you detect any change in the European attitude on that over this continuing high rate of unemployment in Europe still likely to make them resist any very strong statements on trade --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the -- It's a good question. The recovery has really been uneven, as you know, in Europe and job creation really has been a problem in Europe. So there are still economic difficulties, so that I think there has been some reluctance in terms of timing, in terms of actively pursuing further liberalization. But I think there is -- certainly we saw it again out of the OECD Ministerial -- a clear indication of -- or felt need for the importance of improving the system and further liberalizing trade.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 10:42 A.M. EDT

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

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BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON ECONOMIC SUMMIT TRADE ISSUES

May 25, 1984

Room 450, Old Executive Office Building

10:01 A.M. EDT

MR. SIMS: We're going to try to get this started right away. Our briefer has a meeting with the President at 11:00 a.m., so -- you may be here, but he won't, so we'll have to close on time.

Q Will you tell us what he tells the President?

MR. SIMS: Who knows -- This briefing is on background. It's attributable to a Senior Administration Official, or a Senior American Official. As usual, we'll have a transcript of this briefing. I should look ahead -- some of you are interested in other briefings on the summit. On Tuesday, Secretary Regan will be here in an on-the-record briefing. We had announced that for 9:15 a.m. Some of you have a schedule problem. The Secretary is willing to come and start at 9:00 a.m., so we will do it at 9:00 a.m. Tuesday, with Secretary Regan. At that time, we hope to have for you the press book, if it's printed and ready to distribute. That is the only time we could get you together with Secretary Regan and --

Q Can we have it in the briefing room at the White House?

MR. SIMS: No, it will be in this room.

Q Why?

MR. SIMS: Because the size of the audience will be too large for that.

And then Thursday, next week -- the 31st -- we would hope to have the final in our series of briefings at 2:30 p.m. with a Senior Administration Official, and we'll let you know who that is as we get closer to it.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Good morning ladies and gentlemen. I want to speak about the economic issues at the London summit.

The major theme of that summit will be sustaining the economic expansion. Fortunately, a great deal of progress has been made in recent years in achieving convergence in economic performance among the summit countries. For example, on growth -- in 1982 there was a very wide range in the growth among those major summit countries with the extreme being Canada off 4.4 percent in real GNP, and Japan up 3.3 percent.

By '84, our best guesstimate as to what's happening this year, six of the seven summit countries will have growth exceeding 2.5 percent.

On the inflation front, there has also been growing convergence. For example, in '82, Japan had only 2.7 percent inflation, but Italy had 16.3 percent -- and the average inflation for the summit countries in '82 was 6.8 percent. This year, all but France and Italy

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have less than 5 percent inflation, and the average inflation rate for the seven summit countries is down to 4.7 percent.

The emphasis in this summit will be on pursuing policies that are likely to sustain and reinforce the growth without re-igniting inflation. And there is general agreement, among the summit countries, that it requires certain kinds of action on the part of the various governments.

Certainly, to keep inflation down, there is a commitment to pursue stable, moderate growth in their money supplies. There is an agreement to restrain government spending, both to cut the amount of resources allocated to government and also to reduce the budget deficits.

It's agreed in all the summit countries that the public sector is too large. Although, of course, the exact size varies widely among the countries. In the U.S. and in Japan total spending on government, or -- total government spending as a percentage of GNP -- is approximately 35 percent in each country. However, for all the other summit countries, there is variation. And they all exceed 45 percent -- that is, they're spending much more money on government as a percentage of their economy than either the U.S. or Japan. So reducing public spending is an objective -- to free resources for private investment and thus increase economic growth.

Also, it's generally agreed that there is excessive involvement of government in the various economies. This is reflected in many cases in high tax burdens and also depressing regulation.

On the U.S. side, we, of course, are commited to reducing our deficit primarily through spending cuts. The Treasury study has indicated that the problem is not the deficit per se, but the size of government spending that causes the major problem. Displacement of private activity is essentially the same whether the excessive spending is financed through higher taxes or through borrowing. Therefore, the objective is to get the spending under better control.

Fortunately, there has been important progress in the Congress in recent weeks on reduction of our deficit and reduction of spending. Even without the deficit reduction plan, which is now underway, we believe that the ratio of federal outlays to GNP is expected to fall to about 23.8 percent in '85, and down to 22.2 percent in '89. And the deficit would, under those projections, fall from the $179 billion, which is about 5 percent of GNP, to $129 billion, or 2.4 percent of GNP over that same period.

Q Could you give those figures again?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, sir. We believe that without the present efforts to reduce the deficit, that the ratio of federal outlays to GNP are projected to fall from 23.8 percent in fiscal '85, to 22.2 percent in fiscal '89. And if you talk about the size of the deficit, it implies a reduction from $179 billion, or 5 percent of GNP, to $129 billion, or 2.4 percent of GNP over that same period.

Q Yes, but, what's the period?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The periods are the reduction in the deficit from fiscal '85 to fiscal '89.

Q And without a special effort, what would they be?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we haven't got the final results of the Congress yet, and, of course, there's going to be followup in addition to this downpayment. And I'll speak about that in a moment --

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Q But, you're --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Clearly, the markets -- if we could -- if I could complete -- I think it would be better for me to complete the statement, and then I'll be pleased to spend the remainder of the time trying to respond to your questions.

Clearly, the markets are concerned. And we need more action. And, thus, the President has labeled this attempt as a downpayment this year. And, as you know, it's passed both Houses, but the Conference Committees will attempt to iron out the differences in the reasonably near future.

Thus, the downpayment emphasis was intentional. It's only the first step. We expect to continue these efforts in future years. And, of course, the President has, again, announced his support for two longer-range measures of the balanced budget amendment, on the one hand, and line-item veto power on the other.

From our point of view, the U.S. budget deficit is not the major cause of the world's economic problems. All summit countries had total deficits between 3 and 4 percent of GNP in '83, except Canada and Italy, where the deficits were even higher. A lower U.S. deficit would not solve the structural problems that face the EC nations, and it certainly would not solve inflationary tendencies abroad.

There is, of course, no convincing evidence of a linkage between the budget deficits and interest rates. Excessive spending is, indeed, the problem. And other summit countries have higher spending relative to their economies than we do.

Turning for a moment to interest rates and monetary policy: the strength and balanced nature of the recovery in the U.S. and Germany demonstrate that interest rates, up to now, certainly have not choked off high levels of investment. Capital spending of U.S. businesses are rising more rapidly than during the first five quarters of any recovery since the Korean War. And there are signs that investment remains strong this year.

And the reason, of course, is that, although interest rates do, indeed, impact investment, there are many factors that impact an investment decision. Such as -- inflation, consumption growth, the regulatory environment, the tax regime, and general government attitudes toward business. We have succeeded in substantially increasing the after-tax rate of return on investment in the United States. Therefore, investments so far remain strong, and it's our objective to keep it that way.

All of these factors, which I have cited, are favorable in the United States, although they are not generally as favorable abroad. We, of course, are not happy with the recent increase in interest rates. Perhaps it's partly cyclical. Certainly we need to continue to work with the Federal Reserve to achieve stable, moderate money growth so that we can continue to reduce inflationary expectations.

Let me turn to the dollar for a few moments. We frequently hear, among our summit partners, the word "overvaluation." And we think that's not a very meaningful statement in a floating exchange rate system. We believe that the major reason for the strength of the dollar has been favorable economic conditions in the United States compared to economic conditions abroad. That, of course, has been determined, to a very considerable extent, by the kinds of policies we have pursued in this country, vis-a-vis some of the policies abroad.

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The strong dollar, in our opinion, is not caused by high U.S. interest rates. We've done a lot of work on that at Treasury. On occasion we can find a correlation, but, frequently it goes in the opposite direction.

The strength of the dollar then, has reflected successful U.S. economic policies, compared to our summit partners. The decline in U.S. inflation, the increase in output, the increase in productivity, the increase in business profitablility, have all attracted funds to the U.S.

There also, of course, have been from time to time, safe haven capital flows to the United States. Thus, it would have been impossible for us to hold down the strength of the dollar without weakening our own strong economy to match the weaknesses elsewhere in the world. We do not intend to rekindle inflation and throw away those gains.

Intervention certainly could not have prevented the dollar from rising. Some have argued capital controls, but of course, from our point of view, that would have indeed, been counterproductive. And the effect would not have lasted.

We are anticipating in the months ahead that the dollar may well decline moderately. Most of the rapid improvement in the United States is behind us relative to our foreign partners. They are beginning to expand even though their pace of improvement is behind ours, we are expecting closer convergence.

We note that there is a strong rising current account deficit. Other countries are now making progress on their inflation rates and, hopefully their currencies will become more attractive.

With respect to the yen, we will be talking next week concerning the agreement reached by the working group which we believe will lead to capital market liberalization and internationalization of the yen, and over time should lead to strength in the yen.

It has been alleged in some quarters that the U.S. is draining capital out of Europe. And from our point of view the numbers do not support that argument to the extent that it's presented to us. The inflows of foreign capital, foreign owned capital dropped $5 billion in '83 to $83 billion. Inflows from Europe dropped from $42 billion to $35 billion. The major factor in U.S. capital account last year was the $94 billion dollar slow-down in U.S. banks lending to foreigners. And that, of course, was mainly due to increasing reluctance to lend to LDC's, especially after mid 1982.

In our opinion, therefore, the interest rate trend in the United States was not the major factor.

Let me turn, for a few moments, to another subject which I'm sure will be discussed at the summit.

Yes, sir?

Q Wait, could you give us the figures on capital flows that you just gave?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again?

Q Yes.

Q Repeat it.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The ones I just recited?

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I stated that inflows of foreign-owned capital dropped $5 billion in 1983, down to $83 billion dollars. Inflows from Europe alone --

Q Excuse me, a million or billion?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Billion. Did I say million? I thought I said billion?

Q Well --

Q Well, it dropped from $5 billion to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It dropped an amount of $5 billion to a total of $83; i.e., it dropped from '88 to '83.

Inflows from Europe dropped from $42 billion to $35 billion. The major factors that I cited were the $94 billion dollar's in U.S. bank lending to foreigners. Due, primarily to reduced rates of lending to LDCs.

Another issue that will be discussed at the summit, of course, is the international monetary system. We in the United States do not believe that the system has functioned perfectly, but that it has served us well. That the problems are not, primarily, the system. But, primarily the national policies pursued by the government. Therefore, it's not a question of system design, it's a question of getting more converging policies and results.

It has helped -- the system has helped to enable us to avoid major monetary crises that certainly would have arisen under the par value system. It certainly also has helped us avoid capital control because, with fixed exchange rates, almost certainly, there would have been a trend toward more capital controls.

What we need to make the system work better is more prompt adjustment, sounder policies especially abroad, and finally, greater convergence in economic results. There is a broad consensus among the G-10 deputies, of which I'm one, that the system has been working very well and that a return to a fixed-rate system is certainly not feasible or even desirable at the present time.

However, a wholesale reform of the system, from our point of view, would not be helpful. Also, a monetary conference or other moves in that direction would not focus on the weaknesses of the system. Reform implies that the problem is the system rather than national policies and that there is a quick fix to deep-seated economic problems, and we do not believe that to be the case. There would be a great risk that the monetary conference at this stage would distract from the real task of improving national policies and raising unrealistic, and probably, unfulfillable expectations.

There are studies, as I think you know, underway in the G-10 deputies and the G-10 ministers, on improving the system. And we reported that to the ministers in Rome a few days ago. The topics that have been studied and will continue to be studied in the months ahead include the exchange rate system, strengthening of IMF surveillance, a discussion of international liquidity, and finally, the role of the IMF especially now and in the period ahead.

The area where the United States is placing major emphasis is in strengthening IMF surveillance. We have made many suggestions and they will be considered further in subsequent meetings. As noted in the G-10 communique issued in Rome, we want a thorough review of these issues. The work is proceeding very well and we hope that a report to ministers will appear in the first half of 1985.

Let me turn for a moment -- just a few moments -- to another topic that will be discussed at the summit -- that is, the international debt strategy.

Our objective will be to reaffirm the five-point Williamsburg strategy. And just to refresh your memory, that included the necessity and desirability of major LDC countries adjusting. It included initially the provision of additional resources to the IMF, and that has been achieved. It included the necessity that commercial banks would have to continue lending to the LDCs, albeit at a reduced rate of increase. It also included the desirability of bridge financing where appropriate, and finally, the basic importance of encouraging an OECD recovery.

The strategy, looking back and up to the present, has promoted economic adjustments. It has avoided serious disruptions in the financial system. We will certainly urge a continuation of this strategy, using a case by case approach. The strategy is adaptable. It has worked in different ways for different nations. The most recent one, of course, being the Argentine situation. We think that the strategy can be strengthened and we will be making those arguments, stressing particularly the importance of sustaining recovery in the OECD, the importance of keeping markets open to LDC exports, and also, encouraging LDCs to improve the investment climate so that more capital resources will be voluntarily flowing to those nations.

So, in summary, we believe there will be an upbeat summit in London. President Reagan will be reaffirming the kinds of sound policies pursued in the U.S. and encouraging them to pursue elsewhere so that we can sustain the summit country economic expansion. He will reaffirm our five-point debt strategy because we believe both of those will continue -- will contribute to a continued world economic recovery.

Thank you very much. I'll be pleased to try to respond to your questions. Yes, sir?

Q In terms of the Argentine loan, what's the feeling of Treasury in terms of whether the loan has a May 31st deadline or whether this will be continued?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have a swap agreement, as you know. And we have not made a final decision as to whether or not that swap agreement will be renewed. The four Latin countries have actually loaned funds and in the meantime, the Argentines are working very hard with the IMF and it's far too early to say what the final results will be.

Yes, ma'am.

Q I wonder if you could talk a little bit about intervention in the foreign exchange markets. That was an issue at Williamsburg. Has the United States intervened more this year? Can you just generally speak about that? I know some of the information is private and --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question was --

Q May I -- wait, just one final thing. Could you talk --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Would you speak up a little, please?

Q Yes. Could you talk a little bit about yesterday and can you tell us if the U.S. intervened yesterday?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I cannot talk about yesterday. I can talk about our intervention policy. We committed at Williamsburg to continue our policy of intervening for the purpose of avoiding disorderly markets. We also committed to participate from time to time in a joint effort at intervention. And we have followed up that agreement with a few joint interventions. And we continue to the same policy.

We do not get major pressures from abroad to intervene primarily because of the study that pursued -- that followed the Versailles summit. The conclusion of that summit report was that intervention could not make a lasting impact upon exchange rates, that it was useful for the purpose of avoiding disorderly markets, that policies -- changed policies, converging policies and results were really the long-run solution.

So, there has been no change in our intervention policy.

Yes, sir?

Q Yes -- you said that you expect the dollar to decline gradually over the next few months. But when you briefed us before the OECD meeting, you said you would tell the Europeans that we would not resist such a decline. You didn't say that today -- that's --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We will not resist a decline in the dollar. What we will resist are disorderly markets. And that has been our policy since shortly after President Reagan came to Washington.

Q Yesterday, sir, R.T. McNamara said that the markets were disorderly yesterday. Given that, that implies something, doesn't it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am unwilling to talk about what happened yesterday. I do sign each month a statement to Congressional leaders, and, of course, the Federal Reserve in New York does report on any intervention that occurred during the period. It is not our practice to talk about actions in the interim.

Yes, sir?

Q Two questions: Have there been more joint interventions in the twelve months since --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There have been none prior to Williamsburg. And the answer is yes, there have been some since.

Q And if you get questions as you are apt to get in London on these rising concerns about the soundness of the banking system, what, essentially, will be the U.S. response?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the U.S. response will be that we do not believe those concerns are justified. I realize there are rumors from time to time. We're following the developments very carefully. The Federal Reserve, of course, stands ready to provide funds on occasion, so we are not -- we do not share some rumors that I hear. So, we're quite confident about that particular aspect.

Yes, sir?

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Q -- your analysis of the relationships of interest rates on deficits, however intellectually correct it might be, is at variance with the views of many of the leaders of other countries.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm aware of that. (Laughter.)

Q Do you, therefore, expect a great deal of difficulty with this subject? Are you going to go in there hitting them with the same thing that you just hit us with or do you think you can just sweep it all under the rug in the first day?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We do not plan to sweep issues under the rug. We will be talking about the importance of policies designed to reduce inflation expectations and, hence, reduce interest rates. We also -- President Reagan will be emphasizing the efforts he's making to reduce deficits. We think reducing the deficit is very important, provided it's done primarily with spending restraint.

And some people make that connection. I just might say as an aside I've invited every Deputy Finance Minister that I know, and I know most of them, to send me the data supporting their points of view. I have sent the data supporting mine, and I have yet to receive any such evidence. I know of 15 journal articles prepared by professional economists that all support our point of view.

Yes, sir?

Q -- can you after three years of hammering away at this point at these summits, can you cite any evidence of any progress that you've made in convincing the other nations of your -- of the wisdom of your --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: President Reagan has made enormous progress. I can remember the first meeting in Canada when the President stated very clearly the kinds of policies that he intended to pursue.

Q I'm asking specifically about the relationship between deficits and interest rates.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And the point is that other nations are now pursuing the kinds of policies that we have been pursuing all along. It's been a gradual evolution. It's been very difficult for at least one country, but there has been enormous progress.

I do not think there is enormous progress in convincing people that large deficits are not correlated with interest rates. They still believe that despite the fact there is no evidence.

Q Sir --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, sir?

Q -- in our own economy per se, our interest rates are high and our deficit is high. You haven't convinced your own markets of that. How do you expect to convince -- how do you expect to convince other countries?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, I'm not -- We don't expect to convince them. What we expect to convince the world of is that we will continue to pursue low inflation policies, that inflation expectations will continue to drop and that -- ultimately, that will result in lower interest rates.

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Q But you're saying low inflation. Are you -- But you haven't convinced them you're pursuing low deficits. Well --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think that the Europeans -- I've spent a lot of time in the last few weeks -- and they are very pleased at the efforts that the administration and the Congress are making, and they're very pleased about the President's assertion that this is a downpayment, that further moves will occur next year. So, I think it's unfair to say that they ignor the action we have taken. They just say it isn't enough. And we agree. We want to take further action.

Q Sir, can I go back to the debt strategy?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q You said that you thought it could be strengthened and you mentioned OECD recovering, keeping markets open and other things. Would any part of the strengthening of the strategy relate to adjusting or easing terms and the nature of the caps that have been suggested on interest rates by other people?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We think it's, indeed, appropriate for creditors and debtors -- I'm talking about the banks who are loaning the money and the governments that are borrowing the money -- to work on innovative processes among themselves for helping with the problem. And we have no -- obviously, have no objection to that.

We will not impose from Treasury mandates that could slow the process.

Q Well, I'm not talking about an imposition, but are you saying that you would encourage a discussion of a cap on interest rates?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We would encourage discussion between borrowers and lenders for new techniques to make it possible for the debtor countries to ease their problems.

Yes, sir?

Q What is the current status of your campaign to internationalize the yen?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We will give you that information in great detail, probably on May 30th in Japan and May 29th in the United States. They're a day ahead of us. All I can say at the moment is that the working group headed by Vice Minister Oba and myself reached agreement in Rome. That report has been submitted to Secretary Regan and Minister Takeshita. And we expect that there will be a release. But, remember, it's important to note that both Minister Takeshita and Secretary Regan must confirm our results before there is a final agreement.

I fully expect that will happen, but until it happens, I have to put that one little proviso in.

Q On debt again --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q -- you said one of the parts of the program at Williamsburg was to increase funding for the international institutions and that has been done.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The IMF?

Q Right. Does the Reagan administration oppose moves or at least pressure from other countries to add still more funding to the IMF?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We will not participate at the present time in additional funding to the IMF. We think they have adequate funding. And, of course, in addition to the quota increase, there was an enlargement of the GAB, which can be used under certain limited circumstances, so that we do not think that is a problem.

We are pushing very hard to try to limit access over time to gradually phase it out. Of course, if you have very easy access at the IMF, you could run out of money in a hurry. But we do not have easy access. We do have programs that encourage adjustment. So, we think financing of the IMF is not a problem at the present time. They have adequate financing.

Sir --

IOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, ma'am?

Q Everything you've said in your whole presentation is that if the rest of the world would just follow us, all would be lovely and perfect. Is there any place where the United States may compromise on any issue that you've presented or is it that if they would only follow us, then there'd be a very rosy world?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What we've all attempted to do is to get greater convergence of economic results. There is a growing recognition in Europe that they do not have flexibility in their capital and their labor markets.

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We are creating jobs in large amounts and they are not. Over the past -- since 1970, I believe, we've created about 24 million jobs. Western Europe, the EC, have lost jobs of about 2½ million. They are working very hard at taking a look at some of the policies that prevent flexibility. I do not want to argue that we have a perfectly flexible system. But it's much more flexible than is true in Western Europe. So I'm not arguing that we have the best of worlds in the United States. I'm just saying we look very good, compared to the rest of the world.

Q When you're asked at the summit why interest rates have gone up recently and what the outlook is for the coming months, what will be your response?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, there has been a strong recovery in the United States. And, of course, there has been increasing demands for credit. And I think that's the major force. We're expecting some slowdown in the rate of rise in economic activity in the months ahead and some slowdown in the rate of rise in credit demands.

It's our belief that if we stick to our policy of moderate stable growth and money and we work toward getting the deficit down, that this will contribute to reduced inflationary expectations.

Q So you think given this stage of the business cycle, the rise in interest rates has been justified?

SENIOR ADMIMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't want to say "justified." I'm just saying it's not unusual for interest rates to go up at this particular stage of a business cycle. What is unusual is that the level of interest rates remains very high relative to the level of inflation. That's very unusual and we're very concerned about it. And the only way we know of correcting this -- There are two ways that adjustment can occur.

One is, we go back to inflation and confirm the market's expectation that's going to happen and then the real rate will go down. And that's a no-win game from our point of view.

The other reason -- the other way, of course, is to persist in our policy thrust until the market believes.

My making statements or others making statements is not enough. What is necessary is demonstration of low, moderate inflation. And we continue to pursue those policies and there is no give on the part of the President on that front.

Q You just said that the level of rates and the real interest rate is unusually high. Is there any concern that perhaps the rules of the game have changed and that we're going to have to learn to live with higher real rates of interest?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's possible. One can think of one argument supporting that point of view. Although, even that argument would not support present interest rates. I.e., we have improved the after-tax rate of return on investment in the United States. Almost certainly, that has occurred. There's a lot of evidence indicating that.

Economic theory tells you that as after-tax rates of return rise, this means higher real rates than would have been the case prior to that move. So I think that could explain some of it. But in no way does it explain the kinds of interest rates that we have today, vis-a-vis inflation.

Yes, sir.

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Q Are you going to be able to convince the Europeans, or, for that matter, Congress or the markets in this country, that the deficit in 1985 is going to be only $179 billion?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we'll have to wait until the numbers are in.

Q But -- I mean, you deal with Finance Ministers around the world, have you been able to convince anybody that in 1985 the deficit's going to be $179 billion?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think there is a general belief around the world, as a result of the initiative of President Reagan, that we're taking seriously the deficit and that it's going to be coming down, both this year, next year and the years thereafter.

Q But you said $179 billion, even if you didn't get the deficit reduction bill.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, but we're going to get it. We're going to get it. And, therefore, that means we'll have even lower deficits into the future.

Q No, I want -- The question is --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I need not convince the rest of the world on a particular number. What I think is very important is that we inform the rest of the world what our strategy is so that they understand what we're doing and what we're planning to do and they're more impressed by what we do than what we say. And when the Congress completes this first package, there will be greater grief -- (Laughter.) -- belief. Belief in the rest of the world. (Laughter.)

Q Well spoken, sir.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- greater belief in the rest of the world that we will then follow and make additional reductions in the deficit.

Q Is that on the record? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would like to strike "grief" and say "belief."

Q If the dollar is not high on account of high interest rates, why, over the last year or so, indeed, longer, has the dollar tended to strengthen when U.S. rates went up and decline when U.S. rates declined?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Our interest rates, despite what's happened in the last few months, are way down from where they were when we came into office. The prime as I remember was 21 and a half percent. Even today, it's a little over half of that.

There's been an enormous -- well, we have also prepared studies attempting to measure the relation between real rates of interest relative -- not only the levels of real rates of interest, but the spreads in real rates of interest between the United States and other countries and the dollar, and we cannot find a sustainable relation. Now, that doesn't -- I don't want to imply that it's not there. Maybe it is. But I haven't been able to find it. My staff hasn't been able to find it. And no one has sent me evidence that they have found it.

Yes, sir.

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Q You said earlier that so far, high interest rates have not choked off investment. I assume, at that time, you were referring to choking off investment in the U.S.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, sir.

Q Do you have indications as to what effect high interest rates in the U.S. have had on choking off investment in Europe by European --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, they have, as you know, much lower rates of return on investment in Europe and the performance because of different policies -- higher taxes, higher government spending, more regulations -- and therefore, they have not enjoyed yet the recovery and capital investment that's occurred in the United States. So, you know, I do not want to -- I do not believe that the United States is the only factor in determining interest rates. Therefore, if they want to encourage investments, as we certainly hope they will do, it means they must move in the kinds of directions we've been moving -- to limit government, to increase rates of return, to increase flexibility of resource flows, so that they, also, can enjoy higher investments.

Yes?

Q In discussing this unusual high real interest rate question, you've left out monetary policy. Which of the recent statements that the administration has made about monetary policy will be the one brought to the summit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I have been out of the country for three weeks. (Laughter.) And therefore, I'm not certain that I know about all of those statements. But I'll tell you what I believe President Reagan believes, and he stated, I understand, a couple of nights ago again, that inflation expectations are the problem on interest rates, that he wants moderate, stable growth in the money supply. And I have heard no statement to the contrary.

Q Can you explain why you said --

Q You said --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We'll get you next. Yes, sir?

Q -- earlier -- you said the main reason that interest rates have gone up was strong credit demands. Since one of those sources of strong credit demands are the federal budget deficit, why does it not follow then that the budget deficit is at least one of the factors pushing interest rates --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There has been no increase in our actual or expected budget deficit. In fact, it's been coming down. A little, not enough.

Q When?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I have been hearing $200 billion as far as the eye could see. It isn't going to be $200 billion. It's going to be below $200 billion, and even more below in subsequent years. So the trend is downward, not upward.

Q $199 billion.

Q Isn't it, including all budget items, very close to $200 billion for this year?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It won't be that high.

Someone had a hand back in the back.

Q Right over here.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All right.

Q You talked about this increased demand for credit. Is not that an indication, despite the lower inflation rate, that the economy is indeed overheating despite what the administration has said about that? And what indications do you have that we expect to slow down, and did you mean slowdown in economic growth?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I expect -- our projections have all year indicated that we expect a reduction in the rate of growth as the year proceeds, and that is still our expectation. There has been some weakening in orders. There's been some weakening in several other series. There's been weakness in the stock market. All of them suggest that the rate of rise in economic activity is very likely to slow as the year proceeds. That's consistent with our economic projections.

I'm hopeful, but I do not know that, that that will take some of the heat off of the money markets. But it's certainly a possibility.

Q But has this increased credit demand indicated an overheating of the economy?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I do not think it's an indication -- there's no evidence -- I love economic growth. It's a marvelous development. It reduces unemployment; it creates more jobs; it raises standards of living. I see no evidence based on growth that the economy is overheating. The evidence that I would look for is a sharp surge in inflation. And I don't see that. It hasn't happened yet.

We do anticipate, as we said, early on this year, that, unfortunately, there will be some modest pick-up in inflationary pressures in the latter part of this year. But

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help in inflationary pressures in the latter part of this year. But I think it -- still, the best bet is very modest. And we're hopeful that next year, and subsequent years, as we convince the market, we're going to have a gradual slowing in the rate of monetary growth -- that further progress will be made on the inflation front. Our objective is to get inflation to zero, and we're not there -- but, we're making progress.

Q Just one more question --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, sir.

Q -- to follow up. Hasn't the administration said that -- you just said that you do expect a modest pickup in the inflation --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Yet the adminstration has said repeatedly that the markets' fear of increased inflation is unjustified.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. Because they're expecting inflation much higher than the modest pickup that I'm talking if you look at the real rate. I mean, I think I checked this morning -- 30-year government bonds are now yielding 13.7 percent, I think -- or .71 yesterday. And if you, even if you subtract 5 percent inflation, which is a fairly generous estimate of what's been going on, you can see that they're expecting a lot more inflation than 5 percent. Because the normal long-term real rate of interest ought to be somewhere in the 3-4 percent range. It might be now. So, I think the market is misjudging future inflation under Ronald Reagan.

Q Would you buy one?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I cannot manage my own money, therefore, I don't think about those issues. (Laughter.)

Q Well, why do you think that your agreement with Japan will produce a weaker -- or a stronger yen? Won't liberalization of the Japanese capital markets simply cause a movement of Japanese money to take to the United States -- take it --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I expect that there will more trade over time, denominated in yen, assuming this agreement is confirmed by the Ministers. I expect that there will be -- there are many people that would like to make investments in yen securities. There are lots of reasons to believe that the longer-run effect of this agreement -- if it is finally confirmed by the Ministers -- will be, over time, to improve the value of the yen in line with very strong basic economic conditions in Japan.

Q And the short run?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: One cannot tell. In the short run, there are a few actions that are likely to be taken that may work in the opposite direction. That's why I'm talking about -- out there a ways.

Yes, sir?

Q Yes. On improving the international monetary systems, you spoke a little while ago of increased IMF surveillance being one of the primary U.S. objectives. What will that involve? Specifically?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that's in -- I cannot go into the detail, but that's in line with our basic point of view that it's not the system that's at fault, it's varying economic

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policies and results that are at fault. So that to the extent we can increase the surveillance process, this, we hope, would lead to greater convergence in economic results, and hence, less volatility in exchange rates. We have offered a series of suggestions. They have not, at this stage, been all -- certainly not all of them have been accepted by our counterparts, but we will be returning to that, to discuss it in July.

MR. SIMS: We'll take just about two more questions.

Q Will this involve --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sir?

Q -- greater coordination of the rich nation's policies, or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Greater coordination and economic results is what I'm talking about. Now, we recognize that there are differences between economies, and therefore, we do not think it would be productive to have the -- identically the same policies with no adjustment for the particular nation in all countries. But, we do think that we can agree, and should strive to achieve low inflation in all countries, and higher growth in all countries.

Yes, sir? Yes, ma'am --

Q Where does Germany fit into the picture? Isn't theirs a strong economy?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They are doing fairly well. Their economic growth rate is rising, however, they're having great difficulty in reducing their unemployment. And, of course, they are threatened, now, by some strike problems. But Germany has improved. They've always had relatively low inflation; they continue to have relatively low inflation. Their growth rates are picking up.

Yes, sir?

Q Why are you so confident that when the dollar begins to decline, it will do so gradually? Some other experts are concerned that it will be a sharp decline.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Primarily because I'm convinced that we will not change our basic low inflation policy. The last time the dollar took a dropping, the policies were resulting in sharp acceleration in inflation, and that's very unlikely to happen under President Reagan -- it will not happen.

Q How about the confidence factor related to the banking assistance received yesterday. Doesn't that affect the dollar?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As I indicated, we're not concerned about -- we're watching it carefully -- but, we think the banking system is very strong, and we expect the rest of the world to believe that.

Thank you very much. I enjoyed it.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 10:50 A.M. EDT

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

ON THE

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MINISTERIAL MEETING

FRIDAY, MAY 25, 1984, 2:30 P.M.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Thanks. I will just run through some of the highlights, and if you are interested, I can also go into some detail on the Secretary of State's schedule.

This is the first NATO Ministerial Meeting in Washington since 1969. There will be three days of discussions. It is a little lengthier than the Ministerials that some of you are used to in Brussels, from May 29 through the 31st.

This meeting does commemorate the 35th Anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty. It also is different in the sense that -- as you know, a substantial chunk of this meeting will take place outside of Washington at the Wye Plantation, which is designed to allow the Foreign Ministers, divorced from their respective staffs, to have informal discussions of the issues.

Following the return of the Ministers from the Wye

Plantation, there will be a dinner at the White House which the President and Mrs. Reagan will host, and the following morning a meeting in the Cabinet Room with the President and the sixteen Foreign Ministers.

The substantive issues are fairly straightforward: Obviously, East-West relations; we expect a major topic of the conversations at the Wye Plantation to focus on an assessment of current Soviet attitudes, objectives and goals. By and large, people will want to address the apparent Soviet decision to freeze relations with the West; their decision on the Olympics; their delay in various discussions, such as the conversations we have had on upgrading the U.S.-Soviet "hot-line"; their continuing refusal to return to the Geneva nuclear arms control negotiations; as well as their treatment of Andrei Sakharov and Mrs. Bonner.

As some of you will recall, at the last NATO Ministerial last December, Leo Tindemans, the Belgian Foreign Minister, suggested that it would be timely to take a look at the so-called Harmel study and report done in the late 1960's on strategy towards the Soviet Union. That study produced a two-track conclusion that the West should pursue a strategy of defense and dialogue with the Soviet Union.

Since that suggestion was approved by the Ministers at the December Ministerial, NATO has been engaged in a comprehensive study of East-West relations. The conclusions of that study have now been reached in Brussels. The conclusions will be addressed by the Ministers at Wye Plantation. And just to emphasize, this is the first formal study undertaken within the Alliance of East-West relations since 1967.

Without scooping the results or the conclusions of that exercise, I think it is fair to say that the United States and its principal allies share a desire for a constructive relationship with the Soviet Union along the lines that President Reagan outlined in his January 16th address.

The study that has been undertaken takes a sober look at Soviet behavior in Europe and in other regions. It examines human rights and arms control. It underscores the need for Alliance solidarity, military strength, realism, as a basis for a constructive East-West dialogue.

We think that the Brussels declaration reached late last year at the Ministerial meeting, as well as the President's speech of January 16th, as well as the NATO study, demonstrates a basic convergence of views within the Alliance on East-West relations, and a consensus on how to respond to the current situation.

Just a few remarks on arms control. The Ministerial Meeting will review negotiations where the West has made recent moves, including the U.S. initiative to ban chemical weapons. That initiative was taken in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, NATO's initiative in Vienna on MBFR, and the Conference on Disarmament in Europe in Stockholm.

The Ministers will also discuss the INF and START situation, and I think, without prejudging the results of the meeting, it is safe to say that NATO will stress the U.S. readiness to negotiate nuclear arms control without preconditions.

On other issues, as is customary, the Ministers will review the international situation, particularly current developments in the Gulf. While it is not formally a NATO issue, we have made real progress in recent years in getting the Alliance to address so-called out-of-area questions like the Gulf, and it will be a timely opportunity for the Secretary of State and his colleagues to address the situation there.

We believe that it is increasingly important to share views on global issues, Central America, Southern Africa, Afghanistan, or other questions that almost certainly will come up in the Ministerial sessions.

And unless you would like me to go through the Secretary's schedule in detail, I will be happy to answer your questions.

Q On the Gulf, is NATO legally, politically, able to do anything?

A NATO as an organization, no, but as former communiques have made clear, NATO has endorsed the concept that countries within the Alliance that have both the capacity and the will to safeguard Western interests outside of the formal boundaries of the Alliance, should consult on those situations and take action when necessary.

Q Can you address the question of the Dutch Government's pending decision, and what effect it would have on NATO if, in fact, they defer decision or don't go ahead with it?

A I think the impact on NATO would be fairly marginal of a failure by the Dutch to move forward with deployment. I think it is really very important to remember that the Dutch have never supported the deployment of 48 cruise missiles on their soil. It is not an issue of whether or not the Dutch are going to fall out of the missile consensus. On December 12, 1979 the Dutch Government reserved its position on the so-called double-track decision, and the issue they are now addressing is whether or not they will now join the INF consensus.

So, what we have seen in the past year is a decision by the British, the Germans, and the Italians to go forward with the deployment of missiles in the absence of an arms control agreement despite the Dutch reservation.

So the question is whether the Dutch are going to continue their opposition to the deployment of missiles on their soil, or are going to join the consensus.

The question, I think, is less the impact on the Alliance of a Dutch no decision and more the impact on the Dutch and their future role within the Alliance of a no decision.

I can restate that by saying that we are confident that regardless of what the Dutch Government decides to do, in the absence of an arms control agreement, the deployment in the other basing countries will continue. And I might add that not only includes the British, the Germans and the Italians, but also the Belgians.

Now, our view is that it would be vastly preferable if the Dutch went along with the other basing countries and deployed their 48 cruise missiles on schedule, as laid out in the December 1979 decision. But the basic consensus within the Alliance and INF will not be influenced by a negative Dutch decision.

Q What about the Italian President Craxi's suggestion that the Alliance freeze deployments as a way of getting the Soviets back to the bargaining table?

A I do not believe that is his suggestion, and our discussions with the Italians have indicated that it is not his suggestion. The Italian Government is not advocating a moratorium on INF missile deployments in the current situation.

(See next page)

B-1 Q What's the -- You talk about it's more a question of the impact on the Dutch themselves and their future role in the Alliance. What do you mean? How does this affect their future role in the Alliance?

A I think that it's self-evident. They have an opportunity here to join the NATO consensus, and obviously, whether they do or they don't will have an impact on their participation or their role within the Alliance in the future.

Q That seems to be -- What kind of -- You know, this is a military decision that they are --

A It is not a military decision; it is a political decision. The INF decision was taken by not just Defense Ministers; it was taken by the Foreign Ministers, and it has been addressed at senior levels by government heads ever since 1979.

Q What you're saying seems to diverge from the standard line that we are expecting the Dutch to fulfill their obligation to NATO. Are you saying they have no obligation?

A That doesn't diverge. We think that they do have an obligation to NATO. They are identified as a deployment country, and we expect them to fulfill their obligation. But it would be a major mistake to suggest b-2 that somehow the Alliance consensus on INF would unravel if the Dutch don't go forward.

Q Are the Ministers expected to --

A It would be like making the tail wag the dog.

Q Are the MInisters expected to discuss a new policy towards international terrorism?

A I'm sure the question of terrorism will come up, but as for a NATO policy on terrorism, no.

Q [redacted] regarding the Soviet Union's policy, you mentioned you believe that they have decided to freeze or to impose a freeze in relations. Several days ago, one of your deputies, Mark Palmer, gave a speech in which I believe he said that toward the end of April the Soviet Union had made a decision to change its policy towards the United States and freeze relations -- thereupon, following the Olympics and several other things which were mentioned.

Could you fill in a little bit your view of what caused them to make this change, and what makes you, or at least Mr. Palmer, think it was a late-April decision, on their part?

A I'll let Mark Palmer speak for himself on the question of --

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Q But he doesn't exactly just speak for himself when he makes a speech for the State Department.

A I'm not -- You're asking me about whether there is some decision point in late April. I'm not aware of any decisive moment where the Soviets made a decision. I think that we do see a change in Soviet attitudes from the end of the Andropov period and when Vice President Bush visited Moscow and spoke with Mr. Chernenko, where there was at least an indication that the Soviets might be prepared to engage in a give-and-take.

Since that time, though, based on various actions we've seen them take including the Olympics, including the unwillingness on their part to meet with and discuss issues with U.S. officials, that there apparently was a decision taken to self-isolate themselves. But I'm not aware of any specific date or specific moment that a decision was taken.

Q Do you have any notion of about when, in this trail of events since the death of Andropov, this was?

A No. I think this is all reading backwards -- a little bit of "Monday morning quarterbacking," looking at what the Soviets -- this increasingly negative attitude the Soviets have exhibited, and going backwards and looking at when they might have taken a decision like this.

Q Do you go along with the reports --

b-4 Do you credit the reports which were coming out of the visit to Moscow by Foreign Minister Genscher to the effect that Mr. Gromyko is now in charge of Soviet foreign policy to a degree that he was not before, and that this may be part of the problem?

A I don't know if it's a part of the problem, but I think there is a general assumption shared by people in the State Department and beyond the State Department that Mr. Gromyko is certainly playing a very influential role in foreign policy.

Q To follow up with my question, please, I understand why the Gulf area is not within the jurisdiction of the NATO discussion, but why not terrorism if the terrorists are already active in Europe-- the NATO countries?

A You didn't understand me. The Gulf area certainly is within the jurisdiction of NATO discussion. The NATO Ministers are able to talk about events all over the world, and terrorism is certainly within the jurisdiction of any discussion. But that is very different than saying that it is a NATO problem per se, and that NATO must have a position on that problem. We don't believe that should be the case. We believe that NATO --

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Q Why?

A Why? Because it just isn't appropriate.

Q What is the current situation on the hot-line talks? Is there anything at all going on now, or is that just frozen also?

A Well, there have been -- As you know, there have been three rounds of those discussions, and we are hoping that there would be another round. We are still interested in making a good faith effort in improving crisis communications with the Soviet Union.

Q What else is going on in terms of the relationship? Are there any ongoing discussions in any other areas besides the (inaudible)?

A Well, there are normal diplomatic relations. We continue to have discussions with the Soviet Union at all levels, in both Washington and in Moscow; but what the Soviet Union seems to have done is rule us out-of-bounds, for example, in discussions with various Soviets who visit this country with U.S. officials. They have turned down the opportunity, for example, of various visiting Soviets to come into the Department and have discussions with us here. They are carrying out probably what might be called a minimally correct relationship.

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Q Did Minister Sushkov see Dam today as scheduled?

A I assume he did.

Q But there are no negotiations on any specific --

A Well, there are plenty of negotiations, yes. There are various bilateral discussions going ahead. I'm not going to -- They are confidential; I'm not going to go into detail. I don't want to convey the idea that we have no discussions underway -- we do. There are correct state-to-state relationships. There are discussions on a variety of bilateral issues and discussions on other questions.

(Continued page 14.)

Q What happened at the end of the last round of the "hot-line" talks? I had understood that they were about to sign it in Moscow and then -- no?

A No, that's not correct. There are both, I think, some technical questions that remain to be resolved which we are working on, and there's also this political question of whether the Soviet Union at this stage really wants an agreement. We don't know the answer to that question.

Q Have there been any assessment on the motives for the Soviet freeze or self-isolation?

A Oh, I think you know those motives as well as I do. The President, the other night in his press conference, indicated that perhaps the election timetable here is one motive. Another motive is their sense of wounded pride over having contested the INF deployment issue and having lost. We also think they are interested in influencing Western public opinion by creating a growing sense of anxiety in the West over the lack of dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union.

And there could also be just a certain immobilism in Soviet policy due to the leadership, transition, underway in the Soviet Union. So there are any number of possible hypotheses. The problem, of course, is we don't know.

Q Is there expected to be a sort of Washington declaration, a sort of historical one in the 35th --

A There will be a communique released from the meeting.

Q Is there going to be some briefing on this study you're talking about?

A I hope so.

Q About when would it be, would you think? What would your guess be as to when that would be?

A I don't know, Don, but we will look at that if there is interest in the study and its conclusions. I think we can do that.

Q Why don't you put the study out Monday for, say, the start of the conference?

A The study is classified, and I think properly so. If governments had not been able to work, say, outside of the glare of publicity, we would not have had an honest effort to look at these problems. But I think we will be able to talk about the conclusions in some kind of briefing that we would happy to arrange.

This is not unusual. I remember, if you might recall, Bernie, there was a study that was on done East-West relations for the NATO Summit, which was in Washington -- I think, in 1978 -- and Sam Huntington, who was on the NSC staff at that time, was organizing that. I think that study was also classified, but I think people briefed on it, and so forth.

Q Can you take a minute to give us the Secretary's schedule?

A Very briefly. I'll run right through it. Unfortunately, he has to take off a good part of his Memorial Day Monday for bilateral meetings.

He is seeing the Turkish Foreign Minister in his office; then the Spanish Foreign Minister, and then he will be having dinner with the British Foreign Secretary, Geoffrey Howe, at the British Embassy on Monday evening.

On Tuesday, he will be seeing the Italian Foreign Minister, and have a brief session with Secretary General Joseph Luns who, by the way, this is his last NATO Ministerial. This is his last. He is going to be replaced, as you know, by Peter Carrington.

The formal session of the Ministerial will begin after lunch on Tuesday here in the Dean Acheson Auditorium. There will be an opening ceremony. The Vice President will make some introductory remarks.

Following the opening ceremony, the Ministers will hop on helicopters and fly down to the Wye Plantation. There, the Secretary of State will have a separate bilateral with the Dutch Foreign Minister. And then there will be an informal dinner with the Foreign Ministers at Wye.

On Wednesday, their discussions at Wye will continue through the morning. They will then have lunch. They will continue their discussions until late in the afternoon. They will then all return on Wednesday evening to Washington for the dinner hosted by the President at the White House.

On Thursday, here in Washington, they will go back into semi-open session, not public session but with their staffs as opposed to the restricted discussions at Wye. Following that session, which will end the plenary session around lunchtime, the Secretary of State will give a press conference at 1:00.

On that same morning on Thursday, prior to their plenary session, where they normally discuss the communique, the Ministers, together with Secretary General Luns, will meet with the President in the Cabinet Room, and then the President will make some remarks to the Ministers in the Rose Garden. That's Thursday morning.

Q Aside from the question, for a minute, of a moratorium which you discussed when you talked about Craxi's proposals, will there be any discussion during this session of any changes -- any changes in the deployment schedule, speeding them up, slowing them down?

A No. I don't think there is any desire to change the deployment schedules. I don't see any real initiative there.

I might say, I'm sure the general issue of negotiating strategy will be addressed, but I can tell you from my own experience in discussions with the arms control directors of various NATO countries that I doubt very much there will be any initiatives to change our current policy towards the negotiations, which is, we will be prepared to get back into the negotiations right away, to negotiate in good faith, to meet the Soviets half way. But we are not prepared to make any changes or concessions in our negotiating approach as a pre-condition to sitting down with the Soviets.

Q What about if the Soviets agree to resume the negotiations, would the United States accept a symbolic number of presence of cruise and Pershing missiles?

A No. I think so far our position is clear. We want to negotiate on the basis of equality. An outcome that left the United States a symbolic presence -- a few missiles -- compared with the massive Soviet SS-24s would not be acceptable to either the United States or, I would assume, the Allies.

Q So you're absolutely ruling out any de facto freeze of any kind in the deployments; is that right?

A I don't think I could be any clearer than I have been. We're going forward without an agreement.

Q When is the Dutch decision due?

A It is not due. It is up to the Dutch Government. There is no deadline that I'm aware of.

Q In other words, isn't there a deadline related to the schedule of deployment of Pershing and cruise missiles?

A People say that they have to make a decision in the near future, but this is all based on how quick you can pour concrete and what the construction necessitates. I think it's a mistake to talk about any actual deadline.

Q So you would not be expecting a definitive decision from them on this occasion?

A I just can't say, Barrie. I think it has more to do with Dutch internal politics than any kind of objective deadline.

Q The other night the President mentioned Soviet -- apparently in a misleading fashion. Apparently, he was talking really about Denmark. What do you expect the Danes to do about --

A I don't know what country he was talking about. So I wouldn't say if he wasn't talking about Belgium, he was talking about Denmark. I just wouldn't be able to say.

What do you expect the Danes to do about what?

Q About this money that they're going to have to appropriate for a get-set preparation?

A We expect the Danish governments to fulfill their commitments as a member of the Alliance.

Q Let me just follow that up. There have been some reports I've seen in recent days that it would be devastating in terms of the strategic balance not to have the Dutch go forward.

Were you suggesting earlier that that would not be the case?

A "Devastating?" You're telling me that 48 missiles, plus or minus, is going to change the future of the world? I think that's ridiculous.

The fact is, this is primarily a political issue. We think militarily it's important that the Dutch demonstrate their solidarity with the Alliance. We think that it is important for the future, as I said, of the Dutch role. But I'm not aware of anybody who said this was devastating. Who said that?

Q I saw a wire story coming out of London that quoted, I think, ISS sources that this would severely hamper the effort to balance the SS-20s.

Q Hopelessly untrustworthy group. (Laughter)

Q That organization, you had something to do with it.

A You mean the New York Times? (Laughter)

(Background briefing concluded at 3:15 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING

WEDNESDAY, MAY 30, 1984, 10:40 A.M.

MODERATOR: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. We are going to do this briefing on NATO events to date on a BACKGROUND basis. For the benefit of those who are perhaps not familiar with our State Department rules, "BACKGROUND" means that you may attribute this information to a senior State Department official, but you may not identify that official either by name or by title.

For your information only and not for publication, the briefer is ...

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Thank you.

I think we should see this briefing as part of our effort to try our best to keep you informed during this Ministerial -- although as you I think undoubtedly understand, it's not especially easy. All the Ministers are sloshing around down at Wye Plantation. (Laughter.)

For some of you who were not here for our earlier briefing last week, one of the principal things we have tried to accomplish at this meeting was to get the Ministers away from their respective staffs, create a little more of an informal atmosphere for them. They are at the Wye Plantation.

They arrived there last night. Over dinner the Foreign Ministers met alone with Joseph Luns. There was a separate dinner for the Permanent Representatives, the Ambassadors to NATO.

At that dinner, the topic was East-West relations. And the real focus was on the Soviet Union and discussions about how to understand current Soviet behavior and intentions.

The three Foreign Ministers who have recently visited the Soviet Union -- that is, Fernando Morán with King Juan Carlos, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and Minister Andreotti from Italy -- were asked to really begin or lead off the discussions by describing their impressions of their visits to the Soviet Union, their meetings with Gromyko and Chernenko; and that led then to a broader discussion of East-West relations.

This morning the discussion on East-West relations has continued. The plan is for that discussion to move into arms control-related issues, then to a discussion of NATO questions -- by that I mean questions of NATO strategy, the relationship between conventional forces and nuclear weapons, proposals for reducing reliance on nuclear weapons, upgrading Alliance conventional forces -- issues like the so-called two-way street -- that is, how to address weapons-procurement problems within the Alliance -- and discussions of new organizational approaches to Alliance security, such as proposals for reviving the Western European Union.

And, finally, this afternoon, the discussions will move to what in NATO jargon is known as "out-of-area" issues -- that is, regional questions, most prominently the question of the Gulf and the Iran-Iraq war.

So that is the plan. The Ministers will return late this afternoon; and, of course, there will be a dinner hosted by the President at the White House tonight.

I'd be happy to try to answer any of your questions.

Q What are some of the theories to explain the Soviet behavior?

Q The question, please?

A I was asked what are the theories used to explain recent Soviet behavior.

I can't -- well, conversations at Wye, of course, are confidential; so I can't say what theories were necessarily discussed by the Ministers last night. But, generally speaking, I think there are three or four different explanations that have been offered by various observers.

One is a sense of a political reaction to the setback suffered by the Soviet Union to successful INF deployment -- that is, describing the Soviet Union as a wounded bear that is unhappy and upset over having lost the political struggle with NATO over the deployment of missiles.

Another explanation offered is that the Soviets are engaged in a calculated strategy to raise the anxiety levels amongst the Western public in a hope that the strong united front that the Alliance has projected over the last year could begin to unravel.

There is, of course, the possibility that the Soviet Union would -- or plans to -- intervene in the U.S. Presidential election and that the Soviet Union is not going to take any step that would help reelect President Reagan.

But these are different suggestions that have been made.

Q Perhaps --

A Wait, just a second. I think this fellow.

Q Do you have information about that so-called East-West Study which was initiated by Tindemans? Will that be approved, to start?

A Well, we expect, as I said, the Ministers to address the East-West Study. They're most likely to discuss that on Thursday morning here back in Washington. We haven't wanted the question of the actual wording of the Study or any discussion of the communique or declaration to get in the way of real informal discussion down at Wye. But we have seen some reports about some controversy or disagreements about that Study.

I have not noted any major disagreements over that Study amongst the Ministers, and I had an opportunity yesterday to talk to the principal Ministers involved with the Study. So the reports that suggest there are some major disagreements between the United States and Germany in particular seem off base, seem vastly exaggerated.

Q Apropos of U.S.-Soviet relations, there's a report today that an American diplomat was badly beaten up in Leningrad last month. I was wondering what you could tell us about that and if you see that as part of a pattern of the deterioration of relations between countries?

A Well, I don't want to get into that question. I'd sort of be scooping my colleague and his people for the noon briefing. I'll just say that an incident like that did take place and then leave it to the noon press briefing to address the broader questions.

Q Has Shultz had a meeting with the Dutch Foreign Minister --

A Yes.

Q -- and can you give us any focus on that?

A Yes, yes. He met with Minister Van Den Broek last night at the Wye Plantation.

Q Did he get any indication from him that the Dutch are leaning any more toward deploying missiles than they have been?

A Well, I don't think I want to comment on how they're leaning at this stage.

Q Can you tell us what Shultz told the Dutch Foreign Minister, if not what the Dutch Foreign Minister told Shultz?

A Well, I think I would just say two broad things that are not necessarily different than our earlier position: one, that we expect the Dutch to follow through on their obligation under the December '79 decision; and, secondly, we are sympathetic and sensitive to the special problems that the Dutch Government faces with this issue.

Q How much discussion has there been, if any, on the Persian Gulf?

A Well, based on what I said, recognizing that there were some bilateral meetings -- for example, the Secretary met with Minister Andreotti for breakfast yesterday and the night before he met with the Turkish Foreign Minister. There were discussions of the Gulf in both of those meetings. It is not expected that there will be any more discussions on the Gulf until this afternoon, but I'm quite sure that there will be a good give-and-take on the Iran-Iraq conflict in this afternoon's sessions at Wye.

Q Is there any consideration being given by the American Government to some kind of joint escort force or patrol, or anything of that sort?

A No. I don't want to get into that for purposes of this briefing.

Q Could you expand on the whole notion of the Western European Union and its possible revival -- a brief bit of history on what the purposes and aims of a revival would be?

A Well, I'm not really the best person to do this, because it's a group that doesn't even really involve the United States. I would go to either the Germans or the French, who have been really instrumental, I think, in proposing this idea.

Q Can you expand on the Foreign Ministers' impressions of Chernenko and the relative or seeming ascendency --

A No.

Q -- of Gromyko? Anything on that?

A I really can't do that. The discussions at Wye have been confidential.

Q What kind of pitch will the Secretary be making in connection with the Persian Gulf? I'm thinking about in the context of the French providing the missiles to Iraq while we're giving . Stingers to the Saudis, et cetera.

A Well, I'm not sure I understand your question.

Q What sort of pitch will Shultz make in trying to get some allied policy on how to approach the escalation in the Gulf?

A Well, I don't know, Bernie. Since the discussion hasn't even taken place yet, you are asking me to really speculate, and I wouldn't want to do that. I really wouldn't feel comfortable about it.

Q Sort of a housekeeping question, if I can. What sort of documents or communiques will be issued at the end of this meeting?

A There will be a communique. Whether there are additional documents is, I think, premature right now to say.

Q On that particular question about a communique or some documents, the NATO Ministerial meetings in December in Brussels came out with something that was called the "signal of Brussels", a gesture toward the Soviet Union of good will.

Is there anything of that sort intended this time around? Are you going to make a sort of pitch for this particular approach, and is the East/West declaration, which will be part of or an additional document to the communique, intended as a signal of Washington, or anything of that nature?

A Well, you sort of answered your own question.

Q Are you trying to make a pitch --

A I don't know if you want to call it a signal or not. There have been reports about a possible declaration of Washington, whether you want to consider it --.

Q You wouldn't steer anyone away from that sort of notion?

A Not at this stage, no.

Q Have the Europeans expressed any concern that U.S. troops would be diverted from Germany to the Gulf, and would they consider the U.S. responsible for their security?

A Well, I just want to emphasize they haven't even discussed that subject yet. They are scheduled to do so this afternoon, and when the Ministers come back this evening, I would suggest you try to track them down and see what concerns, if any, were addressed.

Q Can you tell us more about the Harmel study, and, if not, when can you tell us something about it?

A Well, the Harmel study, that is just a matter of record. It was a study undertaken by a group of so-called "wise men" in 1967 to --

Q I'm sorry, I meant the updated one.

A Well, that study was suggested by Minister Leo Tindemans at the last NATO Ministerial in Brussels. The study has been underway. It has been undertaken within the Alliance -- in other words, not by outsiders or so-called "wise men" -- in Brussels, and the Ministers will be addressing and discussing that study and its conclusions at this meeting.

Q And will we be able to find out much about that?

A Well, I think that we will be able to brief in more detail on that study later on in this Ministerial meeting. Be happy to do that.

Q Is any discussion being given to formulating a new proposal on arms control that would be offered to the Soviets as a result of this meeting, or to look for anything like that?

A I don't think so. I think that what we expect at this stage is that the Ministers -- and here I don't want to foreclose what the Ministers might suggest -- but I think they will make a distinction between, on the one hand, appearing open and ready for a dialogue with the Soviet Union -- assuming the Soviets are ready for a dialogue -- and, on the other hand, making concessions which are principally designed to bring the Soviets back to the negotiating table.

The U.S. position is that we should be ready for a dialogue, but that making concessions at this stage would be a sign of weakness.

We expect our allies to share in that view.

Q Can I follow that up? Is the United States informally discussing new arms control proposals, should the Soviets come back, with the NATO allies? In other words, we have been told for some months now that you have got various things in the works should the Soviets come back to Geneva. Are any of those being discussed with the Allies?

A I really don't know quite how to answer that question, and so I won't.

Q Just yes or no will do. (Laughter.)

Q Is the Greek Minister going to meet the Secretary of State?

A Well, yes, they are all going to meet down at the Wye Plantation. I mean, that is the purpose of this meeting, is to have them down there in a very informal setting where they can sit around and have lunch together and dinner and have conversations, so that all the Ministers should have a chance to talk to one another.

Q A moment ago when you described the distinction that the Ministers are making between appearing open for a dialogue but not willing to make concessions, you said, "not willing to make concessions specifically designed to lure them back."

Are there other kinds of moves being discussed which are not designed to lure the Soviets back to the talks, but which might --

A Well, possibly, and I would note that there are some negotiations that are still underway. People sometimes sort of ask questions as though there aren't any negotiations underway, and there are.

Q So there are specific proposals being discussed --

A I didn't say that.

Q -- regarding the other negotiations which are --

A I said "possibly."

Q Why is this follow-up study that Tindemans is chairing one to be discussed here --

A He is not chairing it, he is suggesting it. It was a study done within the NATO system.

Q When it has been discussed, and so forth, why is it then going to be classified? Why is it not going to be made public? What is the purpose of that?

A Well, I think that the concern was that if it were undertaken with the knowledge that it would be made public that it would not be the very candid appraisal of East/West relations that we wanted.

Presumably, if the Ministers are comfortable with the study and they do want to produce a declaration, that declaration will, in fact, reflect the conclusions of the study. And I hope that later on in this meeting, assuming again that the Ministers are comfortable with the study, that we will be able to talk a little bit about the study. But we felt that a classified effort was the best way to preserve, I think, a certain honesty in putting together a study so that it would not be just an exercise in public relations.

Q To what degree do the allies share the U.S. view as you outlined it; that is to say, to be ready for a dialogue but not offer concessions because they would be seen as a sign of weakness?

A I think, generally speaking, they share it. I think you will want to judge for yourself following the completion of this meeting. But we have not seen any major differences on that subject so far.

Q Are any of the allies recommending concessions?

A We haven't seen any, no.

Q Can I ask if you expect to have any reference in the communique to the continued deployment of the INF and perhaps to the pace of such a deployment as it will continue?

A Well, if you are asking whether or not there is some suggestion of endorsing a moratorium, there will not be any endorsement, and I think you will see -- I can't prejudge what will be in the communique -- but, again, there are no calls right now for any change in the current INF deployment schedule.

Q You said earlier that one of the explanations for the Soviet hard line is that it is calculated to raise the anxiety level in the Western countries.

Have the Ministers reported that it has raised the anxiety levels at all, and, if so, what do they plan to do about it?

A Well, let me just say, I will make a distinction in my remarks. First of all, it is not our view -- that is, the American view -- that it has raised the anxiety level. If anything, there is less anxiety now than there was a year ago -- at the height I would say the missile deployment question, the large peace demonstrations, etc. But what the respective Ministers believe, I can't say. The meetings in Wye are underway now, and I don't think I am in a position to report at this stage what they believe.

One more question.

Q As you know, the Defense Ministers meeting in Brussels just a fortnight ago ended in a kind of a cold climate. Would you describe the climate this time of the Foreign Ministers meeting opposite?

A What do you mean, cold climate?

Q There was some, you know, misunderstanding at least between the German Representative and the American Representative on the infrastructure question on the money, and so on.

A I think, to go back to your question, that we saw -- just based on what I saw yesterday and in conversations we had -- that there seemed to be no important differences between the German Foreign Minister and the American Secretary of State.

Q Can you just take one more, a non-substantive question. You mentioned that the Ministers were sloshing around --

A That assumes all the other ones were substantive.

b-9

Q Well, this assumes there won't be much substantive information, so maybe we can get some other. Can you give us a little more of the -- I mean, when you say they were sloshing around, can you give us any other flavor about the nature of the meetings?

A No. I will get you somebody else that can give you that local color. Actually, I don't know if you have ever been to the Wye Manor, but it is a very nice place. It is run by the Aspen Institute and --

Q But not in the rain.

A Well, I don't know. It depends on if you like sort of a Gothic horror story. (Laughter)

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 11:00 a.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING
WEDNESDAY, MAY 30, 1984, 5:45 P.M.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am going to make some general comments on the atmosphere, because with my position as [redacted] it's most important for me to preserve the sanctity of the Council, the Permanent Council, and the Ministerial Council, and I would not want to violate that.

The Wye Plantation meeting was a tremendous success despite the rain. The location is magnificent; we might have wished for sunshine, but most of our work was indoors anyway. There was an extraordinary full exchange in this informal setting. The three principal topics discussed on the informal agenda East-West relations, the state of the Alliance, and then later this afternoon, what in NATO jargon is known as out-of-area problems.

Claude Cheysson, who was the President d'honneur this year, congratulated the organizers of the meeting for its tremendous success. Foreign Minister Genscher has been an advocate of this type of exchange, and I think he indeed was happy with it also. This was not a drafting session, but an exchange on policy matters important to the state of the Alliance.

I think there were strong feelings that it was important to have intensive consultations within the NATO Alliance. After all, the Alliance has been subjected to an enormous psychological strategy and campaign by the Soviet Union; and this kind of meeting where there was not just exchange, but in-depth exchange, builds cohesion and unity which is necessary. By the way, this idea of the Wye meeting was Secretary Shultz', and I think it truly scored.

Now, let me say that on the discussion of East-West relations and the Soviet Union, I think we benefited greatly because three Foreign Ministers had been there recently -- Andreotti of Italy, Morán of Spain, and Genscher of the Federal Republic. The new Turkish Ambassador had been stationed there three times, so there was a great deal of expertise in the room.

As I think you are aware, we had mandated in December an East-West study. That initiative was taken by Foreign Minister Tindemans of the Belgian Government, and after all, the Belgians were the initiators of the Harmel Report some 17 years ago, and Foreign Minister Tindemans regarded this as a follow-up of that study of some 37-odd pages double-spaced as completed. The basic study is a classified study, but out of it will come a public document, a public statement tomorrow in addition to the communique.

I think that there was the feeling of the importance of not another basic study like that at this point, but continuing assessments as we go along by the Permanent Council.

I think the study, as you will see when the public statement emerges, indicates that our basic political strategy as it was formulated in 1967, at the time of the Harmel Report, is sound indeed. Just as a reminder, the Harmel Report, future tasks of the Alliance emphasized that first we should maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure, and the second function was to pursue the search for programs, progress, towards a more stable relationship.

Let me say that in the intervening years, as we reached the height of detente, I think many people got those two functions turned around in their thinking, with perhaps the detente function in front of defense and deterrence, but that's not the way it was in the original report which talks about these two important functions, both of which reinforce each other. So it was wrong perhaps when some people placed the primacy on the second function and tended to discard the first.

With regard to the state of the Alliance, all Ministers felt that the political state was healthy, was dynamic. There were no suggestions for basic restructuring of the Alliance, reordering of the machinery, or change in its strategy of flexible response, which also was codified in 1967 -- that same year.

Secretary Shultz and others emphasized the major importance of doing more on the conventional level, the third leg of the triad, in terms of our deterrent strategy. There was a recognition that such does cost money. I might say -- and I'm a little more free in talking about what my Secretary talked about -- but he also, since a number of members felt that NATO and the countries of NATO could do better in articulating its own story to the public, my Secretary felt that it would be helpful for the Permanent Council to really examine this issue of perceptions and better communication.

As to the out-of-area issues, the last part of the afternoon, here of course, NATO does not -- it's not within the NATO area -- NATO does not operate collectively, so this is an exchange of views and information. And that did take place. Our Secretary gave an update, and others contributed. So finally, and in sum, I would say that the Ministers, despite the weather which began to abate about the time that the helicopters were going to take off and bring us back, felt that this was another example -- and a superb example -- of the value of consultations. What occurred at Wye was more in-depth than in some formats, that the cohesion of the Alliance, the unity of the Alliance, the political strategy was strong.

Those conclude my comments.

Q Can you tell us whether the sixteen Ministers sought to reach a common strategy for defusing the situation in the Gulf?

A Well, once again, I would comment that it would not be within the jursisdiction of a NATO meeting to attempt to devise a strategy for an out-of-area problem. That's for those countries in other fora or bilateral, in their bilateral relationships. It's an exchange of information and analysis that would take place in this --

Q Were there any reservations expressed about the U.S. measures taken so far?

A No.

Q And did any of the others indicate that they were going to take parallel measures?

A Again, this was not a discussion that was oriented towards action steps. That's just not the function of a NATO meeting.

Q It's been said by American officials here that they hoped that other countries not within NATO's structure, but just individually, would speak out more or seem to be more actively involved, because at present, just the U.S. seems to be saying and doing things.

Was this at least expressed to them?

A Well, as you know, our policy very much recognizes that other countries have a greater economic energy stake in the area than do we. And the President in his statements has made it quite clear where we stand on this issue in balance; and I think the purpose of the discussion today, the value of the discussion today, is the contribution of information and ideas among a range of knowledgeable people. But, again, I want to be very careful, since I serve in NATO, that this is not a forum designed to work out a common, concerted policy in any area outside of NATO; but the exchange that goes on there is enormously valuable to the member-countries of NATO as they reach such policies and coordination. So I think, therefore, the session was very valuable.

Q Did your discussions on this state of the Alliance where you spoke of re-emphasizing conventional warfare get to the issue --

A Not re-emphasizing conventional warfare. We're deterrence people. Excuse me. (Smiles)

Q All right. Let me rephrase it.

A We're on the peace side.

Q Right.

A We have a defensive posture. The other side doesn't.

Q Conventional response --

A Excuse me for that.

Q That's all right.

(Continued on page 8.)

Q Did you get to the issue of no first-use, and what emphasizing conventional deterrence does to the policy of flexible response with nuclear weapons?

A Let me give you the way that I put it. We want flexible response to be truly flexible. This was not a meeting of Defense Ministers today, and those things are discussed more with Defense Ministers.

But in the 1967 flexible response doctrine, there was that conventional or direct defense part of the triad. We want to see accomplished in the balance of flexible response strategy what was designed in 1967. So we're trying to fill a mandate, and it's more important than ever today to fill that mandate because of the shift in the balance since 1967.

At NATO, when we talk about conventional improvements, we're doing it within that balance of the three triads of flexible response -- the strategic nuclear forces, the theater nuclear forces in which the INF effort helps restore, and the conventional; and it's not NATO strategy to move towards a pure conventional defense. And when we talk about improving conventional defense, it is within this basic triad, within this balanced framework. That is where the programs that Defense Ministers talk about in detail which were talked about at the Defense Ministers' Meeting two weeks ago -- sustainability, increased ammunition stocks, infrastructure is one part of it, longer-range emerging technologies that pushes the nuclear threshhold back. That is within this designed strategy.

Q Was there general agreement that within this designed strategy conventional forces should be improved?

A Yes, absolutely. And that also -- I want to emphasize -- was at the Defense Ministers' Meeting in December. That was a very strong topic of conversation. It was a very strong topic of conversation in the May meeting two weeks ago. The problem of NATO is (a) making better use of our resources to accomplish that, and (b) getting more resources to accomplish that.

This was not discussed in any great detail at this meeting because that is something for the other forum.

Q On the INF issue, did the Craxi proposal, that he set forth in Lisbon, come up at all? Was that discussed? Did any country raise a question about parliamentary difficulties in meeting the timetable as set forth in '79?

A No, because I think the Craxi proposal in Lisbon has already been corrected and is a past issue. I find, really, a remarkable degree of unity on our programs. I find also that a great appreciation for President Reagan's efforts in developing -- in fact, I might have left out one or two things that I intended to say.

There was remarkable unity. Our political strategy is correct. I think there tended to be at this meeting a longer term view of things; I'm not talking about the next month, the next two months, not speculating on every characteristic of one Soviet leader, but looking ahead more through the years. And the President's efforts at trying to develop a constructive dialogue in a very difficult period were appreciated throughout the group. There was a strong sense of realism.

Q I'm sorry, who said that?

A This was the atmosphere of the meeting.

Q In this context of long-term, were any concerns expressed by any of the Ministers that U.S. pursuit of ballistic missile defense might force them to pursue counterpart systems which would be very expensive both for their conventional forces and for their economies as a whole?

A I think the Europeans in these meetings appreciate the fact that the SDI program is a research program, and I think in the public discussions that unfortunately has been lost.

The fact that it's a research program is so important, because it means that options for the future are open. It means, second, that throughout that period we will be in close consultation with Allies; and, third, as the President has said, as we go along we hope that there can be constructive interface with the Soviets.

Q Did they it up at all in any way?

A Our briefings -- our Secretary of State and Defense -- in meetings, in the agendas that are covered, always brings this up as a matter of consultation. I'll put it that way.

Q There's been some talk here about what some people are referring to as a "Declaration of Washington" which would in some way try to give some kind of encouragement to the Soviet Union to come back to the negotiating table.

Could you elaborate any on the discussion about this, and what might be done?

A There is going to be a public statement. I'm not sure, Steve, whether it's been declared, whether it's going to be a declaration of Washington or a statement, or what's the icing on the cake?

STAFF: It's going to be a "Washington Declaration on East-West Relations," or "Washington Statement on East-West Relations."

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think maybe they didn't want to have a declaration from each meeting now.

In addition to the communique, there will be this statement that draws on the authority of the longer, more detailed study. I think the purpose of that is to set a balanced framework of our efforts which is, as I say, on the one hand, have looked to deterrence and defense; and, on the other hand, looked towards a constructive dialogue.

Once again, I think that these Ministers are impressed with the President's search for that constructive dialogue.

Q In connection with that, it sounds terribly familiar, what you just said. It goes back, in fact, to Harmel. What's the purpose of making a declaration in Washington to reaffirm the old truths of seventeen years ago?

A I don't want to sound as mundane as you put it. But I think it's terribly important that at a time when public perceptions of the Alliance's posture are sometimes not accurate.

Q What do you mean by that?

A That there has been this re-examination of a 17-year period -- experience of a 17-year period -- and you say, well, at the end of this we come to conclusions that basically we've got a sound political strategy. What we need to do is to work very hard to effectively apply it.

We've reaffirmed some fundamentals.

Yes, you're right. We've reaffirmed some fundamentals. But I would rather be on sound ground with fundamentals than on unsound ground with new ideas that might not be as productive. Because I think, despite the difficulties that we have now in working this constructive relationship with the Soviet Union, there is the belief that if we keep the cohesion and unity, that that in itself is going to have an effect over time with the Soviet Union.

We are turning to various tables in one form or another.

Q The Harmel Report was published. Why is your 39-page report not being published? Is it because the members don't actually agree on what's in it?

A The Harmel Report that was published is two or three pages. It would be about the length of the public declaration, would it not, Steve?

The Harmel Report did have an extensive background part. That background part was never published. Am I accurate in my recollection?

I think the value of the two-tiered approach of a classified version is that it enables people to work at a document without worrying about the public relations of every word and worrying about the substance. When you get 16 nations participating in a document, it doesn't read like

William Shakespeare. It becomes a committee product. But to use a word I learned in the State Department twelve years ago, it's not "anodyne." It's still a rich study with deep analysis, but by keeping that analysis and not having to release it, I think, enable people to get into more sensitive ground in their discussions. Because, after all, we're talking --

Q Were there any misgivings among the Allies on your suggestion of a return to the primacy of defense over dialogue?

A It's not really primacy of defense over dialogue. Both are there. It's not one over the other. But in Harmel, defense and dialogue are stated first with the emphasis that defense and dialogue can contribute to the development of the constructive relationship.

If you don't have effective defense and deterrence, and political cohesion, then it is very difficult to develop that kind of constructive relationship, because the Soviet Union pays a great deal of attention to the other elements -- the political cohesion, and the state of defense and deterrence.

Q It calls for no new departures on the part of NATO, this declaration that we will get? No new overtures?

A   It calls for an increased emphasis on the program that we have before us, which I've just stated, with its two approaches. That's a good political strategy.

Q   Is this statement geared primarily for the Kremlin or for the Western audiences of these NATO alliances?

A   Such a statement has to address our publics and has to address the Kremlin; and this makes very clear to the Kremlin -- it reaffirms that we seek a constructive relationship.

Q   Thank you very much.

(Background briefing concluded at 6:15 p.m.)

ACTION PA-02

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DEPARTMENT FOR PA, PA/PRESS, ALSO PASS NSC FOR
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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.), ES
SUBJECT: SECRETARY SHULTZ ON BOARD ON-THE-RECORD
PRESS BRIEFING TO EL SALVADOR
MAY 31, 1984, AS DELIVERED

1. THIS IS AN ON-THE-RECORD SESSION WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND EL SALVADOR.

2. Q: WHAT ARE YOU HOPING TO SET INTO MOTION BY YOUR TRIP--WHO ARE YOU GOING TO BE TALKING TO AND WHY?

3. SHULTZ: WELL, WE ARE HERE TO REINFORCE CERTAIN AREAS THAT WE BELIEVE IN: DEMOCRACY, THE RULE OF LAW, WIDELY SHARED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THE NECESSITY TO CREATE A SECURE ENVIRONMENT FOR THOSE THINGS TO TAKE PLACE, AND THE IMPORTANCE OF RECONCILIATION IN THE WHOLE AREA FOR THAT MATTER, TO OBTAIN THOSE CONDITIONS--THOSE ARE ALL THINGS THAT WE HAVE SUPPORTED. HERE IS A PERSON WHO HAS BEEN ELECTED. WE ARE COMING TO THE INAUGURATION WITH A STRONG DELEGATION FROM THE UNITED STATES, FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR, FROM THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, THE CONGRESSIONAL BRANCH IS DESIGNED TO SAY THAT. IN TERMS OF WHAT IS SAID TO THE GOVERNMENT OF EL SALVADOR, AND PEOPLE OF EL SALVADOR AND ALSO TO THE OTHER COUNTRIES THAT WILL COME HERE IS AN IMPLICIT MESSAGE. IN TERMS OF THE FLOW OF EVENTS FOR THE DELEGATION THE FIRST THING IS A RECEPTION GIVEN BY PRESIDENT MAGANA FOR ALL THE PEOPLE WHO ARE OFFICIAL DELEGATES TO THE INAUGURATION, AND THAT TAKES PLACE THIS EVENING. THEN THE AMBASSADOR--OUR AMBASSADOR--IS OFFERING DINNER TO THE DELEGATION AND WE EXPECT TO HAVE THERE THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF COSTA RICA, EL SALVADOR, HONDURAS, GUATEMALA, VENEZUELA, COLOMBIA, PANAMA. AS FAR AS WE KNOW THAT IS THE GROUP--I DON T KNOW. THE LAST I HEARD THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF MEXICO WAS NOT GOING TO BE IN ATTENDANCE, BUT THERE IS SOME UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THAT. AT ANY RATE HE WOULD BE WELCOME. THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF NICARAGUA IS NOT ATTENDING THE INAUGURATION. SO IN OTHER WORDS THE CONTADORA FOREIGN MINISTERS THAT ARE PRESENT--THAT WILL BE DINNER. THE AMBASSADOR IS OFFERING BREAKFAST FOR THE DELEGATION IN HONOR OF PRESIDENT MAGANA, WHO WE THINK HAS DONE A VERY COURAGEOUS AND GOOD JOB HERE IN MANAGING ON A DIFFICULT PERIOD. SO WE WILL PAY OUR RESPECTS TO HIM AND THEN GO TO THE INAUGURATION ITSELF, AND THEN FOLLOWING THE INAUGURATION IN THE AFTERNOON, I AM NOT CERTAIN OF THE TIME -- I THINK IT IS AROUND 2:30, BUT DON T HOLD ME TO THAT--WE ARE GOING TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT DUARTE AFTER HE HAS BEEN INAUGURATED, AND AS I UNDERSTAND IT HE WILL BE SWEARING IN HIS CABINET AND SO ON BEFORE HE RECEIVES ANY DELEGATIONS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES. THAT S OUR PROGRAM.

4. Q: ONE FOLLOW UP. DO YOU FIND ANY IRONY IN THE FACT THAT THE DELEGATION INCLUDES SENATOR HELMS WHO SUGGESTED AND CHARGED AT ONE POINT THAT THE CIA HAD BECOME INVOLVED IN THE ELECTIONS ON THE SIDE OF PRESIDENT DUARTE?

5. SHULTZ: WELL, SENATOR HELMS REASON FOR WANTING TO BE--OR BEING WILLING TO BE ON THE DELEGATION IN HIS VIEW--I JUST FINISHED DISCUSSING OR GOING OVER OUR PLAN WITH ALL THE DELEGATION--BUT SENATOR HELMS VIEW IS THAT THE IMPORTANT THING IS EL SALVADOR AND THE GOOD OF THE COUNTRY AND THAT ALL PARTIES SHOULD BE WORKING FOR THE GOOD OF THE COUNTRY, AND THAT DOESN T MEAN IF THAT YOU ARE OPPOSED TO SOMETHING YOU SHOULDN T SAY SO, BUT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF TRYING TO HELP THE COUNTRY SUCCEED, AND THAT IS HIS VIEW AND WE THOUGHT AND WE ARE VERY GLAD THAT HE IS ABLE TO JOIN THE DELEGATION AND IT WILL BE VERY HELPFUL TO HAVE HIM ALONG WITH US IN MAKING THOSE STATEMENTS, BUT YOU CAN TALK TO HIM YOURSELF.

6. I THINK IT IS A FINE THING FOR HIM TO DO AND IT SHOULD BE QUITE HELPFUL.

7. Q: CAN YOU, MISTER SECRETARY, GIVE US YOUR EVALUATION OF WHAT PRESIDENT-ELECT DUARTE S PROSPECTS ARE, PARTICULARLY IN THE SHORT TERM, IN TERMS OF MAKING PROGRESS ON THE NUMBER OF ISSUES THAT ARE OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE--HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE REST?

8. SHULTZ: WELL, PRESIDENTE DUARTE IS CERTAINLY VERY FAMILIAR WITH ALL OF THE PROBLEMS AND HAS THOUGHT ABOUT THEM A GREAT DEAL. HE WILL HAVE A CABINET FORMED AND IN BEING SHORTLY AFTER HE IS INAUGURATED, AND I WOULD EXPECT WILL GO RIGHT TO WORK ON THE PROBLEM SO I THINK WHEN YOU HAVE A PERSON WHO IS FRESH IN THE JOB WHO KNOWS THE PROBLEMS PRETTY WELL THAT THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE OF GETTING A GOOD STRONG START ON THEM AND CERTAINLY WE SUPPORT HIM. I THINK HE WENT AROUND TO THE COUNTRIES IN HIS NEIGHBORHOOD RIGHT AWAY. AFTER HE WAS ELECTED, AS YOU KNOW, HE CAME TO THE UNITED STATES, AND HAS MADE A VERY STRONG IMPRESSION EVERYWHERE, AND I THINK HE STARTS IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF VERY BROAD SUPPORT TO HELP HIM GET DONE THE THINGS THAT HE WANTS TO GET DONE. SO HE S GOT EVERYTHING GOING FOR HIM. BUT WE ALL KNOW THAT THERE ARE A GREAT MANY PROBLEMS NOT THE LEAST OF WHICH IS ACROSS THE BORDER IN NICARAGUA.

9. Q: WHAT IS YOUR EVALUATION OF PRESIDENT DUARTE S MOVES TO SPLIT UP THE ARMY AND THE SECURITY FORCES?

10. SHULTZ: I DON T WANT TO MAKE COMMENTS ON PARTICULAR THINGS THAT MAY HAPPEN. I THINK FROM ALL THAT I HAVE

BEEN ABLE TO READ AND UNDERSTAND FROM TALKING WITH HIM WHEN HE WAS IN WASHINGTON. HE IS CERTAINLY FULLY COGNIZANT OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SECURITY DIMENSION OF THE ARMY'S WORK, AND I THINK HE WILL BE ABLE TO WORK EFFECTIVELY WITH THE ARMY, AND THEY WITH HIM. AS TO PARTICULAR THINGS IN DEALING WITH IT, I THINK THAT'S UP TO HIM TO DO, AND TOO MUCH NOISE FROM THE SIDELINES FROM THE UNITED STATES WE SHOULD AVOID.

11. Q. ARE YOU CARRYING ANY MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO MR. DUARTE?

12. SHULTZ: YES, I MET WITH THE PRESIDENT THIS MORNING AFTER HE SPOKE TO THE NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS AND BEFORE I WENT OVER TO THE MINISTERS MEETING, AND CERTAINLY THE PRESIDENT ON THE OCCASION OF THIS INAUGURATION WISHES HIM WELL, AND I AM TOLD BY THE PRESIDENT TO EXTEND HIS EVERY WISH AND HIS SUPPORT, SO I WILL DO THAT WHEN I MEET WITH PRESIDENT DUARTE.

13. Q: WHAT IS YOUR READING OF THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON EDEN PASTORA. DO YOU HAVE ANY SENSE OF WHO WOULD HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE, OR WHAT WAS THE OBJECTIVE?

14. SHULTZ: WELL, IT'S EASY ENOUGH TO SPECULATE ABOUT THE DESIRE OF THOSE WHO OPPOSE HIM OR TO GET RID OF HIM, BUT AS FAR AS HAVING AT HAND THE RESULTS OF SOME INVESTIGATION, I DON'T HAVE THAT AT HAND.

15. Q. THEN YOU DON'T KNOW WHETHER IT WAS SOME OF THE OTHER CONTRAS OR WHETHER IT WAS THE NICARAGUANS?

16. SHULTZ: NO, I DON'T THINK IT WAS ANY OF THE OTHER CONTRAS, AND I HEARD SOMEBODY SAY THAT IT WAS THE CIA, AND THAT IS ABSOLUTE NONSENSE. ABSOLUTE NONSENSE.

17. Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY SENSE OF WHAT IT IS GOING TO MEAN IN TERMS OF THE CONTRA OPERATION?

18. SHULTZ: WELL, THE CONTRA OPERATION IS -- I GUESS IT IS SOMETHING I DON'T THINK I WILL DISCUSS.

19. Q. DO YOU GET THE IMPRESSION THAT MEXICO IN THE WAKE OF THE ELECTION IN EL SALVADOR IS REEVALUATING ITS POSITION AND MAY NOT BE AS SYMPATHETIC TOWARD THE REBELS AS THEY ONCE WERE AND MAY PERHAPS BE MORE SYMPATHETIC TOWARD THE GOVERNMENT, AND TOWARD U.S. POLICY?

20. SHULTZ: WELL, I DON'T WANT TO SPEAK SORT OF ON BEHALF OF OR ABOUT MEXICO. I THINK IT IS UP TO THEM TO SPEAK OF THEIR ATTITUDES, OR ANY SHIFTS OR NUANCES OR WHATNOT. I WOULD SAY THAT WHEN PRESIDENT DE LA MADRID AND SECRETARY SEPULVEDA AND OTHERS WERE IN WASHINGTON WE HAD A LOT OF TIME TOGETHER, AND I HAD A LOT OF TIME WITH THEM IN JUST A LITTLE GROUP. AND I THINK THAT OUR VIEWS OF THE SITUATION, WHILE NOT IDENTICAL BY ANY MEANS, ARE IF YOU SAID THE SUM TOTAL OF VIEWS EQUALS 100 PERCENT, AND YOU PICKED A NUMBER THAT REPRESENTED THE EXTENT TO WHICH WE HAD A COMMON VIEW IT WOULD BE A VERY HIGH NUMBER. SO THE DIFFERENCES ARE PERHAPS NOT SO GREAT AS PORTRAYED.

21. Q: DO I GATHER THEN THAT YOU BELIEVE THAT THE SANDINISTAS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BOMBING OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE LAST NIGHT?

22. SHULTZ: I WOULDN'T WANT TO MAKE THAT STATEMENT ON AN ON-THE-RECORD BASIS, NO.

23. Q: MR. SECRETARY, WHEN MR. DUARTE WAS IN WASHINGTON A COUPLE OF WEEKS AGO HE SPOKE OUT VERY FORCEFULLY ABOUT HIS DESIRE TO ACT AGAINST CORRUPTION IN THE ARMED FORCES AND ABUSES IN THE ARMED FORCES. NOW IF I RECALL CORRECTLY LAST DECEMBER VICE PRESIDENT BUSH WENT TO EL SALVADOR WITH EXPRESSING AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THOSE OBJECTIVES, AND HE HAD A LIST AT THE TIME OF WHAT WAS REPORTED OF ABOUT TWO DOZEN OFFICERS. NOW WE HAVE ALL BEEN WATCHING THESE TRANSFERS, AND AT THIS POINT ONLY ABOUT SIX OR SEVEN OFFICERS HAVE BEEN MOVED. ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH THE CHANGES THAT HAVE OCCURRED IN THE ARMED FORCES SO FAR, AND WHAT DO YOU PLAN TO DO TO HELP PRESIDENT DUARTE IN WHAT HE HAS ALREADY SAID HE WANTS TO DO?

24. SHULTZ: WELL, PRESIDENT DUARTE HAS TOLD US AND SAID PUBLICLY WHAT HE BELIEVES AND WHAT HE WANTS TO ACHIEVE, AND THE OBJECTIVES THAT HE SETS OUT ARE OBJECTIVES THAT WE SHARE AND APPLAUD. HE HAS ALSO SAID, "WHY DON'T YOU PEOPLE GIVE ME A LITTLE CREDIT FOR KNOWING SOMETHING AND STOP TELLING ME HOW TO DO EVERYTHING." AND SO MY ATTITUDE IS THAT HE HAS BEEN ELECTED AND HE IS A PERSON OF KNOWLEDGE AND HAS OBJECTIVES THAT I THINK ARE LAUDABLE, WE SUPPORT THEM, AND LET'S SEE HOW HE WANTS TO DO THINGS AND TRY TO HELP HIM INSTEAD OF TELLING HIM ALL THE TIME.

25. Q: THEN YOUR VIEW, SIR, IS THAT

26. SHULTZ: I DON'T WANT TO EXPRESS AN OPINION ABOUT THIS, OR THAT OR THE OTHER IS ADEQUATE AND HAS TO DO MORE WITH THIS OR LESS WITH THAT. HE SEES HIS PROBLEM. HE HAS A VERY DELICATE PROBLEM TO SOLVE, AND HE IS TRYING TO SOLVE IT, I AM SURE OF THAT. AND I THINK THAT ON A LOT OF THESE THINGS PROBABLY HE'S GOING TO BE THE BEST JUDGE.

27. Q: I WANT TO TAKE YOU TO THE GULF WAR FOR A MINUTE. CAN YOU... IT'S SORT OF A TWO PRONG QUESTION. CAN YOU GIVE US SOME SENSE OF YOUR PERCEPTION OF THE EBB AND FLOW OF THAT AT THE MOMENT AND THEN KIND OF LAY OUT HOW THE CURRENT AMERICAN POSTURE LOOKS TO BE EVOLVING. I MEAN WE HAVE SOLD STINGERS TO THE SAUDIS, WE ARE TALKING NOW ABOUT GIVING THEM A NEW SET OF AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES, WE ARE TALKING ABOUT ARMS TO THE KUWAITIS. WHAT IS THE EVOLVING PATTERN THAT YOU SEE IN RELATION TO WHAT'S HAPPENING?

28. SHULTZ: WELL, FIRST, OF COURSE THERE IS THE WAR THAT IS ON THE GROUND BETWEEN IRAN AND THE IRAQ AND IT'S A VERY LARGE WAR. THERE SEEM TO BE ON THE ORDER OF A MILLION PEOPLE ARRAYED AGAINST EACH OTHER, TREMENDOUS CASUALTIES. FOR WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE IT END. AND SO WOULD MOST OTHER OBSERVERS. BUT IT DOESN'T SEEM TO END, AND IT'S VERY RESISTANT TO MEDIATION EFFORTS BY PEOPLE AND COUNTRIES WHO ARE WELL ACCEPTED. SO THERE IT IS. NOW NEVERTHELESS, WE AND OTHERS ARE ENGAGED IN A WIDE RANGING DIPLOMATIC EFFORT NOT ONLY ON THE WAR ITSELF, BUT IN AN EFFORT TO CONTAIN ITS

EFFECTS SO THAT IT DOESN'T SPREAD TO THE GULF AND AFFECT THE RESOURCES OUT OF THE GULF AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE GULF REGION. WE HAVE MADE STATEMENTS -- THE PRESIDENT HAS, AND IF YOU GO BACK, FOR EXAMPLE, PRESIDENT CARTER MADE STATEMENTS IN HIS STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGE IN 1980, AND YOU CAN FIND STATEMENTS BEFORE THAT OR STATEMENTS BY WARREN CHRISTOPHER, LET ALONE SOME RECENT ONES. IN OTHER WORDS, IT'S KIND OF A BIPARTISAN VIEW HERE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS THROUGH THE STRAIT NEED TO BE KEPT OPEN, AND SO WE HAVE EXPRESSED OURSELVES ON THAT, AND WE HAVE A CERTAIN NAVAL PRESENCE THAT CAN BE HELPFUL THERE. AND OF COURSE THE STATES OF THE REGION ARE THE ONES MOST IMMEDIATELY AFFECTED AND INVOLVED, AND SO FAR AS WE CAN SEE THEY FEEL THAT THE MATTERS ARE OF SUCH A NATURE THAT THEY CAN HANDLE THEM, PARTICULARLY IF THEY GET SOME SUPPORT SUCH AS THE SUPPORT THAT SAUDIA ARABIA ASKED FOR AND WHICH WE WENT AHEAD WITH. SO OUR APPROACH IS TO BE INVOLVED IN THE DIPLOMATIC EFFORT WITH INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES AND IN THE UN TO BE HELPFUL TO OUR FRIENDS IN THE REGION. OUR POLICY AS FAR AS THE WAR ITSELF IS CONCERNED IS ONE OF NEUTRALITY, BUT THERE ARE ASPECTS OF IT THAT WE ARE NOT NEUTRAL ABOUT--WE ARE NOT NEUTRAL ABOUT THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, WE ARE NOT NEUTRAL ABOUT INTERRUPTING THE FLOW OF COMMERCE IN THE GULF. NOW I THINK IT IS TO BE NOTED THAT THE FLOW OF OIL FROM THE NON-BELLIGERENT STATES IN THE GULF IS GOING ON ABOUT AS IT HAS GONE ON--THAT IS THE LIFTINGS HAVEN'T CHANGED THAT MUCH--THE LIFTINGS FROM IRAN ARE DOWN SOME, BUT THEY HAVEN'T CEASED BY A LONG SHOT. SO IT'S AN UNEASY SITUATION, BUT IT'S A SITUATION THAT SO FAR HAS BEEN MANAGED.

29. Q: DO YOU SEE THE U.S. INEVITABLY BEING DRAWN CLOSER AND CLOSER TO A PARTICIPATORY ROLE, I MEAN, THAT IS, DO YOU REALLY THINK THE GULF STATES EVEN WITH THE ADDITIONAL WEAPONS THAT WE SUPPLY THEM ARE PREPARED TO TAKE ON THE DEFENSE THEMSELVES, OR WILL WE ULTIMATELY HAVE TO DO SO.

30. SHULTZ: WELL, THEY FEEL THEY ARE PREPARED AND WE CERTAINLY HAVE NO DESIRE WHATEVER TO BE DRAWN INTO A CONFLICT THERE. BUT WE DO HAVE SOME CONCERNS AND SOME INTERESTS. SO WE HAVE STATED OUR VIEW ABOUT THOSE INTERESTS AND WE WILL SUPPORT THAT VIEW.

31. Q: MR. SECRETARY, CAN YOU SAY FOR THE RECORD WHO YOU THINK IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BOMBING OF THE ARDE PRESS CONFERENCE THIS MORNING?

32. SHULTZ: WELL, I DON'T KNOW, AND THEREFORE I CAN'T SAY, AND I THINK I AM JUST RESTATING WHAT I HAVE ALREADY SAID.

33. Q: HOW IMPORTANT IS IT TO U.S. GOALS IN THE REGION THAT THE ARDE, THE FDN AND THE MISURA AND THE OTHER GROUPS ACHIEVE UNITY OR TRY TO GET THEMSELVES TOGETHER ON A JOINT PROGRAM?

34. SHULTZ: WELL, THESE ARE ALL PEOPLE WHO ARE REACTING TO THE WAY THE SANDINISTA REGIME IS BEHAVING AS A PEOPLE IN THEIR COUNTRY WHO THINK THAT WHAT'S HAPPENING IS DEEPLY WRONG AND THAT THE REVOLUTION HAS BEEN STOLEN, AND I THINK IT'S QUITE EASY TO IDENTIFY THE MARKERS ON THAT. NOW WHETHER OR HOW COHESIVE THEY CAN BE AS A GROUP IS A QUESTION MARK, BUT PROBABLY THE MORE COHESIVE THEY ARE THE BETTER OFF THEY ARE GOING TO BE, BUT THAT IS ESSENTIALLY THEIR PROBLEM TO WORK AT.

35. Q: ....TO US THAT THEY GET TOGETHER?

36. SHULTZ: WELL, THEY ARE REPRESENTING THEMSELVES AND THEIR VIEW AND I DON'T WANT TO START PREACHING TO THEM, PARTICULARLY THROUGH PRESS CONFERENCES.

37. THANK YOU. SHULTZ

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
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PRESS BRIEFING
BY
SECRETARY OF TREASURY DONALD REGAN
ON THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH
PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE OF JAPAN

The Cornwall Room
The Connaught Rooms
London, England

1:55 P.M. (L)

MR. SPEAKES: Can we please have quiet in the back, those who are standing. The President, as you know, has just finished his meeting with Prime Minister Nakasone. We have with us Secretary Regan who will brief you on that meeting. We're going to have to ask for quiet or we'll have to clear the room for those who are standing.

Secretary Regan will brief on that meeting. I will follow him with a couple of other announcements and details of anything you might have for the day.

Q Could you cut off the television set, please?

Q Thank you.

MR. SPEAKES: No sooner said than done. Anything else? Okay. Secretary Regan -- it is on the record, it is for radio and television coverage.

SECRETARY REGAN: Well, as you know the President and the Prime Minister of Japan met this morning. The meeting lasted about 45 minutes. After the normal greetings, the first thing that the Prime Minister brought up was the report on the Yen-Dollar that Finance Minister Takeshita and I have recently submitted to the heads of government.

He was quite complimentary about it. And said that the Americans were tough negotiators. The President said that he had seen the report, thought it was an historic document, felt that, although it might not be in the immediate future, that its impact would be felt -- that within 2 to 3 years there indeed would be a new type of financial market in Tokyo.

The next subject the President brought up was the possibility that if there were an oil crisis that there should be more cooperation and more discussion among the nations as to how to handle such a shortage of oil. There was no discussion of actual terms of what one nation would do or another. They discussed in generally broad terms and agreed that some type of sharing, some type of contingency planning were the areas that should be carried forward at this time.

The Prime Minister then brought up the fact that he was looking forward to, what he characterized, as a bright summit. And he hoped that they would also have much discussion on peace and freedom. The President agreed that those were topics that needed discussions and they would get into that matter.

Then came the subject of trade negotiations. The Prime Minister stated that he intended to put forward a proposition that there be preparation for a new round of trade negotiations in 1985 and the actual negotiations in 1986. The President said that he would strongly back the Prime Minister in that endeavor -- that he, too, thought that after a year or so of perparation there would be an opportune time for the actual discussions themselves, and that in the meantime, some of the last remaining things of the Tokyo round should be accomplished.

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The next subject that came up was cooperating among the summit countries for assisting the debtor countries in their problems. In this connection, the President pointed out the need for these countries to consider equity as well as debt as a solution to their economic growth. Far too many of them were relying on debt. This had got them into problems, that if they were to open up their economies, open up their tax systems and the like to attract more capital, they would be in a better position. And Mr. Nakasone agreed with that.

Mr. Nakasone said that he thought that high-tech, services, and agriculture were subjects that needed to be discussed in the next roung of trade negotiations. So, Nakasone then brought up the subject of the Los Angeles Olympics and said he thought that this would be a very successful Olympics -- that so many countries were coming. The President said that he regretted that there were so many -- a few nations that were not going to participate under Soviet influence, but nevertheless agreed that he thought the games would be very competitive, very well attended.

They then discussed their China trips, each saying that he thought that his own trip had been very successful, and that the other appeared also to be. They discussed some aspects of the Chinese economy and what it was doing and that the Prime Minister brought up the subject of the Korean Peninsula and how that should be settled. He said that he had told the Chinese that he thought it was best that it be settled between the two nations involved. And that the Chinese as well as the United States should be on the sidelines encouraging the two nations.

The President agreed with that. He said that's exactly what he had told them also -- that he didn't think that we certainly should be there to make it a trilateral. That if anything it would have to be quadrilateral, but he would prefer a bilateral type of arrangement.

About that point they'd run out of time and they agreed to see each other for dinner tonight.

Q Dr. Feldstein says that in the short run he thinks interest rates will go up. In the next year the U.S. will have a growth recession. Do you agree with both those points?

SECRETARY REGAN: Well, that's what makes a market -- differences of opinion and I differ with that, yes.

Q Well, what do you see in interest rates?

SECRETARY REGAN: Well, I will stick to what I have been saying, that I see interest rates trending down based upon the idea that our rate of growth will probably slow in this second quarter and continue at a slower pace in the third and fourth quarters of this year, and if that is so, there's less demand. With less demand actually price falls and the price of money is the same as anything else -- interest rates should come down.

Q Well, if the rate of growth slows will that induce a so-called growth recession next year?

SECRETARY REGAN: No, I don't believe so. The normal recovery period without -- if you eliminate the wartime periods and the post World War II -- has been 36 months for recovery and I really think that this recovery is going to be stronger and more prolonged than normal. It started in November of '82, even just an average recovery would take us well into the end of '85 and the early part of '86. Yes?

Q How further did they get on this question on sharing contingency planning for an oil gulf prices?

SECRETARY REGAN: They agreed on just broad outlines of that, leaving it more for specifics that will come later in

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discussions among the seven, or more particular for experts to get into it. It was a broad discussion I'd characterize.

Q Did Nakasone agree to that?

SECRETARY REGAN: Yes.

Q And did the President discuss U.S. military involvement in the Persian Gulf?

SECRETARY REGAN: No. There was no discussion of military involvement nor any of the Gulf incidents or anything of that nature was -- they stuck strictly to the subject of the negotiations. Helen?

Q Was the President chiding Nakasone about his reluctance to make any kind of negotiations on the oil?

SECRETARY REGAN: Oh, no. Absolutely not. It was an affable discussion back and forth.

Q Did the President bring a contingency plan on the oil question?

SECRETARY REGAN: No. They did not get into specifics. The President did not bring up any specific plan. They talked about, in general, the need for contingency planning for cooperation and the possibility of sharing. Andrea?

Q Mr. Secretary, did the President ask Nakasone not to go to the spot market?

SECRETARY REGAN: Oh, no -- no. Nothing of that nature came up whatsoever. No.

Q When you say contingency plan, did they discuss a military contingency plan or did they discuss contingency plan for sharing of oil reserves?

SECRETARY REGAN: The contingency of sharing oil reserves and how to handle the situation. No discussion whatsoever of military.

Q Did the President ask the Prime Minister whether Japan is willing to make any kind of commitment such as the U.S. has made to freedom of navigation in the Gulf?

SECRETARY REGAN: No, none of those specifics came up whatsoever. Now, a question over here.

Q How does the IEA system fall short that you need some further contingencies?

SECRETARY REGAN: Nothing like that came up for discussion. Again, I repeat, it was broad, it lasted for about 5-7 minutes. It was in generality, no specifics.

Q I'm simply asking why the question was raised since you have an IEA system?

SECRETARY REGAN: Well, there are other ways besides the IEA solution that could be thought of

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and all they were saying was there was need to think in terms of all types of contingencies.

Yes?

Q Did the President give the Prime Minister any kind of pledge of helping them with their oil supplies if there was an interruption?

SECRETARY REGAN: No. They talked --

Q Question?

SECRETARY REGAN: The question was: Did the President give any kind of a promise to share and the like? I said the answer was no, they did not get into that type of specifics.

Q Mr. Secretary --

SECRETARY REGAN: Yes.

Q The Latin American Finance Ministers say they'll get together later this month in Colombia. They're reporting that in Buenos Aires. What do you think of that kind of meeting? Is that a good idea? And, secondly, how are the Argentines doing in their negotiations with IMF?

Q Question?

SECRETARY REGAN: As far as a meeting of the Latin American nations, that's their choice; if they wish to get together for a discussion, it's up to them. We have no comment on that. And as far as the Argentine is concerned, it's my understanding that they have made a proposal to the IMF. The IMF now has that under consideration. The Argentines hope that that will lead to the actual signing of a letter of intent prior to June 15th.

Q Since the President mentioned to Mr. Nakasone the need for contingency planning, did he bring any such plan with him?

SECRETARY REGAN: As far as any contingency plans, no, we did not bring contingency plans with us. This is an idea of a general discussion taking place here. That would be one among many subjects discussed, so to get into detail as far as heads of government is concerned is not something that they would contemplate at this moment.

Q Mr. Secretary --

SECRETARY REGAN: Yes.

Q -- second question: Did the President and the Prime Minister discuss any further or liberalized aid to Third World countries apart from this question of equity that you mentioned before?

SECRETARY REGAN: No, they did not again get into specifics but agreed that this is one of the topics that should be aired at the plenary sessions in the summit. And they were also sure that other discussions would take place, either with the Finance Ministers or the like.

Q -- further or liberalized aid?

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SECRETARY REGAN: Well, the topic being how to handle the problem of what are some of the solutions that could be offered.

Q Chancellor Kohl yesterday told the Bundestag that he felt that high U.S. interest rates and big deficits are hurting the economy. Apparently, other leaders also feel that way. As the summit begins, do you feel, does the U.S. feel under seige on the question of interest rates and the deficit?

SECRETARY REGAN: No, not under seige. We know that our interest rates are high. We deplore high interest rates as much as anyone else. After all, we're the greatest of the debtor countries. We have a trillion five hundred billion. So, it hurts us to have high rates of interest also.

We, I think, will probably point out that the exact connection between high deficits and high rates of interest has not been made, in spite of what the common belief is. And we're still waiting to see proof of that. High interest rates are a result of many things -- fiscal policy, monetary policy, condition of the country, growth in the economy, opportunity for investment. There are many things -- rate of savings -- that affect high rates of interest, not just deficits.

Q But no one agrees with you in -- who is attending the summit. (Laughter.)

SECRETARY REGAN: Pardon?

Q The other leaders do not agree with you.

SECRETARY REGAN: When you pin them down, they admit that there are other factors, but they believe -- What they are worried about, and rightly so, is the high rates of interest. They don't literally care whether it's our deficits or what it is; whatever action we can take to get them down, they would approve of.

Q Did the President agree with -- did the President agree with Prime Minister Nakasone's timetable for the new trade round?

SECRETARY REGAN: Yes, the President was very supportive of that timetable -- preparation in '85 and negotiations themselves, hopefully, in '86.

Q -- services a subject presumeably also --

SECRETARY REGAN: -- high tech, services and agriculture. Yes, we're supportive of that.

Q Can you explain why you didn't bring a contingency plan for the sharing of our strategic oil?

SECRETARY REGAN: Yes, because that would be too much detail for the summit to get at -- to get on. There are many other economic questions besides that one. And we didn't bring contingency plans for high interest rates. We didn't bring contingency plans for many things. It's not in a summit, with the

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limited amount of time available, that these leaders can get into that detail. They leave that to finance ministers, to trade ministers, to oil ministers, and the like.

Q So that's where those negotiations are going on right now.

SECRETARY REGAN: Yes.

Q What actions are you going to take to bring down interest rates?

SECRETARY REGAN: Only just what we have been saying right along. We will be telling about our downpayment on deficit reduction -- pardon?

Q You just said deficits and interest rates aren't related.

SECRETARY REGAN: I just started to tick them off. You took a couple of words out of my mouth. The first one is the downpayment, since they're so interested in our deficit, and stressing that word downpayment -- I explained that downpayment has different meanings to different people, but it certainly means there's a lot more to come -- secondly, that we will be working on holding a steady monetary policy; third, that we will be -- that we feel that our rate of growth will be slowing down -- and this will be a welcome sign -- and, fourth, we're pledging, as we did at Williamsburg, that we're going to keep inflation down.

Q If I could follow, Paul Volcker stated about a month ago that the economy is in the midst of its strongest expansion since World War II and --

SECRETARY REGAN: You'd never know it from some of the press reports, but go ahead.

Q He left ambiguous to the extent to which the economy really is slowing down. And it's suggested that perhaps growth remains very, very strong. If that is the case, doesn't this suggest that your projection of lower interest rates may not come about and, in fact, interest rates may continue to climb?

SECRETARY REGAN: I saw a very well-known economist the other day predicted that the current quarter we're in is zero growth. There are many projections as to what the growth of our economy is currently.

Q Don't you think Volcker, given his position, is able to influence that outcome and is a better forecaster?

SECRETARY REGAN: No comment.

Q In your discussion on the Gulf, did Prime Minister Nakasone have anything interesting to say about the status of Japanese relations with Iran and whether there was any movement on that score of the negotiations --

SECRETARY REGAN: They did not get into that, no.

Q How urgently do you view the whole idea of working up a contingency plan on oil and on the whole idea of strengthening the international conservation?

SECRETARY REGAN: Obviously, these are two matters of concern to us. Secretary Hodel has been working on such a thing, along with NSC and others, including Treasury. We have been working on all kinds of plans for contingencies. Conservation -- the world is using 14 percent less oil today than it was in 1979. Every nation, every corporation within a nation, individuals within a nation, understand the need for conservation.

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I think all of us are much more conscious today than ever.

Q You say that the issue of a contingency plan will be taken up at some point down the road by ministers -- finance ministers, energy and so forth. How soon do you think this must be addressed in light of what's going on in the Gulf?

SECRETARY REGAN: Obviously, as was pointed out from a question over here, it already is in discussion at the IEA to which we all belong. And there'll be further bilateral and other multilateral discussions as time goes on.

Q No overwhelming sense of urgency?

SECRETARY REGAN: No. Yes?

Q Mr. Secretary, the Latin American nations --

MR. SPEAKES: Last question here.

Q The Latin American nations have sent a letter apparently to Prime Minister Thatcher and the President suggesting that the case-by-case approach of the debt problem really isn't sufficient. How do you respond to that and does that in any way affect U.S. reasoning?

SECRETARY REGAN: I'll have to respond to this from a strictly USA point of view because the subject as yet has not been introduced into any of the plenary sessions of the Summit. As far as our response is -- each nation does differ from the other. Bolivia's problem differs from its neighbor, the Argentine. Venezuela's problem is certainly different from that of Colombia. So you can't have one solution to all of these problems. The Philippines' problem differs from that of Yugoslavia, yet they both have problems with high debt. So how can you have one solution for all of these?

We have been handling them on a nation-by-nation basis and rather successfully, I think, since 1982. And we would propose to continue that.

Now, one other new element has been introduced, and that's this most recent attempt in Philadelphia over the past weekend to encourage banks to take another step.

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Once the program has been started, as the Mexican program did start back in '82 -- we've had two years of that program. Now there's need for a longer-range solution in the case of Mexico. So that would set a formula, if you will, that you take a short-range solution, get the problem under control, both internally in the country and externally as far as the banks are concerned, and then move to a new step or a new plateau or what have you for the future.

Q Will the administration encourage the commercial banks to do that type of thing?

SECRETARY REGAN: As far as I'm concerned, the U.S. Treasury and the federal government should step back from that. That's negotiations between debtor and creditor. However, we would encourage them to go for different types of solutions, but we would not impose those solutions. Absolutely not.

SECRETARY REGAN: Thank you.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 2:15 P.M. (L)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(London, England)

For Immediate Release June 9, 1984

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
SECRETARY OF TREASURY, DONALD REGAN
ON
THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT

①

Cornwall Room
The Connaught Rooms
London, England

5:30 P.M. (L)

SECRETARY REGAN: As you know, we've just completed the summit. There were three declarations, the central one of which, of course, was the economic declaration. There were others on international terrorism, on East-West relations and arms control, and the statement on Iraq and Iran.

Now, as far as the economic side, I think we got most of what we wanted. I think the main emphasis was probably on the fact that the economic expansion is underway in all of our countries; and, indeed, for the most part, in all industrialized countries. We agreed to try to continue that expansion, particularly in a non-inflationary way.

Our greatest area of concern, apart from the economies themselves, were the international debt and the condition of many of the developing, and less developed nations. And much of the communique is devoted to things we have agreed to do to help in both of those cases, both the debt situation, and additional funds and help for the less developed nations.

We agreed that the case-by-case method, or country-by-country method, is the proper one to follow. We noted the good work of the IMF in this area up to this point.

We agreed that ways to help these other nations, both debtor nations and other less developed nations, so characterized, are with more trade. And in that area, we stated that we thought that in addition to debt, more equity investment was needed in many of these nations as a way to encourage new jobs. There's quite a bit in this here about methods to cut down on unemployment and to get more jobs for people in our nations, particularly the European nations.

We agreed on the necessity for open borders, as far as trade is concerned, and to work against protectionism.

We also stated that all of the international financial institutions should have, where appropriate, greater funding; and that countries were encouraged to be more generous in giving to both multilateral and bilateral aid.

As far as the other things we covered, we did agree that we thought, in some of these international debt situations, the proper way to go is to have multiyear re-negotiation, where there was effort, successful effort, being made by these countries to correct what was wrong in their economies.

We have a paragraph here on the environment and the necessity of studying carefully what we're going to do there before we actually do it, because, indeed, scientists are still divided on the effects of many of these things.

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There's a statement here regarding oil and the necessity for sharing in the oil markets.

And then finally, an invitation by the United States to the rest of the countries to join them in manned space.

On a one-liner, just to characterize the sessions -- I'd say there was spirited discussion, but we ended up in final agreement.

Q Mr. Secretar

SECRETARY REGAN: s?

Q You said you got most of what you wanted. What did you fail to get?

SECRETARY REGAN: Well, I suppose this is "true confessions"? (Laughter.) One of the things that we did want -- we wanted a date for trade negotiations. We had hoped that discussions would take place in 1985 leading to the start of a round of negotiations in '86. Most of the countries did not want a specified date for fear that they'd run up against a date and wouldn't have the ability to think through what actually they wanted to talk about when they got into negotiations. So, I think the phrase in here is -- as quickly as possible -- rather than putting 1985.

Q Anything else that --

SECRETARY REGAN: Well, yes, there's a reference in here that some countries want to reopen the common commodity fund. We are dubious about that. We've not ratified that agreement; and we don't

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think that our trying to activate that fund at this time -- we think it's more of a price-fixing mechanism. We didn't think that that would be productive, but nonetheless the statement is in there.

Q Mr. Secretary --

SECRETARY REGAN: Over there.

Q -- there's another part that Mrs. Thatcher dropped out in her speech on governments renegotiating debts with poor countries. Does that mean that you are not committing yourselves to that?

SECRETARY REGAN: Oh, no, no. She, in the interest of time, was trying just to hit a few highlights in this. I suspect that in her press conference she'll go over this more carefully. No, she wasn't trying to duck out.

Q Is this the official version or is what she said the official version?

SECRETARY REGAN: This is the official version. This is what the heads actually have signed.

Q Mr. Secretary, when you say that -- agree that greater funding for international organizations -- does that mean you're talking quota increase for IMF or SDR allocation? If so, how much?

SECRETARY REGAN: That is not specific as to what we are talking about. In the discussion period, there were, as you know, references to the fact that IDA VII has already been negotiated at $9 billion. It has been suggested by many countries they would like to donate over and above that. That was one of the things that many said, well, if other nations want to devote more to IDA, that was up to them to give over and above that. We in the United States pointed out that we've increased our bilateral aid -- our Caribbean Basin Initiative, what we're trying to do in Central America, the African fund that we have set up -- that we're doing a lot more on a bilateral effort. And, indeed, most of them around there said that any nation that could afford to increase its bilateral aid should.

Let's take one over here.

Q What was the spirited part? Was that on the interest rates and deficits?

SECRETARY REGAN: No. The -- well, the question was: What was the spirited part? Was that interest rates and deficits? That was a little spirited. It was a rather good discussion, I would say.

Q Well, did they give anything? I mean, did --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q Was there any bending on our part?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. We have all agreed, because all nations have deficits, that all nations should try to get them down. We, like they, deplore high rates of interest. And we all said that it would be great if we could get interest rates down.

Andrea.

Q Mr. Secretary, did any of the other leaders agree with the U.S. position that interest rates are not affected by deficits?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, they discussed that, and they said that they saw a linkage. Now, in our

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discussions, as you know, there were apparate discussions at times -- heads of state of government in one room, foreign ministers in another, and finance ministers in another. And most of that discussion on interest rates took place, first of all, in the finance ministers and then for a little bit in the plenary session where all three groups came together.

We pointed out to them that there has been no study shown to us of this linkage. People keep saying this, but we've asked for the last four summits for proof of this, and so far no one has come up with them. On the other hand, we have at least 20 studies by individual professors, economists, and the like indicating that our position is the correct one. So faced with this evidence, they said, well, they still found there was some type of linkage but they weren't sure what.

Q Well, just to follow up on that --

SECRETARY REGAN: -- follow up.

Q To follow up on that, you stated that the other countries all thought there was a linkage, but you have not seen a study. If it's the case that all of these other industrial nations believe there is that linkage, could it possibly be that the U.S. position is wrong?

SECRETARY REGAN: No. I think possibly they're wrong when they don't have proof of what they're saying. We have proof of what we're saying. So we think ours is correct. Now, that's not to say that we're in favor of deficits. Don't get us wrong. We definitely told them -- and we agree with them -- we'd like to get deficits down. But our primary reason for getting deficits down is that we think the federal government is spending too much, and, therefore, we want to cut back on spending and ergo would reduce deficits.

Yes.

Q Mr. Secretary, on the spirited part, was that with the ministers or with the heads or with both?

SECRETARY REGAN: Both. After all, let's face it. There were -- what -- seven, eight times three, twenty-four of these people, all having been used to speaking in public, most of them members of Parliaments or Diets or what have you, so none was exactly shy and loathe to express his or her viewpoint.

Bart?

Q Mr. Secretary, you've said in the past that high interest rates so far have not interfered with our recovery in the United States. In the language of paragraph four where he says high interest rates and failure to reduce inflation further and damp down inflationary expectations could put recovery at risk.. Does that represent a shift of opinion or a nuance in our thinking at the moment?

SECRETARY REGAN: No. In that paragraph four where we're talking there about high interest rates and failure to reduce inflation further could put recovery at risk, it is true that if interest rates stay where they are or continue higher, that could put recovery worldwide at risk. This also applies this language to

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the debtor nations as well as to the members of the summit.

Q Was the suggestion made, either in your meeting of Finance Ministers or in the summit, that in fact interest rates are likely to go higher?

SECRETARY REGAN: There were many discussions of that. President Reagan sort of set the tone in saying that he believed interest rates came down. I know that Secretary Shultz took that point of view, and, obviously, I have never wavered on that.

Yes?

Q Is there anything in the communique that you would identify as either a new initiative or a departure from current U.S. policy?

SECRETARY REGAN: None that I can recall, Owen, but let me check to see if -- I don't know of any new initiative -- that is, something that we have not previously discussed or something of that nature -- that would have come up.

Q -- revision or a departure from existing policy?

SECRETARY REGAN: No, except for that one that I have already mentioned -- and I'll try to find it -- about that agricultural fund. That's the only one that I know of that --

Q You wouldn't consider the multi-year rescheduling as a --

SECRETARY REGAN: No, multi-year rescheduling has been a subject that has been discussed back in the United States long before we came here. It was the subject of discussion in Philadelphia last week among the bankers themselves. That is not a new idea.

Yes?

Q Mr. Secretary --

Q In its earlier draft, there was a statement welcoming the U.S. deficit downpayment, and that was dropped in the final draft. Is this one of the things the United States wanted to see accomplished and managed to get out?

SECRETARY REGAN: Well, they welcomed it. The fact that singling us out as having done something about it and not saying how well they had done on their -- getting their deficits down is not the way the communiques are written. So, that's why that one was dropped.

Yes?

Q Mr. Secretary, on that Item 9 on what has been agreed -- back on interest rates -- "necessary strengthened policies reducing inflation, interest rates and also budgetary deficits" -- that's --

SECRETARY REGAN: Which 9 are you on?

Q Under "We have therefore agreed" -- last item.

SECRETARY REGAN: Oh, that's on page 9.

Q -- page 4.

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SECRETARY REGAN: There are several of these numbers.

Q Page 4.

SECRETARY REGAN: Page 4 -- okay. All right.

Q As far as -- since the administration wants to see the deficit come down and that has no effect on interest rates, what are we doing to reduce interest rates?

SECRETARY REGAN: Well, controlling monetary growth, controlling federal spending, things of that nature. You've got to admit that monetary policy does affect interest rates. And, therefore, that's one of the things that we're watching. Getting some of our deregulation, things of that nature, which adds to the inflationary cost of products -- we've been doing a lot of work in that and so on.

Q -- follow-up: Will the administration be putting any additional pressure on the Fed?

SECRETARY REGAN: Is the Fed -- Is the administration --

Q Is the administration going to do -- is going to put any additional pressure on the Fed?

SECRETARY REGAN: No, the administration doesn't put pressure on the Fed. Occasionally, we have an open-mouth policy regarding what they're doing, but -- (laughter) -- we don't put pressure on them.

Q On that same point, Mr. Secretary, on the same point, it says, "to control monetary growth and where necessary reduce budget deficits" -- Is there someplace where reducing budget deficits is unnecessary?

SECRETARY REGAN: Some of the nations thought that their deficits were down about as far as they could go in view of their high unemployment and the like. And at this moment, they were not prepared to agree that they should reduce their deficits further at this time. They thought they had brought them down to -- considering their -- to an irreducible minimum, considering their current economic condition.

Q Did we offer an acceptable level of our own deficits?

SECRETARY REGAN: No, that never came up as to what would be an acceptable level in the United States for a deficit.

Wait a minute. Let's try to get somebody else who -- Back over there first.

Q Well, Mr. Secretary, you say that nobody sent you reports showing any relationship between net and interest rates. What about the report of the President's Council of Economic Advisers? (Laughter.) Have you ever paid attention to that or do you still think that that document is inoperative? As a second source, there --

SECRETARY REGAN: No, that was not a study. In there -- in the true sense of the word -- there was a statement in there made, but there was no proof or backup. It was not a study in the true sense of a classical type of study.

Q There are a great many other studies which exist --

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SECRETARY REGAN: Well, if you do, would you mind sending them to Treasury to my attention? I have not seen them.

Q Mr. Secretary --

SECRETARY REGAN: Please.

Q What would you say the chances are that there'll be a new round of GATT in 1986?

SECRETARY REGAN: I'd say a good chance because we are going to be working, trying to speed up the process as much as possible -- first of all, complete the Tokyo round and then get started on this. And

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Ambassador Brock will be talking to his opposite numbers in order to give this a push. After all, we have, what, 18 months before 1986 and an awful lot of talk can transpire in 18 months and that's what we'll be working on. Over there?

Q Mr. Secretary, can you clarify what was the agreement with regard to the world --

SECRETARY REGAN: Would somebody repeat that to me?

Q Could you clarify what was agreed to in regards to security of world oil supplies? Was it decided that the IEA contingency plan is sufficient, or was the Japanese proposal for a supplementary contingency plan accepted?

SECRETARY REGAN: I would say that this paragraph 11 was worked out jointly. There was no one particular plan that we followed here. Each one discussed what their reserve stocks were, that type of thing, and they agreed that if they continued along on this line, they probably would be successful.

Okay. I see that my time is up. Secretary Shultz is here, so thank you all.

END 5:47 p.m. (L)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(London, England)

For Immediate Release June 9, 1984

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE SHULTZ
ON
THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT

②

Cornwall Room
The Connaught Rooms
London, England

5:48 P.M. (L)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The first statement issued by this summit is a statement of democratic values. And I think it's fair to say that the subsequent statements and the discussion generally can be regarded as expressing what the heads of state felt is necessary at this point in time to give maximum support to those values.

Obviously, economic recovery, with inflation attended to is a key. Obviously, the inter-relationships of the various economies represented at the summit and the developing world is a key. Clearly, as we look in the security dimension, the conduct of our arms control negotiations, and in general, the need, as expressed in the East-West statement, for the West, the free countries, to maintain their strength and their resolve and to be continually ready for reasonable dialogue with the Soviet Union and its allies got great emphasis and much discussion.

And, of course, and unfortunately, in this day and age, the problem of terrorism increasingly demands attention and received a great deal of discussion at this summit.

So I think, in a way, you can conceive of the way this summit proceeded as having started with values, and then looked kind of across the board at the key aspects of supporting those values in 1984.

Q Mr. Secretary, did any of the leaders have any new ideas of how to bring the Soviets back to the negotiating table?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The key, of course, is to be there, to keep expressing that point --

Q What's the question?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The question was, did anybody have any new ideas about how to bring the Soviets back to the bargaining table. And the answer is that the key is to maintain the resolve and firmness and also reasonableness.

Now, let me point out that in the statement, it takes note of the fact that there are a lot of places in which discussion is taking place. So, of course, you're referring to the nuclear bargaining table, but there are a lot of bargaining tables where there's a considerable amount of activity, and, of course, many, in a sense, bilateral bargaining tables -- ourselves; President Mitterrand will be traveling to Moscow; three of the foreign ministers in the room either have been or shortly will be having direct discussions with their counterpart; and so on. So there's a lot of discussion going on.

Q Is there any intention for President Mitterrand to bring anything from this group of leaders when he goes to the Soviet Union? Any expression from the group?

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SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, far be it from me to try to speak for President Mitterrand. He speaks for himself. But I have no doubt about the fact that what was discussed here and the expressions of resolve and firmness and the desire for dialogue, and so on, are very likely to be emphasized by him.

Q Did anyone encourage the President to try a new approach in getting -- to get the Soviets back to the arms table?

Q Question?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Did anyone encourage the President to try a new approach in getting the Soviets back to -- I think you must have meant -- the nuclear --

Q Yes, I did.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: -- bargaining table. And I keep emphasizing the fact that there are lots of contacts going on in various forums, some multilateral, some bilateral.

There was no discussion of any particular thing to do beyond saying that it is a mistake when somebody picks up and walks out of a bargaining setting to try to make some concession in order to get them back. The fact is that the positions taken by the United States in both the INF and START talks are reasonable positions. In the case of INF, especially, they've been worked out in extensive consultation with our allies. In both cases, it's in the nature of the positions that they lend themselves to give and take, and that is the spirit in which our representatives are ready to go to those bargaining tables, as it said in the statement, "anywhere, any time, and without preconditions".

Q Can you shed any light on why the statement stops -- falls short of urging the Soviets to return to the table, and just says we hope that the Soviet Union will act in a constructive and positive way?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, we're inviting a response from the Soviet Union about what they think, and

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so coming back to the bargaining table, of course, ultimately is the way you have to get somewhere. And so that's clearly what we want. The President has said that. And I think all of the leaders in one way or another have said that.

Q But it wouldn't be a more accurate reflection of the feelings to urge the Soviets to return?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, that's a formulation that's been used. And I think people felt, let's try a little different formulation. But it's basically the same idea.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you think the Latin American leaders will regard the call in this declaration for multi-year rescheduling as an adequate Western response to the severity of their debt repayment problems?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, they will have to speak for themselves. I do think that an excellent job has been done in working our way through the internat . debt problem. There is still plenty of work to be done. The idea of multi-year rescheduling, in effect, trying to move a great proportion of the debt out of the rollover and short-term area into longer obligations gives more stability. And I think it's fundamentally a proper idea. I would call your attention to the fact that there is a long list of things that have been proposed in this statement that show a broad action plan and awareness of this problem and a capacity and willingness to deal with it.

No doubt, the most important things to be done in dealing with the debt problem don't have to do explicitly with the debt at all. The most important thing is that the world economy is moving forward and the stronger that movement is, the better off people are going to be because it is the process of trade and the development of that in their external accounts that gives them the capacity to do something with their debt problems. And the same with some of the other suggestions that are made.

For example, the importance of getting equity as well as debt capital in as you're trying to attract finance from outside, and so on. So there's quite a menu of things that are suggested to deal with that problem.

Q Mr. Secretary, on the question of terrorism, we've been told all week that it's more important to get private agreements than public statements. Really a two-part question: What do you think that the public statement on terrorism accomplishes?

And, secondly, the language on concrete action is so weak, it only talks about proposals which found support. Did the nations agree, without getting into the specifics of it, did they agree to take any concrete joint action on terrorism?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Of course, private actions on something like this are the key. But there is a great deal of importance, I think, attached to identifying this problem publicly so people can see that the heads of these governments assembled felt that it was important enough to spend that much time on and to develop it in the detail that it has been developed in this statement. It's in greater detail than -- or at least on a broader scope -- than has been so in the past.

There will be follow-up in terms of various national pieces of legislation. And I would say the things that are listed are examples of steps that will be taken. But all of the ones that are listed, I think, can be helpful. To some degree they're taking place, but they can be firmed up and this subject will be developed further.

Q On that same subject, is this in fact an agreement? Does it go as far as being an agreement? And what is the

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United States willing to do out of this list? What specifics will the administration follow?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, the declaration says what people have agreed to. I don't think any of these things are agreements in some sort of formal or treaty sense at all. But the United States will proceed, I'm sure, as is laid out here. We are putting forward -- have put forward, for example, pieces of legislation designed to close the gaps, as it says here. We will be cooperating and do cooperate in the exchange of information and intelligence which can take place, I think, on a stronger scale.

No doubt, there will be benefits from identifying known terrorists more carefully. And when someone is excluded from Country A, it's interesting to know what the reasons are. And if they have to do with terrorism, if the same person applies to your country, you can think that over and ask yourself whether or not

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you want that person in here and so on. So all of these things are by way of illustrative types of actions that are likely to be taken by all. It is always a point made in the Summit that of course while the seven countries get together, each one is a sovereign entity and nobody is trying to tell the United States what is must do or any of the other countries what it must do, but they represent undertakings of what we agreed is worthwhile carrying out and in our own sovereign way we will go about it. And each country, of course, has to develop these points in a slightly different manner.

Q Were preemptive strikes discussed as appropriate policy in either the heads meeting or at the ministerial level?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, in the ministerial meeting I can't say about all of the heads' discussion, but I was in a good bit of it, perhaps almost all of it on this subject. In the foreign ministers meeting, we discussed this subject very fully and I don't want to go into all the detail of it, but I think that there are great ramifications that go beyond purely defensive measures.

Q Does that mean that we are considering preemptive strikes?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I will simply refer you to the answer that I just gave very consciously on that subject.

Q Mr. Secretary, the United States made a number of appeals to the Soviets to return to Geneva. The other day you embraced a proposal that they had previously favored in Stockholm, yet there doesn't seem to be any affirmative response at all from the Soviets. Was there a sense in the discussion of the East-West declaration or in the other conversations of pessimism about relations with the Soviets, because nothing that anybody seems to do seems to get a positive response from them?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Quite to the contrary. I think the general spirit and sense here, as was true in the NATO foreign ministers' meeting just a week or so ago, is one of confidence, quiet confidence. But nevertheless, the notion that basically we're on the right track and that it is important for us to maintain our capacity and will to defend our interests and our readiness to engage in dialogue when they're ready. Now, in the views around the world, I think people very much prefer the stance of the United States and our allies to a stance of saying, as the Soviets seem to say for reasons that they know better than I, that their stance is that they seem not to want to engage in discussion of a great many of these issues. Now we hope that they'll come around because as the statement says, we believe that it's very much in their interests to discuss these matters.

Quite a number of people reported that when they or people working with then discuss these matters with the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union was very quick to assure their visitor that of course the U.S. elections had nothing to do with their attitude and it almost reminds you of that line, perhaps appropriately quoted in this country, "me thinks he dost protest too much". But at any rate, that's where the situation sits and I think we're in a very good posture.

Q Mr. Secretary, on terrorism, getting back to the point about having no real agreement on some of the principles that are mentioned under point number six, isn't it really more damaging to have issued a statement on which there is no agreement about intelligence sharing --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Oh, there is agreement. I don't know why you say this statement shows there's no agreement. What it shows is that there is a very calm and collected expression of the points in this phraseology -- I might note it as nice British phraseology, which everyone accepted -- a kind of tendency for slight understatement. But nevertheless to say, and to say competently, that we've discussed this issue. There are things that we can do individually. There are things that we're going to collaborate on and we expect all of this to develop and these examples are just suggestive of the ways in which it would happen.

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Q But would it be accurate to say then that even though it just -- it simply says proposals which found support. Would it be accurate to say that all of seven nations have agreed to share information intelligence and technical knowledge?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Found support is, as I said, a very nice term of art that the British contributed in the drafting, and I think it allows both for the fact that everyone agreed

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on this list, and that, in the process of carrying out these various undertakings, each country has to adapt it, somewhat, to its own circumstances which do vary considerably; and so, we would expect that to happen. But I think it's a very forthcoming -- and, personally, having thought about this issue a lot, and worried about it -- I'm simply delighted that in this meeting there was this much attention to the subject, and the statement was as extensive and forward-looking as the one that's been produced here. And it came, really, with no strain. Everyone is concerned and wants to see things advance, but yet we don't want to overstate or over-display our hand here.

Q Do you expect cooperation from France?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Certainly.

Q Mr. Secretary, the administration has taken a great deal of credit for convergence of economic policy by the Europeans' adopting the approach of the President toward the economy. On East-West relations, contrasting former talk of an "evil empire" with the current emphasis on dialogue, would you say the United States has moved toward the European position?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I would say that the United States, insofar as East-West relations are concerned, has been consistently on a path of saying that the first prerequisite is to be strong. And the second prerequisite is to be realistic about what is going on, and not to shy away from saying what the truth is. And the third prerequisite is to be willing to engage in dialogue with the Soviet Union and try to work out problems.

And if you go back to the statements made by the administration early on, you'll see the seeds of this policy all the way through. For example, in the very strong and wide-ranging agenda on an arms control, and a consistent application of the idea that what we want is reductions, not control, not freeze -- reductions. And that refrain has been played throughout.

Somebody over here --

Q Mr. Secretary, that -- the line about reducing the risk of surprise attack, and attack by accident -- on the East-West portion --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The last paragraph you're speaking of?

Q -- does this reflect concern among your colleagues over the tenor of Soviet alarms over the Pershing II?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, I think that that last paragraph is an effort to say to them, and to say to the world -- you know, there are some things that we ought to view as matters that we have in common. We must have in common the importance of peace. And as far as the particular thing that you mention, of course, confidence building measures, having to do with avoiding surprise attack and so-on -- that emerges out of the original Helsinki Accords. It was discussed in the CSCE talks in Madrid, and it's a centerpiece of the NATO position that we have taken in Stockholm and which we are seeking to engage with the Soviet Union and the other states there; and, in effect, as it says here, to put some real structure into the idea that the Soviets are fond of, and which, of course, people have agreed to before, namely the idea of the non-use of force.

Q Mr. Secretary, can you explain why there was a statement by Mrs. Thatcher on the Iran-Iraq conflict, and not a declaration, as with the other topics?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, it just sort of emerged that way. I don't know quite what the answer is to that, but I would describe, I guess, what happened more or less like this: Clearly, in the economic statement it's important to take note of the oil

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supply situation It was reviewed, and, I think, concluded, we have concluded in the United States, that basically the situation is in far better shape than it was in earlier periods. And that even if there is a disruption of some sort, it's manageable.

Now, I think in the discussion we felt that it wasn't sufficient to say that, because we are concerned about the broader aspects -- the human toll of that war, and other aspects of that war. And so, going on from the economic statement, it was felt that, while perhaps we didn't need to make a special declaration on it, the chairman ought to show that we do have these broader concerns. So that's how that emerged.

Q Mr. Secretary, in the Iran-Iraq conflict -- the statement says the principle of freedom of navigation must be respected -- in the Gulf -- Was there any --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, I would say everywhere -- it doesn't restrict it to the Gulf. But certainly the Gulf is the operative place right now.

Q Okay, sir. Was there any discussion of what action, individually or collectively, might have to be taken if that principle is not respected? We're talking about the Gulf now --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Yes, well of course we reviewed the positions of different countries and generally described and analyzed the situation. And, as I'm sure you're aware, there has been a lot of consultation, in one way or another, on this. And I'll just leave it at that.

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Q Mr. Secretary, on terrorism -- was there an attempt to come up with a list of countries that are believed to be responsible for state-sponsored terrorism? And what was the discussion about the ties that some of the partners have with some countries that the United States believes are involved in state-sponsored terrorism?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There was not an effort to make out a list. But I think the -- the extra dimension noted on the problem of terrorism right now, and identified in the statement, is the dimension of state-sponsored terrorism. And we felt that it was important to do that, and probably sufficient, under the circumstances, to do that.

Q Mr. Secretary, to what extent -- we were told that the Sakharov issue was discussed -- to what extent do the cast of states see the Sakharov issue as significant to the overall East-West public agenda?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, of course, it's part of the concern that we all have for the rights and well-being of any human being, let alone such a distinguished person -- and Mrs. Bonner. So, obviously, that was discussed. I think, under all the circumstances, it is not necessarily productive to make some sort of public statement about it at this point in time.

Q Are you convinced they're alive?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think that Larry designated you as the last questioner. Is that correct, Larry?

MR. SPEAKES: That's right.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I didn't do that -- he did that. (Laughter.)

Q Well, okay -- can you tell us what the President thought of the demonstrators? And, I have --

Q Speak up, Maureen --

Q -- a second question. Can you tell us if, during the sessions, there was a time when voices were raised?

Q Question?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The first question is, what did the President think of the demonstrators? Well, when the President came into the hall, we basically milled around briefly and went in and Mrs. Thatcher gave her statement; and then the heads, of course, left before the ministers and I had a chance to exchange a word with the President on that particular subject. So, I don't know the answer, in a direct sense, to that question.

Were there times where voices were raised? Well, people don't shout at each other at these, but I would say that the discussion was spirited discussion. These are all issues that people care about. And even things where people agree on, they worry about how it's phrased, so that it gets the right nuance to it. So, these meetings -- at least I've observed the Williamsburg one and this one, and people have told me about some of the earlier ones -- beginning with the Williamsburg summit, the heads of state have taken over, and they're running this thing. And most of the discussion and all the operative discussion is really their discussion, and the various things that come out of it are worked through by them. Other people, of course, help with drafting and so-on, but it's very much their summit; and they are all people who are widely experienced, and they all care about these issues, and they're all forceful people, and they're all people who are accustomed to being listened to. And so, I think it's very important that that kind of discussion take place, and significant, as a result of that, that the results are as broad and as important as they are.

Q Summit booty (Laughter.)

END 6:14 P.M. (L)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DRAFT

ON-THE-RECORD PRESS CONFERENCE

BY

CRAIG A. NALEN, President and CEO, OPIC

LUTHER H. HODGES, JR., Chairman and CEO,
National Bank of Washington, and

SHARAD TAK, Vice President and Co-Owner, SASC
Washington, D.C.

Tuesday, June 12, 1984, 10:30 A.M.

MR. CARLSON: Hi, good morning.

This is an ON-THE-RECORD press conference on the subject of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation's first loan guaranty commitment to support a U.S. private investment project in the People's Republic of China.

The briefers who will explain the project and the financing and the technical details to you are Craig A. Nalen, President and CEO of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation; Luther H. Hodges, Jr., Chairman and CEO of the National Bank of Washington; and Sharad Tak, Vice President and Co-Owner of Systems and Applied Sciences Corporation. They will give you a little bit of a rundown on the project, beginning with Mr. Nalen,and followed by Mr. Tak and then Mr. Hodges; and then we'll be happy to take your questions.

Mr. Nalen?

MR. NALEN: Thank you very much, Brian.

Ladies and gentlemen, nice to see you here this morning. We're very pleased to be here because this marks an important milestone for the Overseas Private Investment Corporation for a number of reasons.

Primarily, we are dealing with China here, which has been the subject of a great deal of attention focused upon it; and not too long ago, during President Reagan's trip there, he emphasized many times the importance of U.S. private investment as a vehicle for accelerating development and strengthening the ties between our two great countries.

Thus far, OPIC has been no stranger to China and we have been involved in about 14 projects, but mostly with regard to one of our major programs -- which is our Political Risk Insurance Program.

For those of you who may not know, OPIC is a U.S. Government Agency whose primary mandate is to encourage and facilitate investment -- private U.S. investment -- in friendly Third World countries. China, obviously, comes very high on our list right now; and we've had 14 projects so far, all in the political risk insurance area -- which is one of our means of encouraging U.S. private investment.

One of our other programs is a Finance Program, where we lend money directly to small businesses and also provide loan guaranties.

I think today is important because not only is the country China but the company that we are involved with is a small company. It is a local company, it is a minority-owned company, and it is a company that has competed against a number of other companies worldwide and was awarded this project in China; and I think before we spend an awful lot more time of me trying to describe the project, I will tell you one other reason that it's important because it has to do with the use -- the peaceful use -- of outer space.

And without any more ado, I'd like to introduce a Co-Owner and Vice President of Systems and Applied Sciences Corporation, Mr. Sharad Tak.

MR. TAK: Thank you, Mr. Nalen. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

Systems and Applied Sciences Corporation is very proud to be part of this historic venture. Our company is grateful to Overseas Private Investment Corporation for the loan guaranty, for without this guaranty we won't be able to fulfill the requirements of this contract with People's Republic of China. This contract for Landsat -- which is land resources satellite, a ground station and processing station facility -- is the first of its kind in the Republic of China. The contract calls for delivery of a complete ground station, which consists of two parts: a receiving station, which will be a hundred kilometers from Beijing, the capital of China; and a processing station, which will be right in Beijing, at the Academy of Sciences.

The system includes a full capacity to process the pictures from the land resources satellite when it makes a pass over China and the data which is delivered or which is made available to the Chinese by our Government.

This is a first high-technology venture in China from a U.S. corporation. This means 10 million dollars of business to Systems and Applied Sciences Corporation. And without the 4.7 million dollar guaranty which is provided by Overseas Private Investment Corporation, this project wouldn't have been possible.

We wish to express our deepest thanks to the Reagan Administration, to the Department of State, to the Department of Commerce, and to OPIC for their cooperation and assistance.

Thank you.

MR. HODGES. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I'm Luther Hodges, Chairman of the National Bank of Washington; and, obviously, our bank is proud to be here with our good customer -- Systems and Applied Sciences Corporation -- and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.

This day happens to mark at least one year's effort in developing the financing for the contract for the People's Republic of China's first Landsat earth station, and our bank has been able to conclude a very difficult credit transaction because of the very constructive assistance from the Overseas Private Investment Corporation; and we are very, very grateful.

I happen to have just returned from Beijing a couple of weeks ago when I accompanied the Mayor of Washington on his visit to the country and the sister-city arrangements with Beijing, but I'm particularly proud that a Washington bank and a Washington area firm can conclude this major transaction with the People's Republic.

I might also add that I happen to have been a Director of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation during my tenure with the U.S. Department of Commerce, and it makes me especially pleased that my bank is today working so closely with OPIC.

I think you'll have questions for Mr. Tak or Mr. Nalen; and we, any one of the three of us, would be happy to answer any questions that you might have.

Mr. Nalen?

(Continued on page 6.)

MR. NALEN: I might add that this is not the first project that OPIC has assisted in China. I may have mentioned there are fourteen others that have already gone forward in the last year-and-a-half or so. We've got another 25 in the pipeline that represents some $2.5 billion, but what I think is so important about this is that it is something where Congress has sort of mandated us to pay special attention to, and that is in the Small Business area. And by mandate, again by legislation, we must have at least a third of our projects involved with small businesses, so we are particularly pleased that Mr. Tak and SASC, his fine company, have been able to work with us and we've been able to work together with Mr. Hodges and his local bank, so it's really representative of an excellent example of teamwork, I think, and we've got a great project here.

Question.

Q How large is that small business?

MR. TAK: We did in excess of $36 million last year and expect to do over $40 million this year in our contract revenues.

Q What sort of thing exactly does your business do?

MR. TAK: We are a contractor primarily to Defense

Department and National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

Q What do you gentlemen foresee as coming out of this, on this particular project? Do you see more and more of the same? Will they need more things like this? Is this a one-shot enterprise or is this an expandable technology?

MR. TAK: There are about fifteen countries already have Memorandums of Understanding with our government, whom our government has agreed to provide the same technology to receive and process data from land resources satellite.

As I mentioned, we are the first one to get a contract with China and also the first one to get international contract to process data from this new satellite instrument called Thematic Mapper. We expect that we will be able to receive quite a few more contracts of similar nature with time.

Q When do you expect to be in operation?

MR. TAK: In the fall of 1985.

Q Is that just a delivery or is that actually working?

MR. TAK: It's delivery and installation and start to receive the data.

Q Does anybody in your company speak Chinese?

MR. TAK: We have several people in the company, and they should speak Chinese.

MR. NALEN: I might add that there is a continuing and growing interest by the U.S. private sector in business opportunities in the People's Republic of China. There is also a great deal of interest by the Chinese Government in doing everything that they can to encourage this interest. OPIC has been asked by the People's Republic of China, in coordination with the White House, to lead an investment mission to China, which we will do later this year -- in the first two weeks of December, as a matter of fact -- working in close coordination with the Chinese.

Q There is some mention in the background material here of upgrading your earth station to receive SPOT data. Is that included in this package or would that be a subsequent package?

MR. TAK: We will be providing capability to receive SPOT data at this station in China, but we will not be providing right now to any processing capability for SPOT. However, we have another contract with Sweden where we might, we will be providing them some processing capability for SPOT data beginning next year or the year after.

Q So they will be able to receive it, but they won't be able to process it?

MR. TAK: They will not be able to. At least, we will not provide them technology to process it.

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Q Is there any reason why you didn't go into providing the processing capability?

MR. TAK: It's not part of our contract.

Q Was there any reason why it wasn't part of the contract?

MR. TAK: I guess they didn't ask for that or didn't provide funding for this additional work.

Q Mr. Tak, one thing you said I didn't quite catch: I understood you to say the government will process the data for the Chinese. You're talking about the U.S. Government?

MR. TAK: The U.S. Government will provide the data to Chinese.

Q Provide the data.

MR. TAK: By turning on the instrument when the satellite is passing over China.

Q On a continuing, indefinite basis?

MR. TAK: They have an agreement between the two governments and they will provide according to those agreements.

Q How significant is this program in terms of opening up new markets to small business? In other words, it would be difficult for a small business to compete for this type of project in this country.

MR. TAK: When we competed for this contract in China, we were against General Electric and some other companies. We feel, as a corporation, that it is a very significant step for us, and it should open doors for other companies. Especially, with the help of OPIC, it makes a model project, and I hope that other small business companies will take the lead -- follow the lead.

MR. NALEN: Yes. I don't think that should be overlooked. Although a small company, they were pitted against some of the world's finest. It was a very competitive selection process which they won, which I think says a lot for the technological capabilities, that they don't necessarily have to rest in large businesses.

Q Could you tell us something briefly about the characteristics of the Landsat station produced by your company and with those produced by other companies -- any difference or -- ?

MR. TAK: Well, sir, in ground station, the riskiest element is software which integrates the antennas, the tape recorders, and other things. Our company has been experienced in producing risk-free software, and we had already tested it out at NASA Goodard Space Flight Center. The hardware is pretty much standard, which we will be buying off the shelf, the majority of the hardware. So I think it does not provide too much of a risk in going with us because we are experienced in that technology, and we have done very well.

Q Did you do any other satellite ground stations for other countries before, besides China?

MR. TAK: We have done -- We have not done complete satellite ground stations except of a smaller nature for other governments.

Q Thank you.

(The press conference concluded at 10:48 a.m.)

FILE COPY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

FRIDAY, JUNE 15, 1984, 11:08 A.M.

MODERATOR: Good morning.

As you are aware, this is a BACKGROUND briefing. The subject matter is on the June 16 to 23 state visit of the President of Sri Lanka.

Your briefer, for your information only, is .....

FIRST OFFICIAL: Thank you.

Let me begin by a brief statement.

As many of you may know, President Jayewardene's visit is one of several visits by leaders from the South Asian region over the last two years. In fact, this is the fifth visit in this two-year period, which began just about * a year ago with Mrs. Ghandi's visit. We had one from the President of Pakistan in December of '82. Last year we had an official working visit from the President of Bangladesh, followed by the state visit of the King of Nepal in December. And so this is No. 5, the Jayewardene visit.

And we feel that these visits provide the United States with an excellent opportunity to highlight our relations with the nations of the region and our interest in them.

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*Corrected to read "two years ago."

We're very pleased that President Jayewardene accepted President Reagan's invitation and that we have this chance to show our appreciation for Sri Lanka's democratic traditions, its dynamic economic policies under President Jayewardene's leadership, and it's moderate non-aligned policies.

I'll begin by providing some background on the President's schedule while he's in the United States.

He and Mrs. Jayewardene's first day, tomorrow, June 16th, will be spent in Williamsburg. They'll arrive in Washington on June 17th and will be formally welcomed by the President and Mrs. Reagan at the White House on June 18th.

That day also will include meetings between the two leaders at the White House, a luncheon hosted by Secretary Shultz here and a state dinner.

During the remainder of the Washington portion of the visit, President Jayewardene will meet with other members of the Administration, the U.S. Congress, and the World Bank.

I understand that on Tuesday the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will be hosting a luch for him and that he will be meeting later in the afternoon on Tuesday with the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and he and Mrs.

Jayewardene will be guests of honor at a reception hosted by the Sri Lankan Ambassador here.

The party will leave Washington on Wednesday, June 20th, for stops in Santa Fe, New Mexico; Niagara Falls, and New York City. At each stop they'll be met by local officials and private citizens.

And the visit will end on Saturday, June 23rd, with the party's departure from New York City. They go on from there to London.

The visit provides an opportunity for us not only to focus on our relations with Sri Lanka but to state clearly as well our foreign-policy objectives regarding South Asia.

Simply put, it serves the interests of the United States for the nations of South Asia to prosper in independence, to be at peace with one another, and to expand the possibilities for economic growth and development through regional cooperation.

We've got programs of development assistance and other aid in the region to encourage economic growth, and we intend to continue that assistance.

We do not seek broad security alliances with the nations of South Asia. We do not have any significant security relationship in the area with any country other than

Pakistan. We do not seek military bases there, and we believe -- and this is certainly the case with Sri Lanka -- that we can contribute most to regional security through our development assistance programs.

Our policy towards Sri Lanka is consistent with this policy toward the region as a whole. Last year Sri Lankan development suffered a major setback when severe violence broke out between the majority Sinhalese community and the minority Tamils.

In our view, communal accord is essential to future political stability and growth in Sri Lanka. We, therefore, support the efforts of the Government of Sri Lanka to reconcile communal differences in the context of a united Sri Lanka.

Some members of the Tamil community -- that's the minority in Sri Lanka -- call for the creation of a separate state to be formed from parts of the island. And among those who argue for a separate state are some who resorted to terrorism -- to the killing of security personnel, government officials and others.

We acknowledge, of course, the right -- indeed, the need -- for the Government of Sri Lanka to combat terrorism and to assure that terrorism does not achieve its goals.

At its core, however -- and this is a very important element in our policy towards Sri Lanka -- the communal problem in the island is a political one, which requires a political solution. In an effort to find such a solution to communal grievances, the Government of Sri Lanka convened an all-party conference on January 20th.

The Government of India played a role, which we very much welcomed, in facilitating a dialogue between Tamil leaders and those of the Sinhalese majority community.

We intend to commend President Jayewardene for his efforts to solve the problem of communal discord and to tell him that we regard it as most urgent that a peaceful solution be found.

Among the other topics which we expect might arise in our discussions with President Jayewardene are our expanding bilateral relations, international issues of interest to both nations, American support for Sri Lanka's democratic system and its economic policies -- which have emphasized private investment and enterprise -- and, finally, our satisfaction with the establishment recently with an Israel Interests Section in our Embassy at Colombo.

I have my colleague with me, and we'd be happy to take any questions that you've got about the visit.

Q With President Jayewardene's arrival on Sunday, he is being met by Honorable Michael Armacost.

A Yes.

Q Earlier, Mrs. Ghandi, and also President Zia, were all met by Secretary Shultz.

A Yes.

Q And when President Ershad was here, Acting Secretary Kenneth Dam met him, since Secretary Shultz was away from the country.

A Yes.

Q Why is it that Secretary Shultz is not meeting President Jayewardene now?

A Well, it's my understanding that Secretary Shultz has another commitment at that time. He will be, of course, hosting the luncheon for the President the next day.

Q The last point you mentioned about Israel's Interests Section in the U.S. Embassy in Colombo, aren't you creating, by having Israel to operate from your Embassy, a precedent which could be still -- I mean this precedent, or what you are about to take, is already creating a lot of consternation throughout Islamic and Asian countries and it's faced with objection. And this precedent might be dangerous that you might want to put Israel and other Embassies -- United States Embassies -- in countries where it doesn't have relations with that country?

A This was a decision reached by the Sri Lankans and the Israelis. They decided that it was in both of their own interests to have some form of Israeli representation in the country, with a third country acting as the protecting power, and the Israeli representation taking the form of an Interests Section.

When both countries asked us to play that role, we agreed so to act.

This is not, as you know, an unusual arrangement. We do act as protecting power for other countries. It is, I must say, the only example of a separate Interests Section; but it was, as I stress, at the specific request of both countries.

Q It is the only example of a separate Interests Section?

A What I mean to say is this: We do act as a protecting power in some cases. We have represented consular interests elsewhere.

But in this case there will be, as a member of the Israel Interests Section of the United States Embassy in Colombo, an Israeli diplomat or several Israeli diplomats.

They will not be in the United States Embassy itself; they will be in separate premises.

This is the first time that we have agreed or that we have been involved in such an arrangement.

Q Will it carry the U.S. flag or Israeli flag or no flag -- the residence?

A No. It will carry a U.S. flag.

SECOND OFFICIAL: If --

A If there are separate premises.

If they operate -- as they very well might -- out of a hotel, then the question of a flag won't arise.

But, yes, the answer is: If they set up a separate building and wish to fly a flag over it, that flag wouldbe the U.S. flag.

Q So the question of whether or not they're actually going to have a separate facility, as I understand this has not yet been determined.

A Oh, yes; it has been determined.

Q Oh, O.K. So it's either going to be a very interesting facility --

A It's not clear yet where they will eventually locate, since this was only announced on June 1st; and they do have, I believe, still in Colombo now, a senior diplomat. Presumably he's out looking at the real estate market.

Q Does that arise from the fact of that Israel Interests Section under a U.S. flag?

Q The tenor of the previous question was the fact that this might cause political problems for the United States, in Arab countries certainly.

A I certainly would hope it would not cause political problems for the United States in Arab countries. I don't see why it should.

Q On the same question, we get reports that this has caused a lot of concern, not just because of the international ramifications, but because of local ramifications as well, and that those local ramifications, as I understand them -- and I'm not as up-to-date as I should be on this -- was that there were rumors that were all over the island saying that the Israelis were going to put in Mossad agents who would be training Sri Lankan security forces in dealing with Tamil problem in the North. Is there any substance to this?

A I don't have any information on that. Do you want to elucidate in any way?

SECOND OFFICIAL: It would be best to ask the Sri Lankans. They have announced that they hoped for some security assistance and advice from the Israelis, but as to what arrangements they have, we're not the ones to answer that.

FIRST OFFICIAL: There have been protests within Sri Lanka itself, I understand, that is at the domestic political level.

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Q How were the requests made? Did they attach a reason as to why they needed the Israeli Interests Section, or did they simply say they wanted to open an Interests Section?

FIRST OFFICIAL: They said they wanted to open an Interests Section.

Q Did you question that?

A No, I think that we felt that we should go ahead with this request. We are generally sympathetic, as you know, to efforts on the part of Israel to expand its diplomatic representation in countries where it has not been recently represented. In the case of Sri Lanka, there had been a break in diplomatic relations in 1970.

Q Do you see the U.S. playing a role as mediating some sort of diplomatic relations being once again restored? Did the U.S. --

A That is something for the two countries to decide. No, I do not see the United States playing such a role.

Q Are there any implications in this situation? Assuming for a second -- and I know it's a hypothetical question, but maybe you could address it anyway -- assuming that they do provide some security assistance with the civil problems and the sectarian problems, is there any danger to U.S. interests or U.S. standing that's been addressed here, if the fact that we are the protecting power for such activities is seen as a kind of anti-Tamil position? In other words, you get my gist: it seems to me the primary domestic dispute is, there is real concern that these people are going to come in here and they're going to counsel the Sri Lankans on how to crush what could be a secessionist movement, and that they could use nasty means.

A I would just as soon not answer that very hypothetical question. I wonder, too, if we, having spent so much time on this Israel issue, might move on to some other aspect of the visit?

Q Here is one you may be able to answer: When Vice President Bush was in India, Mrs. Ghandi was complaining of the policy of U.S. encirclement because of our relations in Pakistan, with China, and with Bangladesh. Has there been any complaint from India that this could be another aspect of U.S. "encirclement" of India via involvement of the U.S. flag in an operation against an Indian minority in Sri Lanka?

A No, there has not.

Q If we could go to another point outside of this, President Jayewardene has recently been last month in China, in Japan, and in South Korea, and in all these places, the main theme of his speeches was sort of a Buddhist revival in Asia in the interest of peace and so on and so forth. I understand

4 he has not got any arrangements to meet with any Buddhists communities in this country. Is that so?

A I don't believe that is true. I know that he is going up to the Buddhist Temple on Sunday afternoon.

SECOND OFFICIAL: That's correct.

Q Which one?

A The one on Sixteenth Street.

Q You mean the ashram, the ashram on 16th Street?

A The ashram on 16th Street.

The Vihara.

Q Can you give us something on the size and scope of U.S. aid, economic assistance (inaudible)

A Yes, sure. In Fiscal Year '84, the total of U.S. economic assistance to Sri Lanka was $72.5 million. Of that $40.3 million was in development assistance projects. Almost all of the rest was PL-480, Title One and Title Two.

The development assistance has been largely focused on the Mahaweli scheme, which is a multi-purpose irrigation, power-generating scheme, opening up new land in central Sri Lanka. We have been particularly involved in irrigation and water management in that project.

Q Would you spell that word for me, please?

A M-a-h-a-w-e-l-i.

Q What is the proposed budget assistance in the next budget, please?

5-t

A In the Fiscal Year 1985, the total budget will be $74 million, assuming that Congress goes along with it.

Q What do you expect to be -- this is not speculative, I hope -- the results of the discussions with President Reagan and so forth? What is this government seeking through these talks and -- Can you speak to that?

A I think they did not come to Washington with any particular shopping list. At least, they have not told us of any particular items that they wish to gain from us in the course of the visit. We do expect to sign an agreement with them, but I don't want to go into details, and it would be a technical agreement.

Q No defense items, either?

A There would be no defense items, no.

Q Even of a minor nature?

A I should think the security issue is simply the question of a defense relationship; a security relationship with Sri Lanka does not arise. We have a $150,000 per annum international military education and training program, quite similar to that which we have in many other South Asian countries, including India. We did some years ago, I think in '81, provide a $2 million FMS credit for the purchase by Sri Lanka of an ocean-going tug. That money is still available to

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Sri Lanka. It chose, however, because of their reestimation of the maintenance costs involved and the high rate of money in the United States, not to go ahead with the purchase.

Q Was that for the purpose of the ship-scrapping operation that goes on in that part of the world, or was that more to international trade -- for the tug?

SECOND OFFICIAL: Sri Lanka doesn't have much of a ship-scrapping operation.

FIRST OFFICIAL: No. This was largely seen as something they could use for security, and particularly at at that time, anti-smuggling.

Q And I am assuming that the $150,000 in military training is aimed most specifically at the police force, is that correct?

A No, this is not for the police force. This is training for the military services.

Q You're saying a technical agreement is being signed by the President this week, this coming week?

A Not signed by the President. It will be signed by the Secretary of State. That will be done -- I don't want to let "the cat out of the bag." It will be done right after the luncheon in this building on Monday.

Q And it's a technical agreement?

A I'll tell you, then, since you're pressing me.

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Q Can you give us a little more detail?

A It will be on science and technology, and we'll save the details for Monday.

Q Who will be signing for Sri Lanka? You said the Secretary will be signing for the U.S. Who will be signing for Sri Lanka since the Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka is not coming on this visit?

SECOND OFFICIAL: Minister Ronnie De Mel.

A The Finance Minister, De Mel. He is the only Minister who will be accompanying the President.

Q Thank you.

MODERATOR: Maybe we can take just two more questions and wind it up.

Q Is there any particular reason for Santa Fe?

A Yes, there is. The President of Sri Lanka is very much interested in American Indians. This dates way back, I think he told me, to his reading of novels of the American West when he was much younger than his present 77 years. And so when he goes out to New Mexico, he will be going out to the Santo Domingo pueblo and visiting with some American Indians.

Q How about Niagara Falls?

A Beg pardon?

Q How about Niagara Falls?

A That, I'm told, is an interest on the part of Mrs. Jayewardene.

(Laughter)

Q Does the Administration here agree with the Sri Lankans' assessment of the Tamils? You seem to be very careful to say that it's reconciliation, that some Tamils have committed terrorism, whereas some of the stories coming out of Sri Lanka suggest that Tamils as a lot are terrorists.

A I think that we both can agree that there is a terrorist element in this. As far as how precisely the two sides agree, that we will discover, I'm sure, in the course of the talks.

Our bottom line, however -- and I want to stress this again -- is that this is not solely a terrorist issue. This is a political problem. It calls for a political settlement, and it's our view that such a political settlement can best be achieved under the auspices of the all-parties conference.

As I suggested, we would certainly be talking to the President of Sri Lanka about that.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 11:32 A.M.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ON-THE-RECORD BRIEFING
BY
JAMES E. NOLAN, DIRECTOR
OFFICE OF FOREIGN MISSIONS
THURSDAY, JUNE 22, 1984, 3:00 P.M.

FILE COPY

MR. CARLSON: Good afternoon. This is the briefing on the annual report on the Implementation of the Foreign Missions Act of 1982. It's an on-the-record briefing and the briefer is Jim Nolan, the Director of the Office of Foreign Missions. He has a brief statement, and then we'll take your questions.

MR. NOLAN: The Office of Foreign Missions has a couple of key objectives, and since there was a news article on it today about a report which we had submitted to the Congress, we thought it would be useful to discuss some of those objectives with you.

The office is, obviously, created to improve the conditions under which Americans serve abroad and at the same time here, through the controls which we exercise over foreign missions in the United States, to enhance our national security at home. I think, as is apparent from the report, if you got a chance to look at it, there are a number of areas in which the Office is involved -- certainly the area of real estate in which we review each acquisition of real property by foreign missions in the United States, to measure it in terms of reciprocity, our own needs for real property in that particular country abroad, and to look at it in terms of national security interests.

There is a whole area of automotive interests in which the Office is involved. U.S. persons serving abroad have a number of problems with regard to automobiles. We have countries in which we pay very high fees to register our cars; we have countries in which there are severe restrictions on the types of vehicles we may bring in. There are even countries where we have to export all our vehicles in whatever condition -- have no other way to dispose of them. So there are a number of automotive issues which the Office is dealing with.

Certainly, the area of taxes is one which was of concern to the Congress as they produced the legislation which created my office. Both the Foreign Relations Committees of the House and Senate were very concerned about the extent to which the American Government is required to pay taxes in various countries abroad. And we are looking at a whole range of tax issues here, not only questions of taxes on real estate, but taxes such as the Sales Tax exemption, which we give now to all diplomats versus the taxes which we pay abroad, back taxes in many countries around the world sometimes. The total of our tax payments in just that alone may be somewhere around $25 million a year, so there are a number of areas in which we are concerned.

I think when the Office first started, the fact that we were running a travel service for certain countries where we are required to use government travel facilities abroad was fairly well publicized, so I don't think I need to say very much about that except that we do continue to run that.

We've also looked at a wide range of Customs practices, delays, searches, and various things which are happening in various parts of the world to the goods which we are sending to our Embassies, and to attempt to address some of those problems to relieve those. So what we have for you this afternoon is a board which shows some of the new license plates which are to be issued, and I would be glad to briefly explain them to you. (Laughter)

They are, of course, red, white, and blue -- as is appropriate. The top two plates are for diplomatic personnel. The plate on my right is plates that would be issued to an embassy here in Washington, for example. The next two characters on the plate would be an alphabetic designator which is a random designator which will identify the embassy, and then there is a three-digit number.

The other diplomatic plate, on the far side of the board, is a plate for a mission, for example, to the United Nations. The Consular plate is self-explanatory for any Consuls across the country. The international organization plate which is shown here is one that would be used by those few officials of the United Nations Secretariat who enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.

The plates at the bottom, again, are staff plates. The plate to my right, for the staff, administrative and technical staff of an embassy here in Washington; the plate to the left for the administrative and technical staff of a mission.

There are, for your information, about 24,000 vehicles now registered in some 28 states around the United States. We have gone out and talked to all the various state governments, to the motor vehicle associations, and we will begin issuing the plates in about mid-July. It will take us approximately ten months. We will do just a little over 2,000 plates a month for the ten-month period to begin the first cycle.

We will, of course, impose fees for the plates where we are charged abroad, and the fees which we charge here will match the fees which we are charged abroad. Where we are not charged, there will be no charge for the plates, as has been the custom here in the past.

Q Under this system does it mean that Dobrynin

A The Ambassador for each country will get 001 for his country, so there will be 138 one's, I guess.

Q The 2-letter country designator at the beginning would, so all the cars from a given Embassy would have that same designator?

A That's correct. But it is not a designator that is readily identifiable to the country, simply because we don't want to encourage any kind of incidental vandalism.

Q Can you discuss the question of to what degree diplomats abroad are now immune from the normal traffic rules that we are not immune from, I mean, can they -- red lights, parking, hitting anybody, immuned from all that?

A The questions of immunity are difficult ones. We require our people abroad certainly to obey the laws, and if they fail to do so, to pay whatever tickets or fines are assessed. In this country, the obligation to obey local law is the same on the diplomats here, and it is our practice to encourage them to deal directly with whatever the jurisdiction is that they are having some problem with.

The fact that you have a diplomatic plate doesn't give you any rights to endanger public safety by parking it anywhere you want, and we try and encourage the missions here to be aware of that, but as is all diplomatic property, it is obviously protected from search or from seizure as --

Q You don't have any recourse if they choose to ignore it, do you?

Q That's the point.

A Well, the only recourse that we have is to take it up with the Embassy concerned, and to tell them what is acceptable and what is not acceptable behavior.

Q In other words, the bottom line is, they can park anywhere, go through any red lights, knock any people over, and they are diplomatically immune?

A Well, you got a whole series in there.

Q Yes, that's right.

A O.K. They can do all those things, I guess as can anybody. The penalties that they are subject to depend, first of all, on what their privileges and immunities are. If they are full diplomats, they are immune from arrest, so that they cannot be arrested for these actions. But the right to drive in the United States, or the ability to drive in the United States, is not a right; it's a privilege which we grant, and therefore, it is certainly my view, as we administer this program, that if we have individuals such as you describe, they will not be provided the diplomatic plates which will enable them to do it.

Q Even if they are diplomats?

A Even if they are diplomats.

Q Is that a change?

A I think it is, yes.

Q Does that require a provision for the retrieval of the plates if they prove to be bad guys?

A That's correct.

Q What kind of service does that require?

A I don't think it will require anything but bringing the Ambassador to the State Department and pointing out the problem and asking for them.

Q I want to press this because any of us who have spent some time in New York, especially around U.N. General Assembly time, knows what happens there with the diplomatic cars. Are you saying that now if this takes place, you're going to yank the plates?

A That's correct, if we have repeated and exacerbated abuse of plates. That's not saying we're going to pull the plates for every single parking ticket that is acquired, but what we will say is that if the abuses are sufficiently serious, then absolutely, we would pull the plates.

Q How do you intend to enforce this business of not driving? The fact that he doesn't have this plate doesn't stop the diplomat from driving any car that he rents or borrows, does it?

A It doesn't, and the only leverage that you have on that is the leverage on his Embassy that exists anywhere.

Q I suppose you could PNG somebody.

A That's correct. That's correct.

Q Are these diplomats driving on their national driving licenses, or are they required to -- ?

A They are required to comply with the local law of whatever jurisdiction that they are housed in, and most U.S. jurisdictions require a license by that jurisdiction.

A They are required to have a Maryland driver's license (inaudible).

Q Would this be the first time that a U.S. resident would be able to take legal action against a diplomat, if he is injured in an accident?

A The question of injury is a separate issue to the license plate issue. As you know, there has been considerable Congressional concern for some time, a concern certainly shared by the Department, with regard to Americans or individuals in the United States who have been injured by diplomats and have been unable to collect damages because of a claim of immunity.

The Department has for many years encouraged all Embassies and missions to maintain adequate liability insurance, and for the most part, they certainly have. It has not, however, been clearly 100 percent, and that is a continuing problem. The way we seek to address it is, we are exploring now, if you will, a group liability insurance program which will be mandatory upon all missions and will cover all their vehicles. The insurance levels will probably be at a minimum for a million-dollar liability. This will insure that there is no, will be no accident in which an American is injured and is unable to collect damages.

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Q Why don't we have it already?

A The last session of Congress transferred the authority for this program to my office. We want to write a request for proposal to the insurance industry which meets a kind of unique situation. We obviously want to give adequate time to the insurance industry to bid on it.

We are very near to having the proposal ready to go out, and I would think we would be ready to be in a position to issue the contract somewhere around the 1st of September.

Q How about some of the reciprocity cases? I'm particularly intrigued by the Czech telephone incident. How does any of this affect, for example, sort of a classic case in which we got taken to the cleaners by the Soviets on reciprocity regarding the construction of embassies? They're perched out there on Wisconsin Avenue, or wherever it is, and I think we're still digging a basement in Moscow, aren't we?

A We're certainly well beyond the basement in Moscow. In general terms, I would say this. It's been my experience, at least, in the eighteen months that I've been here, that it is easier to deal with on-going issues and new ones than it is to go back to old issues and try to get them straight.

Unfortunately, in most of the old-issue ones, much of your leverage is long since gone, and it's much more difficult to handle. So it won't solve -- no piece of legislation, and no way that I administer the office is going to solve all of these. And, I think, some of those, the ones you've described, are just -- reciprocity is going to be achieved by time and we can't ever get back to it.

Q Are there cases where reciprocity has backfired; where we've done something and it just made things worse? You give example of the Czech phone, which speeded things up obviously. Does it go the other way, too, sometimes?

A Yes. I think it's only fair to say sometimes it does go the other way. Not that it so much backfires, but that we discover that the leverage which we presumed we had is not as effective as we thought it would be.

Q What is the situation of our Embassy and the Soviet Embassy? Could you bring us up to speed on that, please?

Q Theirs is nearly complete, isn't it?

A Our Embassy -- and I'm not the expert in this -- our Embassy is scheduled for completion in late '86 or early '87. Their residential quarters at the Mount Alto site have been completed, and the Chancery building itself is probably scheduled for completion sometime next year.

Q The Soviet --

A The Soviet Embassy site here. So they will undoubtedly be finished, the construction of the Embassy here, prior to the fact that ours is completed. That is not to say, however, that it will necessarily be occupied here, the Chancery itself, prior to our occupation.

Q Is that a case of being outwitted by the Soviets?

A No, I think they were judgments made at the time for things we wanted and things they wanted, which I'm certainly not in any position to second-guess or even to say I wouldn't have made the same one.

Q Could you explain why it was appropriate to make the tags red, white and blue, since now they're sort of a discreet diplomatic plate that blends in? This seems like it'll really stand out.

A Now, we have 28 diplomatic plates, as a matter of fact, of one kind or another because we have 28 states which issue them. So they come in all varieties and shapes, some of which are recognizable by police departments and other jurisdictions and others of which are not. We wanted a plate which was clearly an identifiable diplomatic plate, and we wanted the plate to be clearly the property of the United States as we have described our desire, perhaps, at sometime to retrive it. So the color seemed appropriate.

Q May I ask you, I notice that the report here talks about February '84 instead of June 22. Is this being made public because the story was in the Post today?

A Yes.

Q Was it given to Congress --

A It was given to the Congress in the annual authorization process as a report they had requested.

Q In February?

A In February. Yes.

Q Because of the story that --

A Because of the story that was printed; and the number of questions which came flooding in about it, we thought we would do it this way.

Q Do you think this is a precedent?

A In what?

Q I mean, if the story now appears and we get the document, it's very interesting. (Laughter)

Q From your office, yes.

A It's a precedent from my office since it's the first report my office has done to the Congress.

Q Could you explain the reciprocal-beating policy?

A Reciprocal what?

Q Beating policy? How are you going to reciprocate for beatings of U.S. employees in Leningrad, for example? Are you going to send larger people? (Laugther)

A There is no way to reciprocate for that kind of treatment. We have had American embassies burned abroad; we have had mobs obviously within American embassies abroad; we have had American diplomats assaulted in many parts of the world.

It is the responsibility of the host governments to see that it doesn't happen, and when it happens at the behest of or with the blind acknowledgment of the host government, that is all the more depressing in its behavior. But we certainly, in the United States, like to think -- and I think we are a country of law, and therefore I don't believe there is any reciprocity that possible in that area.

Q Shannon would like to volunteer for your hit squad.

Q Where do we stand on the Libyan building in New York?

A I think the Libyan building is a good example of the kind of thing which the office was created to do. The Libyans, for those of you who are not aware, had been construcing a 24-story office building in New York for a number of years. They are preparing now to get ready to move into it.

Under the Foreign Missions Act, all embassies are required to come to us and advise us if they wish to change locations and wish to make new uses of property.

We had requested the Libyans to advise us as to what use they intended to make of the property in January. We heard nothing. New York City was concerned that the property be occupied as they had not even certified it for occupancy; wrote to the Department of State requesting our assistance, at least, in getting the Libyans to comply with New York law, which we're certainly glad to do.

Friday, the 15th, New York City Police Department had put up barricades around the building. At 4:00 p.m. on Friday afternoon, the Libyans produced a diplomatic note stating how they wish to use the building, and we are now in the process of reviewing that note. The uses which they have proposed appear to us to be acceptable, and we will respond to it.

It's an example of what I have tried very hard to do in the office, and that is, work with the local governments, both in the District of Columbia and New York where we obviously have the majority of our establishments so that both Federal and local needs are met.

Q You say, the Libyans response is acceptable, and they will get the building, or did you say if its --

A They will get the building subject to some terms which we will set. That is, if they desire to lease some portions of the building, we will place some requirements; that they must have our approval for who they wish to lease it to. Other than that, yes, the building is acceptable to us.

Q You say how many diplomats in the States -- 24,000-28,000?

A There are approximately 24,000 vehicles.

Q And diplomats, you gave us a figure?

A I didn't give you a figure, but I would think the figures all totaled is somehwere in the sixties; 65,000, if not more, if you consider families, diplomats and the like. I'm not precisely sure what the figure is. We could probably find it for you.

Q You have the figure just for diplomats? You don't have it?

A No, I don't have it with me.

Q And would that include the U.N. people as well?

A Yes.

Q So that the bulk, in fact, is in New York. More so than Washington?

A The majority, I think, of the diplomatic vehicles, certainly are here in Washington. The majority of the diplomats -- those having diplomatic status, I think, are here in Washington. In New York, you have the Secretariat, and the several thousand employees of the Secretariat who don't have any diplomatic status.

Q New York, you say?

A Yes. So I think there is a difference there.

Q Twenty-four thousand --

A Yes, there are about 24,000 cars.

Q Most are in New York?

A Most of the cars? Most of the cars are here in Washington; New York being second. California, I think, is third.

Q I have a question about the use of embassies for communications, interceptions, and so on. Under the real estate section you reeled off, you said national security aspects are one of the criteria.

Would it ever be the case that you would not allow a foreign government to buy an embassy because of a particular geographical element that allowed it to intercept things better?

A I think as far as I'll go on that one is to say that obviously, where a Foreign Mission locates meets a broad spectrum of national security concerns. Communication/security concerns are clearly one of those. Certainly, that could be a factor as well as many others.

Q A lot of people pointed out -- I don't know this is correct -- but the new Soviet facility is very nicely located for that kind of thing. Would you care to say anything about that?

A No, I wouldn't.

Q On the Libyan Embassy, did you ever have any reason to think there might be some use of the building for terrorist activities, and now you're satisfied that that won't happen, or was it always just a case of wanting them to comply with our laws, and terrorism never entered into it?

A No, certainly terrorism has entered into our head and our concerns in dealing with any Libyan establishment.

We cannot insure -- there is no guarantee that an act of terrorism won't occur anywhere. And certainly no prior action that we can take, prior to the occupancy of a building, is going to give a guarantee for the life of the use of the building that nothing nefarious will ever occur there.

So I can't say that the process that we have done guarantees that nothing untoward will ever happen in the establishment. The only thing that I can say on it is that certainly compliance with U.S. law is more than just a token gesture. It's, we think, a very important one.

Secondly, how 24 floors were to be used and which parts of the building would have privileges and immunities and which would not is an important principle to establish in the first stages of the building, and not after the building is occupied. So that's, I think, the reasons that we wish to make it very clear what it is we were recognizing as we began the process.

Q May I ask you sir, when we talked before about the ability to yank foreign plates under certain conditions, this has existed prior to this report. I'm just trying to find out whether this has developed that or we already had that right?

A I think, frankly, we could always have requested a state to have done it.

Q That's not new, then?

A I don't know that there was any practice of having done so, but I cannot imagine a state not having acceded to the request if we had made it stronger.

Q So this doesn't really endow you with any additional sanction?

A No. It does not endow us with any additional sanctions except in one sense. That we will also be the registrar and titler of these vehicles. So we do have some practice leverage with regard to the vehicles that didn't exist when they were titled by a variety of states.

Q Do you compensate the states, then, that were getting the fees from this, like New York or California or the District?

A No state ever got a fee.

Q They didn't get a fee

A The states did these all --

Q They were all free?

A For free, and are therefore delighted to see the Federal Government do it.

It is a cost to the states which will certainly be less. And for that reason, besides just the normal headaches of the program, they're glad to have the Federal Government assume doing it.

Q How will they be issued, say, in New York -- by the U.S. Mission?

A We have a Service Bureau Office. My office does the Office of Foreign Missions in New York, and they will be issuing the plates in New York.

Q Is it, then, that with these plates you are now serving notice on the diplomats that they had better abide by the various laws we talked about in contrast to the laxity in the past, or these plates may be yanked?

A I won't contrast it to the laxity of the past, but I would certainly urge them to conform to U.S. law and to respect the local laws of the jurisdictions in which they're operating vehicles.

Q Will they be issued on an individual basis, or will each embassy have a number allocated?

A A number of missions own -- the mission itself owns a number of vehicles. So those vehicles would be issued the licenses to the mission itself. Others will be licensed to the individual -- to the present ownership.

Q Thank you very much.

(Briefing concluded at 3:30 p.m.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
ON U.S.-SOVIET BILATERAL RELATIONS

June 27, 1984

The Roosevelt Room

9:35 A.M. EDT

MR. SIMS: This is on background, but it's for your use as soon as the briefing is concluded. We'll do a transcript, and if others -- press -- want to know more about this issue, we'll provide it to them when we get it done later today.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, you'll recall that the President made a major address January 16 when he outlined his approach to U.S.-Soviet relations -- particularly indicated the areas that he would like to move ahead and improve the relationship. In that speech he set out three areas, broad areas, in that he would like to see more cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

One of these was reducing the threat and use of force in settling international disputes; another was moving to reduce and control the high levels of armaments; and a third was in the area of improving our working relationship with the Soviet Union.

Well, as you know, he has had a lot to say recently in a number of speeches about our arms control and arms reduction proposals. Quite a bit has had to be said about our desire to engage the Soviets in a more productive dialogue on the regional issues.

And this week there is meeting at the Smithsonian Institution a group of scholars and representatives of foundations who are active in U.S.-Soviet exchanges. I think the President felt that this was a good time to describe the efforts he has made to improve the bilateral relationship.

In January he set out certain goals, concepts, and I think in the speech today he will be reporting on what we have done in the interim -- the sort of things we are proposing. And he will listen. There are a lot of these -- I'm not sure of the exact count -- but, close to 20 things that we have proposed in this bilateral area. And, in doing so, I think he wants to make it very clear the direction we would like to move to increase contacts, to improve the dialogue, to try to settle problems in the relationship.

Now, in the speech today, he will also be pointing out some of the difficult decisions that have to be made in this area. On the one hand, we do want to increase contacts and the quality of our dialogue with the Soviet government. On the other hand, we are faced, from time to time, with the sort of Soviet actions that require us to make it clear that certain types of actions are unacceptable. Or, they're unacceptable because they threaten the peace, or they violate agreements or understandings. Sometimes these actions do, in fact, have the effect of impeding contacts. But we have to have a way to make this point without resorting to military threats. I think we've seen, for example, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that brought a number of steps in limiting, for example, the level of meetings with Soviet officials.

And, obviously, we have problems from time to time when there are human rights abuses, violations of the Helsinki Final Act, when we just can't go ahead and do business as usual. And we shouldn't.

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Now, I think the President will be talking about these problems, and some of them -- really confronting them -- and everyone else who deals with U.S. Soviet relations -- the dilemma -- dilemmas that aren't easy to solve.

But I think the thrust of what he will be saying is that we do want to improve our contacts. We do want to communicate more effectively. We're making a lot of proposals that we hope will be accepted to make this possible. And, although we know that we can't change the situation overnight, we're going to keep working on it with the aim of having a better and more productive working relationship with the Soviet government and better communication with the peoples in the Soviet Union.

Q I'm sure it's not going to come as any surprise to you that since -- that the timing of all of this -- it starts January -- it is being interpreted as an election year attempt, you know, aimed a lot more at voters than it is at the Soviet Union. Is there something you can point to to assure us that that is not the case?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think it -- and, in fact, is a coincidence that these things are coming in a year divisible by four. That's the fact of the matter. If you look at the way our relations have developed with the Soviet Union, I think you will see that we have had to go through a period, following a whole series of Soviet actions in the 1970's, sort of culminating in the invasion of Afghanistan, to make clear to them that that sort of action is simply threatening to the peace and which we have to resist.

And, I think that we started efforts, and we started them last spring, to get -- to improve the dialogue, and to get into a better sort of working relationship. But, you know, things keep happening, and things that we don't do. We didn't shoot down a civilian airliner. And I think that anybody who thinks that any American President would not have reacted to something like that, or could have stayed silent, just really doesn't understand Americans --

Q Can I just follow up on --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- therefore, I'm just saying that I think that one, really, if you're going to be objective, should look at this in the context of the dynamic of the relationship, and the election is really not a relevant factor in it.

Q If I could just look at it from the other side, then, is it a relevant factor, do you think, in the Soviet response? Have the -- these 20 things that you've outlined, has there been any kind of --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I said almost 20. I'm not -- haven't counted the exact number --

Q Okay. Whatever. I mean, do you think the Soviet response is somehow tied to the election year?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think you'd have to ask them that. You know, I can't speak for their perceptions.

Q At the same time that the President is holding out the olive branch, we see such things as the Marine general at the Navy War college talking about a limited war with the Soviet Union being an almost inevitable probability; and the next day we see a report of a Navy admiral drawing a line against Cuba. Putting ourselves in the other guys' shoes, doesn't this confuse the signal that's coming out of here?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that first instance, I think it was explained that he was speaking not from a clear text, and not, certainly not speaking on behalf of the President; and the

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President does not share the view that was expressed. And just -- it seems to me, that if the Soviets want to understand what we're saying, they'll watch what the President says, what the Secretary of State says. These are the authoritative spokesmen.

Q You refer to January when the President outlined new improved relations with the Soviets. We're now in June. Despite all of these extensions of doves and olive branches, what's the problem? Why haven't relations improved?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that, first of -- well, the question really is better directed at the Soviet side --

Q Well, I'm asking for your analysis of the situation. What do you all see?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, first of all, I think that sometimes the degree that relations are bad is exaggerated in the public mind. One thing I think we should understand is that, though relations are not good, and they are -- have not -- the Soviets have not been as cooperative as we would have hoped in acting positively on our suggestions up to now, that it is not a more dangerous relationship in terms of the possibility of U.S.-Soviet direct confrontation. If anything, we have a safer relationship than we've had for some time, in that respect.

Now, I do think, without trying to speculate on all, what all the precise reasons would be, one should bear in mind -- and this really relates to one of the earlier questions, that the Soviets in the last three years have gone through -- they've had three different leaders. And, they have had changes in the leadership. There has been a good bit of, one might say, organization of new administrations -- to put it in our terms. Their system is, of course, quite different, but they're as affected as any other when the leadership of the system changes.

Now, I think one must recognize they have not -- probably have not been in the best position to make major decisions, or to make new decisions. So, it seems to me that you have to be a little patient, if one is expecting something new.

My colleague -- do you have anything to add?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I think that's right.

Q The President --

Q What happened -- oh, sorry --

Q The President seems to have recently been moving away from the hardline stance about a summit in terms of desiring a set agenda, knowing exactly where it's going -- can you give us some characterization about his feelings, the administration's feelings, about a U.S.-Soviet summit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think he's expressed very clearly what his feelings are; and I don't think it needs any more elaboration. I think, I hope you'll look at what he said. I'm sure the press office can get you copies if you don't recall --

Q I know --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's very clear. And I think any -- you know, I just don't think it's necessary to go beyond it.

Q When do you think one might happen?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think anyone can say, because, obviously, it takes agreement with two parties to have one.

Q Has this been specifically discussed in any of this quiet diplomacy?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Obviously, all of our quiet diplomacy is directed at trying to find ways that we can solve some of the problems. One result of this could be, you know, eventually, a decision that it would be useful to have a meeting at the high level to -- if it seemed that that would be useful.

So, in that sense, you can say it's always implicit in any of the diplomatic contacts that we have. But I don't really think I should go beyond that, if we're going to keep our diplomatic communications confidential, as they should be.

Q What happens next? Shultz and Dobrynin had this three hour meeting. Is another meeting scheduled between them? Or is some meeting scheduled somewhere between American and Soviet officials?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are meetings between U.S. and Soviet officials almost every day. And I think you'll see, when you see his speech, that obviously since all of these things have been proposed there have been a lot of meetings and a lot of ways to propose it.

At the moment, I don't know of any specific dates that have been set at, let's say, the Foreign Minister level. But, contacts with American officials at various levels go on all the time.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think one of the things you'll note in the speech is that we have not just posed things, we've actually had delegations in Moscow. There have been Soviet delegations here on a broad range of subjects. And that pattern will continue.

The President will point out that [illegible]mber of areas we're expecting soon to have further talks with [illegible]ets. So, there is a -- as my colleague says -- there is a tremendous amount of back-and-forth going on; not all of it as productive as we'd like, but still a lot of process.

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Q I'd like to take it back to the statement you made earlier --

Q Can I just follow up?

Q Surely.

Q One second.

What about the Soviet journalists who refuse to meet with the Secretary of State, which I read in the paper this morning? Have you got any reaction to that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, just -- it seems to me it does illustrate one of the problems we have in dealing with them. We are proposing what dialogue, across the board. And they have not always accepted our offer. They have not always expressed a willingness even to confront some of these issues. I think that's unfortunate, but, obviously, you should ask them for a comment as to why.

Q What are these 20 steps, or nearly 20 steps? Are they proposals? Are they meetings? What is it you're talking about?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: These are proposals which we have made to the Soviet Union with the object of improving our bilateral working relationship with them.

Q Do you have any reason to believe that they're likely to take up any of these between now and the election, that there is any sign of improved relations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We would hope so. I think some are pretty close to agreement. Some are not.

Q Can you say -- are close or what we're talking about more specifically?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not at this point.

Q I'd like to take it back to the statement you made earlier about the degree to which Soviet-American relations are -- being exaggerated and that the -- talking about the reduced danger of war. The contrary viewpoint is expressed by General Brent Scowcroft. He says that Soviet-American relations are as bad as he can remember. And Ambassador Kennedy, for whom the seminar is named that the President will be addressing today, talks about the current atmospherics bearing the unmistakable characteristic of a march toward war. Are these people uninformed? Or how do they reach that judgment? There seems to be a dichotomy --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I certainly don't agree that there's a march toward war. Quite the contrary. But you can say that certainly I, and I think many of the rest of us, simply read it different ways.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'd just like to point out that it was at the height of detente, 1973, when we came as close as we have at any time in the last 20 or 30 years to a military situation. And that was over the Middle East situation, Israeli-Egyptian conflict, when we went to DEFCON III and the Soviets took various preparations as well.

If you contrast that or the '62 Cuban missile crisis, for example, we just aren't in that kind of environment right now at all. There is no place in the world where you can pinpoint that

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we are near a confrontation that could, in turn, lead to war.

I think it's also very important to remember that the basis of peace is, of course, military balance. We are in a much stronger position today in terms of military balance and the Soviets respect for our stength than we were, say, in the latter part of the 1970's when the Soviets were openly saying in their literature that the corrolation of forces had shifted and was continuing to shift in their direction and they were beginning to take a number of very risky steps in a large part of the world, Afghanistan, southern Africa, Ethiopia. I mean, the list is a long one.

We haven't had any example of that recently. And I think the reason is very clear: The Soviets are reassessing how far they can go with us. And the situation is, therefore, more stable, more peaceful.

Q Given the lack of dialogue now, you can think of all kinds of -- the Syrians-Israeli standoff in Bekaa, the Persian Gulf situation. Any one of these, it would seem, could go to a DEFCON III like that.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have discussed all of those situations with the Soviets over the last months, both with Gromyko and with Dobrynin here. So there is no lack of communication about those situations.

Q So you are communicating about the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, yes. We see them, as my colleague said, we see them regularly at those levels.

Q Can we just get back one more time to this -- the political -- or non-political aspects of this? You say, well, we -- you know, KAL, you sort of mentioned kind of as a a benchmark. I mean, that you didn't -- we didn't do it, that that was them and that, obviously, is detrimental to relations -- Has something happened between -- Do we just think, "Okay. They've gotten the point." Or what's happened between September 1st and January 13th? What happened in that time period to make the President believe that now is the time to move and say, "Okay. Let's go ahead -- "

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, my point was it was already moving before that. Now, obviously, unexpected events, like KAL, and expected events, given their policies, like the implementation of NATO's decision in December, the dual-track decision to deploy American missiles in Western Europe, these had an impact on one's ability to move ahead in -- this is just -- it seems to me -- obvious to anyone who thinks about it. And the -- But the views the President expressed in January were not new views. It was -- They were put together in a comprehensive form, but he had expressed all those before.

Q Oh, but it was a new tone, you know, as you know. I mean, we were -- you know, I mean, this is a man who came into office --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But look at the tone in September UN speech, when he made the proposals regarding INF.

No, I don't think it was a totally new tone. It was a comprehensive laying out of how we wanted to put the relation together. But I think that you will find the logic of explaining these in the context of all that was happening in U.S.-Soviet relations, both expected and unexpected, rather than in the domestic political situation here. That's my point.

Q Has the Soviet Union made proposals to the United States to improve relations?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They have made a number of proposals, most of them in the -- sort of the arms control area, which we have taken seriously, and some of which we have -- the President has indicated we'll move on. For example, their proposals for a non-use of force treaty or declaration at Stockholm. He announced of course, in his speech to the Irish Parliament that we would consider that in conjunction with Soviet consideration of the concrete confidence-building measures that we and our NATO allies had proposed. So we've shown forthcomingness in looking at theirs.

We do have problems with some of them, and serious problems with some of their proposals, which we consider rather one-sided. But we haven't excluded talking about these. We feel that we do want to continue talking and negotiating about the central issues. And I think everybody recognizes, for example, that nuclear arms are as important as any other. And we just have to keep expressing our desire to move ahead on those negotiations, on intermediate-range and strategic weapons. The Soviets keep refusing, for reasons that, perhaps, they better explain. I think it's incomprehensible, if their policies are what they say they are, that they would refuse to negotiate on these central issues. But they are.

Q Does the President feel that expanded scientific and cultural exchanges are a necessary first step toward arms control talks being resumed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think he's going to put it in the context of a first step, but in the context of something that is desirable for both countries to expand. And I don't think we're looking at this as necessarily tied to other things, except in the loose sense, that the better we're communicating, presumably, the better we'll be able to solve some of these other problems. But I don't think he's looking at, you know, that it will inevitably lead to anything specific.

Q But it's the only thing you've got, right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, it's not the only thing we've got. We're talking, as we've said, in many other areas. The reason -- It's simply that he has not had the occasion before -- and it wasn't timely, because we needed some time to make these proposals and to discuss them in diplomatic channels. He had not had the occasion before to lay out for the American people, and for specialists, for that matter, just exactly what we are proposing. And that's what he's going to try to do today in this area of improving the bilateral relationship.

MR. SIMS: I think we're going to have to give up the room. Maybe one question to end it, if someone would like --

Q Another political question. Some of the conservative columnists say that the politicians have taken over White House policy toward the Soviet Union with the election in view. What have you got to say about that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I see absolutely no foundation for it. Certainly those of us who work in foreign affairs, I don't feel that anyone has taken over.

Q Can I just ask real quickly? The answer to his question, do we understand you that there's been no movement at all on arms control, getting them back to the talks, since they left?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There has been no movement on INF and START.

Q Right. Okay. That's --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Now, there certainly has been -- I can't say there's been no movement at all. We're not -- the subject today is not the arms control area --

Q Right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- but certainly there has been movement.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have talks going on in Vienna on conventional forces and --

Q Right. I meant specifically on nuclear talks.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. Going back to the table with those two, there has been no movement.

Q Okay. Thank you.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 10:00 A.M. EDT

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE PROPOSAL FOR ASAT NEGOTIATIONS

June 29, 1984

The Briefing Room

6:30 P.M. EDT

MR. SIMS: This is a briefing with Mr. McFarlane. He will read a statement that is on the record first. The remainder of the briefing will be on background for a Senior Administration Official.

MR. McFARLANE: It's a statement on behalf of the President of the United States.

The United States government has taken note of the statement by the Soviet government proposing a meeting of delegations in September to begin negotiations on preventing the militarization of outer space.

The militarization of space began when the ballistic missiles were tested and when such missiles and other weapons systems using outer space began to be deployed.

The United States government, therefore, draws attention to the pressing need for the resumption of negotiations aimed at a radical reduction of nuclear weapons on a balanced and verifiable basis.

Therefore, the United States government has informed the government of the Soviet Union that it is prepared to meet the Soviet Union in September at any location agreeable to the Soviet Union and to the government of the country where the meetig is held for the following purposes:

First, to discuss and define mutually agreeable arrangements under which negotiations on the reduction of strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons can be resumed.

And, second, to discuss and seek agreement on feasible negotiating approaches, which could lead to verifiable and effective limitations on anti-satellite weapons.

We will also be prepared to discuss any other arms control concerns or other matters of interest to both sides.

We will continue contacts with the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels on arrangements for these September talks.

That's the end of the statement.

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Q You said "either, or"?

Q Is that the end of the picture?

Q Anything -- What if they --

MR. SIMS: That's the end of the picture.

Q -- say only anti-satellites? What then?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The United States will be at the meeting in September prepared to discuss both items or any other matters of interest to both sides.

Q What if they want to discuss just one and refuse to discuss what we want to discuss?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We will be prepared to talk about both.

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Q Is there any direct linkage between these two issues?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We believe there is an imperative to discuss the full agenda. And the United States will be prepared to do so.

Q Well, are you saying that you would be unwilling to go for such a meeting in September if they would only discuss one issue?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're making no preconditions. We're stressing the importance of discussing both items.

Q You're saying, then, that you would be willing to meet with them in September and, even if they're only willing to discuss one, you'd bring up -- you'd be willing to meet with them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The United States intends to discuss all items in these areas.

Q Would you talk about --

Q Well, will you go if it's clear --

Q -- talk about arrangements --

Q -- that they --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Excuse me. John.

Q You're talking about arrangements for talking, correct? So that when you go to this meeting you'll get a better idea of -- there will not be any definitive meetings on these issues. You'll just be discussing arrangements for meetings. Correct?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think you've misunderstood. And I say again, the United States is prepared to meet with the Soviet Union to discuss and define mutually agreeable arrangements under which negotiations on the reduction of strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons can be resumed, and to discuss and seek agreement on feasible negotiation approaches which could lead to verifiable and effective limitation on anti-satellite weapons.

So we're not talking about arrangements alone.

Yes.

Q Will you go if it's not certain that the Soviet Union will talk about both the nuclear weapons and the anti-satellite weapons?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We surely hope that the Soviet Union will be prepared to discuss both issues. And we intend to discuss --

Q But if it's unclear, are you still willing to go to meet with them, if it's unclear that they are willing to discuss both?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It will surely be clear by the time we go. And the United States intends to discuss both things.

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Q I really think you're not answering the question, which is are you willing to go only if they will discuss all three issues. It seems to me that's a fairly straightforward --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And I've given an answer, I think straightforward in both terms. There are no preconditions on the United States' commitment to go and to discuss both items.

Yes.

Q As far as the first paragraph of your statement is concerned -- (inaudible) -- the militarization of space. Could you be more specific as to when that militarization of space started?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As the statement says, the militarization of space began when the first ballistic missiles were tested.

Q Which means?

Q '59?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Mid-'50's.

Q By whom --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Soviet Union tested ballistic missiles in the 1950's.

Q So the Soviet Union were the first to start it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The United States doesn't make this point to draw attention to whichever side tested first, merely to point out that, in the Soviet position, pointing to discussions on the militarization of space, that this is not an item of the 1980's, focusing exclusively on any particular system. It is an area that involves ballistic missiles, involves satellite systems and so forth. And, therefore, the agenda for discussions on space systems encompasses all weapons which use space.

Q Well, are you then rejecting that the Soviet language that this should deal with anti-satellite weapons and saying it should deal with all space weapons, including ballistic missiles? Is that the point of your response?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: My response expresses our willingness to discuss anti-satellite systems. But it refers, again, to the fact that the central issue on our agenda is how to reduce nuclear systems and that there is an obligation on both sides to get back to the table to do that.

Q All right. Now, let me try one more time on the wording of your statement, because we don't have it yet to look at. Are you talking about the meetings that you're willing to go to as preparatory to actual negotiation? Or are you talking about actual negotiations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The commitment is to discuss arrangements under which strategic and intermediate-range negotiations can be resumed, And, further, to discuss and seek agreement on what feasible negotiating approaches will lead to successful outcomes in the anti-satellite area.

Q -- pre-bargaining session.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct.

Q It sounds a little bit like you're willing to get more into the substance of the outer space -- or the anti-satellite issues and willing to just discuss arrangements for future discussions on INF and START. That's what it sounds like. Can we get --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I would put it the other way, Steve. The United States is ready today to sit down again and discuss strategic arms reductions.

Q I know. But we're talking about your definition for what would occur at this September meeting.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, if indeed the Soviet Union said on the first day of the September session, "We'd like to negotiate strategic arms and intermediate-range weapons," we would do so.

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Q But it sounds like this statement being issued today has -- is more willing to discuss the substance of the issue on the anti-satellite and willing to just discuss arrangements as a minimum on -- for START. Isn't that --

Q No.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We don't intend that. Quite honestly, this is a -- I believe -- a generous statement of the fact that the Soviet Union has made emphatically clear it is not ready to discuss strategic arms. We believe they should, but at September let's at least talk about arrangements for doing that.

Q What if -- what -- I'm just still confused about this one point. If they are unwilling to talk or, let's say, you go there and they say, "All right, we're not going to talk about INF and we're not going to talk about START, but we are willing to talk about ASAT," are we willing to sit there with them in, say, Vienna in September and just talk about ASAT?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We intend to talk about both issues.

Q Well, I know, but let's -- I'm asking you whether we're willing to discuss just the one issue with them. You've said that there are no pre-conditions on our commitment to discuss both issues. Are there any pre-conditions on our willingness to discuss the one issue?

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: At the meeting, the Soviet Union may raise what it wishes. The United States will as well, and we hope for a fruitful exchange in both areas.

Q In other words, they don't have to listen, but we do intend to talk about both issues? And if they choose not to listen about one, we'll still show up?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Yes?

Q Sir, is this going to be conducted at the ACDA level or at what level do you foresee these negotiations being conducted?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As I said, we will be in touch with the Soviet Union and work out arrangements for venue, timing, composition in the weeks ahead. We have underway for some time extensive work on the anti-satellite area, and we have also had a lot of work going on that's completed on the START and INF area. So, established responsibilities in the former area are already clear and pretty well known, and we can easily in the next weeks compose a delegation for the -- that will encompass all areas.

Q Had you known about this offer before it was publicly announced today? And if so, how long?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Did you view this as a breakthrough or as a positive development -- the Soviet statement today?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we were puzzled and found unusual the way in which it was tendered. The normal course of events, serious discourse on these issues has been a matter for diplomatic channels. For it to be made public is

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unorthodox. But we take it seriously, and we intend to be there.

Q You said that Dobrynin was being informed of this. What was his response? Does he seem to think, "Well, okay, we can sit down and talk about these two." Did he say, "I have to study it"? What was his reaction after he was informed --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't characterize the reactions, refer you to the Soviet Union for that.

Q Are we willing to discuss a comprehensive ban on anti-satellite weapons which is the specific thing they offered today? Do we still feel -- believe that is unverifiable?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The U.S. position was stated in our March report to the Congress where we made clear that a comprehensive ban would encompass areas which are patently unverifiable. Our continued efforts since then have led us to conclude that there are areas where discussions can lead to fruitful outcome, but that would not encompass a comprehensive ban.

Q So, what we'd be willing to talk to them about in September would only be these partial areas of controls, not a comprehensive ban?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right.

Q There are those --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes?

Q -- who say that the Soviets made this proposal at this time because they realized how far ahead the U.S. was in this field of anti-satellite weapons. What do you make of the timing of this -- of -- why do you think it came at this time?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The United States has no particular comment upon the timing of it. As I've said, our own efforts in the past six months have been very heavily focused, both in the strategic intermediate context as well as in the anti-satellite context. The Soviet Union is very much aware of that. Indeed, it's been a matter of public reporting. So, we have no particular comment on the timing of the initiative.

Yes?

Q -- do you accept that this proposal by the Soviet Union as clearly an indication that they are ready to resume the strategic -- intermediate weapons -- START or INF?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Soviet Union has not commented upon that area. The limits of their proposal are pretty clear from what they've said. We are saying that their proposal only encompasses part of the agenda and that we have a common responsibility to focus upon the central strategic systems as well and to get on with reducing nuclear weapons -- offensive systems. But we are willing to discuss both and intend to.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 6:46 P.M. EDT

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
ASEAN-ANZUS MEETINGS
MONDAY, JULY 2, 1984, 2:07 P.M.

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I might mention, by way of Background, as a kind of a reminder, of the importance of the countries the Secretary is visiting. If you look at them as a group, though, each of them is very individual and very different.

Leaders with whom he'll be speaking represent roughly three hundred million people and roughly $400 billion worth of GNP. It's a very sizable fraction of the world's population and the world's economy. It's, of course, been a very rapidly growing area of the world economically, and that is part of the reason we have such a big stake in ASEAN and in the Pacific.

It's also a very strategically located region, a very important part of the Asian-Pacific region in which the United States has such a large stake. I think it is important to keep that in mind in thinking about the visit as a whole.

The Secretary will be leaving Thursday evening on a trip that will take him to Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand.

The Secretary's visit to Kuala Lumpur on July 9 and 10 will be very important in maintaining the momentum of senior level meetings with the Malaysian Government. Prime Minister Mahathir's visit to Washington in January of this year was very useful in deepening our bilateral relationship with Malaysia in a number of areas, including trade, investment and general international cooperation.

While in KL, the Secretary will meet with Prime Minister Mahathir, with Deputy Prime Minister Musa Hitam, and with the Acting Foreign Minister Abdullah Badawi. The Foreign Minister himself, Ghazali Shafie, will be attending the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Jakarta at that time, and the Secretary will meet with him subsequently in Jakarta.

We anticipate that the Secretary will take up international economic subjects with the Malaysian leaders, bilateral trade matters, increased U.S. investment in Malaysia, and cooperation with Malaysia on renegotiation of the international rubber agreement. There may also be discussions of the subject of GSA disposal, the surplus tin which we feel have been very usefully covered by a Memorandum of Understanding concluded with all the ASEAN governments last year.

On the international side, we expect discussions will focus on developments in the Middle East, on Asian regional matters, most importantly Kampuchea, and on East-West relations, including arms control.

These high-level talks come after several visits in the past few months -- Deputy Secretary Dam, who was there early in the spring, my own visit after the President's trip to China and a very recent visit by U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, their measure of our appreciation and Malaysia's importance both within ASEAN and bilaterally.

In Singapore, Secretary Shultz will meet with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and First Deputy Prime Minister Goh Keng Swee. Traditionally, a discussion of the international economic situation has figured heavily in our talks with Singaporean officials, and we expect that the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister will be most interested in the results of the London Economic Summit.

We also anticipate that global strategic matters and Asian regional affairs, again most specifically the situation in Kampuchea, will be taken up.

In both KL and in Singapore, the Secretary, as well as in Jakarta later, the Secretary will meet with representatives of the American Chambers of Commerce, or, as they are called there, the American Business Councils. These meetings involve informal exchanges of views on doing business in those three respective countries, as well as on the international outlook for American business.

The fact that the Secretary is taking this kind of time to meet with American businessmen underscores the importance that we attach to their activities not only for their benefits to the U.S. economy but also their benefits internationally.

The Secretary's visit to Jakarta has both the bilateral component on the first day and the multilateral component, namely, his participation in the annual ASEAN post-Ministerial Consultations. They're held each year in the capital then serving as the Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee. Last year they were in Bangkok;

this year they are in Jakarta. They're called post-Ministerial because the ASEAN countries will have just completed their Ministerial meetings among the now six countries.

For the first time this year Brunei is a member of ASEAN. They invite what they call their dialogue partners, the six dialogue partners, to these meetings -- post-Ministerial Meetings.

The bilateral program, which points up for us Indonesia's importance in the region, and President Soeharto's status as a senior world statesman, will consist of meetings with President Soeharto and with Foreign Minister Mochtar.

The Secretary also plans a trip to Jogjakarta, in Central Java, to visit the Borobudur Temple which is one of the outstanding examples of ancient Buddhist culture in Indonesia.

The ASEAN post-Ministerial Consultations on the 12th and 13th will take place in several meetings. First, there will be a meeting of all of the six ASEAN Foreign Ministers with all of the dialogue partner Foreign Ministers. This is known as the 6 + 6 meeting, with the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the Canadian Foreign Minister, plus the representatives of the European community; meeting with the ASEAN Foreign Ministers to discuss the international political and economic situation, I think, to include prominently the London Summit and Kampuchea, and the prospects for a political settlement there.

Regarding that last point, we will be particularly interested in ASEAN's assessment of the chances for a political settlement and of the prospects and difficulties involved in dealing with Vietnam on this question.

We, for our part, will want to reaffirm the importance the U.S. attaches to ASEAN as a successful, economically growing regional grouping, and to reaffirm our full support of ASEAN's strategy for dealing with the Kampuchean problem.

The second meeting in which we participate will be the so-called 6 + 5. This is an innovation -- it's the first time they've had this meeting. It will consist of the ASEAN countries and the dialogue partners from the Pacific region.

This important session will focus on prospects for Pacific Cooperation, and we will be very interested in the views of the ASEAN countries on how they see

Pacific Cooperation proceeding in the future. This is an area in which there is a great deal of interest, though I think the prospects for any rapid policy initiatives are not obvious, at least, right now.

Lastly, there will be the traditional ASEAN dialogue with just the United States, the so-called 6 + 1. Many of the topics taken up in the preceding meetings will be dealt with in greater detail here. It's also the occasion for the Secretary to give his major public policy statement on ASEAN. The meeting begins with that public statement and then proceeds to a closed session.

Around these key ASEAN meetings there will also be bilateral sessions with, I think, it's nine or ten Foreign Ministers. The Secretary will have his first meeting with the newly-appointed Philippine Foreign Minister, Arturo Tolentino.

He will meet with Singaporean Foreign Minister Dhanabalan, with Malaysian Foreign Minister Ghazali Shafie, and with Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi.

He will also meet for the first time with the Foreign Minister of Brunei, Prince Mohamad. He will meet with Papua New Guinea Foreign Minister Namaliu who attends these meetings as an observer. He will be holding his eleventh, I believe it is, with the Japanese Foreign Minister Abe. We anticipate that he will meet with Canada's Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Chretien, assuming that his schedule permits him to attend this meeting.

This round of bilateral meetings, apart from making our life very busy there, will firm up our high level official relationships with each of the countries involved. And in the case of three of them, of course, provide an opportunity to get to know them in their new capacities.

The Secretary leaves Jakarta on Saturday morning, July 14. He visits Canberra the 14th and 15th where he will meet with Prime Minister Hawke, Foreign Minister Hayden, and other senior Australian officials. These meetings are part of a continuing close dialogue with the Australian Government on a wide range of global and regional issues, and on specific issues of the ANZUS Alliance.

From Canberra, he will go to Wellington on the 15th through the 17th to attend the annual meeting of the ANZUS Council with Australian Foreign Minister Hayden and New Zealand Foreign Minister Cooper. He also will have bilateral meetings with New Zealand Prime Minister Muldoon and with opposition Labor Leader David Lange.

The ANZUS Council, as in the past, will have on its agenda a wide range of global and regional matters of common interest but with a particular focus on developments in the Asia-Pacific region since the last meeting in Washington in July of last year.

We are aware, and Connie knows, and maybe the rest of you do also, that New Zealand is having elections on July 14th that immediately precede the Council Meeting. However, you won't succeed in getting me into speculations about the outcome of the elections other than to note that whatever the results, the Council will be meeting and we will be working with whatever government is in New Zealand and expect to have continuing close relations with a good and long-standing ally.

Be glad to try to answer questions, other than the one I ruled out.

Q A follow-up on that then?

A Okay.

Q Did anybody in the American Embassy here take a position that ANZUS could still be a viable treaty if American ships and planes are denied access to Australian or New Zealand ports?

A Let me just say categorically that we feel that access to ports in the area is an essential part of our ability to carry out our obligations to the Alliance in peacetime as well as in the event of any possible emergency.

Q Did anybody, though, ever say the opposite in a public letter to anybody in New Zealand?

A I'm certainly not aware of one.

Q Because that's the whole basis of the election, that Prebble said that there was a letter from the State Department saying ANZUS could carry on even if a new government comes in and port calls are denied.

A I'm certainly not aware of any such letter, and I'm told categorically there is none.

Q To follow up on your statement just a second ago, the access is essential to carry out obligations in peace as well as war, is access by nuclear armed vessels necessary to carry out obligations in peace?

A Certainly, those of you who have followed

/There is no page 11./

this issue know very well that it is a long-standing U.S. policy to neither confirm or deny the existence of nuclear weapons on warships --

Q That, of course, wasn't the question.

A -- and therefore access by U.S. ships requires the continued observance of that policy.

Q Yeah, but you don't have to identify them to anybody to not dock there. If you don't send them in, then you don't have to identify them.

A Well, then, you've already identified them. You already are in that situation, and I would say no ally requires that we make that kind of certification before ships visit.

Q As you know, one of the issues of the election is not just nuclear arms but nuclear power, too, because they want a whole nuclear free zone. I mean, that's what Labor is pushing for.

A No, I know; both things are there.

Bob?

Q You mentioned the -- to assess the ASEAN strategy for dealing with Kampuchea. Could you say more about what that strategy is, and specifically, could you say something about these reports of Vietnamese troop pullouts from Cambodia and what they signify?

A That's a shorter answer. They don't seem to signify very much. We've had announcements every year of Vietnamese withdrawals from Cambodia and yet the level of Vietnamese forces in Cambodia remains the same or even grows slightly.

(Continued on next page)

Q What is that level now?

A I think in the neighborhood of 150- or 160-thousand. And we would certainly welcome genuine withdrawals in the context of a Vietnamese commitment to overall withdrawal and the establishment of a neutral regime in Cambodia. But what we've seen so far seemed to be nothing more than troop rotations in disguise for propaganda reasons.

The ASEAN strategy is a very sophisticated one and a subtle one, and I'm not sure I can do justice to it in a short answer. But I think the heart of it is the effort to achieve a political settlement. It's a recognition that all parties, including Viet-Nam, have a legitimate interest in this issue but that it has to be settled on a basis that Viet-Nam has to confront a clear choice between continuing to occupy Cambodia and enjoying the fruits of its aggression there or, alternatively, withdrawing and then having the benefits of constructive relations with the ASEAN countries and with other countries of the world that support ASEAN.

I think the choice is very clear; and I think the success of the strategy has been in both making clear ASEAN's willingness to have a political settlement but also in making clear to Viet-Nam that they won't have the benefits of trade and of foreign assistance and other things that might flow from the ASEAN countries and from the West until they face that choice directly.

Q Does there seem to be any sign that it's working?

A Not yet, but this is clearly something that will take time. I think the essence has got to be to persuade Viet-Nam that unlike some of their previous experiencesin the past, they can't just wait out the rest of us and have their way. And I think they're tough people to persuade of that, but that's the object.

Q Is U.S. aid to Son Sann and Sihanouk that Armacost confirmed last week part of a U.S. effort to increase pressure on the Vietnamese to get out in keeping with the ASEAN strategy, and is it something new in connection with this meeting?

A I'm not sure what Ambassador Armacost said precisely last week. Our position has been one of strong support -- political and humanitarian support -- for the coalition and for the ASEAN countries and backing them.

I can't make clear often enough that we give no support of any kind, even symbolic, to the Khmer Rouge's actions in the past we deplore deeply.

We certainly encourage other countries -- specifically, ASEAN countries who were in the lead to give support to Son Sann and Sihanouk that they need. And in many ways, including our very substantial assistance to Thailand, I think we may help to make that possible.

Q Is that support though very small and longstanding, nothing new about it, or is it fairly significant support recently given to step up the pressure on Viet-Nam to get out of Cambodia?

A Our support for Thailand is something that is longstanding. We have increased it fairly significantly over the last four or five years since this situation developed in a steady kind of way from, just very rough figures, roughly 30 million in '79 or '80 -- this is assistance to Thailand -- to roughly a hundred million today.

The exact levels of assistance that they give to the coalition forces are I don't believe something that they disclose. They're a small fraction of that total that I mentioned to you. And I wouldn't relate them directly; they're not directly relatable.

I think all of us have been impressed over the last few years at the ability of the non-communist resistance to grow, and that's a development we want to encourage.

Q I think the answer was on Thailand. Is the aid to Sihanouk and Son Sann part of a new U.S. effort to apply greater pressure on Viet-Nam to get out of Cambodia?

A You keep referring to the aid. Our support in that regard is political and humanitarian. We don't have any new policy in that area, and we look to the ASEAN countries to take the lead in providing direct assistance to them.

Q There has been concern in some of the ASEAN countries about China; and this concern, according to reports, has been heightened by the U.S. agreement to help rearm in defensive weapons the Chinese army. What is the response of the United States to this concern in ASEAN about Chinese military growth?

A It takes several, to emphasize several points to them -- (1), that we are proceeding in this area very slowly and very carefully-- we're considering specific requests on a case-by-case basis-- and that the concerns of the ASEAN countries are very much one of the things that we have in mind. We do not want to take any actions in this area that weaken their security.

At the same time, we also underscore that it is in the interests of all of us to see China better able to deal with the military pressure that China faces on its northern border and that China's ability to do that, we think, contributes to continuation of the very constructive policy that China has followed in the region for roughly the last ten years and that we think it's very much in the interests of ASEAN, as well as the United States, to see those policies continue.

Q Can you give us some idea of the bilateral talks in Australia? What issues do you want to emphasize?

A I'd say at the moment our relations are very good, so I don't see specific problems that are likely to be prominent. I think we'll certainly want to talk about the upcoming ANZUS meeting and any issues that might come up there. I certainly imagine we'll be discussing anything that comes out of the ASEAN meetings in Jakarta. Obviously, Australia has a major interest in the success of ASEAN and the stability of that region.

There are almost always trade matters, although I would note that Australia's economy is picking up very nicely, as is ours, and there's nothing that does as much to solve trade problems as an improving economy.

It probably also will include some fairly extensive review of East-West issues. The Australian Government, and Prime Minister Hawke personally, have been very interested in that matter all along; and I think they'll be quite interested to know where things stand as the time we get there.

Q Coming back to China for just a moment, have there been any case-by-case requests yet -- individual requests, specific requests, made by China for military sales; and has there been a review and approval of any of those?

A No formal requests. We're not at the stage yet of actual formal requests. We have, as we've noted in previous briefings, had very detailed discussions, particularly in the area of anti-tank missiles and improved artillery-shell production; and those discussions are proceeding along the line that would very likely lead to requests.

As I say, we're moving in this area very carefully and very slowly -- we, for the reasons I stated earlier, and the Chinese for their part because I think they want to be very certain, they want to be very careful about how they spend their money, they want to be very careful and maintain their own self-sufficiency; and I would say, finally, they don't want to be in a position of making formal requests until it's very clear that we will approve them.

Q Could you give us some idea of the time frame of the likely requests?

A I think they're possible, but only possible, within the next few months. If it took longer than that I wouldn't be surprised, but I think we're talking about roughly that time frame.

Q And, if I may, just one more follow-up on the China thing.

Will you be relaying anything, any answers to questions on the nuclear agreement? Certainly there would be some questions, I would imagine, among, well, both ANZUS and ASEAN, regarding the nuclear power agreement with China.

A We've gotten questions before, and if we get them again we'll answer them also.

Q One of the answers has to be --

A I explained when I was there, and I think it's important that they clearly understand it, that the cooperation we're talking about with China is limited to peaceful nuclear cooperation, limited to the sale of power reactors and technology of that level.

In fact, it doesn't even provide for the sale of peaceful technology that's in the so-called sensitive category of enrichment or reprocessing --

Q And won't --

A -- and so it has no impact on China's military capability. And, of course, China already has nuclear weapons and is already a nuclear power.

Q Won't the answers have to be a little bit different now to the questions about China's intent with regard to third countries and so on?

A No, I don't think they're different. I think the fact we are at the point we're at I think shows that we take very seriously the matter of having this be a tight agreement. But as far as its impact on China's capabilities, we're quite convinced that what we're providing will be limited to the peaceful area.

Q Does Shultz plan to raise as noisily this year as he did last year the issue of the American MIAs?

A Well, he wasn't noisy last year. Somebody just sort of chose to -- I think we will continue to emphasize it in fairly strong terms.

It's something, I know, that he personally feels deeply about; and I think virtually all Americans that I know of do. And I think that when the Vietnamese finally recognize that that's the case and that they will score more political points by being on this issue than by continuing to haggle, I think we will all be much better off -- politically, as well as humanitarianwise.

Q Is there anything that is forthcoming or does it stand about where it is?

A Well, at the moment it's a little bit discouraging. We had thought, after the visit of Assistant Secretary Armitage to Hanoi in -- was it late January or early February? --

VOICE: Early February.

A -- early February -- that technical discussions on this subject were going to be resumed. They were scheduled to begin in April, and the Vietnamese postponed it for technical reasons; and we hope that they will give us an appropriate date soon.

So I don't mean -- when I said "discouraging," it's simply discouraging that those talks haven't picked up again; but we would hope that they would do so shortly.

Q You mentioned the Middle East. Are you going to raise the issue of the Australia-New Zealand participation in the force or are you going to try to convince Australia to change its mind or talk to the New Zealanders about staying in?

A Certainly the participation of Australia and New Zealand in that force is a very constructive action. I think that force is key to maintaining the integrity of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, which is one of the comparatively few elements of basic stability we have in the Middle East, and it's something that all of us benefit from. And the decision by the Australian Government to, at least for now, continue their participation in that force is one that we welcome.

Anything we can do to encourage continued participation we, of course, would like to see.

Q They said they'll pull out.

A At the end of the two-year period. I'm not sure we -- besides, that's what they said; that's correct.

Q Will you be raising this specific issue?

A I don't know -- I'm not sure what specific issues we will raise. It's certainly our view that that participation is helpful, and we would see it as being indefinitely so.

Q There are some unconfirmed reports that Thailand is perhaps negotiating with China to buy some F-7s from China. Would we be apt to encourage or discourage such a sale, and how would it go with the ASEAN nations?

A That's the first I've seen of those reports, so I think until I've looked at them better I will refrain from commenting.

Q Are any agreements likely to be concluded at any of those stops or any announcements made -- such announcement on the sale of F-16s to Thailand, something like that?

A I don't anticipate any specific agreements being concluded, and certainly the question about advanced aircraft to Thailand is not in the stage where we would expect any announcements right now.

Q What is the purpose of the Secretary's trip to Hong Kong then?

A Rest. Those of you who made this trip know that it's very hard, after flying 12,000 miles and being twelve hours out of kilter, to function coherently.

Q Will he be meeting with authorities there on --

A He probably will have a dinner and meeting with the Governor there. And we certainly will be interested in hearing their assessment of the negotiations with the Chinese.

Our position is well known, and I'm glad to repeat it, that we, the United States, feel we have a very large stake in the continued prosperity and stability of Hong Kong and strongly hope that the British and the Chinese will succeed in working out an arrangement that will preserve that prosperity and stability -- but feel, also, that any direct involvement by us and the details of those negotiations would, frankly, not help achieve the very end that we're interested in seeing.

So we maintain a listening brief on the sidelines and one of strong support and encouragement for their own efforts.

Q Just one more?

A One more.

Q Can we anticipate any sort of repetition of last year's unpleasantness between Mr. Haig and the Under Secretary over the question of Viet-Nam-Kampuchea policies or haven't they talked that out?

A There must be some standard response for "when we stop beating our wives." (Laughter.)

I don't think there was that unpleasantness last year; and I think if there were shades of difference -- and it seems to me there were more shades of difference in things said on the substance that it certainly didn't reflect any personal animus or any personal tension.

So I would expect we will continue to have frank discussions of this subject. And, of course, it's the ASEAN countries who, first and foremost, have their views to present.

But I think that we've got a good strong personal relationship between the Secretary and the Foreign Minister, and I would expect that to continue.

MODERATOR: Thank you very much.

I've mentioned, by the way, that there are some background notes on the countries in ASEAN and ANZUS for anyone who needs further facts and figures.

(Whereupon, at 2:40 p.m. the BACKGROUND briefing was concluded.)

UNEDITED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ON-THE-RECORD BRIEFING
M. PETER McPHERSON, DIRECTOR /Administrator/
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
FAMINE-STRICKEN AFRICA
TUESDAY, JULY 10, 1984, 2:40 P.M.

MS. SEMERAD: I'm Kate Semerad, the head of Public Affairs for the Agency for International Development.

The White House announced today, or is about to announce today, that the President has asked Peter McPherson to take a trip to Africa to investigate the drought-stricken continent. He will be talking about that subject today.

The session is On-the-Record for both sound and camera

MR. McPHERSON: Good morning, or good afternoon, rather.

On the 30th Anniversary of the PL-40 Program, celebrated a few moments ago over at the White House with the President, talking to it and others, certainly it is appropriate to focus on the famine conditions, the circumstances there in Africa, and how the U.S. Government has and will continue to play a role in connection with this.

We are providing more food aid in this Fiscal Year to sub-Saharan Africa than we have at any time in history, exceeding even the highest levels that we provided during the Sahelian drought during the early 1970's, a drought which many of you will recall was a particularly terrible one.

To date, in this Fiscal Year, we've provided over 450 thousand ton of emergency food worth over $157 million. This is food, or resources, in connection with the drought and the disaster. This is an important distinction to make as opposed to the usual or other kinds of programs. This is disaster assistance.

This is twice as much disaster effort as we had in sub-Saharan Africa in 1983. It's three times what we're doing this year; it's three times more what we did in 1982.

Overall, our food programs to Africa -- the disaster assistance and other kind of foods that were provided -- will amount in this Fiscal Year 1.3 million ton of food valued at over $438 million.

Note, these last sets of figures are the overall figures. In the first set I gave you, the 157 million ton, is for the drought disaster.

Frankly, reports indicate that the drought is going to continue; and in some areas, remarkably worse.

In the southern part of the continent, they will continue as they've been. They've been very bad in a number of countries. In the east, where it hasn't been as bad, it looks like it can get much worse, particularly in Kenya.

Let me talk about Kenya in a few minutes. Possibly in the western part of the continent, there may be some improvement. The rain suggests that so far. But, frankly, we've become very cautious about just what the rains will do.

The four countries that I'm going to visit are Kenya, Senegal, Mozambique and Mauritania. I've been to most of these countries before, and Africa many times of course, but want to get another close view, on-the-ground view, of just what's happening to our programs and generally review, as well as get a first-hand current view of what is happening there in terms of the drought situation.

As I said, one of the countries I'll be visiting is Senegal on the western part of the continent. Senegal has been suffering a prolonged drought and food scarcity for some time. Because of insufficient rainfall last year, crop production was cut in half in all but the southermost region of the country; southern most region not being down near the Niger River. But most of the country, the food production was one-half. There are estimates that the grain import requirements have increased by about 70 percent.

We've been in the forefront of the donor response to this effort. We provided Senegal this year $13 million in food aid. In order to be sure that the food reaches the people, in addition, we've put up a million dollars for in-country distribution and transportation.

Just as an aside, it's one thing to get the food to the ports, where we sort of have control of the situation, -- careful control -- it's another thing to try to get distributed within he country where you get road problems.

We'll talk about Mozambique in a while; and in Ethiopia , we've gotten conflicts. It gets to be pretty difficult sometimes to get things around. Like in the case of Senegal, we have provided a million dollars to help get the food around in the country.

Ordinarily, we look to the country itself to provide that but in some cases we've stepped in with additional assistance to be certain of the distribution.

Mauritania, which is a Sahel country, is frankly a chronic emergency country by most standards. They've been suffering a drought since the early 1970's. As a result, they've been importing about two-thirds of their total food needs. Believe me, people in Mauritania don't eat very well. So this is two-thirds of really pre-bare minimums. There really aren't any signs of situations improving. It's a small country in population. But, nevertheless, a severe problem for those people involved.

We've provided $7.3 million of emergency food aid this year in addition to $10 on a regular program.

We'll have a handout -- several handouts -- that will get into this, but the figures I'm running through now will be there in this handout so you can easily see them and review them.

Kenya: Pretty key country, really and a fairly large country -- the Horn of Africa; one that we have a long and important relationship with It hasn't been a drought-stricken country this last year. It looked like, however, in terms of need, next year it could be one of the very worst. The so-called long rains in recent weeks have failed; simply weren't long, I guess. Didn't last long. The net result is that some observers are speculating that Kenya may be facing the worst food shortage historically that it's ever faced.

The Kenya Government and the donor community have already begun to look at this. We've talked with the Kenya Government there, our Aid Mission Director. Chuck Gladson, incidentally, until very recently was the Deputy Director for the Food For Peace Office is now the head of the Kenya program, so we'll have a special expertise in working with this situation. Some estimates are it might require as many as a half million ton of food just to prevent starvation.

I know Kenya fairly well, and I really look forward to sitting down and talking to the Kenya people, to the leadership there, and getting into where they see the drought and what the problems are, and taking a bit of a first-hand view of the situation myself.

Mozambique is a country we've been giving emergency food assistance for a couple years. A lot of it, as a matter of fact, some $20 million this year. The distribution problems have been one of the things that's held up there. You've got a civil war in the country, and you've got a number of logistical problems. Everything from flood to drought, and on and and on. To get food around the country has been quite a problem.

Frankly, we weren't happy with how it was working. So a few months ago -- indeed, the President was involved in this; we talked to the President about it at some length -- we provided a contract to CARE of $2 million to establish a logistical support system to insure that the food gets out there.

One of the things I surely will be looking at carefully is how that CARE contract for distribution operation is coming along.

We've talked quite a lot today about the emergency food situation. That has to be focused on. You can't, obviously, do anything but that. It's a long history of this country to do exactly this. But I think it's very important to be sure, as we deal with this drought, and the disasters, that we say, wait a minute, what can we do long term; how can we deal with this in such fashion that the countries do a little bit better job of taking care of themselves?

To that end a few months ago -- in this very room, as a matter of fact -- Secretary Shultz proposed the Africa Economic Policy Initiative. An initiative in which the President proposed to Congress a $500 million fund to be spread over five years, $75 million to be obtained from Congress for Fiscal '85, and that fund is really a very imaginative proposal.

That $75 million was to be used to facilitate, give a little emergency political focus to some governments who want to but have a difficult time politically making some changes

Probably the biggest problem in food production in Africa -- not the only problem; there are several of them -- but the biggest single problem in food production in Africa is that the urban-oriented politics of Africa -- that's where the military is, that's where the students are, that's where the populations are; the populations that can riot, and on and on -- the urban-oriented politics, and in a lot of countries there isn't really much of any participation in the political process by rural communities . Almost entirely urban oriented.

The net effect is that the politicans wish to provide cheap food for those urban groups that can riot, and so forth. They're not necessarily broke in many cases. The only way to get cheap food is to hold the price that they allow the farmer to get substantially below market prices. But by holding the price substantially below market prices, there's been a major disincentive to production; not to say that, in effect, a discriminatory tax is involved, but a major disincentive to producing.

For at least ten years, perhaps fifteen -- our figures aren't all that great -- but for at least fifteen, every year the per capita food production in sub-Sahara Africa has been going down. That's an astonishing figure when you think about it.

If you could reverse that policy so as to allow those farmers to get market prices, or something more, you would clearly be able to help countries to be in a better position to help themselves. So this fund is to be used, in effect, to negotiate with countries to say, wait a minute, why don't you raise your prices to your farmers this year, we'll provide a little money or a little political cushion to make it so it's easier in the transition. This, I think, is one of the more imaginative proposals that have come out concerning the whole problem of African food production for many years.

I think that it is useful to talk about it in the context of this emergency drought because the drought is primarily due to weather, but if they had better program policy production in place, they would be better able to handle that themselves. Not totally, perhaps, but better able to.

So with those remarks, I'm happy to be here today and I look forward to going to Africa again to look over the situation, and, of course, would like your questions.

(Continued on next pages.)

Q The first one, mechanical: When do you leave?

A Saturday.

Q Saturday?

A Yes.

Q A larger question: As you describe it, does not your short-term emergency food program work to defeat the long-range insentive that you just talked about? If cheap food is a disincentive to farmers for growing food, wouldn't free food be an even bigger disincentive?

A Well, it certainly would be if you weren't careful. If, however, as is the case in many countries, where food production is half what it was before because of weather, then providing free food for the next period doesn't appear to be a disincentive. We're very careful about that.

On the other hand, if we would go to a country and say, "We're going to provide free food for the next two or three years, regardless of your own production," as opposed to closely tieing it what people produce and what their needs are, we clearly would be.

There's something called the Belman method, which is part of the PL 480 legislation, that says we have to look at whether or not the food we provide to a country is a disincentive to local production when we consider these programs.

I would say this sensitivity is one that just continually must be monitored, and I don't say it's a closed issue. I do believe that for now, in places like Mozambique and others where you've clearly got just destitute people, it is a problem. But I'm concerned about it over over a period of time and have dealt with it several times in the three-and-a-half years I've run this program.

Sir?

Q You're having a lot of trouble getting the economic-policy initiatives through Congress. Why do you think that is and what do you think should be done?

A Well, actually we've had unanimous, virtually, support excpet for one committee -- and, in many ways, an individual, particularly, within that committee. The Foreign Affairs Committees, both in the House and the Senate, without dissent passed the economic-policy initiative -- in other words, authorized it.

Now, it came before Senator Kasten's Subcommittee on Appropriations -- Foreign Op Subcommittee -- and Senator Kasten asked some questions about it and frankly felt that at this time he should not support it.

Now, I view Senator Kasten's position as one to be subject to ongoing discussions.

And in view of the broad support this has -- the broad bipartisan support, really, in Congress -- I believe that this is a matter which we can work through.

Sir?

Q Why have you selected these countries in particular to visit when there are always so many more who are also afflicted by the draught?

A Well, first of all, Kenya -- I think perhaps it's reasonably clear why we select Kenya -- because this is a disaster about to happen, if you will. And we think the dimensions of it may be very great, indeed, and sizably a portion of the whole in another year.

Now, Mozambique has frankly had one of the most severe problems -- not so much because their production was markedly less than some other areas; I think several countries in the Sahel, for example, had just as great production problems -- but, rather, the logistical difficulties were much, much more severe. Both Ethiopia and Mozambique have perhaps been our most severe logistical situations, and we've got a contract in place to try to deal with this problem and I want to go and see how it's working.

Senegal, Mauritania, are part of the Sahel -- the traditional area of draught -- and are, of course, on the eastern side of the Continent; and it makes sense to take a look there too.

But Mozambique and Kenya in many ways stand out as having unique situations to look at.

Still, what I've done, of course, is I've looked at some problems on the east side of the Continent. I've looked on the east side and Kenya on the west, and Senegal and so forth, and then the south to try to get a bit of a broad view.

I don't need the facts as much as I need to see and talk to the people. The facts are ones which are very competently and steadily put together by our field and by the Food for Peace Office headed by Julie Bloch, who's here today as a matter of fact, our Assistant Administrator for Food for Peace; Terry Lambacher, in charge of the Food for Peace Program.

What I need though is to get a feel.

We're dealing here with sub-Saharan Africa. I might mention that last week, Thursday and Friday, I was in Morocco -- which we sort of think of as northern Africa, of course, not so much Africa. But Morocco has got some real drought problems, and we've provided a lot of drought assistance there.

You go out there and you walk around, wherein sometimes past you'd have a decent amount of grass, and, you know, it looks like a beach. I mean a little stubble here is sticking out there and there that's colorless. And the dust -- I walked into a little Moroccan village last week. And in Morocco's Islamic society you can't sort of walk in hoses and knock on doors. Men are there, but it's not quite the thing to do.

But I talked to children through an interpreter and moved around. I mean it was really uncomfortable because the dust got in your eyes, in which it almost seemed like an American dust-bowl situation.

I wasn't around for that, as I don't think most of you people were -- or any of you -- but, still, the drought is real. It's hard to imagine how these people can continue to deal with it as they have so well.

Q Could I just as a follow-up on that? I was just wondring, for instance, why you weren't visiting Zimbabwe, which is now going into a food-deficit situation. I wondered whether it was because of problems the U.S. hae been having with its food-aid program to Zimbabwe and the distribution in Matabeleland.

A Well -- no. The reason for not visiting Zimbabwe are that, you know, we just need to select certain places; and other places, as a result, don't get selected to go to, I suppose. But it's positive as to Senegal, Kenya, and so forth.

We have been concerned about being sure that food was distributed throughout Zimbabwe and have expressed our strong view to the Zimbabwan Government that that be the case. We had been assured that it would be. And, in fact, to the best of our information at this time, food is being distributed appropriately and non-discriminatorily throughout the country, to the best of our knowledge.

What you find in disasters -- and I found this both in Lebanon, when we were dealing with that man-made disaster, if you will, and in drought and so forth, is you have to continue to monitor it and because problems sort of jump up.

There's no way to systematically, sort of, completely organize it, the way we would do in America. If something were here, you'd have to watch it, get signals where problems are, and gulp.

(Cont'd on next page.)

Q What's the status of the $90 million that was appropriated or in the Supplemental just a couple weeks ago?

A We have committed that full $90 million.

Q Did you already have the $75 million when the Secretary General announced that fund? You wanted $75 million for the first year and you already had that, or did you have to get it?

A I am not sure just which $75 million you mean

Q Oh, I thought that --

A It is the $90 million, perhaps

Q Oh, that was $90 million, the initial?

A Yes.

Q Oh, I'm sorry. I thought it was 75.

A We were able to draw upon other funds in a fashion that we could largely obligate the $90 million in anticipation of Congress giving it to us, and that's why just a few weeks after Congress has given it to us, it's all gone. We now have another $60 million which we haven't used which Congress has allowed us to utilize -- I mean, Congress has given it to us. That was just passed. Congress has allowed us to obligate that, not as the usual procedure would be, just through the end of this Fiscal Year, but through March of '85.

In short, we think that we have the monies available to do things. There's something else that I think is worth talking a few moments about, though, so I'd like to -- the President just announced a food initiative, and I'd like to, however, speak of that, not for attribution, as is customary when the President makes an announcement that same day. As you well understand, Administration officials don't stand up and be extensively quoted by name in connection with that, but it seems like it wouldn't be fully candid with you to spend all this time about Food for Peace and then not talk about that. Unless there's other questions about the general situation, let me move in -- Jim?

Q I just have one. Are you likely to sign some PL 480 contracts before --

A No. I don't think so. It's not that -- that isn't the goal.

ON BACKGROUND

A You've got this right here, do you not? (Referring to handout)

Q Yes.

A Let me see it one second. (Journalist handed copy to Briefer) What the President said -- and a fact sheet is available at the White House -- again, this needs to be NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION -- was a five-point initiative. I'm sure we can make copies of this, can't we Kate? We've got copies here. We'll make some available with our packet if you want them.

But the five points are a prepositioning of grain in selected areas in Africa. It takes from 60 to 90 days to get food from here to Africa. We were just down to Norfolk loading up a ship this morning, Secretary Block and myself, that was going off to Senegal and Benin. It takes 60 to 90 days to get food there. That's quite a long time. The Europeans, incidentally, traditionally don't get food there nearly that rapidly, but if you're going to respond to emergencies, you've got to have something that works. We're not prepared to announce locations, but we are discussing with countries the prepositioning of food.

We have done prepositioning, by the way, for some time in disaster assistance. For example, we have tents and blankets and that kind of stuff prepositioned in Italy that we've moved around and that were flown to Lebanon at the time of the Lebanon disaster emergency help. That's one.

Two, a special $50 million Presidential fund that can be drawn on as emergencies require. This would be a fund that we'd set up now. We're not suggesting we need the money right this minute, but we have found, like the Kenyans and so forth, you can never tell for sure, and that fund would -- we would have to ask Congress for the authority to operate that fund in the flexible manner that we would desire. So we would expect to, as I say, ask Congress for their help.

Third, there would be a method that would allow us to pay for ocean transport -- PL 480 -- when a country was in position so they really need that kind of help. You'll see the detail or you can ask questions if you want.

Fourth, the creation of a Government task force to better forecast food shortages and needs. We have, of course, struggled with this for some time, but, frankly, we're not satisfied that we've got these forecasts down to the extent we need to. We think that we can pull together some people within the government and perhaps outside that can take a close look at our methods to perhaps get a better fix in advance.

And, fifth, establishment of an advisory committee of business leaders who can help us think through this in terms of the overall agricultural situation.

Any questions about this matter on which, as I say again, I do not want to be quoted?

Q About how many places would you imagine? Maybe just one East Coast prepositioning place and one West, one in South Africa, or --

A When you think about prepositioning, you think about closer locations, and, obviously, with no roads in Africa, relatively speaking, you don't talk about prepositioning something inland. Basically, you'd look at population centers, you'd look at a way to get into the Sahel, you'd look at a way to get in the south. So it leaves one option: It will be to look at the manner that you suggested. But you basically look at coastal logistical efforts.

Q Does this explain the $50 million, like where it comes from and all that?

A A little bit. It explains it to the extent that the Administration is prepared now to -- it doesn't explain the detail, but it does give a general description.

Q This will be an additional $50 million over what's already authorized?

A The $50 million that -- at least for now we would think about allocating from within overall foreign assistance, current level, but the method and from where they'd be taken is not set forth as of this moment.

Q Okay. Thank you.

A Ladies and gentlemen. Nice to be here.

(The briefing concluded at 3:11 p.m.)

FILE COPY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
EL SALVADOR
FRIDAY, JULY 13, 1984, 11:08 A.M.

SENIOR OFFICIAL: Good morning. I would like to begin just by giving a little background on the origin and nature of the document that has been distributed to you.

I'm sure that you're all familiar with the practice of submitting semi-annual reports to the Congress, which began following enactment of the Foreign Assistance Legislation in 1981, which mandated periodic certification with respect to various issues about the situation in El Salvador.

That certification requirement covered human rights, control over the armed forces, elections, land reform, progress in the cases of murdered American citizens, and so forth.

The legislation expired at the end of the fiscal year 1983 and Congress passed a free-standing bill that would have continued it in effect in fiscal year 1984 until new legislation was enacted.

The President last November declined to approve that free-standing bill and it did not become law. Nevertheless, the Administration undertook to provide voluntary reports on the situation in El Salvador, adhering to the similar six-month schedule that had been followed, under the certification legislation and covering the same subject matter.

The first such report was submitted in January and we distributed it to the press -- and I think had a similar BACKGROUND session at that time.

Subsequently, the Congress did enact **new** legislation in the urgent supplemental appropriation approved on July 2nd, Public Law 98-332. That legislation appropriates 61.75 million dollars in additional military assistance for El Salvador and conditions the obligation of those funds upon the submission of a report from the President to the Congress stating the President's determination that El Salvador's Government has demonstrated progress with regard to land reform, elections, freedom of association, the rule of law, and termination of activities of death squads.

In addition to that determination, the Congress required that the report describe the progress in particular aspects of military training, medical evacuation, and U.S. military assistance programs.

The authority to provide that determination and

and report, as in the case of previous requirements under the law, was delegated to the Secretary of State by the President and the Acting Secretary of State -- Kenneth Dam -- signed the determination and approved and transmitted the report to the Congress yesterday.

Now, the table of contents -- you know, I will not try to go through this lengthy document with you but commend it to your careful reading as time permits.

I would point out that the table of contents identifies with an asterisk each of the items that the legislation requires be addressed and also includes the other elements that we have traditionally included in reports to the Congress and the public on the situation in El Salvador so that those particular required elements can be considered in the broader context of the overall situation.

With that structural introduction, I would open the floor to your questions.

Q You say here that there are indications of a major guerrilla offensive later this year. What are those indications?

A Well, this really gets into intelligence sources and methods and I can't address those specifically.

We can state the general conclusion, which is stated there. It's been stated in a number of public statements by senior officials of this Government and the Salvadoran Government that we see and hear indications that the guerrillas intend to launch a new offensive later this year.

Apart from specific intelligence information, it would also be consistent with the pattern that this conflict has had over several years -- in which there have been sporadic offensives and then the periods when the guerrillas were not as active across the board.

Q But you can't be specific about that.

A I can't be specific and say what our sources of intelligence are and that sort of thing, no.

Q Can you be more specific about the increased U.S. military assistance that the report calls for? In immediately following that conclusion about a major guerrilla offensive, are you talking about strictly the amount of money that the Administration has asked for to date?

A Yes. Let me say that the report identifies a number of areas where the Government of El Salvador is working. We believe it is making progress. With regard to economic recovery, we did see a leveling off of what had been a rather drastic decline over several years.

With respect to land reform, we've seen over the last few months a substantial increase in definitive titles being issued to the beneficiaries in the Land to the Tiller Program. That means that the former owners have received compensation, which is a condition for the definitive title being issued.

We have seen some progress in the administration of justice, and we have seen some progress in the conduct -- increased professionalization and performance by the military in protecting the elections and taking the offensive to the guerrillas in the eastern part of the country.

All of these things are resource-dependent.

The Report of the Bipartisan Commission on Central America was submitted last January, and it seems in some ways to have become history. But I would like to remind you that there is legislation before the Congress that passed the House in May -- we hope that the Senate will take it up in July -- that calls for a substantial increase, not just for El Salvador but a substantial increase in resources -- both economic and security assistance -- for the countries of Central America.

For FY '84, we have a supplemental appropriation request for El Salvador of 134 million in economic assistance and 178 million in military assistance. This urgent supplemental that was passed to meet the most immediate needs provides a little under 62 million dollars. So there's a substantial portion of our supplemental request that remains unfulfilled, and we think that prompt action on that would be a major boost for the ability of the Duarte Government to achieve its objectives -- some of which are outlined in the appendices to this report -- and to preserve and advance a more secure environment in which you can have things like the land reform go forward where these farms can be productive and not have the farmers chased away by the guerrillas.

Q If I can follow up on that, just to be clear, so the amount of money that is in that original supplemental request is the total amount of money that you're asking as a result of this report. You're not planning to come in with an additional supplemental.

A This report does not contemplate any new or different legislative or funding requests. The President submitted in February a legislative proposal and a request for supplemental appropriations and a budget amendment for fiscal year 1985. And it is that legislative program and that budget that Congress has taken only this partial action on thus far and on which we hope they will complete action in this session.

Q Speaking of the 62 million dollars that the

Congress already approved, is the State Department going to use 32 million dollars of that to replenish the Pentagon stocks?

A Well, the short answer is "Yes"; but let me just clarify technically what is involved here.

In the period that the Salvadoran army was seeking to protect the elections and maintain some security in the countryside, we were dealing with a situation where the amount of money available for military assistance was about half what it was last year; and Congress was asked to take quick action on the emergency needs.

It did not complete that action at the time of the Easter recess. And the President, after consulting with Congress, approved sales to the Government of El Salvador of about 32 million dollars in equipment, training, ammunition, and other consumable supplies, to tide them over while Congress completed action on this appropriation.

Now, that 32 million dollars in material was sold out of the stocks of the Defense Department and the training resources that were provided.

The Government of El Salvador signed contracts promising to pay, and those bills become due within a hundred-and-twenty days after delivery -- well, they become due when they are delivered, and they must be paid within a hundred-and-twenty days.

So the first 32 million will be used to pay those bills of the Government of El Salvador under those sales contracts, and that leaves then about 20 -- what is it? -- 29.7 million left for additional procurement and training for the Salvadoran armed forces. Our request and the need is for substantial additional resources.

Q Does the indictment of the killers of the church-women release the 22 million dollars, and who judges that? Does the State Department make the decision on it?

A Well, it's a question of fact. What the law said was that -- I go closer to nineteen million that was held back --

Q Yes.

A -- under the terms of the continuing resolution that was enacted last November. That said that 30 percent of the amount allocated for El Salvador -- which turned out to be about 19 million dollars -- could not be spent until there had been a verdict in that case.

Well, there has been a verdict -- the unanimous verdict by a Salvadoran jury. The verdict was that they were guilty. And the five defendants were subsequently sentenced by the judge to serve -- although there were cumulative sentences because of multiple counts, the maximum sentence that is permissible under Salvadoran law is 30 years, and they've all been sentenced to that 30 years with no possibility of parole.

Q Well, that's new money then that goes to --

A Well, it's old money that was held --

Q Yes.

A -- sort of in escrow that has become available and has been put to use.

Q With all these different categories, I can see that you're going to have 30 people walk out of here with 30 different figures for the total aid package to El Salvador.

Could you go through both economic and military for this year?

A Yes. I could, in a summary way, say that under the continuing resolution -- maybe we can do the military first, to take this 19 million while everybody's got that in mind. The continuing resolution provided 64.8 million dollars. Nineteen million of that was held back until there was a verdict in the churchwomen's case.

That verdict was entered in May and the 19 million dollars became available.

O.K.?

Q Yes.

A The Administration requested a supplemental appropriation of 178.7 million, in addition to the 64.8 that had already been appropriated.

That, by the way, carries through on a recommendation of the Bipartisan Commission and was part of the package of recommendations that was sent to the Congress in February -- including substantial increased economic assistance as well -- and Congress has acted on the urgent part of that 178.7 by appropriating 61.7.

So the difference between 178.7 and 61.7 is the amount of the amount of the supplemental that Congress has not yet appropriated and which we would like them to act on.

On the economic assistance side, the continuing resolution provided for El Salvador 198.6 million and the supplemental appropriation request that was a part of this comprehensive package to implement the Bipartisan Commission requested for El Salvador an additional 134 million for this fiscal year.

Congress has not acted on any of that, which is a matter of considerable concern to us, and -- I might add --

to the new government that is trying to begin to implement its programs without much in the bank.

Q And the 120 ESF is part of that 198.6?

A Now, where did you get that number?

Q Well, it was, you know, on a piece of paper I had.

The ESF for this year requested was 120 million, wasn't it?

A For El Salvador?

Q Yes.

A Ninety, in the supplemental. A hundred-and-twenty is what was already provided under the continuing resolution in ESF.

I gave you gross economic assistance figures.

Q Yes.

A That includes -- if you want to break down the economic assistance, I'll do it. But let me just give you ESF.

It's 120 million in the continuing resolution, an additional 90 requested in the supplemental.

Q Well, that surprised me.

A Please, somebody ask me a question without any numbers in it. (Laughter.)

Q Well, this is a numbers question.

What I think you told us is that altogether, if Congress doesn't act, the Salvadoran military assistance for this fiscal year will be 120 million dollars -- which is far more and which is the highest level it's ever been; isn't that right?

A No.

Q O.K. Are you talking about military assistance?

A Military assistance.

Q You're talking about military assistance. It adds up to the 64.8, plus the 61.7.

A A hundre d and twenty-five.

Q You're saying that's what has already been provided.

A O.K. That adds up, for a fiscal year, of 122-123 million --

Q Yes.

A -- and it had been--in the last couple of years,80-odd million had been the level.

And as to why the substantial increase, I would refer you to tha report of the Bipartisan Commission -- which pointed out that we are seeking to encourage the substantial transformation of the armed forces of El Salvador to enable them to conduct humane counter-insurgency strategy in opposing a guerrilla force that has substantial external support, both on the training and command-and-control side -- and also on the military-supply side.

The programs of military assistance that we have had in the report that we're submitting to Congress now highlights in several ways the changes in performance within the Salvadoran army.

Now, that's largely a matter of political will, I think, for which we in the United States can't claim credit. But I think we've seen quite a change in the performance of the Salvadoran army over the last couple of years. And I think that our training and our materiel support have contributed to that.

It would be, I think, erroneous and somewhat chauvinistic of us to say that we deserve the credit for their improved performance, because they're the ones who are out there facing the guerrillas. But I think that our military assistance programs have made a substantial contribution and that there's room for a lot more to be done; and they certainly need additional resources to have the mobility, to have the communications capability, to have the training to carry out the strategies that their leadership is committed to -- and do it in an effective way and protect the economy and the population.

Q Is there a correlation between this increased professionalism of the military and the drop in the number of, as you say, incidents of politically motivated violence?

A There's no statistical way you can make that kind of a correlation. I just -- you know, I don't know to --

Q Let me make sure that I did this right. You list the term 93 there for incidents of politically motivated violences.

A That's a monthly average --

Q Is that deaths?

A -- over the last five months.

Those are deaths, yes.

Q And did you use the same methodology this time around that you used before?

A We have used the same methodology consistently since 1980, which is to rely on published reports of non-combat deaths of civilians in the Salvadoran press. And we've been through, I know, on other occasions -- and the report comments, to some extent, on the fact that there are other organizations that use different methodologies. We include a chart that has two lines on it. One line is the numbers -- that is, a composite of the private organizations which tend to show higher numbers. And one is our line, based on the press report, which tends to show lower numbers.

But by whatever methodology you use, it is interesting and somewhat encouraging to see that both lines follow a similar trend.

Q What is the comparable --I mean you have 93 against figures earlier last year and six months ago, but what's the comparable number for the Tutela Legal?

A Well, I don't know that we have Tutela Legal as such. We have the composite figure that shows it's over 200.

Q Right.

A We do then have an appendix on Tutela Legal methodology --

Q Right.

A -- which indicates that it appears that, at least to some extent, they also rely on press reports --

Q Right.

A -- and then pick them up in their figures.

Q Right. I guess my question is: Would Tutela Legal show the same comparative decrease? Tutela Legal, as your figures show it.

A You were at the chart there in your own copy, and that top line is a composite that includes Tutela Legal and several others.

I think the short answer to your question is "Yes." If you took each of the private organizations separately, the line wouldn't be quite the line that you have on the chart, but all of the lines would be moving in the same direction -- downward, yes.

Q Can I come back to the military aid for just a second?

Is the Administration considering using its own Air Force to bring air strikes into --

A No.

Q -- El Salvador?

A No.

Q Is it considering using Honduran air force flights to accomplish that goal?

A No. And I'm going to make clear I'm not going to talk about contingency planning, which was a question that was addressed in one of the newspapers this morning. And there are all kinds of contingency plans, but we don't have any plans to do either of those things.

Q If those things came about without contingency plans or without the plans -- whatever -- (laughter) -- if those things came about, would the funding for that come out of the supplemental requests?

A If something that we don't plan to do were to come about, it would be because we then changed our mind; and I'll have to address that on some other occasion -- if something came about. I just can't deal with something that's that hypothetical, I'm sorry.

Q Well, it's not included in the contingency package.

A No. The money that we have requested for military assistance to El Salvador, without planning to do the kinds of things that you refer to, is not intended to be used to do those things. I mean I just can't deal with it.

Q Can you say anything, or does the report say anything, about whether the flow of arms from Nicaragua -- which used to be such a big thing around here -- no longer exists -- or is there anything in there on that?

And, also, are the rebels still getting -- how much of U.S. weaponry goes to the rebels?

A We do address in the report that the reports that we have on lost or captured weapons from the Salvadoran forces are really quite low. And we do not think that there is a disproportionate loss of weapons to the Salvadoran guerrillas by the armed forces.

It was interesting to hear a former guerrilla, who's been in town this week on one of the radio shows, say that he was told by his leaders to claim that the weapons were bought from corrupt officers and that sort of thing when, in fact, they had been shipped in from Nicaragua -- just an interesting sidelight; There's no need to get into statistical information here on that other than the reported loss rate, I think, from the Salvadoran armed forces is about seven-percent loss for small arms.

Q I'll --

Q Just to follow up on that, Fred Ikle testified before Congress that 40 percent of the guerrilla arms, he thought, were formerly Salvadoran army equipment. Does this represent a change in that number?

A Well; all of these numbers are very soft numbers. The fact that we have a seven-percent loss rate reported doesn't tell us how many losses aren't reported. The fact that you have a study for one region for one short period of time that comes up with that 40-percent number doesn't mean that that's a valid number for the country as a whole or over a sustained period of time.

It's also important to bear in mind that the guerrillas doesn't have as many arms as the Salvadoran armed forces do and to say that 40 percent of the guerrilla arms came from the government is not the same as saying that 40 percent of the arms we sent to the government went to the guerrillas.

So we think -- you know, there are some arms that have gone to the guerrillas. We don't think that that is as serious a problem as some have suggested it to be.

Q And do you think there's an improvement in that situation?

A Improvement -- I think that the one thing you can say is that we do know that some of the guerrillas who have turned themselves in and who have been captured have complained of shortages and have had relatively small amounts of ammunition on their person -- which suggests that something is working. Either the interdiction is working or the loss rate is down. But that's sort of anecdotal.

I'm very leery of statistics in this subject because we're really dealing with unknown efforts to conceal facts and the guerrillas have an interest in distorting those facts.

I think, as -- was it Montenegro? -- was recounting, if you give credence to that, it would suggest that you shouldn't believe everything that you hear.

Q Mr. Duarte has been President a month now --

A Yes.

Q -- and the Archdiocese said just the other day that there were 134 deaths in June.

I'm wondering: Have you seen any improvement in that month he's been in office? Can you look at anything statistically and say it's better or not any different or the same -- or worse?

A I'd say first of all it's too soon to tell. I think that the report -- you know, six months from now -- will be a more interesting opportunity to assess how successful President Duarte has been in implementing his program. I don't think there's much serious question about his intentions.

I would urge you to look at his inaugural address, which is excerpted in the back of this report; and the question is: Will he be successful in carrying out his intentions?

And I don't think we're going to be able to tell on the basis of one month.

Now, as to the specific point of deaths, I don't think it was the Archdiocese but it was Tutela Legal that made the assertion. And that's one of these that doesn't have anything behind it other than a number.

I don't know that that is an accurate number, based on what we have seen in analyzing the numbers that have been used. You have to take -- you know, approach that with some suspicion as to its accuracy. I think President Duarte was asked about it the other day and said: "Does anybody have any information? Who are these people who were killed?"

From what we know, we don't see, in the first month of the Duarte Administration, a major turn-around for the worst in terms of civilian violence. Whether the favorable trend, that has been continuing for some time now, will continue, will be accelerated -- whether it will be aborted and turn sour -- you can't tell on the basis of one month what the next six months or the next year of the Duarte Administration will have.

Q On the other side --

Q I'd like to follow on that, excuse me.

You didn't answer the -- you don't have anything in the report on whether you're still getting anything in from Nicaragua? Has that been slowed to a trickle down to a mob or something?

A We have various reports. I think we will have something that we'll be able to put out sometime in the near future about Nicaraguan support.

We have no doubt of the continuation. It is something that ebbs and flows. It is something that is carried out in a manner that is attempted to be hidden from us and from the Salvadorans, and I do not have -- you know, I can't give you statistics on rounds of ammunition or numbers of rifles -- or we can't have charts on something like that.

Q Can I just follow on that?

MODERATOR: We have time for one more.

A O.K. This is the only thing to heaven. (Laughter.)

Q The question back -- of human rights again. Yesterday, as well as the Tutela Legal figures, two Salvadorean human-rights groups charged that the Duarte Government, since coming into office, is persecuting them directly in attempting to hush their demands by threatening and intimidating them through various measures.

Do you think that -- in your mind, is there any evidence now that that is not the case?

A That's a nice question. (Laughter.)

I just don't know of that particular allegation.

From what I know of President Duarte, my own impressions of him as a human being, my knowledge of people that he has put into responsible positions in his government, I find that an incredible assertion. This seems out of character with the man who, I think, is a true proponent of human rights -- who wants to see a better country for the people of El Salvador and is going to work very hard to achieve that.

So I'm surprised at that assertion. I know nothing about it, and it seems to me out of character.

Q Yes. Well, specifically, they charged that the military has kidnapped human-rights activists from two groups and that former political prisoners who had been given amnesty had been killed by the army after being let out.

A Well, anybody can say anything, obviously; and maybe the fact that they're able to say those things in El Salvador is itself some cause for comfort that freedom of speech is alive and well.

But I hadn't heard that before and I just can't comment on it.

I could say on the military the report refers to the newer ESF procedures that were inaugurated in December requiring that arresting officers be in uniform or identify themselves -- that notification go to the Human Rights Commission, to families and the Red Cross.

And we know that measures have been taken to enforce those procedures and that they're generally being followed and there's a policy of the Duarte Government to continue them in effect.

So all of this, you know, seems to run counter to that specific allegation; but I can't confirm or deny it because I haven't heard of it before.

Q O.K., thank you.

(Whereupon, at 11:44 a.m., the BACKGROUND briefing was concluded.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO THE CARIBBEAN SUMMIT

July 16, 1984

The Briefing Room

10:34 A.M. EDT

MR. SIMS: All right. This briefing will be on BACKGROUND, attributable to a Senior Administration Official and for your information only, not for publication.

We're handing out the tentative summary schedule for your information now. We'll have more information Wednesday when we put out the full schedule.

Q Why can't we be on the record?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All right. We've got coming up what constitutes a first for the Caribbean region, in that the -- virtually all of the heads of government for that region are going to gather together, starting tomorrow night, the 17th and closing at midday on the 19th, at the University of South Carolina, down in Columbia.

At the invitation of the university which, through its President, Doctor James Holderman, communicated to us back in January, beginning of the year, that he felt, they felt that it was -- the events of 1983 had focused attention, in sort of a new way, on the -- on the Caribbean. And that this would be an opportunity to take a look -- for the leaders of the Caribbean -- to take a look at the situation that they faced in the -- in the coming years. And so, they began this initiative in January; they are the organizers of the Conference. They've been the one's who're doing the invitations.

We have been supportive from the outset. We thought it was a good idea and had liked it. There -- we are -- are really participating observers or observing participants, in that there are a series of meetings, which I'll go into in a little bit, where, basically, it's only the Caribbean heads who meet. Then there is -- there'll be a session where a high level team from the Executive Branch, representing a number of agencies, will get together with those heads in private sessions and discuss matters of common interest.

And then, the U.S. participation will culminate when the President comes down on the 19th and has a private -- fully private session with the leaders; a working session. And then participates further in a working lunch with them and then, I think, as your summary schedule probably shows, makes some remarks, along with some of the leaders.

We see this as a chance to encourage what is really going to be a major answer to the -- the long term -- to the future of that Caribbean region, which is, with -- with 20 million people, some 250 little plots of ground, little islands down there, that -- that these people have got to work together, we think, if they're going to -- to satisfy the basic aspirations of their populations, of the people of the region. There is just no way that external assistance or involvement is going to solve those basic problems. Those people have to do it together, they've got to get together and work.

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Now, we're coming out of -- or they, literally, are coming out of the NASA, CARICOM heads meeting; that's the Caribbean common market, which has thirteen members,

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but there'll be others at this meeting who are not members of that group. There's no single regional organization down there that is -- has as its -- has full membership from all those Caribbean states.

So, we see this as an opportunity to encourage these people to continue and expand the cooperation that will allow them to look at seriously some of the very real challenges they face.

And those challenges are two kinds: They've got security challenges in that there has consistently been a low level of -- but active one -- of radical political activity in a region which by and large is marked by the existence of democratic governments which have -- are marked by governments in power, loyal opposition, all the rest, and where you've had peaceful changes of government over the years without any great difficulty. Most of them, as you know, are based on the European parliamentary, democratic model. They don't follow our system.

But they've got basic democratic institutions. Those institutions work to a greater and lesser degree. We think that that's the basis for an awful lot of hope for the future.

Then, we have a series of economic problems for the region. And you'll be getting some more detail on this, as I understand it -- probably the next day or two -- in the form of handouts. But you've got growing populations in small islands and highly educated populations compared to most of the less developed world. Some of these islands are running 90, 95 percent literacy -- again, education systems which are really out of the 19th century, in some cases. And there's nothing really wrong with that, I guess, except that they're preparing a lot of young people for university educations, and they don't prepare very many engineers or technicians or computer programmers and that sort of thing. So, they've got those kinds of problems.

The -- We see this meeting as the opportunity for the leaders themselves -- and that's the way the University wanted to set it up -- was, in effect, give them the chance in shirt-sleeves and informally to meet together, walk around together, talk together. And I think that it has every prospect of giving that opportunity. And we have encouraged it.

It starts off -- I'll give you -- let me give you just a quick rundown of the schedule. That won't take long, and then I'll give you a list of the -- I'll read through the participants for you. But that's still somewhat tentative.

Tomorrow evening, they arrive -- I think at this juncture of those who've accepted -- virtually all will arrive tomorrow. So, they'll have an evening event, a Southern barbecue, and -- given by the University. Then, they get up in the morning on Wednesday; they have a session really that takes them through the whole morning. It's going to be -- the working sessions will be chaired by Prime Minister Eugenia Charles from Dominica whom some of you may have met before. There's a working lunch, and at that lunch, subject to confirmation, our Treasury Secretary Mr. Regan will make some very informal remarks. Then, he runs a session which is really a discussion of debt, economic restructuring for the region.

Then, the afternoon, from roughly 2:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m., we have a combined working session which will be chaired by John Compton, Prime Minister of St. Lucia, who will work closely with Acting Secretary of State Dam who heads the U.S. support team which will go into a wide range of issues. The team has representatives from Commerce, OPIC -- the Overseas Private Insurance Corporation -- AID, and, of course, State Department. That evening -- there will be a press briefing that afternoon by the Caribbean Chairpersons Charles and Compton

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Then that evening there is a reception and a dinner at which the University Choir will sing. I'm told that's a very good thing.

Then on Thursday morning, the delegations meet again at a working breakfast, which U.S. Trade Representative Brock will hold forth. That session will be chaired from the Caribbean side by Nicholas Brathwaite, who's Chairman of Grenada's Interim Government, Interim Advisory Council.

Then starting around mid-morning, President Reagan arrives and you all can pick up on that schedule that you have for that.

Q Is the Regan and the Bill Brock session open to press coverage?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. No, none of those working sessions will be open to the press or to public.

Let's see. Coming -- if you don't have this already, just very quickly -- Antigua and Barbuda, it'll be the Deputy Prime Minister Lester Bird; from Barbardos, the Foreign Minister is going to represent Prime Minister Tom Adams, who has a bi-election on the 19th that he considers very important.

From Dominica, we have Prime Minister Charles, as I mentioned; President Salvador Jorge Blanco, whom some of you have met before, will be there from the Dominican Republic; Nick Brathwaite from Grenada. The Haitians will send their UN Permanent Representative. It's kind of interesting to even have Haiti show up at something like this. The University was anxious to get some representation. And, as some of you probably know, the President, Jean-Claude Duvalier, I don't think has left the country for many, many years. I think since he was 17 or something.

Q I don't blame him. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Anyway, Prime Minister Seaga from Jamaica, Prime Minister Kennedy Simmonds from St. Kitts-Nevis --

Q He's afraid he'll lose his job.

Q Could I ask Bob if --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q -- he could get this list out to us?

MR. SIMS: Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Can we get this list?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

St. Lucia, Compton.

Then, the -- you know there are a group of still dependent but self-governing, virtually autonomous states in

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the region: Anguilla, the British Virgin Islands, Netherlands Antilles, Turks and Caicos. They're going to be represented by their heads of government, the chief minister or prime minister, as he's called, in that area.

And we will have representatives from Puerto Rico and from the U.S. Virgin Islands, as well.

The French dependencies, Martinique and Guadalupe and French Guiana, have been invited and the University is working with Paris on their participation. If it happens, it's my understanding it would be the prefect and the head of the National Assembly from each French dependency.

Q What's the count, basically?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The count?

Q The count.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What is the total now? We're up to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- fifteen.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Fifteen.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Fifteen from the Caribbean.

Q What about Guyana?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Guyana has not accepted the invitation.

Q Is Castro invited?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon me?

Q Castro?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. The University did not invite Cuba.

Q Why?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Speculation: Probably didn't think it --

Q Would he have been allowed to come?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: was conducive to --

Q Would he have gotten a visa to come?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Interesting question. (Laughter.)

Q Suriname --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Suriname was invited and had indicated that the Prime Minister would attend, told the University the he would attend, but then got word that since Lt. Col. Bouterse, who's the -- I guess, the head of state, was going to be out of the country, the Prime Minister felt that he should not be and he really didn't choose to send a representative. So, they will not attend.

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Q Is this supposed to be a celebration of the Grenada invasion? I notice the President's going on the day that Grenada is on the agenda.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On Grenada? Oh, you mean, just -- Oh, because Chairman Brathwaite is chairing that breakfast? No, they're different. The President won't attend that. But, no, it is not supposed to be a celebration of Grenada.

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It was interesting that at their CARICOM heads of government in Nassau, Grenada wasn't discussed. We really don't expect it to be a major item here.

Q Did you mention Trinidad and Tobago?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They were invited and have not accepted.

Q Will we have any new initiatives to offer?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Well, what are the security -- what are you going to be talking about in terms of security, the threat and -- what are you going to talk about if Grenada is not in the picture?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think it's just a review of the bidding -- well, look at it -- post-Grenada. What does the Caribbean look like now? I would expect that all of these leaders have indicated to us in their conversations with us that they remain concerned about radical, political elements, some of whom are receiving support from Cuba and others, in the region and we think they are in the process of, in effect, defining the threat to security in the region as -- in the wake of, if you will, the events of late 1983. And we would expect them to continue to discuss that. We really don't think that security is going to take up as much time in their discussions, in their own deliberations -- nor in ours -- as will the economic developmental, general political situation.

Q What's the President's message going to be to these people when he meets with them, and what is his overall thrust?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We are delighted that you people are coming together to discuss your problems. We want you to continue to do that. We encourage you to do it. And anything we can do to help you in that discussion, in those deliberations, we think will be to everybody's mutual benefit.

Q There's not going to be a discussion of U.S. aid or U.S. help in the security area or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not in -- he's not taking any message in either of those areas except to say that, in effect, we are interested, we are concerned. We see it as matters which need to be discussed. But no new programs, no initiatives, no headlines there. (Laughter.)

Q No headlines there.

Q -- guarantee that.

Q You want to bet?

Q -- countries that criticized the Grenada invasion, none of them is coming. Bahamas, Belize, Guyana, and Trinidad-Tobago.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q How do you interpret this refusal to come? I mean --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, as I understand it, each has a good -- a reason that it considers good for not coming. For instance, in Belize, Prime Minister Price indicates that he's got elections coming up, he's got a hot political scene, and that he doesn't feel that he can take the time to be away. And each of the others has something similar. And I think, at this point, I think we have to remember that one of the extraordinary features of this is that these little economies are going to spend the money to send these people out to another meeting, and I think that the University itself was very concerned that they might not be willing to do that. They are, but some of them clearly, for that reason or another, found themselves unwilling to participate.

Q Are they, in fact, spending the money to send the people to this meeting? Or who's financing the whole thing?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: These people are financing their own participation. That is, the travel expenses are being paid by the University at South Carolina.

Q What about expenses in South Carolina? Is the U.S. government picking up the tab for that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no. This is a University of South Carolina initiative, a venture of theirs, and entirely funded by them as far as the events on the ground down there.

Q Are there --

Q The CBI -- I guess it's going to be a focus of the talks, obviously. Is there any intention to see how it stands now to do something else about it, and where does it stand actually?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, where it stands is the implementation of the real guts of the CBI began in January of this year. Twenty of twenty-seven potential beneficiaries were designated on or just before December 31st. So it's six months in.

Basically, looking at what the results are, there's just not a whole lot on the record in that period of time because what you're talking about is shifts in patterns of trade and in basic investment, and those are the kinds of decisions that don't get done right away.

Nonetheless, there have been a lot of issues that have come up about CBI implementation. It turns out that a lot of these governments don't know something about our customs and they're not equipped and familiar with dealing with that sort of thing.

We think that there will be discussions about how the United States -- and these will be with the technical crew that's down there -- about how the United States can help them, and we'll be suggesting to them how they can help themselves take advantage of this twelve years of free trade access and look at it and see what the reading is from their side as well.

Q I understand that from the text element -- I mean, of the package, there has been no single agreement between the U.S. and any of the potential beneficiaries about exchange of information that could make possible --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is a convention tax write-off, in effect, a convention tax deduction. If a country is agreeable to an exchange of certain bank information with us, then we will allow that country to benefit from a convention tax write-off. So conventioneers going there from the U.S. can write it off and that we hope will encourage tourism, which is darned important in the region.

I think that the Dominican Republic is very close to closing such an agreement with us, and Jamaica. And we have it with Jamaica. And others are still talking about it actively. But it's a major negotiation, as you might imagine, because it effects a lot of them very deeply.

Q What countries are these radical elements so -- you know, such a threat, being supplied by Castro or the Soviets?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, you've got, in each of the island Caribbean states, one degree or another, you've got -- there is an active and very violent, we believe, Communist Party element in the Dominican Republic. We see the same kinds of activity in Guadalupe, in Martinique. Those are the French departments. You go to Saint Lucia, Dominica, the small island states. And it's not as if it's new. Some of these have had trouble before. Back in '79, back in '80 there were these kinds of things.

Each has them. They are -- I guess the safest way to describe them is that they are certainly not popularly supported in that they are neither large nor do they seem to have captured the imagination of very many of the populations down there. But they are a steady point of concern for the governments in the region. And they are a point of concern for the loyal opposition as well. When you talk to the labor movement in St. Kitts-Nevis, they express the same concerns as does the group that is currently governing that island state.

Q Well, are these people going to talk about putting together a unified approach, or something, to deal with this radical element, or is that one of the things on the table?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I suspect that there may be some discussion of some sub-regional effort. We don't see, ourselves, that you're ever going to have a major Caribbean security system or defense force, that sort of thing. The Eastern Caribbean States have had for several years now what they call a regional security system. It's that organization of Eastern Caribbean States that you've probably heard of plus Barbados membership. And they are in the process, those states are, at this point, trying to work out for them the most sustainable, affordable kind of approach to security that they can find and the most practical. So that's the kind of thing that they'll talk about in general terms. But, again, nothing specific.

Q Is the U.S. going to talk about any help in that sense or is that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We've encouraged them -- well we provided this peace-keeping money, post-Grenada, to help form 80-man special services units which are really taking police and bringing them up to another level of competence, which I characterize as sort of a SWAT team approach, which allows a police force to deal with organized violence, whether it's politically or otherwise inspired. The problem has been that with the small and traditional police sort of thing and no military establishment on any of these islands -- if you've got 25 or 30 people together who are organized and reasonably well-equipped, they could probably paralyze the situation and maybe even do worse.

So we helped them in the fall and in the ensuing months. And so we will continue to encourage that. We'll describe that situation, I imagine, in talking to them. And where we are now is that we continue to encourage those Eastern Caribbean States to go on and talk about cooperating among themselves with command communications control sort of activities. But we don't encourage them at all to get involved in army building.

Q Are you involved in the Mariel --

MR. SIMS: Last question.

Q -- negotiations of the prisoners?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not at all.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 10:57 A.M. EDT

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON U.S.-USSR DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS LINK

July 17, 1984

The Briefing Room

12:25 P.M. EDT

MR. SIMS: This briefing is on background. It's attributable to a senior administration official, for your information only and not for publication.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You have the President's statement, and I don't have anything to add to that. I'd be happy to take your questions.

Q Why was this done in so much secrecy, including the initialing of something that is a real advancement in U.S.-Soviet relations, I guess?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't think it --

Q Question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question was: Why was this done in such secrecy? I don't think that's correct. I mean, the fact that I'm here, and we're discussing it with you, doesn't make it a secret event. And the Soviet --

Q Well, it's after the fact --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And the Soviet Union understood that the signing, the initialing, would become public -- and the fact that an agreement was reached.

Q Well, was it at their request?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. We discussed with the Soviets the ground rules for how we would present this agreement.

Q Did the Soviet Union ask you to downplay the publicity?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we're free -- each is completely free to address the agreement, to say what we would like to say about it.

Q Was there a distinct Soviet interest in the U.S. not portraying this as a breakthrough in renewed dialogue between the two sides?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we -- the President calls it a small -- a "modest but positive step" -- and I think that's an accurate description. I don't think there is any disagreement between the United States and the Soviet Union over what this arrangement represents. It's a good beginning to a process of enhanced communication; to building confidence, and managing potential crises.

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Q How does it avert misunderstanding? In what way -- in lay terms -- what would that be?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, let me give you a few examples, and maybe our -- my colleagues -- might want to add something to this. We already, of course, have a Hotline capability, and, in the past, we have used it. Publicly, for example, Presidents have noted that the Hotline was used in the 1967 and the 1973 Middle East Wars. What this arrangement provides is an ability to expedite communications and to provide graphic material.

I am told, for example, in transmitting written material, that this will provide a three-fold increase in terms of sending material in a given period of time. Let me put that differently -- suppose we needed to send the Soviet Union a two-page document. My understanding is that currently that takes about 6 minutes. We would now be able to provide that Soviet -- provide the Soviet Union with that two-page document in less than 2 minutes. Now, that's a three-fold increase.

Now, in a crisis situation -- a situation involving the need to take decisions very rapidly -- a reduction of the time required from 6 minutes to under 2 minutes could be very important when important decisions had to be made.

In addition, we will be able to provide graphic material including maps, for example, to one another. There are instances, or have been instances, where we think it would have been useful to do so. You all recall two incidents in the last few years where Soviet satellites were disintegrating, and entering the atmosphere. We would

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be able in such a circumstance to exchange trajectory information, make -- so that neither side would become alarmed or confused about what that represented. So, we think that the ability, here, to provide information, to provide more detailed information to clear up misunderstandings and to save time in a potential crisis situation is a very useful thing to have.

Q When --

Q Were you talking about a telex machine that sends, now at the rate of 64 words a minute, and replacing it with a facsimile machine that sends a page a minute?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What we're talking about is enhancing the existing teletype machine with the ability to send facsimiles. But, let me ask my colleague to give you the -- a more precise and technical explanation.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you. The existing teletype system that is in place, will remain in place and in operation. The facsimile will be added to that and be augmenting the existing system.

Q When will it be put in and how much does it cost?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not -- I don't have an estimate of the cost. My colleague might be able to help you on that. We project that this will be installed over the next 18 to 24 months.

Q Will American experts do the installation in Moscow also?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Would my colleague like to answer that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No --

Q What's the question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Will American experts install the machines in Moscow?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We would expect the American experts to do the system integration, but installation will be performed by the Soviets on their end.

Q What companies? What companies?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are various firms involved.

Q What do you mean, integration?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Marrying our system and their system.

Q Has the hotline been used during the Reagan administration?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't want to comment on that.

Q Could you tell us a little bit about the current round of negotiations? Was the agreement ready to be signed on Friday when they broke for lunch and had the luncheon at the Soviet Embassy --

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but just -- it was a matter of working out the arrangements for the -- for the initialing, itself, that held it over the weekend?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I think I can be quite precise on this. It was not the arrangements that led to any delay, and, in fact, there was -- there was no delay. We never had a precise date or time in mind for the agreement. The substance of the agreement was reached late last week. It was only -- it was necessary for the Soviet negotiating team here to send the agreement back to Moscow and get the approval of the people in Moscow. So it -- they didn't get the green light until yesterday, so we were able to sign it this morning; initial it this morning.

Q The President, in the last paragraph of his statement says, " This is an appropriate technical improvement to the hotline." Do you or the administration, view this as a step, in any way, in arms control?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION: Well, we do believe that it is a step in arms control. All arms control agreements are technical in nature. We think, in terms of categorizing it, it is not an agreement that limits numbers of weapons. It's an agreement that fits into the area of confidence building measures.

And, I just might remind you of the history, here. There has been interest, both in the Executive Branch and in the Congress, in building confidence; looking for ways to avoid crisis and to manage crisis, if they occur, more effectively. There were some proposals made by the late Senator Jackson, Senator Nunn and Senator Warner, and at the same time, there was an intensive study undertaken by the U.S. government on proposals that we might make to the Soviets.

Roughly a year ago or so, we privately raised this subject with the Soviets and we proposed four steps that we thought we should take with the Soviet Union. The first step was to upgrade the existing hotline. The second step was to provide direct communication links between the Ministries of Defense; our Department of Defense and the Soviet Ministry of Defense, so there would be a military to military channel of communication.

The third step was to enhance the communications between our embassy in Moscow and the

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State Department and their Embassy here, and their Ministry of Foreign Affairs. And the fourth was to work out ways of communicating and dealing with terrorist incidents involving nuclear weapons.

Now, the Soviets have indicated an interest in this fourth area -- this question of nuclear terrorism -- and we hope to pursue that area with the Soviets. So far the Soviets have not been willing to address the other two categories, that is the military-to-military communications and the enhanced communications between Embassies and Ministries of Foreign Affairs. So, but -- at least as I was saying before, we've begun this process. We don't want to exaggerate its significance. You should ask the Soviets whether it represents a new development in the overall U.S.-Soviet relationship.

Our position is very clear. We want to make progress on these issues; we're open to further confidence-building measures; and we will be following up with the Soviets when we can.

My colleague -- do you want to add --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, that's fine.

Q Why did they strike out in Stockholm then -- with Goodby?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sorry --

Q Why did Goodby strike out-- on these other things?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I wouldn't say that Ambassador Goodby struck out. I would say that we've made, as you know, in the President's Dublin speech, a proposal there. We're willing to listen to the Soviet proposals if they're willing to listen to ours. And that negotiation has just got underway, and we hope to make progress there.

Q Has a date been set for the start of consultations on the nuclear terrorism issue?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. Not as yet. Although we are discussing the issue in diplomatic channels.

Q What's your --

Q Wasn't there a confidence-building measure that involved some kind of a command center with the U.S. and Soviets? What happened to that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that was never a proposal of either the -- of the U.S. Executive Branch or the Soviet Union. It was a proposal or an idea that's been raised on Capitol Hill. And we have examined that concept in terms of this -- of a -- of this major study we have undertaken. We have not yet gone to the Soviets with such a proposal. But what we think is -- this process that we are getting underway will build confidence and reduce the prospect for crises.

Q What is your assessment now of the outlook for talks on space weapons?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I can only really describe our position on that, which is that we plan to be in Vienna, on September 18th. We -- there are no preconditions on our side for going to those negotiations. And when we arrive in Vienna we will have serious ideas about how to make progress in the area of outer space arms control.

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Q I have a couple technical questions. Can we nail down exactly at how many words a minute this machine transmits --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it's -- it's not a -- you can't say "words per minute" because it is a facsimile transmission device. It's like if you take a document -- one page or two-page -- and you put it in this machine and it comes out the other end. And I gave you a two-page document as a little less than two minutes.

Q Oh. Okay.

Q Was there any thought given to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: My colleague would like to --

Q Was there any thought given to -- I'm sorry --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me just add on that -- you can fit as many, you can transmit as many words through facsimile as you can fit on a page, and it takes a minute to send a page.

Q Oh, okay -- thanks.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: So, if you write small, you can get a lot of words in there. (Laughter.)

And you had one?

Q No, it's all right. My question's answered.

Q How is the Hotline linked with the Pentagon? How is that information relayed to the White House? Is it received here simultaneously? Or does it have to be relayed after it comes into the Pentagon?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sorry, I don't want to discuss that.

Q You said you'd have ideas on arms control when you go to the -- to Vienna. Does this mean we are insisting on bringing up INF and --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, what I said was -- and I didn't say arms control -- I said --

Q What did you say?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- I said we will have serious ideas on outer space arms control. But I'm -- as the man once said, I'm glad you asked me that question, because we also think that the problem of outer space arms control, anti-satellite weapons, is related to other weapons. I'll remind you that we have reconnaissance satellites in space that count the systems on both sides. We have early warning satellites that warn of any attack, so --

Q -- going to insist on bringing up the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- so we think the problem of offensive nuclear arms should be addressed in Vienna. But you -- as I earlier said, we are not approaching the Vienna talks with any preconditions.

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Q Who will lead the delegation on September 18th?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is a decision that has not been taken.

Q Has the U.S., now, developed these proposals? You say they will be ready by September, but are they -- what stage are they in?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We are in the process of addressing these issues internally.

Q Have you received the formal response from the Soviets, yet, on the Vienna talks?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, they have given us a proposal, which they made public, and we have responded to that proposal. And we have responded positively.

Q Was there a formal response to the President's message, the President's letter to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry, I can't discuss that, those communications.

Q Why wasn't the happy signing ceremony this morning done in public as other such signings have been?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, as I mentioned last week --

Q Champagne?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- we discussed the arrangements, there was champagne, in fact. (Laughter.) We discussed the arrangements with the Soviet Union. They were amenable to holding a reception following the initialing ceremony. There was a photographer, a State Department photographer present at that reception. And I believe that, in a little while, we will have a photograph of that event for you.

Q But why wasn't it open to press coverage?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We discussed --

Q In a free society?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, unfortunately, we are dealing with the Soviet Union and they don't necessarily agree with our definition of a free society.

Q -- you drew a distinction --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would have loved to have had you there.

Q Ha. Ha. Ha.

Q You drew a distinction between initialing and signing. Was it initialed simply because it was an addendum or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct. You should get this correct. It was initialed because that is just the diplomatic procedure of this exchange of notes.

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Q Is the answer to the question that the Soviets did not want it to be a public ceremony?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think you should probably address that question to the Soviets.

Q Do your remarks regarding Vienna mean that you have completed the inhouse study which means that you know where you want to go at Vienna, now, and you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I said that process, our internal review process, is still underway.

Q Just a mechanics question. Those of us who are, either have used or have had to use the products of facsimile devices know that there are facsimiles and facsimiles. (Laughter.) Is this going to be a high-resolution state-of-the-art kind of device?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm going to let our expert answer that question.

Q No, it will be illegible, I think. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it will be state-of-the-art, high-resolution, and we're examining several of the leading products.

Q You must have a pretty specific --

Q You must --

Q -- a very detailed transmission.

Q You were pretty specific about what you, what the U.S. delegation would be prepared to do in Vienna on September 18th. Are you satisfied that the Soviets will be there on September 18th?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We hope they will be there.

Q But you're not satisfied that they will?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We hope that they will be there.

Q All right.

Q Is there some reason that this took, I mean, some technical reason? Or was there an argument over these improvements? I'm not sure why it took a year to agree to send graphs and do it faster.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it sounded -- that's a good question because I'm not a technical specialist, myself. And I used to wonder in this process of why did it take so long. And, the fact is that it is a very complex area. You're talking about pieces of equipment, you have to agree on that equipment. You have to agree on, say, the role of the satellites in transmitting the equipment. I think that in terms, in relative terms, if you compare it to other negotiations we've had in the arms control area, one year is a very short negotiation.

So, the answer to your question is that the time it took was principally because of resolving the various technical issues involved. My judgement is that there were no major political impediments to getting, to achieving this agreement.

Q So, somebody on either side was worried that the technical stuff could be abused in some way?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it just agreeing it's a new technology. You wanted to add this facsimile capability and it's not easy to work out all the technological wrinkles very quickly.

Q It seems that you got quite a bit less than the President proposed in May of '83 in terms of these confidence-building measures that he wanted. Is there a sense of disappointment that you didn't get as much as you asked for?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, no, because we went to the Soviets. Let me make it clear of what we tried to do. We went to the Soviets with four different proposals. And we didn't say - We were prepared to negotiate on all four, but

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over a year ago, the Soviets told us that they were not prepared to negotiate on all four simultaneously. What they did tell us is that they were prepared to begin talking about the upgrading the hotline. So we've known all along, at this stage of the process, that this is what we wanted to achieve and we're very satisfied with what we've achieved. This is what our objective was, was to enhance the hotline.

Now, what we hope is that this is the beginning of a process that will now lead to other areas of improved communications and confidence-building.

Q Did you say it will take 18 months to get into place?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Eighteen to twenty-four months.

Q I take it from what your colleague just said earlier that you have not yet chosen the specific equipment that you're going to be putting in here. Is that true?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think we know what kind of equipment we need. But why don't you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The final manufacturer selection has not been made. The level of equipment has been determined.

Q You will restrict it to an American manufacturer, won't you? I mean, the Japanese make a -- these things you can buy anywhere, right? (Laughter.) I mean that seriously. I mean, are they ahead of us in this particular area?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's going to be a number of components that make up that system and I really am not prepared to say that every piece is going to be American-manufactured. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh-oh.

Q Will it be open -- open --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Just a couple more questions, and then we'll --

Q Will it be open to bid?

Q Will you now open talks on updating the teletype circuit or will that be just left in its present state as a backup to the facsimile?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, both the teletype and the facsimile are useful, and they don't substitute for one another. They're complimentary and they can be used -- for instance, a shorter message can use the teletype and that can go quite quickly. What this is mostly useful for is sending graphs, graphics, maps, as well as lengthier documents and messages.

So, first of all, you shouldn't view them as a substitute. Secondly, the Defense Department is looking at this question of other steps that could be taken on the hotline and they may have some proposals at some point in the future.

Q Why is the hotline in the Pentagon instead of in the Operations Room?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, do you want to answer that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that entire terminal, since its conception, has been in the National Military Command Center and that's where the operation of the terminal, the maintenance of the terminal, and the translators are located. And that's where -- that's the action site in a crisis situation.

Q If the President -- just to follow up on that, if the President wanted to send a message in a crisis to the President of the Soviet Union, how long would it take him to deliver it? A short message.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That can be done -- of course, assuming he knows what message he wants to send -- (laughter) -- he can be -- Well, we're talking about deciding what the message is -- can be done very -- it can be done -- well, depending on the message, it can be done almost instantaneously.

Q If you're in --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, go ahead.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me add to that. There are a number of pre-formated messages to deal with crisis situations which come --

Q Stop. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- which come in small letter, you know, small letter codes and can be transmitted in seconds. We hope we won't have to. (Laughter.)

MR. SIMS: All right. Thank you very much.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 12:52 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Columbia, South Carolina)

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON CARIBBEAN LEADERS' CONFERENCE

Russell House Student Center
University of South Carolina
Columbia, South Carolina
[July 19, 1984]

12:42 P.M. EDT

MR. SIMS: We'd like to begin this briefing. Let me state the ground rules at the outset. This is for background only. It is attributable to a senior administration offical or a senior American official, for your information only and not for publication. This is being fed into the mult and so forth for your convenience, but it is not for broadcast. It is for background.

We have to conclude this by 1:15 p.m. in order to get you into the room for the remarks.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Good morning.

What I would like to do is give you a summary of the meeting that was held this morning. It was kicked off by the chairman -- yes, sir?

Q Are you going to allow still pictures for the camera crews --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATONN OFFICIAL: That's not in my job description. (Laughter.)

MR. SIMS: There's no photography of the briefing, please.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Prime Minister Seaga chaired the meeting. And he led off by saying, making a rather interesting observation -- and I think, if you look at the composition of that group, you'll understand. We have a tendency to lump the whole Caribbean together. But what you saw represented there was French speaking Caribbean, Spanish speaking Caribbean, and English speaking Caribbean. And he made note of that, and the fact that although they had been members -- or neighbors for many years, that it was the first opportunity that many of them had to get together informally, as such. And he thought that it -- he found it very productive and hoped that they would have further opportunities.

Let me make one comment with regards to -- because it will thread through here, so we can -- I know there seems to be some misunderstanding. You talk about two different things, both today and in the conferences that were held yesterday. With regards to security aspects, there are two different things. There's a Caribbean Peace Force that is made up of eight countries; the United States and seven Eastern Caribbean countries, that have a presence today on Grenada. That is known as the Caribbean Peace Force. That is separate and distinct from discussions that have been taking place in the Caribbean as to Caribbean regional security force. These are two different items. So if you could separate them for your thinking.

Prime Minister Seaga, after his opening remarks, turned the program over to the President for his initial opening remarks in which he was pleased to meet with them and spoke of the bilateral meetings that he had had with them before and was glad to see the opportunity to speak to them in a group. And it

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was just an opening welcome and thank you for inviting him to it.

The Caribbean leaders then divided the subjects among themselves in a very short presentation -- spoke to them -- President Jorge Blanco was first -- covering the economic matters. He spoke to both the economic challenges and the opportunities. The challenges, well-known to all of you and to the participants, were the current debt situation and high rate of unemployment. And he saw the opportunities coming from growing trade with the United States and also the need to develop their economies through foreign investments. He gave the example of the successful free trade zones that they had implemented in the Dominican Republic and pointed out that may be of interest to the other Caribbean countries.

He also talked about the U.S. aid program and how it shifts as the different needs throughout the period of time come about. For instance, there was a period of time in which the budget deficits were prime, and that would mean ESF type of money. And as they come out of that budget deficit problem and look to expand their economy, then aid can, or should be directed in other matters -- in other means.

Chairman Brathwaite, of Grenada, then spoke to the security aspects. He thanked the neighbors in the Eastern Caribbean and the United States for having "rescued" Grenada from a -- in his words -- brutal and totalitarian regime.

He spoke about the necessity of protecting democracy in the Caribbean and differentiated the mechanisms that were available to some of them under the OAS, that is from foreign invasion, to the necessity, because of their physical presence -- that is, islands in which people can land weapons for insurgent groups -- the necessity for naval patrols as well as for a regional approach to their security aspects.

Prime Minister Compton focused then on some of the current CBI activities that are going on. And he recognized that this administration, in his comments, was the first administration to do more than -- to recognize the Caribbean for what it was. He gave a very brief history of, in the last twenty years, thirteen of them had received independence, and having had that independence, then had to evolve in a social and economic sense to keep pace with the aspirations of their people. And he spoke -- he said that the CBI was the first visible manifestation of -- other than lip service, on the part of the United States.

Prime Minister Charles then spoke and acknowledged that they feel close to the CBI because the President had allowed the Caribbean leaders to participate in its formulation. As you may recall, several of them came to the United States during the two years in which it was being debated by the Congress to make their feelings known on the matter.

She acknowledged that what was originally envisioned by these countries in the Caribbean for the CBI was not what eventually passed in the Congress and she urged the President in the future to look to the adjustments as we see how the Caribbean works and where it can be improved.

President Reagan was then asked to make some remarks. And he spoke to our continuing commitment to the economic development of the Caribbean where, in 1985, the amount of U.S. assistance is three times that of what it was in 1979. And the Caribbean initiative, because of its 12-year program, demonstrates our long-term commitment to the area.

He acknowledged that the CBI fell short in law as to the original -- what was envisioned, and pledged to seek improvements as we analyze it. You should remember, this Caribbean Basin Initiative is -- went into effect on January 1st of this year and is just six months old into a 12-year program.

He noted that within this period of time, that in the first quarter of this year, the imports to the United States from the Caribbean has increased some 26 percent over the same period of time from last year. And Prime Minister Seaga added that, in his modest look at Jamaica, that he was used to, prior of January 1, 1984, to expect in their promotional activities to gain two new investments, that is foreign investments, a week in Jamaica. And he has found that since January 1, 1984, that average has gone up to three times a week.

And the President finished up by pledging that he would press with the U.S. private sector to invest in the Caribbean because he agreed with them that the expansion of their infrastructure and their ability to expand their economy was key to their total development.

Prime Minister Seaga then gave a very excellent write-up. I don't know why I wrote any notes; I should have just taken his. And I understand he'll be having a press conference at 2:30 p.m., and you might be able to get more details from him.

I think I'll stop there and take your questions.

Yes, sir?

Q When you talked in terms of naval patrols in addition to regional security, did the question of use of U.S. naval patrol forces enter into the discussion?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The use of naval patrols was taken in the context of regional securities. The -- Chairman Brathwaite -- well, he addressed that -- placed it within that context and did indicated in his remarks that he was looking for U.S. assistance in setting up this regional security.

This is nothing new. We have met with them since Grenada, with different groups at different times, as they evolved this idea of a regional security force. You might note that within the Caribbean there are different slants to how it should take place, what should be the size, and the rest of it, and our role, really, I think, is to provide just technical advice at this stage until they can come to a consensus on how they feel that that regional security force will take place.

Yes.

Q Well, once they come to some consensus, would you then envision that the role would be larger than just technical advice? Would we be supporting it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. It depends on what you think "larger than". We currently deal with them on a bilateral basis --

Q We can't hear the question.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay, the question was, as they come to some consensus in regards to their regional security force, do we envision a larger role for the U.S.? Did I do justice to your question? Okay.

You should understand, number one, that we deal with them bilaterally now

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on the question of their security force. And we will continue to deal with them on a multilateral. I would envision that what the U.S. position in this will be will be the same as it is in a bilateral, that is in the area of training and through different programs possible assistance -- that is, assistance in equipment and things of this nature. I don't envision a so-called active part for the United States in this Caribbean force.

Yes, sir? -- I mean, regional force.

Q In his luncheon remarks, Mr. Seaga asks the President to raise the possibility of, I suppose a "Kissinger type" international commission for Caribbean development. Did that come up? Did the President respond?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it did not come up.

Q Well, can you -- can you react to that, please?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that the President will have an opportunity to address that himself. That idea, as you know -- those of you that may have been here for a couple of days -- that idea has been discussed informally, been brought up by Mr. Seaga.

As I understand it, it is something broad in the sense that it would involve the European Community because they have ties to the Caribbean. Its thrust would be to try to fill some of the needs that they see with regard to infrastructure, investment, and the rest of it.

And I think at this stage it's -- it's just kind of a skeleton of an idea. The Kissinger Commission was a U.S. -- totally U.S. As I understand the Prime Minister's intent -- it is something much more multinational.

Yes, sir?

Q Well, you say the President will deal with this -- when will he deal with it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, he may respond in his remarks. I don't know, but I don't want to --

Q It's not in his prepared text?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q It's not in his prepared text?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, you've got copies of it, and I think you'll see that it's not in there.

Yes, ma'am?

Q Do you intend, when Congress returns next week, once again to put forth your proposal for giving aid to the Contras? It was dropped from the bill before the recess.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it's safe to assume that those programs that are important to the administration, and those of course that I deal with deal with Latin America, that we had pursued prior to Congress going into recess -- we will pursue them again. If you look at the Congressional calendar, there aren't too many days left. And so it's a question of trying to get our priorities in line.

Yes, sir?

Q Any invitation extended to the President to visit some part of the Caribbean?

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Q Question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question was whether any invitation to visit -- extended to the President to visit parts of the Caribbean. In the formal remarks that took place I did not hear any. There was an informal chit-chat that took place, and now, of course, they are sitting at lunch. But up to now, the answer is no, I have not heard any.

Yes, sir?

Q Textile trade policy was --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry?

Q Textile trade policy was high on the agenda for this morning and yesterday. Did that issue come up with the President?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Textiles was mentioned in one of the speeches -- not by President Reagan -- as illustrative of some of the -- what was characterized as trade barriers they face. And it was just used as an example in passing.

Yes, sir?

Q Who mentioned it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q Who mentioned it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I believe it was President Jorge Blanco.

Q What do you mean, "get our priorities in line" as far as the Contras? I mean, are you suggesting to us that there's another priority ahead of the Contra aid?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I didn't mean to suggest that. What I tried to tell you was that when the Congress went into recess that we had certain aspects that were important to us at that time, which included a variety of programs -- which includes the so-called Jackson Plan and others. I think you can expect those that were of interest to the administration prior to recess to be pushed again after the recess.

Yes, Helen?

Q What are the main complaints against the CBI -- not enough money? And what reforms will he propose?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think the main -- and I wouldn't characterize them as complaints -- it was -- the time that was spent in discussing it was in a certain amount of sadness, in the sense that, that which was originally envisioned -- and, as I said, they participated in formulating this early on -- that which was originally envisioned and introduced in the Congress was not the animal that came out of Congress. And I think that they -- it was more spent on that, in that context. But then also saying, "Okay, now we have this law, what is it that we can do to make sure it works right?"

Yes?

Q Just a followup to this question -- is the administration willing to go back to Congress to ask for a change in the CBI?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, not at this stage, no. It's

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too early. The CBI is six months old, you know. It's still -- it's just getting started. Let me get one guy here.

Q Well, on a followup on that, you said that the President pledged that he would try to improve it. Does that mean --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In the context it is. We look at it and as they identify areas that could -- need to be improved and we do, then at a later date we can go back and look at it.

Yes.

Q The regional forces being discussed, as you know, is essentially eastern Caribbean. Do you envision similar regional -- sub-regional forces in other parts of the Caribbean, number one?

And, number two, did anyone other than Mr. Braithwaite take up that issue of security forces?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Number one, I don't envision other regionals because I have not heard of other regionals. Obviously, security throughout the Caribbean is a concern to, not only them, but to us, also.

And, as to your second question, I'm sorry, give it to me again.

Q Did anyone other than --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, yes. Yes, it was mentioned in reference by Mrs. Charles, by Prime Minister Compton.

Yes.

Q Is there any intention on the President's part to change his position on textiles? Because -- correct me if I'm wrong, but I thought that he had agreed with Jesse Helms, Strom Thurmond and several others from affected states to support continuing those barriers.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is no intent at this time to change the position. The law is the law and we're working with that law.

That doesn't mean that it doesn't create heartburn for some of our friends. But that's not an unusual event. We've run into that in other areas of the world, as you're well aware of.

Q That was specifically changed, wasn't it, during the legislative process --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was one of the several changes that were made. The other significant one was the knocking out of the investment tax credit, the whole arena of the investment tax credit. That was probably a more significant move.

Q So, on the two things that these people care about most, those two major complaints, there's no flexibility in the American position? There's no change at all in the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. As I said, the conversation led to talking about the original concept and what we have now. And we work with what we have now. And it doesn't mean that as we look at it we don't look at areas that may be improved. Without any -- Go ahead.

Q I'm sorry. My point is that when you said that the President did acknowledge some sadness over what we have now, the President contributed to that by changing his position on the textiles, so -- because of the political pressure from those states.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it was a -- as you know, it was in the Congress for two years and that changes were made in the Congress.

Yes, ma'am.

Q Do you have any reason to believe you'll have any better luck getting the Nicaraguan Contra aid bill through Congress now? What -- Do you have any new arguments to make to them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me go to your first question. I'm trying to figure out how to formulate it because you know that we -- how we deal with so-called "involvement of th U.S. government with the Contras," and yet I'm still trying to be responsive to your question.

Q You're on background.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That doesn't -- make no difference.

Q Yes or no? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Black or white. Yes or no.

If you asked me personally, yes, I think that we may be able to get something done.

Q $21 million?

Q $21 million?

Q You say, "something," do you mean the full 23 or are you talking about --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, you just asked me a question. You asked me a follow-on. I'm not going to address the numbers thing. And -- maybe we've got some more questions on this conference, if we could -- follow that.

Q How about Nicaraguan sham elections?

Q Wait a minute. The second half, though, of the question. That is, what new arguments will he use? Or is there anything new or different you can tell Congress that you couldn't tell them six months ago?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We continually dialogue with Congress on this subject. I mean, you could lay out a whole bunch of stuff to them and -- you know.

Q That's a great verb.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What? To dialogue?

Q To dialogue with! (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You ought to see me conjugate it in Latin in the first declension. (Laughter.)

Yes.

Q Where do things stand on your discussions with the Nicaraguans? Your last session was on Monday.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, Ambassador Shlaudeman had a discussion, a day-long discussion in Atlanta with Tinoco in which they went -- They covered mainly procedural rules. But -- in accordance with the understanding that we have with the Nicaraguans, we try not to characterize those talks as they continue.

Yes.

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Q How do you know the election -- how does the President know that the Nicaraguan election is going to be a sham?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: How much do you know about the way it's set up? You want to talk about their Election Commission?

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It's got three people on it. They're all Sandinistas.

Look at the election commission in El Salvador: It was represented by every political party there. The opposition in Nicaragua, known as the Coordinadora group, have come out with four or five specific points that they feel need to be done before an election. The Nicaraguans have not addressed those points. I think the President's on very solid ground when he talks that way.

Q Well, how does that position us in the world community by saying this before the election? Doesn't this hurt us in the world community?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. Well, wait a minute. If the object of the exercise is to have a free election, then I think it's good to be able to -- use another one of those favorite verbs of yours -- vocalize our thoughts on the issue.

Q Before the election --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- after the election it doesn't do -- you do -- you said they had a sham instead of wanting to see a good one? (Laughter.)

Yes?

Q On a related question, the Kissinger Committee recommendations -- Commission recommendations -- what's the chances of that getting through Congress probably on a continuing resolution?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, as you know, procedurally it passed in good form in the House authorization bill. That's a long step from appropriation. That may — it has, as you may recall, both FY'84 and FY'85 components to it. If an authorization bill does not pass both Houses of the Congress, which is a possibility, then I would think that the continuing resolution might be a strong candidate for it.

Yes?

Q Did they get beyond procedure in Monday's meetings or do they still have to discuss it? And, secondly, why in the context of these negotiations going on is the President making speeches almost every day describing Nicaraguans as totalitarians -- a totalitarian jungle, and so on. Doesn't that affect the negotiating climate?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't think he makes speeches every day. He made one yesterday --

Q -- made one today -- (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think you have to look at the thing in total. I think if you look at Daniel Ortega's remarks and D'Escoto's remarks, I think you can put them in the same vein. They speak candidly what they think about us. I think the President has a right, especially in light of this election to cross-analyze what we feel of it this time. We'd like to see them do a good election there. So that's the purpose of speaking there.

Q Did they get beyond procedure on Monday, or did they --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As I said, I'm not going to characterize. That's the deal we make with them.

Q Do you think that this conference being held

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yesterday and today is meeting its objectives? And I'd like to know what those objectives were?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the idea was from the University of South Carolina -- and I think they've done an excellent job putting it together -- and I think Prime Minister Seaga spoke for all of them when he said, even though we're neighbors we haven't met a lot of these guys, and this type of conference, as opposed to just little bits and pieces of a Caribbean region, is very useful.

I think they may be looking forward to other meetings of this type in informal settings. Several have talked about it.

Q Yes, indeed, the President from the Dominican Republic said that they would be willing to invite the same group to a meeting, a second one, to a thing in the Dominican Republic. What was the reaction of President Reagan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: She didn't make that observation in their meetings, but I think that the general reaction among all the people is that -- that have participated -- that it's a useful thing to get the Heads of Government together like this.

Q Would the President go?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't answer that. I'm sure -- you know, there's scheduling aspects -- the fact he's here manifests his interest in it.

Yes?

MR. SIMS: Last question.

Q I just wanted to ask --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Make it an easy one. Throw me a softball, come on --

Q How long was the meeting? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Boy, that was a softball, "How long was the meeting?" Well, it went according to schedule, and let me tell you what the schedule said. It ended at 12:15 p.m., and then they had an informal, and it started at -- it ended at 12:10 p.m., started at -- yes, it went an hour.

Q Also, just to follow up to that -- you have summarized some of the major points made, but how much dialogue took place? I mean, how much time did the President spend talking versus listening?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, if you wanted it broken down arithmetically, I would guess that the President listened about -- oh, about 85 percent of the time, or maybe 90 percent. Remember there are 14 delegates in there.

MR. SIMS: Thank you.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 1:04 P.M. EDT

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON NATIONAL POLICY ON THE COMMERCIAL USE OF SPACE

July 20, 1984

The Briefing Room

1:04 P.M. EDT

MR. FITZWATER: This briefing is on background attributable to a senior administration official. The briefing, fact sheets, and the advanced text of the President's speech are embargoed for 2:00 p.m. this afternoon.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you, Marlin.

What I'd like to talk about here for just a couple minutes is something that the President will be speaking to at the Apollo reception in about an hour or so, and that's probably a very appropriate place for him to discuss this subject, which is getting business more involved in doing things in space. And the reason that's an appropriate occasion to talk about this subject is it was really the Apollo program that laid the scientific and technical foundation for being able to do new things and to work in space in a way that will help people here on earth.

What we're really aiming at with these initiatives is to improve the quality of life on earth as opposed to just doing exploration in space. Now, what we're talking about is opening up some new vistas through things that we can do in space that you can't do on earth. And let's talk about a few examples that we find very exciting.

We may be able to produce some medicines that you cannot produce on earth, at least in the quanity and the purity that we can in space. And through those medicines, we hold out the opportunity of being able to cure diseases that we have been fighting for generations.

Also, we're able to produce new alloys that really make super-metals that are much stronger and much lighter than anything that we've ever known before. And we're able to be able to see the environment in ways that we haven't been able to see before so we can get to trouble spots quickly. And that should effect all of our lives in a positive way.

Now, the President's initiatives, which we're calling the National Commercial Space Initiatives, fall into four main areas and there are 13 of those initiatives. Now, I believe you have a fact sheet that lays some of them out but let me try to give you an overview on some of these.

The four areas that we're addressing are economic, legal and regulatory, research and development, and finally, policy. And what I'd like to do is take each of these in turn, and let's discuss what the ramifications are in each of those areas.

If we look at the economic area, you'll see there are five major initiatives. Now, you've got this in your fact sheets so you don't have to try to read these charts --

Q I don't.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They should be there.

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Q They are. Not as neat.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not as neat. Well --

Q At the bottom of your fact sheet.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The thrust of these economic initiatives is to eliminate provisions in the present tax codes and regulations that discriminate against doing business in space. Now, that's an important point. We're not looking at creating new, unique tax provisions for space businesses. Rather, there are discriminatory provisions that occur not because anybody wanted to discriminate against space businesses, but because these tax provisions were written long before anybody envisioned doing anything in space.

And a perfect example of that is, if you look at the one that talks about the ten percent investment tax credit, space businesses are not eligible for that tax incentive. Why? Because things that go to space are interpreted as being exports, even though they come back to America and are used here. And as a result, it's been held that space businesses are not qualified for that incentive.

Q They're considered exports?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They are considered exports.

So we're trying to eliminate those kinds of anomalies in the tax code.

We look at the legal and regulatory area. There, there are two categories of initiatives. The first category is designed to make the

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government more efficient, to get decisions out more quickly. Time is money to businesses; they've got to pay people, so we're trying to get quick decisions. We're doing that both in the radio frequency area and in the area of launch regulation.

The second two initiatives under the regulatory heading are designed to -- it's really a matter of equity. In terms of international competition, we want to open up foreign markets to our companies to the same extent that our markets are opened up to foreign companies.

Okay, if we go on from there and look at the research and development area, really what we're trying to do here is to increase industry's participation in setting our nation's research agenda. What we're saying there is, if they have a stake in the basice research that government does, then they're more likely to pick that research up and use it in getting it to the market. Now you all know that where we've had a lot of our problems has been in competing with Japan, Inc., or Germany, Inc., or some of the foreign competition.

We generally do better in getting the basic research done and then we don't get it to market and we lose a lot of foreign trade and, as a result of that, we lose jobs and all the advantages that that implies.

Q How much money is this? What amount of drain will these tax proposals have on the Treasury?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Can I take one more minute to finish this and then we'll take questions, just to give an overview.

I might mention the second part of the research and development area is to broaden non-aerospace industries' participation in doing research in space, and NASA recently signed an agreement with 3M, where 3M is going to invest tens of millions of dollars in doing space research, which is -- really holds out the potential of making a number of major technological breakthroughs.

Finally, in the policy arena, what we're looking at there is to establish a consistent space policy that will last. The point that I want to make here that's important is that space businesses take longer to get to where they've got a cash flow and are generally more capital-intensive than terrestrial businesses.

Now let's take a specific example of that. Some of you may have heard of the McDonnell-Douglas/Johnson & Johnson electrophoresis drug-making machine that holds out the capability of producing drugs that can cure a number of diseases that we can't make on earth. Now they started their -- that project about six or seven years ago and they're still about two years away from getting it to market and getting cash flow.

What that really means is we have to have a consistent policy over a number of years. The other point that you may -- I may want to call your attention to is the national focus for commercial space issues. What we're looking at there is establishing a commercial space-working group under the Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade. The idea there is to assure that we have -- we can get speedy decisions of issues that are very important to getting space business going.

Now let's take a shot.

Q I have a question. On these tax reforms that you've proposed here, what's the revenue drain anticipated?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. Treasury took a a look at that and felt it was very small in the near term. Now the reason for that is the -- and most of those provisions, as you'll see, are aimed at credits for doing capital-intensive kinds of things and for doing new high-tech research. And right now there are only about a dozen or so companies that are committed to doing that and in

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the process of doing it. So the drain in the near term is small. Now in --

Q How much? I'm sorry.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They did not give us a specific figure; they said that would be crystal-balling it, but it was small enough to where the Treasury Department did not object to these initiatives.

Q How about for the mid- and long-term?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Now the other side of the coin is if we are successful, you end up having two things happen. One is obviously the amount of tax credits grows. The other side is the amount of jobs and tax revenue grow. And when you look at the trend of those two, in our estimation, you will end up with more taxes rather than less, more tax revenue rather than tax outflow.

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Q One other, if I may. DOT's got an Office of Commercial Space.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q I don't see their name, or any of their representatives on this --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me distinguish between what we call "privatization" versus "commercial use" of space.

DOT has been given, by the President, the responsibility for getting into the private sector commerical, expendable launch vehicles. It's the transfer of a program from the public sector to the private sector.

Now the commercial use of space side is dealing with new -- creating new technology, new wealth. It's really stimulating entire new ways of being able to do things that don't exist yet -- not in the government, not anyplace. So the thrust is quite different.

The public -- I think we would want to add one other thing -- the potential for benefiting the public in terms of being able to improve the quality of life, we feel is greater on the commercial size. The privatization aspects that DOT is heading up can be very important from the point of view of the efficiency of a program. But you really have two different objectives with those two.

Q Can we draw a parallel in history to -- to this idea of the government subsidizing railroads, or the government offering monopolies to telephone and communications companies? And if you can, is there any policy on anti-trust, or consumer protection out of opening up space for those big companies that can afford to do it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is an analogy in terms of developing the space infrastructure -- namely, the way of getting to space, and then operating once you're in space. So that would deal with the development of the shuttle, the development of the launch vehicles that can get you out there, the development of the space station -- which gives the people a place to actually produce these new drugs and metals and whatever else they can come up with -- crystals is another example. So, to that extent, the analogy holds.

Now, the other side of the coin is -- how do you leverage the money that government spends on basic research to stimulate much greater investment on the part of the private sector, so that we don't have to spend taxpayer dollars for it. To that extent, your analogy's not accurate. We've got a whole different purpose.

Q Well, is it possible that the companies that get in on the ground floor -- to mix a metaphor here -- in space technology and medicine -- will be able to, in effect, monopolize a market for products we haven't even thought of yet. And, if so, is the government, in effect, helping them do that with this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The answer is, anybody that wants to go to space can go. All you have to do is pay for the ride to get there. So, the only possible way one could interpret it that we're going to give any kind of -- have any kind of anti-trust problem -- would be if you talk about those few occasions that we've worked out, what we call "joint endeavor" agreements, to give free rides to space.

Now, in that case, in order to get around the anti-trust problem, what we have done is said that we will provide a very limited

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period of exclusivity in technical area of exclusivity to the private company. So let's take a specific example:

We have one such agreement with McDonald-Douglas to get its drug producing machine into space. What we have said is -- as regard to that specific, technological way of separating drugs in space, for a short period of time, we will not fly other people free. However, any other technology that also can produce drugs in space, we would.

And also, anybody that wants to pay to fly the same technology up, we would fly them.

So, the Justice Department has felt very comfortable that we don't have anti-trust problems and that we are not creating them --

Q It's gone through Justice?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right.

Q Are you indicating that all of this commercialization would be done through the space shuttle program?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. No, I do not want to indicate that. The space shuttle is certainly one of -- is the nation's, our nation's, most important vehicle for getting up into space and being able to work while we're in there. There's no other capability for doing that, so to that extent, it's very important.

However, if you want to

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look at remote sensing or communications, then you've got expendable launch vehicles that would also do that. And if you want to look beyond that, you've got free-flying platforms that are unmanned and then even beyond that, you've got the space station capability coming up.

All those will help with this effort.

Q How far down the road is that, the space-station capability?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Presently we have said we would do it within the decade from January, so you're talking the early nineties.

Q Is that on course?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, yes. Congress recently approved the funding for that. I think that's in your fact sheet.

Q Are you envisioning a --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me --

Q Does the new policy assure the cooperation of the regulatory agencies? For example, if Johnson & Johnson develop a drug they want to use, is there any assurance that it won't be held up by the Food and Drug Administration?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They -- Johnson & Johnson is working very closely with the FDA. Beyond that, I would refer you to them on that question, because I don't want to get into proprietary information. I don't know how much they would want released. But I do understand they've been working very closely and it looks like there aren't any major problems.

Q For other examples beyond that one specifically, does this new policy instruct the agencies to try to facilitate the industrialization of space?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the answer to that would be yes. I think that's probably the best way to answer that.

Q Is there a day coming when space launches for science will be handled privately, that the government will be out of the business of --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think all of us are hopeful that that will happen. Now, obviously, the consideration that we've got to worry about is getting the Shuttle to where it's operational, so that a private business could take it over without having to worry about its changes being made, because it isn't fully operational. Also, we've got to make sure that they can make money at it, or else the government would end up having to subsidize a private operation.

So there are lots of different ways that could happen. You could take the old Comsat model, which really ended up getting communications satellites out to the private sector, and it was a government effort, went to a quasi-government and then, finally, out. Those are the kinds of things that we have been asked to look at.

If you look at this bullet right here on policy, we talk about developing a plan for privatization of specific government programs; that'll be one that we look at.

Q Which government programs will you privatize?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, again, we're not

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prepared at this time to make a decision on that. What we will have is a plan being prepared that will be presented to this working group at the Cabinet level and we'll get approved.

Q Can you say what some of the things you are considering now? Some of the things that would be --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, one -- one is the one just mentioned in terms of the Shuttle. You know, a private company has come in and asked to -- to purchase the fifth orbiter, if it were built. So there is some movement in that regard already. Obviously, the expendable launch vehicle area is one that's already occurring; another one that the Department of Commerce has had to lead on is the LANDSET area. So all of those are ones you could mention.

Q Who wants to buy the orbiter?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's a company called Astrotech.

Q Is that one word?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's one word. And they would, I am sure, be more than willing to chat with anybody that would be interested.

Q Where are they from?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They are based in Florida, although they also have offices here in Washington. And, if you want, we could get you their number.

Q Is Klaus Heiss' proposal to build a shuttle dead now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Klaus Heiss has basically withdrawn that proposal.

Q Will the new breaks, such as the dropping of the export classification, will they extend to users of Ariane, American companies that choose to use foreign boosters?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Run that question by me one more time.

Q Will some of the breaks, the tax breaks and things like that, will they extend to American companies that choose to use foreign boosters?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That really isn't -- doesn't work. The way that it will -- the way it will work is that U.S. companies that do things that are connected to the U.S. and benefit U.S. taxpayers will get the benefits; those that don't won't.

MR. FITZWATER: Is that it?

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 1:22 P.M. EDT

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THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
(Santa Barbara, California)

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON ASAT TALKS

August 1, 1984

Vista Mar Monte Room
Santa Barbara Sheraton
Santa Barbara, California

10:30 A.M. PDT

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll be glad to take your questions now ON BACKGROUND.

Q Well, is this it? I mean, is it your view now, or this government's view that the prospect for talks in Vienna is no longer there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Soviet response is surely not encouraging. They have hardened their position, set forth preconditions, and sought to prejudge the outcome of the Vienna talks. Thus it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the Soviets were not serious about their proposal when they first presented it on June 29.

We hope, however, that this is not the end of the road. The Soviets claim that their proposal for talks in Vienna in September remains in force. For our part, we have repeatedly told them that we accept their proposal; that we are prepared to have a delegation in Vienna to engage in serious talks on outer space, including antisatellite weapons, and that we approach the talks without precondition.

If the Soviets are prepared to address the issue on the same basis, it should be possible to begin talks in Vienna this fall.

Q Are we sending them another note through diplomatic channels, or have we received a note back through diplomatic channels? Or is it just this press briefing that you're responding to?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have received a formal expression of the Soviet position in diplomatic channels which was concurrently made public by the Soviet Union.

Q So, you don't now expect talks to take place?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We don't rule it out. We cannot be encouraged by what the Soviets have said. We remain willing to press on. This latest reply is not encouraging.

Q Well, may I just press the second part of my question. Are we now going to send them, through diplomatic channels, a further expression? Or, should they take what you're saying publicly here to be the United States response?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I've said publicly that we remain willing to come to terms on how to convene talks in Vienna in September. And you can expect that that attitude will be sent formally to the Soviet Union.

Q But -- well, you mentioned you were disappointed that they conducted talks through the public media rather than through diplomatic channels. But isn't that what we're doing here? Did you send them a note? Or is this our response to them, done publicly in a press conference situation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What I have done is to correct the record as to their portrayal of our position. We are responding to the Soviet distortion -- their misrepresentation of what our position is. However, our own interest in coming to terms with them will be conducted in private, as it should be, as normal.

Q Did you precede this statement with a diplomatic note or not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we haven't. The diplomatic channels are open, and will be active in coming days and weeks, we hope, on both sides.

Q Do you expect to make a new proposal to them? Or simply express our willingness to come to terms? And, given the fact that we seem to have a firm position on wanting to bring up the nuclear issues and also no moratorium in advance of the talks, what's the basis for any kind of compromise here? I mean, it doesn't sound like there is any place where the two sides can get together.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, Chris, our most recent position has moved virtually within a millimeter of adopting the Soviet proposed text. Consequently, for them to reject that, is a source of great frustration.

Let me say this: the President's reaction today, in having read the latest communication, was one of utter frustration borne of the fact that the Soviet characterization of our unwillingness to talk, based upon our wanting to talk on "militarization of space" as opposed to the prevention of the militarization of space, was incredible.

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It seems to us that the Soviets are trying to obscure, by semantic distortion, what is manifestly our purpose, and we hope theirs -- the limitation, the control over, the minimization of space weapons. For them to make a big point about preventing the militarization of space is rather like talking about the prevention of air pollution. Both of us, anybody, would like to deal with the problem -- to control it.

But it also masks the fact that they, indeed, are the only ones who have a tested, operable, co-orbital antisatellite system. It also obscures the separate, but related fact, that both of us rely upon military systems in space for entirely peaceful purposes -- the monitoring of arms control agreements and so forth.

So, to say that we have to back up and talk about the preventing of militarization of space is a diversion of the central issue here.

Q: But aren't there still some very major disagreements? You say we're within a millimeter of their position, aren't we still insisting that we would be able to bring up other issues, as you've said, the proposed strategic relationships, and aren't we still unwilling to agree to a moratorium as the talks begin?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Two points: One is your point on the moratorium, and where we'd stand; and the other, our interest in raising offensive systems.

I'll take the last one first. We have made clear our willingness to have our negotiators, as an early item on the agenda, talk about what restraints ought to be applied in the course of the negotiations. That is the normal thing to do. To say that we ought to, today, adopt a position which concludes, as an outcome, some kind of arms control limitation, is to prejudge the outcome of the talks. It's also to ignore that you've got to have some fairly clear understandings on each side about how you verify what you are doing, and so forth.

So, it has become for them a precondition that is just manifestly unfeasible. It also ignores or slides over the fact that they are the only ones, indeed, who already have a system like this. So it is, of course, in their interest to call for such a moratorium. They don't need to worry about it.

Yes?

Q Well, wait a minute -- then can you answer the other part about the strategic?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The larger point that we have made is that it is in the interest of all humankind for the two superpowers to discuss control of, reduction of, the system which today constitutes the leading, clear and present danger -- threat -- offensive systems. And in terms of priorities, it seems clear that we have an obligation to talk about things that threaten today versus things that are not yet upon us.

Now, that said, we are entirely willing to talk about these future systems, systems that they have, but we don't yet have -- but still, let's talk about those. But we think that it is irresponsible not to talk about existing systems which constitute a threat. No, we haven't made it a precondition that we negotiate these things, that we discuss them even. We have simply said that we intend to raise them.

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Now, if the Soviets don't want to listen, all right. But we cannot abrogate a U.S. responsibility to talk about these things.

Yes?

Q As you look at the whole record of this thing so far, do you think they were sincere in the first place?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Their latest position makes that very much in doubt.

Q So, what does the administration feel they were up to? Were they getting involved in domestic politics here, or what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't conclude that. I can't account for this change. I must admit that in recent days the appearance was that they were giving serious consideration to it, at least there was some turmoil within the government over how to respond, but their answer doesn't leave much basis for hope.

Q Whose government?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Soviet.

Q Does the administration feel that in any way -- that the way we handled our part of it, our communique, sometimes not alluding to ASAT specifically, compounded the problem at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't see how they can. From the beginning our position made explicit

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that we were willing to go back and talk about their term, the militarization of space, and, separately but originally also, that we thought it was an excellent idea. And we have never departed from that position. The fact that we have, in intervening times, characterized it more generally was not a moving away from that position, and indeed, we have reaffirmed the original position. We thought some alternative formulation might have suited them better. But it has never -- the U.S. position has never varied from the beginning.

Q Do you think, in rhetorical terms, that the Weinberger statements maybe set this thing back in any way?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Why not? Wasn't the tone of what he said just too -- appear to harden the U.S. position, while you seem to be saying that in the diplomatic channels, you were presenting our position in much softer terms. And then he came out with a very -- more hardened line.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think that Cap intended, nor from my reading of it, did he say anything different from the U.S. position. I think that he stressed his concern that they wouldn't talk about offensive systems. But he didn't alter our complete willingness to talk about their issue. And he surely didn't intend to alter our position.

Q Well, now, he uses --

Q One more question. Who -- can you tell us at what level the latest note came from? Was it from Chernenko to Reagan or was it at a lower level?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't want to characterize the level of communication. It has, at all times, been at a very high level.

Q When was the last communication?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry I sound doctrinaire. I don't want to say that either. But it has been very, very recently.

Yes.

Q Two questions. One is, back to the original question, I take it this is our response; that we don't have any specific diplomatic note going to the Soviet Union on this latest message of theirs, is that correct? I mean, what you're saying here is the response?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, no. I thought that earlier that I had made it pretty clear that we expected, we hoped there would be further exchanges in both directions and that we intend that.

Q Secondly, generally, what would the joint statement that we proposed say?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that's still under -- it's pending, I guess.

Q But can you generalize it in sort of a basic way?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, without any intent to blur, we've accepted the proposal that we convene to talk about the militarization of space, including antisatellite systems and other issues relevant to this matter.

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Q Which are testing weapons?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that would encompass anything they wanted to raise. We also think it encompasses offensive systems, too.

Q But it was a general statement and not specific?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it was specific to the extent that it did take their language on both those points, on saying we are willing to talk now about militarization of outer space and antisatellite systems.

Q And other issues? I mean that was --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right.

Q But generally, just written other issues, not specific other issues?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct.

Q Can we go back to the Weinberger interview for a minute? The way I read that, he certainly seemed to be saying that there was not much point in our going to Vienna to meet with the Russians if they weren't willing to talk about missiles. I mean it doesn't seem, from my reading of it, to be much in doubt. How could that not have set the process back?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think Cap's larger intent, as I read it, was to say that the world right now exists with thousands of weapons on both sides, and that's what we ought to be talking about. And so, to the extent that that is the first or the most urgent problem we face, that talking about others is relatively less important. But I don't think that he intended to imply that we wouldn't talk about others, and we will.

Again, I should say that this has never been for us a matter of insisting that the Soviets come to Vienna or any place else with prepared offensive positions to talk about. It's just that we believe we must. And their response is less important than the fact that we get back to a discourse on the issue.

Q Weinberger, on Sunday, made clear that from his standpoint, we would not accept the Soviet preconditions. He said it would be kowtowing. We would not kowtow to the Soviets. That was very tough language.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the language that was formally stated by the highest levels of our government as to what we would agree to do was unambiguously clear and it is virtually the Soviet proposal. I don't --

Q How can you say that? I don't understand. I mean there are --

Q Opens the mouth and it comes out.

Q -- major differences, aren't there? I mean, on the two major issues, there continue to be differences. You haven't indicated there was any compromise on either of the big issues.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATON OFFICIAL: Well, I guess we just disagree, Chris. This text would have committed us to just what I've said. It didn't raise or make an issue about our agenda in any sense. Indeed, I think we opened a new possibility by making clear as well that we were willing for the joint announcement, if they

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wanted it to, to say something about what restraints would be appropriate, in the context of their moratorium proposal, during the negotiations.

Q It would have mentioned moratorium?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it said that we were --

Q Willing to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- willing to consider what restraints ought to be applied during the negotiations.

Q You made a reference to the possibility of further communications on this in diplomatic channels. And given that we seem, by your own words, to have moved to the outer-most limits of our position by coming within a millimeter of a dot from theirs, what basis do you see for further talks and discussions with the Soviets on this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'll give you a personal opinion on it. It seems to me that the Soviets truly don't want to sit down and talk with us right now. It seems that they do have an interest in talking about certain arms control matters. It's my sense that they want to pick a different time, and I wouldn't speculate on their motives for that. I think, however, that if September's not good for them, then we can do it later. And we are ready anytime they are.

Q Have you had any contact, or has the government had any contact with Senator McGovern to get his view of what they were telling him, his view on it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have not. I believe that he has talked with the U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, but I don't know the result of that.

Q Does this latest round of proposals and rejections by both sides move the overall U.S.-Soviet relations in one direction or another?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think it does. To me, it represents a curious anomaly in the normal tone and content of U.S.-Soviet relations, but I don't think it alters fundamentally the principles which guide each side or their both having clear self-interest in a sensible dialogue with the other.

There are other things going on that are barometers of normalcy and there will be other statements from back in Washington in the next few days on those.

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So I don't think there's -- it represents, surely, any crisis. It's just --

Q Can you say why it is that they don't want to meet with us now? What's your opinion --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry --

Q Why is it that they do not want to discuss this with us at this time, in your opinion?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know. I wouldn't speculate on that?

Q Is the election a reason?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know.

Q The Olympics? (Laughter.)

Q Weinberger said he didn't know either; but he thought maybe they were trying to defeat the President. He offered that as one possibility.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I wouldn't speculate on that.

Q When do you think the President's policy would begin to pay off, the policy namely of the military reformation buildup to put pressure on them to come to the negotiating table? This is a syllogism he has emphasized. When will that begin to pay off?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: First of all, I think, to the extent that there is greater stability in the military balance, and, therefore, that deterrence is more effective and that the willingness of the Soviet Union to take risks in developing countries from Angola to Ethiopia and Afghanistan, Nicaragua and so forth, seems to have been checked that it is already paying off significantly.

As to when they may see it in their self-interest to come back and talk about arms reductions, next year.

Yes.

Q What's --

Q Next year?

Q You say that flatly, next year you expect that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is my personal opinion.

Q Once we test an antisatellie weapon, is there any way of verifying an agreement after that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question is once we've tested an antisatellite system, is there any way of verifying? Gosh, yes. There are some you can and some you can't. I don't mean to be frivolous; but the one, for example, that we are testing is imminently verifiable, if you're not going to do it anymore. But some you cannot. I take your point.

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Q But as far as an aircraft -- it's an 18-foot rocket, that you fire from the aircraft. How do you verify whether we're using them or not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are ways of -- such as we considered in the SALT II context, where you can identifiably distinguish the mission of a particular aircraft that makes it subject to verification. But I take your point, not all systems are verifiable and that's why it is useful to sit down and talk about how you can avoid crossing that threshold.

Yes, Debbie, you had a question.

Q Yes, but just to get you back on the question of timing, there seems to be -- you know -- burbling up over the last few days, they want to pick a different time, we're willing. Are we now saying to them, "Listen, let's talk about a different time." Is there some discussion now of not focusing solely on September, to try and get this off --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't say there's a focus on it. As part of an openess or a flexibility, we've told them that, if this is a problem for them, that we are not -- we are flexible on that point. But we haven't made a major issue on it. We're not sure that it really is the central issue for them. But if it is, fine. We'll talk about it any time.

Q But are we going to offer another alternate date, for example, go that far?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, they'd offered the date in the first place. If they want to offer another one, they can. We've told them that the date is not a hangup for us. Any time is okay.

Yes.

Q You had mentioned turmoil within the Soviet government on this issue. Do you think there are factions in the Soviet government that wanted these talks now and they were overruled?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I surely couldn't say that, based on what they've said. But --

Q Well, what did you mean by "turmoil"?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it may be overdrawing the issue. It took, for example, five days this time, I think. Earlier, their responses came a little faster. So it may be wrong to characterize it as "turmoil." But it just seemed to us that there must have been something going on, some serious thought being given to it.

Yes.

Q Would you say flatly the Soviets will come back to the arms negotiations next year? How close after January 21st would you think?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I was talking in a sense of the internal logic of preserving a stable balance, as opposed to the political equation.

It just seems to me that time works to make clear to the Soviet Union that self-interest justifies their trying to put

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some restraints on our systems, and the sooner the better, before the systems mature and more political capital, as well as financial capital is put into them. So, that natural logic we think ought to have already pursuaded them to do it, but I think, in any event, that early next year is -- probable.

Yes, John.

Q In other words, this has nothing to do with the President being reelected and being set in place for four years?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

John.

Q Given the overall instability that you've talked about before of three different leaders, and given Chernenko's age and the possibility of more instability and turnover in the Soviet government, why are you more optimistic now that they would come back to the table than you were before, in that it seems that -- why is the future going to better? Why wouldn't they just continue to build for four years, as they have before, or they have in the past, and continue this arms race, given the instability in government?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I guess I'd conclude that personally, based on the ABM experience, back in the late '60's, and, really, their respect for American technology. At that time, the prospect of our building a very good ABM system led them to say, "Let's avoid that." And they came to the table and talked about it. And with our modernization program now having three years of authorization behind it, there's a very compelling logic to their wanting, as in 1969, to put some limits on those.

Q But they had a stable government -- I mean, they had long-term leadership stability at that point. Now, they don't. I mean, you're talking about logic, the logic of the Soviets. Haven't they been illogical because of this? I mean, in our way of thinking, illogical because of this leadership change?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I take your point. I think that the Soviet military are -- or is a very realistic community of leaders. They can see the inexorability of the U.S. programs and can only be chagrined at what it implies for their position and their advantages. And I think they would exert a significant influence toward negotiation.

MR. SPEAKES: Drake, last question. Excuse me.

Q Oh, no --

Q Do you have any --

MR. SPEAKES: Drake, last question because my colleague has to get to the airport.

Q -- of the President's reaction as one of utter frustration. Do you have anything more to offer directly on what he has said about this latest development --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President took the Soviet reference to our alleged misleading position by not wanting to talk about preventing militarization of space as astonishing in the context, and his reference was to what he has said in the Japanese Diet about both of us working toward the complete

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elimination of strategic nuclear weapons and that clearly our approach to these talks would be toward limitation and toward controlling and toward reducing and that for them to characterize it otherwise indicates a lack of seriousness and that's what produced -- the frustration, but --

Q To whom did he express that? To you? Were you in a room when he got mad and said, "I'm utterly frustrated"? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We talked -- the President, the Secretary of State and myself.

Q What do you think realistically are the chances --

MR. SPEAKES: Supposed to be last question --

Q -- that the two sides will meet in Vienna in September?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry --

Q What about the Consular offices --

Q -- opening in Kiev --

SENIOR ADMINSTRATION OFFICIAL: Larry has cut it off. I'm sorry.

END 10:58 A.M. PDT

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FILE COPY

ON THE RECORD BRIEFING
BY
AMBASSADOR JAMES L. BUCKLEY
ON
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON POPULATION
THURSDAY, AUGUST 2, 1984, 1:31 P. M.

MR. BRIAN CARLSON: Good afternoon. This is an ON-THE-RECORD briefing by Ambassador James L. Buckley, Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the International Conference on Population which is being held in Mexico City, August 6-13. It's a briefing on the U.S. policy statement, and Ambassador Buckley has a few remarks, and then he'll take your questions.

Ambassador?

AMBASSADOR BUCKLEY: Thank you. Good afternoon. By way of background, the restatement, if you will, of United States population was prepared in anticipation of the conference that will be taking place in Mexico.

The purpose of that conference is to review the World Population Plan of Action which was adopted at Bucharest ten years ago. In its words, "The plan of action is an instrument 'for the promotion of economic development, quality of life, human rights, and fundamental freedom.'"

These, then, are the basic goals that are addressed by the comprehensive statement of population policy recently released by the government, namely, the enhancement of the quality of life in a manner consistent with basic human values.

This rearticulation of policy reflects twenty years of experience with family planning and economic development assistance programs. It does not reflect any radical, new departures; rather, it represents a significant sharpening of focus.

These are the policy's major elements:

1. The statement reaffirms in very clear terms America's continuing and undiminished support for foreign voluntary family planning programs, provided only that they are

truly voluntary and that U.S. funds are not used to finance or promote abortion.

2. It recognizes that population growth, in itself, is a neutral phenomenon. Whether it represents an advantage or disadvantage depends on the conditions existing within each country in which it occurs.

3. The statement affirms that the experience of developing countries demonstrates that free market-oriented economies are those most conducive to growth and to a significant rise in real personal income.

4. The statement also notes that rising income is historically associated with falling birth rates. It therefore follows that the encouragement of economic reform should be an essential part of any strategy seeking to achieve ultimate population equilibrium.

Let me now suggest where this statement of American policy differs in emphasis from earlier policy, and where it does not.

First, it rejects the Malthusian pessimism reflected in the Global 2000 report issued during the Carter Administration.

Second, it incorporates as an explicit component of a comprehensive population policy the encouragement of a free economic environment that is an objective of our existing economic development policy. In short, the two have been wrapped into a single document.

Third, it withholds U.S. funding from any private organization that promotes abortion in other countries.

In all other respects, the new statement merely tightens the safeguards in support of what has been longstanding policy concerning the use of foreign assistance funds.

Where American policy remains unchanged, as I stated at the outset, is in its support of voluntary family planning programs abroad. The United States continues to support them both as an integral part of programs to improve the health of mother and child, and as an essential element in facilitating the exercise of parental control over the size of their families.

This, then, is the substance of the statement. I'd be happy to try to field your questions.

Q Ambassador Buckley, on the policy of not giving money to governments which then use that money for abortion or non-favored birth control programs, since money is fungible, what difference does it make if you segregate the U.S. funds? In other words, they can simply take something from that fund and move it over to the other abortion program?

A First of all, this is simply a bookkeeping tightening of existing policy with respect to the U.S. funds in support of abortion, which is prohibited -- has been for ten years. What this does do is, while on the one hand recognizing the sovereign prerogative of other nations to define their own policies, it nevertheless satisfies American taxpayers that their funds are not being used for these purposes.

Q In other words, let me simplify and paraphrase what you're saying: It makes us feel good, but it doesn't necessarily do the job.

A No. And feeling good is very important. (Laughter) That's one of the policy objectives of the World Population Plan of Action.

Q Mr. Ambassador, when a senior Administration official first briefed reporters in this room on the policy change, he was asked about the private voluntary organizations which might specifically be affected by the new policy. He mentioned International Planned Parenthood.

International Planned Parenthood has already been subjected in the last year, several years, to segregated funding because of this '73 law.

Is it the position of the Administration that this segregated accounting has not worked? If so, why are we applying it to UNFPA? And, if it has worked, why the funding ban to International Planned Parenthood?

A I would say, first of all, I was not in on the formulation of the policy. I have one job only, and that is to explain it when I get to Mexico, and then go back to my work abroad.

What this does do, as I stated in my introductory remarks, is to say that any organization that actively promotes abortion is not eligible to receive funds. That takes care of the fungibility problem. It also recognizes the distinction between the prerogatives of a nation and private organizations.

Q Well, let me put it another way: In Mexico, if you were asked why this policy has been adopted which does affect Planned Parenthood, how would you explain it?

A It is the decision of the United States Government to make this distinction in recognition of the rights of sovereign governments which are not necessarily the rights of private organizations. The United States makes that distinction. It, at the same time, has its own sovereign right to determine how to deploy its own funds.

Q Ambassador, the official who spoke here previously, he suggested that the U.N. organization as well may be subject to a funding cutoff.

Will the outcome policy paper produced at the conference determine whether or not the U.S. continues to support the organization financially?

A No. It is purely a matter of how the funds possessed by that organization are used, and my understanding is that at the present time there is no problem.

Q Also, on the -- I gather that the number of draft recommendations have been drawn up for the Committee to discuss in Mexico City. Are there elements that you are aware of now that in particular are unacceptable to the U.S., and that you'll be seeking to modify?

A We are currently in the process, my delegation and I, of going through all of these to determine how they might or might no impact on this particular policy statement. A brief review suggests that most of them are completely outside its range.

There are some items which are clearly extraneous, and then the question is, is it good policy at the United Nations meetings to allow attention to be diverted to irrelevant matters.

Q Specifically, where you want the statement to say something explicitly about the unacceptability of abortion as a means of family planning?

A No. We are addressing a series of questions which have been prepared in earlier meetings, preparatory councils. But if something were to appear that was explicitly contrary to our statement, we'd certainly speak up.

Q What about economic incentives and disincentives? What position is the U.S. going to take on that?

A We will be presenting our view based not on what we do at home, but what we believe is clearly observable as one looks at the developing world in the years since the end of the Second World War.

We believe that if one, for example, looks at the experience of a series of countries from North Korea -- South Korea, rather, right around through Thailand, that there is a pattern of vigorous economic growth, there is a pattern in which, yes, there has been significant increase in populations, but these are beginning to dwindle, and we believe that other countries ought in organizing their own affairs perhaps pay attention to other models and see if they can do what they're doing better.

We're not in a position to dictate to anybody, but we do feel the responsibility to make these observations, to try to focus attention on what we believe will be a combination of factors which can most effectively and efficiently, and in a manner consistent with basic human values, address the long-term problem of population.

Q Mr. Ambassador, there were a number of questions raised this morning at the House Foreign Affairs Committee which went unanswered. I wondered if I could pursue them a bit here.

First of all, there was some concern that you hadn't attended this morning at the last moment, and there was a letter sent to the White House from 19 Congressmen that you hadn't and were possibly circumventing Congress.

Do you have any response to that?

A Sure. As soon as I arrived here over the weekend and started plunging into the kind of work required to prepare for a conference of this nature, I just ran into this situation that it would be very, very difficult to take the time out for a congressional hearing when my principal responsibility was to see that we are prepared for the meeting in Mexico.

There are 85 recommendations that need to be analyzed. It was only yesterday afternoon that we were able to bring together our delegation -- and not even all of them -- for the first time to start the job of examination. I spent all morning with key members of the delegation doing precisely that.

I advised the House Committee of the difficulties I faced. I tried yesterday afternoon and evening to reach the Chairman to explain, because I'm sure he would have understood, especially given the fact that Mr. McPherson was there to explain the policy and give answers, and especially given the fact that he is in the business of implementing the policy, and I will have nothing to do with that.

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Q There was raised as to the definition of "actively promoting abortion." If an organization lists as an alternative an abortion, among other alternatives to someone coming in, will that be considered active promotion of abortion?

A I'd have to leave that judgment to the people who will actually be administrating the program. There's a range of possibilities, obviously, if somebody took out ads saying, if you want to limit your family, try such-and-such a clinic. That would disqualify the organization. If someone at a casual cocktail conversation would say, I personally feel this is appropriate, that obviously would not.

Where you are in between would not be for me to decide.

Q Has there been any support from the Allies on this particular position, or have any other countries ever offered this sort of proposal before?

A I have no idea.

Q If your abortion policy has the intended effect, or the most desired effect, which would be to reduce the numbers of abortions given by family planning programs, this, as is well known, would result in an increase in the number of illegal abortions and attendant mortality and morbidity.

How do you propose to deal with that? Are you going to press hard for more funds for regular family planning programs?

A I already stated that we continue our vigorous support of family planning programs with the objective of broadening their outreach, the ability to reach people. And if they are effective, they ought to avoid that first situation you describe. But the fact that people might resort to something illegally does not necessarily change the moral dimensions of the problem.

Q Is the broadening of the outreach, is that synonymous with more money? Is the U.S., on the basis of this policy statement, prepared to increase its contribution?

A I think you would have to examine each country in turn, how effective are the programs, how efficient, to what degree have the various communities within the country themselves been enlisted in these activities.

I would point out that the United States provides 44 percent of the total funding for international family program of family planning support. I think that adds up to a very major effort by anyone's definition.

Q I don't quite understand your position on the basic issue. You say here that population growth is a neutral phenomenon, not necessarily good or bad. And then you say, the United States supports and helps to control it.

A No, I didn't say. I said it helps support family planning programs; family planning programs in turn, are --

Q That's not population control measures?

A -- are a neutral on population control. They make it possible for families to decide to have fewer children and to do so with facility. But the ultimate decision is that of individual couples, and written throughout the United States declaration is the preservation of the right and prerogative of individual parents to make that decision and no one else.

Q I'm not questioning the right of individual parents, or whatever. But is not the United States supporting population control measures by supporting family planning? If not, what is it doing there?

A It is supporting two things, as far as family is concerned. Number 1: Fundamental health measures. There are crying situations, desperate situations, especially in impoverished areas of the world, where rapid spacing of children, or the having of a child very, very early in life or too late in life, involve tremendous health risks for mother and child.

The instruction on family planning, the knowledge of family planning is a way in which people have a better understanding of how to control conception, how to avoid conception.

Number 2: With that knowledge in place, those facilities in place, it also facilitates the ability of a nation, working with its own people which encourages them to have smaller families, to achieve that objective.

Q "Objective," being what?

A If it is their objective to reduce the fertility in those countries, it'll be achieved much more readily

Q But isn't that population control? That seems almost the definition of it.

A That is, the population control based on the individual decision of each country involved; each society involved.

Q Then you say, it is not either good or bad?

A I'm saying, it's not in itself, per se, not good or bad. Whether it is an advantage or disadvantage, I also said, depended on the conditions within a particular country. A doubling of the population of Singapore did not retard its economic growth. And Singapore now has declines in fertility rates.

You double the population of some other areas and it is a very, very major problem. A major problem that's been defined and described in many fora.

Q When you promote economic development at this meeting, could you be more specific about what measures you would be emphasizing, like, for example, education for women?

A Certainly, those are items on the agenda which we have always supported and will continue to support. The basic proposition that we will be saying -- and don't forget I've got about twenty minutes to explain a statement, to present a statement -- is that it is observable that those countries which have opted for decentralized, free market-oriented economies have been more successful in raising the standard of living of their people and in accommodating a growing population than have been those which have been tightly, centrally controlled and directed.

Q Ambassador, the policy statement also opposes coercive measures in family planning. Could you specify what that is, what that covers, and maybe a few examples?

A Again, I can give you examples on the extremes because it will be up to the individuals applying policy, implementing policy, to make the decisions in between.

Tax incentives to encourage smaller families clearly is not coercive in our judgment. On the other hand, to grab somebody and force that individual into a clinic to have sterilization against that individual's will is clearly coercive and it would disqualify.

Q But what about a pattern of economic benefits of housing and denial of benefits -- again, housing, school, and other things?

A Now, you're getting into that in-between ground that it is not my position to explain.

Q And you don't need to define that in the context of the Mexican Conference?

A No.

Q You were talking about irrelevant recommendations among the 85 that you are right now reviewing. Could you mention a few?

A There is one proposal that talks about the need for disarmament. We think that there are other fora that perhaps are more appropriate.

Q Whose proposal is that?

A The Secretariat's.

Q That's the only one that comes to your mind right now?

A We've gotten to number 19 in our review of 85.

Q How come you started so late with your review?

A I have another job. I arrived over the weekend. I'm working with a delegation, several of whom have only recently surfaced. We do have a first cut by the Department of State which has brought attention to several items. But we, as a delegation, have not had the chance. By the time we are there, I assure you we will be very well prepared.

Q Mr. Ambassador, I just wanted to clarify this. When you started, you said that you were not in on formulating this policy. At any time after you were asked to head the delegation, did you request that there be a change in U.S. policy?

A I stated that I would consider heading it if it were a statement that I could approve. I can approve it. I do approve it.

Q Is there anything you would add to it if you could?

A   I have left my private druthers behind. As I take on this job, I have one commitment only and that is to support every part of that statement as effectively as I can.

Q   What is it that you find so objectionable about Global 2000? Do you object, for example, to the population projection figures?

A   They are always tricky. They make lots of assumptions. But the other one that we most particularly focus on is the assumption that the world's resources are finite, that if you increase your population by ten percent, you decrease the capital resources available per capita by that equivalent percentage.

We believe that human experience simply does not justify that. That human inventiveness, in fact, solves problems, finds new resources, and in these days at a startling rate.

Q   Critics of the new policy charge that countries at the Conference in Mexico City are going to -- it's going to embarrass the United States. That's what critics say. What do you think about that?

A   I can't think of anybody in my delegation who is going to feel at all embarrassed. In fact, I'm told by people who attended the Conference ten years ago in Bucharest that there was a very sharp division between North and South, the North saying you have to stop breeding; the South saying, what we want is economic development.

If anything, we seem to have moved in the direction of more countries.

Q   How do you think the other countries will perceive it?

A   I hope the way it is intended, as a constructive contribution to an analysis of what is involved in achieving the basic goals of the World Population Plan of Action, which, as I stated at the outset, is to achieve a better quality of life for all human beings. And that is not a function of numbers alone; it's a function of per capita income, of productivity, and also of a respect for basic values.

MR. BRIAN CARLSON: Thank you very much.

(Background briefing concluded at 1:55 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ON THE RECORD BRIEFING
ON
MALARIA RESEARCH BREAKTHROUGH

THURSDAY, AUGUST 2, 1984, 2:42 P.M.

MS. TINSLEY: I apologize for the delay. My name is Sarah Tinsley, with AID's Bureau for External Affairs.

The briefing today will be on a recent breakthrough on the development of a human malaria vaccine. The opening statement will be made by M. Peter McPherson, Administrator of the Agency for International Development.

This briefing is ON THE RECORD for both sound and camera.

Mr. McPherson?

MR. McPHERSON: Thank you. It is nice to see all of you here today.

Economic and health development is a lengthy and open-end process. Success is measured not in years but sometimes in decades. Yet the U.S. Foreign Economic Assistance Program has realized very important achievements in many areas -- for example, today, as we're talking about in health.

AID sponsored research has led to the pre-clinical development of a new drug against river blindness.

Also, AID provided much of the funding in the successful effort to eradicate smallpox.

AID provided much of the funding for the Diarrheal Research Center in Dacca, Bangladesh, resulting in the discovery of an Oral Rehydration Therapy. This therapy is really a dramatic method for reducing the death of children around the world. We think in a few years it may save as many as five million lives a year.

Today we're marking the occasion of significant progress of U.S. researchers toward the development of a malaria vaccine. For the first time, using genetic engineering technology, we have produced a human malaria antigen. In layman's terms, an antigen is an agent of immunization.

What we're announcing today, and the importance of the announcement today, is instead of taking this antigen from mosquitoes -- which was the way we first got it -- we are able to practically produce this malaria antigen in large quantities.

This antigen, as I was just suggesting, will be the basis for the long-needed vaccine for human malarias. There'll be some testing on animals for safety purposes and then for effectiveness, and then moving on to such tests on humans which will need to be conducted next.

Malaria is one of the most widespread causes of death and illness on the face of the earth, affecting about 200 million people -- we estimate -- a year -- 200 million people. Probably--though we don't know for sure; there may be much more -- a million people or so die a year from malaria.

As we look at this -- what we feel to be -- very exciting step -- is that it is exciting, but that it's also sobering to realize that we may soon be able to reap the benefits of some twenty years and 35 million dollars in investment by AID in this project.

When the Reagan Administration came into office three and a half years ago, there were substantial questions asked as to whether or not we should continue to fund this project. After carefully looking at the matter, being advised by a number of experts -- some pro and some con -- I decided that it really was an important thing to continue to put money in because of the tremendous, huge payoff that was involved here -- or potentially involved.

Accordingly, in my last three years, we at AID have invested nearly 17 million additional dollars into this research -- that 17 million being part of the 35 I mentioned. In other words, almost half of it has been invested in the last three and a half years.

As I indicated, over the years AID has sometimes challenged the prevalent scientific opinion as to whether or not this was a practical thing to do. The road of this research hasn't always been smooth, but we're certainly happy that we persisted. And we've been supporting and working with over 17 universities and research institutions on this project.

Important results have been achieved along the way, but the most significant breakthroughs, paving the way for the vaccine development, have occurred during the last two years at New York University by a team led by Dr. Ruth and Victor Nussenzweig -- both who are with us today.

In view of this impressive progress, I've committed AID to accelerate its funding for malaria vaccine development, with a goal of initiating vaccine trials in 12 to 18 months and making a vaccine widely available in five years. We think this is a practical schedule.

AID is encouraging the research institutions in our network to enter into arrangements with private industry for eventual vaccine production. Arrangement through the private sector for distribution is really, we found, the way to distribute technology by far the most rapidly -- and, hence, our encouragement of this step.

Our objective, obviously, is the production of a hihgly effective vaccine, at a cost which all people can reasonably afford in developing countries.

We're talking, incidentally, about half the population, roughly, in the world being subject to possible malaria problems.

It's now my great honor to introduce Drs. Ruth and Victor Nussenzweig of New York University -- perhaps they'd come up here with me -- who have led a team of U.S. researchers working on malaria.

I'm also pleased to welcome Dr. Thomas McCutchan of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases at NIH, and Lieutenant Colonel Wayne Hockmeyer of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research -- who is here now -- and in the audience, Colonel Franklin Top, a medical doctor, Director of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research; Dr. Frank Neva, the Chief of the Parasitic Disease Laboratory, NIAID; Dr. Nyle Brady, my Senior Assistant Administrator for Science and Technology; Dr. James Erickson, Chief of AID's Communicable Disease Division; and Dr. A. O. Lucas, Director of WHO's -- World Health Organization -- Tropical Disease Research Program.

WHO has helped support the NYU work. NIH and Walter

Reed, building on the earlier work of the Nussenzweigs, have achieved similar research results using a different methodology and a different genetic material.

Let me now turn to Dr. Ruth Nussenzweig.

DR. RUTH NUSSENZWEIG: Thank you, Dr. McPherson.

I feel the need to give you a little bit of background on the research which has led to the data -- which are the reason for this press conference.

Mosquitoes transmit malaria by injecting a stage called "sporozoites" into man during the bite. The sporozoites -- the infective stage of the malaria parasite -- circulates for a short time in the bloodstream of Man and then in a few minutes these sporozoites enter the liver, change into another stage, and finally indeed multiply and invade red blood cells and cause the disease known as malaria.

Our research, which was initiated a good number of years ago, has consisted of using the sporozoite stage and using an attenuated form of the sporozoite as a vaccine. And it was shown that various animals -- rodents, monkeys, and even Man -- could be immunized and fully protected against malaria by the attenuation of irradiated sporozoites

The problem to this apporach to a vaccine is, however, that sporozoites cannot be mass-produced; they cannot be cultured. And, therefore, it would involve obtaining sporozoites from mosquitoes. And so this is a totally impractical approach.

The next important step, the next important research advance, has been to characterize on the sporozoites a protein, a molecule, which really is responsible for the protective effects which we had observed when whole sporozoites were used for immunization. And this protein covers the entire surface of the sporozoite and is present in all malarial species.

This protein, therefore, appeared to be a good candidate for a vaccine. But the problem, in a way, was still the same in the sense that we could not get enough parasites to obtain enough protein for a vaccine.

The next step was really to demonstrate that this protein, which I mentioned, seemed to be a good candidate -- that this protein was important. And we produced monoclonal antibodies which were directed against this protein and showed that these antibodies against the specific molecule were able to completely abolish the infectivity of the parasite. This was the proof that this, indeed, was a very important protein, which probably is involved with the infectivity of the parasite and with the mechanism of entry of the parasite into the liver cell, which is the next stage.

The difficulty of obtaining enough material, of obtaining enough of this protein -- the protective antigen -- was overcome through the use of genetic engineering techniques; and this involved identifying and isolating the DNA corresponding to the gene encoding for this protein -- and the rationale being that under these conditions the bacteria, Escherichia coli, would be mass-producing the antigen needed for vaccination purposes.

This approach was first used at NYU using a sporozoite of a monkey malaria -- Plasmodium knowlesi -- and this resulted in some rather interesting and, to some degree, surprising findings: namely, that the important part of the molecule, of the whole protein which we had previously identified, was made up of a small sequence of amino acids so that, indeed, only that small part of the molecule appeared to be very important and now our next candidate for a vaccine.

And we also found that there were in the molecule a large number of repeats of these few amino acids, which probably is the basis for the fact that this is so highly immunogenic that it is protective. It's repeated many times within the same molecule.

The following step was to chemically synthesize this small peptide, this small series of amino acids, which, because it is small, became a rather simple procedure. And it was then shown that this particular peptide -- this small group of amino acids -- was, indeed, the correct moiety because antibodies against this peptide -- they also recognize the parasite; and, in fact, we have recently shown that these antibodies, produced by immunization now, with the small series of amino acids, completely abolish sporozoite infectivity.

Now, this takes me to the present work -- namely, the cloning of the gene, encoding the protein of the most important human malaria parasite: Plasmodium falciparum. And this was done simultaneously in our laboratory by a Dr. Vincenzo Enea, a molecular biologist, and at the National Institutes of Health, in collaboration with the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research.

Again, the portion of the molecule which seems to be responsible for its main non-effects is very small -- a repeat -- and in this case it's a repeat of only four amino acids. It is a very, very small peptide which is repeated a very large number of times within the same molecule.

And it was shown by both groups of investigators that the chemically synthesized peptide reacts with the antibodies and it, therefore, seems to be the correct moiety.

I would like you to realize that this involves much further study in the sense that it will be necessary to find a proper system to deliver this peptide. And the difficulty is not to be underestimated because up to now there is no single vaccine based on a synthetic peptide which is in use in Man. There are several candidates, but there is no single one which is present and being used for human vaccination.

I would like to mention a second insert possibility which is being followed with regard to this vaccine development -- namely, the possibility to use directly the product produced by the bacteria Escherichia coli. So the first possibility is the synthetic peptide. The second is the whole protein produced by bacteria. And then there is a third possibility -- we're attempting one -- which is being pursued in collaboration with Dr. Bernard Moss at the National Institutes of Health -- which is to use the vaccinia virus -- the virus which produces the attenuated virus which was used for smallpox vaccine in the past -- to use this as a way to mass-produce the antigen for malaria so that the vaccination would consist of the recombinant smallpox vaccine which would contain the genetic information and which could mass-produce the material for malaria vaccine.

Now, I would like to mention that one attractive feature of the sporozoite vaccine -- of a vaccine based on this material -- is that all the evidence indicates that malaria parasites from all regions of the world have the same protein so that the vaccine produced against one given strain of malaria would be effective against the same malaria species all over the world.

In short, what we have done is to have found -- identified -- a good candidate for a vaccine and which, as Dr. McPherson mentioned before, will require trials in non-human primates first and then in Man.

I would also like to finally point out that this is the very first protective antigen of a parasite which has been identified. And this raises, therefore, hope that in the future there might be development of vaccines also against other parasitic and tropical diseases.

Thank you.

MR. McPHERSON: Thank you very much, Doctor. Are there questions, please?

Q Mr. McPherson --

A Yes.

Q -- a little clarifier here. We can recognize this use as a preventive, as an immunization program.

A That's correct.

Q As a means to have a preventive effect.

A Yes.

Q Is it of any use or any extrapolation of what they've been doing -- a use for inoculation after the fact of infection?

A It is not. It's a preventative.

Q It's been stated that there's a resurgence of malaria and that there's something over 200 million cases. Is that the annual -- or is that the total people with the disease or the annual --

A Doctor?

Q -- new cases?

DR. VICTOR NUSSENZWEIG: This is a minimal estimate, actually, up until recently which we have quoted here. And they have the figure out there of 220 million cases a year between new infections and chronic infections.

Q O.K.

A It's interesting --

Q Now, is that --

DR. VICTOR NUSSENZWEIG: It's 85 percent of that* caused by Plasmodium falciparum.

Q As far as resurgence, how many million a year were there at the most when malaria was at its peak, or is this more than it was at its peak?

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*Subsequently corrected to read, "It's 85 percent of the deaths that are caused by Plasmodium falciparum."

DR. VICTOR NUSSENZWEIG: I think it's much, much more than it was at its peak. And in certain countries malaria was close to being eradicated, but then there was a resurgence.

Q Does anybody know, before we started to use DDT in the 40s, how many cases of malaria there were around the world?

DR. VICTOR NUSSENZWEIG: I think Dr. Lucas can answer that question more precisely.

DR. LUCAS: Sir, what has happened is that malaria was cleared up from areas of the world -- as the southern part of Europe and in the subtropical regions -- and then it was sent very low in places like Sri Lanka and India, almost to the point of extinction -- and then came the recent increase in the numbers.

Certainly, if you look at the area of the world affected by malaria now, it is less than before DDT was used. So what has happened is that malaria has been cleared from areas where it was not deeply entrenched.

We were very hopeful that it would be cleared from the tropical areas, but unfortunately there has been a rebound.

Q There are more cases of malaria now than there were during the early 40s, for example?

DR. LUCAS: No. In terms of rates and areas affected, no.

Q The number in this total case --

DR. LUCAS: The increase in the number of people, probably more.

But we are looking, really, in terms of changes that have taken place in the past two decades.

A Doctor, do you want to speculate --

DR. LUCAS: It's been a kind of U-shaped curve. It went way down and it is now coming up.

A Do you want to speculate on why it returned?

DR. LUCAS: Oh. Several factors have occurred. One of the important factors has been the emergence of drug-resistant strains of the malaria parasite. Pluroquine, the drug that was widely used -- highly effective, very cheap -- unfortunately, the parasite has become resistant to it in many parts of the world -- Southeast Asia, in Latin America -- which ended up about five years ago -- and it has swept across now from the eastern coast from Kenya right through the central part of Africa. So that's one factor.

The other factor, of course, has been the resistance of the insects to the insecticides -- so that the two measures that have been used as the focus of control -- drug treatment and insecticides -- became less effective.

And added on to that, the cost of malaria programs, the loss of morale in places where they had hoped that they would overcome it and so on, led to an increase in recent years of the malaria problem.

Q Can somebody identify fully the speaker?

DR. LUCAS: Oh. My name is Lucas. I'm the Director of the UNDP World Bank, WHO, Special Program for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases. There's a Tropical Disease Research Program in Dovrefjell.* (Laughter.)

Mr. McPHERSON: I think that will do it just right.

It's interesting -- I went to -- it was in a little Pakistani village about a year ago where they had, in the last couple of years -- a year ago, at least -- irrigation available to them, and they thought the irrigation was wonderful but, goodness, it's too bad the malaria was back. -- the irrigation being water in which mosquitoes were bred.

Q Doctor, could you just repeat the way in which the vaccinia vacine would come into use as a possible malaria vaccine?

That went a little fast for me.

A Maybe you can try it.

DR. VICTOR NUSSENZWEIG: I will try it.

You have vaccinia virus, and you insert in the DNA the gene for the malaria protein. So now the vaccine virus makes the protein from the malaria parasite.

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*Subsequently corrected to read: "Tropical Disease Research Program for short."

So now to take that virus and to scarify the skin, like you do in vaccination -- that virus will infect locally the cells and will become now -- those cells will be living factories of producing the protein of the malaria parasite -- so that vaccine, the vaccinia virus -- will carry the malaria vaccine, together with its own antigens.

Q Could you give us again the time frame or how soon this could be introduced?

DR. VICTOR NUSSENZWEIG: The time frame is difficult to say, but it looks like the trials in primates could occur quite soon.

Q I missed something. Is there no vaccine against the parasitic disease, did you say, right now? This would be the absolute first?

DR. RUTH NUSSENZWEIG: Not against human parasites. Some are better in it.

MR. McPHERSON: I'd like to introduce -- we got into the questions quicker than we might have -- Dr. McCutchan of NIH. I know he has some comments too.

DR. McCUTCHAN: Yes. My name is Tom McCutchan. I work at the National Institutes of Allergy and Infectious Diseases in the Laboratory of Parasitic Diseases.

I'm speaking for my colleagues -- John Dame, who is in the audience -- and Lou Miller -- and for our collaborators at Walter Reed and at the National Cancer Institute.

We have cloned the entire gene for a protein on the surface of the malarial parasite Plasmodium falciparum.

This protein is considered by many to be a prime candidate for use in the production of an anti-malarial vaccine.

We have also been able to construct a bacterial virus that is able to produce the protein in the laboratory.

A short description of our work and its potentially wider significance is in the press packet. We are certainly proud of our contribution but feel that some balance is needed in the evaluation of its importance.

The cloning of this gene is an important step, but historically there have been many steps that have led to this point. Most of these advances have come from the laboratories of Ruth and Victor Nussenzweig and their collaborators.

These investigators are primarily responsible for showing that a sporozoite vaccine is feasible and that one particular protein -- the one cloned -- is capable of providing a protective immune response.

These results indicated to us and to those researchers at NYU that the cloning of this gene would be an important step.

As molecular biologists, our job was to find the needle in the haystack -- the one in literally thousands of malarial genes that encodes the appropriate protein -- and to transfer this to a bacteria and make it produce the protein of interest.

Our initial problem was one that is common to many of those who study parasites, and that is that the parasite takes on many shapes and forms during its life. These are called life-cycle stages.

As it happens many times, an important molecule for study or for a vaccine is produced in the stage of a parasite life-cycle that researchers are not able to produce in quantity. For example, the sporozoite gene -- which we were here to talk about today _- is produced, as you know, in the salivary gland of the mosquito. We were simply not able to obtain quantities of these sporozoites large enough needed to produce the RNA, which contains the information with which to reconstruct the needed gene.

This was a problem that many people faced and kept some other laboratories from trying to clone this gene.

My laboratory, however, discovered a way, by using a nuclease, or a protein from plants, to excise complete, intact genes from the DNA that is available at every stage of the life cycle in a form that was useful for producing the protein in bacteria.

This advance may be also very useful with regard to finding genes -- other genes in malaria that are important -- as well as in other parasitic diseases.

Finally, there are people who must be mentioned. John Dame, whom I've mentioned, did the work of finding and analyzing the gene and did a very fine job.

The group at Walter Reed made and provided immunological reagents and immunochemical expertise for identification of the gene product. Their valuable contribution in this collaboration should be stressed.

Prem Reddy,at the National Cancer Institute, helped us with DNA sequencing; and Lee Maloy, from the National Institutes of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, also helped us with peptide synthesis.

And, finally, Lou Miller -- the head of the Malarial

Section, who coordinated the entire effort.

MR. McPHERSON: O.K. We've got -- yes, questions right here.

Q My understanding is that the parasite takes three forms during its life cycle and that there are four kinds of malaria. Will this vaccine you're predicting in five years actually protect against all three forms? Is that necessary? And will it combine protection against all four strains of malaria?

DR. VICTOR NUSSENZWEIG: You're talking about different species of malaria.

There are malaria -- what you call falciparum and what you call vivax. There are different species of malaria parasites. Each one has a different protein. So a vaccine, in principle, would have to include proteins from each species.

Now, there's another problem -- that malaria has different stages. And each malaria has different stages of evolution, like shown in this cycle. The mosquito injects sporozoites, and we are talking about sporozoite vaccine.

The sporozoites enter the liver and come out. In this you have the blood cycle. In the blood the parasite is entirely different from that one. It changes, like a metamorphosis -- completely different antigens.

So in order to get protection against the blood cycle, if you did not protect against the mosquito bite then other antigens are involved.

That's a separate problem.

A The point is that we do --

Q Are you going to develop the polyvalent vaccine?

DR. VICTOR NUSSENZWEIG: Right. The ideal vaccine, in principle, would be polyvalent vaccine -- involving not only the sporozoite antigen but other antigens from other stages of the malaria parasite.

Q So that you have all four major types of malaria then covered by the vaccine?

DR. VICTOR NUSSENZWEIG: You can have malaria vaccine from all stages and from all species in a pool.

A No. The point -- I think at least part of the answer to your question is this vaccine deals with the first stage (pointing to chart) -- deals with when the mosquito bites the human being. And if that were to be effective, then of course it would cut off the rest of the stages.

DR. VICTOR NUSSENZWEIG: Right.

A It does not deal with the subseqent stages -- this vaccine.

We didn't get into this. I think we're going to be -- we're getting perhaps too technical for some and perhaps not technicalenough for others.

Q Would you expect the first stage to be fully protective?

DR. VICTOR NUSSENZWEIG. Yes, it is possible -- depending on the load or the dose of the mosquito injection -- that you can perhaps protect a part of the population at least, even with the vaccine against sporozoites. But that's something which has to be studied.

A Yes. Our hope is, of course, is that this will be sufficiently effective so it will essentially take care of the rest of the stages -- I hope.

Yes -- other questions?

Q Will one injection be enough, and would it need to **be refrigerated?**

DR. VICTOR NUSSENZWEIG: Well, it would help. It's too early to tell -- still -- too early to tell.

But the hope with any vaccine in underdeveloped countries is to have a vaccine which requires a single injection. If not, you get some very complicated delivery problems.

For example, the vaccinia, if it works, would be marvelous because the delivery system is so simple.

A Let me suggest -- I see some people who are getting a little restless -- our experts are certainly here to answer further questions.

Unless thee's something else that's a general questions, we can perhaps --

Q A simple-minded question: Are we killing the sporozoite or neutering it --

DR. VICTOR NUSSENZWEIG: I'm sorry?

Q Are we killing the sporozoite or neutering it before it can do any damage -- with the vaccine. Are you killing it?

DR. VICTOR NUSSENZWEIG: It's neutral. I mean the sporozoite cannot go on. It simply does not develop in the liver any more; it stops its development.

Q All right, thank you.

Q Is development of a vaccine a foregone conclusion at this point in your people's minds or is this the last thing -- the last major hurdle?

A What we're really doing -- we think we've got the vaccine. And, moreover, we've got a practical means of producing it in large quantities. Instead of taking it from the mosquito, we've got the vaccine. We now can produce it in large quantities.

The question now, in the usual sequence of these things, is "Is it safe?"; and we have to test it in primates and then in human beings. And "Is it effective?"

And those are a series of steps which we will do in careful coordination and approval step by step with the Food and Drug Administration.

Q That's not what Dr. Ruth Nussenzweig said. She said we have identified a candidate for a vaccine.

A Well, Ruth?

DR. RUTH NUSSENZWEIG: Well, I think it's a problem of difference of language but not of content.

Dr. McPherson also mentioned that the efficacy of this vaccine has still to be tested. So a vaccine, in my mind, is a vaccine when you get protection -- when you get complete protection -- and we have animal data indicating that we are on the right road. But we do not have sufficient data neither with this particular protein nor do we have data in Man to be certain that we have a vaccine.

So we'll consider the vaccine when we have gone all these steps which Dr. McPherson just mentioned.

Is that clear?

Q O.K.

Q Can Dr. McCutchan give us his appraisal of how fast he expects a practical vaccine to be around?

DR. McCUTCHAN: I think I would listen to Dr. Nussenzweig's advice. (Laughter.)

Q Would you listen to Mr. McPherson also? (Laughter.

DR. McCUTCHAN: No. It's very -- I'm a molecular biologist. I feel that it's very difficult for me to estimate the time involved in doing these things; they're very complicated.

Q Dr. Ruth --

Q How many cases of these are there in the U.S.

A I don't think very many. I think it's not largely a U.S. kind of situation or problem -- this lady says.

Q Dr. Ruth said -- you said at the outset that you had tested an attenuated form of the sporozoite vaccine in various animals -- rodents, monkeys, and even Man.

You mean you took it yourself or what? Who -- did somebody try it?

DR. RUTH NUSSENZWEIG: Well, some investigators, indeed, did it. We were not directly involved. We're doing the monkey experiments also.

Q How many investigators or how many people tried it?

DR. RUTH NUSSENZWEIG: There were a half a dozen individuals who were so-called "volunteers" who were immunized by the bite of infected and attenuated, irradiated mosquitoes.

Q They were immunized by the bite of --

DR. RUTH NUSSENZWEIG: Bite of mosquitoes which were carrying the parasite but which had been irradiated so that the parasites were no longer infected.

Q But -- yes -- and then what happened?

MS. TINSLEY: We've got time for one more question.

Q I mean yourend of the story.

DR. RUTH NUSSENZWEIG: And then several of these people -- which includes two of the investigators -- were protected. Not all, but some of them, were protected against -- now challenged by the bite of infected mosquitoes -- and, in fact, were completely protected in the sense that they failed completely to develop an infection.

Q Who are these two investigators?

DR. RUTH NUSSENZWEIG: Dr. David Clyde at the University of Maryland, the National Center, and Dr. McCarty. *

Q McCarthy?

DR. RUTH NUSSENZWEIG: McCarty.

And this was done a good number of years ago -- nearly ten years ago, nine years ago. And this is the only time that it has been shown in Man that a parasite antigen could

* Center for Infectious Disease Research.

produce protection.

A Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much.

These people are available if somebody has a further line of questioning to pursue.

Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 3:19 p.m., the ON THE RECORD briefing was concluded.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY WITH ZAIRE
THURSDAY, AUGUST 2, 1984, 4:04 P.M.

FILE COPY

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: On Friday, August 3, there will be a treaty signed in the White House between the United States and Zaire, a Bilateral Investment Treaty signed on behalf of the Zairian Government by the Commissioner of State for Foreign Affairs, the foreign minister in short, and Ambassador Bill Brock.

The major clauses of this Treaty, which was very carefully negotiated over a number of months, provide, as I think you've seen in past cases -- several others have been signed with the United States -- for protection of investments, arbitration at the time of disputes, and capital transfers. In short, creating a legal framework in which two nations come together, make a decision, and decide on how best to promote an investment climate creating a better framework for investments in the future.

The exact details of the Treaty I will leave to my colleague from [redacted] who I believe is sitting to my left. [redacted] was one of the -- if not, the key negotiator, and he can fill you in on any details that you have about the Bilateral Investment Treaty.

The reason I wanted to get together with you today was to underscore the importance that we attach to the Treaty, and that in a context of the policies we have been pursuing over the last several years in Africa, and with respect specifically to Zaire, particularly in the field of economic reform. We all know too well, as we look across the third world in this period of serious economic difficulty the enormous problems that Africa is confronted.

This podium has been used before. The Secretary has spoken to the subject. Africa is facing a time of unparalleled economic difficulty and distress. We have had as a cardinal principle in our policy, working towards a restructuring, a stablization of African economies and towards policy reform on the African continent. We have done so in cooperation with our Allies and in cooperation with the international institutions, the Fund and the Bank.

The world is full of still continuing difficulties, and a lot of question marks about where we are going and whether this period will be survived and in what shape countries will be when they come out of it.

The reason I wish to underscore Zaire today is for the specific reason that I think we have before us an example of where this very tough international medicine is taking effect. There are encouraging signs about the direction Zaire is taking as a result of having joined in an international effort, taken sovereign decision of its own and moved to restructure and reform its economy and take very deep, biting measures to make certain that it succeeded.

I don't have to go back over history a great deal. Zaire has a reputation that all of you know very well. A reputation for economic difficulty, a reputation for mismanagement in the economy; it's had a lot of press treatment, a lot of criticism in the Congress. Its history has been engraved pretty indelibly. But I think it's worth taking a look back for a moment before I tell you where we are today, and go back to the time that many of you recall in the early 1960's in which Zaire was embroiled in a desperate civil war.

Mobutu came to power in '65, and the civil war came to an end. The first serious institutions in the country were put into place. At that time, and almost coincidentally, there was a rise in the international price of copper which represents fifty percent of Zaire's exports, a sharp rise producing a handsome dividend. A dividend that caused the Zairians to sit down and begin a program of intense investment, hasty investment, sometimes a misguided investment, and the country extended itself

To give you an example, by 1975, Zaire was about a $1.8 billion in debt. Today, it's about $4.4 billion in debt. It was about $1.4 billion in debt by the end of '82.

In the mid 1970's, the international prices of copper began to cascade in a downward collapse, and the Zairians, among other copper producers, as other base metal producers in the world, began to experience really severe difficulties

In addition, Zaire had two invasions in the Shaba area -- '77 and '78 -- which further set back its economy. But I think if we look at the copper price alone, you can understand how severe it was when you realize today that copper prices in nominal terms are about lower than they have been in the last 10 years. In short, in real terms, they are at the lowest point they have been in the last 30 years.

As I said, copper provides half of Zaire's export revenues. Other related minerals, like cobalt, have equally experienced sharp down turns.

Not so many years ago, in 1978, cobalt was selling at $25.00 a pound. My memory today is it's in the $5.00 or $6.00 range, if not even below that. What is it? It's back up to $12.00.

Starting as early as the mid 1970's, the Zairians sat down and began to try to work out reform programs with the IMF. They went through several of these. None of them worked. However, in 1983, after considerable reflection, after a great deal of consultation with the Fund, with the Bank, with a great deal of prompting from donors and a very strong effort on our part, the government has taken a major new look at its economic policies and economic choices.

I think if you want some good news today, you will be looking in the next several minutes at a program of economic reform as deep and as far-reaching as any that's been undertaken in the third world, and happily at this point one of the more successful

Let me give you a couple of ideas of what they've done. The reforms, which began in late '83, have included a variety of issues. An 80 percent devaluation of the currency; a floating exchange rate, the implications of which are very important, a very sharp reduction in the size of the positions of the staffing ceilings of the civil service, bringing it down from about 250,000 to 200,000; the elimination of subsidies to state-owned enterprise and other subsidized prices in the economy, including food prices, basic staples; the liberalization of price control so that there could be an economic return to those who had a product to put on the market in a competitive sense, and a budget that is now, to use the Fund's term "transparent." It's a public document, and a budget that is squeezed down to a point today that Zaire is practically covering civil service salaries and external debt, a sharp reduction in the size of the budget.

As a result of these reforms -- very biting, very deep cutting -- the Fund moved forward in December of 1983 to extend a $350 million capacity for new drawings. The donors came together in Paris in December '83 and gave Zaire a rather serious rescheduling to make it possible for Zaire to meet the conditions set out by the Fund.

This undertaking, on the part of the Government of Zaire, an undertaking implying great austerity, has meant hardship, and times have been unusually difficult in Zaire. Prices have risen sharply, commodities have been in less ample supply. It's been a very tough time, but it's been a time in which government has stuck by its word, has carried forward.

The President of Zaire is serious about this as well as his Council of Ministers. And as recently as the month of June we've had direct assurances of that government's intention to persevere despite the adversities that they face. The results are beginning to come clear.

The value of the now floating currency, called the "Zaire" itself, is stablized at about 36 Zaires to the dollar. Foreign exchange is finally available through official, open, audible channels for the key imports the economy needs on a competitive basis for the first time in many years. Inflation has been brought down very sharply from 76 percent in 1983 to 5 percent in the first six months of this year; a really drastic squeeze.

As a side note, this process of deep-cutting reform has had an impact on an area that has been of substantial concern to the United States Congress, to all of us, and that is the issue -- corruption. For, as steps have been taken to liberalize the economy, get government out of the process of allocating foreign exchange and micro-managing pricing and producing, and introducing much tighter administrative controls over the budget and making all of this public, there has been an important and significant effect on the capacity and level of corruption.

(Continued on next page)

In addition, there have been a number of people, some 200 -- recently calculated -- civil servants who have lost their jobs as a result of finagling. The tax collection has improved. But I think the real issue that I'd like to focus your attention on is that the economic reforms that I've described, the dismantling of subsidies to parastatals, have reduced the opportunities for the misuse of government funds.

The conversion to a floating exchange rate has removed foreign exchange from a market where it could be acquired and then resold at profits which were both illegal and exorbitant. You've seen this kind of major form of diversion brought under control in a manner that even two years ago few of us who follow and are interested in this extremely large and important country, and a country key to our interests in Africa, would have thought possible.

There have also been a major set of reforms taken as late as June in the mining sector in which the government marketing board for mineral sales has been abolished and the company most interested in recuperating foreign exchange for the production of minerals. Gecamines, the large metals conglomerate, is now in the direct metals marketing business. That, I underscore, is, I think, one of the most significant reforms that's been undertaken.

As I say, the Zairians are going to stick with this program, and it's in light of that that we, the United States, have been looking with increased interest, sympathy, encouragement, at what's been going on. We have progressively increased our aid levels from about $33 million in 1983 to $45 this year, and we're asking for $59 next year.

We have seen, as well, the bilateral investment treaty in a similar context of trying now to respond to an economy that's taken medicine. How do you get the patient up off the pallet? How do you infuse new resources? and private investment is clearly one of them.

There are a number of American companies that have been active in Zaire. Equity investment value of our companies in Zaire today stands at about $200 million. Well known companies are General Motors, Goodyear, CitiBank, Rayovac, Continental Grain, Warner-Lambert, Mobil, Texaco, Armco. All of them are present or in the manufacturing or production business. Many have suffered under the conditions of the market place in Zaire over the last years, and have hung on because they face, they know, a large market, a nation of 30 million people, a country of considerable resources and great potential.

They're looking to a slightly different future. They can now obtain foreign exchange for their key imports through official channels, compete for it, compete for it in the floating exchange market, and this year for the first time -- or last year, actually, 1983 dividends this year, the dividends acquired in 1983 -- for the first time in a decade a year's dividends have been remitted to parent companies.

Two new American investments will be taking place in light of market prospects and perhaps as well some of the changed circumstances. Gulf is looking to expand its interests as well. Zaire is a petroleum producer.

There are a number of incentives offered to future investors, offered by the Government of Zaire. There are a number of attractive prospects in timber and plantation agriculture, and in mining, and as the economy picks up speed, light industry itself should become more attractive, and we offer a number of incentives ourselves.

OPIC, a name known to all of you, offers insurance against expropriation and political risk. It does not now offer convertibility risk insurance, but OPIC is taking another look at that. OPIC is, however, prepared to consider direct loans and loan guarantees, and to finance feasibility studies for potential investors in Zaire.

The IFC, the International Finance Corporation, and the World Bank, is also keen now to promote investment in Zaire and ready to finance up to one-quarter of the cost of approved private investments through loans or equity participation.

I'd like to think that the framework of the BIT which will be signed on Friday will provide another reason for people to take this potentially important market and potentially rich country seriously and respond. It's time that we all find ways to respond, for we as a nation, privately and publicly, have insisted strenuously on economic redressment in the Third World, in the Zaires of this world, and we have before us a country that has taken very tough, demanding steps, is moving in that direction, and we're encouraged by what we see.

Thank you very much. I'll be happy to take questions or, if they are specifically on the treaty and the terms of the treaty, I'd like to ask my colleague if he'd join me.

Q If I could just raise one question: In a number of Third World countries where even lest drastic measures have been imposed, it has created a certain degree of political instability.

What in your assessment is the impact of these new reform measures on Mobutu's regime?

A I think it's a very good question, and I'm not sure any of us know the answer in a great deal of detail. I think in a general manner I've been struck over the last several years. When I've seen the extent of economic punishment that's been foisted on Africa, and the relative capacity of Africa to absorb that, that there is something beyond the numbers that makes Africa a bit different from Latin America or perhaps other parts of the world where measures with such political difficulty could hardly be taken and governments survive.

But I think it's also fair to say that Zaire went through a long period of trying to survive without taking such measures, and that a government, a system, that has gradually grown and come in place over the last 20 years for Zaire had to have been one of the least institutionalized countries in Africa at the time of independence. Those institutions have worked. They've stood up, they've taken the test, and they've understood what their job was.

There has been considerable suffering and unhappiness, but protest has been something that has been channeled through the political machinery that exists in the country. Zaire is just finishing right now a presidential election undertaken in orderly circumstances. We're seeing a country that has got its act sufficiently together to be able to survive that kind of difficulty.

Q Are you suggesting that their recent presidential election was a real presidential election?

A I think in answer to the question, when a government puts its name on the line and goes out to the polls, sits down and has a test of the electorate, has a political process that functions -- of course, Zaire is a one-party state -- but when that goes on, that government is making a statement about its confidence, its ability to live with the political realities it faces. Particularly important at this point are the severe economic conditions. Nevertheless, that government is prepared to go out and have the political process, as is defined in the Zairian constitution, function. I think that speaks for itself.

Q Can we just go back? You said there were two companies looking at investing in Zaire. You mentioned Gulf. What's the other one?

A I don't have the name of the company with me. One is a tin manufacturer, and the other is, I believe, a shoe manufacturer. Do you have anything to --

SECOND OFFICIAL: There are two new investments, tin mining and shoe manufacturing, and Gulf Oil is putting more money in, and another manufacturing company is putting money in. Unfortunately, I'm not sure of the name. I think it's GM, but I'm not sure.

Q One other question on that. Is Ex-Im now open in Zaire?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Ex-Im has a lot of outstanding debts with Zaire. As far as I know, there are no new requests of Ex-Im for coverage for Zaire. Isn't that correct?

SECOND OFFICIAL: That's right.

Q I believe an Ex-Im official told me earlier this year that they were -- in fact, Mr. Draper said earlier this year to me that, for all intents and purposes, they were closed in Zaire and were not entertaining any proposals if and when a proposal did come along.

FIRST OFFICIAL: Again, I don't think it's a likely issue at this point. If it were, it would be worth discussing with Ex-Im. You'd have to see what was on offer, what the conditions were, and see what Ex-Im would do in the face of a precise offer.

But I think Ex-Im, like the rest of us, is looking at an economic situation that is different than the one we've known in the past, and, therefore, they can make an assessment based on facts. That's what OPIC's doing, and others.

THIRD OFFICIAL: Just to point out that Ex-Im just had two representatives in Zaire right after my visit to Zaire. So they are looking at Zaire. They haven't closed the door in Zaire.

Q Thank you.

A Right.

(The briefing concluded at 4:27 p.m.)

FILE COPY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
U.S. RESPONSE TO POLISH GOVERNMENT'S
RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS
FRIDAY, AUGUST 3, 1984, 1:37 P.M.

Q On the statement from California, can you elaborate on what the President means by "complete and reasonable implementation of the amnesty decision? What is "complete" and "reasonable?"

A The Polish Government announced that they would release 652 political prisoners. We understand that to mean that that includes the four K.O.R. leaders and the seven Solidarity leaders, the so-called "Eleven."

By "complete," we mean that all of them would be released. By "reasonable," we mean that there would be no steps taken which would bring into question the sincerity of this effort. I don't want to get into hypothetical situations, but obviously rearresting is a concern that we would have or any other particularly negative steps that seem to negate the significance of this action.

Q So this is something that would just hang there indefinitely as a mark?

A As the statement indicates, we are going to continue to watch the situation very closely. That's correct.

There are some steps that we're taking right away, and which the President's statement indicates that we are going ahead on the scientific exchanges right away.

The question of the IMF, as we indicated, is still pending that completion of the amnesty, and of course some other considerations which we've indicated in here of an economic nature.

Q And that, you assume, implementation of that amnesty -- it's already announced -- would include the four corps leaders and the seven Solidarity leaders?

A   Absolutely.

Q   And that is linked to the IMF?

Q   That's correct.

Q   Do the Poles set a date for when the amnesty would be complete?

A   They said 30 days from the time that it began, which was the 21st. We would, of course, be quite pleased if they completed it ahead of schedule, and they have already released quite a few people.

Q   Do you have an evaluation of the impact of the sanctions, just in a general sense?

A   We think that the basic economic downturn in Poland was not because of the sanctions. There have been problems with the Polish economy which go back some years.

We think that the sanctions have had a significant impact in the sense that they have clearly registered on the Polish Government, and more broadly our concern about martial law, about the fact that they made Solidarity illegal. We feel that the political impact has been very significant.

Q   When the sanctions were announced, it was said that we had several objectives, one of which was lifting of martial law and another one was that we might encourage -- I think it was called negotiations between the Church and the government and Solidarity.

What is the prospect, or progress in Poland on those other two major fronts?

A   There is a dialogue between the Church and the government. It is not a fully satisfactory dialogue, I think, though that is a question which you all have to really address to the Church more than to us. But there is some dialogue between the Church and the government. There is not, however, by any means, a satisfactory dialogue between freely formed trade unions in Poland and the government.

One of the reasons why we still have some measures in effect is because all of those original objectives that we set, and which in fact many in Poland, including some in the government, believe in. Those objectives have not been fully achieved.

Q If I may follow on that. Far from not being met, one of our objectives was that Poland would institute -- would legalize trade unions, free trade unions. Have we dropped that entirely?

A Not at all. We haven't dropped it all. It remains a very strong objective, an explicit objective. They understand that it is still our objective. And as I indicated, we still have some very significant measures in effect which we would hope, among other things, would urge the Poles in that direction.

Q What is it you consider to be the most significant measures that we still have in effect?

A The two NATO measures which are most significant are a limitation on high-level contacts and on new credits. In addition, we have bilaterally some other measures. For example, I would say the most significant of those is that we have not given them back most favored nation trade status.

Q Can somebody lay out the economic advantages that Poland will get by virtue of being allowed to join the IMF?

A I think it's important to make a distinction between membership in the IMF and drawing on IMF resources. And what the President's announcement does, of course, is communicate the United States views on the prospects for reactivation of the membership application.

The application process, as with any other country, could take some time, a number of months. Beyond that, the IMF Executive Board and the Board of Governors would review the final application to be submitted.

If and when Poland becomes a member, it would then have the rights that any other member would have to apply for drawings under IMF arrangements, depending on its balance of payments need and a variety of other factors. I think it's premature at this time to conjecture about the size of any possible IMF program for Poland.

Q You put no dollar figures to this?

A No, because it does depend upon a range of factors, including Poland's quota in the IMF. That quota is not determined until the process of application is sorted out. It depends upon a variety of economic factors, including national income size, balance of payments, national monetary aggregates, etc. which will have to be worked out between the Polish authorities and IMF staff and management in the months ahead.

Q Is this going to be of economic benefit to Poland this year?

A I don't see how one can reach a firm judgment on the question of whether it would be this year. As I said, the application process typically takes a number of months, and there is no particularly reason to expect that Poland's application at this point would be different, pending, of course, the important step in the President's announcement of complete and reasonable implementation of the amnesty measures.

Q Do you agree with the Polish Government's claim that the sanctions have cost it $13 billion?

A Polish officials, in informal discussions with us, have made both estimates and claims about the impact of our sanctions. Clearly, they have had some impact, but I think that we would not agree on that precise figure. I really wouldn't be in a position at this stage to give you a precise figure, but that one, I think, we would not endorse.

Q Would it be in the neighborhood of billions? You're not downplaying that magnitude of the claim, are you? They say $13 billion. Is their loss in the billions?

A I would rather not give any precise figure or a comment on the magnitude beyond saying that there has been a impact.

A I think one of the factors to keep in mind is that even if there had never been the whole period of Solidarity and the martial law question and the sanctions, even if none of that had happened there would still have been a very serious problem in Poland as there was in much of the rest of Eastern Europe.

Commercial banks, for example, were not eager to loan in this situation to any of those countries. They had accumulated an enormous debt to both governments and private banks. There were enormous internal structural problems in Poland: Outdated machinery, lack of ability to assimilate western technology that they had bought.

There were a series of problems, and it is genuinely -- it's not a question of ducking the issue --it is genuinely difficult to estimate what the scale is of the effect because it's so hypothetical. What would it have been like with out it? I don't 'think anybody really knows. The Polish effort in putting a precise figure is quite clear. They're trying to position themselves politically as much as anything else.

(Continued on next page)

Q Since we're ON BACKGROUND, could you tell us what the Vatican view of this issue was?

A The Vatican feels strongly, and I think appropriately, that it would not be right for us to talk about their views. I think we all understand the Pope's strong feelings for the situation in Poland.

The Vatican has indicated publicly that they hope the West as a whole would strengthen its relationship with Poland if there were steps in Poland which made that possible.

So in a very broad and generic sense, the posture of the Vatican is quite clear. But to go beyond that, I think you should ask the Vatican.

Q Was there an agreement with the Allies that these were appropriate steps for the United States to take?

A Again, that's a little bit difficult, Barrie, to get into. The Allies are all so sensitive about our talking about what they wanted.

Let me just say that the EC countries have felt for some time that there needed to be a strong Western response to positive steps in Poland, and, therefore, that there is a good deal of coherence now as there has been in the position that all of us are pursuing.

Q At the time that martial law was imposed, and these sanctions were imposed, you will recall that the United States Government took the position that the Soviet Union was in large part responsible for them and placed sanctions of another -- some other different sanctions on the Russians at that time.

What is your estimate now of the relationship between Poland and the Soviet Union, and in what way is the Polish Government showing or not showing an independence in that context?

A The relationship has always been difficult, and I think it remains difficult. Speaking broadly about Eastern Europe now, there is clear to us an inability on the Soviets' part to meet the economic needs of Eastern European countries, including Poland.

So there is some considerable tension in those relationships. There is also a strong awareness in Poland and elsewhere of the importance of the Western connection for them, and there is also in Poland, of course, a keen awareness of being Polish, which is quite different than being the Soviet Union in terms of religion, of history, culture and politics.

So I think we face a real opportunity now in Eastern Europe, including with Poland, to open a new chapter at a time when there are -- and we've seen this not just with Poland but with other countries in Eastern Europe as well when there are some differences with Moscow and when there are constraints on how much the Soviets can do.

Q Could I follow up with really two questions? One is in this particular case, if I recall, there was some high Soviet official who was in Warsaw at the time that these announcements were made, or something. Does it appear that these things were done with the approval of the Russians, with the acquiescence of the Russians, or what was the Russian role, if we know?

And, secondly, with regard to Eastern Europe more broadly, in addition to this, what is the United States doing or what direction is it following in order to pursue this whole Eastern European broader situation that you mentioned?

A The Soviet official was Prime Minister Tikhonov. It was interesting that in his speech to the meeting in Warsaw that he addressed, that he did not mention the amnesty.

We don't know, Don, exactly what their views have been, how they have dealt with the Poles on the amnesty question, but it was intriguing, at least, that they made no reference to it publicly at that time.

I think the Soviets face a dilemma. They, of course, want the stability of the grave in places like Poland. On the other hand, they know that in order to achieve even minimal stability, these governments have got to make some compromises and concessions to their own people's natural desires.

So they face a complex game, and I think we just simply don't know precisely what went on, but one could speculate that they probably are not entirely comfortable with this situation, or with the fact that there are some 800-900 churches in Poland whose construction has been permitted, and a number of other rather interesting differences between the domestic situation in Poland and that in the Soviet Union.

On the broader question, what are we doing to improve our relations with Eastern Europe and to see opportunity in this situation, Vice President Bush visited three Eastern

European countries last year. Secretary Shultz has developed a good relationship with a number of the Foreign Ministers. Some of us at a lower level, like Rick Burt, have visited recently East Germany, as you know, some other countries there.

We are moving forward in a number of areas, cultural exchanges, trying to expand trade. I think one of the more interesting things that we've been doing recently is that we've expanded our arms control dialogue with these countries. We have gone to them with our version of what's going on, for example, on Vienna and INF.

That's something that in some past years wasn't done very much. People tended to think that you had to deal only with Moscow. It's very clear to us that Moscow does not keep these governments well informed on arms control and political/military issues.

So we've been trying to give them our arguments, and we think that that's had some effect. If you look at the declarations from Warsaw Pact Foreign Minister meetings, they are, on the margin, softer or more moderate than those of the Soviets themselves.

So we think that a number of Eastern European Governments, some that you might even be surprised about, are trying to exert an influence on Moscow to get them back to the arms control tables in Geneva and Vienna and elsewhere.

Q Given the limitations of the Soviets to help Eastern Europe, can Jaruzelski make further liberalization moves without triggering some Soviet crackdown?

A Within certain realistic limits, we believe that he can. Yes.

Q Do you have any idea what they would be?

A We think that he can open a more genuine dialogue with workers.

Q What will be done now regarding the civil aviation agreement and the scientific exchange? What discussions, talks, mechanics?

A On the Civil Aviation Agreement, the steps which we are prepared to take, I think were well identified in the statement that has been distributed. We would expect that we would negotiate a normal bilateral aviation agreement with Poland to implement those steps and any other arrangements that would be appropriate in the civil aviation area.

We would also expect that Poland would drop its case -- its insistence that certain aspects of our aviation arrangements be subject to international arbitration.

At this stage, next steps would involve a discussion at the working or technical level about the best way to proceed and what issues and questions could -- should appropriately be discussed before we take those steps.

I can't give you any timetable on when we expect that to happen.

Q I have one question regarding the statement. In one place it says that the move by the Polish Government represents a significant move, and down lower it says that the amnesty declaration is a potentially positive development. So in once place it's "significant," and one is "potentially positive

A You're a good grammarian. (Laughter) I think it's simply that the difference is not substance, or at least it's not intended to be. The use of the word "potential" is just an indication that the amnesty, of course, hasn't yet been carried out in full. The first word is significant if it's carried out fully, and we, therefore, now acting on good faith believe it is a significant move, and one assumes that it will be carried out, and then it will be more than potentially significant; it will be just plain significant

Q Thank you

(The briefing concluded at 1:59 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ON-THE-RECORD BRIEFING
ON
DECLASSIFICATION OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION ON SALVADORAN GUERRILLAS

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 8, 1984, 1:32 P.M.

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. The briefing this afternoon, as you know, is on the question of some recently declassified intelligence information and related subjects on the Salvadoran guerrillas and arms supplies to them.

Ambassador Thomas Pickering, the U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, will have some opening remarks, and the briefing will be conducted by General Paul Gorman who is the Commander of the U.S. Southern Command in Panama.

I'd ask you to hold your questions until the briefing is completed. They will then both be happy to take your questions.

Ambassador Pickering.

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: Thank you very much, Alan. I gather that everybody knows this is ON THE RECORD. No surprise.

We have been asked by the public and the Congress many times for evidence of Nicaraguan, Cuban and Soviet support for the guerrillas in El Salvador. This request has focused on the issue of logistics support for those guerrillas.

Why are we so sure the support comes from or through Nicaragua and Cuba to the guerrillas? For the last few weeks we have been giving a classified briefing to the Congress on this subject. A number of members of the Congress on both sides have asked us -- indeed, they have urged us -- to declassify that briefing and to provide it to you, and through you, obviously, to the American public.

After very careful review last night, we were able to have a decision made to declassify about 95 percent of the key information in the briefing that we have been giving to the Congress.

In the briefing, and in the questions to follow, we will not be able to go beyond what you receive in the basic briefing regarding intelligence sources and methods. The briefing will discuss a number of incidents; incidents which are interrelated, showing evidence of an outside logistics effort to support the guerrillas in El Salvador. We hope to show some physical evidence of this and, as well, to provide oral and written evidence developed from intelligence collection and analysis.

We are certain you will draw your own conclusions from this briefing. As with most things, it is the accumulation of evidence, not a single piece of it alone, which provides the basis for conclusions. No single piece of evidence to be presented here could in any sense be called a "smoking gun" or a "silver bullet." But what is important is that careful, painstaking, patient work was accomplished to put together information on a series of events and incidents about which we can tell you today.

Critical to your understanding of the briefing is the fact that there is a great deal of additional sensitive intelligence material and information about which we cannot speak today but which has been absolutely central in literally leading us to find, or to find out about, the events that we are going to speak about.

Finally, two other pieces of the chronology of this kind of support is very important, I think, to pass onto you. These are not new pieces but they fit the pattern and are important to recall

First, in late 1983, a very enterprising newsman, Sam Dillon of the Miami Herald, visited a place called La Concha on the northwest coast of Nicaragua. This small fishing port is located about forty miles from the coast of El Salvador.

Dillon wrote a revealing story of how the local Nicaraguan inhabitants of this so-called fishing cooperative were, as traditional smugglers, co-opted by the Sandinistas after the 1979 takeover to continue their activities by smuggling weapons to El Salvador, using large ocean-going canoes called, in Spanish, "cayucas." The story ran in the Washington Post of September 21, 1983.

The second important event, or development, is a statement made very recently by President Duarte of El Salvador. Duarte noted that at a July 1983 meeting of the Contadora Foreign Ministers, the Nicaraguan Foreign Minister, when pressed on the issue of Nicaraguan materiel support for the guerrillas by the then Salvadoran Foreign Minister, Doctor Fidel Chavez Mena, freely and openly in front the Contadora ministerial colleagues, admitted that support. And, indeed, this report -- we have additional evidence to corroborate from sources who were there in a position to know.

Now, I would like to ask General Paul Gorman, Commander of the United States Southern Command, to present you with the briefing. Afterwards, he and I will be available for your questions, and we have some additional handout material available for you at the end of the briefing. Thanks.

GENERAL GORMAN: Thanks, Tom.

Let me begin with a press conference that was held on the 27th of July in San Salvador in which President Duarte accused Nicaragua of intervention in the on-going war in his country -- accused them of acting in that war as the principal source of the munitions being used by the insurgents, and specifically, by moving munitions across its beaches. This is a quotation from that press conference. He said, "They are sending in weapons, training people, transporting bullets at this very minute; they are using fishing boats as a disguise, introducing weapons into El Salvador at night through Montecristo, El Cuco and El Espino.

To your right is a map of the area. I'm going to ask Dick Schaden to point out La Concha or La Pelota down in Nicaragua just mentioned by Ambassador Pickering, and El Espino, El Cuco and La Playa Icacal in El Salvador. These are the places just referred to by President Duarte. Also point to Montecristo, an island at the mouth of the Rio Lempa.

If you'll drop the overlay ... We'll be talking about the areas highlighted in green. They include those beaches to which I've just made reference. The mouth of the Rio Lempa, around the Isla Montecristo, and certain areas up along the Lempa, particularly up in the northern part of the country where it forms the boundary between El Salvador and Honduras.

President Duarte, in that conference of July 27, took issue, specifically, with recent assertions of the insurgent leadership, the leadership of the guerrillas in El Salvador, that they capture the ordnance in their possession from the government troops of El Salvador. This is a statement issued by the FMLN Command, the General Command, on 6 July 1984: "We wish to tell the United States Administration that the weapons carried by the Salvadoran workers are the weapons we have recovered in combat from the army they train and direct."

And, again, on the 24 of July: "Imperialist spokesmen have reported that the FMLN has expensive and sophisticated weapons that were acquired in the socialist countries and were brought into the country through Nicaragua. This misinformation campaign seeks to minimize the huge amount of weapons that our victorious army has seized in battle."

As you know, on July 18, 1984, the U.S. Government released a background paper on Nicaragua's support for Central American subversion. That's the green book. I believe you have it in your kits.

This background paper addressed directly the question of how El Salvadoran guerrilla units are supplied with ordnance. You will recall that the paper describes shipment by sea from northwest Nicaragua to the Salvadoran coast by land through Honduras and by air.

More recently, as the Ambassador mentioned, a classified presentation had been prepared, largely by members of my Command, on the origin of guerrilla arms and munition. This presentation was put before members of Congress.

Members of both parties have asked that portions of that briefing be declassified. My remarks this afternoon are in response to those Congressional requests.

As the Ambassador stated, I can go no further in discussing intelligence sources and methods than my comments on the series of visuals which will follow.

In my opening statement, before a number of you to the House Foreign Affairs Committee last week, I praised the El Salvadoran Armed Forces for improvements and reforms undertaken within the past eight months; reforms which I characterized as revolutionary.

Among their more important gains has beer distinctly better intelligence. This gain has proceeded only partially from exchanges with the United States. Most of it -- that gain better intelligence -- is a payback for aggressive patrolling by their armed forces, by sound -- and by that I mean humane -- use of guerrilla defectors, prisoners and documents, something that we did not see until the very recent past, and adroit use of human sources among a population which largely supports and cooperates with President Duarte's government.

I propose to discuss four specific cases, or series of events, which illustrate the problem faced by President Duarte and his armed forces.

First: Infiltration across the beaches of Espino, Cuco and Icacal, and up the Lempa River and Juquilisco Bay in southeastern El Salvador.

Second: Overland infiltration, using way stations and camps in areas dominated by guerrillas.

Third: Dispersed stores or caches. And,

Fourth: Well-guarded headquarters or base areas for control of guerrilla operations and logistics.

I believe each of these cases, or instances, demonstrate the validity of President Duarte's judgment that his country is the victim of a pernicious form of aggression by Nicaragua.

First, I direct your attention to the Jucuaran area, which is identified on the larger map over there as the green area right at the base of the map. (Indicating)

We know from a man who participated in the event, a defector, that on the 28th of April, at night, a shipment of assorted munitions arrived via these cayucas, to which the Ambassador made reference, on the beach, vicinity of Playa El Espino near the town of Boca de Botoncillo.

The shipment was there met by a guerrilla reception party and manpacked to a point just to the southeast of the village of Jucuaran. At that point, the shipment was transferred to pack animals and carried to the vicinity of the town of El Brazo.

Earlier the same evening, trucks were hijacked near the town of El Transito and moved to El Brazo where they rendezvoused with the mule shipment. This was on the evening of 1 May. At that time, the shipment was transferred to trucks and moved north towards the city of San Miguel.

Intelligence analysts in El Salvador, and at my command, believe that this shipment was probably involved in logistically supporting the May 6 attack by that faction of the guerrillas known as the "ERP" on the city of San Miguel -- an attack in which the Ambassador personally participated, since he was fired on by these ERP troops south the city as he attempted to bring in the election observers on the morning of 6 May.

That attack was thwarted by the Salvadoran Armed Forces, which had been alerted by intelligence to not only its timing but its location.

The U.S.-trained ARCE Battalion of the Salvadoran Armed Forces, reacting to that attack from the south, pursued the guerrillas south of San Miguel, and on the 10th a company of the ARCE captured, near El Transito, Bulgarian ammunition. You have seen pictures of this before in the green book that is in your possession. But let me point out a couple of things about this ammunition.

First of all, Bulgaria operates a factory which produces NATO-standard ammunition. That factory -- Number 10 -- is identified by the factory markings on the base of this munition. (indicating) The United States intelligence services have seen this particular type of round only three places in the western hemisphere: South of the town of San Miguel, in El Salvador, just this year; several times in recent years, observed by attaches, in the hands of the Sandinista army in Nicaragua, and in 1973 and 1974, it was observed in the Dominican Republic in the hands of a group of insurgents known to have been supported by the Cubans.

In the continuation of that operation, on May 11, the ARCE Battalion captured a Vietnamese mortar, this time near the town of San Carlos. This is the box in the mortar sight was contained. The markings on here, in Vietnamese, are instructions to use with the '81 millimeter mortar. This is the sight, it was manufactured in North Vietnam in the late 1970's. And in the box there is an inspection, or factory clearance chip, which would indicate that it was shipped from the factory, probably circa 1978. But, again, we don't know much more about it -- as far as the material evidence -- than that.

Needless to say, neither Bulgarian ammunition nor Vietnamese mortar sights are in the hands of the Salvadoran Armed Forces, and our analysts believe that this materiel was part of that shipment that arrived at the Playa Espino on the 28th of April.

During the operation, the ARCE Battalion commander received, from peasants in the area of the operations, information which indicated that the phenomena reported on the 28th of April was not unique, that there were a number of these sorts of landings, and that the guerrilla column that went down to meet the landing of 28 April was but one of many.

Moreover, his information, collected from peasant informers, indicated that there was a large headquarters near the mouth of the Rio Lempa.

On May 21, reacting to this intelligence, the Salvadoran Armed Forces inserted small reconnaissance patrols into the Isla Montecristo, near the mouth of the Rio Lempa, for the purposes of locating that headquarters.

On the night of the 23rd, these patrols captured a young Salvadoran who had been forcibly recruited by the guerrillas ten days earlier. He freely led the Salvadoran Army to a large guerrilla camp nearby which turned out to be the headquarters for which the Salvadorans had been looking.

On May 25, the Salvadoran Army overran this camp, killed 18 guerrillas, seized a large amount of weapons and ammunition and destroyed some 34 ocean-going small boats, the so-called cayucas; seized a large number of guerrilla documents, the property of the headquarters, including organizational notebooks, records of weapons, plans and several guerrilla maps.

One of the maps was that of the commander of the FPL faction in the area known by his sobriquet as "Daniel" and I'll show you that map here. (Indicating) You have a seen a picture of this in the green book. This is a colored representation, and the colors are important because, as the key over here indicates, the red area is guerrilla-controlled or dominated region. For those of you who know what a mangrove swamp is, this is a mangrove -- malarial -- very difficult area in which to operate. An ideal place for a guerrilla stronghold.

The mustard-colored area is identified up here as contested, and the brown area over here is identified as an area, or expansion, as part of the plan of Daniel. This is the red area, on the larger portion of the map; this, the mustard portion, and this the area identified for expansion.

Identified by a red line running through this is the secure route, and Daniel's notebooks talks about the movement of supplies from Playa El Espino, identified down here, up the secure route. They record, among other things, rendezvousing with aircraft in the vicinity at airfields.

If you take the information that we received from the defector concerning the 28 April munition and you plot it on Daniel's map, as we have done with the assistance of that gent, you can see an almost complete overlay. I've plotted on here the various events in the sequence that I earlier recorded them to you.

I am going to snow you some results of U.S. intelligence which led us to corroborate or establish greater credence in the human intelligence that the Salvadorans were putting together at the same time.

One of the means that were employed for these purposes was the AC-130 aircraft which can see in the nighttime. There's been a certain amount of publicity directed at the AC-130 and its results.

I want you to understand -- and this is very important -- that the sensings of the AC-130 are but one indicator to us that there was some furtive activity underway along that coast.

I'm now going to play for you a crudely edited copy of certain tapes that were made aboard some of these aircraft. The whole movie quality of this imagery is a very low-fidelity recording, and you should understand that it is only an approximation of what the crew members see on their scopes. I'd ask that you bear with us in this respect. For those of you who would want a technical explanation for that, we're dealing here with equipment manufactured back in the Sixties that operates at 900 lines and your American standard 500-line equipment is incompatible with it.

Could I now show the little tape, please? Could we have the lights down, please?

(The following portion is transcribed from the film.)

"MODERATOR: What you are about to see are the results of the recent reconnaissance flights over southeast El Salvador through the eyes of the sensors of the BIELD KIRK reconnaissance platform.

"The BIELD KIRK platform is an AC-130 aircraft. Attached to the aircraft are two types of night sensors -- infra-red sensors and low-light television. Crew members are equipped with night-vision goggles. The aircraft flies at altitudes between 6,000 and 12,000 feet, verifying its location and the location of its targets through on-board avionics, sensors and maps.

"The areas which the following tapes cover are sections of the coast of southeastern El Salvador, between the two arrows shown here. According to U.S. and Salvadoran intelligence analysis, it is along this coastline that the majority of the seaborne logistics infiltration enters El Salvador from embarkation points in Nicaragua.

"Normally, the seaborne routes near the Nicaraguan coast can either travel directly across the Gulf of Fonseca or detour further out to sea and land at points further west along the Salvadoran coast.

"The first sequence occurred between midnight and 3:00 a.m. Salvador local time on 24 June 1984. All of the imaged activities occurred on or near Icacal Beach. The first sighting occurred on the eastern bank of the inlet located just to the west of Icacal Beach. This sighting consisted of 25 hot-spots, some appearing to be animals and some appearing to be personnel.

"Just after this sighting, BIELD KIRK also imaged three trawlers, each 60 to 70 feet in length. These were located 1,800 meters to the east of the 25 hot-spots and about one-half mile off shore. You're now seeing one of these trawlers through the infra-red sensor. This is the same trawler as seen through the low-light television. The ship has it's outriggers extended and is towing two canoes.

"Normally, such trawlers, involved with resupply activity, will load materiel onto the smaller boats for delivery to waiting personnel on the beach. On return to the coastline, it searched for the 25 hot-spots. When it discovered the original hot-spots at 2:25 a.m., it split into two groups of twelve to thirteen. The BIELD KIRK aircraft then located approximately 100 hot-spots 1,800 meters to the east on Icacal Beach where the three trawlers were noted previously.

"South-Com analysts believe that these hot-spots were personnel involved in receiving supplies from the trawlers noted just off the shore earlier.

"The next sequence you will see involves the probable meeting of the mother ship --in this case, a shrimper -- and two smaller boats which will carry transferred materiel from the mother ship to the coast, as shown by the arrow. This meeting was observed approximately ten nautical miles south of the mouth of the Lempa River just after midnight on the morning of 10 July 1984.

"You are now observing this shrimper and the two boats on low-light television. The shrimper, which is 75 feet in length, has a smaller boat in tow. It has its outriggers extended on both sides as if to give the appearance of fishing. It is running with lights on, also to avoid suspicion. The two smaller boats, both 18 feet in length, have square-shaped sterns. It is likely that the shrimper had completed a transfer of materiel to the two 18-foot boats just prior to the arrival of BIELD KIRK.

"When the shrimper realized that the BIELD KIRK aircraft was overhead, it began to move away from the smaller boats in a southwesterly direction towards open seas. The shrimper quickly attained high speed, again, not indicative of normal shrimping procedure.

"For the time being, the two 18-foot boats remained in place. Upon the arrival of the BIELD KIRK, the two boats pushed apart and began to move toward the Salvadoran coast. The boats quickly attained high speed, estimated at between 20 and 25 knots.

"On three occasions during the boats' movement toward shore, one of the boats stopped, apparently to check if the BIELD KIRK aircraft was still overhead. During one such stop, as shown here, a crew member of one boat apparently threw an object overboard.

"Aircraft crew members saw this activity through their night-vision goggles.

"When the boats landed on the beach, they were met by personnel, noted on the screen as hot-spots. Of particular note, a crate was apparently off-loaded from one of the boats onto the shore.

"We have freeze-framed the imagery here to better outline the crate, which is just off the bow of the boat in the center of the screen.

"At this location, along the southeastern coast of El Salvador, BIELD KIRK image would appear to be the formation of a pack animal train on the beach in the early morning hours of 11 July. After forming up, the personnel at the lead of the formation led the train inland.

"The larger hot-spots you see are probable pack animals, the smaller hot-spots are personnel. Notice also that smaller hot-spots are leading the larger hot-spots as apparently a man would lead a pack animal. Notice also the interval that is maintained by the hot-spots leaving the beach at the head of the column."

(End of film).

GENERAL GORMAN. In order to give you some feel for the difference in the quality of the imagery, we obtained from the National Aeronautic and Space Agency here in town this player which presents a higher astro-count image, and we'll show you that last event in the fragment of tape relating to the formation of the mule train on the beach.

There is no sound with this one.

You might comment, Dick, if you can see.

(Film displayed on video terminal, and narrated by Lieutenant Colonel Schaden.)

LIEUTENANT COLONEL SCHADEN: You can see that the animals are very distinct from the people in this tape. Keep in mind that the crew is going between this low-light footage and using the night vision goggles that are there.

What you see is the pack mule being formed up, people moving forward in front of their animals; and if I continue this tape all the way through it, they actually go off the beach area itself into the woodline. They are, in fact, moving off now.

Q Is that the trawler?

LIEUTENANT COLONEL SCHADEN: No, sir. This is is all on the beach. That's a house.

GENERAL GORMAN: Okay. Can we have the lights up please?

The landing on the beach, that we showed you here, was right over in this area, and that mule train that you were just looking at on Daniel's map is where the blue spot is.

There are copies of that tape, as I understand it, available, and also some still photography which identifies the place of the business.

There is one inconsistency in the reporting on that. The mule train, on the voice recording, is indicated as having been imaged on the 11th. Actually, the imagery was taken late on the evening of the 10th, the discrepancy coming from our having used the time of arrival back from mission as opposed to the logged time of the sighting.

While we were looking at the operations across the beach, we became aware that there was a significant amount of infiltration arriving overland from Honduras as well. In one such area, up along the Rio Lempa, where it comes up against the Honduran border in northern San Miguel, there is a key logistics center, one in which three of the principal guerrilla factions are all involved. It's called the Petacones area, and if you would point that out on the map, please.

During the period June 30 through July 3 of this year, the Ponce Battalion operated in the Petacones area. The Ponce Battalion is a battalion of infantry -- anti-terrorist, BIAT; a Salvadoran-raised and Salvadoran-trained unit. But it has a number of officers and non-commissioned officers in it who have been transferred from American-trained battalions.

That battalion, in the time period indicated, using only organic weaponry and taking no losses, operating at night in small groups, in a classic counter-insurgency operation, penetrated this Petacones headquarters area; killed a number of guerrillas, disrupted guerrilla logistics and acquired significant guerrilla documents.

This is a map here which was captured during this operation. It is the map of the commander in the area. Identified on it are the locales of the three principal factions -- the ERP, the FPL, and the PRTC -- who are situated in the area. Their headquarters are identified as well.

The Ponce Battalion operates under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Monterrosa, the Salvadoran Armed Forces Commander for the Third Brigade, headquartered at San Miguel.

Our own intelligence analyst agrees with his that those operations in northern San Miguel did, in fact, disrupt guerrilla supply movements to the west and to the south.

Two weeks ago, Lieutenant Colonel Monterrosa, during a visit to his headquarters by General Jack Vessey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and myself, presented these two snapshots of guerrillas which were taken from a role of film removed from a guerrilla body.

The picture over here shows men loading mules with a U.S.-manufactured heavy machine gun. The clothing and the web gear of two of the men are also apparently of U.S. manufacture.

Along the upper Rio Lempa, U.S. C-130s, such as the one that you just saw in the film, have followed such mule trains moving at night out of Honduras down to the Petacones vicinity.

The same intelligence means have also detected trucks moving from the Honduran border south toward Petacones. Over here is a second snapshot. The gentleman on the left, Colonel Monterrosa identifies -- and he knows his name -- as a communist party political officer.

(Continued on next page)

I want you to note that he is carrying a Soviet-manufactured AK-47 assault rifle. The man in the center has a Soviet-type grenade at his belt, and both of these weapons must have come from outside El Salvador.

The center man and the one on the right are carrying what appear to be U.S.-made rifles, but, as we shall see in a moment, these weapons may very well have come to El Salvador from Vietnam.

Now let me turn your attention to another guerrilla stronghold in El Salvador in the Guazapa Volcano area. About 10 to 12 days ago the Salvadoran armed forces began what they called Operation Guazapa 13. During this operation the Salvadoran army successfully acquired intelligence from campesinos and from defectors.

As the army moved into the guerrilla stronghold, a guerrilla turned himself in and offered to lead Salvadoran armed forces units to an arms cache which he had helped create.

The Salvadoran Tigre Battalion immediately followed the guerrilla and located the arms. Among the items seized were some 44 U.S.-manufactured AR-15s, some seven M-16s, some six Belgian-manufactured FAL rifles, one U.S. M-1 rifle, one U.S. M-1 carbine, one U.S. .45 calibre Thompson submachinegun, three U.S.-manufactured light anti-tank weapons, and a substantial amount of TNT, Soviet-manufactured fuses, and other materiel.

In the U.S. Southern Command, we make a practice of tracing all reported weapons' serial numbers from whatever source, as long as we are certain that the serial numbers are accurate.

In this case, concerning the 44 U.S.-manufactured AR-15s, 33 have been traced, using the computers of the United States Army. 85 percent, or 28 of those weapons, were manufactured in the 1960s and shipped from the United States to Southeast Asia.

15 percent, or five -- there are no records for the serial numbers listed. None of those weapons were shipped to El Salvador. We still have 11 that we're concluding tracing action on.

Let me enlarge on this picture. The country team in El Salvador and Southern Command have traced the serial numbers on AR-15s and M-16s which the Salvadorans have captured from the guerrillas in recent months. We have also traced serial numbers of such U.S.-made weapons from lists or records in documents captured from the guerrillas in recent operations. The results are shown on these charts.

73 percent of the 214 weapons in this sample, as of 21 July, were manufactured in the 1960s and shipped by the United States to Southeast Asia. 19 percent, some 40 weapons, were shipped to El Salvador.

Of 239 weapons, for which we could find serial numbers listed in guerrilla records, 57 percent were traceable to Vietnam, and only 5 percent traceable to shipments to the Salvadoran armed forces.

This evidence suggests to me that the guerrillas are not primarily armed with American weapons captured from the Salvadoran army, but with American weapons supplied by Vietnam through some trans-shippers -- Cuba and Nicaragua.

Some of you have heard the ERP Commander, Alejandro Montenegro, who was captured in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, in 1982. He stated, and has stated repeatedly, that the majority of guerrilla M-16s came from Vietnam to Cuba, Cuba to Managua, Managua to El Salvador.

Also of interest in this look at weapons are Chinese-made -- I refer there to the People's Republic of China -- type 56 rocket launchers which were manufactured in the late 1950s.

This is one such weapon here (displayed), and I will make these available to you for your inspection afterwards. This is familiar to American servicemen in Vietnam, where they saw them in profusion, as an RPG-2. It is a Soviet-style rocket propelled grenade launcher.

Of particular interest, however, to this discussion are the serial numbers which are contained on the pistol grip here. We found, in recent months, two significant bodies of such weapons, one in El Salvador and a second in Grenada.

In the Cuban Embassy and in a warehouse on Grenada, a number of those weapons were captured, and a list of those serial numbers was prepared. We recently discovered that comparable weapons found in El Salvador, captured from guerrillas, removed from the battlefield or taken from caches, fit the same serial number sequence and fit very closely.

Thus, up here is serial number 307419. You'll find 307417 on the list right here. Up here is 308622, and you'll find here 308626, and these others are similarly listed over here in pink and fitted into the serial number sequence.

It is difficult to imagine how that coincidence could have occurred had not these weapons reached El Salvador via the same sequence cited by Montenegro; that is to say, Vietnam to Cuba, Cuba to Managua, Managua to El Salvador.

I now want to shift your attention to yet another guerrilla stronghold in San Vicente department of El Salvador, again along the Rio Lempa north of the Isla Montecristo, to which we made earlier reference.

In recent weeks there have been a series of engagements in San Vicente. In those engagements where intelligence was available to the Salvadorans, they performed superbly. Without intelligence, they were unable to avoid ambushes, and they took casualties.

In support of Operation Guazapa 13 and in action in the Cerros de San Pedro, the 5th Brigade's Jiboa Battalion was operating north of San Vicente City.

On 26 July the Jiboa was ambushed by a large guerrilla force.

In response to the Ambush, the 5th Brigade's Canas Battalion moved out of San Vicente to reinforce Jiboa. It, too, was ambushed. Both units suffered casualties. These units lacked tactical intelligence on guerrilla movements, which contributed greatly to the ambushes.

It is significant, however, and consistent with the pattern of professional improvement, to which I made earlier mention, that the commanders concerned in those setbacks have already been relieved by the Ministry of Defense.

In contrast to these tactical mishaps, between 27 and 29 July, Salvadoran airborne infantry and special operations units launched an operation in the vicinity of San Bartolo Ichanmico that was advantaged by tactical intelligence, and which inflicted severe losses on the guerrillas.

Again, utilizing a deserter who was prepared to lead these troops past the outguards, special operations units set up ambushes along the known guerrilla-used escape route from a major headquarters in that area.

Other army units and the Salvadoran air force then assaulted the guerrilla headquarters from different directions, the guerrilla fled the assault, and, as suspected, moved into the prepared ambush.

With this ambush and subsequent fighting the next day to include guerrilla counter-attacks and counter-ambushes, guerrilla losses were heavy. ESAF, Salvadoran armed forces, losses were light.

Among the items seized were a significant quantity of guerrilla headquarters records and documents, including maps, message center logs, personnel notebooks, hospital administration papers, and currency.

Two documents from this batch are particularly instructive. The first lays out a plan by the guerrillas for sustained propaganda for the rest of 1984 against "interventionist escalation by Yankee imperialism," with Presidents Reagan and Duarte particular targets of the propaganda campaign.

The second document is a military plan which indicates that whatever the guerrillas of the FPL faction may say for propaganda purposes about where their support comes from, in their own councils they regard the Socialist countries of Nicaragua, Cuba and the U.S.S.R. as their "strategic rear guard essential for the logistical flow and financial resources."

These documents, which have just been transmitted to Washington, we are going to make available to you in the Press Office immediately following this meeting in both a copy of the original and an English translation. I regret that the full text of the military plan is not in hand. It is a long document. We are working on that, and it will be published as soon as we get it up here to Washington. I picked from it what I consider to be the significant portions.

In my judgment, President Duarte of El Salvador is exactly right when he castigates Nicaragua for its role in fostering political violence in El Salvador. The guerrilla front is ludicrous in insisting that it gets no ordnance from abroad. External support for the guerrillas continues to be a mainstay of the guerrillas.

Conversely, the democratic government of President Duarte, inaugurated in June of this year, cannot long endure without U.S. assistance. A guerrilla offensive is imminent. The insurgents are determined to damage Duarte's prospects by any means at their disposal, and they possess the means for much bloodshed and destruction.

The measure, which is now before Congress, the Central America Democracy, Peace and Development Initiative, based on the recommendations of the National Bipartisan Commission, was carefully formulated, in my view, to provide the minimum amount of U S economic and security assistance needed to assure security for the Salvadorans against guerrilla depredations.

As you know, the Kissinger Commission argued for decisively large amounts of aid for El Salvador. In February, Congress was presented with a two-year request for security assistance. Of this amount, only about one-third has thus far been made available, and in dribs and drabs, making systematic planning difficult

I am convinced that the entire amounts will be needed, and some help should be sent before the summer is out.

First, to meet the impending guerrilla attacks;

Second, to continue the momentum of improvement in the Salvadoran armed forces;

Third, to provide that confidence and continuity of U.S. support which breeds tactical boldness and facilitates coherent tactical and strategic planning; and

Fourth, to convince the guerrillas and their supporters to accept meaningful negotiations rather than prolonged struggle.

Thank you for your attention

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: The floor is open for questions.

Q General Gorman, could I just ask two questions, one right after another? When you detail this flow of arms, could you be a little more specific? You say a guerrilla offensive is imminent. Has the flow of arms increased substantially? Has it abated? Could you give us some idea of what the flow of traffic is?

And, secondly, with this considerable surveillance that you appear to have, just how effective has the United States and the Salvadoran armed forces been in blocking the weapons flow? I mean, how much have we captured as compared to what we think gets in?

GENERAL GORMAN: The preoccupation of the Salvadoran armed forces over the last several months has been safeguarding the electoral process. That was certainly my primary mission.

What we have reported to you here was intelligence acquired during the process of providing that security. It was serendipitous to our primary purposes.

The Salvadoran armed forces, as have we, have been aware, of course, of this logistics flow for years. What is new about all of this is the specificity as to where it is occurring and the methodology that is being employed by the guerrillas in moving this materiel.

It is also highly significant that each of the events that I have cited in Jucuaran, in the Petacones, in the Guazapa area, and in the San Vicente area, involved defectors. That is to say, the Salvadorans were led to their quarry by members of the guerrilla forces themselves, and were assisted by intelligence provided by the people in the countryside. That was not happening until very recently, and I believe that it reflects the consensus that exists in El Salvador for the support of the Duarte Government.

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: Paul, could I add one thing? One of the things you noticed, that at least a share, perhaps a very large share, is seaborne infiltration. The inability of the Salvadoran navy to deal with seaborne infiltration is a direct function of the lack of assistance to that navy, a direct function, I would say, of the incapacity of us to persuade the Congress that this was, (a) a real problem, and (b) that the Salvadoran navy should be given the capability to deal with it.

That's the reason why at least one portion of this briefing was particularly important to support the current request that General Gorman has made clear to you is a principal reason for showing you this particular series of events.

Q Ambassador Pickering, you're not going to give percentages of what you think you may have captured as opposed to what's flown in? I mean, is there any idea to say what you're talking about in terms of --

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: No. I would say this, if I may: Recent estimations of 50 percent being captured are way off the mark. Those have been corrected in subsequent statements by the principal source for that information. We believe it is considerably less.

One real indication is that over 36,000 M-16s have been provided to El Salvadoran forces by the United States.

Less than 2,000 have been lost by those forces, a figure of less than 7 percent. The guerrillas are estimated at between 9,000-11,000 people, so that would be at the wildest, I suppose, perhaps less than 20 percent of their armament -- perhaps around 12 percent of their armament.

Q General, you say at one point toward the end in your conclusion, if my notes are correct, that without U.S. assistance the Duarte Government cannot long endure.

Do you mean to say there, sir, that if Congress refuses or cuts the amount of aid requested by the Administration, Congress would be to blame for this Duarte collapse?

GENERAL GORMAN: I would say that the Salvadorans cannot maintain their present military posture without continued U.S. assistance, and that the amounts and kinds of assistance that we have provided up to now will not carry them through the year if the expected offensive materializes.

Q But are you predicting collapse without --

GENERAL GORMAN: Oh, no.

Q -- continued U.S. aid?

GENERAL GORMAN: As many of you have observed, what happens when U.S. aid falters, or they suspect that U.S. aid is not going to be forthcoming, they hunker down. It is during such periods that the guerrillas resurge, and this hunkering down on the part of the Salvadoran armed forces and the resurgence of the guerrillas accounts for the seesaw nature of the war today.

Q General Gorman, you said that in the San Bartolo ambushes, the big difference was made by the tactical intelligence that the Salvadoran army had in one case and didn't have in the other. Are you suggesting with this that the United States should provide tactical intelligence from airplanes to the Salvadoran army?

GENERAL GORMAN: In the event the tactical intelligence, to which I make reference, was human intelligence acquired by the Salvadorans themselves.

Q Ambassador Pickering, specifically what support do you think should be provided the Salvadoran navy, as such, to interdict these supplies?

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: The proposals that we have put forward to the Congress make very clear in those proposals that additional boats are required and additional training is required, and some additional armament is required, in order to prosecute the sort of intelligence that might become available -- prosecute contacts as a result of the sort of intelligence that might become available.

All of those things are required. The navy has been the bottom priority. That has necessarily reflected the scarcity of assistance to begin with, and some attitude of mind on the part of the Salvadorans. The attitude of mind, I think, has been shifted about, but additional assistance in that area is certainly a very important part of the package that the President proposed to the Congress last February and is urgently seeking now.

Q General Gorman, I wonder if you could say anything more about this Bulgarian factory that is manufacturing NATO ammunition?

GENERAL GORMAN: NATO-standard ammunition.

Q How long has that been functioning? Can you say anything more about it at all?

GENERAL GORMAN: No.

Q General Gorman, this briefing that you just gave, is this the same briefing that you gave the members of Congress -- have given to them?

GENERAL GORMAN: As the Ambassador indicated, it is substantially the same.

Q So, in other words, there is more that they got than this?

GENERAL GORMAN: As he indicated, yes. There is a good deal more that is available.

Q General Gorman, as late as about a year ago there was a feeling in El Salvador that the El Salvadoran armed forces were not able to utilize a lot of this COMINT and ELINT kind of intelligence that the United States could furnish.

Has that changed?

GENERAL GORMAN: Yes, sir. Let me describe to you an event that occurred on the evening of the 4th of August. An

AC-130 aircraft on the Troncal Highway, just south of the Honduran border in Chalatenango, located a group of trucks -- my memory is six in number, 18-wheelers -- parked beside the road with 18 of these hot-spots alongside the trucks.

We had no explanation for that; simply reported it to the Embassy. After some consultation with the Estado Mayor at night -- middle of the night -- they asked that the aircraft return to the scene and report further on the activity. When it got back, it could find none -- neither the trucks nor the hot-spots.

However, the Salvadorans had already issued orders to the Atlacatl Battalion, which was located some miles to the south, to move to that place. They arrived about dawn. They discovered a group of banana trucks from Honduras parked in a tunnel.

The story of the truck drivers was that they had been proceeding down the highway about 6:00 o'clock that evening. They were stopped by a group of guerrillas. The trucks pulled over, the drivers herded off to the side, robbed, and the guerrillas began removing bananas from the truck.

When the BIELD KIRK came overhead, most of the guerrillas piled in the trucks, apparently aware that they could be observed. So what the BIELD KIRK saw outside of the trucks were apparently the drivers and the guards that were left with them itself.

Immediately after the BIELD KIRK departed the scene, the guerrillas moved the trucks to a nearby tunnel in order to conceal them from overhead and proceeded to finish their unloading of the bananas.

The Atlacatl Battalion closed some six hours later, having moved north on foot.

What that illustrates is (a) this year we've got an Estado Mayor to talk to in the middle of the night. The Embassy is able to do business in passing such observations, (b) that the Estado Mayor does in fact exercise command and control countrywide, and (c) that they can react to such intelligence.

Q But in the case of the July 10 incident which we saw a film on, was there any reaction by the Salvadoran forces?

GENERAL GORMAN: The Ambassador mentions the paucity of boats. They have three 100-footers. They can keep two of those at sea at any point in time. You're talking about 50 miles of coast.

They tried, but you can see from the speed of those vessels, the prospect of their making an intercept is very small indeed.

In a number of incidents they have been able to go to a place where there was reported activity and ascertain what that activity was. In most such cases they ascertained that the activity was either friendlies -- troops, etc., or innocent, i.e., fishermen.

We have yet, however, to intercept one of these crates. Salvadoran patrols have seen the crates in cayucas. They've even taken photographs, hand held photography, which turned out to be so blurry that we couldn't make anything out of it. We know that the stuff is coming. We have yet to get our hands on it, or they have yet to get their hands on it. They are as frustrated at it as are we.

But I think that the judgment of a year ago, which was sound, is no longer true. I think they are increasingly in a posture where they can and do react to real time intelligence.

Q General Gorman, could you please flesh out your statement that a guerrilla offensive is imminent. What makes you so sure that it is imminent, and would this be a final offensive?

GENERAL GORMAN: All I can tell you concerning that is that it is the judgment of U.S. and Salvadoran intelligence analysts, based on all of the sources at our disposal, that the guerrillas plan to conduct an offensive, and they plan to conduct an offensive soon.

They have been talking about August. Our present judgment is that they would have difficulty in mounting a country-wide phenomena of the sort that we have seen them attempt in the past. But we have learned one thing in this war, and that is not to underestimate the resourcefulness of those people.

Q I'd like to ask one very brief military question and one political question to the Ambassador. The military question is simply, what would it cost, in your estimation, to essentially seal off the coast that's been used in the gulf and La Union, where you've been describing today, in terms of training and boats, and so on?

GENERAL GORMAN: The Salvadoran guerrillas and their external supporters have demonstrated remarkable facility in shifting their methodology to meet countermeasures. I couldn't begin to estimate in dollar terms what that would cost.

The proposals that we presently have before Congress, in my view, would permit the Government of El Salvador within two years to obtain effective control over 80-90 percent of its territory and people, effectively confining the guerrillas to marginal areas of the country.

That effective control, in my view, includes, importantly, blocking or attenuating most of the sort of activity that we were observing over the past two months, and I believe that the aid proposal before the Congress would put the Salvadorans in a position to do just that.

Q I'd just like to follow with a political question. President Duarte, since he has become President, has kind of put aside for now the question of a dialogue, saying that security conditions are not adequate for the left to participate in municipal elections.

Senior officials here, prior to the elections, said that that was a policy goal for their integration into the '85 municipal elections.

Has there been, in a sense, a policy change by President Duarte, and what's the U.S. view?

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: No. I would say not. I think that President Duarte has a series of priorities as he moves ahead in establishing his newly elected government, which has been in office just a little over two months.

He has told us that he maintains very high priority on opening up this issue of a dialogue. That he would like, however, to improve the security situation of the country. He has moved to do that. As you know, at least a number of key events have taken place, not the least of which is the disbanding of the Treasury Police intelligence unit of over 100 men.

Those sort of steps, he believes, must be taken, not only to guarantee effective security for all of his people, but also to begin to respond to the argument advanced by the guerrillas frequently for their non-participation in the electoral process, that they cannot be guaranteed sufficient security to deal with that issue.

I believe this is a live question. I believe President Duarte in due course will make his views known about how and in what way he wishes to proceed, but at the moment he is in this consolidation phase, and it's very important, in our view, that he have the time and the breathing space and the necessary support during this consolidation phase to move on to other things in the future.

Q Do you think there will be efforts, however, prior to the '85 elections for the dialogue to open or re-open?

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: I can't predict that, but my impression is that Salvadorans are sensitive to the notion that, in order to have people come in and talk about participating in elections, you have to have an election in the offing, and I think that's a very important part of the process.

The next Salvadoran election is scheduled for the spring of 1985 and is to be related specifically to electing members of their National Assembly, their congress, and to mayors of cities, considered by many a very appropriate time to try to persuade people who have been on the outside to participate in the process, because there are real opportunities in that kind of process, as opposed to a presidential election, in having candidates win.

Q Could we ask General Gorman a couple questions, please?

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: Sure.

Q General, could you tell us whether you think there should be an involvement of U.S. troops in El Salvador --

GENERAL GORMAN: No.

Q -- to seal off that situation?

GENERAL GORMAN: No.

Q What, sir?

GENERAL GORMAN: I said no.

Q And could you tell us, sir, since you talk about "the stuff is coming," and "external supporters regularly," could you tick off those foreign countries, as you see it on the spot, that are in fact involved in supporting the guerrillas? Could you give us a list of those countries?

GENERAL GORMAN: Well, I think the remarks that I made here earlier specifically identify Nicaragua, Cuba, and the Soviet-bloc nations -- Bulgaria, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam -- and, I presume, virtually any of the countries that have been involved in providing armaments to the Nicaraguans, including Libya and other radical Arab countries.

Q Sir, your briefing has revealed that the guerrillas have considerably sophisticated strategic and other military skills. Where have they learned these skills? Campesinos and others do not have these skills. Are they being trained in other countries such as Cuba or Nicaragua, or are they being trained by members of the military from these other countries?

GENERAL GORMAN: Yes, ma'am. Just within the past several days there was captured in Honduras members of yet another group that had been infiltrated into that country from Nicaragua.

One of these men defected to the Honduran authorities, and he led the Honduran authorities to two others, and to weapons that they had buried, upon arrival there. I cite this for two reasons. First, they left Honduras some time ago, were taken to Nicaragua, and then moved to Cuba, where they have undergone training in preparation for reinsertion into Honduras.

This training has been extensive. In some instances, these men were trained as long as two years by the Cubans. They carried back into country two U.S.-manufactured rifles each.

I have a weapons serial number trace on only one of those weapons at the moment, but it was manufactured in the 1960s and shipped to Vietnam, like most of the other weapons that I see.

When I appeared before the National Bipartisan Commission last fall, I placed in their hands a map. It was the map used by the guerrilla commander for the attack on the bridge at the Quebrada Seca, which some of you will recall was the place where the entire detachment guarding the bridge were massacred outright by the guerrilla assault force.

That map was laid out in a symbology that was direct lift from a Soviet general staff college, and I showed the Commission the field manuals that are used in such Soviet education. The man who put together that plan was no simple campesino. He was a man who had received military training --

an excellent military training -- from professionals. That was a plan that would have gotten an A at Fort Leavenworth.

AMBASSADOR PICKERING: Let me take one more question, and just remind you that the notes that General Gorman used for his briefing are also going to be available with the two documents he mentioned in the Press Office. So, a final question.

Q Your recent suggestion that the self-imposed limit on the Mil Group be raised to 125, that wouldn't require any appropriation action by Congress, would it, and is it going to go through?

GENERAL GORMAN: Each and every U.S. individual that is in there under the so-called "55-man limit" is chargeable to the Salvadoran Government. They have to pay for that out of their security assistance, and they pay handsomely, sir.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 2:40 p.m.)

FILE COPY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

TUESDAY, AUGUST 28, 1984, 11:02 A.M.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

MODERATOR: Good morning. This is our BACKGROUND briefing on the subject of the KAL shoot-down.

Q Could we ask the question that was asked yesterday, why this should be ON BACKGROUND?

MODERATOR: Well, we looked into that and we decided that we just wanted to keep it ON BACKGROUND, that it was more appropriate.

Q But why, I mean, besides your desire? What was the reason for it?

MODERATOR: We just felt that it was the best way to handle this in the context of some other things that were going on this week and where other people are appearing.

Q What does that mean? It mean the TV guys will get him ON THE RECORD and we get no one ON THE RECORD, right?

MODERATOR: If you want to get something ON THE RECORD, we can make some arrangements about that; but in order to cover the broad --

Q There's nothing harm -- It's just -- I'm sure Burt will make several cameo appearances ON THE RECORD and several others (laughter). It's just -- Is it you don't trust we can get the words right?

MODERATOR: No, it's not that at all.

Q Would you upstage Burt, is that the -- (Laughter)

MODERATOR: Well, we just decided to do it this way.

O.K. Shall we go ahead?

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yes. I think the real reason is that I'm not as good-looking as Burt or Mark Palmer, and we don't want to lower the standards that the European Bureau has set for ON THE RECORD appearances on major public issues. (Laughter)

There is also an element I think, that affects the decision to go on BACKGROUND aside from the fact that, as you will see, I'm not very experienced at it, which is that we are not engaged in a campaign to "hype" this anniversary. I mean it's an anniversary of concern to a broad public -- indeed to a world public -- and we wanted, during this week or these weeks, to once again try to set the record as we see it, straight. But it is not an attempt to magnify the tragic event which took place a year ago, or the background to it.

It's an event probably which will never be entirely clear. We think that the evidence is complete enough and clear enough so that you can identify the principal issue in the shooting down of KAL-007, which was that the Soviets shot down an unarmed civilian airliner without positively identifying it, without adequate warning to it, and without justification, and that 269 innocent lives were lost.

We have, from the beginning, considered this an international issue rather than simply a U.S.-Soviet bilateral issue. The Soviet Union, from the beginning, by the time they "got their act together" after six days and made their first statement on it, were obviously concerned to do what they could to paint it as a U.S.-Soviet bilateral issue, and I think it is from that political purpose that the theory of the spy plane probably developed.

The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) -- I guess there are other ways to pronounce the abbrevation, but I will call it ICAO -- took the lead in investigating the shoot-down, and its report, based on the exhaustive investigation by impartial international experts, its report formed the basis for the overwhelming public condemnation by that body of the use of force against the airliner. That condemnation of the 6th of March, 1984, by the ICAO Council in Montreal, the vote was 20 to condemn; there were nine abstentions, and there were two votes against -- the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.

The Council resolution also voted to deplore deeply the Soviet failure to cooperate in the search and rescue efforts of other involved states and the Soviet failure to cooperate with the ICAO investigation itself.

With regard to the shooting down of the airliner, the Council reaffirmed that such unjustified use of armed force constitutes a violation of international law, that it is a grave threat to the safety of international civil aviation, and that it is incompatible with the norms governing international behavior, elementary considerations of humanity, and the Chicago Convention civil aviation regime.

Now, it is not unknown for airliners to stray off course. That certainly happened in this case: the airliner did cross Soviet air space. That has happened to many airliners, including lots of Aeroflot airliners. The problem was not that the airliner was off course, but the Soviet reaction to it. Instead of following ICAO's recommended procedures, instead of following their own procedures which are substantially coincident with the ICAO recommendations and which call for escorting an intruding plane out of territorial air space or requiring it to land, the Soviets shot the plane down.

There was a precedent for this in Soviet behavior. In 1978, the Soviets shot down another Korean airliner which had violated their airspace after the intercepting pilot had positively identified it as being a civilian aircraft. In that case, two lives were lost, but the airliner succeeded in landing on a frozen lake in northern Russia, with only that loss of life. KAL 007 was not that fortunate.

The Soviet attempt, as I say, to portray this whole tragic incident as a problem in U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations I think lies at the basis of the charges that 007 was involved in U.S. intelligence, at the instigation of U.S. authorities. These charges are totally false. The U.S. does not use civilian airliners for intelligence purposes, and there was no U.S. intelligence connection whatever with this plane, directly or indirectly. The various theories in circulation which allege such a connection are based in some cases on distortion of fact, in some cases on the gaps in the record, gaps which will remain probably -- most of them in the record -- and will continue to feed theories of this sort. But the record in its totality, I'm satisfied -- and we believe as a government -- shows that these charges are false and will continue to be false.

No agency of the U.S. Government even knew that the plane was off course and in difficulty until after it had been shot down. Because of that fact, the plane could not have been warned by U.S. authorities that it was off course. Only the Soviets, to the extent of the evidence that we have, only the Soviets knew where it was before it was shot down, since they tracked it for two-and-a-half hours on radar before destroying it.

The Soviet Union, after a year, over the course of this year, has admitted responsibility for the destructon of the airliner, but has expressed no regret for the action that it took, nor has it given the world any assurance that it would not act the same way if similar circumstances arose again. The tragedy could, therefore, be repeated.

One of the reasons why I'm here -- that magnifies it a little too much. One of the reasons that we are trying again on this anniversary to set the record straight is to try to make sure that it is never again repeated.

At that point, I'd like to take questions.

Q Can you take up the theory that was floated in a British magazine, The Defense Attache, that the orbits of the KC-135 and the KAL and the space shuttle at one point coincided in such an unusual fashion as to suggest an intelligence mission?

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: The orbits, as we understand it, did not coincide. The RC-135 -- you called it a KC-135; we call it an RC-135 -- these are modified 707s with a very different profile from the 747. They run regular missions in the Western Pacific off Kamchatka mainly to verify compliance with arms control agreements. There was an RC-135 on such a mission at the time that KAL 007 was passing south of its route, of Red 20. The two planes never came closer than 75 miles of each other. They were never in contact; there was never communication between them. The crew of the RC-135 was totally unaware of the existence of KAL 007. The plane returned to Alaska, was on the ground when 007 was shot down -- and had been for some time -- 1200 miles, I believe, from the site of the shoot-down.

The Soviets are aware of these flights. They are familiar with the regular orbits that these flights take, and they should, we feel, be able to tell the difference between these two planes. The planes never flew together; they were never close enough to create a single blip on the radar screen, which is one of the Soviet claims, as far as we can tell, unless they have some very unusual radar. And so there was no connection.

With regard to the Space Shuttle, the Space Shuttle was passing over the Pacific at this time, but it was over the radial horizon of the events which took place, and could not have been in communication --

SECOND OFFICIAL: Not over the Pacific.

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: It wasn't over the Pacific?

SECOND OFFICIAL: Below the radial horizon and could never have communicated with it.

SENIOR STAFF OFFICIAL: Well, strike "Pacific." It was below the radial horizon and could not have communicated --

SECOND OFFICIAL: -- or received signals of any kind.

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: -- or received signals of any kind with 007, and did not. So, as far as we can see, there is nothing to that particular part of the Defense Attache story.

Q When you say that no agency of the U.S. Government was aware that the civilian airliner was off course, I assume that's a blanket statement to include of our most sensitive intelligence equipment out there, in which case I'd ask you if you couldn't -- it seems logical you could carry that one step further and say that everything we know about the plane being off course, then, was put together in hindsight, that it had to be dug out from tapes, that there was no U.S. human being who knew at the time that there was a blip, or electronic signals, or something out there to indicate a civilian airliner was off course.

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: That's my understanding. All of the evidence that we have was put together afterwards from data which had been taken and stored.

Q Can we say, beyond saying that no agency of the U.S. Government knew, that no agency of a Western government knew, because I mean that would take into account the Japanese?

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Excuse me.

(Discussion with staff personnel.)

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Evidently, it does not hold for the Japanese Government. Taken from the ICAO report, the radar information available included radar data concerning the track and altitude of 007 between 1812 GMT and 1829 hours when it was in the vicinity of Sakhalin Island.

Now, I don't know, however, if that was --

SECOND OFFICIAL: They did not identify it as 007.

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: They did not identify it as 007; it was an unidentified aircraft simply floating across the screen. And they, as I understand it, they also do not ave the task of monitoring and then tracking space platforms of that type

Q Did they then make a jump that it was in fact over Soviet territory?

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I think -- Well, they knew it was over Soviet territory.

Q The Japanese knew?

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: The Japanese, but it was unidentified.

Q Are you saying, to follow up, are you saying flatly that the RC-135, -- this is an hour-plus earlier, when it was 75 miles from 007 -- you said did not know of the existence of 007; and you're saying that a sophisticated, electronic platform like an RC-135 does not know of the existence of an aircraft and doesn't and doesn't pay attention to the existence of the aircraft 75 miles away from it, just for its own protection

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I am saying that.

Q But you're saying -- I've been mystified. Maybe you can clear it up for us. Was the Soviet -- Well, to start, as you know the airliners squawk through their transponder to give a signal to say, "I am 007," and fighter planes have an intercepter, and they say, "O.K. I get that signature, and this is 007."

The record, I think, shows that the 007 was squawking. Am I right on that?

SENIOR OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q What isn't known is were the Soviets intercepting the squawk and therefore identifying that it was 007, and knew full well what it was, or didn't they identify the fingerprint? And if not, has there been any effort by the State Department to say, "Heh, lookit. Why don't you guys equip your fighters with planes so you know what you're shooting at with these transponder receivers"?

SENIOR OFFICIAL: There is no evidence that the Soviets received the squawk and identified the fingerprint. One of the problems has been that the Soviets have not made available a lot of the data that they have, did not cooperate with the ICAO investigation. And that was deplored in the ICAO resolution. That would be one of the things that the Soviets might do to equip their aircraft to receive these kinds of things, if they do not already.

Q Can I just follow up? Do we know it was not equipped, or do we not know at all?

SENIOR OFFICIAL: We don't know.

Q May I follow up? One is, are our military aircraft, for weight purposes, equipped to read a squawk of a civilian transponder? And (2) was the 1300 squawk of 007 on record anywhere with Air Control to identify it as 007? I don't think it was.

SECOND OFFICIAL: I think there is something here, a report, which says that that was an unusual squawk, but it was received in Japan. An emergency squawk is 7700. Why the 1300? Apparently, it was assigned by an air traffic controller.

SENIOR OFFICIAL: I can repeat what he said.

Q Please do. Why don't we hear it?

SENIOR OFFICIAL: (Laughter) Yes. My understanding from the ICAO report is that the 007 was squawking 1300. That apparently is a bit unusual, and they concluded that it was assigned by an air traffic controller.

Now, the emergency squawk for these kind of planes is 7700, and it never did squawk that. Apparently, another squawk was also being intercepted, which it never did squawk

Q 7700 what, please?

SECOND OFFICIAL: 7700 -- I think that shows up as a digital display on the transponders

Q But you don't know, and as far as I know, 1300 was not an assigned squawk?

SECOND OFFICIAL: I believe it was, according to what I've seen in ICAO report.

Q Well, I don't think it was.

Q But the U.S. has not pushed, in a bilateral way, kind of informally or formally, to say, "Please, Soviet Union, equip your fighters with these receivers?" Have you done anything there?

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: The U.S. has encouraged the Soviet Union to consider steps which would prevent this kind of tragedy from ever taking place again. I'm not going to go beyond that.

Q To repeat the question I asked, are our fighters equipped, and can they be for weight reasons, with such identification?

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I don't know the answer to that question.

Q Do you have any evidence at all that the Soviets picked up any debris?

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Oh, indeed we do.

Q Any meaningful debris?

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: We don't know what's meaningful. The debris which they furnished us with two assortments of debris, us and the Japanese. It was meaningful in the sense that it was debris from KAL, which is important to the families of the survivors; but it was not meaningful in the sense of giving any evidence as to what happened in the course of the tragedy.

We have no evidence at all that the so-called "black box" was found by the Soviets in the course of their own independent search and rescue effort. We certainly didn't find it ourselves. So there is no evidence that there has been meaningful debris picked up.

Q There is a report in, I think, in this week's Aviation Space, a technology weekly, that the Soviets apparently recovered part of the cabinet's music system, sound system.

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: We've seen no evidence that that's true. I don't know where --

STAFF: (Whispered): We've seen where it is reported informally that the Soviets picked up much more than they turned over to us. They never turned over sensitive things like identification cards, wallets, or ladies' undergarments.

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: The two navies were sort of in close proximity to each other, and their informal reports from sailors -- I mean we think that perhaps the Soviets did pick up more than they turned over to us; but there is no evidence as to what it was and nothing -- and it has not been publicized by the Soviets.

Q Besides the RC-135, those people who propound the theory that the flight was on an intelligence mission point to the sophisticated radar installation at Shemya; they point to the U.S.S. Observation Island, the ship that was in the region -- all of these that are there -- and among their missions are surveillance and monitoring.

Are we supposed to now say, as a result of your comments that the system just collapsed that night or that time, and that nobody there, all that equipment, was aware of this airliner?

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I think you're supposed to say, as a result of my comment, that the equipment that's out there -- and there's a lot of it, both U.S. and Soviet --

is not equipped to pick up deviations of this kind. Shemya does not have aircraft search and tracking capability.

I can't speak for the Soviets, but the things that we have out there simply are not equipped. If that's a failure, then you can call it a failure, too. But the capabilities are not such that they would pick up this kind of a deviation from a plane of this sort. It was a plane which appeared to be on its normal civilian transit, over a recognized route which was reporting in on schedule as it went down the route, and there was no reason to suspect any deviation. And the facilities that are out there have other missions.

Q Given this situation and the concern here that an occurrence like this not happen again, has there been any consideration for making facilities in the region capable of picking up just this kind of deviation? Has there been any upgrade of facilities in the year since that accident?

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Well, it is certainly one of the things that you consider, and is under consideration. But I have to get back to basics: there was no reason -- I mean, had we suspected that the Soviets would shoot down an unarmed airliner, there would have been a reason to upgrade your facilities in order to track it; but it is the kind of thing which is so unique and so outrageous that to consider a general upgrade of facilities in order to track this kind of plane and prevent this kind of thing happening again, is, of course, one option, but our hope is that it never will happen again.

(Continued on following page.)

Q At the end of the year, one year later, what is the U.S.'s best considered opinion as to why the plane was off course?

A Again, relying upon the investigation of the ICAO people, we don't have a fixed judgment as to why the plane was off course. There are too many unknowns. There will continue to be, I think, too many unknowns to arrive at a competent judgment.

Their best judgment is -- the most plausible possibilities were that it was one of two kinds of navigational errors:

First of all, either the holding of a constant magnetic heading of 246 degrees by the plane or an undetected error of 10 degrees eastern longitude entered on to the onboard inertial navigation system while the plane was on the ground in Anchorage could have produced a flight path to the area where it was destroyed.

Now, we don't know whether either of these cases occurred. We do not know the reason why it was off course. And in view of the destruction of the plane, there's no one to interview and no material to piece over in order to ascertain it. And the Air Navigation Commission under ICAO, which sort of did a supplementary investigation, found it difficult to validate or endorse either of those possibilities.

I think the answer is we just don't know. We don't have a good answer.

Q At any time during those moments when the Japanese radar had picked up this unidentified plane but were certain it was over Kamchatka --

A Sakhalin.

Q -- Sakhalin -- was there an effort by the Japanese to communicate with that aircraft?

A No. The aircraft itself was communicating with Tokyo at that point -- I mean a whole variety of communications just at that point with Tokyo. As far as I'm aware, there was --

Q I mean to alert it.

A But they didn't know that it was it. I mean there was no connection made between the unidentified aircraft sailing over Kamchatka and the plane, the 007, which was in what appeared to be normal communication with Narita Air Control.

Q Why should that be an unidentified aircraft. When the transponder was on, wouldn't a number appear right by the readout on the radar screen identifying what it was?

A I don't have an answer. I just don't know.

Q Did the Japanese release all their material to you? There was a period there when they were holding it close to their vests. That's one question.

And then I'd like to follow up his question: What is your best judgment on why the Soviets did shoot the airliner down?

A What was the first question again?

Q Did the Japenese release their material that they held close there after the accident to the State Department or any other U.S. agency so you could sift through their radar information and whatever communications they might have had?

A They released a certain amount of material -- I can't say that it was all the material; I just don't know -- to the ICAO during its investigation. And what they released to us was the air-to-ground material that they had on the Soviet side, which we subsequently with their agreement released ourselves.

Q You spoke about --

Q What about the other question? Wait a minute. How about why the Soviets did it?

A Why the Soviets did it?

Q Yes.

A A personal view rather than a Government view: The Soviets are in a -- I hate to use the word "paranoid" because it's bandied around so much. But for the last 18 months,or two years really, we have sensed a general heightening of Soviet concern about -- heightening of the Soviet classic, Soviet feeling of being encircled by the outside world and being ringed around in a hostile world, and an increasing desire -- of which the evidence is a whole series of measures in a tremendous variety of fields -- really to isolate the country from outside influence, outside contact, and outside penetration which is not under official control.

Now, without being far-fetched -- I myself, again, not announcing a Government view -- I mean I connect the difficulties over telephones, the increased Customs control, the closing down of the City of Leningrad -- a whole variety of events -- with this general feeling of greater isolation.

I can well imagine that a heightened state of alertness and a heightened emphasis on the inviolability of the USSR state boarders would be a part or a feature of this general feeling if isolation.

Of course, we don't know what the Soviet alert orders are at that level of detail in these various places. But given this state of mind, the intrusion of an aircraft of this sort, the prominity even to recognize the familiar U.S. intelligence operations like RC-135 -- and perhaps also what appears to be quite an inefficient interception over Kamchatka. The first incursion over Kamchatka before the plane even got to Sakhalin would have produced a decision to shoot first and seek your explanations afterward.

Q Could I follow that up a minute? Was there any evidence in anything you've gotten to indicate that the ground commander or the pilot -- or whoever gave the order to fire -- was reprimanded in any way, or does this look like it was the full blessing of the high command of the Kremlin?

A We do not know. Most of the evidence is that the actual order to fire came from Far Eastern Defense Commanderin Khabarovsk. We do not know what kinds of communications they had with either military or civilian authorities in Moscow before giving that command. The decision has of course received the full blessing of the full leadership, but that happened post hoc.

Q You talk about gaps in the record. Some of the gaps are our own doing -- for instance, the tapes of the ground controllers over Sakhalin and the tapes of the first encounter over Kamchatka. It would be interesting to hear the ground controller and know that the ground controllers had never told the pilots to signal the plane or something like that. I wonder why we've decided not to release the other tapes that we have.

A Well, you may know more than I do, but my understanding is that we don't have tapes, the ground-to-air tapes, because we do not pick up ground to air.

Q My recollection is it's on the record that we said we had ground-control tapes -- or I guess what happened is that Speakes over at the White House talked about what the ground controller had said to the pilot. That's my recollection of it.

Q He inferred it, if anything.

A I think you really ought to check that out because my understanding is that for technical reasons -- I mean how you pick up things that are shot -- you see, something from an airplane you can pick up fairly generally on line of sight. Things that go from the ground up to an airplane -- technically you don't have it. I don't think we have that stuff.

Q We've released all we have, is that the idea -- and voice transmissions?

A That's my understanding.

Q Can you share with us the discussions that the U.S. Government had with the Soviet counterparts on this issue in Moscow or here? And did you get the door slammed in your face, "Not interested"? What is the nature of that talk when you say you're trying to avert a repeat of this tragedy?

A I'm not in a position to share that with you.

Q The Soviets have asked for permission to restore Aeroflot flights to the U.S. As I understand it, it's part of the talks on opening consulates in Kiev and New York. And I mention this, this is germane, because part of the sanctions imposed after KAL was the closing of the Aeroflot offices in New York and Washington, as I recall.

Could you bring us up to date on the status of those talks?

A Well, Aeroflot has been kind of a punching bag for a whole series of sanctions. I mean it's not simply the KAL sanctions-- Aeroflot has also fallen under Afghanistan sanctions and Poland sanctions-- so that the difficulty of lifting sanctions on Aeroflot is multiple.

There were a number of problems with the operations of Aeroflot while Aeroflot was flying which go beyond the sanctions. There were problems of reciprocity and commercial treatment of American carriers to the USSR, for instance. There are the multiple sanctions.

There is of course the question, the specific last sanction on Aeroflot operations, which I think has effectively closed them down as a result of KAL. We do not reject in principle. We certainly don't reject discussions.

I mean there have been discussions with the Soviets about resumption of Aeroflot operations, but I can't emphasize too much the difficulty of proceeding in that direction. The Soviets tend to mention it in tandem with the question of moving on to open consulates in Kiev and New York. Now, we don't see a substantive connection between the two questions and we think the two questions should be discussed separately at this point.

Q Could you give us an assessment, or taking a look now over the year, of the impact of this incident on U.S.-Soviet relations and whether or not we're able now to put it behind us?

A Well, the incident as such was, from our point of view, a body blow to the efforts which we had under way to move forward with the Soviets in a variety of areas in the summer of 1983. There had been progress in a number of fields on the U.S.-Soviet agency which simply came to a halt.

You will remember that the autumn of 1983, however, was characterized not only by the KAL tragedy and its aftermath but by the struggle over negotiation and deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe. So it's hard to say that it was simply KAL which brought this mildly hopeful process under way earlier that summer to an end.

From the Soviet point of view, I think, one of the difficulties in dealing with the Soviets is that they're never wrong; and talking to them in the early days about KAL, it appeared from their statements that what was wrong with what happened was not the shooting down of an airliner and the loss of 269 lives but the way it was "exploited" by the United States.

In other words, they took it in bizarre but characteristic fashion as part of an American campaign to isolate and blacken them in world opinion. I think they did the job themselves. But, anyway, they will seek to blame everything of this kind on us; and it probably made it more difficult for them also to move forward.

Now, to say that we've moved beyond KAL is not entirely true. I mean there are sanctions in the civil aviation field resulting from KAL which are still in force. I think the memory of KAL -- KAL as another unfortunate example of the Soviet propensity to use force and offer explanations later -- I think remains vivid in opinion.

There are still claims out against the Soviet Union as a result of the KAL tragedy, so I think it would not be entirely true to say that we have put it behind us. The effect will linger; and, of course, death is death. You don't roll that back.

Q Is there any doubt in your mind or in the collective judgment of the people who've looked at the evidence that this could not have been the case of mistaken identity? It was a young pilot, an old plane; it was at night. Is that all ruled out in your post-audit of it? Do you think it could possibly not have been a case of mistaken identity?

A Well, I think it's uncertain as to whether the Soviets have positively identified this as a civilian airliner. I think the problem is that they did not make the positive identification that they should have made and that as a result of which they would not have shot it down.

Q They didn't know what they were looking at at this point.

A They thought -- I think they probably thought it was an intelligence plane. I mean they didn't --

Q They didn't know if they shot down one of those MIG aircraft.

A Well, to go back to the '78 precedent, one of the problems with it, however, is the question of evasive action which has arisen in some of the material. In '78 they did shoot down a Korean airliner which they had positively identified as a civilian airliner, but I think their subsequent claim was that it had taken extensive evasive action.

They've also made that claim with regard to this plane.

On our examination of the evidence, what happened was that the plane asked for and received permission for gaining an altitude to conserve fuel, which is perfectly normal. That went to Tokyo and came back to Tokyo. There was nothing evasive about it, despite the subsequent Soviet claim.

Q Well, your personal feeling is it was a case of mistaken identity?

A My personal suspicion is that they believe they were shooting down an intelligence plane.

Q What time did the word reach Washington that a civilian plane had intruded Soviet airspace and that it had been shot down? Do you know anything about it?

A I don't have a time. I mean speaking personally, I was woken up with the report that it had been forced down on Sakhalin, which would have been late in the evening -- I mean 10, 11, 12 o'clock. But I don't have an answer to your question of what time it reached Washington.

Q You introduced this, what you call, your personal suspicion that they believed they were shooting down an intelligence plane. Do you feel that that in any way changes the U.S. indictment of the Soviet activity?

A No, because I don't think you shoot down planes. I mean I don't think you should shoot down planes, even if you are convinced that it's an intelligence plane. I mean this is compounded by the fact that it wasn't and that there were innocent people aboard. But I think if you had a plane heading toward Omaha of this sort, I cannot imagine that we would simply shoot it down without identifying it.

Q Would you comment at all on statements that have been made -- not official statements -- that this incident provided the greatest bonanza of Soviet intelligence information ever collected by U.S. intelligence?

A I'm not an intelligence buff. It sounds like hogwash to me. From 21 years of experience in the Government -- which means that you're always tiptoeing around the fringes of intelligence -- it does not look to me as if whatever could have been gained from something like this could possibly be and described as a "bonanza." Penkovsky was a bonanza. But whatever could have been achieved by use of this plane for intelligence could not possibly, as far as I can see, have been big enough to warrant it.

Q Question: That same *Defense Attaché* article that my colleague mentioned says there was a third piece of flying American hardware in the area besides the shuttle and the RC-135 -- namely, a Ferret-type electronic spy in the sky -- which made three passes over the area, three slices -- one just before the period opened, one during the medium and one as it was concluding.

Is that true; and, if so, could it have capability of picking up Soviet communications, responses of one kind or another from Kamchatka?

A The sky is full of satellites. I don't think that we have a satellite called "Ferret." I mean that's the British denomination.

SECOND OFFICIAL: Intelligence satellite.

A All I can say is that for our part there was no cooperation, no coordination, or no communication with any satellite that we had in the area at that time.

There was another platform out there which has also come up, which was an Orion P-3, an anti-submarine warfare plane, which was airborne on August 31st from 1540 Greenwich Mean Time to 2115 -- in other words, bracketing the period of the KAL tragedy -- over international waters north of 40 degrees north. But this aircraft never came closer than

400 nautical miles.

I mean you remember the RC-135. Of course this was 75 miles -- this one, the Orion. It was never closer than 400 nautical miles--and, like every other U.S. platform, had no connection and no communication with KAL 007, and there were no other reconnaissance aircraft.

Now, you're talking about the satellites. I can't list the statellites. But none of them had any communication, coordination, contact with this airplane.

Q Can you tell us about what was taking place on the Soviet side at this time, whether there was any unusual Soviet activity and missile test and anything like that that would have warranted the RC-135 flight -- or to simplify the question: What was the RC-135 doing in the air at this time?

A I think the RC-135 was doing what RC-135s do. It was on a normal flight on a normal orbit. There are lots of them. There are numbers of them in a course of a single day. I don't know how many of them there were that day. And they monitor -- they go up and down the coast over international airspace and international waters monitoring Soviet installations in that area.

To my understanding, there was no special mission involved.

Q What about the claim that the plane took -- can I just ask one question? What about the plane took a dog-leg, that it was going in one direction and then had to go up a little bit to head over Sakhalin? Is that true, as far as you know?

A I'm glad you asked me that. (Laughter.)

The Soviet preliminary report showed this dog-leg over southern Sakhalin-- I'm drawing now on the ICAO report -- whereas the tracks shown by Wakanai radar are that the Japanese radar on Okaido followed a smoother curve, making two assumptions. An explanation could be given as follows.

First, assuming that the radar information is based on memories, radar observers rather than on recorded radar data, the shape of the depicted curve could have been smooth and an even more distinct bulge could have been displayed by an Air Defense radar on Sakhalin Island.

Secondly, assuming that the airliner could have flown almost overhead the radar antenna -- which is what sounds right to me -- the track would have been distorted by the slant-range effect - in other words, you're following it from the side and suddenly you're following it vertical -- which would project the aircraft's height as a horizontal distance on the radar display. And the Wakanai radar, the

Japanese radar, would not have shown such a distortion.

So I think the jog is probably in the eye of the beholder.

Q You said that -- to pick up your "body blow" phrase -- you were trying to make efforts to move forward with the Soviets on a variety of fronts. Were you at that time, prior to KAL, getting that same readiness to move forward with the Soviets?

A Yes, in a modest way -- in a modest way.

Q Is the United States engaged in any international legal action yet on this or is that all behind us now?

A I think "engaged" is gilding the lily. I think it is the subject of a suit about this case, which is one of the reasons you're getting fairly careful statements from U.S. Government officials.

Q What's the status of that? Where do we stand on it?

A The judgment -- I'd have to refer you to Justice on that.

Q Where will you take this, sir, when you don't believe in the International Court?

A Excuse me?

Q When you don't believe in the World Court, where will you take this to?

A I don't know. (Laughter.)

Q Does any agency of the U.S. Government possess classified information that would cast further light on the incident but which cannot be released at this time for security reasons?

A I don't have an answer to that.

Q Thank you.

Q One more.

Q Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 11:51 a.m., the BACKGROUND briefing was concluded.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

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PRESS BRIEFING
BY
ATTORNEY GENERAL WILLIAM FRENCH SMITH
ON THE CABINET COUNCIL MEETING
ON DRUG ENFORCEMENT MATTERS

The Briefing Room

3:09 P.M. EDT

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: As Mr. Roussel has indicated, I have just concluded briefing the President and the Cabinet Council on the current state of our drug law enforcement efforts. And I thought, in that connection, you might be interested in some of the figures which I made reference to in that meeting. These, I think, are hitherto unpublished figures with respect to the current prices of drugs in the United States and elsewhere.

In Colombia, as of February 1984, per kilo of cocaine cost approximately $2,500. Obviously, all of these prices are estimates; but these are fairly accurate, we think. As of August 1984, that price is now $3,500 to $4,000 per kilo.

In Medellin, if that's the way you pronounce it, the price -- that's also in Colombia -- the price is $3,300 in February of '84. Now, $7,000, August of '84.

In the United States, the price of marijuana in the United States, per pound January 1, '82 was $250 to $350. January 1 of 1984, $350 to $500. August of 1984, $600 to $700, or twice as much as in 1982.

With respect to seizures, in 1981, we seized something over 6,000 pounds. In 1983, we seized --

Q What?

Q Of what?

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: Cocaine. In 1983, we seized some 38,000 pounds, almost 38,000 pounds.

Heroin, in 1981, we seized some 700 pounds. In 1983, we seized some 1,300 pounds.

With respect to drug defendants, in 1980, we arrested 8,317. In 1983, we arrested 10,128. Those conficted: 1980 4,484; 1983, 6,398, or a 43 percent increase.

Q -- figure in 1980 --

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: 1980 is 4,484; '83, 6,398, or 43 percent increase.

Of those actually imprisoned: 1980 -- I'm sorry. I don't have those figures.

Well, in any case, those are some of the figures which I made reference to in --

Q What is the significance of the price going up? Do you think that that means the supply is shrinking?

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ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: Yes. So far as we can tell, the supply varies almost in inverse ratio to the price, and, therefore, we think that prices increasing to that degree certainly indicates that the supply is to a corresponding degree decreasing.

Q To what do you attribute that?

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: Well, there are a variety of reasons. One, of course, is increased law enforcement efforts. We think that the South Florida Task Force, the twelve task forces that are blanketing the country, where in each case for the first time, we have brought within a single entity all of the agencies of the federal government to deal with the drug problem. And they're working on a cooperative basis.

Another reason is the fact that the Columbian government is taking very direct action now with respect to cocaine growers and processors and shippers. We think that that makes it pay a significant difference. Plus, of course, our interdiction efforts. What we have done -- there's no question about the fact that the gains in the past, considering the amounts of money involved, have been worth the risks in the eyes of so many of these drug traffickers.

What is happening now is those risks are substantially increasing, and we intend to continue that process.

Yes.

Q Isn't it ironic, don't you think, that the -- it took an assassination of one of their government ministers to get the Colombian government to do what you've been asking them to do for some time?

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: Well, there are -- actually, there are a number of motivating factors. Certainly, that was a highly personalized one and I'm sure was influential. But you have to consider the fact that I think there are four reasons now why countries are paying more attention. Not just Colombia, but others. Colombia is a good example.

I think that most countries, just as a matter of national pride, do not want to be known as a drug country. Perhaps even more significant is the fact that -- and this is a recent phenomenon -- these countries now are developing for the first time addict populations of their own. Pakistan, for example, really didn't have a heroin addict population as recently as 1979, 1980. Now it has one estimated at somewhere between 100,000 and 150,000. That's true in Colombia. It's true in Bolivia. It's true in Peru. It's true in Thailand. And that makes a good deal of difference.

The third reason is the foreign aid. I think that we are using now our foreign aid more as a leverage device in order to make sure that those countries that do get our foreign aid are paying attention to this problem.

And the fourth reason is that -- and this is particularly true in Colombia -- there are certainly indications that drug syndicates are allied with either terrorist organizations or insurgency groups or both. And this, of course, has a potential for governmental instability and, therefore, is still another motivating reason.

Yes?

Q Is the DEA, at this point, or do you feel the DEA at this point, has a lot more contacts in Colombia, a lot more informants? Have you established a far better network in Colombia than you've had in the past?

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: We think that our efforts in this respect are improving in just about all countries involved. Colombia is one of particular concern to us, needless to say, and we have concentrated to a considerable degree our efforts there. But we are also

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working very closely in countries elsewhere.

Q Specifically, on contacts, on drug informants in those areas?

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: Well, we do the best we can wherever we are.

Q Using these statistics that you've cited -- I mean, how far are you willing to go and say how much progress the government is making in the war against drugs?

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: We think we're making substantial progress in the war against drugs, and the figures that I have given you are just one example of that. As you know, we have brought in substantial new and additional resources. We have reorganized the total law enforcement effort. With respect to DEA, we've reorganized DEA, but

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perhaps more significant, we brought the FBI into the drug battle for the first time in history. And that is quite a significant addition to our resources. And I think that you see the results of all of these efforts, not only just in the prices of the drugs that are involved. You see it with respect to the number of drug defendants that have been convicted, which I referred to here; you certainly see it in terms of the substantially additional seizures that we have made here and there. And there are a lot of other reasons that cause us to be quite optimistic about what we're doing.

This does not mean, by any means, that this problem is licked. As with crime generally, it probably is never licked. We'll only be able to get a total grip on the drug problem when we are able to eliminate the demand. Now, that, we think, will come about one day, but it's not there, not yet. And until that comes, we're going to throw the full force of our law enforcement effort against this number one crime problem.

Ralph?

Q General, the President said the goal of this program was to end the drug menace and cripple organized crime. Would you tell us what that means? Does that mean that we will see heroin and cocaine no longer available in this country?

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: Well, needless to say, that is certainly our goal. But that's a long-term goal. As I say, that will ultimately only be achieved when we eliminate demand. Law enforcement alone will not be able to conquer that problem. We, of course, are concerned with the supply side. The demand side is a very important part of it, too. And this administration certainly has given that a high priority, as indicated by what the First Lady has done in this area, as well as the efforts of HHS, Department of Education, the White House drug effort and so on.

Q What about reports that they're moving the processing plants from Colombia to South Florida?

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: That has happened to a certain degree, but then that is bound to happen. In other words, drug traffickers, drug processors are going to ebb and flow in accordance with what they see as being the path of least resistance. But what we're trying to do is make sure that there are as few paths of least resistance as possible. Hopefully none.

Yes?

Q NBC Nightly News presented a report, I believe, within the month that said there was a glut of cocaine, particularly in the Florida area, and that the prices were dropping by as much as 50 percent. Is that just an isolated incident? Were you aware of that report? Because it does seem to fly in the face of the prices that you're giving us.

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: We hear these reports from various places. And sometimes we wonder what the sources are. Needless to say, prices do vary. And we would certainly not deny that prices have gone up and down over the years. But the figures that I gave you today, both with respect to -- well, with respect to really all three drugs -- we think are quite indicative of the fact that the supply is, in fact, decreasing rather than increasing. That does not mean it is not available. It is available, but it is now available at a much higher price which indicates that the supply is correspondingly less.

Yes?

Q To your knowledge or intelligence information, has this increased pressure made it so difficult that any organization

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at all is showing any sign of getting out of the drug traffic business?

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: We're putting organizations out of the drug traffic business. For example, the Pagans -- the Pagan Motorcycle Gang is one of four motorcycle gangs. It deals with amphetamines or did deal with amphetamines, PCP, and so on, had close contacts with the Mafia. We have now broken that gang; we have arrested all of the top leadership and have, in effect, put them out of business. Now, we intend to continue to do that.

We've done the same thing with respect to money laundering operations. We, in Atlanta last February, had the largest, single cocaine bust in history,

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which included -- and this is perhaps more important than the amount that was seized -- including arresting the head of that organization and a large part of the leadership of that organization. The same thing happened in New York in what is referred to as "the Pizza Case." In that case, which certainly stands on a par with the French Connection, and even more so, as a matter of fact, because, as distinguished from the French Connection, in the Pizza Case, which is the largest single heroin ring broken in history, we also arrested the top leadership, including the head of that organization, a fellow by the name of Badalamenti, who was arrested in Madrid. So that that organization has been broken up and the leadership has been arrested. Now that means -- and as I say, this was the largest heroin operation and is on a parallel with the French Connection -- we got the top leadership. In the French Connection, they did not. So that represents progress. And we are going to continue that effort.

As you know, our 12 Task Forces that we set up around the country were designed to not go after the users. They were designed to go after the networks and the leadership. And -- I don't know whether I've mentioned this so far or not; but those Task Forces in 1983 alone indicted over 3,000 individuals. And over a third of those were the leaders of the -- either organized crime or drug trafficking networks. Now, that is where we get the best return for the dollar spent and the effort spent. And that is where the thrust of those Task Forces is directed.

Yes.

Q Mr. Attorney General, you've cited a lot of examples today. And I wanted to ask you about a specific example. Your department recommended this year that the President commute the sentence of the Louisiana Agriculture Commissioner Gilbert Dozier. And you did this after Mr. Nofziger, who was representing Mr. Dozier, spoke to high officials in your department. Was that commutation -- do you think it was correct and does that -- doesn't that fly in the face of some of the comments that the President and you have made about fighting crime? Mr. Dozier was convicted of racketeering and extortion.

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: That case was handled on exactly the same basis that any other case would be handled on. The fact that Mr. Nofziger was involved had nothing to do with it whatever.

With respect to just about anything we do at the Justice Department, we hear from people from all over the spectrum. We hear from Congressmen. We hear from special interest groups. And we hear from X, Y and Z. So the fact that somebody wanted to crank their viewpoint into our decision-making process in this case is no different from any of the other cases that we deal with daily. And that particular case was disposed of on the basis of the same criteria that are applied in every other case dealing with this kind of subject matter.

Q What's the criteria?

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: Well, I think you'd better ask the Pardon Attorney that. But there are hosts of criteria, such as, for example, what is the customary or average length of time served for a given crime. There is sort of a gridlock of considerations which go into the determination of each of these cases. And in that case, the same criteria were used as were used in any other case.

Q Well, if Mr. Jensen, the Associate Attorney General, met with Mr. Nofziger and Mr. Dozier's lawyers, who else did he meet with? Did he meet with other people also?

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ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: Well, I don't have any idea. But I'm sure that he would meet with whoever wanted to meet with him. This happens as a matter of routine, day in and day out. We're not isolated, or an island over there. We hear from everybody on everything. If we were to shut off all input, we couldn't do our job. And I'm sure Congress wouldn't be very happy about it. We hear from Congressmen, from lobbyists, from, as I say, special interest groups. Anybody who wants to give us their viewpoint, we're perfectly willing to listen; but that doesn't mean, in any way, that our decisions are made on the basis of any particular input.

Yes.

Q Me?

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: Yes, you.

Q I have two little questions. One was you didn't mention Turkey. And about 12 to 15 years ago, we wrote stories about Turkey being involved in this and ending up in Denver -- here in The Denver Post. Has Turkey been eradicated?

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ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: Well, Turkey hasn't been eradicated. (Laughter.)

Q Yes, I know, but I mean the drug problem.

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: At least not -- no, actually, Turkey and Mexico are very good examples of the possibility of being able to do something about the drug problem in dealing government to government. We've had very successful relationships with Turkey. We've had very successful relationships with Mexico. And in both cases, the results have been really very, very satisfying.

We're doing, now, we think, the same thing with Bolivia and we think we're doing the same thing in Colombia. We, needless to say, have very good relations with both Pakistan and Thailand, and we think that real -- this, of course, is an international problem. It has to be dealt with on that basis. This is one of the reasons why we have already negotiated and signed some 13 mutual assistance law enforcement treaties and extradition treaties. And we're working on 8 more, because this is another very important part of our dealing with foreign governments to get at this overall problem.

Q The second part of the question --

Q Mr. Attorney General --

Q May I ask my second question?

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: Yes.

Q About a month ago, there was a reception at the Foreign Relations Committee at the Senate. Senator Percy presided. And the sister of Castro revealed that about 5,000 Cubans were going to be shipped over to Florida from Cuba -- more -- in a short while. Will they be bringing any of those drugs?

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: I'm sorry, I really don't know -- I don't know much about that particular meeting.

Q She lives in Florida and she apparently talks against her brother --

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: Yes. I'm sorry, I can't comment on that.

Q It's been reported that a recommendation has been made that Jackie Presser be indicted. Will you make a decision on whether to authorize his indictment before the election? And, secondly, do you think it is unseemly for the White House to be sending people to court his support for the general election?

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: Well, I have no comment with respect to any individual pending matter.

Q How about the White House contacts with the Teamsters Union and Mr. Presser, in particular?

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: Well, I think you'd have to ask the White House about that, Rob.

Q Have you given the White House any advice on that subject?

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: Well, I don't -- as I say, we do not comment on that -- on matters of that kind.

Q Marion Barry --

Q Well, anyway --

Q Marion Barry says that --

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Q Chris, just to follow this up -- the White House counsel has warned others in the White House not to have any contacts with Mr. Presser because of this investigation. Aren't you willing to at least issue that caution today? Is it not as valid as it was when Mr. Fielding issued it?

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: Well, Mr. Fielding has done what Mr. Fielding has done, and all I'm saying is that we just do not comment with respect to investigations, even whether we have one or don't have one.

Q Not dealing specifically with the investigation, but in terms of your advice to the President, has this issue come up in Cabinet meetings and have you discussed the issue with the President?

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: I just do not comment on matters of that kind.

Q Marion --

Q This is on the drug --

Q Marion Barry says that you've been unable to find any evidence of him in drug use, and that as a result, the Justice Department is resorting to a leak-a-week tactic against him. How do you respond to that?

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: Well, here again, I just don't respond to that. I do not comment on matters such as that, although it certainly goes without saying that we are as distressed about leaks as anybody else is. And I guess we all have our fair share of leaks, but in the law enforcement business, we certainly do not like them and certainly do not engage in them to the extent that we'd have anything to say about them.

Q Well, he -- are you doing anything to see how that information got out about this investigation of -- supposed grand jury investigation?

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: We do what we have to do in matters of that kind.

Q He believes the Justice Department and the prosecutor's office are on a political vendetta against him. Is that true?

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: Well, you'll have to talk to him about that. As I say, we do not comment -- we do not comment on matters under investigation, and even whether or not they are under investigation.

Q You've been serving a considerable amount longer than you had anticipated. You wrote the President saying that you would like to return to California. How are you holding up? I mean, do you find it very difficult -- (laughter) -- to continue in your job?

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ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: No, not -- as a matter of fact, I don't find it difficult at all. Actually, whether to resign or not resign in my case, at that time, was a very close question. I found the job fascinating and I still do.

It's hard work, but it's a fascinating job and staying or not staying was a very close call and since I am staying, I'm carrying on just exactly the way I did the previous three years and am enjoying every minute of it --

Q How much longer --

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: -- with one or two exceptions.

Q Were you asked to leave?

Q How much --

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: Beg Pardon?

Q Were you asked to resign -- were you asked to leave?

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: Certainly not.

Q And will you stay on --

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: It would be rather ironic wouldn't it, if you'd be asked to leave and then asked to stay on?

Q Well, that's the way life is with Mr. Meese's problems. (Laughter.)

Q No smiling.

Q Is Mr. Meese -- if the report is negative on Mr. Meese, will you stay on in the second term if the President is elected

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: I will stay on as long as the President wants me to stay on within reason. (Laughter.)

Q Do you expect the President to renominate Mr. Meese, or do you think that's not going to happen?

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: It's not a matter of renominating him, he has already nominated him --

Q Well, will he stick by him?

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: He certainly has up 'til now.

Q Do you think he will?

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: Well, you'll have to ask him that.

Q Are you as concerned --

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: I think he will.

Q -- about leaks as you are about government officials who might take cocaine. You seemed to be disturbed only about the leaks. You would be very disturbed about --

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: Well, well now, you've only scratched the surface. We're concerned about leaks, but we're concerned about a great deal more, and, certainly, the use of cocaine by government officials would be pretty high on that list.

Q Could you explain the standard as it applies to government officials -- I'm not clear on this but I believe that you said there may be a different standard where a private individual might not be -- might not be indicted where a government official might be or investigated.

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: You're going back to that Capitol Hill business?

Q Yes, right. It's been raised in connection --

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: Our policy on that is very,very simple and it seems to be very difficult to explain. And that is, that -- a use is a crime as well as distributing --distrubution is a crime. And we are in the business of prosecuting for all crimes. And we will prosecute all crimes to the extent that our resources permit. We do make certain decisions based upon the allocation of resources, but the idea that we have a policy that we will not prosecute users is just not so. We do not have such a policy. We have a policy that we will prosecute all violators of the law, but in actually doing the things that we have to do -- making decisions in individual cases, we have a problem of allocation of resources, the way everybody else does. And, in that respect, we may sometimes not prosecute a user and prosecute a distributer. Or we may prosecute on user and not another user. But the idea that we're not going to prosecute any users is not so.

Q Let me just ask a clarification. Do you have any policy of attaching greater importance to investigating use by public officials?

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: Say that again?

Q In a situation where the local U.S. Attorney doesn't normally prosecute users, would you change that policy if a public offical was involved?

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: No, as I say, we don't have a policy like that. That is not a policy.

Q Did --

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: It may -- It may be just as a practical matter --

Q Well, call it a practice if you like, it's still illegal, I agree with you, but U.S. attorneys have policies whether formal or informal that they --as to where they expend their prosecutorial resources --

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: Yes -- that's my point.

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Q My question is, do you -- do you encourage them to expend those resources more often if there is a question of a public official as a user being involved in drugs, rather than a private individual?

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: There's no really -- no way to answer that question other than to say that to the degree that the U.S. Attorney does that, he's not doing it on the basis that we are not prosecuting users, he does it on the basis that we do not have the resources to prosecute everybody, and therefore, in terms of doing this or that, we're not going to prosecute that user.

Now, that's the way that system works. Now that does not mean -- as a matter of fact, I suppose in one sense it does mean that there are factors that we will take into consideration in any given case that would made a difference -- in a given situation.

Q Given the outcome of the DeLorean trial, do you think the Justice Department will continue expending its resources on "sting" operations?

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: Of course.

Q This has not changed your view?

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: It hasn't changed one bit. The mere fact that we happen to have a result in one case which, by the way, by our standards, was not a particularly unusual case. It was a case that was made unusual by the press. We didn't make it unusual. And, in fact, that was just another drug case as far we we were concerned -- (Laughter.)

Q Talk about the allocation of resources -- you tried the man for three months.

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: The simple fact is that undercover operations are an essential tool of law enforcement. And without it, we would not be able to come to grips with large segments of crime across the spectrum, including public corruption, drug trafficking, organized crime, and so on. This is an acknowledged law enforcement tool. It has been upheld by every appellate court that has dealth with the subject. And the mere fact that one jury, in one case, comes out with that particular result, certainly, in no way, would affect our use of this very important, and critical law enforcement tool.

Now that doesn't mean that there may not be situations where we cannot improve upon our processes or procedures. Whenever we find that we can we certainly will do that. And we're very conscious about protecting individual rights and individual liberties. And we do that. We have undercover guidelines.

But the idea that one case is going to cause us to give up such an important law enforcement tool -- that doesn't make any sense whatever.

Q You don't think that there is a growing wave of opposition in this country to entrapment?

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: Well, now, if there's a growing wave of opposition to entrapment you can include me in it. Because we don't agree -- in -- with the principle of entrapment either. As a matter fact, undercover operations -- "sting" operations as they are called -- do not involve entrapment the way we operate under our guidelines.

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Q Well, then why do you -- how do you explain the fact that a number of members of that jury felt that Mr. DeLorean was entrapped?

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: Well, I'm afraid you'll have to ask the members of that jury. But we do everything we can do to avoid an entrapment situation. That does not mean, of course, that when you consider the tremendous number of cases that we try across the country -- and so many of them are based upon undercover operations -- that either abberations will occur, or mistakes will occur. Of course they will.

Q Do you think they did in that case?

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: Nobody is infallible. And I'll have to say that when you consider, generally speaking, the type of people that you have to deal with in this arena, that the record that has been compiled has been really quite outstanding, as indicated by the fact that, in the Abscam cases, out of 96 jurors who dealt with that subject matter, the vote for conviction was 90 to zero.

And, as I say, every single appellate court that has dealt with the question as to how that was handled -- in the Abscam cases -- upheld

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the propriety of the procedures and needless to say, in each one of them a question of entrapment was loudly raised.

Q Do you think mistakes were made in the DeLorean case?

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: I'm just not in a position to comment on that yet. We're certainly -- we have a practice of whenever a case like that is tried we -- naturally, we'll review it to see what happened in it and see whether or not things should have been done differently and we'll certainly do that in this case.

Q As part of your review, are you looking into the testimony in the trial that there was unusual White House interest, as one witness testified in the case?

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: We'll certainly review all aspects of the case. But this is the first time I've heard about unusual White House interest.

Q You didn't hear about the witness who testified that --

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: You can find witnesses who'll testify to anything.

Q You are going to review that too, then?

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: We'll review whatever needs to be reviewed in that case.

Q Are you going to appeal the pocket veto?

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: What?

Q Pocket veto?

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: We're considering that.

MR. ROUSSEL: Let's get Ben and that's it. Last one.

Q Did the President attend the meeting -- the Cabinet meeting this afternoon, and did he stay awake?

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: Let me say something about that. He attended the Cabinet meeting this afternoon, and let me say I think that I have attended every Cabinet -- almost every Cabinet meeting that has been held during the last three and a half years when I have been in town and not otherwise involved, and I have not once on any single occasion, ever, seen him nod off or do anything other than to pay complete attention to whatever was going on.

And I also want to say that as far as I'm --

Q Did you ever nod off?

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: --as I'm -- as far as I'm concerned, the subject matters that come up before Cabinet meetings in most cases are very fascinating and important issues, and they're not the kind of thing that anybody goes to sleep on --

Q Does Mike Deaver --

ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH: -- with one or two exceptions.

MR. ROUSSEL: Thank you.

END 3:44 P.M. EDT

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
GENOCIDE CONVENTION

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 1984, 2:35 P.M.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

MR. CARLSON: This is the BACKGROUND briefing on the Genocide Convention, and it is on BACKGROUND with the briefers referred to as Senior Administration Officials

I have an additional or a Fact Sheet Some of you may have noticed that in the Press Office we have [illegible] text of the Convention and a short summary of it. I've got a Fact Sheet that I'll hand out while they begin.

FIRST SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. This will give a little more background as well as some of the other considerations which explain in more detail than was the case with the other thing that was handed out.

Let me say first off that I appear before you in my Acting capacity, as pleased as I am to be here on something that I've been associated with fairly closely for the year and a half of my tenure in the Human Rights Bureau. The fact that Elliott Abrams, the Assistant Secretary, is taking one of his rare departures into vacationland finds me doing this in his stead. He would be delighted to be here doing this himself since he has believed over the period of his tenure so strongly in the merits of the Genocide Convention and of the endorsement by this Administration of its ratification.

As you know, for some 35 years and more this Convention has languished, signed but unratified, by the United States -- certainly, in my view, a very good idea whose time never quite seemed to come, and through successive administrations, Presidents and Secretaries of State of both parties -- a very bipartisan matter -- have supported the Convention, but were unable throughout that long period to resolve some of the perceived problems, constitutional issues, and others that prevented, surrounded its ratification.

However, it is the case that, again, after a very thorough review which frankly looked back at the whole, you might say 35-plus-year history of the various objections and considerations which had been raised, the review conducted by this Administration concluded just in this recent period that the time had come once again to urge the Convention's ratification. So it is certainly very much our hope that the ratification of this Convention, which very much gets to the heart of many of our most important human rights issues, will take place

Certainly, the United States has been, is, will be at the forefront of human rights concerns in the world, not just because we have a Human Rights Bureau, but because successive administrations have recognized that human rights very much is at the heart of what we are all about. And it's certainly the case that even in the last couple of years we've seen a proliferation in the number of other governments adopting a more activist stance, if you will, toward the handling of human rights issues, and greater participation on the part of other parliaments. Certainly, in our own Congress, the number of very interested and able activists in human rights speaks for itself; and we see the ratification of this Convention after lo, these many years as very much being in that vein.

Obviously -- and we can go into some of this perhaps -- the reasons for the long delay in the ratification of this Convention are not menial, that is to say various issues were perceived to be a problem, both by Members of the Senate as well as legal scholars. It's interesting to note that at one time in the history of this Convention, the American Bar Association which now enthusiastically endorses it, did oppose it for various reasons; but after a thorough re-study already quite some years ago, the ABA has dropped that opposition and has become one of its most ardent proponents, and we are certainly grateful to the work and the support which have come from the ABA as well as a goodly number of other organizations. We believe the concerns have been researched, addressed, and that certainly everything now speaks for proceeding with ratification.

Obviously, it would be the Administration's hope that action could be taken toward ratification as expeditiously as possible. We all know that the time of the present Congress is relatively short, so if we fail in this upcoming three or four weeks, or whatever it may consist of, obviously, it would be our hope that it would receive the earliest possible consideration in the next Congress.

I think that's pretty much it. I'd like, as I say, very much to put the long and thorough effort that we've gone through to come out with the President's strong backing of this Convention in the context of our overall human rights policies. I think that's been the case, in both a bipartisan sense as well as very much fitting in the whole panoply of all the other things that we're involved in in human rights.

whether that's what we do in the United Nations and its bodies or things we get into in our annual Human Rights Reports and the whole approach which has become much more extensive and is very much with us to stay, I'm very pleased to say.

Yes, sir.

Q Why did it take this Administration three and a half years to come to this conclusion?

FIRST SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would probably place the onset of the intensive effort on studying all of the issues -- and as I said, we didn't just look at the issues as they appeared in black and white in the package, but went back through the long, tortuous three decades-plus of why the various objections had surfaced and what we should do, both as part of coming to this conclusion to endorse the Convention as well as, of course, obviously to testify subsequently as to our reasons on this score.

I would place the onset of this from about 1982, early '82. You may recall that it was about the end of '81 when the post of Assistant Secretary for Human Rights was formally filled, and intensive efforts working with our colleagues from other departments began.

Q Should it be seen as a coincidence that this announcement comes from the Administration of a President up for reelection one day before he speaks to B'nai Brith?

FIRST SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. No, I would reject the premise, that, you know, it is connected with any given speech or political event. It just does happen to be the case that, as I've mentioned, the Convention on Genocide, if anything, is very, very bipartisan and has a very long history, and conscious of joining that long line, you might say, of both Democratic and Republic Administrations which endorsed ratification of the Convention, the timing did very much coincide with where we came out with the very long and careful study of this.

Q Do you have any sense of whether the opposition that has surfaced and threatened legislative tieups in the past has diminished in any way?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: Well, it would be our hope that just as it has been the natural phenomenon, I think, after lots and lots of study over so many years that -- for example, the ABA has shifted its position -- it is our belief that that same phenomenon has occurred with respect to other groups and other individuals.

Certainly, I think what we want to see as part of the ratification process is the fullest possible airing of all views surrounding the Convention and the ramifications thereof. That, obviously, is a part of the Constitutional process, in any event, the prerogatives of the Senate of the United States, and I think we can anticipate -- and indeed the Administration would want -- this fullest possible airing of all aspects.

Q [redacted] the -- I'm sorry. [redacted].

Q I was going to ask -- this may sound unduly cynical, but so be it -- why did the President himself, or the White House at least, not step forth with this announcement and instead have it done this way?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: Well --

Q After all, it is a Presidential decision, and it gives it the caste of something the President wanted to put a little distance between himself and the document.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: Well, with all due respect, certainly I would not agree that that was the motivating factor. I think it's sort of a natural thing that the Department of State has tended to take the lead in this over the years, working with our colleagues from Justice and elsewhere, and would actually announce what is in fact the President's decision, as noted in the statement which John Hughes released at the noon briefing. But as I say, I see that as a natural thing.

Q Do any of these documents indicate the status of ratification around the world? I just haven't looked through this enough to --

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: Indeed, I guess we're up from 95 states. I might turn to my colleague here at this point to speak to the ratification process. There are very few major countries -- of course, we are the major exception at this point -- not to have ratified.

Q Did China ratify?

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q How many of them have ratified?

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: According to records, 96 countries have ratified, and we will have a status list for you if you wish to pick it up after the briefing.

Q Can I ask another question, which might go to you, I guess? But this Fact Sheet here says toward the end that in order for this thing to actually become effective, not only does it have to be ratified, but there has got to be implementing legislation enacted, putting on the U.S. Criminal Code a new crime called "Genocide" and setting forth the penalties et cetera, et cetera.

Can you give us a definition from what you plan to have in the Criminal Code as to what the crime of Genocide would constitute, or what -- I guess my sentence is turned around: What would constitute the crime of Genocide?

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: Well, the Convention indicates what Genocide is in Article Two, and for a more detailed explanation of what the legislation might look like, I think I would ask my other colleague, who is with the department which would be responsible for drafting the implementing legislation.

THIRD SENIOR OFFICIAL: That hasn't been done yet. The Convention itself defines in detail the crime of Genocide, and the understandings that would implement the United States' position with respect to ratification would amplify that.

We have a copy of the bill that was proposed in 1976, which simply further defines the term of Genocide. But the source of the definition primarily is going to be the treaty itself, which specifies the terminology that would be involved in the statute.

Q This was the bill proposed by the Administration in 1976, or by some Congressman, or what?

THIRD SENIOR OFFICIAL: This was by Congressman Scott in 1976. It was S-3155. We don't have legislation that we've proposed this time, but the legislation itself is, and I suspect will be, relatively simple since the definition of the term "Genocide" is spelled out in the Treaty itself.

Q Well, it's spelled out all right and I've got it in front of me, but I don't -- it would take a lot of interpretation or further nailing down to know what a lot of these things mean because they are kind of general, such as "causing bodily harm or mental harm to members of a group."

"imposing measures intending to prevent births within a group," and all that sort of thing.

THIRD SENIOR OFFICIAL: There would undoubtedly be -- and there was on the previous occasions that this legislation moved and the Treaty itself moved through the Senate Foreign Relations Committee -- would have to be hearings that would help amplify, in the legislative history and in the statute itself.

The previous statute that I referred to defines terms such as "racial group," "religious group," "substantial part," and terms that appear in the Treaty itself; and the term "mental harm" is articulated in some greater detail in the Understanding which would be affixed to this Administration's proposal.

Q Well, has this Administration drawn up some law which it is prepared to support -- of course, it can't pass it; it can only propose it or endorse it, I guess -- to make it clear what is the crime of genocide?

THIRD SENIOR OFFICIAL: No, we do not have a specific statute before us.

(Continued on next page.)

Q Why haven't you done that in these 35 months, or whatever it has been?

THIRD OFFICIAL: I think a substantial part of that process is going to be the process in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee also.

In the first place, I don't think drafting a statute which will cover this will be extraordinarily difficult, but I think that the process will benefit by the hearings.

Q I apologize because I'm behind the curve here, obviously. But a Federal law -- I guess I've always thought of genocide as being a crime committed by a government as an element of its policy. That obviously is not the case.

THIRD OFFICIAL: The Treaty defines either by a ruling official, a public official or a private individual.

Q Okay. As a private individual then, a U.S. citizen who violated the statute that would flow out of the ratification of this Treaty would then be subject to prosecution under Federal law in the United States. I'm trying to think of an example -- Ku Klux Klan?

THIRD OFFICIAL: Without getting into specific groups, and as the Treaty talks about concentrated efforts involving the killing of human beings or seriously injuring human beings with the intent to destroy a substantial part of that group on account of their racial group or their ethnic group or their religious group is the general heart of the definition of "genocide." That would be not only in the Treaty, because the Treaty is very clear in terms of those factors, but that would be in the statute.

Q Wouldn't it have been -- since you reject the contention of any political timing, motivation here, wouldn't it have been efficient if the Administration had legislation ready to roll on the day Congress moved in if it were really interested in getting this through in this session, or at least to wait until after November 6 to propose the legislation in the new Congress so that it would be ready to roll? Wouldn't that have removed even the appearance of political motivation?

FIRST OFFICIAL: The appearance is in the eyes of the beholder, but the honest intention all along, as I say, if the effort really did take a good long while, was to make this recommendation as soon as all the parties had conducted the most vigorous examination of all the problems it had had over the years.

Q But that's before the legislation had been drafted?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Before the legislation had been drafted.

Q Was it the intention from the beginning?

FIRST OFFICIAL: That's certainly my understanding of the -- we are coming back to something asked earlier: Why do we think the chances are better now than they were and proved to be in the past. It would be something we were talking about earlier. Now, as opposed to obviously 35 years ago, and certainly even to a shorter period, we have a body of Federal statutes which have satisfied a number of the earlier concerns that might have been envisioned back in 1950.

THIRD OFFICIAL: Let me add that in the Treaty process of a party who becomes a party to the Treaty, you are committing to create legislation. It has not been typical in the past that the legislation becomes the process of ratification of the Treaty, unless I'm mistaken. The legislation is something that has come along afterwards, and there have been efforts to develop something along that line. But that is not what has been contemplated either in other countries or in this country in the past.

Q The Treaty specifically says, or the Fact Sheet specifically says that the instrument of ratification would not be deposited until the legislation is passed.

THIRD OFFICIAL: We have added that.

Q So under this Administration's proposal, ratification would not, in fact, take place until after the legislation was all passed?

THIRD OFFICIAL: We have added that because -- and, again, correct me if I'm wrong -- but that has been something that has not been included in the past. It has been an objection which has been raised before; and the ABA Committee, and the appropriate committee in the Senate, has felt in the past that that was would be an appropriate feature to add to the United States proposal, and we concur.

Q Can you tell us why it took two and a half years of review to basically endorse the Treaty and the situation it was in 1976? What caused you the most trouble? What provisions did you have doubts about?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Well, speaking as a non-lawyer -- one of the few on this podium; indeed, the only -- we looked at it most particularly over the last -- almost going on two years -- we were very conscious of the fact that this had been marched up the Hill only to fail in Sisyphus fashion so many times that we wanted to be through -- it wasn't just a catch word.

We really did want to go through all of the objections and considerations which had been raised in the past, game those out against where we thought things might be now, talking with the ABA, and a whole host of other organizations, how one could satisfy some of the significant concerns. That was just simply a time-consuming process.

In fact, we were working quite actively over this period with Justice, and others at the White House. It wasn't just sort of a snap, quick thing to do. It really did a long time.

Q Did you attempt to determine whether members of the Senate who opposed this previously were still opposed?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Certainly, consultations with members of Congress was very much a part of what we've been doing as it will be what we hope is the active period of consideration of ratification in the period ahead.

Q Did you specifically speak to Thurmond and Helms?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Beg your pardon?

Q Did you specifically talk to Senators Thurmond and Helms, who proposed this in the past, and what is their viewpoint now?

FIRST OFFICIAL: I couldn't attempt to characterize just where they've been and where they are at this point. But, obviously, it goes without saying that we would engage in the fullest range of consultations with most particularly those who had perceived problems in the past.

Q In the 35 years that this thing has been around, has anybody ever invoked it successfully?

FIRST OFFICIAL: They have not, if I'm -- you mean, in terms of raising --

Q Yeah.

FIRST OFFICIAL: -- a case before this? It's my understanding that a case has not been brought before --

SECOND OFFICIAL: To answer your question, we have to define what you mean by "invoke." Has any state taken on another state in the international court about the interpretation or application of this Convention? The answer is no.

Q Isn't there machinery in here -- I don't know where the language is -- that one country notifies the Secretary General and then he takes the action?

SECOND OFFICIAL: You notify the Secretary General when you become a party to this Convention because is the depositary.

Q No, I mean in case of an alleged violation of the -- of an alleged case of genocide?

THIRD OFFICIAL: There is a provision in the Treaty itself that allows you to go to the Security Council for something called appropriate action under certain various circumstances. But the crime of genocide, to the extent that it's committed by an individual, he would be subject to prosecution in a criminal context under the laws that have been enacted pursuant to this statute.

There may also be -- and there is a provision in the Treaty itself -- for a mechanism for countries to seek interpretations or clarifications of the Treaty in the ICJ.

Q What, for example, would stop somebody from going and saying, in Kampuchea, there is apparent genocide going on, and we would like you to use your legal machinery to stop it? Why hasn't anybody? What weighs against somebody doing that?

SECOND OFFICIAL: Your assumption is that there's legal machinery to stop it. Those questions could be raised with political organs of the U.N., and, indeed, I believe have been. But the Convention doesn't establish a mechanism to do what you indicate you would want done.

Q So then the obvious question is, what good is it?

THIRD OFFICIAL: I would just want to say this, and probably something can be added to it.

The principal focus is to require nations of the world to enact laws that prohibit, punish and therefore hopefully prevent acts of genocide by individuals. There is a deterrent. And the purpose behind the Treaty, in substantial part, is to make it clear to people that participate in these acts is that they may be punished.

Q What does this law, again, flowing out of this Treaty, provide for in domestic terms than the present law doesn't cover? You've got murder, assault, all kinds of --

THIRD OFFICIAL: The various civil rights statutes that have been enacted by the Federal Government over the years, since this Treaty was first introduced, cover most of the territory

In fact, 18 USC 241, and the provisions that follow that statute, probably make into a crime just about anything that would be genocide under this Treaty. So in a substantial sense, the United States has provided for it. It hasn't labeled it as "genocide." It hasn't called and set out a specific penalty for violation of something called "genocide."

I haven't attempted, and I don't know whether anyone else has, to try to determine whether there are certain types of conduct under the Treaty itself that might be beyond the scope. But you're right, in the thrust of your question, that the civil rights statutes that do make Federal criminal violations into conduct against people because their race or religion, and so forth; it does cover the territory.

Q So, given that, is this really just to remove a source of embarrassment on the international scene from the United States?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Let me say, certainly, it is the case that the Soviet Union and others, who, of course, are parties to the Convention, very often charge us with non-ratification as proof of this and that. Many of you are all too familiar with that.

So very much from our standpoint -- from the standpoint of the United States -- ratification is meritorious also on those grounds.

I'd like to come back to what you were saying earlier about "what good is it?" As my colleague was saying, there is implementing national legislation, which is, you might say, a concrete manifestation that flows from the ratification of the Convention, and there is as well the symbolism which -- let's face it -- in the approach to handling sometimes very intractable human rights matters plays a very important role in both what is said and the way others react to what is said.

I would certainly submit that a lot of the attention we pay in the United Nations, and the various bodies, the things that we do together with other countries, other parliaments, can and does have an effect also in its symbolic sense. So we would certainly see ratification of the Convention also in that sense as well as the concrete applicability.

Q You mentioned earlier that one of the provisions in this Administration's proposal now, that was intended to address the Congressional criticism, was the business of passing the laws first and then depositing the instrument of ratification.

What other specific arguments or changes, if any, is the Administration going to make on the Hill to support this that will address specific criticisms that members of Congress have had in the past?

FIRST OFFICIAL: That's been a big part of our effort, as I was indicating a while ago, to sort of line up the various main lines of those concerns and those objections. Our hope and anticipation would be that as expeditiously as possible the Congress -- the Senate will again --

(Continued on next page)

Q What are the lines, and what things have you done to change the treaty or proposal?

FIRST OFFICIAL: I'll certain defer to some of my legal colleagues here, but a lot has focused, among other things, on the historical role of states' rights, that is, the United States states' rights, as versus international conventions of this nature. Certainly Constitutional questions in this vein have been raised.

It is our belief both by virtue of how the body of Federal legislation that we have now demonstrates, as well as measures to ease those Constitutional concerns, that a lot of that has been put into a perspective which people do not regard as representing a problem.

We will be doing things, obviously, as the Senate now begins to hopefully exercise its role with this reindorsement of the Administration's views of the merits of the Convention, as they schedule the hearings that would be part of the natural process, and so forth. It would be during the course of those hearings and in our consultations with individual members of Congress that we would seek to allay such remaining concerns as there may be, or, for that matter, if they have for their part views on other ways that the ratification process should proceed, we would take that fully into consideration.

As I say, these three understandings and the one declaration are from some years ago. If the Senate of the United States, in its infinite wisdom, perceives some other aspects, obviously, we will be very open-minded.

Q The Administration is not going to propose or back any other reservations, or whatever?

FIRST OFFICIAL: As I say, these three understandings and one declaration seem reasonable to us in that they appear upon closest and most prolonged observation to satisfy the concerns raised. Obviously, though, if others thought that something should be phrased somewhat differently, we're not going to fail to pay attention to some concern.

Q You're not proposing anything further than this, right?

FIRST OFFICIAL: No. This would be our proposal.

Q Two technical points: Since the Senate Foreign Relations Committee already recorded that out, is that still on the table, or does it have to be re-passed by another Congress?

FIRST OFFICIAL: My understanding is it's on the table and that --

Q So a Committee wouldn't have to take it up again?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Although the assumption is that, indeed, it would, after all this time has passed, again schedule hearings. Just as the Administration, the President's statement in support of the Convention, is really you might say a political manifestation, as other Presidents have done in other --

Q Had Truman actually signed it or had just sent -- I mean, can you say he signed it?

FIRST OFFICIAL: I think that his is the actuating signature, as I understand.

SECOND OFFICIAL: It was signed on behalf of the United States.

Q By the President?

SECOND OFFICIAL: I can't tell you whether he signed it or someone --

FIRST OFFICIAL: I've got that somewhere here if I can find it.

SECOND OFFICIAL: I don't have the facts with me here.

FIRST OFFICIAL: The only thing I have here in this is that Truman then transmitted the Convention to the Senate for its advice and consent on June 16, 1949. Presumably he did that by squiggling off somewhere on there.

Q There's a line here that Hughes read earlier about the commitment of the country to prevent and punish acts of genocide. Would this legislation suggest ways to punish, since it's hardly an individual act, but largely a governmental business? Would this legislation --

THIRD OFFICIAL: No. The treaty contemplates that the states that become a part of the treaty will enact legislation to punish individuals who engage in acts --

Q The Government.

THIRD OFFICIAL: No. The states wouldn't be punishing other governments. To the extent that there's a state against state activity, it would be something that might be taken up in the International Court of Justice, and then to the Security Council. But the contemplation of the treaty is individual states will enact criminal laws against individuals, and the punishments will undoubtedly, and have been, both fines and imprisonment.

Q The statement earlier said that by ratifying it, the U.S. could utilize the Convention in our own efforts to expand the freedom fight for human rights abuses. In what ways would that all take place?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Both in the positive, as well as the, you might say, sense raised here earlier, that certainly we would like to be a party to the Convention in order to be associated with that large body of nations which already is. It's perfectly shameless of the Soviet Union, for example, to sort of point to us on this one when it --

Q Do you think there's any positive way to get used?

FIRST OFFICIAL: It seems to me it adds to that whole range of things we do in the United Nations itself in New York, the U.N. Human Rights Commission, the whole sort of internationalization, if you will, of human rights issues.

Q Would the U.S. be inclined to, whatever, invoke this, or whatever, against a country -- case such as Kampuchea?

FIRST OFFICIAL: That's perfectly conceivable to me that we will, having this, being a party to it, that certainly it will be one of the tools that we would give consideration to using.

I think in general, in human rights areas, a number of you know only too well where we try at times to come to terms with some of the most awful things, which, as I say, can be terribly intractable, it's best to have as many arrows in our quiver as you can have. I would certainly count this as one.

Q Not having it, then -- are there cases in the past where the U.S. might have liked to have -- in fact, would have liked to have invoked it or threatened to?

FIRST OFFICIAL: I can't be retroactive as such, but, certainly, if we were parties -- if we were a party to it, it's something that would have been amongst the range of options in the real world that we could have considered.

Q But there has been no process initiating, that you know of, one state against another, under this treaty?

FIRST OFFICIAL: That's correct.

Q A correlated question -- do you know of any action that any state has taken against any of its own nationals under implementing legislation?

THIRD OFFICIAL: To prosecute individuals.

Q Yes.

THIRD OFFICIAL: I do not know of any. We were talking about this before. It's not clear to me what legislation, in addition to legislation labeled "genocide," may have been inspired or promoted because of the focus of attention on this in various different countries. I don't know the answer to your question, but I wouldn't want to be categorical on the negative side because there may have been criminal prosecutions for like crimes in countries.

Q What happened to those other conventions? The Human Rights Convention. Was that finally passed by the Senate?

FIRST OFFICIAL: There are these other conventions. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which -- what? -- I guess was entered in force back in '76. Also the International Covenant on Economic and Social and the Rights of Women, and these have all been under review and study, although I would certainly say to you that our primary effort has gone into the Genocide Convention.

Q I think I'm not following you. There are still some others not approved by the Senate?

Q The ones he mentioned.

FIRST OFFICIAL: Yes. In fact, let's see -- did I miss some? Civil and Political Rights -- Economic, Social and Cultural, actually.

Q Can you give the full names?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Sure. Or we can provide those subsequently. Also the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination.

Q Have those been signed by the United States as well?

FIRST OFFICIAL: The one on Civil and Political Rights has been pending in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee since February '78. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, pending since February 23, '78. Finally, International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, pending as well since February 23, '78.

Obviously, it is the case, having, as I say, devoted the bulk of our effort toward the most tenured, long-languishing instrument, the Genocide Convention, it would certainly be our hope now to then move in behind some of these others.

Q Did you say the one of the Rights of Women is pending?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Convention of the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women.

Q Why didn't the Administration recommend that the Senate go ahead and pass these other ones?

FIRST OFFICIAL: They've been looked at, just as the other one was, again against a range of various considerations advanced both by lawyers as well as members of Congress. We may have seen, for example, in the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights, where that whole area of economic and social rights has been one traditionally where the Soviet Union and a number of its friends have tended to emphasize, whereas they have de-emphasized civil and political rights. So we wanted to satisfy ourselves that in the version that we approved this, moved on this, that we not subject ourselves to letting others use this propagandistically. So we want to look a little more carefully at a number of the provisions in those.

Q Can you address some of the objections that have been raised in the past, including the ratification of this treaty would constitute an infringement of national sovereignty? That somehow it would infringe on property rights of the United States, and that somehow it represents a conspiracy to institute some form of one-world government?

FIRST OFFICIAL: I think I might turn to my colleague at this point.

THIRD OFFICIAL: I'm not sure I'm the one to answer that last part, but the concern of people in the early days and over a period of time with respect to this, as far as state sovereignty and the like, was in a couple of respects:

One, it would have been a treaty which would have required the United States to enact criminal legislation. Some people were concerned that a treaty can go into effect with only the approval of the Senate, and that both houses of Government would not have approved. This, of course, is a controversy that goes back to the late 18th Century also with the Jay Treaty.

There was also a concern that when you're going to deal in the criminal field, the treaty would bring about a Federal criminal murder statute and other Federal criminal assault statutes, and so forth, and the first objection, I believe, is dealt with by our provision requiring legislation, therefore action, by both houses of Congress to implement the treaty before it takes effect.

The second provision with respect to Federal criminal statutes in areas normally governed by the states is pretty well covered by the fact that most of this civil rights legislation would make the conduct of this nature a crime anyway, so that a substantial additional impact in the criminal area is not being added.

There was also some concern at one time about whether a treaty ought to govern matters of domestic affairs anyway, such as criminal matters, but that has pretty much gone by the wayside because so many of the treaties since the Second World War affect things that were thought of many years ago to be within the purview of the states.

So most of those concerns -- the ones that I researched and saw as being articulated the most vigorously by the opponents of the treaty -- have either been taken care of because of the passage of time or change in circumstances.

Q But would that also have taken care of the objection that somehow a U.S. citizen might be placed under the jurisdiction of a foreign or a world court?

THIRD OFFICIAL. Well, he won't be placed under the jurisdiction of a world court unless the United States further agrees under the treaty to a tribunal to cover that, because the UCJ would not cover individuals.

It's also been answered in substantial part by virtue of the fact that United States' citizens are subject to the jurisdiction of foreign countries for crimes that they commit in those countries anyway.

We have a provision here with respect to the extradition process, so if it's a United States' citizen and some other country is seeking extradition of that United States' citizen, the United States would have the right to put him on trial here. So I think those objections have been substantially met also.

Q You guys got a head count in the Senate? Do you know how many opponents there still are, probable?

FIRST OFFICIAL: No. I wouldn't profess to have a head count, as such, except just sort of the general conclusion, observation, that because of a number of the concerns that have been addressed -- as my colleague was saying -- there are far more who would certainly support it. But I don't have a head count as such.

Q Thank you very much.

(The briefing concluded at 3:15 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ON-THE RECORD BRIEFING
ON
U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL COUNCIL
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1984, 11:13 A.M.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS: Good morning.

This is the second time that the United States Holocaust Memorial Council has held a conference here at the State Department. The first was in October 1981, when we hosted the Liberator's Conference, which included representatives from the governments and armies of fourteen nations which participated in the defeat of Nazism and the liberation of the death camps.

Today, the State Department is honored to be hosting a conference entitled, "Faith in Humankind: Rescuers of Jews During the Holocaust." Briefly, the purpose of this conference, which began yesterday evening and will continue through tomorrow, is to focus attention on the Holocaust from the perspective of the individual rescuers -- that is, non-Jews who risked their lives on behalf of Jews during the Holocaust.

Yesterday, Secretary Shultz' addressed the opening ceremony of the Conference at the Kennedy Center. Today and tomorrow, Holocaust survivors, rescuers, scholars and public figures will examine the legacy of the rescuers. We are pleased that representatives from 22 nations are participating in the Conference.

At the risk of oversimplifying terribly, perhaps I could say that the basic message of this conference is: You are your brother's keeper. That message, of course, is as old as the Scriptures. Yet up until World War II, at least, many statesmen and leaders felt that compassion stops at the border -- that another nation's "internal affairs" are beyond the purview of legitimate international concern, or even discourse. Partly because of the events of the Holocaust, this attitude began to change in the aftermath of World War II. Today, a number of international covenants, conventions and declarations -- including, of course, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights -- attest to the fact that human rights are everyone's business. As Alexander Solzhenitsyn put it, there are no "internal affairs" anymore. Nevertheless, despite virtually universal verbal adherence to the Declaration, the fact remains that many regimes continue to abuse human rights. And for this reason we in the United States, and throughout the democratic world, must constantly reaffirm our dedication to the defense of human rights and the brotherhood of mankind. What better way of making such a reaffirmation than honoring the rescuers -- those incredibly courageous men and women who, in the words of Pope John Paul II, have "left us the heritage and challenge of defending all innocent human life in our own day."

I would like to introduce someone who, through his writings and personal example, has risen to that challenge.

Elie Wiesel, an internationally acclaimed author, and Andrew Mellon Professor of the Humanities at Boston University, is the Chairman of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council. Before being appointed Chairman of the Council, he served as Chairman of the Proceeding Body of the President's Commission on the Holocaust. Mr. Wiesel, who as a boy was deported to Auschwitz and Buchenwald, is widely regarded as the preeminent spokesman for the victims of the Holocaust. The author of many notable books on the Holocaust, Mr. Wiesel has also written on the Bible, on the Hasidic masters, and on moral responsibility in today's world. Last spring, he was awarded the Congressional Gold Medal, one of only 25 Americans in this century to be so honored.

Professor Wiesel.

PROFESSOR WIESEL: Just a few words of gratitude to Secretary Abrams. His hospitality is moving; his generosity, I hope, will be contagious.

Since 1981 we have been working with him, and I must say there is some historic justice -- or maybe poetic justice -- to the fact that our conferences -- and we have many in store -- have all taken place in the State Department, and I hope will continue to take place in the State Department.

Why? Because, to be honest -- I hinted at it last night in my address -- we have some doubts, some sadness, when we think of the history of the State Department. That has no reflection on what is happening today. Quite the opposite. But the history of the State Department, when thousands and thousands -- if not millions and millions of Jews -- needed a word, needed a message -- or, in more complete terms, needed a visa -- and the visas did not come -- in those times -- in those times -- let's not forget that, and we cannot forget that -- life and death meant a visa, and how many consuls -- instructed by, we know exactly whom in the State Department -- refused. And then not even a visa, an application, a stamp, a letter meant the difference between life and death.

So, therefore, it is just that now the State Department, because of what happened then, is I think more humanistic and is indulging, I would say, in ethical explorations such as ours. And, therefore, we have this conference here, which is a unique conference.

I would not be correct if I would not single out some people here who are really responsible for the organization of the conference:

Dr. Carol Rittner, who is a Professor at Mercy, a Sister of Mercy -

Professor Harry Cargas, of Webster University,

-- a member of the Council

and Sondra Myers, who is in charge of the overall organization of the Artistic Program and the conference itself --

and I see here my Vice Chairman, Mark Talisman, whom I thank for being here, for all that he has done. And, my friends, if you have any questions that you think I could answer, try -- please.

Q In a nutshell, we've heard what the people on the panel downstairs hope that this accomplishes. Do you think this is going to set a precedent for future exploration of this topic; and could it, in a sense, rewrite part of history?

A (Professor Wiesel): Rewrite history? No. I would never want to rewrite history. That is a Communist, authoritarian method -- that they rewrite history with every year or every regime. I believe in writing history, in remaining faithful to history. And I think in the United States, where we enjoy freedom of democracy, we enjoy the freedom of believing in history.

What I do believe, however, is that this will teach us lessons, meaning the importance of the individual, that one person can change things -- that we do not need armies nor do we need organizations. Any person has or could have a chance, a possibility, to affirm humanity with simple gestures. And who knows the consequences of such gestures? This is what we are trying to teach through these lessons.

Q Sir, can you explain why it took 36 years for these people to be acknowledged in this way?

A It did not take, really, 36 years. Again, I think you should like to be correct. Israel has a remembrance authority called "Yad Vashem," and Yad Vashem has a Commission presided by a Supreme Court Justice. And that Commission is seeking out righteous Gentiles. That Commission does nothing else but trying to honor righteous Gentiles.

What we have done, actually: We have tried to bring them together.

Now, we have not brought together too many because we don't have the means and it's not an easy task, because we also want to go beyond that, really. We are trying to explore their behavior. At least, through them I would like to understand what happened. That is what really bothers me. I want to know what motivated them.

Why? Because for so many years many of us have been almost fascinated by the consequences of evil. I couldn't understand a killer; I still cannot. As a novelist, I can never write about the killer in the first person. I cannot say "I" in the place of a killer.

Now I want to understand the opposite, the mystery of goodness. And it's "What made these people good?" And, as you see, it's amazing that thse are not exceptional people. These are simple people, simple human beings. They do not see themselves as heroes, neither before nor after -- not even during. This is, therefore -- this is the unprecedented initiative we have taken. It is true this is the first international conference dealing with the righteous Gentiles.

I'm sorry -- please.

Q Two questions:

Do you have any percentages on the number of people in countries, such as Germany and Poland and so forth, who helped other Jews? And, also, do you see any trends in this country which are alarming trends that you saw perhaps in the thirties in Europe?

A I do not know percentages about the countries because as we have heard from scholars it's true there were not too many Jews there -- like Denmark or Bulgaria -- most of the Jews were saved. In other countries, such as Poland or Hungary, most of the Jews were killed.

Now, the difference is of academic importance, an academic question. I know that Yad Vashem has been looking

-- again, since '52 -- has been looking for righteous Gentiles, and I think they have reached a very high figure until now -- less than 5,000. But less than 5,000 for a whole Continent of Europe is, I'm afraid, a low figure. It's a depressing figure. But we are still looking.

As for your other question, I would never equate any situation anywhere with what happened in Europe -- not even Cambodia.

Secretary Shultz yesterday mentioned Cambodia, and to use of genocide. I went to Cambodia. It became apparent that massacres are taking place. I went to the border; I met with the refugees. And even there I hesitated to call it "genocide." It's a massacre; it's a catastrophe; it's a tragedy; it's a disaster. The human vocabularly has enough words, unfortunately -- or fortunately -- to describe all these catastrophes. But "genocide" is a strong word, and I would not want to shibboleth -- surely, not in America.

There are danger signals. I think anti-Semitism in the world -- not necessarily in the United States, in Europe especially, anti-Semitism is on the rise.

What worries me even more is that in the United States and in many other countries there are more and more so-called scholars, so-called historians, so-called researchers who are publishing books upon books, trying "to prove" that all this never happened.

Now, to have these people, who work in respected institutions, come out with such absurdities is something so vicious and so ugly that we don't really know how to deal with it. I would never engage them in a debate because I would never dignify them with a debate, and yet they continue. That is the danger, I think.

Q I was wondering: If you don't consider what happened in Cambodia genocide and if the accepted figures are that of a population of approximately six million people in the country, in the decade 1970 to 1980 two million of those people were killed -- essentially, by being forced out of the cities.

What would you call it?

A No; I didn't say I wouldn't; I said I hesitated. I said I hesitated to call it "genocide."

Why? Logically, of course, three million out of six million deaths. I said I hesitated meaning because live in a generation where we use words so easily -- too easily. So I wanted, actually, to say that before using such a word one thing must stop -- thinking before I use such a word I stop, and then I may use it.

Q Does it concern you that there hasn't been nearly as much attention paid to the Cambodian situation with

Pol Pot and the fighting, either within or without the Jewish community, who are most sensitive to this kind of thing -- over the past, say, 10 years? I mean where have been the outcries, if you will, about Cambodia -- which is the closest thing we have to a modern-day Holocaust, or is it in your view?

A I am a Jew, and as a Jew I went there to bear witness for those victims. But I think I'm probably among the first ones to alert public opinion to the boat people.

At the same time, I say it with a sense of gratification and gratitude that Israel was the first country to accept boat people. And of all people it was Menachem Begin, whose first gesture, when he became Prime Minister, was to accept a boat full of boat people. So the Jewish community is sensitive.

How sensitive, I don't know. Maybe not sensitive enough. But then no community is sensitive enough -- sensitive enough to tragedies. What is happening today in Afghanistan -- how many people care about it? How many people care about the starvation of children in Africa? In Ethiopia, what about the Falashas? My God! We get reports that, I think, 40 people died last week in a certain country, having left Ethiopia. Why don't we shout?

Well, we tried -- but not loud enough.

Maybe this is perhaps the moment, sir, to remind all of us that the Senate is just voting tomorrow on the Genocide Treaty and the Convention. And I can tell you, with all the strength that I have, that I am behind it. I'm very pleased. I'm very happy that President Reagan came out publicly to support that ratification, and I hope that the Senate tomorrow will ratify that Treaty. It's absurd that the United States of America -- which is still, I think, the most democratic and the freest nation, and the strongest freest nation in the world -- should not be behind such a Treaty.

Q Are you hoping that the conference will inspire individuals nowadays to take some specific action? And, in fact, as you just suggested, is the timing not a coincidence that this has been held the day before the Senate considers it? (Laughter.)

A Oh, no.

The second question -- don't give us that much credit here. (Laughter.) Don't think that six months ago we knew already that now they will discuss it in the Senate -- no.

Q It's real important, the first question.

A Yes, the first question. I hope so.

I'm an educator; I teach. And it's not a coincidence that most of the people who are involved with our work on on the Council and around the Council are educators.

I do believe in our responsibilities to us, the young generation, because I feel responsible for them. These are young boys and girls whom we make responsible for a world that they have not created, and now it's up to them to do something with this world. And, therefore, we must give them the tools. And the"tools" is knowledge -- it's memories.

Q In which European countries would you say that anti-Semitism is rising now? I mean specifically.

A I have said that it's France, for instance, where the right wing has made inroads in the last European elections. And whenever we have a strong right wing movement, the anti-Semites are not far.

Q In our country too?

A For America? No. In America you have anti-Semites, but not the anti-Semitic movement. These so-called "deniers"-- those who deny the Holocaust -- I think they are the worst anti-Semites. And there are many. But, fortunately, they have not managed to mobilize themselves into even a semblant of a movement. They're a group -- a despicable group -- but not a movement.

Q What explains the fact that a clear majority -- and one might even say the overwhelming majority -- of the ruling strata of Europe during the thirties and forties didn't just passively by but often actively collaborated with the Nazis .

A You mean during the War.

Q During the War, yes.

A Not all.

Q Not all -- a large amount.

A Let me try to think aloud with you.

You think about France, yes. Pétain, Marshal Pétain, surely had a government -- a legal government -- and his policy was collaboration.

Now, did Marshal Pétain reflect France? Charles de Gaulle said that he did reflect France. But in the eyes of history it is de Gaulle who reflected France, not Pétain.

Or maybe,if we are pessimistic,we would say both reflected -- except at different times.

Where else? There were countries where they did not.

In Holland they didn't have a government.

I think in Norway they did have Quislings. Again, it was a very small minority.

How they managed fear, terror? No, that's not enough. I think it was ideology. All those who collaborated with the Germans during the war actually had been spiritual collaborators before the War. Laval in France or Marcel Déat -- they were anti-Semites. There were Nazis before. There were Nazi movements in Europe before. Very few liberals, humanists, yielded to the temptation of Nazis during the War in Europe.

Q What did you think of Robert McAfee Brown's remarks, comparing the Jewish victims of the Holocaust with the Salvadoran refugees -- who, he said, are victims of their government and of U.S. deportation policies?

A I have such a respect for Bob McAfee Brown and such affection that I think I may qualify his remark. I don't think he said that.

Probably he equated "his response" -- two words -- the victims of Salvador today -- to the response of other people before the War to the victims. But he did not make the equation between victims.

He's learning; and, therefore, he's a great moralist. He's learning; he's groping. He's trying to find a way out -- what to do with violence, what to do with victims of violence today.

But then so are we. We live in complex times, and the situations are sometimes complex.

Q You yourself asked the really basic question question at this conference -- and that is why so few people came forward either in official positions or just ordinary citizens.

Do you expect to get some answers from the people who are here, and would you care to speculate on that really central issue: why did so few people come forward out of the millions of people who could have helped save the Jews?

A I would listen. I'm a good listener, and I will listen to all the participants.

I can give you an example. My wife was saved during the War in Marseilles by the Italians. I was not the person who came to knock at the window, of whom I spoke last night. Maybe he was or maybe she was; maybe they were not. But somebody knocked at the window. But the fact is they came late.

We could find sparks. There were sparks. Why so few, I think, is a mystery.

I really believe that anything that relates to the events of the Second World War -- meaning with regard to this terrible catastrophe -- is within the domain of mystery. There is always something that escapes us. There is always the unknown element -- always.

So even if I knew all the answers, still there would be something that I wouldn't know.

And the truth is: Why so few? My God, I don't know why. Why so few? I don't know why so few.

(Cont'd on next page.)

Q Do you expect to get the answer at the end of this conference from interviewing the people who are here?

A The problem is that those people don't have the answer. They are the answer. They don't say they have the answer; they say, "what do you mean, what do you want from us, we did because we had to do it." They don't build intellectual theories on it. They simply said, "come on, a neighbor of ours was in danger, I had to save her; a child was the street, I have to take him." So they are the answer.

Q Were Americans in anyway involved in any of the rescue efforts? Are there any statistics on that?

A I do not think so. I think the Americans, of course -- we must be fair in that regard, too. Number 1: Let's not forget that the American army came to Europe, and tens of thousands of soldiers died fighting our enemies, our common enemies, and they freed and liberated many concentration camps. I was liberated by the American army in Buchenwald.

Therefore, from this viewpoint, yes, the Americans were involved in rescuing Jews. Furthermore, there were many American agents who came to the OSS in Europe.

I know of some people whom the OSS had trained to parachute them near or inside concentration camps. They didn't succeed, they were caught, they fell far away from the target, but attempts were made.

However, that, again, should not blind our lucidity. There wasn't a single American commander that changed his plans already in Germany simply to free one day earlier a concentration camp or a labor camp. Why not? These were great men. After all, these officers, they were good men ready to give their lives for freedom, for our freedom. Somehow they didn't do it.

Again, there are many mysteries in that question as well.

Somebody must moderate here. I think, Elliott.

Q Can I just try one and come back?

Obviously, people don't do it because of personal fear.

A No. Certainly not.

Q And that's why I was asking, do you want to inspire people nowadays to do some specific kind of thing?

A What we would like to inspire people is to show the nobility in remaining human, and that there are always moral choices involved. Somebody who says, no, I prefer not to open, that doesn't mean that that person runs away from the problem. Quite the opposite. That person is now part of the problem. By not opening the door, by not becoming involved, that person had already chosen the negative side.

Albert Camus used to say, "Not to take a position is also taking a position." This is what we try actually. If I had one formulation for the whole concept of our aspirations, it would be that we are trying to fight against indifference.

The whole purpose of this conference, and of three year's ago conference, is to fight indifference.

Q I am from West Berlin. I have one question. Do have fear that Germans now could have anti-Semitism nowadays, and what is your demands to Germany today?

A First of all, of course, I do not believe in collective guilt. I do not believe at all in condemning the whole German people, not even then. Surely, not today.

Of course, with regard to the German youth, there is no problem at all. I think all the German young people today have to prove themselves whatever they are, whether they are democrats or not, whether the love Jews or not.

I think it's psychologically or humanly; one usually expects when a Jew meets a German -- let's say, if I meet a German my age, something happens. Something is bound to happen. Not judgment, but something. That's really all that we expect, that something should happen.

Q We look at the past to determine the future. Do you see any similarities between the current Fascist anti-Communism and, say, Nazi anti-Semitism? Is it the same disobedience of "thou shalt not kill," as a matter of policy?

A Between anti-Communism?

Q Yes. There's a similarity between Fascist anti-Communism and Nazi anti-Semitism. Is it the same disobedience of "thou shalt not kill," as a matter of state policy?

A Start again. I take your question seriously. That's why I'm thinking about it.

I would not say that apriori an anti-Communist is a Fascist. One can be anti-Communist and not be a Fascist. Some can be anti-Communist and be a good democrat and a good libertarian, or a good liberal.

There are Fascists who are Communists; there are Communists who are Fascists, and the two have much in common.

The moment a state tries to impose its style of life, its laws, its philosophy, its will, its whims on every individual, that state is close to Fascism, whether Communist or not, and I am against such a state.

Q Some of the speakers have emphasized the great bravery of the rescuers and the risk of life, and so forth, whereas others of the speakers have emphasized the simplicity of the acts, simply opening a door, giving some food, something like that.

Can you discuss the apparent contradiction between these two things?

A There is no contradition, if we remember the context. There was a war going on; occupation. Nazi terror was everywhere. To open the door was simple. It may have been dangerous.

People who were hiding Jews were in danger. Therefore, they are heroes. But to them, somehow they disregarded danger.

I'll tell you something else, which may sound funny. When I think about this period in our history, I suddenly develop in me a great love for human frailties and weaknesses. What do I mean by that? Some Gentiles say "Jews" simply because of money -- because they got money -- and you know something, good. I am glad they wanted money. Because since they wanted money, they save Jews.

Q There's been a controversy recently in Japan with regard to the way that the Japanese school children are being taught about the period of World War II in their textbooks. With regards to that, what's your view of the way in which the period of World War II is described in the countries in which Jews were massacred? The Bulgarian textbooks -- I mean, if you have knowledge of German textbooks, etc.

A I have some knowledge but not about all the countries. In Germany, until very recently, I don't think that what we call the Holocaust played an important role; a few pages. Not even in part. But there is a change now.

I think there is an awareness now. The young Germans are beginning to be aware, and therefore they are studying. Since they want to study, they force the teachers to teach.

In the United States, it is, of course, encouraging to know that there is such a demand for what we call Holocaust Studies. Ten years ago it was difficult to establish such programs. Now every college and every university wants such programs.

One of the major activities, one of the principal aims of the Holocaust Memorial Council will be and is to establish such programs, to disseminate. The absolute necessity to teach is our obsession.

Q Did you meet with much resistance from survivors and spokemen for survivors in organizing a conference which is to focus mainly on the rescuers who represent a small number of the people?

A Truthfully, not much but some. Some, not many Three or four called me up saying, aren't you afraid that the larger picture will be forgotten or overshadowed? Well, I am not afraid. I think that we must tell the truth, at least the way we see it. If not, we are lying. And all the force that we have is the force of bearing witness.

If we don't tell the truth, we have no right to bear witness, and this is part of the truth. So why not say?

Q I stayed a year in Denmark and I have seen the importance of a long democratic tradition in this issue to help Jews, and so on, especially on the issue of religious tolerance

What do you think about the so-called religious fundamentalists? For example, Meir Kahane?

A I'm against intolerance in all --what can I tell you? This is not my world. I believe that religion, if it's organized, can present danger. Because in the beginning, for so many centuries, religion meant exclusive truth. And it took some time, even within the Jewish religion, to explain to all of us that it is not so. Truth is something that belongs to all of us. We all have a fragment of truth. Maybe together, it did.

I, therefore, do not see myself on their side or in their camp at all.

Q You have some Roman Catholic clergy, and presumably laity here, who rescued Jews. I wonder, do you think that you will get any closer to the much discussed question about the general silence of the Vatican during this period from talking to these people, or was that going to be explored? Why the Pope was as silent as he was?

A In other words, was Pope Pius a righteous Gentile?

(Laughter).

If I had to give a certificate, I must tell you I would not give it to him. Maybe some of our Christian scholars will, and I'm sure they will, explore that question. I, as a Jew, feel it would be disrespectful for me to deal with Christian dilemmas. I have respect for my Christian friends, and I know they will do so.

I have written about it. Therefore, I may repeat it. I have written already 20-30 years ago, that the silence of the Pope in those years was terrifying.

I think the silence of the Pope then was probably interpreted -- surely interpreted -- by many killers as consent. I don't think that the Pope wanted to kill Jews. I don't think that the Pope even saw that they would be killed because of his silence. I don't think so.

I really do not believe that anyone in his right mind could think of helping the killers. Absolutely not. But we are dealing with a unique person in history. The Pope has influence, and the Pope therefore must have vision. The Pope therefore is more responsible for what he said than for what he didn't say. He was responsible not only for what he said but also for the way his words or his silence were interpreted. So therefore I'm a little bit more critical of his silence. Not of the person; of his silence during the war.

Q What about the Protestant churches in general, like the Archbishop of Canterbury? I can't recall whether there was anything said along those line

A I don't know. If he was silent, then he, too, has to be criticized. But, again, that is not really the subject of this conference. Maybe one day we will have a conference about silence and courage, of clergy or intellectuals. Maybe next year we will meet here again, and politicians as well.

But for the moment, really, I think this conference is a unique conference. It's a first, because we are going to explore good instead of evil.

We thank you very much. We thank you Elliott, again, for your hospitality.

(Briefing concluded at 11:45 a.m.)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release September 18, 1984

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
AMBASSADOR WILLIAM BROCK
ON STEEL IMPORTS

The Briefing Room

4:06 P.M. EDT

AMBASSADOR BROCK: President Reagan has rejected the International Trade Commission's proposed remedy of new tariffs and quotas and tariff rate quotas on imported steel.

The President clearly determined that protectionism is not in the national interest. It costs jobs and raises prices and undermines our ability to compete at home and abroad.

At the same time, the President has committed his administration to take effective and swift action under existing U.S. fair trade laws to deal with surging volumes of unfairly traded steel.

U.S. steel firms and workers have faced an unprecedented and unacceptable surge of imported steel as a result of: One, diversion of steel imports into the U.S. market due to quotas and import restraints in other nations; and, two, to massive unfair trade practices, such as subsidies and predatory, below-market pricing, or dumping.

The President has instructed the U.S. Trade Representative to consult with those nations responsible for such unfair diversion and the resulting import surges with a view towards the elimination of such practices.

Q How?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: Second, the President has directed my office and the Department of Commerce to vigorously enforce U.S. fair trade laws and, when necessary, to self-initiate countervailing anti-dumping and Section 301 cases involving steel in order to defend American firms and workers from the predatory trade practices of other nations.

There are no simple solutions to complex problems. Clearly, the President has based his decision upon the national interest and not on the special narrow confines of a specific case.

Thus, we have attempted to carefully chart a course which deals with unfair practices and surges in a fashion to provide breathing time for an industry to restore its competitive ability, incentive for adjustment, certainty of market access for our trading partners and a clear determination not to be the world's steel dump.

This decision clearly indicates the President's commitment to maintain our efforts to liberalize world trade and to take those actions which create jobs for American workers in sales overseas, rather than closing our markets here at home.

In sum, the President has refused to put at risk the thousands of jobs in steel fabricating and other consuming industries, whether they make refrigerators, tractors or automobiles. He has refused to take any action that would put at risk the exports of our farmers and other workers in export industries.

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Instead, he has sent a clear message that while the United States intends to play by the rules, it expects and insists that others do so as well.

It was the administration's hope that this combination of actions taken without protectionist intention or effect would enable one of the United States' most basic and vital industries to return to a level playing field, one in which steel is traded on the basis of market forces, not government intervention, and one in which the market will see a return to a more normal level of steel imports, or approximately 18.5 percent, excluding semi-finished steel.

-more-

Q What's the President going to tell steel workers in Pennsylvania and Ohio when he goes there to campaign? They wanted relief.

AMBASSADOR BROCK: Well, they've got a commitment from this administration to deal with the cause of the problem. The basic difficulty has been the existence of subsidies, dumping, diversion because of the quantitative restraints that other countries had, which forced the steel into our market. And this program deals with all of those elements of the problem.

Q What figure --

Q It takes a long time -- Ambassador Brock, you're asking them to negotiate and to do things voluntarily. What assurance can you give to any of these effected steel workers that anything will come about from this?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: We believe that U.S. trade laws are adequate to deal with the problem, if they're applied in a comprehensive fashion. The industry has filed more cases than at any time in its history. The administration has taken and processed more cases than at any time in history.

The effect of those cases is being felt now. We already have voluntary agreements with Mexico, with South Africa, with the European Community. The possibility exists for others. We think that over the next 90-odd days we will have in place commitments not to continue the unfair practices, not to continue the surges that result from unfair practices and that the problem will largely be behind us.

Q Two questions. What figure --

Q Which countries do you have those agreements --

Q What figure are you using at the moment for the percentage of imported steel?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: The present level would be around 24-25 percent, Sam, over this year.

Q Twenty-five percent?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: Yes.

Q Then how do you propose to reduce that to 18.5 percent? Is that a surge? Does that figure represent a surge at the moment?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: Understand that 18.5 percent is the basic steel mill product, excluding semi-finished. If you add in semi-finished, which is a different category, you'll be at about 20 -- approximately 20 percent.

Q Well, is 25 percent an abnormal amount? It's a high amount historically.

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AMBASSADOR BROCK: Yes. What we're --

Q Could you --

Q Well, tell me about the surges and which part of that is a surge.

AMBASSADOR BROCK: What we're shooting for -- We think that part of the problem has been the 201 case itself, that because that case was filed a lot of governments got very nervous, a lot of industries got very nervous and began to surge into the U.S. market in order to establish a higher base, if -- in case we did provide a quota system, which we didn't. But that was why they did it.

As a consequence, you do have in '83 a level of about 20 percent that went up very quickly to about 25 percent in '84. And that's the surge that we're worried about. We think that the '83 level was pretty -- was reasonably market-oriented and acceptable, that that kind of level can be dealt with entirely within the existing U.S. laws. And that's what we intend to do.

Q What's the stick? When you try to get a voluntary agreement --

Q Who are the major villians? Who --

AMBASSADOR BROCK: I'm sorry.

Q When you try to get a voluntary agreement --

Q Who are the major villians here? What countries do you have --

Q -- what sort of stick do you have? What sort of pressure do you put on countries for a voluntary agreement to reduce their exports to us?

Q And which countries?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: We have very strong U.S. laws against unfair traded steel.

Q Why don't you enforce them, then?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: They are being enforced. What we are seeing now, though, is the enforcement has been on a product by product basis. It's been very cumbersome and very bulky.

What we're now seeing is the clear indication from countries, such as Mexico and others, that it is in their interest to have an agreement that deals with a problem so that they can get the cases off of their back and have some predictable market opportunity here. It's in our interest as well.

We think that by this particular approach of trying to deal with it within the context of our present laws, unfair laws, that we can get to about the 1983 level and let our people have a shot at competing.

Q Ambassador Brock --

Q When you say --

Q Ambassador, does the President think that the ITC did not act in the national interest or thought about jobs or all the things that are involved here? I mean, that they just out of the blue picked a solution?

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AMBASSADOR BROCK: Not at all. The President, I think, feels, as do all of us that have been involved, that there is injury, but the injury was primarily caused by unfair trade. And that can be dealt with without using the remedy proposed by the ITC.

The President has rejected the ITC remedy as being not in the national interest.

Q In terms of what?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: That is his obligation.

Q In terms of what --

AMBASSADOR BROCK: He has to look at the total need of the country.

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He has to look at the need of steel consumers, fabricators, automobile workers, farmers. And the decision was that that particular remedy was inappropriate, would cost us jobs, would cost us economic growth and would not solve the problem.

Q Ambassador --

Q You said --

Q Mr. Ambassador, which countries would be involved in this -- in these negotiations? Which countries are you seeking to get --

AMBASSADOR BROCK: Pretty much the same countries we've had the cases with in terms of the CVD -- or countervailing duty and anti-dumping cases. All right, that would be countries like Brazil and Spain. The diversion problem would more appropriately fit with the countries like Japan and Korea. But that's about it.

Q Do you predict --

Q Are these voluntary agreements or orderly marketing agreements or --

AMBASSADOR BROCK: Not orderly marketing agreements. There will be none because there's no authority for that. There is no 201 acceptance so we have none of that. What we, frankly, would like to do is to tell these people that they by a combination of devices have caused a problem that is outside of U.S. law and outside of international agreements. And, therefore, we would expect them to restrain themselves and not to engage in those practices in the future. And that will bring the process down to a market-determined level.

What we really are seeking is a return to a market that is operated with equity and in which our people are given a chance to compete, but no unfair advantages.

Q Why should they --

Q Ambassador Brock --

Q Why should they agree?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: Well, because I think that most workers would be very reluctant to ask for something that would cost somebody else a job. And it is our conclusion that the kind of protection that was requested under 201 could cost at least two jobs for every one defended.

Q What's going to make those countries --

Q But are you going to want letters from --

Q -- agree to these -- what's going to make these countries agree to do this and stop diverting and filling in gaps where other countries have limited products?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: We don't have any doubt about their willingness to reach these agreements. I guess you'll have to get an answer to that after you've seen the end of the process, but we think over the next 90 days we will have the problem pretty well behind us.

Q Do you have those agreements --

Q -- why do you say -- base that --

Q Can we get a question in the back, please?

Q Yes.

AMBASSADOR BROCK: Yes, go ahead.

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Q I would suspect that some in the steel industry, both workers and companies, are going to say, "Well, if these measures can solve the problem, why haven't you -- without tariff protection -- why -- or quota protection -- why haven't you done them already?"

AMBASSADOR BROCK: We have been doing a lot of them. As I testified before the Congress against the Steel Quota Bill, I said precisely that these processes were at work and they were making a dent in the problem. What we've done, though, is to add the additional element of trying to deal with the surge problem that occurred currently because of our recovery, partly because of the 201 case filing this year.

Q Ambassador Brock, on what do you base your --

Q -- this cover all carbon steel products, that you're talking about; is it all carbon steel products or just the items that were involved in the ITC investigation?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: No, we are talking about unfair trade, and we are not limiting ourselves to those items covered by the ITC because that was a determination of injury. We're not challenging that, but we're saying the causative element was unfair --

Q What's happening to pipe and tube?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: -- it was unfair practice.

It is covered in the overall approach.

Q Is the Canadian market affected at all -- the Canadian steel producers?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: To be honest, probably not, if any. Not much.

Q -- have you already had signals from some of the foreign steel producers? You seem pretty confident that they're going to go along with some type of agreement. Have you had signals or preliminary talks with anybody?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: Yes.

Q Well, can you tell us which countries?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: No. (Laughter.)

Q Have the Europeans agreed to --

Q Well, is the premise correct?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: But I --

Q Are they going to go along?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: The ones that I had talked to were very pleased that we did not take the action of following the ITC advice of tariffs and quotas and felt that this was a much better solution. It was based on equity. It was based on the integrity of the market process, upon trying to keep the trade as free as we could. And I think the response will be better than it would be had we used a hammer.

Q -- voluntary agreements --

Q Is it the hammer of the ITC agreement that has forced these countries to realize that they have been injuring the United States through their unfair diversionary tactic?

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AMBASSADOR BROCK: Well, I think the ITC decision helped focus some minds on the problem. Yes. But that does not say that it's necessary to accept the remedy proposed.

Q Are you going to get from these countries -- their --

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part of the voluntary agreement, letters? Will you get a letter, for example, from Japan that will call in a process of you monitoring Japan's steel shipments?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: It's possible. It may not be necessary. It depends on the individual country.

Q How many countries are you going to actually be negotiating with, number one; and number two, are you saying that Japan has been trading steel unfairly in the United States?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: I have not said that and I have no intention of implying that, but I do say, Clyde, that there is at least some problem when Japan's imports in 1983 were 4.9 percent of its market and in this country, they were 24.9 or something like that. In other words, five times the level of penetration in this market that it was in Japan, double what it was in Europe. And I think it is fair to state that, whether the reduction in imports in those areas was by governmental action as in the case of Japan or non-governmental action, in either case it had the effect of diverting prior to our market.

Korean steel is probably the most competitive in the world, quality and price. And yet, it is sold here rather than in Japan. I think that says something about the element of the problem.

Q How many countries are you going --

AMBASSADOR BROCK: I don't know -- three, maybe four, basically.

Q Ambassador Brock, was part of your decision influenced by the administration's feeling that the industry has not done enough for itself, that it hadn't done anything about becoming more competitive and about high wages?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: The basic decision was that we simply could not, in the national interest, find it appropriate to provide quotas and tariff to bar exports -- or imports. The price in terms of our farmers, our automobile workers, our people in tire plants, in refrigerator plants -- too many jobs would be put at risk. So that was the first element.

I do think that the -- well, I've lost track of the question now.

Q And the -- about becoming more competitive and whether there's a sense in the administration that the industry has got to help itself on the wages and competition.

AMBASSADOR BROCK: I think you have heard me on the subject, or some of you have heard me on the subject before. It is a matter of some concern that this industry has had protection in the past and has not taken advantage of it to get competitive. During previous waves of protection, management practices continued unabated, wage rates went from 130 to 176 percent of the national industrial average. And it is awfully important that the industry understand that they have the most important role of all to play in the solution of this problem. It can't be done by us.

Q Would the steel agreement with the Europeans be affected in any way by this?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: No.

Q Well, wasn't that a good aspect, which you were just discussing, of the plan Walter Mondale outlined yesterday which was to impose quotas but tying them to an almost mandatory modernization of the steel industry?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: What Mr. Mondale would have done is to put two workers out of jobs for every one that he helped in the steel industry. He clearly would disadvantage the automobile worker.

MORE

He clearly would jeopardize our farmers. He would clearly jeopardize anybody in steel using industries, construction workers, people in all trades. I can't imagine a less logical approach to the problem.

Q But the question was, wasn't that aspect of his plan, that is a mandatory modernization tied to the quotas, a good aspect, something desirable?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: Yes. But if the United States government has to tell firms to compete, you got to wonder whether they can be saved. I think this industry's made a decision to compete. They roll back their wages, they are plowing back their investment now, much different from where they were three or four years ago.

I think they're in much better emotional condition to start competing. But I'm going to tell you, if we have to force them to do it, when we get through forcing them, they won't be competitive.

Q Mr. Brock, you said you had a favorable response from the foreign producers. Have you had any response from either -- from domestic producers or labor leaders in this country? Have you -- are they aware of your --

AMBASSADOR BROCK: We will be discussing it. Specifically, Jack Block is discussing it with farm leaders now, at this moment, at the Department of Agriculture. I think it is true that the President will be meeting with certain leaders in the steel industry in about seven or eight minutes. But our indications are that people -- at least some in both groups feel that this is a workable approach.

Q Ambassador Brock, the Japanese, under some pressure from us, agreed to voluntary quotas on the cars that they import to the U.S. Is that the kind of comparable situation you expect here with steel?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: Not -- in the sense of them being aware that they have caused a problem, perhaps. But it really is quite different. Back in the 1981 period when we were talking about automobiles, that was a factor that was external to Japanese or American firms. It was caused by the Iranian-Iraqi war, the car shortage -- or the gas shortage, and the move to small cars.

You really can't say that that has been the case here. We just simply have not gotten competitive in the United States and it's time we did.

Q Ambassador, our market share -- when you say foreign producers have 24, 25 percent now, what does that compare with in terms of your objective? The 18.5 percent excluding semi-finished or the 20?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: 20.

Q So you want to go from 24 to 25 to 20?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: You know, I want to be very clear. That's not a target, it's not a commitment. It is an estimate, best judgment we can give you that that's what will occur if we are effective in dealing with the unfair trade and get back to an equitable trading process with a market competition working.

Q If you want to, can you do that in 90 days?

Q Does this mean that -- Mr. Brock, can I --

AMBASSADOR BROCK: Oh, no. We can get in place the process that will achieve it for 1985.

MR. SPEAKES: Last question. We have --

Q Ambassador, what is this going to cost American consumers?

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AMBASSADOR BROCK: I don't think it will. I honestly believe that this process is the only way we can deal with it without imposing the cuts. We are operating in the industry at about 59 percent of capacity now. We're keeping the market open for fairly traded steel that is not subsidized, not dumped, not caused by diversion. That means competition will continue to work. There's no possibility that this -- if it is implemented with good faith, there's no possibility it's going to cause an increase in cost.

Q Mr. Ambassador, are you going to go to Japan and say what you should do is open up your market and let more Korean steel in? Is that what you mean by attacking the problem --

AMBASSADOR BROCK: I have already done that.

Q And you have already done that, and the answer has been?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: I don't have an answer yet. (Laughter.)

Q Well, but is that what you hope to accomplish?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: I think that would be a significant step forward in solving the problem.

Q Are you saying that industry now has accepted this, that you've sounded them out?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: I didn't say it. I think they'll have to tell you that. I said that we have some indications from some that this might be workable. But I think --

Q If you brought them in so they could come out and tell us that.

AMBASSADOR BROCK: Well, we'll have to wait and see what they tell you, Sam. I mean, let them speak for themselves. I don't know -- I have talked to one or two. I don't know what they all are going to say.

Q I wonder if this President's father ever told him what steel men were? (Laughter.)

Q Won't it -- isn't it possible this could cost jobs in the steel industry? You're saying it's going -- it's not going to cost them in the related industry --

AMBASSADOR BROCK: No. In the long term, this is the only way to save jobs in the steel industry, by letting the market work.

Q In the long term, we're all dead.

Q Well, that's a thought.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 4:27 P.M. EDT

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY A SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING
WITH THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER AT THE UN

September 21, 1984

The Briefing Room

2:25 P.M. EDT

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I thought for just a few moments I'd start off with the President's perspective on the meeting next week with the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union to discuss briefly the preparations for it and the President's views of what can be accomplished.

The President believes that this meeting provides an opportunity for the United States and the Soviet Union to renew high-level dialogue that can lead to a re-engagement between us and a serious discourse devoted to the resolution of problems, problems across the board, resolution of disagreements on regional issues, importantly, on arms control issues and in bilateral issues.

Surely, from our side as well, it will be an opportunity to stress our continuing concern over the individual rights as they are restricted in the Soviet Union.

In preparing for this session, the President has spent quite a long time in reviewing the record of U.S.-Soviet relations in the post-war period, but particularly in the past 15 years.

He expects that, similarly, the Soviet Union has probably examined this same history and reached their own set of conclusions.

For his own part, he has reached several conclusions, again, about what has happened and how we have been successful, the reasons for when we have been unsuccessful and has applied those into forging the way in which he will deal with the Foreign Minister when he's here.

For example, he believes that there has been a fundamental change in the United States that has taken place in the past 10 years. There has been for two centuries a very deep and enduring sentiment for isolationism in this country. But he believes that, for many reasons, on the one hand our growing appreciation in this country of the importance of overseas markets for our own prosperity; separately but related, our reliance upon overseas resources, that we have important interests overseas, consequently, that it will be necessary for the United States to sustain an activist role in international affairs for the foreseeable future and that to do so requires a sustained investment of part of our national treasure and a steadiness which the American people are willing to support over time.

The acceptance that we have important interests leads to, he believes as well, an acceptance of how we can best promote those interests, specifically, that we are best served by associating with other like-minded countries in maintaining

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strong alliances and we intend to do so. In addition, that we have an important interest in seeking to foster the stable development of less developed countries and that we must be prepared to invest a certain amount of our treasure in that, more than we have.

He believes as well that there are, clearly, fundamental differences between ourselves and the Soviet Union, that their purposes are not the same in the international community, that for their part, they seek to expand their influence beyond their borders and will continue to do so.

In short, that we face in the coming years a competition between ourselves and the Soviet Union and that as a responsibility of the leaders of the United States, now and in the years ahead, to assure that this is a peaceful competition.

He has a number of ideas as to how right now we can begin to put in place mechanisms for us and approaches on each of the several issues that separate us to assuring that this will remain a peaceful competition.

Now, these are a few of his own conclusions. He expects the Soviets have drawn their own. And he has ruminated with us in the past few weeks on what he believes is the Soviet perception of us, or what may be.

For example, he thinks that it's likely that the Soviet Union looked at the history of this same period, particularly that in the 1970's, as a period of considerable decline by the West in general, the United States in particular. He imagines that they focused upon such events as the way that we emerged from Vietnam and all that did to call into question the reliability of the United States and its ability to define an interest, define a strategy and pursue it to a successful conclusion.

He expects that separately, they probably looked at the dramatic change in the strategic balance that occurred over the past twenty years, but which, by the mid-'70's, resulted in a condition of approximate parity and saw that as a sign of declining health of our society generally. And probably, he thinks, that they examined the history of the late '70's and saw that our economic decline was demonstrative of our inability to solve problems and, as well, promised that our ability to sustain an activist role overseas was weakening

Q -- Reagan campaign speech.

Q -- Kissinger --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President believes that in the past four years they have seen the substantial renewal which has gone on in the country, but probably that they doubt we can sustain it. And that probably they believed it was worth, and they could afford, an investment of four years or so in seeking to change that policy and that that is what has been at the foundation of their confrontational approach.

At any rate, whether they believe these things or not, he believes it important that he give them his perspective of this country's intentions in the years ahead, that is, that he is confident this country can sustain an activist role overseas, that it will sustain effective deterrence, that this is

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a society which is now prepared for leadership in the world and peaceful competition.

And then, we'll get to really the second part of the meeting, which is, how do we do that? The President, as I said, has a number of ideas about how we can get started. You'll recall that by this time the Foreign Minister will have met with the Secretary of State and they will have gone over the pending agenda of disagreements on regional issues from Afghanistan to southern Africa, Central America and so forth, bilateral issues from maritime agreements to boundaries to cultural exchanges

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and so forth and arms control. The President expects the conversation -- at least from his side -- it will focus on arms control. And his purposes will be twofold: first to make clear that since their walkout we have used the time to advantage, to examine our own positions in START and INF, and the last four and half months in anti-satellite systems; and that we have come away from that with an array of flexible positions and a readiness to engage on these issues with great flexibility. That is not to say that he will in this session get down into the detail of saying, "Here is a new offer in this area, and here is another one in this one," but to say that, if together we can find a way to resume this discourse, you will find that we are prepared to deal constructively with your concerns in a very flexible fashion. And, finally, he will say, "Let's figure out how to do that."

Now, while we have been looking at these areas of START, INF and so forth, the Soviets have expressed an interest in anti-satellite systems. Last year, the President as well spoke publicly about the value of conducting research to examine whether in the decades ahead we might be able to place greater reliance upon defensive systems in strengthening deterrence.

These are important issues. So are offensive systems. He believes it reasonable that we consider where we are to clear the air and to make clear that we are prepared to discuss all of these issues and that we invite their own proposals on how we can begin to do that.

Well, I could give you a lot more wisdom, but why don't I take your questions for a while.

Q Well, what's different about this approach than we've had in terms of -- we have said we'll deal with anti-satellites and the offensive weapons -- what's so new?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're going to have a Russian to listen to it.

Q Well, you've been talking to them now since June, haven't you?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think that we have been trying to get them to listen for well beyond that, Helen, but they --

Q But is there anything new in this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I've just said there's quite a lot that's new in our substantive positions on each of these issues. And so that we can get to an exchange on those, we need, first, their agreement to entertain it at all.

Q Is it your belief or hope that this meeting would lead to another session either with Gromyko or to a meeting between the President and Chernenko or another Soviet leader? What's the -- where do you want to see it go in terms of the -- kind of process?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: First of all, there's been a long hiatus here where there hasn't been frequent high-level discourse. Now that that is occurring, we think it's probably necessary first to clear the air of misunderstandings and to establish foundations. After all, this is the first time the Foreign Minister has met with the President personally to see where he intends the country in the years ahead and how he feels about dealing with the Soviet Union -- and to put out some ideas from our side on how we can do that.

Now, when that happens, the Soviet Union's going to have to think about that, and they will. And I expect that they will come

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back to tell us what they think about it. And I would expect that to be at the ministerial level. Now, at that point, I would think the final step -- and reasonably soon -- would be to say, "Okay, we agree on this format and that and let's start again."

Q Let's start what?

Q -- some --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But I wouldn't think --

Q Start what?

Q -- again.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Resume a habit of high level discourse in each of these regional and functional areas -- disagreements on regions, disagreements on arms control, disagreements on bilateral issues, and so forth.

Q Some senior administration official or other has evidently suggested that this could lead, through contacts not necessarily by the President, to a summit meeting, or series of summit meetings on the Ford Vladivostok model. Do you look for something like that to come out of this somewhere down the line?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I really wouldn't. And that wasn't me.

Q Wrong official.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it is the wrong official. I don't think that's likely.

Q Can I just --

Q You don't think -- excuse me, I want to follow -- you don't think summit meetings are likely as a result of that process?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Bill -- I'm sorry -- good point. I think that the President's position, both on wanting an outcome that would justify a summit meeting, is, as it always has been, supportive. But that he believes that there has to be some groundwork established by ministerial level and other subordinate exchanges beforehand. And he still feels that way.

Bernie?

Q Are you -- is it your intention, in other words, to suggest more regular meetings at the Shultz-Gromyko level, such as there was in the past, when they would discuss all the outstanding issues other than this once-a-year-at-the-U.N. type of meeting?

And, when you're talking about specific differences on regional and bilateral -- are you talking about the type of meetings we've had in the past, such as having an Assistant Secretary talk about Afghanistan, or an Assistant Secretary talk about Southern Africa -- is that the type of -- which were held periodically. Not very recently, I guess.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're talking about both, really. And, in fact, as thorough-going a practice of exchanges between our officials and theirs, at all levels, as we can get. So we're talking about not just the Secretary of State, but perhaps between the Ministers of Defense, Agriculture, and all of the other Cabinet officers and counterparts as well as subordinates in support of that.

Q If the President said -- believes that Vietnam was viewed by the Soviets as a measure of U.S. decline, where does the Lebanese policy fit in? And the failure of that earlier this year?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't accept your characterization, and I don't think that, for the Soviet Union, the experience of seeing U.S. diplomacy succeed and have the PLO leave Lebanon, they view entirely as a loss, indeed, as a loss for their side.

Q But, but --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that, too, since that time, the clear evidence that when problems occur in the Middle East, whether it's in the Gulf, whether it's in the Red Sea, that the countries of the area turn to the United States, not the Soviet Union.

Q But then you are saying that -- putting Lebanon aside -- that the President believes the Soviets now see a renewed America, renewed policy, a renewed strength -- in other words, that theory of rearming the country and refurbishing its foreign policy -- finds us at a point where they now well believe that they have to deal with us. Is that his view?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q May I expand on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Steve?

Q Because I was confused by the way you characterized the period of decline before -- in your introduction. You said that this period of decline led to a situation in the mid-1970's of -- using your words -- "approximate parity." And then this led to economic decline. But, I believe, that in the late seventies that military began, and the President did not view the mid-seventies as a time of parity, but rather of inferiority. Did you mean to suggest that the President has now reassessed that recent history? You seemed to emphasize that he'd spent a lot of time going over the last 10 or 15 years. Has he now reassessed that period, and now come to think that what he used to think was inferiority by the United States was, in fact, parity?

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And, secondly, what does he think exists now, parity or superiority, compared to what it was a few years ago?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: First of all, when I ticked off those issues, I was saying that we assume that they, the Soviets, not us, the Soviets may have looked at those three different outcomes of the '70's and seen them as indicators of decline. So if in their perception, when they saw the evolution of the balance to a position of parity, that, as a reflection of trends, their improvement and our decline, they liked those trends and believe that those reflected decline on our part.

Separately, the economic decline, and our apparent inability to cope with it in the late '70's, was a similar manifestation of a society in decline.

Now, that doesn't have anything to do with President Reagan's judgment on what the balance may have been. In fact, however, if you research the President's record, his own estimate in the mid-'70's of what the current state of affairs was is that there was rough parity and that we were --

Q Is that wrong, to have parity?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I didn't say it was wrong at all.

Q Oh?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In fact, that's what has reaffirmed that he seeks to preserve today.

Q Well, I'm sorry, but this is more than an academic interest, I think. Does the President think that there was rough parity then when he took office? And, if so, what does he think exists now? Or does he think we were behind when he took office and what does he think now? This would appear to be important in shedding light on his frame of mind as he goes into these important talks.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President believed that the -- that there existed effective deterrence at the time that he came into office, but that the trends of having no modernization in U.S. systems promised to erode that position to one of our own vulnerability. That's just simple logic.

And it's for that reason that -- to preserve a position of parity and stability that he proposed the modernization of the U.S. triad.

Q Earlier you said that the President has some ideas which he'd like to put on the table as to how to clear up the misunderstandings that exist now. I'm a little confused as to what those ideas are, and, specifically, is he going to propose some sort of regular or periodic meetings at the ministerial level?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. Now, that is one of probably a half dozen ways of renewing exchanges on this agenda. You can have ministerials exchange your views on it. You can have delegations, perhaps a new kind of delegation on both sides, strike up a discourse on some part of your arms control agenda.

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You may take several different approaches and his point is here that we want to find those. We're not insisting on any particular one. But we have a panaply of possibilities. We'd like to know what they think about it, so that we can then close quickly on how to do it.

Q Well, are you also then looking or considering the possibility of abandoning, say, the current INF and START forums or -- maybe as a way to get the Soviets back to talking about arms and allowing them to save face?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'd put it the other way around. I wouldn't say that we are -- talk of doing away with anything. We want to build something and that something is a prompt, sustained dialogue on this agenda of disagreements.

Now, we are not wedded to any particular format. We want to know their ideas. We have some, but there's a lot of flexibility here.

Q -- arms control?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Bill.

Q Let me clear up the question of what it takes to lead to a summit meeting. You rejected the notion that there could be summit or summits on the model of Vladivostok. But then you seem to suggest that if the preparatory work were done, it could lead to other kinds of summits. What is it that you rejected when you said that you didn't think that would happen?

Q -- repeat the question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question

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was that I had appeared to reject the format of a Vladivostok interim agreement approach, and if we don't have that in mind, what is wrong with it, and what do we have in mind. Well, my point was to say that in this session we're not going in and proposing and focusing upon a Vladivostck kind of get together as something we want to do right now.

At the same time, I'd have to say that if the Russians were to come up with that idea or if, in the give and take, they say that there ought to be a way station on which you mark progress and milestones, I think the President would give it very serious consideration.

I took your question originally to be, was I saying or had I said before that that was going to be a central objective of the President in this meeting, and I -- that's not so.

Q What are --

Q Does the President --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Excuse me. Right after this one.

Q What is it, or what do you find in recent Soviet behavior or actions that makes you think that they would be amenable to a regular series of ministerial meetings, including perhaps the Minister of Defense?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think, first of all, the experience of the past four years has been one in which their strategy hasn't produced the results that they have wanted. And this approach of confrontation and intimidation and of playing upon the fears of the American people and the allies, that it hasn't come out the way they preferred. So they may be considering another approach.

Separately but related, I think the maturing of our own programs, notably defense programs, give them a self-interest, particularly their military -- a self-interest in wanting to come to the table to seek to put caps on those very programs. And so, for both reasons, the Foreign Minister has accepted to come and have a meeting. And he has done so out of self-interest and perhaps out of the conclusion that if they are to change course, they had better first meet the President of the United States and find out from him personally how he thinks, what his priorities are, and how to deal with them.

Q Does the President --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Lou.

Q Excuse me. Does the President think that the meeting that Mr. Mondale is going to have with Mr. Gromyko the day before in any way undercuts what he's trying to do?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Well, what is his view of the meeting -- of that meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, he welcomed the statement of the former Vice President that his message would be that the United States is together in its determination to solve problems and to maintain our strength. He hasn't commented beyond that.

Q In your answer to the question over here when you said that he was not wedded to any particular formats in terms of talks with the Soviets -- but the question had started out by specifically asking about the formats of INF and START. And I want to make sure I understood what you were either suggesting or not suggesting -- I mean, did that answer go to the point of whether we would be willing to set aside the format that the arms control talks had started in?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We think both of those are very solid, viable, valuable settings. We're talking about strategic and intermediate-range INF systems.

We will entertain any alternative idea and give it very serious consideration.

Q Can you point to any other -- aside from the fact that Gromyko is coming here, any other signals you may have gotten to indicate that the Soviets accept your reasoning?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I wouldn't comment on that. I am -- well, I'm sorry. You'll just have to -- I feel confident that they have a very high interest in renewing exchanges with the United States, but, I'm sorry, I wouldn't go beyond that.

It's not based on intuitive, inductive, or other logic personally. It's based on what I read and what I see each day as estimates on their thinking now.

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Chris?

Q Two questions: You said in your introductory remarks, I think, that you didn't think that the President would get into the specifics of arms control although he would express a willingness to negotiate on everything flexibly. Two questions: One, are you saying that neither the President nor Shultz will be offering any new arms control proposals? And, secondly, on this question of format, is the U.S. going to offer any proposals about changes in formats or are we simply expressing the willingness to receive flexibly Soviet proposals?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the President will make clear that, having spent virtually a year in exhaustive examination of how we might make progress, that we have some new ideas. And he will speak generically in strategic and long-range INF -- what kinds of approaches we believe may hold some promise of making progress. But he won't get into the numbers of launchers, warheads, missiles in X context to be balanced against their counterparts -- no -- because -- I mean, we could do that, but the first item of business has to be where are we going to meet, how can we do it and are you really willing to come at all.

Q If I can just follow please -- but will either he or Shultz offer in a -- you talk about generic ideas -- also new ideas about formats for negotiations? Or are you just simply saying we're going to receive what they suggest?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think we will have new ideas on formats.

Q On new formats?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q What are the ideas?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Excuse me?

Q Can you tell us what the new ideas are?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. (Laughter.)

Q Well, you're on background. Why not?

Q -- now. Akhromeyev in his interview a week or so ago was complaining that in the START forum that originally the United States came in with inequitable proposals. Is the President prepared to commit himself to equitable solutions, providing equal security to both sides in his talks with Gromyko?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Akhromeyev is just wrong. And, of course, we're coming in with equitable positions that will lead to a stable balance.

Q More equitable --

Q What's he going to talk about at the U.N. meeting on Monday?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll be glad to give you about five minutes of wisdom on that. Is anybody else interested in that?

Q Yes.

Q Is it totally unrelated to U.S.-Soviet relations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

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Q -- really interested. (Laughter.)

Q Africa.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All right. Lesley's responsible. She asked for this --

Q -- are you all going to be upset with me?

Q We'll see.

Q No.

Q It depends on what he says, Lesley.

Q Could I just ask one question before we go to that? You said that the President took a crash course in studying --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I didn't.

Q -- post-war U.S.-Soviet relations. Then, the last ten years anyway. Did he change his mind at all on the Soviet Union in studying up on all -- what's happened in the past, which he obviously has been following through the years anyway?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, to say he's changed his mind, I think, implies different value judgments on their system. Maybe you don't intend that. If that's what you intend, no. He believes, as he has, that our systems are fundamentally different, and they're going to remain so. His purpose in this review is to determine what approaches have worked in the past and which ones haven't. He has also spent quite a lot of time on reading just literature on the Soviet Union.

Q Human events.

Q Yes, what has he --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Goes back a long time now. He asked and was given books on the Russian people --

Q Can you tell us which books?

Q What did he read? That's interesting.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Land of the Firebird.

Q Anything else?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, there've been four or five. They're -- And he's visited with authors of pieces like this and then with people who have come and gone from the Soviet Union from out of government -- authors as well as --

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Q Who wrote that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Susanne Massey.

Oh, God, don't go calling her -- that poor woman is going to be -- (Laughter.)

Q Well, give us some other names so we --

Q What's her home number? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think I like Lesley's question better. But it was a very broad interest and the character of the Russian people, the nature of the Soviet decision making process was a separate, turgid piece that we gave him about six months ago -- a separate piece that we gave him on the --

Q Who was the author of that one one? (Laughter.)

Q Turgid piece?

Q Detergent. (Laughter.) Have him launder his thoughts with. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There was a separate piece that we'd given him on the current relationship between members of the Kremlin today; another piece on the role of the party versus the role of the ministries; a separate piece on the economy of the Soviet Union historically and today.

Q Has he studied up on Gromyko at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q What's he done on that? I read something that he had read transcripts of Gromyko meetings with other people --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, that, plus these --

Q He -- he has done that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He has gone over those meetings with the Secretary of State. And the specific Gromyko role over the past 37 years was a specific paper that he got.

Q What was that?

Q Gromyko --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Excuse me?

Q Would you repeat that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Chris had asked -- had he focused on Gromyko, and I said that he had -- both within the context of previous meetings with U.S. officials and Gromyko's personal stewardship in the past 37 years.

Q Did you mean transcripts? Transcripts of Gromyko?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRAYIN OFFICIAL: Well, the transcripts were part of the meetings where the Secretary discussed these meetings with him. And yes, here and there, the President has read those transcripts. I couldn't certify to you that he's read every single transcript.

Q Is part of that -- understanding Gromyko's style and how he handles himself in meetings?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q What conclusions do you come to about that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President's conclusions I wouldn't comment upon.

Q The point is he does feel better informed now -- he does feel better informed now by this --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This goes back. It's not a matter of the recent past. This extends over a couple of years. And there has been an acceleration of it in the past 6 months, but the President's recurring interest -- and, ever since I've been here -- each morning in meetings, those things that come out again, and again, and again, are what makes the Soviet Union tick, and what are their interests today?

Q He now knows that submarine launched missiles cannot be recalled. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Do you have a question?

Q I do -- to follow up on Helen's question about whether the President has changed his mind. In his recent studies, has he become convinced, for example, that -- that Marxism-Leninism should not be left on the ash heap of history, as he said earlier, or that, perhaps, the Soviet Union is indeed not the "Evil Empire" as he once called it.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President believes that we and the Soviet Union will compete as super powers in the years ahead for the forseeable future. And he believes that that can be a peaceful competition. And he intends to try to make it so.

Q Could I just follow up on Jim's question first. Does the President feel it's necessary to explain to Gromyko, or somehow reassure him, that he is somehow a different person, or a changed person from the evil empire President of two years ago?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

You had a question -- on the side.

Q Yes. There's a reported CIA study which says the Soviet Union is not merely in decline, but deterioration. Does the President subscribe to that? Is he aware of that? And, if so, why would he want to bother at this point? (Laughter.)

Q That's a good question.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President acknowledges the super power status of the Soviet Union, and believes that they and we, together, have a responsibility to assure stability in the world.

Q Does that mean the CIA studies are wrong?

MR. SIMS: We're going to have to take about two more, because he has something else to --

Q You seem uncomfortable with these questions that are based -- maybe

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not that one, but other questions that are based on the President's own words in the past.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not a bit uncomfortable with the assertion that President Reagan has wanted, for as long as I have worked for him, to solve problems with the Soviet Union. He has adopted an approach to doing that which relies upon making clear to them that we have no hostile intent, that we intend to remain an activist power in the world, that we respect their super power status and do not seek to change their internal system and that we are prepared to reduce tensions in the world by dealing seriously with, first, the reduction of arms and discussions aimed at solving regional and bilateral problems. That is a matter of very deep conviction for him.

Q That sounds so reasonable, and yet, if you're the Soviets looking at him, as you say he has been looking at the Soviets, they hear all these other words, some of which have been quoted here today, others I could -- I don't mean to argue about it, except to ask you whether he doesn't perceive that they listen to the Ronald Reagan who has been saying all these other things all these years. And does he not feel some responsibility for that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, two points, Sam. I take your point, but I think there are two factors that bear.

First of all, the President's public speeches, notably, the January speech of this year, countless other statements since that time, are on the record for the Soviet leaders to see.

Q May I interject? Could the Soviets not be excused for thinking that the tone of those speeches, which changed so markedly in January of this year, have something to do with the fact that there's going to be an election in the United States? I don't mean to be disputatious; but, for heaven's sake, as Sam points out, the public record is so much on the other side.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the public record of the -- Well, I'll back up. The private record of what his gut intentions are, what he senses is -- what he believes must be the legacy of his stewardship before leaving office has always been, from the very earliest days, a reduction in the level of nuclear weapons and making peace in one or two other parts of the world. Now, that is something that is unambigiously clear.

Now, I was about to make a second point on Sam's original question. And that is that I think any serious student of the Soviet Union and of its decision-making process and what influences it toward being hostile or conciliatory is just what they tell it it is. And that is the international correlation of forces. The Soviet Union doesn't make decisions based upon the level of rhetoric in any country. They see those things as tactical considerations at most. And for them, their view of the United States and of how to deal with it is conditioned fundamentally on that correlation of forces.

And so I don't believe that there has been any ambiguity in Soviet thinking about how this country -- whether or not this country is willing to deal with them. They know very well that we're willing to deal with them.

Q Can I go back to Chris Wallace's question --

MR. SIMS: Don, we're going to have to stop here and I'm sorry.

Q What about the UN question that I asked about [illegible] minutes ago?

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Q The UN speech. You were going to give --

Q Why do you have to go?

Q Can you do it --

MR. SIMS: He has to go. He has a schedule. I'm sorry.

Q Just give us a quick rundown.

MR. SIMS: You know, we've been here for 45 minutes. Good questions are worthwhile --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I --

MR. SIMS: -- can't keep all afternoon.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I apologize. I talk slowly. But if it's any solace to you, the Secretary of State's going to give an on-the-record --

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Q Well, can you just give us --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- speech --

Q When?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- on the UN speech.

Q When?

Q Sunday.

Q Is it mainly U.S-Soviet relations? Is it mainly disarmament? Can you characterize --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is about half U.S.-Soviet relations and the other half is an expression of the optimism, the confidence that the President feels that we have the instruments at hand. We and the other country members of the United Nations to solve problems on a very broad scale -- social, economic, as well as security problems. And he goes, in a short excursion, over the several regional disagreements that exist today and talks to how we can make some headway, and then focuses on the Soviet Union. And he -- in that context, he has three principal themes; that is, the imperative of reducing nuclear arms, the importance of solving regional disagreements, and the opportunities there for broadening bilateral exchanges between us. And he closes with a -- I must say -- uplifting bit of eloquence on how promising the future is.

Q Any new proposals?

Q Does he have anything new --

Q Any new proposals?

Q -- any new proposals?

Q Go for the gold?

Q Four more years?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 3:10 P.M. EDT

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JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE
U.S.-JAPAN ECONOMIC SUB-CABINET CONSULTATIONS

BY

UNDER SECRETARY WALLIS
JAPANESE DEPUTY MINISTER MOTONO
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1984, 3:10 P.M.

MR. CARLSON: We may have some late arrivals, but why don't we go ahead and get ready to begin?

This is our ON-THE-RECORD briefing on the subject of the U.S.-Japan Economic Sub-Cabinet Consultations. The briefers are the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Moriyuki Motono, and the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs W. Allen Wallis. Gentlemen.

UNDER SECRETARY WALLIS: The U.S.-Japan Sub-Cabinet Consultations is a series of meetings that are held twice a year, in the fall here in Washington and in the spring in Tokyo. Of all the consultations that go on between the United States and Japan, that is the highest level one that goes on regularly. There are some irregular one -- between the President and the Prime Minister from time to time, but not regularly scheduled.

On our side, in these consultations we had, as we usually do, senior officials, generally at the under secretary level, from the State Department, the Treasury, the Commerce Department, the Agriculture Department, the Special Trade Representative, the Energy Department, the National Security Council, the Council of Economic Advisers -- and I may have offended somebody. Oh, the Agency for International Development, and I still may have offended somebody by leaving them out. But that's the character of our delegation, the composition of it, and the Japanese have a similar group on their side.

The talks are broad-ranging and because we hold them regularly, we know each other quite well and so they are fairly free-wheeling. We don't feel it necessary to "beat around the bush" about points we want to make, nor do we take umbrage when the other side expresses some irritation with aspects of American economic policy. And we try to figure out what could be done to minimize friction, and we're trying, especially now, to look ahead and try to anticipate what might develop since things are in a relatively calm period right now.

We talked about the world trading system, about the multilateral institutions, the financial institutions and the trading institutions, and our role in them -- what we can do jointly to strengthen them. And we have essentially similar points of view -- close to identical -- in both of those subjects.

We also talked, particularly this morning, we spent on bilateral relations, that is specifically between the United States and Japan and what we could do to make those more successful.

At the last Sub-Cabinet meeting, which was in February in Tokyo, most of the time went to figuring out how to capitalize on the results achieved by the Prime Minister and the President when the President visited Tokyo in November. We feel that, on the whole, a great deal of progress was made as a result of those things, and they didn't loom quite as large now, but there are a number of those things that are going on, and we will be continuing to watch with interest.

There have been a number of steps in Japan, favorable steps from our point of view, since the last Sub-Cabinet meetings, and we discussed those at some length -- generally liberalization of either lowering tariffs or changing laws that restricted American imports, or particularly aspects of financial arrangements have been liberalized to a considerable extent.

So I think these probably have been the most productive of any of the meetings, which is not a large number, that I have personally participated in. I attribute a lot of that to my colleague, Minister Motono, and I'll turn over the podium to him now. And after he has made his statement, we will be available for questions.

DEPUTY MINISTER MOTONO: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you, Under Secretary Wallis, for your introduction. I am in a position to share fully the views expressed by Mr. Wallis as to the attitudes we took together vis-a-vis these consultations and the characteristics of this particular meeting.

Although I am not prepared to make any statement, I may just say, to begin with, that as trade cannot be a kind of one-way street, the efforts to improve our trade relations should be also an effort -- it is not a one-sided effort -- it should be a common effort. And in order to achieve this type of effective efforts, we need a lot of good communication, good understanding on the basis and correct perception or understanding of the basic facts.

It is my conviction that this type of a series of meetings we had in the past week, either on industrial policy or high technology or on trade or investment commission, served a lot in promoting this common perception of the realities as well as the problems which exist, not only on a bilateral basis, but also on a global basis. In other words, the problem of protectionism in the world at large, the ways and means to cope with our efforts to fight protectionism, which is the basis, to my mind, for ...... if we expect the continuation of a non-inflationary sustained growth of the world economy.

I think we were very successful in this type of conversation, especially at the high-level meeting. I was very gratified by the leadership extended by Under Secretary Wallis and also the very positive attitudes, positive in addressing the problems and also in having no inhibition about making very clear any dissatisfaction or criticism in areas where they are, from his colleagues. And I can say also that this attitude was reciprocated by our side. So we are now in an area where we can talk very freely and, I think, very efficiently on those matters, and I think the orientation was there.

As to my own delegation, I must say that we came here with the spirit to keep the ongoing momentum in addressing those problems. We certainly have been doing a lot since, the last meeting we had in February, as Under Secretary Wallis has stated. There has been a package on the 27th of April about various things, covering things like beef and citrus or the reform of the tobacco monopoly, or the Nippon Telephone-Telegraph Corporation, and also more perspective in the opening of the international and capital market.

These aggregate measures are slowly, but steadily, bringing some concrete results. And I think - well, I thought that it was very necessary that we should not just sit on the achievements, or sleep on the achievements -- I don't know how to say it - but very vigilant to the course of events. And I think it is the responsibility of those in government to see that these favorable trends are keeping their own momentum and achieving results -- at least, that they are in the right direction to achieve results, in the middle term, if not in the short term.

Continued on next page)

So I think it is from this attitude that we cope with those problems, and I also, especially, personally, having been associated with Under Secretary Wallis in the preparation of the last two summit meetings of the seven industrialized countries, looked at the problem of the world economy and observed the satisfaction that, first of all, the American economy, which is at the center of world growth, has not only recovered vigorously but now is expanding.

Perhaps my views are too optimistic, but I think the success in the Reagan Administration in coping with the problem of inflation is the key to a very smooth transition to a long-term, sustained recovery which may not be necessitating some artificial, shall we say, kind of social engineering type of, for instance, tax benefits, to stimulate consumption.

But the recovery -- this cyclical factor -- can come back in full strength with lower inflation, and then through this very liberal policy you have been taking in maintaining the American market open. There are some details, of course, which are of a political nature, but I think one can say fairly that the American market has been open, that it has served to transmit its strong demand to the world at large, including the developing countries. And this inflow of goods from abroad, including also that of Japan, has helped to keep the inflation down.

At the same time, we noticed in our exports to your country a lot of, for instance, machinery -- in machine tools, like robot machines or office automation machines -- which reflect the strong surge of investment in high technology in the area or in the service area which certainly would help to increase -- which have helped to increase the productivity factor, aspect, of the American economy.

I think this policy is certainly going to bring more concrete results in the international competitiveness of the American economy, and therefore would reduce the trade deficit.

I think the recession also had a very helpful effect in helping American business to get leaner and improve their own productivity.

So, by and large, I think this macroeconomic policy mix, which sometimes is criticized, has also its positive effect, and the posterity will see how the results will be.

Perhaps I'm too optimistic, but those are the observations I made during the discussion. On the other hand, we were also very happy to report to the meeting that the achievement of the Japanese economy has shown some favorable progress.

First, the domestic demand is very strong. The Economic Planning Agency has just announced on the 19th -- that is, yesterday, in Washington time, I think -- that they are upgrading their perspective for GNP growth. The were real growth rate was estimated to be 4.1 at the beginning of the year. Now the target, the prediction, is 5.3.

When I left Tokyo, they were saying that there will perhaps be an addition of one percent, but it seems to have gone beyond that.

Consumer spending still leaves much to be desired, but a strong trend has been appearing in private investments. The growth rate has been upgraded from 5.1 to 8.1. Housing is rather stagnant. That has been reduced from 5.2 to 4.0. In government expenditure, although the fact that we are having a tremendous deficit in our budget, the outstanding balance of our debt is approximately 128 trillion yen, which would correspond to approximately $553 billion. In short, corresponding to about 83% of the total debt of the LDCs -- a big debt.

We are spending 22% of our budget expenditure to service this debt, and in last year's budget, when it was 18%, it was approximately the same amount as the amount spent on social welfare in Japan. That gives you an idea how big the burden of debt-spending is.

So we have embarked upon a policy of administrative reform, which will tend to cut expenditures -- and we were successful in undergoing a lot of administrative cuts in public spending -- and to alleviate the economy.

On the price sector, the outlook for consumer prices has been revised downward from 2.8 to 2.6, so we are safely in a very low inflation rate. We have a very slow inflation rate pressure, and we should utilize this to further increase our internal growth.

On the current account, we are predicting an increase in our current account surplus from $23 to $33 billion. This reflects an increase in our trade balance surplus, but I should also mention that one very visible phenomenon is the tremendous increase in our deficit in the long-term capital account.

For the first six months the net outflow of capital accounts reached $20 billion -- in other words, exceeding the surplus of our current account balance, which was only $16 billion. The deficit in the long-term capital stood at $20 billion.

That shows how the influence on, for instance, the currency rate of the international flow has a greater impact than the trade flow. But, anyway, most of that money which goes out from Japan abroad comes to the United States, especially imports, in terms of portfolio investments, in addition to the direct investment which is contributing somehow to new investment and rationalization of the industrial process.

But these resources come to alleviate, if I may say so, the pressure on the demand on the capital market. I think we are still very much interested by the difference in the real interest rate in the United States and Japan, and this flow is certainly going to continue.

These are the various aspects of the macroeconomic point of view which we discussed in the meeting. Perhaps I should rather stop at this stage and ask for your questions.

Q Did you make some kind of an agreement? Did you make any agreements today, or did you just discuss the economies of the two countries?

UNDER SECRETARY WALLIS: No. These consultations never involve formal agreements, other than things like, "Let's work on that," or "Let's get somebody working on it," or -- I mean, they always result in something like that, that we're going to pursue this question or that question, but never a formal agreement between the two governments, or an informal one.

Q Did you agree on working on something?

UNDER SECRETARY WALLIS: Can we what?

Q did you agree at this meeting today on working on anything?

UNDER SECRETARY WALLIS: There are a number of things that are continuing. One that comes to mind first because we did it last is on energy cooperation. There are a number of opportunities, particularly in the long run, for cooperation between the two economies on energy.

Japan, essentially, has no energy sources within its own country, and we have very abundant ones, so we've had discussions about coal. There recently was a mission over there, talking to the Japanese about coal, and they have been over here also last spring talking about coal and possibilities of purchases in the long run.

There are explorations about natural gas, particularly from Alaska, both from the North Slope area, where there is an infinite amount of gas not going to any good use at all, and from the Cooke Inlet, where they have already been getting natural gas from us since 1969. But there's a possibility of an additional project there.

So those were the main -- that was an example of one of the last things. We have an experts group that meets from time to time, and we talked about the possibility of asking them to meet again before the end of this year. That wasn't a formal decision, but that's an example of the kind of thing that comes up. I'm sure there were others, but that, as I say, comes to mind first because it was the last thing that happened before we came down here.

(Continued on next page)

Q Did you have any discussions or extend your views on the recent U S policy on steel imports to the United States?

UNDER SECRETARY WALLIS: Not very much. That was a fresh decision, and the Japanese were interested, in a sense of curiosity They asked us to explain it as best we could. We can't give a very full explanation yet of exactly how it will work So that was not a very there's great interest in that, but it did not take up much of our time simply because neither of us had a lot to say about it yet

Q Were there any responses from the Japanese side about that kind of protectionist measure?

UNDER SECRETARY WALLIS: Both of us have worried about the rise of protectionism. We worry about the extent of protection practiced in Japan, and they worry about some of the protectionist measures we have, and they worry about the pressures that are here currently to increase protectionism

But, of course on the whole, the Administration has resisted most of those things. But that is always a thing that we're very keenly aware of, the dangers of protectionism -- and not just here and Japan, but in the LDC's, for example, and in the European community. That's a matter of great concern to all of us And I would say always, at these meetings, there is serious discussion of protectionism and how we can resist it, not only in our own countries but in the world trading system

As you know, the Japanese have initiated a proposal for a new round of negotiations in the GATT on world trade. We're backing them strongly on that, and we're working -- when I say "we," that's primarily Bill Brock, the USTR, and he's working very hard at laying the groundwork for that, and so are the Japanese

Yuki, if you want to give any different answers or correct any of these or supplement them, step up

DEPUTY MINISTER MOTONO: No, I don't think I have to give much more than what Allen has said

I know that you are interested, especially Japan, about how we dealt with the steel thing. But, as you know, it came up just during the meeting. We had to ask for clarification, and this clarification should be coming up.

The point is, of course, we are aware that it reflects a strong desire on the part of the American Administration to keep the market an open-market system. The question is how those measures are going to be implemented. So I think we need a little time to know more about the way this is going to be carried on.

Q So that means that you are not satisfied with the explanation from the United States side about the steel?

DEPUTY MINISTER MOTONO: As Under Secretary Wallis has mentioned, we were not going into the details of the measures at that stage. We asked for certain clarification, and that will be forthcoming.

UNDER SECRETARY WALLIS: When you used the phrase "not satisfied," that lends itself to marvelous misrepresentation. It's literally true, they weren't fully satisfied because we didn't know the answers. But "not satisfied" suggests a feeling of irritation and annoyance, which they certainly did not express.

(Press conference concluded at 3:38 p.m.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(New York, New York)

For Immediate Release September 23, 1984

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE SHULTZ

The Jade Room
Waldorf Astoria
New York, New York

5:45 P.M. EDT

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The President's had a busy day and it isn't over. He started, as you know, with lunch with the Secretary General, and then three bilaterals, and, coming up in about an hour a reception in which he will meet Heads of Delegations, Heads of State, and the permanent representatives to the U.N.

To go through these in series: with the Secretary General, the President expressed his support for the Secretary General's wide-ranging efforts and for the United Nations. We discussed developments in the Middle East at some length, especially since Mr. Brian Urquhart had just returned from the Middle East and reported on his observations there.

The President gave the Secretary General a little preview of the speech. We discussed U.S.-Soviet relationships. The Secretary General had been to Moscow recently -- talked a little bit about his observations there, about his efforts with regard to Afghanistan. The Secretary General -- as we all are concerned about the Iran-Iraq conflict -- the question of the potential for the use of chemical weapons arose. And the Secretary General also described to us his efforts on Cyprus in which we are trying in every way we can to be helpful.

So that was a wide-ranging and very useful meeting from the standpoint of the President.

With President Alfonsin of Argentina, again we had a discussion that ranged over quite a number of areas. I think, principally, reinforcing the importance of democracy -- particularly democracy in our hemisphere -- and the President expressed his strong support and pleasure at what had happened with the election of a democratic government in Argentina. And President Alfonsin, of course, supported the notion of democratic governments throughout the hemisphere.

We had a considerable discussion of domestic economic policies -- ours, theirs -- and the difficulties involved when an

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economy is out of kilter -- getting it back into kilter. Secretary Regan was there, our Secretary of the Treasury, and he described at some length for President Alfonsin the proposal the President has had him make in Washington in connection with the IMF bank meetings in calling for discussions next spring on debt problems, both in -- principally in the development committee of the bank but also in the interim committee of the IMF.

We had some discussion of trade matters. The President's decisions on copper and steel were certainly welcomed. And also it was touched on that President Alfonsin had taken the lead with Vice President Bush and others in Quito in raising the importance of the drug problem. And we are, of course, following up on people's concerns and interests in that area.

President Mobuto of Zaire -- the President expressed his admiration for the fact that in Zaire we see a country that is working hard on its economic problems -- has a difficult time, as you know, it's heavily dependent on copper, and copper prices have been low -- so they have considerable problems at home, and I would say the meeting, in terms of the time spent, was spent mostly in hearing President Mobuto describe some of the problems he sees in Zaire and to which he hopes we can work with him in addressing them. He left us with an aide memoir that went into some detail. And we, of course, will follow up and see in what ways we can be helpful to them.

Finally, the President had a meeting with Prime Minister Willoch of Norway and here our NATO defense efforts were discussed

-- the importance of the cohesion that has emerged in the alliance, views exchanged on that; the strong performance of Norway in its defense budget and defense efforts. We had some discussion of the President's speech and upcoming meetings and outlook for relations with the Soviet Union, and some discussion of Central America, which the Norwegians are very interested -- in developments there

; and finally, some questions about the world economy.

I think very briefly on the President's speech, I guess Bob is going to provide you with -- I don't know what it is he provides you when you get two lines, or whatever it was he said. And obviously the specifics will come forward tomorrow when the President gives his speech.

But at least, as I've read it, and talked with the President, about what he wants to achieve in that speech, I would say it's very much an effort to get everybody's eye on the future. And to consider what can be achieved in the future. The importance of economic development; the importance of human rights and freedom; and the relationship between these two things as is suggested by the U.N. Charter itself.

We of course want to emphasize, and the President will

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be talking about our friends and allies and the importance of working with them, but also the importance of working with countries whose systems differ from ours. All this is part and parcel of trying to construct a future that will be a good one from everyone's standpoint.

The President wants to call attention to the importance of regional issues and the importance of seeking ways to deal with them. And of course he will be spending a fair amount of his time in the speech on questions involving the U.S.-Soviet relations. And here he'll have a number of suggestions to make, but I think all of these in the spirit of wanting to see a constructive relationship develop with the Soviet Union and his dedication to trying to do that, whether it be in the area of arms control, whether it be in the area of concern about explosive regional issues, whether it be in the field of bilateral matters between the two countries, or whether it be in the framework of the Helsinki Accords and concern for human rights.

So, this is a brief rundown on the day, and tomorrow, as you know, the President will be making some calls on the Secretary General and others; giving his speech; and he'll have a bilateral with Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann in the late morning.

Q Mr. Secretary, in the speech, will the President give any specifics about his ideas -- if he has new ideas on the subject of arms control -- or will he be trying to communicate just a sense of his desire for negotiations to resume and flexibility -- I mean, how general will he be; how specific will he be?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, how general or how specific depends on what you mean by those terms. He isn't going to propose a whole new agenda. Quite to the contrary, we have a very big agenda out there, and, at the same time, we want to continually

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emphasize that the nature of U.S. proposals is of a piece with give and take in a spirit of negotiation. And he will, in various ways, get across ways in which we want to implement that idea.

Q -- going to propose the U.S. become more deeply involved in regional disputes and offer our good offices in mediating them, as The New York Times said today?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, the United States --

Q Including Shamir's proposal?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The United States, traditionally, and in this administration, the President's administration, has always felt that it's important to help as we can throughout the world with problems that people have. And so, for example, we've been very active in trying to work with the problems of southern Africa. And the President will refer to that. We've certainly been supporting, in every way we can, the ASEAN efforts to deal with the problems of Kampuchea and so on around the globe. So, I think that, as in the past, the United States must engage with the problems of the world and be part of the solution, and not part of the problem. And, of course, that goes very strongly for the Middle East. And we'll want to help as we can there.

Q To get back to the previous question, the arms control question, you pointed out, of course, that we do have a program. We do have an agenda. But we also have reached no agreements with the Soviet Union in any area, unless you include the Hot Line. Should that agenda be modified, or is it just a matter of finding a new procedure for talking with them?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, the agenda is there, and it needs to be worked on and developed. And the extent to which an improved atmosphere can improve the chances of working through that agenda, I don't know; but we're certainly going to try and try again.

It is a very big agenda with a lot of forthcoming proposals, not only in the field of offensive nuclear armaments, but in such wide-ranging areas as chemical weapons and conventional forces and confidence-building measures and so on. And so we'll want to pursue that. But the President will have some thoughts about how to go about it that we hope may make things go better.

Q Have you had any signs or indications from the Soviets that they are prepared to reciprocate on this constructive relationship that you're talking about?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Pat, we are looking forward to our discussions with Mr. Gromyko; but it remains to be seen what response they'll have. But we think, with the meeting that I'll have with Mr. Gromyko, of course, we'll see what the Soviet expression is on this when he gives his speech on Thursday, and then the President will welcome him in Washington on Friday.

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Q Mr. Secretary, are you, the U.S. government, willing to undertake some sort of a diplomatic initiative at the request of Israel to try to get an agreement with Syria for the withdrawal from Lebanon at this point?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, we're always -- want to be helpful where we can. And you can be helpful if all the parties concerned want you to be. So we'll just have to see how that works out.

As you know, Ambassador Murphy went with a team to Beirut. Some members of his team will be returning with their report tomorrow, in the early afternoon, I guess it is. Ambassador Murphy will stay in the area and will be touching base with our friends. And, as you probably know, he's been in Damascus recently. So we'll be exploring matters.

Q Mr. Secretary --

Q Sir, Mr. Secretary of State --

Q -- sir, can you expand a bit on the American reaction to the Nicaraguan statement of the other day, which it said it supported completely and would sign the draft Contadora agreement. The reaction in the State Department yesterday seemed surprisingly harsh. Could you expand on why the U.S. did not welcome the Nicaraguan statement?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I would express it this way: Over the period of the efforts of the Contadora countries, we've seen a great deal of progress. We saw the emergence of 21 principles, which we thought were excellent and we endorsed them.

We have seen the effort, now, to translate these principles into something that's more operational. And we see now a draft treaty that does that in part, but misses in some substantial part. Other countries have yet to be heard from. But I think that it's a broad,

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positive development in its general sweep. There are certainly problems with the current draft -- at least so some of the countries that we've heard from believe, but, at any rate, we continue to work with the situation, including in our own direct negotiations with Nicaragua in support of the Contadora process.

Q Sir, since you're talking about Latin American countries, I understand that you were present while President Reagan and President Alfonsin from Argentina -- we are from Argentina --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: That's correct.

Q Thank you very much, sir. Have you got any impression on that meeting, any statement we can make from our country?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I tried to summarize the subjects that were covered, but I would say, as a general proposition, it was a very positive meeting. And I know from hearing the President -- we stand around after these meetings and talk about them -- that he had a very positive reaction to President Alfonsin and I think the two people as individuals, at least from President Reagan's standpoint, felt a good sense of communication.

Now, I think the positive sense of forward motion for democracy was very important. And I believe it's fair -- I'm not -- I don't want to speak for the Argentines, but I think President Alfonsin was really quite interested in the ideas that Secretary Regan put forward.

Q Last question, sir. Was economics one of the items that was talked here?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Yes, it was a major subject of discussion in discussing the U.S. economy and what had happened to it and the difficulties we had to go through, and so on. And President Alfonsin described his situation. And, as I said, the Secretary of Treasury Regan's discussion was essentially about a way of examining certain world economic issues. And I believe that on the whole, that was -- well, I know it was a very welcome discussion.

Q Mr. Secretary, when you talk about regional issues, you mentioned the Middle East in particular. Do you intend, or does the administration intend to provide opportunities for the Soviets to play a constructive role in that part of the world if that is their intent?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, we're always glad to have a constructive role played by anybody. At this point in time, as we look at the issues, we try to help as best we can and so we'll just have to see where we go on that.

I'm sure that when, if we do engage with the Soviet Union, as I have with Foreign Minister Gromyko from time to time and also with Ambassador Dobrynin, the Middle East is a subject that's -- it's very important to both countries. And I might say that when you have talked about Lebanon and the West Bank, and so on, you haven't exhausted the subject. You've got to turn to Iran-Iraq and what is going on there and in the Gulf, and all of those problems. So we'll undoubtedly discuss them.

Q Mr. Secretary, how does the -- following on what you just said, how does the Murphy mission now fit into the framework that you established after the American withdrawal -- after the denunciation of the May 17th Agreement, when you said that the parties would have to look to an agreement finding a way on

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their own to achieve the withdrawal, essentially leaving the impression that the U.S. was going to let them take the lead on it? Is that what's happening now? Have they asked the United States to come back in and become involved, both sides?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, as far as Ambassador Murphy is concerned, I'm going to hit your question with a glancing blow here. As far as Ambassador Murphy is concerned, of course, he went there to lead the team making our preliminary examination of the tragedy in our Embassy in Beirut, and while he was there, we thought it was a good thing for him to go and talk to our friends in the area, and he's going to proceed to do that, just as a matter of touching base and assessing the situation. So we'll see as he goes along what will come out of that.

Yes.

Q Sir, was the issue of Chad raised during the meeting between President Reagan and Mobutu, and what was the analysis made by the two parties on the decision made by France and Libya to withdraw their troops?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I don't want to discuss reactions. The President did express his admiration for the fact that Zaire had put forces in Chad promptly and still has forces in Chad. And so, obviously, both are interested in developments there. And I don't want to pursue it further than that.

Q Mr. Secretary, the administration has

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allowed four agreements -- bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union to lapse or terminate: space, energy, science and technology and transportation. What is your attitude on them? Do you want to now resume negotiations and resume those agreements?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, we've had a great deal of discussion about agreements for work in particular areas, including some that you mentioned and others, such as environment. And it is our intention to try to have discussions of that kind at a high level. And I believe that that was covered to some extent even in the President's statement -- and I'm trying to remember just when it was, but it was in the early summer, maybe in June or so in the White House -- that ran through the different -- perhaps July -- ran through the different things that were under discussion.

But that notion of having discussions at a reasonably high level or even ministerial level on subjects of joint interest is certainly something that we have been talking about and will pursue.

Q Two questions: First of all, is there going to be an opportunity for substantive discussion during the reception this evening, either by you with Mr. Gromyko or the President with Mr. Gromyko. And, secondly, as you begin the course of this week in the discussions that will be taking place with the Foreign Minister, how much do you really hope for to come out of these? Is it really just a question of improving the atmospherics or do you really believe that at this point especially in the middle of an election campaign there is an opportunity for some substantive agreement on specifics?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, first on the reception: Receptions are roomfuls of people, at least half of them talking at a given time. There's a pretty good noise level, but I hope that there will be a chance for the President to talk individually with at least some of those who are present. And he'll welcome that opportunity, but it isn't really a kind of setting where you can dig in very far. But, nevertheless, it's a way of starting something.

Insofar as the discussions themselves are concerned and what may or may not come out of them, it, of course, remains to be seen. And we expect to talk through our agenda and, no doubt, they will do the same. And we have stated our desire for more constructive relationships. They have in various statements from Moscow over quite a period of time said that they would like the same. So, we'll see if there are some ways that over a period of time we can bring that about.

Nothing of this sort just changes like that. That's not the nature of the case. It's a gradual process.

MR. SIMS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Q Does it have anything to do with Mondale?

MR. SIMS: You are --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: My keeper says that I must go. I think --

Q Mr. Secretary --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: -- he wants to give you his two lines from the speech or whatever it was you were going to do.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 6:09 P.M. EDT

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(New York, New York)

For Immediate Release

September 24, 1984

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
SECRETARY OF STATE
GEORGE SHULTZ

The Jade Room
Waldorf Astoria Hotel
New York, New York

September 24, 1984

12:29 P.M. EDT

MR. SPEAKES: Let me have your attention, please. Secretary Shultz is here, on the record, available for cameras, and he will brief on the last bilateral with Prince Sihanouk.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: In addition to his address to the United Nations and his courtesy calls on the Secretary General and the President of the Assembly, the President had a meeting with Prince Sihanouk and Prime Minister Son Sann. He listened to their descriptions and analysis of what is taking place in Cambodia -- the Soviet presence, directly and indirectly; the attitudes of the people of Cambodia toward it; and the progress being made in the resistance and by the forces of democratic Kampuchea.

And the President expressed his support for what they're doing and recalled to them that we are working and supporting the ASEAN efforts as well as providing a substantial flow of humanitarian assistance for refugee aid and, of course, a major security assistance program with Thailand.

And it was a very cordial and useful meeting.

Q Mr. Secretary, is the Murphy mission now a full-scale, expanded inquiry into resuming the possibility of -- on the Rumsfeld idea? And also, have you received yet the report from Murphy on the bombing?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The Murphy mission hasn't changed from last night when I described it to you. He was sent over there to head the team examining what happened in our Beirut tragedy, and then we felt that since he was there, it would be useful to have him visit around in the area. And he went to Damascus, met with the Foreign Minister, with Mr. Haddam, and with President Assad, and he's now in Israel. And he will probably make some other visits around, but it isn't -- there isn't any special mission beyond that. But he is visiting around and finding out what people's views are, and we'll see.

Q How about his report on the Beirut bombing?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The people with him were Ambassador Oakley, who is head of our counter-terrorism office, and Deputy Assistant Secretary Fields. Both of them will be getting into New York early this afternoon. I expect to meet with them about 2:00 p.m. this afternoon, along with Ambassador Spiers. And we will hear their report directly. And I haven't got that report yet. I expect to get it at 2:00 p.m. this afternoon.

Q Mr. Secretary --

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Q Mr. Secretary, can you tell us, in the President's speech to the General Assembly, why he did not mention any of the Soviet violations of past agreements when he was listing those agreements, and why he, in the context of Afghanistan, did not talk about what the Soviets have been doing there?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, as far as Afghanistan is concerned, basically, the President stated our position on Afghanistand and reiterated it. It hasn't changed. And there it is. And I think the President's views about questions of keeping agreements are well-known.

The President was wanting to put forward and invitation to the Soviet Union based on a realistic appraisal always of what is going on in the world to try to work constructively with us. And that's what the intent of the speech was.

Q A deliberate intent, Mr. Secretary?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, there was no deliberate intent to do anything except what I stated. You can't make every speech you've ever made over and over again or -- even by UN traditions, it would be too long.

Q Can you explain the umbrella -- the umbrella proposal for the nuclear arms control? Could you tell us how that might work?

SECRETARY SHULT: What the President put forward was an idea. What special shape it may take is something that we can readily work out if it turns out that the Soviet Union is interested in the idea. But the idea is that we ought to have some forum in which people who are working on the subject of arms control discuss the subject across the board and in a setting where one can look at the relationships between one type of negotiation and another, and in the process of doing that, help to keep the individual negotiations on the right track and to identify new areas more readily that might be negotiated out and give a kind of mandate for how that might be done -- that type of thing. So that what he is suggesting, in other words, is a more across -- a setting in which a more across-the-board discussion could take place than is so when you are discussing a particular aspect of the general field of arms control.

Q Mr. Secretary, that goes to relate -- that goes to procedure. Do you see anything in the President's speech that suggests any substantive change in any of the positions the United States has taken in START, INF, MBFR -- any of the now dormant negotiations, or are you hoping that by changing the procedure, changing the venue, perhaps, you can revive those negotiations?

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SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, the positions of the United States in a very wide array of arms control fora are forthcoming and have been described properly as positions that lend themselves to negotiation. And we're prepared for give-and-take in all of those different fora. And the President in all of the different ways that he expressed himself in his address, and I'm sure as he meets individually with Foreign Minister Gromyko, will be emphasizing that and urging that in one way or another we find a way to get at these issues.

Q -- stand corrected -- he's proposing two sets of institutionalized meetings here: one at sort of the expert level on a more or less regular basis; and, then, separately, including yourself, at the ministerial level?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There are a number of proposals in the speech. I don't want to try to go through them because you've all read the speech. But, certainly, he has instructed me to take up with Foreign Minister Gromyko when I meet with him the regional issues so-called and problems of conflict in different areas of the world that both the Soviet Union and ourselves are concerned about and see if we can't develop some method of discussing them systematically and usefully.

And, of course, I've done that from time to time with the Foreign Minister, but maybe we can do it on a more extensive scale to see a possible pattern of development of extending those consultations by bringing in relevant people, such as, for example, in Southern Africa, Assistant Secretary Crocker with a counterpart -- that kind of thing.

Then, there is the suggestion in there of contacts at a ministerial level across a broad range of subjects. I discussed that yesterday in response to a question. There's nothing more to add on that. And, then, there is the proposal for military discussions which, we think, might have the benefit -- this was, interestingly enough, a suggestion that came from the Pentagon -- benefit of military-to-military contacts and exchange of information with the kind of usefulness that, we think, goes with confidence-building measures such as notification of exercises and observation of exercises and things of that kind.

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Q On the regional question, do you mean to suggest that you would like to invite the Soviets in to talk about the Middle East?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, you have a way of putting things provocatively. (Laughter.) I would think that the --

Q Thank you. (Laughter.)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There are a lot of issues in the Middle East, and we have views about them, and they have views about them, and it might be helpful to exchange views. And, at least in certain areas where there is great tension -- such as in the Iran-Iraq war, and such as there have been from time to time between Syria and Israel -- just to let the Soviet Union know what we are thinking and what we are doing, and perhaps hear from them. So, there are all sorts of ways in which such discussions could be useful, and perhaps, to begin with, discussions that are aimed at damage control of one kind or another.

Q Do you --

Q Mr. Secretary --

Q -- excuse me -- follow up -- Mr. Secretary, do you mean to invite them into any kind of negotiations in the Middle East -- this fall?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I tried to describe what we had in mind.

Q So then -- you're cancelling out what I'm suggesting?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't have anything there to cancel out. (Laughter.)

Q Mr. Secretary, do we have any reason to believe that the Soviets, beyond their acceptance of these invitations, are ready to take a different approach to negotiating on any of this wide array of matters? Is there anything other than optimism on our part, I guess is --

Q Question?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Is there anything other than sheer optimism -- (Laughter.) -- to lead us to think that the Soviet Union might be interested in any of this -- have I summarized your question fairly?

Q You did better than I did. (Laughter.)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The President said that, given the importance of this relationship, it is essential for us to try, and try again -- I think those were his words. And, what the President has been doing here is to put forward our good intentions, our willingness to engage, to accompany it with references to a lot of wide-ranging content that is there. So it isn't just a generalization. And to invite them to engage with us. And we believe that it's important to do that, and to do it again and again, as the President said. And we hope that one day the Soviets will decide to join us. Whether they do now or later, we'll still be there.

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Q Mr. Secretary, when you said the President has instructed you to bring up the regional issues in your talks with Mr. Gromyko later this week, does that mean that you will not in those talks be dealing with the other questions the President raised on arms control fora and the umbrella for arms control?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't know why -- no. There's certainly no inference that, by referring to regional issues, that that's the only issue that we would be willing to discuss. To the contrary, we will, I'm sure, have a wide-ranging discussion as we always do. We have a full agenda of matters that we want to talk about -- arms control issues, regional issues, bilateral issues, and, always, in my discussions with the Soviet Union, I bring up problems of human rights.

Q Mr. Secretary --

Q Mr. Secretary, do you think it's likely --

Q -- you talk about the fact that --

MR. SPEAKES: Last question.

Q -- that there's no point in repeating the same speeches over and over again, but we did all notice the lack of any criticism at all of the Soviet Union today, and a generally more conciliatory tone. To what degree is all of that the result of some policy analysis in the administration that this is a more opportune time to take this tack, and to what degree is it a result of the election being 43 days away?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I think if you examine what the President said last January in a major address confined solely to U.S.-Soviet relations, you'll find the same basic themes as you see in his speech today. And if you think back through the history of the Reagan administration, there is a long span of proposals in various areas of the relationship -- most prominently arms control because that gets so much attention -- so that by this time there is the widest array of proposals in various areas of arms control on the table than has been the case for a great many years. So, I think the President's speech here is a part of the continuity of his thinking.

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And he is taking the occasion, particularly with Foreign Minister Gromyko here, to try to put the constructive and positive and forward-looking opportunities forward in the effort to emphasize the importance that he attaches to moving in a more constructive relationship wtih this U.S.-Soviet situation and toward trying always to advance the objectives of peace, which, of course, is something that we all seek and pray for.

Q And what about the election, sir?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I talk to the President about foreign policy problems all the time, and -- when is that election, anyway? I don't think it has any bearing on this. Really, I don't.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 12:45 P.M. EDT

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF
PRIME MINISTER MULRONEY OF CANADA

September 25, 1984

The Briefing Room

1:27 P.M. EDT

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The meeting, including the Rose Garden event with tne astronauts and the luncheon, went on for approximately an hour and forty-five minutes.

The atmosphere was as friendly as it could be. And there was a positive and open discussion between the President and Prime Minister on a wide range of issues.

The President began by congratulating the Prime Minister on his recent overwhelming electoral victory and commented on the very busy first week in office the Prime Minister has had with the visit to Canada of both the Pope and the Queen.

The first part of the meeting was devoted to a discussion of global issues, including East-West relations, the President's UN General Assembly speech, arms control and the NATO Alliance.

With regard to East-West relations, the President indicated he wanted to pursue the ideas mentioned in his UN General Assembly speech. He noted he wanted to build a sustained dialogue with the Soviets. And he said he wanted to improve the atmosphere between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and build a more constructive relationship.

The Prime Minister encouraged the President in his efforts and said he hoped they were met with Soviet responsiveness.

There was a discussion of new approaches in our dialogue with the Soviets and expectations for Friday's meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko.

The President said it was in both the U.S. and Soviet interests to resume serious discussions on arms control and said the U.S. was ready, willing and able to sit down.

The Prime Minister characterized the President's UN General Assembly speech as remarkable and commended him for his initiatives.

The Prime Minister indicated his commitment to enhancing Canada's NATO ties, a position which was welcomed by the President.

There was also a discussion of the role Canada can play in international affairs as a middle power.

Some time was spent on bilateral issues, including a discussion of trade, investment and environmental issues.

With regard to trade, the Prime Minister talked of stimulating domestic Canadian growth. And there was a discussion of the strength the U.S. economy has shown and the positive effects this can have on Canada's recovery.

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The Prime Minister noted the need to ensure Canadian access to U.S. markets, expressed appreciation for the President's recent decision on steel.

The Prime Minister said these actions were an indication Canada has much to gain by maintaining friendly relations with the U.S.

The Prime Minister spoke of his desire to increase private investment flows in Canada in order to reinvigorate Canada's economy.

On the question of management of U.S.-Canada relationship, the Prime Minister spoke of the importance to Canada of its relations with the U.S. He talked of more high-level meetings at the Cabinet level.

With regard to managing the relationship better, there was an agreement between the President and Prime Minister that the dialogue begun today should continue, most likely on a yearly basis with meetings between them.

The President noted that Secretary Shultz was committed to continuing his quarterly meetings with his Canadian counterpart. In that regard, we would like to announce that the next such quarterly ministerial meeting will be held October 15 and 16 in Canada.

It is important to note, this was not a negotiating session. No decisions or commitments were expected or made. It was meant to be the opening dialogue between the President and Prime Minister with a detailed discussion of the multilateral and bilateral relationship to be left to the October Foreign Ministers meeting.

Q Did acid rain come up? And, if not, why not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was mentioned in passing, along with a number of other bilateral issues, as a way of underscoring them for consideration at the upcoming ministerial meeting. There was not a discussion of positions or of any of the details regarding acid rain.

Q Was there a desire

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to avoid it? It seems to have been conspicuously absent from the agenda.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't believe there was a desire to avoid it. The time on the schedule, almost an hour and 45 minutes -- actually, an hour and a half if you delete the astronaut portion -- was open for whatever the President or Prime Minister wanted to discuss.

Q But isn't that the most pressing bilateral issue? It's clear it's something that neither of them wanted to discuss.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't believe that's correct. You have to understand the Prime Minister's been in office -- a week ago yesterday is when he started. I think there was a decision on both sides that a detailed discussion of the bilateral and multilateral agenda would be left to the upcoming ministerial meeting. Afterall, that's only two and a half weeks off.

You also should understand that it's -- I believe there will be a -- the Throne speech made in Canada sometime late October, early November, which is the point at which the Canadian -- new Canadian government would be presenting its ideas on many of these issues. In some ways, it would have been premature to try to go through all of the files today.

Q Was there any note of concern when he raised it? Did he say this is an issue which Canadians care a lot about or was there any kind of concern? Or was it just listed, is the way you seem to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was listed with a number of other bilateral issues for the ministerial meeting. However, there isn't any need to underscore it. I think it's very clear, both at the White House and at the State Department, for that matter, that acid rain is the number one issue on the U.S.-Canada relationship. After all, almost every meeting we've had at the ministerial level has, at some point, considered the acid rain question. And I might point out that when Mr. Mulroney was here last June, he mentioned the acid rain issue in very specific terms and made a suggestion about what he felt the President should do regarding it.

Q How did the Canadians say there were going to enhance their NATO ties?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There was a discussion of the increase in defense spending along the lines of what Mr. Mulroney mentioned during his campaign. In addition, there was a general comment by the Prime Minister regarding keeping Canada's NATO commitments.

Q Did Central America come up?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It did not.

Q Could you list all the bilateral issues that were touched on, please?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, there was a discussion of trade FIRA, investment, the national energy program, although there was not specific mention of the back-in -- acid rain. There was also a fairly lengthy discussion of -- at the request of the Prime Minister -- of various programs that have been started by the U.S. administration in the area of finding waste and duplication in the U.S. government.

Q Could you describe the personal chemistry? Was it sort of like a vice president of a company meeting the chairman of the board?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not at all. It was very much a conversation between equals, as I might point out, their discussion in June was.

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When I said in starting that it was as friendly and positive as a meeting could be, I checked that with Mr. Mulroney's staff afterward because, really, I don't think two people could have gotten on better.

Q Did his advice ask to include cutting -- how to cut social spending?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon me?

Q Did the advice asked about cutting government spending include --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it was government waste and duplication, not necessarily in the area of spending for government programs. More in the line of the Grace Commission and some of the management programs that we've seen the U.S. administration undertake.

Q That previous question on how they got along and the chemistry, that's not a bad question because when they came out and the President was speaking and the Prime Minister was waiting his turn, he didn't seem to know what to do with his hands. He kept putting them in his pocket and he kept -- we wondered whether there was some -- he had some problem there. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President or the Prime Minister?

Q The Prime Minister. I mean, we can show you the video tape -- those hands are just like this as he's waiting to speak, and we just wondered if there was some nervousness or upset between them.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't comment on why he was doing that, if, in fact, he was doing it. However, I might point out -- excuse me -- if I could answer the question.

Q Please.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I might point out that there was absolutely nothing in the meeting that would have led anyone to be uneasy walking out of it. It was very, very friendly.

Q Did they talk about sectoralfree trade?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not specifically. Just in the sense that trade and investment in Canada was very important, especially as a means of Canada making its way out of the economic situation that it's in -- with high unemployment, a deficit nearly twice ours as a percentage of GNP.

Q Did the Prime Minister make clear he was changing FIRA and the National Energy Program?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, he didn't. He indicated that he expected to have some initiatives in those areas soon, perhaps when he calls Parliament back into session.

Q And they're meeting for sure now once a year? There's an agreement on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's certainly what it seemed like to me. The President was very specific in his answer when the Prime Minister

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suggested yearly meetings.

Q Anything about high interest rates and deficits?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No there wasn't. There was a discussion of general economic trends and the need to spur increased growth in Canada. There were some comments about the strength of the American economy and its recovery, but not specifically about interest rates.

Q Did the Prime Minister suggest how Canada might act as a middle power in sustaining the dialogue with the East bloc?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That was in the context of the traditional role that Canada has played, and his desire to continue that role. I think those of us who follow the Canadian scene understand what the specifics of what that is. He did not go into any of those specifics, though.

Q Is there any --

Q What about acid rain? What did they say?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As I said earlier, it was listed as one of those bilateral issues that should be left for further discussion at the ministerial meeting to take place in approximately two and a half weeks.

Q Well, what did they spend an hour and a half talking about?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's -- excuse me, let me finish this one. Pardon me?

Q Is that what they said you would tell them --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's what Mr. Mulroney said when he was talking about a series of issues, yes.

Q Is there any prospect for any agreement or tangible progress on the ministerial meeting on this particularly touchy subject?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We'll have to wait and see. After all, it's a new government; a government that's been in power for -- this is the 8th day. A lot of new ministers who are getting into their departments. I think the ministerial meeting -- that would be, what, three and a half weeks after they came into power, I think it could be a very useful session.

Q Well, is there any groundwork at this point that would lead one to expect tangible results from that meeting on this subject?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we see it as an opportunity to walk through the entire agenda, see where -- what there positions are, any changes that -- they might be considering; to go through our positions and see what sort of programs and management techniques we can devise at that meeting and after that meeting to address where we are. We very much see that as the kick-off.

Q Were there any differences of view expressed on any

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subject -- differences of view, or differences of approach on subjects, at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Prime Minister reiterated some comments I believe he had made earlier during the campaign about the level of dialogue that existed between the U.S. and the Soviet Union over the last few years. During his campaign he was encouraging increases in that dialogue, and he reiterated that concern -- the concern of the Canadian people regarding the state of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Q Excuse me --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But again, that was in a very constructive way, given the Gromyko visit coming up, and expectations for that meeting.

Q The previous Prime Minister was quite critical of the way President Reagan conducted East-West relations, and nuclear arms control talks. Are you saying that the Prime Minister today was just reflecting the views of the Canadians and not his own?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, first of all, regarding Mr. Trudeau's approach -- our opinion of the Trudeau peace initiative was that it was constructive, not that it was critical.

Q "Dammit, Pierre," is constructive? You call that remark --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That was -- wait -- that was a different setting. That was at the London Summit. When they met here to specifically discuss that initiative, the President's quote was that he wished Mr. Trudeau Godspeed in his efforts. So --

Q Yes, but that's not -- (Laughter.) -- it's somewhat broader than just Trudeau's peace iniative. I think he did have a track record of being fairly critical of the United States in regard to East-West relations.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In the years he was in power, yes, he did comment. With regard to specifically what Mr. Mulroney said, though -- he was talking about his comments -- Mr. Mulroney's comments during the campaign. That's all I'm trying to reflect in the meeting.

Q Was there any indication by the President or the Prime Minister that this is a different kind of relationship, now; that they agree politically? That he and Trudeau did not? That they have a different view of the world? Was there any of that kind of talk in the meeting at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was not a discussion relating to their agreeing politically. It wasn't a discussion, really, of political philosophy. The discussion did not develop that way. When you ask, do we forsee a major change in U.S.-Canada relations -- we'll have to wait and see. Our position has been that two or three years ago -- U.S.-Canada relations -- there was a downturn; but in the last few years, especially with Secretary Shultz's commitment to meet four times a year, things have improved That's been reflected on both sides of the border in comments by the Canadian Foreign Minister and Canada's Ambassador here to

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the U.S. So I think we're starting from a much improved situation. There's always room for it to improve from there, however.

Q Well, isn't it clear the President's just a lot happier to have this guy in power than the person he succeeded? I mean, there isn't any secret about that, is there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All I can tell you is that they got on very well today. I think that bodes well for the President's relationship with the Prime Minister. What that means from a historical point of view, I'll leave to the historians.

Q Can you clarify whether, when Mr. Mulroney was praising the President's steel decision, he was praising it because it is not protectionist or because it is protectionist? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: From the Canadian point of view, I believe it's that it was not protectionist.

There's a very interesting aspect to that. Approximately 11,000 truckloads of steel move from Canada to the U.S. through four or five border checkpoints every month. If there were global quotas that had to be imposed at those checkpoints we, in essence, would be closing down those checkpoints. So --

Q If we --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- from that point, it continues the present level of steel imports to this country from Canada and exports to Canada.

I think you have to note that it's an integrated North American steel industry, and I think his comments were a reflection of that.

Q Do we have any information yet as to whether the new government will replace Ambassador Gotlieb and his letter-writing wife? (Laughter.)

Q Or either one of them? (Laughter.)

Q One or the other.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's really not something for me to comment on.

Q Well, I mean, it is. Do we know yet whether they've notified us that they're going to change Ambassadors? That's all I'm asking.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's been no such notification.

Q Would you expect it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We'll wait and see if it happens.

Q Mr. Mulroney made a comment about --

Q This is a clue, Sam --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Excuse me. If I might add one thing here: During the time I've been working on Canadian-U.S. relations, my experience has been that Ambassador

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Gotlieb has been a very effective Ambassador in this town for Canadian interests. I think --

Q So we don't want him replaced. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that's a reflection of how he's viewed at the State Department. So we're certainly not going to be commenting on whatever Mr. Mulroney decides to do with his Foreign Service. That's his choice.

Q You're not in the pay of The Post, are you? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I guarantee you, I am not in the pay of The Post. (Laughter.)

Q On the subject of the yearly meetings, I assume you mean in -- I assume you mean in addition to the Summit meeting, since the Prime Minister and President do see each other there.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right. In fact, this may develop along the lines that Secretary Shultz' meetings have developed. Two of the Foreign Ministerial meetings are full bilateral, multilateral agenda meetings, last the better part of two days, one in this country, one in Canada. The other two quarterly meetings take place on the periphery of multilateral events, like the ASEAN meeting in Djkarta, Indonesia a few months back or one of the NATO Ministerial, something like that, where they'll meet for a shorter period of time.

I suspect that if this works out the way we -- the way it might possibly work out, we could have one meeting between the President and Prime Minister, followed by, perhaps, something bilaterally at the Economic Summit.

Q Well, would the President go to Ottawa next and -- Are we talking about President Reagan going to Ottawa?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You're raising a protocol question and those certain kinds of meetings have to be exchanged from one country to another country and so perhaps it would be --

MR. SIMS: Last question, please, sir.

Q Mulroney made a remark about not being subservient. Did anything like that come up in the meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not familiar with that remark.

Q His remarks with -- at the Astronaut ceremony, he talked about refurbishing the relationship, but not being subservient, but a maturity of the relationship.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it was very clear from the meeting that Mr. Mulroney is going to be a -- the Prime Minister is going to be a very active and effective advocate of Canadian concerns. He comes across in a very precise and assertive way.

Q But did he make remarks along those lines in the meeting, suggesting that we'd like to get along, but you should

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understand we're not going to be subservient?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not specifically.

Q Well, what did he --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He did not specifically touch that.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 1:48 P.M. EDT

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
MAURITIAN INVESTMENT MISSION
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1984, 2:32 P.M.

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Well, I'm a little surprised that we have three people here who are interested in Mauritius. Mauritius is not well known by people in this country.

This morning the Department of State welcomed the first ever Mauritius business mission or delegation to the U.S. This mission, sponsored jointly by the Department of State and the Commerce Department, and in cooperation with the United States Information Agency, is the second in a series of business missions to the U.S. from select African countries designed to assist in the promotion of business opportunities in Africa.

Mauritius is one of 17 countries which have been targeted for strengthening trade and investment activities between the U.S. and countries in the Africa region. Mauritius, as you know, is a small island state in the southwest Indian Ocean, with a population of approximately one million people. It is multi-racial, consisting of approximately 68 percent Indian -- Asian Indian -- 27 percent Creole. Chinese represent three percent, and approximately two percent of the population is French.

It has had a multi-party parliamentary system of government since it achieved independence in 1968. Independence was achieved from Great Britain.

Within the past three years, Mauritius has conducted two general elections and peacefully transferred political power from one political party to another. This is rare in the developing world and demonstrates Mauritius' political maturity and inherent political stability.

As a moderate-income developing country, the per-capita income is approximately $1350. Mauritius has emphasized trade as opposed to aid for development. In that regard the private sector plays a vital role in facilitating the country's economic development. Therefore, we are delighted to host the Mauritian Investment Mission. It is an excellent opportunity to familiarize the U.S. business community with opportunities in Mauritius and to promote increased economic contacts.

The importance of the mission for Mauritius is underscored and demonstrated by the fact that the Deputy Prime Minister of Mauritius, Sir Gaetan Duval, is heading the delegation. The mission will participate in a series of briefings at the Department of State, which began this morning, and includes the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the Department of Commerce, the Special U.S. Trade Representative, AID, and the Ex-Im Bank

This afternoon they will meet with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and they are currently meeting with the Editorial Board of the The Washington Times

Assistant Crocker and I hosted a luncheon for the mission on the Eighth Floor of the State Department this afternoon, and later on Mr. Crocker will be meeting with the Deputy Prime Minister for discussions of a political and economic nature

On Wednesday, September 26th, the African Studies Program at Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies will host a conference on Mauritius entitled "Economic and Political Priorities in the Mid-1980s." At lunch, Sir Gaetan Duval will speak on political trends in Mauritius and the Indian Ocean

The mission will then fly on Thursday to New York for a program being arranged by USIA, including a luncheon at Citibank

During the second week, the delegation will meet with American businessmen interested in investing in Mauritius. The Commerce Department in particular has arranged a series of appointments around a number of specific investment proposals, or projects, which were submitted by the Mauritian business community about two months in advance of their arrival this past weekend

The program will end officially on Friday, October 5th, in Hartford, Connecticut, where the Equator Bank is hosting a session with the American business community. We hope -- in fact, we expect -- that the program will help to promote increased contracts in trade, investment, and tourism between the United States and Mauritius

If you have any questions, I'd be very happy to try and answer them

Q What is the primary trade in which they are interested in the United States?

A Well, as you know, Mauritius exports sugar to the United States as well as textiles, primarily in the form of knitwear They have lobbied for some time, unsuccessfully, to have the quota, or quotas, raised in both instances. We anticipate that the trade agreement between the U.S. and Mauritius will be renegotiated, or up for renegotiation, in about a year, and at that time those particular issues will be addressed.

They also export to the States jewelry, eyeglass frames. They are interested in the possibility of joint ventures in athletic shoes, various types of fishing equipment, and a number of other specific investments of a fairly major nature that I don't have at my fingertips at this moment

There is a trade imbalance between Mauritius and the U.S. We are buying much more from Mauritius than they are buying from us

Q Do you have a figure on that, please?

A I can give you some figures. Well, let's take 1983

In 1983, we exported 8.5 million dollars worth of equipment to Mauritius Mauritius exported to the U.S. 31.5 million dollars

Thus far, from January 1984 to June, our exports to Mauritius total 3.8 million and from Mauritius to the U.S 20.8

So, as you can see, there is a substantial trade imbalance

Q How many people are involved in the mission and who do they represent? Are they all government officials?

A There are approximately ten members of the delegation. I have a list of the delegation here, if you'd like to have a copy

As I indicated, Sir Gaetan Duval, the Deputy Prime Minister, is heading up the delegation

We also have the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Industry, Mr. Philippe Kin.

The remaining members of the delegation are all from the private sector. They represent the Chamber of Commerce, the Mauritian Exports Development and Investment Authority, President of the Mauritius Export Processing Zone, Managing Directors of a number of the leading industries. So it is heavily weighted in favor of the private sector.

Do you estimate -- is this based on general fact-finding or do you expect some agreement in some way to result from this trip, specific results?

A We do not anticipate any agreements of an official bilateral nature to transpire. The reason that we received quite a number -- about a dozen -- investment proposals two months prior to the delegations arriving was so that we could arrange very specific business appointments for members of the delegation. We have placed emphasis on trying to facilitate the business delegation's ability to transact business.

Of course, in a two week period of time we do not fully expected that any deals will be consummated; but, at least, the dialogue, the negotiating process, will have been initiated.

We have had discussion, of an informal nature with the Government of Mauritius over the past year and a half with respect to a Bilateral Investment Treaty, which is a Treaty brought about during this Administration designed to provide to the American business community greater protection, if you will, in terms of doing business in developing countries.

To date, within the Africa orbit, we have negotiated successfully treaties with Senegal and Zaire.

We are in various stages of negotiations with approximately five other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, and we fully expect that within the next year or so we might perhaps have a Bilateral Investment Treaty with Mauritius.

Q Is it receiving what type of economic support funds, or what have you, at this point?

A Mauritius does receive aid from the U.S. Government, approximately about two million a year annually

SECOND SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: This year there will be a special reprogramming deal

A There will be a special reprogramming of another two million dollars of economic security assistance funds to Mauritius. So we will have a total of about four million dollars going to Mauritius in FY '85. It's a fairly modest aid program, as you can see.

Q What are "economic security funds"?

A Economic security assistance funds are used primarily to help a country, such as Mauritius, which has had, like most African countries, some economic difficulties brought about by the worldwide recession and a lower of the demand for their commodities. It helps to stabilize their economies, to some extent.

Q Their insecurity just caught my ear, because it is their economic --

A Their economic funds.

Q -- assistance funds. Yes.

MODERATOR: It's ESF -- economic support funds.

A Support, not security. I'm sorry. If I said "security," that was a misrepresentation on my part.

Q Are there any plans for an American trade mission to go to Mauritius later?

A We have talked about a reciprocal delegation to Mauritius, but no specific plans have been advanced at this point. In fact, the Mauritius Government, when I visited there a year ago, pressed us to bring a delegation, or to take a delegation, to Mauritius first; but we decided to do it the other way around since Mauritius is not that well known in this country.

So that is a possibility in the future.

O.K.?

Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 2:46 p.m., the BACKGROUND briefing was concluded.)

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release September 28, 1984

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE SHULTZ

The Briefing Room

2:30 P.M. EDT

SECRETARY SHULTZ: President Reagan had a useful and intense interchange of views with the Foreign Minister and First Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Gromyko. The meeting lasted around an hour and a half altogether, including the working luncheon, and it was --

Q How long?

Q How long, sir?

Q -- three and a half hours --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Three and a half hours -- is that what I said?

Q You said one hour and a half --

Q You said one and a half.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Thank you. Well, I always look to the press to keep things accurate. (Laughter.)

Q Ohhhhhh.

Q That's why we're here.

Q When -- when did you start doing that?

Q Am I glad there not -- (Laughter.)

Q Go ahead, sir.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The meeting was a very strong personal interchange between two individuals. And while some others had occasional things to say, it was very basically a meeting between two men.

The President's purpose was to put forward to Mr. Gromyko, representing the top level of the Soviet leadership, the President's view that we need to have a more constructive relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union; and to express the many ways, again, that he believes this can be done.

And through this lengthy interchange and conversation, I feel sure that, from the President's point of view, and our point of view, this position that we have was made clear.

So, I'll be glad to take your questions.

Q Sir, can you tell us how Mr. Gromyko reacted to this position that you just outlined?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I think you have to ask Mr. Gromyko for his reactions. I'm not going to try to characterize them, except to say that from our standpoint,

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it was a very strong and useful interchange, and Mr. Gromyko, of course, expressed his views very powerfully and aggressively, as he always does. And the President listened to him carefully.

Q Was there any --

Q What was the agenda -- what did they talk about, and what do you mean "strong"? What do you mean by "strong"?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Forceful and direct. So that -- there was a desire, I think, on the part of both parties to try to be as clear as possible and not to dress up a subject at all. So, these discussions were very direct. It started with the President making a statement of his views, and then Mr. Gromyko made a statement of his, and then the interchange started, and as I say, carried on through the lunch period.

Q What was the subject?

Q Mr. Secretary, you use the word "intense". Are you suggesting that they argued? Was the atmosphere angry?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It wasn't angry. It was calm and deliberate and businesslike throughout. But, by intense, I mean that both men were really engaged in this conversation and were, both, I think, fully aware of the importance of it. And, so, in that sense it was a strong and intense interchange.

Q Mr. Secretary, did anything -- did anything come out of this meeting that would lead to further meetings between either you and Mr. Gromyko or the President and Mr. Gromyko, or a summit?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The objective of the President was to put forward his view, which would continue to be his view if he is reelected, and as far as an outcome is concerned, at the end, of course, as I think the President said as he was leaving, we agreed to stay in touch and I'm sure that we will.

Q Mr. Secretary, was there anything out of this meeting that would lead you to think that there would be a likelihood of the Soviets returning to any of the arms talks, or of talks beginning on the space weapons?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't want to try to predict the start of any particular talks. The objective wasn't to try to focus on any particular thing of that kind, but to try to clear the air of general issues involving where we think this relationship should go; involving the importance of coming to grips with the problem of immense nuclear arsenals and doing something to reduce them -- these broad and very significant questions. Question of preventing the militarization of outer space and issues of that kind were all discussed in the course of the meeting.

Q Do you think the relationship was changed as a result of this conversation, or these conversations today?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, it remains to be seen, of course. I would -- was -- I'd have to say, very impressed with the

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spirit and knowledge and intensity of the President's discussion, and I think it simply must have come through --

Q Sounds like --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: -- that this was a man talking with great conviction and a sense of importance of what he said.

Q Mr. Secretary did Mr. Gromyko respond either positively or negatively to any of the specific suggestions that the President made in his United Nations speech? Number one. And number two: Can you tell us a little bit about the session that the two men had alone in the Oval Office when the rest of you headed off for lunch?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There were some references to the President's UN speech, but I don't want to characterize it beyond that.

The brief meeting that the two men had alone was something that the President wished to do, and he had some things that he wanted to say privately to Mr. Gromyko. And that's as much as I care to say about it.

Q -- you know what they were --

Q -- were discussed, Mr. Secretary?

Q Mr. Secretary, was there anything that you heard there -- any suggestion from the Soviets, any surprises about anything that Mr. Gromyko had to say that suggested something that you didn't already know or hadn't heard before?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I think that an interchange like this is always an educational thing for all parties. And I felt privileged to have been there. But I can't put my finger on some particular insight that I'd care to single out.

Q Mr. Secretary, did you detect any change of positions on the Soviets' part on anything?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The object wasn't to test out a question of their position on this, that or the other, but rather to set out general objectives and the confidence of the President in wishing to try to obtain those objectives, to put behind that confidence, as he did in his UN speech, the many substantive suggestions that are out there for negotiation and discussion as well as the procedural ideas that were contained in the President's UN speech.

Q What do you mean by "stay in touch," Mr. Secretary? Does that mean there are no specific plans for any further meetings? Does that mean that the idea the President had for multi-level, Cabinet-level exchanges was not accepted?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, there are all sorts of ways to stay in touch. And just exactly how this will come about remains to be seen. Of course, we have regular and continuing dialogue at the Ambassadorial level, both Ambassador Hartman in Moscow and with Ambassador Dobrynin here. And that represents a continuing vehicle for organizing any further discussions that might be needed.

Q -- nothing came out of this?

Q Mr. Secretary, you said yesterday at the United Nations that you were sad and disappointed at Mr. Gromyko's speech. You said that, as the President had said several days before, that the United States would

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continue to try to get the Soviet Union to behave in a constructive way in international relations in the cause of peace. And I want to recall that to you. Do you believe that this meeting today in any way advanced the cause of peace? Wasn't Gromyko constructive?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: In my opinion, the meeting definitely advanced the cause of peace and I think when you have a genuine and intense discussion between two people at the top of these two most important governments, and it is a genuine, calm, businesslike, but intense discussion, that's sure to be helpful.

Q Did it clear the air, as far as you're concerned?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, clear the air -- there are lots of -- there's lots of distrust, there's lots of apprehension, there's lots of differences of opinion, and I don't think one discussion is going to clear the air completely. But I think it undoubtedly made some progress in that direction.

Q Mr. Secretary, the Foreign Minister, in his speech at the UN, said that the United States would have to back its words with concrete deeds. Is that still the Soviets' position, and is it still his view that the United States has to do something in certain areas for the Soviets will reciprocate?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think both the United States and the Soviet Union -- although I'll only speak for the United States -- feel that what counts is what is done, deeds. And that is why, as the President has approached this relationship, right from the beginning of his administration, he has concentrated on substantive matters. And by this time, there is a very long list of substantive suggestions, proposals, treaties. And he added some in his UN speech. So I think that it's perfectly correct to focus on deeds, not that the general atmosphere that can be created by discussions isn't a positive thing to do. But the essence of the matter is what is actually going to be done.

Q Are both sides going to follow this meeting now with some deeds?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The agreement at the end of the luncheon was that we will stay in touch, and how one side or the other will come to grips with specific suggestions will emerge from that process. But I remind you that from the area of nuclear armaments to space to chemical warfare to confidence-building measures to nuclear tests sites, there is a wide array of substantive proposals -- deeds, if you will -- that the United States, the President has put on the table for the consideration of the Soviet Union.

Q Mr. Secretary, is it fair to sum up by saying that the two men spoke forcefully about their known

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positions, and that nothing is really likely to come in any concrete fashion until after the election?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, that wouldn't be my summary, no. I don't know just when further discussions may take place.

Q What about the first part?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, you caught me so much at the end, that you'll have to repeat the first part -- but I'll think I'll stand on a summary. I've been trying to summarize in the brief statement I made in the beginning and in response to your questions.

Q Did the President raise human rights?

Q Do you think the President's attitude about the Soviets has changed at all as a result of his personal meeting with Mr. Gromyko? He's been pretty hardline toward the Soviets in the past.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, the President has consistently had a -- a set of ideas that have guided his policy. And they've really been pretty consistent throughout his Presidency. He has, from the beginning, insisted that we have to be realistic about the differences between our systems and other aspects of Soviet behavior. He has, from the beginning, been consistent in saying that we must be -- build our strength, our military, our economic, our spirit -- and he has said from the beginning that we also must be ready to negotiate. And there is an interplay among those three things, and that remains the case today. And I don't think the President has changed at all during the course of this period. Right now, particularly given the fact that many of the problems that were present at the start of his administration have beun dealt with, or are in the process of being dealt with, certainly there is a great emphasis on the importance of negotiation about the many overriding issues that are before us.

Q Mr. Secretary --

Q Did the President raise human rights in any fashion to the Foreign Minister?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Yes.

Q How did he do that?

Q Question, sir?

Q What was the question?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well the President -- the question was: Did the President raise human rights? -- and the answer is: Yes, he did, certainly. And I think, again, the President has said from the beginning that in all meetings with the Soviet Union, this subject will be raised; and he did so.

Q Sakharov?

Q Can you tell us what he said -- can you elaborate in any way?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, I think it -- I just will --

Q Sakharov?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: -- be glad to give you subjects that were talked about, but as to the content individually --

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Q Sakharov?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: -- I'm not going to give the names that he mentioned or anything of that kind.

Q Mr. Shultz, do you think that this meeting will help President Reagan for his reelection? (Laughter.)

Q Ahhhhhh. (Laughter.)

Q Now there's an interesting question --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I have no idea. (Laughter.) That's not my field. From the standpoint of the -- but from the standpoint of this meeting, it is a meeting that the President and I started talking about some time ago. The President has thought about the substance of it very carefully --

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undertook it in the spirit of a person, a human being who is President of the United States and who is dealing, as he deals with the Soviet Union, with matters of overriding importance. So, it was, as I've said, a very serious, businesslike but intense meeting dominated by important substance throughout.

Q Mr. Secretary --

Q Mr. Secretary --

MR. SPEAKES: Let's take George and --

Q Did this meeting --

MR. SPEAKES: -- Maureen and Helen and close there.

Q Did this meeting cover --

MR. SPEAKES: George.

Q Would you list the subjects? Just list the subjects that they covered.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, a great deal of the time was spent, at the beginning, on stating views and having discussion of these overriding issues of the nature of our relationship, where is it heading, the importance of dealing with the nuclear threat and things of that kind. So, it was, in a sense, philosophic, but, nevertheless, connected to overriding issues. And both men discussed that, and I don't recall just how much time, in total was spent on that.

There was a considerable amount of time spent discussing, in particular, but not negotiating about, just discussing the problems of nuclear weapons and what could be done about them.

There was some discussion of regional issues and particularly the Iran-Iraq situation, the situation in Lebanon and the Palestinian issues. So, those were basically the kinds of topics covered. And, as I said earlier, the President explictly did bring up the problems of human rights concerns.

Q Was there anything on which they agreed and, if so, could you itemize?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I said that they agreed to keep in touch. And that was the --

Q Was that it, in terms of --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: -- the end point. And I think that, at the end of an intense discussion like this, it's not the sort of thing where you agree, "All right. We'll do X, Y and Z." But rather that an effort has been made, on both sides, I'm sure, I know from the President's side, to get across, on a very personal level, his own convictions and his own views and depth of feeling about this subject. And, at least from my perspective, he did a very good job of it.

Q Why did he want to talk to Gromyko alone? And what -- Do you think it was to convey this personal view of his? Over and beyond the official --

MORE

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SECRETARY SHULTZ: He had some things -- points that he wanted to make to Mr. Gromyko alone, and he did it that way because he felt that just two individuals, all by themselves in a room, even though the others of us who were sitting around were not too numerous, nevertheless, there's something about a close one-to-one statement that perhaps carries special weight. And so he had some things that he wanted to give that weight to.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 2:50 P.M. EDT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
FOLLOWING MEETING BETWEEN
SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
AND
FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI GROMYKO

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 1984, 1:35 P. M.

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, everybody. We're ON BACKGROUND, attributable to senior American officials.

FIRST SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: As you know, the meeting took place in the Adams Room today on the 8th floor. Mr. Gromyko arrived about 10:00 o'clock. He was met at the C Street entrance by Secretary Burt and Ambassador Hartman. Went up in the elevator to the 8th floor. Was met at the doors by the Secretary. The Secretary escorted Mr. Gromyko and his party into the Adams Room. They each had a glass of orange juice in front of the blazing log fire.

They then went into the Jefferson Room for the photo opportunity where you gentlemen -- am I stealing all your good stuff? (Laughter)

Q Do you have more of this?

A The format was the same as in New York. There was a table. They met four on four. The Secretary sat directly opposite Mr. Gromyko. There was a white tablecloth over the table. Couple of jugs of water on the table. Side table: coffee, orange juice and sweet rolls.

The Secretary, both before and after the meeting, showed Mr. Gromyko a number of the relics, if that's the correct word, in that room, including the --

Q Conger wouldn't like that.

A -- including the desk used by Jefferson, the desk on which allegedly the Declaration of Independence was written.

As you know, the Secretary came down, saw Mr. Gromyko off. He then called the President, had a call of around 10 11 minutes with the President. The President's at Camp David. Then the only remaining event of the afternoon is that Deputy

Secretary Dam will escort Mr. Gromyko to the airport later this afternoon when he takes off.

Q Do you have a time on that?

A I don't have a time on that, unless --

SECOND SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: Around 5:00 o'clock.

A Around 5:00, somewhere around there.

Q That is a Soviet plane, right? An Aeroflot plane?

A It's a Soviet plane.

Q Why is Secretary Dam going?

A I think Deputy Secretary Dam met Mr. Gromyko, rode in with him, and I think it's considered appropriate that he will ride out with him.

We're still ON BACKGROUND. This is all still attributable to senior American officials.

SECOND SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: I brought (my colleague) along to give me a little help against this group.

I think I will just make a few opening comments. One would be that today's meeting was principally designed to wrap up threads that were left dangling after yesterday's meeting between the President and Mr. Gromyko.

As such, it was a constructive, useful meeting and, if we put this meeting in the broader context of the President's meeting yesterday and the meeting with Mr. Gromyko and the Secretary of State earlier this week in New York, then we get over eight and a half hours of rigorous give and take on nearly every global and bilateral issue which produced an agreement on a process of follow-up exchanges between the two sides.

I'll be happy to answer your questions.

Q At what level will this be?

A Just say that I don't want to go into details about follow-on -- follow-up exchanges other than to say it will likely occur at a variety of levels.

Q And what's different about that than what was taking place, and what has been described by you and others as quite a -

A I'm not trying -

Q -- large array?

A All I'm saying -- I mean, you're asking me what is the same or what's different. All I am saying is that these extensive discussions at the highest levels this week produced an agreement that there should be follow-up discussions.

We thought these discussions were very useful, and we think the further discussions on a range of different issues will be useful.

Q Can I just follow that up a bit? The President was rather specific in his U.N. speech in proposing a number of different venues for talks, including what he called an "umbrella framework" for arms control issues, as well as what I thought was going on anyway, kind of expert level discussions on regional issues.

Is there any -- when you're talking about an agreement on a process of follow-up, are you including these kinds of proposals in that, or is it just more routine foreign office-embassy contacts?

A First of all, I would go back and look at the President's speech on the regional discussions. He talked about regional exchanges at the political level. That could involve experts; there wasn't just expert discussion. You should go back and take a look at the language.

But what I am not going to do is go through a checklist of proposals that the President made

Q Could you

A -- Wait, let me finish -- and tell you how the Soviets reacted to each of those proposals. But I think that it is fair to say that those proposals were discussed today and in the earlier sessions, and we hope that the Soviet Union will come to recognize they are all useful proposals, and that they will go forward.

We have given the Soviet Union a set of channels for enhanced dialogue: on regional problems, on arms control problems, on what might be called the "philosophical level" of the future of the overall relationship in this so-called "umbrella proposal."

We hope that the Soviet Union will respond. And the real purpose of the sessions this week was to give the Soviet Union the background of our thinking on all of these issues so that Mr. Gromyko can take the message that he heard from the President and the Secretary of State back to Moscow, report to the other members of the Politburo -- presumably Mr. Chernenko -- and that over time we will see a more responsive Soviet Union.

MORE

Q Sir, Secretary Shultz said when he came down that the agreement to keep in touch, which I assume is what you're talking about here, was among other things that they agreed on. What were the other things that he was referring to?

A I don't want to -- again, I'm not going to -- I'm not able to go into too much detail on the specifics of their discussions. I think -- and I heard Secretary Shultz -- I think what he was saying, that among other things in the meeting, there was this agreement to stay in touch.

Q Oh, I see. It was not among other agreements?

A Again, I can't -- I haven't seen the transcript. This is my -- this is what I heard But you want to go back and play your tape again.

Q Yesterday when Secretary Shultz gave his readout, he said that what you had agreed on was to keep in touch, and when he was asked about whether there was a specific sort of mechanism for doing that, he said, "No."

Are you saying now that today you have agreed on something that is more specific than the vague "keeping in touch" that would make this go forward in a kind of steady process?

A We would like to see more regular, steady discussions and conversations with the Soviet Union, and there was some discussion of how best to do that.

Q But did they say yes or no?

A I'm not going to say more than that.

I said that there was agreement on a process of follow-on conversations.

Q What does that mean when you say there was an agreement, and now you won't say whether they agreed to it or not?

A I did. I thought I said that.

Q It's double talk.

A I thought I said that.

Q No. You said there was an agreement on the process of follow-up, and when Joanna asked whether the Soviets had agreed to a regular process, you said, as I understood you

--

A I said -- I said that there was agreement.

Q But they have agreed now to a regular process?

A I said that there is agreement on a process of follow-up conversations.

Q But that does not -- you're not implying that there's agreement on the President's proposal for high-level exchanges?

A What I said on that -- and I just reiterate -- is that we hope the Soviet Union will take those proposals and find them in their interest to respond positively.

Q What's the distinction?

Q We're all confused here. What's the distinction here?

A (My colleague) is going to help me out.

THIRD SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: Let me just try to make the distinction. As [redacted] as one who has participated in the process, I give you an impression that after these three days of talks, we are going to have a more rigorous exchange. How it's organized, exactly what the channels are, that remains to be decided, but it's my clear impression from those meetings that this will be a thoroughgoing exchange that we're going to have with them, and both sides agree to this.

Q And this includes arms control questions?

SECOND SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: I think the assumption is yes, that it includes all the topics that were addressed this week.

Q Without being specific, but was there a discussion about a possible follow-up meeting at the minister level, assuming the President is re-elected, or is that left pending for the obvious reason that there's an election coming up?

A I don't want to comment on that.

Q Can I ask about one other thing the Secretary said? He said the follow-up, the keeping in touch, would be done carefully, not casually.

A What? Sorry.

Q I don't understand what that means.

A Well, what I think he meant --

Q Now (your colleague) used the word "rigorous." I'm trying to get an idea what --

A Well, what I think the Secretary meant was, is that both sides recognized and agreed this morning that there had been a tremendous amount of dialogue this week and that the next step that was really necessary was for both sides to sit down by themselves and think through the implications of the fact of the meetings as well as the substance of the exchanges; and that's what is meant by both "careful and rigorous," that we will want to study what was said --

Q Did you hear --

A -- so that we can build on this week's conversations.

Q Did you hear anything from the Soviets this week that leads you to believe there has been any change in the Soviet attitude toward the U.S. or the Soviet policy on questions like removing missiles from Europe or anything of that sort of, that kind of substance, or was the discussion primarily on the ways to talk?

A I think it's important -- No. The discussion was on ways to talk, but the discussion was principally on what to talk about and the substance of what our differences are.

Q Sir --

A But I mean I think that before I say, even ON BACKGROUND, what we saw is new or not new, I think we do want to go through this process of careful evaluation.

Q Sir, was any progress made in these talks towards resuming arms control negotiations of any kind?

A I hope so. I hope so.

Q Does that mean that you don't know?.

Q One specific thing that was missing --

A It just means that I hope so.

Q -- in Gromyko's speech and in some of his contacts with other people, especially in New York, was the moratorium demand. Do you sense, without necessarily addressing that specifically, flexibility on the Soviet side in moving back toward arms control talks?

A I think it was very healthy that after a period in which the Soviet Union appeared unwilling to address nuclear weapons issues that there was a good give and take on these subjects, both with the President and the Secretary of State. That was a healthy, positive development: that we talked about the problem of nuclear weapons and how to control them.

Q Did you also talk procedurally about how best to resume negotiations? In what I mean, the President made some specific proposals.

A The issue of how to get back to the negotiating table was brought up. I think that's obvious.

It's clear that it is our desire, and it remains our desire, to get negotiations underway. We continue to believe that the Soviet walk out from the Geneva negotiations was unwarranted.

Q But the question is, did these eight and a half hours of talks bring both sides any closer to --

A We will have to see. We will have to see. Again, I answered this question before. I think it's healthy that there was a primary subject in the exchanges in all the meetings this week was the problem of nuclear weapons.

(MORE)

Q Before the week began, there was a lot of uncertainly as to why Mr. Gromyko accepted these meetings. Do you know any more now about the reasons for going through with this?

A No, and I think he'll have to answer that question when he gets around to going down those thousand questions.

Q Can you say anything about the Vienna talks?

A Sorry?

Q Can you say anything about the Vienna talks, the status of them? Has that changed at all as a result of this

Q The non-militerization of space.

Q Excuse me?

A Oh, you mean the -- you're not talking about the MBFR; you're talking about the --

Q No, the Vienna -- space or other issues talks, whatever you want to call them?

A Just that, clearly, that subject is related to the nuclear weapons problem, and that relationship and that overall subject was addressed.

Q Did the Soviets agree that it was related to the nuclear weapons subject?

A Well, again, I'm going to follow what I think is our position on this and not describe what the Soviet position is on any of these things.

Q Has anything changed, I'm asking, in the status of those talks?

A I think that we want to -- what we'll want to do is go carefully over these discussions.

Q Can I be more specific? Yesterday, the White House, ON BACKGROUND, was saying that in the discussion with Mr. Gromyko the President drew attention to the line in his speech where he said if these talks on outer space took place, we could -- the U.S. would be willing to discuss restraints and that sort of thing. I just wondered, did --

A Well, first of all, you're asking me to comment on what I saw as a statement in the press by an unidentified source. I'm not going to do that.

And, secondly, I'm not going to describe what the Soviet position was.

Q That's not what I was going to ask you. I was going to ask you whether today there was a more specific discussion -- in other words, were there any proposals exchanged, and that sort of thing?

A I said there were some threads from yesterday's meeting which were addressed in today's session.

Q Based on the Soviet attitude about holding umbrella talks, what is the Administration's position on perhaps appointing an individual to oversee all sorts of arms control negotiations?

A Well, I'm not aware of any Administration position on that subject.

Q What about the Soviet attitude on the umbrella talks?

A Sorry?

Q The idea of these broad --

A We would hope that the Soviet Union would agree to this proposal. We see it as an excellent way of getting back to the negotiations on offensive arms.

Q Do you expect anything from this follow-up process coming out before the November elections?

A You're asking me to predict what might happen in the future, and I can't say. We would like things to develop as quickly as possible, but it's impossible to say.

Q Did these eight and half hours of discussions produce any progress whatsoever in any of the other niggling areas of bilateral problems, such as cultural agreement, Aeroflot, that sort of thing?

A The bilateral issues in the relationship were addressed, but I think it's fair to say that the issues of nuclear weapons and arms control and regional problems took precedence. .But these problems came up, and we would like to see some progress in the bilateral relationship. And we hope that as a result of these meetings there will be further progress.

Q Let me try this, either you or (your colleague). As I see what you're saying is that there was an agreement on some kind of process in which the Soviets would get back to you, and presumably you would get back to the Soviets, on different ideas that were exchanged. Because you said you hoped that they would be agreeable to this and that.

Is this process more than just Gromyko talking to Ambassador Hartman?

A What I would say is this, Bernie: The fundamental objective of this week's meetings was to give Mr. Gromyko an opportunity to hear from the President himself, as well as from the Secretary of State, our views in detail on the most pressing problems of our time. That was the key objective.

Now if that produces a Soviet decision to re-engage in a constructive dialogue with us, that will be an important achievement. But that, really, is up to the Soviets in their own decision-making process. We can't predict how they're going to assess what they were told this week and how well they're even able to assess what they were told this week.

We would hope that this would produce a series of exchanges on a variety of levels covering several different issues like arms control, regional disagreements. But the important point is that we got our view across.

Q But let me just clarify one thing. Are you saying that prior to any resumption of talks, either in Geneva or Vienna or anywhere else, it is likely that there will be a continued exploration at a high level, on a one-to-one basis, of some of these issues? In other words, is there more work to be done in your sense, are you suggesting, before --

A I don't know. I just don't know.

A FIRST SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: Let's take a couple more questions. One over here.

Q So you say that you hope that the Soviet Union would respond and would be involved in a constructive dialogue. So this was not part of that dialogue you are talking about? We are still yet waiting for that kind of dialogue? This week's meetings were part of that dialogue?

A No, we felt that this week's meetings were constructive. But we have made other proposals, more focused proposals, to address different subjects, and it's clear we want the Soviets to accept those proposals.

FIRST SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: This is Fred Francis' last day at the State Department, so he ought to have the last question. (Laughter)

Q Are we any closer, after this eight and a half hours, to President Reagan sitting down with Mr. Chernenko?

A Time will tell. (Laughter).

A Thank you.

(Background briefing concluded at 1:55 p.m.)

[illegible]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
RE
CONTADORA PROCESS
MONDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1984, 2:33 P.M.

MR. ROMBERG: This briefing, which is ON BACKGROUND, attributable to a senior Department official, is on the Contadora process and on the -- if you wish to take it to that -- the meetings that were held recently in San Jose with the EC 10, and that general area of interest.

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Thank you.

I have a couple of points that I'd like to make and then open it up for your questions.

This is a period of extraordinary diplomatic activity that we're engaged in now and not one that was not foreseen -- that is, as early as last January, looking at what would be the likely course of events for this year. In part, because of the fact that the U.S. is going to have elections, we knew that there would be substantial diplomatic activity during this period. When the Nicaraguans in February announced that they would be having elections essentially concurrently with our own, it became clear that that would act as a significant catalyst to bring about a major intensification of diplomatic activity and, in fact, provide for us some substantial opportunities in that regard.

This led in part to an intensification of efforts on the part of the Contadora countries. It led to the Mexican President, De La Madrid, having come to Washington to discuss Contadora with President Reagan and with Secretary of State Shultz -- their request that we initiate a series of bilateral talks with the Nicaraguans to see what could be done, this having taken place in May -- and then in June we had Secretary of State Shultz' trip to Managua on the 1st of June, followed up shortly thereafter with the tabling within the Contadora 9 countries of the first draft of a Contadora Treaty.

Since that time there have been a half dozen meetings between ourselves and the guans related to the Contadora process. And the Foreign Ministers and working-level people in the ministries in Central America have been in active contact with each other within the Contadora process -- leading to the tabling in September of a second and substantially improved version of the Contadora Treaty, with a request by the Contadora countries that they -- the Central Americans -- provide comments back to them by October 15th.

The process of developing comments on this second draft has proceeded pretty much the way it did on the first draft, with intensive consultations between the Central Americans and ourselves on the content of the second draft. A great deal of effort has gone into it. Every country has a slightly different perspective on the second draft. I think there is a general view that although substantially improved it needs still some further refinements in order to make it a treaty that would in fact bring peace to Central America.

The reason why this has been such a diplomatically intense period is in part -- as I pointed out previously -- a function of the Nicaraguan elections being scheduled for November 4th. Imagine, if you will, if the Nicaraguan elections actually take place as they're currently constituted with a significant provision of the Contadora Act, of the Draft Treaty, calling for free and fair democratic elections in the countries of Central America.

Obviously, if the Nicaraguan elections -- will have already taken place -- the Nicaraguans will claim that they have already abided by that section of the Treaty and will be reluctant to sign on to new elections.

If those elections in fact turn out not to be free and fair, it will be unacceptable for the other countries of the region to sign on to the Nicaraguan interpretation of what is meant by "free and fair elections" under the Treaty.

So, too, if the Nicaraguans, let's say, postpone their elections and allow for free and fair participation. That would also have a profound impact as to how the Treaty would be viewed by the other Central American countries -- so that, in a very serious way, the date of the Nicaraguan election is intimately tied to many of the other considerations that we're hearing today.

The Nicaraguans hoisted, if you will, in the dilemma of trying to determine whether or not to postpone their elections, have consistently maintained that they would not do so, while privately signalling the possibility that they might, and at the same time have agreed to accept the Contadora Act as it's currently drafted without any further revisions being made to it as essentially a device for trying to define the Contadora Act in a way that would be convenient for them and then leaving intact many of the remaining loopholes.

I'll be glad, if you're interested, to get into other detailed description of what some of those are if you'd like -- and with that I'll throw it open to your questions.

Q Why don't you begin with that and then some of the loopholes?

A O.K. I would say that there are basically three problem areas in the current draft. That is down from a substantially higher number in the previous draft. We think it's a superb document in terms of being a basis for negotiation but does not ensure that what it purports to do will actually be done in these areas.

One of these areas, problem areas, is the lack of simultaneity -- that is, that there are certain sections of this Act which would go into effect upon signature. There are certain sections that go into effect 30 days after signature, but there are other sections that have yet to be negotiated among the parties.

It would require, for example, on the question of arms levels, that the five Central Americans agree among themselves on how to proceed in terms of arms reductions. And the Act, as currently drafted, calls for negotiations among the parties to be concluded within a certain period of time. But there's absolutely no assurance that that negotiation would in fact take place and that an agreement would be reached in that negotiation.

In that sense, that portion of the Treaty would then not go into effect, while several other sections of the Treaty that are interrelated with it would go into effect -- you would have an unbalanced implementation -- so that this question of simultaneity is one that is preoccupying, particularly I think to the Hondurans and the Salvadorans, because one of the things that would go into immediate effect, or into effect after 30 days, would be a cutoff in foreign assistance -- foreign military assistance -- to those governments.

The idea in the Act is that that cutoff would only take place for a short period, pending the negotiation of the arms agreements. But in point of fact it would give the Nicaraguans veto over future shipments of arms to those countries.

The second area is the lack of precision and detail on verification. Under the Act -- which is improved in this regard with respect to the previous Act -- it still would require that the Central American states agree at some future time on the verification mechanisms.

The draft calls, for example, for five independent verifiers to be appointed by the Contadora countries and agreed to by the Central Americans. The

Act is unclear what would happen if agreement was not reached among the Central Americans. There is, obviously, the possibility, therefore, that you would have the provisions taking effect without an effective verification mechanism in place.

In fact, even in the ideal circumstances under this current draft, the verification mechanism would not take place -- would not go into being -- until 30 days after the signing of the Act and after the implementation of some of the other provisions of the Act so that there is a serious weakness still remaining in the verification area.

In that regard I should also point out that there are no provisions in the Act as currently constituted for staff or for the funding of the verification mechanism. All those things are left to future deliberation.

Now, let me say that I don't want to sound excessively negative on these points. These are the shortcomings. The positive side is that the verification is included in the Act, and it is clear -- the intent of the drafters -- that verification take place. And that we view as an extremely positive event.

So, too, it is the intent of the drafters of the

Act that there be some kinds of arms limitations; and that is also extremely positive.

The question really is not so much of what is in the Act but how well drafted it is in terms of actually being something that can be implemented and will be implemented.

The final area of overriding objection, I would say, is the question of what is meant by "democratization" and this whole effort on the part of the Nicaraguans to essentially trivialize the democratization portions of the Act by having it take effect immediately, thereby ratifying their own electoral process -- which is, clearly, not the kind of electoral process that is envisioned in the Act itself.

Q If a third draft of the Contadora document meets all these -- or satisfies these -- objections, then would the United States remove its objections to the document?

A It isn't that we have raised objections to the document, other than simply pointing out that there were areas that used to need or where improvements continue to be needed. So it isn't a question of removing the objections. Obviously, if once a document is in place that would bring peace to the region, then we would strongly support it.

Q But if they changed the language in those three areas to meet the needs of verification -- which supposedly would also be the needs of some of the countries in the region -- then do you think the document would then be ready for collective signing?

A I think if those three broad areas are met, it would certainly be our view that -- I mean you'd have to look at the document -- that is, as it stood at that stage -- but those are the three principal objections; and, if those were removed, then I think you would have a document that would have a chance of bringing peace to the region.

Q Does the verification procedure need teeth? I saw nothing in the document that would provide for some method of enforcement.

A Well, there are several methods of enforcement in any verification, as you all know. One of the best is the ability to bring to public scrutiny violations.

One of the areas that probably could be improved in the document is the fact that all of the reports of the Verification Commission are supposed to be kept confidential. That would strike us that exactly the opposite should be the case: The reports of the Verification

Commission should be made public.

Yes, it does need teeth -- particularly with respect to the Ad Hoc Verification Group on Internal Reconciliation and Electoral Procedures.

That currently is a group that -- first of all would require Nicaragua's assent, and everybody else's assent, as to the membership of the Group -- and that is not yet worked out.

And, secondly, it reports to the parties, but nothing happens then after that, so that presumably there is absolutely no recourse.

On the security measures it's somewhat better in that if the parties are unable to work out differences, there is a reference procedure to the Contadora countries. But even then, if they are unable to work out the differences, there isn't any mechanism for enforcing the Act.

Q How many countries have accepted the drafting of the second draft as it now stands?

A Well, first of all, I think it would be misleading to say that the Contadora countries themselves have accepted the document as it currently stands. I think many of the shortcomings that we see in the document today, as well as all of its positive points, are -- the views are shared between us and a number of the Contadora countries themselves on what those shortcomings are.

Among the others, the only ones that have said they want the Act stopped in its current state and that they are prepared to sign -- but not see any further negotiations on it -- are the Nicaraguans.

(MORE)

Q The suggestion has been made by some people, rightly or wrongly, that they were pretty ready to accept this as it was until we started throwing warning flags on our friends down there pulling them back.

A Oh, I suppose you could argue that there would have been a brilliant tactic to have been made that we should have immediately leapt on it and the Nicaraguans would have rejected it and shown all the reasons why they couldn't accept it. But, in fact, I think what we're looking for here is a document that will bring peace and stability to the region and not simply looking at this as a purely propaganda ploy.

In that regard I might add that it's not at all clear to me that [illegible] the long run Nicaragua won't come to regret its precipitous action on this particular document, in that they are going to have a hard time arguing, as they have heretofore, that it will be impossible to accept a treaty that contained a democratization provision.

Q How likely are you to get this and to get it approved?

A Well, clearly there is another round of negotiations to be gone through. I don't know if it is just one round or if it's several This draft, believe me, is much closer to being the kind of thing that is needed than, quite frankly, we would have anticipated could have been developed in this period of time. On the other hand, some of the deficiencies are substantial, and whether the Nicaraguans have really adopted a take-it-or-leave-it attitude toward it,or whether they are [illegible]pared to sit down and negotiate seriously on the issue,remains to be seen. If, in fact, they're prepared to negotiate seriously, then I get the impression everybody else in the region is, in which case I would say the prospects would not be that bad. But the critical factor, once again, comes in: (A) Nicaraguan intentions, and (B) what are they going to do with these elections that are scheduled for November 4? Because if they go ahead and hold elections that are universally considered to be fraudulent, the question will have to be raised how does that fit in with the democratization provisions of the Act? Are they prepared to schedule new elections then after that date, or in fact are those a take-it-or-leave-it proposition?

Q I wondered what exactly you're calling for now. Would t be all right with you if all the countries did sign on October 15 this draft document, or are you saying that there should be no signature?

A No, I think it's not a question of whether we're calling upon them to sign or not sign. They all have their own views as to what needs to be done. I think the four Central Americans other than Nicaragua have all in their own ways expressed what their reservations are with the current draft as well as saying that they think that it's a substantial improvement over previous drafts and a step forward, and we would agree with that general point of view. We would favor the signing of a document that would, in fact, restore peace to Central America. Now, this document in its current form doesn't quite achieve hat objective and it needs some refinement.

Q Okay, could I just follow up on that? You say that to sign it now will not bring peace to Central America, so that your implication is that it shouldn't be signed at this time. But according to FBIS, Duarte said in Caracas that he was willing to sign it before November elections in the United States, and Foreign Minister Gutierrez of Costa Rica made a statement to La Republica in San Jose in which he said that the decision had already been made to go ahead and sign it and that Costa Rica's objections had been rectified in the second draft. Now, are they really just saying this for public consumption, on one hand, and that privately they really have these reservations and have no intention to sign?

A I think you would have to ask them what it is that motivates their public statements and what their views are on the issue. In our contacts with the Central American countries they've raised essentially the same order of problems with the current draft that we have while having probably the same potential remedies in mind in terms of drafting language. And I think there is a view that a good treaty can be had in the sense that some refinements can be made to the existing draft which would make it in fact a good treaty that would have a chance of bringing peace to the region.

Q Well, can I just ask when did they bring it, especially in light of this 14 September statement of Foreign Minister Gutierrez that said the new document is verifiable and obligatory and binding on each of the countries and its problems with the previous document had been taken into account, when exactly did Costa Rica, for example, or President Duarte bring to the United States' attention the problems that it had with the draft? When was that exactly?

A We've had numerous conversations with all of those parties since the draft was originally tabled, and I would say those comments -- I wouldn't want to put what our private diplomatic contacts have been with respect to their public comments. Nevertheless, I think the general level of reservations about the current draft has existed for some time in each of the Central American States at least since they've had a chance to sit down and look at it seriously. Let me say also that one should not confuse the public declarations that they have made that they would be prepared to sign a Contadora treaty by a certain date, or that they would be prepared to support the Contadora process, with a specific endorsement of this particular draft. In fact, this draft should be endorsed as a positive step in the process, but it still needs further steps in order to constitute a document that would bring peace to the region.

Q I'm not sure I follow you. I want to see if this is a fair statement of one thing. If I understand you, what you are saying is it is the view of the United States for the Contadora process carried through the conclusion of coming up with a document to have validity, Nicaragua either has to abandon the elections that are now scheduled on November 6 (sic) or supersede them at some later date with elections under another set or type of rules. Otherwise, you say it doesn't have any validity?

A I would say that if the Nicaraguans would hold to the premise that the elections that they've currently scheduled along the lines that they've currently scheduled them constitute free and fair elections as called for under the Treaty, that that would, in fact, render meaningless one of the provisions of the Treaty and that such an act would make a negotiation of a comprehensive treaty very difficult.

Q You mentioned Nicaragua's intentions. Does it really make a difference whether they sign or don't sign the Contadora agreement if they intend to go ahead and do what they're doing, or if they intend to change and come into the process? It still doesn't matter if they sign, does it?

A Well, I take your point. I think, however, we would view that there is a useful treaty out there. That is to say that if you were to be able to refine the second draft and had the verification mechanisms in it that are necessary to insure compliance on the part of the parties, that that in fact would be a very useful development -- the seeing of the coming into fruition of such a treaty. So in that sense I would say it is important, it would be important to have it, and we have been working toward it and we intend to keep working toward it.

Q Alan Romberg said earlier that he understood another draft or some revisions might be being prepared already. Has the United States seen those, and would it support them or think that those revisions would be an acceptable Contadora treaty?

A There are a series of drafts actually in preparation right now in bits and pieces of language that I don't think I could comment on. Some of them are very good; some of them are less good. We'll have to wait and see what actually surfaces under that process before we can take a position on it. We obviously have in our own minds the kinds of fixes that need to be made to make it a good and binding document, one that closes off the existing loopholes.

Q Have you told someone about those and they have said yes we could put that in a draft?

A We have a regular and very active exchange of views with both the Contadora countries and the Central

American countries, including the Nicaraguans, on these issues, and we have been in touch expressing our views to all of them.

Q And has anyone agreed to incorporate those into a draft?

A Well, I think there is a general run right now of looking at drafting changes that have to be made. Some of them incorporate our changes; some of them undoubtedly don't. This isn't a question of everybody signing onto what we want to see done. They take our comments into account like they do those of the parties directly involved.

Q The shortcomings of the Treaty are pretty obvious, as you described them. They must have been obvious as well to the Contadora four, the countries that wrote it up. Is it possible that they left out these sensitive issues such as how many helicopters can overfly whose territory, how many days a week, and how big the army should be, simply because they were very sensitive issues that could be resolved only by the countries themselves? I can't believe that they would submit this as a final document expecting that the five Central American countries would embrace it.

In fact, I don't think they have, in the sense that clearly in putting the document forward and asking for comments on it it would imply that they didn't intend to imply that this be the end of the process. On the other hand, they're driven by the same facts of life that drive the rest of the diplomatic process in the region, and that is that if the Nicaraguans do go ahead and have their elections on November 4 there is sort of a pressure to get something done before that date. Now, I think they were interested in having a debate on the merits of the issue, and I think that's precisely what's going on in diplomatic exchanges right now, and I think a lot of positions have clarified as a result of the tabling of the second draft.

I think it was a commendable effort on their part, but I don't think it was one that they intended would close off the debate and everyone could pack their bags and go home and peace would be restored to Central America.

Q Why didn't they say so?

A Well, I don't think that they would have. It would have been improbable or asking too much of them, I think, to say that, "Look, we're tabling here an imperfect document that needs additional work." I think that wouldn't have achieved the objectives that they had in mind.

Q Daniel Ortega apparently demands that the United States sign off on whatever is agreed. Do you understand what he is getting at, and will we be a formal signatory of whatever comes out?

A We haven't yet decided exactly what our formal role will be with respect to it, nor do I think it's the most relevant question. The fact is that if there is a peace agreement reached among the countries in Central America, I think that will pretty much dictate the U.S. role; so that that is perhaps not the crucial question, and what Daniel Ortega had in mind is not abundantly clear since it has had a number of different iterations.

Q You alluded to this before, but what is your sense at this point as to where Nicaragua stands on it insofar as saying, "We have bought it, and this is what we have bought, and that is it." You talked before about the possibility of maybe it's take it or leave it or maybe it's open to revision, but you must have a sense of how Nicaragua --

A Actually it was a good negotiating ploy. I think they see it as having been a good negotiating ploy, and it had an additional benefit from their perspective in that it took the attention off of their elections where they were getting a lot of heat. I think that that negotiating ploy is already beginning to wear thin and in fact will come back and haunt them in the sense that going through nominally signing on to these things will someday be cited by the other Central Americans as a form of pressure on them to in fact abide by the provisions that are in the current Act. So it remains to be seen who will get the last laugh on this one.

Q If I can ask you one last question, in terms of what you were previously saying about the possibility that the Contadora four did not really think that this was a draft that would be workable or a draft that they wanted signed, how would you explain the statement last week of Bernardo Sepulveda, Mexico's Foreign Minister, that he in fact thought that given the unofficial but stated agreement of all the Central American countries to the revised draft treaty as it stood, that he would not only push for its signing before the October 15 deadline, but might even try to push that up quite a bit, and speaking about the next couple of weeks?

A Obviously I would leave for Sepulveda to explain his own public remarks. I'm unaware, quite frankly, of any expression of interest from the Central American countries other than Nicaragua to the Mexicans of a desire to sign this particular draft. There is an enormous desire to sign a treaty that will in fact bring peace to the region, but it has to be a treaty that leaves open the prospect of achieving what it purports to achieve. Specifically on the areas of democratization in Nicaragua and on arms and force levels, foreign advisers, and support for foreign insurgencies.

In that regard -- to go back to the earlier question--just because the Nicaraguans say that this is take it or leave it doesn't mean that it actually is take it or leave it. The fact is that the question of the extension of the date of the election is very much open to question still, and further modifications to the Treaty I think are still very much open to question also.

Q Have you received any indications that they may change the date of the election, recent indications?

A They flood the circuit with indications on all sides of the issue. (Laughter)

(Whereupon, briefing concluded at 3:02 p.m.)

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATON OFFICIAL
Prime ON
VISIT OF FOREIGN MINISTER PERES OF ISRAEL

October 5, 1984

The Briefing Room

10:05 A.M. EDT

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll begin by going over the schedule and the expected major participants on both sides. Then, I'll say a few words about the issues we expect to come up and, then, be happy to take your questions.

He'll be arriving on Monday morning. And Ambassador Lewis and Ambassador Murphy will be meeting him out at Andrews. Then, Secretary of State will meet them at the Washington Monument grounds. We'll go directly into an initial meeting to review the schedule and see that we're going to be able to --

Q What are all these times?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me just run through it on the basis -- I think the times will be -- well, the important times will be published, won't they, Bob --

MR. SIMS: I -- not unless you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think that we can say the exact time of the meeting. I'd be happy to indicate early morning or late morning. Arrive early morning. First meeting will begin after arrival. And I don't know how long it'll go on. The rest of the day will be free until that evening when the Secretary will host dinner for the Israeli delegation at his home.

Tuesday will begin with the Secretary hosting a small breakfast for the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister and Vice Prime Minister Shamir. That will be followed by a morning meeting with the Secretary of Defense, and, then, in late morning the delegation on Tuesday will come over to the White House to meet with the President. There will be a small meeting with the President, then a traditional few minutes of one-on-one with the President, then a larger meeting in the Cabinet Room, followed by a working luncheon.

We expect the official departure statements will take place after that. That would be about 1:30 p.m. on Tuesday. And, then, the Israeli delegation would adjourn over to the State Department for further talks. That evening there will be a call on the Vice President, and the Vice President will host dinner. The dinner will be at the Department of Agriculture because the 8th floor of the State Department is undergoing renovation

Then, on Wednesday, there will be a pre-departure breakfast with the Secretary of State. And they will depart early Wednesday morning.

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As for the major participants on both sides: On the Israeli delegation, of course, it will be led by Prime Minister Peres; Vice Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Shamir; Ambassador Rosenne; Menachem Meron, who's the Director General of the Minister of Defense; Abraham Tamir is the Director General of the Prime Minister's office and his National Security Advisor; Yossi Beilin is the government's Secretary; Hanon Bar-On, the Deputy Director General with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and other advisors to the Prime Minister.

On our side, the principal participants in various talks will be, of course, the President and Vice President, the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Treasury, Ambassador Kirkpatrick, Undersecretary Armacost from the State Department, Bud McFarlane, Dick Murphy, our Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs, and Herb Stein, former

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Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, who was serving as a consultant to the Secretary of State.

As far as issues, one can say, in general, that the U.S.-Israeli relationship has been very close and cooperative over the past year and we expect that to continue and see a reaffirmation of that type of relationship. Obviously, the Israeli economy will be a principal issue. And in that regard, I'd say that our posture is, we're ready to work closely with Israel's leaders in their efforts to find effective, creative, and enduring solutions to Israel's current economic problems.

On the political side, certainly, the question of South Lebanon and Israel's plans for -- or hopes -- for an early withdrawal of its forces will be on the agenda. These will be following on discussions that the Secretary and Foreign Minister Shamir have had recently in New York on Ambassador Murphy's recent visit to the area. It's worth noting that the discussions so far have been exploratory, that we're not engaged in any formal negotiations or mediation, but the United States is willing to play a helpful role if the parties want our involvement and if there seems to be a reasonable prospect that something can be achieved, meaning that if there is a prospect that the current wide gaps and differences between the parties can be narrowed.

We're not now in that kind of a situation, but it is a moving situation with the government of Israel having announced its intention to withdraw if satisfactory security arrangements for its northern border can be achieved. We have the Unifil renewal coming up at the UN on October 19th. And they're have been a lot of discussions among the various concerned delegations on that subject in New York.

We expect the questions of broader peace will also be discussed and what might be possible in the future on reaching a broader peace between Israel and its neighbors. Certainly, the relationship between Israel and Egypt, which is a key relationship in the area, will be discussed. And, normally, in such sessions, we have a review of Israel's security posture.

I mentioned that the Secretary of Defense is on the schedule and these discussions would take place within the framework of our traditional commitment to helping Israel preserve its qualitative edge and to maintain the capability to defend itself against any combination of potential adversaries.

I just close my remarks by saying we're looking forward to the visit, we welcome it, and we expect to see a reaffirmation of the very close U.S.-Israeli relationship that is currently the case.

I'd be happy to take your questions.

Q How much money do they want?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We expect that --

Q And how much will they get?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: These are questions that it's premature to answer right now. Obviously, the economy is high on the list of items to be discussed. We expect that the Prime Minister will be laying out for us his plans and his program in that regard, and in the context of that program, we will see how we can best be helpful.

There's been no discussion up to this point of actual figures. I expect that --

Q At what level has there not been a discussion?

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There's been a discussion at some level of figures, has there not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In terms of government to government, there has not because we have not yet been formally presented with the full Israeli program. We -- obviously, you have seen and we have seen some measures that Israel has taken. And we certainly note with -- that the Paris goverment is addressing this question with great seriousness and with great priority. But actual figures have not yet come out.

Q But you're not meaning to imply that this administration is going to hold off funds to the Israeli goverment pending its approval of the Peres plan for getting the economy back on its feet?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm saying that this is something we're going to discuss and work out together. That is one of the reasons -- that's the reason why included in our participants are the Secretary of the Treasury and Herb Stein. I think the general characterization of our posture now is, we're going to be in a listening mode, but a sympathetic listening mode, and we want to see how we can be most helpful in helping the Israeli government put into effect its plan, its program.

Q Peres said a few days ago he is not going to be asking for any specific supplemental aid on this trip and this is its stop-gap aid. But are you looking for a longer-range plan and just -- what type of economic talks are you looking for? Some long-term aid program or military aid program so you can get some hearing on this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the wrong focus is "aid program", Bernie. I think the right focus is a long-term and comprehensive Israeli economic program that will lead to the restoration of health to the Israeli economy. That's what we're -- I think both we and the Israeli government are looking for. And stopgaps and sort of quick-fix bridging arrangements may, indeed turn out to be part of that, but the focus is going to be on a long-term, a comprehensive, and an effective program.

Q Are you going to have a ceremony on the signing of the free trade legislation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that's one we haven't quite answered yet because, as you know, we're just in the process of getting the enabling legislation now and the negotiations on the free trade area are not quite complete yet. There are some further negotiations that have to take place. I think we're over the watershed and it's not going to take a long time to wrap them up, but there is a little more that has to be done.

Whether there is some kind of a signing of principals or heads of agreement, something like that, that's something that may or may not come about at this point.

Q Is there any particular reason why this was not set up as a State visit? It's his first visit here as Foreign Minister.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think I know the answer to that. It's --

Q Isn't it more customary for that to be the format?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, the -- I think it's customary that you have periodic visits to Washington by Israel's leaders. It happens generally more than once in an administration and in a term, and I wouldn't put any particular emphasis or value on whether we call it a State visit or a working visit.

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Certainly, as I've indicated by the schedule, the amount of interchange that we're going to have is really very comprehensive. We're going to have the opportunity to get into the issues that concern us very deeply.

Q On the troop withdrawal question, could you summarize for us

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what the U.S. understands to be the positions of the Lebanese and the Israelis at this point, and talk a little bit about what might be done to narrow what you call "wide differences" between the two.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think I'm prepared to do that at this point, Barry. A certain amount has been said in the press, but our understandings are still in the category of diplomatic communications between governments, and I think I'll pass that one.

Q Yesterday Prime Minister Karami said at a press conference that he had asked to see the President this week. Are there any plans to receive him in Washington?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think the President is going to have the time in his schedule.

Q Do you see any effort to get anything moving on the President's September 1st, 1982 program?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: At this point, I wouldn't see too much that is realistic. We have just had, you know, the Israeli elections and the extraordinary effort that went into forming this coalition government. It's well known that the area of Middle East peace negotiations is the one that has been probably the most difficult for this unity government to resolve within itself. And it's going to take some time to sort that out.

For our part, the President reaffirmed in his U.N. General Assembly address that our policies are based on his September 1st initiative. We will certainly be discussing this subject with the government of Israel, and we're in a mode that we want to take advantage of any opportunities that exist to make progress toward broader peace. We don't want to miss any opportunities and we want to work to create an atmosphere that makes those opportunities possible. But --

Q Well, why don't you see Karami then if you want all these opportunities?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Secretary of State has just seen Mr. Karami up in New York, and they've had very comprehensive discussions, so I don't think it's correct to say we haven't -- we haven't been talking with Mr. Karami -- we have.

Q Does that mean that the Secretary of State sees no profit for the President in seeing him -- no progress that can be made?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that we've explored and addressed the issues pretty thoroughly with Mr. Karami and we understand each other's positions. It may be that Assistant Secretary Murphy will be seeing him again before he leaves.

Q And were those positions at odds with each others?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right now there are considerable gaps between the positions of the parties.

Q What kind of gaps?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Large gaps.

Q Large --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, but I just -- I'm not really prepared to go into that beyond what different parties have said in the press already.

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Q Does Karami have the kind of authority that would be necessary to negotiate any change in those gaps?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He is certainly one of the principal figures of the Lebanese government, and has a considerable influence. His views will be influential in the way the Israeli government comes out. He is Prime Minister and Foreign Minister both.

Q But does the Lebanese government have the authority to narrow these gaps -- or shouldn't you be talking to people in Damascus?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Obviously, people in Damascus are not unrelated to that problem, and the Secretary of State is meeting with the Syrian Foreign Minister today -- up in New York.

Q As I understand it --

Q In that regard, is the U.S. ready to offer itself as a mediator in any troop withdrawal?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is not a decision that has been taken yet. We are not engaged in any formal negotiations or mediation. We have been engaged in exploring the positions of the parties to see whether there is a helpful role that we can play. But we're not sure there is.

Q Do they really want to listen to --

Q Excuse me -- you said -- we're not sure there is?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not sure there is at this point.

Q Well, what do you base that on?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On the exploratory

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contacts we've had so far.

Q I think you've just answered my question.

Q Is this what you're going to tell Peres because it seems to me that Shamir did ask for U.S. mediation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think his latest statement that he said in New York was that he had not formally asked for U.S. mediation.

Q No, he asked in an interview, didn't he?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, he said he was thinking of asking for it. We looked closely at that interview.

Q Getting back to --

Q So, he backed away from it, huh?

Q Getting back to the aid package, is the U.S. government willing to forgive the loans that it has provided Israel over the last 20 years? And, also, is the government willing to grant permission to Israel -- excuse me, to other countries which receive FMS credits, to use those credits to buy goods from Israel?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are a lot of possibilities, and a lot of them have been explored and discussed and speculated about in the press, and it's premature to talk about what kinds of things might be done. Those decisions are only going to be taken in the context of Israel's own program, which we don't really have fully spelled out to us yet.

I think the one thing that is quite sure is that Congress is going to approve the FY '85 assistance program for Israel, and those funds will be available. And what beyond that is -- remains to be seen.

Q Well, what kinds of recommendations have the -- did the Stein Committee make to the President about economic austerity measures that Israel should implement and what kinds of things the U.S. government should consider in providing the Israelis --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the primary feeling has been, as I've said, that we've got to work with Israel and Israel has to develop its program. And we will work with it in a helpful mode to try to make that program work.

Q Isn't -- we keep talking about -- you keep talking about the Israelis' program -- won't the Israelis' overall program be a U.S.-Israeli program in the end? I mean, we're talking about a lot of input by the U.S. and a lot of our economic advisers and a lot of our dollars going into Israel. So, therefore, we're going to have quite a lot of input. Is this not an Israeli-U.S. plan in the end? Is that not what we're getting --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think it's an Israeli plan. If you're talking about the way the U.S. assists, you've got an overall Israeli annual budget of something on the order of $20 billion. You have an economic assistance program from the United States that in this amount about to be voted is going to be $1.2 billion. So, that is not anywhere near a controlling or really influential portion. It's obviously important, but to say -- to put it in terms of joint -- our role is not that great. It's first and foremost Israel.

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Q But that's predicated -- that aid is predicated on certain conditions by the Israelis as well to -- in their austerity plan or whatever -- I mean --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That particular aid is not predicated on any Israeli plan. If it hasn't been voted, I expect it will be by the end of the day. And those funds will be available.

Q Do you expect any discussion of settlements?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Within the context of what might be possible toward a broader peace, I expect there will be a discussion of settlements. We'll want to understand each other's positions.

Q How about other West Bank issues?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think they will come up. Sure.

Yes?

Q Is it the U.S. view that Israel would benefit in its economic performance if it dropped wage indexing?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know as we can be that affirmative on any one single measure. What's you're looking at is a comprehensive approach. And indexing, obviously, fits into that. But I don't think we want to point to any specific measure or action as being indispensable or the absolute condition. No, I wouldn't put it that way.

Q As I understand it, as part of this unity government, Ariel Sharon was again given a post in that government. Am I correct?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, that's correct.

Q Is he going to come to the United States as a part of the Israeli entourage?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, he will not be part of this delegation. No. He's the Minister of Transportation.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Commerce.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATIUN OFFICIAL: Commerce, yes.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 11:32 A.M. EST

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ON-THE-RECORD PRESS BRIEFING
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
RE
FORMATION OF
INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCE
ON
AFRICAN FOOD EMERGENCY
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 9, 1984, 1:36 P.M.

MISS SEMERAD: Good afternoon. Thank you for coming.

The briefing today will be on the formation of an Inter-Agency Task Force on the African Food Emergency. The briefer will be M. Peter McPherson, the Administrator of AID and the President's Special Coordinator for Foreign Disaster Assistance.

The briefing will be ON THE RECORD for both sound and camera.

MR. McPHERSON: Good afternoon.

The drought in Africa is a very serious one, and I'd like to make a couple of announcements concerning it -- concerning the U.S. response.

So far this fiscal year, fiscal year 1985, we have committed some 52 million dollars' worth of food for Africa. That's food to some 13 countries, I think, in the handout we have made available. It will be a breakdown by country.

In fiscal 1984, the year just finished, we provided 172 million dollars' worth of food. This was some 500,000 tons of food. It is our expectation that in fiscal '85, the year just beginning, that we will commit in excess of that amount.

We have just created an inter-Government, a Governmentwide, Task Force to coordinate the U.S. Government's response to this disaster situation. This Task Force includes the Department of Defense, the United States Department of Agriculture, OMB, the State Department and many other agencies.

The first meeting of the Task Force was held this morning. In my role as the President's Special Coordinator for Foreign Disaster Assistance, I've appointed as my Deputy for Africa Drought and as Chairman of this Task Force General Jules Becton, who will speak to you in a moment.

Let me review very briefly what we did in 1984. The situation was especially bad in southern Africa and in parts of West Africa. Some 26 countries all over the Continent ultimately were affected. As I mentioned a moment ago, there was a total of 172 million dollars committed and over 500,000 tons of food.

Actually, the U.S. provided over 50 percent of the food which actually arrived in Africa. And the U.S. is, by far, the fastest-responding government to disasters; and in this case we provided, as I indicated, some 50 percent of the food.

What we did in 1984 was three times what we did in 1983 and four times what we did in disaster assistance for Africa in 1982. We delivered in 1984 more food for Africa than we did at the high point of the drought, the terrible drought, in the early seventies in the Sahel.

The situation in 1985, of course, is one that we've been working hard on. The situation may be worse, though it's in different parts of the Continent -- or, at least, the severity is in different parts of the Continent. It appears that in southern Africa the problem may not be as bad. But, clearly, it gets worse in countries such as Kenya and Niger.

Our projections -- an important part -- are based upon a rainfall that we know has not come. For example, in Kenya and Niger -- in both countries -- it appears that roughly 50 percent of the normal rainfall has occurred, so that the crops which will be harvested in the next few months will be at less than 50 percent of the normal production -- with, obviously, serious shortfalls and very hungry people.

The drought is now two and three years old, depending upon the location around the Continent. Farmers, historically, in Africa have kept two or three years of reserves against bad times. But, obviously, this drought has stretched on and on. Those reserves have been used. Therefore, that, along with this lack of rainfall, adds to depth of severity of the situation.

In some parts of the Continent, warfare has had an impact. There has been warfare in Mozambique, in Angola, and Ethiopia. In those war-torn areas particularly, the problem is quite severe.

There are some broader problems, of course, that have contributed to all this. Agricultural policies in many countries have in effect discouraged food production. But for at least 10 years -- and probably 15 years -- per capita food production in Africa has been going down every year. This is in part because urban dwellers have political power. That's where the government employees are; that's where the students are; that's where populations are that can ride, and so on. And many times they have put into place policies to keep food for urbanites but doing that by holding the price a farmer would get below market level. And that impact, of course, is that it's a disincentive to production and agriculture has run down in many places in the Continent.

That agricultural policy disincentive system, combined with population growth rates -- which have been very large, actually larger in many parts in Africa than most other parts of the world -- Kenya, for example, the classical example, with four percent population growth rate -- all these factors have contributed to the severity of the situation.

The U.S. has, as I indicated, responded very extensively in 1984. It is our plan to do so again in '85 to this disaster assistance, this disaster situation. We think that we've got to keep in mind through this period that the long term is also of critical importance and can't be neglected during this time of stress.

To that end, the Executive Branch has asked for 1985 from Congress approximately a billion dollars in total economic assistance. Included in that billion dollars is the so-called Africa Economic Policy Initiative that I spoke to you about in some past press conferences. That's a fund which will be used for purposes of, in effect, rewarding countries that make substantial steps in improving their economic policies -- like those farm prices I mentioned a moment ago.

The Conference Committee on the Hill has approved a package of some 75 million dollars without naming it the Africa Economic Policy Initiative, but that package we expect to use for those purposes.

Those are my comments today. I would next like to introduce for a brief comment General Becton, and after his comments we would welcome any questions you might have.

GENERAL BECTON: Thank you, Peter.

As Peter said, this morning we had the initial meeting of all interested U.S. Government agencies. The Task Force will be made up of representatives of those agencies.

In my judgment, the creation of this Task Force both strengthens U.S. response and helps to maximize the management efficiency in responding to emergency needs. And we look forward to accomplishing those two things in the very near future.

MR. McPHERSON: Thank you, Jules.

Questions?

Q And precisely what will the Task Force do?

A (Mr. McPherson) There are many parts of this Government which need to, did last year, and some who will [illegible] more this next year, make a contribution to the U.S. response. And the Task Force is to together look at what needs to be done and coordinate it.

As an example, of course, USDA has as a budget item the food itself and in fact is responsible for shipping the food. That needs to be pulled and coordinated in with the AID people who are on the ground out around the world.

Department of Defense is thinking through the type of contribution that it might be able to make.

OMB has an obvious contribution as we look at the budgets of this effort, and so forth.

This Governmentwide effort, we think, will augment the effectiveness in responding to what is really a very pressing situation.

Q Mr. McPherson, what are the countries that have the largest need? Would Ethiopia be one of the largest ones, and are you going to be enlisting the help of private agencies to help distribute more of this food?

A The largest needs are, as we know them today -- and this has been a changing pattern in the last few weeks; we end up finding there's more or less rainfall in this or that country -- the largest needs are in Ethiopia, in Kenya, in Niger; and it would appear

Sudan and Mozambique may well follow in that category. We're not as sure about Sudan and Mozambique at this time.

Now, in Ethiopia, last year we didn't do anything government to government. It was all done either through United Nations Organizations or largely through private voluntary organizations that you just inquired about. Catholic Relief Service is predominant.

We expect to do a lot, again, through PVOs -- private voluntary organizations.

Now, in Kenya, we will probably do more -- quite a lot more -- through the government apparatus itself. Now, there are a variety of reasons why we think that the Kenya Government is in a position to do that. It's a question of monitoring, a question of effectiveness, and so on.

Are there questions?

Q One other question.

A Yes, sir.

Q When we talked last fall, Niger was not on the list.

A That's correct.

Q What precisely happened in Niger to put this situation so serious right now?

A It didn't rain; it didn't rain -- and that's what it is. The rainfall, which should have occurred the last couple of months, hasn't come. And based upon that -- and we've got pretty good data -- well, reasonable data -- from satellites that shows plant coverage as well as on-the-spot feedback. That would suggest that the rain didn't come and, therefore, like 50 percent of normal rain over the last 30 years, on a 30-year average, occurred. And based upon that, we project 50 percent or less production this next year.

Now, one of the, frankly, frustrating parts of all this is that our data keeps on changing and we never feel absolutely comfortable about it.

Keep in mind that we don't even know how many people live in many of these countries with any precision, let alone know how many are hungry. So the communication, the transportation, in many of these parts of these countries just isn't very adequate. And all that together means that we look to satellite information, we look in reports, we look to people roving around and taking a look.

But it's nowhere near the precision that you get in East Texas, for example.

Q Mr. McPherson, granted the data is pretty slim here.

A Yes.

Q But you can estimate to what degree the U.S. effort and the efforts of other donor countries are actually meeting the needs of the hungry?

A Our best judgment is in fiscal '84 we did a really very good job of meeting the needs of most of the hungry -- meeting the most pressing needs of the hungry.

And our effort today, of course, is to gear up between ourselves and between other donors. This is not, of course, just a U.S. enterprise but between ourselves and other donors. We can do so again.

Q Stay on the mikes.

A Pardon? I'm sorry. Yes, let me go over here for just one second; O.K.?

Q Do you have any figures, sir, on the fatality toll that the drought has been responsible for in the last few years in Africa --

A I don't --

Q -- in round figures or --

A I just don't have a figure. I don't think anyone does.

Q We're talking about food. Can you break that down into some -- what are we talking about -- in the various forms of food aid --

A Well, we're talking about --

Q -- both?

A -- things like corn going into Kenya; we're talking about wheat; we're talking about some milk -- a range of commodities.

Grains are the dominant commodity that's involved --grains of various types: corn and wheat.

Yes?

Q O.K. NOAA had been talking about -- last year they've been talking maybe southern Africa was undergoing a 75-year cyclical drought. It won't exactly show what type of drought this is. Given that, how long was the duration of this Task Force supposed to last? Is it indefinite? Do you plan on phasing it out after a time? How long will you guys expect to be operating?

A We expect to be operating, I'm sure, for the next several months. We have not set a phase-out time; we'll be operating as long as there's a need.

Sir?

Q What assurances have gathered since the last time we went over this, Mr. McPherson, that much of the food aid -- and I think particularly in Ethiopia -- is getting directly to the people who need it most and aren't being diverted by the governments?

A We never had any problem with our own food in Ethiopia. You'll remember our conversations on that. We have directed our food entirely through non-Ethiopia Government entities and, therefore, we're in a position to assure ourselves directly that that food was getting to where we wanted it to go.

Now, it's true that other donors -- the European Community and other donors who were using the Government of Ethiopia structure -- there was at least some question as to whether or not all of that food was getting there. But I think that, by and large, they were satisfied after checking that their food did arrive and to the right place.

Now, I don't have direct access to their reports on that; but I was confident, and am confident, that the U.S. food was going to where it was supposed to go.

Q Do you have a standard system of feedback on that?

A Yes; we do, indeed. For example, every bag of food has a number on it. And upon question of diversion, that numbering system is a means for us to check back through and find out were the bag was supposed to be and so on.

We spend quite a time auditing and verifying that our food is used in the right way.

A standard problem, incidentally, with food -- I think you can all see how it would occur -- these bags are very sturdy things -- we ship them around the world; it's important that they be sturdy -- yet the very sturdiness of them makes them attractive for poor people to use for all kinds of things.

So very often you'll see a bag in the market that says "Gift from the People of the United States"; but, in fact, the gift involved is that somebody decides the bag could be used another time. And a number of stories arise because of that.

Ma'am?

Q I have a question regarding -- I guess it's -- methodology of approach to solving these problems, if that's all right. It seems to me you have --

A It sounds like the kind of questions we've asked.

Q Good. (Laughter.) O.K.

It seems to me there are two things you have to be dealing with.

One is the absolutely immediate need of people who are starving --

A Yes.

Q -- and need the food right way -- no ifs, ands or buts.

The second aspect, however, in my sense, is to view the thing as something of a war that has to be won -- in a, perhaps, longer-term sense as well. Some people advocate that we go into Africa with a very ambitious approach of building the kinds of infrastructure that's going to make a dent in the long term in the situation there.

If there is no rain, what can we do to bring water up out of the subterranean, you know, levels of water that do exist --

A Sure.

Q -- this kind of thing? Is there any attempt being made by the Administration, through your Task Force or anything else, to deal with that kind of approach to it?

A We think this problem needs to be looked at fundamentally the way you've just approached it. You've got a short-term disaster that needs to be responded to. You've got a long-term problem that really must be worked at and the disaster can't really take all your time. You can't stop because there's a disaster.

I would probably approach it a little differently -- that long-term situation. Let me tell you how I respond to it.

First of all, we've got to get the agricultural policies of these countries so as to encourage production, the question of how much you pay your farmers. If you pay them below market levels, they're probably going to produce less than what they should -- if, for no other reason, they can't afford to buy fertilizer to put the fertilizer on land to get the production.

And we're working hard on that through our Africa Economic Policy Initiative.

In addition, people, I think, often forget that there's been almost no research done on crops that have high yields for Africa. Most of the agricultural research has been done for temperate zones, like U.S. and Europe, to irrigate these areas.

Africa, outside of , has almost no irrigation. What I'm saying is there's almost no research, historically, that's been done on dry-land agriculture on 10-, 15-inch type soil. This whole area here (indicating on chart) is like 10 inches. Much of it is 10-, 15-inches

We don't have high-yielding sorghums of milk, which are the grains that are grown there.

Well, the U.S. -- AID -- only after a few years, have put a lot of money into high-yielding varieties. We aren't there yet; it's a long-term process. But that's the kind of thing you have to do.

Irrigation -- well, let me step back to one other point. We simply don't have a human-resource base in Africa to do it. We're putting a lot of money into training, and we've got to. It's a long-term process. But probably what the infrastructure of Africa needs most is a human resource -- the human infrastructure, if you will -- because by doing that, all kidns of things can be done.

Drought, of course, can never be -- we never can totally control the weather. At least, we don't know yet that we ever will be able to by it.

On the other hand, it's interesting to look at India. Twenty-five years ago India was a land of constant waves of starvation and drought and produced about 50 million tons of grain a year.

Last year they produced 152 million tons -- 152 million tons -- and that threefold increase was because we got higher-yielding grains, the grain revolution --

a number of other things -- and we got a lot of irrigation. The irrigation was able to stabilize that production, even though it was drought. Even though last year and the year before there was quite a lot of drought in India, production didn't fall dramatically.

I don't suggest that you're going to have massive irrigation for a long time in Africa, and there's a lot to do in terms of human-resource base and a lot of other things. But there's no reason why you couldn't have.

Here's the Senegal River Basin (at chart), a number of river basins over here further down -- in other places, in the Sudan -- and there's no reason why in a couple of decades with the right sort of base you can't have quite a lot of irrigation there. At least, that's my judgment. Not everybody agrees, but I believe that's the case.

Ladies and gentlemen --

Q How do you get this figure of 158,000 metric tons? Is that directly related to the need?

A Yes.

Q It's estimated?

A Yes.

Q And the U.S. share will be that much?

A Well, those are the needs that we've identified, and the request we've gotten. It needs to be verified. And we expect in the next few weeks, of course, to commit substantially more.

Q Is that a certain percentage of the total need?

A No. That's in response to the need as we ascertained it. It's not a percentage of the whole.

Q I don't know quite what that means -- because, of course, a lot of countries donate. So do we figure out how much we should donate along with other people, or do we just see some area that needs a certain amount of tons and we should have so many tons there?

A That's what we do ordinarily, and we're checking with other donors to make sure that we're not duplicating what they're doing. But we do not sit back and say, "Well, we're going to give this percentage and that's it. Somebody else has to do it."

Q Also, on Ethiopia, apparently there's a story I've been asked about that the United States is sending a team to Ethiopia to see if we should do more. Is that true or have you already, in fact, announced that?

A No, we have not announced that. We've been talking to Ethiopia for a long time about our concerns on the need, in our judgment, for the Ethiopia Government to do more for itself.

For example, we think the Ethiopia Government has more trucks that it could make available to this disaster at this time. And I must say that once the Tenth Year Anniversary was over -- which was just a couple of weeks ago -- the Ethiopia Government appeared to be spending a great deal more time on this drought, and we welcome that and we're hopeful that some good things will come out of it.

Ladies and gentlemen, I have to leave.

Q So you are sending a team?

A We have made no decision. We've been talking to them.

Q So you haven't sent a team?

A We haven't sent a team. No, we haven't sent a team.

Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 1:59 p.m., the ON THE RECORD briefing was concluded.)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF
PRIME MINISTER PERES OF ISRAEL

October 9, 1984

The Briefing Room

2:00 P.M. EDT

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it's almost a pleasure to be back with you, ladies and gentlemen. (Laughter.)

Let's look at the headings, first of all, in the President's departure statement just to set the framework for questions, anything you want to follow up. As you know, the President spoke of our talks focusing on several issues. He listed the economy first and the discussions with the Prime Minister about revitalizing the Israeli economy and putting it on the road to sustained recovery, and how vitally important a strong economy is to national security; the Prime Minister's plans for increasing the competitiveness of Israel in world markets; further economic subject on the free trade area. Then we talked about the situation in Lebanon.

As the President said near the end of his statement, that he had reaffirmed our fundamental commitment to Israeli national security and maintenance of the qualitative edge for Israel. A number of security-related issues that would be discussed between Secretary Weinberger and Defense Minister Rabin when the Secretary visits Israel next week.

The President concluded with comments on the support for -- of the United States for the peace process, the steps taken in Resolution 242, Camp David Accords, and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. He reaffirmed his initiative of September 1. The Prime Minister stressed that Israel is also determined to move the peace process forward.

A word on the tone of the White House meetings today. I would characterize them as very open, very warm and really extraordinarily wide-ranging. A lot of topics and details were touched on beyond the subjects that you heard about in the departure statement.

I heard the Prime Minister refer to a new level of harmony and understanding between Israel and the United States and the lasting friendship of the United States and, of course, his personal complements to the President.

The other subjects were covered -- of course, in considerable detail, the economy. That started with the first meeting yesterday with Secretary Shultz at the hotel. That has continued in further discussions last evening, the Secretary's home this morning, and I'm sure there will be further exchanges on the issues connected with the Israeli economy in discussions at the Department this afternoon and a final session tomorrow morning.

The free trade association was discussed. Its status is that you still have a number of details to be negotiated, but both sides felt confident that by putting a time limit of 30 days, that

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signaled it could be wrapped up and initialed off.

Other subjects which came up in the White House sessions were quality of life program, which the Prime Minister raised; quality of life effecting the Palestinians on the West Bank; Israeli desires -- Israel's desires for improved relationship with Egypt, and for dialogue with Jordon.

On Lebanon, there were no surprises. What you have heard about the Israeli position is that they are committed. They have decided upon a unilateral withdrawal without linking their withdrawal to those of other forces, provided security arrangements for Israel's northern border can be worked out.

We raised the question -- beyond the questions of our varied and very fruitful relations with Israel, the relations that we intend to pursue with America's Arab friends in the area, and we had a good exchange on that.

I have some detail on the Joint Economic Development Group which was referred to in the departure statement. And perhaps if I presented that before we went into questions, that might set the economic -- the framework of the economic discussions that we had in a little clearer perspective. We have consulted periodically with Israel on the Israeli economy and on American assistance to Israel Israel is facing serious difficulties and the new Israeli government that's just, I think, 20 days old today -- the new Israeli government is one of national unity, which under the leadership of the Prime Minister and Vice Prime Minister Shamir, plans to carry out a far-reaching economic recovery program.

And we recommended that in support of this effort, it would be useful for the United States and Israel to strengthen the dialogue on the Israeli economy, including ways of promoting economic growth and development, and for that purpose we have established this group called the Joint Economic Development Group. It will examine and exchange views on the means of expanding Israeli economic growth and development through increased trade and investment between our two countries. It will examine the appropriate role for U.S. economic assistance in support of the government of Israel's economic objectives.

It would have a steering group led on our side at the Undersecretary level and by an official of comparable status on the Israeli side. There would be technical level working groups. There would be a number of U.S. agencies participating, such as State, Treasury, AID, OMB, CEA, the NSC, and there maybe others added as the organization has its first sessions.

The chairmanship would rotate. We would call on distinguished private American and private Israeli economists to also participate in the group as advisors to the steering group and as advisors to the technical level working groups. The intent is to have this group meet bi-annually. The initial meeting would be in Washington. Meetings thereafter to alternate between Israel and the United States.

Now, officials of both governments will have to get together to work out more precise terms of reference and procedures based on that sketchy outline I've just given you.

Well, I'd be happy to take questions relating to the visit and anything else.

Q Two questions, if I may. First, does this now replace the Eagleburger-Kimche contact group?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. That's -- no, that's an entirely separate affair. This would be devoted

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exclusively to economic development and -- in both economic development, economic growth in Israel. That's both far more specialized, but involving a far more varied membership than the Eagleburger -- former Eagleburger, Kimche group. That will continue with Armacost and Kimche.

Q The second question -- on Lebanon, a U.S. official who sounds a lot like you is being quoted as saying in the meetings yesterday that there is different music -- different sounds coming from Damascus. Are there any indications that the Syrians would go along with any sort of withdrawal arrangements, security arrangement in Southern Lebanon?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think there are indications, but I think much remains to be seen. Much remains to be put to the test. I think you will recall a statement, to those of you who subscribe to Le Monde, by President Assad back in July, that the question of Lebanon should be handled separately from the general Middle East peace -- Middle East peace issues. That's an indication.

Q Do we have here essentially an agreement in principal for the United States to provide whatever help might be necessary for Israel in rebuilding its economy?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me try to tackle it this way: We see two classes of problems, and that they're very closely interconnected. The first class of problem is for Israel to get control of its budget, its monetary arrangements, the rate of inflation. A related problem, once these steps have been taken, is to develop additional areas to stimulate a dynamic healthy growth in the Israeli economy. We discussed both questions.

The government of Israel described to us, the Prime Minister described to us, the steps that his government has already taken. These are positive steps. We consider them positive steps. And the Prime Minister told us that his government intends to continue its efforts to formulate plans on broader reforms and broader plans for development. We will be following these plans with the greatest interest.

Now, the fact that Congress has completed appropriation of the economic support fund for fiscal '85 means that there will be immediately available $1.2 billion. That sum will enable the government of Israel to undertake its short and long-term programs without having to pay undo attention to balance-of-payments problems.

It has already addressed these in part through restrictions such as limiting the amount of funds Israeli citizens may spend abroad. The Prime Minister was very open about the longer term programs. They are still be formulated. And the appropriate mix of American support for restructuring, for example, has to be very carefully thought through.

We're going to work closely with the government of Israel on all of these questions in the framework of the Joint Economic Development Group. Should there be a question of additional funds needed, or other forms of support, we would hope to be in a position to make a recommendation to Congress when it returns. We do not see any problems we cannot deal with.

These talks have demonstrated our full intention to be supportive of the government of Israel.

Q Do you expect that, therefore, that there will be a request for additional funds once Congress returns, and I assume you mean next year?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We honestly don't know. A lot of this is going to depend on the progress of the reform program in Israel, the use that it makes of the $1.2 billion in the economic supporting funds. There are a large number of ideas being

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developed within the government of Israel. A lot of them have yet to be, I guess, decided at the Cabinet level; but there is certainly a ferment of thinking going on. And just how their economic needs, and what need they will have for American support will develop, at this stage, at this point in time, neither of us can predict. I know there have been a lot of sums cited in the press over the last days, over the last several weeks. These

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are just, maybe, call them approximations. They're not the result of serious hard thinking through of the programs and of the -- what will be the effect on the economy as the government moves against inflation, moves to stimulate growth, moves to work out a -- what I believe they're calling a "social compact" within Israeli society, between labor, government and the industrialist -- the business sectors.

Q But you are talking about 1985 would be the time frame for any supplemental request of a --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If that were to come, yes, it would be later.

Q Would you --

Q Did the Prime Minister actually ask the United States to become involved on a more basis in mediating with Syria on the question of providing the guarantees necessary for Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon? And, if so, why has the United States not yet agreed to do so?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Has he made a formal request? You -- that was a pretty complicated question --

Q Did he ask you to do it? I mean --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Did he ask us to do it?

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, he met -- I, rather -- I met with the Prime Minister -- or this unnamed official (sorry) met with the Prime Minister in Jerusalem two weeks ago following a visit to Damascus. I was able to share with him some impressions I had of Syrian thinking. The trip was, to use a fresh and vibrant word, exploratory. It remains that. We have not made any decision to mediate. And, to your specific question, there hasn't been a formal request of the government of Israel that we do so.

They, in a variety of ways, have made their positions public on -- you're aware of issues effecting UNIFIL, issues effecting the movement of Syrian troops, infiltration through and around Syrian lines. But that has not -- we have discussed these. We have exchanged views and the President has not reached any decision on a deeper or more active American role in the process.

Q What sort of security guarantees does Israel want for its northern border, in order to withdraw? And is there a role for the United States in helping to provide that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Israel has not spelled out to us precisely what it wants in terms of security arrangements. Our discussion has been on the level of -- that there must be adequate security for the northern border before there is full Israeli withdrawal.

I think what has come through, quite clearly, is that Israel has options other than full withdrawal if it cannot secure adequate arrangements.

Q Are these arrangements to be diplomatic deal with Syria or is it to find some way to teach the Vahad group how to patrol the border? Or what's the -- what do they want?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They want force along the border that they can have confidence in. That's, I suppose the basic requirement.

Q Will they be going back to the same strip of land like they did with Lahad before -- along the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's been no such precision in talking to us.

Q Is there anything to this idea of putting the Lahad group into the -- giving it some status within the Lebanese army?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, you'll recall, that was, I think, worked out in the words of the May 17 Agreement, that they would somehow, the former group would be somehow incorporated and turned into a territorial brigade, I think was the term.

Q What I'm asking is, do you think that willingness, expressed then, exists today on the part of the Lebanese?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think if you see the Beirut press you've had some very strident attacks on the Lahad force -- it speaks for itself. That's a sticking point, obviously.

Q Did the Prime Minister make known his concerns this morning about U.S. military assistance to Arab states in the region, and the --

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and his concern that this process erodes Israel's qualitative weapons advantage. And if he did make those concerns known, what was the response of the American side?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Actually, we raised the question. That we have a very wide and close intimate relationship with Israel; and, as I think I said, to the effect that we intend to have close relationships with a number of our Arab friends as well. And just -- just, I don't want to characterize the Prime Minister's position on that, but I think that, as you've seen, there's been no complaints about the supply of arms to Egypt. The difference is you have a peace treaty. There was some passing comment that they would prefer to see Soviet arms because of the lower quality.

Q Sir -- did --

Q On getting back on the economy, did the Prime Minister ask for any kind of specific guarantee along the lines of what he wanted for the Israel -- that the United States stands behind the Israeli currency on the Israeli economy?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, nothing -- nothing sweeping like that. I jotted down some ideas when I spoke of the need to get control of the budget, the monetary arrangements, the rate of inflation. I think the whole approach has been to try to find a way to deal with the overall problem -- problems -- in the Israeli economy. And we didn't -- that approach, from our side, was welcomed and accepted, and that has led to the Joint Economic Development Group.

Q When the President said, on Friday, Mr. Peres was quoted in Yediot Ahranot -- the Israeli paper -- as saying that he was coming with a specific request for up to $5 billion in outright grants in the next fiscal year. Can you confirm that figure, sir?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There were a number of figures cited, but there was no -- no such specific request. And as I say, I think these are best described as early approximations. Let's study together, let's work together, let's see what is really needed. If -- and he, I might just cite briefly as what he listed as the government's program -- perhaps nothing surprising, but let me just -- perhaps it's not news, let me just tick it off rather quickly. That on the budget side, the $1 billion in cuts agreed by the Cabinet and the last three words, of course, are critical, I gather, in the Israeli Cabinet. If you don't have it agreed, then I am going to take my share of the cuts, you don't have anything to go on. And the apportionment of those cuts, ministry by ministry, is almost complete. Reductions affecting the standard of living -- those involve cuts in subsidies on fuel, basic commodities, prohibiting luxury imports -- the one I'd mentioned, reducing foreign currency allowances for travelers; increased taxes on real estate other property. On inflation -- the government has to reach agreement on a social compact between all the sectors of Israeli society. It is working on that to ensure that all sectors share the burden of austerity equally. Apparently there is -- there are proposals now before the Cabinet, and it's hoped to reach a decision shortly on the social compact.

Finally, on renewed growth, the objective is to increase growth, to increase development. Now, from -- as you can see, as these proceed -- some are achievements, some are firm intentions, and it's precisely in that frame of mind that we met and that we interacted with our visitors.

MR. SIMS: May I have -- just one more, please.

Q Let me ask you about something in your answer, sir, when you said, "no such specific request" was that in response to the

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$5 billion figure? Or no specific request whatsoever?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There were a number of figures cited as illustrative and what might be helpful, what might be useful. And we discussed -- we threw -- we discussed those quite thoroughly, and the result was that we need a lot more work, a lot more study together to see what should be done.

Q What is --

Q Only in general terms, rather than specific --

Q Would it be correct to say that you didn't shut the door on more dollars and cents aid in the future, but that essentially you are putting off hard and fast decision until the working group has a chance to hash it out?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, which will, of course, go on at the same time as the work within Israel, by -- under Israeli leadership, to reshape, to restructure the economy.

Q On Lebanon -- when the President said that we would be willing to mediate if others want our help -- what is your sense of what the other parties would be willing to accept in terms of American help?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it's that lack of clarity that has contributed to our lack of a decision.

Q Well, where does Damascus stand now on an American role?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, there have been some statements in public about interest in an American role on withdrawal, but precisely what that role would be, what they would be interested in is not clear. It's too early to say.

Q Is that the direction that we've told the Israelis we will now pursue -- to try to clarify what Damascus intends --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well I'm not -- I'm just not going to get into any further discussions on what's really the frontier, where do we go from here, we haven't reached a decision.

Q On dialogue with Jordan -- on what basis did they express desire to have dialogue with Jordan -- on Camp David, or on the Reagan iniative, or what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He has never, from his first speech at the Knesset, the Prime Minister has never put a condition on the framework of a dialogue with Jordan. He just wants a dialogue.

Q Is there some new commitment on Israel's part to the September the 1st initiative? The last we heard, they'd turned that down out of hand.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I was looking back to a statement made 26 September. The Prime Minister told Israeli TV that a distinction ought to be made between President Reagan's initiative to bring peace to the Middle East and the specifics of his plan. He welcomes the former. As to the plan itself, the Prime Minister pointed out that while the new government of Israel has not yet discussed it, there exists the decision of the former government to reject it.

Q Did he go beyond that today?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END [illegible] P.M. EDT

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
SECRETARY SHULTZ'S TRIP TO PANAMA
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 9, 1984, 3:03 P. M.

MR. ROMBERG: This briefing is ON BACKGROUND, attributable to a Senior Administration Official. The briefing is on the trip to El Salvador, Panama and Mexico. The briefer has a few words to open with and then will go to questions.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What I thought I'd do is go over with you some elements of the schedule for your own planning purposes and otherwise.

We plan to arrive in El Salvador some time around noon. Meet with President Duarte at the Presidential residence. Have a luncheon hosted by him. Then I think there will be a press opportunity for you.

Q At the Presidential --

A I don't know the details, but that's the kind of order. You know what we do -- we make it difficult for you, to figure out where you can't file, and that all goes into our planning.

Then we'll be getting back in the airplane in the middle of the afternoon and flying to Panama. It's about an hour and thirty minutes -- hour and fifty minutes.

Arrive in Panama around 6:30. The Secretary will be going to a meeting with the President-elect at his residence, and then later we will be going to the Presidential Palace for a reception hosted by President Illueca.

There may be a bilateral with another head of state at that time, and as you go through here, we've got blocks of time for bilaterals that we have not firmed up yet with different heads of state that will be there.

The next morning we will be going to the speech of outgoing President Illueca and the inauguration of President Barletta, coming back to the hotel for possible bilaterals -- a couple of them. I think there's a press meeting scheduled around 12:15. Depart the Presidential Palace, go to a luncheon hosted by President Barletta, proceed from there to the airport enroute to Mexico City

Arrive in Mexico City mid-afternoon. Have a meeting with President de la Madrid in the early part of the evening. I think they will be giving another press opportunity for you at that time following the meeting with President de la Madrid. Then to a dinner hosted by Ambassador Gavin

The following morning there will be a breakfast meeting with Secretary Sepulveda, and depart from there for the airport early morning

You may find this hard to believe, but in the Mexican schedule, that which took the most time in trying to get it done, was to try to find a time that was good for you to file and also not delay -- have a lot of us sitting around time. I know you may find that hard to believe, but trying to get all these balls in the air, Alan beats me over the head to make sure that you have enough time. And through skill and cunning we've managed to work it out where I think you'll find it satisfactory

I'm also told that at last count you may get an invitation to dinner also, so --

Q Where?

Q What country?

A Where would you like to go?

Q (Laughter)

A In Mexico. So pack the clean jeans when you go. With those little smart remarks, I'll let it go and take your questions

Let me just go quickly over the things that I think we can look forward to

Q Wait

A Yes?

Q Leaving on Friday morning?

A Yes

Q Out of Mexico City?

A Yes. I always do that to you. I'm not telling you where we're going. (Laughter) We're wheels up for San Juan

Q When?

A It's four hours and thirty minutes enroute. Arrive in San Juan and spend about an hour and forty-five minutes on the ground greeting the Pope. At 5:00 p.m. wheels up for Washington, fly three hours and thirty-five minutes

Q Will we stay at the airport in San Juan?

A I think so. You know, I hate to tell you this, but that's not in my job description, looking after the Pope, but I'm along for the ride like you. But I would say that, yes, that's what's going to happen. I don't think there's going to be much movement there. There's going to be thousands of people

If any of you have ever been involved in a Pope's visit before, it makes the President's advance look like amateurs. They're tough.

In El Salvador, we'll have an opportunity to review with President Duarte how he views things on three fronts, really. One is on the military front with regards to the war with the insurgents. The second will be the implementation of that portion of the FY-84 supplemental and, hopefully by then, some determination on the FY-85 and how we go about implementing the Jackson plan portion of El Salvador.

Of course, the third will be to get his reading on the initiatives that he is now making with regards to the dialogue with the guerrillas.

In Panama, aside from welcoming in another democratically elected government, it will give an opportunity for the Secretary to meet with other heads of state. The reason I'm saying that is we haven't firmed up who at what time yet. It's a little tight. But I would think that there's something of regional interest, following up on an earlier regional meetings that we had with these heads of states, and the Vice President had in Quito, I would think that the whole regional cooperation on the drug issue would be a subject that would be in the forefront.

Also, obviously, the whole Contadora process and where we are, I think would be a a subject that you will find in all three capitals

Then in Mexico City it will be an opportunity to follow up behind not only President de la Madrid's visit here, but the subsequent visits that we have had with Secretary Sepulveda and to see how the whole range of U.S.-Mexican bilateral relations -- as you know, they're quite extensive on the economic front -- elements of border cooperation, I'm sure that they'll want to chat with us a bit about Simpson-Mazzoli, whatever state that may be in at that time, and so it's an opportunity to follow up what really is an ongoing high-level dialogue on the U.S.-Mexican relations.

With that I'll stop and take your questions

Q What are you working on? Trying to firm up a substantive meeting with Mr. Ortega in Panama?

A No. There are no plans at this time to meet with Daniel Ortega. I didn't mean to infer him in that. And there are other heads of state going there for which we are very close to getting their times down

Q So he's out.

A Yes. There's nothing underway now nor do we envision -

Q Given the Duarte initiative on the guerrillas, any plans on talking with Ungo or anybody like Ungo in Panama?

A No. I'm sure that it will be a subject of discussion among the heads of states and foreign ministers, but that's not a role for the Secretary of State.

Q In what state would you describe the comments that are coming from the various countries on the Contadora treaty, the acta as it exists now? Do you have word on what the Hondurans are going to say, what the Salvadorans are going to say, their comments on the -

A I think the best way to describe them and be responsive to your questions is that after what appeared to be a push by a very small number when the smoke cleared out, of countries involved to sign up on a draft in which, when tabled, said we'll wait on comments til October 15th, and yet there was this kind of move at about the time of the U.N.

I think everybody has come to the realization that it is precisely that -- that it was a draft, that the people were prepared to comment on October 15th for it, I think they plan to comment, and I think that most people now would agree that that process is continuing, and that the countries are working on their comments as they go into this -- what I would expect to be translated into another acta.

Q Are you going down with proposed language?

A Proposed language for?

Q For the acta.

A No. We're not going down with proposed language for the acta. Obviously, the subject is a fluid one; it keeps moving. We have at different times looked at different drafts, and we continue to look at them, but we're not going with something in hand. No.

Q If I can ask -- and this sort of follows up a question at the morning briefing as well -- what form will U.S. input take in terms of the drafting process now? The deadline is coming up. Will there be a formal document put forward by the Administration to the Core Four or to the whole group?

A No, no.

Q Well, what way will the U.S. get its input into the process now?

A There is a variety of ways of U.S. inputs. First, you understand that, as you well know, we are not a signatory to that document, so to a certain degree, putting up formal drafts, and the rest of it, is probably not the proper and certainly not the most effective way.

Harry Shlaudeman has made his rounds of the countries, and continues to. We deal with the nine or eight Ambassadors in this capital. Our Ambassadors in the eight capitals deal with their counterparts. We had a chance to chat with the Core Four Foreign Ministers in New York -- the Secretary did.

I met on the fringes of that with them and some of their people. It's just kind of a continuous process in a variety of formats. But there's no formal submission of a U.S. draft type of thing.

Q What is the --

A And each one of those countries has different interests in that portion. I mean, it's obvious that each country may highlight a portion of the draft and others will be less important, whereas for the second guy, this other one, say -- you get kind of a general approach to it.

Q What is the reaction so far of the Administration to Duarte's initiative? Are we going to encourage him, do we want to lay down any parameters within which he has to -- we would encourage him to stay in his discussions with the guerrillas?

A No I think to a certain degree that would be presumptuous of us. I think going into his administration, we had an opportunity after his election prior to his inauguration, after his inauguration. And through this whole flow of conversations that we have had with him, he has shared with us his thoughts on what he needs to get done in order to be able to be in a responsible position to deal meaningful with the guerrillas. We're very comfortable with his understanding

There has been no reason why we should get nervous or anticipate any problems. He has stuck along the same lines which he has outlines which he has outlined to us earlier. There is no talk of power-sharing or any of these things that were questions raised prior to him coming to office. We have had long discussions with him on the subject

He is the elected President of El Salvador. He picks the time and how he goes about doing these things If he wants to share these things with us, he does, and we chat with him about it. We're comfortable in the way he's moving

Q How much prior notice did we have of that?

A Prior notice infers -- if you mean prior notice of the subject, how about before the election? If you mean prior notice as to a date, that's a whole different ballgame. That's what I've just tried to explain to you, that this whole thing is a kind of rolling atmosphere. And the fact that he managed to pick out of the air Monday versus Friday or next Wednesday, I don't consider that within a surprise factor

The fact that he entered into a dialogue with them, timing notwithstanding, was no surprise. It was a natural evolution of what is going internally in El Salvador

Q Would you tick off the very small number of Central American countries which pushed to sign the draft treaty right away?

A Nicaragua. You said Central America, right? I answered your question specifically.

Q Salvador didn't suggest that?

A No.

Q Could you straighten that out a little bit? Duarte, very specifically at his press conference, just before the -- no, just after the United States announced its objections, said that we want to sign it October 15 but then make sure Nicaragua --

A Maybe you and I read different drafts, because I went back and read what he said and you may be entirely correct, and also as you understand.

One of the beauties of Latin culture is the way you can couch things nicely. What I read from it was that he started off by saying, "This is a useful exercise in which we must engage. Page 2: We have some things we think we ought to fix it to make it better." I read more of that into it than I did --

Q What's the relationship between the October 15 meeting and the October 19 meeting in Honduras among the five signing countries? What's going to happen -- I mean, if they're getting their content, their constructive comments on the 15th --

A Okay. Let me tell you the dilemma that some of these face. You are presented with a written piece of paper that said we would like your comments by 15 October. Fair enough? That's a fair approach. But following the comments, I think several of them would like to engage in discussions about it rather than just send a piece of paper that may or may not be taken into account on it. So, I think, what you see, as I said, is an evolutionary process. First, they reduce to writing specific portions of it, and then they have a chance to talk about it among themselves.

Q You don't expect further amendments to emerge after the 19th meeting?

A I see it all as one process. It may be that the explanation of those comments they make on the 15th they re-enforce on the 19th and accommodate each other.

The difficulty that has happened on this process -- and it's mine, and it's a very difficult process for them to do -- is this actual interchange between each other rather than each guy making his deal and speaking past each other, it gives them an opportunity to sit down and talk about it.

Q According to the Mexican press, diplomats there are speculating about this being an initiative designed or encouraged by the United States to counter the Nicaraguan acceptance of the Contadora Treaty; that is, the fact that Duarte is doing his number on the 15th and that there is this meeting on the 19th is sort of designed to steal the thunder from Nicaragua. What do you say to that?

A If I had to comment on everything that appeared in the Mexican press, we'd be here all day.

Let's face it. I invite you talk to the four foreign ministers of the four countries which are affected by this thing.

Q I would. (Inaudible)

A No. That's not my job description either. You're perfectly capable of doing that. If you talk to them, you'll find out they have strong feelings on certain aspects in which they would like to engage in a dialogue rather than just send in a piece of paper.

Q Can you describe for us your view of how El Salvador's military is doing in the military operations against the insurgents, and what you feel the prospects are for insurgents to actually engage in meaningful dialogue with Duarte?

A I think the interesting aspect -- and it's not lost on you but it may have been lost on the general public -- is that what Duarte is invited to sit down and talk to is the armed guys, not the political arm. I found that kind of interesting.

Let me just finish up, this one here. I would say, from everything I can detect, the military in El Salvador is doing very well. But then you have to put it in the context in which they're working. They are working in a context of a country, large rural areas; they don't have an over abundance of rapid transportation, etc. And so it's possible that they could suffer a reverse in Area A, Area B or Area C.

Everybody has been waiting for the other shoe to drop since January and it hasn't dropped.

Q Where is the outbreak of new violence that we have been waiting for from the insurgents' side?

A I think maybe the outbreak of new violence on the part of the insurgents might be a testimonial to the ability of the Salvadoran Armed Forces now to detect and rapidly confront a building group that we're going to do something.

Q In the absence of an outbreak of new violence is a tribute to --

A Yes, yes. I think so. When you face up to guerrilla operations, to a certain degree it's a spoiling operation. If you can keep them from marshalling or keep them from doing certain things like that, then you put it off of their timetable. I think there's a certain element of that.

Q The military has been successful in intimidating the guerrillas to a degree, in breaking up some of their --

A I'm not so sure that "intimidation" is the right word. I'm not going to quibble with you over words. I think one can assume that to a certain degree they've been successful in spoiling the ability for the guerrillas to muster and make a move, but that doesn't say tomorrow that they don't blow up the power line or a bridge or something spectacular of that nature.

Q Do you no longer expect a large offensive?

A No, I didn't say that. I think that everybody is waiting. I think the guerrillas have not given up. Given the opportunity to do something splashy, they would go ahead and do it. It would be in their interest to do it.

If they find out that you and George Shultz are going down there, they may do it while you're there in living color. Who knows.

Q You referred to the point that I was going to raise about Duarte insisting in talking only to the guerrilla leaders?

A No, no. I didn't mean that. This time he talked about the armed.

-MORE-

Q Yes, and he made a point of, that people who were outside -- I guess he met Ungo, Zamora, et cetera -- are out of touch with the reality of Salvador. Do you share that? And do you think that, I mean that the FDR, by the fact that the guerrillas accepted, may be out of the picture?

A No. Let me try to phrase it to you as I understand it. I think that possibly Duarte has come to the conclusion -- and he may have come to it long before many of us -- that there are two elements to the guerrilla movement: there is a political element that may or may not have -- has "X" amount of sway over the military element -- certainly not total. Then, it becomes debatable as to how much. So in order to really put an end to the violence, that is the armed conflict, and at the same time bring into the fold the political aspect, there is a necessity to be able to talk to both of them.

Q Do you expert that the most that -- Which one?

A Go ahead.

Q -- that the most that can come out of this October 15th meeting in La Palma is an agreement to begin a dialogue between the two sides? Is that the most that can be expected?

A Well, I don't know what to expect out of that meeting on the 15th. I think -- it's the first round. I would think, in one form or another, it would not be the only round.

Q Why do you think the guerrillas have agreed to meet him at this date that he's picked?

A It suits their purpose. Now, what is their purpose? It may be that they may want some running room, time-wise. It could be that they are totally tired of fighting and don't want to continue, which I find -- I don't put much credence on that theory. I think the best thing to do is, obviously, for one reason or another, it suits their purposes to talk. Now, I think maybe Duarte will be able to, based on his talks with them, will be able to better evaluate the reasons for their sitting down, and maybe we'll be in a better position on the way back to talk to you about what --

Q Can I put sort of 2 and 2 together of different things here? You've said that the talking suits their purpose, and you've sort of indicated that you don't really know any more whether there is going to be a major offensive. Would you anticipate --

A No, I didn't say that. I just said I did not dismiss the idea of a so-called offensive.

Go ahead.

Q Would you put those two things together in any way, or do you think one is designed as a decoy for the other? Or do you think that one is an indicator that there will or won't be an offensive? Would you in any way link those two?

A I'm not going to use your words, because otherwise --

Q So use your own words.

A -- and I know you guys don't write headlines, but a headline tomorrow could say, "Government official says meeting is decoy for fall offensive," and I know you wouldn't want to put those words in my mouth. That isn't it.

Q Far be it!

(Laughter.)

A But who knows? I don't know how to attach the possibility of that. I hadn't really delved along that line thinking that it would be a decoy.

Q How do you relate the two together -- I mean, the military situation and this unexpected timing of the talks?

A Well, they may want to feel Duarte out, they may want to find out how much control does he have over the military. How far can they push him? Will he go in on amnesty? You know, what is -- They may want to find out precisely how serious he is about the whole thing.

Q Can you assess where we are on Contadora? I maybe naively thought that things were heating up; there was a lot of activity, had visions of Secretary Shultz going down talking to people, saying, "If you get some changes," he would do his part to contribute to an agreement quickly, but you're giving us a real slow-down. Is this just part of the process?

A No, no. If I gave you the impression of a slow-down, I didn't meant to give you. What I've tried to give you is, my impression of the Contadora process is an ongoing process. It may have been -- and I think rightly so -- that you may have gotten the opinion that due to the efforts of Nicaragua and one or two others that all of a sudden it was over, and it was a "sign this deal," and there was that sense of urgency, and it was one that I didn't think was an accurate portrayal of the way the process was going. So I think the Contadora is proceeding according to schedule.

Q So was the middle part of what I said right then, that Secretary Shultz will be down there talking to people and --

A Oh, the Contadora process will come up in all of the discussions -- no doubt about it -- because it's an ongoing thing, and all three of the players are involved.

Q Do you have any sense of how long it will take -- years, months, I mean?

A No, I don't have any sense, but I would say that they are at a difficult portion right now, and that is the finite, the very difficult aspects of the whole verification-- program and how you go about it in the different aspects. And as they grapple with that, it may take some time, but it isn't like they are grappling with -- they've come a long way, I guess is what I'm saying, and I'm not going to put any timeframe to it.

Q Can I follow that up? A week or so ago, a senior official was talking about the timing of the Nicaraguan elections vis-a-vis the Contadora process. Would you anticipate that either another draft will be ready before, will be circulated and publicized and so on, before the November 4th date, or would you anticipate perhaps receiving a signal from Nicaragua on this trip with regard to the postponement of the elections? How do the timing of the Nicaraguan elections and the Contadora process mesh, at this moment?

A Well, they, obviously, to a certain degree, can affect one another. If you have a Nicaraguan election that goes forward according to the plan as we knew yesterday, that is that there is no participation on the part of Cruz, that his crowds still get beat up, stay at half an hour, that the opposition has half an hour on the state radio and TV a night, limited debate, all the rest of these things are still going on -- then, if you take the current draft of the Acta as it deals with democracy, there is a total disconnect between the two. And that's where we had trouble understanding how you could have a signing of a document, when you have in essense not stuck to one of the segments. So in that sense they are connected. But I don't think -- And so, therefore, there can be -- there can be a connection between the two, but I think it's elastic -- I don't think it's this (indicating), the connection being that, obviously, at this stage of the game, some modifications in the ground rules for the election in Nicaragua -- and one could argue saying it's a month away today, or less than a month away today, possibly an extension of that time -- would affect peoples' belief of what the guy thinks about something he's signing. But I don't -- It's not a rigid connection; I think it's kind of elastic.

Q Do you anticipate either a new draft before November 4?

A I think that that is a possibility that there could be a new draft before then. It's a possibility. They're meeting on the 15th, they're going to meet again on the 19th.

Q How about the question about Nicaragua's (inaudible)

A I don't know. There are still continuing efforts between the Coordinadora and to attempt to get some type of accommodation to their requests, and it's not just limited to the Coordinadora. It's interesting to note that many Europeans have been, through the Socialist Internationalists, and others have been involved in that process.

MR. ROMBERG: [redacted], why don't you take two more.

SENIOR OFFICIAL: Two more.

Q A couple of quick questions.

SENIOR OFFICIAL: Three more. I'll take all three so you don't feel (inaudible)

Q In Salvador, will human rights be a topic with Mr. Duarte, as it has in the past?

A Oh, I'm sure that it comes up. It's always a subject that comes up. It's a subject that he's interested in talking about.

Q But will it be a key topic, as it has in the past?

A No. It will be a central theme among the others that I've ticked off to you, because he personally takes a deep interest in that whole thing.

Q A follow-up question that is slightly different, talking about European leaders, in Panama, do you anticipate meeting with any European leaders? I understand President Mitterrand might be there.

A At this stage of the game, we do not have any European leaders in the top of the batting order for the amount of time we have left for it.

Yes, Joane, and then you.

Q A number of European countries have already said they will sign the Protocol on the Contadora Treaty which says, "We promise to do nothing to disrupt the findings, the implementation of this Treaty."

Is the United States prepared to sign that protocol?

A No, no, I don't think that's what the Europeans said. They may have said it, but that isn't my understanding of what they said. What my understanding of what they said was that they applauded the process as it goes, and when they finally agree among themselves as to what they're going to do then they would face up to it.

As to the question of signing a Protocol, that's come up before, and I don't think we're prepared to address it at this time, really. The object of the exercise is to find something that they can agree among themselves. Us warm handing it or not is academic.

Q Is there any meeting scheduled with Mr. d'Aubuisson?

A I'm sorry.

Q Any meeting scheduled with Mr. d'Aubuisson in El Salvador?

A No, not that I understand at this time, unless he is invited to lunch hosted by the Salvadorans. I don't know. I haven't seen that guest list.

Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 3:33 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
GRENADA DOCUMENT COLLECTION

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WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1984, 10:35 A.M.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

MR. CARLSON: Good morning. This is the BACKGROUND briefing that we announced yesterday on the present situation in Grenada. It is ON BACKGROUND. For those of you who are not familiar with that, the attribution is to a senior State Department official -- well, there will be two senior State Department officials.

Each of the two officials have a few brief remarks for you and then they'll take your questions.

FIRST SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: It's about Grenada a year later. There has been enough interest expressed by you and your colleagues that we thought it might be useful to give you a little bit of a framework for right now.

To start these things with schedules sometimes help put them in perspective. Starting with today, there is going to be a series of events that relate to Grenada. Today at 2:30 Secretary Shultz and the National Archivist, Mr. Warner, will open the Grenada Documents Collection at the National Archives on Constitution Avenue. That's a collection of over 10,000 documents that were discovered in various locations on the island after the events of October 25, and they constitute a very large collection of both governmental and party documentation.

They've been microfilmed for permanent storage. The originals will be returned to the Government of Grenada. The microfilms will be on file at our National Archives. They will be indexed and they will be accessible starting this afternoon to any members of the public and scholars who want to get at them.

On October 19, which is the anniversary of the killing of Morris Bishop and perhaps as many as 100 other Grenadians in the fort at St. George's, there will be on Grenada, sponsored by the Grenada Council of Churches, some ecumenical, religious services. It will be a quiet day of mourning and remembrance for all the Grenadians who lost their lives that day. It is not a governmental event. The Government of Grenada is not actively engaged on it.

Similarly, we understand, on October 25, which is the anniversary of the rescue mission itself, there will again be some prayer services in the churches. There is nothing planned of a governmental nature on Grenada.

On October 28, the airport at Point Salines will be dedicated. That is a Grenadian Government event. Attendance is at the invitation of the Government of Grenada. Our understanding is that it will be about an hour-and-a-half to two hours long, and the only speaker will be the Governor General, Sir Paul Scoon. There will be representation from Washington, from this government, and we understand the Prime Ministers of most, if not all, of the neighboring states have been invited.

Q Can you tell us who the American representative will be from Washington?

A At this point, it will be Peter McPherson who will head the group. The composition is still being discussed.

Q Can I follow that up? Are there any plans for President Reagan to go to Grenada on October 25?

A No, none.

Q He will not go?

A That's correct.

Q O.K.

Q Or Secretary Shultz?

A Shultz will not go.

On October 29, the next day, there is again a non-governmental event, which is the University of St. George's Medical School on Grenada. They will dedicate a plaque honoring the U.S. servicemen who lost their lives in the rescue mission. That again, will be local, non-governmental. Our Charge d'Affaires will be in attendance, Lorry Lawrence, who is down on Grenada, and possibly some who were down there for the events the 28th, but that's not clear yet.

And then, the next event after that of major significance is the election, which has been called for December 3. With that, let me just say, as we've told some of you before and the Administration has said, we went into

Grenada to rescue people and to respond to calls for help from duly-constituted authorities, both regional, and in the case of Grenada, the Governor-General. That having been done, we concluded that we should be making every effort to help the Grenadians help themselves through what is clearly a period of recovery -- recovery of political institutions, recovery of their economy, their own well-being -- stability, if you will -- and to help them take their place in the regional context once again.

That process is moving along. My colleague will be able to tell you what we're doing very specifically and generally on the economic assistance front, but politically, as you know, with the elections now having been set, you've got three principal contending groups down there. You have the trials of those who were accused of the murders, accused of murder and charged, which are now, as we understand it, going to get underway on the first of November.

For those of you who have not either been back or been there, it's an island that seems to be quite tranquil and stable. Law and order is maintained. I might say that our own contingent down there consists at the moment of somewhere in the neighborhood of 225 to 240 -- because there is movement in and out -- U. S. military personnel, men and women from the Military Police Corps, flight crews, and helicopter maintenance personnel operating what is really a transport system or moving supplies and people from one place to another, in support of a Caribbean Peace Force contingent which numbers about 400 and which is assisting the rebuilding of the Royal Grenada Police Force.

Training of that force is the principal responsibility of the United Kingdom. The British have provided over two million pounds, most of which is going to that effort, and there is an accelerated training program underway which we would see probably bearing fruit in the February-March 1985 time frame, to be able to field a Royal Grenada police force of somewhere in the neighborhood of 500 which the authorities have deemed adequate for the island. And once that thing is in place and depending on the wishes of an elected government at all times, we'll be able to look at how we make disposition of our own people on the island, as will the other Caribbean states.

Do you want to pick up from here?

SECOND SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Thank you. We will be handing out, if we haven't already, a cover sheet that gives a little history of U.S. AID's arrival on the Island, and then in eight sectors of activity, where we were October 1983 and where we are October 1984.

I would say at the outset that in putting the AID program in context, you have to start by the climate in which we find ourselves engaged, and you begin with a small-island economy, which like most island economies in that region, is very heavily dependent on foreign investment, foreign markets, and to some degree, foreign assistance, in the wake of the economic slump that's now beginning to end in that region, for its foreign exchange, which in turn is essential to maintain its imports required for survival and growth -- raw materials, food, fuel, machinery, et cetera.

Unfortunately, both by mismanagement in the regime twice removed and doctrinaire state intervention in the Bishop regime, what you had was a situation where both foreign and domestic investors had been discouraged, where infrastructure had been neglected and allowed to rot, where human rights had been repressed, where Grenadians of talent, therefore, had fled, and where domestic taxes had reached nearly confiscatory levels -- not really the situation conducive for stability and growth. So when the interim government took office and the Governor-General's appointment, they had three basic objectives: (1) to intervene in life-threatening situations and provide emergency relief, (2) to begin to rebuild the infrastructure of the island, including finishing the Point Salines airport, and (3) to lay the conditions necessary for long-term sustainable growth and development, and to thereby provide the jobs necessary for productive growth.

Our assistance program was designed to reflect those three concerns of the interim government, first, the emergency relief, which many of us discussed at the time, and now, the more longer-term assistance focusing on these various sectors of activity, ranging from the airport to other infrastructure -- transportation, agriculture, and development of the private sector.

I think rather than take you through those, I'll just stop here and with my colleague, I guess, be available to answer any questions I can.

Q First, what is the status of the airport at this point?

A What is the status?

Q How much have we put into it and what's its status?

A   Well, we authorized, as you know, in May, when the bid was awarded, $19 million for completion of the airport and we have spent most of that, not all of it; and the status of the airport is that it will be ready for dedication on October 28, on time and under-budget.

Q   How much will it cost to run the airport?

A   We're studying that. There have been a wide variety of figures. As you know, the feasibility study back in January was $10 million. I've heard figures now down as low as $3 million. We believe that may be slightly on the high side and we're busily examining that.

Q   What's the outlook for traffic?

A   Well, two airlines have already agreed to fly there on a regular basis, regional airlines. Pan Am is, of course, coming through both ways on the 28th and on a return trip, but at this point does not have regularly-scheduled service planned.

Q   Which airlines are going to be running scheduled services into --

A   To tell you the truth --

STAFF MEMBER: LIAT.

A   LIAT. And is it British West --

STAFF: British West Indies Airline.

A   British West Indies.

Q   You lumped the airport in when you were talking about infrastructure rotting just now. You mentioned the airport as one of those things. Was the airport rotting under the previous regimes or was the airport a threat to the U.S. under the previous regimes?

A   It was neither. I mean, it might have been a threat to the U.S. if it had been used for military purposes, of course, but it wasn't rotting, it was being constructed. If I linked it at that part of the sentence, that's a grammatical error. I mean it is part of the infrastructure they want to rebuild. That's one of the interim government's objectives -- in this case, finish rather than rebuild. It's a misstatement

Q Is it presumably still true that if it were to be used for military purposes, it would be a threat to the U.S.?

A Not if we were the ones using it

(Laughter) I mean, it's like anything else. It's, "Who's on the other end?" It's a neutral instrument It depends on the intent of the person who has command of it and how they will wield it

Q As far as you're concerned, the only thing that's changed since President Reagan saw it as a threat was that it's the good guys running it, not the bad guys?

A No, that's not the only thing that's changed For one thing, we have scaled down the size of the enterprize which makes it far less militarily suited, you might say, in terms of ancillary facilities and a huge fuel oil tank farm and so on We have tried to scale it down both to save money on completion and to make it more appropriate for commercial use, particularly, as this gentleman suggested, limited commercial use that will begin to expand over time

It's like Dulles, in a way; I mean it is overbuilt for the traffic at the moment, but is going to be capable of handling expanding traffic that's expected

Q What is it going to be named, do you know?

A It's going to be named Point Salines, as far as I know

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL The interim Council hasn't made a final decision, and the two names that are being considered are Point Salines International Airport and Grenada International Airport

Q They're not considering naming it "Ronald Reagan Airport"?

A They are not

Q How about [redacted]

A I wouldn't turn it down, but they didn't offer it

(Laughter)

Q Can I follow on the size of the airport for a second? In terms of down-sizing the fuel farm, how much have you down-sized it by?

A I can't give you those numbers, but I'll get them for you.

Q Can it handle and service any size aircraft --

A Yes.

Q -- operating today, including 747s?

A Yes.

Q Will the United States Government use this airport for military purposes?

A I can't answer that. I know of no plans to.

Q Is it using it now? Are our forces using it now?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: Yes, it's being used now for, I think, C-130 flights which are used to resupply the Caribbean Peace Force and our own military support element.

Q One of the arguments that was made in the days when the airport belonged to the other side was that this field would bring in jets, if it were used for tourist purposes, it would bring in jets that had so many people that the Island could not accommodate them, that there was no way to handle the baggage, that the roads wouldn't work, or anything else, for tourist trade that size, and therefore, the argument was, it's not for tourist, but military.

Isn't that still the case? There has been no building of hotels; there has been no increase in the capacity of the island to absorb so many tourists? Isn't it still for military purposes, only this time it's ours?

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: I would vigorously dispute that. One of the reasons we are trying to get it done this cycle is in order to impact this year's tourist flow. There are, roughly, 600 rooms on the Island, as I recall. And I believe the normal tourist season is 280 days, and if you have a 7-day occupancy, and have double occupancy per room, they can hold something like 44,000 tourists. Pre-rescue mission, I think they were running around 32,000, so we think that they have room for expansion, that the airport will lead to further hotel construction, should lead to further expansion of that base, in order to be fully utilized, but it already can be utilized for that purpose. And it's far more convenient for tourists than the antiquated and distant facility in Pearls.

Training is going on. Part of the Canadian program, the $7 million program for CIDA has to do with operations and maintenance, and that will, of course, include the baggage-handling as well as security, and so forth. What is not going to be finished, among some other things, on opening day is the road network to St. George's. There have been some improvements, but the new road, the new five-mile cut-through, will not be done by then, and further paving in that area and some others will have to be done into the Spring of 1985. But that infrastructure is now coming along. It was not being pursued at the time the airport was being developed under the other regime.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: Well, let me just say that not only was it not being pursued, but we know, and the Grenadian business people and the hotel association have told us, that plant had deteriorated, that occupancy was down dramatically, and had been going steadily down since '79. But what you see now is renewed interest in Grenada. What you see the hotel association and the business people down there promoting is not the large-scale tourist development that you've seen in other islands. Perhaps Barbados is an example, where you can have a Ward Air 747 disgorge 350 or 400 passengers, and they all go into one hotel, and a few days later they leave, and some more come in, but rather the kind of thing that I associate with St Lucia and some of the other small islands, which is what the Grenadians call the up-scale market. That would see perhaps a jet flying in maybe twice a week, which is what St. Lucia does, and coming from the States, from either New York or Miami, you'd have 30, 40, 50 passengers off each day, and then when that same plane comes back from Port of Spain or Caracas, or some place else, it picks up 30, 40, or 50. And that would continue until this infrastructure, this tourism infrastructure, has gone through what we understand to be a very likely dramatic increase.

There are two substantial investment projects which involve new hotels, and there is very active bidding on the Grenada Beach Hotel, which is the old Holiday Inn, and which has about 150 rooms available. So (1) the existing capacity wasn't being used. We think that just with the kinds of things my colleague has described, that's likely to be used more. The capacity is going to be increased. That's going to take time but as it does, then that airport will, as the Feasibility Study indicated, really begin to pay for itself.

(Continued on following page.)

Q What can you tell us about your current estimate of the GNP of Grenada? How much have you spent in the last year in overall aid, and how much do you estimate you will have to spend in the next year or two?

SECOND OFFICIAL: Well, the total this year that just ended, of the fiscal year, was about $47 million. Is that right?

VOICE: GNP?

SECOND OFFICIAL: No, what we spent.

VOICE: What we spent. What we obligated is about $50.

SECOND OFFICIAL: Yes, and the total will be $57.2. is what is currently planned. In other words, another ten for 1985. I don't have GNP numbers off the top of my head.

VOICE: It's over $110 million.

SECOND OFFICIAL: Did you get that? $100 or 110 million?

Q You said the airport would open October 28th?

SECOND OFFICIAL: That is when it is dedicated. It doesn't open to commercial traffic until the next day.

FIRST OFFICIAL: The morning of the 29th, yes.

Q Since we are ON BACKGROUND, perhaps you could tell us a little about the election campaign, with particular reference to the forces loyal to the two preceding Prime Ministers, Bishop and Gairy?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Well, the New Jewell Movement remnants are splintered. Some of them under George Louison and Kendrick Radix, who were ministers in the People's Revolutionary Government, have constituted themselves in something called the Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement, which is, by declaration, a political party movement, and which has talked about naming candidates for the 15-seat assembly, which is the elected government in Grenada -- Fifteen constituencies. It is a first past-the-post race, so a majority of votes in each constituency, or any constituency, is not required to win. So the MBPM has said that they will field a candidate. So far they have named none.

Other elements of the New Jewell Movement have indicated that they don't think it is appropriate to re-enter the, or to enter this democratic process. Some say that continued revolutionary activity is what is needed; others say that it is time to cool their heels and watch and see what happens, and a variety of statements are made.

You have to remember that the New Jewell Movement, according to their own figures, probably never really had more than 350 full members, and of that only about 80 to 100 were active members, other than candidate or applicant members.

That doesn't mean to say that -- hum?

Q 80 to what?

FIRST OFFICIAL: 80 to 100 - and that while that doesn't mean that there wasn't support for the NJM on the Island, those are the membership numbers. We don't have at all a perfect fix on what their numbers would look like today, but I have had Grenadians who I think are in a position to at least make good guesses tell me that there may be 4,000 - 5,000 people who would consider themselves supporters of something like what there was before, but because it has divided itself, it is hard t, see how they would fall down or come down in any set way.

On the Gairy side, Eric Matthew Gairy, former Prime Minister, active politically since 1951, really, early '50's, is certainly the strategic leader, wants to be the strategic leader, of the Grenada United Labor Party, GULP. That Party is indeed planning to contest the election. It had a list of fifteen candidates.

Our understanding is that some of those people disturbed by Gairy's own behavior over the last several weeks have withdrawn their candidacies, and do not wish to associate themselves with the Party, as a result of some of the things he is reported to have done or said.

Gairy has said publicly that he will not run for election, but that he will hope to be named Governor General, which it would be the prerogative of the winning Party, that which forms the government, to do. Other speculation is that he would have a crony stand down from his or her seat, and have a bi-election called, and then Gairy would run in that constituency and be elected and then take over the government.

As you can imagine, there is just a lot of still discussion about what might or might not happen.

Then the third major force on the political scene, a new one, is the New National Party, NNP, which is the association of one long-time Grenada political party, the Grenada National Party, GNP. The leader is Herbert Blaize, a former Chief Minister and a former Premier -- these are pre-independence titles for Prime Minister -- who is a tried, tested politician on the Grenadian scene, who has associated himself with two younger men, new to the political scene, Francis Alexis, who was head of the Grenada Democratic Movement, GDM, which is a movement that really found its birth, I guess, or came to life after the 1979 revolution first as a group of exiles, self exiles, and then later as a broader political group, and then a third element under George Brizan -- B-r-i-z-a-n -- which was the National Democratic Party which he formed in just the last six months or so, and those three groups have gotten together under the New National Party agreeing, as we understand it, that there is a better chance for them to prevail in these elections if they run a single candidate in each constituency. They have done that. They have divided up the constituencies among themselves and they are going to stand the election.

Q On the election question itself, what would be the U.S. attitude if Eric Gairy, indeed, returns as Prime Minister of Grenada? Would you oppose that?

FIRST OFFICIAL: From everything we see, Grenada is going to have the first free, fair, open, uncorrupted elections that it has had in a long, long time. If the voters of Grenada choose a majority from one or another of these parties, then this Government is going to have to look very, very carefully at the performance of that Government, what its policies are, what its practices are, and how it sets about running things, and we will make our judgments on the basis of performance, not on the basis of labels. Where we see a democratic process here that looks very clean, looks very open, so if the Grenadian voters speak, we'll listen.

Q Can I go back to your colleague for a second? As you know, unemployment remains a very, very major problem there and that is why you get very little luck in attracting investors.

What I am curious about is how much consultation have you had with the political parties regarding their plans for alleviating a very, very high tax burden on any investors there, and whether plans are moving ahead with your industrial park?

SECOND OFFICIAL: First of all, we are not talking to the political parties. We are talking to the interim government continually, and as to luck on attracting investments,
that leads me to another subject about how much can you expect in the amount of time one has been dealing with all these complex problems?

The interim government has begun to move on a series of complex reforms that took time both to formulate on their part and then begin to enact and put into effect.

That includes a complete shift away from the intervention of the state in all phases of economic activity toward a more market oriented system which we think is going to produce results, and by example, the usury rate was recently changed and the Ingles Toy Factory opened up a week later. The investment guide has been promulgated which offers concessions similar to those found throughout CARICOM, limits the discretion of the government in making those concessions so that they can be more automatically pursued, if you will. In the case of the Ingles Toy Factory, I think there was a five year tax forgiveness. A whole shift away from what I found when I went down there with the White House Task Force right after the rescue mission, and we found, as I recall, in the hotel area for foreign investors effective tax rates of 85 percent, but when you reform the entire tax code of any country, you get yourself into ,a very complex process, and we are very pleased that they have come as far as they have.

They have indicated that they wish to divest themselves of seven state-owned enterprises, and they have already returned thirteen farms, so we see considerable movement toward an economic revival aided by a series of policy reforms that we are helping them with at their request.

Q If I could just follow on that one thing, Ingles Toy has a total of 25 employees, I believe, and I have been told that there is going to be an estimated thousand school leavers a year coming out of various institutions there, and that the private sector provides not very many jobs at all, that it is necessary to absorb this growing population of young Grenadians.

What do you honestly think the prospects are in the short-to-medium term for attracting enough foreign investment to alleviating the pretty massive unemployment problem?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Obviously you are describing a situation that has pertained in Grenada for a number of years and it pertains in a lot of the small islands of the Caribbean, so there is nothing really unique about it, but in the case of Grenada, we know that there are between 50 and 60 investment proposals that have been placed before the interim government.

Three enterprises have really opened their doors -- I'm sorry, two have opened their doors and are at work, Ingles being one. There is a third which is about to open, that is in the fishing area.

There are twenty which are about to be given, we understand, government approval, and when the investment will occur and when something will be seen from that, I am just not sure.

I don't know if in those 50 to 60 proposals there is enough employment to absorb the unemployment on the Island. Numbers are hard to come by, because there is no good data base, but certainly there are several thousand unemployed people on that Island, so I don't know if they are going to absorb that, but they certainly hold out promise, they hold out a lot of hope for people, and my own judgment is that the investors who are sort of standing in the wings are waiting to see what happens on December 3rd, and to see what government is indeed formed, and then they, as we, will look at what that government seems to indicate, what its promises are - to get back to your other point. We have not talked to the political parties about their policies or programs, but, indeed, some of them are pumping out manifestoes and documents which state what their policies will be. Some are more articulate than others, and some are more precise than others, but it is that kind of thing that comes out of the political process, and those are the things the Grenadians have to judge, too.

Q Who is ahead in the elections right now?

FIRST OFFICIAL: There is no "ahead."

Q Can you tell us who is winning?

FIRST OFFICIAL: No. There have been two polls done by the St. Augustine Research Associates out of Trinidad. One was very broad and very general, which sort of got at what Grenadians were worried about, and they are the things you might imagine they would be worried about -- their economic well-being, the future. That first broad-brush poll seemed to indicate a very real concern about Gairy, that he was not considered to be the kind of leader that Grenada needed under the circumstances, and it gave fairly favorable marks to people like Herbert Blaize and George Brizan, but it was very general, and

I don't think that you would translate that into any kind of action.

FIRST OFFICIAL: A second poll that was conducted in August by the same firm in Trinidad and Tobago, which was more focused, nonetheless pre-dated the formation of the new National Party. The coalition had not yet formed and so it is extremely difficult to extrapolate from the data that it provided the kinds of things that would give you a picture of a horse race at this point on the track.

I guess, if anything, it looked like it would be -- it could be a close call, but how close I don't think anybody can judge.

Q How big is Gairy's support there, do you know?

FIRST OFFICIAL: No, I really don't know. People use the term "25 percent," but 25 percent in a 15-constituency race doesn't mean a whole lot.

I think what they mean is about 25 percent of the population would consider themselves favorably disposed toward Eric Gairy. How that translates into party vote, I don't know.

Q Is the United States providing any financial aid to any of the parties, or any other kind of aid to any of the parties?

FIRST OFFICIAL: No, we are not. The National Endowment for Democracy is providing some funds to civic action groups which are mainly from, I think, staffed by the churches, or through broad church auspices and other public service groups, to promote the return to democractic processes, sort of get-out-the-vote kinds of things. But we are not providing any direct support.

MODERATOR: Why don't we take just one more, and then the second official has something he would like to say.

Q Can you tell us how much unemployment there is?

SECOND OFFICIAL: Yes. 8,000 to 9,000.

Q And the population of Grenada?

SECOND OFFICIAL: 89,000 now?

VOICE: Ninety thousand.

SECOND OFFICIAL: Ninety, and the answer to the question on employment generation was a quick sketch of the proposals that have been submitted thus far that my colleague mentioned. It indicates employment generation of about 1,700. But I wanted to close with one thing, and that is, from AID's point of view, our objective is to let Grenada be Grenada, to support Grenada in its evolution towards its view of a free democracy with a market economy. We aren't trying to turn it into Rosslyn or Tyson's Corner, and it isn't going to look like that when you go down there, and we did not fill all six bays in that large airport with furnishings. We don't intend to use all those bays. That isn't necessary. We are proceeding in an orderly way with the road program and other infrastructure development rather than incurring millions in overruns in an attempt to create a Potemkin village for you. So don't expect it to look like the opening of Dulles Airport.

Grenada is slowly evolving in its own way with its own deliberative speed towards its own view of a free democratic society, and we think it is doing a hell of a fine job getting there, but there are still a lot of bridges to cross. Thank you.

Q Could I ask you a broader question? What impact does the Administration see its rescue mission in Grenada having had in the past year outside of Grenada, for example on the Soviet Union, on Cuba, on Nicaragua, on other countries in Latin America? What impact has this Grenada project had on policy in a broader sense, outside of the Island?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Well, obviously, I don't deal off in those other continents, and I am not going to presume to try to interpret things too broadly.

I will say that not only within the Caribbean but certainly within this hemisphere we have had steady statements of approbation, about an American willingness and resolve to act when action certainly seemed to be required under the circumstances that pertained at the time. And I think that if that demonstrates resolve, real purpose, then you can interpret for yourself what effect that has elsewhere.

MODERATOR: Let's just deal with the question on the mental hospital that we had, and then that will be it.

SECOND OFFICIAL: Yes, Joanne. I didn't want to miss a shot of going around on that with you and Doyle again. What is your question?

Q Would you just describe the progress, if any --

SECOND OFFICIAL: Immense, immense. (Laughter) Quite a bit, unaided by any outside visitors. It is proceeding to the point where next week we think their patient overload will be moved into the interim facility at the old doctors' residence. I am told that work is on schedule. The design is being re-examined by the top mental health architect that was originally a part of the consultant group, and there are, as I understand it, at least three alternatives to that design being worked out, including the use of prefab materials and other things to bring the cost down to where we feel it will fit within the budget we had worked out with the interim government for the total assistance we were providing. You know, any overrun we have there has to come out of something else that they have negotiated with us, and then construction, hopefully, could begin around the turn of the year. But the interim facility will be complete and everyone will be in their own rooms by next week.

Thank you.

MODERATOR: Thank you, very much.

(The briefing concluded at 11:15 a.m.)

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ON-THE-RECORD PRESS BRIEFING
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
ON
U.S. EMERGENCY FOOD ASSISTANCE TO ETHIOPIA
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 25, 1984, 2:10 P.M.

MISS SEMERAD: Good afternoon. The briefing today will be on U.S. Emergency Food Assistance to Ethiopia. The briefer will be M. Peter McPherson, the Administrator of AID, and it is ON THE RECORD for both sound and camera.

MR. McPHERSON: Good afternoon. I've been here many times over the last couple years talking about the drought in Africa. Certainly, most of us have become convinced that this is one of the worst droughts, if not the worst of this century in Africa.

In 1984, the U.S. provided some $173 million of disaster assistance in food to Sub-Saharan Africa. That was roughly 50 percent of the food that actually arrived for the disaster use. It was more food, more resources than were provided to Africa during that terrible Sahel drought during the early seventies that I think many of you will remember, either that or hearing about it.

Our response so far this year is, frankly, enormous, because this, apparently at least in some areas, getting worse and worse. We have provided in these few days, these early few days of fiscal year 1985 -- that beginning October 1 -- so far to Sub-Saharan Africa some $85 million, $85 million which we have obligated.

This is, of course, a great human tragedy, and the President has been following the matter very closely. Over the past months and years, I've given him several different reports. In fact, my latest report to him was this morning, telling him what we have done exactly so far this year with Ethiopia. Through me, he wishes to convey his really deep concern about this enormous human tragedy that is occurring in Ethiopia and Africa throughout. He has instructed me and the Agency for International Development to respond to the needs there. We are certainly attempting to do just that.

Ethiopia, as I mentioned, is an enormous problem. It was a problem last year. The last fiscal

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year, we provided some $19.8 million of resources for the disaster, but so far this fiscal year, again only a few days old, we provided $43.7 million, or have obligated $43.7 million of food and disaster assistance. This, in fact, is more for this month for Ethiopia than we provided for any country throughout Africa last year -- in short, an enormous immediate response -- but it's clear there's going to have to be a great, great deal more.

Now, there have been many problems in working in Ethiopia in the last year and there are going to be this year as well. Let me just review them for just a moment or two. First of all, the biggest problems are in the north. There is some indication, in fact, further down here in the south that there has been some rain in recent times. The big problems have been up in the north where you see these signs of various cities (indicating map). That is, in fact, also the area where there had been, and continues to be a civil war, and that civil war has greatly complicated distribution of food. I can go into that: There are various towns throughout here that fall through the government, and then back to the guerrillas, and so on. It has greatly complicated our delivery. Some areas, frankly, aren't safe for trucks to go with food and so on.

Another problem has been the terrain. The terrain of Ethiopia, certainly in the north, is a difficult one with huge mountains and so on. Another problem has been the port facilities. It is the Ethiopian Government estimate that through the ports we can deliver, donors can deliver approximately 50,000 tons of food a month. That, frankly, may not be enough food to take care of the need. It is not perhaps enough food by the Ethiopian Government estimate, and we think it is probably not enough either. That port capacity is a real problem.

Another problem, even when you get the food into the city, into the country, is the number of trucks to take it around, assuming you can get through the civil war areas, just the physical number of trucks, capacity to carry the food. The RRC, the relief agency of the Ethiopian Government, has approximately 300 trucks at its disposal, we believe. But that probably isn't enough, and other trucks available in the country, at least at this time, is a restraining factor. It's arguable, in fact, that trucks within the country may be the biggest restraining factor at this time.

Another problem is that there are some 42 million people in Ethiopia -- millions of people, of course, in the north where it struck. We figure, incidentally, about 6 million people may be at risk, and those 6 million people up and around here don't all live in cities, naturally; they live off where they farm, and in many cases, many, many miles or kilometers from the nearest city, so for people to get food, they have to come in some place. There's just no way that you even know where all these people are. Remember, there isn't any census, there aren't any records; you don't really have a good idea, really, within hundreds of thousands sometimes of how many people live where.

Q Excuse me, you say "at risk." You mean from the civil war or from the drought?

A From the drought. From the drought.

So people have to come into feeding centers or into towns, and often what's happened here -- and they have to walk a long way, usually walking -- what happens here is, by the time they bring their kids in, or they come in, there are severe problems, and many of the deaths we're hearing about are people that are literally coming into camp to die.

Another problem -- and I'm going to review some of these in a few moments as to how we think some of these problems can be tackled -- another problem, in all candidness, has been the Ethiopian Government. Certainly, up until the time of their anniversary celebration a few weeks ago, it seemed that they were not especially interested in working with donors and really tackling this tremendous problem. Estimates are that they may have spent a couple hundred million dollars on this tenth-year anniversary celebration, that we weren't able to get data on the number of trucks, on the problems. We felt they didn't give priority to food coming into ports. At one time, we had cement from the Soviet Union take priority over food that we knew we had to get in -- a number of problems.

Those are the problems we faced. Let me talk about how we're trying to take care of these difficulties. First of all, there is an immediate problem. By an "immediate" problem I mean people without food today. What we have done in the last few days, we have been providing gasoline, or reimbursement for gasoline, to Ethiopian Government cargo planes to fly food into certain areas. I can point this out on the map. Where we've been flying it is to Mekele, which is a major population center, and from there it's gone out. It comes up from up here, up near the port, into Mekele.

In addition, we provide some $25,000 for this. It costs a couple of thousand dollars per flight. We've made it clear that there is another $75,000 available for such flights. Actually, of course, to the extent there is a need and we can respond this way, we certainly are going to do so.

In addition to our flights getting food around, the International Committee of the Red Cross has also had a plane operate. Tomorrow, we are sitting down with some of the private voluntary organizations -- World Vision, Catholic Relief Services -- to talk with them about plane service that they might be offering. This is all in-country, note. This isn't bringing stuff from outside the country; it's all in-country, because it's clear to us that at least in some of these cases, we are going to have to fly food from the ports -- the port down here in Djibouti, Aseb, up here, these ports along here (indicating map) to fly food into the camp areas. This is, obviously, a short-term measure, but it's clear that there is food in-country that's needed, that needs to get to the camps.

The longer term -- by "longer term," I mean the next few weeks out. This problem, we would not want to have permanently be solved or longer-term solved by such flights unless we need them intermittently. What is necessary, in our judgment, is a much broader response among other people, among other entities on the part of the Ethiopian Government.

It is our judgment that the Ethiopian Government, since their tenth-anniversary celebration, has been much more focused on this problem. In fact, Commissioner Dewait, who is the head of their relief agency, the so-called RRC, will be in New York next week at the U.N., and we have made arrangements to get together with him to talk with him in detail about what additional support we think we can provide and what we think we need from him.

We need the Ethiopian Government. We and the other donors need some very concrete things from him. We need additional trucks allocated, no doubt, from the

Ethiopian military to this effort -- several hundred trucks. We estimated as many perhaps as 300 additional trucks need to be allocated from the Ethiopian Government military to this effort.

I mentioned that in-country trucking may be the biggest restraint for substantial increases in amounts of food. Another restraint, you will recall, was the capacity of the ports to bring in the full amount of food that's necessary.

We think that some technical assistance, some port experts, in fact, may be able to help, and we're anxious, either ourselves or other parties, to provide such expertise. We think, no doubt, that the Ethiopian Government is going to have to give priority to a larger amount of food within those ports to bring it in. There has been priority sometimes to other items.

We're going to have to discuss how we can deal with the areas, the civil war-torn areas, the guerrilla-controlled areas. That has been something that really has never been worked out to everybody's satisfaction and we've got to get that straight. In short, we expect early next week to be sitting down and concretely presenting our ideas and how the Ethiopian Government can allocate more resources to achieve a more effective program in that country.

A couple of weeks ago I announced -- I know many of you were here -- that General Jules Becton, who is here with me today, would that day have his first meeting with the Inter-agency Task Force to deal with the whole of Africa. General Becton indeed has had almost daily sessions with committees of that Task Force, and with a tremendous focus on Ethiopia.

Let me say, in conclusion, that frankly, I'm saddened at the fact that while the West has provided -- and the U.S. particularly, being the largest provider -- has responded really enormously to the situation in Ethiopia. It almost seems like callous indifference that the Soviet Union has virtually done nothing. In the last year or so, all we know they've done is provide some $3 million worth of rice, a commodity which isn't consumed generally in Ethiopia. $3 million. Now, Ethiopia is really virtually a Soviet satellite, and we just don't understand why the Soviets can't respond more.

I wonder, for example, if there isn't more equipment that they could help to get this around in, if there isn't more resources. I'm positive, really, that there should be a much greater response. As I say, it almost seems like callous indifference to be providing billions of dollars in military assistance to this country, and nothing for practical purposes in terms of food when it's clear that 6 million people are at risk.

I mention this not to berate the Soviet Union, but it seems to me that we need some world press attention on this. We need to have the world press focus on the fact the Soviets have done virtually nothing, and I would hope that perhaps that focus would bring some action.

It's good to be here again today, and I welcome any questions that you might have.

Q The second part of the problem, the great food problem, Mr. McPherson, is very apparent, but how about medical assistance, not only in terms of medicine, but physicians to get in there to handle the great problems that have existed in these camps?

A First of all, I didn't mention the medical care, but that's part of our package and part of what we have been providing and will be providing as time goes on here. I don't think that physicians, per se, are -- I mean certainly not the sort of fully-trained, expert physicians, but elementary medical care is --

Q Paramedics?

A -- yes, the kind of thing that is necessary. We've done some of that; we expect to do more. The numbers that I gave, provide, include some medical care as well as others.

Q Is it the area which is called Tigre?

A Yes.

Q And do you think the two American people who have been kidnapped in Lalibela last work were relief workers working in that kind of operations?

A I don't have information on that situation. Tigre is right here, and that's in the middle of the major problem area of civil war.

(Continued on next page.)

Q Who is the gentleman, again, you will be meeting with?

A Commissioner Dewait.

Q Can you spell that, please?

A Sure I will. It is D-e-w-a-i-t.

Q And that is the full name, Commissioner -- ?

A No, I don't have his first name.

Q All right. What day will you be seeing him?

A Well, we expect it will be about Wednesday.

Q At the UN?

A New York or here. The final -- the location isn't worked out.

Q The United Nations or in Washington.

A Yes.

Q So you are going to meet with Dewait of the RRC next week.

A Yes.

Q Are you making any approaches to the various and sundry liberation fronts, the Aromas or the Tigrans or the Eritreans, to see to it that food can be brought into areas under their control?

A We have had discussions -- we pursued getting the food into those areas, and though I'd like not to comment on it extensively today, it is clear that we are going to have to have the cooperation of all parties if we are to move freely.

Q Mr. McPherson, will you talk to us a little bit about this problem on a continent-wide scale, because the drought has not just been Ethiopia but right across Africa.

A It certainly is not just Ethiopia. There are roughly twenty countries, at least -- it depends on how you define it -- that have serious drought problems this year. It is our judgment that the most serious problem areas are going to be Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Niger and Sudan. Those are the countries that we think are going to be most serious now, but frankly the situation has been unfolding in such a fashion that it is hard to tell.

Now, Ethiopia of course with 42 million people is a huge country. Kenya, down below here a bit, is a large populated country, too, so we expect fairly substantial food requirements for Kenya, as well.

Q Do you have programs for these other countries?

A Oh, yes.

Q Can you run over that a little bit?

A Yes. In fact, I think -- Kate, do we have the hand-out?

VOICE: In the hand-out today, yes, we have figures on all of the African countries where we are providing assistance.

MR. MC PHERSON: Yes, we have got -- for example, in Kenya, I personally have met with the President of the country. We have had a team looking at the situation, projecting requirements, work extensively.

It is a lot easier to work in Kenya because there is no civil war. We can plan it more carefully and more completely. Logistics are just a lot easier. They are not perfect by any sense of the imagination. You have still got the port questions there in Kenya.

In Sudan, the logistics get a little bit more difficult, too. There is fifteen million population in Sudan. The drought area is particularly the case in the western side of the country.

Niger, it's several parts of the country. Niger's population is not as large, but it is landlocked, and there could well be some real logistical difficulties getting food there.

Mozambique was a major problem country last year and so our structure is reasonably set up in Mozambique.

The southern part of Mozambique has received substantial rain -- or some rain -- in recent times, and we don't think it is going to be as bad there, but the northern part in Province Tate, which is the province which sticks out into Zimbabwe there, is a problem.

We have CARE on the spot in Mozambique helping us coordinate, and so forth. I have met with the President of Mozambique myself in recent weeks to discuss this program at great depth and in fact have visited camps there, feeding camps, in Mozambique.

Q Is Ethopia the only African country where there we are not providing direct government-to-government help, that is to say, where you are working only through private agencies?

A Or UN agencies. We have done very little in Angola, as well. Ethiopia, however, is the major case where we have not worked directly with government. The issue of how we work, or what is our relationship with the government, is one, of course, that will be under discussion in the weeks ahead, and I suppose it is pertinent that we provide gasoline for cargo planes piloted by Ethiopian government pilots in recent days.

Q Could you talk about that just a moment, because these private agencies say that they simply cannot distribute more than 200,000 tons a year in Ethiopia. Private agencies like the Catholics, they say that there must be direct government help such as you have in places like Senegal and Mozambique, and wherever.

Can you explain why there isn't, and how important is it in your view that there be bilateral help as opposed to channelling it through agencies?

A I think it is critical that -- a couple points -- one, in recent days, the PVO's have been suggesting that they have broader capacity. I met with them all about three weeks ago and we discussed this capacity problem at great length, and there is a suggestion in the last couple of weeks that with certain help their capacity might be three times greater than what they originally proposed it.

So that is expandable in part. It is, however, not a full answer to your question.

It is my firm view that the problem of Ethiopia will not be addressed unless there is an expanded and more effective program of the Government of Ethiopia.

Nobody else has the capacity. No outside group can come in and quickly enough fill the capacity to deliver this. What I am saying is that we look forward to our discussions on how we can play an effective role in this whole area, and we will be discussing this next week with Dewait.

Q Is the United States Government prepared for bilateral help?

A Our interest is an effective program, and as indicated by our willingness to provide for Ethiopian Government cargo planes.

Q Is that a yes?

A We are going to be talking about that. We made it very clear what we need. It is not a political matter. It is just a matter we got to have responses from the Ethiopian Government to this situation. We have got to have those additional trucks. We have got to have people tracking the food when it gets out there. You can't sort of just drop it and leave it, and so on. We obviously are interested -- well, I think I have given my response.

Q Can you see the day when American planes will fly directly into Ethiopia?

A At this hour we are talking about how to use planes that are there, or that we can get there, that are not government, U.S. Government, planes, certainly, to take care of this problem.

The situation is evolving, but I think that our response now is the appropriate one.

Q Some of the food groups have talked about the need for U.S. providing trucks and spare parts, and stuff like that.

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A You remember that year ago, we provided money to the Catholic Relief Service to rent trucks, and that worked fairly well, and we would expect to perhaps do even more of that, but I think that whatever we can rent may not be sufficient, and the Ethiopian Government that has its paristatal, that has perhaps 6,000 trucks under its control, and has perhaps thousands of military trucks, is the primary reservoir of trucks to move this around.

I think you can speculate a lot on "ifs", returning a bit to your question. We are committed to an enormous response here. I mean, by any measure, historic or otherwise, $43 million in less than a month of obligations, is an enormous figure. I mean, it is historical proportions. It obviously is a commitment made with deep interest on the part of the President of the United States to respond to these terribly stricken people, and we are going to provide -- we are going to respond to this need as best we can. And we are searching for answers day-by- day. There isn't a day that doesn't go by that I don't spend quite a lot of time on Ethiopia these days searching through how to get this job done, how to get the food there.

The man back here has a question.

Q Yes. Obviously it is a Marxist government, and that is why you don't --

A No, it really isn't why. It is more -- why we have had problems in the past was because we didn't think they were doing the job for their people, because they weren't willing to allocate resources. They weren't willing to provide us information. We have really always made the distinction that to solve a problem, we were going to get food to the people that were hungry.

Q But my main question though was what coordination is there with other countries? Is the United States doing a certain part, and others will do some other part?

A The coordination is -- the gatherer of the information, if you will -- has been the World Food Program in Rome. I have sent -- communicated with my colleagues -- the Canadians, the British, the French, and so forth, -- either directly or by my staff periodically. In fact, today, I will be sending another letter, cable, to each one of these colleagues saying, "Here is what we have done. Update me on what you have done."

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This informal approach of keeping in touch with others to be sure we were aware of what others have done has been our approach. We have not said, "This was the United States' percentage, and that's somebody else's percentage." We have been the largest donor, and we fundamentally tried to respond to the need as we could see it in --

Q But do you coordinate it in any way, like saying, "We'll take this area, you take that one?

A As an informal matter, that has worked out that way. I am not satisfied that that coordination is as tight as it has got to be, given the tremendous explosion and need, however, and one of the reasons for my letter to my colleagues is to tighten up that coordination

Q I'd like to press you on the figure of obligations for FY '85. Are you telling us that you have made approvals of $45 million --

A $43.

Q $43 -- since October 1st, or were these approvals underway before the fiscal year started?

A They were underway in some cases before the fiscal year began, but they were for resources which were Congressionally approved effective as of October 1.

Q So could I ask you to go back and say when you first started using FY '85 funds for this, in practice, I mean.

A Well, we began to anticipate the fiscal year, of course, several weeks before the fiscal year began. I can't give you an exact date, but these were --

Q Was it back in August or July?

A No, not that long. A few weeks before, but knowing these resources were not available until October 1, and it was after October 1 when these obligations were made.

As you, of course, understand, the poor person in Ethiopia doesn't focus on our fiscal year, so we have had this. This has been a moving target problem.

Q I understand that. I am not saying they should, or anything, but what I am curious about is, when your FY '84 money ran out, and when you started spending FY '85 money.

A We didn't start spending FY '85 money in any formal sense until October 1, and we began anticipating it a few weeks in advance. There was not a time however -- we did not have a period at the end of '84 and before '85 when we wished to obligate resources but could not. If I said that clearly enough. There was not a break when we did not have resources which we legally had the authority to obligate.

Q What does obligation mean in this context?

A Obligation means that the Federal Government and our Agency has made a decision, a formal decision, to ship food and the process to do so has begun, to spend the money.

Q Are these Congressionally mandated expenditures in this amount?

A No.

Q Have you cut down any on the amount of time it takes you to get food there now?

A We think so, we think so. We think we can buy food at port, like New Orleans, and we think we can make the purchase much faster than what was done in the past. This was part of the Presidentially-directed study to attempt to do so.

Q Have you finished arguing over the pre-positioning process? Is that in place now?

A Well, there is -- our pre-positioning approach is no doubt -- of course, we are struggling simply to get the food there, so far, so pre-positioning hasn't been a major point. But our approach to pre-positioning will be to deliver food, at least initially to countries which we are quite sure are going to have needs in the months or years in advance or ahead, and so in fact we are going to be pre-positioning food in particularly problem countries.

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Q What time did it take before and what time period are you trying to shorten?

A Well, it has been taking historically about three months to get food there, and we think that we can shorten that to something in the range of a month, depending upon the circumstances.

Q Is the grain itself the food aid, or is that converted somehow?

A I didn't go into that. Let me do so, because there is an interesting twist to this.

Much of this is grain itself -- wheat. But what you find when a person is severely malnutritioned, simply hasn't had enough food for some time, is that, especially kids, you can bring them out of that state. You can save them much more likely if the food you give to them is enriched. In other words, something like various soyfood, made of soybeans, enriched food, high protein food, and so at least a part of the food which we are in the process of now shipping will be this enriched food for exactly that purpose. Sir.

Q Has some of this food been stolen, or a lot of it?

A Well, we haven't had that problem. Now we have with private voluntary organizations, the Catholic Relief Service, World Vision, with international organizations like the International Committee of the Red Cross, and so forth, that we have known and worked with for years, and in our judgment just do a very good job.

There have been some stories in the European press about European Community food, and other European donor food, about theft. I am not in a position to directly comment on those. I am confident that our own food, however, has been carefully controlled, in part, frankly, because I suggest because of the mechanism we have used to distribute it.

Q What has the Ethiopian Government done differently? You said that before the celebration, you had problems with them. What are they doing now?

A Well, they have actively begun to go out and try to talk to donors as to what they need. They have given us information, or at least more information. This

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trip of Dewait to New York, in my opinion, is indicative of much broader interest and focus.

We think that the Ethiopian Government is simply more serious about tackling this problem. The RRC itself, and Dewait, the individual, have been serious these many months, but we haven't been at all convinced that the Ethiopian Government per se has been, and we are hopeful.

Ladies and gentlemen, it is nice to be here, and thank you, very much.

(The briefing concluded at 2:44 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ON THE RECORD BRIEFING
BY
M. PETER McPHERSON, DIRECTOR [Administrator]
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
ON
ETHIOPIAN RELIEF
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 1984, 2.07 [P.M.]

MS. SEMERAD: We have Mr. M. Peter McPherson, the Administrator of A.I.D., with us today to answer any questions that you might have on the White House release earlier today on the U.S. response to the African drought situation. His comments will ON THE RECORD for both sound and camera.

MR. McPHERSON: Good afternoon. I do have a very few brief comments, but primarily I'm here to answer whatever questions you might have.

Commissioner Dawit -- who is head of the Ethiopian Relief Agency -- and myself met this morning, and there will be further meetings this afternoon. They were very productive sessions this morning, and I'm sure they will be today. We will meet again tomorrow

Basically our discussions focused, or in large part, on distribution of food within the country. We will have more extensive comments tomorrow afternoon, I would expect, after the close of those discussions; and I'm not really in a position to comment on them further.

The release which the White House issued this morning, among other things, talks about planes. We are providing two planes -- cargo planes -- each of which will provide 17-18 metric tons per load time. Those two planes, as you'll note, will be available for at least 60 days. I think the White House statement was tentative. It is now firm that those planes will be provided.

This will be in augmentation of the gasoline that we have been providing to Ethiopia Government planes. We've been doing this for a couple of weeks now.

What the release today from the White House I think indicates is that this is not just an Ethiopia but, rather, this is almost a Continent-wide problem. There is really very serious drought in at least countries and in many other countries which are affected as well.

With those comments, I'd be happy to accept any questions that you might have.

Q Mr. McPherson, since you say the White House statement was tentative and you say the arrangement for the planes is now firm -- since the tentative aspect was quote, "I think subject to talks with Ethiopia" -- is there anything that came out of your talk with Commissioner Dawit that has made it now firm?

A Frankly, we wanted to communicate our willingness to provide those planes and have the government approve it; and that was the only reason for the tentativeness of that. We did so this morning, and so we will be providing the planes.

Q Sir, two days ago the White House issued a statement in which it said, among other things: "Basic to this whole effort is a more cooperative attitude from the Ethiopian Government and the dedication of more of their own resources. They reportedly spent a substantial amount for their Independence Day celebration but have paid little attention to this problem. There are more than 6,000 trucks under government control, for example, but only a few hundred are now available for emergency food shipments."

My question to you is: Has the Ethiopian Government changed its attitude? In the language of the White House, is it being "more cooperative"?

A We think in the day since this celebration a few weeks ago -- the Ethiopia celebration -- that the Ethiopia Government has focused substantially more on this problem. The discussions with Commissioner Dawit today and tomorrow have been so far, and we expect will continue to be, productive. And we'll be commenting more concretely, I expect, tomorrow on the results of those discussions.

Q Can you elaborate a bit now? Are they going to dedicate more trucks?

A I'm not in a position to do so today, sir.

Yes.

I'd like to pursue something that's been troubling me a little bit all along. When did you first know of the magnitude of the problem in terms of the revision of the figures upward to six million people who were being threatened? When was A.I.D. first apprised and firm in its belief that six million people were, indeed, threatened?

A Well, we have felt for several weeks -- a few weeks, in any case -- that this problem was growing in seriousness. You will recall, I believe on October 9th, that I was here in this same room to announce an Interagency Committee to deal with Africa drought as whole. You will also note that all but about 10 million of that 45 million which we have announced for Ethiopia was prior to the NBC broadcast of the BBC film.

In short, for a few weeks we have been convinced this problem was growing.

We, of course, have felt that this was a fairly major problem for some time -- reflected in our commitment last year of over 19 million dollars worth of food, the largest amount which was given by any donor in Ethiopia in fiscal year 1984, and a very substantial amount. It is one of the largest amounts of any food of any amount that we gave to any country in Africa for fiscal 1984.

Q O.K. Though it seems to me I recall having session with Jay Morris sometime this summer where a few reporters talked with him about the problem that the U.S. was apprised several months ago that this situation was indeed a very, very terrible one.

My question to you is: Why did it take you so long to move the massive amount of aid that you, indeed, now feel is necessary to alleviate the famine there?

A Well, what we found all long -- and we found this in Ethiopia and we found this in every other country we ever worked in, frankly -- is that that we need really excellent cooperation from the government of the country in which we're working to be able to have a massively effective relief effort. And we think that in the last just very few weeks that the Ethiopia Government had begun to be deeply involved in this problem, and we welcomed it.

Q Mr. McPherson --

A Yes.

Q -- you say you now have the aircraft approved for operations inside of Ethiopia. This is obviously a change from the Ethiopian attitude last week in which some British aircraft were turned down. Has that since turned around with the Ethiopian Government?

A That is correct.

Q It has been turned around.

A My understanding is that the two British aircraft will be going in for some 60 to 90 days.

Q How does that fit in with the previous announcement that the distribution would be by voluntary agencies? Is this in addition to their efforts, and how does that work?

A Well, these aircraft would be not run by the Government of Ethiopia but rather would be operated with private people. It is true, however, that we have gone beyond strictly working with private voluntary organizations -- at least two weeks ago, in which we provided gasoline, or reimbursement for gasoline, for Ethiopia Government airplanes.

Q Was there any talk with Commissioner Dawit about getting food into Eritrea and Tigre?

A I'd like to withhold further comments on my conversations with Commissioner Dawit until the next time we get together, but certainly will say that the north, the contested areas, are of intense interest to us. And there has been speculation of food truces and that kind of thing in the last few days; and we, the United States Government, certainly welcome any easing of restrictions or ability to get food around Ethiopia. Certainly, the combat has been a major limitation in effective distribution in Ethiopia.

Q I'm going to ask you about these Trans-America airplanes.

A Yes.

Q One: I understand that "Trans-America" is going to be painted off the planes for security reasons. And could you comment on that? What's the security problem?

And, two: What are these planes going to do? Are they going to go from the port into the interior? In other words, is the idea to help break the logjam from the ports or what?

A I don't have the detail of what's going to be painted. One plane has to be painted, but I can't tell you just why or how. We rented these just yesterday and we're working out how that fits together.

Let me just review the problem, and I think the use of the planes will become clear. The problem is that we've got food in the country, but we can't get it to site of the poor people -- of the hungry people. That takes trucks, in some cases; but in many cases it takes air transportation because of the bad roads -- in some cases a question of conflict along the way, the guerrilla activity -- and so forth. But if there's an airport nearby or some semblance of an airport, we can fly it in.

So what we're flying it from is from port or near port to site of hungry people.

Q Are you and Mr. Dawit going to have a joint news conference tomorrow?

A We're working out how we might do that.

Q O.K.

Q And --

Q One other question.

A I'll be right to you, sir.

Q The figures that you and the Ethiopian Government have been using suggest there are six million people at risk, and I've seen reports from Addis Ababa which suggest that this excludes the hungry in Eritrea and Tigre Provinces. And if you include them you have ten million, instead of six-.

A We have never in our figures excluded those two provinces because, in fact, those two provinces probably include -- well, clearly include -- a vast number of very hungry people, indeed.

Now, it has to be said -- and I know you people, most of whom covered these kinds of stories for some time -- are aware that these figures of how many hungry people there are are difficult to nail down. We don't really have a good population figure for many areas, let along knowing how many hungry people there. But we've always included in any estimates that we've made the people of those two provinces.

To follow along the question that was here a moment ago, those are two provinces where there has been really the most fighting; and it is in those areas where there has been a lot of fighting where there is the greatest hunger -- the greatest number of probably starving people.

(Continued on next page.)

Q In this handout from the White House, it says the new approvals total 208 thousand metric tons out of the $45 million. What is it? Is it grain, is it flour, is it -- what is it?

A It's grain, and it's enriched foods of various kinds. First of all, there's just a lot of grain, but it's whole grain usually and so it has to be put in water and then pounded up; really, kind of ground up.

The way they do this in most of these areas is that you have great big container of some kind, put water in it, soak it for a while and there's a long wooden pounders that women pound away at. It's quite a thing. That's the whole grain.

But, in addition, we have been providing some enriched food, usually enriched with soy, from soybeans. That enriched food has a really excellent impact in bringing people back quickly, especially children who have been hungry for some time.

Q Also, from the White House statement of two days ago, "We will ask for more trucks to be made available for priority access to port facilities and for assurances that food can reach victims in rebel areas."

Have you asked for such assurances?

A Let me discuss that in some detail. Not today, but I'm sure I will be. That enters into the discussions that I've had today and tomorrow. I'll report on that not today.

Q Can you tell us if there's any progress?

A I really don't want to talk about the discussions.

Q Too delicate now?

Q No, it's just not appropriate. Commissioner Dawit and I have had some good discussions, and I want to work closely with him in my report of those conversations. I know you would appreciate that from the point of just diplomatically doing it correctly.

Q You have mentioned a couple of times in the last several weeks that we feel better about the Ethiopian Government response since their anniversary celebration ended.

Is it the U.S. Government opinion that Ethiopia spent money and resources on its anniversary celebration that should better have been going to feeding the people?

A Let me just say, it's clear they spent a great deal of money on their celebration. Well, we don't really know. Some of you people have estimated $200 million, others have said $100 million. But, clearly, it was a lot of money, and there clearly has been for sometime substantial needs in Ethiopia.

Having said that, it seems to us that there is really quite a lot of interest in getting at this problem and figuring it out. I know that the presence of Commissioner Dawit here, and in New York meeting with U.N. agencies, is reflected, we think, of that broader interest, and, frankly, we're pleased by this change of events.

Q I would like you to respond to the charges, first, of Dr. Charles Elliott that the United States has withheld assistance to Ethiopia in hopes that the famine might topple the government, and, secondly, to Tip O'Neill's charges regarding the tying of aid to the contra to emergency food assistance for Africa?

A The idea that we would have tied any aid to political considerations in Ethiopia is just wrong and uninformed.

There's been a very conscious policy to provide food and assistance to desparately needy people without regard to politics now for some time.

Specifically, the President has been saying, and we've been echoing, that a hungry child knows no politics. That's our position. I know it for a fact. I've been vigorously pursuing that as the chief implementor of this policy, and I feel very strongly and deeply about the policy.

The question of tying food with the contras -- money -- the facts are that several months ago when that was the issue, we were not held up at all in obligations of monies for food during the time that the contra dispute went forward.

Q Do you anticipate in the course of the coming fiscal year that we will be shipping many times more food into Africa than we did last year?

A We shipped a $173 million worth of food and assistance last year which was the largest amount of assistance ever provided by a U.S. Administration for drought in Africa. I say that again. The largest amount of food ever provided by a U.S. Administration to Africa was provided by us, by this government, last year.

We have already gone a very substantial amount. The fiscal year is not yet over -- is only a month old. This Fiscal Year 1985 is only a month old and we've already provided a $131 million of food and disastrous assistance; a huge amount reflecting a tremendous problem, of course.

How much more we will provide this year than we did last is not yet know, but it's clearly going to be more.

Q Do you have anything to say about the Soviet promise to deliver 300 trucks, precisely the number you recommended, to show all your clout in Moscow?

(Laughter)

A How persuasive I am, I gather.

Q Plus some other vehicles.

Q We don't have any information as to when those trucks or airplanes or helicopters would arrive. There's been some speculation, but I gather that the date of arrival isn't firm.

Frankly, we welcome any assistance the Soviets or the Eastern-bloc might provide. We think that they have an obligation as members of the world community to provide substantial amounts. This would be a change of their position, and we welcome it frankly. We have a problem to take care of it and we hope we can all work together to get it done.

Q What would you say to skeptics who look at the announcement five days before the election that we're now expanding the aid to three more African countries -- Kenya, Mozambique and Mali? Why now, why not last week? Why not two weeks ago when --

A Of course, last week we did. This amount, which was announced today, is on top of substantially greater amounts already provided. In other words, this is an on-going situation where we obligated very substantial amounts of money to many countries in Africa before this became a matter of such broad speculation. We're responding, and we need to and we're going to continue to. We surely wouldn't wait until after the election to do this. We've got a problem right now and we're doing it.

Q You were asked before about Tip O'Neill. I don't think you had a chance to respond. Did you?

A Yes, I did. Mr. O'Neill suggested that the whole food response now was a political one, and that's just wrong. We have responded to the need as we've seen and as we could deliver efficiently the food to hungry people.

I'm quite proud of what we've done. I think that as U.S. citizens we all should really be very proud, because it's very great indeed and we've got a big problem, and we're getting at our share of handling it.

Q Does AID have any firm estimates on the number of persons who are dying daily? I've heard estimates -- 1,000 to 6,000 a day.

A I think the facts are that people don't know. That, of course, is sad in itself.

As I know you can, you need a picture of the area that is drought-stricken. You've got people in camps. In those camps you can, I suppose, make counts of children or adults that die. But many people are still not in camps. They're out in their homes or their communities.

And so often they get into the camps where they can be fed very late, and they have been very hungry for some time. That malnutrition, or lack of food, particularly affects children. We just don't know. For me to speculate would be just out speculation.

I have no doubt that there continues to be many deaths each day in Ethiopia, and that is why we and the world community -- and I'm convinced that's also why the Ethiopian Government -- is showing such a substantial interest in this problem at this time.

Ladies and gentlemen, I'm sure I'll be seeing you soon. I look forward to further discussions.

(Briefing concluded at 2:27 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ON-BACKGROUND BRIEFING
RE
NEGOTIATIONS ON NAMIBIA
FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 1984, 2:06 P.M.

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Just a few opening points. This is to provide a summary and some background on the latest developments in the ongoing southern Africa negotiations.

I think the basic point we would want to make is that it is clear that progress is being made. There are some important new developments, but at the same time there are no dramatic breakthroughs and we have some arduous work ahead.

It's important, we believe, to understand the nature of the fundamental political decisions that have been made and that remain to be made. But starting first with the recent ones that have been made, there clearly has been the emergence of a consensus in Luanda within the Angolan Government around a series of political decisions resulting in a package of ideas which have been put to us officially and authoritatively and which we have been asked by the Angolan Government to present to the South African Government.

The concepts that I'm referring to have been outlined in very general terms in Jim Hoagland's Washington Post interview with the President of Angola. And this set of concepts obviously includes acceptance of the principle and a willingness to proceed with Cuban troop withdrawal in the context of an overall regional settlement of the Namibia question.

We have now, as I mentioned, at the request of the Angolan Government, conveyed these principles and these specific proposals to the South Africans, who recognize them to be just what I said -- that is, official proposals. And that fact is, of course, of some significance. The South African Government has undertaken to study these proposals carefully and provide a considered response, which we believe could take place quite soon within a matter of a few weeks.

We issued a very short statement out of Cape Verde yesterday which many of you have seen a reference to, which basically just summarizes that I've just said, and we have that available here for those who may want to see it.

Having said that, I would stress as well that what we face ahead of us could indeed be an arduous process. There have been important and serious decisions taken; there are more to be taken. And this is in the context of where the U.S. is playing the key mediator role. We see the prospect now for the beginning of tough back-and-forth and of important political decisions.

Let me say as well that we, of course, are operating on the basis of Resolution 435 as the internationally accepted basis for Namibia's independence. We historically helped to produce that set of agreements, a complex set of agreements. Our position on it has not changed, and that is the basis on which I believe all parties are operating.

Another point that I would mention is the question of the completion of the Lusaka Agreement. The Lusaka Agreement in February of '84 pertained to the disengagement of forces in southern Angola, an area of some 25,000 square miles. This is all in the public arena already, and most of you will be familiar with it. That process has nearly been completed, and I think we can say today that there is a will and a desire on the part of both the Angolans and the South Africans to complete that process as expeditiously as possible. We have that authoritatively from both governments concerned and expect that there will be meetings between them in the coming days on that matter. We urge them to complete it, as we have all along, and we of course are prepared to offer our services to help out in that regard if we're asked to do so.

There obviously are many other things going on in southern Africa, but I think that's where I would leave it as far as these negotiations are concerned and then I can take questions.

Clearly, I'm not going to go into the substance of these proposals; and we are at a very extremely delicate phase of a very complex negotiation. The movement that we're referring to and that we have seen is obviously important. I think if one had to try and put a fine point on it, one would say that we're at the phase of serious political decisions. We are, if you will, at the beginning of what could become the end game. Clearly, we would wish that to be the case. We will proceed with our full energies to bring this to a conclusion, we hope.

It's a time when you will predictably see reactions from a number of parties, position-taking, perhaps even some nervousness -- and that's not surprising in the context of a serious negotiation.

I think I'll stop there and take questions.

Q There have been reports emanating from suspect sources, but nonetheless there have been reports that Korean troops are replacing the Cuban troops in Angola. Do you have anything that you might enlighten us on about that?

A We have absolutely no confirmation of such reports. I think there have even been some denials of it. We haven't seen anything to confirm it. It's sort of a distinct impression that what the parties in the region would like to do is to see the region free of foreign forces.

Q I would think that would go completely counter to good faith in the negotiation, would it not?

A Well, I don't think that anyone is seriously considering any such move. They would not be consistent with the basic desire to get South African forces out of Angola, which they nearly are -- out of Namibia, which they will be in the context of a solution there -- and Cubans out of Angola; it would not be consistent with that whole effort.

Q About a month or two ago, it was being said that the problem in getting the South African troops to move the last 25 or so miles from Angola was that no one could agree on what would happen next when that happened -- what would happen in Namibia itself. And the fact that both sides, you're saying now, want to finish this -- does this mean there's at least an agreement on the next steps, or what?

A Well, there's a complex history here -- one of the reasons why that issue of how to define what would take place once they get to the border.

There was an effort at one stage back this past summer to try and couple that in some fashion with an agreement on a preliminary cease-fire or a cessation of hostilities of some form inside Namibia. That idea has not achieved consensus and is not at this stage being pursued by any of the parties. And that in itself represents a step forward at this point.

The key question, of course, remains what takes place once they reach the border. I think a lot of thought has been given to that on both sides. And it really isn't all that complex a matter, now that the other issue of a cessation of hostilities inside Namibia has been dropped to one side.

I'm not saying, in other words, that they have negotiated the details of a follow-on arrangement or mechanism, because they haven't; but there's a will to do so.

Q But can you at least say: Is there a willingness on Angola's side to negotiate the complete withdrawal of the Cuban troops in return for implementation of 435 in all its aspects?

A Well, I've indicated what has been stated publicly already. The Angolan Government has accepted the principle that this issue can be part of a package of concepts and principles that form the basis for a settlement.

I think that's about all I can really say on it at this point.

There have been proposals before it on the issue of Cuban troop withdrawal, as well as the other issues, and that's clearly what's implied.

Q What do the Angolans get out of this? Do they get full relations with the United States, and who is to protect the government in light of the threat from the Savimbi forces?

A Well, I think it's fair to say that from the outset we've been working on the principle that this is not going to work if it is seen as suicidal for any of the parties. So if we're seeing this forward process it's because people are beginning to see their way through to a conclusion that would not be suicidal -- it would have something there for everyone.

On the first point that you raise, it has always been our position -- going back to three Administrations -- that the Cuban issue had something to do with our relationship with Angola and that in the context of an overall settlement of these questions that the normalization of our relationship could take place. And that remains the position.

Q Well, could you elaborate a little on the other point? I mean is there some effort being made to negotiate between the Savimbi people and the MPLA -- are you involved in that -- or how is the government to survive? How would you avoid the suicide situation?

A Well, on the first point you raise, we are not involved in any such negotiation. That is an internal Angolan question -- obviously, of the greatest sensitivity. And the timing of the auspices or the venue for any such discussion, when and if it's to take place, is not for us to say. We don't rule out, obviously, that such a thing could take place and could help to bring peace to Angola itself.

We would obviously want to see peace come to Angola, but that is not part of the international negotiation that we are talking about that involves the independence of Namibia.

Q Do you have the impression that South Africa is now satisfied, or on the road to becoming satisfied, with Angola's ability to keep SWAPO from penetrating, once they pull back to the border?

A I think that's a question you'd best put to the South Africans. The disengagement agreement in Lusaka is, for the ~~most~~ part, completed; and if this final step is taken it would have to indicate some degree of satisfaction about the benefits of implementing that agreement. There were a number of undertakings in that agreement. There were three major ones: the maintenance of SWAPO and Cuban forces out of the area in question -- that is the area to be vacated by South Africa's forces; and, on the other side, the pullout of South African forces from that area.

Q A few points -- first of all, a point of clarification. When you talked about normalization of relations after the Cuban (withdrawal), you were talking about with Angola, of course, not with Cuba; right?

A Did I say with Cuba?

Q No, but I just wanted to make sure you were talking about Angola.

A Angola, yes.

Q O.K. Now, did you speak to Prime Minister Botha all about the increasing violence and so forth in his country or did you just stick to this topic?

A Well, we talked about all the issues that exist in our bilateral and regional relations, for sure.

Q Did you give any new protests to him? Did he give any explanation to you that you can tell us about?

A Well, we have made clear repeatedly, and continue to do so, our concern about violence-- our belief that there must be and needs to be as an urgent matter a dialogue within South Africa--and that's the way to solve internal problems there.

We have made also very clear our belief in due process, the rule of law. Our feelings about detentions and bannings and so forth is our longstanding position.

Q Can you --

A And, of course, we discussed all those matters.

Q Can you give us an idea of his response?

A No; I don't think I would.

Q One last question. Is he likely to come here? And why is he in Italy now, do you know?

A I'm getting a lot of questions that I think should be put to the South Afircan Government, actually. I can't tell you precisely why he's in Italy now. There are no plans at this time for him to come here.

Q Are there any plans for you to meet him somewhere in Europe?

A No.

Q How close do you think an agreement is?

And how many Cuban troops are left right now in Angola, and how many of them did withdraw in the past few months?

A Well, this process we're talking about hasn't begun yet. I'm not aware of any Cubans having withdrawn at this point.

I think our general estimates of the number of Cubans in Angola are in the range of 30,000 or so, give or take.

Q Do you have any timetable about when you might hear back from the South Africans and any idea when this will come to fruition or it will fail?

A As I indicated, we will be probably hearing back some South African views within a matter of a few weeks. I would guess that was the case.

Let's see if I have anything more specific on that for you.

No. I would guess mid-November, the second or third week in November, we would probably have something back.

As far as the process coming to a head is concerned, that's very, very hard to predict. A lot depends on the maintenance of a sense of momentum, political will,but we're not predicting any particular time frame here.

Q That would not necessarily guarantee the end of violence in either Namibia or in Angola, I would gather. It simply guarantees the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of foreign forces from that area.

A Well, I think what we're talking about is the issues of war and peace into neighboring countries; and they are, in an obvious sense, interrelated. To put it mildly, we'd be disappointed if the level of violence didn't decrease as a result of the success of this negotiation.

Q Yes. You had mentioned the dos Santos interview in the Post.

A Yes.

Q And I'm wondering if there was anything in there that the Angolans haven't been saying for the past three years that I missed and what exactly was new in there that you referred to.

And the other thing is: You haven't used the term "parallel movement" here at all today, and I'm wondering if that is still the operative principle in this package.

A I think it's still the operative principle; but nothing changed in that regard. The key points in that interview -- which, of course, are confirmed by many other reports available to us and from our direct contacts with the Angolan Government -- are, first of all, the clear statement that it is in working with us as a mediator that these problems are going to be solved and a statement of a desire to do precisely that; and secondly, the statement that the Cuban troop withdrawal issue is part of a package of principles and concepts that form a whole, which clearly means that the Cubans would be departing Angola in the context of a Namibia settlement.

Now, that is not the position we've been in for the past three years. I think that speaks for itself.

Q They haven't told you that in your previous talks with them over the last two or three years, is that what you're saying -- or are you saying that the difference is that they're probably posturing in this regard, and the answer is --

A The difference is a consensus around both the principle, and then going beyond that to put on the table concrete, authoritative proposals toward that objective, and then asking us to table them with the South African Government.

Q And is there any connection between this new consensus in Angola and the firing of Paulo Jorge as Foreign Minister?

A Well, I wouldn't draw any conclusions in that regard. I'd refer you to the Angolans on that matter.

Q If I remember correctly, it was in the fall of '81 that the UN General Assembly -- some senior State Department official -- told the Assembly that they thought that in 1982 the UN Resolution 435 -- the process -- would be under way and Namibia would be well on the way in.

Just in summary, what happened at that point to set that back? Why didn't that happen in '82?

A Well, we completed the negotiations that remained to be completed on the Namibia side of the equation. At that point the negotiation proceeded satisfactorily through the early months and up through the mid-summer of '82 on all the issues concerning Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the Namibia side of the equation -- by which I'm referring to understandings on a series of matters related to Resolution 435. This is all in the record, and it's easily available if you wish to go back to it.

It had been our hope, given the rate of progress we were able to make in negotiations with the Front-Line States and SWAPO on those issues, that that would, if you will, crystallize the momentum and you'd have equally rapid progress on the Angolan-related issues.

That did not take place.

The only lesson I would draw from that is that the fewer predictions one makes as to timing, the better -- in a complex negotiation.

Q I would like to go back to the issue on the

Cuban troops. In that Washington Post story, I think I remember, it just mentioned that some -- a few months ago -- a few thousand; I can't remember -- Cuban troops had left this year. I'm not saying about withdraw just had left Angola. Have you been able to confirm that?

A I'd have to refer back to the story. We can all look at the story to see what was actually said. If any have left, I would suspect it wasn't a very large number this year.

Q Are you reasonably well satisfied that South Africa is not presently aiding Dr. Savimbi?

A No. (Laughter.)

Angola is a country that is involved in a civil war that has become internationalized, and there is foreign support flowing into Angola from outside on both sides of the conflict. There can be no question about it.

Q Is one of the parts of the package that all this outside support would cease on both sides?

A I think a clear element of any such package would be that you would see parties agreeing to respect each other's frontiers and territorial integrity, and that would apply both as concerns Namibia and as concerns Angola.

Q What about internally in Angola?

A What is the question?

Q Regarding what he just asked you.

A Well, you can't get internally in Angola unless you go across the boundary of Angola.

Q No, no, no. What I'm saying is: Would part of this package be that there would be a cessation of aid by South Africa to UNITA?

A It's pretty straightforward that, if one is going to recognize the boundaries of a country, that principle is involved. It's also pretty straightforward that Resolution 435, when implemented, changes the security equation on the ground that exists as between Namibia and Angola.

Q Do you have the impression that the Angolan proposals that you've conveyed to the South Africans are opening positions or are they locked in down there? Because, clearly, they're not acceptable as they are or else you have something more to talk about.

A Well, I don't think it's really for us to characterize in an adjectival sense the seriousness or whether it's an opening or a final position, whether it's a bottom line or what-not. I think, as I indicated, we have some tough negotiations ahead.

Q To what degree is the front-line group going to be involved in the negotiation ahead?

A The Front Line States are very intimately involved as parties which have participated in negotiating the understandings on Namibia as concerns Resolution 435 and all its associated agreements. That remains the case. And, in a sense, the front-line states and the Contact Group are together parties in the UN context of these understandings.

The Front Line States have never undertaken to be parties to a negotiation on Angola;and they are not, in any formal sense, at this point.

Some of the Front Line States are closer to the area involved and are more actively involved in their own bilateral contacts with the Angolans -- for example, the South Africans and others.

So I think in general the Front-Line States follow this subject with a great deal of interest and they meet frequently to discuss it -- discuss developments.

MODERATOR: I will take one more and that's about it.

Q Is it your feeling that with democratic elections in Namibia that SWAPO would, win those elections; and, if so, what form of government would you see coming out of that?

A Well, on the second point, part of the UN plan -- Resolution 435 for Namibsa -- is an election to a constituent assembly which would draw up that constitution. So those issues have not yet, obviously, been decided.

There has been agreement in general terms on a set of constitutional principles which exist -- which are in the public domain as a UN document -- but I think that's about all one can say at this point.

There have never been any opinion polls that I'm aware of in Namibia, and I think it would be risky business to make predictions as to how that might come out.

Obviously, the way people vote depends on a lot on the circumstances in which they're voting.

MODERATOR: O.K., thank you.

(Whereupon, at 2:31 p.m., the BACKGROUND briefing was concluded.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ON-THE-RECORD PRESS BRIEFING
ON
U.S. EMERGENCY FOOD ASSISTANCE TO ETHIOPIA
FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 1984, 3:50 P.M.

②

MRS. SEMERAD: Good afternoon. Mr. M. Peter McPherson, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and Mr. Dawit, the Commissioner of Ethiopia's Relief and Rehabilitation Agency Commission, will brief on their joint statement concluding their negotiations on U.S. disaster assistance to Ethiopia.

The briefing will be ON THE RECORD for both sound and camera.

MR. McPHERSON: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. You have before you the Agreement, and I think perhaps most of you have had an opportunity to read it. Let me very briefly review the points of that Agreement, and then Commissioner Dawit will have a comment or two, and we will, of course, be available for questions.

Commissioner Dawit has agreed on behalf of his government that substantial additional trucks will be provided, the exact number to be determined pursuant to an immediate review of the situation. As I think all of you will recall, we have felt for some time that additional trucks were important, and so we view this to be a very important step.

Commissioner Dawit confirms that food shipments will be given top priority at ports inasmuch as in the next few weeks and months, we think that substantial, additional food will need to be moved through those ports. We, too, think that this is a very important step.

It is further confirmed by Commissioner Dawit that private voluntary organizations will be allowed to distribute food to needy people throughout Ethiopia. The U.S., on its part, commits to an additional 50,000 tons of food to be delivered to and through the Government of Ethiopia. As I think most of you recall, we have to date delivered food exclusively through private voluntary organizations and the World Food Program.

Based upon food being delivered efficiently and pursuant to U.S. regulations, the U.S. will consider additional food to be delivered through the Ethiopian Government. The U.S. will provide 50 percent of the in-country transportation cost for this additional 50,000 tons. The Ethiopian Government will find money for the other 50 percent.

The U.S. will consider equipment to expand the capability of the ports in Ethiopia. This will be given immediate review. I spoke a moment ago about the need for additional capacity of those ports to move food -- equipment such as vacuators, which is big mobile equipment that essentially suck food right out of the hold of the ship -- suck the grain out -- is one of the things that might be looked at. Mobile bagging equipment that I've seen in many parts of the world is another and the type equipment that could expand the capacity of those ports, and we have committed the U.S. to looking at that possibility.

In addition, the U.S. will consider rehabilitating and possibly bringing in additional well-digging equipment. What we're finding is that in some of the sites, the camp sites, there is a need for more water. That possibility will, as well, be given immediate review.

Lastly, as was confirmed to you yesterday, the U.S. will be providing two L-100 cargo planes to be arriving in the next few days. They will be available for at least a couple of months, and longer perhaps, depending upon the need. The U.S. will continue to provide fuel for two Ethiopian planes -- those planes operating, of course, within Ethiopia, for purposes of delivering food to clusters of people who are in need.

That, in brief, is the nature of this Agreement, and we will welcome your questions in a moment.

Commissioner Dawit.

COMMISSIONER DAWIT: Thank you very much, Mr. McPherson.

Ladies and Gentlemen: I would like to take this opportunity to express the gratitude of my government and the people of Ethiopia for the overwhelming response we have received from the American public because of the critical situation that is taking place inside Ethiopia.

We also find the measures taken by the Administration to be very encouraging, and we hope that this encouraging signal will continue through the coming year. Our needs are quite many, and the seriousness of the situation has been properly understood by the Administration and as an initial response to this crisis, we find the measures taken by the Administration are encouraging, and we hope that this will continue, and we appreciate more assistance that will reach our people.

Q How are you going to get around, or is it necessary to get around, the legal restrictions on a bilateral program with Ethiopia?

MR. McPHERSON: There are no legal restrictions in delivering disaster assistance or disaster assistance food to a country.

Q What about the well-digging equipment and improving the ports?

A This, in our judgment, is within the disaster provisions. Note that the port equipment that we'll be looking at is mobile equipment. That's not permanent improvements or fixtures. Essentially all this would be looking at addressing this disaster, this immediate need, and accordingly there are no legal restrictions to proceeding along these lines.

Q Could you talk about the funding a little bit, how much all of this is going to cost AID?

A Yes. The 50,000 tons of food is worth $12 million, approximately, so that the total amount that we will be providing is -- that we have provided in this first month of Fiscal Year 1985 is $60 million. I think you have that detailed in the back of the statement, some $51.2 million for 130 thousand tons, and 6.3 million for medicines and supplies, and 2.5 million for the aircraft.

Q And well-digging and the port improvements?

A We have agreed to look at that carefully, and we'll be making some judgments about that in the next few days as we determine the nature of the need and our ability to deliver to that need. But there is no dollar amount at this time.

Q What about the delivery of emergency food assistance to those in Eritrea and Tigray, the province? Have they not been getting that until now?

A There has been some food delivered in both provinces, and we believe, of course, that it's important to have that food delivered to those areas. I think the statement in that regard speaks for itself.f

Q What guarantee do you have that it's going to get to Eritrea -- those two provinces? Is there anything to --

A There's no question that the conflict in the north will continue to be a burden in terms of delivering food efficiently and quickly. But we feel that the statement of the U.S. and Ethiopian Government at this time is a very positive statement to efficiently and really effectively carry that out.

Q To carry that on, could I ask both of you, was there any discussion of a food truce? In other words, the Ethiopian Government trying to take the initiative in arranging for some sort of cease-fire for delivery of food to the guerrilla areas?

COMMISSIONER DAWIT: Thank you. I think this will take us into a very long argument and take a lot really to explain to you the whole phenomena. I believe that there is a misunderstanding of the current situation inside Ethiopia. People here are meant to believe that there is an entire civil war in Ethiopia, that there is a rebel-held area inside Ethiopia.

But to me and to those of us who live in Ethiopia, there's no such kind of rebel-held area. There are bandits operating in certain areas and these bandits, of course, cause problems in the movement of relief activities with relief items to certain areas. But I can assure you that relief supplies will reach every sector of the population, in some places with difficulties and some places with certain security arrangements, but we are able to reach all sectors of population inside Ethiopia.

Q Are you satisfied with that, Mr. McPherson? Do you believe that that is a realistic appraisal, do you?

MR. McPHERSON: I really am not in a position to talk about the internal conflicts within Ethiopia. I believe that the statements made here concerning the ability of the private volunteer organizations to deliver food to all parts of Ethiopia are important and are positive. It's on that basis, among others, that we're proceeding here.

Other questions?

Q Where is the extra PL-480 money going to come from? Will you go back to Congress for a supplemental request?

A We haven't run out yet. We've still got enough money and it's positive, and I feel quite confident that in the weeks ahead we're going to be able to continue to deliver not just to the needs of Ethiopia, but you'll recall yesterday that

I talked about Kenya and numbers of other countries -- Niger, and so on.

We've got a big need ahead of us. There is clearly starvation, certainly in Ethiopia and in some other parts of the continent, that we have to address, and the President's committed personally to addressing those needs. As we approach the Congress coming back, I'm sure that we're going to be dealing with the question of what resources are necessary.

(Continued on next page)

Q Does that mean you will be thinking in terms of the supplemental?

It seems that the numbers have already busted, or gone over the Africa amount?

A These numbers are very substantial by any measure; this additional $12 million on top of the $131 million that I announced yesterday for an Africa total so far this fiscal year in 30 days -- what? That's $143 million. A very substantial amount.

Last year you will recall that we had $173 million, so in 30 days we've almost got last year's amount. It's a huge need, and we think the U.S. Government -- the United States citizens are certainly committed -- I know the President's committed - to delivering the food that needs to be delivered, and we're going to continue to work on that.

As to what we're going to need from Congress when they come back, I think we need to look at that in the weeks ahead. They're, of course, not here to ask at this time. But before they left, we carefully reviewed the situation, thinking in terms of being sure we had enough money for the months in which they were not in town.

Q Commissioner Dawit, is there any optimism in the outlook now for Ethiopia, or does it look as though the drought situation is going to discontinue or get worse?

COMMISSIONER DAWIT: Well, I think either it will get worse or it will remain on the same level as it is right now unless we try to approach the situation from a different direction, trying to find a long-term solution to this recurring problem. That's why our appeal this year is not only for relief supplies but to help Ethiopia overcome this recurring problem of continuing drought. That's in the area of resettlement, in the area of rehabilitating the land itself, soil conservation, water management and construction of small and big dams.

We have to get out of dependency on rain and people have to be able to change the entire cultural pattern in Ethiopia.

Q Commissioner, can you tell us the amount of help and assistance that you get from the Soviets?

A As you heard on the news. They have just delivered 12 airplanes and 24 helicopters to reach some remote areas inside Ethiopia. This is the response of the Soviet Union for our recent appeal.

Q Commissioner Dawit, U.S. officials have criticized your government for spending a great deal of money on the anniversary celebrations, and also for paying less attention to the drought than might have been the case.

How do you respond to these criticisms, and have U.S. officials, in your estimation, tempered these recently.

A Thank you. I think I would like to answer that question because it's being told in many places. It's being raised by many people.

The United States has experienced a long tradition of party functions, and we never had a party at all in Ethiopia. There was a regime that has existed for a long number of years, and this year, as a result of the revolution in 1974, through a number of process -- different kind of processes we've been through -- we managed to create our own party. That was historical for Ethiopia.

While it could be a party that is built on an entirely different ideology from what we see in the Western world, it is a party that we believe will benefit the Ethiopian people, and we try to celebrate this event in a colorful manner. But I want to assure you that what we saw in Ethiopia was a parade and that parade was conducted by the existing army which didn't incur any expense.

We had some new lights which are permanently displayed in many parts of Europe and North America, but we had our own humble display of lights and this was entirely with the assistance we received from North Korea. We didn't rally spend anything on that.

Then we build the Congress Hall. We never had a Congress Hall. Anyway, this is going to be a permanent infrastructure for Ethiopia. That cost us around 19 million birr. Otherwise, we had monument for the Unknown Soldier for the sacrifice made by our army; we constructed a monument.

That's what we did. But it gives the impression as if we had spent quite a lot. My information from the government treasury, we didn't spend more than 2.5 million birr; around $1.2 million U.S. dollars, aside from the construction of the Congress Hall and the monument for the Unknown Soldier.

Thank you.

MR. MCPHERSON: Ladies and gentlemen, let me just say, and I think in conclusion, Commissioner Dawit, we were able to get him down from New York. He was up there this morning, and I know his schedule is a hurried one. In our discussions this afternoon and yesterday, fundamentally, we focused on the problem that is before us and we think we've reached a positive agreement that, in fact, can save peoples' lives. We're pleased with that. I know the Commissioner is. We, the United States Government, is and certainly the President of the United States is happy that we can do something that will save peoples' lives.

Thank you very much, and we appreciate your being here.

(Briefing concluded at 4:05 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ON THE RECORD BRIEFING
BY
M. PETER McPHERSON, DIRECTOR /Administrator/
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
ON
DROUGHT IN ETHIOPIA
FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 1984, 1:35 P.M.

MS. SEMERAD: Good afternoon. Mr. M. Peter McPherson, the Administrator of AID, will be briefing today on his return from Ethiopia, and on the general drought in all of Africa. The session briefing is On the Record for both sound and camera.

MR. McPHERSON: Thank you. My trip to Ethiopia last week was one of the most meaningful experiences, frankly, in my life; powerful experience, really.

I literally really cannot explain what it's like to witness this enormous tragedy. Thousands have died. It's really very clear that thousands more will die. I think this is now determined.

I do believe, however, that if the world works together that hundreds of thousands of people can, in fact, be saved. I believe that it's a moral principle that starving people must be fed when most of us have so very much. I think it would be a betrayal of western civilization standards, if you will, to close our eyes to the starvation that we see there in Africa.

I come away from my trip with six conclusions. (1) In excess of seven million people are seriously, or will be seriously affected by the drought, just in Ethiopia. (2) Food needs from the donor community, in the next twelve months, are approximately one million tons of food. (3) We, the U.S., have some fairly concrete ideas on how to deal with the massive logistical problem that we're facing. (4) A logistical plan for Ethiopia must be agreed upon by the Ethiopian Government and by the donor community. (5) On the basis of that logistical plan, and on the numbers such as I've set forth here today, the donor community and Ethiopia Government should come together and essentially work out who's going to do what. And (6), the U.S. Government is prepared to continue to provide substantial help to the people of Ethiopia.

I'm going to be dealing today largely with Ethiopia. But I think it's important to keep constantly in mind that this is an Africa-wide problem, and what we're seeing in a very serious way right now in Ethiopia, unless prompt and careful action is taken by all the world, we're going to see in many other places in Africa.

When there, of course, I reviewed very carefully the actual situation on the ground. The drought is most serious up here in the north; serious in a sense that this is where people are now starving to death. (Indicating) These are the camps, basically along this main area here -- main road, if you will.

I've seen a lot of places around the world beginning when I was a Peace Corps volunteer in Peru, I guess 20 years ago. I worked in a slum that was built on top of the old Lima garbage dump; literally on a garbage dump. Things weren't too good, really, there. I've seen a lot of other places, I suppose, especially in the last four years that I've run the Foreign Aid Program. But, you know, I've never seen anything like this. Just never seen anything like this.

A lot of places in the world you see kids with big bellies. What "big bellies" mean is a kid lacks protein. But you don't see very many times, and I've never seen, hundreds of children who were like shrunken little old men with no belly, almost no flesh. I've never seen it.

In those camps, along the line up there, we see quite a lot of that. Down in the south and to the west, there's clearly large areas where there's very little food and where the food is rapidly being eaten up to the extent that there is food. We don't have the kind of problem down here that you have up there. But unless prompt and effective action is taken by the Ethiopian Government, and by the donor community, I'm convinced that sometime early next year you're going to have the same kind of massive problem down here.

The U.S. Government, as you know, is doing really just an enormous amount. We provided some $60 million in a period of just over 30 days. The food, I know, is getting there. I can testify myself from looking and asking on the ground that our food is getting there, and I have absolutely no doubt that because of the food that we have shipped from here, there are children alive today. I have no doubt about that.

Just the same, there simply isn't enough food getting into the country fast enough, and let me talk about that in a minute.

Let me review the numbers just one second again. We provided 130,000 tons so far this month. The other donor community has on stream another 200,000. That's the west. I don't know of anything that the Eastern bloc has actually committed.

In fact, speaking of the Eastern bloc, frankly, they're beginning to fly some planes, but I think we in the west need to continue to push on this. There's very little concrete there yet. I feel very strongly that they have an important burden to carry here.

It's interesting, but it looks to me like the people of Ethiopia -- and I, of course, talked to numbers in the camps and in the city and around. I just don't feel the Soviets are going to do very much, and they certainly know that the west and the United States particularly is doing an enormous amount.

What we face here is a massive logistical problem. I think there's no way really to understand this story unless you get into that logistical question.

The current logistical systems, beginning with ships coming up to the port and ending with food actually being fed to a kid someplace out in the camp, that current logistical system is not able to put food through in excess of 50,000 tons at this time. Probably less. But yet it appears to us -- our judgment as of this time is that you need twice the food through that logistical chain that is now possible to get through the chain.

Let me go through that because I really think that's the essence of understanding how we actually handle this problem.

First of all, ships coming up to the ports. There are three major ports. (Indicating) Up here, down here at Aseb, the major one, and then through Djibouti. Aseb being the major one.

The donors need to carefully coordinate when ships are going to arrive. That, I think, is going to happen now but it hasn't been the case always in the past. So you had that major port sometimes with no ships and sometimes with several ships backed up. You've simply have got to coordinate that shipping coming in.

Next, the capacity of the port to unload the grain, unload the food, needs to be significantly augumented. It's clear that's a major limitation at this time.

(Continued on next page)

We think that that augmentation probably can occur by things like baggers or equipment that essentially sucks the grain right out of the hull of a ship and then unloads it onto a truck -- mobile equipment that can be put in place. But as of this time the capacity of that port -- of all those ports -- is not more than 50,000 tons a month.

Now, once you get it into the port then you've got another link in the chain. Remember again that any link that squeezes is a limitation on the whole chain. Now, once you get it there you've got to either fly it out to some point down in where you can use it, or you've got to truck it, or some combination. You might both truck and fly. In fact, that's what we're doing up here, we're trucking in about a hundred kilometers, and then we're flying down a couple of hundred kilometers. Some combination of trucking and flying is what you need to do. And currently there aren't enough trucks allocated to move as much food as you need.

Now, you all remember -- many will remember anyway -- that last week when the Ethiopian Government Commissioner for Relief and I had this press conference and we delivered a joint statement and one of the items there was the Ethiopian Government agreed to substantially increase the number of trucks which were allocatted to this matter.

Now, we're anxious to have that done. We're in the process of talking to them about exactly how many, and it's my hope that that will occur very promptly. Trucks aren't the only solution, but that will help.

Now, once you get food to the camps you've still got some questions. Remember that this is just a listing of a ring of camps along the road, but here fifty or whatever a hundred kilometers out a lot of people live. Some of you, I'm sure, have been to Ethiopia, and, frankly, there are vast areas of the country where there are no roads at all. I think there are something like 8,000 miles of paved roads in a country twice the size of Texas. There are vast areas where there are simply no roads. It's hill after hill, mountain after mountain practically, and it's clear that many of those people have never been out of their valleys. It just is extremely difficult for many people to go very far.

What we in fact have now in these camps is a lot of people coming in from many kilometers away who have come in so late that they've come almost in time for their children to die. It's children and old people, incidentally, who are, of course, most susceptible to death in these circumstances.

One of the things that's necessary is to get enough food into those camps so that the word spreads and people will come in at an earlier time, come in and get food, get bags of food and then take them back out. In some areas there are donkeys that people can use -- in Tigre particularly, and Tigre is one of the worst hit provinces, people have donkeys and they'll bring them in and then take the food and then take them back home.

I've, of course, not described all the logistical problems, but what I've tried to give you is a sense that this is a chain that has to be worked with in every link, and only by having every link be expanded so that you can put in a hundred thousand or so tons a month will you be able to deliver enough food so as to save those hundreds of thousands of people that I think can be saved if this all works together.

What is happening now, this very day, is that each country, each donor country, is ad hocing the approach. We, the U.S., are flying in -- I have a couple of planes there that we've chartered -- we're providing gasoline to a couple of Ethiopian Government planes. A lot of things are happening back and forth by us and other donors. And the Ethiopian Government is doing some things that are important, there's no question about that. But the facts are that this is sort of an ad hoc approach instead of a system-wide approach.

We've got to realize that these people are going to need food for at least a year. The year period, incidentally, is the period a year from now we had hoped there would be a harvest that would be substantial. We'll know nine months or so from now whether we've got the rains to have the big harvest. But that's where this year comes from. We need to have a system of logistics to handle this whole thing for the next period of time.

We, the U.S. Government, have a number of ideas how to approach this. I gave you some flavor of some of our thoughts, but we've got a number of ideas, and we have something of a system-wide plan, if you will. We are sharing our ideas with other governments and with the Ethiopian Government. Indeed, as I said, I spent a lot of time talking to the Ethiopian Government about some of these thoughts.

What needs to happen now is that the donor community and the Ethiopian Government need to agree on a logistical plan. And that plan, along with the total need, needs to be presented to a donor meeting and an Ethiopian Government meeting in the next very few weeks for people to agree upon who is going to do what and how it's going to be coordinated.

I talked today about Ethiopia at some length, but I think we have to recognize, and I urge you in what you write to keep on focussing on the fact that this is really an Africa-wide problem. We're talking about six other countries anyway that in the months ahead, unless there is very substantial response, are going to have Ethiopia kinds of problems. Perhaps not the dimension in terms of people, because Ethiopia is a very large country, but there are going to be major problems in countries like Niger and Malawi and Chad, and western Sudan, Kenya, and so on.

There's a total of about twenty countries by our defining of the problem that have serious difficulty that has to be addressed.

I mentioned a moment ago the need to have a donor conference -- our belief. That has to be. That isn't something that we dictate, and we don't call it, of course. It's a meeting rather that the donors would collectively, along with the Ethiopian Government, agree to have. But at that conference it seems to us that it's important to focus not just on Ethiopia but it's important to focus on all Africa too, because again in the months ahead so much of Africa could have Ethiopia-type problems.

I think as we talk about Ethiopia and Africa it's important to keep in mind that the drought is really a

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disaster built on a number of other problems, and we've got to look at those underlying problems. And I don't think, frankly, we should be depressed and feel that it's impossible to deal with those underlying problems.

Twenty five years ago, or thirty years ago, we looked at the Subcontinent -- India and Pakistan, and even now Bangladesh. We looked at those countries, at that area of the world, and every decade or less there was a drought. Sometimes millions of people died in those by starvation. There were tremendous problems there. But the facts are, through a combination of sound government policies in India and Pakistan, sound government policies, a miracle rice and wheat that produced enormous increases in yields, substantial irrigation invertments, a lot of efforts over three decades or so, India is now self-sufficient in grain roughly, Pakistan probably more or less the same. Even Bangladesh is, no question, making some steps. I think that we've got to keep in mind that these are problems, huge as they seem, that can be solved over a period of time if the right things are put in place.

There is no question that in many countries in Africa agriculture has been discriminated against by paying farmers less than market prices so as to benefit urban consumers. There's no question that Ethiopia, for example, one of the Soviet exports to Ethiopia, that of collectivized farming, has been a terrible mistake for Ethiopia. You might say it has been the same dimension, or worse, for Ethiopia as it has been back home for the Soviets. The facts are that policies and pricing structures are important to look at, important to handle.

The West has a role here, I think, in helping these countries produce some technology that's applicable. The Green Revolution technology was fundamentally a technology for irrigated areas. We do not have the high-yielding seeds for dry-land agriculture that we have for irrigated culture. And most of Africa is dry land except for some parts along the Nile of Sudan and some river basins over here. (Indicating on map) The U.S. Government, AID, is putting a lot of money into this.

I can go on and talk about other things that need to be done and in many cases that we're trying to work at now, but I think it's very important to recognize that this is a long-term problem that we need to continue to focus on.

On a personal note to you here at the press, what we see in Africa today -- and really underlining what I've been saying in the last few moments -- obviously is tragic, but it's really a magnified version of what we at AID work at year after year in lesser proportions. Your reporting has focused the world's attention on this terrible problem, and frankly I think. The question now, I think, though, along with dealing with the situation, is how do we sustain a level of attention, a level of commitment, in the world's governments and the world's citizenry to solve this tragic problem, which, after all, is going to take several months or a year, and to over a long period of time really prevent these kinds of tragedies from occurring.

Those are my comments. It's nice to be here today. I'd be happy for any questions.

Q The Ethiopian Government has been charged with asking outrageous prices for landing fees, for docking, for transporting it. It has also been charged with keeping hungry people out of the camps, taking small children and leaving them in weird places, all sorts of charges indicating that they do not really want to feed all their population and want to take advantage of this famine politically. What do you say about that?

A One of the things that we discussed at length with Commissioner Davit when he was here last week was port fees. We were assured that there would be no prepayment of port fees, which has been a bone of contention, that there would be no fees for port services in excess of actual work rendered, services rendered. We obviously think that's important, and we will track that issue completely and carefully. I felt that Commissioner Dawit was firm in his assurances, but we will track that carefully in its actual execution.

We too, of course, heard the stories printed by you and heard otherwise about people being taken out to the countryside and left. I cannot give you any concrete information about that, but we are especially anxious that that not occur, and we will be pursuing every situation or example that we hear of in that regard.

In general, we think that it's very important that the Ethiopian Government implement this program in an apolitical way. We in the West, we the U.S., have followed the policy that a hungry person was going to get food regardless of the politics of his Government, and accordingly we, of course, want the Ethiopian Government to deliver food to starving people regardless of the politics they may have within their country.

You will note that part of the statement that Commissioner Dawit and I issued last week was a position that food would be given to people based upon need -- translated that food would not be used politically -- that PVO's, private volutary organizations, could go any place in the country to deliver food. That had not always been the case, and we're going to track that one very closely as well.

In short, we're absolutely committed to the proposition that this feeding program is to be done apolitically and is to be done with full sensitivity to the human rights of the starving people.

Q What would you consider -- if you discovered continuing or new abuses, what action would you take?

A I think we have to look at that as the situation occurs. We certainly are going to make any concerns like that known to the Ethopian Government, and I think the donor community generally will want to make our problems such as that known to the Ethiopian Government. I would like not to speculate further than that, but we feel intensely about these issues, and you can be assured that we won't stand by.

Q Can you tell from the tonnage figures that the so-called liberation front areas are getting as much food as the other areas?

A We think that the donor community food is going into the areas where there has been fighting in very substantial amounts. How much the RRC, Ethiopia Government, has delivered to those areas is less clear. We don't have as good figures there.

Now, you probably also know that there has been food coming in from Sudan into these contested areas. That's an important source of food. I think overall that there has been a lot of problems in the contested areas. I cannot tell you whether it's because of action -- I certainly cannot not tell you this is because of Ethiopian Government action. I don't know that. I know for a fact that it's tremendously difficult terrain, that the fighting does hinder delivery of food. So there are a lot of factors. But all of our flying, in fact, is food in the areas that are surrounded or involved in contested situations. So we're especially delivering in that context ourselves today.

Q As the government of most influence in the area, have you been talking with the Soviets about what they can do to get transportation loosened up and things like that?

A We have not had direct discussions with the Soviets on this, but we know the Ethiopian Government has been, and we continue to communicate what we think about this. The Ethiopian Government is coordinating the aircraft which is being used.

Q Wouldn't it be more practical maybe to talk to the Soviets directly, or is there no way of doing that?

A I think we're going to be prepared to follow whatever method we can to have an effective program here.

Q What are the Soviets doing exactly?

A The Soviets have several planes and several helicopters that they've indicated they're going to use for food delivery. We know that there is at least a couple of Soviet planes which have been or are in use. I don't know of any use of helicopters yet. It's interesting, the Soviet planes carry their own loading and unloading crews, which makes it difficult to carry as much food as you want. I think there are some twenty or twenty four people on the plane to load and unload the activity.

We think the Soviets could do an enormous amount. And what we are anxious to see them do is just that, and we'll keep the focus on it to, hopefully, get that.

Q Several questions which I'll ask all at once. When will the donor conference be held? And, regardless of what is agreed to, what must the Ethiopian Government do? What must the other donors do? What must the U.S. do? And finally, from the time the food leaves the U.S. how long does it take to get to the camps, and how could that time be shortened if there are agreements as you suggested?

A Well, first of all, the donor conference is something that I'm proposing publicly today. Obviously, there have been informal discussions with other donors. But we are not suggesting that we chair it. We are not suggesting that it's our conference. But we are suggesting that this is a practical way to get the job done.

I would suggest that a donor conference needs to be held in the next few weeks, and I think it needs to be attended by people that can make decisions, I think essentially by my counterparts or such, so that you can go to a conference and you sit down and you can decide what you're going to do. Again, this isn't our conference. This is something that the group needs to work out.

Now, we do this quite often, by the way, on development assistance particularly. So it's no novel approach. It's a common sense approach, frankly, in my judgment.

Now, in the process of getting ready for that conference, as a practical matter, you agree upon a plan and you begin to divide it up. That's what happens in donor conferences generally. So I would envision before we actually got there, got to the meeting, that a lot would get under way. We, the U.S., probably have a particular ability to deliver food, and I'm sure that would be a major part of our contribution though, as some of you remember, we have been putting in some medicines and some transportation and so forth.

Q Which are the other donor countries?

A Well, the people that are involved already are the Germans, the Brits, the French some perhaps -- not as much the French so far. No doubt the Japanese would be. The Australians I think have got the capacity to deliver a lot of food. The Dutch. Numbers of others. And it seems like the Soviets ought to deliver here.

Q You talked about the logistics problem of getting food to people. If you are able to work out the logistical problem, is there enough food now, or is the problem simply logistics? Assuming you can get more into the country, is it there, is it ready to be delivered?

A The commitments for food for the next twelve months are not in place. The donor community will have to increase their commitments in food. There's enough food in the pipeline now to fill the pipeline as it now is constructed, but not if the pipeline doubles. And I would expect that part of a conference would look at how to get that additional food.

Q Can I follow up just a second?

Q You criticized Ethiopian efforts earlier. Can you tell us why or just what your position is now on that? And can you also tell us whether your change of heart, if any, is the result of news coverage and the outpouring of aid from the American people themselves?

A Well, I've been critical for some time of the Ethiopian Government in terms of what they were doing prior to their anniversary celebration. I think it was here in this room several times I've said, "Look, they've spent all this money in the celebration. They're not focused, they're not worrying about the number of people that are dying." But it also has been my position now for a few weeks that there was steadily greater focus on the part of the Ethiopian Government to this problem, and I felt that that focus, that attention was certainly evident, and when Commissioner Dawit was here, we had our joint press conference and issued our joint statement, and it's also true that I felt, when I was in Ethiopia, that there was some focus on trying to deal with this problem.

We're prepared to take the Ethiopian Government at its word on these issues, work closely, and of course to say "wait a minute," if a problem occurs. In the meantime, we're trying the best to put together a good program.

Q So there has been a change of heart, then, on your part?

A Well, I don't know. A "change of heart," isn't the word. We have always taken the same position -- the Ethiopian Government should do a great deal. We see the Ethiopian Government more involved in this issue than they were a few weeks ago, and we hope that continues.

Q Was news media exposure in any way involved in your taking the position that you take now?

A No. I think my position has always been the same. I wanted to see what the Ethiopian Government did. Maybe you're asking, "Was the media's attention a reason for the change of heart of the Ethiopian Government"? You'll have to ask them.

Q How much more food will be needed in the next 12 months?

A I think that in the next 12 months, there will be a need for about a million tons. There is in the pipeline perhaps something like 300,000 tons now, so you're talking about 600,000 to 700,000 additional tons.

Q Of course, many Americans who see the famine on television are moved and want to do something . Many are ready and willing to send money, but what you seem to be saying today is that because of the logistics difficulty, it really doesn't matter right now how many additional people contribute, you simply don't have the means to get the food to them in greater quantities.

A Well, let me talk a little bit about that: it's not just a matter of food. I think American citizens can help. I spent some time with a private voluntary organization in Ethiopia that had some resources, and they asked me, "What shall we do with it"?

I said, "Look, why don't you buy some blankets. You can buy blankets within Ethiopia. You don't have to get them through ports."

This area up here (indicating) much of it is 7-8,000 feet high. What you get at that altitude is intense sun and heat during the day and really cold at night. That's really tough on these people, frankly, so I recommended that they buy some blankets in Addis, and I think there are means that they can get them up to this area.

I think there is quite a lot the American people can do like that -- medical care, for example, and some other things. But essentially, if possible, we're talking about cash -- what the American people can contribute is cash. In fact, there is a group of private voluntary organizations that are involved in Ethiopia which have gotten together and have an organization called "INTERACTION." The phone number is an 800 number that people can call. That number is 1-800-982-1400. It's a good group of people, and I hope that the American people continue to respond as they have been.

Yes, ma'am.

Q I have two questions: First, a Washington Times Nairobi correspondent reported earlier this week that Mombassa and Niamey were being considered as two pre-positioning points for U.S. food deliveries in Africa. Can this be confirmed, and if so, what are the arrangements?

My second question is: Will the U.S. start food aid to Niger and Chad, and if so how much and when?

A The ports in Kenya are ports that, frankly, don't need pre-positioning at this minute. What they need is, they need food to get in there on a steady basis to feed people in Kenya. So I suppose it's pre-positioning for Kenya; it's not pre-positioning for the Continent.

As to Chad and Niger, there certainly are problems in both countries, and we have, or are in the process of delivering food to each country. I think there are some 25,000 tons of food on the way to Chad at this time, and we have received a cable yesterday for an additional 30,000 tons of food for Chad. Chad is one of those six additional countries that especially worries me for the next few weeks.

Q And Niger?

A Niger the same. We've got some food on the way there as well. That has to go through Nigeria and up the way. That's the way that will be working.

Q Do you have any figures on --

A I don't have any on the tip of my tongue. I know we can get them for you if you want them.

Q You say that assuming logistics are worked out, we will still need 6-700,000 more tons in the pipeline.

A Yes.

Q What do you see as the likelihood of that happening in the next 12 months?

A Well, I think with the interest of the world in this problem that we ought to be able to put together a very substantial additional tonnage for Ethiopia.

Q You can meet that goal with 600,000-700,000?

A Well, I think the donor community needs to get together and realize what a serious problem you've got, and that people's lives are at stake.

Q In view of your logistical problems, are you considering a change in policy like greater use of United States Air Force directly to help you out on this?

A We have a long history of closly working with DOD. For example, on Grenada, AID and DOD worked side by side a few days after the rescue mission. DOD is an option that we consider every time we look at things. It happens that under the provisions that govern DOD, you can only use their airplanes, for example, if there aren't commercial options. For example, the other day when we were talking about and did lease a couple of aircraft, we went the private, shorter route in the fashion that we did.

We have made a conscious effort to closely coordinate these issues because we know that the Department of Defense is very interested -- and we are. The Inter-Agency Task Force head in fact is a man by the name of General Becton, a retired general, who gives us a certain amount of institutional relationship, and on that Task Force serves DOD, who have assigned a full-time person from their Department to work with us on the Task Force.

My response in short is that DOD is an option which we continue to consider, and the relationship and help is certainly there.

Q The South African Foreign Minister today urged European nations to do more for Ethiopia; yet you didn't mention South Africa as one of the countries that is helping already in that country.

A That's interesting. I didn't know that.

Q Are they doing anything to help? And will they be included in the donor conference, if it's convened?

A I think our recommendation is that South Africa also look at its homeland. In our judgment, there is a considerable concern on our part of some drought in those areas within South Africa. However, I'm sure that the world and we would be happy to accept any help that South Africa would give to Ethiopia or any place else.

Q We would like to see this conference you have proposed discussing the broader issues of food problems in Africa as a whole, or just to discuss the present situation in Ethiopia.

A I'm sorry. I didn't understand you. Would you repeat?

Q The conference which you have proposed between the donors, are you saying that the conference should discuss food problems, the food situation in Africa as a whole or, you know, or address itself to the present situation in Ethiopia?

A The most immediate problem is Ethiopia, but I think when such a group would get together, they should also talk about the Africa-wide drought problem, as well, and perhaps at least some discussions about the longer-term situation.

The immediate problem, unquestionably however, is Ethiopia, and we've got to move on this quickly. We cannot take a long time with diplomacy; we've got to move rapidly.

Joan, yes.

Q White House officials are talking about a massive program of aid to be proposed for the Third World, some sort of a large program overall. What is that? Can you tell us more about it?

A I cannot confirm that at all, frankly. I don't have information about that. I hear those rumors, but, frankly, I don't know that they're based upon anything.

Q Two Senators have talked about a joint session of Congress, if needed. Is one needed for this emergency?

A We believe that in the next few months that we can tap into hundreds of thousands of additional tons of food, and our plan is to continue to do that.

Q The last drought in the Sahel region 10 or 11 years ago went on for several years. The last major drought, last major famine was Cambodia, where the United Nations set up a whole system. Is that what you're proposing with the conference, something that is going to look at an institutionalized program that is going to last for a while, or are you talking about a bunch of the lads getting together to sort out --

A I think it's important that we not sort of institutionalize long term a dependency. Without trying to comment on the situation in Asia, the facts are that camps -- we should be sure we don't put in more camps than we absolutely need because camps tend to bring people in, make them dependent, not have them back on their land where they ought to be out when it's time to plant.

We really have a problem here that I envision that needs to be addressed over the next 12 months, and I'm hopeful there will be rains eight or nine months from now so that the problem will be substantially addressed by such rains. I don't want to have a permanent structure there in Ethiopia. I think it would be a mistake.

Q Could you tell from your trip how effective the airlift organized by church groups has been?

A I think they've done a good job. I think it's an important operation. Makes a good contribution, certainly.

Q Is the contribution you're hoping to get from the Soviet Union logistical, or food, or both?

A I think they can make contributions or a whole range of food. They would have to buy food probably on the world market -- but food, possibly logistics, medicine.

There's a tremendous amount that needs to be done, and the Soviets should not simply do a few visible Band-aids and move on.

Q But did you see any evidence of that pledge of 300 trucks and 24 of (inaudible)?

A I've heard nothing more about the trucks except in the press release. Maybe it's there, but I haven't heard of it.

Q Could you give us some idea as to how many tons of feed and how many people over a given period of time?

A Well, the 100,000 tons that I'm speaking of would feed two or three million of those people virtually entirely for that 12-month period as well as feed a portion of the diet for the other three to four million people that I speak of.

What we think we have in Ethiopia is a population of roughly seven million people that need to be fed, need to have some food from us in the next 12 months. The numbers that have been used -- and I'm a little uneasy about them because they're sort of calculated in somebody's laboratory or something; I'm not sure they work in the real world -- but the numbers that have been talked about that the international donor community uses is about 700 grams a day for an adult and something less - 300-400 grams for a child, roughly 500 grams overall on the average. But those are average figures.

Q Do you have any figures for the donations you have from France, West Germany, Australia?

A I don't have them with me right here. I think we have some -- I know we have some ideas which perhaps afterwards you can chat with my staff, and we can give them to you.

Q Are the Canadians not contributing?

A Oh, yes, they are. CIDA is doing a good job.

Q Are you sure you touched them all now, because if people are excluded, they're going to be angry.

A O.K. I'd be happy to go down through them all. CEDA is doing a very good job. I gave an illustrative, not a full, list.

Q That's not the way it's going to come out in print.

A O.K. The EC, the European Community, is an important donor. The largest donors have been the Canadians, the EC, and the U.S. In individual countries, a number of them have given a lot. Let me just go around the globe, if you want: You've got Japan, you've got Australia, you've got the

Scandinavians, the Swedes, the Norwegians, the Danes. There is some Saudi activity, we think. Finland, France, Great Britain, Italy, Netherlands, Norway. Those are the western countries, and there is some indication of East Germany, the Soviets, and perhaps Bulgaria.

Q And you would recommend all be included, all donor countries?

A I think anyone who is willing to realy contribute needs to be involved.

Ladies and gentlemen, nice to see you all.

Q Thank you.

A Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 2:24 P.M.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
SECRETARY'S TRIP TO BRAZIL

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 1984, 2:30 P.M.

MODERATOR: Good afternoon. This a session ON BACKGROUND, which means you may attribute this to a Senior Administration Official but not to the briefer by name or title. The subject is the Secretary of State's trip to Brasilia. The briefer will not entertain or answer questions on extraneous or peripheral matters, such as crates in the Nicaraguan port of Corinto or other such matters.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is an opportunity for me to brief you on another leisurely trip by the Secretary of State to Latin America -- departing here Saturday morning, returning in the early hours Tuesday morning.

I think that probably the best thing is for me to go over with you the schedule briefly.

It's depart tomorrow morning at 9:00. There will be a refueling stop, arriving in Brasilia 7:30 p.m. -- that is Eastern Standard Time; it will be 9:30 Brasilia time.

Sunday the Secretary will have a lunch with Brazilian dignitaries, and then at 4:00 o'clock there will be an informal dialogue of the foreign ministers going to this meeting. I'll have more on that later. Let me just run through the schedule. And that evening the Secretary will dine again with other Brazilian leaders.

Monday he has a breakfast meeting with four foreign ministers. He will have a meeting with President Figueiredo later in the morning. At 11:00, the opening ceremony of the OAS General Assembly. He'll have a lunch with other Brazilian leaders. He will have further bilaterals in the afternoon. There's a second plenary session of the OAS in the afternoon. He will speak, address a plenary. He will be third in a series of four speakers. He will hold a press conference Monday evening, and he'll go to a reception given by the Foreign Minister of Brazil for the delegates, and following that reception will go to the airport and enroute back to Washington.

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Q Monday?

A Monday night.

Now, Secretary Shultz is the Chairman of the Delegation. Other members of the Delegation are myself, Ambassador Diego Asencio -- U.S. Ambassador to Brazil -- and obviously Ambassador Mittendorf, who is Permanent Representative to the OAS.

One of the things that you'll note is scheduled for Sunday, I told you, is an informal dialogue. This was something that was not initiated at the last Organization of American States but was used, and the foreign ministers found it a very useful way in which they sit in a room and converse with each other rather than in the plenary sessions where you really got kind of set speeches. And because many of them thought it was useful last time, they're going to reinstitute it this time.

I think that you can expect in the informal dialogue, in the margins, and during the formal sessions, that here are some 13 items on the agenda for the formal Organization. But I think that you'll find that our estimation is that most of the dialogue will center around the economic situation, the narcotics situation. I'm sure that there will be a report and discussion of the Contadora process. And those are generally the items that we feel will have the most attention.

I think at that stage I'll just go ahead and stop and entertain your questions.

Yes, sir.

Q I was wondering if Secretary Shultz is likely to raise the issue of the possible advanced aircraft that may be aboard that ship.

A Aboard what ship?

Q The Soviet ship. Given the OAS meeting.

A I wasn't here earlier to hear your chastisement. Would you like to do it again?

Q Given the OAS meeting

A No. Let's be realistic. I've got to believe that the subject will be raised in informal discussions of the rest of the members, and I'm sure that the Secretary will respond accordingly to them.

Q Is he planning to see Foreign Minister D'Escoto too?

A I asked the question this morning and then I get the answer back: "Is D'Escoto going or not?"

MODERATOR: No.

A D'Escoto is not going?

If he's not going, it will be kind of tough to see him.

Q Are any other Nicaraguan officials going with whom he might be --

A Well, Nicaragua has a Permanent Representative to the OAS. I would assume he would be there.

Q Would there be a meeting?

A You man a specific meeting between Secretary Shultz and a Nicaraguan official ? A bilateral -- is that what you're saying?

Q Well, you mentioned several different forums in which that might take place -- at the breakfast, the bilaterals, the formal --

A He is not in the breakfast; he is not scheduled for breakfast. No Nicaraguan is scheduled for breakfast or bilaterals. Obviously in the informal dialogue a Nicaraguan representative participates.

Yes, sir.

Q Real or imagined, can you estimate how much concern this whole crisis or pseudo-crisis in the last couple of days has caused among some of the other countries -- OAS members

A No.

Q You know, some people talk about a war scare.

A Sure. And you people have a much better feel for the different rumors that float around in different parts of the world on this issue. No doubt about it, it's a top issue with regards to newsworthiness; and I can understand that. But as to, you know, a specific impact, no, I can't give you anything on that.

Q Have you ever picked up a fear on the part of some other countries that we might be closer to --

MODERATOR: I think we're wandering.

-- conflict?

MODERATOR: I think we're wandering. Let's stick to the briefing on the Secretary's trip.

A The answer is "No."

Yes.

Q Do you expect that the Secretary will get his first look at the new Contadora text at this session or would --

A I'm not sure that there will be a -- I know that they're working on one. I'm not sure that there'll be one in finished form at this meeting. I don't really know.

Q Maybe not finished form, but would this be the first discussion of what this new test would contain?

A Well, the process that has gone forward is that following the plan, the different countries made their observations on or about October 15th. The vice ministers have met in Panama. I'm sure that there'll be some kind of dialogue between the Contadora countries. They'll take the occasion of the meeting in the OAS to get together. And so I'm sure there'll be discussions and items. But as to whether there'll be a formal kind of "Here's a draft" and how it's different from this draft and all the rest of it I'm not really sure that they're at that stage.

Obviously the Secretary has a keen interest in the subject, and Shlaudeman has been down and working with him and we continue. but I mean this thing is not like "Ta-da-da. It's an OAS and some big things can happen." I mean this process has been going on for awhile and continues on as you go through it.

Q That was true of the Secretary's last trip to the region also.

A What was true?

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Q That the process had been going on for some time and --

A And it still continues.

Q But there was a lot of discussion during that trip.

A Oh, sure there was.

Q Well --

A The Secretary in that trip saw six heads of state, in addition to the eight or the nine ministers.

Q That's not an unreasonable question to raise -- whether or not his suggested revisions will be posed at this forum to see whether that would be an acceptable draft to the U.S.

A That there will be continued conversations on it? Yes. I'm just avoiding your characterization of it because I think that that's too finite. O.K.?

Yes.

Q Might the U.S. be interested -- given the news of the Soviet freighter and MIGs or no MIGs -- in tabling a resolution before the OAS in which we try to prevent either MIGs, advanced jet aircraft, from coming in to Central America or trying to get support for something along that line? Are we interested in something like that?

A Well, obviously we're interested in reducing tensions or things that cause problems in any arms buildup -- this is the irony of it -- and any arms buildup, or alleged arms buildup, during a period of time in which they're trying to get a Contadora peace treaty signed that, if stuck to the words of the Treaty, would lead to a reduction in arms seems to be working at cross-purposes. So anything along those lines that can get it back on to the path of the Contadora peace process, Treaty, obviously is something we would want.

But you have to remember that the Contadora process is separate and distinct from the OAS and from the UN.

Now, at the UN a report was given on the status of where they were. It is an item on the agenda of the OAS, but it's an item on the agenda within the context of a report of where they are. There is no generic link between either OAS and Contadora any more than there is between OAS and the United Nations.

Yes, sir.

Q What is your specific answer to his question about whether anything is being drafted in the way of --

A There is nothing being drafted at this stage on that type of resolution. I mean, not that we are aware of -- the U.S. Government.

Q To get precision on the earlier answer about the subject being raised here in the OAS, when you say the subject might be raised, would it be raised by the United States or the United States would only respond to the subject being --

A You're talking in a formal situation?

Q Yes, in a formal situation.

A In a formal situation it's an item on the agenda, and I think it's brought forward by the Contadora four and it's been there on that agenda for quite awhile.

Q How about the Soviet freighter?

A I don't think that the United States is going to raise it at the OAS as a formal agenda item.

Yes.

Q Can you give us an idea of the theme or themes that Secretary Shultz is going to strike in his formal speech?

A Theme or themes in which he's going to -- ?

Q Shultz is going to formally address the OAS.

A Well, a fast way to get in trouble is to preempt your boss. (Laughter.)

Q I think there can be --

A But I think there are logical ways in which you can expect what are the themes.

Let's look at the recent, last three or four years', trends towards democracies. Let's look at the economic challenges that you have facing them and how does that cross-cut with the social/political fabric -- that is, the economic challenges versus bigger democratization.

You could expect, because of recent meetings and pronouncements at the United Nations, that there is an increased focus on the narcotic problem as more than just a producer/consumer or single-country problem.

I think those are the ones that you'll find would be addressed in the Secretary's speech.

Q You said he's going to meet with four foreign ministers Could you say which ones?

A Yes. It's Core Four. The so-called Core Four -- there will be a breakfast meeting with them, and then bilateral meetings with other foreign ministers. We're still putting those together.

Q And it's not going to be raised because of the danger that it would just arouse a lot of talk and opposition about the U.S. position?

A Are you talking about raising it as a formal agenda item?

Q Yes.

A It's not necessarily a forum in which you can resolve a problem per se We all know it' going to be discussed -- that subject -- around the edges. I'm sure that the Secretary will take the opportunity to consult with his colleagues and tell them of our position, but it's not something of a formal agenda-item nature. That's not our feeling.

Yes.

Q I think maybe you were trying to tell us something before that slipped past me when I was listening earlier and now --

A Well, try it on size. Maybe I wasn't and you thought I was, but now you've got my attention.

Q That's what I would like to do.

What you seem to be saying is that as a formal agenda item the U.S. will not raise the issue of the Soviet arms buildup in Nicaragua but in informal fringe contacts Secretary Shultz will volunteer to the other foreign ministers that an arms buildup during the time when the Contadora process is going on is at cross-purposes with what the U.S. would like to see.

A All right. Let's dissect that.

First, I think if you go back I find it ironic that -- that's me speaking -- that the subject is going to be raised. Whether Shultz raises it or somebody else gets to it first, that's a logical conclusion: It is on people's minds.

He'll take that opportunity to explain to explain our feelings on the matter.

Does that help you?

Q Thank you.

A O.K.

Q Would he also ask perhaps for regional support and any action the U.S. might care to take as a result of this?

A No. There's no contemplation of that at this time -- to ask for any regional support --

Q Can you --

A -- for any type of thing.

Q Can you go beyond the issue of the freighter at the --

A Let me back up and say to you so that we understand each other -- and I'm not trying to quibble with you -- but today is Friday. That formal meeting isn't till Monday.

It is, I guess, conceivable that the Government may decide and ask to inscribe for a formal one; but there is no discussion t this time on that subject. O.K.?

Q Can you address the question of whether there has --

A Not to your question but to his question.

Q Can you address the question of whether there has been an unusually large Soviet buildup just within the --

forget the MIGs -- the four helicopters -- that this ship may be carrying helicopters and may not be --

MODERATOR: You're wandering and you're not sticking by the rules that the briefing is on the Secretary's trip and --

Q I don't think so at all. We're just talking about the possibility of this being introduced --

MODERATOR: Well, I'm --

Q -- as an agenda item.

MODERATOR: I'm ruling your question out for you.

Q I'm just asking if there has been a Soviet buildup.

MODERATOR: All right. I think we're about ready to bring this to a close.

Q Could I --

MODERATOR: That's the last question there.

Q Can we go on now rather than stop?

On Contadora, aren't we --?

A Go ahead.

Q Can there only be talk because the United States is not ready to accept a Contadora agreement so long as the Nicaraguan elections stand?

In other words, a Contadora agreement is far off anyway, right, so what could be accomplished at the OAS meeting?

A Well, I don't know whether I share your assessment of a Contadora Acta agreement being far off or not. I mean I'm not disputing it. I'm just saying I'm not necessarily sharing it -- one.

Secondly, there is no doubt that that which occurred in Nicaragua on November 4th didn't pass the test of any draft of any Contadora I've seen with regards to democracy; and I think that's shared by most people. And, nevertheless, life goes on. And so what you try to do is to continue the whole process of the peace and see how it can be incorporated in it.

Can I try to?

MODERATOR: Sure.

A Right. Yes, I'll -- O.K.

MODERATOR: But the problem is that he's already asked this question today and he's already had an answer --

A Right.

MODERATOR: And it's an old trick to try to get two different answers from two different questions.

A Well, let's see how closely we're united; all right?

We've not rehearsed this. So with my "father's" indulgence, I'll try to give you my response on it. (Laughter.)

MODERATOR: I give my "son" the last question. (Laughter.)

A If you look over a period of time, and if you want there are graphic charts displaying it and the rest of it -- and it goes back to the period of time in which the United States wasn't providing military assistance or other assistance to Nicaragua -- you will find a continued flow and an increase in the rate of flow of weapons, et cetera, into Nicaragua. That has not decreased. O.K.?

Now, did I do it justice -- what you said?

MODERATOR: Very good.

Thank you gentlemen and ladies.

(BACKGROUND press briefing concluded at 2:50 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES OF THEIR ROYAL HIGHNESSES THE GRAND DUKE AND THE GRAND DUCHESS OF LUXEMBOURG
FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 1984, 3:17 P.M.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I'll run through the schedule, and very briefly, to kick the thing off.

The Grand Duke arrives in the U.S. on Sunday, goes to Williamsburg; will fly up here Monday afternoon, the 12th, to Andrews. Tuesday morning at 10:00 a.m., the White House arrival ceremony. 10:30 meeting with the President in the Oval Office. 12:30 luncheon hosted by Secretary and Mrs.. Shultz. 2:30 Tuesday afternoon the Grand Duke and Duchess will visit the Freer Gallery. At 4:30 the Grand Duke will meet with the Secretary of Defense. 7:30 that evening -- Tuesday, November 13 -- President and Mrs.. Reagan will host the Grand Duke and Duchess at a state dinner at the White House.

On Wednesday the Grand Duke will lay a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Arlington Cemetery. There will be a luncheon given by the Luxembourg side in honor of the Vice President and Mrs.. Bush. The Grand Duke and Duchess will visit the Hirschorn Museum. There will be tea with Vice President and Mrs.. Bush. That evening a concert by the Orchestra of Radio Television Luxembourg and a reception hosted by the Grand Duke and Duchess.

On Thursday morning they will leave the Washington area to travel to Colorado Springs, San Jose, San Francisco, and Chicago, departing the U.S. on Monday the 19th.

In about one minute's summary, Luxembourg is a small country, but it's important to the U.S. because of its membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and in the European Community. It is a founding member of both.

The Grand Duke himself, who's been in office for 20 years, escaped from the Continent of Europe at the beginning of World War II; served in the British armed forces and landed on the Normandy beaches in 1944. Luxembourg was, of course, the site of the Battle of the Bulge; and there will be a Fortieth Anniversary commemoration of that next month.

Luxembourg will hold the Presidency of the European Community Council between July and December of next year, 1985.

The United States investment in Luxembourg totals about one billion dollars. On a per capita basis, U.S. investment in Luxembourg is highest of any country outside of North America. Luxembourg is an international financial center with a hundred-and-fourteen banks, making it the third largest banking center in Europe.

Luxembourg held national elections last June and a Christian Social and Socialist coalition entered into office. They are continuing the policy that supports NATO that all Luxembourg governments since after the war have supported.

That's all I have.

Q Questions? I have one question as to why the visit is being planned for this particular time. Does it go along with the Fortieth Anniversary of the Battle of the Bulge celebration?

A We had that in mind. There had not been a state visit for more than two decades and Luxembourg, although small, is an important country to us. They support us in the UN and in NATO.

The Vice President visited Luxembourg last February and at that time invited the Grand Duke and Duchess to come for the state visit. And it is appropriate, I think, as we approach the Fortieth Anniversary of the Battle of the Bulge, that they're here.

Q You said that he's going to be meeting with Secretary Weinberger at some point next week.

A Tuesday afternoon. That's right.

Q Do you have an idea what they're going to be discussing?

A Well, the Grand Duke, as constitutional monarch, does not get involved in his discussions and will not with either the President or the Secretary of Defense in the details of foreign and defense policy. But, obviously, he's interested in the broad lines; and Luxembourg play a role in NATO. It is the locale of the NATO Supply Agency. And the major airport in Luxembourg is used each year during the Reforger exercises and the NATO AWACS aircraft are registered in Luxembourg. So there are NATO issues; and I'm sure that while there won't be any exploration in detail of these because of the Grand Duke's constitutional position that he and Secretary Weinberger will be talking about these things.

Q Have they been pretty strong allies in NATO? I mean in armed forces.

A Oh, yes; they've been very supportive and well committed to the Alliance and have made a contribution. Geography makes them very important. Although it's a small country with a small population, they're crucial to the lines of communication into West Germany. So in their way they've made a valuable contribution.

Q One other question about the Radio -- was it Radio TV Luxembourg Orchestra --

A Yes.

Q -- concert?

Do you have any idea if any of our media is going to be picking that up for broadcast?

A I honestly don't know. We can check it out --

Q It's a curious question.

A -- and let the Press Office know.

Q There might be something that somebody might be interested in.

A Uh-huh.

Q That's about all I have.

A O.K. Thank you.

MODERATOR: Thank you very much.

(BACKGROUND press briefing concluded at 3:22 p.m.)

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release November 16, 1984

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
PETER McPHERSON
ON AID TO ETHIOPIA

The Briefing Room

10:08 A.M. EST

MR. McPHERSON: Good morning. I just spent several minutes with the President reviewing, really in some depth, the situation there in Ethiopia. The President did today, as he did to me on the phone a few weeks ago, couple weeks ago, and has over the last couple of years, expressed really deep concern about -- are we doing enough? Can we do more? And we must continue to do a very substantial amount in Ethiopia.

I'd like to announce today some additional decisions on food to the continent. This must be viewed as a continent-wide problem, not just an Ethiopia problem. The decisions that we're announcing today are as follows: $37.5 million additional dollars for Ethiopia -- that's 85,000 tons of food. That'll bring the total amount we've done to Ethiopia since October 1 -- about 45 days -- to 97.5 -- dollars -- $97.5 millions of dollars. And, it amounts to 215,000 ton of food -- an enormous amount by any measure.

Incidentally, approximately 5,000 ton of this will be going to Mother Theresa's four feeding centers there in Ethiopia. President Reagan spoke to Mother Theresa just a few days ago about those centers, and he was especially anxious that we continue to provide food to these centeres.

Other decisions announced today: $5.9 million for Mozambique;

Q Dollars?

MR. McPHERSON: These are dollars. $5.9 million dollars worth of food for Ethiopia -- for Mozambique. $8.5 million dollars worth of food for Moratania; $5.6 million dollars of food for Chad; for a total of $58 million and 137,000 ton of food that we're announcing today.

Now, what this total amount that I've announced today brings us to is -- of new tonnage, of total tonnage so far this fiscal years -- of 537,000 ton of food this year.

Q I'm sorry -- 500 --

MR. McPHERSON: 537,000 ton of food this fiscal year, which is the last 45 days.

Q How many dollars is that?

MR. McPHERSON: Let's see, that's $[illegible] million dollars worth of food.

Q What was the dollar figure, Pete, for today? The total for today that you gave?

Q -- 58 --

MR. McPHERSON: Fifty-eight.

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Now, let me -- $198 million dollars of food today. To date, for all of Africa, a little over a half a million ton, 537,000 ton, for all of Africa to date.

Now, it's interesting to put those figures in perspective. Last year, in the preceeding 12 months, beginning October -- ending October, or September 31st -- in that 12-month period, fiscal '84, we provided $172 million dollars worth, and a little over -- approximately 500,000 ton.

The food that was provided by the United States government to drought-stricken Africa in fiscal '84 was a larger amount than what was ever historically provided by any administration in any one year period to Africa for drought. What I'm reporting today is the figure which we provided, in only 45 days, is larger than any other calendar year ever provided to Africa. In other words, the response of the U.S. is truly enormous.

Again, I say to you, that this is not just an Ethiopia problem, it's an Africa-wide problem. And we feel very strongly like it's important to get the whole donor community together for the world to work together to solve this horrendous problem.

It's essentially a three stage problem: It's the problem of responding to the emergency; it's the problem of getting the food there the next 12 months; it is, thirdly, the problem of long-term development so that

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you don't have reoccuring disasters. I would welcome your questions.

Q How does what we have done compare to the perceived need in Africa and in Ethiopia? What is the dimensions of the problem and to what extent does the United States emergency food aid go to solving that immediate emergency?

MR. McPHERSON: I'd like to answer that, because that is the question. We -- we believe that in the range of -- let me say that more exactly. We believe that in excess of 7 million people are or will need to be fed by donor food in the next 12 months. We believe that it will take approximately in the range of a million ton to do that.

The current pipeline capacity -- when I speak of pipeline, I mean getting the ships into port, the unloading capacity of the port, getting the food trucked or flown from port to camp site -- the current pipeline capacity is about 50,000 ton. The pipeline capacity, the capacity of the system to deliver food to the mouth of the starving kid, is about 50 percent of what is necessary to substantially meet the need.

Q Fifty thousand tons or 500,000 tons?

MR. McPHERSON: Fifty thousand ton a month, I beg your pardon, about 50,000 ton a month is the current capacity.

Q So it's about 60 percent.

MR. McPHERSON: In that range. And so what you need to do to get enough food there is to expand that pipeline capacity to approach 100,000, 80,000 to 100,000 ton a month needs to be able to get through that pipeline.

Q Are you talking about Africa here or are you talking about Ethiopia?

MR. McPHERSON: I'm only talking Ethiopia.

Q What does that involve? Getting more trucks in there or what? Do you have a lot of political problems in this distribution?

MR. McPHERSON: Does everybody understand what I just said about the pipeline? I don't want to be confusing about that, though. That is a critical point. Did I get that straight? Fifty thousand ton is the capacity. We need to double the capacity. What does that involve? Well, I suppose I've spent more time on the pipeline capacity than almost any other issue in the last few weeks.

It involves a whole series of things. It involves coordination among the donor community, so that ships that come into the main ports can come in a synchronized fashion, so they don't bunch and then have the port be not utilized. That -- that process is being put into place. It involves augmenting the capacity, the offloading capacity of the ports themselves.

A lot of what is being done now is really just hand work, baskets of grain being taken out of hulls of ships and dumped. There is equipment, what is essentially suction equipment, that pulls grain out of hulls of ships and dramatically increases the speed at which it can be done. There is bagging equipment, such as we've got -- suction and bagging equipment that we've got in Dakar and Senegal, that kind of equipment which we're working through with other donors and the Ethiopia government to get in place.

The -- once you get off the ship, then it's a question of enough trucks that function and/or planes that can fly it in. The Ethiopia government, when they were here -- some of you remember a

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couple of weeks ago, the head of the relief commission and I had lengthy meetings, and there was an agreement on a number of things, and one of the agreements with the Ethiopia government was that they would allocate substantially additional trucks to this effort, because the trucks are there in the country and we're hopeful, and we see some progress in terms of getting those trucks available for this process.

Now once you get food to the camp, I don't mean to belabor this, but it's a long question and I think you need to see that any blockage, any tightening of the pipeline any place along the line, of course, limits the whole, once you get food to the camp, then people aren't automatically in the camp. One of the things I showed the President was a picture of the train. It's like a series of Grand Canyons where a lot of these people are living. And the difficulty of getting the people -- getting the food to the people is horrendous.

We worked out a number of approaches there -- it probably is going to involve some more camps and numbers of other steps, but that's the pipeline situation.

Q Is the government doing any better at getting food to various parts of the country, including those provinces where they've had rebel activity?

MR. McPHERSON: My judgment is the Ethiopia government is substantially more interested in getting this problem solved than what they were a few weeks ago.

Q Why?

MR. McPHERSON: Well, I -- I don't mean to be glib, but I guess I think we almost have to ask them . They've -- they have, since that celebration, the 10-anniversary celebration, which was a substantial focus on their part up until then, they seem to have turned back to this horrendous problem and we're getting a lot more information from them. We weren't getting much information, frankly, before. We're getting more information, we're getting a lot of cooperation and we think that things are beginning to move.

Q Well, does that mean they're going to go to this push that you've put on?

MR. McPHERSON: Well, I don't know, and I don't think it's artful for me to claim any credit, I just don't know. All I know is that things are -- there is a lot more focus and interest on this and we're taking advantage of that by moving really very aggressively to put a lot more food in, to work with the government in getting food in to the people and, frankly, what I think is, if we can -- if we, the donor community, we the U.S., and the rest and, frankly, the Russians, too, of course, if the international community, if the world can work together on this, literally hundreds of thousands of people are going to be saved.

Q Is a direct U.S. airlift out of the question because of the political situation on the ground there?

MR. McPHERSON: We really haven't placed into the factors here political concerns when it meant whether we were going to get the food directly to the kid that was starving. We really have taken the firm position, and I've been up to my, I've been deeply involved in this for a long time, that a hungry child simply knows no politics. And so, as far as I'm concerned, all workable options are there to look at.

Now there are horrendous terrain problems, and we have moved into chartering some planes to move food around. We've been doing that for, oh, three weeks or so, and before that, in fact, we provided some gasoline to Ethiopia government planes to move some

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food.

Q How much aid are the Soviets --

MR. McPHERSON: This lady right here --

Q Go ahead.

MR. McPHERSON: Okay, sir, finish, and she's next.

Q Well, how much aid -- how much of this gap in the 1 million tons is being made up, so far, at this point, by other countries?

MR. McPHERSON: We've provided, I guess, with today's announcement, the figure I just gave, and the rest of the world has provided a couple hundred thousand ton that are in the pipeline. So we are overwhelmingly the largest donor so far this year, and we were the largest donor of food assistance last year.

I might say that the Soviets have provided a few visible band aids, but really not much more. And what the U.S. and the West is really doing is challenging the Soviets to do what we're doing. This is not an unfriendly challenge; this is a wish to have full assistance for these people.

Ma'am?

Q Could I just follow up on that? It doesn't sound like you're going to fall, then, very much short of the 1 million. It sounds like you should be able to make the figure, the goal, in terms of volume. It's a question of distribution.

MR. McPHERSON: Well, I think distribution is going to be -- I don't want to downgrade the problem of getting a million ton, because a million ton is just a lot of money and a lot of food, particularly when you've got all these other countries in the continent that have a lot of demands as well. The French, no doubt, for example, will be giving a very large amount of food to francophone countries that need it, and so on. So it's not going to be easy to get the volume, but there's no question, the thing that worries me the most is the logistical distribution system.

Q Do you see a need to go to Congress next year and ask for more funds for this?

MR. McPHERSON: Well, at this juncture, we have a large amount of monies and food which we can draw upon. We've been drawing upon them very quickly, as you can tell. I think that what we do with Congress will be -- will have to be sorted out in the next few weeks and certainly will be done so well before they return.

Q Mr. McPherson, a couple of the years did you not return some AID money to the government and, if so, how much of that was for Africa, and does that factor in at all?

MR. McPHERSON: Not really. We returned $28 million. In fact, I had a nice big ceremony out in the Rose Garden here. What that involved was, there were $28 million worth of projects, and have been projects every year since then which, frankly, weren't working. When you're -- we have a $6 billion budget and with projects in 60 countries, and some of them don't work out the way we think they should work, and what I did managerially was make the decision that if it wasn't working, we were going to cut it out.

Q Was any of that Africa relief?

MR. McPHERSON: Yes, I've forgotten the number, but a few of them were Africa, but none of them were Ethiopia and none of them -- and, frankly, they weren't working, and that's why we chopped them

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out. I think -- it's interesting, now that I look back at it after almost four years, our willingness to cut out what doesn't work has a tremendous message for my whole bureaucracy and for governments in which we work, and we continue to implement that kind of approach.

Q What is the role of the Soviet Union in Ethiopia right now, and have they tried to block it, and wasn't the U.S. a little slow in responding to this catastrophe?

MR. McPHERSON: Well, the Soviet role at this juncture is, to my knowledge, is providing some planes and maybe some helicopters. We've seen the planes. I haven't seen anything else operate, I don't know of anything else operating. They said they're going to provide trucks, 300 trucks. We haven't seen any trucks yet. We'll be happy to see any assistance that has a material impact upon the situation from anybody.

Now as to the U.S. promptness of response, last year, last fiscal year, the year ending September 31, we provided $19 million and this year, of course, we've done this enormous amount, and I might point out that a substantial portion of what we've done this year was before there was a great deal of public focus. I think some $30 million was already obligated this fiscal year before the NBC telecast.

This has been something which, especially the last two months, has really begun to worry me, and we've done a lot of steps pursuant to that. What happened was, a couple months ago, large numbers of people that were really in terrible shape, with these kids, shrunken-up little old men, these children shrunken up, just in terrible shape, began to come -- about a couple months ago -- began to come to these camps, and they came from these valleys a long way away, and nobody, I think, really had the information. There's relatively little communication, you understand, of the depth of the problem.

It's my judgment and it's something, frankly, I care quite a lot about, that the U.S. response was very substantial and we certainly are deeply committed to making an enormous response in Ethiopia and around the globe, around the continent, in the months ahead.

Yes, sir?

Q You talk about 215,000 tons of food have already been allocated for Ethiopia this fiscal year. Is there any sense of what the U.S. plans to do in the rest of the year for Ethiopia?

MR. McPHERSON: We anticipate -- we are hopeful that there will be a donors' meeting in the next few weeks, where the donors can get together and can essentially divide up the responsibility. We'll continue to allocate in the months ahead, weeks ahead, I'm sure, but I suspect that the donors' pledging conference, or donors' conference, will be the important point for decisions, for the longer term decisions.

What we're responding to now is a whole series of immediate emergency, but that 12-month kind of time frame is one that we'll be working on in the weeks ahead.

Sir?

Q What's the scope of the problem in the rest of Africa?

MR. McPHERSON: The scope of the problem in the rest of Africa is millions additional people are going to be seriously affected. And it's going to take very substantial amounts of additional food.

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Q Any estimate of the amount?

MR. McPHERSON: Well, we're in the process of a country-by-country basis working out those figures. I've got some figures but they don't feel nailed-down enough for me to publicly announce them . But that's an urgent effort going on. In the meantime, of course, we're allocating food to each and every one of these countries as we nail that down.

One of the things that's difficult to understand as we sit here is, if there's a drought in West Texas, everybody knows about it and understands what it's about, and you can walk out there and get a feel for it, and count the cattle that are -- practically count the cattle that have problems, and so forth. But in these countries, we don't even know the population within a million, sometimes.

I mean, it wasn't a year ago that commonly the population cited for Ethiopia was 30 million people. Recently, the UNFPA, United Nations population program, did a rough census for Ethiopia, and the figure now is some 42 million people. I mean, the dimensions of what we don't know about these countries -- and you've got Chad that's got drought, and in Chad you've got that war there. You've got Mozambique with a civil war in Mozambique. I mean, the communication and informational gap is very substantial.

But I'm convinced that, one, there are millions additional people in Africa that are going to be seriously affected and that we're

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going to have to worry about, we the world community, and that there are -- it is going to take a very substantial, additional amount of food to address those urgent needs.

Sir?

Q If there is -- if rainfall comes about, how long would it take for the next harvest to alleviate -- for alleviating this problem, some of the problem?

MR. McPHERSON: There are what are called short rains and long rains in Ethiopia. The short rains will come, maybe, in a few months. But even if they do, historically that produces only about 10 percent of the crop. The long rains, which produce the other 90 percent of the food will be coming in 8 or 9 months. And approximately a year from now, if those rains are good -- are average, if you will -- then there will be substantial food harvested in the north in about one year. So that's why I have this year kind of program in mind for Ethiopia.

Sir?

Q Can you say, on the basis of your talks in Addis, or other information, just how much did the Ethiopians spend on their independence celebration -- because that was an issue a couple of weeks ago --

MR. McPHERSON: I don't really know. I mean, I've read the reports of $100 to $200 million. I just don't know. You go through Addis and there's substantial construction. There's a lot of paint; there's a lot of signs; a lot of big arches; but I don't know. And I'm sure that the world never will know.

What I can say is that I -- that I do feel some focus and interest right now and the U.S., for purposes of this drought, has been able to work reasonably well, we think, with the Ethiopia government the last few weeks. Of course the proof is in the pudding in the next several weeks as we struggle to really deliver and work through the government, and we're anxious to try to do that.

In the meantime, we're taking them at their word that they're deeply committed to this problem.

Q Has that donors conference been scheduled yet?

MR. McPHERSON: No, it has not, and we are not the official callers. We're the major donor, but historically it has proven to be effective for us to work with the group, and I would expect that, in fact, that such a conference would be called soon.

Q Who has the responsibility to call it?

MR. McPHERSON: Well, there are a lot of ways this could be done. Sometimes the recipient country calls it. Sometimes the U.N. might be involved. Sometimes a group of donors might -- there's a lot of communication, discussion going on at this very time -- of how that might be done.

Q What do you call a challenge to the Soviets? Are you essentially looking for them to complement with logistics what you're providing in terms of food? Or are you looking for food from them as well?

MR. McPHERSON: Well, I think that they need to provide a very substantial amount. If they were to provide food, which they certainly could, they could buy it on the world market. But there are medicine needs, there are blanket needs, there are logistical needs -- trucks, all that kind of thing -- planes and so forth. There are just a lot of ways that the Soviets, which, of course, is a society with substantial resources, could put into this; and we look

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forward to them to do it.

Let me take one more --

Q Well, has the --

Q Have you had any contact with them? Have you solicited any contribution from them? Have you said, "Help us out"?

MR. McPHERSON: We've made clear to Ethiopia -- the Ethiopian government -- what we think might be done here, and I'm confident that the Soviets understand basically what needs to be done, and the world's desires for them to make very substantial contributions.

MR. SIMS: Ben, last question.

Q The $1 million -- the one million ton figure that you gave -- was that just for Ethiopia?

MR. McPHERSON: That's just for Ethiopia.

Ladies and gentlemen -- nice to see you today.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 10:32 A.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release November 22, 1984

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
ON U.S.-SOVIET ARMS NEGOTIATIONS

The Briefing Room

/noon/
12:00 P.M./EST

MR. MCFARLANE: Good morning. As a result of exchanges in the past eight weeks between President Reagan and Chairman Chernenko of the Soviet Union, I'm pleased to inform you today that the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to enter into new arms control negotiations. The Soviet Union joins us in making the following announcement at this time.

The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to enter into new negotiations with the objective of reaching mutually acceptable agreements on the whole range of questions concerning nuclear and outer space arms.

In order to reach a common understanding as to the subject and objectives of such negotiations, Secretary of State George P. Shultz, and Foreign Minister Andre A. Gromyko will meet in Geneva on January 7th and 8th, 1985.

When I advised the President of a tentative agreement this past Monday in Santa Barbara, he commented that, "This is good news. It is the first step on what will be a long and difficult road. But the world is depending on us. I want you to get back to Washington and speed up the work necessary to prepare our position."

The announcement today stems from the President's personal efforts culminating in the proposal made in September that the United States and the Soviet Union renew talks aimed at a reduction of nuclear weapons. Since that time, discussions between ourselves and the Soviet Union and private channels have advanced understanding of the scope and priorities of such a process.

As these exchanges have proceeded during the past eight weeks, the President has personally provided guidance in more than a half dozen meetings which have included the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and others, and has led to the announcement we make today.

The President has informed his counterparts in allied countries. The Congressional leadership has also been informed in advance. The President will continue his efforts to strengthen and consolidate bipartisan Congressional support which is so essential if we are to negotiate effective arms reductions.

We have consistently taken the position that reducing nuclear weapons must be the most important objective facing both countries, and we are ready for genuine give and take with the Soviet Union for the purpose of reaching concrete agreements. We've continued our preparations over the course of the past year, and we enter the talks in January in the spirit of honest compromise and getting results.

I'll be glad to take your questions at this time.

Helen?

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Q When Gromyko and Shultz get together, will this be talks about forthcoming talks, or will they really get down to cases on nuclear negotiations and outer space, and is this also an acceptance of the umbrella idea?

MR. MCFARLANE: On the first part of your question, I refer you back to the second sentence of the statement, which says in order to reach a common understanding as to the subject and objectives of such negotiations, the two foreign ministers will meet. That is, this is a meeting to set the agenda and the course for further negotiation.

With regard to the second part of your question, the President has felt for some time that we need to have a clearing of the air and a renewal of serious discourse on the full range of arms control issues, strategic offensive, intermediate-range offensive, outer space systems, and toward that end he proposed at the United Nations speech in September, and in meetings with Foreign Minister Gromyko, that we have umbrella talks which would encompass the full family of arms control issues.

We believe that the talks that will open in January encompass the most pressing of these issues, which include strategic offensive, intermediate-range offensive, and outer space.

Q Are there any preconditions at all that we have had to agree to other than saying we will deal with the full breadth of arms control issues?

MR. MCFARLANE: No.

Q No preconditions?

Q Mr. McFarlane, to what extent will Shultz and Gromyko have to focus on the problem of weapons in space? Is this a stumbling block to the general arms control talks?

MR. MCFARLANE: No.

Yes?

Q Bud, do you expect that there will be an arms control "czar," so-called, appointed before this meeting takes place in January?

MR. MCFARLANE: The public portrayal of that individual is of a person who would oversee the decision process here as well as participate in negotations with the Soviet Union. There are no plans to appoint such a person. The President will preside over the National Security Council, which includes the Vice President, the Secretarys of State and Defense, and other advisers. I will chair the subordinate interdepartmental process which will support his decision-making.

Yes?

Q Bud, what effect do you see on the immediate level of world tension between the super powers of this announcement in Moscow and here in Washington?

MR. MCFARLANE: The President sees it as a positive sign of an acceptance by the Soviet Union of a willingness to enter a serious dialogue on arms control toward the purpose of lowering tensions and lowering the level of arms. But we will see. It is important that at these sessions both sides enter with a spirit of goodwill and that they lead to specific negotiations to follow.

Q I'd like to follow that, if I may. Does the administration see any linkage between the arms talks that are to

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come and other Soviet behavior?

MR. MCFARLANE: Well, I think that the relationship between arms reduction talks as well as the climate of the relationship as reflected in regional disagreements is clearly accepted by the President. They are related. The good faith reflected in arms reduction negotiations are affected by -- or the pace and quality of those negotiations -- by the activities of the Soviet Union in other areas.

I draw your attention to the President's decisions taken in the wake of the KAL incident in which he believed at that time that the importance of sustaining arms reduction talks transcended all but the most extreme examples of intolerable Soviet behavior in other areas.

Yes, Helen?

Q What does this mean in terms of a summit between the President and Chernenko?

MR. MCFARLANE: The President, as you know, on several occasions has expressed his willingness to meet with Mr. Chernenko, if that would be useful. I think, however, that it's premature at this point to speculate on whether or not the meeting between George Shulz and Prime Minister Gromyko would lead to a summit.

Yes?

Q Mr. McFarlane, you listed three most pressing issues, with the outer space weapons in the third place. Is it a list of priorities for this administration?

MR. MCFARLANE: The scope of the talks in January include all, no doubt would encompass a discussion of the relationship between offensive and defensive forces and lead to productive negotiations. We set no discrimination as between the subjects on the agenda.

Yes?

Q Bud, would you talk a moment about the process by which we got to this point, specifically, how many discussions at what level, and whether or not, in the final instance, the meeting was set up because of an invitation and a letter by Chernenko?

MR. MCFARLANE: Yes and no, and let me preface what I say with a statement of the importance that our own government be able to deal in these negotiations in a private way. Historically, progress has been made when each side has been able to consider proposals by the other privately, reach decisions privately, communicate those privately, and demonstrate that it has the integrity to avoid special pleading on behalf of one constituency or another. We intend to do that.

The process, I will say, in summary, has been one in which the leaders at the highest level, the President and the Chairman, have exchanged their views as well as subordinates through diplomatic channels. There have been clarifications since the meeting of the Foreign Minister here in Washington in September of what the President intended and his concept of umbrella talks, and through an iterative process that has involved Soviet questioning, the Secretary of State and Defense absorbing these views, making recommendations to the President and, as I said earlier, perhaps half-a-dozen meetings.

The appreciation on both sides of each other's thinking has matured to the point that both believe it timely to enter into more formal talks. We expect that process to be carried on through diplomatic channels and not in the public domain.

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Yes?

Q Would you elaborate on the importance of Mr. Adelman's view on how we should approach arms control and whether or not the Soviets also share this view?

MR. MCFARLANE: It seemed to me that Ken was stating, first of all, his confidence that we are at a time in our history when the outlook for success in strategic arms negotiations is quite good. He goes on to say that as an adjunct to, as a complement to, that process devoted to formal agreements, there is an opportunity for each side to undertake individually, but without formal agreement, certain courses of action or behavior or restraint that can improve the climate, perhaps leading over time to formal agreements, but that we can make progress without there needing to be a formal agreement concluded at all times.

Let me give you an example. In the past 20 years, quite apart from formal agreement with the Soviet Union, the United States has reduced both the size and explosive capacity of its own nuclear arsenal by an enormous amount -- the warhead levels today are roughly a third lower than they were 17 years ago -- simply by decision on the part of the United States. Now if that could have been reciprocated by the other side, that would have been a very useful process.

Similarly, the megatonnage today is less than half what it was 25 years ago, quite apart from any influence of arms control agreements. Now this process in which each side can do things which improve stability -- and, after all, stability is what we are after in arms control talks -- can establish the conditions that improve the possibilities for formal arms control agreements, that is all. In short, what Ken is saying is, in addition to what we must continue to do, formal efforts at formal agreements, we can have as an adjunct, as a complement, perhaps, these informal but complementary courses of action by both sides.

Yes?

Q You ruled out the czar, but you didn't seem to rule out a special envoy who would work under Shulz and maybe under you in terms of taking care of the day-to-day contacts and negotiations pursuant to the Geneva meeting. Could you elaborate on that?

MR. MCFARLANE: The precise format for the follow-on negotiations

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and how they can be nurtured is open to decision still. There have been no decisions made on that. The talks haven't yet been held.

There is the possibility that there would be value in having someone once the talks are underway in the several specific areas of interest -- strategic, intermediate range, and so forth -- for someone to advice, trouble-shoot, and be a designated hitter that could assure momentum is sustained over time. But there have been no decisions taken on that.

And I distinguish between that and some new person who manages the bureaucratic processor in Washington. That arrangement is under the supervision and control of the President, and at lower levels, under me.

Q Well, just to follow up, who will accompany Shultz to Geneva? Will Mr. Adelman, Ed Rowny, Nitze be in that group?

MR. MCFARLANE: The composition of the delegation hasn't been set and it's just premature to speculate on that. The Secretary and the President will discuss it, I'm sure, in the days ahead.

Yes.

Q Bud, in the President's UN speech, he suggested that he would be willing to consider a moratorium on testing anti-satellite weapons once talks actually began. Is that the case?

MR. MCFARLANE: Issues like that, and others, are left for the negotiation and premature to speculate on the outcome at this time.

Q Mr. McFarlane, follow up to that question, you said it would be left to the negotiations. Which negotiations? Between Shultz and Gromyko or the follow-up negotiations?

MR. MCFARLANE: The Soviet Union has preferred that these sessions, themselves, focus upon setting the agenda for talks to follow. And implied in that is that the negotiations will be the place where substantive points such as have been raised here will be dealt with. The United States enters those talks prepared to discuss and to treat constructively each of the items on the agenda in January.

MR. SIMS: Bud, could we move to questions from Santa Barbara unless there's some pressing question here.

MR. MCFARLANE: Let's go on to California then.

MR. FITZWATER: All right, we're ready to take the first question from Santa Barbara.

Maureen?

Q Okay. Bud, I want to go a little bit more to the logistics of these talks. You mentioned three items that are on the agenda -- the medium-range, the strategic, and the ASAT. Are you, in essence, saying that this is going to be a merger of all the other negotiations, is going to supercede the negotiations that ended a year ago, or that this is going to be an effort to resume those separate negotiations?

MR. MCFARLANE: The text of the announcement, Maureen, states that we will be treating the whole range of questions concerning nuclear and outer space arms. In the nuclear domain, that encompasses both strategic offensive and intermediate-range offensive systems.

Now, at these talks, the purpose will be, as the second sentence says, to reach a common understanding on the subject and

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objectives of such negotiations. Now, it's clear that negotiations on these issues will take place. The format for them, the venue, the scope, will — is left to be determined during this first session, and perhaps follow-on sessions. And to prejudge the outcome of that is not useful at this point.

MR. FITZWATER: Jerry.

Q Can I follow up, please?

MR. FITZWATER: All right.

Q Are you then saying that this could restructure the way the United States and the Soviet Union have been negotiating arms control, and you just don't know yet how it's going to turn out?

MR. MCFARLANE: I think it's too early to say that. I think, for our own part, we believe that the established institutions and channels and delegations, and so forth, make possible immediate progress in each of these areas without further delay. And we are ready.

But we are ready to talk and to listen about alternative ideas on the other side, and we look forward to doing that in January.

MR. FITZWATER: Jerry.

Q Bud, in all the exchanges of the Soviet-U.S. leaders that led up to this decision to meet in Geneva, has there been a change in the sense that the Soviets are no longer imposing prior conditions? Is that a major change in the situation?

MR. MCFARLANE: Well, Jerry, I think we are focused on the future and less concerned with history. If you read the text of the joint announcement, there are no preconditions.

Q Bud, is there anything that's off limits in these talks? You've mentioned all the things that are possibility for discussion. Is there anything going into this initial set of talks that is off limits, that this will not discuss?

MR. MCFARLANE: Well, in broad terms, the announcement

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states the scope of these negotiations, nuclear arms, and outer space. The United States is prepared today because we spent quite a lot of time in the last year reviewing our positions in a half-dozen areas of arms control -- strategic, offensive, intermediate-range, mutual balanced force reductions negotiations, chemical warfare systems, confidence building measures such as are on the agenda in Stockholm, and outer space. We are ready in each of those areas -- ready to respond and ready with ideas.

This particular announcement foreshadows a focus, in particular in these talks, on strategic offensive, intermediate range offensive, and outer space. But we are open and ready to discuss all issues.

Q Bud, when you said that you are not -- that it's premature to discuss the issue of a moratorium -- is there an administration position? Have you resolved the differences inside the administration on the whole question of a moratorium on outer space testing?

MR. MCFARLANE: Well, in keeping with what I said earlier, I wouldn't foreshadow the positions that the United States will take in these talks. The President has spoken publicly to the issue of moratoria or other proposals which must be left for the negotiations themselves. The administration's readiness, in terms of decisions within the government here, is clear. We have our positions and we're ready to go.

Q If the Soviets, in the discussions on agenda, prefer to focus on the outer space issues first -- what is the United States' position regarding insistence that the strategic nuclear issues be included in the format for the first talks that would follow?

MR. MCFARLANE: I'm sorry -- I was looking at something else here -- could you say that again, please?

Q Maybe it wasn't too clear. What is our position regarding the strategic talks being included in follow-up negotiations? In other words, is it your sense that the Soviets are still insisting on a moratorium on space testing as the first priority of any follow-up negotiations, as you prepare to address the agenda? And are we still insisting on resuming the nuclear talks in some kind of format before we will deal with the space issue?

MR. MCFARLANE: Well, I wouldn't pretend to speak for the Soviet Union. They have stated their attitude toward each of these items, back in the summer -- July, August -- as well the United States. The President has made clear that it's important that we recognize that there are systems which exist today which pose a threat to stability and we cannot ignore those systems on how to reduce them. And so that is extremely important to us. There are other families of emerging technologies which we do believe can enhance deterrence. And we believe that a sober exchange between ourselves and the Soviet Union designed to reach an agreed understanding of how these sytems can improve the stability of the strategic balance is in order.

Now we are ready to consider such proposals on limitations -- generically -- on arms control, and enter these talks in that spirit of give and take. But it seems to me that the announcement today does confirm that the Soviet Union intends to discuss, to negotiate, toward agreements in the area of offensive nuclear arms. And they have so stated in this agreement -- or this announcement.

Q Bud, does today's announcement indicate that the administration now accepts that Chernenko has consolidated his control?

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MR. MCFARLANE: I think it's out of place for us to comment upon the Soviet decision process. Clearly the Soviet Union has taken a decision to renew negotiations toward arms reductions, and that's what counts.

Q But, on that subject of preconditions -- the Soviets have often said that they would not come back to arms talks as long as we deploy new missiles in Europe. Can you give us any opinion at all on why the Soviets appear to have changed their position, and are we prepared to change our deployment plans if these talks go well?

MR. MCFARLANE: I wouldn't comment on the Soviet decision process. What's important is that they and we have agreed to negotiate toward agreements. The substance of those negotiations is a matter for private discourse, and it's premature to comment on that now.

Q Bud, this summer the space talks fell through. The United States wanted to expand the talks and talks in general -- arms negotiations. Is there any chance that this exchange in January will not take place? Is there anything that could make it fall through?

MR. MCFARLANE: Well, I can't imagine anything. No.

MR. FITZWATER: We'll take one final question. Candy, you'll have to come up to the side to -- about the third table.

Q Bud, as you know, the analysis of how important this all is in the scheme of U.S.-Soviet relations has already begun. I wonder if you could give us the administration's analysis of what this means, is it just the next logical step, what you all think of it and, also, do you think it's the beginning of a thaw?

MR. MCFARLANE: Well, I think this, I believe that the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union is acknowledged on both sides to be central to the preservation of peace and stability throughout the world, that the meetings in September established the acceptance on both sides that we had no hostile intentions toward them, that we had reservations about their own intentions toward us, but that as super powers we had responsibilities to ensure the avoidance of war, that we could deal as equals, that we had political differences that will surely endure, that the United States is prepared to compete in the world, but that the fundamental requirement is that that competition be peaceful.

I think after that exchange, which was an important event, the messages received on both sides have been absorbed, pondered, and that we're at a moment where each side has decided to make a determined effort to reduce tensions -- we surely have -- and that this discourse ought to encompass arms reduction, disagreements over regional issues from Afghanistan to Central America, bilateral issues in which there is an opportunity for more exchanges, trade, the resolution of problems.

The United States will as well sustain its concern over human rights, but that it is essential that there be a sustained, serious discourse between us devoted to the peaceful resolution of disputes. Now I would not say that this is a milestone of conclusion but, rather, an opening of a process that will be difficult and sustained over time.

MR. SIMS: Thank you very much, Bud.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 12:29 P.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF
PRIME MINISTER RATU SIR KAMISESE K.T. MARA
OF FIJI

November 26, 1984

The Briefing Room

10:06 A.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me just start with a brief statement. The Prime Minister of Fiji, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara arrived in Washington yesterday, November 25th, to begin an official working visit. He will remain in Washington until Thursday morning, November 29th.

Tomorrow the Prime Minister will meet with the President as well as member of the Cabinet and have a lunch with the President. Later that afternoon he'll meet separately with the Secretary of State and be the guest of honor at a dinner hosted by the Vice President.

On November 28th he will be seeing the Administrator of AID and then attending a luncheon in his honor at the Department of Defense.

Those are the highlights of his schedule. This is a unique and important visit. It is, in fact, the first visit ever -- official visit to Washington -- by a leader from a Pacific Island country. And of course in that context, Prime Minister Mara is the first Fijian to make an official visit to Washington.

He comes from a region that is not well known to Americans today, but unfortunately was very much in our mind four decades ago. We suffered almost 300,000 casualties throughout that area during World War II and nearly 30 percent of our worldwide losses.

But since that time, Oceania as the region is called, has changed greatly and very much for the better. Nine independent countries have emerged since 1962. The Prime Minister's visit points up our growing ties with the island region in general, and with Fiji in particular.

Fiji is a leader in the Pacific islands -- second largest in size, roughly comparable to Massachusetts in land area. And it's third in population with about 700,000 people. Since independence in 1970 it has enjoyed political stability and considerable economic growth. Fiji is one of the world's most successful examples of multiparty democracy and multiracial society.

We and the Fijians share many values and institutions. I might note from the notes of the State Department on Fiji that among developing nations, Fiji's accomplishments over the 13 years since independence are remarkable. The government has dedicated itself to economic and social progress, and the country has made real advances in the fields of education, agriculture, health and nutrition. Individual liberties are safeguarded, and a solid democratic tradition of government has been established. In the area of human rights, Fiji has been singled out by Amnesty International for its

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complete lack of abuses against the person.

Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara is the only Prime Minister Fiji has had since independence, and unquestionably ranks as the elder statesman of the region. We are deeply grateful to the Prime Minister for Fiji's support of peacekeeping missions in the Middle East. With one battalion in the UNIFIL forces in Southern Lebanon, and another battalion with a multinational force and observers in Sinai, Fiji actually maintains more troops in peacekeeping operations in the Middle East than inside its own borders.

We are also very appreciative of Fiji's support on a range of foreign policy issues, from Grenada to Afghanistan; and particularly for Fiji's decision to reopen its ports to U.S. Navy ships. We welcome this opportunity to consult with the government of Fiji and to demonstrate our regard for Fiji's remarkable accomplishments and our growing interest in Oceania.

I'll be glad to try to answer questions.

Q What specifics do you expect will be on the agenda?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would think a very broad range -- from very specific issues, like issues of sugar quotas, issues of bilateral assistance, possibly issues of such things as rights, landing rights for Fiji's airline -- to regional issues, including the undoubtedly the very strong concerns in the Pacific about nuclear waste dumping and about nuclear testing, I would imagine would likely come up.

The whole question of regional security in the South Pacific I think is likely to be discussed. The government of Fiji, on a number of occasions, has both expressed its strong interest in the success of ANZUS, and its strong interest in continued U.S. naval presence in the South Pacific. And, as I think I noted in my opening remarks, Fiji itself has welcomed our ships in its ports.

There are other regional issues. There's concern right now about the situation in New Caledonia. And finally I would imagine there would be considerable discussion about nonregional topics. As I've noted, Fiji, particularly for a country of its small size, plays a remarkable international role. Its peacekeeping force in the Middle East certainly give it an interest in that part of the world. And I think its broad interest in nuclear issues and in related arms control issues would probably mean that there'd be some discussion of that subject as well.

Q Do we seek any permanent military relationship in terms of having our own bases, or U.S.-Fiji bases?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. We don't seek any bases in Fiji. In fact, we already have important air and naval bases on Guam, and we have exercized an option for a long-term lease of land in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariannas. So, I think our options are well covered already.

Q What support can Mara expect from the Americans in relation to moving the French -- or getting the French to move its underground tests in French Polynesia somewhere else?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that's a difficult issue for us, since we test underground ourselves. And since, moreover, we do believe that the French deterrent plays an important contribution in NATO security. I think -- I can't predict anything -- but, I think it puts us in a position where what we can mostly do is listen and try to understand the complaints.

Q Are they likely to discuss American plans to test missiles in the South Pacific?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know if that would come up.

Q I understand Mara would be interested in trying to get an increase in the Fiji sugar quota to the United States. Can you look forward to that with some optimism?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sure that will be discussed. Unfortunately, I think one can't be optimistic, because we have --

Q What was the question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Whether there would be increases in Fiji's sugar quota for the United States. As sympathetic as we are, given all the contributions that Fiji makes, the system under which sugar quotas are allocated is a very mechanical one, and designed to make it nearly impossible to bring in that kind of political consideration. Fiji, of course, is a major -- well, is a significant exporter of sugar, and sugar is its major export crop, so I'm sure that subject will be discussed.

Q How much sugar do we now import?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it's slightly -- from Fiji?

Q From Fiji.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's slightly under 1 percent of our quota -- it's about .7 percent of our quota. And I don't know what that is in tonnage -- do you have the figure in tonnage?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't recall. It's about 18,000 tons, I think. It varies slightly each year.

Q How important is that particular figure to Fiji's --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Very important to Fiji. It's 70 percent of Fiji's export earnings -- is sugar.

Q And what portion of exports to the United States?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Do you know --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think a very large fraction is exports to the U.S.

Q Can you go over any --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Of course the quota means, because of the way our market is structured, we pay a much higher price for sugar that is generally available on the world market, so that access to our quota is important for all sugar producers.

Q What was that 70 percent figure you just --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Seventy percent of Fiji's exports are from sugar.

Q Are there any concrete plans to send American navy ships into Fiji --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have had visits there regularly since the government announced its policy of permitting ship visits, including nuclear powered ships. There are no -- I don't know of specific plans -- there may in fact be some. These

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things are often things that come up as a ship happens to be in the area. On some occasions -- on one occasion when there was a typhoon there, we sent in ships to help provide disaster assistance.

Q Has there been any discussion that Fiji might take up the slack if New Zealand persists in banning nuclear powered, or nuclear armed ships?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it's not the way -- it is very important and helpful to have access to Fiji's ports, but that really is separate and different from New Zealand.

Q Is Mara seeking any specific foreign assistance from the United States? Any grant programs or whatever?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We currently have a multilateral program in the South Pacific run by AID, in which Fiji participates. That distributes a total of about $6 million a year.

Q Six?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Six million dollars -- to 10 countries in the region. Mainly, that money goes through private voluntary organizations and regional institutions. We also currently have a very successful Peace Corps program there with about 100 volunteers in Fiji alone. And we contribute to regional organizations such as the Asian Development Bank and the South Pacific Commission. We have had requests for bilateral aid, and I imagine those requests will be discussed during this visit, but I can't predict any outcome of those discussions.

Q How about the landing rights question? Will that be resolved this trip?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Probably not in this trip. For one thing, Fiji's airline is in a major reorganization, and its future is unclear, and it's not -- there've been discussions with a number of other airlines, I think, including Quantas, for possible new arrangements under which the airline would operate, so that would make it -- I think until those arrangements are clear, it's very difficult to address the question.

It's a difficult question for us, in any case, because the basic issue is one of landing rights for foreign airlines versus trade and passengers for our own airlines, and so that's been a difficult one with many countries. I don't think it will be resolved this visit, but I'm sure it will get a great deal of attention. And Secretary Dole, the Secretary of Transportation, will be in the meeting with the Prime Minister.

Q What will be resolved this visit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not sure. We'll see how the visit goes. We have, in the case of sugar, in the case of landing rights, two issues that are very hard to resolve, but visits like this -- or at least to resolve satisfactorily -- visits like this are helpful in moving them forward. Certainly, as we address the landing rights issue in the future, I'm sure the discussions between the Prime Minister and the President are going to be a keystone and will be referred back to a great deal.

There may be possibilities of some movement on bilateral assistance but, as I said, I can't predict that one right now. But the most important thing is having the opportunity to have this kind of broad exchange of views. As I've noted, it's been a very long time -- I mean, since the first countries of the Pacific became independent, we have not had a visit with a leader from that region. I think it's very valuable for the President and for senior American officials to hear directly from the Prime Minister what his concerns are and what the concerns are of people in that part of the world.

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We face a number of common problems and have common interests in approaches in dealing with them.

Q When did Fiji gain independence, did you say?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: 1970.

Q Was that basically overall for Oceania?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I guess the first independent country was '62 and there are now 11 sovreign countries, two of them associated with New Zealand and nine fully independent.

Q Who was Fiji a colony of?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Great Britain.

Q You said there have been requests for bilateral aid. Do you have any figures on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's been a request both to make a portion of the currently multi-lateral program into a bilateral program and general requests for increased assistance. I don't have, I don't think specific figures have been mentioned, but Fiji's need for development assistance has been stressed to us a number of times.

Q How old is the Prime Minister?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sixty-two?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I believe he's sixty-five-ish.

MR. SIMS: I think you'll find that in the background notes which we have available in here.

Q Is the President -- one more question, if I may -- the President has often expressed his interest in promoting democracy. Is he going to be discussing the subject with Mara about how Fiji can serve as an example elsewhere in the Pacific?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't predict, but I think it would be a very natural topic of conversation. It's a remarkable record that not only Fiji but, really, virtually all of the South Pacific countries have achieved of maintaining representative institutions and, as I indicate from that mention of the amnesty report, also fully free and liberal systems.

I think we appreciate that there's an important connection to economics here and that for these countries to continue that success record in the future, it's very important to keep their economies functioning effectively. That's difficult, because their tiny size makes them -- gives them only a limited domestic market for anything they produce, so that's a problem that needs attention and certainly will get addressed during this visit -- not one that you cannot resolve overnight, unfortunately.

Yes, sir?

Q On the basis of what's likely to come up, can I put it in this manner? What is it likely to be, if we get quoted a Christmas present that Mara can expect to take back either to Fiji or to the region, for that matter?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that's your phrase, I'm not going to use it. If -- let's wait until the visit is over. We'll be briefing you at the end of the meeting with the President and we'll see what the results are, but I don't want to sit

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here and try to predict what the Prime Minister and the President are going to agree on.

MR. SIMS: All right, we will have a briefing at the conclusion of the meetings. I find that the age is not in this background sheet; it's 64. So we'll see you tomorrow.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

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10:23 A.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER-FOREIGN MINISTER TARIQ AZIZ
OF IRAQ

November 26, 1984

The Briefing Room

12:15 P.M. EST

MR. SPEAKES: The governments of the United States -- and we'll have a printed copy of this, also -- the governments of the United States and of Iraq have agreed to resume diplomatic relations effective today, November 26, 1984.

This agreement has concluded today between President Reagan and Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Iraq, His Excellency Tariq M. Aziz.

The two countries' diplomatic missions are upgraded as of this date from interest sections to embassies. And the principal officers will hold the title of charge d'affaires, pending the appointment of ambassadors. Ambassadors will be appointed as promptly as posible under the nomination processes required within and between both countries.

That's the end of the statement.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The official program started this morning with a meeting at 10:00 a.m. with Secretary Shultz, then to the White House for a meeting with the Vice President. And they've just concluded in the Oval Office with President Reagan.

His program, beyond this, will be a working lunch with the Secretary, which starts in a few minutes. He will be paying courtesy calls later today on Secretary Weinberger and Bud McFarlane.

The program beyond that, I think tomorrow -- this afternoon there will be the ceremony of flag raising at the Iraqi Embassy.

Q When is that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's scheduled for mid-afternoon. I'm sorry. I don't have the exact time.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: 3:30 p.m.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICAL: Okay. Fine.

During his stay in Washington, which will continue through Thursday, Tariq Aziz will be meeting with a number of our representative of "think tanks," such as at the Carnegie Endowment, American Enterprise. He'll be at an editorial breakfast with The Washington Post. Meetings on the Hill have been scheduled, one with Senator Boschwitz and other Foreign Relations Committee members. My list has a number of others down, but still tentative pending their return to Washington this week.He will be also interviewed, I see, by Evans and Novak. (Laughter.)

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Q On the record?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As far as we know.

Well, let me make just a few points about the resumption of relations and take your questions before I have to get back and join the Secretary and the Iraqi party for the rest of the talks.

We welcome the resumption. It reflects the de facto normalization of the U.S.-Iraqi dialogue that has developed gradually since relations were broken back in 1967.

Just to give you a little idea of the time frame on this: We established our Interests Section in Baghdad back in '72, twelve years ago, under protection of the Belgian Embassy. So the -- while it's a 17-year break in formal relations, we have had a dialogue which has gradually developed over the last several years, capped by the meetings today.

We think it is a positive development. It has been achieved by patient efforts over a number of years. It's had the support and encouragement of a number of key Congressmen from both parties.

Today's step reflects changes that have already taken place in U.S.-Iraqi relations. I wouldn't read into it any prediction of major changes in our respective policies. It is a bilateral step that doesn't impinge on our relations with other states in the area. And, specifically, it signals no change from our neutrality in the Iraq-Iran War or U.S. reappraisal of Iraq's weight in regional balances. The latter is a fact that we have long recognized. It also has no effect on our relations with Israel, which continue to be stronger than ever.

This step recognizes the importance of our holding productive discussions with an important state in the Middle East, where the interests of the United States and the free world are significant.

It will reinforce our dialogue with Iraq at the policy level on the range of issues effecting regional security, including those on which the views of Iraq and the United States may, from time to time, diverge.

For its part, Iraq has publicly characterized its decision to reestablish relations with us as consistent with its desire to balance its relations with the Soviet Union. We welcome and respect Iraq's desire to emphasize its independence from any outside domination.

Resumption of relations implies no mutual endorsement by Iraq or the U.S. of the foreign or domestic policies of the other. Rather, we have both recognized that a direct authoritative and candid dialogue is the best approach to managing our differences and, where possible, to resolve them amicably and constructively.

Be happy to take your questions.

Q You're painting this resumption then as being about -- except for the diplomatic boilerplate -- no change whatsoever in the relationship. Is that correct?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think there is no essential change. I think the fact is that the dialogue with Iraq has developed very steadily. It's accelerated over the past couple of years, I'd say, when the head of our Interest Section began to get access to more senior levels in the Iraqi government. When Don Rumsfeld was traveling in the area last December, he met with the Iraqi President. I think, in fact, there'd been some Congressional contact. Congressman Solarz, I think it was, two years back, met

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with President Saddam Husayn. Others traveling this year had met with the President with, of course, Tariq Aziz as Foreign Minister, with Deputy Prime Minister Ramadan, who's -- overall charge of their economic development and the party affairs. So I wouldn't expect -- I don't think you should see this as a sharp -- or a major step forward, no.

Q Yes, but isn't this a natural outgrowth, these gradually developing relations, of our interest in the Iran-Iraq War?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's been one of our primary interests in relationships with Iraq. But, as I said, Iraq is a major state in the area, major player in the regional scene.

Q Sure. But then it has something to do with the war. And there is a perception of a U.S. tilt toward Iraq in the war, whether -- whether you want to say it or not. So --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the fact remains, resuming relations is a bilateral issue. And we think that our policy of neurtality in the war, which has been established since 1980, it continues to be our policy. It's the best ways to get American interests secured, which are the earliest possible peaceful settlement of the war and one that will preserve the integrity, the sovereignty of both Iraq and Iran. So, I think it is a misreading to see this as a tilt towards Baghdad, the fact that we are resuming relations.

Q Did the President discuss the Iran-Iraq War? And, specifically, did he discuss past U.S. concerns about chemical warfare?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not going to go into the details. We have discussed chemical warfare during the --

Q This visit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- Foreign Minister's visit. We have discussed the present situation in the war, as I say, repeated our earnest intent to commit the United States to support any effort towards a peaceable negotiated settlement to the war.

Q Is there any -- Well, what is our position on chemical warfare as of now? What is --

SENIOR ADMINSITRATION OFFICIAL: Our position on chemical warfare is as laid out, I'm happy to say, in 1925 in the protocol against it.

Q I mean, actually what is going on between Iran and Iraq --

Q They denying using it, right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, they have never --

Q Do we have any evidence of it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, you recall our statement, a very strong statement, last March, I believe it was, which we made on the basis of evidence.

Q Do we have any evidence that it has either stopped --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We know of no evidence since that time that it's been used.

Q The U.S. and Iraq have been negotiating a major dairy sale for a while. Is that now being announced? And is the

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U.S. going to send any new arms to Iraq?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Second question, we have never sent arms to Iraq and there is no prospect of our changing our policy on arms supply. That policy, as I say, was laid down the outbreak of the war. In practical terms it applied heavily, of course, to Iran because we had supplied the Shah's military establishment. We really never had been a supplier of the Iraqi. Although, I gather the Iraqis have captured a fair number of American arms over the course of the war;

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but that's not our doing.

On the -- your question on the economy, Iraq --

Q On the dairy sale that's been negotiatied.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Dairy? Yes. I have wheat and rice, the principal products, as being financed through the CCC, and that Iraq is presently the Department of Agriculture's largest customer worldwide.

Q Well, this one that has been discussed for the past three weeks -- it was announced by --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. All right, I have the figures of 663 million this year.

Q I don't want the wheat and rice, I want the dairy one.

Q He doesn't have the dairy.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't -- I will admit, I do not have the dairy one. Thank you.

Q Can you get back to us on that then?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Looking quickly.

Q Even though this may be routine and not a major step and all that, it does improve discourse and Iraq has a few things they're interested in. So I wonder if you could tell us if, for instance, the Iraqis are asking the United States to stop the resupply of parts to Iran, which, apparently, is permissable under the hostage agreement, and whether the Iraqis are asking the United States, as The Washington Post reported last summer, for assurances that Israel won't interrupt the new pipeline the Iraqis are trying to build through Jordan, and would the United States like the Iraqis, even though they're independent you just said, to buy less arms, fewer arms from the Soviet Union? Are these things likely to come out of this new step-up in relations?

Q Do you have the points?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I've got the pipeline through Jordan, the Soviet arms, resupply of parts --

Q Soviet arms. Meanwhile, U.S. military equipment gets to Iran. That can't make the Iraqis too happy. (Laughter.) All Washington Post stories of last summer. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Did I read it first in The Post?

Q You read it last summer. But now you have relations so what can you do about it?

Q You may have given it to The Post. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, that's not my habit.

All right. One of the principal interests that the Foreign Minister has and the government of Iraq has is encouraging us -- well, first of all, expressing appreciation for what we have done to cut off, limit, choke off, whatever phrase fits -- choke off is probably the best -- the supply of arms to Iran coming from free-world sources. There's nothing we can do about the Soviets, there's nothing we can do about the Libyans, the Syrian source of supply that has gone on, continues to go to Iran.

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We have been extremely active in cutting off where possible, where we hear of it in time and where we can persuade friends and allies around the world -- and it's been done on a global basis since I think the office was formally established last December under Dick Fairbank's direction.

So Iraq is -- has seen the effect of that. They have seen a steady deterioration in the Iranian war machine and is appreciative of what we've done in mobilizing that effort on a worldwide basis.

Does it want us to slack off? No. Does it want us to increase the effort? Yes, surely. This is not something that can be cut off or can be solved as a problem. It's an ongoing process in the arms market that we have and will continue to move on vigorously in the future.

So we have reaffirmed our interest in doing -- being of assistance in bringing the war to an end through that means and that's certainly an interest of the Iraqis.

Did they need that -- did they need to restore diplomatic relations to get that? No. No. I mean that has been our policy and we've been pursuing it.

Q The spare parts --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question of American spare parts for Iran --

Q Israel.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This has not been raised here. I think they are convinced of our bona fides on this, that we are not supplying lethal equipment or spare parts for military arms, weapon systems, to the Iranians.

Q What are we supplying?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, you've got the -- under the Algiers Accords back in '79, there was a general statement made that we would not be continuing any boycott of Iran, any commercial boycott. So sales have gone forward in a variety of areas. I don't think our sales -- I'm sorry, I didn't bring any figures with me, but I don't think we'll find, looking at the statistics that the Commerce Department would have, that they're very dramatic in volume.

But your other questions.

Q The pipeline --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The pipeline through Jordan? The pipeline through Jordan is not being pursued very actively today. You've got two pipeline projects being undertaken by the Iraqis. One is through Turkey, which is a doubling of the present line. The other is what's called a spur-line through -- from southern Iraq to connect with the Trans-Peninsula Pipeline in Saudi Arabia.

The third project which has been discussed and which we got a preliminary -- I think it's called preliminary commitment -- out of the

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Export-Import Bank to finance American materials with, they are not pursuing at the moment. They're going to go ahead on the first two. They think that they can complete those largely within the coming year or, really, '86, and the Foreign Minister made the point that, you know, we are maybe the only country, that is, Iraq is the only country, in the area that has adopted a deliberate policy of involving its neighbors in its own economic development, in this sense, that it is through construction of these alternate lines it is putting its product through Turkey, through Saudi Arabia, and its future economic health and welfare will depend on close relationships and the stability and development of those other countries.

So I think Iraq sees this type of project as a gauge of its interest in assisting development of regional stability.

Q -- Israeli angle?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You had one other?

Q Well, the question is, are they genuinely -- are they concerned, I don't know if you can tell if they're genuinely concerned -- but are they concerned and are they registering concern about the possibility of Israel interfering with those pipelines, which they were during the summer?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think that's certainly probably the principal reason for their not pursuing it at this point in time.

Q You mean the Jordan line?

Q Yes.

Q Since Barry asked three questions and quoted the hell out of The Washington Post, can I ask you two?

SENIOR ADMINSTRATION OFFICIAL: I didn't answer his third one. Do you want that, or shall I go into yours?

Q No, go ahead and answer his third one.

Q Soviet arms, yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Soviet arms, do we expect them to buy less?

Q Well, would we like them, do we whisper that perhaps it would be nice if they cut down a little bit and went more French --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We haven't gotten into that. They have two principal suppliers, one is the Soviets, the other is the French; that's their business.

Q You said, in answer to an earlier question, there's no prospect of the United States changing its policy on arms supply. Is there some prospect of some other kind of changes in the military relationship between the United States and Iraq and, if not, why is he seeing Secretary Weinberger? And, secondly, what effect, if any, do you expect the resumption of relations between the United States and Iraq to have on the overall Middle East situation, which you've just come from a big tour of?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. Let me restate that ever since the war started just over four years ago, our policy has been not to license either direct or third-country transfers of U.S.-controlled defense articles either to Baghdad or Tehran. Resumption of relations doesn't portend any change in our arms policies towards either Iraq or Iran.

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Why is he calling on Secretary Weinberger? I think that's a courtesy visit appropriate between senior officials, and he asked for the call and Secretary Weinberger agreed.

Q What about something short of arms, like upgrading military attaches or selling non-arms lethal equipment, or something like that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are, of course, no military attaches; you wouldn't have them in an Interests Section, but --

Q Will we have them now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We haven't -- we haven't faced that question, we haven't raised it. I think it's a possibility. It's a normal feature of a full embassy, but that hasn't been discussed within our government as yet, to the best of my knowledge. So I don't think -- don't read in the Weinberger call a hint that there's going to be some surprising new cooperation with Iraq in military planning, non-lethal equipment, lethal equipment. If it was going to be a surprise, we wouldn't have announced the meeting with Weinberger.

Q How about the second part of the question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The overall effect on the Middle East situation? I think, as I mentioned, we consider Iraq a significant player, a major player, in the Middle East. It's attention is focused first and foremost on its conflict with Iran today. I can't tell you what, in the overall situation, if you're talking about the Middle East, the Arab-Israel situation, I can't tell you what their role is going to be. They do not see themselves as a front-line state; that's a change from the history of as late as the seventies.

They see themselves as concerned, concerned about the Palestinian future, about some of the central issues, but I think you've seen an evolution in Iraqi attitude. It is interested in being supportive of moves such as the Jordanian resumption of diplomatic relations with Cairo. It is supportive of the holding of the PLO conference in the PNC, Palestine National Council, conference in Jordan going on right now.

I recall a statement which was publicized in the Baghdad press made by Saddam Husayn to Congressman Solarz, who I think was the first congressional visitor to meet with him -- this was back in '82 -- that a secure condition, or a condition of security, is necessary for both Israel and the Palestinians, and that no responsible Arab leader looks forward to the destruction of Israel.

Iraq acknowledged the President's September initiative. It supported the subsequent position at Fez, the Arab summit. He has, the Iraqi president has called for a relationship between Jordan and the Palestinians as natural and necessary. Iraq has said it will accept any approach to a solution acceptable to the Palestinians and no longer sees itself as a front-line state in a legitimate position to champion a particular solution.

So I don't know the answer to your question, what will be its overall effect, but I think if you add up some of those comments, and these are public positions taken by Iraq over the last few years, you can see why we are interested in this dialogue.

MR. SIMS: Helen, last question, please, and we've --

Q Well, it took 17 years to resume relations with Iran, and what would be our attitude toward movement in that direction now?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we never expected it to take 17 years with Baghdad. We are -- we are prepared today to discuss improved relations with Iran when Iran ceases its support for international terrorism and when Iran is prepared to seek a negotiated settlement of the war with Iraq. This step today with Baghdad should not be read as a step against Iran; this is a bilateral matter, a normal matter of resumption of relations. But our position on Iran, as I say, we're interested in improved relations and we have those two conditions, if you will.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 12:43 P.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER MARA OF FIJI

November 27, 1984

The Briefing Room

1:38 P.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think you can tell from the tenor of the remarks on the departure statements it was a very warm meeting, I think, characterized by great respect on both sides for our accomplishments as countries. And I sensed great cordiality between the two leaders, great frankness about -- talking about a wide range of issues.

It began with a short, small meeting in the Oval Office and followed by a larger meeting joined by a number of members of the Cabinet, including -- in addition to Secretary Shultz and Mr. McFarlane who had been in the Oval Office meeting, we had Secretary Weinberger, Secretary Dole, Secretary Block from Agriculture, Director of the Peace Corps, Loret Ruppe, and head of the Agency of International Development, Mr. McPherson.

Among the subjects that were discussed by the two leaders were questions of nuclear weapons and nuclear arms control, regional issues of stability in the Pacific, including the current issue of ship visits that's dogging the ANZUS Alliance.

The President expressed very strong appreciation for the many things that Fiji has done to play a responsible role in world affairs, including not only Fiji's own policy on ship visits and Fiji's support for U.S. actions in Grenada, and Fiji's leadership in condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but also the very large contribution Fiji makes to peacekeeping forces in the Middle East. Two of Fiji's three battalions are in the Middle East -- one in Lebanon and one in the Sinai. I think it's 13 Fijian soldiers have actually been killed in the course of this peacekeeping --

Q How many?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thirteen.

The President expressed great respect for Fijian military services and their professionalism and their dedication.

In connection with that, the President talked about putting together a military assistance program to help in standardizing -- Fiji's program to standardize their rifles. And also if Fiji's interested, we would be prepared to examine a program for 1986 beyond this standardization in '85, and that is a subject, I think, the Prime Minister will be discussing in more detail at the Defense Department.

The President indicated that we are sympathetic to Fiji's request for bilateral assistance, that we are prepared to negotiate a bilateral assistance agreement, that we are prepared to bilateralize some of the aid that now goes to Fiji through our regional multilateral program and that we will also be making a request to Congress in the budget that goes up shortly for additional ESF assistance -- that's Economic Support Fund assistance -- for Fiji for fiscal year 1986.

Q And that's strictly bilateral -- that grant?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The ESF is strictly bilateral. The --

Q -- numbers?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's very dangerous this early in the budget session to give precise numbers. We're looking at something in ESF that would be roughly comparable in size to the -- and additional to what Fiji presently gets under the multilateral program of development assistance, so, in effect, we're talking about a rather substantial increase. The current multilateral program for the whole region is $6 million of which we estimate Fiji's share is roughly $1 million, though some of this is in -- this is spread out in individual programs. That's development assistance.

And for FY '86, we would be looking in addition to that at an ESF program, and,

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as I say, of rough -- size roughly comparable to what Fiji gets in the multilateral program.

Q What was that figure? $6 million?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: $6 million is the figure for the entire regional program of which roughly a million dollars goes into projects for Fiji.

Q Can you give a ball park estimate on --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I can't say anything more than to say, yes, we hope that after we're through the budget process, that the request for additional SF for Fiji will be roughly comparable and additional to what Fiji gets under the multilateral program. So we would be talking, in effect, about a rather substantial increase for Fiji.

Q What are some of the programs?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Various -- they include a range of things, from the University of South Pacific, which is in Suva and which is supported by this program. But they are all in the area of development, heavily focused on agricultural development and particularly programs that would enable Fiji to diversify its agriculture. As you know, as I mentioned in the briefing yesterday, roughly 70 percent of Fiji's exports at present are sugar, and Fiji is very interested in getting a more -- diversity of exports so they're not so dependent on one market, and particularly a market that is as vulnerable as the sugar market is.

So, I suppose the short answer is, principally agricultural development. Also some on fisheries. There was discussion of the fisheries issue. That's one that is under active negotiation. We had a round of discussions in Suva with all of the South Pacific forum states on a regional fisheries agreement in September. We're very hopeful that that agreement can be successfully concluded so that we can -- our fishing boats can proceed to fish in those waters on an equitable basis and one that is satisfactory to both the countries of the area and to the United States.

Q Does any other country have to pay a fee to fish for tuna down there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, most other countries -- the United States has a very unique position on tuna. Most other countries take the view that tunafish, within the Economic -- the so-called EEZ, the Economic Exploitation Zone, which is 200 miles offshore, is the resource of the country. The United States has a unique position in international law that holds that migratory species like tuna are not subject to that restriction. So we've had -- we're unique in having this kind of problem and having to work it out.

Q On the nuclear issue, could you give us some idea of what the President said? I know what you said yesterday, but did he give some clearer indication that the U.S. is thinking more seriously of using Fiji more frequently than we do now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. We're not looking for bases in Fiji. We're not looking at Fiji as a substitute for New Zealand. And as I think I made clear for both Fiji and the United States, the viability of the ANZUS Treaty is something that's important over and beyond any specific requirement for specific ships at a specific time.

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We're very grateful for the access that we have there, but we have no particular plans or see a need to increase that. They also talked about the nuclear issue and the very important but very general terms of the need for nuclear disarmament, but the fact that this can't -- is not something that can be done unilaterally.

The President repeated in the Oval Office what he said a number of times in public, that a nuclear war can't be won and should never be fought, and he mentioned to the Prime Minister the letter that has come across from President Eisenhower -- I gather it's from one of the later years of the Eisenhower administration -- in which Eisenhower mentioned that when weapons become so destructive that you can't say who are the winners or losers in a war, it's time to find a more sensible way of settling disputes.

I think there's a very strong agreement between the two men on the importance of reducing and hopefully eliminating nuclear weapons and I think, at the same time, though, you have to ask the Fijians, I don't want to put words in their mouths, but I think there is agreement that this is something you can't do unilaterally; you have to have agreement.

Q Can I have one more follow-up, please? Is it possible, though, instead of scheduling nuclear ship visits to New Zealand this year, that the U.S. would schedule them to Fiji instead? Could Fiji be a substitute?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Fiji is not a substitute and the issue in New Zealand is not only the question of the requirements for ship visits in that specific region, but also the question of the reciprocal obligations that allies have under an alliance, and we feel and, as the ANZUS communique said last summer, the ship visits are an essential part of that alliance and we think it is an important obligation of an ally.

Q Could you touch on if there was any discussion on an increase in sugar quota as well as landing rights, two issues that were brought up yesterday?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The sugar quota issue was discussed at some length, particularly with Secretary Block. The length of the discussion is not proportionately the amount of progress we can make, because under the GATT agreement we are very limited -- in fact, our flexibility is virtually nil. But we are very sympathetic to Fiji's situation. Secretary Block made very clear that our unhappiness with the world market situation, where the world market is being destroyed, essentially, by subsidized European exports, and a country like Fiji, that is truly competitive and, as a matter of fact, I think Fiji is one of the unique cases of sugar production by many thousands of small holders, not by large plantations, and yet the market for their product is being ruined by the dumping of subsidized exports.

He, of course, enlisted any support that we can get in pursuing that fight, but also made clear that he would take a very hard look at how the "allocation" is done within the constraints, and I say they're formidable, to see if there's any way to make any adjustments. The Fijians did raise a question about some of the statistics that we're using and Secretary Block has agreed to look into that issue of the statistical base.

We'll be meeting, I believe, later this afternoon with Mr. Ali, who is the President of the Fiji National Sugar Corporation -- have I got the title right, Dick?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: To discuss this issue. I do not want to raise expectations. As much as we would like to do

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something positive here, we don't think there's a lot of room, but we will try.

The question of civil aviation was only literally mentioned by Secretary Dole, and she noted that she would be meeting with the Fiji delegation later, I believe with the Prime Minister, and looked forward to discussing the issue then.

Q Can I ask you one question? Did they discuss the proposal for a South Pacific nuclear-free zone and did the Prime Minister ask for the President's support in asking the French to stop nuclear testing in the South Pacific?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That subject was not discussed in detail with the President though, as I said, there was some general discussion about the nuclear issue, including the problem that, for people in the South Pacific, it tends to all become wrapped into the very deep and profound concerns about radioactive pollution that first arose in our early tests back in the late forties and early fifties and continues to be a very strong one.

The Prime Minister will be meeting this afternoon with Secretary Shultz and I would imagine that would be among other topics on the agenda, a rather logical one.

Q May I ask, was there any discussion about the opening of canneries, tuna canneries? And how would it affect the Western area of the United States and our canneries there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Prime Minister did refer to an interest the Fijians have expressed to us before for joint fishing ventures, including doing tuna canning out there. That's something, basically, that has to be done on, at least on our side, on a private sector basis.

Certainly there's a growing interest on the part of our tuna fishermen in fish from those waters and we would certainly view the development of a joint venture of that kind as very positive, but it's something you've got to let the market do, particularly in our system. And, frankly, it doesn't work in any system if the government tries to do it.

MR. SIMS: Could we get one Fijian question?

Q Did the Prime Minister extend an invitation to the President to visit Fiji?

Q Oh, when are we going?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'd have to check the record for that precisely. I don't think I heard it, but we'd better get one.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 1:55 P.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
A SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF HELMUT KOHL,
CHANCELLOR OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

November 28, 1984

The Briefing Room

10:04 A.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Chancellor arrives this evening, fairly late, will be having breakfast with the Secretary tomorrow morning, meeting with the Secretary of Defense thereafter.

White House schedule begins at 11:30 a.m., Oval Office meeting, followed by working lunch. He will be meeting after lunch with the Vice President and has several private meetings here and will be departing for Bonn late in the afternoon. So it's a very quick visit.

We see the visit as part of a very intensive schedule of consultations between the President and key allied leaders, including, of course, Chancellor Kohl; Prime Minister Thatcher; Prime Minister Nakasone, shortly after the new year; Belgium Prime Minister Martens.

In addition, the Secretary of State will be meeting with his counterparts, NATO counterparts, in Brussels on the 13th and the 14th of December. Secretary Weinberger will be attending the DPC Ministerial, also in Brussels, the 3rd and 4th of December. All of this is part of, as I said, a very intensive consultations process.

One of the obvious subjects for discussion will be the meeting which Secretary Shultz will be having with Foreign Minister Gromyko in Geneva January 7 and 8. And we think it's very important to have a chance to talk with our key Western allies, Prime Minister Nakasone, as well, prior to the meeting with the Soviet Foreign Minister.

So that is the general context within which the President will be meeting with the German Chancellor tomorrow.

Yes.

Q Is the U.S. going to show these allied leaders any proposal we're going to make? Or are we just -- is it still all -- Do we have anything concrete that we're going to go into this January meeting on? And are they being consulted on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the basis for the discussions in January was the President's UN speech -- UN General Assembly speech of September -- which laid out a very broad agenda for East-West discussions, U.S.-Soviet discussions.

Obviously, the European allies have their ideas and they would like to have a chance to discuss the subject, discuss this meeting with us at a high level prior to the meeting. We're interested in the Chancellor's perspective on East-West relations. It's a very important subject for the Germans as well as for us. But I don't think it's a case of discussing specific proposals, no.

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Q What is the American perception of Chancellor Kohl's political problems and legal problems, domestically? And do you think that effects the bilateral relationship?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Taking the second question first, no. The Chancellor appeared, as I understand it, for seven hours on the 7th of November before the Bundestag Committee, which is investigating the Flick affair, and responded to all of the questions posed by the various members of the Commission. And as far as I can tell, that subject is closed.

Q What will the U.S. tell the allies when they say, "What we really ought to do is offer to limit the deployment of missiles in Europe in exchange for Soviet limitations"?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the allies haven't said that. And the Federal Republic, in particular, has made clear that they -- it does not regard an INF deployment moratorium as an appropriate step for the United States to take.

They agree with the position which Mr. McFarlane took the end of last week, that a moratorium at this time would be very ill advised, very inappropriate. This is not a European position. That is, to say that we should engage in a moratorium.

Q What is the European view, though, on strategic defense and whether or not that ought to be subject to some kind of moratorium?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think over the past year, the European view of strategic defense and the President's proposals of March '83 has changed quite a bit, as they got a much better understanding of what was involved here. There were, perhaps, at the beginning some misunderstandings and when it became clear that what was in view or envisaged was a research program, I think the Europeans recognized that it would be unwise not to engage in such a research program, given what the Soviet Union is doing itself.

Q So you would not anticipate any concerns expressed by Chancellor Kohl?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not on that subject, no.

Q All the leaders in Europe agree with the Star Wars?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm saying that the anxieties and questions which were originally raised have been largely answered during the intervening period.

Q How do you know?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I beg your pardon?

Q How do you know?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We've discussed the subject with our allies. There's been quite a bit on consultation on this subject.

Q And they all now go along?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They are satisfied that this is an appropriate response to what the Soviet Union is engaged in itself, yes.

Q What the Soviet Union is engaged?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Beg your pardon?

Q In what the Soviet Union is engaged?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Soviet Union is engaged in a very extensive program very much along the same lines.

Q Very much along the SDI, you mean?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I beg your pardon?

Q Very much along the SDI?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, very much.

Q You mean, they have a Star Wars project, also?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Indeed, they do.

Q Are you suggesting there aren't differences of opinion on how the U.S. should proceed in these -- in the meeting in January between administration officials and Western European officials?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I didn't hear the first part.

Q Are you suggesting there are no differences of opinion on how to proceed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In essence, I am suggesting that there are no differences of opinion. There will always be nuances of difference in an alliance of 15 members, or 16 members, but, basically, I think there's a very strong consensus in support of the approach which the President has been taking with the Soviet Union. And I think the NATO allies are inclined to see the January 7-8 meeting as an indication that that approach is working.

Q Well, wasn't it really pushed by Kohl? I mean, wasn't he actually the first pushing for this kind of thing, and for the Gromyko meeting and -- you know -- long before it took hold? And he wanted to meet with the President?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You mean that the --

Q All I'm saying is I don't think that Kohl, per se, has felt that there's been enough movement in the nuclear arms control field.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The German Chancellor has made clear that he recognizes or believes that it was inappropriate for the Soviet Union to abandon the two arms control negotiations in Geneva last November. And he has urged the Soviet Union to resume the process. He has welcomed the President's proposals. And I don't feel that we are under pressure from Chancellor Kohl or from other European leaders to do something other than what we're doing now.

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Q Several administration officials have said there are new proposals or new ideas in all areas of arms control. They wouldn't be unveiled until the U.S. gets to the table with the Soviets. First of all, is Geneva in January the time when some of these will be unveiled, and second of all, will the allies be told what these new ideas are?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There will be an intensive consultation, consultative process. It's already underway. And I really can't comment on what, in fact, the Secretary will unveil in Geneva. I think, to a degree, that will depend upon the course of the discussions.

Q So we're open to ideas on strategy in Geneva from people like Kohl and Thatcher and Nakasone. They may propose things that we would want to take to the table?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is very important that we have this type of a consultative process before the meeting and, obviously, we're interested in their ideas, sure.

Q Well, are we taking their ideas into a big pot to come out with a proposal or are we telling them what we think?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think you want to regard this as cooking a stew of ideas. I think we have a very good consensus already with the allies about how to manage the East-West relationship. The January 7-8 meeting is part of the process. We're interested in their ideas, obviously, and we've already been conducting intensive consultations. It's picking up now as we move closer to that event.

Q Will the President bring up the question of whether West Germans ought to beef up their conventional forces, arrayed against the Warsaw Bloc?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There will be discussion of defense issues both with the President and I think with the Secretary of Defense. We have made clear our view that more is needed on conventional defense. And conventional defense will be one of the subjects discussed, yes.

Q What is the status of the U.S. missile deployment now, and in a broader context of all these meetings, what will he be doing to try to get the Belgians to come on line, let alone the Dutch?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The missile deployment in Western Europe is proceeding on schedule in all three of the countries where deployment has begun. And it is the view of the allies that the process should continue absent an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union which would obviate either part or all of the deployment.

Q Well, are you --

Q What about the Belgians?

Q -- the second part of the question. What are you going to do to get the Belgians and the Dutch on line?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We believe that the Belgians and the Dutch will continue on the schedule. It is the view of the other allies, including the Federal Republic of Germany, that there should be no changes in the deployment schedule absent an arms control agreement which would, as I say, obviate either part or all of the program.

Q Have they, in any way, indicated that they will hold to the schedule?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, these are very substantive meetings. I'm not saying that they're simply coming in and taking note of the fact that the Secretary will be meeting with the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union in January; they need to discuss strategy, they need to discuss the approach to these meetings. But there is, I think, a very good consensus on the basis of which they will discuss the approach to the meetings.

Q I'm having a hard time figuring out what the -- if there is a consensus on the approach or the strategy, then the strategy is already going forward. So I can't quite figure out what their -- I mean, is it a -- possibly you're going to change your strategy as a result of these meetings? I can't quite figure out --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no, I don't think there would be any change in strategy as a result of these meetings. But I do think there would be a better understanding on both sides, that is to day, the German Chancellor and the President, of exactly what it is we expect to get out of the meetings.

I don't think you have these meetings in order to change your basic strategy. I think you review the state of affairs, and you look out and see what's going to happen in the next couple of months, and decide what, if anything, you need to do about it.

But we do approach the meetings, I feel, on the basis of a very good consensus between this administration, or this country, and the Germans and the other NATO allies.

Q Are you going to meet -- are there any attempts being made to set up meetings with -- other than these one, two, three, four -- with Kohl, Nakasone -- any of the other allies? I understand Shultz --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not that I'm aware of at this time. I don't know -- my colleague, do you want to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. No current plan at this time, but we have -- this is what my colleague is trying to emphasize -- this is all part of the consultation process. This is a continuing process; it never stops. The President has corresponded with all the NATO allies on the subject of the January meetings. And he even informed them prior to the announcement that you people had here. This is part of the --

Q I think we're trying to find out if this is true consultation -- where there's real input --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's alway true consultation --

Q -- where there's real input, or whether we're going to tell them what we're going to do.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: True consultation. This is not an alliance like the Warsaw Pact -- there's a lot of give and take here. (Laughter.) It's a Democratic alliance -- I say that --

Q -- ever attended the Warsaw Pact?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think I have some idea as to how it functions.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: My colleague lived in the Soviet Union for years.

Q Briefly, very briefly, what is this basic strategy

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for the talks that you refer to? I mean, have you -- has the United States settled within itself a basic strategy for these talks?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, I think we have. I think the basic strategy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union was set out in the President's speech in the U.N. General Assembly in September. It was prefigured, in a sense, by the January 1984 speech.

Q But last week it was announced by Larry Speakes and the White House that the President would be working out the strategy for the forthcoming talks with the Soviet Union. So if the strategy is it the same which it was two years ago, as it was said by President Reagan, so what is the President working out now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President obviously is looking toward this talk -- these meetings -- the meeting in Geneva in terms of the specific proposals. But I would personally say that the basic approach was outlined in his UN speech and this is not something which is now being changed.

Q So it will be nothing new?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALL: I beg your pardon?

Q It will be nothing new in the United States strategy?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not saying that. That was your interpretation of what I said.

Q Right.

Q What kind of signals are you trying to send to the Soviets with these meetings with Kohl, Thatcher and Nakasone?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think we're trying to send signals to the Soviet Union. I think we're trying to have consultations with our allies. These are normal, natural -- as my colleague says -- ongoing consultations, I don't think it's a question of signaling the Soviets --

Q But the message we're trying --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We view this as strength. We take great pride in that we consult with our allies.

Q Could you go over the schedule again tomorrow, from arrival to departure? I didn't hear it at the beginning.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, he arrives late, fairly late tonight, around 9:00 p.m. -- and --

Q Where?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- and sees the Secretary -- at Dulles -- and sees the Secretary of Defense; meets with the President at 11:30 a.m., followed by a working lunch. There's a session with the Vice President; and I think at 3:00 p.m. there will be a press event with the Chancellor and the German press and then I think he'll be leaving around 5:00 p.m. or 6:00 p.m. tomorrow afternoon.

Q Are there departure statements?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There will be statements, as I understand it, following the meeting -- or following the working lunch -- should be around 2:00 p.m.

Q And then he goes from there to the Vice President's office?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is my understanding --

Q -- or he leaves the White House and comes back?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, he will be going to the Watergate from the White House and then to the meeting with the Vice President.

Q What's at Watergate?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's where he's staying.

Q Oh. (Laughter.)

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 10:20 A.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release November 29, 1984

PRESS BRIEFING
BY SENATOR ROBERT DOLE
AND CONGRESSMAN ROBERT MICHEL
ON THEIR MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT

The Briefing Room

10:52 A.M. EST

MR. SPEAKES: The President just concluded an hour and five minute meeting with the Republican leadership of the Senate and the House. And we have with us the leaders of both Houses respectively. Senator Dole -- the President began the meeting by congratulating Senator Dole and looking forward to working with him and, of course, continuing the relationship with Congressman Michel in the House.

So, with that we will bring them before you and let them tell you about the meeting and what they think about any other issues. Senator, Congressman.

Q -- say at the outset we think this is a very civilized approach, being inside. We'd like to do it here regularly.

SENATOR DOLE: We're at the indoor --

Q Speak for yourself.

SENATOR DOLE: We like it, too. (Laughter.)

Q That way you avoid having us genuflect to you, eh?

Q Well, Senator?

Q Well?

Q Well, Senator Dole --

Q What is --

Q -- what do you think about this package of budget cuts?

Q Civilized, eh?

Q Do you think it should be presented as one package and do you think Congress will pass such deep cuts?

SENATOR DOLE: Well, that's a very interesting question.

Q Thank you. (Laughter.)

Q What does that? You haven't made up your mind?

SENATOR DOLE: Let me say that I was uncharacteristically quiet today. In fact, I didn't know we were taking over today. I kept looking for Howard Baker in the room, but he didn't show up.

So -- no, I think we just had a discussion. There are a lot of things we need to do. There's been no strategy developed that I know of, unless Bob has --

CONGRESSMAN MICHEL: Well, I guess to give you a little briefing on the entire meeting, Bob McFarlane ticked things off

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initially, gave us a little review of the consultations leading up to the announcement there on Thanksgiving Day. And then we had Don Regan, the Secretary of the Treasury, again reiterating the effort of the administration on tax simplification, while there was some exchange there on that in view of Bob Packwood now being the new Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, some dialogue with respect to a time frame.

And then we moved quickly on to more mundane things like the budget itself and Dave Stockman filling us in on the details of where we are and what we'll have to do on the expenditure side because we're all committed obviously to follow the President's campaign pledge of tax increases being off the table, that we've got to move on the expenditure side. And there was this rather heated discussion even in the area of defense being included as one of those areas where increases heretofore that came rather automatic may need a second look. And I think that's about it.

Q How did the President react to the idea that defense might have to be curtailed?

CONGRESSMAN MICHEL: Well, that -- there's no specific decision there. Obviously, the President wants to continue his commitment that he's made for all the years that he's been in office. But --

Q -- I mean, will he go for a curtailment of defense as a price for getting these other budget cuts?

CONGRESSMAN MICHEL: Well, there was -- the expression was made to the President or in the group that in order to get some of the other cuts, I think, you'd just about have to help move that along with some give on the defense item. But we weren't talking about specific figures.

Q Senator Dole, why do you people feel that you have to automatically follow the President's campaign pledge on taxes? Do you really think that the deficit can be dealt with only on the spending side?

SENATOR DOLE: I think our -- obviously, our first obligation is to take a look at what Dave Stockman will finally present on the deficit side, see where we are after we've taken a look at that. Then, we can make the next judgment. But we're going to try to support the President's campaign pledges, support his program. He's indicated to this group that taxes are a last resort.

There's a possibility -- there was a lot of discussion today of a freeze of some kind. There seems to be a feeling among Republicans on both the House and the Senate side -- we need to develop sort of a spending freeze package of some kind because it has some bipartisan support.

Q And did the President react to that? Does --

Q Senator, you don't think for one minute that --

Q Excuse me, Sarah --

MR. SPEAKES: Let's -- if we're going to bring it in here let's do it with some order, please.

Q Yes, please.

Q Did the President respond --

MR. SPEAKES: Start with the first row. So let's try to do that.

Q -- to the idea of a freeze?

SENATOR DOLE: No, but I -- he didn't discard it

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obviously. He just indicated that that was -- we indicated there was a lot of interest in that. I think Dave Stockman did indicate that that's something that's under consideration, but not any specific formula.

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Q Senator Dole and Senator Michel, both, do you think that --

Q No, he's a Congressman -- Representative.

Q -- this proposal of Mr. Stockman that he -- and Mr. Reagan -- that they have everything, all of the cuts just in one package and one kill it or accept it by one vote, do you think that's in the nature of Congress to accept that sort of an action?

CONGRESSMAN MICHEL: Well, of course, in '81 and '82, when we put together the reconciliation package, the only way that really passed was the fact that we had everything together because it then ameliorates that hurt on individual items, but, nevertheless, accomplishes the overall goal that most every member of Congress, Republican or Democrat, talk about these days. Their whole campaign was the deficit's too large. Now, it's getting time to perform. Now, I think the American people spoke very forcefully, "We don't want our taxes increased." Now, we've got an obligation, seems to me, to come back on the other side of that, and maybe those spending reductions that we propose out there will be hurtful. We haven't decided fully on this by any stretch of the imagination.

Q Will that cut down the debate on each of those issues, like Veterans and --

SENATOR DOLE: Not on the --

CONGRESSMAN MICHEL: You can't stifle debate in the House or Senate, particularly.

Q Tell us more about this heated exchange on defense versus domestic, social cuts.

CONGRESSMAN MICHEL: Well, maybe that's not exactly the exact adjective to use --

Q Pardon? But, I mean, did it --

Q Could you elaborate a little more?

CONGRESSMAN MICHEL: Well, I made a few points and --

Q What side?

Q What were they?

Q What side?

CONGRESSMAN MICHEL: -- and the Secretary responded. And that's the way that meetings should be held if you're --

Q You mean, Weinberger?

Q Weinberger?

Q But did he say, "Over my dead body there'll be defense cuts"?

CONGRESSMAN MICHEL: No, no, nothing. Nothing.

Q Which Secretary?

Q Which Secretary? Weinberger?

Q Which Secretary? Weinberger?

Q What were your points?

Q Mr. Michel --

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CONGRESSMAN MICHEL: Well, my point --

Q Can you tell us what happened?

CONGRESSMAN MICHEL: The point I was attempting to make was that without -- to fulfill the President's commitment of restoring the country's defenses to the point where they ought to be, initially, we thought in terms of five years because we knew nothing about chances for re-election. The fact that we've now gone through the election cycle and he has, for all practical purposes, an eight-year period of the Presidency, and my judgment and feeling, as I was expressing to Cap, that we can raise our sights, or lower them, whichever way you want to look at it here, to fulfill that commitment over an eight-year period of time, rather than making it absolutely mandatory to have it done within five years. And that gives us a little bit of room. But I guess maybe one of my problems with an outright freeze is that the one area that really gets hurt there is defense. And I don't want -- particularly at this -- on the eve, whatever, of any kind of negotiating posture with the Soviet Union do we want to give any kind of indication that we have -- that we're modifying that strong position that we want to maintain vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

Q What did Cap say to you?

CONGRESSMAN MICHEL: Excuse me?

Q What did the Secretary say --

CONGRESSMAN MICHEL: Well, of course, the Secretary continues to make his point that, as a percentage of this and that, you know, compared numbers years ago, we're really not all that much out of line and that -- I think there's certainly some merit to that because I've -- making that point. People forget that, you know, 20 years ago there was a considerably more percentage of GNP going into defense than there is today.

Q What did the President tell you about this?

CONGRESSMAN MICHEL: Pardon?

Q What did the --

Q Did President Reagan comment at all on the discussion between Mr. Weinberger and Mr. Michel on the question of scaling back the defense increase?

SENATOR DOLE: Well, not in the debate. I think he just made a general observation.

Q Which was?

Q What was it?

Q What was the general observation?

SENATOR DOLE: Very general. (Laughter.)

Q What was it?

SENATOR DOLE: So general I can't remember what it was -- (laughter.)

Q Senator Dole, do you think that the package being sketched out by Stockman has any chance of passing with all those cuts?

SENATOR DOLE: Well, we don't know what it is. I mean, we read the paper daily to find out; but -- that was mentioned, too,

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leaks, and if anybody knows who's doing that, if you'd just report to — (laughter.) But —

Q You know what the numbers are, though.

SENATOR DOLE: Yes.

CONGRESSMAN MICHEL: — subsidies —

SENATOR DOLE: I think the point we made — I just say this — we have new leadership in the Senate, we want to work with the President, Bob Michel and the leadership in the House, and the Democratic Party leadership, too, in both Houses. We want to start early. That's the final point we made with the President. I think it's shared by the House. We only have so much time to get this done, whether it's going to be one vote or several votes. But we believe it has to be understood by the American people. The American people have to be prepared for it. And then we have to do it, and find out if we have the votes.

Q Senator, when you say there was no strategy developed, do you mean the President didn't present any strategy or there was no strategy for selling —

SENATOR DOLE: It wasn't intended for that purpose. It was the opening — Don Regan opened the meeting, as Bob said, gave us the tax simplification pitch, and then we had Dave Stockman on the budget deficit. It wasn't a strategy meeting. We're just getting into it. We're going to have other meetings.

CONGRESSMAN MICHEL: And bear in mind we're not even into December yet. Normally, we don't put that budget process to bed before maybe the middle of December for presentation sometime in January. We're going to have a meeting with our leadership and Mr. Stockman

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I think Friday afternoon. There's got -- Pete Domenici made the point very well, too, that the Senators want to have their input again now that we've got something on the table to talk about, and then our natural response before anything is finally put to bed.

Q Congressman, what kind of --

Q What kind of strategy do you think it will take --

CONGRESSMAN MICHEL: Let's have the follow-up over here.

Q Could you indicate what kind of a strategy you, as the leaders on the Hill, think it will take to sell whatever package David Stockman and the President give you?

CONGRESSMAN MICHEL: Well, I think we're going to, before we start talking about any kind of package, we'll have a thing called the State of the Union message and that will lay out some broad framework for us. And I'm not altogether sure -- thinking now only in terms of the House -- who's going to be Chairman of that budget committee. There's some dissension over there on the other side of the aisle. Now, that's very critical, the way I look at it from my perspective, from a minority point of view in the House of Representatives.

Now, I still think, however, that we want to move something as swiftly as we can so that the results -- well, the sooner we get at it, the sooner we get results.

Q Did the President express any views on any of these matters? Did he express any views on this -- any opinions in this meeting at all?

CONGRESSMAN MICHEL: Bob indicated that in general terms, he just laid out what some of our problem was, asked the other principals there to comment in detail, but making no firm commitments, whatsoever, because this was a free give-and-take exchange for the moment.

Q -- kind of spending cuts --

Q Without knowing the specifics --

MR. SPEAKES: Let's get Sarah, and then take one more question --

Q To follow up on your discussion of defense spending, what kind of growth in the defense budget do you see as reasonable?

CONGRESSMAN MICHEL: I don't think I would want to comment on that off the top of my head without -- the Secretary and I were supposed to meet yesterday. It got cancelled because of other problems. But I would want to certainly show the Secretary that courtesy of getting together with him personally before I ever got around to specifying some specific figure.

Q Can you talk --

MR. SPEAKES: Let's let Mike go --

Q Even without knowing the specific programs, we do know that Stockman is talking about cuts of $40 billion next year, $100 billion in spending by '88. Are those sort of cuts doable? I mean, can the deficit be reduced that much just through spending cuts?

CONGRESSMAN MICHEL: Bob, you may have your comment. My point is, if that's where we've got to start from, from the standpoint of giving an indication that we have an orderly plan between now and 1988 to get down to something -- such a figure,

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you've got to come up with something. And it's probably in that $40 to $45 billion range from what we know of the figures now.

Now, that will -- some of that will be adjusted by what kind of growth rate you're talking about, what your target figures are. But, generally, I think that's what we're -- we're probably talking and thinking about now as a start.

Q Is it doable --

Q Will there --

Q Let's hear the Senator's answer.

SENATOR DOLE: That's the target. Whether we can achieve that, or not, is something else. And it seems to me that that is the reason for this sort of -- the takeoff this morning. And we don't have -- they didn't give us anything in writing. We don't know precisely what the plan is. We know generally what the figures may be. We don't even know what some of the assumptions may be.

So just to say, well, it's going to be $110 billion by '88 in spending restraint -- that's not hard to write down but it may be difficult to achieve. So, you know, I can't make any judgment after an hour meeting on whether or not we can achieve it.

But I think the point was made that we're all willing. We want to start early. We understand it's going to have -- we're going to have to bring in some Democrats, it's going to have to be bipartisan, particularly in the House, and certainly I hope it will be in the Senate. So it has to be something that we can -- the American people will stand for and will help us pass.

Q Have you taken a position on the flat tax?

SENATOR DOLE: No.

Q What do you think of it?

Q Was there any discussion of that in this meeting?

SENATOR DOLE: Well, it was tax simplification that was laid out by Don Regan --

Q -- expert on taxes. Do you have any view?

Q And a timetable for the passage of that, was that agreed to or --

SENATOR DOLE: No, there wasn't any timetable. There was some general feeling that maybe we ought to put the deficit up front. But, again, I just haven't taken a position on the flat tax. As Chairman of the committee, I didn't know whether that would be appropriate. But my own view is that it's a very, very radical change in the system.

There have been a lot of good things -- the Treasury deserves a lot of credit, as does Don Regan. But to get that done is not going to be easy. It's going to be a lot of work and I wish Bob Packwood the best. (Laughter.)

Q What happened to all that unity last night, Senator?

Q Easy for you to say.

SENATOR DOLE: Still have it.

Q Do you think Ms. Kirkpatrick --

Q -- majority on the Hill --

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Q Senator Dole, do you think Ms. Kirkpatrick should be EPA Administrator?

SENATOR DOLE: Who?

Q Ms. Kirkpatrick. EPA. It's the only thing open.

Q ABC correspondent.

END 11:07 A.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

PRESS BRIEFING BY
A SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF CHANCELLOR HELMUT KOHL
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

November 30, 1984

The Briefing Room

1:50 P.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you very much.

As the Chancellor of Germany was saying that -- this is a very brief visit, but already I think that in his visit here, the Chancellor and the President and others that the Chancellor will be visiting while he is here, have covered an extraordinary range of ground. And I should say that the visit isn't entirely over. I think at 3:00 p.m. the Chancellor will see the Vice President and the Secretary of State, amongst others, will be present. And the Chancellor is also going to meet with Caspar Weinberger later today, before -- and hold a press conference before he departs back for Bonn.

Just make a few points and then I'll take your questions. I think as both the departure statements demonstrated quite adequately, the meetings have been very warm and friendly. Not surprisingly, the Chancellor laid the groundwork for those very warm and friendly meetings by congratulating the President for his election victory.

Following some discussion of politics here in the United States and in Germany, and -- return to that -- they turned to, I think, an issue that is uppermost on both their minds, and that is the upcoming Geneva talks with Foreign Minister Gromyko. There, the President laid heavy stress on the U.S. commitment to consult closely with the Federal Republic of Germany and other key allies, as we approach those discussions, and beyond those discussions. And they both agreed that it has really been through an intense consultative process during 1983 and 1984 that Western solidarity has been maintained. And in the view of both was probably a major reason that Mr. Chernenko has agreed to resume the arms control dialogue.

While agreeing on the importance of consultations and also on the importance of the S ultz-Gromyko meeting in Geneva, there was also agreement that while this was a very hopeful development, that we should keep our expectations in check, that we want to make as much progress as possible in those talks, but to recognize that it is up to the Soviet Union, as well as the United States, for progress to occur there.

After the discussion of the Geneva talks, the subject turned to the question of strengthening the Alliance's conventional defenses. And here I think it would be useful for me just to point out one paragraph in the joint statement, which I understand has been released and you've seen. I think it's an important statement. That is, the President and the Chancellor consider it essential to redress the steadily growing conventional force imbalance favoring the Warsaw Pact. Therefore, an improved conventional defense posture would help ensure that the Allliance's capacity to act is fully preserved, that deterrence is strengthened and that the nuclear threshold is raised.

The President and the Chancellor, therefore, agreed on the need for a coherent Alliance approach to enhancing NATO's conventional capabilities and are prepared to participate in Alliance

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efforts to make the necessary resources available.

Now, the timing of this statement is important because beginning next week there are two important ministerial meetings in Brussels where the subject of improving the Alliance's

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conventional defense posture will be addressed.

The first is the meeting of the Alliance Defense Ministers which will begin early next week in Brussels. Of course, Secretary of Defense Weinberger will be representing the United States. And the following week, the meeting of the Alliance Foreign Ministers where Secretary of State Shultz will be attending.

We see this statement and this agreement between the two largest members of the Alliance in military terms and their agreement on the need to strengthen conventional defenses as an important prerequisite to an Alliance-wide effort to strengthen the Alliance's conventional defenses and in such a way reduce the risk or threat of a nuclear conflict in Europe. That's what is meant by the term "raising the nuclear threshold."

I just want to make a point here on this subject before I move on to the others, and that is both sides are agreeing on the need to take these steps, but they also recognize that they can't take these steps alone. That is, it has to be an Alliance effort to do so. And so, the focus now of our efforts and the focus of the West German efforts will be talking to other Allies of the 16 members of NATO so that in these discussion of the Defense Ministers and the Foreign Ministers steps can be taken to enhance NATO's conventional posture. We think it's timely to do this after the efforts in 1983 and '84 to modernize NATO's theater nuclear capabilities, that now the emphasis and spotlight should go on the conventional side of the equation.

There was, though, some discussion of the subject of INF and intermediate-range missile deployment, and it was of the situation in Belgium. Some of you may have seen from the tickers there was a statement by the Belgian government on the subject of INF missile deployment which essentially says that the Belgians are committed to the 1979 decision. There was some discussion of this between the President and the Chancellor, and they were both satisfied with that statement and pleased that the Belgians appear to remain committed to NATO's double-track decision.

Anticipating the V-E Day commemoration next May 8th in 1985 and recognizing that the economic summit between the industrialized countries will take place in early May, there was some discussion between the President and the Chancellor about a possible commemoration of V-E Day -- that is, the 40th anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe -- and some discussion, particularly by the Chancellor, of the importance of this commemoration to the German people. There was also some discussion over the question in the economic area of the U.S. budget. Of course, you're all familiar with the intensity that that issue is being examined here. And Chancellor is interested in getting a status report from the President on that subject.

There was also a discussion of returning to really East-West relations -- I guess you would call it Sovietology -- with the President, the Chancellor, the Secretary of State and others talking about what we know and what we don't know about the status of Mr. Chernenko; whether there is a succession crisis underway in the Soviet Union or not; developments in the Soviet Union as well as a fairly broad ranging discussion on Eastern Europe; the inner German relationship, that is, the relationship between the Federal Republic and the GDR; a discussion of events in Poland and Hungary, Romania; and, finally -- well, two last subjects -- a very brief discussion on Central America where the President was able to congratulate the Chancellor for their decision to resume diplomatic relations with El Salvador; and a discussion of the question of steel imports, specifically of tube and piping.

There is some -- as some of you may know -- there is some discussion; there has been a decision on that question which will affect European Community imports of steel piping and tubes. That issue will be addressed later this afternoon in a little more detail, as I understand it, in the meeting with the Vice President.

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So, I'd be happy now to take your questions. Andrea?

Q Can you quantify for us what kind of strengthening is necessary, is desireable by the Alliance vis-a-vis the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On conventional forces?

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we really can't at this stage, and it wouldn't be appropriate for us because, again, as I wanted to stress, any decisions that have to be taken in this area are going to have to be taken by the Alliance as a whole. So, really, what has happened today is that you got an agreement by two key members of the Alliance that strengthening must take place in this area.

Now, we have to broaden that discussion, and it will have to -- undoubtedly have to address the various areas of the conventional balance and decide specifically what steps need to be taken. So, this is really kicking off an effort in this area.

Q Can you say whether, when the Chancellor questioned the budget deliberations here, whether he was questioning the defense commitment and whether he had any assurances from the President in response that there would not be a lessening of --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, he did not ask, as far as I know, whether there would be any lessening, and I don't think he has any reason to ask that. I think that the steps --

Q Did he ask him about the budget in general?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, he did ask about the budget and the question of the deficit and so on. But I don't think -- given the record of the Reagan administration, its strong commitment to the Alliance, its efforts to increase defense spending, its strong efforts last year on the Hill to combat the efforts by Senator Nunn and others to pass legislation that could have led to a troop withdrawal -- I don't think there was any question in the Chancellor's mind about the dedication and commitment --

Q Was he asking in connection with the dollar or -- I mean, was it an economic question or a military question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it was an economic question.

Q Okay.

Q Well, on the subject of the balance, there would be a quantative increase in forces, I take it, not just a qualitative increase if you redress the imbalance?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it remains -- I think right now, again, one thing that we wanted to avoid at all costs, Sam, was trying to precook any kind of discussion in the Alliance on what specific steps must be taken. I think the words in the statements really speak for themselves. There's a recognition of the need to strengthen our conventional capabilities.

Now, that -- there are already studies underway about how new weapons technology -- new technologies like smart weapons, smart bombs and the like -- could be used to redress the balance. There's a question, as the statement says, of whether our current resources are sufficient. So, I think that the question of whether qualitatively, quantitatively or in terms of resources, we're doing the adequate amount. It's something now that is going to be addressed within the Alliance. ?

Q -- ask you about the theory. Is the theory that, by

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raising the nuclear threshold, you would make it less likely that a war would be fought with nuclear weapons and more likely that a war in Europe would be fought by conventional weapons?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, no, I wouldn't -- I won't ask you to kind of analyze that question: If you're strengthening your conventional weapons in Europe, it's very unlikely that your -- it's more likely a war's going to happen in Europe? The concept --

Q That wasn't my question.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The concept of raising the nuclear threshold and emphasizing our conventional forces is designed to two things: one, make it less likely that nuclear weapons will be used in a war in Europe; and two, make it less likely that a war would ever take place in Europe. That is, you're strengthening both the nuclear -- we have strengthened the nuclear deterrent. Now, we want to strengthen the conventional deterrent. The impact is to strengthen overall deterrence.

Q Chancellor Kohl in his statement --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is -- but let me just, to make it clear -- we're not advocating a new strategy here. What we're trying to do is maintain the credibility of the Alliance's existing strategy which is one of flexible response -- that is, giving the Alliance a range of options, conventional and nuclear, to deter an attack.

Q -- move away from the trip-wire theory, wouldn't it? I mean --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, but we have never had a trip wire. We have -- Sam, we've got -- we don't have 300,000 American troops in Europe for a trip wire. Since the early 1960s, the Alliance has said we need a large, credible conventional capability in Europe.

Q Chancellor Kohl in his statement on the South Lawn several times referred to the importance of the Western Allies being closely associated with, closely coordinated with in various ways the play with the East -- the talks with Shultz and Gromyko and so forth. Is there going to be some kind of special mechanism, or did he ask for one, to be set up to do this coordination?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me first of all just -- and simply -- answer that question. And it's no. Let me qualify that. There was no discussion of any such mechanism. And I'm not aware of any plans to create such a mechanism. What I can say is there is going to be a very intensive period of consultation with our Allies through a variety of different channels both before and presumeably following the Geneva talks.

This round of consultations was really kicked off during this visit.

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It will continue on when Secretary Shultz visits Brussels himself and consults with the Alliance foreign ministers. There is a meeting scheduled before Christmas of the NATO special consultative group, which consults on the intermediate range nuclear force problem.

Prime Minister Nakasone is going to meet with the President in early January. And we have our normal consultative machinery, the NATO Council, which can be used for this purpose. So the President, as I said before, has committed himself, as we did during 1983 and in early '84 with the onset of missile deployment, to very close consultations.

Q Did Chancellor Kohl bring with him a list of specific positions that he would like to see the U.S. take in Geneva -- things like moratoriums involving Star Wars development?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The answer is no.

Q Did he have any recommendations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sorry?

Q Did he have any recommendations for the President?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, he had -- I would say he had general recommendations of the sort, you know, that we want at this stage. As someone, I think, was asking here -- that he wanted West German views to be taken into account through the normal consultative machinery. And the President was able to promise that we would do so.

As for recommendations on substance of negotiating positions, he did not, and it's probably too early for that to occur.

Q On the discussion about VE Day, is there talk about having all the World War II allies and the defeated participants get together somehow?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Bernie, I think at this stage it really is too early. There was no talk of specifics like that. There was a recognition that there were a number of possible things that could occur. But, really, at this stage, there was just a realization that this was an important date looming on the horizon and that what we needed to do was to get together and discuss it. And the Chancellor and the President agreed that Secretary Shultz and Secretary Genscher now begin to look at specific possibilities for commemorating VE Day.

Q Is it likely, you think, that you would have a high-level meeting including the -- all -- I mean, if the Germans are going to be involved --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I just don't know, Bernie.

Q -- find out in some way that the President stay on until the 8th to be involved in this after the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think -- again, all they wanted to make sure was that something that we've started thinking about and clearly they've been thinking about it, and now what we want to do is begin to coordinate our thinking.

Q Well, you've been thinking about it since he was excluded last year. I mean, this is critical to them.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You're correct, it is critical to them. And he wanted to make sure that their thoughts are going to be incorporated into our thinking on this, and that's why there's agreement that Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Genscher

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would start working and discussing this problem. And I would imagine that their first opportunity to do that would be when they meet in Brussels the week after next.

Q Did they discuss inviting the Soviet Union?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, there was -- again, Sam. there was no specific discussions like that yet.

Q On the subject, do you think that the President would either stay through the 8th or that they would move up some ceremony?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, you're asking me --

Q The 2nd through 4th is the way it's --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is when the summit is going to be. But you're asking me to comment about suggestions and options that haven't been -- that have not been addressed yet.

Q He did not then invite the President to stay?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What he -- you mean for May 8th?

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I mean, I wouldn't want to rule that out. I mean, it's possible that he could.

Q -- earlier this week that the President was going to participate today in his first NSC meeting to discuss the strategy for the Shultz-Gromyko talks.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I signed a paper the other day which said if I talked about this I'd be thrown in the slammer. (Laughter.)

Q That's the first official confirmation here we've had of that. (Laughter.)

Q Well, it was announced. I mean it was announced that that was going to occur --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, fine. You let them -- let somebody who hasn't signed that paper talk about it.

Q What did Kohl have to say about the deficit? Was he complaining about it or just inquiring about its size?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, he was -- you know, he's a politician. He obviously comes to town here, he picks up The Washington Post or The New York Times or any other newspaper, and he reads the headlines, and he obviously is interested talking to another politician about, gee, what's going on here? You know, how are you going -- how are you approaching this problem?

Q How specific --

Q Can you give any guidance --

Q Did he complain at all or inquire about the U.S. intention behind the counter-force doctrine during the discussion on coordinated --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q He did not?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He did not.

Q He did not raise it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Can you help us at all on Lomeiko's announcement today about non-proliferation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION: No, I can't because I haven't seen it because I've been with --

Q Was it discussed at today's meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q How specific were the exploratory ideas the President informed Kohl of? He said, "The President informed me of exploratory ideas for the talks in Geneva."

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think I would say that at this stage, we have not been able, as I was saying before, to go into many specifics.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I mean, what I'm talking about is sort of the general categories of the issues, you know, intermediate-range nuclear forces, strategic, arms reductions, outer space. But not -- we have not really gone much beyond that in terms of -- we're still, as you know, working on our own interagency deliberations. And what was discussed was sort of the general categories of what -- of issues we intend to raise and, in addition, our commitment to using existing consultative mechanisms to ensure that allied views are taken into account.

Q On this consultative question, if detailed negotiations do get underway with the Soviets, do you envisage, as a result of this, a deeper and more direct European input into the U.S. position in these detailed negotiations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll be quite honest with you. My experience it'd be hard to imagine more detailed and direct consultations than the ones we have had during 1983 and '84 on this subject. I mean, consultation in the arms control area and the whole missile deployment question was truly unique and unprecedented in terms of we have a special mechanism already. It's called "the Special Consultative Group." The exchange of letters between the President and his counterparts in Europe has been very frequent and very detailed. So I think that -- I think it's hard to argue that we need to do more.

Q But when Kohl referred to a broader base for what have been up until now U.S.-Soviet negotiations, are we going to see a situation where the Soviet Union is going to be negotiating in future talks with the Alliance as a whole, rather than directly, specifically with the U.S.?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I doubt it, very much.

Q Will the President, or anyone else in the administration be getting more specific with the allies on the strategy that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As time goes by, as we are able to reach decisions and think through the problems, the answer is yes.

Q Will they get more specific, though, before the talks --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The answer is yes. I would expect so.

Q Can you say how serious the imbalance is with the Warsaw Pact --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't -- this isn't the right kind of place; but I think that --

Q Why is there a problem --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Why is there a problem is that very simply, historically, although NATO in 1952 agreed that it should balance or it should have a balance -- the Warsaw Pact capabilities in the conventional area, NATO has never been able to do this. And, as a result, you have an imbalance, for instance, in certain areas, tanks from -- between three to four to one, in artillery pieces in same -- again, sort of three to four to one. Traditionally, NATO has depended on nuclear weapons to balance that conventional disadvantage. But, of course, the Soviet Union in the last 15 years has achieved nuclear parity or even better in certain areas and that it is now time that we address the problem of conventional forces.

Q But is the gap widening? Aside from the nuclear

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gap, is the conventional gap widening?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In certain -- I would put it this way, that the gap is already wide, that in certain areas we have, by -- in past efforts, we've been able to narrow the gap. In other areas, though, it is still widening.

Q Are you looking for some successor to the three percent idea? Is that basically what you're sort of heading down the road towards?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we still support the three --

Q Some kind of a commitment like that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it's too early, Don. I think we want to say at this stage that, again, that the United States and the Federal Republic has agreed that this is an important area where more effort is necessary. It would not be appropriate for us to define, really, our objectives beyond that, until we've had a chance to listen to the views of all the other allies. And we have a new Secretary General, Peter Carrington, who discussed this issue with us when he was here, I think, in September. He has strong views on this. He's been speaking out on this. The Supreme Allied Commander, Bernie Rogers, over that last 12 months, has also been laying heavy emphasis on the need to do more in conventional defense. So there's a number of important participants and players in this process, who will have to be consulted.

Q Well, how important is the view on the Hill here, that unless the Europeans do more --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think it would be any -- any secret to the fact that one reason that we're interested in pushing this issue is that there are several influential Senators, like Senator Nunn, Senator Roth and members of the House, who have made it clear that they would consider cutting back on the American presence in Europe, unless the allies are seen to be doing more. And so, we think that there's not only a

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military value in conventional defense improvement but an important political value in strengthening the Alliance and maintaining the American commitment to Europe.

MR. FRANKLIN: Let's take just one more question.

Q Are the Germans now at 3 percent? Did Kohl indicate any willingness to control --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think that you get into a real debate when you start talking about "are the Germans right now at 3 percent", because the Germans have a budgeting process where they budget, and then when they're through budgeting, they come back and see if more is necessary to be spent. Now, just one example, in the last two or three years, it appeared that they wouldn't make the 3 percent, but then they came in at the last moment towards the end of their budget cycle and added additional funds. They also argued that certain funding that they -- that is not directly included in their defense budget should be considered part of the defense budget -- for instance, what they spend to -- on Berlin.

So I don't want to -- I want to try to avoid, at this stage, the question of whether the Germans are making 3 percent. I think the statement speaks for itself when it says, "Let me just say that the President and the Chancellor, therefore, agreed on the need for a coherent Alliance approach to enhancing NATO's conventional capabilities and are prepared to participate in Alliance efforts to make the necessary resources available."

Q Can you say this follow-on force attack proposal is part of the American interest in redressing the balance? Is that part of the same --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, let me just -- yes, it is, and it's one initiative of many initiatives. I mention there's another initiative called "Emerging Technologies", which is looking at how advanced weapons technologies can help redress the balance. The other is this follow-on forces concept.

But let me make it clear on this follow-on forces question, there's nothing really very new about this. It's not as though NATO has not had contingency plans for striking targets deep in Eastern Europe. We've had long-range -- we've had our Air Forces, NATO Air Forces in Europe have been deployed for years and been assigned targets in the event of war deep in Eastern Europe. So it's -- there's really nothing new.

What there's an effort to do is to see whether new technologies could better perform this task and, taking into account changes in the Warsaw Pact, apparent changes in Warsaw Pact military doctrine and how they would fight a war in Europe.

The point is that nobody wants to fight a war in Europe, rather conventional or nuclear. And what we -- NATO has to demonstrate to the Warsaw Pact is that we have the capabilities to fight a war in different contingencies so that the Soviet Union would never, in time of crisis, be tempted to launch an attack.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 2:17 P.M. EST

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PRESS BRIEFING
BY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS
CHESTER CROCKER
ON DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

The Briefing Room

10:25 A.M. EST

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: Well, I'm very pleased to be here to give a little sense of some discussions that we have just had here with the President and his top team on developments in Southern Africa.

I was able to provide something of an update in terms of the negotiations that we have underway on the issues of Namibia and Angola. The issue of getting Namibia's independence, of course, which is an important initiative of the administration going back over three years now, and to give him some sense of where that matter stands; as well as to talk about our relations with the South Africans, our views of developments in that country, and to get the President's thoughts on both the regional dynamics in Southern Africa and, as well, the situation in South Africa and our position there.

Q How long were you with him?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: I guess we were over there about 25 minutes or so this morning.

Q Long meeting --

Q Did he have thoughts about our relationship with South Africa?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: I'll be getting to that. I'm going to provide a bit of a scene setter on this, and then we can go to questions.

I think we feel that the situation in the region needs to be clearly communicated and clearly understood with all appropriate audiences, including of course domestic audiences here, but in Africa as well. The President made very clear his strong support for the regional peacemaking effort that we've been engaged in on a most active basis for the past three and a half years, or so. We can take note, and we do, that the syndrome of cross-border violence has been substantially reduced, particularly in the last year to 18 months.

That there is, in fact, an active peace process underway in Southern Africa in which the various states are exploring peacful alternatives to a path which otherwise could lead to heightened cross-border violence, internationalized violence, with dangerous implications for everyone.

At the same time, we are not, by any means, complacent. And we would not describe the situation in Southern Africa as one that is satisfactory. We don't yet have some of the agreements we are seeking on a regional basis, and the situation in South Africa itself does not enable one to be complacent.

We have made very clear, and the President reiterated his concern this morning, our deep concern about moves of repression in South Africa that could shut down peaceful alternatives inside that country. We have repeatedly made clear our concern about detentions, for example, of moderate black labor leaders, precisely because, I

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think, all Americans who follow this subject recognize the important contribution that a free trade union movement can have to the process of constructive change in South Africa. So, we have expressed ourselves very clearly on that and will continue to do so.

You're all familiar with some of the recent headlines suggesting various forms of repression in South Africa and that's of concern to all of us. It is our view that there must be a sustained process of constructive change, away from apartheid. As the President has said repeatedly, that system we consider to be repugnant. All Americans share that view about a system which is based on legally entrenched racism. And hence we urge constructive change to continue.

Having said that, I think we also believe very strongly that one must look at the situation in South Africa in its historical context. There is a process of change underway in that country. It is essential that there be more of it; that it be negotiated by all South Africans; participated in by South Africans of all races; and that it is South Africans themselves, rather than outsiders, who should be doing the negotiating.

So I think one can say, based on this discussion that we had this morning, the President is very supportive of, and feels very strongly about, our policy in Southern Africa. It's an important part of the world. It's an area of the world in which our interests and our principles coincide; they are not in conflict.

And we must pursue what we have been seeking to do, and are determined to continue our efforts. I think with those few initial comments, perhaps I might just say that we do strongly support the notion of negotiated change inside South Africa; that we believe there are some moves toward dialogue inside that country that should be expanded and accelerated. And to the extent that it is, all Americans will support it.

Q It sounds like you're against the demonstrations. And also, what -- I mean, what overt moves has the United States made in terms of the homelands and so forth. You haven't really made any protest against the uprooting of people -- whole villages who have lived there for centuries -- to other places. Where has the United States stood?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: Well, you've asked two questions. I would say on the demonstrations that, obviously, this administration, like any other, would support the peaceful right of Americans to express their views legally and peacefully on issues of concern. We share that concern.

On the issue of homelands and forced removals, our position is crystal clear, if one wants to look at the various statements that have been made, and the various expressions of concern, demarches that we have made. We have weighed in very strongly and very clearly on the issue of forced removals of settled black communities.

Q Well, it's not enough, obviously.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: I think if one looks at the record, one will see that -- sure, it's mixed, we're not complacent about it. But the government of South Africa is well aware of our concerns on this particular point which have been made clear to them.

Q Let me go back to demonstrations, the first question. Why should the demonstrators who are arrested, sitting in at the South African Embassy here, not be prosecuted?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: I think we have a strong position of concern about both the right of peaceful protest and the issue of the inviolability of diplomatic premesis. Those are two

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issues on which we obviously have to make clear for our own worldwide reasons what our positions would be. If demonstrators wish to figure out some means by which they can be arrested without crossing that line, why that's up to them.

The State Department has not weighed in, I don't believe the administration has weighed in, in any fashion, as far as what the local police, District police, are doing.

Q I don't think many people believe that the U.S. Attorney here reached his position that people lawfully arrested -- which means the officer believes a crime has been committed -- ought not to be prosecuted without any advice from the U.S. government. Because, as you know, many people suspect the reasons they're not being prosecuted is to deny them what apparently they are seeking -- and you can agree with them or not -- and that is, a more public forum in the courts to press their cause and argument.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: Well, as I say, I'm not aware of any effort by the department that I work for and with to do that, or anywhere else in the U.S. government.

Q So you deny that the U.S. Attorney sought any kind of advice from the State Department at all on this?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: I'm not aware of any.

Q Well, what would our attitude be -- if I may just press it another way -- if our embassies overseas were the subject of what we would consider to be an unlawful, if not seizure, at least sit-in on the grounds, and the host government did not prosecute the offenders. What would that do to the inviolability of embassies of all countries?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: We would expect, as we are providing here, that there be protection afforded diplomatic premises. Whether or not we would, ourselves, as an embassy abroad, seek to bring the charges or to prosecute, I can't say. I would assume we would leave that to the discretion of the host. The host's job is to provide security and protection.

Q What evidence do you have of what you call the process of change underway, and the fact that there are certain moves toward negotiations internally?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: I think it's a very important point, and it's one that needs to be better understood than it is in this country -- is that, for the past five, six years or more, one can look at a number of changes taking place in South Africa -- some at government initiative, some without reference to government, as simply a function of socioeconomic change -- that are significant changes in South Africa. One can look at rates of spending for black education; one can look at the opening up of trade unions on a democratic and peaceful basis to members of all racial groups. One can look -- and this is more controversial -- at the recently adopted constitutional changes which have the effect of ending the principle of a white political monopoly for whites only in South Africa and very limited power-sharing for two other racial groups.

Q But, I mean --

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: Having said that, of course that constitutional change, as we have said repeatedly, avoids the main issue -- it does not address the main issue -- which is the participating in politics of the South African black majority. But to say that it doesn't represent any kind of a step, I think, is to miss the point. There is ferment, there is change, there is more and more consideration being given, we believe, amongst various people in the white community, the white establishment, to further moves that

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must be taken.

Q Isn't that mitigated by the repressive moves -- the recent ones?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: We've made very clear that we're extremely concerned about the repressive moves. And we cannot condone them; we do not condone them. In fact, if they were to continue they could shut down some of these possibilities that I've just been referring to. So it's a mixed picture.

Yes?

Q This administration has spoken out very loudly with regard to human rights abuses in Poland and the Soviet Union. While you say that you've made your concern known to the South African government, it hasn't been in the same form. There haven't been Presidential statements -- the high profile focusing on the problem. Why is South Africa different from some of the communist repressive regimes that the administration has criticized?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: I think we've spoken out extemely clearly on this. If you look at various public statements by all levels of our government, including the President -- if you look at his recent interview in the Washington Times, for example, you'll see once again his position is very clear on these issues.

If you read, for example, the annual human rights reports which we in the State Department invest a great deal of energy in, you'll find that the sections discussing the situation in South Africa pull no punches whatsoever. We don't believe in doing that. We have weighed in very heavily --

Q Have the American people ever heard the President speak out on this?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: Well, he's made various statements is all I can tell you. We've had other high level speeches --

Q Can you recall anywhere the American people have heard him talk about this?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: In press statements and interviews at various times in the past four years -- if you wish us to pull the --

Q Television? Have you ever been here to brief the President before on this?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: We've had a number of briefings on the situation --

Q With the President?

Q The point we're getting to is, the point we're trying to make is that there seems to be a level of tolerance here for the South African government that is not given to other governments who do precisely the same things the South African government does, including trade, including public statements, including --

Q Votes on sanctions in the U.N. --

Q -- votes on sanctions in the U.N., etcetera -- I mean, we are far more tolerant of the South African government than any other it seems under the same circumstances, and the question is why? Is it economic?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: I think I would look at it

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in terms of what is effective in the context of a given relationship. If one is talking about ways to influence change in South Africa, and then one looks at the issue that you just raised, of economic sanctions, one has to ask some very tough questions. What will be the result if we are to seek -- to undermine that economy, whose economy is, in fact, an engine of change? What will be the result if we make it official U.S. policy to wage economic warfare against the people of South Africa? Is that doing the majority of the population of South Africa any good? What will it do to the neighboring countries? I mean, those are the kind of questions we have to ask.

Q But what about the underlying -- we're not talking about economic sanctions -- I didn't say sanctions, I asked if it was an economic question? Is that why we're more tolerant -- because of our trade and international trade with South Africa? What happens if -- I mean, the United States exerts subtle pressure on other governments, economic pressure on other governments, far short of sanctions, that are not being used against South Africa.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: I think there are many techniques that one can use and can point to; but, one must look at each individual relationship on its own merits. We are aware of the fact that our views and our relationships are important to the people and to the government of South Africa, and we seek to keep that in mind as we proceed, using both quiet diplomacy and using occasions such as this to communicate as well as our efforts to bring about peace more broadly in the region.

Q So why wouldn't you do this on camera?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: I can't answer that -- I think that's more a question of the ground rules that are set for events such as this.

Q Well, if you want these views to be known -- you tell us if the President gives an interview to a newspaper, you come out here, you're on the record -- but you won't talk before a camera. I mean, once again you fall short; you come short.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: I've talked on camera a number of times. I'm not against cameras. But I just think it's a question of the formats that are used for these occasions. I'll defer that question to those who own this space. (Laughter.)

Q The American people -- the American people own the space, do you not agree?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: Thank you, Sam.

Q Could you go into Namibia developments and your talks in Angola please?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: Yes. What we've seen in the past two or three months is an important further threshold forward in that peace process concerning Namibia and Angola. We have a fair degree of agreement about the principles that must form part of a package approach to those two questions. We have seen the government of Angola state publicly, and in fact communicate publicly, its proposals, which specifically include a planned reduction and removal of Cuban

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forces from Angola as part of that package. We have taken delivery of Angolan proposals -- brought them to the South Africans, we have South African counterproposals, and we are at this point at the stage of seeking to narrow the gap between -- between the two -- two positions.

Q What's your view of Jesse Jackson going to South Africa?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: Let me finish this question and I'll be happy to take that one.

So, I think what one should recognize is that we -- we have a gap to bridge. We are not making predictions as to how easy or soon that will take place. These are difficult issues, but we have, for the first time, a common framework of political principals which is accepted by both sides. We have the impression that both sides are negotiating earnestly and are engaged in that negotiating process. So we will -- we will continue. My Deputy Frank Wisner is in Angola, actually, right now with -- the next round is underway, in terms of those discussions and we hope to move that forward as rapidly as we can.

Q What is the gap that you talk about? What constitutes that gap?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: The principal remaining issue will be the question of the timing and the sequencing as between on the one hand, South Africa's commitments under Resolution 435 to pull out its forces from Namibia, and move Namibia to its independence, and on the other hand, the timing of the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. It's principally that issue which is under discussion at this point.

Q Well, are they going to be linked? Is one contingent upon the other? Are they going to be simultaneous? What is your objective?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: Well, the objective is to get parallel movement on the two, and a formula that will be acceptable to both sides. We're not defining this in terms of any specific doctrine, but clearly, there's got to be a sense, on both sides, that there's something in it for the other.

Q Well, have they both agreed to pull out?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: They've both agreed to move forward with the process, but the precise timing has not yet been negotiated.

Q But, I mean, they have agreed on the principal of a withdrawal?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: They have agreed on the principal of a withdrawal.

Q How does Savimbi factor into this?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: The question of the conflict inside Angola -- the civil conflict inside Angola -- is not one that is part of this international negotiation. Having said that, we clearly would be only too happy, as I am sure everybody else would, to see peace come to Angola. It's really an issue for Angolans themselves to decide how, and when, and under what auspices to address that issue.

Q -- Jesse Jackson?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: Could you restate the question?

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Q Yes. What's your feeling about Jesse Jackson's proposal to go to South Africa? Perhaps negotiate, or whatever he wants to do there. Would that be helpful to the process?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: Clearly we support the wish to any American to obtain approvals, visas, whatever is required to visit other countries, and we've made that -- that very clear. I can't predict what his purpose and what his negotiation might be about. I think you better address that question to him.

Q Well, your reference earlier to outside negotiations, was that in reference to Jesse Jackson? You said that the problem there is to be solved by South Africans themselves and not outside negotiations.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: I think what I said was not outside intervention, which is a very different point.

Q You said negotiations.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: Well, if I did say let me correct it. What I mean to say is that the issues of change away from apartheid to a system based on consent of all South Africans is -- are issues that must be negotiated -- ought to be negotiated by South Africans themselves, not dictated from abroad, or as a result of foreign intervention. It does not mean that we do not express our views and that other Americans too, express our views, and people in Western Europe, or anyplace else.

Q Does that go for Poland too? I mean, why is not some outside intervention helpful?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: Well, let's use the word more specifically then -- what we mean by intervention. When I'm speaking here, one could say I'm involving myself in the process, but what I'm talking about by intervention is physical intervention. We do not believe that Southern Africa and South Africa, specifically, is going to be moved more rapidly toward constructive change.

Q I don't think anyone was talking about that.

Q -- pressure?

Q Who has suggested the use of armed forces?

Q What about outside pressure? We've used that with other countries.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: There's a significant amount of pressure that exists in our policy. I think that point needs to be stressed again, and again, and again.

Q Well, let me ask you about Ted Kennedy last week who said that your policy of constructive engagement is simply giving credibility to what the South Africans are choosing to do.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: I would turn that around. I think the statement -- I think the proposition is rubbish. Our policy is sometimes misdescribed by people who haven't bothered to read what we have been doing for the past four years.

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If anything we have been adding to the ferment that is taking place within the white community of South Africa.

It is not perhaps totally by accident that it's during this administration that the National Party of South Africa split and that you saw a willingness of the Prime Minister, who Bishop Tutu has described as a courageous man, to do that -- to split his party and to put forward limited constitutional proposals of the kind we were talking about earlier. So, let's be very clear. Constructive engagement is not an embracing of any status quo.

Q How did we bring that about?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: I'm not going to comment further on it. And I think it'd be wrong for Americans to try and crow and take credit. I'm just saying that it's not pure coincidence.

Q -- you are taking credit for it. (Laughter.)

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: I'm pointing out that there may be a historical coincidence.

Yes?

Q Have you checked on the labor leaders who have been detained? And have you sought to obtain their release?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: We have. We have weighed in on the issue of the labor detainees.

Q You've checked on their status?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: Yes, indeed.

Q What is that then? What is it?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: Well, there are a number of labor leaders -- principally the General Secretaries of FOSATU and CUSA who are two of the principal multiracial union confederations who have been detained for interrogation under the Internal Security Act. There are others as well, but those are the two principal individuals.

Q And you sought to get -- obtain their release?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: We have made it very clear that we would like to see their release. Yes.

Q Prospects?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: I wouldn't want to predict that.

Q Isn't that weighing in in a way that you just said that you didn't think should happen in South Africa?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: No, I don't think so at all. We have consistently, and not just in recent months, taken our views, sometimes strictly in diplomatic channels, other times diplomatic channels as well as public statements, weighed in on various things that concern us. And we will continue to do that. That's part of constructive engagement.

Yes, you've had your hand --

Q Beyond making your views known -- I mean, I'm getting the impression that you're telling the South African government that you don't like what they're doing. Isn't there something between verbal protest and an economic blockade that you all could be doing and are you doing it? Unless you're satisfied with the pace of change.

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: I think we're always -- we always have our eyes open for additional things we can be doing, above all additional things we can be doing to communicate what it is we stand for, what it is we wish to see and to make sure that message is understood with all the different audiences that are watching.

Q Is it possible the South African government doesn't know how this administration feels about apartheid?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: Is it possible?

Q Yes. Do they not know?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: I think it's unlikely.

Q Right. So, clearly, unless you're satisfied with the pace of what's going on -- the pace of the change -- if it's rapid enough for you, then that's fine. But isn't there something else you could be doing? Have you thought about doing something other than verbal protest?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: We have done more than verbal protest. That is the point. We have used various channels. We have made various suggestions, and we will continue to do that. I think you would understand -- in this case as any other -- that if we discuss all of this in the public arena there are limits to how effective one is very likely to be. But we will continue to look at all avenues that we think are constructive avenues. We're not going to destabilize and add fuel to the flames and seek to wage economic warfare in the country. That is not consistent with our policy.

Q So, you're leaving open the possibility that you are doing something other than just talking to them, but you would rather not tell us what that is?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: I wouldn't want to speculate on -- that we are doing other things. We always have our eyes open as to other things that might be done to be more effective -- sure.

Yes?

Q Mr. Crocker, getting back to Angola, you said that Savimbi is a domestic problem. But has the question of South African aid to Savimbi come up as part of the solution? And, secondly, at what stage are the plans to remove the South African troops from Angola?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: The issue of South Africa's relationship with Unita has been discussed in the proposals put forward by Angola, and, in fact, the Angolans obviously do have concerns about their security and sovereignty in this whole process. We believe those concerns can be and will be addressed. They'll be addressed in the context of implementing the overall settlement plan for Namibia, not as some form of precondition.

So, that, I think -- perhaps you want to follow on that, I don't know -- but that's --

And the second question?

Q About the South African troops in Angola.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: Yes, the disengagement process remains, for the time being, with the Joint Military Commission being based at Ngiva, a town about 40 kilometers from the border. They have had recent high level meetings, and are planning to have one at ministerial level, that is, the South Africans and the Angolans some time in the coming weeks with a view to completing the process.

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As far as we have been able to figure out, both sides feel that the process is working okay on the ground. But there is a desire to complete a disengagement.

Q Can you give us the rationale behind the U.S. position on the sanctions vote at the UN some weeks back?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: I'm not sure which vote you're referring to. Perhaps you could be more specific.

Q Wasn't -- correct me if I'm wrong -- but weren't we the only member of the Security Council that abstained on sanctions against South Africa maybe two and a half, three weeks ago?

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: I'd like to be sure of the specific resolution before answering, but we have abstained on a number of such resolutions, and I presume it's fair to say that we're not embarrassed to be a country which does what it believes in and stands for what it believes in.

Q Which is not -- but an abstention is.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: No, it's not. Not by any means.

Q Isn't that sending a certain signal to the South Africans?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: It depends what the issue is. If one is saying, for example, that the UN Security Council has a right to approve or disapprove the constitutions of sovereign states, then that's a precedent that has pretty dramatic implications.

Q Then we should vote against it if we think that's wrong. To vote present or to abstain is not taking a position.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: It's taking a position. It's taking --

Q Shows cowardice.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: Most people who work in the UN system know very well what an abstention means.

Q But somehow, it didn't upset the other members of the Security Council.

MR. SIMS: We're going to have to stop. How about one more.

Q How do you explain, Mr. Crocker, Bishop Tutu's criticism of American policy toward South Africa if it is, as you say, rubbish that that policy is ineffective?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: I would say that the description of our policy as ineffective is rubbish and I also think there's a considerable degree of lack of information and misunderstanding as to what it is we stand for, what we're trying to achieve. We're --

Q On Tutu's part?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: Not only his. Not only his. Obviously, many of the things we're doing in the region are not things that we can talk about in terms of press conferences. But it is abundantly clear and we intend to make it clearer.

Q But you're saying -- and I don't want to put words in your mouth, but I want to understand -- you're saying that among others, Bishop Tutu doesn't have the information he needs to make that judgment?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: I think that could be said, yes. In fact, the President said it not so long ago. So I'll say it again.

Q It sounds like you're very concerned about the perception of our policy and that's why this briefing was staged today.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: I think it's important that we be understood. We have been spending the bulk of our time the past four years with the constructive engagement policy in the region

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communicating with others who are parties to negotiations, and if, in the process, we haven't been giving weekly briefings to the press corps or in the State Department --

Q It's not a question of weekly briefings. These are developments, and we take positions at the UN that seem to support --

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: Seem to?

Q Support South Africa. We have not been very vocal on all of these moves that they've made lately.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: The record -- I'm sorry, you have to look at it -- is a clear one of our making it known what we stand for on internal South African issues while, at the same time, seeking to work with the South African government and others on regional negotiations.

Q May I ask --

MR. SIMS: Thank you. I think we've covered everything --

Q Well, just one final wrap-up about what -- the pressure beside a couple of verbal protests. I mean, you just tell us we've done things, but am I right, you haven't told us what we've done other than these statements, is that correct? I just want to understand --

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: It's not simply a function of protest on individual incidents. Let us look at some examples.

You have a threat of forced removals or a detention of some labor leaders. On a specific case like that, there are protests and there are diplomatic demarches, and so forth. There are very different kinds of pressures.

For example, when we say, as we do repeatedly, publicly and privately, that this administration, this government, this country does not accept or endorse the homeland policy, what are we saying? Think about it. What we're saying is that that doctrine, which is the basis of grand apartheid or territorial apartheid, is not something that we can condone or go along with. We cannot condone the de-nationalizing of South African black citizens. We consider all citizens -- all South Africans to be citizens.

That's a very clear form of pressure because it is the removal of American support from such a doctrine or such a policy.

Q How does this removal get translated, though, into specific actions that hurt?

Q It doesn't effect the trade relations yet.

Q Some people, believe it or not, don't care what you say about them.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: It gets translated very clearly. People do not recognize homeland travel documents. People don't have negotiations or relationships with homeland governments. What that means, in fact, that, ultimately, South Africa is one country and all of its people must negotiate their future. That's a powerful signal.

Q Is there less pressure in this administration than the previous one?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER: I would say that the techniques of communication and of getting our goals advanced are different.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 10:52 A.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF
PRESIDENT JAIME LUSINCHI OF VENEZUELA

December 3, 1984

The Briefing Room

3:00 P.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I thought I would start off with running through the schedule, if that would be of any use to you. If not, I can skip it.

President Lusinchi arrived about an hour ago at Andrews. Tomorrow the official visit starts.

He is hosting a private dinner for the -- his traveling group in the Embassy at the Embassy this evening.

At 10:00 a.m., there's a White House arrival ceremony at which there will be statements by both, followed by a meeting with President Reagan at 10:30 a.m.

At 12:30 p.m., Secretary Shultz will be hosting a lunch for him at the State Department.

There will be a press readout of the meetings up to that point at 3:00 p.m. tomorrow here, I guess. Is it?

MR. SIMS: Here. With the same anonymous briefer. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: President Lusinchi will be meeting with Secretary Shultz at 4:30 p.m.; with the AFL-CIO at 5:15 p.m.; and then there's the State Dinner hosted by the President and Mrs. Reagan for President Lusinchi.

Wednesday, he's having breakfast with Paul Volcker. He will participate at a wreath-laying ceremony at the Simon Bolivar Monument on Virginia Avenue.

Later in the morning at 10:00 a.m., he will address the Organization of American States.

At 11:15 a.m., he will participate in a wreath-laying ceremony at Arlington National Cemetery.

At 1:00 p.m., he'll be the guest for lunch of the President of the Inter-American Development Bank and Mr. De La Rosie, the Managing Director of the IMF.

At 3:00 p.m., he'll be meeting with Mr. Claussen, President of the World Bank.

He will, in the afternoon, depart for San Francisco where he will spend -- that's late Wednesday afternoon. He will spend Thursday and Friday in San Francisco.

Thursday, he will be unveiling and dedicating a Simon Bolivar monument at the UN Plaza and attending a lunch. Friday is a private day. Saturday he will return to Miami and then back to Venezuela.

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This is not the first time the two Presidents have met. They met at the United Nations General Assembly in -- this September. And it is the second State visit, that is to Washington, of a Venezuelan President since President Reagan has been in office. President Lusinchi's predecessor, President Herrera Campins, came here in '81 on a State visit.

Dr. Lusinchi won in a landslide victory in December of '83. His party is the Accion Democratica, a Social Democratic party. Dr. Lusinchi is a pediatrician by training. And he's been a leader of that party for quite a while, having served 20 years in the Venezuelan Congress.

I think the primary issues for discussion will be the Contadora process and Central America, the economic situation and the debt, and the Caribbean.

Venezuela has been very active in its foreign policy and promoting democracies through both of the parties there. And the government of Venezuela, over a period of time, has assisted both the Caribbean and the Central American countries through the -- in conjunction with Mexico through their oil facility where they provide a concessionaire type of financing for their oil to Jamaica, Domincan Republic, Costa Rica, Panama, Honduras, and other countries.

The government of Venezuela on the economic front and a committee of the commercial bankers reached agreement to reschedule some $20 billion of Venezuela's $27 billion public sector debt. They reached that agreement in September.

Venezuela, however, has no IMF program. It has felt that their liquid reserves were sufficient. But they have maintained close contact with the IMF and have received favorable marks from them. Lusinchi has reduced the public sector deficit.

And I think, at that stage, I'll just stop and take your questions.

Q What's the purpose of the Volcker meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The economic situation in Venezuela -- as I said, they rescheduled their debt. It's mainly to -- I think to exchange ideas with Mr. Volcker. Mr. Volcker,

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as you know, takes an active role in the international economic scene, and it's -- he's just a logical one that most foreign leaders meet with when they come to town.

Q Does -- excuse me --

Q Is the President of Venezuela seeking any kind of U.S. loan or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, not that I'm aware of, no --

Q Could you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In fact, their whole rescheduling, and the whole process is going very well.

Q What do you consider the main purpose of the meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Main purpose of the meeting with President Reagan?

Q Right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that you will find it will focus on the Contadora and Central American issue. I think also, President Lusinchi has taken an active role in looking at the drug situation in South America. He's introduced a resolution before the United Nations calling for a more cooperative approach to the -- what is really a transnational problem. It's certainly an effort that we support.

Q Could you bring us up to date on the Contadora and what the prospects for an agreement are?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't have much to offer for you on that. We're hoping to be able to get a reading from President Lusinchi. We know that following Brazilia, the four contadora countries have been meeting, and we're looking forward to hearing from him tomorrow on what the prospects are.

Q Your not expecting any breakthrough or anything? Just a -- you make it sound as if it's kind of routine -- is it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't consider it routine because President Lusinshi has taken an active interest in it, and it will be good to get from him firsthand what his latest impressions are -- where they are. But, I don't see, I don't look for any major breakthrough or announcement tomorrow.

Q The two governments have very different positions on Contadora and Central America.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't agree with that assessment.

Q Is there a third draft treaty -- to be taken up?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know. I would assume that they are working on one. If there is one finally blessed by whatever level, I'm not aware of it.

Q Well, is the U.S. going to ever bless one? Or are you going to continue to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We keep looking for something to bless.

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Q Well -- but, what's the big problem?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It centers on -- and we have to go back to ACTA II, which is the last kind of semi-public finished draft that was put forward. And there was a marked lack of simultaneity and verification, and we've made that known to all the parties involved, and they've acknowledged it and they are are working with it. We're not the only ones that feel that lack.

Yes, sir?

Q Are you bracing for any kind of lecture or frank discussion on the Contadora process? That is to say --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're not bracing for any lecture. I think we're looking forward to a very frank discussion. I've had the opportunity to have several with President Lusinchi since before his inauguration. And Harry Shlaudeman visits with him on -- as he makes his rounds. And we've found him always to be very frank and straightforward with us.

Q Do you think you'll be getting a third draft tomorrow while the President's still --

SENIOR ADMINISTRTION OFFICIAL: No, I don't think so. I mean, I'm not ruling it out, but I'm not looking for one tomorrow, no.

Q So you won't have anything to bless after tomorrow's session?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't think so, no.

Q You're not expecting any kind of initiative to be launched between the two Presidents on Central America?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I think that there's a comfortable, acceptable format known as Contadora. And you're not looking for any one of the four players to step out in front. So, I'm not looking for that.

Q Will you be giving him a reading on the Manzanilla talks? Or do you expect he already is aware of what's --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we normally try to keep the Contadora countries appraised of those, and Harry, in fact, was just in Venezuela.

Q And -- did he have an opportunity to chat with him on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Indeed he did. I saw him -- he saw him a week ago today.

Q So, where do those talks stand then?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, they're continuing.

Q Are they still businesslike, or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, I think so, pretty much so, yes.

Q Getting anywhere?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's hard to measure because -- it's hard to measure because it isn't like you are negotiating with them over -- I'll trade you this sentence for that sentence, or let's clean up this paragraph -- type of thing. As you know, the whole purpose of it is to -- if there are any agreements or understandings as a result of Manzanilla. The whole purpose of the

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Manzanilla talks was to feed them into the Contadora process.

Yes?

Q How about those six ships steaming toward Nicaragua? Have they gotten anywhere yet?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I know nothing of six ships steaming towards Nicaragua, but I've been gone all morning, so -- (Laughter.)

Q The President gave an interview a week ago -- said the six Soviet ships --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, those ships -- all right --

Q Yes -- how about it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have nothing to report to you on that.

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Q Well, do you know anything about them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have nothing to report to you on that.

Q What does that mean?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Just what I -- exactly what I said.

Q Sir -- Venezuela has openly expressed concern about the closing of the Exxon refinery in Aruba --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct.

Q -- that is nearby. Do you share this concern?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, we do. For the purpose -- for the rest of you, it -- there is a refinery on Aruba that has been receiving oil that is crude oil, and then processes it on the island of Aruba. That refinery has been going for some 55 years. It was built to accommodate Venezuelan crude which is a special type of crude and it -- the announcement was made it will be closing in March.

One of the reasons is that up to last year, Venezuela has provided a concessionary price for that oil and has felt that it can no longer do so and the refinery has not become -- is no longer economical. And so the owners of the refinery, who happen to be Exxon, have instituted a phase-down program to close it down. And it does -- it is of concern in the sense that the refinery provides a significant part of the GDP to the island of Aruba.

Q Are you -- is the U.S. or -- expecting Venezuela to raise that issue?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that, reading the papers in Venezuela and based upon the queries I've been -- gotten -- that I've received recently, I think that there is a possibility that President Lusinchi may raise it.

Q Can't the United States do something about it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it's -- it's a difficult situation. I think everybody recognizes that. When you cut down the concessionary price of the oil, and it is no longer an economically viable entity, it makes it kind of tough.

Q Since when --

Q How close are you to cutting a deal with Cuba at the talks in New York?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have made -- we've made some progress there and I think we -- we probably -- and I've been gone all day today, so I haven't gotten fully read-in on the -- on the issue. And so at this stage I'd rather not address it, although I can tell you that I think we expect that there's a reasonable chance that we'll be having another meeting.

Q Since we're on background, could you say whether or not Venezuela agrees with the administration with respect to Nicaragua?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that's -- that's kind of a broad question and I'd rather -- I'd rather let Venezuela -- his question was, we're on background and could I say whether Venezuela agrees with the United States with respect to Nicaragua.

I would rather let the Venezuelan government speak for themselves. But let me just say that, right from the beginning with

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President Lusinchi and with his predecessor, we've had some very productive talks on the whole -- on the whole issue of Central America and the problems you face, including the security issues of the exportation of revolutions. It's something that concerns a lot of the countries there.

Q I'm sorry, sir, can I come back for just a second again?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure.

Q Another meeting in the Cuba -- meeting, you know, a continuation of the current session, or another meeting at some point in the future?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'd -- as I said, I've been gone all morning and I haven't gotten a full readout on that thing. I can't be responsive. If I can get something more for you, I will.

Q Okay.

Q You say you think we've made progress there. Do you think that the progress is -- has gone as far as it will go at this stage in this round of talks?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I mean, as I said, I'm having difficulty characterizing it. But from what I gathered late Friday, the answer to that is no. There's no use having another meeting if you're not making any progress.

Q President Lusinchi was the author of the -- of a resolution before the U.N. to make drug trafficking --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's what I mentioned a little earlier. That's right.

Q Does the United States anticipate any cooperative agreements concerning this or any -- any international drug fighting fund to go to such countries as Bolivia to help the farmers there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, you know, we have been out front on that whole problem on -- on drugs in -- not only the Caribbean, but also South America -- both the transiting aspect, the shipping, as well as the growing. And Venezuela among other countries has been one of the several countries which we have dealt with.

We -- the idea of taking of more cooperative aspect towards both eradication and interdiction, is at least they point in the right direction. And I don't want to really get into the specifics of whether the U.N. is a proper forum or not for it. But I think that the motivation behind it is something we certainly welcome. Yes?

Q Did you, meaning the State Department, have anything to do with sending the Nimitz to the Cuban waters?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Listen, I have trouble running that desk of mine, much less moving a great big aircraft carrier around.

Q Did the State Department have anything to do with it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Anything else on the visit?

Q Did the State Department have anything to do with it?

Q Do you interpret this problem of the Exxon Aruba only as economical problem or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no, no, no.

Q -- politically too?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it has an economic dimension to it, but it -- any time in which you take away a -- a source of employment, it creates a problem obviously for those that are not -- no longer will be employed. It also creates a problem within the society.

It's broader than -- I was trying to give you the economic reasons for why it was getting shut down.

Q The Contradora countries have, at a private level, criticized some of the elements of the Tegucigalpa draft that was tabled, do you expect Lusinchi might ask

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the United States to back off a little bit from its public support --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What I expect from President Lusinchi is what we've always had with him. And that is if he's got something on his mind, he tells it to us straight up.

You had a question in the back there or no? -- died for lack of interest -- (laughter.)

Q Yes, on the foreign debt -- Venezuela is a member of the Contadora -- or I mean, the Cartagena group that asked for a dialogue with the industrial countries. And the United States, up to now, has been, you know, kind of rejecting this --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's not correct -- entirely correct. Secretary Regan announced in October that we look forward to a meeting during the meetings of the -- not the IADB --

Q IMF.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- and the IMF, that's correct. Yes.

Q No, but --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: During that period of time. That's correct.

Q No, but is it possible that the United States agreed to a formal dialogue outside the IMF just between --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it will be taking place at the time that the IMF is going on. It'll be outside of the IMF.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 3:18 P.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the White House

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON VISIT OF PRESIDENT LUSINCHI OF VENEZUELA

December 4, 1984

The Briefing Room

3:06 P.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me start by answering a question that we've been asked several times today. We are unaware of any letter or communications from the Nicaraguan government to the Venezuelan government. The subject did not come up at all. There was no letter that was discussed or talked about being received or anything of that nature.

The Presidents met for an hour and a half. And then Secretary Shultz hosted him for lunch and was just finished about five minutes ago or so.

In the discussions between the Presidents in which the Vice President and Secretary Shultz, Secretary Regan, Mr. McFarlane participated as well as the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Commerce and Industry or -- and Mines and the Minister to the President and the respective Ambassadors: The subjects that they discussed were the Contadora process; the debt issue, peripherally as it relates to Venezuela because, as I told you yesterday, they're doing fairly well in rescheduling their debt; focused on the impact on the rest of Latin America.

Considerable time was spent on the narcotics issue, its transnational nature. And they talked -- they took a very brief tour de raison of some of the other countries in Latin America, specifically Bolivia and Chile. And those were the subjects that were discussed.

Perhaps it'd be best if I took your questions. Yes, Helen?

Q Does that mean that there is no letter --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't know. I don't know if there's any --

Q So, you're not saying there is no such thing?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, that's right. I can't speak for the mail system between the Nicaraguan and the Venezuelan government. All I can tell you is that I've been hit up several times today, and I can tell you that no letter was alluded to or discussed between the two Presidents.

Yes?

Q Yes, the Foreign Minister from Venezuela, Morales Paul said yesterday that he did have a message that was delivered to him through the Secretariat to the Nicaraguan government from Daniel Ortega that included some interesting new perspectives that would shed new light on the Contadora peace process. What were those new perspectives that he was referring to?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He didn't share with us anything that may have shed any light on his mind. Okay? There was no reference to any -- as I said, as far as we can determine no message, no letter was received between the two.

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Q Could you shed some light on what was --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- maybe the mails are slow. I guess maybe that may be part of the problem. I don't know.

Q Did they talk specifically about Nicaragua?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Madame, I just told you what transpired in that hour and a half. There was no mention of any letters. Nicaragua was discussed, but there wasn't any, "I have a message from and here's what it says" type of thing.

Q Could you give us a briefing on what was said vis-a-vis Contadora with specific reference to Nicaragua?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Contadora was discussed in its overall context, and obviously Nicaragua was discussed as was El Salvador. The dilemma that one faces in light of the more recent draft known as ACTA II among the Contadora aficionados has a rather strong paragraph on it, a very explicit paragraph on it, dealing with democratization. In light of the event that took place on November 4th which the Nicaraguans called an election, it doesn't seem that the two marry up to each other.

So, this presents a dilemma for the Contadora countries. How do you square away those paragraphs dealing with democratization and that which took place in Nicaragua? That's recognized by all parties working on it, and it was discussed. How do you square the two away?

Yes?

Q Did the President of Venezuela then share President Reagan's opinion which he expressed so succinctly out on the lawn during the arrival ceremonies that the elections in Nicaragua were a communist sham?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't recall President Lusinchi using those words. Nevertheless, the distinctions between what happened in Nicaragua and what is required in the ACTA are apparent to all.

Q Did he say that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not going to put words in his mouth. That subject was discussed, and I think that there was agreement, that there was a distinction between what is required and what is. But I'm not going to put any quotes in his -- not going to attribute any quotes to it.

Yes?

Q -- follow up on that -- during the speech, President Reagan this morning said that he hoped that President Lusinchi would "work with me" to ensure that the pleasures of free elections and real democracy made to the OAS and to the Nicaraguan people are carried out. Did he get any specific response from President Lusinchi on whether he will cooperate with him in putting pressure on Nicaragua or working in some way --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The discussion was -- a discussion took the form,

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as Venezuela is one of the four of the Contadora countries, which has taken a deep interest right from the beginning and that they will continue to take that interest. And it is, I think, difficult for any one of four to attempt to take a lead as such. But there's no doubt about it that President Lusinchi plans to continue to play a very active part in the four Contadora countries.

Yes.

Q Can you tell us what your interpretation is of President Lusinchi's comments this morning that the solution rests on the exclusion of external factors both continental and extra-continental? And the solution also rests on not using force.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the conclusion of not using force is a basic premise of the whole purpose of Contadora, which everybody's trying to bring to fruition.

The "extra-continental" is exactly what it means. "Continental", and the term "hemispheric," has been used at different times. And in some interpretations, it's used to exclude Cuba. And it, maybe in other people's minds, is -- it might mean exclude the United States. But I don't know what President Lusinchi had in mind.

Q Well, was there --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Both -- Those terms have been used before. It's not a new introduction of a term.

Q Did you conclude that he meant the United States? Cuba?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q The Soviets?

SENIOR ADMINSTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think that's what "continental" meant. It meant the Soviets, no doubt about it.

I would rather let him explain what he felt about it. I think --

Yes.

Q Can you tell us about this intriguing conversation on Bolivia and Chile? Would you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- there was -- in the tour de raison, specifically were mentioned the economic and social challenges faced by Bolivia, and also the recent difficulties in Chile.

Yes.

Q Was American support for the Contras discussed --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q -- in light of his comment?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Was not. Did not come up.

Q Did President Lusinchi give any sense that the revisions in the Contadora Act that are being developed now would be any more satisfactory to the United States than your second draft?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We got the impression that of all the, you know, revised suggestions that they got, that they felt that they could accommodate much of them.

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Q Well, why don't we just write it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q Why don't we write it ourselves?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry, I can't hear you.

Q I said, why don't we write it ourselves?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Maybe nobody else would sign it. (Laughter.)

Q This morning --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I could do that in about half an hour, Helen. It would make life a lot easier. (Laughter.)

Q This morning, during the photo op, the President of Venezuela indicated that there were some amendments or changes or modifications that he would be discussing with the President -- posed interesting possibilities. What was discussed in that context and what have they led to?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, they were in the general area of the security aspects, which were of a concern, as evidenced by the Tegucigalpa group that put forward their comments on the second draft, more specifically to the elements of exercises in the region, the manuevers, rights to bases and these kind of things. And these -- he talked in generalities in those terms.

Q Well, was Lusinchi carrying any kind of --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q -- concrete proposal?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no. He was speaking for Lusinchi and giving his assessment of how the process will proceed, which is the continuation of trying to take on board all of these different comments.

Q Did he ask for some troops or -- breathing -- at the breathing space for Ortega in Nicaragua?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I didn't catch any of that.

Q When we were dealing with ACTA II, so to speak, it was made clear here the United States' concerns were simultaneity and verification.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct.

Q Have the Nicaraguans come any distance on either of those issues?

(Reporter falls down.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They didn't go as far as he went. (Laughter.)

We have not heard back from the Nicaraguans in that context, you know. Maybe that was something in this phantom letter that was supposed to have been delivered. I don't know.

Q But you didn't hear anything today in that context?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATON OFFICIAL: No. No, no, no. He didn't -- as I said, he didn't try to portray movement or posture on the part of the Nicaraguans.

Q Did Lusinchi express any concern about the slowdown in the U.S. economy or slack oil prices?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, he did not address either one of those. Speaking of oil, they did discuss the pending closure of refineries in Aruba and Curacao.

Q Did he ask for any U.S. support of pressure on Exxon to keep it open, or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, he just -- he outlined the problem, and said that we have to keep working to see if we can find a solution; and the President agreed. They both acknowledged a very difficult problem.

Yes?

Q In Lusinchi's arrival statements, he also talked about the need for cooperation, negotiations, political solutions, in the region "to the exclusion of none." Was there any --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: To the exclusion of none.

Q Right. Was there a discussion of involving Nicaragua more in that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, not in that sense. I mean, the climate was such that Nicaragua was, obviously, a part of that whole process. There wasn't any special emphasis made on that point.

Q Going back to the Aruba thing -- do they agree about maintaining or retaining the level -- some conversation to solve this matter?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Some what? Conversations?

Q Exactly. At the technical level, would you say that he outlined the program --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, there was no formal mechanism set up, but this is not his last meeting. He meets this afternoon with Secretary Shultz and later with others. I'm sure that some of the ideas that were just broached, or thoughts broached in the Oval Office, will be explored in more depth with Secretary Shultz.

Q Which one of these subjects that were discussed -- in which one of them did they spend more time?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Probably the Contadora -- the whole Contadora process.

Yes, ma'am?

Q Any more details on the discussion of debt -- did they talk about Argentina, or what were you saying --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, they didn't dwell on Argentina, per se, on the debt issue.

Q What about --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q -- Venezuela's outlook for '85, '86? Any further --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it was mainly -- I think there was agreement that there -- that the debt issue was central to the whole economic recovery and the ability to get the proper developmental financing for the return of the growth within

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the countries.

Yes?

Q Did President Reagan discuss where he feels the Contadora process can go now, or should go now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. And it outlined, basically, that it's a question of trying to close the gap in those items that are still -- in which there was some disagreement over, as reflected in ACTA II.

Q Would you elaborate on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTSRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, sure. Basically in the democratization -- the dilemma I gave you earlier -- the democratization theme paragraphs, and also the specifics. And not only the simultaneity, which is a technical aspect in the sense of timing, but it's the expansion in the verification aspects and also the clarification of subjects dealing with maneuvers and exercises, and rights of transit.

Yes?

Q Yes, just to cover one other aspect of this alleged letter. You say no letter was presented. But, is it possible that maybe --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no, no. He didn't say, "I've got it here in my pocket, but I'm not going to show you, so" --

Q No, no, no --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm convinced there was no letter present at that time.

Q No, no -- no letter, but any verbal message from Nicaragua?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no, no, no.

MR. SIMS: Can we have the pool camera crews now and we'll get the writers in a minute?

Q For what?

MR. SIMS: For the President's return.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, look, I'm all done if you guys are. Thank you very much.

Q Why don't you ask them if they got such a letter?

Q Well, what about the drug trafficking?

SENIOR ADMINISTSRATION OFFICIAL: What?

Q -- ask them if they had -- if they knew anything about such a letter?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we didn't ask them whether they knew anything about such a letter, because they didn't get the questions until after we came out of the meeting.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 3:22 P.M. EST

#2266

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release December 5, 1984

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE JOHN BLOCK
AND
ADMINISTRATOR OF AID M. PETER McPHERSON

The Briefing Room

2:18 P.M. EST

SECRETARY BLOCK: Ladies and gentlemen, certainly you just heard the President's announcement. And not to belabor the point, the President announced 300,000 metric tons from our wheat reserve to be made available to countries in need. In addition to that, $50 million to be transferred into Title II, P.L. 480, Public Law 480, also to supplement this -- the needs for people that are hungry. And this is the latest announcement of the President's, and he did review with you the very heavy commitment that we have been making to the African hunger problem and the special effort that's been made since -- in this latest fiscal year.

Q Excuse me, Secretary Block, but wasn't that --

SECRETARY BLOCK: One more point, Mr. McPherson, of course, has worked this subject in great detail. He's been there in some of the countries and he will assist in answering these questions, and probably will answer more of them than I will.

Q -- is this that -- How much of that is new, of the 300,000? Wasn't there some of that announced last week or --

SECRETARY BLOCK: That's all new. No -- well, it was only mentioned that it was under -- it was going to be released some time. It had not been released. It was released today. The President released it.

Q All right. Can you say yet, Mr. Secretary, or Mr. McPherson, where this surplus actually goes? I mean, in its present form, it's not useable, is it? What happens to it?

SECRETARY BLOCK: It -- Well, first of all, we'll review the countries and determine which countries it goes to. That's not decided, precisely where it goes, and I think we all know there are several countries that have some really severe problems. And that product can be delivered, depending on the needs, in plain grain or it can be processed into flour or something else, right? Whatever.

Why don't you take --

ADMINISTRATOR McPHERSON: Yes, we would anticipate that in the weeks ahead we'd make decisions concerning whether it would go as plain wheat, as flour or as what is called "bulgur," which is, essentially it's wheat which has been cooked and processed. And those decisions need to be made.

A point that I think is worth making is food going into Ethiopia, which, of course, has been the main focus of the news, we anticipate, roughly, in excess of 100,000 tons from us and from all of the donors combined going to Ethiopia in December and in January, and a substantial amount in February. So, we've got the pipeline to Ethiopia really filled as about what that country should be getting a month.

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And other countries, we'll be making these decisions as time goes on.

Q Is that to say 100,000 --

Q -- pipeline will be filled before this announcement or as of today? How long have you had that pipeline filled?

ADMINISTRATOR McPHERSON: Just the last few days. Last few days.

Actually, it was a very interesting thing. Some of you remember when I got back from Ethiopia that I was deeply concerned about being able to move enough food into Ethiopia, and I projected roughly 100,000 a month was what was necessary. In the last couple of weeks, the Ethiopia government put into use several hundred trucks to move food out of the Ethiopia ports, a really quite dramatic increase in delivery of food within the country. Some of you recall that when the Director of the Ethiopia Relief Agency was here a few weeks ago, one of the agreements that he made for his government, as part of that overall agreement, was that they would put substantial additional trucks into this process, and that has occurred.

Q When would any of this -- this surplus actually reach its destination?

ADMINISTRATOR McPHERSON: When will this food?

Q That's being released now, yes.

ADMINISTRATOR McPHERSON: Well, it would depend upon how we allocate and how we use it. One would guess it'll be a couple of months before the food actually arrives there.

Yes.

Q Would you say --

ADMINISTRATOR McPHERSON: Before this food; but I would point out, again, that American food is, in fact, getting in the mouths of children. I've seen it. And I've observed it closely myself.

Yes, back here.

Q Would you describe the distribution situation in countries other than Ethiopia?

ADMINISTRATOR McPHERSON: Well, it varies. There are about seven countries which we think are particularly in need: Mozambique, Kenya, Chad, Niger, Sudan, Ethiopia --

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What have I left out? Several -- seven countries altogether, which we see to be priority countries -- each situation varies. We are getting food into each one of those countries.

Q Ethiopia --

Q With the so-called pipeline filled -- would you say, in your opinion then, that the immediate crisis is over in Ethiopia?

ADMINISTRATOR McPHERSON: No, I would not. The pipeline is -- ships moving into port, being unloaded, and then, we hope, a regular stream of trucks going into the camp. I know that as of last week there were six trucks of several ton-load each that went into one of the major camps there around Mekele. But there's going to be ongoing problems.

One of the things that we're doing right -- that we're doing right now -- is giving half a million packets through World Vision. In fact, this is literally being done today. A half a million packets of oral rehydration salts will be given to World Vision to be delivered into that country. Diarrhea is a major problem for kids that come into these camps and a major killer during these days when we're trying to get the food into the children to revive them. And these packets are helpful.

We're going to be doing that kind of thing day-by-day. It's going to be -- it's really a gigantic process. Somebody will remember that just last week we diverted a ship on high seas that was on its way to India to get food into Ethiopia. We're making adjustments every day, and in no way would I suggest the crisis is over. And it's clear that people are dying in Ethiopia today.

I'm commited, as Secretary Block, and certainly the President has made abundently clear -- he's committed to doing everything we can do to save those children and those people.

Q There are thousands of rebels in Ethiopia that are not getting this food -- the Ethiopian government reportedly blocking this food from getting to them. The Ethiopian government is not exactly friendly with the United States. What are we doing to try to break that block and get that food through to thousands of rebels who are starving and not getting any of this food?

ADMINISTRATOR McPHERSON: One of the commitments that was made by the Ethiopian government when they were here, and publicly stated in the press conference in the State Department, was their commitment to deliver food to people in need without regard to any other consideration except need.

We expect to hold them to that commitment. We are -- "we" the U.S. government -- are providing a substantial amount of food to contested areas.

Q Are we doing anything to guarantee that that food gets through? Other than asking them to get it through?

ADMINISTRATOR McPHERSON: We're confident that the food is getting to people in need. The food that we are providing -- and we haven't discussed this extensively publicly -- but the food that we are providing -- is being provided not through the government of Ethiopia, but through private voluntary organizations. We're especially conscious of this concern and are tracking it closely here.

Q Could I have both of you comment on -- this process will feed people until they're hungry again and will have to be renewed. How long do you expect the wheat reserve would hold out for this kind of emergency need?

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ADMINISTRATOR McPHERSON: Go ahead.

SECRETARY BLOCK: Let me just say that we have abundant stocks of food in the United States of America. And there are large stocks of food in Europe. And the Western world has no shortage of food, and we have plenty of food to help these people for an extended period of time if that's necessary, and it probably will be necessary. At the same time, I think we all know that the long-range objective would be developments, rather than dependency, in these countries. And that has to be part of the longer range process. But right now, we just have to feed people.

Q Secretary Block, don't you have a problem with the Hickenlooper Amendment, preventing us to go in with development aid, because we don't have agreement on some property they've taken over in Ethiopia?

ADMINISTRATOR McPHERSON: There are two questions -- two problems that prohibit us from, at this time, providing development assistance to Ethiopia. For all of you here, let me make that distinction. Disaster assistance can be provided under the law to any country, and that is the essence of the President's philosophy of "a hungry child knows no politics." We provide assistance to starving kids regardless of their government.

Now, when we go beyond that, and we try to work long-term development, then the law prohibits us from providing assistance to countries that have expropriated property, and haven't,

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in a timely and a proper fashion, compensated for that property -- property of U.S. citizens. And that's the Hickenlooper Amendment. In fact, the Kalamazoo Spice Company had property expropriated a few years ago and that matter has not been cleared up.

The second problem was what is called the Brook Amendment. The Brook Amendment prohibits the U.S. government from providing this long-range assistance when a foreign government is greatly in arrears on their payments to us for foreign aid that was given to them some time ago. And Ethiopia would be blocked from receiving assistance from us on either account.

Q Would you go over the numbers again one more time? 300,000 tons, and then $50 million in addition to 300,000 tons?

ADMINISTRATOR McPHERSON: That's correct.

Q And then, what other donors are providing this $100,000 to meet the pipeline needs per month, as you suggested?

ADMINISTRATOR McPHERSON: I'd like to talk --

Q What proportion of it is the United States and the other donors?

ADMINISTRATOR McPHERSON: Well, it varies by month. I think in December, we're providing about a third. In January, that percentage goes up some. In February, we provide a substantial portion of what's going in.

This effort for Ethiopia and the effort for Africa must, and is, a worldwide effort. A very important part of our program has been to try to get the world to work together to solve it.

In fact, I just came from -- I was in Paris yesterday morning with a group of heads of agencies around the world like mine, my counterparts from Europe and Japan and Austria, Australia, and other places, talking about this problem and figuring out how we can all pull together to solve it. It's very important that this be a worldwide effort.

Q Where did we get this $50 million? Would you explain that, please? And what the transfer does.

ADMINISTRATOR McPHERSON: Yes. There are basically -- this is abbrieviated -- but there are two types of food programs that the U.S. government has that the Agriculture committees on the Hill appropriate to Secretary Block's department.

One -- program one is a Title I program. This is food that is given to countries for them to sell within their country. And, essentially, it's balance of payment support for those countries because they can -- they don't have to use their own hard currency import.

The other program is what is called Title II. And this is the feeding program. This is -- and it's out of this Title II that you ordinarily -- you ordinarily take emergency assistance.

What the President did this morning -- the President and Secretary of Agriculture -- did really was to move $50 million out of this balance of payments account into this feeding account.

Q Well, what will that money be used for?

ADMINISTRATOR McPHERSON: It will be used -- what will it be taken from?

Q What will it be used for?

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ADMINISTRATOR McPHERSON: It will be used to feed children and feed people.

Q Specifically. I mean, since you're providing grain, are you purchasing other food with that money or paying for transportation, perhaps?

SECRETARY BLOCK: Well, it will be providing -- probably mostly grain, but there may be something in addition to that. And it will be determined certainly primarily on the basis of the needs of the specific countries. Some countries have certain needs and others may have different needs in terms of food. And I would say it would be mostly grain, though.

Q What is the impact of taking $50 million out of Title I?

ADMINISTRATOR McPHERSON: There was a Title I reserve that Congress appropriated last year that was unallocated. It had not been allocated to any specific country. And it will be taken, as we've just indicated, from this Title I account, not taken from any other -- any country around the world, and put in this Title II. It could be used, as the Secretary just indicated, for a variety of things.

One of the types of food we're giving most to these countries is enriched food -- grain enriched with soy meal -- so as to be high protein. And the high protein is particularly helpful for children that are -- that have gone on some time without adequate food.

Q The question is the use of the money, I think. The $50 million is going to be used for transportation mostly?

ADMINISTRATOR McPHERSON: It will be used for -- largely for food, but some of it could be used for transportation. You maybe will recall that the President asked for authority to shift around Title II monies last year so that some of that could be used directly for transportation.

Q So the 300,000 tons is in addition to that?

ADMINISTRATION McPHERSON: In addition to --

Q The 300,000 is going to also go to Ethiopia, or where-have-you. Okay. So --

ADMINISTRATOR McPHERSON: There's two accounts --

Q The value is $50 million plus the value of 300,000 --

ADMINISTRATOR McPHERSON: That's exactly right.

Q What is that value when you add freight and everything else? What are we talking about?

ADMINISTRATOR McPHERSON: The 300,000 ton? It would depend, but it probably would be about a couple hundred million dollars.

Q A couple hundred million?

ADMINSTRATOR McPHERSON: Yes.

Q Secretary Block, on the other kinds of food, any chance any area, surplus here will be -- can any of those products be given?

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SECRETARY BLOCK: We have 416 Title in the law that gives us the authority to give away dairy products to hungry and needy people and we have been doing that

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and we will continue to do that on the basis of need and demand wherever it may be. And it does help to reduce our stocks, and we'll put that surplus to a very good use.

Q Are you sending any to Ethiopia? Can it be used --

SECRETARY BLOCK: I don't know if it's going to Ethiopia --

ADMINISTRATOR MCPHERSON: We've delivered -- we're in the process of giving some milk to Ethiopia out of 416.

SECRETARY BLOCK: -- okay.

Q Secretary Block, at the same time that the President is appropriating this additional aid to help the starving people in Africa, we're told that he also made a final decision with regard to you this morning on farm price supports to cut them in half. I want to know first of all your reaction. Can you live with that? More importantly, is this causing outrage among farmers?

SECRETARY BLOCK: Well, let me say first of all I have been working with the White House on this farm program proposal for some weeks now. And the budget that was proposed has got more in it than the farm program portion of the budget or the commodity portion. And we're still looking at the details of it, but I am very much committed to bringing down government spending and getting the deficit under control. And that's the President's desire; that's my desire.

And, I might also add, American agriculture will receive the greatest benefit in terms of a lift to the farm economy if we can indeed successfully attack the budget deficits which should help to bring interest rates down and improve the currency relationship to the United States and other countries. So, American Agriculture will be accepting, along with other departments, a certain number of reductions -- some cases freezes in specific parts of the budget -- and that, I think, will be accepted by he industry.

Q After looking --

Q Don't you fear a backlash from farmers with the farm price supports literally in half? I mean, you're --

MR. SIMS: Can we --

Q -- their representative.

SECRETARY BLOCK: I don't think that --

MR. SIMS: -- not on the subject --

SECRETARY BLOCK: I don't think that that evaluation on the numbers is necessarily exactly right. But over a period of time, yes. I think they can be expected to be reduced as much as half. And that would be no new news because I've said before that we need to reduce the cost of government farm programs and return agriculture to a market-oriented system and be competitive in international trade. So, it'd be nothing new.

Q But you don't feel that betrays any of the President's election year promises to the farmers to help them out? He went to so many farm states.

SECRETARY BLOCK: Absolutely not. I have preached myself my commitment to market orientation for agriculture in this country. I've said over and over again that we need to be competitive in international trade. I've expressed on a constant basis my desire to bring down the cost of all government programs, and Agriculture, I said, is willing to take its lumps along with the rest. And we're prepared to do that as we address a very serious deficit question in this country.

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Q Are you planning to appeal anything you were told this morning in terms of cuts?

SECRETARY BLOCK: I'm still reviewing the whole thing.

MR. SIMS: Any other questions on food aid or --

Q Well, what might that mean to wheat prices, sir? What might this mean to wheat prices?

SECRETARY BLOCK: It won't mean anything to wheat prices -- this decision today. We have --

Q Could you possibly say that into the mikes? I'm sorry.

SECRETARY BLOCK: All right.

The President's decision to make these additional grants to the needy countries will not have any impact on wheat prices. We have abundant stocks of virtually all grains. Thank you.

Q Secretary Block, I think there was an inaccuracy, you know, in the figures that, you know, McPherson said and that ought to be cleared up.

SECRETARY BLOCK: -- get Peter to tell you --

Q -- the $200 million for that, 300,000 is enough.

Q That's $66 million for a --

ADMINISTRATOR McPHERSON: I was wrong. We need to correct that.

SECRETARY BLOCK: I think it'd be more like --

ADMINISTRATOR McPHERSON: Yes, it's about $75 million.

Q For the grain alone -- 300,000 tons?

ADMINISTRATOR McPHERSON: The grain is $50 million, and the freight is about $25 million.

Q Yes.

Q So, it's $75,000 for 300,000 --

ADMINISTRATOR McPHERSON: -- $75 million.

Q -- million for the 300 -- yes.

Q Mr. McPherson, what is your understanding --

Q So, can we say accurately it's $125 million?

ADMINISTRATOR McPHERSON: That's what we --

Q For the total, for the $50 million and --

ADMINISTRATOR McPHERSON: I -- how would -- are you willing to put a value on the wheat?

SECRETARY BLOCK: Well --

ADMINISTRATOR McPHERSON: That's --

SECRETARY BLOCK: -- you're pretty close to being right on that -- $125 million altogether.

Q Mr. McPherson --

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SECRETARY BLOCK: Let's go with your figures.

(Laughter.)

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 2:38 P.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release December 6, 1984

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
LARRY SPEAKES, SENATOR ROBERT DOLE AND CONGRESSMAN ROBERT H. MICHEL ON THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH THE REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP

The Briefing Room

10:56 A.M. EST

MR. SPEAKES: The President met with the Republican leaders of the Senate and the House today.

The President told the leaders, "The people have made it plain. First, we must reduce the federal deficit. There is no alternative to spending controls. We must not spend one nickel more next year than we spent this year.

"Second," he said, "we must continue the economic growth, with no tax increase. And I underline, 'no tax increase.' If we work together," he told the leaders, "it can be done. I am willing to lead," the President said, "I am willing to lead the charge and to go to the people. We face a time of critical choice. It is a moment in history when we say, 'If not us, who? If not now, when?'"

The meeting lasted 90 minutes. OMB Director Stockman took an hour to review the working paper, which was 20 pages long. It was an overview of the preliminary decisions the President has made with his Budget Working Group. And then there was discussion by the leadership.

We have with us Senator Dole, the Senate Republican leader, and Congressman Michel, the House Republican leader, who will review the discussion.

Q Do you think somebody could get that statement?

Q Senator Dole --

SENATOR DOLE: Yes.

Q He's willing to lead the charge; but he's not up for reelection anymore.

SENATOR DOLE: Well --

Q Senator Dole, can you sell it?

Q That's easy enough for him to say.

Q Can you sell it without a decision on defense, and with no tax increase?

SENATOR DOLE: Well, I think the indication was that, obviously, we're going to address defense. Secretary Weinberger's not in the country now, I think is the reason we didn't get into that. But it's a challenge. And I think it's also an opportunity for many of us to fulfill campaign speeches with some action around the Congress. So, yes, I think it's -- Not in every case, obviously, there may be some changes, modifications. But it's still in that -- still in the stage of preparing it. Nothing's in cement, and we'll

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still have input throughout next week.

Q But do you actually think that these --

Q -- do you think --

Q -- from what you've seen of the kinds of domestic cuts that you were briefed on, is this the kind of plan that Congress will go along with, or has the President and Stockman picked out a lot of those sacred cows and things that Congress has refused to cut for four years?

SENATOR DOLE: Well, obviously, Congress probably wouldn't go along with everything; but there may be other ideas and I haven't -- we haven't discussed it with each other; but --

Q Well, what's your overall assessment of these kinds of cuts, though? Are they --

SENATOR DOLE: My overall assessment is it's a very good start and that we have an obligation, too. I think nearly every member of Congress who was running for reelection was talking about deficits and cutting spending, freezing -- and these are freeze plus. There are some terminations. There are some modifications. But, you know, I think everybody in the room was upbeat about the general effort.

Q Senator, do you think --

Q Mr. Michel. Can we hear --

Q -- this can be done --

Q -- Mr. Michel's assessment?

Q Do you think this can be done --

Q Well, can we have --

Q -- without a tax increase --

Q Mr. --

Q -- Senator Dole?

SENATOR DOLE: Well, yes.

Q Mr. Michel --

Q You do? Wait one second. You do think this could be done without a tax increase?

SENATOR DOLE: My view is that we don't talk about tax changes because if you start that, somebody's going to start dropping all the spending items. Let's get the spending items done, see where we are, and then we'll go back to the last resort, resort.

Q But you have said in the past that you think we're going to need a tax increase. Have you changed your mind, or where are you on that?

Q What about Jerry Ford's one year --

Q Excuse me.

Q -- increase?

SENATOR DOLE: I haven't changed my mind. I've just suggested that the President is going to give us a program that I think we can -- we have an opportunity of getting to pass.

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Q Mr. Michel --

Q What about the Ford --

Q -- Mr. Michel's --

CONGRESSMAN MICHEL: Well, let me just say that I think in a generic sense the freeze concept, you know, generally sets well with the American people, and -- However, when you get to the individual specifics, you know, my Adam's apple was gurgitated and I had to swallow it again -- (laughter) -- on a few of these items. But I think when you spread that around in an even sort of way, I think it'll take some time until that takes hold. And we're going to make our best effort to doing that --

Q What is the toughest to swallow?

CONGRESSMAN MICHEL: Excuse me?

Q What's the hardest part to swallow?

CONGRESSMAN MICHEL: Well, I don't know that I want to set out any specific one because you've got a whole array of them, and somebody else's cup of tea is another's poison. And so -- but when you average it all out, and I think that's one of the things we're going to have to sell our individual members, each one of us then, after you average it out, has taken his kind of hurt. But collectively --

Q Senator Dole.

CONGRESSMAN MICHEL: -- it gets you to a point where you want to be out there without a tax increase. And if there was any mandate, I'll tell you, out there with the American people on that one issue between Mondale and the President -- And so we'll have to give it our best shot.

Q -- gets you --

Q Well, what about asking federal employees to take a five percent pay cut?

CONGRESSMAN MICHEL: Excuse me?

Q What about asking federal employees to take a five percent pay cut, is that fair?

CONGRESSMAN MICHEL: I understand that -- there's some imagery connected with that at the top, because I would assume we get to that area that means all of us at the top. Now, how many times have we heard out there from constituents, "Well, you fellows, you know, if you'd just take the lead out there and show some dent of effort on your own part, maybe the rest of us would fall in line.

SENATOR DOLE: In fact, I'd suggest that probably -- at least we discussed it yesterday on our side -- that members of Congress would take a 10 percent cut, and those in high places.

And, of course, the alternative is is losing jobs. I mean, it's going to be one or the other. We're either going to try to do it with pay restraint, or I assume they'll be -- the federal work force will be made smaller.

Q So we can assume that you like -- that you will go for the five percent cut --

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SENATOR DOLE: We're going to try to go for all of it. I mean, I kept hearing somebody next to me last night -- kept saying "Amtrack" in her sleep, but you know -- (Laughter.)

Q Can I get this straight -- you're going to go for all the cuts the President has proposed? Is that correct?

SENATOR DOLE: Well, we're not there yet, I mean --

Q You said you were going to go for all of them --

SENATOR DOLE: When we get down to the final package -- this is the interim package.

Q Senator, is this going to be a more difficult package to sell to Congress than the '81 budget cuts?

SENATOR DOLE: Well, it probably -- again, if we match our campaign rhetoric with the package it would be very easy, but I'm afraid some may forget what they've said when they were running for reelection.

Q Why -- is this a more middle class package than the '81 package?

SENATOR DOLE: Well, this is going to hit everyone. And you know, I'm from the farm area, and there is a big, big cut in farm subsidies --

CONGRESSMAN MICHEL: Yes -- and the --

SENATOR DOLE: -- and it's up and down the line. It's directed, at least the proposal, is to help the small farmer and the bigger farmer is not in the program. He's going to receive no direct benefit.

Q What will happen --

CONGRESSMAN MICHEL: And at that time -- at that time there was much more fat from which you could make a reduction than now after having pared down that 13, 14, 15 percent growth, down to something less than half of that. Unfortunately, however, in '85, when you look at some of those figures and add-on's from the Congress -- we're back up to about 13 percent growth -- so --

Q What will have to be done with Defense.

SENATOR DOLE: Considerable.

Q I mean, is $8 billion enough, Senator?

SENATOR DOLE: Well, again -- you mean in defense?

Q Yes.

SENATOR DOLE: I don't know whether that's been even suggested, but there is a difference between the $34 billion and the $42 billion that they hope to reach, so --

Q What about in the out years? Isn't that where it really becomes --

SENATOR DOLE: I think that's true in most cases --

Q Would you like to see a freeze in defense spending?

SENATOR DOLE: Well, again, we haven't discussed defense, so I guess what -- most of us, in fact, a number spoke up today -- we want to see that addressed. We're not going to run off with this package without defense in it, and obviously that's not the intent of

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the President. It just happens that the Secretary of Defense is not available right now.

Q Is it clear to you, then, that the President is going to agree to some defense cuts?

CONGRESSMAN MICHEL: Well, I'm inclined to think he's certainly gotten a message from people he relies on pretty heavily in the Congress that, unless there is some give there, it's kind of unrealistic to expect that you can do the other things. And so, for the moment, I think that's the way we'd prefer to leave it, and particularly, as Bob says, with --

Q The reason we ask is because we have not been able to really ascertain, in this press room, how the President feels about any defense cuts.

And we just wondered, did you have any kind of expression from him that would give you an idea?

CONGRESSMAN MICHEL: That would really be conjecture on our part, because for this morning, that was not the topic of conversation.

Q What about the Dominici plan to include Social Security? Did that come up? And what do you all think of that?

SENATOR DOLE: Are you talking about COLA's?

Q Yes.

SENATOR DOLE: Well, that's a rather big item at $7 billion, and $10 billion, and $10 billion. But again, the President reiterated what he'd said in the campaign before about benefits. But I'd be -- so that's sort of where we left it. I mean, I think there is a general feeling that, at least we ought to take a look at that, to see whether there is any bipartisan support on the Hill. But the President hasn't suggested that at all.

Q Would the Hill cut -- would Congress get out front on that, and then perhaps he would go along with it? I mean, what is your sense of --

SENATOR DOLE: No, I'm not suggesting that. I'm just saying that I think if -- it has been looked at in Congress before. In fact, there are Democrats and Republicans who suggested it last year -- but this is sort of an emergency measure. And I think we have to treat it that way. Obviously, every group's going to jump and scream and kick when they see their little item in the list.

Q Well, do you agree that the list --

Q -- Social Security ought to be --

Q Let me finish.

Q Do you agree that Social Security ought to -- excuse me -- do you agree that Social Security ought to be included --

Q Now, girls --

Q Ladies.

SENATOR DOLE: Well, I don't have any -- my view is that -- it's my view that basic benefits are protected, COLA's or something else -- and maybe we ought to take a look at COLA's.

Q Senator, do you think this can move through in one -- one piece of legislation? One measure? As some think -- the Democrats are saying, "No, we want to piecemeal it through," -- or,

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how do you think it will go?

SENATOR DOLE: I just haven't focused on it. I'd like to have one vote, but obviously -- a voice vote if we could work it out. (Laughter.)

Q Do either of you agree with Senator Goldwater that the MX should be scrapped?

CONGRESSMAN MICHEL: Well, I was rather shocked to, I guess, read that this morning. But that didn't come up at all today, and frankly, I would -- it would be my intention to be brushing by a few other members to see what their reaction was on that, because, for me -- we were talking about the possibility, obviously, that with additional seats in the house, and that being a very narrow vote the last time around, whether that was the key as to whether or not, you know, it flew or did not fly.

When you have one with the credentials of Barry Goldwater making a public statement like that, it forces a guy -- a leader -- counting noses to go -- "Hey, did that make any points with you?" or, "Does it affect you one way or another?" I'd have to make an assessment.

Q Senator Dole, how do you feel?

Q -- are you talking about federal salaries --

Q Let me -- let me ask Senator Dole to respond --

SENATOR DOLE: I heard Senator Goldwater express that yesterday. I'm not certain I share that view; but, again, he'll be Chairman of the Armed Services Committee. It seemed to me that that might not -- he's talking about -- our first action comes -- when -- next March?

CONGRESSMAN MICHEL: Yes, March.

SENATOR DOLE: I think that's a matter that the administration probably will discuss with Senator Goldwater. (Laughter.)

Q You're not certain you share the view? Which means what?

SENATOR DOLE: Means I have have a different view.

Q You don't agree with Senator Goldwater --

SENATOR DOLE: I don't agree.

Q All right.

Q Can you two really sum up how you feel about this budget -- I mean, I'm a little confused. The budget cuts the President has proposed -- are you going to go for them?

SENATOR DOLE: Well, I think my view is, until we get the final package, then -- yes, when we have the final package, and we've had our input, and the President says, "Go," then we've got to go.

Now, there may be some changes along the way, but --

Q What's your view --

CONGRESSMAN MICHEL: Well, in my judgment we've got to give encouragement to that process, because it's our obligation, our responsibility. We can't sit on our haunches and expect something good to happen. It doesn't happen that way, and some of us have to take the point and the heat, and we're prepared to -- some of us --

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are prepared to do that.

Q Senator, you say considerable things need to be done to the defense budget. What do you mean?

SENATOR DOLE: A lot. You know, and I think we've got to find some real money.

Q How much?

SENATOR DOLE: Well, I haven't got any numbers; I'll leave that up to the experts. But -- rather substantial --

Q More than $8 billion?

SENATOR DOLE: Well, you're not going to get much more than that the first year. I think it's the out years where you pick up --

Q Senator Dole --

Q This past weekend you were talking about -- if you're going to get $10 billion, $20 billion, $30 billion, $40 billion dollars out of the defense budget, you're going to have to talk about some major programs -- do you still feel that way?

SENATOR DOLE: I don't think I mentioned that. I said $30 billion, $40 billion, of $50 billion dollars -- that's a lot of stretch in there.

Q Do you disagree with Goldwater on freezing the defense budget?

SENATOR DOLE: Well, it's a little more difficult to freeze a defense budget. And, as you'd find -- if you've all looked at this list of things -- maybe you'll surely all have this -- you take just the plain -- sort of the push-button freeze, that's only about 17 percent of the savings. You've got to reform, terminate, modify a lot of programs; and you'd have to do the same on the defense side.

MR. SPEAKES: Let's take Andrea for the last question.

Q If the President doesn't make a commitment to cut defense by that kind of money over the next three years, will you all take the leadership and do it for him?

CONGRESSMAN MICHEL: I didn't hear the first part of the question.

Q If the President doesn't reach the decision --

CONGRESSMAN MICHEL: Yes --

Q -- to cut defense -- not necessarily in this first year, but the long term -- by $20 billion or $30 billion more in years two and three --

CONGRESSMAN MICHEL: Well, without mentioning a particular figure, I think the Congress has demonstrated within the last year, particularly, that we had our own ideas and feelings about authorization levels in some areas and appropriation levels in some, and made those adjustments to the degree that that earlier talked about 18 or 19 percent came down to 13 percent, down to 7 percent, to roughly 5 percent. So --

Q The answer is --

CONGRESSMAN MICHEL: -- I think that demonstrates that there is some capacity on the part of the Congress to make its wishes

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known in no uncertain terms. It really does reflect itself eventually, and ultimately, in dollars and cents.

SENATOR DOLE: And I think the important thing -- whatever comes should be a credible effort. We're not playing the game of -- come in high, and we'll go down low. Our view is that -- this is it. This is a credible package, and hopefully we'll all be able to sign off on it and not start playing a Congressional game with the White House.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 11:10 A.M. PST

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BACKGROUND BRIEFING
SECRETARY SHULTZ TRIP TO LONDON, BRUSSELS, BONN
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1984, 11:10 A. M.

MR. JOE REAP: Good morning. This is a BACKGROUND briefing on the upcoming North Atlantic Council meeting.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I'll go through as this rapidly as I can, and then try to answer any of your questions. This is a normal sort of run-through that we do prior to these NATO Ministerials.

Sandwiching the Ministerial meeting in Brussels are visits to London and Bonn. It will begin in London with a meeting with Foreign Minister Howe, Tuesday, December 11. The meeting will take place outside of London at a country estate, with the emphasis on informal discussions on East-West relations and arms control as well as bilateral questions. Obviously, the upcoming talks in Geneva will be a prime issue on the Secretary's, and I would assume the Foreign Secretary's agendas.

From Britain the Secretary will travel on December 12 to Brussels, where he will have bilateral talks with the leaders of the Belgian Government, including Prime Minister Martens. Again, East-West relations and arms control will be key questions on their agenda. There has been, as you know, some heightened attention to the question of INF deployment, preparations for deployment in Belgium, and I'm sure that question will be addressed in the Martens-Shultz meeting on the 12th.

On the evening of the 12th the Secretary will kick off his participation in the NATO Ministerial with the traditional quadripartite foreign ministers' dinner. That's with the German, French and British Foreign Ministers, and this meeting is principally a review of the situation in Berlin. For those of you who have followed events in Berlin recently, there is a longer list of topics to take up than is normally the case concerning Berlin, and, of course, the broader inter-German relationship.

During the NATO Ministerial itself, in addition to the large meetings -- so-called super-restricted sessions that take place which allow a multilateral exchange -- the Secretary will have several bilateral meetings, including with Secretary General Carrington and the Dutch, Spanish, Turkish, German, Greek, Portuguese, Italian and Canadian Foreign Ministers. In the larger NATO meetings, again, this Ministerial provides an unusually good opportunity to consult on U.S. preparations for the Geneva talks and to listen to allied views on East-West relations and arms control.

In addition to that subject, there will be a military briefing for Foreign Ministers on the military balance in Europe, and I expect some discussion of decisions taken this week by the Defense Ministers on the importance of upgrading NATO conventional defenses. So while the Geneva talks on arms control will be primary subjects, NATO conventional defenses will also, I think, receive attention by the Foreign Ministers.

Immediately following the NATO Ministerial meeting on Friday afternoon, December 14, the Secretary will participate in another traditional meeting, or what is really becoming a traditional meeting, and that is a Ministerial meeting with the members of the European Community Commission. In addition to the Secretary, Secretaries Baldridge and Block, and Special Trade Representative Brock, as well as Deputy Secretary of the Treasury McNamara will participate in the meetings with the Commission. The Secretary will have a separate meeting with the President of the Commission, Gaston Thorne.

These are regular high-level consultations between the United States and the Community, which are important for managing the commercial relationship. As you know, the European Community is going through an enlargement process -- the admission of Portugal and Spain, which raises important trade questions for the United States -- so this will be, I think, a key question on the agenda as well as combatting protectionism.

Following that session on Friday afternoon and in the evening, the Secretary of State will fly to the Federal Republic of Germany on Saturday, December 15, where he will meet with Chancellor Kohl at Kohl's home in Ludwigshafen. That will continue the discussions that were held here last week with the Chancellor, and again I expect amongst other issues that the Geneva talks will receive a lot of attention.

With that, I'll try to answer any questions you might have on the Secretary's visit to Europe.

Q How explicit do you anticipate you will be able to be with the allies in terms of defining what your Geneva positions are going to be? Are you going to try to lay it out in detail, or are you going to keep it very general so it doesn't end up on the front pages?

A Let me just say that we have been very successful, I think, in our consultative processes with the allies, as I think can be demonstrated by the INF experience during 1983. Nearly every important arms control initiative that we have taken has been taken not only with the knowledge but also the views and recommendations of our key allies, and I expect that to continue.

I can't really say how explicit we can be at this particular meeting. It will depend on decisions that may or may not be taken, but, as the consultative process continues beyond this meeting, we certainly want to inform our allies of what decisions the President has taken and also listen to their views.

Following this NATO Ministerial, for example, there will be a meeting, I think on December 20, of the NATO Special Consultative Group which focuses on INF and arms control. As you know, Mrs. Thatcher will be here on December 22, and that will be opportunity to consult, as well as the visit on January 2 of Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone.

Q Will you at this point have a government-wide Administration position on arms control?

A I think it's fair to say that process is -- that such a position is in the process of being formed. At the various meetings that are under way, discussions are being held that are designed to produce that.

Q Can you say at this point whether there will be consultation with the Allies, either -- well, probably not before, but right after the Geneva meetings, in terms of either Shultz himself or someone from the party returning, or will you be scheduling that?

A I would simply say it's looking a little far ahead, Ralph, but I will say that I can't remember an important high-level U.S.-Soviet exchange which hasn't then led to a debriefing to our key allies. I'm quite confident that will be the case following the meetings in Geneva on the 7th and 8th.

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Q Is there anything else you can us that you would be telling the allies perhaps about the scheduling of the Geneva sessions? In other words, the 7th and 8th are Gromyko and Shultz. Will there be other things around that, perhaps with allies present in Geneva, or --

A Well, I think I've listed some of the --

Q Well, aside from the ones that are visiting here.

A Well, I just can't say at this stage. I'm not really able to say.

Q Since some of the key players of World War II will be at the Brussels meeting, do you expect the German suggestion of commemorating VE-Day will be explored there?

A Well, I have to first of all say I have never heard that expression "key players" used in the context of a war --

Q Well --

A -- but --

Q -- war is just a game, as Nelson said.

A I guess so. But I'm quite sure that there will be discussions of VE-Day and commemorating VE-Day -- just as there were during the visit by the Chancellor, I think both in NATO Ministerial and in the Secretary's discussions with the British Foreign Secretary, as well as the Chancellor in Ludwigshafen.

Q Does -- sorry.

Q Are we going into the military balance briefing with the suggested outline for improvement of the NATO conventional defenses?

A Well, that process is really already under way within the defense ministers' committees -- the military committees --

Q Do we have anything to add to it at this point?

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A -- and when I say a "military briefing," this is not a U.S. military briefing. This will be a NATO military briefing provided by the international staff of the Alliance. And, boy, I'm glad that I've asked you that question!

This is not a U.S. undertaking or a U.S. initiative. What we see is I think a common desire on both sides of the Atlantic to enhance conventional capabilities, to raise the nuclear threshold. And while this is principally a defense undertaking, we think it's important though that the political aspects of this issue be addressed in the foreign ministers' meeting.

Q How does the enlargement of the EEC affect trade, the U.S. trade interests --

A Well --

Q -- and, second, what will be the main issues of the talk -- the meeting -- between Secretary Shultz and Moran Lopez, Prime Minister?

A Well, we have trade agreements with both Spain and Portugal, which can be directly or indirectly influenced by decisions taken by the Community, and Spain of course will, about the pricing of their products, if and when those countries enter the Community.

So I would just put -- I will just say just very generally -- while we support the enlargement process, we don't necessarily want to pay for it.

So this is something that we need to discuss not only with the Spaniards and the Portuguese but with the Commission itself.

But there are a range of issues that will clearly come up in the talks with the Commission: obviously, the fact that the Secretary of Agriculture is there when there's an agricultural question, and the concerns that we have had over a possible protectionist action taken by the Europeans on American agriculture; imports; the general question of protectionism -- more specifically, the problem which has emerged more recently on steel, on European imports here.

So those are all questions -- and in some ways, as you know, are fairly sensitive ones -- but this is a good opportunity to diffuse these problems. I would say that this is one of those unsung successes really of the U.S.-European relationship over the last two or three years in that we we have really avoided, at a time when protectionist pressures were very intense, any serious trade wars between the United States and Europe. And I think it's in part because of these discussions which we've annually held which have led to follow-on discussions and mechanisms for resolving these disputes.

Q You said -- I'm sorry, I had another question but a follow-up on the trade question -- you said that the U.S. doesn't want to pay for the announcement of the EEC. Does that mean that the U.S. would have to renegotiate its trade agreements with Spain and Portugal or renegotiate the EEC agreements?

A No. It would be --as I understand it, we would have to examine whether we would have to renegotiate agreements with Spain and Portugal.

Q And Secretary Shultz and Moran, Spanish Prime Minister -- what would be the main issue; I guess NATO -- and what would be the main point by the Secretary?

A Well, I think the main point there would be what it's been for some time -- which is that we think that Spain should remain a member of the Alliance -- and we think our view: while this is a decision the Spanish Government, the Spanish people, have to take, our view is that a fully integrated Spanish membership in the Alliance would be preferable to the current situation.

Do you have anything that you would say on the role of Greece in NATO? Do we expect them to be a problem at all as we get prepared for the Geneva discussions?

A No. I don't expect they will be a problem.

Q The fact that they've taken exceptions in the past on the communiques -- does that continue to be any sort of a problem for us as we approach this meeting? And --

A I don't pay much attention to Greek reservations.

Q Is Shultz going to have a bilateral with them?

A He is meeting the Greek Foreign Minister.

Q You've mentioned the unusual agenda on the Berlin dinner this year. Can you be more specific on what some of this is?

A Well, there's been a lot of activity in the inter-German relationship. Of course, the whole question of, say, for example, the cancellation of the Honecker -- this gives the German Foreign Minister an opportunity to brief the three occupying powers in Berlin on German thinking, West German thinking on the inter-German relationship.

It also gives the occupying powers an opportunity to talk with the West Germans on developments in Berlin -- there have been some problems which have been reported in the press, for instance -- and Berlin air reservations on --

Q Is that possible?

A -- air corridors. And this is something that I know the ministers will want to discuss.

Q Hasn't that been solved, by the way? I mean --

A No.

Q -- there were no -- oh.

Q How much do you expect to get into an itemized discussion of future military programs, conventional weaponry, that the U.S. would like to see in Europe?

A Not in a foreign ministers' meeting. This is really more of a bailiwick for the defense ministers. But it is important though that the foreign ministers do address the broad question of NATO defense policy in Europe.

Q Will Ambassador Nitze be along on this trip at all?

A I'm not sure. I think you should check with the Press Office. I believe he will be, but you really should -- the Press Office should have something on that.

Q Do you expect much discussion in Brussels about Soviet compliance with existing arms control accords -- and, specifically, the question of SSX-25 -- raised?

A Well, I can't say. We will be prepared to address the compliance question. It is a serious problem.

Q Will we have any discussions with the Dutch on their deployment decision?

A Well, there will be --

Q Will this be an issue?

A -- there will be, I think, a bilateral meeting with Foreign Minister van den Broek; and I'm quite sure that the INF issue will come up in that meeting.

Q Do you expect to hear from any of the other participants at NATO any kind of advance word on Soviet positions in Geneva? Have any of them been in Moscow lately or received messages that you would expect to hear about at this NATO session?

A No, I can't think of any recent visits. Mr. Gorbachev is going to be in London for a week prior to Mrs. Thatcher's visit here. But, no, I couldn't say whether or not any of the other allies will have more insight into what the Soviets will bring to Geneva than we would.

Q How is the U.S. viewing the Belgium decision not to make a decision for awhile on the missile?

A Well, we just -- we would expect that the Belgians continue to adhere to the December '79 decision, and we would expect that they deploy on schedule.

Q Thanks.

A O.K.?

(BACKGROUND briefing concluded at 11:28 a.m.)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON SOUTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS

December 7, 1984

The Briefing Room

12:07 P.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I guess, if we're all seated, I'd like to give a bit of a readout on the meetings that have taken place this morning with Bishop Tutu of South Africa.

The Bishop had about a half an hour of discussion in the Oval Office with the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and others present. And then the meeting continued in the Vice President's office for, oh, I'd say, approximately another hour, after which he, the Bishop, made some remarks to the press which you've all, I assume, heard.

The President also took a few questions in the press conference on the subject of his meeting this morning, so I won't repeat that ground. But I think the President and Bishop Tutu both felt that the meeting was useful. It was described, I think, by both as a good meeting. There was a good chance from the meeting to make each other aware of assumptions and to exchange assessments.

The President emphasized, as I believe he did with -- in his press conference, that we believe that our policy is having results, that we're on the right course. From our standpoint, we would add that we think it is, therefore, the right policy.

The President indicated interest in the ideas that the Bishop put forward and some of the points that he made in his own remarks about things that he would like to see established as targets for accomplishment are, of course, things, as the President said, which we are already doing through one channel or another.

The President emphasized at considerable length the importance of our being there rather than walking away and being absent, not being a player in the scene in Southern Africa. He emphasized, as well, the key importance of private diplomacy or quiet diplomacy as a means of getting things done and the inherent dilemma that that creates when people ask, as they have every right to do, for examples of what is being achieved.

I think if there was one most striking impression that both the President and the Vice President, in their meetings, would take from these exchanges, it would be the point about perceptions and communication. And as the President made clear to me in discussions over here earlier this week, and to others, we have a strong policy; we are proud of that policy, we want it to be understood, and we are determined to make it understood.

That applies not only, of course, here, but, more importantly perhaps, in South Africa, amongst various audiences there. So we will be looking at ways to make it clear what it is we have been doing, what it is we have been accomplishing, and what assumptions we're operating on.

Q Well, why don't you start right now?

Q Yes.

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Q What accomplishments have you made and exactly what are you doing?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll get to the questions in just a second. I want to make certain I give you a full sense of the meeting.

I think the President stressed in his discussions, as did the Vice President, how strongly we feel not only about the system that we're talking about -- a system based on legally entrenched racism -- but how strongly we feel about things that take place, including repressive moves that we've seen in recent weeks and months, including the effects that policies can have on family life, such things as forced removals which we have spoken out on many times and will, of course, continue to do so.

Q Where do you speak out on those? I must have missed it.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll now go to questions. Do you want to be the first question?

Q Well, I'd love to hear what you have said and what you have to say specifically about the forced removals. I've never heard you say anything.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, of course, we're dealing here with a press corps which is not at the regular briefings that are given in the State Department necessarily. But I would venture to say that there is no government in the world that has spoken out more frequently on some of these kinds of events that concern us than our own. And those statements, of course, are carried not only here in our noon briefings, they're carried through our information services overseas, they're carried by our embassies overseas.

We are cited on many occasions by white and black South Africans alike as being the first to speak out on forced removals, which I think anyone would agree are an unacceptable approach to resolving problems.

Q Well, what do you say? What is it that we say?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We say that we cannot condone and we deplore the forced removals of settled black communities of part of a doctrine of, in effect, denationalizing South African citizens. We reject the homelands policy, and have made that known at all levels, privately and publicly.

Q Do you have --

Q The thing that's a little confusing is that you're talking about how strongly and forcefully we've talked out, using words like "not condone" and "deplore." Then the President comes in here and promotes -- and talks about how important it is to have quiet diplomacy. That's a little confusing. I wonder if we could just maybe fumble it and say what comes out the other end in terms of accomplishment; what, in fact, has our policy, whatever exactly it is, accomplished?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'll be glad to get to that, and, in fact, the question came up the other day and we know that people are interested in the answer to it. So I'll be happy to get to it.

But let me just say at the outset that, as the President indicated, there is an inherent dilemma when you are conducting a policy that is based essentially on quiet diplomacy. If we were to take every occasion that comes up, every event that occurs, and issue a litany of rhetorical statements, we would be eroding our diplomatic capital. So we do, in fact, prefer, and as a matter of preference, to use the diplomatic channel.

But we also recognize that people must understand in a general sense what it is we're doing, what we stand for, what we stand against. And so we obviously have to make choices on a regular basis as to when we speak out and when we don't. But when it comes to the kinds of

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things that have been cited in previous questions, such as forced removals, such as the detentions of labor leaders, such as the killings of blacks in disturbances and so forth, we have been as clear as anyone could ask us to be.

Yes, sir -- you had your hand up.

Q Well, what about his question?

Q How about the accomplishments?

Q -- the accomplishments -- you say you'd be glad to get to his, to the accomplishments?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, let me do that in a fuller sense, then, right now. The President has cited, in his answer to questions, too, that we considered to be extremely important. In fact, if one wants to look at the origins of constructive engagement as a policy, it is the investment philosophy of U.S. private firms in their overwhelming majority in South Africa.

Q Wasn't that goal before this administration, Mr. Secretary?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, it was. And we have pursued it, and we have urged publicly and privately that firms adhere to the Sullivan principles, because we believe that those principles represent, if you will, a beacon, a high standard, that all can follow and all should follow. Those principles have accomplished a great deal. As the President indicated, they add up to a very substantial amount of money for broad goals of black advancement in the work place and outside the work place in terms of housing, in terms of education, medical benefits and so forth.

But equally, if not more important, has been the example that is set thereby for the many other foreign firms, and for South African firms themselves. The U.S. standard of corporate citizenship in South Africa is the class of the field. And we are proud of those who have adhered to those principles and have implemented those principles.

The President also indicated that we have government programs. And this, again, is a matter of public record. Anyone who's followed testimony in Congress would be aware of the fact that we've had government programs which this administration started and has expanded very considerably to promote black education, to promote the training of labor union leaders, to promote a wide range of human rights programs and activities -- these go back, starting in 1980 and up to the present time -- to promote management training and a series of things of that kind.

We have, with the support of Congress -- I would say the bipartisan support of Congress -- pushed those programs. They have a solid base. We would like to see them expand further.

Let me go on from that. We have seen, during the past few years -- and I think it would be a mistake for us to sit here and claim primary or exclusive credit -- but we have seen the development, the taking root of a labor movement in South Africa which is one of the most dramatic examples of a process of change which, in our view, is indisputably taking place in South Africa.

This movement today has many, many times more workers. There are many, many more unions. They are negotiating, in the interest of their labor force. They are achieving benefits for their members. And that process, we hope, will continue and take root. It's in the interest of all concerned that there be a more stable and more organized pattern of labor relations, and that these kinds of institutions have a chance to fourish as a building block of change

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and a building block of democratic change in South Africa.

We have seen a substantial reduction in the number of banned South Africans during the past few years. The number today being down somewhere around 11 or 12, coming down from several hundred where it was before. There's also been an increase in the number of detentions which is a negative, and we are not complacent about it. We would like to see the number of detained people, of course, reduced. There has been an important expansion in black urban residency rights; rights to have a settled family situation in the area where you weork; to be able to live with your family; and to retain urban residency rights. This is not an area in which we are complacent either, but we think there clearly have been advances in that area.

We believe that our efforts to make clear what we feel about forced removals have had effects. And we would note, just for example, recent decisions taken and announced by the South African government to change the policy concerning urbanization for black Africans in the Western Cape area of South Africa.

We have cited, and will continue to cite, the limited, but nonetheless significant, constitutional change that has taken place in the last year. We fully agree with the critics who point out that it does not address the main issue, which is the political rights of the black African majority. But what this change has done is to remove from the history books the era in which whites have a monopoly of political power, and that's --

Q May I ask --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- that's a point of fundamental importance. So -- if I could finish -- I've been asked for the accomplishments. I'm not going to stop until I've finished.

We have seen, I think, most important of all, and this is a point which naturally causes, I think, a variety of interpretations. We have seen a fundamental realignment in the white politics of South Africa, which has produced, if you will, a coalition that was backed by a two-to-one vote of the white electorate behind the principle of reform -- not with a clear blueprint down the road -- but the principle of reform.

That is something new. It is something which we feel we have helped to encourage, but which is naturally something which comes from within South Africa itself, as will the bulk of the other pressure for change.

I'll stop there. I could go on, but you had your hand in the air.

Q Given all that's been said, is this administration saying that Biship Tutu is inaccurate when he says that during the past four years conditions for South African's black majority has worsened?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We don't see it that way. What we would say is that, while the situation is, remains one of great concern, and in which there is an enormous amount to be concerned about -- that to say the situation is either stagnant or retrogressive is not an analysis we would share of the South African situation.

Q But he lives there -- are we not getting our message across?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think if one talks to South Africans across the spectrum, one would find that the subject "Whither, South Africa?" is one that is probably the most ardent subject of debate in the entire country. And I don't presume to try

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to resolve that debate here this morning.

Q Do you -- are you saying --

Q Would it be unreasonable to expect -- could you see any circumstances under which the President would travel to South Africa to draw first-hand conclusions about whether his policies are benefiting black people who suffer under apartheid? Would that be a good idea for him?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I wouldn't want to comment on that. I think, obviously his -- the President's travel possibilities are for others to define. But I do think that the President is fully briefed on the situation as we see it. And I think, as he said, and as Bishop Tutu said, he had the impression that the President had a sense of what was going on. And of all the many things in South Africa that warrant the term the President has used, which is "abhorrent" to describe the system. There's no debate about that.

Q Do you see any change in U.S. policy? Even subtle changes? Actions on things that Bishop Tutu might have suggested? There was some hint of that in what the President said. Can you be more explicit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the President is very conscious of the fact that there is a -- there is a perception, because that's what Bishop Tutu told him, amongst many in the black community --

Q And the white community --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- that we, in this country, represent, if you will, an endorsement of a status quo. That is not what our policy is, and we're not going to have it perceived that way. In that regard, I think the point that I would simply make is that we want to be understood. We will do the best we can to communicate to the various audiences concerned. In that regard, if you see us speaking more freqently that might well be one example of that. But we're not talking about reviewing, or changing the policy, as the President himself just said.

Q There will be no -- let me just follow --

Q So what you're saying is --

Q -- there will be no specific actions other than speaking out more? Or trying to communicate better?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me --

Q The policy will remain the same?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me, for example, talk about some of the things which Bishop Tutu put on his list of targets. The lifting of banning orders on South Africans who are suffering under banning orders. Of course, many of those have, indeed, been lifted. But we make it a point in all exchanges, that this is the kind of thing which we would like to see done. So this is not something that we have been failing to do.

On the issue of releasing detainees, both labor leaders and others, from the United Democratic Front who have been under detention at various periods of time since September or so, we again have been speaking out publicly and privately on that and will continue to do so.

We, in fact, think it's very important that there be movement on the issue of detainees, and are hopeful in that regard, that there will be. We have been on that case since the day they

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happened; and we're the first to be on that case at the ministerial level with the South African government.

When the decisions are taken, which we hope they will be, we would not presume to say it's a direct result of what we've been doing, because that, as the President has said, is not the most effective way to conduct diplomacy.

Also on the Bishop's list is the end of police violence against the black population of the townships in South Africa. Of course we feel that way and have been urging that that cease.

A series of things on his list are part of current policy. I think what the Bishop may be telling us is that that is not perceived, as clearly as it might be, as part of current policy.

Q Well, maybe that's because you come here and tell us you speak out but we don't hear you and the general public doesn't hear you. Why not?

Q Especially Ronald Reagan --

Q Why haven't you all spoken out more in public with more of a sense of outrage?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we use the channels that we have available to us.

Q Yes, but this is quiet diplomacy -- this is -- what I'm asking you is, quiet diplomacy, and the United States ends up looking as though we have taken an immoral position in the world, or we are criticized for it.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Is it quiet diplomacy when we publish a 25-page human rights report on South Africa which is as detailed as any in the world, and our annual human rights reports which --

Q Yes, if nobody speaks about it publicly.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- which, in fact, are distributed widely across the different embassies, internationally and here at home, are the basis for Congressional hearings, which people who are interested -- I suspect that part of the problem that you may be reflecting is that the constituency that follows the issue may not be as broad as some would wish, and as a result, people don't read these things.

We have testified repeatedly on all these subjects, in public hearings. There's a long, long record, if one wants to look at it.

Q But given the pace of accomplishment and reform in South Africa, would you estimate, as an expert on the area, when aparthied will dissolve, disappear?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't care to make an estimate on that. We've said that this is something for South Africans, themselves, to bring about an end to through a process of negotiation, not imposition, but negotiation --

Q What -- five years, ten years, three generations? What's your sense?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Are you asking how soon it should end or how soon it will end?

Q No, the pace of reform that you've laid out.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I really wouldn't want to make a prediction on that. That would simply be a target for more press stories. I don't think I really need that.

Q You said a moment ago that one of the things that might be coming out of all of this, because of the perception problem that you mentioned, is that you might -- we might be seeing the administration speaking out a little bit more frequently. Are you suggesting that quiet diplomacy is going to get a little less quiet?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I guess what I'm suggesting is simply that if people have a genuine case that they didn't know what our record was, we're going to try and make it harder for people not to know what our record was and what our record is.

Yes.

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Q I'd like to follow up on quiet diplomacy. There seems to be a little bit of name-calling going on. When Senator Kennedy said that the President's policy had failed, you said that was rubbish; and Bishop Tutu came back and said that we're collaborating with an evil, un-Christian empire; and this morning, the President comes back and said people, the demonstrators, the protests that are going on, those people are ignorant. Is it going to be possible to do any quiet diplomacy after all this name-calling back and forth?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I wouldn't say that there's any desire for name-calling. There are a good number of things that are said and done on an issue that is as intricate as this one, and I think the case that it is intricate is a very strong case. People maybe need to know a bit more. They may need to understand that it's one thing to take a solid position, as we all do, on the issue of apartheid. It's something else to define a course of action which might have some effect on it.

That's what's really at stake here. If people say that our policy is one of collaboration with a racist status quo, that statement is rubbish. And I will say it again. But if one says that, you know, there's a need to move toward change, obviously, we feel that's a very strong issue of which we agree with.

Q Well, sir, when we're the only one --

Q Bishop Tutu was going into something very specific --

Q Excuse me. When we're the only ones who abstain from a UN vote condemning apartheid, doesn't that send a signal of collaboration, or can't that be widely interpreted as such?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not aware that we are the only ones who abstained or have abstained on resolutions which condemn apartheid. If you look at the resolutions, you'll see that there's something in it --

Q Well, the most recent resolution we abstained from, true?

Q And we were the only ones.

Q Several weeks ago?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think you'd have to refer me to the resolution and I'll give you the reasoning.

Q I would think you would know the resolution. It was just several weeks ago.

Q We asked you this question three days ago.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are a good number of resolutions that are put forward -- they tend to involve either grotesque misuses of the English language -- if that's the case, we're not going to simply collaborate with that kind of thing -- or else they involve statements that go well beyond simply registering our views on apartheid and call for specific actions that we don't support. And that's obviously what causes us to shape our vote the way we do.

Yes.

Q Bishop Tutu is calling for something very specific. He wants the release of the detainees, he wants President Reagan's support for the political prisoners' amnesty in South Africa, leading up to a national convention like your country had when its Founding

Fathers got together to formulate a new Constitution. Do you support that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We obviously support releases of people. We support the process of dialogue. We support the processes of constructive change. The precise way in which that should come about -- the aegis, the participants, and all the rest -- is not, and I repeat, not for outsiders to dictate or to be intervening on. It seems to us vitally important that the South Africans be given the opportunity to shape their own future. That means negotiation. How that might take place, I think, is not ready for us to say.

Q What would be wrong with amnesty for political prisoners?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Nothing, whatsoever. All the things that you've just cited I've just indicated that we already have been supporting publicly and privately. The issue as was raised by the previous question of some form of national convention, I think that's for the South Africans to determine.

Yes, sir.

Q One of the justifications for the present policy of getting along with South Africa has been that this government is supposed to be helping us in the broader picture of trying to increase the whole Southern Africa area. Can you tell us, are you -- really do have an agreement to move the Cuban troops -- all the Cuban troops out of Angola, for example, as a result of this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, of course, the question was asked earlier, what are some of the accomplishments of this policy? And I think, clearly, the -- one of them

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that is on the list, and which the President himself cited, is that we have developed a pattern of relationship with all the key governments involved in these regional negotiations, which we believe have given us very substantial gains, indeed, in the region.

I would cite the dramatic reduction in cross-border violence in Southern Africa as a whole in the past year to 18 months. I would cite the basic point that we've been supporting, a framework of rules of coexistence between neighboring states in which boundaries -- in which sovereignty is respected as a two-way street. I would cite, on Namibia specifically, the important progress we have had in gaining agreement in principle on all the elements of the package that could bring about Namibia's independence, and that, of course, includes the issue you have just referred to, and which the Angolan government has said, yes, Cuban troop withdrawal will be an element of a package settlement. We don't yet have that settlement; but we have important progress toward it with South Africa and Angola both putting forward specific proposals that could lead to such a settlement.

Q But the Angola government seems to be hedging as to whether all the 25,000 troops go out or whether only a few go out now and maybe none of them later. Do you have a guarantee on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We don't yet have a settlement. We do not. This is a negotiation.

Q What happened in the talks that -- are they still underway, the ones that Frank Wisner --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Ambassador Wisner has not yet returned to Washington, so I don't have anything for you on that.

Q Are they underway right now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, they have concluded.

Q And was there any movement? Can you just say progress --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't have a report. He's on his way home.

Yes.

Q The President just said that there are things that the --

Q Are you convinced that once the Angolans and South Africans make their arrangement and Namibians are also taken care of that the South Africans will feel reassured enough, secure enough to move more rapidly toward racial change?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we certainly will be hoping for that to be the case, yes.

Q That's the whole basis of your policy, is it not? Or do I misunderstand?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The basis of the policy is a regional one, and this should be stressed. We look at the regional peace process and the internal process of change in South Africa as two sides of the same coin. The two can contribute to each other. The failure of either one will set back the other.

Q The President has said that --

MR. SIMS: Can we have just one or two more? Sandy and then here and then Bob. Okay? That's it.

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Q The President just said that there some things on Bishop Tutu's list that were already current policy, but that there were other things that the State Department planned to take heed of. But now you're saying that there doesn't seem to be anything that you're going to be doing that will be different. What was he talking about that was on his list that you're going to take heed of to change?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the main point I would stress is this whole issue of signals and communication and people understanding what the message is and what the policy is.

MR. SIMS: Okay. Here and then Bob.

Q How does the administration balance the progress made through quiet diplomacy when faced with hundreds of thousands of workers going out on strike on November 5th and 6th?

Second, if one of the measures of progress is the new amendments to the Constitution, but is the President also aware of an opposite opinion that for the first time in South African history that Constitution actually institutes race on the books, where it was never instituted before?

And, thirdly, is it a time -- will there be a time when Reagan may have to -- the President may have to address President Botha of South Africa personally on these issues to make known the repugnance that he says he feels over apartheid?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let's take them briefly, but one at a time.

On the stay-away campaign of November 5 and 6, we, obviously, felt that that's a legitimate expression of view by those who engaged in it, while at the same time making clear that we could not condone violent tactics by either those on the side of the protest or those on the side of the government.

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So I don't know what the issue is there in your question. What you had was an expression of grievance that involved a whole series of things in the black community.

Q Well, let me clarify that. There have been about 200 blacks killed in the violence. And the police and the military have been -- in the Grand Daily Mail -- have both been used to go into townships and have taken part in these killings.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And people are expressing their concern about that as well as a series of problems with the labor system, with the educational system, and with wage rates, and with rent increases and bus fares and all the rest. And that's what the stay away was all about. No one is saying that the situation in South Africa is satisfactory. That is not what our policy says; I'll have to say it again.

Your second question?

Q That -- is the administration aware that the Constitution which you said is a measure of progress, institutes race in the Constitution for the first time.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The message that we have tried to get across repeatedly on that Constitution is that it represents a step, a positive step, but that it does not address the main issue of black political participation. There's not much debate, I think, about the latter point. On the former point, I think very much from our view, this is an open-ended process and that's -- it's on that basis that we are interpreting it.

If we were to believe that that is going to be the final step, we obviously would be drawing very gloomy conclusions about it. But I don't think that is the case. I don't think most serious observers of the South African scene believe that is the case.

MR. SIMS: Okay. Bob -- last question please.

Q You said that the administration will be speaking more frequently. Will this respond specifically to Bishop Tutu's request to send a positive signal to the oppressed in South Africa?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Will it be what? Expressed?

Q Will it respond to Bishop Tutu's request to the President to send a positive signal to the oppressed in South Africa?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think our job is to encourage a process and to be understood to be doing so. The very fact of a meeting such as the one we've had today sends a signal in its own right.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 12:40 P.M. EST

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BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
UPCOMING VISIT OF PRESIDENT SEYNI KOUNTCHE OF NIGER
FRIDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1984, 2:10 P. M.

MR. BRIAN CARLSON: Good afternoon. This is our BACKGROUND briefing on the visit of the President of Niger. It's ON BACKGROUND for attribution only to Senior State Department Officials. I ask that you do keep your questions to the subject of the visit of the President of Niger.

FIRST SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Thank you very much. We very much look forward to this official working visit, which will be taking place next week, of the President of Niger, President Seyni Kountche.

I'll say a word or two ON BACKGROUND. If there are any questions, we'll be happy to try and take them, my colleague and I together.

I think the first thing that should be said is that we consider Niger to be an important friend in the Sahel. It is a friend living in a very troubled region where there are security threats of various kinds. It's a region where there is conflict, notably next door in Chad where there has been Libyan involvement, intervention, as well as a very threatening climate.

Niger is on the list of most experts and donors in the top four or five countries most affected by the current drought and famine crisis affecting sub-Saharan Africa. We have a very good relationship with Niger which we would like, of course, to maintain and strengthen.

It is a stable country. It's a country whose economic leadership, economic policies, represent from our perspective a model of common sense, with a record to prove it in terms of strides towards food self-sufficiency that are impressive by any measure.

To give an example of that, while Niger is much affected by this drought and lost some 60 percent of last year's crop, by comparison to the previous year -- and the previous year was lousy too -- Niger's leaders have done an excellent job of planning, monitoring, and preparing for the food emergency which it faces, which gives us all hope that with that kind of planning and preparation the worst can be avoided.

It was among the first to collect the data to do the assessments and to let donors and international agencies know well ahead of time so that planning could be done. We estimate that the food deficit that Niger faces between now and the next harvest is on the order of magnitude of 350,000 metric tons.

We have already made substantial decisions and will be making more, no doubt, as the needs are further defined in the coming period.

During the course of this visit, President Kountche will be, of course, meeting with the President and the Vice President and the top team in the White House. We'll be having a meeting with Secretary Weinberger, with AID Administrator McPherson, Peace Corps Director Ruppe, and others. I think the subjects of discussions will be pretty obvious from some of what I've said.

We have a significant program of assistance in Niger, I would estimate on the order of $20 million a year in regular development assistance activity. That is, non-emergency activity as well as the emergency food that we are providing. I think some 60,000 tons of food have already been decided in the current cycle, and more maybe.

There's a small security assistance program involving military training, and a modest program of MAP. There is a Peace Corps program there. I think I would stop with these background facts. If you have any questions, I'd be happy to have them.

Q In which way do you think that Niger felt threatened by Libya?

FIRST OFFICIAL: I don't know if it's a subject on which I should expound at length because the leadership of Niger will be here next week and may prefer to answer that question with their own words.

I would point out that in terms of the geography, of course, Niger shares a boundary with Libya. It is a direct witness and observer of various of Qadhafi's maneuvers, destabilizing activities, outright aggression in the case of Chad.

Niger is a big country with long boundaries and a modest defense establishment. I would assume from what I've already indicated that Niger would be looking at developments in Chad and elsewhere in the region in the hopes that they come out right.

Q You mentioned a small security assistance -- namely, military training for Niger, and at the same time you talk about a meeting between President Kountche and Mr. Weinberger. Can you expand on that?

FIRST OFFICIAL: I think it's perfectly understandable that there would be such a meeting. There is a security assistance program, and I suppose the two men would be discussing that program and its progress.

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Q Can you give us some details on that program, the military assistance?

FIRST OFFICIALS: I think I might ask my colleague to go a bit further into some of that. We have, as I said, provided some training and some communications, transport equipment, but perhaps my colleague would like to say a word further.

SECOND OFFICIAL: Our security assistance is mostly trained at helping the Nigerians fly, maintain and buy spare parts for their C-130s. Niger, in 1980, purchased two C-130s commercially. That is the bulk of their air force.

Since it's an ex French colony, they get most of their security assistance from the French, but it's our planes, it's our technicians and that's our security assistance to them.

Q Are there any trade issues between the two countries that need to be discussed?

FIRST OFFICIAL: There certainly would be assistance issues and drought-related and food issues. Any trade issues?

SECOND OFFICIAL: Unfortunately, no. There was a large American involvement in the late Seventies in the country when the country had a lot of activity in its uranium deposits. But as you all know, the uranium industry has hit a slump and unfortunately this is one of Niger's problems. Their industry is also in a slump.

Right now the only American involvement we have in the country is City Bank. They have an office there.

Q As you know, Mr. Kountche is at the same time the Acting President of the CILSS. Are you expecting him to come up with some plan where U.S. aid will be necessary to help us in that area to overcome drought and its effects?

FIRST OFFICIAL: You're absolutely right. He is in that capacity. It's an important position because it gives him an overview of the entire Sahelian region, and it gives him an excellent position from which to articulate more broadly the picture in the Sahel, and to express and describe that picture to President Reagan and others here.

I expect he will have a desire to do exactly that, to describe the picture; to describe efforts that his country and others are making to deal with it. He may have some new ideas to put forward. I wouldn't want to speak for him on that. He may. This is a region-wide problem. In fact, it goes well beyond the Sahel now.

There have been institutions set up to try and talk and work together cooperatively. We'd like the CILSS to try and grapple with the problem.

As I said at the outset, it's our impression that Niger has been among the most effective in terms of coming to grips with the problem despite the bad luck, the bad weather and the meager resource base.

Q What prompted the visit at this time?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Nothing particularly special about the timing, except we wanted it to happen for some time. I think both sides have wanted it to happen and this just worked out schedule-wise.

Q Are there any trouble spots in relations between the two countries?

FIRST OFFICIAL: As I said, I think there's a very good relationship between the two countries.

Q What is the internal political situation? Can you describe that?

FIRST OFFICIAL: This is a government which issued from a military coup. It is, in that sense, a military government. There are a couple members of the Cabinet who are military. The rest are not.

A number of initiatives have been taken by the government to move towards a more decentralized political model, and to begin discussions of a movement toward a constitutional regime. It's a stable country, as I indicated. I think in large measure because it has succeeded in getting a handle up to now on a number of the economic dilemmas that are facing that country.

Q How long is President Kountche going to be in Washington?

FIRST OFFICIAL: For several days. We can post the full program. We'll be glad to do that for you.

Q What importance do you attach to the coincidence that Mr. Kountche is here in the U.S. while his colleague and the French President are meeting in Bujumbura?

FIRST OFFICIAL: I don't think I'm really in the position to offer any observation on that. It might be a question you would ask them when they're here next week. I'm sure Niger will be represented there. But President Kountche has been anxious for this visit to take place, and this was a time that was mutually convenient so we decided on it.

Q Thank you very much.

(Briefing concluded at 2:20 p.m.)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS DAY

December 10, 1984

The Briefing Room

11:32 A.M. EST

MR. SIMS: This briefing will be on background, attributable to a senior administration official.

Let me give you a status report on paper. You have some materials we've handed out. The President's remarks -- we will have an advance for you, but I don't know whether we'll have them by the conclusion of this briefing or not. I think your briefer will be able to give you some insights into what the President's saying in his remarks.

There is also a proclamation which the President is signing today on human rights. And we do expect to have that by the end of the briefing -- somewhat parallels his remarks. There is a list available at the end of the briefing on special foreign guests who will be here for the ceremony.

Q We have that --

MR. SIMS: You've got the full list -- special foreign guests? Okay. Fine.

Q Ralph has it.

MR. SIMS: Ralph has it -- (laughter) -- as usual. (Laughter.) For those of you who do not have Ralph's contacts in the Press Office, you may step inside after the briefing and you'll -- you, too, will get a list.

Q I'll fall in after the briefing.

MR. SIMS: All right. Sir?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you.

Morning. We had this ceremony today on Human Rights Day because it's the anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 36 years ago at the UN. We had a similar ceremony -- I think a number of you will remember -- last year with the President and a number of foreign guests.

Others who'll be speaking besides the President will be me; Max Kappelman, who has represented the U.S. under President Carter and President Reagan at the Helsinki meetings, most recently in Madrid; Carl Gershman, the President of the new National Endowment for Democracy; and Senator Lugar. You have or will have that list of guests.

The President will discuss generally our human rights policy and mention a number of countries in the text of his remarks, namely Iran, Chile, Paraguay, South Africa, the Soviet Union, Afghanistan, Poland, Nicaragua, Cuba and Cambodia. And he'll probably have a little bit more to say about two situations in particular -- one, the human rights situation in the Soviet Union, and the other, South Africa.

Just a word about the policy. Our human rights policy

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really is to try to support human rights in countries all around the world in ways that we think are going to be effective. That's how we choose the tactics that we use. Some things are statutory: for example, the annual book that we do which some of you have seen which is now up to about 1500 pages and includes a report at some length on every country in the world; and statements by the President and Secretary of State, others; votes in various international institutions; foreign aid, economic and military; export of things like -- what we call crime control items. The test of all of these tactics to us is effectiveness. We don't have any a priori decisions about which countries you do what to.

Quiet diplomacy which has been talked about a lot recently, and rightly so, is not a principle. It's a tactic. Generally, we start with it, and we certainly start with it in the case of friendly governments. But we go beyond it if we think that that tactic isn't working. And we come back from it if we think that public statements are no longer needed. For example, we've said more in the last three, four months about Chile than in the previous year because the situation there has been deteriorating, and, therefore, our private efforts have clearly not been as successful as we'd hoped. In the last few months, we've probably said less than in the preceding year about Poland because of the amnesty which continued in the last few days -- indicated to us that some of the private diplomatic efforts were bearing a little bit of fruit.

One final word, which we think is quite important in the policy, and that is we emphasize very much the question of roles. There are a lot of players in human rights policy. The Executive Branch is one. You are another. Congress and the human rights groups are two other very important ones. Each has a different role. When we say that we think, for example, a quiet diplomatic effort is useful at a given moment, that speaks for the Executive Branch. It doesn't speak for Congress or the human rights groups.

In fact, usually the most effective way for us to accomplish what we're trying to do is when Congress and the human rights groups, essentially through the press, scream "bloody murder" because that gives us a chance to go to the governments in question and show them what damage they're doing to their country and its reputation and its prospects for getting foreign aid through whatever human rights violations are underway. But I think it's very important to remember that each player has a different role in this, and the notion that human rights groups should behave the way the government does or that the government should behave the way they do, I think, is implausible and incorrect.

With that as an introduction -- be happy to take any questions.

Q We heard President Reagan's stand last week on quiet diplomacy and how it works in South Africa. You said if doesn't work -- not specifically in South Africa but in any country -- you would go on beyond that to another tactic. Do you personally believe it's working in South Africa? Can we anticipate any further action other than quiet diplomacy there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You have had it in a sense

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in the President's statement a few days ago, in the background briefing that was given on Friday, and now in the remarks that the President is making today, there is a turn away from quiet diplomacy. I would have to say that I don't think that's because it is not working, but rather because the policy is not well enough understood in this country. And that's something that the briefer on Friday noted, too, that there seems to be a problem of perception. We don't think it's the policy that is in any kind of trouble; what we think is that people don't understand it well enough. That is a built-in problem in our human rights policy. There's no way around it, because frequently you find you can accomplish more behind the scenes, and then nobody knows what you're trying to do, and nobody knows when you've done it.

There's no way around that, except occasionally to veer away from private diplomatic efforts and go public. It's a dangerous thing to do; because if you push other governments too hard publicly, as the President said last week, that may be counterproductive. But in the case of South Africa, I don't think we have any alternative right this second because of the apparent misunderstanding of a policy.

Yes?

Q But you're talking about a misunderstanding of a policy, and you're calling quiet diplomacy a "tactic." I don't understand here. You're saying that people don't understand quiet diplomacy as a policy and earlier saying it's a tactic.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I'm saying --

Q What policy don't we understand?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry. There has been a complaint that we do not have a strong human rights policy with respect to South Africa. One of the reasons for that complaint apparently is that a lot of what we've done, we've done quietly in diplomatic channels and it is not visible to many people outside the government. Therefore, if you want to convince people of what you're doing, you've got to turn away from quiet diplomacy at least for awhile to show people publicly what you're doing.

But the basic policy of trying to promote peaceful change in South Africa hasn't changed. It's just that, obviously, we're going to have to use a somewhat different mix of tactics.

Q What are those tactics?

Q You said earlier, or indicated earlier, that you are essentially helped -- the U.S. government is essentially helped -- by the public or the press screaming bloody murder --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q If that is the case -- is it the case with the protests at the embassy? Did they, perhaps, help in getting the release of some of these prisoners?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You can't say whether they helped in the release of these prisoners. I think you can say generally that such protests help us make the point to foreign governments that there are very strong feelings and a great deal of attention in the United States to these human rights abuses.

Again, there's always a danger in these kinds of public protests that the other government, feeling its back to the wall, won't respond. But generally speaking, the more public attention and Congressional attention there is and the more pressure there is, the better off our human rights policy is going to be. As long as it's

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pressure for peaceful change and for effective steps, then it's going to be helpful.

Q So in a sense, while you, you know, lived up to your legal responsibilities at the embassy, you, in fact, welcomed that kind of raising of the public consciousness?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I personally don't welcome violations of the law. And I think that's a problem that we've had in the area of human rights. We have it in the sanctuary movement with regard to El Salvador. That's a separate problem; and I would hope that there are ways of making this point without violating the law. But peaceful demonstrations of concern around the country, including, for example, statements coming from Congress are certainly helpful in doing something that we've been doing for four years, and that is warning the South African government that the kind of relations it wants with the U.S. cannot be obtained if the kind of repressive moves that we've seen recently continue.

Q You said that your policy is not visible outside the country. According to Bishop Tutu, it's not visible inside either. So, it's only visible from you all, is that it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. Well, the most important thing, really, may be whether it's visible to the government of South Africa. After all, what we're trying to do in this policy, in South Africa or anywhere else, is fundamentally to change the behavior of a foreign government. That means that they are the real target of this. And they know what we're saying, because we're saying it directly to them.

I think Bishop Tutu knows some -- a good deal about what we've done in South Africa, and I would have to point out that he is not the only spokesman of South African blacks, and that others have taken different tactics and had a different response to U.S. policy.

But you have to remember that the main target of the policy is the government of a foreign country. That's why diplomatic efforts can be so useful.

Yes?

Q Are you telling us --

Q The President is telling us -- let me follow up -- the President has always spoken out loudly and clearly about dissidents in Poland and in Russia. He hasn't said anything about black Africa. And then, of course, when you get to his interdiction on the high seas of Haitians who are black, how can black people here in this country and in South Africa see his policy as based on anything but the color of the skin. You have to do differently if you want to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, of course I don't agree with that. I mean, if you ask, for example --

Q Well, you can disagree, but this is the stand that people are taking. You do know that the interdiction on the high seas happen to be Haitian. You do know that he has not come up and sounded off on Africa, South Africa, as he has other -- you know those are true. So, what's the difference?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We shouldn't really get into immigration policy. I know, because I get the attacks --

Q I mean -- what about foreign policy --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- that we get many criticisms, for example, from the Polish-American community for failing to accept the number of Polish assylum applicants that they

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would like to see approved. It's got nothing to do with race. But with respect to South Africa --

Q The interdiction on the high seas, I'm talking about, you know --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: With respect to South Africa, I think there is misunderstanding of the policy. All I can say is that if you look, and I think that the background -- the briefer on Friday mentioned in the briefing a few of the gains -- that it is primarily black South Africans who are getting the benefit of this policy, whether it's in increased, hugely increased spending for education, or in a virtual elimination of the practice of banning, or in a breakdown of the Afrikaner-only control of the government -- those are moves in the right direction.

Q What he said Friday -- is saying to black South Africa -- which is 24 million other people -- that you go there and work hard -- the laws in South Africa, blacks cannot be paid the same as whites; they can't own land; and they can't vote -- and are you saying to them what he's saying -- live a short, brutal life until you die so white South Africans can get rich. Why can't he say that -- believe that black South Africa --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that is -- a complete --

Q Wait a minute -- why can't he believe that black South Africans have the same things that whites said during the revolutionary -- American revolution -- give me liberty or give me death?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President does support that, and we have said so --

Q Well, answer my question.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm trying to answer your question -- I gather I'm not doing too well.

Q No.

MR. SIMS: I'd think you'd do better if he'd get a chance to answer it, Alfreda -- if you'd just let him answer.

Q Okay.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Your presentation of our policy is an inaccurate one. The United States has supported, for example, equal pay for equal work. It is, in fact -- it is a fact that, under the Sullivan principles, American and other foreign investment in South Africa practices equal pay for equal work -- that is the key principle under Reverend Sullivan's plan, and one of the few places in South Africa where you are guaranteed to get equal pay for equal work is, in fact, in American companies, and some other foreign companies that invest there. That is a key part of our policy.

Another key part of our policy is building up -- helping to build up -- black trade unions, which are a very important matter in which blacks are already exercising a degree of economic and political power and we hope will exercise more. Obviously the expansion of democratic rights which now do not exist for blacks, though they're just beginning to for Asians and Coloreds, is another key part of the policy. So I think the description that you give is just inaccurate.

Q You said earlier that -- you described the President's speech as a turn away from quiet diplomacy. We don't have the speech. Could you elaborate on that, please?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. The President gave a speech about human rights policy last year. And that, too, was a turn away from quiet diplomacy. The point is that quiet diplomacy is not a matter of principle -- it's a tactic. We turn away from it on certain occasions -- like this; or when the President speaks to a variety of etnic or religious groups. Whenever you speak out about a problem it is a turnaway from quiet diplomacy.

In the case of Chile, for example, we've done that recently because of an increase in repression there. In the case of South Africa, it's both a response to events there and a response to the perception that we're not sufficiently getting through.

Q I understand what you're saying, but I want you to go into the President's speech, if you can, today. We don't have the text of it yet.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm reluctant to do that -- to characterize remarks that he's going to be making very quickly, other than to say that he's going to have something to say about the policy in general, but also about those two countries. I don't think anything is gained by my characterizing it.

Q Well, we're on background, and we can't use until 1:00 o'clock, anyway --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, but I don't to mischaracterize it, either; and I don't want to lay emphasis that you, yourselves, would not develop.

Sir?

Q Well, is he going to say something more forceful about South Africa, or is it a matter of just the fact that he includes it in his speech as a some kind of a signal that he's no longer ignoring the country?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He's going to say something forceful. I would not take the modifier "more" forceful, because I think we've been speaking out forcefully for four years. We may not have been getting through loudly enough, but the speeches have been made, not only over at the State Department, but -- to take another example -- at the U.N.

Probably the best and least noticed is the report that we do every year. We put it out every year at the end of January. The longest report -- this is a book which has a report on every country in the world -- the longest single report every year, as I can recall, under the Reagan administration, has been South Africa, the country that received the most attention in those country reports. And I think the position of the U.S. on all the human rights violations discussed there is very clear.

Yes?

Q We're talking about the President here, not the State Department. And I can't recall the President speaking out loudly on South Africa -- every before. Can you?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President has spoken out about South Africa --

Q When?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- oh, there have been interviews over the course of the years, but --

Q So now he's not doing anything different, is what you're saying --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I was just about to say -- but it is clear that the volume is being turned up at the moment, both as --

Q With regard to South Africa, or as a whole?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: With regard to South Africa.

Q You say the volume is being turned -- up?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The volume is being turned up with regard to South Africa. I think I said, in my own view,

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because, as a number of us have said over the past week, it's clear that we have not been getting through to at least the domestic audience here about how seriously we feel about this and how much we've done over the past four years and what's come out of it.

So, we need to do a better job explaining it.

Q But you have been getting through to South Africa --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think we have.

Q This is a one-day turning away from quiet diplomacy then, right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would -- I wouldn't say that. I mean, I think the -- as I said, the tactic -- the use of the tactic depends on how the South African government responds. If repression in South Africa gets worse, then there'll be more and more said publicly. If they draw back from it, and make progress in the direction of -- of reform, then there'll be less and less of it.

So, we haven't made a decision. We're going to stay public on South Africa for, you know, three months, six months, nine months. What we're going to do is watch what happens there.

Q But as a self-critique, you say the only problem with South African -- with U.S.-South African policy or tactics has been public perception here?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would say that.

Q I don't understand one issue here and that is, with Poland -- the President called the government of Poland a bunch of thugs, he's called the Soviets liars and cheats, he's called other -- other countries -- other heads of other countries, you know, similar things. And yet, in South Africa, and we've -- we've talked about this -- we've talked about it with Chester Crocker, the same kinds of human rights violations are going on and yet the President --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, first of all, wait a minute --

Q -- has never -- wait a minute -- that the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sorry.

Q -- President has never spoken out -- that forcefully, not the State Department, not a thick book of, you know, of different countries in a rundown, but the President himself has never said "the people in South Africa are a bunch of thugs," you know, or something similar -- never spoken out that forcefully. Why not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: When you make a decision about when to speak out and what to say, I mean, who speaks out -- the President, the Secretary, lower ranking officials? What language do you use? The question you've got to ask is, what's going to come out of this? Is this going to be an effective thing to do?

We have not felt that that was an effective tactic to use, for example, with respect to South Africa. In part because you use quieter diplomacy when you think you've got a relationship with the government that allows that to be successful.

We clearly don't have that kind of relationship with the government of Poland or with the Soviet government. Now, when -- when a government like that of Poland responds, then we draw back from public denunciations. When a government like that of South Africa engages in more oppression, then we move on to public denunciation.

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So, it is a question of responding to the way in which they act in a manner that we think is going to be effective. You cannot treat all governments alike because their relationship with us is different, and the -- the presumed effect of that public speech is going to be different.

Q Well, then the relationship currently hasn't changed then between us and South Africa?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the fundamental relationship has not changed. What's changed is the degree of dissatisfaction here with South African behavior. That is, the repressive moves in the last few months.

Q I mean, is -- is the turning up of the volume basically a response to the protest going on now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's a response to two things. It's a response to the increased repression in South Africa and to the perception here that we have not done anything about it, or said anything about it, or said enough about it.

So, it's -- it's a response to both events there and events here.

Q The second part of that -- I mean, being related to the current protest? You don't think --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it's not -- I mean, it's -- the -- the -- I wouldn't say it's related to the protests. I'd say its related to the statements that have been made by a lot of people, including members of Congress, that we're not coming through. If we're not coming through, then we've got to do something about that.

Q Are there other new tactics -- you discussed tactics -- are there other things that we'll be seeing other than the -- turning up the volume?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: With respect to South Africa? Well, the first thing to see is if that works. The problem with regard to most countries we deal with on human rights, and South Africa's one of them, is, I think most human rights advocates exaggerate our leverage.

For example, people call for -- Bishop Tutu did -- for various forms of boycotts and withdrawals. You know, the President cancelled the grain embargo on the Soviet Union in part, because of his view that that kind of economic boycott is frequently not very effective. In the case of Rhodesia, you may recall, there was a boycott for a long time and it appears on balance to have done no damage to the Rhodesian economy and has greatly helped now the Zimbabwian economy.

South Africa has had an arms embargo, in which we participate, for a long time. They've developed a large arms industry, which is not in the interest of that policy. So, the question on other tactics is what works. I don't think that, for example, the economic tactics that are being talked about -- no further investment, no further loans, disinvestment --

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are going to help improve the behavior of the South African government or improve the status of South African blacks.

Yes.

Q What works?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, in some cases, nothing works. We have, for example, for four years, been trying to improve the behavior of the Soviet Union in terms of human rights abuses at home and we have failed, as have the Germans, the French, the British, and everybody else who's tried. The same thing, I would guess, one could now say about Chile. That is, the United States has been clearly pushing Chile in the direction in which Uraguay, Argentina, now Brazil, are moving or have moved, and we have not succeeded in doing that.

Now, in the case of South Africa, I would say the policy has been successful. This is obviously the most hotly disputed claim that the administration makes. The government of South Africa is never going to take steps that lead to its being knocked out in an election. That is true of South Africa or any other government that ever has to face an election. They're not going to commit suicide.

And, therefore, what we've got to do is figure out exactly how far we can push them before they just turn away because they would rather say no than get thrown out of office.

Now, Bishop Tutu called the Prime Minister of South Africa a courageous man, as the briefer mentioned on Friday, because he split his party in half over his reformist moves in South Africa, moves which many Americans consider to be pitifully small and, in some sense, are pitifully small.

But the question is, how far can you push them. You cannot push them to commit political suicide. He won't do that because the United States is asking or pressuring. And it may be that all of the pressure that we can put on is not going to produce the pace of change that we want. What I think we can point to is change that has occurred and that we hope has been faster than what otherwise would have been because of our pressure.

Yes.

Q You mentioned the Soviet Union as kind of in parallel with South Africa today in the President's speech, suggesting again that there might be some change there. Will there be in his tone toward the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Towards?

Q The Soviet Union.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't think there's a change in tone. I mean, the tone has really been the same with respect to human rights over the last four years.

Yes.

Q With regard to Chile, you said you've been trying to push Chileans in the same direction as Uraquay and Argentina in the past few years and you have not succeeded. Do you think you might have succeeded if you hadn't been approving loans and things like this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. The Carter administration didn't approve loans and it didn't succeed. In Argentina, we did approve loans and ultimately it became a democracy. In Uraguay, one of the first things we did was to start approving loans and it became a democracy.

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Why, of course, is a complex factor. And in the case of Argentina, I suppose Mrs. Thatcher gets a lot of the credit. But I would not say that had we stopped approving loans for Chile, they would now be a democracy.

And I would also point out that the main move of discretion left to the administration on Chile was to certify human rights improvements, which a lot of people expected us to do four years ago. It's four years later, we have not made the certification and we do not have any arms relationship with Chile, whatsoever.

Yes.

Q Just to go back to the Soviet Union for a minute, is there any concern that, with the new relationship with the Soviet Union in arms talks about to begin in a month, that this might not be the best time to repeat our concerns about human rights in the Soviet Union?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the President will, in part, repeat them today, and we will continue to repeat them. The Secretary of State and the President have -- well, the Secretary has raised them in the several meetings that he's had, and in the meetings the President -- the meeting the President had, that was also a subject. And I think the President said some years ago that whenever there's a negotiation with the Soviets, we would always make sure human rights was on the table. And that continues to be --

Q I'm talking about doing it publicly as opposed to privately. In other words --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry. Well, we're doing it publicly today, and will continue to do it publicly. There will not be silence on Soviet human rights violations because other negotiations -- economic or strategic -- are underway.

Q In October, Congressman Crockett wrote the President a letter, sending him a copy of the resolution that had been passed by both the House and Senate, asking that they free Mandela and his wife. And the President only took the letter and sent it to the government of South Africa and said nothing. So Crockett has written him again. Is he going to do anything about or just say -- mail it on down there without anything?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President makes a comment today about the treatment of long-term political prisoners in his remarks.

MR. SIMS: Let's take one, and then we will have the proclamation here shortly -- the speech. We're working on it. We want to repeat the ground rules. Background, administration official, for use at the time of the event.

Q Can't they say senior official? (Laughter.)

MR. SIMS: Yes.

Q Among the special guests, there are dissidents from Cuba, from Nicaragua. There is none from Chile, for example. There is none from South Africa. There is none from Paraguay, which are the few countries you have mentioned. Why is --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Unfortunately, the head of the Chilean Human Rights Commission, with whom I met Friday, left the country on Saturday. He had appointments in Madrid that I could not persuade him to cancel or I would have liked to have introduced him later today.

Q What about Paraguay? I mean I'm sure there are

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plenty of people living in --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, in part, because there is a limit to the number of people you can have. But I think in the case of Paraguay, for example, that the policy that we've had and enunciated publicly here, and more so and more importantly, publicly and privately in Asuncion by Ambassador Davis, has been the strongest human rights policy with respect to Paraguay this country has ever had or any other country has, too, because we're not supposed to be in this alone. There are other democratic countries in the world which are supposed to be helping.

MR. SIMS: Thank you.

Q Why nobody from South Africa?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry. Bishop Tutu, who would have been an appropriate guest for a human rights ceremony, is, as you know, in Oslo getting the Nobel Prize.

Q Was he invited?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not after we knew he was going to Oslo. It would have been silly.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 11:59 A.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF PRESIDENT KOUNTCHE OF NIGER

December 10, 1984

The Briefing Room

3:12 P.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're here to provide a bit of a prebrief on the official working visit of President Seyni Kountche of Niger who is arriving in town today and will be having meetings today and tomorrow with all the top team here in Washington.

Let me just say a few words about the context of this visit during which the President of Niger will be meeting, of course, with our President, with the Director of AID, Defense Secretary Weinberger, and us at State, the head of the Peace Corps. This visit, of course, at the invitation of the President,takes place at a time when much of our attention is focused on problems of the African drought and famine. Niger is one of the four or five countries most affected by this tragedy that is spreading across Africa.

He is not only the Head of State of such a country, but he is the acting President of an organization called CILSS which is a coordinating committee of those affected by the drought in the Shael, an interstate of grouping of eight West African countries. This puts him in an excellent position to speak; in other words, not only about the problems of Niger but the problems of the whole region, and what conclusions are being drawn not only by his country but by others.

This organization, CILSS, was formed back during the great drought of the early and mid 70s in an effort to try and find a framework or a structure, if you will, for coordination, both among recipients and among donor countries and institutions. Obviously, then, we look forward to a discussion with our Nigerian visitors about those kinds of questions.

Niger is, indeed, suffering the effects of the drought, as I've mentioned. And we calculate that its needs between now and the next harvest will be, indeed, substantial, putting it up at the -- as I said, amongst the top four or five most needy countries in Africa. Niger has a leadership which has adopted amongst Africa's most hardheaded, commonsensical and pragmatic policies, and has made strenuous efforts to prepare for such an emergency in terms of monitoring the situation, in terms of careful policies aimed at maximizing food self-sufficiency. And I would stress that theme of food self-sufficiency. In fact, until this disaster hit, Niger has been more or less self-sufficient in food, even finding a little bit for -- surplus for export on occasion.

So, it's a well-prepared, well-organized effort that the government of Niger has made and has been amongst the quickest to make its appeal when it became clear the extent of the disaster which had struck. To be more specific, our figures would lead us to estimate that Niger lost something close to 60 percent of what would have been the harvest the previous year -- a 60 percent shortfall. And that previous year was a lousy year. So, it gives you some idea of the extent of the problem. We obviously hope that, working closely with Niger and with other donors and sources of assistance, that it will be possible to help Niger get through this difficult time.

Our bilateral relations with Niger, I would describe, as [illegible]. We have a number of common interests, both in terms of

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trying to promote regional stability and to promote responses to Africa's economic crisis and its drought crisis. We have a lot of respect for the quality of leadership and decision-making, particularly on the economic side but other things as well.

We find ourselves in agreement with many of the positions that the government of Niger has taken on international and regional questions, in terms of promoting African solutions to a number of the problems that Africa faces. We have a significant assistance program in Niger; and you may have questions about that, but in a nutshell, I would describe Niger as the largest, the second largest aid program we have amongst that group of eight countries that I referred to a moment ago. And these programs overwhelmingly go towards supporting the goals of agricultural development and food self-sufficiency that I have just cited.

Beyond that, I guess I would just point out that, if you look at the map and see where Niger is located, it is a country that obviously is land-locked, is affected by events and developments in neighboring countries, is an immediate neighbor of Libya, is next door to the Chadian drama, and, obviously, is in a good position to exchange views with our leadership about all those regional questions that are involved.

I think I would stop there and maybe go to questions -- yes, sir?

Q How many people are affected, or likely to be affected by the drought?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think we have good estimates of that. I mean, there's -- a great many people will be affected in terms of having to -- having to have their needs met. We are not, at this time -- and we're keeping our fingers crossed -- expecting that there's going to be massive numbers of people who are going to be starving. But, obviously, that means -- we get our act together, and they won't starve. I don't have a number to give you. But we are looking at a shortfall in terms of food that is up around 350,000 metric tons -- a gap between now and the next harvest. That's a lot of food. And it affects people in different parts of the country.

We're providing assistance ourselves of course, both in terms of food, and also in terms of in-country transport, because transportation is a major part of that picture. My colleague-- would you want to talk about numbers of people that are affected?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Directly affected right now, you are talking about a half million people who are directly affected and have had to migrate from areas where they normally raise crops, or where they're normally involved in livestock activities.

Beyond that, of course, other portions of the population will be affected. At present, as my colleague said, there is not -- we do not have the situation of mass starvation, or widespread starvation as you have in Ethiopia. We're hoping to head this off through advance planning. And of course the government in Niger, as well, has to be credited for doing their own organizing. They've built up very substantial stocks over the last several years which they are now using to feed their population in this period of time before the international assistance arrives.

Q You said they are not threatened with immediate starvation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct.

Q Well, could you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Because of the planning process -- this is my colleague of the West Africa section of the African Bureau, he's also speaking on background -- but, no, that is the case. We do not think people are literally at risk of starvation at this time. That is the case.

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Q Are you prepared to give additional aid to the countries should they ask for it during this visit? Or do you anticipate they will?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question of decisions on food assistance, emergency food assistance, is really a function of identifying -- of getting assessments -- identifying need levels and then responding to specific requests. And we're keeping up with those requests in this situation as we are in others. I wouldn't necessarily predict that there'd be any specific decisions on additional food, where we've got already worked out between the two governments, something on the order of 60,000 tons agreed and negotiated in several packages of decisions that have been taken, and are in the process now of being implemented. But, I wouldn't be at all surprised if additional decisions will be made during the course of this fiscal year as needs are identified.

Yes?

Q How much money is involved in the financing of their private production?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we have a regular development assistance and economic support fund program in Niger of about $25 million a year. The value of this food aid -- I'd have to ask an expert to get you a dollar figure on the 60,000 tons I just referred to. Perhaps my colleague -- do want to have a crack at that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You're talking about approximately $20 million.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's an additional $20 million.

Q Also -- may I follow up? Since they have drought in that area, why don't they go into reclamation programs? Do they have one -- where they have dams built so they can store water?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, one of the problems, of course, has been that there is not a whole lot of water. In terms of rain-fed agriculture it's a real problem because of the irregularity of the rains. There are projects that involve irrigated agriculture along the banks of the Niger river. Those are very, I might say, capital and training-intensive ways to do things. And, as a result, the track record in such projects has been mixed. There are some; and some work. Others have proven very hard to maintain

Yes?

Q Why is Secretary Weinberger going to be in on this meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, nothing particularly astonishing about that. We have a small security assistance program between the U.S. and Niger, and I suspect they'll be talking about that program, and talking about developments in the region generally.

Q And Chad?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sorry?

Q Chad?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No doubt. I mean, it is an immediate neighbor of Chad -- Niger is. Niger receives the bulk of its security assistance, and has its primary military relationship, in terms of support and assistance, with France. We

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have a small program that has been concentrated primarily in terms of support for Niger's two C-130's, which were purchased from us.

Do you have a question.

Q Yes -- I would ask the question in French, since you speak French?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Please, go ahead.

Q It has been said in an interview in "Afrique" -- "Une rumeur veut que le Niger ait signe un accord secret avec les Estats-Unis pour l'insstallation, dans le nord du pays, d'un systeme d'ecoutes permetant aux Americains de surveiller toutes les communications venant du nord du Sahara."

Is that true? The rumor?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's news to me. (Laughter.)

Q Will you translate for us?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is a report of a rumor of a secret agreement between us and Niger to put, as I understand you, some form of communications facility in the north of Niger to monitor communications traffic coming from north of the Saraha.

Q Are you denying it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not aware of any secret agreement along those lines, no. I think I would know.

Q Is there any security relationship, enhanced security relationship, that we're looking for, given the situation in Chad and our relationship with Libya? Is there any assistance we want with Niger in terms of basing or anything else?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't think we're looking for bases, when we have put military supplies into N'djamena, in response to the request of that government. We have come via various routes, including on occasion, over-flying Niger. But, we're not looking for any facilities in Niger. I don't think there's anything in that area that we're looking at as something that we're asking them to do, no.

Q And does he have any -- do you expect him to bring up the question of South Africa? Is that of concern to him in either a regional sense, or any of the questions about your negotiations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, I would assume that, because this is the case in virtually every such meeting with an African Head of State, that there'd be some discussion between him and the President and other officials about Southern African developments, including, most particularly Namibia-Angola negotiations, yes. But I don't think I'd want to characterize anything much more than that until the meetings have taken place.

Q Is the -- does Niger have any border problems with Libya? I mean, is the border secure?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it's a long border -- for the most part not defended. I don't believe there's any boundary claims as a problem. There have, on occasion in the past, been some activities which one could say originated in Libya and were not wholly welcome in Niger, including radio broadcasts

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and public statements and on one occasion a few years ago some pretty overt threats, but there's not an actual boundary dispute over the locations of the boundary, no.

Q How do you spell CILSS? You were talking about -- number of --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: C-I-L-S-S.

Q C-I-L --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: S-S.

Q Why --

Q Do you know what that stands for?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It stands for the Interstate Committee for Liaison on the Shaelean Drought.

Q Could you identify those --

Q Why is he coming at this time? What's the primary reason for his coming now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think it's been a desire on both sides to have the visit, and this just seemed to work out in terms of the timing that was convenient for both sides. There's no particular significance or drama in terms of the bilateral relationship.

MR. SIMS: Any more? Thank you very much.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 3:27 P.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF PRESIDENT KOUNTCHE
OF THE REPUBLIC OF NIGER

December 11, 1984

The Briefing Room

1:57 P.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The discussions that have just taken place have been characterized by both Heads of State with fairly full remarks. I think I would add a couple of points. The President of Niger opened up with a very extensive presentation on the situation that Africa, as a whole, faces. And particularly that region of Africa which he, at this time, represents in a sense, namely the Sahelian countries, because he is the President, the acting President of the CILSS, which is an organization, as I mentioned yesterday, of eight Sahel countries. And he is, in that capacity, in a position to articulate that whole viewpoint.

He stressed, of course, the issue of a famine crisis. He stressed, secondly, the longer term agricultural development crisis that Africa is facing. He stressed the vital importance of maintaining political stability and territorial integrity of small states. We looked -- and we discussed, as well of course, the whole question of North African Maghrebian politics and realignments -- the recent Moroccan-Libyan agreement, if that's the correct term, the situation in Chad, the situation in the Western Sahara dispute.

And then we discussed, at some length, the situation in Southern Africa. He made some points on that. The President, our President, responded to a number of the points that were made, and there was extensive discussion, I think, on the following points: Southern Africa -- the whole issue of the famine, its origins, its roots; and the most extensive discussion of all, I would say, was on the question of what works and what does not work in terms of development, strategy development policy, what one can do to make more effective Africa's own food self-sufficiency, what one can do to reorient development efforts so that they are, in effect, more effective.

I think there was -- I might just leave it there and go to questions.

Q Could you expand on two things? One -- the last thing you mentioned -- on how to make long-term development more effective; and secondly, on the Maghreb politics?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. President Kountche is a very strong believer in the following points as concerns development policy: he feels that, after a generation or so of independence, that African states have made their share of mistakes and that, in part, those mistakes have been encouraged by donor institutions, including the world bank and individual donors, and that the time is now for rethinking in many respects.

I don't think he would describe himself as an advocate of grandiose projects. What he would describe himself as is somebody who has experienced the failures of socialism, the failures of collectivization and parastatals on the one hand; but also the failure of systems which only encourage the production of cash crops for export.

And, therefore, the lesson that one derives out of all of this is the vital importance of peasant agriculture, the importance

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of individual initiative, the importance of farmers -- that is, peasants, individuals -- being given incentives to produce, being given the means -- the necessary inputs and the supporting structure -- so that they can become more productive farmers.

I think that's basically it, in a nutshell. Repeatedly the theme comes through of looking for new paths to try to get a handle on the downward, the tailspin in African agriculture.

Q You say he -- President Kountche -- made a statement on Southern Africa, South Africa, right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We talked about that at some length, yes.

Q Did he endorse our policy of constructive engagement? Or did he say the United States ought to do more?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me get to that. There was a second question here on the Maghreb which I'd like to get to, too.

As we all know, from looking at the map, Niger is an immediate neighbor of Libya; and, therefore, must have some form of relationship with a neighbor. I think the way he would put it -- and I don't want to put words in his mouth -- is "with one's eyes open."

There is a concern that many countries in the Sahel, including Niger, I think, share as to what will be the ramifications as far as the Western Sahara conflict is concerned, what the impact of this Libyan-Moroccan accord might be on Mauritania and other countries who are deeply affected by that conflict. So that was the basic point he made, I think, on that issue.

On matters -- Southern Africa -- to answer your question, Sam -- he was, President Kountche was very much of the view that this is the time for dialogue between all parties concerned. That this is the time between South Africa and its neighbors when people should be sitting down, they should be negotiating, they should be working out, in effect, ground rules for getting along together. That is his view. He stated it publicly. He stated it again here today.

He believes, for example, that such things as the Nkomati agreement between Mozambique and South Africa are important developments in Africa's coming to grips with the problems of good neighborly relations as concern South Africa.

Q So that makes him a minority in terms of black African leadership if he thinks the Nkomati accords were a good thing -- because they're not --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not going to put words in his mouth; I'm telling you what he said. And whether he's a minority or not would depend on one's head-counts, I suppose. But, clearly, what is reflected in the Mozambique-South Africa process is something which he, and others, understand reflects a realistic and pragmatic approach to solving a problem. And I don't think you'd find him arguing against it.

On issues of apartheid itself, I think there's no doubt that President Kountche made clear in his public statement how he feels, his private statements are exactly the same. This is a system which no one can endorse; he doesn't. What he urges is that we all use our best influence to bring about change, and to bring about dialogue inside the country.

Q I'm trying to determine, and of course you have me on this agreement with Mozambique -- I know nothing about it. I'm trying to determine whether he expressed anything to President Reagan which suggested that he was nearer the policy as enunciated by Assistant Secretary of State Crocker on the record here a few days ago -- (Laughter) -- or suggestions offered by Bishop Tutu on the

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record here a few days ago.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think it's a question that, in fairness, should be put to them. And they're going to be here for a day or two -- the Nigerians. And I think it would be inappropriate for me to go beyond what he has said publicly in a forum such as this.

I don't think that I --

Q What did he say to President Reagan? What did he say there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's exactly my point. These are diplomatic discussions, Sam, and if I start providing you a verbatim recount of what he said in a diplomatic discussion I'm not doing -- I'm not doing the job of a host. We are the host in a state visit of this kind. So, I would urge the question, you know, be put -- and there may be opportunities to do that.

Q President Reagan said there were areas of disagreements? What major areas were there?

Q South Africa. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I do not sense a disagreement on the issue -- on the issues of South Africa. I think what we are reflecting in the President's remark about how, naturally, as friends, we may differ on some things, is the simple point that we're talking -- in the case of Niger -- about a non-aligned country, a member of the non-aligned movement, the OAU, and so-forth; and that it would be unrealistic and inappropriate to expect there to be an identity of view on all issues as between our country -- a super power, the leader of one of the world's great alliances -- and a non-aligned country. I think that's simply what that means.

I would be very surprised -- and you could, of course, put the question directly -- if you would find that the Nigerian leadership was asking us to abandon our approach on the Namibia negotiations. On the contrary, I think there's progress there which is perceived, and which they would urge us to persevere and to bring that to a successful conclusion -- using all of our influence. And that means influence with South Africa as well as the other parties -- make no mistake. We are expected to bring South Africa to an agreement. That's what we're trying to do.

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On the issue of basic approaches toward the South African situation, I'd be rather surprised, but again, you'd better ask them, if you would hear them saying that we should be using economic warfare as a means of bringing about change in South Africa.

Yes.

Q What was President Reagan referring to when he said something about rational economic thought?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What he's referring to is the very common-sensical management of the economy of Niger over recent years that has seen a purposeful and systematic effort to move toward food self-sufficiency in Niger. And they have come very close. In fact, in some years, they've even managed it with a tiny fraction for export to needy neighbors.

In the face of the current drought, as you were talking about yesterday, where they lost some 60 percent of their crop compared to the previous year, which itself was a lousy year -- of course, they're not going to be self-sufficient. But even in that respect, the planning for the drought, for meeting the drought, has been a model and one that we would hope that more countries could emulate, in terms of getting monitoring, getting the data together, making plans in preparation of affected populations, making appeals to donors for relief in a timely basis -- that kind of thing.

MR. SIMS: All right, could this be the last one, please.

Q In a recent issue of Congressional Quarterly, they said that they had had to sell off their grain reserves to pay off demands of debtor -- to pay off their debts. Is that correct, and who would force them to sell off their grain reserves? It said this was one of the reasons that they're facing this severe problem.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Niger had purchased, the year before, grains for their national security stock. This is a parastatal that in -- within the country they had bought from the farmers. They had bought this with loans from Caisse-Centrale, and other French banks. They were -- they had to sell it the next year, and what they did was sell some of this to outside countries.

It wasn't -- that's a misinterpretation that somebody was forcing them to sell their food. It was food they had bought and had mortgaged and that there was, last year, excess grains that they sold off to their neighbors.

Q These are French banks that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Caisse -Centrale is a French bank, yes.

Q Can you say if there were any specific pledges of food aid made during this visit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, yes. Yes, we are going to sign the second accord.

Q And how much is involved?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's 45,000 tons.

Q You had 15,000 --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Before, and now we're signing 45,000 tons.

Q That's for next year -- for fiscal '85?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's still in fiscal '85.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The total, therefore, that will have been concluded, including the amount signed during this visit, will be 60,000 metric tons. And we will be looking at additional decisions during the discussions that will be taking place in the weeks ahead after that.

Q When is this agreement to be signed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The meetings are today and tomorrow.

Q Is it just grain, no other product?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sorghum.

Q You said yesterday that their shortfall --

Q For sale?

Q -- was 350,000 tons?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Where will the rest of the shortfall be made up?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that's an estimate of the gap that we think would exist as between now and the next harvest, which is some considerable months down the road. It's obviously, to some extent, the best guess at this point.

There are obviously other donors involved. And one makes decisions as needs are identified. One doesn't make all the decisions up front. One makes decisions as more data come in and as specific requests are put between the recipient and the donor community.

There's a mechanism for doing this and it tends to work in chunks, chunks of decisions, rather than all in one big decision.

Q Can I just ask one? Did they -- did the President talk about the re-arrest of the six South African leaders? Did that come up in the meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it did not come up in the meeting.

Q Do you have anything to say?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not beyond what we said in the noon briefing at the State Department, which we can get for you.

MR. SIMS: President Kountche has a press briefing tomorrow at 3:30 p.m.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: At 3:30 p.m. -- press conference, Executive Room of the Madison Hotel -- tomorrow.

THE PRESS: Thank you

END 2:11 P.M. EST

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UNEDITED

ON-THE-RECORD BRIEFING
ON
AID TO AFRICA
BY
M. PETER McPHERSON, AID ADMINISTRATOR
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 12, 1984, 2:35 P. M

MS. KATE SEMERAD: Peter McPherson, Administrator of AID, will be briefing today on the famine in Ethiopia. The briefing will be ON THE RECORD for both sound and camera

MR. McPHERSON: Good afternoon. The U.S. has responded enormously, both private citizens and the U.S. Government, to the tragedy in Africa. Private citizens, we estimate, have given $15 million, and more, of resources and money to Africa as a whole.

In terms of Ethiopia, the U.S. Government has provided 223,000 metric tons of food in the last two months, since the beginning of this fiscal year. That's a total amount of resources -- that's food and everything else -- of $121.7 million. This includes, as I say, food. It includes recently 5,000 blankets and 500 rolls of plastic for sheeting for some temporary housing. It includes medicines. A number of items.

Overall in Africa so far this fiscal year we have provided $253 million of resources. Included in that is 614,000 tons of food. As I say, enormous and really a historical response, substantially greater than any previous time ever in the history of this country for drought in Africa

I'd like to comment briefly on a couple of topics, and then, of course, look forward to your questions

There's been some discussion recently about resettlements. What's involved here is the Ethiopia Government moving people from north, in the contested areas where the civil war is occurring, down in the south. Substantial resources, apparently, are already at play in this effort. The Ethiopian Government indicates they have moved some 70,000 people, and that they plan to move some 1.5 million people.

This is an enormous movement, enormous effort. I remember in recent years that Indonesia has tried to move many people -- begun to move many people from one area to another -- took years to plan it, a lot of resources. The World Bank worked closely with them, and there have just been tremendous problems in achieving this.

At other times in history, efforts have encountered substantial difficulties as well.

The Ethiopia Government, putting very substantial resources into this, in our judgment poses a number of problems, such as: Can there truly be voluntary consent of those moved when those who are going to be moved are in fact starving or near-starving? Can a starving man or woman give voluntary consent?

There is no preparation, or very little preparation, for the arrival of these people. It looks to us like it may well be a situation of moving starving people from one point to another point where they'll starve in a new location. They're being moved to a location where the climate and circumstances are quite different. Where the drought is occurring now is relatively high -- thousands of feet high. They're being moved down to lowland areas where there are problems such as malaria -- disease difficulties that haven't been prepared for and that we anticipate will be a major source of difficulty.

Other populations. The ethnic groupings are already there in the areas where they're being moved -- at least some of those areas -- and every expectation is that arrivees will encounter difficulties in that area.

But, most of all, the facts are that this move is going to take very substantial resources, and the Ethiopia Government is frankly strapped. They've got the problem of helping to deal and dealing with the starving people that are now there, where they now understand what they are and that they need to deal with it.

We urge the Ethiopia Government to focus on the known problems instead of creating new ones.

Another topic I'd like to comment on: The logistical problems within Ethiopia have been enormous. You've heard me comment about them before. They're enormous in no small part because of the civil war. In times past you've all heard reports of trucks being blown up, of camps like Korem being taken over by insurgent groups, moving back and forth as to who controls it. It's my firm conviction that we're not going to do the necessary job in Ethiopia. We, the donor community, and the Ethiopia Government are not going to get the job done in

Ethiopia unless something is worked out, unless some reduction is put in place of the battles

In short, what we're calling for is a food truce. We believe that trucks carrying food ought to be allowed safe passage. Properly marked trucks, international humanitarian efforts, clearly need to be able to move through areas in safe passage. Clearly, feeding centers need to be safe havens, need to be apart from the battles. Without a food truce involving safe passage of vehicles, without feeding centers being safe havens, without some effort such as this, to be able to move this international humanitarian effort freely through and around the country, we frankly don't believe we're going to be able to save all the lives that can be saved.

I'd welcome your questions.

Q Is the Administration responding to increasing reports from some of the PVO's that have also called for a food truce? Have they contacted you? Have they asked you to make this type of statement, or to have the Administration make a statement like this?

And the second question is, what is the Administration doing in rebel-held territories, specifically Tigre and Eritrea?

A We have been interested in a food truce, safe passage, safe havens -- however you wish to describe it -- for some time. The PVO's -- certainly some of them, especially, have been interested in this, and we continue to talk with them as well as others.

This is not an absolutely new concept, but certainly as time has gone on we have felt more and more intensely that something such as this was critical in order to save really many thousands of lives.

We have not commented to any degree publicly about the work that is being done in the insurgent-held areas. I think many of you know that private voluntary organizations -- the U.S. and others -- are working there. There are many destitute people in insurgent-held areas clearly in need, and we are clearly interested, and those PVO's are doing some work there. But our public comment has been limited to that basically.

Q Okay. One other question: Is the relief effort -- I mean, Ethiopia's organizing its own relief efforts. Is this something which is done outside of a military strategy in Eritrea and Tigre, or do you see the current program of resettlement which comes on the heels of reports that other people are being refused food? Do you see this as part of Ethiopia's military strategy for crushing the insurgents in Eritrea and Tigre?

A Frankly, as a measure of a humanitarian effort, I have not really commented on motives. What I've said before and what I say again today is that substantial resources are being diverted from the efforts to save the lives of starving people into a resettlement scheme which we think is unwise and which is resource intensive.

Q Didn't the Ethiopians do something like this a few years ago when they were having problems with the Somalis in the Ogaden? Didn't they also try a type of resettlement program which ended up with thousands of refugees in the neighboring countries?

A Resettlement schemes are not brand-new in the area, and I'd really rather not comment on the history, as much as to say -- and again go back to the fact that logistics are a major problem. Every time I'm here it seems like a good portion of the time I talk about logistical difficulties in moving food around and the lack of resources to do everything we want. Now to have the Ethiopia Government talk about moving 1.5 million people is, as I say, a major diversion of resources and effort which we think should be focused upon the starving people themselves.

Q Can we go to the next logical question about your conclusion about the resettlement program, which is if the Ethiopian Government doesn't see it your way and doesn't agree that this is a diversion of substantial resources and doesn't agree that it's in any way an obstacle to solving the hunger problem, what do you do about it?

Do you just keep sending food and supplies over there and then find them not getting where they need to get and not solving the problem, or do you eventually say, "Look we've told you what we think you need to do, you didn't do it, there's nothing further we can do"?

Are you contemplating cutting off the assistance at some point if the --

A No. We're not suggesting that we're going to cut off assistance to people that we're not -- in the areas that we're now feeding. We have said from the very beginning that this effort was a humanitarian effort; it was not a political effort. A hungry child knows no politics. We have been very careful to send our food through private voluntary organizations that could carefully account for the food or to in other ways carefully monitor the food We would anticipate continuing with that effort

There's no question that in the weeks ahead there's a real possibility the Ethiopia Government will get these people down to the south and the world will be presented with a problem of those people are starving in the south. How we address that problem, we certainly haven't -- it's not before us now, but we think that the Ethiopia Government must now understand that this diversion of resources, this movement of people from one point of starvation to another, is counter-productive We call upon them now, as we have for some time, to not divert resources to some massive resettlement

We've said, as I indicated in my initial remarks now for several weeks, that U.S. resources themselves -- and I say again now that U.S. resources are not and will not be going into this resettlement effort

Q You met with Minister Dawit -- I don't know -- a month or six weeks ago --

A Yes

Q -- and you stood --

A You sat right here, as a matter of fact

Q -- there with him.

A You sat right there. I remember

Q No. I think I was here. (Laughter)

A Yes.

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Q Were his comments yesterday, particularly with respect to the magnitude of the humanitarian effort being mounted by donor countries, did those comments come as a surprise to you?

A I think that he was not the principal spokesman that was quoted; another Ethiopian Government official.

Frankly, I think this is the classic example of biting the hand that feeds you. We reject them. We think that they're just absurd. I think the world community understands that.

Q This is not the first time that the West is accused of being quiet about this thing for while. International aid agencies have also raised the same point.

Do you think there is a misunderstanding or there is a political explanation behind this?

A I would like not to go into motives. I would just comment that this is biting the hand that feeds you. In fact, the world knows that the West and the U.S., in particular, has responded with enormous resources. That our plan is to continue to help these starving people because as a civilization we cannot stand by while people starve and while we have abundance, and that will continue to be our plan.

Q Mr. McPherson, are we sending aid to the Sudan, to the Ethiopian refugees in the Sudan right on the border near Kassala?

A Yes.

Q Do we consider this part of the Ethiopian --

A They're not part of the numbers.

Q They're not part of the numbers? Okay.

A No.

Q One other question. Do you have any estimates on the number of starving people that are living in the rebel-held areas? I've seen estimates as high as four million.

A The problem is to define what is an insurgent-held area. Those borders to weave back and forth. So, frankly, I've never tried to settle upon an official number I would announce of numbers living in insurgent areas.

Q Do we have a ballpark figure?

A I'd like not to give one because it just raises more questions than not. There are clearly a number of people in Tigre and Eritrea that need to be fed.

Q In response to the charge yesterday about the West and the U.S. not acting quickly enough, when did the United States and your Agency become aware of the magnitude of the problem? What then did AID undertake to do; and did the government of Ethiopia interfere or hinder in any of these efforts in any way?

A Last fiscal year -- the year preceding October 1, 1984 -- we provided some $21 million of disaster assistance; $19 million of that was food. That was the largest single donation of any country to Ethiopia, and one of the larger contributions of food and assistance of any country that we gave in Africa that year.

Large as that was, as the months went on, it appeared to us from information we were getting from the field that this problem was beginning to balloon. There were concerns all along about things such as the Ethiopian Government giving priority use to their ports for cement or military equipment moving in from the Soviet Union.

Perhaps some of you remember my saying here that the Ethiopian Government seemed to be saying, "Let them eat cement," because we couldn't our ships, the priority that we felt was necessary. There clearly wasn't the priority by the Ethiopian Government to put trucks at the disposal of moving the food. Trucks were moving other things.

This is not a criticism of the RRC, the relief commission itself, but rather how much the government of Ethiopia allocated to the relief commission in resources.

Sometime in September -- earlier in September -- the problem looked like it was getting potentially very large indeed to us and to me, myself. We became deeply involved. Some of you remember that we set up this interagency task force with General Becton as head of that task force, and we began to move substantial quantities of food through the system, so by the first few days of October, we committed some $30 million dollars worth of food.

I might point out that was before there was a lot of media attention to this but not before all of us talked about it, since I think I was here several times in those weeks and months preceding October 1.

Clearly, with the explosion of the situation in October, it became a situation where we moved this massive amount of food, to date, where, as I indicated, we moved $123 million worth of resources.

Q Last spring and summer a supplemental appropriations bill moved through the Congress at glacial speed because of the number of riders that were attached to it, and it was, in fact, I think, passed piecemeal several times.

Can you say now, looking back, what the effect of that delay in the bill was on African drought victims?

A We made food decisions as they appeared to be appropriate at that time whether we were able to move them as rapidly as we thought appropriate, and had the resources to do so without regard to their supplemental. That supplemental was clearly very important for us by the time the money was available, but the delay in itself did not delay decisions on food.

Q Why is that so? Why would it not have been better to get the food in there earlier even if it hadn't been consumed immediately -- because of the port facilities, for example, and other problems in transportation?

A I mentioned Ethiopia a minute ago where we weren't able to get our food through the ports because of cement unloadings clogging up the system as well as our having food stock on hand that we could commit. We needed that supplemental by the time we got it, but we did not need it in any material fashion before the time that Congress actually appropriated the money.

At least, that was our judgment as we looked at it at that time. Of course, had we had 20/20 hindsight, maybe more food might have been moved. But with the figures and information we then had available, in my judgment we moved the food as appropriate.

Q Let me just follow this up one more time. If that bill had passed when first proposed, and certainly there wasn't any opposition to the drought relief portions of the bill --

A We probably would have moved the food in the same fashion.

Q You would have still not moved the food until late summer, or whenever you began to take advantage of it.

Q The information which we had at that time suggested the movement of food as we did it. It was not the availability of the supplemental monies which drove those food decisions but rather it was the information from Africa as we had it.

Q Other than the Soviets, who else is helping the Ethiopians in the resettlement program --helping in the transportation?

A We know of no one.

Q Helping them?

A The Food and Agricultural Organization in Rome -- Secretary General Saouma has called a conference for purposes of obtaining donor contributions for this resettlement. We have said that we will not attend that conference. I believe that other donors -- at least some other donors -- have indicated the same. I don't know that any other donors are actually participating at this time.

It certainly is appropriate, we think, to call upon the Soviets and other Eastern-bloc donors to use whatever resources they're willing to put in Ethiopia to allocate those resources to the problem most immediately at hand.

Q A follow-up on that point. Did the 300 trucks promised by the Soviets ever turn up?

A We don't know that they've turned up. Frankly, I don't think so. We don't have information to absolutely confirm that they haven't, but I have no information that those Soviet trucks have been delivered.

What I do have is information that the Ethiopian Government allocated trucks, which they already had in their possession, to move food out of the ports. And by that decision -- I've been critical several times today of the Ethiopian Government. But the facts are that sometime shortly after their Tenth Anniversary Conference, there was a dramatic increase in interest, and I think Dawit being here, and his commitment to me and to all of you, that they would put substantial additional trucks into the movement of food, back in Ethiopia, was delivered on.

They moved thousands and thousands of tons of food out of their ports so very fast, as a matter of fact, that for a few days it looked like we weren't going to have enough food in the ports.

Some of you remember that I was presented with the situation of the Ethiopians doing such a good job moving food that we diverted some ship on the high seas that was on its way in India to get some food into the ports of Ethiopia.

The lesson I draw from this is that the Ethiopian Government, when it's prepared to apply its full energies, its full resources, can save thousands and thousands lives of people. That we, as donors, can help but we cannot be the primary driver in this. The Ethiopian Government really cannot afford, for the sake of its millions of people, cannot afford to divert necessary resources to something like this resettlement scheme.

Let me take one more question and then I'm going to leave.

Q I would just like to know, what do you suggest as opposed to the resettlement program for the long-term solution in the area considering the land and all the conditions?

A I think what the Ethiopians need to do is to rethink their collectivized farming approach, and export of the Soviet Union. It doesn't work back at home and it doesn't work in Ethiopia. I think what they need to do is to rethink their farming pricing schedules. They're paying farmers substantially below production levels which discourage farmers from producing more and investing in the productivity of their farms.

They need to change those economic policies. I think those would be cornerstones of long-term increased productivity for the country.

Q Before we lose the opportunity, I would like to ask you something on another subject for a moment.

You had two of your employees returned to the United States today under circumstances I'm sure you would rather not have had them return.

A Of course.

Q A third is in Germany at this point. On the basis of what you have been told about his conversations with U.S. officials, how do you think the Iranian Government handled your employees during the hijacking incident last week?

A These were good men. These men served you and I really very well. It's clear that they're going to be missed.

There have been a lot of questions raised. There's been some comment from the White House, from the State Department, about the hijacking and the role of the Iranian Government, and I think I really ought to leave any further statements to them. But, clearly, these are men which we will miss and that we admired.

Thank you very much.

(Briefing concluded at 3:00 p.m.)

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON U.S.-CUBAN IMMIGRATION AGREEMENT

December 14, 1984

The Briefing Room

4:33 P.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Perhaps if I go through quickly the framework in which this agreement operates, it will make it easier to deal with some of the questions. Basically the situation that has existed since the time of Mariel in 1980, was that Cuba has refused to accept back people that we found that are mandatorily ineligible to be admitted to the United States under our law.

The U.S. law provides that when a country refuses to take back so-called "excludables" that you must stop the issuance of visas to nationals of that country. As a consequence, our visa processing in Havana has been turned off for four years with the exception of immediate relatives of U.S. citizens. Likewise, the processing of political refugees in Havana has also been suspended during that period.

What this agreement involves is, Cuba has now accepted, or agreed to accept, the return of the group of persons who we have found excludable under U.S. law. The group, as mentioned in the agreement, comprises 2,746 people.

These persons have been through various stages of the judicial process, and nothing in the agreement affects, in any way, their rights under U.S. law. It's simply a statement of Cuba's willingness to accept those persons should they ultimately be determined excludable, or have that determination upheld throughout the court system.

With respect to -- the fact of Cuba's willingness to take them back, however does remove the obstacle under U.S. law for the issuance of visas and refugee processing in Havana. Consequently, we will begin to once again process immigrant visa applications in Havana. These will be done entirely within the framework of existing United States law. Only those persons who meet the eligibility criteria will be admitted through their consular interviews and so on. This will be conducted within the numerical limits that are set for each country and for worldwide entry into the United States under our law.

With respect to the refugee program, there is a group of persons in Cuba who we've traditionally had an interest in. These are so-called "ex-political prisoners," persons who were jailed by the regime there, for usually very long terms, on account of acts -- politically motivated acts -- and who have since been released. Many of them have been waiting for some time to apply for admission into the United States. There was a program that had begun in 1979 and was suspended as a consequence of the Mariel episode and some attendant disorders around our intrasection.

The agreement provides that we will, once again, begin processing applications from these persons within the framework of the Refugee Act of 1980. Both the eligibility criteria, which involves a case-by-case determination by U.S. authorities, and also

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within numerical limits which are set annually through consultations between the Executive branch and the Congress.

The figure established in our consultations earlier this year is 3,000 for fiscal year 1985. This is for the ex-prisoners and their family members. In other words, all the people will have to fit within that ceiling. The size of the program in subsequent years would be determined through our normal annual consultation process between the Executive and Congress -- in light of the experience that we have in processing applications in Havana. In other words, we'll see what the demand is and what level seems appropriate, taking our own interest into account.

Q Is that 3,000 figure for refugees only -- not to include regular immigration?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct. There's really two ways that these ex-prisoners can come. Many of them may be eligible for regular immigrant visas. If they have relatives in the United States and meet the eligibility criteria, they'd come within the normal framework of the immigration law. If they don't qualify for immigrant visas, they can apply for admission under the Refugee Act within this 3,000 ceiling.

Q What are the limits on the immigration visas? Is there an annual limit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is for every country --

Q Talking about Cuba --

SENIOR ADMKINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. For every country, including Cuba, but every other country in the world as well, there is an annual limit of 20,000 -- up to 20,000 -- per country for so-called "preference visas." There's another group of visas which are those that are issued to the immediate spouse and minor children of American citizens, which are not within that 20,000 ceiling. The actual number that would come, though, depends on how many apply and how many are found to be qualified and so on. That's an upper limit set by our law.

Q About the people here -- the so-called criminals -- did they become criminals because of actions they committed in this country? And were they a range of crimes? And about how many of them came here as criminals or how many came here as normal people who commited crimes? And were they all serious crimes? And does that mean that an immigrant who commits a minor crime can be punished by being sent back to a country he doesn't want to go to?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Maybe I can hit that briefly, and if you want to get into some more detail, you can ask our friends from the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

The situation of these people is that they've never been admitted into the United States as immigrants. They arrived illegally; and now the bulk of the Mariel Cubans are in the process of adjusting their status under the Cuban Adjustment Act, so they will become legal, permanent residents. But with respect to this group, they're treated as if they've never really entered, in a legal fiction sense. So they can come under exclusion proceedings.

Having commited crimes of moral terpitude is one of the mandatory bases of exclusion from this country. You can't get a visa if you've done that. The group here -- there's a bit of an overlap. There are people who admitted to committing serious crimes in Cuba when they first arrived and who have been held in jail ever since. There are also people who were free and at liberty in this country -- a much larger group, actually -- who've committed serious crimes since they've been here. Some of those overlap, because some were

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held initially on the basis of what they said they did in Cuba, were subsequently released, and then proceeded to commit a crime.

But the criteria we used in defining this class were people who had committed serious offenses, not traffic tickets or something. We've got murderers, armed robbery, this type of thing on the list.

Q But, traditionally, lots of Americans came here in illegal ways, jumping ship, getting here any way they can. If they had committed equivalent crimes, would they be sent home or is this a process you're just using against these Cubans?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think it's being done under the normal procedures. Perhaps the INS representatives would --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The individuals of which we are speaking are being given the same due process rights of any alien would in the United States who is attempting to enter legally into our country. These individuals, as my colleague indicated, did enter illegally, and a very small portion of them have committed crimes. The crimes they have committed, because of the serious nature of them, with respect to the small group of people, do allow us to attempt to remove them because of the crimes, in addition to their illegal immigration for not having proper documentation.

SENIOR ADMINITSRATION OFFICIAL: I think maybe one reason this is -- this, you know, sort of seems to be something abnormal has been the abnormality of Cuba's refusal to take people back. I mean, with most countries that we have normal immigration relationships, if someone arrives illegally and has committed a crime, we --

Q Well, I mean --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- ship him right back --

Q -- there are a lot of World War II Nazi criminals who have been here for 20 years and there are just about two or three who have reached the stage where they're going home. And you're talking about shipping home hundreds of people.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This --

Q You know, it just doesn't seem even-handed.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, there's a difference there, though, I think, in that once somebody has been admitted as a legal permanent resident, then you have to go through a deportation proceeding --

Q But if he, if he -- Of course, but if he came through --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- which is a different procedure and --

Q -- without revealing that he, you know, sort of killed thousands of people, that's considered grounds for --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, but it gives a --

Q -- sending him home.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It gives him, I guess, more bases for resisting deportation under U.S. law.

Q -- he even gets to ask which country he'd like to go to. But these people have no choice. They go home to Cuba.

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Q You say a larger number have committed crimes after arriving here. Can you give us that exact breakdown?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's overlap amongst all these categories.

Q Some number.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL· About 400 --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, basically there are around 400 people who have been held in federal custody since their arrival. Those are the ones where they -- the sole thing is crimes that they admitted to having undertaken in Cuba before arriving here.

There are a small group of people who are ineligible for admission because of serious mental infirmity. This, again, varies because some of these people go in and out of the hospital and back into prison because they may also be criminals. But I think -- what is it? About a hundred, maybe, in that group. The remainder, 2,200 or thereabouts, are persons who have committed crimes in the United States since their arrival. They may also be included in one of the other groups as well.

Q Where are most of these people being detained right now? Do you have a breakdown of that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The greatest concentration, I guess, is in the federal penitentiary in Atlanta. It's about 1,400?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: 1,500.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: 1,500, something of that order.

The others are scattered around the country in state facilities, in virtually -- almost every state has some. Obviously, there are bigger concentrations in some areas than others.

Q When are you going to start shipping them back? When will that process begin?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The agreement provides that the returns will begin no earlier than 30 days from the entry -- from today. This was to give time for necessary preparations and so on. The returns will be effected at a rate of 100 per month, on the average. There's a rather technical formula that if we're unable to return that number in one month, that there's a carryover, but with an absolute maximum. But, basically, the idea is approximately a hundred a month, so as to allow an orderly process and reception there. This is all, of course, dependent upon our own judicial procedures.

Q -- litigation in certain places for that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is, in other words, this is an expression that -- of Cuba's willingness to accept people at that rate. Our capacity to deliver them is going to depend on the conduct of our own internal due process.

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internal due process.

Q Sir, during the talks, at any moment the Cuban delegation talked about tying these talks to lifting the embargo, the ban on the U.S. tourists to Cuba, anything else they wished it to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As a spokesman indicated, these talks were limited to --

Q I know, but did they wish to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- immigration matters, and that was the subject of discussion.

Q -- can you -- this is a fairly unusual circumstance to have these kind of talks with the Castro government. Can you give us any kind of description of how the talks went about? I mean, they kept being described as businesslike, but --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, I think that was a very good description. They were serious, businesslike, a normal exchange of views. I guess, to me, it is not that unusual since I was involved in the talks in 1980-81 on the same subject. And we've kind of gone through this ground before.

Q Were they orderly or were they -- did they seem to come back and forth from one position and back to something they had rejected earlier or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's always hard -- in any negotiation you have ups and downs and I'm -- of each side. But I think they proceeded in an orderly and businesslike fashion from a point of departure, and we worked towards an agreement that both sides could -- found acceptable.

Q What's Cuba's motive?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The basic -- I think you'd have to ask the Cuban government.

Q No. But you've been dealing with them now two years. What do they want out of this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think it's really appropriate for us to try to speak to their interests. Obviously, they decided that the agreement in its totality was something that served their interests or I assume they wouldn't have signed it.

Q In what way?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But --

Q Well, what is your idea that is in their interests?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think I'd really leave that to the Cuban spokesman to answer.

Q Does the processing of immigrants start --

Q Only a few weeks ago when you -- I'm sorry.

Q Sir, does the processing of immigrants there start right away or does that also have a 30-day lag period?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is no lag period as such because under our own law it's as soon as they're willing to take back excludables the prohibition is removed. There's a practical lag time, however, in that we don't have at this time the staff in the Interest Section in Havana to process the visas.

The agreement -- you'll see that it's in two documents --

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there's a communique and then a minute on implementation. And some of the details -- for example, adding additional staff in the Interest Section are covered there. So, it may take a certain amount of time before the visa applications are running at a significantly higher rate.

I should say, it's never been terminated totally because I mention we've continued issuing visas in Havana to close relatives of U.S. citizens. So --

Q How many did you issue --

Q Did shoot toward a --

Q How many visas did you issue among the family over the past few years?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What's it been running? Three thousand, five thousand a year?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'd say approximately two to three thousand a year.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Two to three thousand a year is a guesstimate.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's -- I don't have an exact figure.

Q What is the relationship -- this decision to the court order, Judge Schoob's order and all the legal implications of that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think they're really separate but related. Separate in the sense that the agreement is an agreement whereby Cuba agrees that they will take these people back as we provide them to them. The litigation is a function of our internal constitutional processes. And, obviously, nothing -- there's no reason we would agree with Cuba on anything involving our internal law.

I think the only real relationship is that -- whereas before the litigation was proceeding in a situation where, even if someone were found excludable, there wasn't any realistic prospect of his going back; now, there is.

Q Only a few weeks ago, the United States resumed relations swith Iraq and the explanation largely was it's normal for countries to have diplomatic relations. Why is it so abnormal to have relations with Cuba? What is the -- no, I mean, really what is the problem? Larry said something about when they show they're eligible to be in the family of nations -- I don't know what that means. I mean, aren't you off on a good footing now where you can move ahead?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- yes. I've been here to talk about one specific issue with the Cuban government.

Q Well, you've got six helpers here. I thought maybe somebody could say what it is about Cuba that makes them eligible for a relationship that the United States has with China, Iraq, the Soviet Union.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think not only do you have the statement here, but the spokesmen of a much more significant level than my own have commented on that --

Q -- I don't know if you found them to have strange habits or something.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- over and over -- this fellow back here has been --

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Q Getting back to the Schoob thing --

Q Yes.

Q -- just for a second, doesn't that have to resolved before you can actually start processing any of these people? Hasn't he said basically that you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Do you want to say exactly what the status of that is or how --

Q I mean, it seems to me that Schoob's ordered to delay this whole thing.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, the Schoob decision does have an effect on the removal of these individuals. But at this time, the Department of Justice is working toward dissolving any injunctions that would impede our removal of these individuals after they have been given their opportunity for due process here in the United States.

Some of the individuals, however, are not affected by the Schoob order. They would, obviously, have individual cases pending to determine their immigration status.

Q How many and where are they located?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it's hard to say. The Schoob decision specifically addresses to anybody who was, is, or possibly will be, in the Atlanta Federal Penitentiary because of incarceration there, so I can't give you a specific number at this time.

Q Thank you.

Q But doesn't this mean --

Q -- you were involved in 1980-81 discussions, could you reply to a contention made by Wayne Smith that this is an agreement we could have reached four years ago but the administraton didn't want to then?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, I might just make a few comments on that

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without getting into any kind of blow-by-blow debate, those talks in 1980-81 were conducted under the previous administration but with the approval of the transition team. And they were in-depth discussions of the issue. They did not succeed, largely because we reached a position -- and I think we made this publicly available before -- at that time, Cuba took the position that it would not accept anyone back unless he wished to come voluntarily, and unless they decided on a case-by-case basis with a complete veto that they wished to take him.

That kind of position did not satisfy neither our interests nor the criteria of our immigration law. And, as a consequence, we were unable to reach an agreement.

We have had exchanges with the Cubans on that subject subsequently. Indications were that they had not changed their position, and so eighteen months ago we took an initiative and got some signals that maybe we could look for some different ways of handling the different set of principles the two sides had. And that led to these talks; and I think we've managed to find something, even though both sides proceed from a somewhat different set of principles as to what the obligation of a country is to accept back its nationals, we were able to find a solution that corresponds with both sides' theories and is the same in practice.

Q In terms of political prisoners and their families, how large of a pool, totally, are you dealing with? Or do you know?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know. It's really a guesstimate, I think, at this point. We'll know as people come and apply and we have an opportunity to review their applications. This is why the agreement indicates that the size of the program in future years will be determined in light of experience. It's both, because, under our law, we have to set a ceiling on an annual basis, but also, we really feel like we want to find out more about this population, and who they are and so on, to determine what kind of a size makes sense.

Q This 3,000 limit you are talking about for fiscal year '85, does it include the former political prisoners and their families? Or is it just the political --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. The former prisoners and their families.

Q So it cannot go beyond the 3,000?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Correct.

Q Is that part of the 20,000, or is that is addition to?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, that's in addition to. And let me emphasize again, though, the 20,000 and the 3,000 are ceilings established under U.S. law. That doesn't mean we have -- and it's very clear that we have not said we will take that many people. We've said we will take up to that many people who are qualified and meet the standards of our law. So, we're essentially repeating what our own law says.

Q On the question of the number of excludables. I understood there was a higher figure of 3,600 altogether. Does this mean that Cuba only accepted 2,700?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q And also, the Governor of Florida yesterday said he wanted the federal government to include up to 2,100 of the Mariel prisoners in Florida state prisons in this agreement.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Basically the Immigration and Naturalization Service, in preparing for this, has checked with all of the state and local facilities in order to put together the list of people we considered excludable. Cuba agreed t take everyone who was on that list. It wasn't a question of numbers. The point was one of the application of our law and our principles of an obligation of a country to take back its nationals who are not found eligible for admission.

And so it wasn't a question of whether it was 25, or 2,500 or 5,000; it was a question of how many are there actually?

Q So, isn't the number that you agree now -- is the number of excludables for the entire country?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I might add -- as I think was indicated -- 2,700 was the number identified as state and federal institutions. So it's meant to cover them all. There might be some more out there which later on will have to be dealt with if they come into this category. There's a bit of a grey area. We don't know how many -- this should cover, certainly, most of those.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In other words, this is all that we were put on notice of by the state and local authorities as of this time.

Q In the question of the Florida Governor asking that all those prisoners in Florida, the 2,100, be also included in this agreement -- that's not going to fly?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'm not sure what Governor Graham's alluding to. We have talked to the state of Florida, as well as other states, and those in Florida state custody are included. I don't know where this number 2,100 comes from.

Q He released that figure --

SENIOR ADMINISTSRATION OFFICIAL: Certainly those in Florida institutions are included in this number.

Q But not in county institutions?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, in county also -- those that are identified as Mariel Cubans that meet this excludable criteria.

Q Can we just clear this up? So, as far as you know, all the excludables are 2,700 people? You've counted all the noses you can, and this, you think, is the amount?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: At this time, yes.

Q But they're all going to stay in Atlanta, aren't they, under this Schoob decision? You've chosen to appeal the court decisions rather than to obey the judge's order to reopen hearings, n't that correct?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, I might just comment briefly, the Justice Department will be taking appropriate legal action and, of course, has already. We believe, under existing United States law, as my colleague has indicated, that these people are excludable from entering the United States.

Up until now, the big problem is that you've not had a place to send them back to under normal immigration procedures. Therefore, with the Cuban agreement, we have an ability to send them back to Cuba. We will pursue all necessary legal procedures to handle the return of these people. We're confident that our laws and criteria will allow these people to be returned.

Q But at the moment, you're under court order to do something else for these folks to determine whether or not they're excludable, isn't that right? And we're appealing that order, which means that they will not leave until the court procedure is finished in the States?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we're taking all necessary procedures with the court, of course, to pursue the remedy.

Q But that can't be done within 30 days. Well, nowhere near 30 days.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The thing is to start in 30 days. We're very hopeful that this can move very quickly.

Q But the 11th Circuit, that could be a matter of months.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, a court can also move fast in addition to slow.

MR. SIMS: All right, Hank and you have one here. Let's let that be it. If some of you have addittional questions, maybe a couple of people would stay back. But let's finish it for here.

Hank?

Q I think I must misunderstand the numbers here. I understood you say that the 3,000 would include ex-prisoners and family members, right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q And that the 20,000 would be under the regular immigration procedures?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Well, the first thing I see under the communique is that you will resume issuance of visas to Cuban nationals up to 20,000, in particular to close family members of U.S. citizens.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's two -- you'll see there's also another paragraph towards the bottom of that page -- "For its part, the U.S. will continue granting visas to parents," and so on.

You're dealing with two types of relatives of U.S. citizens. The immediate family is outside of the quota. The slightly more extended family comes within the 20,000 quota. It's a peculiarity of U.S. immigration law.

MR. SIMS: Last question.

Q Yes, it's a double one. Immediate family -- just the spouse, brothers, kids? What is it?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Immediate family is spouse, children, unmarried under 21. That's the immediate relatives not subject to any numerical limitation.

Q And that goes beyond the 20,000?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Brothers and sisters, married children --

MR. SIMS: That's in your fact sheet as well.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- are preference visas and come under the numerical limitation.

Q Thank you. Did you and your colleague sign the agreement in New York today?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. It was signed -- what was it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: About 1:45 p.m.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: 1:45 p.m. Something like that.

Q Can we know now the name of the hotel where you've been hiding all this time? (Laughter.)

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 5:03 P.M. EST

ON-THE-RECORD BRIEFING
ON
HIJACKING OF KUWAITI AIRLINER
BY
CHARLES KAPAR, AID
MONDAY, DECEMBER 17, 1984, 9:04 A. M.

MS. KATE SEMERAD: Good morning. As you know, Charles Kapar has agreed to meet with you this morning, and we all appreciate your forebearance in allowing him to have some privacy and some rest over the weekend.

He will have some brief opening remarks, and then he will try to answer as many of your questions as possible. I am sure that you appreciate that he cannot probably answer all of your questions, and we would very much appreciate it on those questions where he indicates that he cannot answer your question, that you not press him.

The session this morning will be ON THE RECORD for both sound and camera, but it will not be allowed to go live.

MR. KAPAR: I'd like to say good morning to everyone, and for me it's a lovely day out there, although it may be raining. I'm just happy to be alive. And I wish to thank everybody for all their prayers and their thoughts, and I'm sure that goes for all the hostages. We're all happy to be alive, and I'm here to answer all of your questions. Anything you want to ask I'd gladly answer, and I'd like to go ahead, if possible. Would you --

MS. SEMERAD: Questions?

MR. KAPAR: Please.

Q What judgment do you have on the role of the Iranian Government in ending the hijacking?

A Well, all I could say is for 140 hours, I was confined to an airplane, and we really didn't know what was going on outside of that plane. Any information given to us, of course, was an interpretation from Arabic, and I really don't know their part in the hijacking, and I wish I did know, but I didn't.

I will say, though, their medical assistance, their help in getting us out of the plane, was just fabulous. It saved my life and all the other people's lives. These people want to be friends. That's the way they acted towards us over in Tehran. Of course, they have a lot to answer for, which is out of my province.

Q Mr. Kapar --

A Yes?

Q Could you -- perhaps it would help us a little bit if you could, in not too much detail, but in a detailed enough way, go through the final -- the conclusion of the hijacking in a way that we could -- it would help us make judgments about what was being done from your perspective inside the plane. We, of course, have seen plenty of reports about what happened outside the plane --

A Yes.

Q If we could compare your account with that, it might help us. Can you give us such an account?

A All right. I'll try. It was a strange day. As we woke up, the tension was very high. The evening before, the Kuwait Airline people had sent the plane in, and the pilot had refused to land, I believe, because not all the hostages were freed. And apparently did they did not take the prisoners with them into Iran, and the hijackers were extremely upset. It was a strange evening.

They threatened to kill me, of course. That was the last act. But the hijackers knew the had lost, and I told the lead hijacker that, "I may die, but you're going to die, too." I told it to his face. I'm not ashamed of saying that.

Then a strange thing happened. The crew -- the airline crew were preparing a last dinner for everyone aboard the plane because apparently the hijackers were threatening to blow the ship up and kill everybody with it. I told the lead hijacker -- his name was, I believe, Abu Hassim -- that's what he called himself. I don't know if that was his name or not. He looked at me, and he said he was going to kill me, and I said, "No, you're going to die, too." Then we went on and on, and apparently, I said, "Well, as long as I'm going to die, I mean, give me my last dinner." I noticed they were preparing all this food.

So apparently he thought about this, and then he ordered someone to cut my ropes, and we all went in and had our last dinner together as if we were brothers. They took care of my wounds. I had handcuffs on me. They tried to remove the handcuffs. They didn't have the keys.

These people were strange. I think they were sort of mad. I knew what they were doing. I think they were planning to do something very, very tragic at the last moment. The following day they did save some hot food for us as a last meal in the afternoon, and you could feel the tension. You could cut it with a knife. It was leading up to this.

And toward the evening, a decision was made to release the airline crew, and they were separated from us. They were separated on the other side of the airplane, and then from about row 20 on they tied myself and John Costa and the pilot, Harry Clarke -- they tied us together in the front row.

And the other Kuwait people were -- sat behind us, and apparently the lead hijacker was discussing with the local crewmen his plans. We couldn't really hear it, and not only that, it was in Arabic. He apparently was preparing some kind of explosion of some kind. However, we believed that there was no TNT aboard that plane -- that was our belief -- and there was a black box which they had placed inside the toilet of the first class cabin, and apparently that was supposed to be the explosives.

But he did a strange thing -- the hijacker -- and his people. They went around destroying whatever they could -- the seats, baggage compartments. Whatever they could tear apart, they could. They broke all the windows, of course, they shot out all the windows, and anyone who was going to blow a plane apart, why would they do that? I mean, what would they gain by doing that? All they had to do was put the explosive on, and that would be the end of it.

Q Mr. Kapar, after the plane landed in Iran, did you notice any introduction of new arms into the plane?

A No. That was the strange thing. I only saw, oh, I would judge, about four pieces at any one time, plus hand grenades. I notice in today's Times -- I think it was Times magazine -- they had a picture of Bill Stanford sitting -- standing out on the platform, and there was some hijacker -- it looked like an automatic weapon, and I never saw that before. That was brand new to me. I wouldn't know about it. I was inside the plane at all times, except for the time they beat me up on the platform. That was the only exception.

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Q Can you pick up and tell us how it ended for you?

A Well, apparently, one of the medics -- Iranian medics -- had slowly walked down the aisle and walked towards the rear of the plane where the Kuwaitis were. This was after the hijackers had sort of gone up towards the front and finished with their destruction inside the plane.

Apparently, the medic was doing something that one of the hijackers didn't like and he came -- the hijacker came running down the aisle after him. I noticed that he was yelling at him, and I noticed there was a grenade on the floor, too. Apparently, a grenade had fallen on the floor; and there was a little struggle there, and apparently another medic came in and then another hijacker, and they were struggling around.

Towards the front of the plane we heard a few shots. It wasn't in the plane. We just didn't know where it was from. But then we heard a loud bang. Apparently, it was some kind of gas, a missile, that went off where we couldn't breath and we were choking. At that point in time, I opened -- I was tied to John Costa on this side and Harry Clarke on that side -- opened the knots on my left hand; I still had the handcuffs on me but they still had this red nylon cord on us. Opened the knots on the left hand. I managed to open that, and Harry opened up the one on the right hand side, and we all got up and started running like all hell.

We came out of the plane, and we noticed all these hijackers were all laid out. These Iranians had them by the head and by the hair with a gun. They were just laid out. At that point in time we were rescued by the Iranians who came over with ambulances. They did everything possible to get us to the hospital and to take care of our wounds.

Q I wonder if you could tell us during this crisis what kind of thoughts were going through your head? I mean, personal thoughts, anything besides the obvious fear?

A You mean the last day?

Q Yeah, and also throughout the crisis?

A Well, I'll tell you about the last day. I was sort of bored. I think I went through everything. This fellow was destroying everything, and we were just sitting there. As a matter of fact, I almost fell asleep; I was so bored. I don't know why. Maybe I was just exhausted. Maybe that was the answer.

Q Did they tell you whom they belonged to? What was their affiliation?

A No, they never did. But they did claim they were from Kuwait. I don't know if they were from Kuwait. They were light skinned. One of the leaders was light skinned. I personally think they were more Lebanese or Palestinian. I'm not sure. I couldn't tell.

They were strange people. We had the lows and the highs. If everything went well that day, they treated us nice. If it went bad, they treated us awful. And they tormented the pride to the Pakistanis leaving and the other Arabs leaving. They just tormented these people. They accused them of everything. It was sort of horrible for them. They just didn't understand because a lot of the Pakistanis couldn't speak English. Someone had to interpret into their own language -- Urdu -- in order for them to understand what was going on. There were about 25 of these Pakistanis who were part of the military organization of Kuwait. They were instructors, and so forth. They were basically sergeants. They were scared. They were just frightened to death, and I don't blame them.

Q Do you have any ideas as to why it was that you were spared and the others were killed? What their decision-making process was?

A I really can't say why me. The first one, of course, I believe, in my opinion, I thought they made an example that they were going -- they meant business. The second one, I was told by the local crewmen, if you can get in touch with these people, that they feel it was an accident, that Bill Stanford was killed by accident. I don't know. All I do know, they were both dead.

I was told I was Number 3. But, apparently, they were looking for some government official so they could enforce their exchange for the prisoners that were held in Kuwait. They felt that possibly I was the highest of the three officials. Of course, I wasn't. I tried to explain that to them. But after my first beating I decided to say that, yes, I am a high official and I gave them a title. It seemed to work. They said, "Oh, now, you're free, don't worry, you're okay." I knew they lied anyway, but it saved some days for me.

Q What specific torments did they inflict on you? Did they beat you with a pistol or with their fists, or what?

A Well, the first time they beat me with the butt of the pistol in the head. Naturally, they hit me around the face. They really did a good job on me. I felt it for a couple days after that. But they stopped at that point because they wanted certain information.

Apparently, they found a passport, an American passport, with the first 8 or 10 pages torn out, and they accused -- well, prior to Bill being killed -- Bill Stanford -- they accused myself, Bill and John Costa of tearing those pages out and we were trying to hide the fact that we were very high officials in the American government. And, of course, we denied it, but they carried on something bad on that.

They beat me up on that point. And then they wanted me to admit that I was a high official, which I did. I had nothing to lose. I was practically dead anyway, so I just gave them a name and a title, and it seemed to work. I think, by doing that, it saved a lot of -- well, I don't know if they would have killed anyone after me but I know they would have gone after the other people after me. I know John would have been next and then there were a lot of Kuwaiti officials aboard. There were a lot of Pakistanis which they would easily kill. They wouldn't think twice about that.

Q Do you have any evidence that they were Shi'ite Muslims?

A No, but I do know they were highly religious people. They prayed constantly. The last night, before we were rescued, each one took turns on praying. They were very sensitive about anyone drinking whiskey or any kind of sexy type pictures. They were very sensitive about that.

But as far as I know, they were supposed to be highly religious people.

Q They were fundamentalist Muslims, whatever stripe they were, huh?

A I wouldn't know, but they acted like that; they acted like that.

Q Did the hijackers, to your knowledge, offer any resistance when the Iranians took the plane?

A As far as I could tell aboard the plane, yes, they were struggling with the medics. Off the plane, I had noticed they were already subdued by the Iranians, and apparently they held them by the hair and they held them down by their feet and had a gun on them. I was told one of them was injured. I really don't know.

Q My question is along the same line. So you weren't able to form any impression whether this was a show or a staged rescue?

A No. At that point in time I couldn't say that. I wouldn't know.

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I think this gentleman in front here has --

Q At some point, we were told that somebody's thumb was cut off and thrown out of the plane. Did that happen?

A I never saw that, but I do know that the leader, the lead hijacker, did hurt his thumb, and it was bandaged.

Q The lead hijacker hurt his thumb?

A Yes. That's Abul Hassein.

Q Bani Sadir claimed that these hijackers had been involved in a previous hijacking. Did you hear any talk like that or --?

A No. I never heard that before. That was the first time. I heard this, I think, yesterday or so, but I never heard it aboard the plane.

Q From your point of view, having now been through one of these incidents, is there anything you could advise the U.S. Government on in its campaign against terrorism as far as dealing with, negotiations with this type of hijackers, or dealing with the government on the ground as to how to handle this sort of thing? Would you have preferred, for example, to see an earlier military or para-military action, either by the Iranian Government or by the U.S. Government, or would you have advised waiting till later, or what?

A The only way I could answer it -- I talked to my fellow hostages about this -- I said, "Well, if we were in the same position and we had landed in London, what would the English have done, or even New York? What would they have done?

I think the way it worked out, there were two people killed -- which was tragic, I believe that; it was a shame. However, no one else was killed, and apparently their timing was perfect. I can't say more than that. I know I was safe.

Yes, ma'am.

Q Sir, do you feel that it would be advisable in the Middle East and perhaps in other areas of danger that there would be armed guards riding aboard the planes, "riding shotgun," as it were?

A Well, they did have one security man aboard that plane, and as he rose to stop these highjackers, there was another hijacker right behind him who shot him, so apparently --

Q He killed him, did he?

A No, he didn't. He was saved. He was saved by the chief purser, and there was a Pakistani doctor aboard ship that saved his life.

Q Sir, a follow-up question. You've mentioned going into the, going into a cabin together to eat dinner, the last dinner.

A Yes.

Q Were you all permitted to go to the bathroom or --

A Oh, yes. As a matter of fact, some of the hijackers came over and prepared tuna fish and offered me tuna fish on some bread, tried to treat my wounds, and we were joking -- offered me cigarettes and -- It was unusual, just an unusual evening.

Q You said they told you the second death was an accident. Can you explain that? What did they say?

A Well, I would speak to the Kuwaiti airline crew. Apparently, they heard more than I did. They speak Arabic, of course, and apparently, they felt that there was some kind of accident aboard the platform. I wasn't outside the platform. I wouldn't know. Apparently, Bill had tripped or so, and maybe it looked like he was trying to get away and then they shot him. I'm not sure. I'm just not sure.

Q Given what you saw Sunday night vis-a-vis the Iranian rescue operation, were you surprised two days later when the White House suggested that the Iranian Government was actually encouraging the highjackers to do what they did, and should have moved a lot earlier than they did?

A All I can say is that, I know in the past, we had similar incidents where these planes were hijacked and brought to Iran, and we know that Iran had "not lifted a finger to help" -- I'll put it that way.

I can't say what happened this time. However, I will say that if the Iranian Government really meant to help, then I think the least they could do is have these four people tried as murderers -- I think that is the least they could do. And I think the widows of these two men deserve an answer as to why their husbands were killed, for what reason. I think that should be brought out, too.

Q Sir, in the event that the Iranian Government does not proceed with a real trial, what will that say, if there is no real trial by the Iranian Government?

A I can't answer that. All I can say is, if they really want to reconcile their differences with the West, more specifically the United States, then they must take the first step. That's the way I see it. And that would be the first step.

Yes, sir.

Q Did they themselves ever claim any link with the Iranian Government or with any religious group or with any government?

A No. They have never said they had any link with anyone, except they did say they had a lot of Arab friends who were part of their group throughout the Arab world, including a few Americans. I don't know what they meant by that.

MS. SEMERAD: Two more questions.

A Let me take someone from this side.

Q The other American who survived, John Costa, we know very little about him. What did you find? The only think we've been told is that he's an American, a New York businessman.

A John is a very fine person. I think we complement each other very well. I was sort of "down in the dumps" and he would make me laugh and so forth. He's a fine gentleman. He's a very intelligent man -- he speaks four languages and he's been around. He is a businessman, and he's been throughout the Arab world. He is a salesman of some kind -- I think it's American Surgical Company. I'm not sure.

Q American what?

A American Surgical Instruments, or something of that order.

Q Does he speak Arabic?

A He said he spoke about ten words or so. That's about it.

Yes, sir.

Q Referring to the first killing, can you tell us what kind of exchange there was between the hijackers and Mr. Hegna?

A Well, the only thing I could say -- that was the first day, I believe, we were on the ground -- Chuck -- I called him "Chuck"; he was a good friend of mine -- he was called in by the hijackers; we were in the economy area and he was called into the first-class area where there was a curtain. He went in there and I really don't know what went on behind the scene there.

However, we did hear some shouting of some kind -- we couldn't understand it -- and then I heard a shot. Then there was another pause and I heard another shot. But after that, we just didn't know what happened to him.

Q I'd just like to know if you thought you'd be here today to give this press conference?

A What?

Q I'd like to know if, on board the plane, you thought you would be here today to give this press conference?

A Like I said before, to me it's a very nice day out there right now. I'm alive!

Q How do you feel about future travel in the Middle East, in the aftermath of this?

A Future travel in the Middle East? All I can say is, today it's a very dangerous thing to be an American. I don't know what to say. If they ask me to travel again, I probably would, but I'd be very careful as to the route and to which airline I take.

Q Sir, a lot of families of Foreign Service officers live in this area. What can you tell them? And would you, under what circumstances would you accept another foreign assignment?

A All I can say is, just have hope. I don't know if I would accept another assignment at this time. I just need a long rest before I make my mind up.

Q Thank you very much.

(The briefing concluded at 9:30 a.m.)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
DEPUTY TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
ROBERT LIGHTHIZER
ON STEEL AGREEMENTS

December 19, 1984

The Briefing Room

[Noon]
12:00 P.M. EST

MR. SPEAKES: The President today is announcing agreements with seven countries -- Japan, Korea, Brazil, Mexico, Spain, Australia, and South Africa -- to establish limits on the importing of their steel to the United States.

On September 18, 1984, the President announced his decision to deal with unfair trade in steel by seeking negotiated agreements with major steel suppliers within a 90-day period. The 90 days ended yesterday. Today, the President is very pleased with the successful conclusion of these negotiations, carried out by his United States Trade Representative. He considers these agreements to be a step in the right direction.

We believe that overall steel import penetration of the U.S. market will decline significantly as a result of these agreements and that the U.S. steel industry will be able to compete in the world markets.

We have with us Robert Lighthizer, the Deputy U.S. Trade Representative, who conducted negotiations with each country and will be pleased to explain them to you.

Q Are there any pieces of paper that we can look at that will give us all the figures and numbers, or is it so simple that if you just tell us, we'll have it down?

MR. LIGHTHIZER: Well, it's not simple. It's --

Q Would you spell your name, please?

MR. LIGHTHIZER: L-I-G-H-T-H-I-Z-E-R.

It is not simple. In fact, it's extraordinarily complicated --

Q Good.

MR. LIGHTHIZER: -- like just what you expected. There will be a release put out which will have the numbers that have been agreed to for the five-year program of the President for each of the countries with whom we have agreements.

Q Where is it?

Q Could we have it?

MR. ROUSSEL: It's forthcoming.

MR. LIGHTHIZER: It's being Xeroxed right now.

The one point that I should make is that this is a five-year program; this is just the first 90 days. The President made a commitment to try to deal with the countries that were the

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biggest suppliers to the United States market during the first 90-day period. But this is a continuing process and one which we expect to monitor and deal with additional problems as they arise over the course of the five years.

We expect the United States industry to do what it said, which is to continue to modernize and to become more efficient. So at the end of this time, there won't be a need for a program like this.

The countries with whom we have agreements, if you also include the European Community with whom we negotiated an agreement in 1982, account for about 75 percent of the imports in the United States market. And the seven agreements that we have, taken together, would account for about a 30 percent reduction from current levels of steel imports in the United States market.

Q What evidence do you have that the industry is modernizing?

MR. LIGHTHIZER: Well, the industry is spending more money than they have now -- there have been some mergers and some changes in facilities. We have talked to the industry about that, about what they are doing. There was an agreement, I guess last year, to modify their wage structure. They have, in fact, decreased costs of producing steel by some 15 percent in the last year or so. And that process, we expect to continue and, indeed, think is continuing.

Q Where does that 30 percent reduction put import levels then?

MR. LIGHTHIZER: That is a difficult question to answer. If you assume a 30 percent level across the board, you would have import levels down around 18 percent. Now, there are countries with whom we are not negotiating who, in fact, -- who will either be effected by cases, unfair trade cases, that are going to be filed by the industry, or, in fact, may moderate their imports or have their imports effected by market shares.

At this point, we are still going with the Presidential expectation, which is that imports will be -- of finished steel -- will be around 18.5 percent next year.

Q That's with the agreements now?

MR. LIGHTHIZER: That's right. With the agreements we have now and what we expect to happen as a result of people who are not covered either being effected by cases or, in fact, agreeing, in some cases, to moderate imports.

Q By next year --

Q 30 percent reduction from this year to next year in imports, is that what you're saying?

MR. LIGHTHIZER: With respect to these countries, these seven countries, there is a 30 percent reduction from current -- from sort of annualized current levels to what we expect each of the next five years.

Q Well; how close do these seven agreements bring you to the 18.5 percent a year?

MR. LIGHTHIZE: With respect to these countries, the targets that we set for ourselves that would get us to 18.5 percent, we are almost exactly on mark.

Q -- how close are you to 18.5?

MR. LIGHTHIZER: That depends on what happens to other countries, with respect to other countries.

Q What was the question?

MR. LIGHTHIZER: The question is, how close are we to the 18.5 percent. And I'm saying that that is a factor -- or a function of what happens with respect to the other countries. If new suppliers come in, for example -- in a large way -- for example, Eastern-bloc countries that haven't been a big part of our market, then that is a problem that we'll have to deal with with respect to cases.

We expect there to be reductions in other -- with respect to other countries, but those will largely come as a result of cases being filed -- anti-dumping or countervailing duty cases being filed by the industry or, in fact, conceivably self-initiated by the United States government. The President, in his program, said that we would self-initiate cases against unfair traders.

We haven't done that yet during the 90-day period because we've been focusing on negotiating with these countries which account for such a large percent of the increases.

Q Are there one or two countries among the group not covered that are prime offenders who might be targets?

MR. LIGHTHIZER: There are not countries which I would characterize as prime offenders at this point. There are countries which have a larger share of the market than others, obviously.

Q What are they?

MR. LIGHTHIZER: Well, the country with the largest share of the market and one with whom we made a decision not to negotiate an agreement is Canada. And, in fact, I'm going to Canada to speak with some of the industry officials tomorrow there. We are not seeking an agreement with Canada.

The President made the decision that because of the unique nature of the integration between our industries, that at this time it would be difficult to have an agreement.

Basically, the steel comes across from Canada and the United States in trucks and it tends to go back and forth. In other words, they'll ship some hot product down to us and we'll roll it -- we'll ship it back to them, and it goes the other way also. The idea of having this kind of an agreement, we thought, with Canada at this stage would be difficult, that it might have the effect of really hurting the trade generally between the two countries.

Q Some people say this is kind of a polite form of protectionism. How do you respond to that?

MR. LIGHTHIZER: Well, we don't believe that it is protectionism. We are responding to what is an unfair situation in steel trade in the United States. And defending yourself against unfair trade is not, in our opinion, protectionism.

Q What is Canada's share of the market?

MR. LIGHTHIZER: Canada's share of the market right now is something less than 3 percent.

Q How do you classify Korea in that respect? I mean, they have not been charged with unfair trade at all and you're still reducing their share of the market.

MR. LIGHTHIZER: Well, Korea has agreed to reduce their share of the market. They have been charged with unfair trade,

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although the margins have been very small with respect to Korea. But there have been cases, dumping cases, that have been brought against Korea.

In addition, I would say that there is a -- there are two kinds of unfair trade. There is the countervailing duty, anti-dumping -- the thing that you are used to thinking about; and there also is the fact that in the steel area -- and this was an important part of the President's decision in September -- in the steel area, there are closed markets all over the world with the exception of the United States; the net effect of which is to divert an enormous amount of steel into our market, an abnormally large amount of steel into our market.

Q What's going to happen to the trade cases pending against the countries you've gotten agreements with? Will they be dropped?

MR. LIGHTHIZER: Yes, those cases will be dropped.

Q What about Argentina? Are you negotiating with Argentina right now?

MR. LIGHTHIZER: We have negotiated with Argentina. We are not at the point of having an agreement with Argentina at this point. We negotiated with Argentina as recently as yesterday. We do not have an agreement with Argentina.

Q What are the prospects for an agreement?

MR. LIGHTHIZER: Well, I don't want to comment on ongoing talks like that. Right now, I'm not optimistic.

Q Are you contending that the 30 percent cutback will not result in higher domestic steel prices next year?

MR. LIGHTHIZER: Presumably, there will be some effect. There's debate on that. There's debate on that within the industry, but I suspect that there will be some effect of somewhat higher prices.

Q What is Argentina's share?

MR. LIGHTHIZER: Argentina's share is about .3 percent --

Q Well, how much do you want --

MR. LIGHTHIZER: -- right now.

Q How much do you want --

MR. LIGHTHIZER: I'm not going to comment on ongoing negotiations.

Q Are these negotiations, are these accords all retroactive to October 1st?

MR. LIGHTHIZER: Yes, that is our position, that --

Q And also, these are percentages of the projected steel market in the U.S., is that correct?

MR. LIGHTHIZER: That's correct, right.

Q What is the projected steel market in the U.S. of which these are a percentage -- percentages?

MR. LIGHTHIZER: The current forecast for finished steel is -- what? About 94 million tons next year? 95 million tons?

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MR. PAPOVICH: 95 million.

MR. LIGHTHIZER: 95 million tons next year. That's the official projection.

Q Mr. Lighthizer, what is your expectation with regard to that EEC agreement when it expires next year? Do you have any king of a commitment from them that they will roll that over to the 5.46 level?

MR. LIGHTHIZER: We don't have a commitment from them, but the agreement itself provides for consultations which would lead to negotiations on an extension of the agreement. And we expect right now that we will abide by that part of the agreement as well as the rest of the agreement.

The agreement itself connotes negotiations at least to determine whether or not it is extended. And we expect to engage in that at the appropriate time.

Q Did you say whether these agreements would raise prices? What is your comment on the impact on prices of these agreements?

MR. LIGHTHIZER: I equivocated on that. (Laughter.) What I said was that there is some debate on that, but that some price increase is probably a reasonable expectation.

Q How much?

MR. LIGHTHIZER: I don't know that. There is debate even about whether or not it will have any noticeable effect. I mean, there's -- some people think that it won't have a noticeable effect.

Q Has the Japan duration been settled or are they still holding for one year?

MR. LIGHTHIZER: The Japanese have agreed to more than one year. They have not finally come in and said they agree to five years. Our position is that five years is absolutely non-negotiable.

Q Can I just clarify one thing? You don't know or you're not going to tell us exactly where you are now as far as progressing towards the 18.5 percent goal?

MR. LIGHTHIZER: What I'm telling you is that it is something that you can't calculate. It just isn't as simple as it sounds because you have to make assumptions about what happens with respect to an awful lot of countries who either aren't in our market now or were in it.

With respect to these seven countries which, when you include the EC, become about 75 percent of our market, we are almost exactly on target for what we set out to accomplish to get to 18.5 percent.

Q By when? By when? I mean, by next year?

MR. LIGHTHIZER: Yes, in the next calendar year.

Q And where has it been this year? The penetration.

MR. LIGHTHIZER: About 26 percent -- 25 percent, I think, now, right now.

Q And that includes semi-finished steel? The 25 percent?

MR. LIGHTHIZER: It does not include semi-finished steel.

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Q Does this agreement include any commitment by the U.S. makers to either modernize to invest a certain amount of money in steel-making or any kind of quid pro quo --

MR. LIGHTHIZER: These agreements, themselves, don't deal with that question. That's part of the President's program, though, that they do, in fact, engage, and they have undertaken to do that. They have committed to do that. And the legislation which authorizes us to enforce it makes certain requirements with respect to how much money they spend and the like in terms of modernizing.

Q Do you have any specific targets that agree to -- with the industry?

MR. LIGHTHIZER: We do not have specific targets. It is our view in the administration that that comes too close to something like industrial policy. The Congress required a one percent -- I guess a one percent -- an investment of all net cash flow I guess is what it was. That's what the Congressional legislation says.

MR. SPEAKES: Why don't we take two more, Bob.

Q You said that the U.S. considers five years absolutely non-negotiatable. Which of these seven countries have agreed to that five-year period?

MR. LIGHTHIZER: We have agreement with respect to five years with all the countries with the exception of Japan, which has agreed to more than one year but has not committed yet to five years.

MR. SPEAKES: Last question over here.

Q If you include semi-finished steel, how much would it be -- how much, shall we say, the foreign steel would be of the U.S. market; and what are you going to do about semi-finished steel? Are you going also to negotiate it with these countries?

MR. LIGHTHIZER: We have negotiated semi-finished steel with respect to all of the countries with whom we have negotiated. The President's expectation is that there will be an 18.5 import penetration made on finished steel plus 1.7 million tons of semi-finished steel; the net effect of which is about a 20.2 percent import penetration next year. That's what the President's expectations --

Q 20?

MR. LIGHTHIZER: 20.2.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 12:15 P.M. EST

(2)

ON-THE-RECORD BRIEFING
ON
UNITED STATES WITHDRAWAL FROM UNESCO
BY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE GREGORY J. NEWELL
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 19, 1984, 2:30 P.M.

MR. CARLSON: Good afternoon. This is the Department's briefing on UNESCO. It is ON-THE-RECORD and for cameras. The briefer is Gregory J. Newell, the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. He has a brief statement, and then he will take your questions.

Mr. Newell.

MR. NEWELL: One year ago, the United States notified UNESCO that U.S. membership would terminate on December 31, 1984. We confirm today that U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO will take effect on that date.

UNESCO policies have, for several years, departed sharply from the established goals of the Organization. We have regularly advised UNESCO of the limits of U.S. (and Western) toleration of misguided policies and programs, and of repeated mismanagement failures.* The circumstances that impelled us, last year, to announce our plan to withdraw have not changed sufficiently, this year, to warrant a change in our decision: Extraneous politicization continues, as does, regrettably, an endemic hostility toward the institutions of a free society -- especially a free market and a free press. UNESCO's mismanagement also continues, and approximately 80% of its $374 million biennial budget is still spent at its Paris headquarters, leaving only 20% to be spent elsewhere.

UNESCO has made efforts to reform itself during the past year. Taking the pattern of UNESCO's own past performance as the point of reference, we can agree that those efforts appear genuine. Viewed, however, in light of the serious concerns we expressed last December, an unacceptable gap clearly remains. An independent Monitoring Panel of eminent American experts formally reported a similar conclusion to the Secretary of State on November 27, 1984.

The United States remains committed to genuine and effective internationa [illegible]eration that serves the legitimate needs of developing na[illegible] We intend to continue support for international activities in the fields of education, science, culture and communication through other existing channels: multilateral, regional, bilateral, and private sector institutions

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*Conformed to text being read.

As the President stated in his recent address to the UN, we support genuine and effective international cooperation. To help return UNESCO to that purpose, we have in mind a three-pronged approach:

(1) To promote UNESCO's reform -- from the outside -- the U.S. will designate a Reform Observation Panel of independent experts

(2) We will work with all those -- countries, individuals, and private organizations -- who seek improvement in UNESCO

(3) We will establish an observer mission in Paris to protect American interests at UNESCO and to work with like-minded states on reform measures

When UNESCO returns to its original purposes and principles, the United States would be in a position to return to UNESCO

Thank you. And I'd be pleased to take any questions

Q Do you have any specific examples different from those you've gone over before that you find (economic or other) that you oppose -- on the part of UNESCO -- prompting this decision, specifically, say, on a free press or --

A On the question of hostility towards a free press, we have complained now for many years that UNESCO has been involved with studies, conferences, meetings, and the like, which we believe could lead to the licensing of journalists and the establishing of codes

Q What you're saying, in effect, is that UNESCO did achieve some reforms, or did work toward reform during the past year, but it wasn't enough?

A We are stating, as has the rest of the West, that there has been unprecedented discussion on reform in UNESCO. There has not been unprecedented reform

We believe that the concerns, which were laid on the table not only by the U.S. but by many other nations -- in fact, officially, by Belgium, Canada, Japan, Italy, the U.K., Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Iceland, et cetera -- that those concerns which were made manifest this year, publicly, have not been overcome.

Q Not enough to justify the U.S. changing its mind?

A Well, not only not enough; it hasn't occurred.

Q Can you give us some idea of what kind of money is involved here? What the U.S. contribution to UNESCO was, what percentage of the total?

A Twenty-five percent of the total, which represents in the current budget, about $47 million.

Q But hasn't the United States already paid some of that? That was the 84-85 budget, wasn't it?

A Well, some of the funds which are currently with UNESCO are to our benefit because of favorable rates of exchange. But UNESCO does hold moneys yet that the United States is owed, and when we do leave on the 31st of December, we hope to get back those moneys which are owed to us.

Q $45 million is one year's --

A Is one year's assessment.

Q And what the U.S. in the past, what would otherwise have gone to UNESCO, will it now be allocated to other projects or will there be a net decrease in the amount of funding for these (inaudible)?

A As we indicated with our withdrawal decision in December, we would continue to support these activities in education, science, culture, and communication through other existing means. As to what level that is, the budget is currently under review, and we can't prejudge that.

Q You say the U.S. will have an observer status at UNESCO?

A Yes. Currently, there are about 320 who have observer status, either as countries or as individual organizations. The U.S. will maintain an observer mission in Paris to look after our interests.

Q When are you going to name this mission? Who will head this mission?

A Well, the mission will be filled basically by Foreign Service Officers. We will also have a Reform Observation Panel that will look after our interests on reform, and that panel has not yet been decided on.

Q That's going to be separate from the observer mission?

A That will be separate from the observer mission. The observer mission will undertake the official duties and the ancillary needs which we will have in Paris -- financial arrangements and those sorts of things. The Reform Observation Panel will assess and report back on the reform efforts which they see over the next 12 months.

Q When are you going to name that panel?

A After the holidays.

Q You gave an example about your concern about the free press. What about the free market that you cited? What is the chief U.S. concern there? Is it advocacy of socialism or what?

A Well, the concerns we have here basically deal with the statist theories, new world orders, and movements which UNESCO seems to be headed toward in terms of trans-national corporations.

Q This is a second to the funding question: First of all, will any of the money that has previously been sent to UNESCO in that, roughly, $47 million figure be used to fund the observer mission, the Reform Observation Panel, or (the third item) the assistance to other groups that are keeping track of UNESCO?

And second of all, can you tell me whether in the Administration's view, the funding level of about $47 million should be increased, decreased, or remain about the same for those types of programs, without setting a specific dollar amount, or is this some place where the Administration feels it can afford to cut spending in the effort to trim the federal budget?

A Number one, in terms of the alternatives which would come forth with our withdrawal, we do not see the observer mission or the Reform Observation Panel claiming any of those resources.

In terms again of what level we would have for alternatives, we just can't prejudge that right now.

(Continued on following page.)

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Q You have consistently refused over a period of time to refer in any way to Mr. M'Bow. Do you consider that he has been a flawless leader of UNESCO?

A The answer to that question is that our complaints with UNESCO deal with programs and policies, and not with personalities

Q You talked about the Reform Observation Panel reporting back in twelve months. Are you raising the possibility that at that time, December '85, the Administration will reassess its non-membership with a view toward perhaps rejoining?

A Not necessarily. The reason we state twelve months is that there is a major general conference in November of 1985, at which it's conceivable that there could be some concrete changes forthcoming -- with the withdrawal of the U.S., and with the intention put forward by the U.K.

Q Could you distinguish a little bit more between the function of the observer mission and the Reform Panel?

A The observer mission will be a small mission which will continue functioning as the arm of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs in Paris. They will deal with any residual matters that are left with our withdrawal, and they will keep a watch on UNESCO as observers.

The Reform Observation Panel will probably go to Paris two or three times and possibly participate in other UNESCO activities as observers as well during the next twelve months as independent experts who can then assess the degree of reform, if it is forthcoming at all, and report that back to the State Department

Q It won't be the same panel that would work this year?

A The panel that worked this year was a Monitoring Panel of 15 members. The Reform Observation Panel would be much smaller

Q How much money are you asking that UNESCO return?

A I don't think we have those figures.

Q Secretary Newell, are there other U.N. agencies where similar action might be considered, and should this action today be considered a shot across bow, or a warning to those agencies to get their act together, in terms of U.S. policy?

A It should certainly be a warning to other organizations that this Administration will not tolerate the problems that have caused us to remove ourselves from UNESCO.

In terms of any other organizations that we are contemplating withdrawing from now -- no, we have none. Remember, when we briefed last December 28, we stated at that time that the review process of all 96 multilateral organizations took us down the direction that we felt we needed to be going -- less in some, and more in some, organizations, and that we should probably withdraw from UNESCO, which of course we did with our letter.

Q What's the status of U.S. participation in FAO?

A We have no formulated plans to withdraw from the FAO.

Q Could you explain why you think the United States would be a more effective advocate of reform with an empty seat than staying in and working with U.S. allies inside of UNESCO?

A Yes. Our chief goal here is not UNESCO's good health or UNESCO reform. Our chief goal is international development. It is not occurring through UNESCO. Consequently, we seek to take our political resources and other resources, and use them in other ways, through other existing mechanisms which have proven more beneficial to the Third World.

How do we act from an empty seat? Probably as effectively, if not more so, than we did on the occasion of our withdrawal from the ILO. Recall, during that time there was a two-year -- not a one year -- notice, and it wasn't even in those two years that any change occurred. It wasn't until the U.S. withdrew that there was a hasty action on the part of member states, and the Secretariat of the ILO, to make reforms.

Q What about the U.S. National Commission which voted a year ago that we should not withdraw, and then just last week said they regretted the withdrawal, that they would rather see you give another year's notice, like the British are doing right now, and then withdraw if there hasn't been reform? Basically, they were saying there hasn't been time for these reforms to take place.

A There's been adequate time, and there's been adequate opportunity for that reform to take place. We've had an Executive Board meeting in September/October, we had an Executive Board meeting in May; we have attended over 150 meetings with the Western Information Group on reforms, we have made 145/150 specific recommendations to the Director General in the July 13 letter There has been ample time, ample opportunity. The lack has been, we think, the lack of desire for reform

The British: They are doing what we did last year They put forward their letter stating that unless there is change, then they will withdraw at the end of 1985. They are, if you will, a year behind us

We think that with our withdrawal -- if UNESCO can reform -- that this will increase the opportunity for that to occur with 25 percent reduction in the assessments, (2) with another member state at least threatening withdrawal as well

Q You mentioned other avenues for this pursuit Could you give us some examples of how the effort will be spread around; what agencies?

A We envisage right now looking at agencies such as UNDP -- United Nations Development Program -- which currently has a 20/80 percent ratio; 20 percent at headquarters, 80 percent in the field. UNESCO has just the opposite -- 80 percent at headquarters in Paris, 20 percent in the field

We also see U.S. aid which has a 10 percent headquarters, 90 percent field ratio; and USIA, in terms of communications, that has an 8 percent headquarters and 92 percent field ratio

Q With the U.S. officially out, are there any barriers to U.S. citizens staying on with the Secretariat, joining the Secretariat during this period, or government agencies supporting specific programs, or NGO's working with UNESCO?

A We have been assured repeatedly by the Director General that American personnel -- who are international civil servants -- would be protected in their current contracts. The Director-General held a meeting on the 13th of December in which he indicated that U.S. personnel would still stay on in their posts; and we have continued, even in this year, to submit American candidates for policy-level posts

Q What are the basic reforms necessary, then, for the U.S. even to begin considering going back into UNESCO?

A The basic reforms requisite are those same ones we've been talking about now for eleven months -- and that is mechanisms that will protect minority views, mechanisms that will structurally change the decision-making apparatus in UNESCO; a budget that reflects zero-net program growth, movement away from the New World Information and Communications Order and other statist theories

Q Could you explain about programs that the United States will continue to be involved in -- the copyright program, I understand, and --

A Yes, there are selected programs -- out of the nine major areas in UNESCO, two of them -- which we can continue participating in by virtue of our being a signatory to other conventions and treaties, etc., such as the Copyright Convention, such as the Inter-Governmental Oceanographic Commission, the International Geological Correlation Program

Q How about Man and the Biosphere?

A Man and the Biosphere: We hope to find a way to continue participating

Q Didn't UNESCO adopt a zero-growth budget for two years recently a few weeks ago?

A UNESCO did not. The Executive Board agreed to a zero-program-growth budget for the next biennium, and then unfortunately added a troublesome amendment which would allow for growth of up to two percent -- plus, there's no implementing mechanism attached to the zero growth, as it is With the two percent add-on, we're back about where we were

Q When you speak about mechanisms to protect minority views, aren't you really talking about a veto for the United States and the Western Group so they could have together a veto on the budget; that they could decide which way UNESCO should go?

A We're talking about protecting minority interests whether they be East, West, North or South. For example, on the budgetary question, what we asked for in the Executive Board of 51 members is that 85 percent of the 51 Executive Board Member would be required to approve a budget. That means if we think the budget is too large, eight Western countries can vote against it and stop the budget

That also means that if the developing nations feel that it's too small, they can also stop the budget

Q How many of those 140 recommendations were carried out?

A I know of virtually none. I'm sure there must be one or two, but I cannot cite any right now

One of the problems we had here with the Executive Board meeting, and all the activity that went on in Paris, is that we basically discussed -- and we didn't do anything

We still recognize the genuine efforts that were put forward to discuss, but there was not concrete agreement on most of these recommendations, not just from the United States but from other member states; not only in the West but throughout the world. But we don't have any implementing mechanisms and we don't have any time-line as to when these things would be put in place

Q Your critics say that the intitial indications of U.S concerns that came in May were very vague and that the ones that came in July were too late for very much to happen, and that many of the recommendations couldn't be implemented through the Board meeting but had to wait for the Conference next year, such as program changes

How could they have made the changes you want since they didn't have the meeting scheduled in the time you gave them?

A We'll answer the first question, and then we don't need to answer the second one

We have been criticized all year long for not having been specific, but we have been abundantly specific, first, in our letter of December 28 from the Secretary of State to the Director General; in meetings then that I had with the Director General in January; in a meeting on April 10 with the Secretary of State and the Director General here in Washington. As early as March 5 we put forward specific recommendations. We refined those and elaborated further in April, and then at the May Executive Board meeting, working with 23 other Western Group countries, and consulting with 120 other countries in Paris, in Washington, New York and some 23 Third World capitals. We think we were abundantly specific

On July 13 we put forward another 145/150 specific recommendations for the program of action for the next biennium

Q Is it fair for us to say that you recognize that you will be judged by both the Third World and other members of UNESCO on your commitment to continuing funding these programs by the level of funding, by the dollar amount of that $47 million that you contribute to similar programs? Will you be breaking that out or will it end up getting buried in agency budgets where it would be impossible to know how much of it is actually being spent on those programs?

A Again, on the budgetary side, we just can't comment on that.

Q You have no comment on the dollar amount. But the question of being judged is --

A I would like to address that in a broader context. We have heard now for, goodness, 15 months -- since this has been under consideration and enroute -- that the Third World would feel that the U.S. had abandoned the Third World. Well, that's poppycock. We participate in some 95 other international organizations where we work harmoniously with the Third World -- constructively with the Third World.

Q So you're going to base your judgment -- you think that people should judge you on the basis of the 95 other organizations that you're members of, not on the basis of how much of this money will end up going back into Third World programs?

A We hope they will judge us on our across-the-board approach, which is constructive to multilateral development in the Third World.

Q Two of those organizations you mentioned to me a few moments ago, Mr. Newell, are already American-funded programs. Let me get it straight. Are you suggesting that some of the funding used here would go into those programs over and above their present budgets?

A We, again, on the budgetary side, we just cannot answer that.

Q (Inaudible) money to AID and to the USIA?

A Our alternatives package, which has been underway now for about eight months -- with an interagency force and private sector individuals -- would design resources going to these implementing mechanisms.

Q One of the things the critics would also say is this kind of move weakens the international system when we pull out and say, "We don't like the way you're doing business, we want to do it some other way." Would you answer that charge? Does this, in your view, weaken the international system when the U.S. withdraws?

A We think this decision strengthens it. We think this decision is pro-U.N. It's because the multilateral system is important to us that we have blown the whistle. It's because the multilateral fora are important to us that we have asked all agencies to return to their original purposes, to depoliticize themselves, to get budgets which reflect sound management, and to get more of the resources which they have at their disposal out into the field. So we think this has the opposite effect -- that it will strengthen the system.

We have seen that in this last General Assembly -- in New York. We have seen this in the ITU, the World Health Organization, the ILO, the IAEA, UNIF, the International Civil Aviation Organization -- all of which have had major meetings which have been significantly more encouraging to the purposes of their being in this past year, and we correlate that directly to the UNESCO decision.

Q What's the mechanism for informing UNESCO today if you already have or will, of this decision? Have they been notified today, and how was that done?

A They have been notified. And as we did last December, the Secretary of State wrote to the Director General as well as well to the Secretary-General of the U.N.

Q That letter was delivered today?

A There has been communication today to the Director General.

MR. CARLSON: Thank you very much, Mr. Newell.

(Briefing concluded at 2:55 p.m.)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON NATIONAL SECURITY

December 20, 1984

The Briefing Room

1:03 P.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I suppose I should be properly deflated. I was told on the way up here by Bob that the only question that apparently was evoked by the notice that there would be this session was, why is he coming? (Laughter.)

Q Well, what is the answer? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, many of you have asked to have a session to talk about topical issues and the run up to Geneva, East-West issues, other stories in the headlines in the past few days, and I thought that maybe it would be useful if we took time out from the preparation for Geneva to talk about those; to talk about strategic defense, and to respond to your questions on those or other issues.

For the past several weeks, the President has been presiding over a series of meetings in preparation for renewal of talks with the Soviet Union. He has directed at the outset that we examine every possible way in which we might succeed in renewing serious dialogue on the family of arms control issues, strategic offensive as well as defensive, as soon as possible. Those sessions have -- and more than a dozen of them -- produced a rich panoply of options which the President has heard and will weight in forging the instructions to the delegation which I would expect to be finally prepared before the New Year.

It seemed to me that one of the fundamental lessons from this extensive review has been that the foundation assumptions which inspired the adoption of the current strategy for deterrence about 20 years ago have been called into question; and that our own ability to face those realities and to forge what will be an effective doctrine and strategy for preserving deterrence through the turn of the century ought to inspire our policies toward arms control as well as our defense policies in this country.

Let me tell you exactly what I'm talking about here. For the past 20 years, we and the Soviet Union have based our -- or we, at least -- have based our assumptions on how deterrence can be assured upon the notion that if I -- each side were able to maintain the ability to retaliate against any attack that it might face and impose costs which were unacceptable, that this would suffice to prevent conflict. This balance of terror, if you will, relies upon the ability to threaten the other side with offensive power. It is a condition in which each side is supposed to gain security through its own vulnerability and its own ability to retaliate against the other.

It was this assumption and others I'll treat which underwrote the SALT I agreements and which each side was supposed to accept, this notion that vulnerability was a good thing and that if each side maintained equal forces, that this equality of capability

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of the ability to retaliate would remain stable. The corollary to that assumption was that neither side would seek to gain unilateral advantage, to alter that balance by the building of offensive or defensive forces which could either remove its own vulnerability or overcome the ability to the other side to retaliate.

And, thirdly, there was, about 15 years ago, the conclusion that offensive deterrence was not only sensible but necessary, because neither side could develop a defensive system which could effectively deter the other side. The state-of-the-art simply wasn't that advanced.

Now it would seem to me that each of these fundamental assumptions may no longer be valid. For example, at the outset, the notion that a country is better off in a circumstance in which it is unable to defend itself is a little bit surreal, on its face. The corollary, however, that neither side would seek to alter that condition would undermine that presumption if one side did and, for example, if the Soviet Union, as it has, has gone beyond equality to establish a superior ability in a particular category as, for example, the prompt hard-target capability, then this would call into question the stability of the fundamental balance.

Similarly, if one side, in this case, the Soviet Union, were to establish an advantage through the development of defensive systems able to counter or reduce the ability of the other to retaliate effectively, that, too, would remove the fundamental stability that is supposed to inhere in mutual vulnerability.

Here, again, we see that for the past 20 years the Soviet Union has put quite a lot of money and research into the development of defensive systems. Indeed, if you look at that period, you find that the Soviet expenditures on strategic defensive systems have been greater than their expenditures on offensive systems, although both are quite large.

Finally, on the point that it is -- or it was -- simply not possible to develop effective defenses, the emergence of new technologies, sensors, other systems, suggest the possibility that's no longer the case and that we may see, by the turn of the century, systems which would offer the possibility for each side to defend itself effectively, and that evokes a very promising possibility, which is that you could move away from a strategy based upon the ability to threaten with offensive power to greater reliance upon systems which don't threaten anyone, to systems which are oriented toward military weapons and not people, to systems which would not threaten the Soviet Union nor its society.

It's for that reason that the President, a year-and-a-half ago, proposed the opening of a serious research effort, fully compatible with existing treaty commitments, to see whether, for the 1990s and beyond, some future president might not be in a position to move us away from a strategy based on threatening with offensive power and toward one which threatens no one.

Now that is an important part of the foundation of our thinking

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and seeking to renew serious dialogue with the Soviet Union on the reduction of offensive systems, both strategic and intermediate range, and a serious dialogue on the basic issue of the relationship between offense and defense. This is our purpose in Geneva.

And it will be a our purpose in what we hope will be negotiations to follow to deal seriously, flexibly and constructively with how we can reduce offensive systems. And we spent the past year examining our positions in START and INF, and on the space -- the family of space systems -- we've identified a number of ideas and concepts which we think hold promise of bridging gaps which have existed heretofore.

And we are ready and going to Geneva to exchange thoughts on these ideas, hopefully to receive some from the Soviet Union. And we hope to come away with an agreed plan for the early renewal of formal dialogue, negotiations in each of these areas.

Well, there are a number of other points to treat. But why don't I respond to your questions now? Yes, in the back?

Q Sir, you want to move away from offensive power. What ideas do you have in place of them specifically -- that you will present in Geneva --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't intend to get into the specific systems and possible trade-offs as between them. The President very clearly recognizes that as fundamental a change as this represents, requires a thorough understanding on both sides of its motives and of the how -- the procedure -- through which over time it might be adopted. And it is laying that foundation and making clear that this represents in no sense an effort to gain unilateral advantage but to move us toward a more stable posture of deterrence.

With that foundation laid, we'll be prepared in negotiations, which we hope will follow promptly, to get into the specific ways in which this evolution could take place.

Yes?

Q -- you seem to be saying that SDI really is not negotiable. You use the words, "seriously, flexibly and constructively" --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Constructively.

Q -- "constructively" -- right -- in terms of the American attitude to reduce offensive systems, but the Soviets obviously want us to forego or reduce defensive systems. Are you saying that the strategic doctrine change that's evolving is so fundamental that it really cannot be altered by Geneva and the subsequent negotiations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, to begin with, we face a condition today in which the imbalance in this ability that I referred to as prompt hard-target capability is lopsidedly in favor of the Soviets by a factor of about 3 to 1 with 6,000 ICBM warheads on their side and about 2,000 on ours. That is a fundamental imbalance of great importance for crisis stability, and it needs to be addressed. These are systems which exist today, which threater today, as opposed to others which are not even in the laboratory stage in many cases.

And, so, it's sensible to talk about that as a matter of greatest urgency cleary. And I don't mean to mislead, however. The family of defensive systems and the basic concept of defense, and particularly the enormous investments the Soviet Union has already put into it -- far greater than ours -- and the existence on their side of defensive systems today -- well beyond any U.S. capability -- require that we, first, examine together, for the first time in a long time, what is stability. Is it through mutual vulnerability?

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Does that exist today? Can it be established? In any case, is it not worthwhile to reduce the number of those systems to equality at lower levels? And, finally, how can defense enhance the ability of both sides to feel secure, and not just the United States? And I stress the later because, clearly, in Geneva and beyond strategic defense will be clearly on the agenda.

Q Sir, hello --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes?

Q -- back here --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Barry?

Q You used the phrase, "trade-offs." Is it conceivable in the U.S. strategy to trade off some of our interest in a defensive system for curbing what you see as their advantage in certain offensive systems or must the trade-offs be within those areas -- inclusively within those areas? And, secondly, when you speak of their having a greater capability, I think you said, in defensive systems, that isn't what most analysts seem to think. Are you talking about -- they have a better anti-satellite system or were you simply talking about the defense around Moscow that we don't have? In other words, could you be a little more specific about what you see as their edge in defensive systems?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Glad you asked. It is surprising and perhaps our fault that few people in this country don't understand that the United States today cannot prevent a ballistic missile warhead from coming into the United States. I was struck by a poll not long ago which reported that 60 percent of the American people are confident that today we can prevent a ballistic missile from coming in and exploding in our territory. That's not true. We don't have that capability.

Beyond that, however, while in the 1950s the United States did have a defensive anti-aircraft system deployed that was disestablished, and while today we have a modest capability for anti-aircraft defense, it is infinitesimal when compared to the more than 10,000 Soviet air defense sites now and to a program through which missile systems have been developed that have a capability against both aircraft and missile systems.

In addition, there's the reported -- well, acknowledged -- capability of the Soviet Union through its early-warning and battle-management radars to identify and track ballistic missile attack. And, of course, they do have the site, which is being improved right now, for the defense of Moscow within the terms of the ABM treaty, but with newer and far more capable systems.

We don't have any of those things. So it is -- it is almost as though there were a monopoly, although the difference is insignificant.

Q Well, can you answer the first part of his question?

Q -- the first part --

Q Trade-offs?

Q Any trade off from our area of strength as against their area of strength? Or the trade off within each area?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that it's important that the United States and the Soviet Union accept that if we are to go toward the adoption of greater reliance on defensive systems, that it be done in a stable way, and that it be acknowledged as improving stability and the security that each side feels.

Now, it is very conceivable to me -- if you look at the basic alternatives which the Soviet Union faces -- that they may well indeed accept that premise. Indeed, their very force structure today suggests that they do. Otherwise, why would they have spent well over half their investment in defensive systems? So, if there is a believer in defensive systems, it is the Soviet Union. And they've shown that belief by putting those systems into the ground.

Now, let me answer your question on trade-offs. And that is to say, that coming to terms on how defense can enhance deterrence will undoubtedly involve trade-offs. We believe that it is a defensible proposition, which we will discuss and entertain objection in every fashion imaginable, that we can establish stability through lower levels of offensive power and we'll be delighted if the Soviet Union agreed to that.

We believe that, in that event, defense can nonetheless contribute to enhancing deterrence. But we intend to discuss that, too, and are entirely open to a contrary view. We also think that in offensive systems -- after looking at our START position and theirs -- that there are trade-offs here. As, for example, between areas in which we have an advantage in bomber systems, and their own areas of advantage in offensive ballistic missile systems -- ICBMs.

So, yes, there are trade-offs. And we think, particularly in the START context, that those trade-offs could lead to early progress.

Q Are you saying we might trade all "x" number of bombers for a reduction of SS-18's? Is that an idea?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, again, I'm not going to treat the specific --

Q Is this an example of what you're --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- numbers, but that is generically accurate.

Bernie?

Q Several months ago, most people were focussing on the ASAT tests that were coming up in this coming winter. And in the President's speech at the UN, as I recall, he said something to the

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effect that we won't pay a price for resuming negotiations, but if talks resume, we would consider restraints in this field. Where does that stand? Because that is a live issue, whereas the Star Wars is still way in the future before you're talking about testing or deployment. Is the U.S. going to discuss some kind of negotiated pause or something in ASAT development?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, first of all, I think that it's good to recall that the Soviet Union, in proposing a moratorium, is in an excellent position to do so. They have a proven system -- and deployed -- and we don't. So a moratorium on testing, something they don't need to do, serves their interest.

The President stands by his commitment of the speech and in his talks with the Foreign Minister of September, that, yes, we will consider what measures of restraint are appropriate when the negotiations open. And we shall.

A small digression: two or three months ago, there was the assertion by a leading political figure in this country, during the campaign, that President Kennedy's proposal of a moratorium led promptly to the conclusion of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. And that was really substantial revisionism of history. And I mention it because of how moratoria have worked in the past.

The truth is, in the late Eisenhower years, we and the Soviet Union adopted a moratorium on nuclear testing, atmospheric testing. After some two and a half years, as I recall, the Soviet Union, unilaterally, broke out of that without notice. However, in a program which had clearly been planned over months and years, and in a very narrow space of time, conducted several year's worth of nuclear testing.

Again, at the conclusion of that program, the Soviet Union said, and President Kennedy accepted, the renewal of the moratorium. But the United States had not been able to put together any test program of its own -- being caught by surprise -- and the advantage gained was very substantial.

Now, this is not to say that one precedent rules out henceforth and forever more some kind of moratorium -- it doesn't. But it has pitfalls. The President stands by his commitment of his speech.

Lou?

Q Do you think that the President's renewed emphasis on strategic defense that you've talked about here, and other administration officials have talked about, gives the United States significantly more leverage in these negotiations with the Soviets since they seem so concerned about it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, again, I think -- Lou's question is: Does SDI give us significant leverage to gain concessions on the part of the Soviets in view of the obvious concern that they have about it?

I think, first of all, the concern is probably felt, but it masks their own acknowledged history of enormous investment that dwarfs our own in this area. So to say that the Soviet Union is concerned about defense is utter nonsense, to the extent that they have developed such an elaborate defense of their own, they clearly believe in the concept of defense.

I do think that the research program -- which is just that -- offers the promise of greater stability and enhancing deterrence. And, by their own history of interest in it, too, they must, as well -- it's a matter of coming to terms on how to integrate it. But we have to get agreement on it.

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Q But what you've said --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sam?

Q -- would suggest that their emphasis on defense is for unilateral advantage, not because they believe in moving from offensive terror to a strategic non-defense equality. What makes you think they're interested in the latter?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I believe that the fact that they have had that field to themselves has enabled them to take that position. The opening, by us, of a serious research effort makes clear that -- all right, if they feel that way, if they like defense -- then, perhaps, together we can come to some kind of terms if we have a program. And we think just the state-of-the-art warrants such a program right now.

I'd refer back to when the ABM treaty was negotiated. You'll recall that, in the Johnson years, we tried for a long time to get the Soviets to negotiate about AMB and they wouldn't do it. We had no program. And it wasn't until the Congress authorized, by one vote in the Senate, us to go ahead with an ABM effort, that they said, "Let's talk about that." We came to terms. And that treaty is on the books today.

And so, history shows that the Soviet Union normally doesn't have an interest in talking about something as long as they don't have to worry about our side in that area. But having a program can lead to progress in arms control.

Q I'm trying to figure out in my own mind -- maybe you can help me -- if both sides move to a non-defense, similar capability -- I'm sorry, defensive capability, strategically -- how would that keep the peace from the standpoint of local wars? Would it not make it more possible for the superpowers to engage in local conflict?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Deterrence of conflict depends upon an equilibrium of power -- under any circumstance. It would require that there be an equilibrium of forces in the future, as it does today. The point is that that would need to be conventional power, and not nuclear power -- or predominantly so, at least. Defense capabilities could, however, go beyond stabilizing the situation in the East-West context, and make possible for the United States and the Soviet Union the ability to deter, or at least deal with, putative third-countries' isolated attacks.

Thankfully, we haven't had to face that kind of thing. But for some country, terrorist or otherwise, to some day acquire some kind of weapon like this, could pose a considerable risk. And this could offer an ability to prevent that.

Q Let me --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Andrea?

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Q How do you respond to people like McNamara and Bundy, who say that defensive systems, by their very nature, are destabilizing because they cannot be 100 percent effective with a shield? And secondly, do you agree with Secretary Weinberger's linkage of the size of the defense budget with our negotiating strength in Geneva?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On the first point, the assertion is terribly simplistic and wrong-headed, even by the criteria established by those same individuals when they espoused the offensive deterrent strategy we live under today. Specifically --

Q Can we put that on the record?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Specifically, it implies that the role of defense would be to prevent a missile from ever getting here, any missile or warhead. And that ignores that the Soviet calculus in considering whether to attack or not would be whether the outcome would leave them in a position of advantage. And more specifically, it wouldn't require that the system be 100 percent effective to prevent any attack at all.

If the Soviet Union, disposing of 6,000 warheads, has to ask itself whether only 100 will get through, and then what is their situation, having launched all of those warheads and being vulnerable to a very substantial response, the bottom line ought to be, it is not in our interest to attack at all. And so, significantly reducing by 50 percent, 60 percent, or any measurable figure, would dramatically effect the Soviet calculus to attack in the first place.

And so the assertion that it has to be 100 percent effective just doesn't hold water.

On the second point, clearly, one of the reasons why the Soviet Union is coming back to the table today is that after a long, long period of decline and apparently unwillingness in this country to invest in our security, in the past four years, the President has sustained Congressional appropriations for a significant modernization program which promises by the end of the decade to restore the balance. That investment, then, has been an important factor in influencing the Soviets to negotiate in arms control.

A signal that we were going to be unable to sustain that investment would be an important factor in their thinking as to whether to make concessions or compromise at all, for if it appeared that we were not, why negotiate, if we appeared willing to unilaterally cut our own systems.

So there is a correlation, and I think the correlation is proven by the fact that they are coming back in January, after four years of seeing that investment sustained.

Bill?

Q The trade-offs of which you spoke, can they include the strategic defense, the SDI? Or parts of it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As I've said, the -- first of all, we don't have any of these systems and the Soviet Union has quite a lot of them. So it's a little bit intellectually obscure as to what trade-offs we're really talking about.

But I'll take your point that the research program and our intentions for it have to be on the table and a matter for discussion and agreement and negotiation between us. And they will surely be on the table in that sense.

John?

Q If I could just follow up on an earlier question.

If I understand you correctly, you're talking about talking to the Russians about such deep reductions in strategic defense, that we have to re-examine the whole mutual assured destruction theory or fact that we've all lived on. But if what -- the second point you make is true, that they, indeed, have a -- are ahead of us in defensive systems, why should the Soviets even listen to us in Geneva, because, in effect, what you're saying is that you want a chance to catch up with them in terms of their defensive systems? Why wouldn't they just say, "Good-bye"?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's a possibility. I think the history and this vignette that I summarized earlier, however, gives us a basis for hope, and that is, it was the conclusion, apparently, by the Soviets in the late sixties that although they were further along, that U. S. technology, once developed, could well be better and, as a consequence, it was in their interest to try to limit it.

Well, for whatever reasons, we think that they obviously have a serious interest in it; we've seen it in their statements, and that's fine. We look forward to talking to them about it.

Q You keep talking about the extent of the defensive systems which the Soviets already have deployed, researched and deployed. If you can clarify something -- I'm under the impression that they have only one crude anti-satellite system and no anti-missile system, and that the rest of this defensive array about which you were speaking consists of radars and such things, but not anything that would be a defense against a ballistic missile. In other words, they can no more prevent a ballistic missile from arriving there than we can here. Isn't that the case?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. The defense of a country, in this case, the Soviet Union, against the spectrum of attacks they might face requires that they deal with missile attacks and bomber attacks and today, in the bomber area, they have a massive capability to defend against that. We don't.

Q Okay, but no missile capability?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In the missile area, the ability that they are authorized under the ABM treaty is not only very robust but improving every day -- true enough, limited to Moscow, but the research effect of that and the ability it gives the Soviet Union to break out with the early deployment, unilaterally, conceivably, of the fruit of that research, which has been very vigorous, is very much worth considering.

In addition, apart from the systems deployed around Moscow, Galosh and SH-8, the other Soviet missiles which are ostensibly anti-aircraft, SA-10, SA-12, appear to have the capability, also, to deal with ballistic systems and, again, here, where we are talking about a system which could be deployed against an aircraft threat, which is authorized, but has that capability, could fundamentally alter the strategic balance.

Q Could you clarify whether --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Chris?

Q Yes, I'm a little confused. It seems to me there's a contradiction because, on the one hand, you're saying that you want to change the whole basis for the strategic thought from the "MAD" system of the past several decades to this new idea of a possibility for an effective defense, and yet you say that you are willing to negotiate away, because you say it's on the table, the Star Wars space defense system. I think -- that seems to me to be an internal contradiction, first of all, and if you could explain that and, secondly, I'd like your reaction to Mr. Gorbachev's success, apparent success, in the last week with Mrs. Thatcher on this question of Star Wars.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, first of all, let me say that if there is, or if I've given the impression that our platform is to fundamentally change the basis of strategic deterrence, I don't intend that. What we seek here --

Q You don't?

Q You said --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Good, I'm glad you II 1445

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raised it. Let me go through it, again.

Q A philosophical discussion you were having with us?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right.

Q All right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The United States purpose is to maintain effective deterrence, to preserve peace, to reduce the potential for conflict. Now the construct under which that -- those ends have been pursued has been a construct of reliance upon offensive deterrence. We believe that the Soviet Union, by its actions in the past 20 years and particularly the last 10, has undermined the viability of that, but we think it can be restored. We are confident that it can and that it must involve focusing upon the restoration of a stable balance in offensive systems, and that's what we are about in START, INF separately.

And so we are entirely committed to the preservation of the status quo and of making it more stable by reducing the level of offensive systems on both sides. As a separate matter, we believe that that condition of effective deterrence can be enhanced by seeing together if we cannot integrate defensive systems, which are fundamentally different, they do not threaten anybody, and that ought to be in the interests of the Soviets and us, to move away from something which is posited on your ability to threaten, which is a political fact, not military -- is a less stable condition than your ability to use systems which do not threaten anyone.

But this is a matter for discussion and it doesn't suggest at all a departure from our commitment now and in the years to come to preserve stability. And right now that means in offensive systems and by going it at lower levels.

With regard to the visit of the Soviet Union's representative, Mr. Gorbachev, to London and the statements of interest in making progress in arms reduction are welcome. The United States hopes that that is reflected in the Soviet positions in Geneva and beyond. And I wouldn't comment beyond that.

Yes?

Q It's still not clear -- it's still not clear to me, when you say that the SDI and everything else would be on the table -- whether, at the optimum, you would be willing to accept cancelling the SDI if they would reduce the capability -- dramatically reduce the capability -- of their offensive systems. I mean, at the optimum, is that the kind of a deal that we would like to see?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not about to get into the negotiations that will ensue in the months ahead and the positions that the United States will take. I've gone over what our objectives are, and that they are oriented towards stability, and we see a number of ways that you can get to that outcome, and that we have no illusions that some unilateral U.S. deployment of defensive systems would do that.

And so, getting to a condition in which defensive systems play a role requires Soviet-U.S. dialogue about capabilities and what really does improve stability. So it's going to be probably a central part of the negotiations in the months ahead.

Q But -- going back to an earlier question -- and it's not clear to me -- are you saying that we would consider, in the general sense, we would consider offensive systems traded off for defensive systems? Or are you saying within each area, it would be defense for defense, or offense for offense? Could there be a cross-over to reach this level of stability?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And if you say, could I imagine a condition in which both sides agreed that there ought to be offensive and defensive systems, and that that would be a stable balance? Yes, I can imagine that. The Soviet Union clearly can because it has such a major defensive posture today. And -- but I will not get into what specific systems and in what numbers and so forth, right now.

Q What about -- just areas? Could there be -- I guess, getting down to, not specifics, but the area of defensive weapons versus offensive weapons. For instance, if we have an A system and a B system in the defensive area, would we want some concession from the Soviets in the defensive area for one of those as we would in the offense? Or could there be a cross-over between one of ours -- offensive for one of their defensive -- or so on. Are we locked into a negotiation where there has to be an area-for-area transfer?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is no rigid construct for associating defensive concessions with defensive concessions or any other context. These capabilities have to be dealt with in an overall framework of stability, and each side's view of what is stable. And the composition, at the end of the day, of each side's forces will end up, as it is today, different. But it is impossible now to predict what that outcome would be.

Yes?

Q The negotiations that have gone on, on the specific subjects -- strategic arms, INF and so on -- are all limited in their

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own way. Do you foresee that in order to address this fundamental concept you talk about, do you foresee the necessity for a new forum coming out of Geneva at which these basic discussions about vulnerability and defense can be carried on?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The format for talks which we hope will follow Geneva is one of the leading issues to be discussed in Geneva. We are flexible on that. We have no preconceived outcome that we insist upon. We have a number of ideas as to different formats which we think would hold promise of making progress in each of the areas. So we're willing to offer our ideas, listen to theirs, and couldn't really prejudge what the outcome is going to be. But there can be an outcome; at least we have a number of ideas, any of which we could live with, that we think ought to be reasonable from their point of view.

Yes?

Q I wonder if we could go back to this correlation between the defense buildup here and Soviet willingness to talk arms control. How is the fact that they walked away in the midst of the buildup fit into that correlation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think one has to consider whether taking a tough stance of confrontation, which historically engenders fear in the West, may not have been done in the hope that it will alter our policy; or the attitude of the Congress or the people in this country or Europeans about their willingness to go ahead with this investment in their security, and that this susceptibility of democracies generally to threats, to confrontation, to walking out, to posturing, which, in points in our history, have succeeded in changing our policies, might not have worked.

But that is a close-run thing from their point of view; and that is, if doesn't work, and if not only your political cohesion with allies is preserved, but your own modernization program is continued, then it promises some day to turn from paper to hardware. And our own excellence in technology is something of natural concern to them.

Historically, they have had results in putting limits on American technology by coming back to the table and negotiating arms control. And I imagine that it must surely be part of their calculus that, "Let's try it. We made out pretty well in the '70s, let's try it again." At any rate, they are coming back and we welcome that and we hope we can make some headway.

Yes.

Q I'd like to get back to your statement at the outset about moving more toward a defensive system. Logic and the burden of history would seem to suggest that if you move more toward a defensive system, you're going to get more of both, that as each side builds up their defensive capability, they'll also build up the means to overwhelm or saturate the other guy's defensive capability -- why would that not apply in this case?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The assertion -- and the article that was mentioned earlier has it in it -- that defense will naturally lead to more offense doesn't square with the -- either the facts historically in all cases or expectations of some of the technologies that are at hand; and that is that their effectiveness acknowledged on both sides in being relatively invulnerable could demonstrate that it is fruitless to try, or even if they are vulnerable to offensive attack, or attack by offensive systems, that the cost of doing that is greater than our cost in putting up a defensive system.

And so the -- it's not worth it. But right now, neither

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the systems capabilities nor the cost benefit trade-offs suggest that there is any natural logic to an expansion in offensive power.

Yes.

Q From your discussion of the Soviet defensive system, are you saying that the Soviets have the capability to defend against and prevent a nuclear strike by the United States while we do not have that ability?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I didn't say that. I did say that they have a very healthy anti-aircraft defense and that their -- both their R&D and their development of systems which appear to have the capability against ballistic systems is very far-advanced; and that because it's far-advanced, the ability to, with a surge, break out of that is real.

Q But currently, they cannot --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I would not pretend that today, the Soviet Union could prevent a ballistic missile attack.

MR. SIMS: We're approaching an hour and I know you have to leave. So how about one or two more -- Bernie and --

Q Can you address the ABM Treaty which,

in its current phase, expires or is up for renewal or automatically is renewed in '87? Is that something that has to be factored into the negotiations? Because after all, you can't -- as I understand it -- test some of the things that people have talked about without changing that treaty or just abrogating it. I mean, is that something that is negotiable in the current stage?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's premature, and that question will inure to some future President. I think you'll check -- it's '88, I believe, Bernie -- five years. We had our review in 1983 in the fall, and it'll be reviewed again in the fall of '88.

Q -- '87.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL. Well, I'll check it out, but the U.S. program is entirely compatible with it. And the there's a lot of negotiating to do between now and then on fundamental concepts.

Q Will it be compatible with it until it expires whether -- I mean, do you expect to be in a position to be able to test things that would be in violation of that treaty, whether President Reagan's in office or anybody else, before expiration date?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Lou, I think it's premature now with the state of the R&D that we're doing to say what you might want to do even that far ahead right now. But we don't see any incompatibility between the research effort and the ABM treaty.

Yes?

Q It seems you're saying --

MR. SIMS: Last question, please.

Q -- that the U.S. -- it seems you're saying the U.S. is going to Geneva in an inferior -- currently inferior strategic position. It seems Russia has a big edge on the offensive side and on the defensive side. And, do I understand you correctly that you're only saying it's because toward the end of this decade they perceive we may be restoring finally equilibrium and balance because of our continuing investment that they have this incentive, but if they look at just the strategic situation today, they're ahead? Is that correct?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that unless the Soviet Union thought there were high self-interest and real incentives to come to Geneva they wouldn't come.

Q No, I understand --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Now, that doesn't gest that they think that we are inferior in the context of what negotiation would involve, which is out-year systems. And that's we are talking about -- out-year systems.

Q But are you going to Geneva feeling that the current ation is unbalanced rather than balanced in the overall?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think that tive deterrence exists. There are areas in which the Soviets substantial advantage. There are others in which we have an age. Deterrence exists; we want to keep it that way. And is the basis for a fruitful negotiation.

MR. SIMS: Thank you.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 1:57 P.M. EST

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ON THE RECORD BRIEFING
ON
SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN
BY
MICHAEL H. ARMACOST
UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 20, 1984, 3:00 P.M.

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. This is an On the Record briefing by Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Michael Armacost. It's almost five years since the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, and Secretary Armacost will given you an appraisal of the situation as it stands today.

I would just like to point out this is a briefing on Afghanistan and Secretary Armacost will take questions on Afghanistan.

UNDER SECRETARY ARMACOST: I'm happy to be here and to have the chance to discuss with you the subject of Afghanistan and where we stand. This is a subject of some importance clearly to American foreign policy. It's a subject in which many people in the Department, obviously, have taken a very keen personal interest.

Let me briefly discuss U.S. policy in Afghanistan, what's happening militarily on the ground, how we see the status of diplomatic efforts toward reaching a settlement. Then I'll be happy to take a crack at your questions.

I also have with me Herb Hagerty, who's the Country Director for Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh; Peter Burleigh from INR, and Phyllis Oakley from the Afghanistan Desk.

You're all aware that December 27 marks the fifth anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. That event caused a profound shock in the international community and in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Five years ago, when many of you reported on the Soviet invasion, few of us would have imagined that five years later we would be speaking of an Afghan resistance that has kept the Soviets essentially from subjugating their country. It is an incredible story; it deserves our attention. It is possible only because of the strength of character and courage and fortitude of the Afghan people.

Afghanistan is an issue that's not yet decided. Although it's a truly remote area from a geographic standpoint and it is rather sparsely covered in the media, what happens in Afghanistan is very important for the stability of South Asia and the reduction of world tension in general.

A comment about American policy. We think our policies toward this situation have been clear and consistent. The goal has always been a negotiated political settlement whose objective is to secure the withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Afghanistan and to end the ever-increasing agony and devastation borne by the Afghan people.

We believe a settlement is possible in which the legitimate security interests of all the parties can be protected. We intend to continue our search for such a settlement, not only in the interests of the nations of South Asia but for the peace and stability of the wider world.

Our national interests are not served by simply keeping the Soviets tied down in Afghanistan. The burden of suffering the Afghans carry is tremendous, and U.S. policy is and must be based on the objectives for which we have stood, namely, support for the Afghan right to freedom, independence and self-determination.

Let me turn then to a few comments on the military situation in Afghanistan, beginning with the Panjsher Valley. The story of the Seventh Soviet Panjsher offensive is well known. At the end of April, the largest concentration of Soviet/DRA forces ever assembled in Afghanistan, began a major drive against the mujahidin of Commander Masood.

Masood resorted to classic guerrilla tactics; he pulled his forces back and up to high ground, hiding in the network of caves that riddled the valley sides. Land mines became the major weapon.

At present, the Soviets occupy roughly two-thirds of the valley floor, and have established various garrisons in which to winter.

What has been the 1984 outcome in the Panjsher Valley? Masood was not captured and, contrary to initial Soviet claims, he's alive and well. Although they have suffered considerable losses, his forces avoided major pitched battles and they have escaped to surrounding valleys to fight on. On the other hand, the valley has been denied to Masood as a base of operations, and he has had to find winter refuge elsewhere for his followers

The valley itself is largely deserted, as Masood has moved out most of the civilian population before the Soviet April offensive began. Food resources in the Panjsher have been dramatically reduced and the people of that valley face a rather bleak winter. Although the use of scorched earth type tactics is not country-wide, this is but one illustration of the deteriorating conditions for the civilian population inside Afghanistan as the war continues

When the Soviet offensive in Panjsher tapered off roughly in May and June, they turned their attention west to Herat, Afghanistan's third largest city, where there was a marked deterioration in the security situation.

In early June, roads to the city were blocked and the city itself surrounded by over 300 tanks and armored personnel carriers. Large numbers of Soviet troops proceeded to search the city house-by-house. There was little resistance activity as most of the mujahidin had already left the city, but villages south and west were subjected to intense air attacks

In Herat, as in other Afghan cities, Soviet forces are garrisoned near but outside of the center of town. Except for periodic sweeps and searches for Afghan army recruits, Soviet soldiers are seldom seen in th cities themselves, leaving the security to ineffective local forces. This policy invariably leads to progressive decrease in security, and the Herat campaign was an attempt to relieve resistance pressure on the city and nearby highways

There's no reason to believe that the 1984 campaign was more successful in breaking the strength of the resistance or the support they enjoy from the surviving population than the offensives in 1983

In the first part of 1984, Soviet security in Kabul had been increased, creating the impression, especially for foreign residents and visitors, that the city was firmly under the control of the Soviets and their Kabul regime

In one of the most dramatic changes in the Afghan situation, during this fall the mujahidin have been able to mount attacks, rocket firings, electrical outages, and bombings in Kabul that have resulted in a sharp deterioration in the security situation. This illustrates the mujahidin's skill and persistance in challenging Moscow's forces in their own stronghold

This was demonstrated in the most intensive rocket attack of the war on September 24, and subsequent rocket strikes in late November. There was an earlier bomb blast, you will recall, at the Kabul airport in August.

The dangers of living in Kabul do not come only from mujahidin attack, or from the brutal Soviet reprisals. Deep divisions within the regime have caused a continuing series of revenge killings of officials belonging to rival factions.

The end result is the feeling of a city under seige. As an example of this, the Afghan army has dug an armored vehicle into position at the Intercontinental Hotel. It's no surprise that our small Embassy in Kabul, which we've always maintained, calls itself Fort Apache.

The Soviets have very little to show militarily for the more aggressive posture they've taken during the past year, and, in fact, they may have lost some ground. The preliminary estimates we have place their helicopter and aircraft losses about a third higher than losses in 1983, due in part to the increasing mujahidin use this year of heat seeking surface-to-air missiles. We believe the total Soviet and Afghan aircraft losses for the five year period now are more than 600.

As the Soviets have taken over more of the fighting from the Afghan army, their casualties have correspondingly increased. The estimates, of course, are difficult but we do estimate that these run close to 25,000, with between 8,000 and 9,000 killed, the balance wounded.

Draconian efforts of press gangs and changes in conscription laws have had little effect in rebuilding the Afghan army. Nor has Babrak Karmal been able to increase his political support.

On the other side of the ledger, in spite of their increased effectiveness, the mujahidin are not capable of ousting the superior Soviet military forces from Afghanistan. They have also taken considerable losses, and in many areas which have been depopulated, can no longer count on supplies and shelter from villagers and peasants.

Let me turn briefly to the status of diplomatic efforts.

1984 was not a year of great progress in the search for a negotiated political settlement for Afghanistan, in spite of the best efforts of the U.N. Secretary General's personal representative for Afghanistan, Mr. Diego Cordovez.

After consulting in Tehran, Kabul and Islamabad early in the year, a visit with the Secretary General to Moscow in July in which Afghanistan was discussed, Cordovez led the third round of indirect, or proximity, talks August 24 to the 30 in Geneva. Described later by the U.N. as "technical talks," the most important aspect of them was that the Soviets didn't even send an observer as they had for the previous sessions. We believe this is an indication that they are not really serious about a meaningful negotiation, and they're willing to see the situation continue even though this may not, we think, be to their advantage.

Nevertheless, the U.N. process of indirect negotiations will continue, and a new round has tentatively been called for February. It has our support as a means of achieving a settlement for Afghanistan. This was clearly reiterated by President Reagan when he spoke to the U.N. on September 24.

(Continued on next page)

What is the outlook?

Although the Soviet Union has not been able to accomplish what it set out to do -- to strengthen the communist government in Kabul, gain international acceptance for the Karmal regime, create an effective Afghan army, and eliminate the resistance -- the Soviets show no signs of being ready to work out a solution. This year, they've increased by roughly 10,000 the number of troops deployed in Afghanistan to 115,000. They've modified their tactics and they have been militarily less defensive. The Sovietization of Afghan society and training of Afghan youth in the Soviet Union continues, as well as more attention in the Soviet press to the difficulties Soviet soldiers face in Afghanistan.

But the mujahidin show no sign of weakening. They are better trained, better armed, and more effective than ever. Their morale remains amazingly high. If there was ever a true movement for national liberation, it is in Afghanistan. Soviet control of Afghanistan has not been accepted either by the overwhelming majority of the Afghan people, by the majority of the community of nations, and certainly not by the United States.

A final word about Pakistan. We continue to view Pakistan as the key to our policy toward Afghanistan. The continuation of a reinvigorated security relationship with Pakistan is a vital element of that equation. We believe the Pakistani approach to the United Nations negotiations is serious and forthcoming. Under increasing Soviet pressure, manifested in a series of destructive cross-border attacks in which I believe more than 200 Pakistanis have been killed this year -- they appear neither nervous nor unrealistic in the face of Soviet pressure.

We believe they will remain on course, resistance to pressure and insistence on a peaceful settlement entailing a Soviet withdrawal. We intend to maintain our own policy as well and to continue to support the cause of freedom in Afghanistan.

Now, I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q. What is the condition of the Afghan army, as such? Is it a fighting unit? Is it functioning at all under any semblance of control of Afghans, or totally run by the Soviets?

A Totally under control of the Soviets And there has been quite an erosion in both the numbers of the Afghan army, which at one time numbered roughly 90,000 -- those numbers are down, roughly, to a third of that size at present -- and morale is low, as evidenced by the number of Afghan soldiers who make off with their weapons, a lack of discipline, and a general lack of enthusiasm for this struggle on their part

Q What can you say about the discipline or the morale of Soviet troops in Afghanistan?

A I don't know that I've got anything direct Either Herb Hagerty, Phyllis Oakley, or Peter Burleigh may want to take a crack at that

MR BURLEIGH There are a few limited reports we have of very low morale, but I would say those would have to be put in the context of not knowing too much about it, in general

Q Reports from some quarters suggest that because of techniques such as carpet-bombing and the use of flares to attract SAM Missiles away, the Soviets were losing fewer aircraft, but your figures suggest otherwise Can you explain why the discrepancy?

A I can't explain it As I say, the figures we've got suggest an increase in the number of losses, but I would hasten to add that estimates on these kind of things are always difficult because of the fact that it is difficult for foreign observers to get in, there is hostility toward the press, the Soviets don't advertise their losses, and therefore, these are really estimates, but I can't reconcile the differences

Peter, do you have a comment?

MR BURLEIGH I was going to say too, that one of the explanations for the high-level bombing that the Soviets have engaged in increasingly this year is because when they were using low-level aircraft, they were suffering more losses This is one way of avoiding that situation

Q With the mujahidin political groups as divided as ever in Peshawar, how can there be any hope for Soviets joining negotiations when, in fact, there is no one to negotiate with? It isn't the Pakistanis that are fighting them, it's the mujahidin

A Well, I think the ultimate inducements for the Soviets to negotiate reside, presumably, in a calculation that what they face in the absence of a political settlement is a protracted, bloody, savage, and ultimately inconclusive struggle. And in the event, they are prepared to withdraw their forces. Then, it seems to be a process of self-determination is our, of course, favored means of resolving the question of who governs in Afghanistan.

Our objectives have always been the withdrawal of Soviet forces, the restoration of a non-aligned country, the resort to procedures of self-determination to resolve the question of who governs Afghanistan, and the return of Afghan refugees -- who number now somewhere between two and three million in Pakistan alone, and probably another half million in Iran -- to their homeland with honor and in safety.

Q If I could follow up, if the Soviets' main objective in Afghanistan is to prevent an Islamic republic from disturbing the southern Muslim communities in the Soviet Union, then haven't they reached their objective now? Do they care if they take 25,000 casualties in five years?

A I don't know. It hasn't moved them to alter their policies yet on the basis of what we've seen. One would hope the persistence of resistance would change that calculation. That was one of their objectives. They probably had others. They apparently went in to attempt to save a revolution that had failed.

Q There have been a lot of allegations in Islamabad and Peshawar that aid, including American aid, is not getting to the mujahidin. Can you tell us what the level of American aid is, what kind it is, and whether you're satisfied it's getting to the people that it's intended for?

A You're talking about assistance to the refugee population?

Q No. I'm talking about assistance to the mujahidin.

A Well, all I will say on the subject is that we're doing what we consider appropriate and necessary. What we're doing includes providing a great deal of aid to the refugees in Pakistan. As our total assistance in Pakistan over the last five years exceeds $360 million, the figure for this year will be another $70 million.

I guess that's the extent of my comment.

Q It's a follow up. What prevents the U.S. from publicly supporting the mujahidin in their struggle? And second, do you think the final aim of the Soviet Union is to reach the warm water in the Arabian Gulf?

A As I said, we support the objectives of the resistance in Afghanistan in reestablishing a non-aligned independent state in that country, free of outside coercion and the presence of foreign forces.

With regard to Soviet objectives, I presume they had a number of different objectives. There has been an historic ambition by the Soviets to have access to warm-water ports, as you've suggested. There were political circumstances which prompted concerns apparently in the Soviet minds about the reversal of a revolution in a neighboring country, contrary to their own expectations about historical processes. There were, undoubtedly, fears about a fundamentalist Islamic regime on their border.

It's difficult to sort these out, and you'd ultimately have to ask the Soviets about the nature of their objectives, but I have no doubt that there were several objectives.

Q Mike, two questions. Could you give us any idea of the construction of airfields, or the enlargement of airfields, in Afghanistan and what threat they might pose to the Middle East in general? And, two, what handle can you give us on the effect this is having upon the Islamic population within the Soviet Union?

A Let me comment in general and ask Peter to follow up. The strategic concern about a Soviet presence in Afghanistan obviously includes the anxieties resulting from their access to airports or airfields that were 200-300 miles closer to the Gulf.

Secondly, undoubtedly among their motives was concern about impact of fundamentalist Islamic activities in areas close to their borders. We don't believe those concerns are going to be attenuated by attempting to suppress, in this brutal fashion, what a revolution next door can stimulate. I should expect reactions among their own Islamic population undoubtedly accounts for the media treatment they've given to this conflict.

Let me ask Peter if you want to comment on the

Do you want to stand up, Peter?

(Continued on Following Page.)

MR. BURLEIGH. On that question, that second question, there's also been a change in the relative proportion of Soviet troops who have been posted in Afghanistan from the beginning of the war to now with a greater --

A Fewer Muslims.

MR. BURLEIGH. Yes, fewer Muslims as well.

Q How about the airfields?

MR. BURLEIGH. There are continuing reports that there may be some kind of long-term intention to use some of the bases that exist now and have been there for some time in Southwest Afghanistan but no major construction projects that would imply a logistic capability to use them in the Persian Gulf.

Q Could you discuss the military equipment that the rebels have and what you think they need as opposed to what the Soviets have and are likely to bring in?

A Well, I think, as I indicated in my statement, they have been, we believe, taking more aircraft out -- in part, because of access to heat-seeking missiles. The mujahidin claim that they gave us their equipment -- they captured most of their equipment from Soviet forces -- and that would include such missiles, which obviously are useful -- presumably against helicopters, low-flying aircraft.

Beyond that, these kind of struggles involve principally small arms.

I don't know that I can estimate the requirements and wouldn't attempt to do so. If any of my colleagues would want to, they have a chance here.

Q Let me take a pass at the military aid question again. Leaving aside where the mujahidin fighters are getting the money from, still it's presumably a substantial amount in the last several years, and the reports from the scene and the reports from the folks promoting the Afghan rebels' cause here in town suggest that the money just isn't -- doesn't seem to be getting through. The equipment just doesn't seem to be there in anything near the proportion you would expect, given the large amount of money that presumably has been made available from various sources.

Can you comment again on what -- are they getting the supplies that they presumably should be able to get? And, if not, what seems to be the impediment to those getting to them?

A Well, I'm not going to comment on how or what the mujahidin receive. What I would say is that there is an empirical test of their effectiveness; and that test is that they, with relatively small numbers of forces, against a very large neighbor, putting in the most advanced military equipment, have managed to hold their own and stymie Soviet efforts to pacify the country now for five years. And from the evidence we would think the Soviets, during the past year, have not improved their position. Quite possibly, their position has deteriorated. They seem to be taking more casualties and larger losses of equipment.

So on the empirical test, I don't know that the premise of the question is one I would accept.

Q Mr. Armacost, you said that five years ago you never would have imagined standing here giving some sort of report on how the mujahidin are doing. That implies that you feel that not only can they continue, or not only can they survive now, but they can continue fighting indefinitely. Is that correct?

A From the evidence at hand they seem a very resolute, courageous, effective bunch. Indeed, they've had a lot of experience in their history in fighting foreigners. And that -- the historical roots of their willingness to resist outside pressures -- suggests that they can carry on for a very long time, yes.

Q Since you have chosen to do this briefing ON THE RECORD and you have -- the Department -- has put out a fair amount of printed materials on background in the past five years and so on, you gave a summary and you've discussed aid and so on, I think that a fair question is you've refused twice to discuss U.S. aid to the rebels in Afghanistan. Why will you not discuss them? And does your refusal to comment on it mean that the United States is not giving any aid to the rebels in Afghanistan?

You chose to leave out a fairly major section of this story in your ON THE RECORD comments, and the question is why have you chosen to do that?

A Well, you're speculating I've left a large --

Q I'm not speculating.

A -- portion of it out.

All I'll say -- to repeat -- is that we're doing what we think is appropriate and necessary

Q Then you won't tell us what that is

A Well, I told you we're doing a great deal in the support of Afghan refugees. We're also providing some humanitarian assistance to Afghans. Congress appropriated some monies last summer for medical assistance. Beyond that I won't go

Q When the subject of a negotiated settlement is broached, what seems to be the Soviets' bottom line? Have they shown any flexibility at all over the five years?

A No. They constantly talk about external interference in Afghanistan. Yet they're the ones with 115,000 forces in the country. But, as I said, during the recent indirect talks presided over by the United Nations, they didn't bother to send an observer. So they didn't express, in the most recent round, any particular line at all

Q Sir, in one of your answers, you said: "We recognize the security for some of the bordering country of Afghanistan." Can we consider that you recognize the security which the Soviet Union asked? That's why you don't want to say publicly you support or give the mujahidin any support?

A I said that we believe a settlement can be worked out that takes into account the legitimate interests of all parties concerned. That would include the Soviet Union

MR. HUGHES: I'll take two more.

A Afghanistan existed for some time as a non-aligned country. We think the appropriate resolution would restore that non-alignment. That should not be threatening to the Soviet Union.

MR. HUGHES: I guess two more questions

Q Do you have any figures on the age groups and the numbers of students, children, what have you, that are being taken back to the Soviet Union for indoctrination, training, to their schools?

A Phyllis, do you -- ?

MS. OAKLEY: Yes. They've been carrying on this program for some time and we have said that we think they are between -- anywhere between 10- and 20-thousand Afghans who have been trained in the Soviet Union. But some of these are schoolchildren who are taken for two weeks of summer camp and others are sent for long periods of education.

But obviously as the Soviets are frustrated in their other goals in Afghanistan, they have turned increasingly to training younger and younger groups of Afghan youth in the Soviet Union for longer periods of time.

Q What age range are we talking about?

A Well, there was a recent report in the paper I think where they were talking about children of 7 or 8 being taken for ten years. But all of these things vary a great deal according to the program, so I think it's hard to generalize.

MR. HUGHES: The last question.

Q On the number of aircraft that the Soviets have been losing, two questions -- because you've given us two figures.

One. In the past year there's been an increase of about a third in their losses -- and, secondly, that the overall figure for five years is over 600.

Would you have a year-by-year comparison for at least the past two years, first -- and, secondly, has there been any change in the tempo, so to speak, of their losses over this past year as they have adopted some of these tactics to avoid heat-seeking missiles?

A I have not seen such a statistic.

MS. OAKLEY: We don't really have a breakdown on that from year to year.

Q You don't? Because that kind of leaves that great big 600 number floating out there. And how does one make a comparison of a one-third increase without having a year-to-year number?

A These are, at best, estimates from the intelligence community; but I said that there was a strong caveat in these figures because we are guessing. We don't have observers on the ground and we're not able to follow this -- nor are you all.

We regret to say this is one we would wish you were able to cover more extensively on a day by day basis.

Peter?

MR BURLEIGH I was just going to say essentially that -- that their are estimates made every year It's the same question about casualties and deaths as well We find information from any source we can and then make an overall estimate and judgment for the year It has gone up

Q Thank you

(The ON THE RECORD briefing concluded at 3 33 p m)

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release December 21, 1984

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF
PRIME MINISTER MARGARET THATCHER

December 21, 1984

The Briefing Room

10:06 A.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On Mrs. Thatcher's visit -- she arrives late tonight, flying in from Hong Kong.

Q Do you have a time, sir?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, just late this evening. She'll be having breakfast with the Vice President and then going to Camp David for meetings with the President. Lunch at Camp David, returning to Andrews around, I guess, 2:15 p.m. or so in the afternoon. A press conference at Andrews, and departure for London.

Q Where's the meeting with -- or the breakfast with the Vice President? Here?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Here in Washington. And she will be going -- I assume it's at the Vice President's residence.

MR. SIMS: At his residence.

Q At the residence? Okay.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Admiral's House. And she'll be going directly from breakfast to Camp David, Camp David to Andrews, Andrews to London. That's the visit. Very quick; very important, though, part of a series of contacts which we've had with our key allies.

We had Chancellor Kohl here on the 30th of November. We expect to have the Prime Minister of Japan -- or the President will be meeting with the Prime Minister of Japan on the West Coast on the 2nd of January. We had the visit by the Secretary of State to Europe for the NATO Ministerial. We expect the President -- or Prime Minister of Belgium here on the 14th of January. All part of a very intensive series of consultations ensuring that we and our allies are on the same wavelength as the Secretary prepares for his meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko in January in Geneva.

We had a very successful session in Brussels -- very pleased with the degree of coherence, cohesion in the Alliance -- the unified approach. Rich Burt was just in Brussels yesterday for another meeting of the special consultative group in NATO. And I think there, too, we find a very good meeting of minds between the NATO allies, among the NATO allies, on all these issues.

So I think basically the issues which will come up tomorrow between the President and Mrs. Thatcher will, of course, include East-West relations, in their broadest sense. And, doubtless, Mrs. Thatcher will want to inform the President of her impressions of the situation in the Far East after her visits to Beijing and Hong Kong; her discussions with the senior Chinese leaders -- obviously the President will be very interested in hearing from her on that.

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We do have a few bilateral issues which could be discussed, but I wouldn't expect them to be of any major importance in the meeting tomorrow, which will be fairly brief.

Q What might they be?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we have discussions on trade issues, these sorts of things, which always come up, but I doubt seriously that they will come up between the President and Mrs. Thatcher. We've had some discussions with the British on the civil aviation issue in the past month or so, but also that, too, I would not expect to be an issue for tomorrow.

Q What about the Gorbachev meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I beg your pardon?

Q -- the Russian meeting in London?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I would expect that Mrs. Thatcher would want to brief the President on her discussions with Mr. Gorbachev, her impressions of him, her impressions of the Soviet position as a result of her talks with him on Sunday and Monday. Other members of her government also had discussions with Mr. Gorbachev and that, obviously, would be one of the points which we would expect her to make.

Q You made some reference to the allies and the U.S. being on the same wavelength, and you made some reference to Kohl, and, of course, Mrs. Thatcher's coming here -- the Star Wars, or the Strategic Defense Initiative, is a major item for Geneva. And you watch Europe -- not only Britain -- you watch all of Europe, or at least a good part of it. Do the Germans and the French, specifically, and also the British agree with the U.S. in -- with the administration's intentions to proceed with the Strategic Defense Initiative, or do they have some reservations about it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would say that at the time of the original announcement, or the speech by the President in March, 1983, there were obviously some reservations expressed in Europe.

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But as a result of a very intensive set of consultations during the last year -- 18 months almost by now -- I think Europeans have come to see that the program which the United States is embarked upon, the research program -- I stress research -- is both necessary and desirable in light of the very extensive program which the Soviet Union has been undertaking for several years.

The Soviet Union very clearly believes in the significance and the importance of defensive systems, given the fact that -- or is demonstrated by the fact that the Soviet Union maintains its own ABM system around Moscow and is engaging in a very extensive research and development program of its own using very many -- in fact, the same basic technologies which the President's program envisages -- the research.

Q So, would you say there's no disagreement among these four major allies --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I --

Q -- so far as how the United States should deal with Star Wars in Geneva or reasonably enough for their tactical differences among them about how willing we should be to trade it on?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that the Europeans feel that the research program which the President has announced is, as I say, necessary and desirable. They have expressed concerns about the possibility of a major race -- weapons race -- in space. But that is, indeed, something which -- concern which we share. And I don't think that there's any essential disagreement at this stage between us and our allies on this point.

Now, we'll wait to see what Mrs. Thatcher has to say as a result of her conversations with Mr. Gorbachev, but I would not personally expect Mrs. Thatcher to take a different position from the one which she's taken to date.

Q In which way, sir, do you share the concerns of the Europeans about the arms race in space?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're interested in maintaining deterrence at the lowest possible level of weapons on both sides. And the President believes, and I think the European allies believe, and I think also the Soviet Union believes that defensive systems can play a part in maintaining stable deterrence.

Q How do you explain Mrs. Thatcher's remarks that caused some concern here earlier this week following her meeting with the Soviet visitor expressing real concern about a space weapons race and her intention -- her clear intention -- to raise that very real concern with the President when she visits --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think if you look back over the record that Mrs. Thatcher made no such statements. There were some statements attributed to British officials at the time of the conversations with Mr. Gorbachev which were interpreted by some here in the media as indicating that the British have even agreed with the Soviet interpretation. But Mrs. Thatcher made no such statements, nor would we expect her to make them when she's here.

Q So, you say those British officials were either misinformed or were misunderstood?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think they were misunderstood or misinterpreted. I wouldn't want to say they were misinformed. But there were no statements which we saw attributed to Mrs. Thatcher which were consistent with the interpretation which you put on it; that is to say that Mrs. Thatcher's going to come here and urge that the President abandon SDI.

Q No, that's not -- that's -- I don't believe that was the impression that --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well --

Q -- was given. The impression was that there was concern raised about a space weapons race, as you stated, and that concern was going to be shared. She's got two speeches, if I'm not mistaken, public speeches in which that concern was mentioned and so does Kohl. He's been public --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, as far as the statements which Mrs. Thatcher made and which her government officials made following the talks with Mr. Gorbachev, I don't think there was any basis for grave concern in Washington. I think it was basically an exaggeration in the press.

Q Do you think Mrs. Thatcher got a bit carried away in saying that she thought that Mr. Gorbachev was a fellow that she could do a lot of business with?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't think Mrs. Thatcher is prone to being carried away. (Laughter.) I think she's a very levelheaded lady. And, indeed, the fact that you say that somebody from whatever government -- the Soviet government or any other government -- is someone with whom you can do business doesn't mean that in doing business you're going to give everything away to him or sell out to him.

So, if Mr. Gorbachev is someone with whom you can do business, that is all to the good. I think the assumption on which Secretary Shultz is going to Geneva in January is that the entire Soviet leadership, we hope, is one with which we can do business -- obviously without any assumptions on giving away the store.

Q Will Mr. Ustinov's death affect these talks in any way that you can determine -- the Geneva talks? What is the assessment of that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I had heard rumors of Mr. Ustinov's death, but I wasn't sure that that had been confirmed. Has it now been confirmed?

Q Not officially.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not officially.

Q It appears to be --

Q Have you heard anything, sir?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Mr. Ustinov has been absent from public view as I recall since sometime around the 20th of October. He did not meet with the Indian Defense Minister, was not present for the November 7 events and has not been seen in public, although statements have been made -- issued in his name. He's been shown as signing obituaries carried in the newspaper of other senior Soviet military figures who've also died -- (laughter) -- if, indeed, he has -- (laughter) -- if, indeed, he has, which I'm not sure of,

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so I wouldn't want to speculate on what impact Marshal Ustinov's departure -- if, in fact, he's departed -- would have on the discussions.

Q The reports were that this has been exaggerated.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Exaggerated or premature, in any case.

Q Do you expect Mrs. Thatcher to raise a concern about the federal budget deficit with President Reagan, and its effect on the Western --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would not expect that economic issues would bulk overlarge in the discussion. She could, indeed, get a briefing from the President on his plans to reduce the federal budget deficit. I think she might be interested in that. The British economy, I think, and Mrs. Thatcher might be one of the first to recognize this, has benefited very substantially from the economic recovery in the United States. British exports to the United States this year are at the highest level ever and I think, overall, the British economy has benefited from things such as the high level of the dollar and the high level for imports, the demand for imports in the United States.

I don't think that Mrs. Thatcher is going to come here complaining too much about the economic situation in the United States. Yes?

Q Is she going to get a point-by-point rundown? Is the President going to give Mrs. Thatcher a point-by-point rundown of positions that are going to be taken, at least on the broad issues, at Geneva, and will there -- in the expanded meeting, is that what's going to be discussed? I mean, what are the specifics of this meeting, why --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I really don't want to speculate on what the President's going to say to Mrs. Thatcher tomorrow. I don't think that's appropriate for me to do. I think the purpose of the meeting is clearly one of taking stock of the situation at this particular point, where we are vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in our preparations, what the Prime Minister's impressions of the situation are, particularly after her meetings in London earlier -- her checkers earlier this week with Mr. Gorbachev.

I think it's also, as I mentioned earlier, of interest to the President to hear Mrs. Thatcher's impressions of her trip to the People's Republic of China.

Q Do you know if he has any --

Q -- with regard to what the President might say to her, let me try, again, is there -- is it planned to share with Mrs. Thatcher some of the U.S. negotiating positions for Geneva?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would suspect that the President would discuss with Mrs. Thatcher his hopes, his objectives for the meeting, yes. That's one of the purposes of the meeting, yes.

Q Who will be meeting in the larger meeting at lunch?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not exactly sure who Mrs. Thatcher will have with her, but with the President there will be Mr. McFarlane, Secretary Shultz, Ambassador Price, Mr. Burt, and Mr. Sommer.

Q: Same lunch, same people.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Same people for lunch.

Q No Weinberger or Kirkpatrick, I take it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Well, do you expect any discussion on the Irish question? Are we involved, do we have any interest any more?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we're interested. (Laughter.) I would not anticipate that that would be a major issue in the discussions.

Q Since we are ON BACKGROUND here, and since that always makes such a big difference for these briefings -- (laughter) -- you said that the purpose of this meeting and others is to be sure that we're on the same wavelength. Can you tell us, where might some of the areas be where we're not on the same wavelength right now, some places in advance of these meetings where it's felt that it's necessary to have a chat?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it's incredible to conceive that we wouldn't be on the same wavelength. I think at this point we do have a very good consensus in the Western alliance about the approach to take in these negotiations. Now I wouldn't want to suggest that at all times and as this process unfolds we are going to agree 100 percent with our allies.

Obviously, there will be nuances of difference here but, at this point, given the fact that we are at a very beginning stage in the process, I think we are on the same wavelength, and it's something which we noted with considerable satisfaction during the NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels last week.

Yes?

Q Aside from what Mrs. Thatcher may or may not have said, there is a body of thought amongst strategic thinkers in Europe that SDI would leave them more vulnerable, that we would not sacrifice our cities once we're under a safe defensive umbrella and, also, that technologically it may be easier to hit long-trajectory missiles -- then we think we can defend ourselves, but short-trajectory INF-type missiles that would hit London or Paris we might not be able to intercept, so that a war as a result of SDI might be likely to occur more in Europe and less on this side of the Atlantic. What do you say to them when they raise those concerns at lower levels than the Prime Minister or other top leaders?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, these concerns have been discussed in the press. To the best of my knowledge, they haven't been highlighted in the consultations with the allies. The points which you raise, given the nature of the SDI program, are so highly theoretical and hypothetical, that it's really very difficult to deal with them in other than just a very hypothetical discussion.

So I think the basic point is that the technologies which are involved in SDI are technologies which deserve examination and that the concept of SDI is, if it is, in fact, implemented, or some parts of it are implemented, is the strengthening of deterrence. And I think this is something which is widely accepted in Europe as well as in the United States.

There was some misunderstanding at the beginning, immediately after the President announced the program, that somehow this represented a fundamental shift in U.S. policy. But, in fact, now I think that people understand that it does not represent a fundamental shift; it represents a continuation of the effort to maintain an effective deterrence in this decade and beyond.

Q But deterrence for us or deterrence for --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Deterrence for everybody. We've made quite clear that there is no divisibility of deterrence as far as the United States and Europe is concerned, and the allies accept this and recognize that this is a fundament of our whole approach to the issue.

Q There's a lot of talk of trade-offs and, you know, the talk is rather broad, even including SDI. What about the British nuclear force? Is there anything to discuss about that? Is there any possibility that could wind up on the table, or does the United States and the United Kingdom remain determined that the British nuclear weapons aren't negotiable?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The position is that the British, independent British strategic nuclear deterrent is not a subject for negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union nor, for that matter, is the French deterrent, which is in the same category. However, both Prime Minister Thatcher and President Mitterrand have stated that in the event of substantial deep cuts in the strategic nuclear deterrents of the other countries, or the United States and the Soviet Union, that Britain and France would be prepared to consider equivalent or whatever deep cuts in their own nuclear deterrents.

So I think this is the position of the British Government, the position taken by Mrs. Thatcher, a position which we support.

Q Is there any thought being given either by the United States, by the allies, or by the Soviets that if these talks get off on a good start, that the Western nations would somehow be involved, you know, an East-West large set of arms negotiations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm unaware of any thinking on the allied side along those lines. You'd have to ask the Soviets whether they're thinking about it, but --

Q But do you have any indication --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I've had no indication of that, but I wouldn't want to speak for the Soviet Union in terms of what they're thinking of, but as far as we're concerned, no, no, there has been no --

Q But we go to the table even though the French and British forces, and all the rest, are implicitly involved. We're speaking only for ourselves --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Wait, wait, wait. What now?

Q When we go -- let's assume the United States --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Now the British and French forces are not implicitly involved in the discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union. I don't want to give you that impression. The British Prime Minister and the French President have stated that in the event of an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union involving deep cuts in the strategic nuclear deterrent forces, that they would be prepared to consider cuts in their own, but the British and French forces are neither explicitly nor implicitly involved in these discussions.

Now as far as the allied participation is concerned, we have an extensive set of consultative arrangements in place. Rick Burt was just in Brussels for another meeting of the SCG which deals with INF. We have other consultative mechanisms to handle other aspects of the arms control picture, and these consultative mechanisms will be used very intensively, as they have been used to

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date.

Q Will these consultative mechanisms be used during the talks or after?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, I think it's important to underline that. It's not -- when he's talking about an eventual agreement, it's not in relation to January 7 in Geneva. I mean --

Q Well, what I'm asking is, if things get successful down the road, if it's still the U.S. and Soviet Union just bargaining for themselves, is that the thinking, that as these talks progress --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's no consideration -- no consideration being given to widening the talks, as far as we're concerned, and I can't speak for the Soviets but I can't imagine they would want to do it, either.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 10:30 A.M.EST

FILE CO

ON-THE-RECORD BRIEFING
ON
EMERGENCY SITUATION IN EASTERN SUDAN
BY
M. PETER McPHERSON, AID ADMINISTRATOR
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 27, 1984, 2:07 P. M.

MR. BRIAN CARLSON: Good afternoon. This briefing is ON THE RECORD and for cameras, and this briefing is on the U.S. Government response to the emergency situation in the Eastern Sudan caused by the large influx of Ethiopians from Eritrea and Tigre Provinces.

The briefers are the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, Peter McPherson; the Director of the Bureau for Refugee Programs, Jim Purcell; Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Princeton Lyman; and the Director of the Refugee Programs Office of Emergency Operations, Tex Harris, and I've got them almost in that order.

Mr. McPherson will begin.

MR. McPHERSON: Thank you. I would like to today give a very brief overview of where we are in our drought relief efforts. Then I'm going to introduce another person that will talk about what we've done for this situation of refugees streaming across the Ethiopia border into Sudan. And, lastly, we have a man who just a few days ago was actually in that location and was a key part of putting together the location where refugees have gone in Sudan, and was a key part of putting this whole thing together.

First of all, an update of what I think many of you know. We have provided some $269 million worth of resources, largely food, but additional resources as well, to drought-stricken Africa for this situation in the last three months, and this fiscal year is some $269 million. Of that, $121.5 million is for Ethiopia -- a massive response.

This situation has required continual adjustment practically day by day. As some of you remember, a few days ago how on high seas we redirected a ship that was on its way to India with some food. We redirected it to Ethiopia. A constant adjustment process has been required.

Last weekend we had another adjustment process. We got an appeal from the UNHCR, U.N. High Commissioner on Refugees, asking for us to provide certain assistance to the refugees that had come across -- from Eritrea and Tigre in the northern part of Ethiopia -- that border, thousands a day. We got that appeal on Thursday night. I reviewed the situation with the President on Friday morning, was directed to immediately take action, and by Saturday we had planes in the air from Germany, stopping in Italy to pick up some supplies, and they were actually there by Sunday morning. Thursday night an appeal, Friday a Presidential meeting, Saturday planes in the air, and by Sunday morning planes arriving in Sudan. Not just in Sudan, but in the town in Sudan where the refugees were in general located.

So we've been able to continually adjust and rapidly respond, and we expect, frankly, that there's going to be a whole series of adjustments in the weeks and months ahead like this.

The situation on the ground in Sudan where our airlift arrived is going really quite nicely. There are problems, of course, but we do know that children are being vaccinated. We had a measles epidemic that we were concerned about. We do know that blankets and sheeting for tents have arrived and are in use to provide shelter for people.

With that as background, let me next introduce Jim Purcell who is the Director of the Bureau for Refugee Programs and who has been very directly and intimately involved with this effort. Jim?

MR. JIM PURCELL: I'd like to make a few remarks about the worsening situation in Sudan and how we have dealt with it. Historically, as you know, Sudan, like a number of other African countries, has maintained an open-door policy for those fleeing civil strife and natural disasters from neighboring countries.

As of this past September, there were about 450,000 Ethiopians, 200,000 Ugandans, and several thousand Chadians who had refuge in the Sudan. However, the catastrophic combination of severe drought and civil war has, in the last few months, brought an additional 200,000 new arrivals from both Ethiopia and Chad into the Sudan, which, as you know, is itself suffering from drought and a weakened economy. The influx has been most acute in the eastern part of Sudan, where over 100,000 Ethiopians have arrived since early September.

Just a couple of months ago, we went to New York to a pledging conference for the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. At that time they estimated their 1985 program for Africa to be somewhere in the range of $130 million. The U.S. pledged at that meeting $39.8 million, or about 30%. That was a very high contribution for this early point in the year, but we made that, knowing that the severe impact of drought was going to have a big effect on the refugee care and maintenance program in that country.

However, because of the influx of persons over the last two to three months, the situation has worsened. As Mr. McPherson has indicated, the U.N. High Commissioner has found it necessary to issue a special augmented appeal for the Horn of Africa. This appeal was for an additional $24.8 million.

About 11.8 of that was issued to us this past Thursday in the terms of emergency supplies that were necessary. We did respond in the speed with which Mr. McPherson indicated. The first flight arrived in Kassala on Sunday, December 23, which included eight large portable water tanks, approximately 3200 blankets, and six hospital tents.

A second flight arrived in Khartoum on Christmas day. It carried seventeen 3,000-gallon water tanks, 35 cartons of 5-gallon water jugs, 150 rolls of waterproof plastic sheeting, and 607 bales and boxes of blankets.

On Christmas eve, the first delivery was made of measles vaccines to combat an outbreak of that disease in the reception centers along the borders. These vaccines were donated by the pharmaceutical firm of Merck, Sharpe and Dohme who has a cooperative arrangement with the private voluntary organization, Save the Children.

We delivered 24,000 units which should innoculate up to 100,000 persons. We stand ready to provide additional vaccines if they are required.

We are attempting to stay in constant touch with the UNHCR, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, in Geneva who has the key coordinating responsibilities for refugees in the Sudan. We'll provide additional materials or supplies as they are needed.

The next flight that we plan will arrive in Sudan on this coming Sunday, which will have 22 metric tons of life-sustaining non-fat dried milk for vulnerable group feeding programs in the camps.

I'd like now to introduce Tex Harris who is the Director of the Office of Emergency Operations in the Bureau for Refugee Programs who has just returned from the Sudan.

MR. F.A. (Tex) HARRIS: Thanks, Peter, Jim. My office has the very difficult task of following crisis situations around the world. We have been looking at the situation in northern Ethiopia for two and a half years, following the movement of people displaced inside that country, and recently following the beginning of a large-scale movement across the border into Sudan.

I would like to lay out five brief areas which we have used as categories in terms of our analysis, and then step back and see which ones you all are interested in pursuing.

The first area that we followed is the human political food and health dynamics inside Tigre and Eritrea Provinces, these areas in northern Ethiopia which have been among the hardest hit by the recent drought, and are also areas of longstanding fighting between secessionist groups in both Eritrea and Tigre.

The second area that we have followed is the influx of large groups of Eritreans and Tigreans out of northern Ethiopia into Sudan.

The third area that we have tracked is the response of the Commissioner of Refugees in Sudan and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees as they have to deal with the effects of drought on a large number -- 120,000 -- resettled refugees in agricultural settlements here (indicating map) who were on their way to self-sustaining agricultural production who, because of the drought, are now back to 100% dependence on the United Nations for their daily food.

The other area, the fourth area that we're following, is the 390,000 spontaneous settled refugees who have come across in the last ten years from Ethiopia and have settled in the towns in Eastern Sudan who do have a claim -- although they are integrated into the Sudanese society -- if their farms or if their labor opportunities are so diminished, would have an opportunity to turn to the United Nations High Commissioner and the Sudanese Commissioner for Refugees and ask for food assistance in order to maintain their families.

The last thing that we've looked at, although in a very limited way, is the context in Sudan which itself is in the throes of a very significant drought and a very significant economic problem, as Jim Purcell mentioned.

Those are the areas that we've looked at, and I think we and Princeton Lyman will be happy to take any questions that you all might have.

MR. McPHERSON: Tex, why don't you give a flavor of where you went -- where you just came back from, because I think that people need a sense of that geographically --

MR. HARRIS: Sure.

MR. McPHERSON: That camp just across from the border.

MR. HARRIS: In the first half of December I made an official assessment visit to the Eastern Sudan and visited two of the major concentrations of refugees which are outside of the town of Kassala here (indicating map).

There are two settlements: One is Wad Sherifie, which is about a half an hour slightly northwest of Kassala, where today there are 33,000 Eritrean refugees. In August there were 4,500 refugees in that camp.

When I arrived, three days before, because of the water facilities which consisted of two tube wells, which have been designed to provide water for four or five thousand people, had been so heavily used that the structure collapsed, and there was no water in Wad Sherifie.

The demands had grown so quickly in terms of food that the Sudanese Commissioner for Refugee's People were forced to stop registering new arrivals and were forced not to put people on rations. So you had hundreds of families. When I was on the outskirts of the camp, scores of people came up and asked for our help in terms of getting registered in the camp so that they could receive rations for their families.

In Wad Sherifie, when I was there, there was an outbreak of measles which impacted very heavily on the children, especially those kids who are malnourished. The mortality, as you know, for children who are in good health from measles is very low, but when children are in the condition that they are of having come across this long 30 or 40-day trek, or even the 10-day trek that the Eritreans take, they are in extremely weakened condition and subject to very dire consequences from an outbreak of measles.

In the other camp which is Tekl el Baab which now houses 34,000 Tigrean refugees, it is not a camp; it's really a site. I've described it as kind of a "John Wayne mesa" sitting in the desert. As you look out from Kassala, you see a large mountain to the east towards the Ethiopian border, and strung along the base of this mesa are thousands and thousands of arrivers from Tigre.

There is a pipeline which is run by the Relief Society of Tigre, which begins in Sheri Province or Sheri District of Tigre, which moves thousands of people. The estimates from travelers who have been in the area is that there are approximately 50,000 persons in the pipeline at any one time moving towards Kassala, the camp at Tekl el Baab, or a southern pipeline which is now growing larger since the bombing took place in Shelalo a few weeks ago -- more people are coming out through the southern route to a camp called Sefawa. Sefawa now has 26,000 people, with 5,000 people massed at the border. Tekl el Baab, as I mentioned before, has 34,000 people, and there are 7,000 people which are congregated just across the border waiting their turn to come into the camp.

The UNHCR has begun to resettle people from these areas, and in the last week has moved 9,000 people 300 kilometers to a place called Elfaw, which is here near a large irrigation scheme, which the Government of Sudan has, which is a very ideal site.

MR. McPHERSON: What you've got essentially is in the last few days -- weeks, I suppose -- but very recently, you've got thousands of people a day coming across that border, creating a crisis situation, to which the United States responded. That's in brief what we had, and I think Tex has given you something of the flavor of that crisis emergency situation that has sprung upon us.

Are there questions? With us is Princeton Lyman, who I think many of you know, who's the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa.

-- MORE --

Q Can we talk about putting stuff into Tigre and Eritrea itself? I understand that the U.S. Government has approved 50,000 tons also to be moved into Tigre and Eritrea. The problem will remain on how to get it in there because of the lack of trucks, and you are being asked to supply trucks. What's happening on that?

MR. McPHERSON: When the Director of the Relief Commission for Ethiopia was here several weeks ago, part of that agreement, that public statement that was made by he and I here in this room, was that the Ethiopia Government commitment to deliver food, or to allow food to be delivered, to any part of the country totally dependent upon the need of the people.

Accordingly, we have, of course, tracked that situation carefully. We, however, have not made any public comment about the delivery of food into so-called contested areas.

Q You're talking about areas in which it cannot be trucked in from Addis Ababa, are we not? We're talking about the pipeline from Port Sudan up through Sudan and into the road to --

MR. McPHERSON: You've got two situations, I suppose One, a feeding within Ethiopia -- in Tigre, Eritrea, and so forth. Not all those provinces but areas that are sometimes referred to as contested areas, contested by the government and in various other groups.

We have this commitment from the Government of Ethiopia. There's been, as you know, some discussion about what the U.S. Government is doing in those areas, but we, as a government, have specifically refrained from commenting upon our feeding activities in those areas.

The second part of all this is the feeding on the Sudan side of the border. Food comes into the Sudan side of the border generally from Port Sudan up to the north and is trucked down to the Sudan side of the border.

Q You have a flight scheduled on Sunday. What is the duration of this relief program, this emergency program you're speaking of? How many flights, how many days a week?

MR. McPHERSON: We expect to have another flight here shortly, a third flight, and there no doubt may be more. But, essentially, we view this airlift as a short-term measure and expect to be able to deal with the problem on a longer term fashion, in the next few week fashion by way of a more normal method of ground transportation.

Q It's not expected on this basis to continue for several weeks more?

MR. McPHERSON: No. There will be more flights -- or at least one more flight -- by this is essentially an emergency; a very short-term effort.

Q All these aircraft are based in Germany? What other bases are there?

MR. McPHERSON: The U.S. military craft flew out of Germany, picked up supplies in Italy. Another flight, which was a chartered flight -- the second one -- came out of Baltimore. It was a large cargo aircraft that flew into Khartoum, the capital of Sudan and then by overland truck those supplies were carried in about an 8-hour drive into Kassala itself for distribution.

Q And the third flight will originate where?

MR. McPHERSON: Tex, you perhaps may wish to respond to that.

MR. HARRIS: The third flight responding to an emergency request for dry skimmed milk will originate in Europe. We had hoped to put 30 metric tons of dry skimmed milk on the plane on Saturday for delivery for first flight on Sunday morning. However, the airport manager in Kassala informed us today that he had established a 50,000 pound limit because he's concerned about very heavy planes landing and destroying the runway. If we lose the runway in Kassala, then we lose a major avenue of bringing things in. So in respect of that directive, we've cut back and the plane will contain only dry skimmed milk; 22 metric tons of dry skimmed milk which will be used to start a feeding program.

As you know, when children was extremely malnourished, it is impossible for them to digest and to handle the regular kind of cereal or bread which is the normal part of the diet. So with the food which we're providing, the Commissioner of Refugees, the UNHCR, and the private volunteer organizations working with them will be able to make up milk preparations for feeding to these children.

Q What is its destination? Where will it land?

MR. HARRIS: It'll land in Kassala.

MR. McPHERSON: We've been extremely lucky to have --

the place is certainly is a long way from other places; an airport which we can use. Kassala is really the center of much of the camp locations that we're trying to locate, so we have been able to fly right, really, to the area.

Some of you know, in Ethiopia, frankly, when we've using planes flying out of the ports in Ethiopia, there's been a limit to where we could go because there hasn't been all the airport facilities that we wanted to reach.

Q Can you confirm very recent reports that the Ethiopian aircraft have bombed fleeing refugees? I understand Mr. Harris made an allusion to a bombing, to a recent bombing. Was it a bombing of refugees by the Ethiopian army?

MR. McPHERSON: Princeton, do you have --

MR. LYMAN: There was evidence and reports by people who were in that movement of people that a bombing took place, of people moving from Ethiopia to Sudan.

What is not clear is whether the Ethiopian Government thought that this was a movement of armed cessationists and was bombing for that reason. It's very clear, and it remains unclear in that situation.

Q Do you know how many people have been killed or injured?

MR. LYMAN: Eighteen killed and 53 wounded.

Q Can you give us the date, the precise date of the bombing?

MR. LYMAN: I'll have to get that. I don't have it; I'm sorry.

Q The figure of 50,000 people in the pipeline from Tigre providence into Sudan was mentioned at one time. Do we know how long this pipeline is going to last?

MR. McPHERSON: We really don't. What we know is that people are hungry and people because they're hungry are moving

Q Do we expect all the three million people that are a risk in Tigre to move into Sudan?

MR. McPHERSON: I don't think we expect all the three million people, but we --

Q How are you going to stop them?

A MR. McPHERSON: We're not in the business of stopping them, of course. We really don't know how many will move.

One of the problems in Ethiopia, in the effort there, has been to reach people who were in these far flung, isolated communities with the only method of communication to them was essentially by foot in many cases. So we just don't have a good understanding of how many people might move.

What we do know is that there are thousands of people on the move, and there are thousands of people crossing the border daily. It is to that that, the human wave, that we responded with this emergency effort.

Q Do you have any indication that the people are being moved for political reasons by the rebel groups?

MR. McPHERSON: I think the people are individually moving because they're hungry.

Q And they're not being moved out to get away from the resettlers of the Ethiopian Government?

A MR. McPHERSON: I'm really not in a position to speculate on what other motives there may be. But I do know that the people are coming at some substantial physical peril since they're going in areas often without much water, without much food. They're going at this physical peril to get food, and it's clear they're very hungry people.

Q Can I ask Mr. Purcell a question about his statement, to pin down some of these numbers?

You said over 200,000 new arrivals into Sudan over the past few months from Ethiopian and Chad. Later on, you said 100,000 Ethiopians arriving in Eastern Sudan since early September. That suggests that another 100,000 came in from Chad.

MR. PURCELL: There are approximately 100,000 Chadians who have arrived in the Western part of Sudan over the past few months; that is correct.

Q When you talk about "past few months," you're talking about since early September?

MR. PURCELL: Since early September.

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Q So we have 100,000 Chadians in Western Sudan, 100,000 Ethiopians in Eastern Sudan?

MR. PURCELL: That's approximately correct.

Q What are U.S. aid levels for the past three months? The figure that was mentioned as $121.5 million in Ethiopia. What about Sudan or is that figure included in there?

MR. McPHERSON: That figure is included in there. We passed out a sheet, have we not, that shows by country what we have done? The Sudan figure is almost $19 million worth of food. That does not include this emergency effort which has, so far, cost about $500,000.

In the East, you've got people from Ethiopia; in the West, you've got people from Chad. To understand Africa, it's important to recognize is that there's a tremendous amount of refugees. Across the border there is these various conflicts. Many countries have, on a several different borders -- on a couple different borders, at least -- refugees from one place to the other. So Sudan, in that sense, is not atypical.

Q So your emergency effort is concentrated on Ethiopians in Eastern Sudan; is that correct?

MR. McPHERSON: The flight. George, the immediate flight is concentrated there; the airlift. But, in fact, there is a substantial refugee effort on the Western side to help those people come across from Chad. And, of course, we have an overall emergency effort, drought-feeding effort for Chad for the Sudanese themselves.

MR. PURCELL: I might mention, I described the UNHCR issuing a special appeal of $24.8 million. Of that amount, approximately $14.5 million would go for Eastern Sudan and somewhat over $3 million for the Western part of Sudan. So the UNHCR is the principal organization, and it's attempting to address both East and West in its appeal to the donor governments.

Q And the rest?

MR. PURCELL: The rest would go to Ethiopia to cover those who had participated in the volunteer program of approximately $2.3 million and approximately $3 million to the Central African Republic to fund border survival assistance, and to move refugees now on the border to more secure inland sites. But the UNHCR has augmented its appeal to those areas that are most hard hit by the refugee drought situation.

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MR. LYMAN: Because I know it is getting a bit confusing, you have a drought situation in Sudan affecting Sudanese, and it's particularly severe in Western Sudan where the Chadian refugees are coming in. So you, in effect, have two programs going on in Western Sudan from abroad.

The drought relief for Sudan, which is heavily focused on Western Sudan. I think some 60,000 metric tons of food from the United States is directed there. Then, you have Chadian people coming in in that same area. The Sudanese have been extremely sensitive to making sure that food gets to everybody who is hungry in that area -- Sudanese and Chadian refugees -- and we are working with UNHCR to make sure that the same thing happens so that our different bureaucratic lines don't affect people on the ground.

Q Mr. McPherson, could you describe the interaction between your effort and the Sudanese Government. What are they providing in terms of over-and-above manpower?

MR. McPHERSON: The effort, in connection with these refugees, is largely an international effort. The Sudanese Government, of course, has its hands very much full with a tremendous drought problem of its own people.

The Sudanese Government is clearly allowing these people who are Sudan from Ethiopia to be there, to stay there.

Q In an earlier briefing you commented on the Ethiopian Government program of resettling people to the South. What is the status of that program, and do you have anything to say on it today?

A That program is continuing. We continue to believe that resettlement of refugees from the north to the south is a diversion of resources which would be better spent on people directly. Trucks being used to move people from the north to the south are trucks that could be used to bring food, blankets, tents and so forth, and we continue to urge the Ethiopian Government to use those trucks in that fashion.

There is indication, by the way, that the trucks that are being used to put people from the north to the south, many of them may be Soviet vehicles, and the Soviet contribution of trucks to the drought in Africa -- you remember, that's sometimes quoted in the newspaper -- it appears -- we're not given the full information on this daily, you note -- but it appears that the trucks have "contributed to this drought" have, in fact, simply been used to move people from one part of the country to the other.

We urged the Russians and others to use those trucks for direct route purposes.

Q Will it possible through backdoor food deliveries or aid from other countries to get enough food into Tigre and Eritrea to stop the flow of refugees?

MR. McPHERSON: Clearly, the people in Tigre and Eritrea need food, and some food is being provided.

As I mentioned earlier, we really have not publicly commented on that because we thought that was the most productive way to respond to this whole effort, not to talk about publicly.

I would say, however, that we anticipate that refugees will continue to go across the border for at least the immediate future.

Q Thank you.

MR. McPHERSON: Thank you very much.

(The briefing concluded at 2:40 p.m.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Palm Springs, California)

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
A SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF
PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE
OF JAPAN

December 31, 1984

San Jacinto North Room
Gene Autry Hotel
Palm Springs, California

12:17 P.M. PST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me start with some opening remarks, and then I'll be glad to take questions.

President Reagan's meeting with Prime Minister Nakasone on January 2nd marks their fifth meeting in the past two years. The previous ones were on January '83 in Washington, on May '83 in Washington and Williamsburg, November '83 in Tokyo and June of this year in London.

During the past two years, our two countries have made significant progress toward fulfilling our vision of a new international partnership between the United States and Japan.

Japan today is linked constructively with the United States in virtually every international concern that we have: Working together for stability in Asia, feeding Afghan refugees, alleviating the Third World debt crisis, providing aid to Africa and Pacific Basin cooperation.

Throughout the world, Japan increasingly is involved, not only economically but politically, and working with us as a partner.

The President will cover a wide range of topics during his meeting with the Prime Minister. And I might note that that meeting will be preceeded by an hour-and-a-half meeting between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Abe.

Q -- spell that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Abe, A-b-e. Which, by our count, is the fifteenth meeting between the two -- the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister in the last two years. And I won't try to list those fifteen.

We expect the major focus of the discussions between the President and the Prime Minister will be two subjects. First of all, relations with the Soviet Union, and particularly the prospects for arms control, in light of the Secretary's upcoming meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko.

And second, our bilateral economic relationship, particularly trade problems and sepcifically the problem of access to the Japanese market for U.S. exports.

President Reagan has long believed that our relationship with Japan is not merely important but crucial to our prosperity, our security and our future. Together, our two countries account for over one third of the world's GNP and one half of international bank

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lending. Together, our two countries export and import 22 percent of the world's trade. And together we provide over $11 billion in economic aid to the world's developing countries.

In 1984, Japan purchased $23 billion of American exports. That's roughly equal to our exports to France, West Germany and the United Kingdom combined. And only Canada, our next-door neighbor, buys more from us than Japan.

Japan buys more beef, more citrus, more chemicals, more lumber and logs, more fish, more commercial aircraft and more industrial raw materials from the United States than does any other country in the world. Japan buys about $7 billion a year of U.S. farm products, making it twice as large as the next leading purchaser of U.S. farm exports.

Our exports to Japan directly and indirectly provide roughly 600,000 jobs in the United States. And Japanese investment here, which has now reached $17 billion, has generated roughly 150,000 jobs. That's the positive side of the coin.

On the other side of the coin, we are concerned that while Japan enjoys great success in penetrating our very open markets, it continues policies that make it difficult for us to sell products that should be competitive in Japan.

The President's meeting with Prime Minister Nakasone comes at a time of mounting frustration over our continued inability to gain full access to Japan's market. One commonly cited measure of that is the trade deficit. And in 1984, our trade deficit with Japan is estimated to exceed $34 billion. That's out of a total trade deficit that has now reached truly staggering proportions of $114 billion for the world as a whole.

As a matter of fact, because of that enormous growth in our overall trade imbalance, Japan's share of the trade imbalance has actually gone down.

Our concern, though, is not with the bilateral trade deficit itself, which, of course, in its simplest terms is exports minus imports. Rather, our concern is with market access, or with the export side of that equation.

Even if the United States were not running this massive overall trade deficit, which is largely attributable to macro-economic factors that are producing a dollar that is at record strength relative to all currencies in the world, and even if Japan's markets were fully open to U.S. products, we would not expect to see our bilateral trade between the U.S. and Japan in perfect balance -- far from it -- basically for two reasons. First that Japan is a country with a very high savings rate with domestic savings exceeding domestic investment substantially, making Japan a substantial net lender abroad. And, in fact, that, of course, is something from which we benefit. There's a large export of Japanese capital to the United States.

And secondly, the second element of the so-called "structural trade deficit" is Japan's very poor resource base. An island that is poor in resources will not have the same mix of imports and exports as a resources-rich country. And in a perfectly-functioning international economy, we would expect to see Japan running surpluses with the United States because it runs deficits with oil-exporting countries and other raw material exporters. And viewed in this way the basic structure of Japan's trade is consistent with the principle of comparative advantage, the principle that underlies the free trading system.

But there is also, and this is our concern, a very large non-structural portion of the trade surplus that reflects, in particular, the closed nature of Japan's markets.

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When I say it's the export side of the equation that we're concerned about, I mean specifically that export restraints by Japan are not the answer to the problem, although export restraints could be a way to bring down the trade deficit. They may be appropriate in specific sectors, such as autos and steel, but on the whole what we want to see is free trade, not greater restraint.

So that significant reduction in this non-structural portion of the deficit requires market-opening measures that could substantially reduce pressures on the whole international trading system and tensions in our bilateral relations.

Q Could you ask them to keep it down --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's a request to get the volume down outside.

Despite years of efforts in trade negotiations and many efforts by the Japanese to lower trade barriers, import penetration of Japan's market is still very low, particularly in manufactured goods. Only 13 percent of Japan's domestic consumption of manufacturers is made up -- is accounted for by imports -- excuse me -- compared to roughly 24 percent of domestic manufacturers in the U.S. and Western Europe that are imported.

Japan's imports of manufacturers are low on a per capita basis -- excuse me -- lower on a per capita basis than any of the other industrialized countries and lower as a share of GNP than any of the other industrialized nations.

Progress has been frustratingly slow and incomplete in implementing many of Japan's commitments, as the administration's recent report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee indicated.

Certain high tariffs and residual import quotas on agricultural products continue to restrict our market access.

I think there's going to be another request --

Q Quiet.

Q Shut up.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I guessed it.

And we still face formidable barriers to selling highly-competitive U.S. high technology products and services,

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such as satellites and telecommunications equipment in Japan.

In fact, I'd think I'd say perhaps our single greatest concern is that Japanese protection is being extended not merely to old industries that are in trouble -- which is a familiar phenomenon everywhere and one that, is if regrettable from a free trade point of view, something that reflects political realities -- but it's also being extended in important new sectors where those same political interests have not developed yet and where the United States could be highly competitive.

One area of -- but not to single it out to exclude others -- but one area, for example, of great concern to us is the access to the Japanese market for U.S. software products, which is an industry in which the United States maintains the unquestioned world leadership position. We've had some success over the last year in delaying the introduction of protectionist legislation by Japan, but the threat of that legislation still remains. It's protectionism in a particularly unpleasant form of complusory licensing that would mean that in order to sell your products in Japan you essentially have to give away the intellectual property or license the intellectual property to Japanese companies. And it's something that is of great concern both as a specific problem and a general principle.

Q Could you elaborate on that specifically in lay terms about --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. Maybe when we -- let me finish up and then I'll be glad to come back.

We are concerned in this process with results. Frequently in our negotiations with the Japanese, we have concentrated on process and on changing the process by which goods are imported to Japan; for example, changing the method by which a product is certified to be safe for the Japanese market or in the case of cigarettes, for example, reducing the tariff on cigarettes only to find that there was no substantive increase in our exports to Japan because some other barrier turned up. In the case of cigarettes, it's the state monopoly on distribution that has proved the problem.

I might say in that specific case there's a Japanese commitment to break up that monopoly effective April 1st of this coming year. We hope that will produce results. But the point is what we are concerned with now is not just changes in the process but substantive results, meaning substantial increases in exports of U.S. products that are and should be competitive in the Japanese market.

Failure to overcome these obstacles to achievement of a free and open trading system not only will have its effects on the trading system but will interfere with our efforts to achieve the vision of international partnership that both President Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone share. There's an urgent need for effective action, and that is a primary point that the President intends to emphasize with the Prime Minister during their meeting.

The Japanese understand that in order to strengthen both our relationship and the world trade system their remaining barriers must be removed. But from our point of view, the progress has not been as fast or as complete as needed.

As I mentioned, though, the other important topic in this session will be to bring the Prime Minister and the Japanese government fully up to date with the President's thinking about U.S.-Soviet relations as we enter what could be a period of movement in those relations, particularly in the area of arms control.

And I would say that, our problems in the trade area notwithstanding, it's important to remember that this relationship with Japan is one that has brought enormous benefits to the United States' position and to security in Asia and, indeed, in the world.

It's fair to say that Japan is the linchpin of the U.S. political and strategic position in the Pacific region, a region of growing and already enormous importance.

Japan has been very helpful in constructing our positive relationship with China. Prime Minister Nakasone's visit to Korea and the visit by President Chun of Korea to Japan earlier this year, which is the first time ever that a Korean head of government visited Japan since the end of World War II, has produced a major turning point in relations between these two critical allies of ours in northeast Asia.

Japan's economic support for our strategic concerns in the Persian Gulf region, increasingly also in places like Central America and Africa, have been enormously important. Japan has made efforts that are unprecedented in terms of its diplomacy to try to diffuse the war between Iran and Iraq. It has been very supportive of our parallel policies in Southeast Asia.

It has taken a stand on difficult issues in the security relationship, particularly the issue of ship visits that have been supportive not only to our maintenance of these critical bases in Japan, but to our whole position in the Pacific.

And in the defense area, we have just seen an announcement of 6.9 percent increase in the Japanese defense budget which in real terms will represent roughly 5.4 percent. It's not as much as we would like, but it's a healthy increase. And along with that is a very healthy contribution by the Japanese government to support of our bases in Japan. That figure now running at over $1 billion a year comes out to roughly $21,000 for every U.S. serviceman in Japan.

That's a lot of background. I'll be glad to try to answer your questions, but before I do I'd just like to make one announcement. It's a sad one for those of you who knew him or knew of him. Former Ambassador Naboro Ushiba died yesterday. He was a very distinguished Japanese diplomat. He was one of Japan's most distinguished ambassadors to the United States. He served as Japan's Special Trade Representative. After that, most recently, he was the Japanese Chairman of the U.S.-Japan Advisory Commission, whose report has been a very helpful one and probably, in fact, will be the subject of some discussion during our meetings on Wednesday. So, we very much regret his passing.

Okay.

Q Would you just clarify for me, please, the -- what it means to have this complusory licensing on software and how serious a problem that is?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It would mean that --

Q What's the question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question was what compulsory licensing of software means and what its implications are. It means that an American company selling its software products in Japan would be subject to administrative decisions by Japanese government administrative officials that could require it to license its software to Japanese companies, which essentially means compelling it to sell or rent its property, not on its own terms but on the terms of a government decision.

This is an area where our firms have been enormously competitive. There have been, in fact, some even illegal attempts to get a hold of American software by Japanese companies. This would amount to a legal form of somewhat the same thing, and it would be an enormous barrier to sale of software products in Japan.

Q Piracy? A non-diplomatic term for what we're talking about?

MORE

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm a diplomat. Let me avoid that word.

Larry? (Laughter.)

Q Sir, on the $34 billion trade deficit, does the administration have in mind a goal where -- you made the distinction between structural problems and the more optional problems -- is there a goal that the administration considers realistic to which this figure should drop over some period of time -- a year, two years, three years -- that you think is achievable?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's some difference of view about that. And I don't think we have a firm view. I think our basic point is that as we look at a number of specific sectors where we are competitive -- such as telecommunications, for example, such as forest products, such as computer software, such as chemicals -- we can in those sectors put some ballpark figures. They're ballpark figures, but they could add up, for example, as much as $10 billion of additional exports that should be competitive in the Japanese market.

Now, there's some question whether one can deal with an overall export target since that's influenced by many other forces including heavily by exchange rates over which governments don't -- that governments don't control. But we think a substantial increase of -- I think that order of magnitude is certainly possible.

Q Sir, on arms control --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Over the long term, by the way, I might say.

Yes?

Q Excuse me. The other day when the President responded to these questions put to him by Yomiuri Shimbun, he talked about not moving weapons from West to East. Would you expect that he use this occasion, just before the Geneva talks, to make a specific pledge to Nakasone that we wouldn't -- as an INF, we would not be a party to any agreement that would allow redeployment of those medium-range missiles?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In general terms -- I mean, I'm not sure about the specific form of it, but I think definitely that the President would reaffirm what we call the global approach to these arms control negotiations. That was an approach that was affirmed jointly by the seven summit leaders at Williamsburg in '83.

And it was a very significant statement, by the way, from the Japanese point of view, because this was the first time ever that the Japanese government associated itself with a joint statement on security and arms control with other Western allies. It's a measure of the extent to which Japan has moved in the direction of being a true partner.

And I think it's very fundamental on the President's thinking that we have to maintain that approach, that security is indivisible and that arms control agreements, for example, that simply shift the threat from Europe to Asia are not in our interests and are certainly not in Japan's interests, or in anyone else's, for that matter.

I think Nakasone and the Japanese government under him have been as supportive as any other ally of our position in the arms control negotiations, of firmness but realism, and I think the President will also want to affirm to the Prime Minister our commitment to consult closely as we proceed in any negotiations.

Q Just how much pressure is Ronald Reagan going to put on Mr. Nakasone to make changes in the trade situation? And if he's quoted as saying, well, how can I get tough with a very good friend, all of your elaborations of the difficulties seem to go by the board.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, that's not true. I think the point is that you don't treat a good friend the way you treat -- you don't go into a meeting with a friend like that, treating him as an enemy or an adversary, setting up the kind of confrontation in which, frankly, you may satisfy some people's emotional longings, but you don't make progress.

I think the way you make progress is, in fact, in a cooperative spirit. One -- and I'm sure this is what the President will be saying to his friend, the Prime Minister, we face a common problem. We have common responsibilities to maintain a free and open trading system. If the United States and Japan don't set the lead, then we really aren't going to make it. And in that spirit, we have to find some real solutions.

That's essentially the approach we have taken previously, and that approach has produced some significant results. One -- to pick out one particular one, at Tokyo last year, the President and the Prime Minister announced the common effort to open up financial markets -- jointly, but meaning principally in Japan. There's been enormous progress in that direction. And though there is still some further distance to go, that has been a truly significant achievement.

Q A follow-up to that, is this the tough approach? Some of his aides were urging a tougher approach. Is what you've given us today the hard liners?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You're asking me to characterize other people's positions, but there's a story attributed

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to a high American official that describes the tough approaches. When two people are sitting in a boat and one shoots a hole in the bottom of the boat, then the other one shoots the hole too, and some people call that getting tough. But this person calls it getting wet.

There's a kind of toughness that says --

Q Sounds like Ronald Reagan to me.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If you can attribute it, that's fine. (Laughter.)

There are certain things in the area of what people call toughness that amount to saying, if we have a problem getting into Japan's markets, then we're just going to close them out of ours. And that is the kind of thing that can degenerate into a trade war, into just generally restricted markets all over the world. And that's one of the things we're trying to fight off.

But part of the President's point and Secretary Shultz's point with the Foreign Minister is certainly going to be that there are people who think that that makes sense, even though it doesn't, and that if we want to beat off that kind of protectionist action, we've got to show real progress.

Q The question is, how much of this frustration is the President going to convey to the Prime Minister, or is this message just being conveyed by you and others like you through us?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think --

Q Is Reagan actually going to sit down with him and say, "Look, we're frustrated about this. You've got to do something about this or we're going to have --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the President will be very candid about problems, just as he was very candid when we were in Tokyo -- even candid in public. But there's a difference between being candid about a problem and saying we've got to do something together to solve it, and being threatening, or being abusive, or being confrontational, or making threats that, in fact, amount to shooting yourself in the foot.

Q Well, the President doesn't have a monopoly on candor, though, and Nakasone has been equally candid in some of the interviews given lately. Now, these men have met four times in the past, as you've said. Each time trade has come up. Each time there have been expressions of optimism that Japan would open its markets. And now you talk about mounting frustration going into the fifth meeting. Why have these -- and Nakasone is well aware of the frustration over here. Why has more not been done?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, quite a lot has been done. One of the major achievements, the one I just mentioned, the opening of capital markets, is a very significant achievement.

We've had a major opening of semi-conductor trade between the two countries, leading to an elimination of tarriffs on both sides of the Pacific. And I believe, in this year, our semi-conductor exports to Japan are up -- let me just check that, but I think they're up 66 percent, which is an enormous increase.

We had a significant agreement on the beef and citrus issue, leading -- that will lead, over a four-year period, to a

We produced a significant result in discussions with the Japanese last spring on new legislation concerning so-called value-added networks -- networks that process large flows of data -- that produce the bill in the Japanese Diet that is very non-protectionist and very satisfactory.

We succeeded in this case only delaying for a year -- at least for a year, the potentially obnoxious legislation on software. And our disatisfaction is that the solution so far is only temporary. We would like to see that made permament.

So there has been a lot of progress. And one of the reasons there's mounting frustration is because there's a mounting trade deficit. But that's not because the barriers have grown. We have a $15 billion greater trade deficit with Japan this year than last year. But that's not because there are $15 billion worth of new barriers.

The growth of the trade deficit is attributed to -- the growth, enormous growth, is attributable to basic macro-economic forces that are putting our trade in deficit with the whole world. But it has a political effect. It enormously increases the tension and frustration on any particular issue that's outstanding. So it makes it much more important to make progress.

Q What does it suggest to you when Nakasone says that what he thinks should be done is that more U.S. businessmen just ought to be in Japan trying to market their goods more aggressively, just as Japanese businessmen come to the United States and try to do the same? And he seems to suggest that that's an answer to at least part of the problem.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is an answer to part of the problem. It's something that we've encouraged and urged the American businessmen to do. I think they are doing better at it, though probably the general assessment would be that we're not nearly as aggressive or effective as the Japanese are in reverse.

But that's not the reason why our telecommunications products aren't selling in Japan, the way Japan's are selling in the United States. That's not the reason why our forest products are not selling in Japan. There are a lot of areas where it's got nothing to do with aggressive marketing, and those are the areas where we want to see solutions.

Q Is there any concern on Nakasone's part about SDI, and is the President prepared to reassure him? Has he expressed any concerns, as some of our European allies have?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He has been generally supportive and feels that that's an issue on which I'm sure he's going to be interested on being briefed and in hearing what our thinking is. He certainly wants to see real and significant arms control. But, in general, we've had good support from the Japanese government and good understanding of our approach in that area.

Q Given the mounting frustration and the mounting trade deficit, what are the prospects for discussion and change, progress -- however you want to call it -- on import quotas for Japanese autos, which comes up in March?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As I mentioned, autos are one of the areas where, sort of contrary to our general rule, we practical terms, inconsistent with the long-term goal we'd like to see of free trade.

They have been helpful up to now in the recovery of the U.S. auto industry -- and I suppose one of the reasons that Chrysler is back on its feet. In studying whether to continue them or not, there'd be many considerations, one of them, the question of whether further protection of that kind will benefit the U.S. auto industyr or simply lead it to depend on non-competitive practices because it enjoys that protection. And it would probably be -- it would be judged certainly in the context of overall trade problems and whether we make progress on these other issues. But it's a deliberate decision not to make a decision at this time, but to wait until later and see.

Q What results do you realistically expect from this meeting on Wednesday? Do you think they're just going to talk or do you think there's going to be some realistic results? And if so, what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the results will be principally -- and I think there should be some -- in terms of commitment to a process. You don't solve problems like this in a meeting at a head-of-state level, even, in fact, if you -- if it were a very long meeting. But, just as in Tokyo last year, for example, we made a commitment to set up a process on opening capital markets. We didn't open them in Tokyo. But we set up a process which produced very significant results. It's still continuing. It's to be wrapped up this spring. We sort of finished off a process at that time on semi-conductors. We set up a process on citrus and beef. I would think that -- what we'd hoped to get out of this is a commitment to further progress and perhaps some idea of where the areas are to concentrate or what the approach ought to be. This whole question of how you measure results undoubtedly will be something that we'll discuss.

Q So you mean you're not going to say, "How can we get this trade deficit down to a manageable size?" You're going to say, "What areas are you going to open up so that we can reduce the deficit in those areas?"

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that's more what we'll end up with.

Q Isn't what you've just described more of a symbolic meeting leading to other things further down the line, when the experts and the technicians get involved?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's not symbolic. I mean, I think I agree with part of - the answer to your question is in part yes; but it's -- the symbolism has real -- if that's the word you want to use for it; I wouldn't call it that -- has real practical results. Take the capital market opening thing. As that process proceeded last spring, there were many times in which the Prime Minister personally got involved with the Finance Ministry to a degree that was probably unprecedented in saying, "Look, I made a commitment to the President at the Summit that we're going to carry through on these things. Now, don't tell me these twelve reasons why you can't do anything. Get something done." I'm not saying that's -- those were the exact words. That was the tenor of the kind of intervention.

So commitments made at this level and by people who believe in carrying out commitments, as the President and the Prime Minister believe, have real effect on the people who work for

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It might be something stated in general terms, in terms of some definition of market opening that we would like to see. It might be stated in terms of specific sectors where we'd like to see progress. Some of those sectors of particular concern are -- to us -- telecommunications is one. Electronic equipment, including computers, is another. Medical supplies and pharmaceuticals is a third. And a fourth, high priority sector for us is the whole area of forest products, wood, lumber, paper and so forth.

So there might -- I really don't want to predict whether we'll get into that level of detail between the two leaders; but we might.

Yes.

Q But what more can Nakasone do than he's been doing in the past year or so? What does the President want him to do now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, in a sense, it's to continue and perhaps intensify the same kind of result-oriented efforts that we've had over the last year. It's not a problem that's going to be solved overnight. It's a problem that, by going after different areas of restraint, we expect over a period of time to get a substantially more open Japanese market. And I would think if we can get the kind of commitment from the Prime Minister on other areas that we had on the capital markets area, then we'll see increased progress. And obviously, particularly in view of our overall trade problem, we'd like to see that rate of progress substantially increase.

Q Is the fact that Nakasone is so supportive of the President on arms issues and security make less onorous these trade barriers? Is Reagan willing to forgive some of this trade stuff because he gets so much suport on arms?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't think it -- There's no question that the overall value of the relationship has some impact on the way you approach it. But that actually works both ways.

I mean it does mean that, as the President said, he's not going to treat a good friend like an enemy. It also means, though, that because that relationship is important to Japan, that Japan is going to make, and has made, extra efforts on the trade front that are motivated not simply by economic and trade considerations.

When you come down to these issues of so-called getting tough, yes, I suppose we're influenced somewhat by the fact that this relationship is of such enormous overall value. But, on the other hand, if some of the things that appear to be getting tough really are getting stupid, then you wouldn't want to do them anyway. (Laughter.)

Q Is the Prime Minister's political --

MR. ROUSSEL: Let's make this the last question.

Q Okay. Is the Prime Minister's political situation in Japan sufficiently strong that he can bring about the changes you're looking for?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Prime Minister is in a certain way, in effect, the head of a coalition government. The Liberal Democratic Party is a mixture of four or five major factions and a number of smaller ones. The Prime Minister's own faction is not -- is one of the smaller of the big factions in the party. So he doesn't have the same kind of control over his administration, I think you might say, that the President has over his. (Laughter.)

The systems are different --

Q Boy, are we in trouble. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He certainly has shown an extraordinary ability to lead, despite some of the inherent weaknesses of his position. And our point has to be that this is a problem that isn't just facing Nakasone, but facing the whole Japanese government, and the Japanese government as a whole has to pull together in solving it.

Foreign Minister Abe is the head of the -- of one of the other major factions, for example. He's been very constructive and very helpful and his presence in these meetings will be important.

But we're really counting not only on Nakasone personally, who does have a lot of strength, but on the Japanese government as a whole.

I think I've gotten no time for Japanese questions, so I've gotten permission for the one gentleman in the back. And that's the last one.

Q You didn't mention anything about the Pacific Basin cooperation, which was once talked about as one of the major topics of discussion. Is the President not so much willing to talk about it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry -- about which subject?

Q Pacific cooperation.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question was, I haven't said anything about Pacific Basin cooperation and will that strongly supported, and it certainly serves our interests.

By definition, it's got to be something that comes out of the countries of the region. There's long been a certain suspicion from many of the smaller countries that Pacific Basin cooperation could just become a means for the United States and Japan to tell them what to do. So our approach has been to, in recent years, to try more clearly to follow the lead from the smaller countries, particularly the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, who've made some constructive initiatives in this regard.

We might discuss that briefly at the summit, but I don't believe it will be a major subject.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

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